NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
NOMINATIONS OF
GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIerno, USA; LTG
WALTER L. SHARP, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; LTG RAY-
MOND T. ODIerno, USA; HON. NELSON M. FORD; JOSEPH A.
BENKERT; SEAN J. STACKLEY; FREDERICK S. CELEC; MICHAEL B.
DONLEY; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF; AND GEN. DUNCAN J.
McNABB, USAF

FEBRUARY 6; APRIL 3; MAY 22; JUNE 26; JULY 22, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

FEBRUARY 6, 2008

Vote on Certain Pending Military Nominations .............................................. 1

APRIL 3, 2008

Nominations of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan; LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for appointment to the Grade of General and to be Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army; and LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, for appointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea ................................................................. 5

Statement of:
McKiernan, GEN David D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan ................................................................................................................................. 12
Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General and to be Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army ................................................................. 13
Sharp, LTG Walter L., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea ................................................................................ 13

MAY 22, 2008

Nominations of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Central Command; and LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq ......................................................... 101

Statement of:
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Central Command ......................................................... 105
Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq ................................................................. 111

MAY 22, 2008

To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations ............................................... 215
JUNE 26, 2008

Nominations of Hon. Nelson M. Ford to be Under Secretary of the Army; Joseph A. Benkert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs; Sean J. Stackley to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; and Frederick S. Celec to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs ................................................................................................ 219

Statement of:
Ford, Hon. Nelson M., to be Under Secretary of the Army .................................. 223
Benkert, Joseph A., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs .................................................................................................................................................... 224
Stackley, Sean J., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition .................................................................................................................. 225
Celec, Frederick S., to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs ............................................... 225

JULY 22, 2008

Nominations of Michael B. Donley to be Secretary of the Air Force; Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Transportation Command .................................... 339

Statement of:
Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska .................................. 344
Donley, Michael B., to be Secretary of the Air Force ........................................... 346
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force ................................................................. 348
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Transportation Command .......................... 348
Conrad, Hon. Kent, U.S. Senator from the State of North Dakota ................. 368

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................... 485
VOTE ON CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:46 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Mary J. Kyle, legislative clerk.

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Evelyn N. Parkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Green, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L. Rubin, and Brian F. Sebold.

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator
Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazaraki, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; John L. Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Since a quorum is now present, before I call on you, Secretary Gates, I will ask the committee to consider a list of 782 pending military nominations. They’ve all been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report those nominations?

Senator WARNER. So moved.

Chairman Levin. Is there a second?

Senator INHOFE. Second.

Chairman Levin. It’s been moved and seconded. All in favor say aye? [A chorus of ayes.]

Opposed, nay? [No response.]

The motion carries and those nominations will be reported to the Senate. Thank you.

The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 6, 2008.

1. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of major (Lester W. Thompson) (Reference No. 902).

2. In the Army there are 16 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Gerald K. Bebber) (Reference No. 968).

3. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Thomas J. Harvan) (Reference No. 1104).

4. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain (John G. Bruening) (Reference No. 1105).

5. In the Air Force there are three appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Col. Mark A. Ediger) (Reference No. 1142).

6. In the Army there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Manuel Pozoa) (Reference No. 1174).

7. MG Joseph F. Fil, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, Eight U.S. Army/Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea (Reference No. 1192).


9. Col. Robert G. Kenny, USAFR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 1202).

10. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Daniel P. Gillen) (Reference No. 1203).

11. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Robert Benjamin Bartlett) (Reference No. 1204).

12. In the Air Force Reserve, there are nine appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Robert S. Arthur) (Reference No. 1205).

13. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Chevalier P. Cleaves) (Reference No. 1207).

14. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Jawn M. Sischo) (Reference No. 1208).
15. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Joaquin Sariego) (Reference No. 1209).
16. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with John A. Calcicerra, Jr.) (Reference No. 1210).
17. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Jerry Alan Arends) (Reference No. 1211).
18. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Donnie W. Bethel) (Reference No. 1212).
19. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 11 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Paul A. Abson) (Reference No. 1213).
20. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Mari L. Archer) (Reference No. 1214).
21. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with William A. Beyers III) (Reference No. 1215).
22. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Robert R. Cannon) (Reference No. 1216).
23. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 176 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Vito Emil Addabbo) (Reference No. 1217).
24. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Azad Y. Keval) (Reference No. 1218).
25. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Lance A. Avery) (Reference No. 1219).
26. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list begins with Bruce L. Archer) (Reference No. 1220).
27. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Inaam A. Pedalino) (Reference No. 1221).
28. In the Air Force, there are 62 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Demea A. Alderman) (Reference No. 1222).
29. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Theresa D. Clark) (Reference No. 1223).
30. In the Air Force, there are 113 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Lee E. Ackley) (Reference No. 1224).
31. In the Air Force, there are 129 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Said R. Acesta) (Reference No. 1225).
32. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Jason E. MacDonald) (Reference No. 1226).
33. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Jeffrey P. Short) (Reference No. 1227).
34. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Saqib Ishteeaque) (Reference No. 1228).
35. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Wanda L. Horton) (Reference No. 1229).
36. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list begins with David J. Barillo) (Reference No. 1230).
37. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Joseph B. Dore) (Reference No. 1231).
38. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (William J. Hersh) (Reference No. 1232).
39. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (James C. Cummings) (Reference No. 1233).
40. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Eugene W. Gavin) (Reference No. 1234).
41. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with H. Brueh) (Reference No. 1235).
42. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with David A. Brant) (Reference No. 1236).
43. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Harold A. Felton) (Reference No. 1237).
44. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Anne M. Bauer) (Reference No. 1238).
45. In the Army Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Deborah G. Davis) (Reference No. 1239).
46. In the Army Reserve, there are 37 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Ruben Alvero) (Reference No. 1240).
47. In the Army Reserve, there are nine appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Ronald L. Bonheur) (Reference No. 1241).
48. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Gerard P. Curran) (Reference No. 1242).
49. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Jeffrey A. Weiss) (Reference No. 1243).
50. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Charles S. Oleary) (Reference No. 1244).
51. In the Army Reserve, there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Patrick S. Allison) (Reference No. 1245).
52. In the Army Reserve, there are 30 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Edward B. Browning) (Reference No. 1246).
53. In the Army Reserve, there are 51 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Sandra G. Apostolos) (Reference No. 1247).
54. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Russell L. Bergeman) (Reference No. 1248).
55. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (John M. Dorey) (Reference No. 1250).
56. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Thomas P. Carroll) (Reference No. 1252).
57. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of commander and below (list begins with David J. Robillard) (Reference No. 1253).
59. RADM Mark E. Ferguson III, USN, to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Naval Personnel (Reference No. 1261).
60. VADM John C. Harvey, Jr., USN, to be vice admiral and Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1262).
61. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Orlando Salinas) (Reference No. 1263).
62. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Debra D. Rice) (Reference No. 1264).
63. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Robert J. Mouw) (Reference No. 1265).
64. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Rabi L. Singh) (Reference No. 1266).
65. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander (Michael V. Misiewicz) (Reference No. 1267).
66. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1268).
67. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1269).

Total: 782.

[Whereupon, at 9:47 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID D. MCKIERNAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AFGHANISTAN; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY; AND LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Warner, Inhofe, Graham, Cornyn, and Thune.

Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Daniel J. Cox, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and Ali Z. Pasha.
Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Brian Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

Today the committee considers the nominations of three distinguished senior military officers: General David McKiernan, the nominee for Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan; Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, the nominee for Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army; and Lieutenant General Walter Sharp, the nominee for Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea.

We all know that the long hours and the hard work put in by our senior military officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) require commitment and sacrifice not only from our nominees, but also from their families. We appreciate your and their willingness to bear that burden.

Each of our nominees has served this country in the military for more than 30 years. Their successful careers can be seen in the positions in which they serve today: Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe, and 7th Army Germany; Commanding General, III Corps and Commander Multi-National Corps-Iraq; and Director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.

When confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for helping DOD face critical challenges. General McKiernan will take command of the ISAF, Afghanistan, at a time when independent reviews indicate that the mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering, leading to a strategic stalemate between coalition forces and the Taliban-led insurgency, and that in the words of one of those independent reviews, the violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its international partners falls.

The next ISAF commander will face significant challenges within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance as well. The Bucharest Summit has resulted in some additional troop commitments by allies to the Afghan conflict, but shortfalls remain in NATO members’ commitments to provide the troops, helicopters, and other assets needed to meet ISAF mission requirements.

In addition, some nations place restrictions on the use of their national forces, which reduce the ISAF commander’s ability to deploy these forces as necessary.

General Odierno will become Vice Chief of Staff at a time when the Army is highly stressed by continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Equipment and people are increasingly worn out, and the readiness of our nondeployed units has steadily declined.
General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff, has said, “Today’s Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply.”

Earlier this week, General Richard Cody, the current Vice Chief of Staff, testified before our Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee that ongoing deployments are inflicting “incredible stress on soldiers and families and pose a significant risk” in his words to the All-Volunteer Army.

As daunting as it will be to meet current readiness needs, the next Vice Chief of Staff will also be faced with the necessity to modernize the Army to meet national security requirements of the future. It will not be easy to modernize and transform the Army to meet these future requirements while improving current readiness and sustaining an Army fully engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Finally, General Sharp will be the first U.S. Commander to assume command in Korea since North Korea became a nuclear weapons state. It will be his responsibility to ensure that U.S. conventional forces continue to provide a strong deterrent to North Korean military action and that the military alliance with South Korea remains robust.

I know our nominees look forward to these challenges.

We look forward to these hearings, and also we would welcome each of our nominees introducing any of their family members who might be with them today.

Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. I think General Sharp is the only one that has family with him this morning. General, would you introduce your wife of 34 years?

General SHARP. Thank you, sir. I am honored to be joined today by my wife, Joanne, of 34 years. We were married right out of West Point, and I definitely would not be sitting here today without her support.

Sir, with your indulgence, I would also like to introduce my executive assistant, Cherylanne Anderson, who is also here today with my wife and to thank her and really the thousands of others like her that work and make sure that our offices run smoothly so that we do what we can do to protect and defend. I would like to thank her and recognize her also.

Chairman LEVIN. We welcome both of them and thank both of them.

Senator WARNER. General McKiernan, I believe your family is still in Europe, that is your residence at this time. Is that correct?

General McKIERNAN. Yes, Senator Warner. My immediate family could not join me today, but I am very proud that my sister, Kathie Carney, and one of her sons, Sean Carney, are here today. She is a special education teacher here in Northern Virginia. I am very proud of her.

Senator WARNER. We thank you.

General Odierno, in my visits with you, you always make reference to your family. They are somewhere today. Back at your post, I believe?
General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. My wife of 32 years, Linda, who is my high school sweetheart and who has been through a lot and volunteered much of her time and her efforts to the Army and our soldiers and their families. I could not do it without her, as well as the dedication of my children, who have always been dedicated to the Army themselves.

Senator WARNER. Your son, sir? How is he?

General ODIERNO. Sir, he is doing very well. He is currently getting his masters degree at New York University in New York City, has done very well recovering from his injury, and I am very proud of his service and how he has handled his injury as part of the Iraq war.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say much of my statement will go in the record. I have not too strong a voice here this morning, but I recognize 100 years of service to America in uniform before us and we are fortunate in this country to have individuals, together with their families, that provide this dedication. It is the very foundation of our national security, the men and women who proudly wear their arms and uniforms and their families.

General McKiernan, we had a very excellent consultation when you visited my office. We have visited together on previous assignments you have had. In fact, Senator Levin and I visited you on one of our trips to Kuwait and the Iraqi situation.

Now, in Afghanistan, General, as I talked with you, there is the problem, of course, of the force levels. The President of France, to his great credit, I think, is announcing today an augmentation of forces. Two battalions of marines are going over as a consequence of the shortfall of other nations in their force levels. That was directly testified to before this committee here not long ago in another hearing.

But there is growing concern about the Taliban's resurgence and the presence of the cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan. The easy access that the insurgents have to cross various parts of that border severely complicate the ability not only to protect our forces but to conduct the campaigns over there to return to the people of Afghanistan this country.

I also addressed to you the question of narcotics related by our distinguished chairman. I have spent a great deal of time in the past couple of months on this subject. I have had the opportunity to consult with prime ministers, ambassadors, a lot of senior officers of our uniformed forces, and junior officers. What concerns me is that each year this level of narcotics has gone up. Now, that is hardly the image, the picture, a benchmark of achievement that our forces, together with NATO and the other combatant forces, want to send to the world. We went there to enable that country to reestablish itself to have a democracy.

My most severe concern is that the increase each year allows increases in money that is drained off from the farmer's field to the ultimate destination of those drugs. Those monies are providing arms. The Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to take their cut and buy arms and use those weapons against our forces.

There is not a one of us in this room who have not gone to the funerals of our brave men and women who have lost their lives,
and visited others who are wounded. When we try to comfort them, I find it particularly difficult with this Afghani situation when I say to myself this soldier could well have lost his life, his limb as a consequence of weaponry directed at him and paid for out of this drug trade.

I wrote the President a letter—I do not intend to release it at this time—urging that at this ongoing NATO conference, he ensure that is becoming a top-level agenda item. I will soon find out whether, in fact, without that letter those NATO heads of state address this problem. I think it is unconscionable not only for the United States but of all governments involved in this Afghani operation not to address full-level attention to it.

It is primarily a problem that should be confronted by the Karzai government. I understand that there has been a battalion established to be in training to work on this problem at this time, but that should have been done years ago.

I urge you, General McKiernan, as you take up your responsibilities, to unrelentlessly bring this to the attention of your superiors wherever they may be.

The national caveat issue is a subject at the NATO conference. Let us see what is provided because it puts an instability in the command and control of these forces where it is well recognized and known that certain nations do not have caveats and they are undertaking the majority of the high-risk operations. To me it conveys a completely inaccurate image of NATO and its ability to do out-of-area operations if some forces are going to be responsible for the heavy lifting and others to do whatever their countries permit them to do.

I commend Secretary Robert Gates. I think he is one of the finest Secretaries of Defense we have ever had; I have had the privilege of working with and have known almost a dozen now, and I would put him at the very top in the way he has stood up for his forces and the principles for which we are fighting in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

General Jim Jones, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; and Ambassador Thomas Pickering of the Afghan Study Group sponsored by a distinguished organization, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, under the direction of David Abshire, published reports on these questions, and I am going to quote General Jones’ report: “Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.” I hope you have the opportunity to review those reports. They are very clear in the concerns that they have.

I have also, Mr. Chairman, had the privilege of meeting with the Ambassador from Denmark and others connected with that country, and I want to say for the record here today Denmark has more than 600 troops in southern Afghanistan standing side by side with the British in one of the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan.

Again, Secretary Gates went by on his way to this NATO conference and visited the country of Denmark. He singled it out because it is a small country, but those forces are an integral part of the fighting force. They are there with no caveats. Unfortunately, some have mixed them in with that group of nations which have caveats. But let us make it clear on our record today. As Sec-
Secretary Gates said, “This is an ally who, in my opinion, is really punching above its weight, and I want to visit and basically thank them for that.”

General McKiernan, we wish you good luck, your distinguished career ably qualifies you to take on this responsibility and to move it towards achievement of our goals, and part of that will be the commencement of a significant lessening of the drug trade. It is not going to go away overnight, but it has been rising in output production every single year for the last 4 years.

General Odierno, Senator Levin and I have had the opportunity to visit you many times. I remember on my first trip, you were in the room. At that time, you did not have quite as many stars as you have now, and you were among the general officers who were in the back row, but I remember your impressive statements to us at that time. It is funny how you can remember those days to this day. Your career has won the hearts and minds of the soldiers and the families that you have been associated with these many years, and you will join the Chief of Staff of the Army in this challenging task of rebuilding our Army.

I would like to say at this time, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I think General Cody has done a fine job. One of the things I admire about General Cody is he grabs that telephone, certainly in the 6 years I was chairman, and he rifles through his messages without hesitation. I hope you will follow on in that same way.

All the members of this committee and I think throughout Congress, other members, are very conscious of the need to put a lot of emphasis on rebuilding this Army, to do what we can to see that our forces who are deployed not only have all the equipment they need, but have some certainty as to the time of that commitment of how long they will be overseas.

While you may not be able to speak with specificity this morning, I did hear the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs last night state that in his professional judgment, we monitor daily the situation over there, but thus far, the turbulence that we have experienced—I say “we”—all the Afghan fighting forces experienced here in the past month or so in the Basra region—is not going to change the schedule to bring back those brigades and take it down to 15 brigades in July.

Now, he had to leave the door open, as any prudent chairman would, and I am sure you would. I hope we can achieve that, and simultaneously with achieving that, I hope we can go from the 15-month tour to the 12-month tour and probably a slightly larger period of time than 12 months back at home in retraining and spending some time with the family.

Mr. Chairman, I will close out here with a comment or two about General Sharp. I have had the privilege of visiting with him. You are taking on an interesting job in an area which I spent a little time as a youngster many years ago at age 22. It is still as cold over there today as it was when I was there, and I expressed that to your lovely wife.

It has been a half a century that our forces have been in there. We went in there in 1950. I left in 1952. What troubles me about that situation over there is that we have been working a half cen-
tury-plus, and yet we still cannot get their command and control, their training of the South Korean forces up to a level where they can take operational control (OPCON). As I told you, the latest estimate is 2012. 2012. That is 62 years if you add it up from the date that we went into South Korea to help liberate that country.

I find that unacceptable and I hope that perhaps you, together with our diplomatic representatives over there, can shorten that time and let them get on with it because the people of our country, while we are ready to make the sacrifices to help others achieve their freedom and stability—certainly South Korea has an enormous economic stability. It ranks in the top 10 nations of the world in terms of their gross national product, and they ought to be able to have a commensurate military establishment to support the growth and progress of that country. I hope you will accept my comments this morning as a challenge to work on reducing that date down from 2012.

I thank the chair and the indulgence of the members as I have chatted a few minutes here.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin.

I join you in welcoming General McKiernan, General Odierno, and General Sharp. The breadth and depth of experience possessed by these nominees—both in the Army and while serving in joint commands—is extraordinary. I thank each of them for their service and their commitment to continue serving in these key positions. General McKiernan, you bring a most impressive professional record to one of the most demanding military positions.

Success in Afghanistan remains a critical national security requirement for not only the United States, but the international community. Today, there is no doubt that progress has been made in Afghanistan since 2001. U.S. efforts, together with the service of 25 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and 15 partner countries have assisted the Afghan people in securing their freedoms and rebuilding their nation.

However, there is growing concern about the Taliban’s resurgence; the presence of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan; the commitment of our NATO allies to what is likely to be a longer military presence in Afghanistan; and the capacity of the Afghan government to achieve self governance. However, in my opinion, the greatest concern is the escalating opium economy. You should be prepared to discuss the counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan.

August 2008 marks the fifth anniversary of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. In the session of the NATO Heads of State and Government summit held today, the agenda item is Afghanistan.

President Karzai, Secretary-General of the U.N., and other major international organizations working in Afghanistan, including the European Union and the World Bank will be present. The broad international participation demonstrates that the way ahead in Afghanistan requires a comprehensive approach in bringing together improvements in governance, reconstruction, development, and security.

There is also unease about the security situation in Afghanistan, the size of the NATO military commitment in Afghanistan, and the performance of NATO member countries in International Security Assistance Force. This committee has often addressed the troubling issue of national caveats and commended Secretary Gates for his warning in February that “the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which some are willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and some are not.”

General Jim Jones, the former NATO supreme allied commander, and co-chair—with Ambassador Thomas Pickering—of the Afghanistan Study Group Report which was sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, went even further and said: “Make no mistake; NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.” You should be prepared to discuss the findings of the Afghanistan Study Group, among other studies.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to join Secretary Gates in this recent praise of Denmark. Denmark has more than 600 troops in southern Afghanistan, standing
side by side with British in one of the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates said, “This is an ally who, in my opinion, is really punching above its weight, and I want to visit and basically thank them for that.”

General Odierno, you have been referred to in at least one media account as the “Patton of Counterinsurgency”—the leader who took the theory and vision and put them into action. The war continues, but your record as the Commander of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006 to February of this year brought welcome success in putting al Qaeda forces on the defensive, providing protection to the civilian population, engaging the Sunni population in Anbar province, and significantly lowering the rates of violence.

Your personal and professional experiences make you perhaps the best qualified officer in the Army to join General Casey and Secretary Geren in carrying out the critically important tasks of recruiting, training, equipping, and organizing our great Army at a time of enormous stress on the force. General Cody, the current Vice Chief, testified before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee 2 days ago. He testified about a “resilient” Army, but one that is stressed to the maximum and lacking shock absorbency—that is—the capability to respond to emergent crises or additional demands.

I brought with me the famous James Montgomery Flagg recruiting poster that was introduced in World War I and relied on again in World War II to urge young men and women to join the Army. I'd note that a similar poster that appeared at that time for the Navy and Marines stated “I need you.” I think we all have a duty to turn to those eligible to serve today in our magnificent All Volunteer Army, and their families, and convey this message in the strongest terms. We want them and we need them—we want them for service to country.

General Sharp, you have served since August 2005 as Director of the Joint Staff and undoubtedly are eager to get back to the field. The joint mission in Korea has not waned in importance since I took my turn on Active Duty over 50 years ago. I am encouraged by the commitment to turn operational control of the Republic of Korea armed forces over to the South Korean military leaders in 2012, as testified to recently by General Bell, but I wish it would happen sooner. I wish you great success in your new assignment as Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Warner.

General McKiernan?

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID D. MCKIERNAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AFGHANISTAN

General MCKIERNAN. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, other distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am truly honored to be here today.

I would like to thank the Secretary of Defense and the President for nominating me for this important NATO command position. If confirmed by the United States Senate, I can pledge to you that every ounce of my leadership ability will go into what is certainly a continuing tough, challenging mission set in Afghanistan, to include, as Senator Warner rightfully points out, the counternarcotics challenges.

I also would like to take this opportunity to thank the Senate Armed Services Committee for your steadfast and truly magnificent support to all our men and women in uniform these past several years. We could not be doing what we are doing globally without your support.

With that, I will stand by for any questions from the committee this morning.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General McKiernan.

General Odierno?
STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

General ODIERNO. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you this morning.

As Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, I had the honor of speaking with many of you during a number of congressional visits to the Iraqi theater of operations, and I am so well aware of your dedicated support to our soldiers serving there, your faith in their outstanding abilities, and your understanding of the many sacrifices they and their families endure for the sake of their country, comrades, and loved ones. For all of this, I thank the members of the committee for your support and steadfast commitment of them.

I am humbled and honored on my nomination to be the next Army Vice Chief of Staff. I serve with a tremendous sense of awe for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, leaders, and families who have served alongside of me, and I am inspired by what they have accomplished. I am hopeful for what they will be able to accomplish in the years ahead. It is truly, without a doubt, the best army in the world. I consider myself blessed with the chance to continue serving in its ranks, and if confirmed, I will do so with the integrity, commitment, and drive that such a special position of trust and responsibility demands.

Thank you so much for allowing me to be here today. With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Odierno.

General Sharp?

STATEMENT OF LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

General Sharp. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished members of this committee, I also thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

I am deeply honored to be nominated by the President and the Secretary of Defense for the responsibility to serve as the next Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic of Korea, United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.

I would also like to thank this committee for your continued support to our men, women, and their families who selflessly serve our great Nation both at home and around the world.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee and its members and with our strong partner in the Republic of Korea during the challenges that we face in the months and years ahead.

Sir, I stand by for your questions.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for a minute?

Accompanying General Sharp today is Mrs. Abell, the wife of Charlie Abell, who was a former soldier and former presidential appointee to DOD, and most importantly, he was the Staff Director
of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I welcome you, Mrs. Abell. Please pass on the very best to your husband. We may have to recall him.

Chairman Levin. Give him the good news, though, would you?

[Laughter.]

Let me ask you the standard questions first to each of our witnesses. You can respond together.

First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir.

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

General Sharp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General McKiernan. No, sir.

General Odierno. No, sir.

General Sharp. No, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir.

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

General Sharp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir.

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

General Sharp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir.

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

General Sharp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir.

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

General Sharp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir.

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

General Sharp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir.

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

General Sharp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you all.
We will have a 10-minute round for our first round.

Admiral Michael Mullen was quoted in the press yesterday as saying, "Having forces in Iraq at the level that they're at doesn't allow us to fill the need that we have in Afghanistan."

Let me ask both General Odierno and General McKiernan. Do you agree with Admiral Mullen? General Odierno?

General ODIERNO. Sir, what I would say initially is we do understand that what the Army is able and the Marine Corps are able to provide now is about at the level we can sustain over time. In order to provide additional forces, there would be some give and take between priorities in other contingencies. I think we would have to consider that as we continue to provide forces, if an increase in forces is necessary.

Chairman LEVIN. When you say there has to be some give and take, in other words, you are saying, in terms of the allocation of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that what you are referring to?

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir, or other contingencies as well.

Chairman LEVIN. What would the other contingencies be?

General ODIERNO. For example, Korea. If we would decide to take risk there or some other place where we might have to have forces available in the future. But as of today, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. General McKiernan, do you agree with Admiral Mullen?

General MCKIERNAN. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with Admiral Mullen, and the challenge is exacerbated by the current shortfalls in filling the combined joint statement of requirements by NATO.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of more troops going to Afghanistan, is that going to be difficult to pull off if the force levels in Iraq are maintained at the pre-surge level of about 140,000 troops, General McKiernan?

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I think it will continue to be a challenge for all the reasons that General Odierno just mentioned.

Chairman LEVIN. What about trying to reduce the deployment tours from 15 months to 12 months? If all we are going to have is a 12-month dwell time for the Army, is that going to be difficult? Is that going to be possible if we are going to have more troops going to Afghanistan or if we keep our force level in Iraq at 140,000, General McKiernan?

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, the senior leadership I think unanimously agrees that 15-month deployments are too long, and they are not sustainable. Our goal is certainly to reduce the boots-on-the-ground time to 12 months and try to get eventually to a 1 to 2 ratio, but with the requirements as they are today, that is extremely hard with the size of the military we have.

Chairman LEVIN. Will that be extremely hard if we keep that troop level in Iraq at the pre-surge level of 140,000?

General MCKIERNAN. I think it will be challenging, sir. I cannot answer whether we can get it down to 12 months.

Chairman LEVIN. General McKiernan, the deployment of an additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan was announced as a one-time deal for the next 7 months. If there are no further large troop reductions in Iraq, will there be U.S. forces available to replace those marines at the end of the current 7-month deployment?
General McKiernan. Sir, in terms of brigade combat teams or replacement for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, not to my knowledge is there a force that can be missioned for that following the deployment of the marines.

Chairman Levin. General Odierno, General Cody yesterday testified before our Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee that the ongoing deployments are inflicting “incredible stress on soldiers and families,” and in his words, “pose a significant risk to the All-Volunteer Army.” He said also that he has never seen our lack of strategic depth to be where it is today.

Do you agree with General Cody?

General Odierno. What I would say is I have had a chance to experience this in my most recent assignment, first as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander and also as III Corps Commander as a force provider, that we are, in fact, out of balance. What I have seen as the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq is that we receive forces that are, in fact, well trained, equipped, and at the proper levels, but as the III Corps Commander, I also see that the forces that are left behind do not have all the equipment they need. They do not have the people they need to help to respond to other contingencies. So there is a stress there on the force that is fairly consistent.

Chairman Levin. Fairly consistent. What does that mean? You mean fairly heavy?

General Odierno. Fairly heavy, yes, sir.

I would also say that one of the hardest recommendations I had to make as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander was the extension of the surge forces that I knew would lead to 15-month tours in Iraq as I made that recommendation up my chain of command. I realized that, in fact, 12 months is our goal and 12 months is what we need to try to get to in order to have a viable, sustainable Army over the long-term. We have to continually work to move towards that. There are a number of ways we can do that, by reducing the requirements and also to continue to grow the Army, that it gives us the additional forces in order to continue to meet the needs of our national security.

Chairman Levin. General Odierno, when these recent events took place in Basra, I think you were already gone, but I think you have enough background and you were close enough to it to perhaps be able to answer this question. Do you know whether or not Prime Minister Maliki took the steps that he took in Basra after consultation with the U.S. Army?

General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, I do not know for sure. I really only know about the reports that we both have probably read in the newspapers. I have not talked to any of the leaders there to know, in fact, if he did operate independently without consultation or not.

Chairman Levin. Do you think it would have been wise for him to consult with us prior to his venture into Basra, if in fact he did not?

General Odierno. Yes, I think it is important, the partnership with us working these issues. First, it is a positive step that we want to try to deal against these nongovernmental groups, militias. That is a very important piece. But it is also important with the
partnership that we have full consultation as we conduct operations within Iraq.

Chairman Levin. That consultation take place sufficiently prior to the action on his part so that he can consider whatever advice we give him?

General Odierno. Yes, it should. We should be part of that process.

Chairman Levin. General Odierno, do you think it is useful to keep pressure on the Iraqi political leaders to reach political settlements on the outstanding key issues?

General Odierno. I think it is important. As I have stated before, Mr. Chairman, we have security at a certain level now. In order to continue to improve the security in Iraq, it not only takes the use of continued military forces, but also improvement in economic, political, and basic services, and it is important that the Government of Iraq and its leaders step up and continue to work these very significant issues to the Iraqi people themselves. I believe by doing this, it would continue to reduce the passive support for any insurgent forces or militias that are left within Iraq.

Chairman Levin. Do you think it is useful for us to remind them of the importance of their doing that?

General Odierno. I think it is always important to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, I want to discuss the drug issue in Afghanistan with you. Senator Warner has laid out the problem, and that problem is real and apparently growing.

Part of the solution relates to going after the labs that produce these drugs. The small farmers are looking for small amounts of money that they get, which is more than they are able to get from other crops, and we obviously want to try to work with them to substitute crops. But the big money is made by the people who run these laboratories, the higher-ups, and we have not gone after the labs. There have been some rumors that some of these labs are off limits because of some kind of political connections with leaders in Kabul.

I am wondering whether you are willing to look at that issue to report to us whether or not there is any reluctance, restraint, or restriction on our forces in terms of going after those labs where most of the problem resides and where most of the money is being produced? Would you make an independent assessment of that and give us your assessment as to whether there is any truth to the fact that there is some reluctance or restraint upon our forces, the Afghan forces or any other forces in terms of shutting down those labs?

General McKiernan. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you, if confirmed, I will certainly make that assessment and provide that information back to this committee. I share your concern and Senator Warner’s concern that this problem is a problem for the international community. It is a problem for Afghanistan. ISAF has a mandate to provide certain support to the Afghan Government to work the counternarcotics problem, and if we have actionable intelligence of opium labs, I certainly think that should be part of the ISAF mandate. I will make that assessment and come back to this committee.
Chairman Levin. That is very important that you do that, and we are counting on you to do that. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to accommodate our colleague from Texas, as I will be here with you until the conclusion of the hearing.

Chairman Levin. I am happy to do that.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Warner, I appreciate your usual courtesy.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Again, let me reiterate what we have all said, but we cannot say enough. Thank you for your service to our country and the people that serve under your command. We are in their debt.

I wanted to ask two lines of questions. First, General McKiernan, perhaps as Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, you would be able to comment on a story that appeared today in the New York Times where the President had secured the backing of NATO for a robust missile defense system. NATO leaders adopted a communique saying that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to allied forces’ territory and populations. It will also recognize the substantial contribution to the protection of allies to be provided by the U.S.-led system, according to senior officials who spoke on condition of anonymity ahead of the statement’s release.

First, do you agree that ballistic missile proliferation poses a threat to the United States, as well as our allies?

General McKiernan. Sir, I certainly agree with that statement. I have not worked personally with the theater missile defense question in Europe to any great degree. So I am not familiar with too many of the specifics about that. But the threat is certainly there.

Senator Cornyn. I appreciate that very much.

General Odierno, let me ask you. We talked briefly about this in my office when you were kind enough to drop by. Welcome back to the United States.

General Odierno. Thank you, sir.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you for your service in the III Corps and Fort Hood, as well as Commander of Multi-National Forces in Iraq.

I asked you in my office, when you were kind enough to come by about the Iraqi assault on Basra, how you viewed that. I mentioned to you that while there is some indication in the New York Times today that the Iraqis did not necessarily consult with their American allies, that it actually, to my perception, demonstrated the sort of acceptance of responsibility and an Iraqi initiative against these Iranian-backed militias that could be viewed as a positive development, while we recognize they were not able to handle this independently and required U.S. support, which is frankly not a surprise.

Could you tell me whether you believe that this sort of initiative against Iranian-backed militias, euphemistically called “special groups,” is a positive or a negative?

General Odierno. If I could just say as the conflict in Iraq continues to evolve, it changes over time. Although there is still terrorism and insurgency, it is much less than it was. The bigger threat is the communal struggle for power which in my view is
being fueled by Iranian support to the special groups. One of the things that will have to be tackled is these militias that are equipped, funded, and trained by either Iran's Quds Force or Iranian surrogates within Iraq.

The Government of Iraq stepping up to take action against these groups in my mind is an important step of eliminating these non-governmental security organizations that are trying to sustain control over the population. So I think for that, it is a very important step forward. Obviously, we would much rather be able to resolve these through reconciliation and peaceful ways instead of having to use force. In that way, I think it is a positive step forward.

Senator CORNYN. Prime Minister Maliki called these militias criminals and gang leaders. Would you agree or disagree with his comments?

General ODIERNO. I think there is a mixture. I think as we continue to analyze the threat, there are some that I believe are clearly Iranian surrogates that have a very specific purpose to destabilize the Government of Iraq because Iran thinks a weak Government of Iraq is in their best interest. Then there are criminals that are out there that, in fact, are thugs, have organized crime, and are flat-out criminals trying to extort money from the population. So it is a mixture of both.

Senator CORNYN. I have just two more questions for you, General Odierno.

First of all, let me just quote the words of President John F. Kennedy who once remarked that “the cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it. One path we shall never choose and that is a path of surrender or submission.”

There are some who suggest that the cost of the war in Iraq is too high, and that we should spend the money that we are spending supporting the troops and on ongoing operations in Iraq on other things here domestically. But as a military leader, without commenting maybe on the specifics, I would like for you to comment on how you view the cost of protecting our freedom and that of our allies and whether you feel like we can put a cost/benefit analysis on that from a strictly financial point of view.

General ODIERNO. Senator Cornyn, first of all, I want to make sure it is clear that I understand the costs involved, the cost monetarily, but more importantly to me, the costs in lives of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, as well as those who have been wounded and who will forever have a scar to bear because of this war and will never forget their sacrifices.

But it is always difficult to put a price tag on what I believe to be the security of our Nation. I do believe that the Middle East is an extremely important place for us to ensure that we maintain the security of our country. I will leave it at that, sir.

Senator CORNYN. My last question really has to do with that. I think there are some who have suggested that what we are doing in Iraq is irrelevant to our security here on the mainland of the United States. What is your opinion?

General ODIERNO. I would say that Iraq is an important place, as well as Afghanistan, in the Middle East. The Middle East is a place that we all know there has been a lot of violence over the last several years. It has created violence around the entire world. I
think it is important for us to establish what I believe to be a self-reliant government that is stable, that is committed to governance representing all its people, denied as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the national community as an engine of security and economic development. I believe establishing a strategic partnership within the Middle East with these countries is extremely important for the security of the United States.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much, each of you, and good luck. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General McKiernan, when I look back on the history of the United States’ participation in terms of operating as a part of a coalition force, we certainly did it in France. We did it in World War II. We did it in Korea, as a matter of fact.

NATO evolved out of that concept of coalition forces operating together. It took a long time before NATO realized that it had to expand its authority to what we term “out-of-area operations.” You know the history of that as well as I do. Europe had certainly a comparative period of stability that enabled NATO to take on these out-of-area operations.

The first was the Balkans, and I believe on the whole that the record of NATO’s performance there was quite good. It continues to some extent.

But this question in Afghanistan has not worked as we had all hoped. I am wondering if you would join me in saying that if we do not succeed—I do not call it winning and victory, but just succeed with the basic goals of enabling the Afghan government to establish a democratic form of government. They have it in framework now and they are trying to work the pieces together.

As a matter of fact, in my last trip over there, they just finished putting the legislature together. I remember President Karzai grumbling about the insubordinate members of their legislature. Do you recall that, Senator?

Chairman LEVIN. I do and it reminded me of home.

Senator WARNER. Yes, yes, it did.

But I fear that if NATO does not enable this country to succeed in its goals, that the commitment of the nations of the world to continue NATO will be truly tested. Or to put it in a blunt way, this could end up with the demise of NATO as we have known it these many years, a half century.

Where do you rank the seriousness of attaining the goals in Afghanistan in relation to the continuation of NATO?

General McKiernan. First of all, I share your sentiments. I think that the success of the NATO mission of ISAF in Afghanistan is directly linked really to the relevancy of NATO as a global security means in the 21st century. As you know, sir, I served in the NATO headquarters in the early days in the Balkans, and I think NATO was successful and continues to be successful in the Balkans, specifically Kosovo, today.

I think there is certainly the capacity and the capability for NATO to succeed in Afghanistan. However, there is a question of
will in terms of getting all the right contributions so that we build the right capacity to execute the mission.

Senator WARNER. I would go so far as to say that that will, which you properly and carefully pointed out, is not among the uniformed persons of NATO. It, frankly, resides in the several governments that train, equip, and send those troops to NATO. I am not about to open up all the chapters of European history, but frankly, their legislatures, the heads of state and government of many of the European nations simply are not able. They may well have the will, the heads of those governments, but the legislatures, for whatever reason, are not giving those heads of State and governments the type of support they need.

I think, from time to time, some of us have to sound the alarm because while NATO is the most extraordinary and the most successful military alliance in the history of mankind in my judgment, there could well be a reexamination of the very significant participation, about 25 percent, of this Nation in NATO.

I can remember—and I am sure the chairman can remember, if you will listen to what I am saying here, when we were young Senators, I can recall going to the floor to defend NATO. There were some of our most distinguished colleagues questioning the continuation of NATO at a great cost to the American people and the major portions of our military. I will not name the names, but it is in the record if anybody wants to look at it. They said NATO has redirected those expenditures and those forces to other requirements of the United States.

So maybe out of this hearing can come some little message to NATO. They are not there forever. They are there only so long as they can perform and achieve the goals that we have assigned to them. I say “we.” I mean collectively the 25 member nations.

Unless you have a comment, I will move to another question. Do you basically endorse what I had to say?

General MCKIERNAN. I do, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

General Odierno, another great institution we have is the All-Volunteer Force, and some of us are getting somewhat concerned about the absolute necessity of the Army to begin to somewhat lower the requirements of those recruits coming in to meet the needs as established by quotas. I for one—and I would state it right here—would rather have a smaller Army composed of the right people who can continue to preserve the concept of the All-Volunteer Force than to begin to bring in people that fall considerably below the standards that we have been able to maintain for this Army and the other military forces, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, these many years.

First, your own view about the All-Volunteer Force.

General ODIERNO. Senator Warner, first, I think it is critical that we continue to maintain an All-Volunteer Force. I think it has proven over time the quality of the force that we have been able to put together and the dedication of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that are a part of it and how they have been able to perform over, specifically here recently, the last 7 years. I think it is important that we want to maintain that for the long term, sir.
Senator WARNER. I can just speak for myself. You will recall in World War II, the draft was adopted by Congress by one vote. Today, I do not think Congress would consider, under the current circumstances and the commitments we have abroad now, any concept of returning to compulsive military training, be it a draft or some other concoction that we might come up with. That is not going to be the case.

That puts a special responsibility on your shoulders. You are a trustee of that Army. You are not just the Vice Chief. The long-term view of what you are doing today is going to shape that Army of tomorrow and the future. I, frankly, urge you to make certain that whatever requirements you have to readjust, let us say, in terms of recruiting will not result in any risk to the All-Volunteer Force or bring the perception and quality of the Army down.

After all, the concept of military training, military operations is very simple. It is dependent on the person that you are working with. You call it an “Army of One,” which is quite a good slogan, but it is really in that foxhole. One sleeps while the other is on duty. Aboard ship, some sleep while the others are on duty. You are dependent on your fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to do their duties at such times as you may have to get the needed rest that you need to carry out. If you begin to put into that foxhole people who cannot establish that mutual trust and bond, I think you will see this thing getting worse. It is a problem.

How would you judge the morale of the Army today? It is really interesting, the quotes of Eisenhower and George Marshall. I love history. Marshall said morale is a state of mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. Eisenhower once said in war morale is everything. After 6 years of now conflict, what is your judgment as to the morale of the United States Army?

General ODIERNO. I would just comment, Senator Warner, that over the last 15, 16, 17 months, as I have observed up close and personal the performance of all our servicemembers of all the Services in Iraq, their dedication, their steadfast commitment, their loyalty to their mission, and their dedication to complete their mission has never wavered. We can talk a lot about how you show morale, but how you show it is doing your job every single day without hesitation, the fact that you want to follow your leaders, the fact that you will do anything for your teammates, the person to your right, the person to your left, under very difficult conditions. We witness that every single day.

I used to tell people when I was the corps commander over there that when I was feeling bad or I thought I was down, the first thing I would do is go visit our soldiers or our marines.

Senator WARNER. That would build you back up.

General ODIERNO. It built me back up when I had a chance to hang out with them because of their dedication and loyalty.

Senator WARNER. Let me close out here on my time. We have talked this morning about the necessity to go from the 15-month to the 12-month tour. To what extent can you say now your level of confidence that we can achieve that transition from 15 to 12 by early this summer?
General ODIERNO. Senator, I am going to leave that to others to make that determination, but I would just say that——

Senator WARNER. Well, you will be a part of that decisionmaking.

General ODIERNO. I will.

I would just say our goal is to get down to 12-month tours as soon as we possibly can. We fully realize that 12-month tours is the maximum length that we should have our tours, and so our goal is to push that as fast as we possibly can.

Senator WARNER. Good.

General McKiernan, back to the drug problem in Afghanistan. We have had programs here in American agriculture where we put land into retirement and pay farmers a certain amount of money for keeping it in retirement.

Now, it seems to me that we could establish sort of a delta between what that farmer is getting for an opium crop and what he would get for another crop which is less cash, and we would just go in there and subsidize the difference between those two crops. If you look at the dollars involved, it is nickels and dimes compared to the overall value of that crop as it begins to move up and eventually is dispersed, a lot of it, into Europe.

I cannot understand why Europe does not see this Afghanistan operation as central to their security not only from the standpoint of a breeding ground for terrorism, but also the drugs that are infiltrating into Europe.

Start with some very simple program. Stop the poppies. Try turnips, whatever, potatoes. Whatever you get for that crop of potatoes, if it is less than the poppy crop, here is the cash. If we can choke it off right there in the field, I think we could make some progress.

I do not feel that we should do the spraying because I have done some agriculture myself. That could result in working to the detriment of the water supply for human consumption if you put that much spray around in some of those provinces.

I just think we ought to come up with some innovative ideas, and I am ensured by our discussions together and your testimony this morning you are going to devote your time to it. But as one old farmer who lost a lot of money farming, I can tell that is one way to get at it. Retire that land or pay them the delta between the crops.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Thune.

Senator WARNER. There is a man down there that understands agriculture, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THUNE. Not tobacco farming, however, Senator.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Virginia.

Senator WARNER. We had a lot of peanuts, and you have eaten those.

Senator THUNE. That is exactly right.

But I do want to associate myself with the comments from the Senator from Virginia with regard to NATO. NATO is a club that everybody wants to be in but nobody wants to do the work. The numbers keep getting larger. We keep adding member nations to
that organization, but its effectiveness I think is very much in question if we are not able to step up to some of the challenges we face around the world, particularly in places like Afghanistan.

General McKiernan, General Odiero, and General Sharp, thank you. Each of you has had incredibly impressive and distinguished careers, and we thank you for your service to the country. Each of you has spent a long time overseas in support of your country, and we thank you for your and your families' sacrifice. We appreciate everything you do for our country's freedoms.

General McKiernan, you stated in your response to the committee's advance policy questions that some of the challenges that you will face as Commander of ISAF are under-resourcing and constrained forces. You also go on to state that fully resourcing military requirements and removing remaining caveats will be a major focus, and that we should look closely at options for deploying additional brigade combat teams to Afghanistan.

How many more brigade combat teams do you anticipate you will need to continue the mission?

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, if confirmed, I would need to be on the ground to make an assessment for specific numbers, but again, it is a fact that the requirements stated by current commanders there in Afghanistan—that those requirements have not been filled through the NATO force generation process. So specific numbers of brigades or other military capabilities—I cannot give you the exact numbers today. It would be part of an assessment I would need to make. But we certainly need to build more capacity not just in the military line of operation, but also in the developmental and governance lines of operation. There is more capacity that has to be built there in Afghanistan.

Senator THUNE. What else do you anticipate requesting that has not already been identified, if confirmed in the position?

General MCKIERNAN. Senator, I am not sure if there is anything besides what has already been identified, but what has already been identified, as you correctly state, is more than just ground combat capability, but it is also more aviation, more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, additional operational mentoring and liaison teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, etcetera. So those requirements that are already validated and are waiting to be filled I think is the starting point.

Senator THUNE. You also stated that there have been recent reductions in the number and severity of caveats with regard to some of our NATO allies in Afghanistan. Could you describe in more detail what those reductions are?

General MCKIERNAN. I really do not think there necessarily have been reductions in caveats. I think what I meant to say in that statement, if I did not, is that we need to continue to work to remove caveats because what they end up ultimately doing is degrading NATO's advantages in terms of mobility, fire power, sustainment, and intelligence. We have to, I think, work to continue to remove those caveats.

Senator THUNE. Are some of the caveats worse than others?

General MCKIERNAN. I think so. Certainly military contributions that are precluded really from conducting combat operations make
it very difficult for those same forces to be effective in a counter-insurgency environment.

Senator THUNE. General Odierno, General Casey has argued that we are in an era of persistent conflict. Assuming that he is correct, do you see any utility to the concept of standing provincial reconstruction teams, in other words, teams that are ready to deploy on a moment’s notice?

General ODIERNO. One of the recommendations I made coming out of Iraq was that we should take a look at how we might do that so they can be deployable, no notice, as we continue to look at potential contingencies in the future because I believe with any contingency we might run into, it would be important for us to immediately be able to have an interagency team on the ground to help us work the socioeconomic, political issues that ultimately are linked to operations.

Senator THUNE. What about standing operational mentor teams or standing embedded training teams? Is that something you foresee?

General ODIERNO. The one thing I would say is what I want is the Army has centered around brigade combat teams, and I believe our brigade combat teams we want to be full spectrum in nature where they can accomplish a variety of missions. It is important for us to do that to get the efficiency out of our Army. So in order to get the efficiency out of our Army, what we want is units that can do a number of things. I think through task organization and other kinds of things, they can conduct those type of operations as well as combat operations. We want that flexibility within our force so we get the most out of our leaders and our soldiers.

Senator THUNE. General Sharp, one of the questions that was posed to you by the committee in its advance policy questions regarded the missile defense systems and capabilities that you believe are needed to meet the operational needs of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command. That is, I think, on page 6 of your advance policy questions responses. You responded that among other things, continued development of the airborne laser is needed to provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability required to protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea.

Could you expand a little bit further on why you believe development of the airborne laser is needed to meet the operational needs of U.S. Forces Korea?

General SHARP. Sir, I think as you look across the entire missile defense spectrum, you have to have a layered defense that starts from space and works all the way down to Aegis and other ground-based systems to intercept the missiles. I believe the airborne laser is a critical part of that ballistic missile enterprise to be able to allow for that effective defense.

Senator THUNE. Looking at the readiness challenge, what do you see as the major challenge to readiness? Are the challenges with personnel, equipment, or training, and given events in Iraq and Afghanistan, are we resourcing our forces in Korea correctly?

General SHARP. Sir, the forces that are in Korea today, the U.S. forces that are there today, are properly trained and equipped to be able to accomplish the task and the mission that we have work-
ing with our Republic of Korea allies to defend the peninsula. Likewise, the Republic of Korea forces are also very well trained and very well equipped. They are an outstanding military, and they are also prepared to defend the Republic of Korea.

The forces that we would deploy from the United States, if we had to go do that conflict today, are not as well trained, as General Casey has said, because they are training on the missions that they have to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are counter-insurgency experts of the world. But we are confident that we would be able to deploy those forces and we would be able to win in the Republic of Korea with our Republic of Korea allies.

One other point I would like to make. Because of the amount of Reserve Forces that we have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, Reserve and National Guard, I personally believe right now they are the best trained that they have ever been trained because we have used them in combat environments. They would be also a key component of any conflict in Korea.

Senator THUNE. Do you have any major concerns with transferring wartime OPCON to the Republic of Korea?

General SHARP. General Bell has worked very closely with our allies, and I believe that he has an excellent plan of exercises. He has an excellent plan working with the Republic of Korea to make sure that they have the capabilities that they need from surveillance to command and control to the ability to be able to, at a high level, command the fight. I am confident that by 2012, which is the currently agreed upon time to transfer, we will be ready and the Koreans will be ready to take control of that fight.

Senator THUNE. Thank you all very much and thanks again for your service. We look forward to a speedy confirmation process, and godspeed in your new endeavors. Thank you for what you do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I came at the beginning of this and then left and went to the floor and talked for 30 minutes, having just come back 3 days ago from Iraq and from Africa, giving my assessment of it. This was my 18th trip into that theater. So I do not think I am going to ask you what you have already been asked before because my staff has kind of gone over some of the interests that I had.

I would like to start off with General McKiernan—and I appreciate your coming by so we had a chance to visit before this meeting. A lot of reports claim that the insurgency is growing in Afghanistan and that the security situation is deteriorating. However, in December, General McNeil said—and I was there at that time in December—"My view of the security situation is that it is not deteriorating like other people say. It is showing exactly what it is. There is insurgency here. There is a strong international and indigenous force going after it, and you are going to have contacts." Do you generally agree with that statement?

General MCKIERNAN. I do generally agree with that, sir. I think there are certainly no signs that the insurgency is ready to collapse, and I believe that the environment there in Afghanistan today reflects an interlinkage between the insurgency, terrorism,
corruption at various levels, and criminal activity. I think all of those have to be factored into the approach that ISAF takes in the mission.

Senator INHOFE. When you say the criminal activity, it is my observation that one of the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan is that there is just no central authority there. Afghanistan is kind of a convoluted grouping of cities and local administrations, and there is a lot of corruption there and there is no central place where you can really attack this. Is that accurate?

General MCKIERNAN. I would agree that the history of Afghanistan is really a history of local autonomy. So a strong central government is not exactly the historical trend in Afghanistan.

Senator INHOFE. Does that not create a problem, though? You do not have a strong Federal Government where you can go to one place as opposed to trying to work around the edges.

General MCKIERNAN. I think it is part of the challenge. The challenge is not only building capacity and coherence between governance development and security. But it is developing institutions that were not there previously.

Senator INHOFE. A few months ago I was privileged to go with General Jones. It was his last trip there. That is essentially the assessment that he had of the situation. When I was over there 3 days ago, I met with your replacement at the Multi-National Corps, General Austin, and we talked about the recent violence down in Basra. I know you have already talked about this before I came in. But we were down at Buka, which is right next to Basra, and we had talked to an awful lot of people, even a lot of the troops on the ground. The response that Prime Minister Maliki had down there and the fact that he took a level of control I thought was good, but some people are criticizing the fact that he was the one who went down and did it and he did not do the job properly.

What is your assessment of what he did on that crackdown in Basra?

General ODIERNO. Sir, I would just say again, as I said earlier, the communal struggle for power is growing more and more within Iraq. We still have some terrorism and insurgency. But it is about Shia-on-Shia violence. It is about those nongovernmental entities that are trying to exert their influence. Some of them are Iranian-supported and backed by funding, weapons, and equipment from Iran. It is important that the government understands that they have to take action against these groups in order for the governmental entities, the police force, the army, and others, to be the ones who in fact provide security. So from that aspect, I think it is important that they understand this problem and they understand that action has to be taken.

Having not been there, I am not sure what the level of coordination was that went on, but I do believe it is a partnership and we should do all of these things as partners.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. It appeared that that is the first time they really did take the initiative. At least, it seemed that way to me. Just for a minute—I was talking about this on the floor a minute ago—the Iranian threat that is over there. Back when there were a lot of resolutions about leaving, it got a lot of attention there.
About that time, Ahmadinejad made the statement that when we leave—at that time, he was convinced that we would leave and that would create a vacuum and he would be able to fill that vacuum. I agree that he would like to do it.

But what would the Iraqi people’s response be if they were to look at the Iranians coming in and filling that vacuum?

General Odierno. My assessment is that I believe the Iraqi people, the large, large, large majority, are very nationalistic, and they want Iraqis to solve Iraqi problems. They do not want interference from Iran and want them filling any vacuums. So I believe, for the most part, the Iraqis want to be involved in the solutions.

I would just say that I get some concern because you could make the argument that, in fact, through some of the Iranian support that goes on in Iraq, they are creating the instability. Then they are saying they want to come in and fill the vacuum to correct the instability. So I think we have to make sure we understand that very carefully, and I think we have to watch that extremely carefully.

Senator Inhofe. It was not too many years ago that they were launching missiles back and forth on each other, killing hundreds of thousands of people.

I heard Senator Thune talking to you, General Sharp, a little bit about some of the things that were going on over there in terms of Korea and Korea’s capability. I have always been concerned about their capability. I always remember, because I was on this committee, and I remember in August 1998 when we were trying to get an assessment. We had come out with our assessment at that time—that was 1998—as to how long would it be until the North Koreans would have a multistage rocket that could reach the United States, and they came back. I have the documentation. It was around 12 to 15 years. That was on August 24, 1998. On August 31, 7 days later, they fired one.

I say that because how comfortable are you and our intelligence as to exactly what capability they have and what they are going to do with it.

General Sharp. Sir, we are never comfortable that we have enough intelligence. They do continue to surprise us. That is why we and the Koreans need robust capability in order to be able to defend that peninsula. You have seen—and I think we have fairly good evidence—that we do believe there is enough plutonium that they could have and probably have created some nuclear weapons that are in North Korea right now.

In a closed session, we could go into more details of exactly what we do know and where we think we have holes in that intelligence. But there are holes, and as I said, we need to make sure that we, the United States and the Republic of Korea, are prepared to win that conflict, which I do believe we are today, but it requires the continued commitment of all of us and the Koreans.

Senator Inhofe. The other day in a subcommittee hearing, I commented that I did not think they were making the progress they should be making with the Czech Republic and Poland. I found out later that it appears that they are making great progress right now, and I am glad I was wrong.
Finally, General Sharp, several of the programs that I have really pushed hard are the 1206, 1207, 1208, 1210 train and equip programs and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. In fact, it was our attitude up till the last reauthorization bill that when we invite people to come over—and I do not think there is anything that solidifies for the future better relations for their officers, whatever the country is, Africa or anyplace else, to be training with ours. I think the IMET program has been very successful.

But we had the attitude that we are doing them a favor when we do that, and that is because we had this restriction that you cannot come over unless they sign an Article 98. I put language in last time with the argument that they are doing us a favor more than we are doing them a favor because if they are not over here training with us, there is always the Chinese and others who would like to get their hands on them and participate in that kind of training activity. So we have taken away that requirement.

Lastly, we want to increase that program.

What is your feeling about that program and the success of it?

General Sharp. Sir, thanks to your leadership, I agree completely with the way you are going. I think it is critical for us and really for the world. One of the critical things that came out of the findings of the last Quadrennial Defense Review was that we really need to build partnership capacity around the world. We are no longer having programs just to give money away to buy friends. We need to have programs so that militaries around the world are prepared, capable, and willing to be able to go and help in all types of conflicts from peacekeeping operations to what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan today. The programs that you mentioned are critical to that.

IMET is critical specifically because of its ability to be able to fund military officers and noncommissioned officers to be able to come to the United States to go to our schools so that we can learn from each other and to be able to better interoperate in present and future conflicts.

Sir, I thank you for your leadership.

Senator Inhofe. Those relationships endure.

Do you agree generally with what General Sharp is saying?

General McKiernan. I do, sir, absolutely.

Senator Inhofe. The last thing I would say—my time has expired—would be on the Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP) which we have been wanting to expand both in the funding level as well as the geographic level, to be able to get other places. Would each one of you agree that that is a good idea?

General Sharp. Absolutely.

General Odierno. If I could, sir, I would just say it becomes even more important as we look at the reduction of our forces, that in fact the use of our money in order to move forward, as I talked earlier about continued economic revitalization of basic services becomes more important. So the money that the commanders have to do that becomes an important tool.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I get to walk in and ask questions. That is great.

To all of you, thank you for your service.

General Odierno, congratulations on what I think is going to be seen in history as a very eventful tour of duty regarding the last year.

The one thing that I have on my mind is this tension we have with the pressure on the Army and the outcome in Iraq. From a morale point of view, I know that the force has been strained, but generally speaking, how does the force feel, from your point of view as a commander, about the operations and the reasons we are there?

General ODIERNO. What I would say first is, again, I judge morale on how soldiers, marines, and others perform on the ground, and every day that they are there, they are dedicated to doing their job. They are dedicated to protecting each other. I would say that over the last 12 months for sure, that they really have seen some viable progress going on inside of Iraq, and they understand that, in fact, that progress has been made. They feel that they can continue to make that progress.

Senator GRAHAM. Regarding Iran, as I understand Iraq in the last year, Anbar Province has substantially changed for the better. Is that correct?

General ODIERNO. Yes, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. The awakening, as it is being called, the Sunni Awakening—I think the event that started it was a sheik came to a colonel and said, I have had it with these al Qaeda guys. I am ready to help you. Is that generally what happened?

General ODIERNO. Much communication. That is correct, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. The colonel, pretty much on his own initiative, said, okay, we are going to put a tank in front of your house.

General ODIERNO. That is pretty close, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. The point is that you had al Qaeda overplaying their hand, driving the population toward us, and the reaction of the colonel was to provide that individual better security, to reinforce his willingness to fight al Qaeda. Is that correct?

General ODIERNO. It is, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. That general model was used in Anbar that we would increase military capacity and try to peel people away from al Qaeda. From that, we have gotten now what is called the Sons of Iraq. Is that correct?

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Tell me how the Sons of Iraq has changed things in Anbar?

General ODIERNO. First, I would say, again, people are willing to come forward and looking for security, rejecting al Qaeda. The change that occurred was the rejection of al Qaeda throughout Iraq, starting in Anbar, the elimination of the passive support that al Qaeda had for a long time. What I mean by passive support is not that you supported them, but you did not do anything to help us to get after them. That changed. Like you said, they got tired of how al Qaeda was treating them and rejected their ideologies and what they stood for.
So what happened was once they were able to get security provided to them and they came to the coalition forces to help, once we continued to provide security for them, they then continued to come forward more and more and they wanted to be part of the process of going after al Qaeda in Anbar Province.

Senator Graham. Would you say there is a direct link between our willingness to reinforce and provide security to Anbar Province and the population’s boldness to say no to al Qaeda?

General Odierno. As we became more aggressive in what I call liberating the major cities in Anbar, finishing with Ramadi in March/April 2007, they started to come more and more forward. One of the key components, as we asked for additional forces, was the addition of two Marine battalions that we would put in Anbar so we could control the Euphrates River Valley and all of the population centers along the Euphrates River Valley in order to exploit the success that had begun by this action you talked about.

Senator Graham. Let us talk about Baghdad. The strategy in Baghdad, as I understand it, was to get troops out into joint security stations, out behind the walls into neighborhoods. Is that correct?

General Odierno. It is, Senator.

Senator Graham. Can you tell us about a joint security station? Why such a thing exists, and how that has affected the battle in Baghdad?

General Odierno. Not only was it additional forces but it was our change in strategy to get our forces among the population to create confidence between the population and security forces.

The joint security stations were established so we could have a place where coalition forces, Iraqi Army, and Iraqi police would operate together, would operate among the population. So they felt more secure so they could come forward with information, feel more secure about opening shops, feel more secure about their daily lives, and then also build confidence between Iraqis and their own security forces, confidence with their own police and their own army over time.

It also developed better relationships between coalition forces and the Iraqi population because on a daily basis, they would interact with each other, and it made a very significant difference as we continued to move forward in Baghdad.

Senator Graham. Now, there is a statement being made that sectarian violence in the last year of Sunni and Shia violence has dramatically been reduced. Is that an accurate statement?

General Odierno. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Graham. What do you account for that?

General Odierno. It is a number of things. I think, again, it is first providing security to each other. It is a fact that people realize that in the beginning of 2007, we would not tolerate sectarian violence from either side, either Shia or Sunni. Most Iraqis are not sectarian. There were a few conducting many of the operations.

We went after the leaders who in fact were, in my mind, encouraging sectarian violence for their own gains. Al Qaeda was trying to accelerate sectarian violence because they saw that as a way to continue to destabilize Iraq as it continued to move forward. So we went after al Qaeda. We had some Shia extremists that were sup-
ported by Iranians and others who were conducting sectarian violence. We went after them. They realized that we were going to eliminate this sectarian violence. Since then, it has dropped dramatically.

Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to take much time. How long do we have? 5 minutes?

Chairman Levin. 10 minutes.

Senator Graham. 10 minutes, okay. Thank you.

Economic activity in Iraq. I flew over Baghdad with General Petraeus in February, just a little over a month ago. You said you saw 180 soccer games? I stopped counting, but it was a lot. We all know Baghdad. There is no place in Iraq that is completely normal in terms of what we would like it to be. But it was astonishing to me, in flying over Baghdad, the amount of activity.

Have you seen an economic improvement as a result of better security?

General Odierno. Obviously, we have seen the markets grow. In fact, most of the time, it is about 10-fold. We saw places where, frankly, there were no shops open to where now there are 300 to 400, whether it be the Doura market in southern Baghdad, Shorja market in eastern Baghdad, and Shula in western Baghdad. So a significant increase. What you had was an increase in goods being sold, but also, obviously, a precipitate increase in retail goods that would be developed.

Senator Graham. As you know, I have been very interested in the prisoner issue, and I want to compliment you and General Stone for coming up with—I think it will be seen in history as one of the most novel approaches to dealing with the prison population, having a counterinsurgency program in the prison where you educate prisoners. We are providing education to every prisoner at Camp Buka and Camp Crawford. Exposure to moderate influences in terms of the Koran, and basically trying to give people a second chance on life for those that we feel like we can let go. I just want to recognize your work there and compliment you.

On the political front, the amnesty law, the deBaathification law, the provincial elections, and a $48 billion budget. In your opinion, what does that mean, if anything, for the future of Iraq? What would account for these breakthroughs?

General Odierno. First, again, I believe the fact that we improved the security, it enabled the political factions within the Iraqi Government now to start focusing on what I believe to be significantly important political issues. One is, obviously, the distribution of the wealth to all of the provinces through the budget, through the allocation of reconstruction funds. Second was the passing of the provincial election law. In addition, the accountability and justice law, which was basically the old de-Baathification law, then the amnesty law.

Now what we have to continue to focus on is the implementation of these laws, which is the next step. We have the laws passed. It is now most important that we go through the implementation of these.

Senator Graham. Very briefly, as I understand the law about a limited amnesty, the Shias and the Kurds are saying to at least
some Sunnis, we are going to create a process where you were fighting us last year, but we are going to let you go home and start over.

General ODIerno. That is right. Not only Sunnis, but also Shia and other people. That is correct.

Senator GRAHAM. In the south, the Iranian influence in Iraq is constructive or not?

General ODIERNO. For the most part, I would say that it is clear to me that they continue to fund. They continue to train. They continue to provide weapons to extremist groups in order, in my mind, to destabilize and weaken the Government of Iraq.

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, if Iran were engaging in constructive behavior as a neighbor, what impact would it have on Iraq, if any?

General ODIerno. It could have significant impact. They are neighbors. They can help each other. It is important for stability of the region. I see it as a critical piece as we move forward, that they become much more constructive in their help with Iraq.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, General.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to ask this additional question.

General McKiernan, as we look back over the history of our operations in Afghanistan—I say "our," that is the combined operation of forces that are aligned with us—we see, I think, an ever-increasing dependence upon support, a strong partnership with Pakistan. The relationship between Karzai and Musharraf was not the best at times. It is a little early, I expect, for us to try and assess how the new government is going to work in this area.

But I think this record should reflect what you know very well. Our supply lines are dependent in large measure on the cooperation of the Pakistani Government and people. We use its ports, its airfields to logistically care for our forces and, I presume, the greater proportion of the NATO forces.

Now, you are going to have to be a part-time ambassador. Let me ask that question. Are you prepared to become a part-time ambassador? Should we call the Foreign Relations Committee up and just have you have a second hearing on this?

General McKiernan. Sir, I am not advocating a second hearing on anything. [Laughter.]

But there is a quarterly Tripartite Commission which as you know, the Commander of ISAF and the Chief of Defense in Afghanistan and the Chief of Staff of the Army in Pakistan get together and talk about mutual security interests along the border. I for one—and I know General McNeil agrees that there can be no successful, by any metrics, outcome in Afghanistan without dealing with the sanctuaries right across the border in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the northwest frontier province.

Senator WARNER. We currently have in the United States a very competent U.S. Ambassador, Ambassador William Wood, a personal acquaintance, as I understand, of our Staff Director, Mike
Kostiw. We were talking about him yesterday. Have you worked with him thus far?

General McKiernan. Sir, I have not, but I could tell you, if confirmed, I would hope to have an absolutely linked-at-the-hip relationship with the United States Ambassador.

Senator Warner. I appreciate that. I think one of the great high water marks has been General Petraeus and our U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, and I think it is essential that you have a comparable relationship with Ambassador Wood.

Thank you very much and good luck to each of you. I think the record should also show—how much time have you spent in your area of responsibility (AOR) before your new AOR, Afghanistan?

General McKiernan. Sir, I have probably made about half a dozen trips over there to see U.S. forces that we have provided from Europe that are operating in Afghanistan.

Senator Warner. General Odierno. General Odierno. I have spent a little over 30 months in Iraq over the last several years both serving there, then also several months visiting around the region.

Senator Warner. When you were in your capacity as a Military Advisor to the Secretary of State, you spent a lot of time there?

General Odierno. I have spent a lot of time in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, all of those countries, sir.

Senator Warner. General Sharp, you had a tour in Korea?

General Sharp. Yes, sir, almost 2½ years working for a former boss. General John H. Tilleli, Jr., was the commander in chief there at that time, and then also 17–18 months up in the 2nd Infantry Division as an assistant division commander.

Senator Warner. Thank you. We are fortunate, Mr. Chairman, of that background of experience.

I thank the chair.

Chairman Levin. We are, indeed. Thank you, Senator Warner.

General Odierno, I think what you testified to, if I understand it, is that there is a number of reasons for the reduction in violence in terms of sectarian violence that we saw, one of them being the increase in the number of U.S. forces, another one being the change in the strategy for those forces, another one being the ability to exploit the success of the event that took place when the Sunni Awakening took place. Is that fair?

General Odierno. That is fair, sure.

Chairman Levin. So there is a number of reasons for the reduction in that sectarian violence?

General Odierno. That is fair.

Chairman Levin. At the same time, you told us today that the biggest threat now in many parts of Iraq is the increase in the communal struggle for power. Would you describe that struggle and why that is the biggest threat?

General Odierno. I would. Mr. Chairman, as we have been able to reduce the threat of al Qaeda, although they are still capable of conducting attacks in Iraq—I do not want to ever downplay that at all. They are still capable, but their capacity has been reduced. The insurgency in itself, as it was in 2004–2005, is reduced.

What we are seeing now is a struggle for power as the country moves forward, a struggle between Shia communities, some strug-
gle between Shia and Sunni, struggle between the Kurds and the Sunnis. It is about controlling parts of the country or having influence in parts of the country for the future as the country continues to move forward.

Our goal in all of this is for that to happen peacefully through communication, through diplomatic efforts internal to the country. However, the history of the Middle East and Iraq in some cases causes them sometimes to want to use violence, and we have to be able to continue to work that issue. I think as we continue to make progress in Iraq, again the threat will evolve. This is what I believe to be how it is evolving today as a communal struggle.

The only other thing I would caveat, Mr. Chairman, is you have the external influences from Iran and also from other forces such as al Qaeda and other forces still trying to influence using Syria and other places.

Chairman LEVIN. For that violence to be resolved, is it still true that there needs to be a political settlement?

General ODIERNO. It does. A big part of it has to do with the political piece of it.

Chairman LEVIN. There has been some progress, a couple steps forward and then some steps back, on the political side, but is it still true that for there to be an election on October 1, that there has to be a provincial elections law passed? Is that still true?

General ODIERNO. It is, Mr. Chairman. They really have to pass the specifics of how they will conduct the election, and it is about implementation, as I have talked about.

Chairman LEVIN. As well as implementation of the laws that have been passed. Is it still true that there has not been a provincial elections law passed? I think you misspoke. I think what has passed—and correct me if I am wrong. There is a provincial powers law.

General ODIERNO. I misspoke. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. That has passed. That is the one which requires implementation?

General ODIERNO. That is right.

Chairman LEVIN. That specified that there would be an election on October 1, but without a provincial elections law, that election will not take place.

General ODIERNO. That is correct.

Chairman LEVIN. So we still have to put some pressure on the Iraqis to pass the critical provincial elections law for those elections of October 1 to occur.

How important is it that there be elections on October 1?

General ODIERNO. I think, first, the provincial elections are one of the most important things that must take place. As most of us remember, there are Sunnis that did not participate, and in fact, there were many Shia who did not participate in the last set of elections that currently elected the provincial leaders. So the provincial elections happening as soon as possible in my mind will make people in the provinces believe they are represented by those who truly are part of their province and represent the people. Therefore, it is extremely important it happens as soon as possible.

Chairman LEVIN. But the date specified in the other law is October 1. Is that correct?
General ODIERNO. That is correct, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. It is important that that date be met?
General ODIERNO. I think it is very important we try to meet that date.
Chairman LEVIN. As I gather, there is a real possibility that that date will not be met. Would you say that that is a real possibility?
General ODIERNO. I cannot comment, Mr. Chairman. I do not know that.
Chairman LEVIN. All right.
There are also constitutional changes which are supposed to have been considered by now. Is that correct?
General ODIERNO. They are supposed to continually review the constitution.
Chairman LEVIN. Has that commission met and made recommendations yet?
General ODIERNO. It is unclear. I can get back to you for the record on that.

[The information referred to follows:] Mr. Chairman, at the time of my testimony, the Iraqi Constitutional Review Committee had not yet met.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. It is my understanding they have not, but you can confirm that for the record.

General McKiernan, you have spoken a lot about Afghanistan. I wonder if you can summarize where we are on it. Would you say that the overall level of security among the Afghan people is moving forward, backward, or sideways?
General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I think it depends on the geography. I think where we have most of our U.S. forces in Regional Command East, I think it is moving forward. I think in Regional Command South, specifically in the Helmand/Kandahar area, I think it is in question. I think there is continued need, as I have said this morning, for building capacity, coherence, and dealing with the problem along the Pakistani-Afghan border.
Chairman LEVIN. Would you say that the insurgency has yet been contained in Afghanistan?
General MCKIERNAN. Sir, until I have the opportunity to make an assessment on the ground, I do not know if I could say that it has been contained.
Chairman LEVIN. General, you and I spoke in my office about this question of decoupling the Iraqi and the Afghanistan issue because of the problem which exists in some countries in Europe where popular support has been lost for the Afghan mission based on opposition to the war in Iraq and that there might be value in decoupling rhetorically, perhaps budget-wise, but at least rhetorically, and in terms of diplomacy, for both reasons, we could perhaps get greater support in Europe, a greater focus on Afghanistan, if we made that decoupling. Would you comment on that?
I believe you also in your answer to prehearing questions stated that the public opposition in a number of European countries has contributed to the loss of support for engagement in Afghanistan. Would you comment on that?
General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I think from my experience in the last $2\frac{1}{2}$ years in Europe, in terms of decoupling Iraq and Afghanistan
in the minds of our European allies, I think that is certainly something we ought to try to do in our strategic communications.

I also think that we have to continue to encourage our European allies to understand that the threat in Afghanistan and across the border to the south is their threat as well. I do see a need to decouple in the international community. Our discussions also were whether we decouple in some of our processes back here in the United States. My statement at that time—and I continue to believe it—is in terms of application of resources, we have to balance, at least in the DOD, globally. So it is very hard to decouple Iraq from Afghanistan.

Chairman Levin. In that sense.

General Odierno. In that sense.

Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, the Atlantic Council has found that less than 10 cents of every dollar of aid for Afghanistan goes directly to the Afghan people. Assistant Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher at this committee’s hearing in February endorsed a program that is intended to empower rural Afghan communities to manage their own development projects. It is called the National Solidarity Program. This program is within the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and provides small block grants directly to locally elected community development councils. They are responsible for identifying, planning, and managing their own development projects. Funding for the National Solidarity Program comes from the World Bank and the International Development Association, bilateral donors through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

According to a press release last December, the National Solidarity Program has provided $400 million in payments which were disbursed to 16,000 local community development councils in Afghanistan, and those payments have financed more than 30,000 community development subprojects, which have improved access to infrastructure, markets, and services. Those councils are being established in all 34 provinces and the vast majority of the districts throughout Afghanistan.

A University of York study in Great Britain said that the National Solidarity Program has the potential to be a beacon of good practice among community-driven development programs.

So a couple questions. Are you familiar with the National Solidarity Program? In your judgment, is it a good program?

General McKiernan. Sir, I have done a lot of reading about it, and the people that I have talked to that work it in Afghanistan—I would conclude that it has huge potential as a bottom-up approach for development. Coupled with programs like CERP and what provincial reconstruction teams do, I think in a bottom-up sense, it has huge potential.

Chairman Levin. Will you, when you get to Afghanistan, take a personal look at them? If you continue to be satisfied with their value, can you find ways to encourage the support for those programs?

General McKiernan. Yes, sir, I will.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

General Sharp, Senator Warner commented on this 2012 date, and I happen to agree with him. As I mentioned to you in the of-
fice, I think that the Korean Army is capable to take command earlier and that the fears of symbolism when that happens are not justified by any actions which we have taken and that it is essential that you continue to see if that cannot be pushed forward. I know that date has been set, but that is a long way off. There is no reason for 4 more years to pass in my judgment—and I concur with Senator Warner on this—before that OPCON is transferred to the South Korean forces.

I do not need you, unless you would like to, to respond, but I just simply want to add my voice to Senator Warner on that point and give you an opportunity, if you would like to comment on it.

General Sharp. Sir, if confirmed, I do pledge to work with the Republic of Korea, Chairman General Kim Tae-Young, to continually push to make sure that they have the capabilities, the training necessary in order to be able to take OPCON change and to continually assess that between now and 2012 to make that goal.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.

The Six Party Talks. Would you view them, from what you know of them, as constructive?

General Sharp. Sir, they are constructive. They would be a lot more constructive if the North Koreans lived up to what they promised and gave a complete and open declaration, as they were supposed to do and they pledged to do by the end of last calendar year, which they have yet to do. But they are constructive.

Chairman Levin. Do you see value in military-to-military contacts with North Korea?

General Sharp. Sir, I do. I see that military-to-military contacts make sure that each side understands where each other stands so that there is less of a chance of missteps because of miscommunications, and I encourage that. The North Koreans cut off general officer-level talks several years ago, and I would encourage that to start back up again.

Chairman Levin. Do you believe the right number of ground forces are postured—and I am talking here to U.S. ground forces—to meet any warfighting requirements on the Korean peninsula?

General Sharp. Sir, I believe what we currently have on the peninsula—that General Bell has worked very hard, not just numbers, but more importantly the capabilities that we have there, in order to be able to do the requirements in order to be able to, with our Republic of Korea allies, win the war, win any conflict. We do have the right number and the right capabilities there at this time.

Chairman Levin. You would not support further reductions?

General Sharp. Sir, again, if confirmed, I will continually assess that, but from what I have seen so far working with the Army, the capabilities that are there now are the ones that we need for the future.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. We thank all of you and, again, your families for your service, for their service to this country, and we look forward to a speedy confirmation process.

We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)?

Answer. The Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) is responsible for executing NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan as delineated in Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10302. My responsibility is to ensure that ISAF accomplishes its objectives and meets the reporting requirements of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (as Commander of NATO Operations).

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. As a U.S. general officer with multiple deployment and multinational experiences, I have been closely involved with or in command of NATO and coalition military operations. I feel thoroughly qualified and prepared to lead this complex effort in Afghanistan.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, ISAF?

Answer. Since nomination by the Secretary of Defense for this assignment, I have been able to take advantage of several opportunities to engage with key leaders and organizations that contribute to the campaign in Afghanistan. I will continue to do everything possible to prepare for this assignment in the 2 months to follow.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, ISAF, to the following:

U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Answer. As a U.S. Army general officer, I would be required to ensure that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is advised and informed on the progress of my operation in ISAF and any issues that need to be resolved from a U.S. perspective. While I would be a NATO Commander who obviously has a NATO chain of command thru Joint Force Commander (JFC) Brunssum and then Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), I also would be prepared to keep U.S. Secretary of Defense familiar with appropriate operational issues.

Question. NATO Secretary General.

Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the NATO Secretary General is an indirect one. As the senior international statesmen for the Alliance, he is responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and decisionmaking within the Alliance.

Question. NATO North Atlantic Council.

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the ISAF Commander. The NAC is the principal decision-making body within NATO. It is comprised of high-level national representatives (Ambassadors, Defense Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Heads of State and Government) from each member country that discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. The NAC provides guidance to SACEUR for all NATO military operations and SACEUR subsequently passes operational military direction to subordinate commands.

Question. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an indirect one. He is one of 26 NATO Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), who combine to form the NATO Military Committee, which serves as the senior military authority in NATO. The CHODs in the Military Committee are responsible for recommending to NATO’s political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defense of the NATO area and for the implementation of decisions regarding NATO’s operations and missions.

Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe is a chain of command one. SACEUR is one of NATO’s two strategic commanders and is the head of Allied Command Operations. He is responsible to NATO’s Military Committee, the highest military authority in NATO, for the command, planning and conduct of all NATO military operations. SACEUR also identifies forces required for the mission and requests those forces from NATO countries, as authorized by the NAC and as directed by NATO’s Military Committee. As COMISAF, I would report directly to JFC Brunssum (Land Component
Commander under SACEUR for ISAF), who subsequently reports directly to SACEUR.

Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation.
Answer. Both NATO’s Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), carry out roles and missions assigned to them by the NAC or in some circumstances by NATO’s Defense Planning Committee. SACEUR and SACT work together to ensure the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities and necessary interoperability. As an operational commander in NATO, I will coordinate with SACT to ensure we are leveraging the capability of his staff and command to maximize the effectiveness of our training efforts and NATO operational capabilities in theater.

Question. NATO Military Committee.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO Military Committee and the ISAF Commander. The Military Committee coordinates military advice to the NAC on policy and strategy. As an operational commander in NATO I will ensure SHAPE has the best military advice possible.

Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command.
Answer. The Commander of United States Central Command exercises authority over U.S. Forces assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom, including forces assigned to Command-Afghanistan Transition Command (CSTC–A). As the ISAF operates within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, it is essential that both commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

Question. Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 82, Afghanistan
Answer. Operational control of forces assigned to ISAF is exercised through the Regional Commanders. The U.S. is the designated lead for Regional Command East, and as such, COMISAF exercises control over U.S. forces assigned to RC East via Combined Joint Task Force-82. The 101st Airborne Division is currently transitioning with the 82nd Airborne Division and is expected to complete transfer of Authority (TOA) by 10 Apr 08.

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between CSTC–A commander and COMISAF. It is a coordinating relationship with CSTC–A which is a force provider to ISAF operations. The coordination of our efforts is absolutely critical to mutual success. CSTC–A is a force provider in the role of developing Afghan National Security Force capability. Our coordinating relationship will remain focused on ensuring that well trained and equipped Afghan security forces are produced, sustained and provided to the Afghan people.

Question. United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Commander, ISAF; however, productive coordination is essential. The ISAF Commander must ensure that ISAF operations are creating necessary security and working in conjunction with international organizations toward necessary development and reconstruction. My relationship with the U.N. SRSG will focus on developing and implementing comprehensive regional and national strategies to benefit the Afghan government and its people.

Question. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S. Ambassador and Commander, ISAF but the requirement for close coordination and synchronization of activities is critical. The ISAF Commander and U.S. Ambassador cooperate on the development and implementation of regional and national strategy in Afghanistan and I will work to ensure the effectiveness of that relationship.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, ISAF?
Answer. Under-resourcing and constrained forces face the Commander today and I anticipate facing the same challenges in my initial months as COMISAF. Coherency among the many international and interagency actors is also a primary concern that is being addressed most notably with the recent nomination of the Senior Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ambassador Kai Eide. Additionally, the security situation in Afghanistan is directly linked to security conditions in Pakistan.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. Fully resourcing military requirements and removing remaining caveats that constrain effectiveness will be a major focus. It is critical for ISAF to maximize
its contribution to Afghanistan’s ability to provide and maintain a secure environ-
ment with the forces and resources provided, despite any known shortfalls. As for
coherency, we must address the need for unity of effort through organizational
structure, coordinated planning, responsive resourcing, useful measures of success
and transparency among the many national and international actors. I will also
strive to improve mutual Afghan-Pakistan security challenges through such means
as the Tripartite Commission.

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. Recently-released independent reports have found that NATO is not
achieving ISAF goals in Afghanistan and that the Taliban-led anti-government in-
surgency has grown over the last 2 years.

What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan and the nature,
size, and scope of the anti-government insurgency?

Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan is very complex, and reflects
blurred linkages between criminal, corruption and insurgency based activities.
While it is certainly true that violence, particularly suicide attacks, is up in com-
parison to the past several years, the raw statistics may not tell the ISAF story.
Raw total measures of violence can increase when a greater portion of that violence
is initiated by ISAF forces. The insurgency has suffered significant casualties in the
past year, including numerous mid- and high-level Taliban leaders. The Taliban
have been repeatedly defeated at the tactical level since operations in Afghanistan
began, and are no closer to their strategic goal of recapturing Kandahar than they
were 2 years ago. The current assessment of ISAF from the past year’s activities
is that aggressive ISAF actions in the spring of 2007 significantly degraded insurg-
ent tempo and preempted operations. That will be repeated in 2008. Some analysts
even assess that the Taliban adoption of suicide tactics is less of an indicator of suc-
cess than an indicator of desperation and an opportunity for us to further alienate
them from the people of Afghanistan. All said though, the insurgency is not on the
verge of collapse, but we are not in danger of losing. Progress is being, and has
been, achieved at a pace that is not as great as we would like. The Afghan National Security Forces
continue to improve capabilities and grow capacity, from having no national forces
in 2001 to over 124,000 uniformed members today, and our allies continue to renew
or increase their commitments to the mission.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in ISAF operations to
respond to the evolving insurgency threat?

Answer. Despite all the outstanding work that has already been achieved in Af-
ghanistan, there is still room for improvement. Counter-Insurgency (COIN) doctrine
tells us that one of the key elements of a successful COIN campaign is establishing
a strong national security infrastructure and connecting the population to its gov-
ernment. A strong national force is critical to holding ground and denial of insur-
gent access to the population. The true long-term solution to the insurgency in Af-
ghanistan is an Afghan one and it includes a strong national security force. Accord-
ingly, one of our top priorities must be increasing and improving the Afghan Na-
tional Security Force by focusing significant resources and effort on them. Creating
a national army and police force is not a quick or easy process. The Afghan National
Army continues to make huge gains in capability and is a respected by the Afghan
population. Progress in development of the Afghan National Police has not been as
successful. There is significant momentum, but it will continue to require our high-
est priority. Police initiatives such as Focused District Development and plans to
field over 2,000 additional military personnel in a training role show promise.

Another cornerstone of a comprehensive COIN strategy is the necessity to protect
the population. To this end, we should look closely at options for deploying addi-
tional brigade combat teams to Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the turbu-
 lent southern part of the country. The focus should be on traditional COIN oper-
ations, safeguarding key populations centers, securing roads and infrastructure,
pursuing insurgents in their traditional sanctuaries and defeating them.

Finally, we must continue to focus on refining the strategy to ensure it is com-
prehensive, fully coordinated and understood by all the allied partners. ISAF, Inter-
national Community and, most importantly, Afghan success will rely on develop-
ment and good governance as well as security.

NATO ISAF CAPABILITIES

Question. Do you believe that the current level of ISAF troops and equipment in
Afghanistan is sufficient to carry out the mission? If not, what are the current
shortfalls in troops and/or equipment required for the ISAF mission?
Answer. ISAF certainly needs what was already stated as the CJSOR requirements and the forces need to have critical caveats removed. The underresourced condition of ISAF affects its ability to control battle-space, maintain enduring effects and accelerate Afghan National Security Force development. Additionally, the ability to support the Government of Afghanistan in other than purely military lines of operation is limited. Among the specific shortfalls identified by the current ISAF commander are the unfilled requirement for three maneuver battalions, strategic Reserves, fixed and rotary wing aviation, Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), Afghan Security Force trainers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets and Provincial Reconstruction Team assets.

Question. Do you believe our NATO allies should do more to eliminate the shortfalls in resources for the ISAF mission?
Answer. Yes, but the ability to do more is limited by the willingness of the populations of some countries. We need to better make the case in these nations that this mission is important to their own strategic interests and the right thing to do for the people of Afghanistan.

Question. What is your assessment of the military capabilities of the NATO member states participating in ISAF, and of NATO ISAF as a whole? In what specific areas is more improvement needed? In what areas has there been the most progress?
Answer. Capabilities vary widely by nation. I cannot yet give a complete personal observation or assessment as to either ISAF's current capabilities or its effectiveness until I have been on the ground for a while. However, I have seen that ISAF forces have conducted themselves very well in the most contested portions of the south and east. I am extremely impressed by ISAF performance and fully respect the sacrifices made and burdens borne by all throughout Afghanistan. As Commander of U.S. Army Europe, I have assisted the training and preparation of many of the forces that make up ISAF and have seen great commitment and progress in the understanding of Counterinsurgency Operations and the importance of Afghan National Security Force development. Let me be clear, however, in stating that these training and readiness efforts must continue and strengthen in the future.

Question. To what extent have national caveats limited the ISAF Commander's ability to deploy effectively the forces under his command in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that COMISAF is definitely hampered by caveats. NATO forces possess superior mobility, sustainability and firepower. Caveats tend to negate some of those advantages and cause a level of command friction that makes planning and execution of flexible operations either very difficult or prone to enemy exploitation. Again, I can better assess the operational effects of caveats once I am on the ground.

Question. What do you believe should be done to encourage our NATO allies to remove national caveats?
Answer. At the most fundamental level, the argument has to be made and accepted by the leadership and citizenry of each member nation that ISAF and Afghanistan are important; that the sacrifices required to defeat extremists, build a better life for the Afghans and safeguard our own security are worth it. Also, and very fundamental to this issue, national caveats usually increase the risk to ISAF servicemembers and to mission success.

Question. Secretary Gates has expressed concern that NATO could become a “two-tiered alliance” composed of some countries who are willing to fight and others who are not. A recent independent report warns that if NATO is unable to produce the forces required to fight in the southern region of Afghanistan, NATO's credibility and cohesion will be harmed.
Do you believe that NATO's credibility and cohesion are at stake in the conduct of the ISAF mission?
Answer. NATO’s credibility and cohesion in the 21st century could certainly be affected.

Question. How confident are you that NATO will be able to sustain its commitment to ISAF given the challenging security situation in Afghanistan?
Answer. I am optimistic, despite the challenges. Several heads of state have confirmed commitment to NATO, ISAF and Afghanistan. The military leaders I talk to in Europe recognize the importance of the campaign. There have been recent reductions in the number and severity of caveats, certain new troop commitments are likely to be made and the results of the NATO summit in Bucharest could signal....
increased support. Effective strategic communications that inform our respective populations and political leadership on the stakes and value of the campaign in Afghanistan will also help. Credible success will also add to popular support.

**DECOUPLING IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN**

**Question.** Secretary Gates reportedly indicated that among some European publics, opposition to the war in Iraq has contributed to a loss of support for the conflict in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Study Group recommended the administration “de-couple” Afghanistan and Iraq, in terms of funding and diplomacy, to enable more coherence and focus on Afghanistan.

Do you believe that opposition to the war in Iraq has led to a loss of support among some European publics for the effort in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe that to be true in a number of European countries.

**Question.** Would you support de-coupling Afghanistan and Iraq to improve the focus on Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Yes, internationally that would be helpful.

I believe that our efforts in Afghanistan would not stand to gain by “decoupling” it from Iraq in the U.S. defense budget process. Requirements for funding Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan are developed and approved independent of those funding requirements for OEF, and the Department has consistently received the levels of funding it has requested for the mission in Afghanistan.

I also believe that our force capabilities and the process to provide trained and ready joint forces to both Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF (and other requirements) “couple” our commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY**

**Question.** A recent report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime finds that Afghanistan provides over 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium and that poppy cultivation levels for the coming spring are expected to remain at or near last year’s levels.

Should ISAF have a drug interdiction mission in Afghanistan, including capturing drug lords and dismantling drug laboratories?

**Answer.** No, I believe the responsibility should remain with Afghan and international law enforcement organizations. However, supporting Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) counternarcotics programs is a validated ISAF task. ISAF should not conduct direct military action against narcotics producers, except for self defense or force protection reasons. I support General McNeil’s recent commitment to support the GIRoA’s counter-narcotics efforts within the means and capabilities of ISAF, specifically by helping to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the Poppy Eradication Force, enabling support to Afghan Government and international law enforcement interdiction operations and employing a holistic provincial engagement approach in the context of counterinsurgency operations. (mirroring the U.S. efforts in Nangahar as a model for success).

**TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN**

**Question.** Current plans call for training and equipping the Afghan National Army to a level of 80,000 and building the Afghan National Police to a level of 82,000 in the next few years. A recent independent report by the Afghanistan Study Group recommended that NATO could take over the mission of training the Afghan National Army, currently led by the United States, once NATO members have committed enough resources for this purpose.

Do you believe that NATO should do more to assist in building the capacity of the Afghan Security Forces? Should NATO take over the training mission for the Afghan National Army?

**Answer.** NATO is contributing to the training mission through the contribution of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams and personnel assigned to the CSTC–A staff, but more could be done. I would not be opposed to NATO taking over the training mission in the future and suspect that the U.S. would need to pledge continued resourcing of the program in order to gain NATO consensus and support for addition of this task. The key principle is unity of effort and there is a clear advantage to greater consolidation of the related missions of the current ISAF and CSTC–A.

**Question.** Should NATO allies play a greater role in providing these embedded training teams? If so, what should be done to encourage NATO allies to provide more of these teams?

**Answer.** The U.S. Secretary of Defense and NATO civilian and military leadership have recently been very clear about desiring increased Allied contributions to the
development of the Afghan National Security Forces in the form of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). OMLTs must, however, be totally trained and capable when they assume their mission. Until those requirements are sourced, I think NATO’s primary focus should be on partnering forces with the ANA units in the field and working with these units in that way to improve their capabilities.

Question. What is your assessment of the Afghan National Police? What more can NATO do to improve the effectiveness of the police?

Answer. Progress is being made in the development of the Afghan National Police, but police development is more problematic than military reform at this point. Current initiatives in rank and pay reform are promising as are the already mentioned approaches to Focused District Development. NATO countries could certainly assist by contributing more law enforcement expertise and training/sustainment resources. Ultimately, the Afghan National Police effect will only be as good as their credibility with the Afghan population.

RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Question. What is your role as Commander, ISAF, in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan?

Answer. The ISAF commander’s most important contribution to reconstruction is security. Besides personal engagement and coordination with Afghan and international agencies whose primary mission is reconstruction, the ISAF commander co-chairs, along with the Minister of Interior, the ambassador—minister-level Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Executive Steering Committee. PRT support for elements of security sector reform, reconstruction and development are a major focus for ISAF. PRTs report to the ISAF Commander through the Regional Commands.

Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?

Answer. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are an essential part of our development efforts in Afghanistan, and the primary means by which the ISAF acts to improve the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to govern itself and develop essential quality of life services at the subnational level. From what I have seen, I think they have been exceptionally effective overall.

Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe need to be made in the operations or coordination of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?

Answer. Each PRT is established and run by a Lead Nation, often with the assistance of one or more Partner Nations. So coherency will continue to be a challenge. The PRTs have only been under the command of COMISAF since the completion of NATO’s four-stage geographic expansion in October 2006. Since that time, NATO has identified and initiated actions to maintain a positive momentum of change for PRTs in Afghanistan. Better integration between the PRTs and the ISAF maneuver unit commanders in the Province, and more importantly the Regional Commands, could produce the same coherence and success of the PRTs that is currently experienced by those in Regional Command East. Funding mechanisms should also be reviewed. Instead of National Capitals financing the development, governance and security sector reform efforts of only “their PRTs,” the funds for PRTs, or a portion thereof, could be pooled at the regional level so the Regional Commander’s could allocate the funds in support of better-coordinated, regional counterinsurgency goals and objectives.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM

Question. A key component of the Afghan Government’s development strategy is to strengthen local governance capacity. One program that contributes to enhancing development and empowering governance at the local level is the National Solidarity Program (NSP). This program, within the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, provides block grants directly to locally-elected Community Development Councils, which are responsible for identifying, planning and managing their own development projects. Funding for the NSP comes from the World Bank/International Development Association, bilateral donors, and through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. According to its website, the NSP has provided $400 million in payments to 16,000 Community Development Councils, which have financed more than 30,000 subprojects to improve access to infrastructure, markets, and services.

What is your understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the NSP in Afghanistan?

Answer. My understanding of the NSP is that it reflects the right intent from the bottom-up perspective to develop Afghan capacity. An important feature of the program is that it is Afghan-led. The rural development projects including irrigation,
transportation, education, water supply and sanitation are all very important and consistent with ISAF objectives at the local level. Anything that contributes to Afghan government effectiveness, credibility and governance is positive. The NSP demonstrates clear advantages of the Afghan government in contrast to the destructive activity of the insurgency.

**Question.** Would you support expanding the NSP as a means of building local governance and strengthening development?

**Answer.** I see potential to an expansion of the program at this point so long as it retains the current principles, is nested in the overall strategy to develop Afghan capacity and does not become a program of inefficiency or corruption.

### CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

**Question.** Recent United Nations reports have found that there were over 1,500 civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2007 and that almost half of the non-combatant casualties recorded by the United National Assistance Mission in Afghanistan were attributed to combat operations by Afghan national and international security forces.

What measures have been taken to reduce the levels of civilian casualties resulting from combat operations by Afghan national and ISAF security forces?

**Answer.** Avoiding civilian casualties is a priority within the Alliance, because of the moral and legal imperatives, but also because civilian casualties are counter to the principles of a successful counter-insurgency campaign.

**Question.** What more needs to be done to address the level of civilian casualties in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** The U.S. and all Allies clearly consider minimizing civilian casualties an imperative. Any civilian casualties are a cause for concern, particularly in a COIN campaign where one of our preeminent tasks is to protect the population and engender their support for the Government. NATO needs to continue to take measures, in concert with the Afghan Government and Afghan Security Forces, to prevent any unnecessary casualties. Continued adherence to the law of armed conflict and strict application of proper procedures for attack aviation are also critical. We must continuously adapt operating procedures in accordance with changing conditions and enemy tactics to prevent unnecessary casualties. When tragic casualties do occur, we must conduct deliberate reviews and learn from them. Unfortunately, our foes do not share our moral values and have made it a general practice to occupy positions adjacent to or inside civilian structures, in an attempt to shield themselves from our forces and cause more civilian casualties. This makes the task more difficult, but no less important.

### SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN

**Question.** The Intelligence Community assesses that Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) along the border with Afghanistan provide a safe haven for al Qaeda and other extremists supporting the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan.

What can be done to prevent cross-border incursions by al Qaeda and the Taliban from Pakistan into Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Preventing cross-border incursions from Pakistan into Afghanistan requires close cooperation between Afghan, Pakistan and ISAF security forces so that we can interdict enemy elements as a team. Another imperative is improvement of Pakistan military and paramilitary force capability. U.S. support to Pakistan’s border area strategy including training and equipping Pakistan’s Frontier Corps will help. Economic assistance to the people in the FATA and a comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign on the Pakistan side would also help.

**Question.** What role, if any, should ISAF forces play in countering this threat?

**Answer.** ISAF should play a significant role in the tri-partite program. ISAF could also act to facilitate and support effective Afghan border security management within the guidance of the NATO OPLAN.

**Question.** In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing more to prevent these incursions?

**Answer.** Yes, but they need the help of the others in the region and the international community to help work on the causes of instability in the FATA. In other words, incursions are only a part of the larger security challenges inside Pakistan.

### REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

**Question.** Recent independent reports by the Atlantic Council and the Afghanistan Study Group call for adopting a regional approach to promoting stability in Afghanistan by bringing Afghanistan’s neighbors together to discuss common issues.
What is your understanding of NATO ISAF’s position regarding establishing a regional process for engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors on promoting security in Afghanistan?

Answer. NATO, ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have an established process and strategy for engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors to promote security in Afghanistan. This process and strategy, through constructive, cooperative, and productive dialogue, is designed to improve bilateral political and economic relations, enhance border security, and seek bilateral and multilateral solutions to combating the narcotics trade. There are numerous mechanisms through which this strategy, which is reviewed every 6 months by NATO, is executed:

- ISAF and NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan engaging representatives from neighboring countries in Kabul;
- NATO’s SCR visiting select embassies of neighboring states;
- ISAF Participation in the Tripartite Commission, comprised of senior Afghan, Pakistani, and Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and
- NATO-Afghan consultations with NATO’s Central Asian Partners to discuss regional issues.

If confirmed, would you support including Iran in such a position?

Answer. Yes, from a purely military perspective, I would support including Iran in ISAF’s regional process for engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors on promoting security in Afghanistan. While it would be inappropriate for me to try to give an assessment on the current situation, I support any approved way for NATO to leverage the international community with the Government of Afghanistan to find more effective means to integrate Afghanistan’s neighbors into the development and stabilization of Afghanistan. However, the decision regarding the extent and means through which NATO and ISAF will engage Iran is a political one that NATO’s NAC must make with input provided from NATO’s military authorities. That said, I can tell you that currently, NATO and ISAF may engage Iranian officials in Kabul for tactical military coordination of border issues.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, ISAF?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

[Nomination reference of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, follows:]
To be General.

GEN David D. McKiernan, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of GEN David D. McKiernan, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA

Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended:
- Infantry Officer Basic Course
- Armor Officer Advanced Course
- United States Army Command and General Staff College
- United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
- College of William and Mary - BA - History
- Shippensburg University - MPA - Public Administration

Foreign languages: None recorded.

Promotions:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Promotions</th>
<th>Dates of Appointment</th>
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<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>28 Aug 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>28 Aug 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>28 Aug 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>1 Dec 81</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Feb 88</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Aug 93</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 Oct 96</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Feb 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>6 Nov 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>14 Dec 05</td>
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Major duty assignments:

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<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 73 ...</td>
<td>Jul 75</td>
<td>Scout Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company, later Executive Officer, B Company, 4th Battalion, 63rd Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 75 ...</td>
<td>Sep 76</td>
<td>Executive Officer, B Troop, later C Troop, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 2nd Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 77 ...</td>
<td>Jul 77</td>
<td>Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 77 ...</td>
<td>Oct 79</td>
<td>Motor Officer, later Commander, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 33rd Armor, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 79 ...</td>
<td>May 80</td>
<td>Assistant S–3 (Air), 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 80 ...</td>
<td>Sep 81</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 33rd Armor, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 81 ...</td>
<td>Jun 82</td>
<td>Operations Training Staff Officer, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 82 ...</td>
<td>May 84</td>
<td>Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 84 ...</td>
<td>Sep 85</td>
<td>S–3, 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 85 ...</td>
<td>May 86</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 33rd Armor, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<td>May 86 ...</td>
<td>Dec 86</td>
<td>Assistant G–3 (Training), 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 87 ...</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
<td>Assignment Officer, Colonel’s Division, United States Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 88 ...</td>
<td>Jul 90</td>
<td>Commander, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<td>Jul 90 ...</td>
<td>Dec 90</td>
<td>Senior Task Force Observer/Controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, 7th Army Training Center, United States Army, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 90 ...</td>
<td>Apr 91</td>
<td>Assistant G–3 (Operations), VII Corps, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 91 ...</td>
<td>Jun 91</td>
<td>Senior Task Force Observer/Controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, 7th Army Training Center, United States Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 91 ...</td>
<td>Jun 92</td>
<td>Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 92 ...</td>
<td>May 93</td>
<td>G–3, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 93 ...</td>
<td>Jun 95</td>
<td>Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From | To | Assignment
--- | --- | ---
Jun 95 .... | Aug 96 | Executive Officer to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA
Aug 96 .... | Nov 97 | Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2/G–3, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, Germany and Sarajevo
Nov 97 .... | Aug 98 | Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 1st Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 98 .... | Oct 99 | Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Oct 99 .... | Oct 01 | Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX
Oct 01 .... | Sep 02 | Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3, United States Army, Washington, DC
Sep 02 .... | Sep 04 | Commanding General, Third United, States Army/Commander, United States, Army Forces Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA, to include duty as Commanding General, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait
Oct 04 .... | Nov 05 | Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA

Summary of joint assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 96–Nov 97</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2/G–3, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, Germany and Sarajevo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 02–Sep 04</td>
<td>Commanding General, United States Army/Commander, United States, Army Forces Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA, to include duty as Commanding General, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait (No Joint Credit).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 05–Present</td>
<td>Commanding General, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Commander, Allied Land Component Command Heidelberg, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Germany.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. decorations and badges:

- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Parachutist Badge
- Ranger Tab

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, in connection with his nomination follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   David D. McKiernan.

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:
   January 22, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   December 11, 1950; Atlanta, GA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Carmen Dittrich.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Michelle, 30; Michael, 29; Stephanie, 19.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   N/A

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   N/A.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    Honorary Doctorate (College of William and Mary), Public Service.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

DAVID D. MCKIERNAN.

This 18th day of January, 2008.

[The nomination of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved our ability to conduct joint operations. I believe it is important to review and update based on the changing environment. There should be a requirement to constantly review and adjust to ensure it continues to meet the desired intent.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. There is good reason to consider the development of Goldwater-Nichols Act-like legislation to delineate roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies in support of contingency operations.

DUTIES

Question. Section 3034 of title 10, U.S.C., states that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army has such authority and duties with respect to the Department of the Army as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe for him.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to be assigned?

Answer. Oversee day-to-day operations of the Army involving a wide variety of activities from serving as a principal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army on recommendations and plans of the Army Staff, to ensuring the care of soldiers and their families and ensuring the Army continues to be sensitive to their needs. Maintain our relevance to future contingencies and ensure we incorporate lessons learned throughout the institution. Establish priorities to meet demands and synchronize and focus the Army Staff to ensure strategic relevance.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have served the Army and the Nation from the tactical thru the strategic level. I have been assigned in tactical and operational units for 22 years and have commanded soldiers from company to Corps level while participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a tour of duty as the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/Multi-National Corps-Iraq for the last 23 months. My professional military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into the business of running the Army in support of the requirements of the national security strategy. In particular, my tours of duty in Iraq have provided me with unique insights into the leadership, training, manning and equipping requirements that will make our Army successful on the battlefields of today and tomorrow.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

• Stay connected to the field commands,
• Stay attuned to the ever changing needs of our soldiers and their families,
• Ensure we incorporate the lessons learned over the last 5 years,
• Maintain focus on the warrior ethos,
• Demand high moral and ethical behavior,
• Be aggressive—tackle challenges as they arise.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with:

The Secretary of the Army.

Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary of the Army in his duties to communicate the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary of the Army and to supervise the implementation of the Secretary and Chief's decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Army. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary of the Army about conclusions reached by the JROC about significant requirements. I anticipate that I would at all times work closely and in concert with the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army in light of national interests.

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army

Answer. The Chief of Staff performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff of the Army presides over the Army Staff, transmits the plans and recommendations of the Army Staff to the Secretary, advises the Secretary with regard to such plans and recommendations; and acts as the agent of the Secretary in executing them. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I enjoy a close working relationship with the Chief of Staff of the Army and if confirmed, I will assist him as required in the execution of his duties.

Question. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Answer. If confirmed, it would be my duty, as a member of the JROC, to review and validate all Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System documents for Acquisition Category I and IA programs, and other high-interest programs. I look forward to a collaborative and frank relationship with the other Service Vice Chiefs in this role, and on all actions of national interest.

Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Sec-
retary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary of the Army to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary of the Army in articulating the views of the Army Staff, Army commands, and Army agencies.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. His duties include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Army regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal questions or procedures. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel.

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor of the Chief of Staff of the Army, member of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views about any legal matter under consideration.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will face the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. We must maintain a balance between our ability to meet our requirements and the resources available. Soldiers and units in the Active and Reserve components have been hard at work serving the Nation in the war on terror. Despite our Army’s remarkable performance, this has had an undeniable effect on equipment, training, and overall preparedness—not to mention the impact on families and the men and women of the All-Volunteer Force themselves. Maintaining a high-quality force able to excel in the current campaigns is a tough, multi-faceted challenge made more formidable by the imperative to be ready for other contingencies or conflicts the Army may undertake in support of our national security. This tension between meeting the priorities of the present while preparing for the future—in light of existing and emerging threats along a broad spectrum of conflict; the extent to which we do one at the expense of the other; and managing the associated costs and risks are fundamental to the decisions the Nation’s military and civilian leaders will shape and make.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army to restore balance through the Army’s four imperatives. I will work to sustain our soldiers and their families to insure that they have the quality of life they deserve and that we recruit and sustain a high quality force. To prepare our soldiers, units, and equipment we must maintain a high level of readiness for the current operational environments, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. To reset our force we must prepare our soldiers, units, and equipment for future deployments and other contingencies. Finally, to transform our force, we must continuously improve our ability to meet the needs of the combatant commanders in a changing security environment. I intend to work closely with the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, and appropriate agencies in both executive and legislative branches to develop and execute these plans.
ARMY BUDGET SHARE

Question. Last year’s Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25 percent. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army’s budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the Army’s overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air Force. The result, according to the posture statement, is that “the Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.”

What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the Army?

Answer. The effect is the Army is out of balance as demand has outpaced our ability to provide trained and ready soldiers to the combatant commanders. Through supplemental funding for the global war on terror, we’ve been able to meet the immediate demands, but our soldiers are stressed and our equipment has been used hard. We must restore the necessary breadth and depth of Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity for the future demands on our Expeditionary Force. The solution lies not just in the Army’s share of the defense budget but, more importantly, in the size of the overall defense budget.

Question. What is your understanding about what, if anything, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense intend to do to address this discrepancy?

Answer. I saw first hand the results of the hard work and personal commitment of the Army and DOD leadership as well as Congress to immediately address any shortfall. We received the equipment we needed along with trained, ready and capable soldiers in Iraq. They’ve taken a step toward correcting this discrepancy by increasing the strength of the Army funded from the base budget in the fiscal year 2009 President’s budget rather than relying on supplemental appropriations. I understand the Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to achieve readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources necessary to support the National Military Strategy.

POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems (FCSs) adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next 2 or 3 decades?

Answer. The Army’s future threats are defined in the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the FCSs will help posture the Army to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our National Security Strategy. The Army Initiatives are designed to give the Army required capabilities and adequate capacity providing maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.

Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army pursue in this regard if confirmed as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. As our Nation’s Army, we must always stay focused on our soldiers and their families. They are the centerpiece of our capacity to meet our future requirements.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in particular concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army, which you intend to address if confirmed?

Answer. First, the importance of environmental analysis which encompasses the entire geo-political, socio-economic, and global communications spectrums as they relate to the current conflict. Next, we must remember that it takes a network to defeat a network. Integration of conventional forces and special operations forces must continue to improve. We must also continue to integrate asymmetric warfare capabilities into our full spectrum operations. Finally, our leader training programs
must emphasize the key tenets of adaptability, ingenuity, warrior ethos, and moral-ethical conduct.

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Many soldiers are on their third or fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 months. What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The recently instituted Captains' retention program, which offers a number of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, has enhanced retention of officers at historic rates through fiscal year 2010.

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates averaging 110–120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

Question. What are the key indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently?

Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends. As an example, rates of substantiated spouse abuse have declined steadily since fiscal year 2001 and child abuse since fiscal year 2004. In addition to programs like "Strong Bonds," the Army is committed to providing programs and services that support soldiers and their families. The overall health of the Force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.

Question. In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of discipline.

Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends.

We see the following trends:

The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of soldiers and commanders.

Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates trended upward from fiscal years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted female soldiers, and deployed soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-sponsored "Strong Bonds" training program to help soldiers and families build and maintain stronger relationships.

Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued its aggressive drug education, awareness, and testing programs.

Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward trend. The Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training. Alcohol abuse rates are monitored continuously via the Army's Risk Reduction Program. We are also developing and implementing preventative intervention programs for soldiers at the first sign of trouble. "Prevention of Alcohol Abuse" messages are incorporated in Army-wide prevention of substance abuse campaigns like "Warrior Pride."

Rates for absence without leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL based on the facts and circumstances of the soldier's individual case.

In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest post-fiscal year 2001 rates.
Substantiated rates of spouse and child abuse have declined steadily since fiscal year 2001. In addition to programs like “Strong Bonds,” the Army continues to focus resources on programs and services that support soldiers and their families. The overall health of the force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.

**Question.** For how long do you believe these levels of commitments, in particular the 15 month deployments for combat units, can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

**Answer.** Over the past few years we have seen definitive indications that the force is strained. Stress on soldiers and units resulting from increased time deployed and decreased time at home are visible in several different areas including training, readiness and recruitment. However, we have a plan that will, with congressional assistance, restore balance to our force. We have identified four imperatives that we must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.

We have and will continue to make significant progress in these areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will continue to recruit and retain enough soldiers to meet our end strength requirements. We also have received authorization to accelerate our growth plan to 2011, which will assist the Army in restoring balance to preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels.

While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers into combat to meet the national strategy.

**POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS**

**Question.** The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the undertaking of extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Army uses available data—and generates additional data—on the health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.

The addition of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment and the new annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers after initial redeployment, and long before they start preparing for their next deployment.

The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed “Battlemind” training products to increase this resiliency and have several different training programs available for pre, during and post-deployment.

Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to educate all soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army education and training system to share the information with our new soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.

**MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM V**

**Question.** The Army’s mental health assessment studies in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in OIF and OEF.

Based on the findings of the Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate kinds and amounts of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To date, we have hired 162 providers who are already making a difference in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill all of our behavioral health care requirements.

Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army’s mental health advisory teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

Answer. MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been utilized to create a training program known as “Battlemind,” which changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for high stress deployments.

TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREEs

Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Department of Defense assumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on its proposal to implement increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families. If these fee increases are implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army?

Answer. The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees and civilian visit co-payments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard “working age” retirees under 65 and their families. For these beneficiaries, some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise co-payments for all beneficiaries on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. While the budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total Defense budget and begin to address benefit inequities between military retirees and other Federal retirees.

Question. What is your personal view of the DOD justification provided for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?

Answer. We must maintain world-class medical support for our retirees, but must be realistic in establishing costs and planning for the future.

STOP LOSS AUTHORITY

Question. How many soldiers do you expect to be on active duty, retained under stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2008?

Answer. The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of fiscal year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for September 2008 is approximately 6,000.

Question. What is the Army’s plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end strength through 2012?

Answer. Department of Defense guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a reduction in demand and a return to a cycle of “1 year deployed with 2 years at home.” The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a cycle of “1 year deployed with 2 years at home.”

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid,” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?

Answer. To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders’ requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three components (Active, Guard, and Re-
serve) in developing sourcing solutions. Each component plays a critical role in meeting our operational requirements. Transformation continues from a strategic to an Operational Reserve. It is an operational, expeditionary and domestic force that is an essential piece of our Army. The Army will continue to select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned mission.

**Question.** What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?

**Answer.** The Army has made considerable progress in “total force” management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping and readiness decisions. Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding commitments to the Reserve components for re-set and re-equipping actions, and our Chief’s initiatives and imperatives include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining America’s Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and overseas.

**Question.** Do you support assigning any combat, combat support, or combat service support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

**Answer.** Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are organized and arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. In today’s operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and capabilities across all components of the Army. There are opportunities to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare for future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully engaged in such an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across the Army so that operational demands are fully met.

**Question.** What is the appropriate role for the Army Reserve and National Guard in homeland defense and homeland security missions?

**Answer.** The National Guard forces respond to a natural disaster or provide assistance to civil authorities under control of the Governor in title 32 status or under Federal control in a title 10 status. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) supports the channel of communications between the State and Federal forces.

The Army Reserve plays a unique role since it commands a highly-skilled, flexible force that provides 50–100 percent of the entire Army’s force structure for 21 specialized capabilities such as water supply, medical, transportation, signal, and chemical units.

When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, the affected Governor(s) shall first employ their Air and or Army National Guard with State authority, as the State response forces, if required. In the event of a catastrophic event, the States will likely request Federal military assistance. The Army will provide the majority of that assistance with capabilities allocated to Northern Command from Active, Guard, and Reserve components in a title 10 status, both to support Homeland Defense, and provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities.

**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY**

**Question.** A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve.

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?

**Answer.** The Army has programmed for and has developed plans to optimize the operational and strategic value of the IRR by improving individual deployment readiness levels to ensure timely availability; maintaining a reliable database of mobilization assets; and promoting continuum of service by managing expectations throughout a soldier’s career life-cycle. Human Resource Command (HRC) is accomplishing by implementing the following:

Select soldiers attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability Musters at local Reserve Centers and execute personnel updates, medical readiness evaluations, and training briefings. Executing musters each year will ensure that individual expectations are being established, soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for mobilization, as well as educated on how to build upon a military career.
while assigned to the IRR. In fiscal year 2007 over 8,400 IRR soldiers were mustered and over 720 IRR soldiers transferred to the Selected Reserves (SELRES). HRC is planning on mustering 10,000 IRR soldiers in fiscal year 2008 and anticipates similar number of transfers to the SELRES.

Educate and raise awareness at time of transition. Soldiers are counseled and provided information regarding their assignment to the IRR. The IRR Orientation Handbook has been developed and is provided to newly assigned IRR soldiers in order to establish expectations, provide key information regarding their assignment and annual requirements, promotions, training opportunities, as well as continued service in the Selective Reserves.

**Question.** What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?

**Answer.** In the last 3 years the IRR has decreased in size by 33 percent. HRC has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database to reconcile existing records (blank and erroneous data fields, obsolete military occupational skills, bad addresses); identify non-mobilization assets (passed over for promotion, security violation, physically disqualified, determined hardship, adverse character of service); and separated those soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military service if mobilized. Incorrect IRR addresses have been the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are at a 10-year low overall. Approximately 9 percent of those ineligible for mobilization are excluded for an incorrect address.

DOD established a policy in July 2005 mandating the discharge of officers in the IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation (MSO) unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR. Officers who have fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to elect to remain in the IRR shall be transferred to the Standby Reserve and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date approximately 14,000 IRR officers have been affected by this policy: 2,800 officers elected to transfer to the Standby Reserve and 2,900 have been honorably discharged.

HRC has developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal (IW–VSP) for IRR soldiers to update their contact information and verify their readiness level without having to report to a physical location. HRC screens all information submitted through the website, reconciles deficiencies, and contacts soldiers that require additional assistance.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future?

**Answer.** Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in the IRR is important to managing our operational and strategic capability. The Army recognizes the value of keeping trained and motivated members in the service and we continue to offer opportunities for continued service. The IRR is an important and critical source of personnel resources to fill deploying units and individual requirements.

**OFFICER SHORTAGES**

**Question.** A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 concluded that the Army projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?

**Answer.** Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates. The officer shortfalls are due to the growth of officer requirements of 10,000 ACC officers from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2012. Nearly 6,200 of these requirements are in the grades of Captain and Major. To address this shortfall, we have increased accessions and will have produced nearly 5,000 additional officers by fiscal year 2009.

The Army instituted a precommissioning retention incentives program that is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent our retention of high performing USMA and ROTC scholarship officers by offering them graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in exchange for additional active duty service. The Army has sought officers aggressively from outside the Active Army and has accessed nearly 1,500 officers from the inactive Reserve and from the other services through the “Blue to Green Program.”

The Army’s biggest success has been the institution of an unprecedented Captains’ retention program that offers a number of incentives, including attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers...
to remain on active duty. This program has guaranteed the retention, already within a few hundred officers of historic rates, of our valuable force of heavily combat-experienced officers through fiscal year 2010 and beyond.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on active duty over the next 10 years?

**Answer.** The Army has developed policies to retain our “best and brightest,” combat-experienced officers and NCO's. We will not allow the Army to drift into a post-conflict setting or mindset. This will require refocusing the Army and a commitment to leveraging combat-experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as in the schools and battlelabs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers. To aid our retention efforts we also must continue resourcing programs to support Families in an expeditionary Army during a period of persistent conflict.

**OFFICER RETENTION FOLLOWING REDPLOYMENT**

**Question.** After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from active duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—small unit actions where junior officers are not only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives—may produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly-trained and experienced junior officers.

Do you fear a similar syndrome once the current deployment cycle slows? If so, what do you believe should be done to preclude that from happening?

**Answer.** It is something that we must constantly monitor. We have established several programs to retain our combat experienced NCOs and officers and allow for their continued growth.

**MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION**

**Question.** The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components. Growing medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of BCTs, growth Army end strength, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel.

Do you think a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army is needed?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews medical support requirements as a part of its ongoing internal processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified over 2,500 new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic brain injury, to name just a few.

**Question.** Does the Army have sufficient mental health resources to handle the redeployment of large combat units?

**Answer.** The Army is committed to ensuring all redeploying soldiers receive the behavioral health care they need. We anticipate that repeated and extended deployments will lead to increased distress and anxiety, and a higher demand for behavioral health services, and are planning to respond to that demand. An extensive array of behavioral health services has long been available to address the strain on our soldiers and families who have experienced multiple deployments. However, especially at our larger power projection platforms, the mental health resources are strained. The TRICARE purchased care network is also variable in its ability to support the mental health needs of our soldiers and their families. Currently we are focused on the needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg, but all installations with large numbers of returning soldiers will need resources.

We have a variety of initiatives in place to garner additional behavioral health resources. Most significantly, last year we identified a gap between behavioral health staffing and the increased needs of our patient population. As a result, we initiated an effort to hire 265 behavioral health providers to meet this gap in the U.S. The number of requirements has increased to about 330 providers, both in the
U.S. and at our overseas locations. As of March 28, 2008, we have 162 new behavioral health contract providers working in our treatment facilities.

Question. What plans does the Army have in place to ensure that a surge capability of mental health professionals is available to returning soldiers and their families?

Answer. Through our Regional Medical Commands we shift our assets to fill needs. For example, the North Atlantic Regional Medical Command has been providing behavioral health staff from Walter Reed to support needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg. However, our behavioral health resources are strained across the Army, so we have only limited flexibility to shift resources. Our strategy is to enhance our behavioral health infrastructure throughout the system rather than providing surge teams, which can be inefficient and cumbersome. We also use tele-psychiatry to augment our outreach capacity. Walter Reed has long supported the Northeast with tele-psychiatry and recently has begun to support Fort Hood. Madigan Army Medical Center is currently supporting Fort Irwin and Alaska through tele-psychiatry. Finally, in coordination with the TRICARE Management Activity, we are encouraging civilian providers to join the TRICARE network.

Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?

Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, we are optimistic that further policy and legislative changes will not be needed. We will monitor these important resources closely to ensure our goals are realized.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department of the Army has implemented changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Department of the Army in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

Answer. Sexual assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks. The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational climate where such behavior is not tolerated, and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and Army Staff oversee and implement the Army’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, which is now more than 3 years old. The Secretary, in fact, has taken a personal interest in this issue and has directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase emphasis on sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will assist him in this vitally important effort.

As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to DOD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and Department of Defense policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives. What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and human resource management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional development and
managing our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has done for its General Officer Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

**ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN**

**Question.** The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

**Answer.** The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that challenge by making the commitments set forth in the Army Family Covenant, a promise to provide soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with their voluntary service and daily sacrifices. The Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs and services; health care; soldier and family housing; excellent schools, youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education opportunities for Family members. I will also work to help further standardize the support being provided to soldiers and families and to obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they support our families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving our ability to address soldier-family reintegrations and reunion issues. The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army spouses who volunteer as Family Readiness Group Leaders, Unit Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. The FRSA helps mitigate volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between families and support programs.

**Question.** How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the Army?

**Answer.** The Installation Management Command works extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of families as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans include maintaining support to our soldiers and families throughout the process. At the installations that are expected to grow, we have programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our soldiers and families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these efforts to ensure that our families’ needs are met as the Army undergoes this dramatic era of growth, retraining, realignment, deployment.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness?

**Answer.** The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will provide a comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support and services to meet the needs of the Army’s geographically dispersed population. This effort is crucial in supporting Army National Guard and Army Reserve Families. The baseline services are: information, referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services; school transition services; employer support to the Guard and Reserve services; wounded warrior program services; survivor support services; transition assistance services; employment; home and family life management services; financial services; medical care services; and legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 249 Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. AIFSN will provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar facilities, and access to public and private programs and services. AIFSN will ensure services and support are available throughout the full spectrum of the mobilization process. Additionally, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the OSD to establish a reintegration program for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs and services that specifically address the needs of our Guardsmen and their Families. If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs are implemented fully and assessed properly to ensure we attain expected outcomes.
MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.

What are the challenges in sustaining Army MWR programs that you foresee, and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

Answer. Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of life of our military families. Their continued vitality depends on consistent appropriated and non-appropriated funding to support all of our MWR activities. The Army increased funding for family and MWR programs by $739 million with supplemental funds in fiscal year 2008 and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of soldiers and families. The Army’s MWR funds are currently in sound financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of solvency through the use of best business practices and enterprise purchasing. This allows us to increase the value of our programs by eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be passed on in the form of higher prices.

The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while transforming to a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force. However, the needs of individual servicemembers and their families must still be met, particularly as soldiers return from combat. We are developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a means of adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will continue to explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs to ensure we are meeting the needs of soldiers and families and contributing positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness. We will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the basis for investment capital development to fund an $85 million Capital Program annually for the next 10 years to build Travel Camps, Bowling Centers, Water Parks, Youth Centers, Single Soldier Entertainment Centers, and other facilities for our highly deserving soldiers and families. We will begin privatizing our lodging programs this summer by transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations to a highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest $450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will insure the quality of the lodging we provide our soldiers and families is equal to the quality available in the communities from which we recruit America’s sons and daughters.

We appreciate your support of these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we implement these far-reaching and enduring changes.

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE

Question. Heavy demand on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve since the attacks of September 11 have significantly changed the expectation of Reserve and Guard soldiers about their participation in an operational Army Reserve. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve recently submitted its final report calling for formal recognition of this new and developing role for the Reserve components and recommending changes in career patterns to facilitate development of the Operational Reserve.

In your view, how should the Army's Reserve component forces best be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Answer. The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders’ requests for forces and capabilities by considering all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution. The Guard and the Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are regarded as fully capable for combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers in our Reserve components. The Army will continue to select the best units capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each unit’s ability to carry out its assigned mission.

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s plans to avoid excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand specialties whose skills are found primarily in the Reserve, such as civil affairs, military police, and logistics?

Answer. The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand on low density, high demand specialties. The Grow the Army Plan approved in fiscal year 2007 increases the Army end strength by 74,200, a growth of 65,000 in the Active component (AC), 8,200 in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). With
associated redistribution of Reserve component (RC) Generating Force structure to build Operating Force capabilities, the Plan will increase Army Operating Force capabilities by over 80,000. Since fiscal year 2003, the Army has undertaken rebalance initiatives to achieve the proper mix of capabilities across all three components, eliminate involuntary mobilization of the RC, eliminate over-structure in the AC and minimize high demand/low density shortfalls. By the close of fiscal year 2007, the Army had completed rebalance of 53,600 structure spaces and will rebalance an additional 88,700 spaces by fiscal year 2013, bringing the Army rebalance total, since fiscal year 2003, to 142,300 spaces. The combination of the Grow the Army Plan and ongoing rebalance initiatives has addressed persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by 24,700; Military Police by 16,700; Engineers by 11,400; Military Intelligence by 9,100; and adds 11,200 of structure to SOF (to include growth in PSYOP by 2,200; Special Forces by 1,600 and Civil Affairs by 400). The combined impact of rebalance and growth will build strategic and operational depth across all three components to meet Combatant Commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent shortfalls, and enable strategy.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach its recruiting goals for the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009?

Answer. Recruiting America's All-Volunteer Force will continue to be a challenge because of the growing percentage of youth ineligible for military services (disqualified for medical, fitness, aptitude, etc.), the increased competition with private industry and other governmental agencies, and the decreasing propensity to serve the Nation through military service. Despite these challenges, we remain confident that all Army components will attain the accession targets necessary to sustain or grow end strength.

Question. What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average.

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. Recently deployed units or units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110–120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

Question. The administration has requested that Congress authorize an active-duty end strength of 532,400 for fiscal year 2009 and intends to grow the active-duty Army to 547,400 soldiers over the next several years. Has the Army increased its recruiting goal from fiscal year 2008?

Answer. The Army has not increased its recruiting goals from fiscal year 2008. Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals is not necessary to meet our planned growth in Army end-strength.

Question. If not, how does the Army plan to grow the force an additional 7,000 soldiers with no increase in recruiting?

Answer. In addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss management tools as levers to manage end-strength. Throughout fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, the Army has focused on retaining more initial term soldiers and has seen attrition drop to record lows. The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to grow strength without increasing recruiting goals.

Question. When will the Army achieve an active end strength of 547,400, and once it does, do you foresee requesting additional end strength increases based on current and anticipated operational requirements?

Answer. The Army will achieve a strength of 547,400 by 30 September 2010. While we grow the Army, we will continue to work the transformation, move soldiers into high demand specialties, and examine how effectively we can operationalize the Guard and Reserve. Then we will make a decision regarding whether the Army can meet the needs of the future.

Question. According to Army data, retention of U.S. Military Academy graduates is lower than historical norms. The West Point class of 2000, for example, saw 34.2 percent leave the Service as soon as they were able, and according to press accounts, 54 percent of that class had left Active Service by the 5 year point. The Class of
2001 saw 35.3 percent of its graduates leave Active Service as soon as they reached their 5 year point, and within the next year, a total of 46 percent of that class had left the Service.

**Question.** How can the Army reverse this trend?

**Answer.** The West Point Class of 2000 saw 35.5 percent leave the Service by the 5 year point. The Class of 2001 saw 38.3 percent leave by the 5 year point. A year later (the 6 year point) 45.5 percent of Class of 2000 and 45.5 percent of Class of 2001 had separated. These trends are not statistically different than previous Classes 1991–1999. In fact, there is not currently a statistically significant difference in the Army Competitive Category (ACC) Company Grade loss rates for any source of commission. The losses through the first 5 months of fiscal year 2008 are lower than previous years except for 2003, where losses were lower than normal due to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, the success of recent captain and pre-commissioning retention incentives has already guaranteed the retention above historic rates of our valuable force of heavily combat-experienced junior officers through fiscal year 2010 and beyond.

**Question.** What resources, if any, does the Army need to better manage the early- and mid-career officer population?

**Answer.** The Army has been given the authority through September 2009 to conduct an unprecedented Captains’ retention program that offers a number of incentives, including attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers to remain on active duty. Though it may be too early to directly tie the program to recent retention trends, the Army has recently experienced increased retention among our captains over past years, with loss rates over the first 5 months of fiscal year 2008 lower than all but 1 of the previous 9 years for the same time period. Analysis of our initial phase of execution of the retention program compared to recent Defense Military Data Center surveys indicates that our incentive program has made a significant impact on the retention behavior of our captains. Prior surveys indicated that 52 percent of captains polled intended to separate or were undecided about continuing in a military career. Of those officers, 54 percent took a menu incentive and will now retain to fiscal year 2011. The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers.

**Question.** Army data also shows a large increase over the past 4 years of new recruits lacking a high school diploma. In fiscal year 2003, 94 percent of all new recruits graduated from high school; in fiscal year 2007, that number dropped to 79 percent.

In your opinion, has the Army sacrificed quality for quantity?

**Answer.** No, the Army has not lowered recruiting standards, but they have become more difficult to meet because of declining high school graduation rates and the toughest recruiting environment in the 34+ year history of the All-Volunteer Force. We remain focused on attaining Department of Defense Quality Benchmarks, as our recruiting standards. Without exception, soldiers who enlist into the Army are qualified for their skill/job.

**Question.** How does the Army intend to reverse this trend?

**Answer.** The Army has and will continue to implement measures to reduce this challenge through programs and policies that increase the potential market. The Army is also utilizing enlistment bonuses and other incentives, such as the Army College Fund, Loan Repayment, and Army Advantage Fund to attract quality recruits. However, the Army will only enlist soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.

**Question.** How many Category IV soldiers did the Army recruit for the Active-Duty Force and Army Reserve in fiscal year 2007, and what percentage of the total number of 2008 recruits is made up of Category IV soldiers?

**Answer.** In fiscal year 2007 the Active component accessed 2,738 (3.97 percent) Category IV soldiers. The Army Reserve accessed 782 (3.94 percent) Category IV soldiers. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008 (thru February 2008) the Active component has accessed 1,953 Category IV soldiers (5.5 percent) and the Army Reserve has accessed 431 Category IV soldiers (4.61 percent). Quality Marks are measured on an annual basis. The number of Category IV recruits is closely monitored throughout the year. As Non-Prior Service volume increases, the Category IV percent will decrease. The Active Army and the Army Reserve will be within the Category IV benchmark of 4 percent by the end of fiscal year 2008.

**Question.** According to the Army Times, a new Army assessment has concluded that recruits who receive moral, medical, or other waivers are less likely to drop out of basic training, have lower rates of personality disorder, and re-enlist in higher numbers than other recruits. The assessment also noted, however, that recruits who receive waivers are more likely to desert, experience more drug and alcohol issues,
and have higher rates of misconduct, including an increased likelihood of receiving a bad conduct discharge.

Please describe the Army's current use of waivers, and how these rates compare historically.

Answer. The Army utilizes the recruit waiver process to extend the opportunity to serve the Nation to applicants who fall outside the medical, conduct, drug/alcohol, or administrative screening parameters established for Army recruits. Army leaders and physicians review the files of disqualified applicants to determine if an applicant's previous medical, conduct, or drug/alcohol history will adversely affect his/her likelihood of serving successfully as a soldier. This comprehensive process allows the Army (and the other military services) to expand the pool of applicants willing to answer the Nation's call to service. The percentage of recruits enlisting with waivers has increased over the past several years. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008 (thru February 2008) overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) combined is 19.8 percent. In fiscal year 2007, the overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and AR combined is 18.8 percent. In fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2004, the overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and AR combined was 13.7 percent and 11.2 percent respectively. The Army will only enlist soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.

Question. What changes, if any, have been made in tracking and documenting the performance and impact, positive or negative, of recruiting more individuals requiring waivers for enlistment?

Answer. The Army—through the Center for Accessions Research, the RAND Corporation and the Army G–1—is conducting ongoing longitudinal analyses of recent Fiscal Year Recruiting Cohorts to determine any significant trends and differences of those soldiers accessioned with a waiver (i.e., medical, conduct, etc.) and those soldiers accessed not requiring a waiver. To date, results indicate soldiers with waivers perform comparable or better in most areas observed (e.g., promotions, awards, re-enlistment). These studies, the comments of leaders in the field, and the overall performance of young soldiers during this protracted conflict indicate that the Army waiver process is functioning properly in its role of screening in willing applicants to join America's All-Volunteer Force.

Question. Have the increased use of waivers for criminal offenses had any impact to date on the good order and discipline in the units to which these soldiers have been assigned?

Answer. The number of recruits requiring enlistment waivers has increased over the last few years, in an era of persistent conflict and growth of the Army. However, commanders consistently tell us how proud they are of the young volunteer, combat proven soldiers who are serving under them. Army mechanisms for screening these individuals are designed to mitigate risk and have proven very effective in the past and today. A recent study comparing trends of waivered soldiers and non-waivered soldiers who entered the Army from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006 indicates that they perform comparably in most areas. At this time there is no indication to suggest that waivered soldiers are a detriment to the force. We will continue to conduct studies and analyze the trends.

SUPPORT FOR ARMY FAMILIES IN THE REBASEING INITIATIVE

Question. Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the Department's rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to the continental United States (CONUS) installations and their surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources, including housing and schools, are made available.

What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and receiving communities?

Answer. The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with increased community needs, such as schools, housing, and community activities, associated with Army stationing and growth. Garrison commanders and staff regularly engage with community leaders and have school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and growth. Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the Army provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on projected school-age dependent growth.

The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of family housing and will privatize or build family housing at U.S. locations only where necessary. To support Army Growth, Congress approved $266 million in fiscal year 2008 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Car-
son, and Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting $334 million in fiscal year 2009 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in fiscal year 2010 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at other gaining installations.

**Question.** What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the challenges associated with rebasing are met?

**Answer.** The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized stationing plan that links Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005, Global Defense Posture Realignment, Army Modular Force Transformation, and Grow the Force. The Army’s BRAC plan supports these major stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions and national security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011 statutory BRAC implementation deadline.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained a significant decrease in BRAC funding, of which $560 million was reduced from the Army’s BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the $560 million decrement is not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with all aspects of the BRAC Law.

If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully vetted and work with Congress to garner the resources to implement our BRAC and stationing requirements in a timely and efficient manner.

**SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS**

**Question.** Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now in place to care for the wounded, including the Wounded Warrior Program, and programs for soldiers in Warrior Transition Units (WTUs)?

**Answer.** The Army has made and continues to make significant improvements in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes as part of our Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past 12 months, execution of the AMAP has seen the creation of 35 WTUs at installations across the Army. These WTUs are staffed by 2,655 personnel who provide care and support to over 9,339 soldiers and their families. Although I believe these programs are a significant improvement over past practices, we need to continue tracking and monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue this transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers and their families.

**Question.** How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service?

**Answer.** The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded personnel who have separated from active service. In close coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans Affairs advisors at major medical treatment facilities to facilitate the process of applying for benefits and finalizing arrangements for follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that everything is in place when soldiers transition to civilian status.

The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative, which will allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then return to the Army to work in assignments in the Institutional Army where their education and personal experiences can be put to the best use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting the Warrior Transition Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort Bragg, NC. This program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the Soldier Family Assistance Centers—which support WTUs and are operated by the Army Installation Management Command—to receive education and training in the development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills. Through this program, Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors from the Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and the staff of the Army Career and Alumni Program to develop a winning approach to obtaining employment when they leave the Army.

I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program (AW2) which assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured soldiers and their families throughout their lifetimes, wherever they are located. AW2 currently serves more than 2,300 soldiers, 600 on active duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program case-workers work with soldiers and their families to address and mitigate proactively any issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be my honor...
to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much for their country know that the Army will always be there for them.

Question. How is the Army seeking to measure and ensure the effectiveness of these programs?

Answer. Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting, and resourcing WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports and other measures to track short-, near-, and long-term objectives. These measures show specific details, to include day-to-day operations, but also provide aggregate trending information to ensure the organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on all standards.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to civilian life?

Answer. I think we have some terrific programs in place to support our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers, including some recent pilot programs. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the success of these pilot programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and Congress to find innovative ways to return all of our Warriors to productive civilian lives as proud veterans.

JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the Joint Tactical Radio System?

Answer. There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the critical start-point for a joint program is a “joint” requirement. Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint acquisition program will be cost effective.

Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the Services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems?

Answer. Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area. Key national strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids provide incentives for the Services to collaborate to define and produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At the same time, it is very important for the Services to maintain separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities within a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or increasing program costs.

Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to implement more joint program acquisition?

Answer. DOD has an established process for the development and approval of joint capability documents. This process includes oversight at the Joint Service level through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As these capabilities are evaluated, a joint service designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities documents, DOD Initiative 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be approved, and any changes therein must be approved, by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). Further, as the Services and DOD prepare their budget submissions, resourcing decisions can be made by the Service or OSD. Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions to the OSD leadership.

REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING PROCESSES

Question. As rising personnel and operation and maintenance costs expend an increasing portion of the Army’s budget authority, and as competing demands for Federal dollars increase in the future years, it is likely that the Army will have to address the challenges of reset, modernization, and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the way the Army prioritizes resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation?

Answer. Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are accounting for a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This growth naturally increases the tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has shifted dramatically, requiring our Nation’s Army to reorganize, grow, restation, and transform while fighting the war on terrorism. These demands have caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals. While increases in
our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond to and request support for, largely through requests for supplemental appropriations.

I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound resourcing scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the Nation. However, without a reduction in expected missions or increased resources to match increased missions, the Army will eventually lose the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990s, Army investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment shortages in our forces that we have been scrambling to correct with new procurement, just-in-time fieldings and retention of theater-provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using the lessons from today’s fight, we are transforming to a future force with even more robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to providing the best protection to our soldiers today and in the future.

BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

Question. The military Services are in the process of developing business plans for the implementation of the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions. What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?

Answer. The Army is responsible for executing both the Army’s BRAC recommendations and a portion of the joint cross service group recommendations, as assigned by the USD(AT&L). The Army has developed business plans and budget justification materials, and is executing the program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.

Question. What do you see as the priorities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?

Answer. The Army’s priority is to complete the construction projects required to enable unit and organizational moves from closing and realigning installations to meet the timeframe directed by the law. The bulk of construction funds ($13 billion) will be used in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. If the Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will be significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended.

Question. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community may not be compatible with proposals considered by the Department of Defense. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, DC, will present opportunities for both the local community and the Federal Government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans.

If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?

Answer. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State and local officials to accelerate the property disposition process whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening and has made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations except for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local Redevelopment Authorities are submitting their redevelopment plans, and they will be integrated into the Army property disposal process.

Question. What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?

Answer. I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to execute BRAC 2005.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?
Answer. The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs of record and the laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs) which are developing and evaluating technology options for these programs. The Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However, because of the demands of the ongoing global war on terror, the Army has not been able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the technology that has been matured.

The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been through a formal acquisition development, and the Army must deal with the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even for those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of operation, the Army has procedures to assess the military utility of those technologies for full spectrum Army-wide applications.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter?

**Answer.** The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry, academia, and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore technology options for the soldier. As discussed above, the Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. These agreements document what products the Science and Technology (S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for that technology. The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program evaluation offices and program managers. We must guard against pressures for technology solutions from the non-technical community that reads the popular press and thinks that they are “discovering” technology opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect disciplined technology development and technology maturity assessments towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to withstand rigorous evaluation.

**Question.** What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

**Answer.** The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the current force through several initiatives, including the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army’s number one priority is force protection of our soldiers with individual weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade and modernize existing systems to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they need. I would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army Science and Technology program, and from Future Combat System (FCS) development. I would field the FCS Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). FCS is the core of the Army’s modernization effort and will provide our soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will be to have our soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the world with full-spectrum capabilities.

**ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS AND LABORATORIES**

**Question.** Among the roles the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the development of innovative systems and technologies, supporting their transition to the warfighter, and supporting the Army in making technically sound acquisition decisions.

In your opinion, are the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories sufficiently resourced in funding, personnel and equipment to perform these missions?

**Answer.** Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism the Army has been able to maintain its Science and Technology (S&T) investment at over $1.7 billion for each of the past three budget requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T investment to $1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is sufficient to support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment consistent with our broad resource demands.

**Question.** In your view, do the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their needed highly qualified technical workforce?
Answer. Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly qualified technical workforce. The laboratories and centers have already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.

Question. Do the Army’s Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate flexibility for technology transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory research in order to help them best support their missions?

Answer. Yes the Army has sufficient authority for the technology transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory research. What in your view are the biggest deficiencies in the performance of the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories?

Answer. The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army’s Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their inability to effectively modernize their laboratory infrastructure.

Question. If confirmed, what would you plan to do to address those deficiencies?

Answer. To the maximum extent possible, the Army’s Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the flexibility provided in title 10, U.S.C. to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure. We are also planning to reauthorize the Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the associated minor construction limit to $2.5 million, with a $3 million limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide laboratory/center directors the ability to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on military construction to meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits to account for major increase in the cost of laboratory construction over more common forms of construction.

COMMISSION ON ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

Question. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations concluded that “the Army sent a skeleton contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our warfighters.” According to the Commission, “Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; but they are understaffed, overworked, undertrained, undersupported and, most important, undervalued.” Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission?

Answer. The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and is in full agreement with the Commission’s general recommendations for improvement. Many of the Commission’s recommendations are consistent with the issues identified by the Army Contracting Study completed in 2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was Co-Chaired by Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson, U.S. Army. The Army is currently addressing structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified in the reports with a view to improving both current and future expeditionary contracting operations. The Army is conducting in-depth analysis of all areas. Significant action has already been taken against most of the 22 findings of the Gansler Commission recommendations specific to the Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified to improve current and future Army contracting activities. Our actions stretch across the Army and include an ongoing, comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in addressing these concerns?

Answer. Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the establishment of the Army Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused commitment to implement changes across the Army to ensure that our doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. Secretary Geren directed Under Secretary of the Army, Hon. Ford, to implement specific recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting Task Force as expeditiously as possible. The Army is committed to finishing the development and then implementing an Army-wide contracting campaign plan to improve doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and fa-
ilities. Achieving this objective will require resources, time, and sustained leadership focus. The contracting campaign plan will continue the initiatives already underway in the Army. The VCSA is the conduit for ensuring the consistency in coordination necessary to implement and institutionalize changes across the Army as related to doctrine, manning, training, and support structure changes.

**Question.** The Commission report states that “The Army’s difficulty in adjusting to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan is in large part due to the fact that there are no Generals assigned to contracting responsibilities.” The commission recommends that Congress authorize “a core set of ten additional General Officers for contracting positions.”

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

**Answer.** I support the Army’s plans to continue to grow additional military contracting structure in the Active Force and civilian contracting workforce in line with the Gansler Commission recommendations. Specifically, Secretary Geren directed the realignment of the U.S. Army Contracting Agency (ACA) to the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the establishment of the U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) (Provisional) under AMC. The ACC (Provisional) stand-up ceremony on March 13, 2008 is in keeping with the Gansler Commission’s second recommendation—to restructure Army contracting organizations and restore responsibility to better facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and U.S.-based operations. The ACC is a two-star level command with two one-star level subordinate commands—an Expeditionary Contracting Command and an Installation Contracting Command. The Army is seeking five additional general officer authorizations to lead these commands and to fill additional contracting leadership needs outside of AMC. This recommendation will restore Uniformed Contracting General Officer positions cut as part of Acquisition drawdowns in the 1990s.

**Question.** In your view, is legislation required to implement this recommendation, or can the Army assign new General Officers to contracting functions without legislation?

**Answer.** There is flexibility to assign General Officers to contracting functions within the Army’s current General Officer allocations. Given the current op tempo and the stress on Army leadership, both military and civilian, the Army’s current allotment of General Officers cannot support the new contracting requirements. Therefore, the Army is working closely with OSD to obtain authority for five additional Army General Officer billets for contracting.

**Question.** The Commission report states that “The number and expertise of the military contracting professionals must be significantly increased” to address the problems we have experienced in theater. The Commission recommends that the Army hire 2,000 new contracting personnel.

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

**Answer.** The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the last decade (25 percent cut mandated by Congress in National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996) while the number of dollars we are executing in the Army has increased more than 4-fold ($23.3 billion–1992 vs. $100.6 billion–2006). The Army has never fought an extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and empower our contracting personnel to support the full range of military operations. To date, the Army has identified the need to increase Army contracting and support personnel by 806 military positions and 1,327 civilian positions. These numbers are organizational assessments and may go up or down as our Army Contracting Campaign Planning analysis continues.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the steps being taken to implement this recommendation?

**Answer.** Contingency Contracting force structure increases were being incorporated in the Army’s modular force design even prior to the establishment of the Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now established a contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support Brigades (commanded by a Colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions, and Contingency Contracting Teams. Recommended increases of 906 military and 1,327 civilian positions. These numbers are now under review as part of Army Contracting Campaign Plan process to fill the new Army contracting structure.

**Question.** The Commission report states that most civilians working on contracting issues in Iraq were “volunteers, often with inadequate or wrong skill sets for the job at hand, and often getting their required contracting experience on-the-job as part of their deployment.” The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These in-
clude the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and long-term medical care for injuries incurred in-theater.

Do you support the recommendations of the Commission?

Answer. The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who agree to deploy deserve the benefits and professional opportunities commensurate with their skills, hardships and contributions. We are working with OSD to examine the entitlements, compensation, and benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. As we identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with the OSD and the administration to seek legislative changes.

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to implement these recommendations?

Answer. The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a team led by OSD. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been identified to improve the benefits for deployed civilians and we have initiated the staffing process in these areas. To enhance incentives for civilian contracting personnel to “pre-volunteer” for expeditionary operations, OSD has taken the lead to request a legislative change to waive the annual limitation on premium pay and the aggregate limitation on pay for Federal civilian employees. In addition, OSD is working with the U.S. Department of Labor to ensure there are no conflicts with Workers’ Compensation Laws. The Office of Management and Budget disapproved a proposal to provide combat zone tax benefits for civilian employees; OSD is considering an appeal of this decision.

Question. The Commission report states that some DOD and Army policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example, the report states that volunteers are required to be sent on ‘detail’ so that the providing office has to pay salary and other expenses of deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports, managers in the U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from volunteering.

Do you agree with the Commission’s findings on this issue?

Answer. The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees have been discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however, organizations have been required to continue paying salary and other expenses of deployed employees. With the current tight budget situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed civilian. We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce the organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian personnel. The Army Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force is also studying options to assist CONUS organizations that lose deployed civilian volunteers, by activating Reserve component soldiers, enabling them to get much needed contracting experience prior to an overseas deployment.

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?

Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject “Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity.” In the memo and attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the deployment of DOD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to deploy civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will continue to review recommendations for resolving the issue.

Question. The report states that Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) are an “essential part of contract management”, because they are responsible for ensuring contract performance. According to the report, however, “CORs are assigned as an ‘extra duty,’ requiring no experience the COR assignment is often used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base when a commander does not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally, little, if any training is provided despite this, there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage.”

Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment of the CORs assigned in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Yes, a Contracting Officer Representative (COR) town hall in Kuwait led by ACTF leadership in October 2007 identified both individual COR training and execution shortcomings. CORs stated that they lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee complex theater contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel, they are the “eyes and ears” of the contracting officer and the customer, and must be viewed with the appropriate level of authority across the Army. The customer in most cases is also a Commander. The COR is also the “eyes and ears” of the Commander. Today’s commanders get much of their warfighting support from contractors. As we train and educate our leaders to understand the implications of predominantly contracted-support to operations vs. traditional mili-
tary support they will fully understand and acknowledge the importance of the COR.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?

**Answer.** A standard, minimum training requirement has already been established for Army CORs. CORs must complete the Defense Acquisition University on-line continuous learning module, “COR with a Mission Focus,” prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4500 Army personnel have completed this course. Since October 1, 2007, 190 CORs have been trained in Kuwait. All contracts awarded now by the Kuwait Contracting Office have a trained COR performing surveillance.

**MILITARY ROLE IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES**

**Question.** Shortfalls in the Nation’s ability to respond to national and manmade disasters, including terrorist attacks, as discussed in the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, have resulted in debate about the appropriate role of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies.

In your view, should the Army have a larger role in responding to domestic emergencies that require military support?

**Answer.** Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—has been a leader in this war and has been fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The Army has always supported requests for military assistance and will continue to do so. However, the “role” of the Army in domestic emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal agency.

**Question.** What do you believe the Army's role should be in supporting U.S. Northern Command in homeland defense and civil support missions, including consequence management of a domestic WMD attack?

**Answer.** The Department of Defense and United States Northern Command have worked in concert with the Department of Homeland Security to plan and prepare for response to domestic emergencies. United States Army North is the dedicated Army Service Component Command to the United States Northern Command for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities for the CONUS and Alaska.

Northern Command is the Department of Defense’s conduit to each Federal Emergency Management Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The Command collocates within the Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual relationships with Federal Emergency Management Agency staff, other government agencies, State emergency responders, State Adjutant Generals, and potential base support installations.

When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, the affected Governor or Governors shall first employ their Air and/or Army National Guard with state authority, if required. Each State and Territory has its own Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification). Moreover, 17 States have created federally-funded National Guard Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages (commonly known as CERFP) for search and rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and force protection. These force packages are designed to support all States within their FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country.

In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely request Federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of assets to Northern Command for the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment teams and enhances the civil authority’s ability to provide command and control, medical, logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security, public affairs and mortuary affairs.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the Army National Guard’s ability to meet its state contingency and homeland defense missions, given its operational commitments overseas and current personnel and equipment shortfalls?

**Answer.** The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its ability to respond to state contingency and homeland missions as well as to its operational commitments.

The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. As you know, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member
states quickly and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement.

Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating resources to the Total Army—the Active component and the Reserve components. The Army is currently executing and programming unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve components. The Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements resulting in an improved total force.

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over $49 billion in Army National Guard procurement (for fiscal years 2001–2013). Funding and equipment distributions are firewallled; promises made are promises kept. For fiscal years 2001–2007, the Army resourced $15.3 billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over the next 24 months, the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to the Army National Guard, valued at $17.5 billion—36 percent of Total Army distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night vision devices, and 86,000 weapons.

TRANSITION OF THAAD TO THE ARMY

Question. The Army currently produces and operates the Patriot air and missile defense system, including the PAC–3 system. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is being developed and initially fielded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), with the plan that it will be transitioned and transferred to the Army at some point.

What is your view of the best approach to transitioning the THAAD system to the Army?

Answer. The Army and MDA have been working plans to transition and transfer those Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements including the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system for which the Army is the lead Service. We have collaborated on the past two annual Transition and Transfer Plans and participate in Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for each element to work the specific details associated with transition and transfer. Transition and transfer was the main topic of a recent Army/MDA Board of Directors meeting where it was decided that the best approach for transitioning the THAAD system was to develop and sign an overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA) that incorporates individual, event-driven element annexes to further guide the transition and transfer process.

Question. When do you believe it should happen, and where should the initial funding come from?

Answer. The Army and MDA will be collaborating on defining a series of event driven milestones which are designed to minimize cost and reduce risk, while transitioning an operational capability to the Army. This operational capability will be verified through participation in Force Development Experimentation (FDE) and Limited User Test (LUT). At that point I believe an informed decision to transition can be made.

Initial funding should come from a Defense Wide account. The funding would stay within the DOD agency. MDA would use the account to fund R&D, Procurement and sustainment activities. The services will program for military pay, and specific O&M costs. Detailed funding responsibilities will be specified in the MOA and the annexes.

Question. Do you have any concerns, including resource concerns, about transitioning THAAD to the Army?

Answer. Our primary concern with the transition and transfer of BMDS elements to the Army is long term affordability. Element transitions must only occur when full funding is secured. The procurement and operations and support costs anticipated at transfer are beyond the Army’s ability to program and fund without a total obligation authority (TOA) increase.

FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS

Question. Over the past several years, the Army, with the support of Congress, has concentrated on the procurement of force protection measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, uparmored high mobility multipurpose vehicles, counterimprovised explosive device measures) primarily relying on supplemental appropriations.

If confirmed, what problems do you foresee and what priority would you place on continuing to expand and fund force protection programs, even in the absence of supplemental appropriations legislation?
Answer. I appreciate the assistance of Congress in protecting our soldiers by supporting Army critical Force Protection programs. I can assure you that equipment necessary to protect the lives of soldiers will always be my highest priority for funding. The Army has become increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet war-related requirements and many programs funded through supplemental appropriations, like force protection, have persisted—a symptom of finding ourselves in an era of persistent conflict. As your question implies, we must continue critical enduring programs even if supplemental appropriations go away. Finally, the Army must be prepared for full spectrum operations globally in an era of persistent conflict. While doing so it is important to balance current force needs against modernizing so our soldiers are never in a fair fight.

EQUIPMENT RESET

Question. The ongoing requirements of the global war on terror have significantly increased usage rates on the Army’s equipment. As a result, we know there will be a requirement to “reset” the force not only as the current operations continue but also for some time after they conclude. Given the ongoing nature of both the war in Iraq and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready to respond to whatever contingencies arise.

Do you think that the Army’s equipment reset program meets the requirements of the global war on terror, as well as the requirements for transition to a modular force?

Answer. The Army’s reset program has kept pace with the requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness with rates at more than 90 percent for ground equipment and more than 75 percent for aviation equipment. As you know, our reset efforts are a significant element of our efforts to maintain readiness across the force. Timely and predictable funding is key to ensuring that these reset requirements are met.

Question. In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or mitigate that risk?

Answer. Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk to the Army’s reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of the fiscal year allows for the early purchase of long lead parts which reduce reset timelines, minimize delays in replacing battle losses, and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the depots. To mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant and open communication to ensure that our requirements and the reasoning behind them are understood.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient resources are programmed and requested in the Army’s budget to meet reset requirements and provide trained and ready forces across the spectrum of military operations?

Answer. The development of the Army’s reset requirements is driven by current wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational tempo; equipment stress; battle losses; lessons learned; and the need to reconstitute equipment readiness for the next contingency, which could be any mission across the full spectrum of conflict from low intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset requirements must be funded to ensure Army readiness.

Question. What is your understanding regarding the capacity at which our repair depots are operating to meet recapitalization, modernization, rebuild, and repair requirements for reset?

Answer. Depots are not operating at full/maximum capacity but are operating at a level that theater equipment retrograde will support. In peace time our depots expend approximately 12 million direct labor hours annually. They are currently executing 27 million and have the capacity to expand up to 40 million. Each depot’s production capacity is being optimized by equipment type/commodity. Our depots have enabled deployed forces to maintain equipment readiness for the last 5 years at 90 percent or better for ground equipment and 75 percent or better for aviation and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of the next deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots could do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts, increased work force and more retrograded equipment.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

Answer. Timely and adequate funding is essential. It enables depots to procure long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace and repair maintenance equipment and set the conditions for resetting our redeploying forces. In addition,
we are putting in place several logistic initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset visibility, reduce transportation time and target certain equipment for direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the CSA Reset Pilot Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots are implementing Lean Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous success in improving production rates and reducing turn around times.

**ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT**

**Question.** The Army has long included as a critical element of its strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks around the world and afloat to accelerate the deployment and employment of forces in response to crises. However, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) are nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or options.

What changes, if any, to policies regarding use of prepositioned equipment stocks would you recommend if confirmed?

**Answer.** No changes are recommended to the current policy for the use of APS at this time. The last 4 years demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army’s ability to deploy forces in support of COCOM requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. The Army carefully monitors the use of APS assets and closely coordinates their use with the Combatant Commanders. Whenever use of APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates our APS capabilities and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to replenish our APS with “modernized” equipment that meets the needs of the modular force.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment to re-establish this strategic capability?

**Answer.** APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The Army has an APS Strategy 2015 which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and the Army has an executable timeline to reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2015, contingent on available resources and operational requirements.

**EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY**

**Question.** Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support the pre-deployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF?

**Answer.** The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No soldier will go into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortfalls in CONUS that require sharing equipment among deployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.

**Question.** What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

**Answer.** All soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand pre-deployment training equipment shortfalls occur with some types of mission-specific organizational equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into the theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG–31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home station training and at our Combat Training Centers so soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of
our soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems.

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and uparmored highly-mobile multipurpose wheeled vehicle fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific areas which are driven by the Army’s desire to get the most modern and capable systems immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat Training Centers.

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need arise.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need in time to train before deploying and as well as for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the global war on terrorism, and to replace critical equipment destroyed in battle. The Army is also prioritizing and managing procurements and distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat.

**MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES**

Question. In September 2007, JROC capped MRAP procurement at 15,374 vehicles, with about 3,700 going to the Marine Corps and approximately 10,000 to the Army. In November 2007, the Marines decreased their requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles—citing, in part, an improved security situation in Iraq and the MRAP’s unsuitability in some off-road and urban situations. Reports suggest that the Army may follow suit and reduce its overall MRAP requirement.

Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If the Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is this the Army’s final requirement or can we expect the requirement to change again?

Answer. The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army units is 12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be 17,770. To ensure this assessment met our emerging requirements, the Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and OSD to continuously re-assess and raise the procurement quantity in a stair-step fashion to ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to Theater while remaining good stewards of our Nation’s resources. Recently, based on input from Theater, the Army was able to reduce its estimate from 17,770 down to a range of between 15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do not overstate our requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to almost 12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff and the Joint Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet warfighters needs for protected mobility; preserve options for commanders in the field to make adjustments as force levels and situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately.

Question. Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts?

Answer. The MRAP has addressed the Army’s most critical current battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against improvised explosive devices) with a capable, survivable and sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. However, with the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance and EOD teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into tomor-
row's force structure. Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a tactical wheeled vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles, threats, and capabilities of the various fleets. This analysis includes the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial results will influence POM decisions, the Force Mix Brief to Congress, and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging threats.

SPECIAL UNITS FOR STABILIZATION AND TRAINING/ADVISORY MISSIONS

**Question.** On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the role that "unconventional warfare" will play in the Army's future as well as the need to organize and prepare for a training and advisory role. Some, both inside and outside of the Army, have suggested that special units or organizations should be established to address these mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best handled by the Army's full-spectrum BCTs and their supporting forces.

Do you believe special units—such as a Training and Advisory Corps—should be established? Please explain.

**Answer.** No, I believe future requirements to train and advise foreign security forces should be addressed with a combination of special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, embassy military groups, and Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict security cooperation activities will emphasize Special Operations Forces, small scale specialized forces, and small deployments of full spectrum modular forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post conflict efforts will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces.

The key consideration for training and advising is expertise in your core function. For example, U.S. Army infantry, medical, or engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime function and can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer companies. With some additional training and minor task organization changes, Army modular forces can be ideally suited to train and advise.

**U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

**Question.** The U.S. Special Operations Command, pursuant to QDR guidelines, is currently expanding the size of its Army component. It is also working to raise the language proficiency of its Army special operators. If confirmed, how would you support U.S. Army Special Operations Command's (USASOC) end strength growth?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will support USASOC's end strength growth as currently planned. QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions be increased by one-third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be increased by 33 percent. The Army has already programmed and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, the Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this growth and ensure it meets operational requirements.

Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and specialized tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by these specially selected and trained forces. Growth of Special Operations Forces is within programmed endstrength of 547,400 (Active), 358,200 (National Guard), and 206,000 (Reserve). The growth in Special Operations Forces will greatly contribute to the Army's ability to confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations.

**Question.** What do you see as the best way to enhance language skills among Army special operators?

**Answer.** The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to increase language capability across the force, to include Special Operations. The Army trains our language cadre to the minimum Interagency Language Roundtable level of 2 for language proficiency, with a goal to reach a proficiency of 3. Currently Active component and Reserve component soldiers may earn up to $400 per month per language depending on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum rate of $1000 per month. Soldiers who are in language dependent military operation specialties, such as special operators, are paid the highest rate based on their proficiency for their primary language. This is true even for languages such as Spanish, which has been identified as "dominant in the force" and is not usually authorized for language pay for other Army soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to soldiers to maintain their proficiency.
FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

**Question.** FCS is the largest modernization program in the Army. Total cost of the program is expected to be $162 billion. The Army's FCS includes both manned and robot-controlled weapons linked together by a communications network. Army leaders have strongly advocated for continued funding and support for FCS, but, in February 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates told this committee: "It is hard for me to see how that program can be completed in its entirety. I think that in light of what are inevitably going to be pressures on the defense budget in the future, I think that that one is one we will have to look at carefully."

How would you respond to those who question the feasibility and affordability of FCS, and who call it ill-defined and technologically risky?

**Answer.** FCS's precursor technologies have already made a difference today in combat. FCS precursor Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and robotics show the promise of these emerging capabilities in vital IED defeat and route clearance missions. The Army currently is fielding FCS Spin-out 1 to the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at Fort Bliss, TX. The Army established the AETF so that combat-tested soldiers can test and evaluate FCS technologies. Through rigorous testing and phased software development the Army is mitigating risk to this ambitious plan to deliver needed capabilities.

FCS is currently less than 3 percent of the Army's base budget. At its peak (fiscal year 2015) FCS is projected to be less than a third of the Army's investment (RDA) account. That would be less than 8 percent of the overall Army budget, assuming that budget stays constant.

The FCS BCT is designed to be an integrated combat formation that delivers the full spectrum. As an adaptive force, we will rigorously apply the lessons of combat to the development of the FCS BCT.

Risk is being carefully managed. The standup of the AETF at a cost of 900 soldiers during a time of war is an example of the Army's commitment to bring FCS technologies to soldiers for rigorous evaluation prior to program decisions.

**Question.** Can you explain how FCS addresses the imbalance in the Army to which Army leaders have spoken in defending the requirement for the capabilities the FCS offers?

**Answer.** The current imbalance in the Army is caused by our inability to meet the demands placed on the Army to generate the ready forces we need to meet global demand. The Army is addressing the imbalance by completing its capabilities transformation into modular formations, while simultaneously growing the size of deployable formations. These actions will increase the global force pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational force.

In parallel with these efforts, FCS is our core effort to complete the transformation of the Army by providing modular formations vastly increased capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. FCS achieves these goals by providing the Army increased abilities to project our forces, connect soldiers to the network, and protect soldiers in this century's complex operating environments. Spin outs ensure that we speed these improvements to the Army to meet the needs of warfighters who can't wait for needed capabilities.

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

**Question.** In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding merging two separate small cargo aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA).

In your opinion, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the Army and the Air Force in the JCA program?

**Answer.** No. The primary mission of the Army JCA is to transport Army time-sensitive mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and personnel to forward deployed units, often in remote and austere locations, commonly referred to as "the last tactical mile". Because of the critical nature of this cargo to the success of the tactical ground commander's mission and the short-notice of its need (usually less than 24 hours), lift assets must be in a direct support relationship to provide the necessary responsiveness.

For sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation performs those missions which lie between the strategic and intra-theater missions performed by the USAF and the tactical maneuver and movement performed by Army rotary wing or ground assets. The JCA will provide point to point distribution where effectiveness vice efficiency is critical to meeting the ground tactical mission needs, while simultaneously continuing to push the majority of supplies forward, maintaining the potential syn-
ergistic affect between efficiency and effectiveness. The JCA, Army and Air Force, is meant to be a complimentary asset.

The Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have agreed to examine Intra-theater Air Lift Roles and Missions as part of the QDR. In the most recent Air Force-Army Warfighter talks, we recommitted our Services to the success of the C–27 program in its current format, on the current fielding timeline, and in accordance with the current beddown plan. Together, both services will work any roles and missions issues that may arise.

MEDIUM AND HIGH ALTITUDE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. In a March 5, 2007, memorandum, the Air Force Chief of Staff spelled out the case for the Air Force to become the Executive Agent (EA) for all medium and high altitude UAVs. General Moseley stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive plan to optimize the Nation’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.

What is your understanding of the Army’s position regarding the Air Force proposal that it be assigned as the EA for medium and high altitude UAVs?

Answer. The Army does not support a single Service as executive agent for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The Army supports the Joint Staff’s 2005 and 2007 decisions to not establish an executive agent for UAS (JROC memorandums 043–08 and 136–05), as well as, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 13 September 2007 decision that, in lieu of a single Service designation as executive agent for UAS, directs a UAS Task Force (TF) led by the OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) to coordinate critical UAS interoperability issues and develop a common acquisition path forward.

AROUND MEDICAL ACTION PLAN

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress bi-annually on implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan to correct deficiencies identified in the condition of facilities and patient administration for wounded and ill soldiers.

If confirmed, what would be your responsibilities with respect to the implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan and compliance with the requirements included in the (NDAA)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the smooth transition of the highly effective Army Medical Action Plan Cell to the new Warrior Care and Transition Office under the supervision of the Director of the Army Staff. The Warrior Care and Transition Office will provide Headquarters, Department of the Army oversight, policy, and direction to synchronize and integrate the array of Army warrior care initiatives and related programs dedicated to the support, care, and healing of wounded, injured, and ill soldiers and their families. Through numerous monitoring and oversight mechanisms, including the Medical Strategic Review Group, I will ensure Army complies with all requirements of the NDAA. The Army has prepared an initial report to Congress, which details the extraordinary effort and accomplishments made in the first year of the Army Medical Action Plan. I look forward to continuing to work with Congress on behalf of our wounded, ill, and injured warriors.

Question. In September 2007 the GAO reported that over half of the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) had significant personnel/staffing shortfalls.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that WTUs are adequately resourced to meet the medical and mental health needs of wounded and ill soldiers returning from deployments now and in the coming years?

Answer. In follow-up testimony, February 2008, GAO reported on the significant progress the Army has made staffing the 35 WTUs established as part of the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Currently 2,655 WTU staff members are caring for 9,339 Warriors in Transition and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to demand the right level of support for our brave men and women whose sacrifice demands no less. I also look forward to working with Congress to fund the rapid construction, furnishing, and ongoing support of Warrior Transition complexes. These healing complexes will co-locate fully accessible housing, administrative facilities, and Soldier Family Assistance Centers near our Military Treatment Facilities to provide better support for our Warriors in Transition and their families.

RISE IN SUICIDE RATES IN THE ARMY

Question. In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Army’s current suicide prevention program?
Answer. We are continuously strengthening and revitalizing our suicide prevention efforts. This has never been more important, given the higher than normal suicide rates we are experiencing. While engaged leadership is key to our efforts, just as important is informing soldiers and family members about the risk factors associated with suicide, how to identify suicidal behavior, and what actions are needed to help at-risk soldiers.

Our multifaceted approach includes increasing awareness about suicide, reducing the stigma associated with seeking care, and providing leaders with relevant information they can use to improve their suicide prevention efforts at the unit level. We recently formed a suicide prevention steering committee composed of general officers from across the Army that includes those with expertise in the personnel, health care, spiritual, and legal communities to provide senior-level oversight of our suicide prevention efforts. This group will ensure we have a program that provides robust, evidence and research-based resources, programs, and services for all aspects of the program.

The bottom-line is that we must constantly renew our focus on leadership and battle buddy involvement both in prevention and intervention. It is crucial for all leaders to have access to lessons learned from suicide cases (both completions and attempts) to effect new programs, services, and policies. We are in the process of creating an analysis cell to collect suicide data, analyze trends, develop lessons learned, and provide that information up and down the chain on a continuous basis.

We are keenly aware that, despite our efforts, the suicide rate has continued to climb. We know that we have to change the culture in the Army to reshape attitudes toward those with behavioral health issues.

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to reduce the incidence of suicide in the Army?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the newly-formed suicide prevention flag officer panel. The first priority of this multidisciplinary group is to reduce the perceived stigma of soldiers seeking help for mental health issues. It is also focused on building in our leaders at every level the understanding of the need to carefully monitor the welfare of their soldiers and then ensure they have the necessary skills to knowledgeably question and intervene when they see a soldier who may be at-risk. This involves training that begins when soldiers enter the Army and continues through every leadership course. Leaders know that it is within their responsibility to check on a soldier’s living conditions, ask about his/her family, and, when he senses that something is not right, to professionally, but caringly determine what is going on. I would reemphasize the importance of leadership involvement.

We must also increase our research into the factors that will reduce suicide risk in the Army. I’m not convinced that what we know about civilian suicides can be translated directly into an actionable plan for our population and research in the Army on this issue is incomplete. I would task the General Officer Steering Committee to do a bottom-up study of the factors related to suicide to ensure that our strategy is complete and sufficient.

We must also help our soldiers and their families to build great lives. I am told that four out of five soldiers who commit suicide do so because of relationship issues or because of a poor personal decision that led to legal problems in his or her life. We must expand life skills and relationship training so that soldiers make good decisions and avoid the cascade of negative events that is so often the precursor to suicide. It is also important to enforce the battle buddy in the total Army, emphasizing in interpersonal relationships, mentorship, and counseling at first line leader level.

Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure that senior Army leaders take steps to eliminate the stigma associated by soldiers with seeking mental health care?

Answer. We must continue to change our culture that does not place a shame on those soldiers who seek mental health assistance. If confirmed, I would look at a number of ways in which to continue to address this issue. Again, it starts with informed and engaged leadership. Leaders who are aware of the impact of unformed, judgmental attitudes on those at risk for suicide are in the best position of shifting the culture toward one that better supports those in crisis.

We must increase the number of health care professionals to ensure they are present and available to soldiers in units. This includes behavioral health professionals and chaplains.

We have to do better at ensuring that soldiers are completely aware of the process, risks, and limits when they access behavioral health care. I’m convinced that soldiers don’t really understand how low their risk is when they seek help and we need to change that paradigm.
FULL RESOURCING OF WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

Question. Under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) adequate funding must be provided for the operation and sustainment of the current Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) until new facilities are completed and operational at both National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, and Fort Belvoir in Northern Virginia.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that all support requirements are identified and supported, to include facilities, personnel, installation support and medical operations and maintenance?

Answer. The Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has a very effective budgeting system that allocates resources based on workload and population health. The MEDCOM will continue to resource WRAMC as a fully operational medical center until the fiscal year of closure. The budget will not be decremented for any closure-related actions. In addition, through the Army Medical Action Plan, we have identified and remedied the circumstances that led to problems highlighted at WRAMC last year. All support requirements are routinely monitored by the MEDCOM, the Army’s Installation Management Command, and the Office of Warrior Care and Transition.

ARMY FAMILY COVENANT

Question. In the fall of 2007, senior military and civilian leaders and installation commanders throughout the Army agreed to the Army Family Covenant, a pledge to provide soldiers and their families with the level of support that they need and which their level of service deserves. The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated that the covenant represents a $1.4 billion commitment in 2008 and that Army leadership is working to include a similar level in the budget for the next 5 years.

What do you view as the most essential quality of life needs addressed by the Army Family Covenant?

Answer. The most essential aspect of the Army Family Covenant is its unprecedented level of commitment. Last year, Secretary Geren and General Casey asked our soldiers and families to tell us how well the Army’s systems were supporting them. Soldiers and their families asked for more consistent standards and better access throughout the Army to Family programs and services, physical and mental healthcare, better housing, education, child and youth services, and employment opportunities for spouses. The needs addressed in the Army Family Covenant represent the voices of soldiers and their families. Each facet of the Covenant is interwoven in our Army communities and that is what creates a supportive environment in which soldiers and their families can live and thrive. We will continue to ask our soldiers and families to identify their needs.

Question. What are the greatest challenges which the Army faces in making good on the promises made by the Army Family Covenant, and what would you do, if confirmed, to overcome them?

Answer. The greatest challenges associated with fulfilling the promises made in the Army Family Covenant are maintaining a predictable level of funding after the next 4 years and at the same time, managing the expectations created by our commitment to address the needs of Army families. To preserve the All-Volunteer Force, the Army is committed to providing soldiers and families a full range of essential services to support readiness and retention and enhance family resiliency. The Family Covenant is our promise to provide a strong supportive environment and our families want to trust and believe in the Family Covenant and Army Leadership’s commitment. As we enter year seven of the war, we must also maintain our ability to respond to the unpredictable family requirements the changing environment will present. To overcome these challenges, we will balance our requirements within the Army to provide for our soldiers and their families and we will continue to focus on the specific needs. Taking care of our soldiers and their families is essential if we are to sustain our Army throughout this era of persistent conflict.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress and provide information,
subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[The nomination reference of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, follows:]  

**NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT**

**AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,**

**SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,**

February 5, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 3034:

To be General.

LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]  

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA**

*Source of commissioned service: USMA.*

**Military schools attended:**
- Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
- United States Naval Command and Staff College
- United States Army War College

**Educational degrees:**
- United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
- North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects
- United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategy

*Foreign language(s): None recorded.*

**Promotions:**

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<tr>
<th>Promotions</th>
<th>Dates of appointment</th>
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<td>2LT</td>
<td>2 Jun 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>2 Jun 78</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1 Aug 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1 Dec 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Feb 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Sep 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 Jul 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Nov 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>1 Jan 05</td>
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**Major duty assignments:**
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<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 76</td>
<td>Jan 78</td>
<td>Support Platoon Leader, later Firing Platoon Leader, G Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 78</td>
<td>Aug 78</td>
<td>Survey Officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 78</td>
<td>Oct 79</td>
<td>Ad-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 79</td>
<td>Jul 80</td>
<td>Student, Field Artillery Advanced Course, Fort Sill, OK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 80</td>
<td>Dec 80</td>
<td>Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 80</td>
<td>Dec 82</td>
<td>Commander, Service Battery, later A Battery, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 82</td>
<td>May 83</td>
<td>Assistant S–3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 83</td>
<td>Aug 85</td>
<td>Student, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 88</td>
<td>Sep 88</td>
<td>Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 89</td>
<td>Jun 90</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, CA, (relocated to Fort Lewis, WA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 90</td>
<td>Dec 90</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 7th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 90</td>
<td>Jun 91</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 7th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 91</td>
<td>May 92</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 42d Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 92</td>
<td>Jun 94</td>
<td>Commander, 2d Battalion, 8th Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 94</td>
<td>Jun 95</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 95</td>
<td>Jun 97</td>
<td>Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 97</td>
<td>Aug 98</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 98</td>
<td>Jul 99</td>
<td>Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 99</td>
<td>Jul 01</td>
<td>Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 01</td>
<td>Aug 04</td>
<td>Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 04</td>
<td>Oct 04</td>
<td>Special Assistant to Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 04</td>
<td>May 06</td>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 06</td>
<td>Feb 08</td>
<td>Commanding General, III Corps/Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 08</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX.</td>
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**Summary of joint assignments:**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 86–Jun 89</td>
<td>Captain/Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 04–May 06</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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</table>

**U.S. decorations and badges:**
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal
- Army Achievement Medal
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
ments other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes, I do.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes, I do.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO.

This 4th day of February, 2008.

[The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was withdrawn by the President on April 30, 2008.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. The current transformation of DOD—the largest since World War II, as prescribed in our national defense and military strategies and quadrennial defense reviews since 2001, was in many ways enabled through Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act of 1986—in this regard I would assess that the provisions continue to remain relevant and effective. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the conduct of our joint operations and make recommendations as required. It is imperative, however, to apply similar reform to interagency authorities and relationships we must apply and integrate effectively all elements of our national power to the challenges that face the Nation today and tomorrow.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. The emerging strategic environment presents more complex asymmetrical challenges, regionally and globally, that demand broader and more integrated cooperation of agencies within our own government, and with those of our partners around the world. The employment of all elements of our national power, and that of our partners, must be applied in an integrated fashion. We should seek to continue efforts such as Beyond Goldwater Nichols, the Project for National Security Reform, and Project Horizon, so we can codify a framework of interagency authorities, relationships, and capabilities that more effectively bring to bare all elements of national power to strategic challenges facing us now and in the future.
DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Answer. The Commander, United Nations Command (CDRUNC), serves as commander of an international command and is responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDRUNC acts in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and directives. The CDRUNC also acts in accordance with directives from the U.S. Government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, keeping CDRUSPACOM informed. The CDRUNC is responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control of forces, conduct of combat operations and acceptance and integration of UNC member nations’ forces during contingencies. This includes enabling access to the seven UNC bases in Japan.

The Commander, Combined Forces Command (CDRCFC), as commander of a binational command, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeat an external armed attack. In this position, he is responsible for receiving strategic direction and missions from the ROK-U.S. Military Committee, which acts as the strategic coordinating interface for ROK and U.S. national authorities. The missions and functions for the CDRCFC are prescribed in the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and in the US/ROK Military Committee Strategic Directive No. 2.

The Commander, United States Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), as a sub-unified commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), is responsible for all duties and functions associated with title 10, U.S.C., the Unified Command Plan, and CJCSI 5130. This role provides the U.S. with the means to provide forces to CDR UNC/CFC as required, and to support these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. The situation in Korea reflects all aspects of both the asymmetrical challenges of the new strategic environment, and our need to transform plans, posture, capabilities and relationships with our partners and allies to better meet those challenges. Our alliance in Korea is one that is transforming into a broad strategic relationship that has peninsular, regional, and global components to better meet each of those challenges. I have served in Korea at times when we focused predominately on the traditional and symmetrical threat of North Korea, and I am very familiar with that aspect of the threat that remains on the peninsula. I have also served in a number of Peacekeeping and Multinational assignments that would be beneficial in my role as UNC Commander, and would also allow me to develop further our global partnership with the ROK—a steadfast and significant contributor to stability and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most recently, my positions on the Joint Staff provide me the background and expertise on the transformation of our military to meet traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges that face us today and tomorrow—and North Korea is a prime example of a threat that has evolved asymmetrically over the last few decades. This experience positions me well to continue assessment, integration, and implementation of plans to transform the alliance with South Korea and maximize the strategic relevance and value of that alliance. If confirmed, I will effectively apply U.S. policies and strategies with our ROK Ally, and will provide valuable assessments and recommendations to our defense and national leadership to better shape those policies and strategies.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to conduct in-depth discussions and assessments with key personnel and analysts from relevant ROK and U.S. Government agencies as well as non-governmental specialists. Throughout my time in command, I will continue this dialogue with ROK and U.S. leaders to improve my understanding of all aspects of the evolving situation within the Korean theater.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Com-
mander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea with the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DOD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. CDR UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense, and through him to the President, while at the same time keeping the Commander, USPACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A validated binational ROK–U.S. document provides further guidance on CDR CFC’s unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. CDR UNC communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of the Services, under Title 10, U.S.C. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. They also provide military advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The other combatant commanders, especially the Commander, United States Pacific Command

Answer. COMUSKOREA, as commander of a sub-unified command of USPACOM, reports directly to the Commander, USPACOM, on matters directly pertaining to U.S. Forces Korea areas of responsibility. CDR UNC and CDR CFC keeps the Commander, USPACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Answer. The major challenges include maintaining readiness and deterrence, while implementing the transformation of U.S. forces in Korea and implementation of the plan to transfer wartime operational control to the ROK. Readiness of U.S. forces will be my primary near-term focus if confirmed for this position. The ROK–U.S. Alliance must be “ready to fight tonight” due to the proximity and lethality of the threat. A highly trained and ready force provides stability and mitigates risk.

Sustaining readiness requires tough, realistic training; appropriate levels of manning and modern equipment; training infrastructure; and a quality of life which sup-
ports and sustains our people. I am personally committed to ensuring that the combat readiness of our forces in Korea.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our forces remain vigilant and well-prepared, by maintaining readiness and rigorous training and exercises. If confirmed I will immediately review these elements to ensure that we are as strong and as ready as we possibly be. I will devote myself to maintaining the strong Alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea. A strong, healthy, and capable Alliance is necessary to meet the challenges we face on the Korean Peninsula. Should deterrence fail, combined forces must be, and will be, ready to defeat North Korean aggression.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

Answer. North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. Notwithstanding progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks and the ongoing disablement of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor facility, North Korea’s historical opposition to meaningful reform and its long-term pattern of provocative behavior and proliferation present significant challenges to achieving lasting regional and global stability. In addition to North Korea’s nuclear threat, its missile program, coupled with its aging but still lethal and forward positioned conventional force, continues to present significant challenges. All elements of U.S. and partner national power must be applied to achieve our combating WMD objectives. Nonproliferation diplomatic efforts, such as the Six-Party Talks negotiations, in addition to Counter-proliferation, and Consequence Management plans, capabilities, and posture, are part of a comprehensive strategy to combat WMD. We must maintain readiness across this spectrum and employ our capabilities consistently and appropriately.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

Answer. The October 2006 nuclear test at the Punggye facility supported previous assessments that North Korea had produced nuclear weapons. Prior to the test, it is assessed that North Korea produced enough plutonium jars for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons. According to recent assessments, North Korea pursued a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) capability at least in the past, and the Intelligence Community at IC judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort continues today. If fully developed, an HEU capability could provide an alternative method of nuclear weapons development independent of its plutonium production facility at Yongbyon. The IC remains uncertain about Kim Jong-II’s commitment to full denuclearization, as he promised in the October 2007 Six-Party Agreement.

North Korea continues to build missiles of increasing range, lethality, and accuracy, bolstering its current stockpile of 800 missiles for its defense and external sales. With its test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that can possibly reach the western United States, conducted in July 2006, and preparations underway to field a new intermediate range missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska, North Korea’s missile development program presents a threat which cannot be ignored.

Question. What is your assessment of North Korea’s conventional capabilities and readiness?

Answer. Despite economic hardship, North Korea retains the fourth largest armed Force in the world with 1.2 million active duty and 5 million Reserves, devoting up to one third of its available resources to sustain its conventional and asymmetric military capabilities. Though aging and unsophisticated by U.S. and ROK standards, its military arsenal, which includes 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and over 13,000 artillery systems, still constitutes a substantial threat. Seventy percent of North Korea’s ground forces are located within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone, with up to 250 long range artillery systems capable of striking the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area, a thriving urban area of over 20 million inhabitants. North Korea still has the capacity to inflict major destruction and significant military and civilian casualties in South Korea, with little to no warning.

Question. What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage both the U.S. and ROK to sustain the ongoing transformation initiatives and capabilities enhancement programs. This includes implementation of the Strategic Transition Plan, signed by General Bell and the ROK CJCS in June 2007, which establishes a roadmap to achieve OPCON transition in 2012, while maintaining an effective deterrent and warfighting capability. Our transformation and realignment initiatives ongoing throughout the Pacific, enhance deterrence on the peninsula, in the region, and align us more effectively globally—we must continue these efforts.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES

Question. The current Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, recently testified that there is a current need for additional PAC–3 missile defense systems to counter North Korea’s missile inventory.

Answer. PAC–3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have significantly enhanced our ability to protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. However, there is a significant shortage of PAC–3 missiles currently available on the peninsula to counter the North Korean missile threat.

The Republic of Korea does not currently possess a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability that can fully integrate with U.S. BMD systems. The ROK recently announced plans to purchase eight Configuration-2 Patriot firing units. When fielded, these firing units will possess a localized theater ballistic missile defensive capability for key sites.

In the near term, the Republic of Korea must develop a systematic missile defense solution to protect its critical civilian and military command capabilities, critical infrastructure and population centers. South Korean military and civilian facilities are currently highly vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks.

Question. What missile defense systems and capabilities do you believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these commands?

Answer. Continued production of PAC–3 missiles and development of the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Airborne Laser, and AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense are needed to provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability to required protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. The ROK has announced plans to purchase much needed Configuration-2 Patriot firing units and will begin the process of integration with U.S. BMD systems.

NORTH KOREA-POW-MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS

Question. From 1996–2005, the United States worked with the North Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American servicemembers who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the spring of 2005, the United States unilaterally halted the program.

In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to repatriate the remains of American servicemembers found in North Korea? If so, when, or under what conditions, should the United States resume such cooperation?

Answer. The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of Korean War remains and provides DOD oversight over the entire personnel accounting process. The United Nations Command (UNC) assists DPMO and the USPACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) in arranging operational and logistics support to remain recovery operations in North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts repatriation ceremonies after remains are transferred to UNC control at the joint security area at the end of each operation.

Once national policymakers determine that conditions permit reengagement with North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. negotiating team. If U.S. and North Korean representatives can reach a mutually agreeable arrangement that provides the necessary process and procedures to conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this humanitarian effort. The arrangement must address the safety and security of U.S. personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea. When U.S. commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to U.S. personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North Korea.

Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart cooperation with North Korea on the POW–MIA remains recovery program?

Answer. National policymakers will decide when to restart remains recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.-North Korea policy issue. However, when the decision is made, the United Nations Command will continue to play a key role in supporting remains recovery operations in North Korea.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS

Question. In your view, what is the value of military-to-military relations, in general?

Answer. Military-to-military relations are an essential part of establishing and maintaining overall relationships with our partners. They help to develop mutual respect and facilitate security cooperation amongst partner nations to better meet challenges that impact our common national interests and values. Additionally, often from our military relationships emerge stronger socio-political and economic ones—as recently symbolized by our U.S.–ROK Free Trade Agreement, signed on June 30, 2007.

Military-to-military relationships with countries that present significant security and stability challenges, as in the case of North Korea, are mandatory and critical to crisis management and tension reduction.

Question. What is your assessment of the current climate in military-to-military professional relationships and interoperability at all levels between U.S. and ROK forces?

Answer. The current military relationship is one of mutual respect and trust, bolstered by the very professional nature of both of our militaries. ROK officers regularly attend our professional development schools and U.S. officers do the same in ROK schools. U.S. doctrine not only forms the basis of our combined defense system, epitomized by the Combined Forces Command, but it is also the basis for much of the ROK's military doctrine. Our doctrine also allows us to operate effectively with partners through independent parallel command structures, as we will achieve with the Republic of Korea in 2012, and in multinational command structures as what currently exists under United Nations Command or in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In large part, this is of great credit to the professionalism, training, expertise, and experience of the ROK military. ROK and U.S. forces have exercised and operated together for over 50 years, providing a foundation of shared experience that solidifies a professional bond that only continues to grow and will flourish under any command relationship. This has been proven time and again in our relationship on the peninsula, and in our relationship with the ROK military as strategic partners in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Operationally, while interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces has improved, there are issues that must be resolved. For instance, advanced U.S. warfighting capability has resulted in greater employment of precision-guided munitions. The ROK military needs to invest to balance its ability to put airborne weapons on target to provide more effective use of these assets. Many similar interoperability issues have been identified and the ROK military endeavors to resolve these matters. If confirmed, I will assess interoperability further and seek to reduce, if not eliminate, any interoperability shortfalls.

Question. What would be the value, in your opinion, of military-to-military relations with North Korea?

Answer. The United States and North Korea currently maintain limited relations through representatives of the United Nations Command side of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) and the (north) Korean People's Army at Panmunjom. This channel gives the U.S., through the U.N. Command, an opportunity to discuss any issue of relevance, but is limited by North Korea's intransigence toward meetings on substantive issues. These relations are vital to maintaining the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Issues of an administrative and operational nature must be worked out through the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. This is a consistent and proven channel with which the two countries can and do maintain military communications.

Question. If confirmed, what, if any, action would you take to increase the quality and quantity of military contacts between the United States and North Korea?

Answer. The starting point for improvement in U.S. and North Korean mil-to-mil contacts is North Korea's return to active participation in Military Armistice Commission (MAC) General Officer Talks, as called for by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. In 1991 North Korea unilaterally stopped participating in these talks. General Officer Talks between the UNCMAC, which includes a U.S. General Officer, and the Korean People's Army at Panmunjom can provide an opportunity and appropriate level for discussing matters of mutual military concern.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)—U.S. ALLIANCE

Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.
What is your understanding of the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK?

Answer. The current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is governed by the Mutual Defense Treaty as entered into force from November 1954. In particular, the treaty's requirement that both the U.S. and ROK maintain and develop appropriate means to deter and, if deterrence should fail, defeat an armed external attack continues to serve as the cornerstone of the relationship. Both the U.S. and the ROK remain fully committed to the treaty's provisions and the mutual defense of both nations. We are also an alliance that is currently evolving into a broader strategic partnership based on common interests in the peninsula, region, and world.

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that I maintain the strong U.S.-ROK security relationship that has preserved stability, promoted democracy, and deterred external aggression for the past 55 years. I will also continue to help develop our alliance into a broader strategic partnership that is reflective of our two nations' common interests and concerns in the region and globally.

Question. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and training of their personnel?

Answer is combined with the response to the question below.

Question. What is your assessment of ROK current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland, including responsibility for commanding and controlling the warfighting, readiness, and operations of their own forces in wartime (“OPCON Transfer”)?

Answer. The ROK military is fully capable, highly professional and competent. The ROK currently exercises daily command and control of all of its 677,000-man armed forces, and is working to assume primary responsibility for the lead role in its defense in 2012.

ROK Defense Reform 2020 plan will create a more modern and agile fighting force. The ROK military modernization goal is to develop a self-reliant, technology-oriented, qualitative defense force. As a result of its emphasis on technology under this plan, the ROK plans to reduce its total (Active and Reserve) Army ground forces by approximately 45 percent over the next 12 years leading up to its target date of 2020. The overall Active and Reserve Forces will be reduced from about 3.7 million to about 2 million.

In September 2006, the Presidents of the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed that South Korea should assume the lead for its own defense. In early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense determined that South Korea will assume wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 2012. The ROK military will assume responsibility for commanding and controlling the warfighting readiness and operations of their own forces in wartime/or the first time since the end of the Korean War. The ROK will form a national warfighting headquarters provisionally described as the ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC). U.S. Forces Korea will transform into a new joint warfighting command provisionally described as Korea Command (KORCOM). KORCOM will be a fully capable and resourced complementary U.S. joint warfighting command in a doctrinally supporting role to the ROK JFC. The current U.S.-led combined warfighting command, Combined Forces Command, will be disestablished. If confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. and ROK combined capabilities continue to maintain a strong and credible deterrent, and remain highly capable, should deterrence fail, of defeating a North Korean attack quickly and decisively during the transition period.

DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

Question. In the last decade, domestic opinion in the ROK with regard to the American presence and relations with the North Korea has increasingly split along generational lines, with younger Koreans being more skeptical of relations with the United States while the older generation is much more content with the status quo. If confirmed, how would you see your role and responsibility in the light of these changes in the ROK body politic?

Answer. If confirmed, my role and duties as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea will remain as described by appropriate governing U.S., ROK—U.S., and U.N. documents. My requirement to maintain the Armistice; deter or, should deterrence fail, defeat external aggression and discharge all Title 10 and Unified Command Plan duties and responsibilities will remain the same throughout my tenure, despite any changes to the ROK body politic. I would also add that an enduring, but transformed U.S. presence...
in and alliance with South Korea is recognized by both nations as essential to our common interests—the transformation of our alliance keeps it a relevant and valuable enabler, not obstacle, to maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region. President Lee in recent speeches supports enduring U.S. presence on the peninsula, and has stated a desire to expand our relationship into a broader alliance reflective of our common interests on the peninsula, in the region, and globally.

REGIONAL POSTURE

Question. In your opinion, how should the U.S. employ its forces in Korea to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to military threats, provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

Answer. Transformation and realignment of forces in Korea is not something that has occurred outside of DOD transformation and global defense posture initiatives, but a highly successful example of our strategy. Our ongoing bilateral transformation and realignment efforts in Korea and Japan—and the rest of the Pacific, ensure we maintain the right balance and integration of command and control, and capabilities in the region to meet bilateral defense obligations, enhance regional security cooperation, and better meet global challenges. U.S. Forces in Korea should possess the capability to meet our mutual defense treaty commitments to the Republic of Korea, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to deploy forces to meet regional and global contingency requirements. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA) continually assesses force requirements on the Korean peninsula through CDRUSPACOM to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will ensure that I gain a full understanding of the security environment on the peninsula so that I can provide my assessment and recommendations to continue proper shaping of our ongoing transformation and realignment efforts.

CONSOLIDATION OF U.S. FORCES

Question. The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp Humphrey, South of Seoul. New construction of facilities and infrastructure required to support the consolidation is being carried out using funds from both the Host Nation and United States military construction accounts. The Yongsan Relocation Plan proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey, Korea, as well. This relocation is to be largely funded by the Korean Government.

What is your assessment of the current status of the two consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?

Answer. Both the LPP and YRP are being executed simultaneously and are proceeding ahead. To consolidate 2nd Infantry Division, the U.S. goal is to close a total of 63 facilities and areas, comprising two thirds of all land granted under the SOFA, and totaling more than 38,000 acres. To date, the U.S. has closed 37 installations encompassing over 17,208 acres with a tax assessed value of over $500 million and returned 35 installations to the Republic of Korea. Both sides are working together to develop the land and construct the facilities under our internationally agreed plans to relocate U.S. forces in support of both U.S. and ROK national objectives.

Question. What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?

Answer. As part of the YRP signed by the U.S. and the ROK in 2004, the Republic of Korea agreed to provide at their expense the majority of the required buildings and infrastructure at a cost of billions of dollars. The ROK is aggressively pursuing their agreed to requirements, already spending nearly $2 billion in pursuit of project goals. For our part, the United States agreed to provide the majority of required family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force, at a cost we estimate to be between $1 and $2 billion. Regarding the relocation of the 2ID under the LPP, the United States intends to fund the requirements using both appropriated funds and host nation provided burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of the total cost to carry out the two consolidations will be approximately $2.4 billion.

HOST NATION BURDEN-SHARING PROGRAMS

Question. Two programs supported by the Republic of Korea, the Combined Defense Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded Construction Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. military facility and infrastructure requirements.

What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the burden-sharing arrangement?
Answer. In principle, both the U.S. and the Republic of Korea agree to the goal of reaching an equitable level of commitment to allied burden sharing. The U.S. Department of Defense position is that to achieve equitability, South Korea should share approximately 50 percent of U.S. costs of stationing forces on the peninsula excluding military pay. This year the ROK provided the United States with $787 million in burden sharing funds, which is expected to offset approximately 43 percent of U.S. non-personnel stationing costs. While this year's contribution did not meet DOD's goal, the ROK and the U.S. continue to negotiate toward a more equitable level of burden sharing.

Question. What priorities would you establish for U.S. forces in Korea to make the best use of these programs?

Answer. The next allied burden sharing agreement must be negotiated for a longer term than the 2-year agreements of the recent past to provide stability and predictability for both sides. In that agreement, it is vital to the Alliance to achieve an equitable level of cost sharing as well as the ability for the command to apportion the funds into the agreed categories to meet command priorities. Over the next several years, as U.S. forces in Korea transform and consolidate south of Seoul, if confirmed, I will have to balance my construction priorities with labor and logistics requirements. Our highest priority will be to apply burden sharing funds against the requirement to move 2ID south of Seoul under the Land Partnership Plan.

TRAINING OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. In the past few years as U.S. forces in Korea have drawn down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army and Air Force units based on the peninsula has emerged as a significant concern.

Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close air support missions and other Air Force operations?

Answer. The ground training requirements for U.S. forces in Korea are currently being met. Current access to air-to-ground training ranges in the Republic of Korea has improved significantly in the past 2 years. Additional arrangements must still be made with the South Korean Government to further improve access; however, I understand USFK is pleased with the progress being made. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with our ROK ally to facilitate access that provides the training opportunities necessary to maintain the combat readiness of our entire force.

Question. In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet the training requirements of U.S. forces?

Answer. The current inventory and facility replacement plan for ground maneuver training ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground forces training requirements. We are working closely with the Republic of Korea to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for our air component. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our ally to improve and modernize all available training facilities to ensure force readiness requirements are met.

FAMILY HOUSING IN KOREA

Question. The Commander of United States Forces in Korea has proposed to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea on accompanied tours, thereby increasing the number of families in Korea. This would require the construction of additional housing and community support facilities at U.S. installations in Korea.

To what extent, if any, do you believe the percentage of personnel sent to Korea on accompanied tours should be increased?

Answer. In 55 years, the Republic of Korea has transformed from a war ravaged country to one of the most modern, progressive, and democratic countries in the world. Unfortunately, the U.S. still rotates servicemembers on 1 year unaccompanied assignments as though South Korea remains an active combat zone. While supporting other long-term contingency operations, the U.S. needlessly contributes to family separations with the current 1 year unaccompanied rotation policy in Korea. Additionally, the ROK-U.S. Alliance is emerging into a broader strategic partnership and it is in our mutual interests to maintain enduring, but transformed presence on the peninsula—more reflective of that partnership. Normalized tours offer many benefits and contribute greatly to enhancing our broad strategic alliance with Korea. We should maximize the number of accompanied tours and normalize U.S. servicemember tour lengths in Korea to 3-year family accompanied tours and 2-year unaccompanied tours for our married and single servicemembers, similar to
our policies in Japan and Europe. This new policy can be implemented with an infrastructure expansion plan over 10 to 15 years, with costs being supported by burden sharing contributions from the Republic of Korea.

The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge. The end-state will result in reduced entitlement costs and an overall savings as we decrease the number of servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements resulting from family separations.

QUALITY OF LIFE

**Question.** Through recent investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of making Korea an “assignment of choice” for U.S. Forces.

What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?

**Answer.** I believe the three most essential elements supporting military life in any assignment are quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational opportunities for dependent family members. General Bell made tremendous efforts to make improvements in these areas for our servicemembers. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate, as my predecessors have, for the best possible conditions for all three so that our men and women have the quality of life that they deserve while serving so far from home.

**KOREA ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY**

**Question.** Assignment incentive pay was approved in 2003 for soldiers who agreed to extend their tours of duty in Korea. Since that time, payment of an overseas cost-of-living allowance was also approved.

In your opinion, is eligibility for assignment incentive pay for duty in Korea still necessary and cost-effective?

**Answer.** With the authorization of a cost-of-living allowance (COLA) and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) in Korea, pay disparity for our servicemembers in the ROK has been greatly improved. By extending tours through AIP, we improve readiness and increase stability. From a fiscal standpoint, the incentive pay a servicemember receives for extending his or her tour is less than the costs borne by the government to move two servicemembers (one to Korea, one from Korea). The combined effect of reduced PCS costs, increased readiness and greater stability in Korea is a win/win situation. AIP has been a huge success with over 19,000 soldiers and airmen signing up for incentive pay with an estimated net savings of $112 million in reduced PCS costs. However, while AIP has been a major success from a fiscal perspective, for our unaccompanied servicemembers—over 80 percent of our authorized force in Korea—accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in the States. Rather than providing incentives to unaccompanied personnel to stay longer in Korea, we should focus on enabling servicemembers to bring their families to Korea and establish a more family oriented environment. With tour length normalization in Korea, in accordance with DOD overseas basing policies such as those in Europe and Japan, we could end the Assignment Incentive Pay program.

**MEDICAL CARE FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA**

**Question.** One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea is ensuring access to high quality medical care for servicemembers of all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other factors, have presented challenges. Reforms proposed have included: (1) establishment of a joint military medical command for Korea to streamline command and control of health care delivery for all personnel, (2) development of a managed care support contract for Korea, and (3) offering a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members and DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship.

If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the management and delivery of health care services in Korea?

**Answer.** Quality health care is essential for all servicemembers, regardless of where they serve. However, this is even more important for our servicemembers who serve in Korea—thousands of miles from home. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful and thorough review of the availability of quality health care for our servicemembers and their families.
Question. What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding support to non-command sponsored family members should be reconsidered and revised by the Department of Defense?

Answer. General Bell has made extraordinary strides for non-command sponsored family members by ensuring access and availability of the full range of services, entitlements and privileges for all dependent family members who reside with their military, DOD civilian employee, or invited contractor sponsor in Korea. If confirmed, I will continue General Bell’s efforts by placing special emphasis on critical areas of support for servicemember families such as TRICARE medical and dental programs as well as tuition assistance for dependent children. This may require addressing current DOD policies on non-command sponsored dependents.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. What is your assessment of the progress that the Army has made in the last 2 years in the promulgation of policy on sexual assault, and what do you think will be your biggest challenge in achieving the changes in programs, training and implementation if confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea?

Answer. I believe that the Army has made great strides in ensuring the promulgation of its policy on sexual assault. General Bell has made preventing sexual assault a priority, as well as his policy which is to eliminate any occurrence of this crime within United States Forces Korea. If confirmed I will maintain General Bell’s command focus upon awareness and prevention of sexual assault.

PREVENTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Question. Following media reports connecting prostitution and human trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices. What effects on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea?

Answer. Changes in U.S. policy have decreased the incidents of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea. General Bell has instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding prostitution and human trafficking within United States Forces Korea. The current USFK strategy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement has been a success, and, if confirmed, I will continue this approach.

Question. What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

Answer. I believe that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and extant military regulations are sufficient to ensure the efficacy of the zero tolerance policy. I would be willing to offer any recommendations to this committee should I see the need to do so in the future.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to further enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue General Bell’s zero tolerance policy and strategy of awareness, identification, reduction and enforcement. I will maintain command focus to further enhance the policy’s effectiveness.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

[The nomination reference of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 14, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

LTG Walter L. Sharp, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
- Armor Officer Basic Course
- Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course
- United States Army Command and General Staff College
- United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
- United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
- Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute - MS - Operations Analysis/Engineering

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

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<tr>
<th>Promotions</th>
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<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>5 Jun 74</td>
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<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>5 Jun 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>8 Aug 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1 Jan 85</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Apr 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Sep 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 Oct 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Jan 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>10 Mar 03</td>
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Major duty assignments:

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<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 75 ...</td>
<td>May 77 ...</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, A Company, later Executive Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 77 ...</td>
<td>Jul 77 ...</td>
<td>3-3 (Air), 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 77 ...</td>
<td>Aug 78 ...</td>
<td>Assistant C-3 (Operations), 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 78 ...</td>
<td>Apr 80 ...</td>
<td>Commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 80 ...</td>
<td>Aug 81 ...</td>
<td>Student, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From | To | Assignment
--- | --- | ---
Aug 81 ....... Jun 84 .... | Combat Development Analysis Officer, Office of the Director for Combat Developments, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY
Jun 84 ....... May 85 .... | Combat Development Analysis Officer, Deep Attack Programs Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC
May 85 ....... Jun 86 .... | Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS
Jul 86 ....... Jun 88 .... | Executive Officer, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jun 88 ....... Jun 89 .... | Combat Development Analysis Officer, A3 Task Force, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC
Jun 89 ....... Jul 90 .... | Director of Analysis, Force Developments Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC
Jul 90 ....... Jul 93 .... | Commander, 7th Cavalry Squadron, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia
Jul 93 ....... Jul 94 .... | Director, Models and Simulations Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Command, National Simulations Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS
Jul 94 ....... Jun 96 .... | Commander, 2d Armored Cavalry Zone V, United Nations Mission in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti
Jun 96 ....... Mar 97 .... | Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea, Korea
Mar 97 ....... Oct 98 .... | Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea
Dec 99 ....... Nov 01 .... | Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, GA, to include duty as Commander, Multinational Division (North), Operation Joint Forge, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Nov 01 ....... Mar 03 .... | Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J–8, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Mar 03 ....... Aug 05 .... | Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Aug 05 ....... Present .... | Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Summary of joint assignments:

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<th>Rank</th>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea, Korea.</td>
<td>Jun 96–Mar 97</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J–8, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
<td>Nov 01–Mar 03</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
<td>Mar 03–Aug 05</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
<td>Aug 05–Present</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. decorations and badges:
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Bronze Star Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal
- Army Achievement Medal
- Parachutist Badge
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Walter L. Sharp.

2. **Position to which nominated:**

3. **Date of nomination:**
   February 14, 2008.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   27/09/52, Morgantown, WV.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Joanne Sharp (Caporaso).

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Elizabeth Weyrach, 32; Steven Sharp, 26; Kevin Sharp, 23.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.
   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    2nd Armored Cavalry Association, Member.
    1st Cavalry Division Association, Member.
    Association of the United States Army, Member.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.
13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

**WALTER L. SHARP.**

This 19th day of February, 2008.

[The nomination of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.]
NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; AND LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008

U.S. Senate,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Breon N. Wells, receptionist.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha.

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stieffler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Kevin Bishop and Andrew King, assistants to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant to Senator Thune; David Brown and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets today to consider the nomination of General David Petraeus for reappointment to the grade of general and to be Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM); and the nomination of Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno for appointment to the grade of general and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I).

If confirmed, these two officers will continue to lead our military operations in Iraq, where we have 160,000 American troops deployed in the middle of a protracted and bloody sectarian battle.

As CENTCOM Commander, General Petraeus will also assume responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, where an increasing level of violence poses new hazards to the Afghan Government and the American troops who help support it.

Every member of this committee recognizes that the long hours and hard work put in by our senior military officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) require commitment and sacrifice, not only from our nominees, but also from their family members. The sacrifice is particularly striking in the case of General Petraeus and General Odierno. Not only has each of these officers served more than 30 years in the military, each has already served multiple tours of duty in Iraq, and is volunteering to return.

Over the last 5 years, General Petraeus has served three tours of duty in Iraq, spending almost 4 years there, first as Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, then as Commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and most recently as Commander of the MNF–I.

Similarly, General Odierno has served two tours of duty and more than 2 years in Iraq, first as Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division, and more recently as Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

Over the last year and a half, General Petraeus has been the leading architect of a new tactical approach in Iraq which has brought about some stability in a situation that, a year ago, was far more violent and unstable. General Odierno has been his able partner in executing that new approach. If confirmed, these two officers will bring in an unprecedented continuity of senior military leadership to a military operation, providing unparalleled knowledge of the situation on the ground and fully utilizing the working relationships that they’ve developed with Iraqi political and military leaders over the years.
Regardless of one’s view of the wisdom of the policy that took us to Iraq in the first place and has kept us there over 5 years, we owe General Petraeus and General Odierno a debt of gratitude for the commitment, determination, and strength that they’ve brought to their areas of responsibility (AORs). Regardless how long the administration may choose to remain engaged in the strife in that country, our troops are better off for the leadership that these two distinguished soldiers provide.

We appreciate the sacrifices that you and your families have already made in the service of our Nation. We thank you in advance for your willingness to bear the burden of continued service.

The committee has a long tradition of recognizing the families of our nominees. I know that General Petraeus’s family was unable to make it here today. General Odierno does have a number of family members present.

General Odierno, we’d very much like for you to introduce your family to the committee.

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to do that.

First, as are many soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines, we’re indebted to our families and all that they’ve sacrificed, as you’ve mentioned. First, I’d like to introduce my wife, Linda, we’ve known each other since high school, went through 4 years of West Point, 32 years in the military, where she has volunteered for countless hours for our soldiers and families, and led family readiness groups at the company, battalion, brigade, division, and the corps level. I am indebted to her for not only taking care of our family, but taking care of our soldiers and their families, as well.

I’d also like to introduce my son, Anthony, and his fiance, Daniella. Tony’s a 2001 graduate of West Point, served in Iraq. He’s an Airborne Ranger infantryman who earned the Combat Infantry Badge, the Purple Heart, and the Bronze Star Medal for Valor for his service in Iraq. He currently is attending New York University to get his MBA.

I’d also like to introduce my daughter, Katie, and her husband, Nick. Katie lives in Baltimore. She’s an interior architect. Nick is a construction engineer, and they’re, just, great young people. I’m very proud of all of them. Thank you, sir.

My son, Michael, who’s not here today, attends Texas Tech University, and I also appreciate all his support.

Thank you, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask General Odierno where his son’s fiance lives. [Laughter.]

General ODIERNO. She is from Greenwich, CT.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. I had a hunch we knew the answer to that one. [Laughter.]

We thank you and your families, both, whether they are here in person—we’re grateful to them—or whether they’re not able to be here in person—we’re very grateful, and we hope you’ll extend, General Petraeus, our gratitude to your family.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Now, Senator Warner, I know, is stuck in traffic. Senator Inhofe, would you like to make an opening statement?

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening statement. I would only say that we’ve been real pleased, recently, to even get from some of the generally unfriendly press the successes that are going on. I think the two of you have a lot to do with that. We are very proud of you.

I don’t have a formal statement, sir. I would submit the opening statement of my colleague, Senator Warner.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin.

I join you in welcoming General Petraeus and General Odierno and congratulating them on their nominations. I thank each of them for their service and their commitment to continue serving in these key positions.

General Petraeus, I recall well your nomination hearing on January 23, 2007, for your current assignment, and the stark situation that you, General Odierno, the Multi-National Corps Commander, and, of course, the men and women of your magnificent force, confronted at that time. You returned to testify about conditions in Iraq on September 11, 2007, and again on April 8, 2008.

No military officer understands the challenges we face in Iraq better than you, and no officer has a better foundation to take on the complex responsibilities you will have as Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM).

In your responses to the committee’s advance questions, you acknowledge the many challenges that you will face throughout the CENTCOM AOR if you are confirmed, but I believe that despite the problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iran, and elsewhere—there are opportunities for us to engage and make this a better, more secure region.

In his testimony to this committee on March 4, 2008, Admiral Fallon testified positively about the security situation in Iraq noting it was on an “upward vector.” Similarly, with respect to Afghanistan, the Admiral praised the Afghan Security Forces’ leadership, determination, and willingness to go out and engage, and cited the broad support that the Government of Afghanistan enjoys.

If confirmed, this will be your fourth assignment in Southwest Asia since March 2003. You led the 101st Airborne Division with great distinction in northern Iraq in 2003, and you were later recognized for making significant improvements from June 2004 through September 2005 in the training of the Iraqi security forces as Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

After commanding the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, where you led the development of the Army's doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment, you returned to Iraq to Command the Multi-National Force, and you achieved levels of stability that while fragile, are nonetheless real.

I believe you are the best qualified officer in the Armed Forces for this critically important position, and I thank you and your family for the sacrifices they and you have made during your outstanding service.

General Odierno, just last month you came before this committee in connection with your nomination to be the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, I noted then that your career of service has won the hearts and minds of the soldiers and families that you have associated with over these many years. You testified on April 3 that when you found yourself becoming discouraged, the first thing you would do is go visit soldiers or marines and that would build you back up because of their dedication and loyalty. Well, I believe this probably works equally well on the morale of those whom you come in contact with, and I know it will continue.

Army leaders have come before us and testified about a “resilient” Army, but one that is stressed to the maximum and lacking shock absorbency and the capability to respond to emergent crises or additional demands. I urge you to keep these considerations in mind as you fulfill your new responsibilities.

General Odierno, in the foreword to the new field manual on counterinsurgency, General Petraeus wrote that “conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.” As Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006 through February 2008, you proved that you possess these qualities and that you will continue to build upon your success in putting al Qaeda forces on the defensive, providing protection
to the civilian population, engaging the Sunni population in Anbar province, and significantly lowering the rates of violence. You formed a remarkable working relationship over the last 2 years. I’m sure that it will continue.

I thank you and your families again for the sacrifices you have made. I look forward to your testimony today.

Senator Levin.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Now we have standard questions that we ask of our nominees, and you can answer together:

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? [Both witnesses answered in the negative.]

Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Thank you.

General Petraeus?

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

General Petraeus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee. Thank you for your swift scheduling of this hearing.

I’m honored to have been nominated to command CENTCOM and to have an opportunity, if confirmed, to continue to serve our Nation in a critical region.

Beyond that, I’m delighted that Lieutenant General Ray Odierno has been nominated to command the MNF–I, and I’m grateful to him for his willingness to take on this position, and to his family for their sacrifice, as well.

As has been noted already in recent days, one of this committee’s senior members has just had a big rock added to his rucksack, and I want to take this opportunity to applaud Senator Kennedy’s inspirational spirit as he embarks on a course of treatment that we all hope will lead to a quick return to full duty.
As the members of this committee know, CENTCOM is in its 7th consecutive year of combat operations, and the CENTCOM AOR contains numerous challenges. The AOR includes 27 states and some 650 million people from at least 18 major ethnic groups. Stability in the region is threatened by a variety of religious, ethnic, and tribal tensions, not to mention transnational terrorist organizations, insurgent elements, piracy, and inadequate economic development. The region is rich in oil reserves, but poor in fresh water. Economic conditions vary enormously, with annual per-capital incomes ranging from a low of $200 to a high of over $70,000. In 22 of 27 states in the AOR, young people aged 15 to 29 constitute over 40 percent of the population, and economic opportunities are often insufficient to meet their expectations.

Although the region is diverse, several transnational concerns affect many of its states, and I'd like to quickly review these, and then discuss specific challenges and opportunities within the sub-regions, concluding by outlining concepts I'll use, if confirmed, to guide the refinement of CENTCOM's regional security strategy.

A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals four primary transnational concerns. The first is violent extremism. Al Qaeda is, of course, the highest-priority terrorist threat to many states in the region, as well as to the United States and many of our allies around the world. However, other extremist groups also threaten security in the CENTCOM region. In addition, Tehran and Damascus support militant groups and proxies that challenge the stability and sovereignty of several states in the AOR.

The second transnational concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of WMD-related components and technical expertise. The lack of transparency and efforts by countries such as Iran and Syria to develop their nuclear programs is a major concern to states in the region, and could spark a destabilizing regional arms race. Nuclear proliferation also, of course, creates fears about the acquisition of nuclear devices by transnational terrorist groups.

A third concern is the lack of sustainable economic development in a number of the region's countries. This is not just a domestic social or humanitarian issue, it is a serious security concern, as well; for, without economic opportunity, poor and disenfranchised communities can serve as hotbeds for the spread of violent extremism. We have seen this in a number of areas in the region in recent years.

A fourth transnational concern encompasses narcotics and arms trafficking, piracy, and smuggling. These damage societies, threaten legitimate commerce and the flow of strategic resources, and often benefit terrorist networks. These activities must be addressed if international efforts to combat terrorist financing are to succeed.

These transnational concerns are interrelated and have different manifestations across the subregions of the CENTCOM AOR. While they constitute far from an exhaustive list of the challenges in the AOR, they do provide perspective as we turn to the sub-regions and their challenges.

The CENTCOM region can, in fact, be described as a region of regions, consisting of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf states, Central and South Asia, the Levant, and the Horn of Africa.
The Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf states comprise a region of vast complexity and strategic importance. In Iraq, Iraqi and coalition forces continue to build on the security gains of the past 15 months, as we also continue to reduce U.S. forces and transition responsibility to Iraqi security forces (ISF), strive to maintain the conditions necessary for political progress, help build governmental capacity, and seek to foster economic development.

I should note here that the number of security incidents in Iraq last week was the lowest in over 4 years, and it appears that the week that ends tomorrow will see an even lower number of incidents. This has been achieved despite having now withdrawn three of the five brigade combat teams (BCTs) scheduled to redeploy without replacement by the end of the July, and also with the reduction of the two marine battalions and marine expeditionary unit.

Recent operations in Basrah, Mosul, and now Sadr City, have contributed significantly to the reduction in violence, and Prime Minister Maliki, his government, the ISFs, and the Iraqi people, in addition to our troopers, deserve considerable credit for the positive developments since Ambassador Ryan Crocker and I testified, a month and a half ago.

In the months ahead, coalition forces will continue to work closely with the ISFs in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq and their extremist partners and the militia elements that threaten security in Iraq. As always, tough fights and hard work lie ahead. Nonetheless, I believe that the path we are on will best help achieve the objective of an Iraq that is at peace with itself and its neighbors, that is an ally in the war on terror, that has a government that serves all Iraqis and that is an increasingly prosperous and important member of the global economy and community of nations.

Iran continues to be a destabilizing influence in the region. It persists in its nontransparent pursuit of nuclear technology, and continues to fund, train, and arm dangerous militia organizations. Iran’s activities have been particularly harmful in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and Afghanistan. In each location, Tehran has, to varying degrees, fueled proxy wars in an effort to increase its influence and pursue its regional ambitions.

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse me. Excuse me, ma’am. We’re going to have to ask you to—we’re going to have to ask you to—we’re going to have to ask you to take your seat. Please take your seat. We’re going to—I’m sorry that we’re going to have to ask that you leave the room now. Please leave the room. Thank you. Please—please—we’re going to have to ask you to now please—the room. Please. Thank you. Please leave the room. We’re going to have—you’ll have to be removed if you demonstrate that way we’ve just heard. [Momentary pause while Capitol Police removed protester.]

General, please continue

General PETRAEUS. Even as we work with leaders in the region to help protect our partners from Iranian intimidation or coercion, however, we must also explore policies that, over the long term, offer the possibility of more constructive relations, if that is possible. Together with regional and global partners, we need to seek ways to encourage Iran to respect the integrity of other states, to
embrace nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and to contribute to regional stability rather than regional instability.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates are important partners in efforts to promote regional stability and improve regional economic and military cooperation. Our relationships with these states present many opportunities for advancing common economic and security interests, such as engagement via the Gulf security dialogue. We need to continue our strong, productive relationships with each of them as we strive to deal with the challenges that confront them and the Gulf region.

The countries of Central and South Asia face a variety of economic and security challenges, but they, too, offer abundant engagement and partnership opportunities. In Afghanistan, our focus is on helping the elected government expand governance, security, and economic opportunity, while defeating insurgent and terrorist threats.

In assessing the situation in Afghanistan, it is important to recognize that we and our coalition partners are helping that country build, not merely rebuild, for, even before its 30 years of war, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the world. Exploiting the security provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force, many coalition countries are striving to help Afghanistan achieve sustainable economic development in assisting with the provision of basic services, the development of infrastructure, and the creation of legitimate alternatives to poppy farming. Due to the scale of the challenges involved, and the difficulties in the security arena in particular, we should expect Afghanistan to require substantial international commitment and support for many years to come.

Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan, has been an important partner in efforts to combat terrorism. However, the newly-elected government faces serious economic difficulties and energy shortages, and it is still solidifying its coalition and coming to grips with how to respond to internal threats that have global implications.

We have seen, for example, growth in Taliban and al Qaeda capability and control in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the Northwest Frontier Province. Foreign fighters continue to flow from Pakistan into Afghanistan, where they’re a violent and destabilizing influence. One of our challenges will be to increase the capability of Pakistani security forces, which are not adequately trained or equipped, to secure their border or to deal with the growth of terrorist elements and the insurgency in the FATA. It is clear that we and other countries supporting Pakistan should support Islamabad as Pakistani leaders develop a comprehensive approach to countering extremist and insurgent activity.

In Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, abundant opportunities exist for building security, political, and economic partnerships, and for pursuing common interests. To varying degrees, we have, in fact, partnered in security efforts in encountering terrorism with these countries in the past, and we will have similar opportunities in the future.
U.S. partnerships can also help these countries’ efforts to build governmental capacity and continue economic growth, while also reducing the prospects that extremism will gain influence and be exported.

In the Levant, we see continuing challenges of instability and terrorist activity and facilitation in Lebanon and Syria, even as we enjoy robust security partnerships with Jordan and Egypt.

In Lebanon, the government is grappling with the political and militia activities of Lebanese Hezbollah. Recently, Hezbollah attempted to break the political deadlock through violent action, forcing Sunni Arabs from some neighborhoods in Beirut, and intimidating the government and Lebanese armed forces. Yesterday’s agreement between the Lebanese government and the Hezbollah-led opposition needs to be seen in that context, as it highlights the need to support regional efforts to help Lebanon as it seeks to deal with destabilizing Syrian and Iranian influences.

Syria presents another set of challenges. Of particular concern to Iraq, the Syrian government has taken inadequate measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters through Syria to join al Qaeda elements in northern Iraq. Damascus also continues to undermine stability in Lebanon by encouraging and enabling violent opposition to the elected government. Finally, Syria’s apparent effort to develop secret nuclear facilities is also very troubling. The region obviously would be more secure were Syria to realize that neither harboring terrorist facilitators nor sparking a regional arms race is in Syria’s best interest.

As with Iran, the challenge with Syria will be to find approaches that can convince Syrian leaders that they should be part of the solution in the region rather than a continuing part of the problem. Hopefully, yesterday’s announcement of renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel marks a first step toward that end.

Jordan and Egypt are important partners in U.S. counterterrorist efforts, and they help to promote regional stability by encouraging neighboring states to participate constructively in the Middle East peace process. In addition, Jordan plays an influential role in helping inform attitudes in the Arab world on the situation in Iraq. Maintaining our robust partnerships with these countries can enable us to sustain mutually beneficial security and economic ties.

As it currently stands, the Horn of Africa is another subregion in the CENTCOM AOR. With responsibility for this region which includes Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Seychelles scheduled for transfer to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) this fall, CENTCOM’s challenge will be to provide a seamless transition of responsibilities, and to establish effective coordination and liaison with AFRICOM to ensure unity of effort in the conduct of various counterterrorist and counterpiracy missions.

Having quickly addressed transnational challenges and the challenges in the regions of the AOR, I’d like to briefly discuss some broad principles that will guide our efforts if I’m confirmed. These approaches are consistent with those pursued by CENTCOM under the leadership of Admiral William “Fox” Fallon and now General Martin Dempsey.
First, we'll seek to strengthen international partnerships. We will continue to pursue strong bilateral and multilateral partnerships and to identify, further develop, and pursue mutual interests. Regional partnerships and consensus can create leverage and deter destabilizing actors. Of course, the pursuit of common interests requires robust, two-way engagement, understanding, and accommodating the concerns of others even as we understandably seek to pursue our own. Engagement will be a central aspect of my responsibilities as the CENTCOM Commander, if confirmed.

Second, in most, if not all, of our activities, we will partner with other departments and agencies within the U.S. Government, taking a whole-of-government approach to the challenges and opportunities of the CENTCOM AOR. In most of the issues we’ll address, a purely military approach is unlikely to succeed, and our strategy must recognize that. Indeed, many of you will recall that the campaign plan in Iraq is a joint U.S. Embassy-Iraq and MNF–I product, not merely a military one. A combined approach should also be a central feature of our efforts in the CENTCOM AOR.

Third, and related to that, if I’m confirmed we will pursue comprehensive efforts and solutions in the region. Attempting to address, with our partners, not just the symptoms of current conflicts, but also their underlying causes.

Last month in my testimony, I explained the strategy we have adopted in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq, acting along multiple lines of operation and employing a variety of kinetic and nonkinetic approaches. We’ll seek to apply a similar strategy, writ large, in the CENTCOM AOR, recognizing that enduring security and stability require comprehensive economic, political, social, and diplomatic efforts, as well as military means.

Finally, we should both support the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and ensure readiness for possible contingency operations in order to be prepared to assist in the event of natural disasters, to ensure sufficient deterrence of actions that might threaten regional partners, and, if necessary, to be ready to defeat aggressors that threaten our vital interests in the region.

If I’m confirmed, these concepts will guide our approach at CENTCOM and inform the refinement of the strategy employed to address the challenges and opportunities in the CENTCOM region.

In closing, I want to thank each of you, once again, for the tremendous support you continue to provide to our men and women in uniform and to their families. Nothing means more to the wonderful Americans serving in harm’s way or waiting for a loved one at home than knowing that their service and sacrifices are appreciated by their fellow citizens.

I also want to assure you that, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to meet my responsibilities as a combatant commander to partner with you, the Service chiefs and secretaries, the Chairman and the Secretary, to help ensure that those serving our Nation in uniform have the best equipment available, the best care possible for those wounded or injured, and the best preparation for the challenging tasks we ask our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast-guardsmen to perform in combat. This is a sacred obligation that I take very seriously.
This committee knows well the extraordinary performance of our troopers downrange. Their selfless commitment to duty has, in fact, been foremost in my mind as I have considered the responsibilities of the CENTCOM Commander. Command of CENTCOM would likely mean carrying the heaviest rucksack I’ve ever shouldered; but, given our servicemembers’ repeated willingness to shoulder their own heavy rucksacks in the toughest, most complex situations imaginable, there can be no alternative but to soldier on with them, drawing strength from them, striving to give energy to them, and pressing on together with them to accomplish our assigned missions. If confirmed, it will be an honor to do that with them.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Petraeus.

General Odierno?

STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ

General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I want to, first, personally pass along my best wishes to Senator Kennedy and his family. We’re all rooting and praying for him, his quick return back here to the Senate.

Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt you for just a moment.

Thank you and General Petraeus for your reference to Senator Kennedy. This is a Senate family, which is a very strong, cohesive family, and he is a very important part of that cohesion. We’re never a tighter family than when something like this happens to somebody that has such huge respect as Senator Kennedy. That’s true on both sides of the aisle. We very much appreciate your reference to him. As we note the seat next to us, which is empty, we are all praying and hoping and believing that that seat will be occupied by Senator Kennedy in the near future.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I associate myself with those remarks and thank the generals. I’ve had the wonderful opportunity to know Senator Kennedy for over 40 years. His older brother, Bobby Kennedy, and I were in law school together, back in the late 1940s, and I got to know him at that time, and we’ve been close working partners and good friends ever since. We thank you for that acknowledgment.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.

General Odierno?

General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning.

Most recently, as the Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, I had the honor of speaking with many of you during a number of congressional visits to the Iraqi theater of operations. I want to thank you for your dedicated support to our forces serving there, your faith in their outstanding abilities, and your understanding of the many sacrifices they and their families endure for the sake of country, comrades, and their loved ones. For all of this, I thank the members of the committee.

As I reflect on my nomination to be appointed the next MNF-I Commander, I’m both humbled and honored. I understand the
great cost that our Nation has endured in Iraq. I also understand the importance of our mission there and the responsibility that comes with this position. I am inspired, and I feel a tremendous sense of awe for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and their families for their demonstrated resilience and accomplishments and commitment to the tasks at hand. I consider myself blessed that I've had a chance to continue to serve in their ranks. If confirmed, I will do so with integrity, commitment, and drive that such a special position of trust and responsibility demands.

With that, I'd look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse this slight delay here. We're trying to schedule a vote of the committee on nominations. If we can get a quorum, we will interrupt our questions in order to act on those nominations this morning.

We're going to have to limit our question period to a 6-minute round, because I understand we have up to four votes, starting at 11:30. Whether we can function through that or not, we will have to determine as we proceed, but, at least, we're going to try to get one round each before that time. So, we're going to, in order to do that, have to have a 6-minute round.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, we've discussed—those are the nominations of General McChrystal and Admiral McRaven to——

Chairman LEVIN. There's a number of other nominations. They're included with that list.

Senator WARNER. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. General Petraeus, when you appeared before the committee, on April 8, you said that your recommendation at that time was that, after the drawdown of the five brigades of surge troops that would be finished in July, that you would first undertake a 45-day period of evaluation, and that would take us through August, and that then, following that, you would commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over time, determine when you could make recommendations for further reductions. In response to my questions at the time, you said that you could not say how long that period of assessment would take, whether it would be 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, or more. Is it now your intention to make a recommendation, relative to further troop reductions, before you change command, presumably in September?

General PETRAEUS. It is, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us what has caused that change?

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, what I was trying to explain, last month, was that the period of consolidation and evaluation would include assessments, and that, at the end of that time, if conditions allowed, that there would be recommendations at that time. My sense is that I will be able to make a recommendation at that time for some further reductions. I don't want to imply that that means a BCT or major combat formation, although it could. But, I do believe that there will be certain assets that, as we are already looking at the picture right now, we'll be able to recommend, can be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater in the fall.
Chairman Levin. All right. That, I think, is good news to most of us.

What role are U.S. forces playing in the operations in Sadr City?

General Petraeus. We are providing a variety of enabler support for the operations. Now we're really talking about that portion of Sadr City in which we do not have forces right now. We have, as you may know, Mr. Chairman, up to a certain line in Sadr City, about one-fifth of the way from the southwest toward the northeast, forces together with Iraqi elements. In the remaining portion of Sadr City, which the Iraqi forces just entered a couple of days ago, we do not have forces on the ground, although we do provide a variety of enablers, in terms of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, attack helicopter teams, and, again, other assets. Although those have not been required to be actively engaged in that other part of Sadr City.

Chairman Levin. General Petraeus, at the present time, only 9 of 18 provinces have been turned over to Iraqi control. It's been 157 days since the last province, Basrah, was turned over to Iraqi control, and 157 days is the longest stretch between the turnover of a province to Iraqi control since the first province was turned over in July 2006. The December 2007 DOD report, titled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” stated that, “The current projection is that all provinces could transition to provincial Iraqi control as early as July 2008.” Three months later, the December 2007 Defense Department report stated that, “All remaining provinces are expected to transition in 2008.” Is that still the Department’s expectation, that all provinces now are expected to transition in this year, of 2008?

General Petraeus. It is not, Mr. Chairman. There are several additional provinces already scheduled for transition in the next few months. Interestingly, Anbar Province, once the most violent province in Iraq, and now one of the most peaceful provinces, will be transitioning, mostly likely, in June. The final approval has not yet been given by the Ministerial Committee on National Security, but I believe that that will be dealt with, perhaps later this week or next week.

I expect Qadisiyah Province, which has Diwaniyah as its capital, to go through a similar process later this summer, and then there are others racked up behind it for which we have projections, and we reassess those projections about every month. Frankly, the developments of the last month and a half are causing us to look, perhaps, for earlier transition, in some cases, with some provinces, while still others will be, undoubtedly, in the 2009 timeframe.

Chairman Levin. What happened since December 2007, when the Department said that all remaining provinces are expected to transition in 2008, and now, when apparently a number of provinces will not be transitioned? What has changed? There seems to be greater stability on the ground and progress on the ground.

General Petraeus. There is now, Mr. Chairman, but, again, you have to go back to that timeframe. We were still, in some cases, extending the benefits of the security progress that resulted from the additional coalition and Iraqi forces, still trying to determine how that was going to go, and, in some cases, grappling with some tough issues. Ninawa Province, for example, the only province actu-
ally of the 18 in Iraq that did not see violence go down, had to be slid further to the right in that regard. Now all of a sudden there is a major operation there in Mosul and in western Ninawa Province, that appears to be improving the security there substantially. We’ll be doing assessments during the course of this year, but I don’t think that all of them will be done, by any means, by the end of the year.

Chairman Levin. Just a brief final question. Is it your expectation that the October 1, 2008, date for holding provincial elections will be met?

General Petraeus. I do not believe that they will be in October, sir, based on the very latest. However, the provincial elections law has had its second reading, which is the step just before the conduct of a vote in the Council of Representatives. That could take place as early as this next week. If all of that goes—they’ve transferred the money to the higher electoral committee, they’re doing the security assessments, and a variety of other actions to prepare for the voter registration and then the conduct of the elections—Ambassador Crocker’s assessment most recently is that probably November is a more accurate prediction. But, again, there’s every intention to have elections in the fall, and that is our expectation, still.

Chairman Levin. Yes. That delay is not good news, obviously, to us, or most of us, I think, but thank you for your answer.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome both of you and thank you and your families for your service to the country.

Both of you represent not only two of the citizens of this country, but you represent our military, two career patterns which, I think, incentivize the generations behind you to stay and try and achieve some of the successes that each of you have had. That’s important at this time.

On the question of Iraq, this morning’s paper carried a very interesting article on operations in Sadr City, and it indicated that, where operations are being conducted now, there’s very few, if any, U.S. forces; and that’s, in a way, helping the Iraqi forces to perform their mission, because there’s less retaliation from the insurgents over there. Can you comment on that? Is that a new development? It looks like a very encouraging one.

General Petraeus. Senator, it is an encouraging one, but it is one that has been brought about by, very much, joint action by coalition, as well as ISFs. It was that joint action, and also, frankly, political dialogue, discussion, negotiation, deals, and compromises, that led to the point where the major “special group” leaders, these elements that are funded, trained, equipped, and supported by the Iranian Quds Force, largely left Sadr City. Some of them were killed, by the way. A number of the major other militia leaders also departed, and there was an order for the militia essentially to stand down. That is an important development. The fact that it is Iraqi forces that then can patrol the streets of Sadr City—and they have found some significant weapons caches already, including a very large one in a hospital, I might add, in Sadr City—again, this is encouraging.
It is not a model for everywhere. In Basrah, for example, we have no ground combat elements with the forces there. We do have transition teams, and we do, again, provide enablers. In Mosul, we’re very much partnered with them, but they outnumber us greatly.

Senator WARNER. General Odierno, do you have a comment on that? Because it seems to me that’s one of the most encouraging signs that I’ve seen, that the Iraqis are able to handle these operations, and has left combat as a consequence of the absence of what they view us, as occupiers.

General ODIERNO. I think, obviously, Senator, that each place of Iraq has different solutions. In Sadr City and in Basrah, I would argue, it’s important for the Iraqis to lead in those areas, and take on the majority of the responsibility. In my mind, it is very important that that’s occurring. But the other thing is, we help them significantly, behind the scenes, continue to plan. I see that as a model for the future on how we want to do things. What we want to do is provide them——

Senator WARNER. I hope you could encourage it in every way possible, because the goal is to have the Iraqi forces take over the responsibility of this sovereign nation, such that we can return home.

The Strategic Framework Agreement and the other Status of Forces Agreement, are you being consulted on that, General Petraeus?

General PETRAEUS. I am, Senator. We provided input to that. The lead for that is the Department of State, and, in fact, Ambassador Crocker, with a good deal of support from State. But, I have been consulted. We did provide input.

Senator WARNER. General Odierno, will you, likewise, be consulted, or are you getting up to speed on those two agreements now? Because we don’t want to see them put in place as an impediment for the U.S. military from carrying out what it believes is the best operational situation to get ourselves out of there.

General ODIERNO. Senator, obviously it’s very important to us. We will continue to provide input. We will watch it very closely to make sure that it’s crafted in such a way which allows us to continue to meet the goals of our mission.

Senator WARNER. Right now you’re being consulted, and, once you take command, I would hope that you would be further consulted, to the extent that those agreements have not been concluded. There’s some optimism they could be concluded before you move on up to CENTCOM. Is that right?

General PETRAEUS. I think that is certainly possible, Senator. Again, I’m always cautious about events in Iraq.

Senator WARNER. All right. Back to Afghanistan, one of the major concerns that I’ve had is this drug trade. The dollars flowing from that drug trade, which, incidentally, I think they are now the largest provider, worldwide, of these types of drugs—the dollars that are coming from that are being used to purchase weapons, and those weapons are being used against our forces and other partners in the NATO Alliance. What do you hope to do to try and end that, General?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, a country’s economy can’t be built on illegal activity, obviously.
Senator WARNER. But, in this country it’s over half of their economy.

General PETRAEUS. No question about it. There is clear recognition of it. Obviously, over time there has to be an alternative provided to those who are currently farming the poppy, and it’s as simple as that. But, it is also, as you very well know, extraordinarily difficult and complex to make that transition.

Senator WARNER. I realize that, but it seems to me you can have a very strong voice—I think Admiral Fallon did his best, but we cannot just leave this to the Afghan Government and turn our backs on it, because our people are on the other end of those weapons systems.

General PETRAEUS. I agree.

Senator WARNER. On the question of NATO—while that operation in Afghanistan is largely under the command of NATO—we, of course, have a U.S. commander there—NATO survivability depends on a measure of success in that country. What can you do to further facilitate NATO’s ability to carry out that success and to deal with these really difficult situations, where some of the countries in those forces will not allow their forces, their troops on the ground, to participate in combat?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, of course, what we are doing already, and likely will do a bit more of, which is our contribution of forces to that mission—you rightly point out that the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force is American, but he is a NATO commander.

Senator WARNER. That’s correct.

General PETRAEUS. He is not a commander in that billet. Knowing General David McKiernan very well, though, obviously I’ll partner with him as closely as possible, and with NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, and also knowing many of the coalition-country leaders, who also contribute troops in Iraq, to work with them to do what has been done, and that recently resulted in the pledges of some increases of forces. Additionally, we can help with the lessons that we have learned and, I think, have institutionalized effectively in our military services in the United States, in terms of the doctrine, the education of our leaders, the training and preparation of our forces, and even the equipping of them. We can help with that, as well.

Senator WARNER. But, the national caveats of some of those countries to prohibit their forces from engaging in risk-taking operations that ours and others are performing, to me, is a dichotomy that you just can’t tolerate.

Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, and thank you, General Odierno and General Petraeus, for your service. Thanks for agreeing to take on these additional assignments, which are not the easiest for you, personally, or for your families. We thank them, as well.

I appreciate that you responded that your future daughter-in-law is from Greenwich, CT, because it shows that your son has her good judgment. I would also say that he carries on a family tradi-
tion of heroic service to our country and is characteristic of the tens of thousands of Americans who have served under your command. Both of you have acknowledged that.

I think the two of you and those who have served in Iraq wearing the uniform of our country have really represented the best of our country, and really, if we look at the record here, ought to give the whole country tremendous pride, no matter what one thought about the original reasons we went into Iraq. You have been a force that has been principled, understanding America’s values, you’ve been personally strong, you’ve been resilient, in the sense that when something wasn’t working, in characteristic American fashion you figured out a way to make it work. I personally believe that, in doing so, you have greatly brightened the future for the Iraqi people, increased the prospects of stability in the Middle East, and protected the security and values of the American people. I can’t thank you enough for that.

The military historians and analysts Fred and Kim Kagan recently wrote, “Great commanders often come in pairs: Eisenhower and Patton, Grant and Sherman. Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno can now be added to that list.” That’s heavy stuff, but it happens to be true, in my opinion. I think the two of you have now earned your place into the ranks of the most impressive military commanders in American history, and I thank you for it.

General Petraeus, I continue to be very angry about the role that Iran is playing in training and equipping Shiite extremists who are coming into Iraq and are responsible for the murder of hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi soldiers and citizens. I wanted to ask you—and I know you share that view, of course—I wanted to ask you what the current state, to the best of your knowledge, is, of Iranian support of these special groups and others in Iraq.

General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, we know that support has continued well after Iran’s most senior leaders made promises to Iraq’s most senior leaders that they would stop the training, funding, arming, and directing of the so-called “special group” leaders and elements, and also support for the militia. We know that, because we have detained individuals who were recipients of that training, funding, and arming. They have explained, in great detail, the process for that. We had previously captured the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, which was created to support this effort and to use the lessons that they had learned with Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

We know, from having captured, and from Iraqi troops having captured, massive weapons caches in Basrah, some of which bear markings that denote that they were made in January or February of 2008, some which contain fuses made only in Iran, others which followed a chain to get to Iran and then into the hands of other special groups from Syria through Lebanese Hezbollah, in the case of RPG–29s. This is all very clear. It’s evidence; it’s not supposition.

We have laid this out for Iraqi leaders in the past. We’re going to do it with an update again with their intelligence agencies, as well. Their leaders have laid it out for the public in Iraq. Frankly, it has galvanized a degree of opposition, resentment, and so forth,
by a government that views that it’s a sovereign government of a
sovereign country that is being interfered with by its neighbor to
the east, a neighbor that should, by rights, want to see it succeed,
to see a Shiite-led government in Iraq succeed, given that Iran is
also Shiite, given the common interests they have, the commercial
interests, economic interests, religious tourism, with Najaf and
Karbala being in Iraq, and so forth.
Delegations have recently gone to Iran and shared the concerns
of the Iraqi Government. It is our hope that this will lead to some
change in the activities, that there will be a recognition that this
has been very destabilizing, that it has challenged, again, a sov-
ereign nation and the government of Prime Minister Maliki. We
are looking for signs of that, frankly. We know, though, that a
number of the “special group” leaders have gone back to Iran.
That’s where they are seeking refuge as they have been put under
pressure in, first, Basrah, then other areas in southern provinces,
and now in Sadr City. Over time, again, it is our hope that those
two countries, which will always be neighbors of each other can
reach an understanding that the kind of lethal activities that have
been undertaken in recent years are not in the interest of either
country.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. I think the most
significant part of it—I mean, the most disappointing part, of
course, is the Iranians are still doing what they’ve been doing, re-
sulting in deaths of Americans in Iraq, but the most significant
part is that Prime Minister Maliki is now, from what you’ve said,
recognizing that this is not only an attack on us, it’s an attack on
the sovereignty of Iraq and is asserting that with the Iranians, and
we can only hope that it draws a response.
In the time I have left, I want to ask you something else about
Prime Minister Maliki. When you were here before the committee
6 weeks ago, the offensive the Prime Minister initiated and ordered
in Basrah had just begun, and there was a sense then, widely
shared here in Congress and in the public, that the offensive had
failed, that it was further proof of the inadequacy of ISFs, that
Sadr was the winner, that Maliki was the loser. Obviously it looks
a lot different, 6 weeks later. Give us your own sense of what the
status on the ground is in Basrah now and what it says about the
ISF, Maliki, and the extremists in the south of Iraq.
General Petraeus. Senator, you are correct that the operation in
Basrah did have a shaky start. But, it has since seen enormous
progress that has produced very positive tactical and strategic re-
sults. The tactical results are the return of control to legitimate se-
curity forces in Basrah, something for which the Basrawis, the peo-
ple of that city and province, are quite grateful and they’re pleased
about.
The ISFs, again, after that shaky start, very much stiffened.
They were reinforced by two additional brigades brought down
from Anbar Province. By the way, our support here has been noth-
ing more than transition teams, the so-called advisor teams, with
their conventional and Special Operations Forces and the provision
of enablers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, attack
helicopter teams on occasion, and so forth. They have continued to
expand their areas of control. They conducted operations this past
week, some 50 or 60 kilometers north of Basrah City, in Al Kerna—where the two rivers come together—and the parent site of the Garden of Eden, according to some historians—and then even turned left and have now gone 20 or so kilometers in another direction. This is moving up towards Maysan Province in the marshes and in the city of Amarah, where there have also been some operations by Iraqi forces after quite a long absence there, as well.

On the strategic side, this has all been important, because there has been a degree of support for Prime Minister Maliki in this subsequent period that is unparalleled during the time that Ambassador Crocker and I have been in Iraq. It appears that the Sunni coalition will return to government. Touch wood on that, but that does look likely. The level of Kurdish support from the two senior Kurdish leaders is much solidified. Prime Minister Maliki then demonstrated that he's willing to go after al Qaeda, as well, with Iraqi forces, in a very substantial offensive launched in Mosul, which is one that took place after about 3 months of very careful condition-setting, of the establishment of the infrastructure—combat outposts, joint security stations, the intelligence baseline, and all the rest of that logistical stockpiling. That operation is also off to a good start, tactically. We'll have to see, over time, because al Qaeda will try to come back and try to regenerate. But, they have also launched operations on the so-called “rat lines” along which foreign fighters enter Iraq from Syria, and that's a very important development, as well.

The result is, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that last week's level of incidence was the lowest in over 4 years, and this week's is even significantly lower, and it's a result of these different operations, plus now Sadr City.

Meanwhile, in the Council of Representatives, the focus on the provincial elections law has been good, and, as I mentioned, we hope to see a vote on that in the next week or so, it having had its second reading. Then they can start to focus, we believe, on the hydrocarbon law package on which there has been much greater coordination between the different factions, as well, already; and there are new prospects for progress there that were not at all seen prior to the operation in Basrah. So, it's had a political impact that is very significant, in addition to the tactical military progress that has been made there.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that very encouraging report, which I find nothing short of thrilling.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In my brief opening comment, I made reference to an article, “Success in Iraq: A Media Blackout,” 2 days ago in the New York Post, and I'd like to ask that this be entered into the record at this point.

Chairman LEVIN. It will become part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
SUCCESS IN IRAQ: A MEDIA BLACKOUT

By RALPH PETERS

May 20, 2008 – DO we still have troops in Iraq? Is there still a conflict over there?

If you rely on the so-called mainstream media, you may have difficulty answering those questions these days. As Iraqi and Coalition forces pile up one success after another, Iraq has magically vanished from the headlines.

Want a real “inconvenient truth?” Progress in Iraq is powerful and accelerating.

But that fact isn’t helpful to elite media commissars and cadres determined to decide the presidential race over our heads. How dare our troops win? Even worse, Iraqi troops are winning. Daily.

You won’t see that above the fold in The New York Times. And forget the Obama-infused news networks - they’ve adopted his story line that the clock stopped back in 2003.

To be fair to the quit-Iraq-and-save-the-terrorists media, they have covered a few recent stories from Iraq:

* When a rogue US soldier used a Koran for target practice, journalists pulled out all the stops to turn it into “Abu Ghraib, The Sequel.”

Unforgivably, the Army handled the situation well. The “atrocities” didn’t get the traction the whistleblowers hoped for.

* When a battered, bleeding al Qaeda managed to set off a few bombs targeting Sunni Arabs who’d turned against terror, that, too, received delighted media play

* As long as Baghdad-based journalists could hope that the joint US-Iraqi move into Sadr City would end disastrously, we were treated to a brief flurry of headlines.

* A few weeks back, we heard about another Iraqi company - 100 or so men - who declined to fight. The story was just tedious, as far as the media were concerned.

Then tragedy struck: As in Baqra the month before, absent-without-leave (and hiding in Iran) Muqtada al Sadr quit under pressure from Iraqi and US troops. The missile and mortar attacks on the Green Zone stopped. There’s peace in the streets.

Today, Iraqi soldiers, not militia thugs, patrol the lanes of Sadr City, where waste has replaced roadside bombs as the greatest danger to careless foottraffic. US advisers and troops support the effort, but Iraq's
government has taken another giant step forward in establishing law and order.

My fellow Americans, have you read or seen a single interview with any of the millions of Iraqis in Sadr City or Basra who are thrilled that the gangster militias are gone from their neighborhoods?

 Didn't think so. The basic mission of the American media between now and November is to convince you, the voter, that Iraq's still a hopeless mess.

Meanwhile, they've performed yet another amazing magic trick - making Kurdistan disappear.

Remember the Kurds? Our allies in northern Iraq? When last sighted, they were living in peace and building a robust economy with regular elections, burgeoning universities and municipal services that worked.

After Israel, the most livable, decent place in the greater Middle East is Iraqi Kurdistan. Wouldn't want that news getting out.

If the Kurds would only start slaughtering their neighbors and bombing Coalition troops, they might get some attention. Unfortunately, there are no US or allied combat units in Kurdistan for Kurds to bomb. They weren't needed. And (blessed people that they are) the Kurds are pro-American - despite the virulent anti-Kurdish prejudices prevalent in our Saudi-smooching State Department.

Developments just keep getting grimmer for the MoveOn org fan base in the media. Iraq's Sunni Arabs, who had supported al Qaeda and homegrown insurgents, now support their government and welcome US troops. And, in southern Iraq, the Iranians lost their bid for control to Iraq's government.

Bury those stories on Page 36.

Our troops deserve better. The Iraqis deserve better. You deserve better. The forces of freedom are winning.

Here in the Land of the Free, of course, freedom of the press means the freedom to boycott good news from Iraq. But the truth does have a way of coming out.

The surge worked. Incontestably. Iraqis grew disenchanted with extremism. Our military performed magnificently. More and more Iraqis have stepped up to fight for their own country. The Iraqi economy's taking off. And, for all its faults, the Iraqi legislature has accomplished far more than our own lobbyist-run Congress over the last 18 months.

When Iraq seemed destined to become a huge American embarrassment, our media couldn't get enough of it. Now that Iraq looks like a success in the making, there's a virtual news blackout.

Of course, the front pages need copy. So you can read all you want about the heroic efforts of the Chinese People's Army in the wake of the earthquake.

Tells you all you really need to know about our media: American soldiers bad, Red Chinese troops good.

Is Jane Fonda on her way to the earthquake zone yet?


Senator INHOFE. In there they talk about how the Iraq and the coalition forces are piling up one success after another, the media is not giving you a fair shake on this, which is something not too surprising. But, we're now seeing the lowest violence indicators since April 2004, and the Iraqi Government is asserting more control.

I was honored to be right outside of Basrah when that took place, and, in fact, I talked to you at that time, and there is kind of a mixed feeling as to how the performance was of the ISFs. It was
interesting that our forces that I talked to personally were very complimentary—we’ve talked about how they are now expanding into areas, and we’re real pleased with that. That’s more of a functional thing.

I’d like to ask each one of you how you’re seeing, since you’ve been there a long time, the progress in the training, in the performance of the Iraqis as soldiers.

General Petraeus. There has been a significant increase in the capacity, as well as the capability, of the Iraqi forces. Even though, for example, the operation in Basrah got off to a shaky start, what preceded it was unprecedented, and that is the deployment, really throughout that week, of over a division’s worth of Iraqi forces. That’s a very substantial movement, and something that would have been thought impossible a year ago.

Senator Inhofe. Which they really did on their own, too.

General Petraeus. They did it on their own, and they then had their C–130s turning several times a day (each of the two of their three) typically, that were operating on a given day. Again, not all smooth, not all the way we might do it, but it all got done, and the result, over time, after the initial, again, slow start, was that the units performed quite well.

Indeed, some of the units that did not do well—among them were a brigade that had just literally come out of the unit set fielding, the whole process of basic training and so forth; that unit has actually been provided additional replacements, it has gone through a retraining process, and its elements are starting to reenter the operations in Basrah, and, so far, have done well.

Again, there’s been considerable progress in this regard, and you see it also in a variety of the other southern provinces, in Mosul now, in Diyala Province, Anbar, and also, of course, in Baghdad.

Senator Inhofe. Good.

General Odierno?

General Odierno. Senator, if I could just——

Chairman Levin. Excuse me for interrupting you, General. We have a quorum here, and we have to take advantage of it, as I indicated. [Recessed.]

General Odierno, you were about to say something. Thank you for your patience.

Senator Warner. May I say thank you, though, Mr. Chairman, for that expedited process.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Inhofe. General?

General Odierno. Sir, I would just add, to what General Petraeus said, what we’ve seen consistently over the last 12 to 14 months is an improvement in the command and control, the ability of the Iraqi forces—the learning. They’re starting to understand the command-and-control at brigade, battalion, company level. We’ve seen significant improvements in that, in their ability to do some planning.

Of course, the issue always becomes capacity, and we still have to work on their full capacity to do this across the entire force. But, we are seeing consistent improvement in these areas, and that’s where we have to continue—why it’s so important for us to continue to have transition teams, continue to be partnered with them,
continue to liaise with them, and we'll continue to see this improvement.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. That's why I wanted to mention it. Quite frankly, I've been over there quite a few times, and what I always try to do is get the reports of our troops that are over there participating and training and working with these guys. It's been favorable. They're a different standard from us, but dramatic improvements are taking place.

I've long supported the idea of the independent AFRICOM, and I've had a lot of conversations with General William Ward and his predecessor. I really think it's going to come along fine. I am concerned, however, because, when you think about right now AFRICOM is parts of Pacific Command, European Command, CENTCOM, but the most aggressive part comes out of CENTCOM. Now, you have that whole corner up there. You have Somalia, you have Ethiopia, which has been very good in supporting our efforts in Somalia; then you have Eritrea, just right down there on the water, and the Sudan. That's where, really, things are very active, and a smooth transition is going to be necessary.

I recognize that they're talking about standing that up on October 1st, but I also realize, or suspect, and would like to have your comments, that there's going to be a transitional period. If it's going to be seamless, it's going to take quite a bit of effort beyond the October 1st date. What do you think?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I agree. There is a conference ongoing right now—in fact, in Tampa—between the CENTCOM and AFRICOM staff, to work out—there are a host of different tasks and functions, dozens and dozens of these identified, that will be transitioned, and they are working out that process of transition in ensuring that AFRICOM will have, for example, the command-and-control operational center capabilities, and those types of capabilities to take over the missions that CENTCOM is performing in the Horn of Africa, in particular.

Senator INHOFE. Well, and we'd like to have——

General PETRAEUS. They——

Senator INHOFE. Please go ahead.

General PETRAEUS. They may make a recommendation on how to phase that over time as this process continues.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I would hope, also, we look at the resources that they have, and that they need, that General Ward will have to have, particularly if he stays up in Frankfurt and tries to run the thing from there.

Finally, I always bring up, the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), it's been working real well, although every time I get used to one thing, they change the name, so now it's CCIP—I guess, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. But, as far as in the areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, it's my understanding that the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 million for that program, and I'd like to get a response from both of you as to how well that program's going and your feelings about the future of the CERP.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the CERP is of enormous importance to our commanders and troopers on the ground in Iraq. It's hugely important that it continue. It saves lives. It enables commanders—
when you reach that point where money becomes the most impor-
tant ammunition because of security progress, it enables them to
achieve small, but quick and important, wins on the ground in
small reconstruction projects where we have enormous capacity. In
fact, it was in recognition of that capacity that the Iraqi Govern-
ment did provide that to us, although they’re also doing that with
their own ministries, provinces, and elements, as well.

Senator INHOFE. Good. Good.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator.

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would just add that it gives us flexi-
bility, leverage, and influence at the lowest levels, at the company,
battalion, and brigade level. It’s an extremely important program,
and that needs to continue. We publish a manual that says,
“Money is a weapon that we give to all of our young leaders.” It
has significant impacts, and I hope that we’ll be able to continue
that in the future.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. [Recess for brief
continuation of the business meeting.]

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus, let me add my welcome to you to the panel.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator AKAKA. General Odierno, welcome, to you and your love-
ly family here.

General Odierno, I’ve always thought of culture as important to
people. Cultural awareness of our soldiers has become a strategic
center of gravity in the Iraq conflict. The daily interaction of Amer-
ican service men and women with both their Iraqi counterparts and
civilian population has really expanded the skills required of our
military personnel far beyond which existed just a few years ago.

Given the importance of these skills, what cultural or language
training do units arriving in theater undergo that helps them to
conduct these nontraditional aspects of the operations? Do you be-
lieve this training is adequate?

General ODIERNO. It’s a very important part, sir, of all the train-
ing that we conduct today, and it’s done at the individual level, it’s
done at the collective level. We do it at all our schools now. It’s
been incorporated into all of our warrior leader courses, our basic
noncommissioned-officer courses. It is incorporated in our unit
training at home station. We’ve incorporated a large portion of this
at our National Training Centers, Joint Readiness Training Cen-
ters. It is critical to continue to do this as we move forward. But,
we have to continue to adjust, because we continue to learn more,
we continue to understand it better, and we have to continue to
change and continue to expand this program. It is one that is ex-
trmely important, it’s one that we have to continue, it’s one that
we must continue to learn from, adjust, so we can continue to give
our soldiers the best tools possible to be successful.

Senator AKAKA. General Odierno, your position with respect to
Iraq’s neighbors is that they are an important element of achieving
ultimate stability on the ground. I agree that the ability to get
other nations in the region to actively support political compromise,
reconciliation, and stability in Iraq, will be even more important for the coalition effort in the months to come. General, what are the best approaches to use in achieving cooperation with Iraq’s neighboring countries? Should these approaches be any different when dealing with Iran?

General ODIERNO. I would just say, sir, that, of course, we want to continue to have dialogue with many of the countries. General Petraeus, I think, could tell you that we have tried to have dialogue with the Ambassador in Iraq three different times, with Iran, reaching out to them at that level. So far, it, unfortunately, has not yielded the results we want. However, I would suggest that as we move forward, if we believe it could yield results, we’d like to, at the ambassador level, continue to have those discussions, if we think it’ll be fruitful.

We also should obviously reach out to many of the other countries—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt—and I’ll work with General Petraeus on that, if confirmed, to make sure we work together with those countries, to make sure they are helping us to solve the problems, and to help us with reconciliation, which, in my mind, is an extremely important piece as we continue to move forward, is getting many of these elements to reconcile. We’ve seen a good beginning in that, Senator, and we want to continue that.

Senator AKAKA. General Odierno, you have identified the communal struggle for powers as the number-one threat to Iraq, and asserted that sectarian conflicts fueled from both within and outside Iraq’s borders poses the greatest challenge to lasting security. The membership of the Sons of Iraq, which has been a significant part of recent security gains on the ground, stems from local militia groups, many of whom were former insurgents and are now being integrated into the ISFs. Given the tentative nature of the alliance between these groups and coalition forces, is there a plan to continue transitioning the Sons of Iraq into government-controlled units so that they don’t serve as a base for future sectarian conflict?

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. That’s a very important question as we move forward. Obviously, we are going to try to integrate them as much as possible. What we’ve found is, we believe somewhere between 25 and 30 percent are capable and want to be integrated sometime into the ISFs, are either physically/mentally capable, or will have the desire to do that. With the other portion, we have to develop other programs to ensure that they can be employed. We are working with the Iraqis to do that. We were doing that several months ago. That policy has continued, where we’re trying to develop work programs, we’re trying to have public works units that help, not only to then employ them, but to continue to rebuild the infrastructure, as well as deliver basic services. We think this is a key, as we move forward, and we must continue to work with the Government of Iraq to fund this program, as well as helping us to get that instituted. We will work that extremely hard, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Do you feel this is an essential element of long-term stability that would help legitimize the Iraqi national government?
General Odierno. I do. Many of these individuals, as we've talked with them and dealt with them, what they're really looking for is legitimacy, and they want to be part of the government—future of Iraq. So, this is their way of reaching out, volunteering to first provide security in these areas, and then become a permanent part of the government and part of the Nation as it moves forward.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. My time is expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to associate myself with a statement you made earlier, at least in part—I thought it was a very eloquent statement that these two gentlemen represent continuity at a time when America needs it the most.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Graham. To both of you, I just can't tell you how proud we are of the job that you and those under your command have done. It was a enormous challenge that you both took on. A year and a half ago, this thing looked very bleak. Your personal dedication, and those under your command, I think will go down in history, quite frankly, as one of the most successful counterinsurgency operations ever.

But, we're not here to talk about just the good news, we're here to talk about where we go. I want to congratulate the President for nominating you both, and, to Senator Levin, for holding these hearings as quickly as possible.

General Petraeus, as you go into your new job, it seems to me that one of the biggest problems we face in Afghanistan is, we have many forces over there from different areas of the world, NATO has assumed this fight; to me, this is a test of NATO. Are you concerned about the rules of engagement that some countries have imposed on NATO forces? What do you intend to do about that, if it is a concern?

General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, this is, indeed, a test of NATO, and the caveats that are put on the uses of various national forces are a challenge for the NATO commander there. I think General Dan McNeill, the current commander about to hand off to General David McKiernan, has been very clear about that. It's not unprecedented. I was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations for the Stabilization Force mission in Bosnia, and had a matrix on my desk of which forces were allowed to do which nonstandard tasks, if you will, or different tasks, and that was challenging. It is the same situation in Afghanistan, except more difficult, because, of course, they're in tough combat operations, not just peacekeeping or peace enforcement.

I think that continued dialogue with NATO authorities, with the Supreme NATO Commander, General John Craddock, and the other authorities with the coalition countries, many of whom also contribute forces to Iraq and, therefore, have been able to get to know them and so forth, is going to be part of the answer. I think, also, some additional provision of U.S. forces, and of those forces from those NATO countries that are willing and capable of con-
ducting counterinsurgency operations in the way that is required, will also be important in the months and years ahead.

Senator Graham. As you hand off command here, in a few short months, in Iraq, is it fair to say, from the America public's point of view, that we can expect, in the future, the Iraqis to fight more and to pay more for the cost of operations?

General Petraeus. It is, Senator.

Senator Graham. What would you attribute to the turnaround? I think all of us have met Prime Minister Maliki and some of the key players over in Iraq and have come away a bit frustrated at times. Last year, I think I visited with him in July—I had very little hope that anything was going to happen over there in a positive way. I'm quite astonished at the amount of reconciliation that's happened in the last 90 to 100 days in the operations in Basrah and Sadr City. If you could give us some insight, what happened? What changed?

General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, very significant, of course, was the decision that he made to take on the militia in Basrah. This is a Shiite-led government taking on a Shiite militia. It made an enormous statement about his willingness to serve all Iraqis. The result was increased support from those who had criticized him for a long time for turning a blind eye to the militia or not taking action against them in the way that he did in Basrah. He's followed that up, of course, courageously, inside Baghdad itself. Then also, to show all he's willing to go after all parties that are threatening the security and stability of Iraq, he has, of course, launched the operation in Mosul and Ninawa Province to go after al Qaeda and its Sunni extremist partners. There has been success in a number of these different areas. It's not solidified yet. As always, Ambassador Crocker and I are cautious in our assessments. But, there is significant progress, and, at the end of the day, nothing succeeds like a little bit of significant progress.

Senator Graham. Conversely, how is Sadr's standing among the Iraqi people?

General Petraeus. Senator, Muqtada al Sadr is still certainly seen as the embodiment of a very important movement in that country. The Sadr movement, which was founded on the martyr Sadr, his father, is a very important political element in Iraqi society. It is one that was founded on serving those most disadvantaged in the society. It stayed in Iraq during the Saddam era. It suffered enormously under it. So, it still has enormous influence. However, Sadr himself has recognized—in fact, by issuing the cease-fire order last fall in the wake of the violence precipitated by the militia in the holy city of Karbala, and after the militia elements and "special group" elements were linked to the assassination of two southern governors and police chiefs—that the armed elements associated with the movement were creating problems. In fact, it is that kind of assessment, we believe, that has prompted, over time, this directive to cease fire, to take a knee and so forth, because the people in Basrah were rejoicing at being freed from the grip of the militia. In fact, a man in Basrah told me that now he'd been liberated twice in recent years; once by the coalition forces, from Saddam; and now by the ISFs, from the militia.
Senator GRAHAM. My time is expired. One very brief question. General Odierno, thank you for what you’ve done and what you’re about to do. The force structure that we have in place and the drawdowns that we’re planning to implement over the summer, are you comfortable with what we’re about to do and how we’re going to do it?

General ODIERNO. I am, Senator. I provided recommendations to General Petraeus as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander. I stand behind those recommendations, which is what is going on right now. So, I feel extremely comfortable with what I continue to see as the progress we’re making over there, that we’ll be able to continue with those reductions, as planned, through the summer.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both, and your families.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Odierno and General Petraeus and your families, for your continued willingness to serve and the excellence of your service in the past. We’ve come to expect that from you, but I want you to know we don’t take it for granted, and we truly appreciate that. I know the American people do, as well.

In terms of finding options, General Petraeus—I can talk in football analogies, because Nebraska football may be on its way back—you remind me of an options quarterback who has to figure out all the options that are available and adjust to conditions on the ground before you make a determination.

Senator Collins and I have been pushing, for some time, the idea, which seems to have gained favor, to transition the mission for the combat troops, the coalition combat troops, but particularly the U.S. forces, in Iraq—in Baghdad to fighting counterterrorism activities, which I think is what they’ve been doing, so that the Iraqi forces could take more responsibility for their own security. Apparently, that’s part of what the plan is right now. Is it because we’ve come to understand that that’s necessary, and/or is it because Prime Minister al Maliki seems poised and prepared to do that now?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, again, to continue the analogy, you have to make the read at the line when you have the ball in each particular play, in each particular case, in each particular area. As you recall, when I last testified before the committee, I laid out the so-called Anaconda approach or strategy that we have employed to focus on al Qaeda-Iraq, and it employs much, much more than just what we have traditionally known as counterterrorist forces, our special mission units, the high-end Special Operations Forces. Critical to it has been conventional forces that have cleared and then been able to help hold cities like Baqubah, large neighborhoods in Baghdad, Ramadi, and so forth, and are now, in fact, doing the same to lesser degrees, slightly different approach—in Mosul.

That has enabled us, if you will, when the level of violence is reduced, to have ISFs shoulder more of the burden, and allowed us to focus a bit more discretely on some of the, again, al Qaeda or Sunni extremist elements that try to come back into those areas and try to re-establish roots in them, while Iraqi soldiers and police can handle some of the more day-to-day activity in those areas.
That’s really what is going on, that this transition, if you will, has been the product of some tremendously tough, hard work and fighting by coalition and Iraqi forces, much of it, I might add, during the time that Lieutenant General Odierno was the operational architect of the so-called “surge” of coalition and Iraqi forces.

Senator Ben Nelson. If Senator Graham’s right, that the goal is to get Iraq to pay more and to fight more, we may be succeeding in that. Of course, Senator Bayh, Senator Collins, and I have worked to get Iraq in a position to pay more of the costs for the costs of the war; many of them being our costs, which we have been underwriting for these several years—do you believe that that will put them more in charge, not only of their own destiny, but feel more committed to their destiny, not only in charge, but stronger commitment?

General Petraeus. Again, Senator, I think that transition—some of that is very much well underway. You’ll recall Ambassador Crocker, here, saying the days of the big reconstruction effort are over.

Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.

General Petraeus. We’re still finishing them and all the rest of that, but that is largely over.

Senator Ben Nelson. I knew that was his position, but we——

General Petraeus. In fact, this past week alone, Prime Minister Maliki announced a $5-billion reconstruction effort, and also they are working on a supplemental that will provide additional funds to all of their provinces, ministries, and other activities. They have long since reached the point where they are paying a good bit more for their Iraqi forces development than we are, and that will just continue. Our line goes down, and theirs goes up very dramatically.

When it comes to them fighting, their casualties continue to be well over, right now, three times our losses, and that does not include the Sons of Iraq, who are really a different category, who are also targeted continually by, in particular, Sunni extremists, because they represent the communities turning against these extremists. That’s a very difficult situation for those extremists.

Senator Ben Nelson. The query I would leave you with, in terms of Iraq and its future, is the question of, what if Muqtada al Sadr ends up with the majority in the next elections? But, we don’t need to go into that; that’s purely speculative. We certainly hope that that’s not the case.

I’d like to turn to Afghanistan for just a moment. I’m leading a congressional delegation there next week, as we spoke the other day. Given the challenges that there are in Afghanistan today, do we have any idea, or any vision, of what victory in Afghanistan will consist of? I’m not talking about when, but can we describe what would be victory in Afghanistan?

General Petraeus. Certainly it would be a situation where security is much improved, it does not have these pockets in which reconstruction is challenged, and, of course, where the economy is gradually starting to get to a self-sustaining stage. The differences between Iraq and Afghanistan could not be starker. You have one country which has what now may be the largest oil reserves in the world—it certainly is number two or number three—and pumping oil at substantial rates, and another country that generates, I be-
lieve it’s about $700 million in a year toward its own budget. So, Afghanistan clearly is going to require very substantial assistance from the international community for a number of years, and very important that we continue it, remembering what it was that took place on that soil and the reason that we went there.

Senator Ben Nelson. Sort of reminds us of a war on poverty, but it’s a war getting over poverty, to be able to sustain their own government and their own future. That’s not going to be very easy to solve simply with guns or butter.

General Petraeus. Absolutely, Senator, that’s, again, why I went to some length—and I appreciate your allowing me to provide an opening statement of that length—but to describe the comprehensive approach that’s needed, the whole-of-government effort, and the effort of very much partnering with all like-minded countries around the world, because that’s what it’s going to take.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you both, and good luck to both of you.

Thank you very much.

General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

I just would quickly note that, while we welcome the $5-billion announcement, by the Iraqi Government, of reconstruction funds, they’ve announced before reconstruction funding, they’ve budgeted reconstruction funding, but, when it comes to spending it, their budgeted amount, it’s been very slow. So we assume you’ll keep on top of that.

General Petraeus. Absolutely. It has improved, Senator, from year to year, but there’s no question but that it has to improve a great deal more.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus and General Odierno, I want to just underscore what Senator Graham had to say about both of you, and to express my heartfelt thanks for your service to our country. It’s really impossible to adequately express how much we appreciate the service that both of you are giving.

General Petraeus, you’ve probably learned as much or more about the need for improving interagency cooperation over the past 16 months as anyone, and I hope, if confirmed, that you will speak on the need for improving interagency cooperation, and to stress the consequences if we fail to heed the lessons learned from our efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a topic that we simply cannot just pass along to the next administration.

With those thoughts in mind, would you share with us some examples of where improvements must be made and what, in your professional opinion, are the potential consequences of merely maintaining the status quo?

General Petraeus. Senator, I think you know that a number of us in uniform and Secretary Gates are among the biggest champions for providing additional resources for the State Department, for U.S. Agency for International Development, and for some of our other interagency partners, so that they can, in fact, do just what you were talking about. We have learned an enormous amount
about this over time, and the increase in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the embedded PRTs has been a hugely important development, and a very significant part of the progress that has been made, not just in the security front, but, again, then, in the establishment of local governments, revival of local economies and markets, and reconstruction efforts, again, that were possible because of the improved security situation.

I mentioned, during my opening statement, that the campaign plan that we are executing in Iraq is not just a military campaign plan, it is the joint product of the U.S. Mission-Iraq, the Embassy, and the MNF–I, and it is signed by both the Ambassador and myself. By the way, the main effort—and you always identify a main effort in any such campaign plan—is actually the political line of operation, not the security line. While the security line is a crucial enabler to it, the ultimate solution, as we all recognize, has to come in the political arena.

Now, recognizing that is of enormous significance, and I think it’s very important. In the answers to the advance policy questions, I discussed a bit about steps that are being taken, and further steps should be taken, to improve, in terms of developing doctrine—just as we have in the military—to develop doctrine for kind of interagency cooperation and efforts that are required in the endeavors such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the theater, that there then has to be an education process for those; you actually have to practice it, try it somewhere. Ideally, we would welcome interagency partners joining us, for example, as our BCTs, division, and corps headquarters undergo the mission rehearsal exercises that we conduct for several weeks for each of these deploying units. Those are great opportunities, in fact, to get ready to perform the missions that are performed, again, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Then you need a feedback mechanism, a lessons-learned center.

A fair amount of this is actually now being done. It’s led by the State Department. It is at the Foreign Service Institute. That’s the right place for it. I think that developments in that area will be very important in helping the interagency do better what it is we have learned they must do to enable military forces to be successful in these very complex contingency operations.

Senator Dole. Thank you.

General Odierno, earlier this year General Petraeus answered questions concerning a reassessment phase following the drawdown in U.S. forces to the pre-surge end strength in July. That assessment will, I presume, now become your responsibility. How long do you anticipate that security assessment will take to complete before you decide if you should hold at the pre-surge level or, at some point, resume redeployment?

General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.

General Petraeus and I have talked about this. If I’m confirmed for the position, I think General Petraeus will make an assessment prior to his leaving, and we will have some discussion about that as he does it. We’ll confer about that. We’ll agree to that, that he will make some sort of an assessment as he leaves, and I will then execute that assessment, and then continue to assess and identify and make further decisions.
Senator Dole. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and to the
Army, your extraordinary service, and thank you for your families’
support.
I want to particularly recognize Captain Odierno, because his
service is emblematic of the service of so many young Americans
whose courage, many times, compensates for some lack of wisdom.
Thank you for your service.
General Petraeus, you now have responsibility for a whole the-
erater of operations. It’s interesting, the last Director of National
Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment suggested that al Qaeda has
reconstituted itself in the FATA, in Pakistan. In fact, Admiral
Mullen has stated, “If we were going to pick the next attack to the
United States, it would come out of the FATA.” Do you agree with
these intelligence assessments?
General Petraeus. I do, Senator. Clearly, al Qaeda senior lead-
ership has been strengthened in the FATA, even though their main
effort still is assessed to be in Iraq, by them, as well as by us. But,
the organization of an attack, if you will, would likely come from
the FATA.
Senator Reed. What does that say about our strategy? We have
focused extraordinary resources in Iraq, and, in the intervening
years since we began our operations there, al Qaeda, by our own
intelligence estimates, have re-established themselves, strength-
ened themselves, they have higher operational capacity today. We
have under-resourced Afghanistan, which is the closest theater of
our operations to Pakistan. We’ve been failing to engage the Paki-
stan military in effective counterinsurgency operations. Recently,
the Government of Pakistan has entered into another stand-down
agreement with the tribal leaders there. It seems to me that if
that’s the existential threat, we haven’t made it the main effort in
our campaign plan for your theater of operations. What’s your
thought?
General Petraeus. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
Senator, clearly we have to provide additional assistance to the
new Pakistani Government, which, as you mentioned, is still solidi-
fying its coalition, is developing essentially, a counterinsurgency
strategy, what approach it is going to take for dealing with the
FATA, a significant problem that they have inherited and that was
causing extraordinary violence in their country before they were
elected. We have very substantial programs in that area. I had a
very long conversation with Ambassador Anne Patterson, with the
station chief, with others, who are working that issue, about 2
weeks ago in Qatar. There are very substantial programs, but I
think that the key need is to assess whether the overall concept
that is guiding those—on the Pakistani side, in particular, of
course—is adequate or not.
One of the first trips that I would make, if confirmed as the
CENTCOM Commander, would be to Pakistan to sit down with a
fellow U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate,
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to talk, at some length, about that, and obviously to do the same with the leaders of the Pakistani Government. That is a problem that has to be addressed. As I mentioned, it is a problem that has global implications, not just local extremist implications for Pakistan.

Senator Reed. If your conclusion is, you need further resources in Afghanistan and further resources in support of the Pakistani forces within their own country, where are you going to get them, except from further reductions in Iraq?

General Petraeus. Again, that would be, if confirmed, something I would have to discuss with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, with the Service Chiefs, and so forth, and perhaps with the current MNF—I Commander.

Senator Reed. I appreciate what you’re going to bring to this task, which is incredible skill and insight as to what’s going on in the AOR, but I think it’s a serious, serious comment, if our own intelligence agencies are suggesting that, in the intervening several years of our great effort in Iraq, our existential enemies have become stronger and perhaps even more capable.

Let me switch gears briefly to an issue within Iraq, for both you and General Odierno. The status of the Sunni Concerned Local Citizen group, the Sons of Iraq—I know you responded to Senator Akaka that approximately 25 to 30 percent will be integrated. My guess is that the easy part of the integration has already taken place.

I mean, I was out in Anbar with the Iraqi Highway Patrol, which probably, a year ago, were Iraqi insurgents. The harder part is the remaining 70-plus percent. It doesn’t seem that the administration of Maliki has come to grips with this issue. Is that a fair assessment? We’re still paying them, they haven’t paid them. I know the response is, “we have to get them all to employment,” but they’re still on our payroll.

General Petraeus. Senator, actually there has been a transition of, again, well over 20,000 to a variety of different ISFs or other governmental employment, and that has been supported by Prime Minister Maliki.

There will be additional ones that do get integrated. But, as General Odierno pointed out, one challenge is that not by any means do all of them want to go into the security forces; many of them want to have jobs in their own communities; they just want to help with security until that’s possible. Then, substantial numbers do not qualify, because they don’t meet the literacy or physical requirements. That’s why we’ve generally said between 20 and 30 percent might ultimately end up in some form of ISFs.

There are numerous other efforts that are now being, in some cases, piloted, in other cases starting to really gain traction, in terms of job programs for them, funded by, in some cases dual by the U.S. and the Iraqi Government, and in some cases by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Iraqi Government solely. These are starting to take off. They’re something that we have to push very aggressively, so that there are opportunities provided for these individuals who have stood up and helped to protect their communities when they were really needed.
Senator Reed. My time is expired, but if I could make a comment and then, perhaps in subsequent discussions informally, you might respond. But, my impression—in brief encounter with the Prime Minister—is that he viewed these Sunni Armed Forces as just as much a threat as the Shiite armed militias, and he may very well choose to deal with them, as he's dealt in the last few weeks with the Shiite, which is a military response which prompts some type of political reaction. That could be a serious challenge, General Odierno, to your tenure and your stability.

I don't want to monopolize the time, but I will look forward to discussing this issue in detail with both of you.  
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.  
Senator Sessions.  
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
I would like to join with my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for your magnificent service.  
Captain Odierno, thank you, and for so many of your brothers and sisters in arms who have served our country under difficult circumstances. But, you two generals represent the leadership that has proven itself under most difficult circumstances, have helped position us in a way that I think, today, we can believe, with confidence, that we have a realistic opportunity to establish a very decent good government in Iraq, which will be so important for our strategic interests and the people of Iraq. I can't tell you how appreciative we are and how much admiration we have for both of you.

General Odierno, you were there at the critical point of developing this new surge strategy. General Petraeus, your leadership and planning were just superb.

General Odierno, I asked General Petraeus, when he took command in Iraq, before he left, did he believe our forces could be successful in that country and achieve our essential national goals. He said that he did, he wouldn't have taken the job if he did not. How do you feel? Just tell the American people honestly how you feel about our opportunity for a successful result.  
General ODIERNO. First, as General Petraeus, sir, I would not take this job if I didn't think that we could be successful. Senator, I believe that we have made significant progress, specifically over the last 18 months or so, and I do believe that we are headed in the right direction.

I will not say that we are out of the woods yet, but I would say that we are clearly headed in the right direction. I believe a self-reliant Government of Iraq that is stable, one that is committed to governance and protecting its own people and serving all its people, a place that's denied as a safe haven for terrorists and extremists, and one that is integrated into the international community and a partner on the war on terror, is absolutely possible in Iraq. I think it's closer today than it has been.  
Senator Sessions. Maybe you would tell those who don't know your involvement in our effort there, and how long you've been there—why don't you give just a brief summary of what you've seen and how you've come to reach that conclusion.
General ODIerno. I would just say—having been there two separate tours and then several times in between, asked to conduct assessments both as an advisor to the Secretary of State, but also as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I’ve spent close to 31 months in Iraq. What’s been encouraging is, we understand the dynamics better than we did, we understand the environment, but the progression of the Iraqis is really now starting to show. It started by, first, enabling them, by providing additional security in some key areas, and then allowing the fact that they’ve decided to reject al Qaeda initially, starting in Anbar, where they understood that they did not want to live under the control of al Qaeda, and that they chose to work with the coalition and the Iraqi Government to expel al Qaeda and defeat al Qaeda. I think that was significant.

As other Iraqis saw what happened in Anbar, they realized that the bright future for them is to reject these extremist groups, and that they did not want to be controlled by militias. I think we’re starting to see that play out now with operations in Basrah and Sadr City.

The most important thing to me over the last few months has been the evenhandedness of going after all of the enemies of Iraq, those militias, as well as al Qaeda. But, again, I would say we still have quite a bit of work to do, and they will do everything they can to try to re-establish their influence inside of Iraq, and it’s important for us that we’re able to build up the ISFs and the governmental capacity so that they can, themselves, not allow them to rebuild any influence at all inside of Iraq.

Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.

General Petraeus, you made brief reference to the fact that we’ve now seen, this past week, the lowest incidence of violence in Iraq in 4 years, and that maybe this week would be even lower. I know you don’t want to be overconfident, but tell us what that means to you and what’s been happening there.

General Petraeus. Senator, what it means, of course, is that other activities can proceed. The whole idea has been to achieve a security environment in which individuals can go about their daily lives with much less fear than they had previously. This is not to say there are not still violent activities taking place in Iraq, there aren’t still people trying to blow up other Iraqis, and so forth. But, it does say that again, the incidence of violence is significantly reduced, and to a level, again, that has not been seen in over 4 years, back to 23 April 2004.

When you think about where we were, again, in November, December, January, February, and well into, really, the spring and early summer of 2007—2006 into 2007—that is a very significant development.

Senator Sessions. It went from almost 1,600 incidents, a little over a year ago, to under 400, so that’s a 75-percent reduction, really, a transformative event, I think. We are proud of that.

General Petraeus, my time is about up, but I know that the Senate Armed Services Committee reported out our full authorization bill. It contains language that would ensure private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently government functions in a combat area. It’s my understanding that departments
rely on these contractors for many things. Can you tell us what kind of impact this might have and if we should reconsider that language?

General PETRAEUS. It would have a very significant impact, Senator, because these private security contractors—do perform very important missions. They are securing a variety of different activities in Iraq, and those are so important that we would likely have to use U.S. or other forces to secure them.

The reason we have them there is that we don't have the forces to perform some of those missions, and so, this would be a significant drain on our combat power if it were carried out.

If I could add that, in the wake of the incident last year, there has been significant progress also in the coordination and cooperation between private security contractors and those forces that—if you will, own the terrain—are responsible for the areas. There are much closer efforts between the contractual units and our forces; and, in fact, a lot of this was on General Odierno's watch, and the incidence of escalation of force from private security contractors has been reduced very dramatically.

There are also new authorities that you provided to DOD, which were subsequently delegated to me, where I have Uniform Code of Military Justice authority over those DOD private security contractors, and there are other provisions for those who are under contract for the Department of State. So, I think that the unfortunate incident last year has actually led to a very considerable and good focus in this area that has helped enormously to improve the way these missions are conducted.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, if I may add my personal thanks to Captain Odierno for your service, and tell you how much I personally value it. You're getting a lot of comments today, but you're here symbolically on behalf of a lot of people, I think, and I have very strong feelings about people like yourself, like my son, like Senator McCain's son, who stepped forward, moved into harm's way at a time when the country needed you, and I think we're going to be wanting to benefit from the counsel and the experiences of people like you in the long future. I just wanted to personally add my own thanks.

I would also like to expand a little bit on something that Senator Warner said earlier when he was asking you two gentlemen about this Strategic Framework Agreement that is being negotiated. It's a very important agreement, and he had asked if you were being consulted. I would like to emphasize again for the record, I'd like to see the Senate consulted on this matter. We had meetings, at a staff level, on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and our staff did not receive any of the specific information in this agreement. I think that it's an agreement that's going to have a potentially long-term impact, presently constructed as an executive agreement. I'm going to be among those who are going to be attempting to insist that we have the right kind of participation in accordance with the Constitution on that.
General Odierno, if I may, my view, having spent a lot of time in my life thinking about military issues, strategic issues, and policy issues, is that one of the most essential components of laying down a strategy is the need to be able to articulate clearly what the endpoint of that strategy is. I believe that the failure of the administration to be able to do that, or to be required to do that, is one of the reasons we've had so much confusion and debate after the initial invasion. In that vein, I would like to hear from you as to, in military terms, what do you see as the endpoint in our strategic direction here with respect to our involvement in Iraq?

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator.

First, I believe one of the most important pieces is to be a self-reliant government that is stable, a government that will contribute inside of the regional context and the international context. Obviously that means we need a professionalized ISF, one that could handle those missions, which I think we're moving forward toward; obviously, we need a place where we do not allow safe haven for terrorists or extremists that can affect the security, not only of the region, but also of the United States; and then, obviously one that is integrated, politically and economically, and is an economic engine for continued improvement for its people. I think those are the things that I think we look forward to.

From a military perspective, it's their ability to secure themselves, it's their ability to do it in such a way where their government is allowed to continue to grow. We will do that by providing less and less assistance to them.

Senator WEBB. If I may, General, because I have a very short period of time here, all that being said, and those political goals for the Iraqis, what does the United States military in Iraq look like when that happens?

General ODIERNO. Over time, I think it'll adjust. We will have less and less responsibility for direct combat, more for assisting them in conducting their missions. Over time, that would change into an advisory mission, as we felt more and more comfortable with them being able to do that on their own.

Senator WEBB. How long do you think we should be there, if those conditions are met?

General ODIERNO. It is unknown how long we would be there once all those conditions are met.

Senator WEBB. Right.

General ODIERNO. I think that would be a policy decision on how long we would want to have some sort of contact with the Iraqi Government in the future, and so, I think we'd have to have some discussions on that.

Senator WEBB. What is the endpoint of the United States involvement in Iraq? Let's say that Iraq meets the conditions you just talked about. Should there be a United States military presence in Iraq?

General ODIERNO. I think that's a discussion we would have along several levels, not only from the MNF–I, Commander of the CENTCOM level, and obviously our civilian leadership, to decide what their policy would be in the future towards Iraq.

Senator WEBB. Do you believe that, if those conditions are met, there would be a need for United States military in Iraq?
General ODIERNO. I do not. I believe what we would want, though, is to maintain, obviously, military contacts, as we do with many countries around the world, over time.

Senator WEBB. Right. Thank you for that. That’s a very important clarification.

General Petraeus, there’s some language in response to questions that were submitted to you for the record that go to Iran that I would like to get some clarification, or give you the opportunity to clarify. You used the word “malign” as an adjective. As someone who’s written nine books, I’m trying to struggle with how this fits into what you’re saying here.

You say, “We will continue to expose the extent of Iran’s malign activities in Iraq,” and then you say, on the next page, “Our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating international cooperation in building consensus to counter malign Iranian influence.” You then speak about, “There are consequences for its illegitimate influence in the region.” Can you clarify for us how you’re using those words?

General PETRAEUS. I can, Senator. What I’m talking about there, I am characterizing that influence. It is malign, and it is lethal, and it is illegitimate. The arming, training, funding, and directing of militia extremists who have killed our soldiers, have killed Iraqi forces, and have killed Iraqi civilians——

Senator WEBB. I’ve heard all of that.

General PETRAEUS. It is very malign, indeed. It’s the same situation with what they’re doing in——

Senator WEBB. In the interest of time, here, because you’ve given those answers, would you agree that, historically, one of the realities that we have to deal with is the notion that there will be some sort of Iranian influence in the region? I’m not talking about the specific military incidents, I’m talking about the reality of dealing with the region.

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I’m not——

Senator WEBB. We cannot discount Iran.

General PETRAEUS. I have always——

Senator WEBB. Would you agree with that?

General PETRAEUS. I have always stated, in fact, that there will be Iranian influence, and that the hope is that that Iranian influence is constructive influence—commercial influence, economic influence, perhaps political influence, and cultural influence, religious, and so forth—but not this kind of contribution to lethal activities. That’s exactly——

Senator WEBB. All right, there would be no disagreement from me on the last part of what you just said. The difficulty that a lot of people in this country, including myself, have is that we would hope that we would be able to see some creative leadership, in terms of how to bring a different set of diplomatic circumstances into play. Probably the best example of that, that I would just encourage you to consider while you’re going through this, is the way that we were dealing with China in the early 1970s. China was a rogue nation with nukes, with an American war on its borders. We had no contact with this country for more than 20 years, after the communists took over in 1949. When we aggressively moved forward diplomacy with China, we took nothing off the table—and, by
the way, the Chinese were directly involved in Vietnam at the time. They were providing military hardware, the same as you’re talking about with Iran. They had military activities in Vietnam. We took nothing off the table. We didn’t abandon any of our alliances. But, we, through diplomatic process, tried to reach something that also embraced the historic realities of that region.

General Petraeus. Senator, I think, if you’ll read my statement, that you will see that kind of spirit in it. If you want to use the international relations theorist concept that what you would want to do is to try, through every means possible, help Iran evolve from a revolutionary state—i.e., one that is not satisfied with the general status quo—to one that is more of a status quo regional power.

In fact, as I have testified before this body before, Ambassador Crocker and I supported the conduct of the three rounds of negotiations that have taken place, the trilateral talks between Iraq, the United States, and Iran. Regrettably, it does not appear that there was progress as a result of those. That doesn’t mean that you should necessarily stop them, but I certainly think that what Secretary Gates said the other day about determining how we can gather more leverage, again, more whatever kinds of support that we can, because right now, I think, as he said it, it’s an open question as to whether, with the current circumstances, additional rounds of negotiations would be productive.

Senator Webb. Thank you. My time is up, but I’m glad we were able to get that on the record. Thank you.

General Petraeus. I am, too, Senator. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.

By the way, Senator Webb, Secretary Gates has committed to consult with us on those agreements that you talked about, and I just want to reinforce your point, Senator Warner’s point, on that, that commitment is out there, it’s public, and it’s important.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Martinez.

Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I want to extend my word of thanks to both of you for your service, and to make that extend to your families, as well. I also want to commend you both for the undeniable success that you have achieved militarily in Iraq, and the benefits that it has had to what we hope will be a more stable region, and certainly to make our country more secure.

General Petraeus, when you were speaking, earlier, of the incidents, I wonder if you have the chart that shows—this chart, here.

General Petraeus. I don’t think we brought any of the big boards this time, Senator.

Senator Martinez. Okay.

I love your charts. But when you look at the pattern, it clearly shows a steep decline, which I would say corresponds to the new initiative and the offensive that we went on in February 2007. Would you agree that has had the kind of effect that we see now in the lessened violence?

General Petraeus. It is certainly exactly what has happened. We had to have the surge of offensives to take away—with our Iraqi partners—some of the sanctuaries and safe havens that al
Qaeda and its Sunni extremist partners had, and, in some cases, also that militia extremists were employing. That has enabled, over time, the increase of control by legitimate security forces of areas that were at one time beyond their control, and has brought down the level of security incidents. It is a very significant reduction, as you note.

Senator MARTINEZ. First of all, as you undertake your new command, I want to welcome you to Florida, to MacDill, and to Tampa. We’re awfully proud that you're going to be one of our residents, and we will welcome you there. It will be an honor to have you as a resident of Florida. But, in this broader responsibility, we know that there are problems in Lebanon and continue to see Syria’s activities in the region, including their own very obvious, now, nuclear ambitions, which would be hugely destabilizing to the region.

In the broader Middle Eastern situation, it does appear that the arm of Iran is ever-present in all of these situations, and I know you discuss our diplomatic initiatives who have really borne no fruit. How do you anticipate that we will deal with the continuing challenges that Iran poses to peace and security in the Middle Eastern region?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, starting inside Iraq, we will certainly continue what we have done now, increasingly, in support of our Iraqi partners. As I mentioned, one of the results of the operation in Basrah is, they have seen these massive caches of weapons—for example, over 2,000 rounds of artillery and mortar rounds, hundreds and hundreds of rockets, thousands of pounds of explosives, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and all the rest—is to realize that their neighbor to the east has been undermining their security, and they have, indeed, generated enormous concerns as a result, sent their delegation, had other talks, and so forth.

More broadly, we have to assist the government in Lebanon as it comes to grips with what to do with a similar militia issue there. We have just seen Lebanese Hezbollah, as I mention in my statement, carrying out a very intimidating activity in West Beirut and challenging, again, the sovereignty of that government.

We need to do the same with respect to Syria, which partners with Iran in some of these activities. We believe, for example, that RPG–29s, that were originally sold to Syria back in 1999, eventually made their way to Lebanese Hezbollah, to Iran, and then into the hands of the Iranian-supported "special groups" and were used in Iraq. Combating that trafficking is also very important.

Ultimately, it will take unified action. Ideally, you would like to do it, as Senator Webb rightly is encouraging, with a variety of different engagements and so forth, if that is possible. As I said, I would agree, right now, with the Secretary of Defense, when he said that it’s an open question as to the value of negotiations in the current circumstances. But, that’s not to say that you can’t try to change those current circumstances, try to develop some additional leverage—and it’s about leverage—with the community of nations, many of whom share concerns about the issues of nuclear proliferation and the possibility of a regional arms race with respect to Iran, that, again, you can galvanize action that could encourage Iran, again, to be a more responsible partner of the Na-
tions in the region and cease some of this activity that has been so damaging and destabilizing in various countries in the region.

Senator MARTINEZ. I believe you mentioned that you also had incredible finds of caches in the Sadr City area as the Iraqi forces, as well as ours, have moved through that area. Did I hear you say that earlier?

General PETRAEUS. If I could clarify, Senator.

Senator MARTINEZ. Please.

General PETRAEUS. There are significant finds. They are not yet of the scale of Basrah, but, of course, they’ve only been going at it for a couple of days. Now, there have also been significant caches in other areas in which militia elements were located, in and around Baghdad, and in other southern provinces, as well.

Senator MARTINEZ. Did I hear you mention, earlier, that one of these caches had been found in Sadr City in a hospital?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, it was, Senator. That was used as a location where quite a substantial amount of weaponry, explosives, and other devices was stored by the militia.

Senator MARTINEZ. General Odierno, one last question. My time is about to expire. I know that General Petraeus testified before the committee in answer to one of my questions, he indicated that 107-millimeter rockets that the Sadrists and Shiites “special groups” were firing into the International Zone, and now I’m told that prior to this most recent cease-fire, these have been as large, now, as 240 millimeters. I wonder what your plan, as you take over this command, is, in terms of protecting the border with Iran better, to enable the Iraqi forces, as well as ours, to impede the flow of weaponry from Iran directly?

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would just say we’ve been working very diligently over the last several months to improve the ports of entry along the Iranian border by adding a significant amount of transition teams and our individuals to help train and provide oversight to the Iraqis.

First what we want to do is close these ports of entry, make it very difficult for anybody to get through—illegal weapons and other things through these ports. We’ve done that by a series of other measures, collecting biometrics and other things on individuals who come through there. In addition, we’ll work with the Iraqis in order, then, to also secure the areas in between these ports of entry, and assist them with intelligence capacity, and allow them, then, to help to shut down, hopefully, these networks that are long-standing networks, very complex, and very difficult. Many of these networks have been established for many years and have used to transit other goods besides weapons. So, it will take a lot of hard work for us to get inside of those. But, we are working with the Iraqis on that, and I believe that is one of our major tasks as we continue to move forward.

General Petraeus mentioned earlier that there’s been a significant amount of work done along the Syrian border here in the last month or so, going after the “rat lines” there, and we’ve learned some good lessons there that I think we’ll be able to also utilize on the Iranian border, as well, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. I’m afraid we’re going to have to end it there.
Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. This will give Senator Pryor a chance to have his turn, and then, Senator Pryor, would you recess us until my return?

My return will be sometime between this vote and the second vote.

Senator PRYOR. I'll be glad to.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator PRYOR [presiding]. Thank you.

Thank you both for being here, and thank you for your service and all the things that you do. It's good to see both of you again.

General Petraeus, let me start with you, if I may. I have some questions, not about Iraq, but about Afghanistan. Not to get into all the background and all the details, because we do have a vote, so I'll try to keep my questions short, but Admiral Fallon said that we have a need for 2,000 additional soldiers and marines to conduct training and security missions inside Afghanistan. I know that General James T. Conway has stated that he has enough to go in and clear, but not enough to hold certain areas in Afghanistan. My first question to you is, do you think we need 2,000 additional troops inside Afghanistan?

General PETRAEUS. I do. I think that General McNeill may assess the requirement even larger. However, I would point out that, actually, there are over 2,000 additional forces that have been provided, I believe, since Admiral Fallon made that statement, and they're on the ground, the marines. In fact, the withdrawal of the Marine Expeditionary Unit from Iraq helped reduce some of the pressure and allowed that.

Senator PRYOR. Just to clarify that, I know that at one point there were 3,400 additional that were sent.

General PETRAEUS. That's actually the number that's on the ground right now.

Senator PRYOR. Okay.

General PETRAEUS. It's a good bit larger than just the 2,000.

Senator PRYOR. Okay. Now, my understanding is, the request or the statements were in the context of 2,000 additional, on top of that 3,400. Do you know?

General PETRAEUS. I do not know that for a fact. I would agree, however, that there is a requirement for additional forces, that NATO is providing some additional forces, and that we likely will have to come to grips if and when additional U.S. forces are provided, as well.

Senator PRYOR. Do we have those forces available today to do that?

General PETRAEUS. It depends on the level of risk that we would assign. It would be an enormous challenge for our Services. They would have to come out of cycle, in most cases, because, as the Service Chiefs and Vice Chief of the Army have forthrightly reported, there is little strategic flexibility until this recocking process, if you will, following the drawdown of the surge, is complete.

Senator PRYOR. Right now, there are 3,500 marines that went in March into Afghanistan, and they're going to be there for 7 months, if I'm not mistaken. You would know more about the details than I do. So, that would put them in until October 2008. Do
we have the forces to replace those 3,500 and then do the additional on top of that?

General Petraeus. First of all, I have to get a good bit better into the details of those kinds of specific deployments, but, in general, the campaign season starts to end around that time. As the snow sets in, the tactical activity in the winter is dramatically reduced. I think that there would be a degree of comfort with not replacing them at that time, although there clearly would need to be a replacement when the springs comes, either by NATO or U.S. or a combination of both.

Senator Pryor. You understand the concern, though, that if we don't have the adequate forces there—maybe, for example, we can go in and clear, but not hold——

General Petraeus. Absolutely.

Senator Pryor. Yes. That’s a big concern that I know the Senate will have.

General Petraeus. It’s why they’re trying to build the Afghan national security forces, as well.

Senator Pryor. Right.

Let me change gears here a little bit. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 had a provision in there—we call it section 1206—that has to do with our ability to help foreign military forces conduct counterterrorism operations and support the growth of those capabilities for other militaries. However, there was a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that said that DOD and the Multi-National Force in Iraq cannot fully account for the Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Do you have any comments on that? Do you know anything about that?

General Petraeus. We’ve had GAO, and we’ve also invited the DOD Inspector General in to look at the specific case of accountability of weapons, especially those that were issued to the forces during some pretty tough days in the 2004 and early 2005 timeframe. Over time, actually, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, which has worked hard over the past year to do this, has actually re-established accountability, if you will, for a substantial portion of the weapons that initially were reported as not being accounted for. They continue that effort.

Beyond that, there have been substantial changes made over time, but really started in the spring of 2005, as we were able to build the logistics and property accountability teams that were needed in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, but not available early on, to enable the Iraqis to track their property, their most important property, in a manner that is closer to the way that we track ours. Now we actually even use biometrics with the issue of the M-16s and M-4 rifles that have been purchased—U.S. weapons that have been purchased for them—with their money, I might add, through Foreign Military Sales.

Senator Pryor. I think what I’m hearing you say is, the accountability is very important, to make sure that we know where the weapons are going.

General Petraeus. Absolutely, and also that there have been significant changes to improve the accountability process over time during our time in Iraq.

Senator Pryor. Right.
With that, I’m going to have to end my questioning because I need to get over for this vote. Again, I want to thank you, and I know that Senator Levin will be back here in just a few moments. Thank you for your service and all that you do and your testimony today.

With that, what I’ll do is, I’ll recess this hearing, subject to the call of the chair, which I understand will be in just a few minutes.

General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Pryor. Thank you. [Recessed.]

Chairman Levin [presiding]. The committee will come back to order.

Senator Clinton.

Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both General Petraeus and General Odierno for their service, which has now extended in Iraq over a number of years. When I was in Iraq in 2003, I was hosted by General Odierno, and here we are in 2008, talking about the way forward and trying to determine how best to resolve the difficulties we face. I congratulate both of you on the work that you’ve done and the incredible leadership you’ve provided.

I want to turn, General Petraeus, to your broader AOR, should you be confirmed to head CENTCOM. I know that you’ve had some questions, during the course of the morning, about Afghanistan, but I want to just focus on that for a minute.

I have been increasingly concerned that we have lost the initiative, both militarily and diplomatically. The recent announcement by the new Pakistani Government with respect to the agreement reached with the Taliban is concerning to me. Obviously, we have to have as much of a focus as we can bring to Afghanistan.

I would ask you, General Petraeus, based on your assessment at this moment in time, do we have enough troops to achieve success, however “success” is defined, in Afghanistan?

General Petraeus. Senator, I think that General McNeill has been on the record, and so has Admiral Fallon, about the requirement for additional forces in Afghanistan. Some have been provided by the United States, in the form of the marines that have gone on the ground. Then there are also pledges from NATO nations, as a result of the recent meetings, for some additional forces.

I am not sure that will be all that is required, and one of the early efforts that I have to undertake will be, in fact, a trip to the Afghan-Pakistan region to spend some time on the ground. I’ve recently, actually, met with our U.S. commanders who are in Afghanistan, also the Ambassador and others. I think that, in the areas of the U.S. forces, that we generally have the initiative, but it’s in some of the other areas, particularly in the southern part of the country, where, in fact, we may need to regain that initiative, and that may, indeed, take additional forces, and that’s something that I have to look very hard at.

Also, you alluded to Pakistan and the situation in the FATAs in the Northwestern Frontier Province. Clearly, concerns are there as well. That is, of course, where al Qaeda senior leadership is resident. Their ability and the ability of the Taliban to send fighters from those areas into Afghanistan is very destabilizing. Clearly there has to be a good deal of provision of assistance to the Paki-
stani Government by the United States and other coalition partners throughout the world to help this new government as it solidifies its coalition and comes to grips with how to deal with those problems in the FATA and in the Northwestern Frontier Province.

Senator CLINTON. I certainly urge a much greater amount of attention, because I agree with Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael V. Hayden that if the U.S. is going to suffer another attack on our own soil, it will most certainly originate from the Afghanista

Petraeus. It should be a very high priority. Having met with Director Hayden, actually, recently, about 2 weeks ago in Qatar, together with the U.S. Ambassadors to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Commander, and the current CENTCOM Commander, Lieutenant General Marty Dempsey, it is very clear that there is a very considerable focus on that.

Again, having said that, I think there clearly is more that can and should be done in helping the new government in Pakistan, because this is a Pakistani problem that has both repercussions and does create enormous violence inside Pakistan, but, as you point out, has global implications, as well.

You mentioned the other areas in the region. I am actually fairly well acquainted, because of the location of Lieutenant General McChrystal in my current AOR of a number of the activities that are ongoing in these other areas that you mentioned, all of which are, indeed, concerning.

I would also, though, point out that al Qaeda has been quite open about the fact that it sees its main effort to be in Iraq, and that, of course, it is appropriate, again, to do everything that we can there to pursue al Qaeda-Iraq. That is, in fact, what is ongoing. There has been substantial progress against al Qaeda in Iraq, and that is an effort that we also do want to continue very much, and, in fact, has benefited considerably from the recent offensive directed by Prime Minister Maliki in Mosul and in the greater province of Ninawa.

Senator CLINTON. I know that we may not agree about what the principal emphasis should be with respect to our efforts against al Qaeda, because certainly the ongoing threat to the United States on our soil emanates from outside of Iraq, in my opinion, and I think that we have to raise the visibility of our efforts with respect to al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly along the border, its efforts to set up subsidiaries in Somalia,
Yemen, and elsewhere, because, from the perspective of a Senator from New York now 6½ years after September 11, it is deeply troubling that we have not captured or killed or essentially decapitated the capacity of al Qaeda under the leadership it had in 2001, which is still the leadership it has today.

I just wanted to ask one question, if I could, of General Odierno, because obviously the cycle of repeated and extended deployments are ones that we hear a lot about—the use of National Guard, and the Reserves. The last time I was there, with Senator Bayh, we saw a lot of people, who were born approximately the same time I was, who had been called back up in the Individual Ready Reserve pool. How many troops, General Odierno, do you plan to have in Iraq for the provincial elections in October? Will you request a temporary increase in troops?

General O Dierno. Senator, I will never say “never,” but my assessment now is, with the progress we're making, the progress we're seeing in the ISFs, and what I'm seeing as the security environment on the ground, currently, I do not believe we will need an increase. I think we'll be able to do it with the forces that are on the ground there now, or what we'll get to in July.

Now, I feel fairly comfortable with that. Obviously, the environment and the enemy has a vote. But, currently, I believe we should not need an increase.

Senator Clinton. Finally, General, if there were a decision by the President, in your professional estimation, how long would a responsible withdrawal from Iraq take?

General O Dierno. Senator, it's a very difficult question. The reason is because there's a number of assumptions and factors that I would have to understand first, based on how do we want to leave the environmental issues within Iraq, what would be the final end state, what is the affect on the ground, what is the security mission on the ground. I don't think I can give you an answer now, but I certainly, at the time, if asked, we would do—and we do planning—we do a significant amount of planning to make sure that an appropriate answer is given, and we would lay out a timeline in order to do that.

Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.

Let me thank our witnesses.

Just one quick question of General Petraeus. You were asked about the security contractors. These are complicated provisions that are very carefully laid out, in terms of discretionary action that could affect the international relations of the United States. I'm wondering whether you’ve read all those particular provisions.

General Petraeus. Sir, I have not. All I was responding to was the question, as I understood it here today.

Chairman Levin. All right. Well, I'm wondering if you could take a look at them—it takes up 2 pages of our bill—and then give us your comment, for the record, because I think you would find these to be very carefully set forth. Would that be okay?

General Petraeus. I'll do that, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]
Statutory language that defines the functions of private security contractors (PSC) as inherently governmental and thus precludes using PSCs for security-related tasks would have a negative impact on our operations. The use of PSCs to perform perimeter security, convoy security, and personnel security is important to our mission accomplishment. If we were unable to use contractors for these tasks, we would be required to use U.S. military personnel. The primary missions of the U.S. military in Iraq are to help the Iraqi security forces (ISF) secure the population and develop the ISF to take on security missions for themselves. Diverting U.S. military forces from these primary missions would adversely affect our operations. Today in Iraq there are nearly 7,300 PSCs protecting individuals and property. The removal of these PSCs would initially require an equal number of U.S. military personnel (boots on the ground). Based on force deployment models, sustaining our force over time would increase this number by a factor of three. I assume the draft statutory guidance would also generate additional force requirements in Afghanistan. These numbers would grow further if U.S. military personnel were also required to replace the approximately 1,500 PSCs who provide security for State Department personnel in Iraq alone.

As I noted in my recent confirmation hearing, there have been significant improvements in the operation of PSCs in Iraq over the past 6–8 months. Strengthened oversight and increased authority provided to military commanders has enabled us to use PSCs to fulfill more effectively their security roles in a fully accountable manner that supports mission accomplishment. Last December, the Departments of Defense and State signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which standardized PSC operations in Iraq. Since implementing the MOA, we have observed a greater than 60 percent reduction in escalation of force incidents involving PSC contractors. This oversight is being further strengthened through the development of an umbrella regulation as required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008. This regulation is in final coordination now, and will further codify and extend the oversight and management policies of the MOA to all U.S. Government PSCs operating in a designated area of combat operations. Moreover, since the publication of the Secretary of Defense’s March 10, 2008, memorandum on Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction over Department of Defense (DOD) contractor personnel, commanders in Iraq have begun to use the authority provided by Congress in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 to subject contractor personnel to the UCMJ.

I understand that DOD is currently assessing the interpretation of relevant regulations and the proposed legislative language. I recommend that DOD be given the opportunity to make a recommendation based on their work. I believe it would be wise for there to be dialogue on the definition of what constitutes an “inherently governmental” function and on the impact of that definition on our operations and our force.

Chairman Levin. Also, we have been in touch with you about the situation with the Christian communities in Iraq. We thank you for your awareness of that problem, their security issues, and we would ask you, particularly, I guess, General Odierno, to pick up that sensitivity and keep that concern very much in your mind.

General Odierno. Yes, Senator, I understand.

Chairman Levin. We thank you both. We hope that we’ll bring your nominations to the floor as promptly as possible.

We will now stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms
have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation’s history. This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the ability of military and civilian departments to work closely together. Some progress has been made in this regard. The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who has been given the lead by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD44), “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” has developed the Interagency Management System and a draft U.S. Government Planning Framework. These tools provide a viable process, within existing authorities, to enhance and align military and civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. They have also designed and begun to stand up the Civilian Response Corps system to provide increased civilian expeditionary capacity to complex operations. This system holds impressive potential. DOD has developed a working plan to support the implementation of NSPD44. The U.S. will be well-served by having available the various tools to promote unity of effort across the U.S. Government.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Counterinsurgency requires the commitment of both military and civilian agencies, and unity of effort is crucial to success. NSPD44 represents a good overall start, and new military doctrine helps as well. The State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. In addition, the Consortium for Complex Operations has been stood up to serve as an intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices on the many facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, high-payoff initiative.

Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

Answer. Yes, although, as mentioned above, further development of interagency capacity and doctrine is required.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?

Answer. Combatant commanders have increasingly focused on addressing the root causes of conflict in their regions in order to prevent the outbreak of violence and to mitigate the conditions that allow extremism to take hold. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining this important focus. This focus requires investment in long-term economic and political development, makes whole-of-government approaches more important than ever, and requires even more coordination with civilian activities in combatant commands’ AORs.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, Central Command (CENTCOM), to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander, CENTCOM performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commander, CENTCOM is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the command to carry out its missions.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., allows communication between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed by the Unified Command Plan, I would communicate with the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. I would communicate and coordinate with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. I would also communicate and coordinate with the Director as necessary and expect the Deputy Commander, CENTCOM or Chief of Staff, CENTCOM would communicate regularly with the Director of the Joint Staff.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant commands. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates closely with the Secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip forces for CENTCOM are met.

Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM communicates and exchanges information with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of the CENTCOM mission responsibilities requires close coordination with the Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Service Chiefs to understand the capabilities of their Services and to ensure effective employment of those capabilities in the execution of the CENTCOM mission.

Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Answer. I would necessarily have a relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, in close coordination with the commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I), in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. military and other U.S. Government activities in Iraq and in the CENTCOM region.

Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in close coordination with the U.S. commander there, in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. military and other U.S. Government activities in Afghanistan and in the CENTCOM region.

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with the Commander, MNF–I to support and resource the effort in Iraq to meet national policy goals. It is critical that the relationship between the Commander, CENTCOM and the Commander, MNF–I be close, candid, and productive to meet this end.

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with Commander, NATO–ISAF to support and resource the effort to achieve the goals of the NATO mandate in Afghanistan. There is no formal command relationship (though there are such relationships with the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Afghanistan). However, robust communications and coordination are necessary to ensure the achievement of strategic goals.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a critical time for CENTCOM.
What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. First, I have extensive combat and command experience in the CENTCOM AOR. Having served in Iraq for over 3½ years (as a division commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I)/NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM–I) commander, and, now, MNF–I commander), I have a good understanding of the country's culture, its leaders, and its challenges. My
current position as MNF–I Commander, in particular, has provided me with extensive knowledge about our operations in Iraq, ideas on best-practices that would be useful elsewhere, and relationships with leaders throughout the Middle East and with leaders of Coalition countries. Though I have not served in Afghanistan, I did conduct a 5-day assessment there in September 2005 at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and my experience with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations would, I hope, be useful in supporting General McKiernan and coalition forces operating there.

Second, I have had a number of relatively high-level joint assignments, including serving as a TDY Special Assistant to CINCSOUTH, as Military Assistant to the SACEUR, as Operations Chief of the U.N. Force in Haiti, as Executive Assistant to the CJCS, as the temporary duty commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)-Forward in Kuwait, as ACOS OPS of SFOR in Bosnia, as commander of MNSTC–I/NTM–I, and, now, as commander of MNF–I.

Third, I believe I have an academic background that has intellectually prepared me for the challenges of high-level command and complex environments, as I have studied—as well as served in—major combat operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement operations. My doctoral dissertation at Princeton University was titled, “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam.” Most recently, while at Fort Leavenworth, I oversaw the development of the Army/Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency and also changes to other Army doctrinal manuals, branch school curricula, leader development programs, combat training center rotations, the “Road to Deployment” concept, and other activities that support the preparation of our leaders and units for deployment to the CENTCOM AOR.

Fourth, I have in the past year, as part of my MNF–I duties, met with leaders in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, as well as with many of the leaders of the countries contributing forces in Iraq, many of whom also contribute forces in Afghanistan and the Gulf.

Finally, I believe that I have a solid understanding of the requirements of strategic-level leadership.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, CENTCOM?

Answer. Although there are numerous country-specific challenges in the region, a survey of the CENTCOM AOR as a whole reveals several transnational concerns that affect many or all of the region’s countries. These concerns are interrelated and create significant challenges for regional stability and for U.S. interests in the region.

First is the violent extremism that poses a significant threat throughout the region. Though al Qaeda is the highest visibility and priority terrorist organization, there are also many other extremist groups in the region.

Another concern in the region is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including related components and technical expertise. Iran’s and Syria’s transparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities could destabilize the region and spark a regional arms race. The need to secure existing nuclear material is a related and critical concern.

A lack of economic development in many of the region’s countries is another transnational concern. This is both a humanitarian issue and a security issue, as poverty and lack of opportunity are often enablers of successful terrorist recruiting.

Another concern is the prevalence of piracy, narcotics trafficking, and arms smuggling in the CENTCOM AOR. In addition to being criminal and destructive activities, these practices threaten strategic resources and are often lucrative sources of funding for terrorists.

Because of the region’s importance to the global economy, another concern is the free flow of strategic resources and international commerce through the region.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. Although it is premature to have specific and comprehensive plans, there are several concepts that would guide my approach to the region’s challenges, if I am confirmed.

First, we would seek to build partnerships in the region, pursuing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in identifying and working toward mutual interests. This involves extensive engagement with leaders in the region, and I would see this as one of my primary responsibilities as CENTCOM commander.

Second, we would aim for a whole-of-government approach in addressing the region’s challenges. This approach recognizes that solutions for the region’s challenges
should be as multifaceted as the challenges themselves. Rather than engaging in purely military solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and capabilities resident in the whole of government.

Third, and related, we would pursue comprehensive approaches and solutions, addressing the roots of issues and not just their manifestations. This entails efforts varying from spurring economic development and educational opportunity to strengthening governments' abilities to combat terrorism and extremism.

Fourth, we would posture our forces and maintain focus on readiness to conduct contingency operations, whether crisis response, deterrent action, or defeating aggressors.

These concepts can be applied to each of the transnational threats listed in the answers to the previous question, and they are also important in addressing and preventing the spread of inter- and intra-state conflicts in the CENTCOM AOR.

Signaling U.S. resolve to address the region's challenges is one of the important roles of any combatant commander, and active pursuit of these concepts would also serve that purpose.

**MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS**

*Question.* What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, CENTCOM? What management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

*Answer.* Having not yet performed those functions, I cannot say at this time what the most serious problems are. Until I have been confirmed and made an assessment, it would be premature to establish management actions or timelines.

**READINESS OF FORCES**

*Question.* What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces that have been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom?

*Answer.* Units arrive in theater well prepared for the operations in Iraq. Indeed, I continue to believe that our current force is the best trained, best equipped force in America's history. Leaders at every level, many of whom are on their second or third combat deployments, are using their experience from previous deployments to prepare and train their units well, and U.S. forces in Iraq remain disciplined, spirited, and adaptable in the face of challenging, ever-changing battlefield conditions.

*Question.* Have you observed any significant trends in apparent gaps with respect to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in units upon arrival in theater?

*Answer.* There are not currently any significant gaps in the readiness of units as they arrive in Iraq. The equipment and training they receive in preparation for deployment are excellent. As in all counterinsurgency operations, though, tactics—both those of the enemy and our own—constantly change, and the winning side is generally that which learns faster. We have strived to be a learning organization and have adapted well in the past; with Congress's support, for example, we have effectively employed increasing ISR capability and fielded MRAPs to protect our forces from increasingly lethal IEDs. We have also worked to push lessons learned back to units so they can integrate them into their training. As enemy tactics evolve and new equipment and training requirements arise, I would see it as my responsibility to address those needs, if I am confirmed.

*Question.* What are your views on the growing debate over whether the Army is putting too much emphasis on preparing for counterinsurgency operations or too little emphasis on preparing for high intensity force-on-force conflict?

*Answer.* Although I understand the concern, I believe that the distinction between the requirements of counterinsurgency and those of high intensity combat can be overstated. Indeed, Army doctrine explains that all operations (including counterinsurgency) are a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have performed—and continue to perform—very well in intense combat, gaining new sophistication in the use of fires (increasingly precise) and air-weapons teams, the integration of counterfire radar and unmanned aerial vehicles, the teamwork between conventional and Special Operations Forces, the fusion of intelligence, and the command and control of complex operations. The past year, for example, included significant combat operations to clear Ramadi, Baqubah, various Baghdad neighborhoods, and now Mosul. Beyond that, leaders are explicitly trained and educated in our branch schools in how to think rather than what to think, and they are more adaptive as a result. The Army is now full of experienced leaders (as are all our Services), and it has shown that it is a learning organization, rapidly institutionalizing lessons learned. Finally, it has a more robustly equipped force, including vehicles that offer better protection, which would serve well in a variety of high intensity conflicts.
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?

Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position in Iraq now than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The security situation is much improved, with overall attacks, civilian deaths, and ethno-sectarian violence all down substantially. The week ending 16 May 2008 had the lowest level of security incidents since the week that ended 23 April 2004. Having noted that, progress is uneven and difficult challenges remain, including Iran’s malign involvement in Iraq and the fact that AQI and other Sunni extremists and illegal Shiite militias retain the ability in some areas to carry out lethal attacks and regenerate. Iraqi security forces continue to improve and are increasingly taking the lead. Nonetheless, the gains of the past 15 months remain fragile, and much tough work remains on the security front.

The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on some very difficult issues and has passed some critical legislation. We have seen more unity across sectarian lines at the national level, and this presents opportunities for further political progress. Iraq’s governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas but is improving. Overall, Iraq is moving in the right direction and making progress. However, it will take continued U.S. involvement and commitment to ensure that the gains are not reversed.

Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?

Answer. Recent experience in Iraq has shown us the value of pursuing a comprehensive approach in response to complex challenges and of focusing on key counterinsurgency concepts. In Iraq, we operate along multiple lines of operation. Our strategy recognizes that enduring security and stability rest on economic, political, social, and diplomatic, as well as military, efforts and thus require simultaneous pursuit of a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Our application of a joint USM–IMNF-I campaign plan has required an immense amount of coordination among governmental departments and agencies and reinforced the lesson that the military cannot accomplish its mission on its own. As an example, we have begun to address the foreign fighter problem in Iraq through a series of video teleconferences in which more than 25 organizations from the interagency, Intelligence Community, and DOD participate; this forum has allowed key leaders across all agencies and departments to share current assessments and activities and to discuss future plans.

Because of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, we have already seen some progress in interagency cooperation. After September 11, every regional combatant commander stood up a new doctrinal Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) that was originally focused on counterterrorism operations. Over the past few years, these JIACGs have begun to evolve into interagency enablers for full-spectrum operations. Just this month, CENTCOM formally announced the evolution of its JIACG into an Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare to confront the complex challenges of its region. If I am confirmed, I would seek to build on these initiatives as CENTCOM commander.

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?

Answer. First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments that did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and resume their functions as soon as interim governmental structures were in place; that obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it was (a challenge compounded, of course, by looting). Additionally, although most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators (and that was true even in most Sunni Arab areas), there was an underestimation of the degree of resistance that would develop as a Shiite majority government began to emerge and the Sunni Arabs, especially the “Saddamists,” realized that the days of their dominating Iraq were over. Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by other actions noted below.

A number of other situations did not develop as envisioned, including:

- There was a feeling that elections would enhance the Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian positions, as Iraqis who did vote did so largely based on ethnic and sectarian group identity; major sections of the population boycotted the political process and thus have been underrepresented ever since.
- There was an underestimation of the degree of resistance that would develop as a Shiite majority government began to emerge and the Sunni Arabs, especially the “Saddamists,” realized that the days of their dominating Iraq were over.
rity institutions, in the midst of an insurgency, following the disbandment of the Iraqi security forces.

- It repeatedly took us too much time to recognize changes in the security environment and to react to them. What began as an insurgency, gradually evolved into a conflict that included insurgent attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent crime. Our actions had to evolve in response to these changes, and that was not always easy.

A number of other mistakes were made during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including:

- The very slow execution of the reconciliation components of de-Baathification by the Iraqi de-Baathification Committee left tens of thousands of former Baath Party members (many of them Sunni Arabs, but also some Shiite) feeling that they had no future opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To be fair to the, Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Bremer intended to execute reconciliation (or exceptions to the de-Baathification order) and, for example, gave me permission to do so on a trial basis in Ninewa Province; however, when we submitted the results of the reconciliation commission conducted for Mosul University and subsequent requests for exception issued by Iraqi processes with judicial oversight, no action was taken on them by the Iraqi de-Baathification Committee in Baghdad. As realization set in among those affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we could feel support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab majority areas.

- Disbanding the Iraqi Army without simultaneously announcing a stipend and pension program, a plan for Iraq’s future security forces, and ways to join those future forces left hundreds of thousands of Iraqi men angry, feeling disrespected, and worried about how they would feed their families. The stipend plan eventually announced did help, but it did not cover senior officers, who then remained influential critics of the new Iraq. This action likely helped fuel the early growth of anti-coalition sentiment and of the insurgency.

- We took too long to develop the concepts and structures needed to build effective Iraqi security forces to assist in providing security for the Iraqi people.

- Misconduct at Abu Ghraib and in other less sensational, but still damaging, cases inflamed the insurgency and damaged the credibility of Coalition Forces in Iraq, in the region, and around the world.

- We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an inadequate military headquarters structure. In hindsight, it is clear that it took too long to transform V Corps Headquarters into CJTF–7 Headquarters and that even after that transformation the headquarters was not capable of looking both up and down (e.g., performing both political-military and strategic functions and also serving as the senior operational headquarters for counter-insurgency and stability operations). The result was the eventual creation of the MNF–I headquarters. Moreover, it is clear that we should have built what eventually became MNSTC–I headquarters and TF134 headquarters (which oversees detainee/interrogation operations) and other organizations (e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division Headquarters) much sooner.

- Although it was not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division AOR during my time as the 101st Cdr, it is clear that in certain AORs there were more tasks than troops—especially in Anbar Province during at least the first year of operations.

- Finally, the effort in the wake of the al-Askariya Mosque bombing in Samarra in February 2006, was unable to stem the spiraling sectarian violence. Repeated operations in Baghdad in the summer and fall of 2006, in particular, did not prove durable due to a lack of sufficient Iraqi and coalition forces for the hold phase of clear-hold-build operations.

**Question.** Which of these do you believe are still having an impact?

**Answer.** Although it is difficult after 5 years of developments in Iraq to attribute specific current challenges to particular past activities, it is likely that we are still feeling the effects of many of these activities. For instance, groups that chose not to participate in Iraq’s 2005 elections are still underrepresented in government at the provincial and national levels. For this reason, free and fair provincial elections this year will be very important in pulling an increasing proportion of Iraqi society into the political process.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

Answer. As U.S. forces in theater draw down, our most important steps are those that protect the Iraqi people while continuing to build Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as we assist in providing security, we must also enable Iraqi security forces increasingly to assume the lead in securing their country. We must work to help the Iraqis expand their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage and support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the local and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the challenges associated with internal and external stability and security in Iraq cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must thus continue to engage with Iraq’s neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to support political compromise and stability in Iraq.

Question. How has the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?

Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. While the fundamental nature of this struggle has not changed, it has played out differently over time. Over the past year, we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence. However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing challenges in the area of intra-sectarian conflict have risen to the fore. Iraq continues to face a complex array of destabilizing forces, including terrorism and regional interference; however, as noted earlier, the level of security incidents in the past week was the lowest in over 4 years.

Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to this change in the nature of the conflict?

Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address this conflict over power and resources. As commander of MNF–I, I participated in the development of the Joint Campaign Plan with the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad. This plan lays out a comprehensive approach, along security, economic, diplomatic, and political lines of operation, to achieve the aim of an independent, stable, and secure Iraq. Although there is a long way to go, our strategy to address the conflict in Iraq is achieving progress.

Question. What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control, particularly in southern Iraq?

Answer. Coalition forces support the elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Iraqi leaders have largely united around the aim of disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in that effort.

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007?

Answer. The day after Secretary Gates took office, immediately before his first trip to Iraq, I met with him to discuss the situation in Iraq. We talked again subsequent to his trip. I also talked to the CJCS several times during that period, noting that an emphasis on population security, particularly in Baghdad, was necessary to help the Iraqis gain the time and space for the tough decisions they faced and also contributing my input on the general force levels likely to be required. As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions to LTG Ray Odierno to confirm that his troop-to-task analysis required the force levels called for by the new strategy; I relayed my support for those levels to the CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the strategy’s additional emphasis on the advisory effort and additional resources for the reconstruction effort (both in terms of funding and personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Teams and governmental ministry capacity development).

Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?

Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in Iraq. All four lines of operation—security, economic, diplomatic, and political—are mutually reinforcing and thus must be pursued to achieve a long-term solution in Iraq. Though the pursuit of political reconciliation and good governance along the political line of operation is the main effort, success in this area depends on security conditions that enable and foster compromise. Enduring domestic political progress will also rest on supporting economic and diplomatic developments.

Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
Answer. Iraq leaders have put themselves under enormous personal pressure and are also under the collective pressure of various political elements in Iraq to create stability and long-term solutions for Iraq. Indeed, they have already worked together and compromised on a number of difficult issues in order to pass important pieces of legislation earlier this year. They recognize that in order to succeed in a political process, they will need to produce results, and producing results requires compromise. With regard to expectations about the pace of progress, it is important to recognize that Iraq’s political leaders are still struggling with fundamental questions such as the degree of devolution to the provinces of various authorities and powers in Iraq. Iraq’s political leaders have already begun to make progress in these areas, and they are continuing to move forward on issues such as the provincial elections scheduled for later this year.

Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?

Answer. Although U.S. forces and reconstruction funding are being reduced, the U.S. still has considerable leverage and influence in the form of U.S. forces, the large U.S. diplomatic presence, and the comprehensive effort to increase governmental capacity. Having said that, Iraq is a sovereign country and, understandably, its leaders seek to exercise that sovereignty—and we seek to encourage that. Beyond that, supporting political solutions in Iraq is not purely a matter of leverage and convincing Iraqi leaders of the importance of compromise. It is also a matter of helping Iraqi leaders to set conditions that enable progress. There again, our leverage lies in our robust engagement, working with the Government of Iraq, and helping its leaders to make and implement the hard decisions that are in the best interests of all the Iraqi people.

Question. To your knowledge, aren’t conditions on the ground in Iraq being continuously assessed?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days to assess the conditions on the ground and determine when to make recommendations?

Answer. The withdrawal of over one-quarter of our combat power from Iraq will significantly reshape the battlefield. Our goal is to thin out our presence, not simply withdraw from areas, to ensure we help the ISF hold the security gains we have achieved together and set the conditions for additional progress. A period of 45 days will enable us to repurpose our forces, if needed, evaluate the effect of required adjustments, and avoid premature judgments about the impact of these changes. After this period of consolidation and evaluation, we can then complete an informed assessment and make appropriate recommendations.

Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would allow for a recommendation that further reductions be made in U.S. forces?

Answer. There is no simple metric or equation that can be used to determine the appropriate pace of force reductions. A number of variables are examined as we conduct assessments. Reductions are not merely a question of battlefield geometry; they involve complex political and military calculus. We look primarily at security and local governance conditions—at the enemy situation and the capability of Iraqi security forces, at the capacity of local officials, and at a host of other factors. Though we have metrics to assist in assessing the situation in various locations, in many cases it is the commander on the ground who has the best feel for the situation; it is as much art as it is science.

Question. In the Fiscal Year 2008 defense authorization and appropriation acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control Iraq’s oil resources. Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq’s oil resources?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?

Answer. As is currently the case in Iraq, construction efforts should be focused on supporting the counterinsurgency concept of living among the people rather than on the expansion of large operating bases. Toward this end, we continue to complete some Joint Security Station and Combat Outpost facilities that are necessary for current missions—though the vast majority of these facilities have already been completed. Over time, a few headquarters may be shifted as well, and this may require a few facility changes. Much of our future effort will, however, be focused on reducing the size of our facilities. As we continue to withdraw forces, we will follow a “shrink and share” strategy that reduces base perimeters and maximizes opportunities to share bases with ISF and Government of Iraq users. Eventually, these facilities will either be transferred to the Government of Iraq or closed.
Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi Government to assume greater responsibility for paying the costs of reconstruction and security activities throughout Iraq, including paying for all large-scale infrastructure projects; the costs of combined operations between Iraqi and MNF-I forces; the costs of training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces; and the costs associated with the Sons of Iraq?

Answer. The Government of Iraq has an increasing responsibility and an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in Iraq, and it is making progress in picking up a greater share of the load. As Ambassador Crocker recently stated before Congress, “The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over.” Instead, we are focusing our efforts on helping build Iraqi governmental capacity so that Iraqis can better leverage their own resources. For example, Iraq’s 2008 budget contains $13 billion for reconstruction; beyond that, we anticipate Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and a supplemental Iraqi budget is in the works. An important limiting factor is Iraqi governmental capacity, but this is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by a solid increase in budget execution last year.

Question. What are your views on the concept circulated over the last year that would make Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan a Marine Corps mission and end the rotation of Marine units in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Answer. In my current position in Iraq, I have not been a part of the discussions surrounding this issue (other than those related to its impact in Iraq). If I am confirmed, it is an issue I will discuss with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in Afghanistan.

**CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS**

Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking the steps it must to confront and control the militias? What role would you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?

Answer. The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in recent months to confront criminal militias. Prime Minister Maliki made the decision in March to confront militia elements in Basra that were carrying out violent crimes and mafia-like activities. That operation is still ongoing, but Iraqi security forces have made impressive progress in improving security conditions in Basra’s neighborhoods as well as in the strategic Port of Umm Qasr and in other areas in Basra Province.

The government’s success in Basra has also led to a greater degree of unity among Iraqi leaders regarding the issue of armed militias. Prime Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the Government of Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (an issue on which a public statement of backing was issued by Grand Ayatollah Sistani), and the government and ISF have worked to enforce this policy in Baghdad, particularly in Sadr City. In general, the government has been more willing to use its forces to confront militia elements, but it also realizes that the militia issue cannot be addressed with a purely military solution. In an effort to win popular support, Iraqi leaders have actively pursued humanitarian assistance efforts in areas affected by militia violence and have reached out to tribal and political leaders as well.

There is obviously a long way to go in reducing militia violence, but there does seem to be positive momentum toward addressing these difficult issues and drawing dissident factions into the political process. If confirmed, I would continue to support the MNF-I Commander’s efforts to partner with the Iraqi Government to combat these militias. In addition, I would seek to assist with regional engagement efforts to dissuade Iran and Syria from fostering violence and instability in Iraq and seek to encourage Iraq’s Arab neighbors to play a more constructive role.

Question. What has been the role of American troops with respect to operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra?

Answer. U.S. support for the Sadr City and Basra operations has been generally in line with the support Coalition Forces regularly provide to Iraqi operations. In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in Multi-National Division—Southeast, we continue to support Iraqi-led operations with planning, logistics, close air support, intelligence, and embedded transition teams. These efforts are typical of our role in provinces transitioned to Iraqi control, where Iraqi forces plan and execute operations and are supported by specific Coalition enablers.

Because Baghdad is not yet transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control, U.S. forces are playing a more robust role in planning and executing operations in the Baghdad Security Districts than they are in Basra. We are conducting extensive surveillance operations in Sadr City and partnering with Iraqi units on the ground. Using intelligence elements, ground forces, and air weapons teams, U.S. forces also conducted
very targeted operations in response to attacks originating in Sadr City. As is typical in the “partner” phase of the lead-partner-overwatch transition to ISF control, Coalition forces operate alongside and in coordination with Iraqi Army, special operations, and police units.

Question. What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and security forces’ strategic and operational planning and preparation for the operation in Basra?

Answer. Iraqi operations in Basra were launched more quickly than was originally planned and were hampered initially by incomplete planning and conditions-setting. As operations have continued, we have seen steady growth in ISF planning capability, and recent operations have been impressive.

Once the hasty initial planning issues were resolved, Iraq security forces demonstrated impressive growth in operational capability, and it is notable that, on short notice, they were able to deploy over a division’s worth of personnel and equipment to Basra from across the country and to quickly employ them upon arrival—a feat which certainly would not have been possible 1 year ago.

Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces’ tactical performance during operations in Basra?

Answer. As operations in Basra began, performance of the ISF was uneven, with some units performing quite well and others performing poorly. However, the Iraqi Government reacted aggressively to shortcomings identified in early operations and quickly removed underperforming leaders and troopers and flew in replacements. Many of the units—such as a brigade of the 14th Iraqi Army Division—that originally performed poorly have already been retrained and are back in the fight as operations in Basra continue, though progress with reconstituting police elements that performed inadequately has been slower.

As I noted above, performance of the ISF has improved over the course of the ongoing operation in Basra. The ISF have, for several weeks now, been conducting orderly clear-hold-build operations incrementally through the city and outside the city with sound tactical planning and execution. They have, for example, captured weapons caches that total over 2800 mortar and artillery rounds, nearly 700 rockets, 1,300 rocket propelled grenades, 21 surface-to-air missiles, and over 500 mines, bombs, and improvised explosive devices.

Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi Government’s strategic and the Iraqi security forces’ operational objectives?

Answer. Operations in Basra City and Province are still ongoing; however, they do appear to have achieved the Iraqi Government’s military objectives, strategically as well as operationally. The accomplishments to date have been impressive and have bolstered Prime Minister Maliki’s standing with various political elements. The ISF have made significant progress in eliminating the militia’s grip on Basra’s neighborhoods, and they have cleared numerous huge caches throughout the city. The operation seems to be garnering support from Basrawi citizens and has already had positive effects on Iraqi political unity. Also, the ISF have successfully detained several militia leaders who returned to Basra after fleeing in the early days of the operation.

ACCOUNTING FOR ISF WEAPONS

Question. A July 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC–I) could not fully account for the receipt by the Iraqi security forces (ISF) of over 190,000 weapons provided by the United States. One of the report’s findings is that the lapse in accounting for weapons provided by the United States to the ISF was due to the failure of MNSTC–I to maintain a central record of all equipment distributed from June 2004 to December 2005, including during the period you commanded MNSTC–I.

Have you reviewed the July 2007 GAO report on accounting for weapons provided by the United States to the ISF? If so, what is your assessment of the report’s findings?

Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report. Taking into account the caveats listed in the GAO report (including the fact that the GAO review utilized an incomplete sample), I found the findings to be as accurate as they could have been. The security situation in Iraq in 2004–2005 was very challenging, and the priority was to provide arms to ISF who were preparing to enter the fight. Indeed, Members of Congress, DOD, and the administration repeatedly emphasized the need to accelerate the arming and training of the ISF. On several occasions, we had to provide arms to the ISF in the middle of ongoing major combat operations (e.g., Fallujah, Najaf, and Mosul in the fall of 2004). Many of our challenges stemmed from an insufficient number of logistical personnel in the train and equip effort and in the newly formed
Iraqi units, and also from the lack of a fully operational distribution networks and property accountability systems across Iraq. Accountability has since been achieved by MNSTC–I for a portion of the weapons assessed as unaccounted for in the GAO report, and the effort to achieve further accountability continues.

Question. What has been done to address the accountability for weapons provided by the United States in the course of training and equipping the ISF? What additional steps, if any, are needed to improve accountability for these weapons?

Answer. Accountability procedures have been significantly improved. We have worked to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of munitions under U.S. control from entry into Iraq to issuance to the ISF. We have increased the number of logistics and property accountability specialists in country (in MNSTC–I, in particular) and increased security procedures throughout the chain of custody. We have also worked with the ISF to build their property accountability systems and structures. In July 2007, we partnered with the ISF to establish an M–16 Biometrics Program that links individual soldiers to the particular weapons they are issued. Prior to weapons issue, each soldier is required to provide biometric data in the form of a retinal scan, a voice scan, and fingerprints. In addition, soldiers’ personnel and payroll data are verified before a weapon is issued. The final step in the process is to take a picture of each soldier holding his new weapon with the serial number visible. Similar biometric procedures have been implemented for Iraqi police badge and weapon issue, as well. The fidelity of data and level of detail captured in these accountability procedures are significant. Even as we continue these important initiatives, we must plan for future transitions by ensuring that the ISF can adequately provide security and accountability at key logistics hubs as they assume responsibility for these facilities.

SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop levels in Iraq of approximately 140,000 troops at their current operational tempo?

Answer. There is clearly a strain on the Active and Reserve components. Many soldiers have completed or are in the midst of second or third deployments. This is obviously difficult for them and their families. My own family is well acquainted with this challenge, as I have now been deployed for more than 4½ years since 2001. Reset of equipment also remains a challenge. Having said that, it is more appropriate for the Joint Staff and the Services to determine how long we can sustain given troop levels, though the Army Chief of Staff has said the Army can maintain a 15-Brigade Combat Team level in Iraq and Afghanistan—i.e., the post-surge level. As CENTCOM commander, it would be beyond my brief to determine the overall health of the Army and Marine Corps, though it would be something about which I would be very concerned and on which I would have dialogue with the Service Chiefs. These concerns are somewhat allayed by the ongoing effort to increase the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps and by the ongoing reduction of forces in Iraq. Clearly, the conflict in Iraq (and Afghanistan) has been hard on our ground forces, and I am grateful for Secretary Gates’ efforts and Congress’ support to ensure we have the forces we need for what are very frequently people-intensive operations.

COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Question. According to Field Manual 3–24, the new counterinsurgency manual, “20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations.” Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, requires a force of 120,000–130,000 personnel to meet the minimum requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces.

Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and remains sufficient and if so, why?

Answer. First, the recommended force ratio is a “rule of thumb” distilled for simplicity’s sake from numerous complex cases of counterinsurgency operations. These cases may differ significantly in terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy strength. As with many aspects of counterinsurgency, this is an art, not a science. Having said that, troop levels in Baghdad have been sufficient. Counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host nation police and army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special operating forces and other security elements. Added to those, the thousands of ministry security forces and similarly large numbers of civilian (often third party) contracted guard forces protecting key sites in Baghdad contribute to security in the capital city. In addition, nearly 30,000 Sons of Iraq are
currently contracted to help provide security in the Baghdad area. Taking into account these additional security forces in Baghdad, the force ratio is sufficient; significantly increased security in Baghdad over the last year bears out this analysis.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation from doctrine?

**Answer.** Risk assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a continuous basis in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and undertaken, commanders consider the risk to our own forces as well as Iraqi forces, as well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas that we currently hold.

**AFGHANISTAN**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan and the nature, size, and scope of the anti-government insurgency?

**Answer.** I have not had the opportunity to personally assess the security situation in Afghanistan since 2005. However, the Afghan Government and the Coalition clearly face a resilient enemy that seeks to force withdrawal of the international coalition, to overthrow the country’s legitimate government, and to turn Afghanistan into a safe haven for terrorists once again.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, has repeatedly called our military operations in Afghanistan an “economy of force” operation and said that there are requirements in Afghanistan that cannot be filled and likely won’t be filled until conditions improve in Iraq.

**Do you agree with Admiral Mullen that requirements in Afghanistan are going unfilled?**

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree that these requirements are unlikely to be met until conditions improve in Iraq?

**Answer.** There are several ways to meet the requirements in Afghanistan, including increasing NATO contributions and increasing the capability and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. But clearly a reduction of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq will make available forces that could help meet the need in Afghanistan.

**Question.** If confirmed as Commander, CENTCOM, how would you intend to balance the requirements of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

**Answer.** In consultation with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, I would, if confirmed, work to ensure that CENTCOM’s force posture remains consistent with national priorities, with force levels, and resources reflecting those priorities. It would be my responsibility to make clear the resources necessary to achieve the national policy goals and objectives; I would also intend to make clear how and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the force or mission objectives.

**Question.** If additional troops and equipment are withdrawn from Iraq, do you believe that some of those resources should go to enhance military operations in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Yes; in fact, that has already been the case, with additional Marine forces being provided to Afghanistan some months after the Marine Expeditionary Unit was withdrawn from Iraq.

**Question.** In your view, what additional military or other assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?

**Answer.** I would rely on the commanders on the ground in Afghanistan to determine their requirements; we would then analyze and determine how best to resource those requirements. Ultimately, resolution of Afghanistan’s complex and diverse challenges will require more than just a military solution, though security activities provide an essential foundation for enduring economic and political solutions. Coalition forces in Afghanistan already work alongside civilians on issues such as counternarcotics, economic development, border enforcement, and training of the Afghan Police. More such whole-of-government efforts are likely to be essential in the future.

**Question.** What is your assessment of efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police? What changes, if any, would you recommend for this mission?

**Answer.** I have not had the opportunity to assess our progress in training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces since 2005. If confirmed, I will work with Major General Robert W. Cone and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan to evaluate our efforts in this critical area and to determine what changes to the mission, if any, are required.
Question. What needs to be done to address concerns voiced by President Karzai and others regarding the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan?

Answer. The death of innocent civilians in wartime is a tragedy. The welfare of the civilian population is a critical concern, not only from a humanitarian perspective but also from a mission perspective. Indeed, counterinsurgency doctrine highlights the importance of protecting the population as part of the key effort to win over the people, convince them of the government's legitimacy, and provide for their welfare. Based on conversations with General McNeill, it is clear that Coalition forces in Afghanistan take this concern very seriously and employ all possible means to limit the effect of violence on the civilian population. Efforts to minimize civilian casualties clearly must continue to be given high priority in Afghanistan and our other operational areas.

Question. Are there additional steps that need to be taken?

Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the systems and procedures in place in Afghanistan to be able to recommend at this time specific steps to be taken. Our near-term responsibility includes protecting the civilian population from insurgents and terrorists and also limiting the adverse effects of our military operations on the civilian population. It is important to keep sight of the fact that minimizing civilian casualties can be a very difficult endeavor, as we face an enemy who deliberately places innocents in harm's way. But it is an endeavor we must emphasize.

Question. Afghanistan is in CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR). U.S. European Command, however, oversees the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

In your view, does this "seam" present any problems for the coordination and effectiveness of the NATO ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom missions in Afghanistan?

Answer. All seams present challenges for commanders, and I am sure this seam presents coordination challenges in a variety of areas such as security operations, reconstruction, economic development, and counternarcotics efforts. If I am confirmed, one of my priorities would be to enhance coordination and cooperation between CENTCOM, EUCOM, and ISAF in order to ensure the greatest possible unity of effort on the ground in Afghanistan.

AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED GROUPS

Question. Within the CENTCOM AOR, where do you consider the greatest terrorist threats from al Qaeda and associated groups to be located?

Answer. The greatest threats from al Qaeda (AQ) in the CENTCOM AOR are in Iraq and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. The AQ threat in Iraq is important because Iraq is where AQ has chosen to achieve its fundamental objective of establishing an Islamic state in the heart of the Arab world. AQ in the FATA is a critical concern because AQ's senior leadership is located there, exerts malign influence against our operations in Afghanistan from there, and prepares for future global attacks from there. Another area of growing concern is the Levant, where AQ is attempting to increase its presence, particularly as Iraq and Saudi Arabia have proven increasingly inhospitable to AQ activities. There are additional such efforts in Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

Question. Which of these threats do you believe constitute the highest priority for efforts to counter al Qaeda's influence and eliminate safe havens for al Qaeda and affiliated groups?

Answer. Defeat of al Qaeda is a priority for the United States. Because AQ is a global, distributed terrorist network that is interlinked, we cannot attempt to address individual portions of the network and expect to have a major operational or strategic impact against it. This requires a comprehensive approach that is appropriately balanced and tailored to address specific threats. Clearly, however, the threats posed by the AQ leadership and elements in the FATA and by those in Iraq must rank at the top of the list.

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation?

Answer. My understanding is that military cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan has been robust since September 11. This cooperation includes Foreign Military Sales, military-to-military assistance in training and advising, and border enforcement efforts. The new Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani (a U.S. Army CGSC graduate) has instigated several positive military reforms and sought constructive engagement with the U.S. military. These are all initiatives I would seek to support and further if I am confirmed.
Question. Press reports indicate that incursions across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increased in recent weeks as the Government of Pakistan seeks to negotiate a peace agreement with militants in the border region.

What is your assessment of the level of cooperation the United States has received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?

Answer. On the issue of terrorism, the U.S. and Pakistan have mutual concerns and goals. Recognizing the threat posed by terrorism, the Government of Pakistan strongly supported U.S. activities in the region following the attacks of September 11. Pakistan supported, and continues to support, our mission in Afghanistan by allowing the flow of logistical support through Pakistan into Afghanistan. The government has also in the past demonstrated a willingness to pursue wanted terrorists within its borders.

Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a modification of the government’s approach to combating terrorism. The newly elected government, seeking to address the ongoing problem of extremism and terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with extremists in the FATA and subsequently began thinning out its forces in the region. This appears to be a change in methodology rather than in cooperation. The new Pakistani Government is trying to determine the best way to address the longstanding problem of control over its western areas and is trying to develop a political solution. While it is true that a purely military approach would likely not be successful, it is also unlikely that a purely political approach would have the desired effect—as demonstrated by what is generally assessed to be the failure of the negotiated ‘permanent peace’ in Waziristan in 2006.

Question. What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions by the Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan?

Answer. This is a complicated problem that likely requires a comprehensive solution. Aspects of that solution might include: strengthening the ANSF to assist Afghanistan in securing its borders; working with Pakistan to further increase coordination of border enforcement efforts; and strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps—and willingness of the Pakistani Government—to control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any long-term solution must also address the root causes of terrorism’s growth in Pakistan and must include initiatives to increase economic and educational opportunity in the generally poor and isolated communities of the region.

Question. In your view, should the Government of Pakistan be doing more to prevent these cross-border incursions?

Answer. Certainly increased and more effective efforts by the Pakistani Government to control the border would be helpful to our interests and coalition activities in Afghanistan, and we are working with Islamabad to strengthen its capability to do so. The danger posed by extremists in the FATA, though, is not limited to the threat to our troops and interests in Afghanistan. FATA extremists pose a serious threat to Pakistan itself. Beyond that, an even more serious and enduring problem is that AQ leadership will continue to use the safe haven provided by Pakistan’s borderlands to plan and prepare global terrorist attacks. Our assistance to Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts must also address this important issue and, as mentioned above, be comprehensive.

Question. What more can be done to eliminate safe havens for violent extremists in the FATA’s and the North West Frontier Province?

Answer. The U.S. Government needs to develop a comprehensive approach, in coordination with other countries, to support Government of Pakistan efforts to eliminate extremist sanctuaries in the FATA and North West Frontier Province. Based on our experiences in Iraq, it seems clear that resolution of the challenges emanating from these areas cannot be achieved by application of military force alone—though the security component is critical. Rather, resolution demands a strategy grounded in proven counterinsurgency practices that is adequately resourced, tailored to the Pakistani operating environment, and focused on producing an enduring political solution. At the end of the day, however, the challenges posed by the FATA can only be resolved by Pakistani initiatives, albeit with support from the U.S. and other partners.

Question. What role do you believe U.S. forces should play?

Answer. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will undoubtedly be a topic of discussion between the U.S. and Pakistan. Before speculating on what roles U.S. forces should play, I would want to discuss the situation with Pakistani and U.S. leaders. My understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders understandably are reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements employed in the FATA.

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?
Answer. Lingering tensions between Pakistan and India provide cause for concern. At various times since the establishment of Pakistan, open war, insurgency, and terrorism have marked their relations. The unresolved dispute over Kashmir, regional terrorism, the possibility of crisis escalation, and preparations by the armed forces on each side for major war have all fueled mistrust and suspicion. Naturally, the situation has often precluded Pakistani leaders from focusing more attention on the challenge in the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province. Recently, however, we have seen some indications of improved political and economic relations between the two countries, as they have been cooperating on cross-border commerce and transportation, border control safeguards, and governmental procedures to ease cross-border friction. In addition, shortages of a viable electrical energy supply in the region have led to several conferences and meetings among regional leaders to discuss solutions to a looming energy crisis.

IRAN

Question. What in your assessment are Iran’s goals with respect to Iraq’s stability and security?

Answer. Based on Iranian interference in Iraq, it appears that Iran seeks a Shiite Iraqi Government that is not only friendly to Iran but is subject to the Iranian influence that derives not just from political, economic, and social ties, but also from the presence in Iraq of Iranian trained, funded, equipped, and directed militia forces. Iranian activities also seem aimed at producing just enough instability to keep the Government of Iraq weak. Ambassador Crocker has assessed that Iran has sought to “Lebanonize” Iraq, and there are many indicators that support that assessment.

Question. What options are available to the United States and its allies for influencing Iran’s activities towards Iraq?

Answer. There are a number of diplomatic, economic, and military options available to the U.S. and its allies. On the diplomatic front, we will continue to expose the extent of Iran’s malign activities in Iraq in order to build regional and international consensus against Iran’s actions. We also seek to fully inform Iraqis of the nature and extent of the Iranian threat to Iraqi national interests, as official Iraqi condemnation of malign Iranian activities in Iraq sends a powerful signal to Tehran and enhances normal statecraft and relations between the two countries. In addition, we will continue to encourage a substantive show of support for Iraq by regional states, which would be an important counterbalance to Iranian influence in Iraq. This support could include further debt relief for Iraq and the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations through an exchange of ambassadors with Baghdad. On the economic front, we could seek international support for sanctions, to include travel restrictions, against the Iranian regime for the malign activities of the Quds Force and Iranian intelligence services. On the military front, we will continue to target and expose Iranian malign actors and extremist surrogates operating in Iraq and taking actions—often lethal—against Iraqi and Coalition interests.

Question. What in your view are Iran’s goals in the region?

Answer. Iran seeks to guarantee the survival of its regime and, it appears, to establish a degree of Iranian hegemony over the northern Gulf and also Iranian influence in various states in the region through the use of surrogate militias. The presence of U.S. and Coalition forces in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan provides a significant counter to Iranian aspirations. To pursue its strategic objectives, Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power, with the goal of intimidating the Gulf states and deterring any potential attack on the Iranian regime. In addition to employment of such conventional means, Iran also appears to want to exert its influence throughout the broader region by pursuing a nuclear capability and by supporting terrorist proxies and surrogates in the Palestinian territories, southern Lebanon, Iraq, and western Afghanistan.

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran’s growing influence in the region?

Answer. Our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating international cooperation and building regional consensus to counter malign Iranian influence and destabilizing activities, while also striving to promote more constructive engagement, if that is possible. We have strong alliances and partnerships in the Gulf and throughout the broader region upon which we can build a common cause that may help dissuade Iran from its subversive activities and encourage legitimate statecraft and economic interchange. At the same time, we should continue to work with the international community to demonstrate to Iran that there are consequences for its illegitimate influence in the region, especially for the destabilizing actions of the Quds Force and Iranian intelligence services.
In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage by use of the whole of government, developing further leverage rather than simply targeting discrete threats. As noted earlier, one particular lever may be the ongoing international diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran to end its nuclear program; such pressure seems to be affecting the Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran to focus on longer-term, less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq, rampant terrorism in the region, and a nuclear armed Middle East are not in any nation’s long-term interest, including Iran’s. Along these lines, the international community can reach out to help moderate, pragmatic elements that might influence the internal Iranian debate over Iran’s foreign policy and long-term security interests. At the same time, we should retain, as a last resort, the possibility of a range of military actions to counter Iran’s activities. As Admiral Mullen has noted, our approach should consist of “using all elements of national power, whether it’s economic or financial, international, diplomatic, and not taking any military options off the table.”

Question. Could a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq strengthen Iran’s influence in the region?
Answer. On the contrary, one impact of the U.S. effort in Iraq has been to bring into focus Iran’s destabilizing regional impact. The presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and elsewhere in the region has the potential to counter malign Iranian influence against the Government of Iraq, build common cause in the region, and expose the extent of malign Iranian activities to the world.

Question. Iran is clearly going to remain a significant factor in the CENTCOM AOR. One of the critical objectives for the U.S. in this region is to determine how to achieve a more manageable and stable situation with respect to Iran for the future.

How do you believe we could best encourage or achieve a more manageable relationship with Iran in the future?
Answer. The consensus-building, comprehensive approaches described above (two questions previous) are constructive ways to improve relations with Iran. Such approaches would seek to create leverage and make possible constructive engagement in the region.

FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES

Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in supporting the U.S. and coalition forces in the global war on terrorism.

What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. The military relationship with most of our Central Asian counterparts is good and improving. Soon after the September 11 attacks, Uzbekistan offered basing access and overflight rights to the U.S. for operations in Afghanistan. While this particular access ended late in 2005 after the Andijon events, recently there have been modest signs of improvement in the relationship. Since the U.S. left Kharkish-Khanabad Airbase in Uzbekistan, Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan has become more important as the remaining northern Central Asia base. The Kyrgyz have been willing to expand and solidify that relationship, and improvements to the infrastructure and capabilities of Manas Airbase continue. Kazakhstan has aggressively pursued strengthening of the bilateral relationship with the U.S., recently signing a 5-year plan of military cooperation with the U.S. Turkmenistan’s new President Berdimukhammedov continues to allow U.S. humanitarian overflights and refueling operations. Recent gestures toward improving the international investment climate suggest positive development toward possible future bilateral military relationships with Turkmenistan. Tajikistan remains a solid partner, steadfast in its support for coalition operations and willing to expand the relationship.

Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Central Asian States share our concerns about religious extremism and consider it a threat to regional stability. We are working with partners in the region to improve the collective ability to interdict the movement of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials, and also to exercise control of national borders to counter terrorism and illegal trafficking.

The Central Asia region is relatively stable; however, potential migration of militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan presents a latent threat. Political and economic challenges in some areas provide a potential atmosphere for extremism exploitable by foreign and domestic extremist organizations. Also, the region has become a transit route for human and drug trafficking and is becoming vulnerable to the domestic consumption of narcotics. Contentious borders fuel tension between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the Fergana Valley. The Caspian Sea littoral dispute
and resultant access to energy fields and fisheries remains unresolved. Finally, water management, which is linked to hydro-electric power, is an ongoing area of contention, as a diminishing Aral Sea, pollution, and irrigation programs threaten shared river resources.

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that over two million Iraqis have been displaced; 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have vacated their homes for safer areas within Iraq. What is your assessment of the refugee problems in Iraq? Are more Iraqis returning home?

Answer. Refugee and displacement issues remain a serious concern. There are, however, indicators that the situation has begun to improve. According to U.S. Agency for International Development reporting, the rate of displacement of Iraqi citizens has been slowing considerably for at least the last 4 months, and some Iraqis (in significant numbers in some areas) are returning to their homes. These returns are motivated by a variety of factors, including: improved security in places of origin, deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, increased restrictions in neighboring countries, and tribal reconciliation. It is encouraging that the Iraqi Government has begun to give more attention to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the drafting of a national policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and a Basic Law for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration.

Question. What should be the role of the U.S. military in your view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their homes occupied by others?

Answer. The U.S. military can assist with key leader engagement on this issue and help partner with Iraqis to assist in their development of the governmental capacity needed to handle refugee and IDP returns.

Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in addressing this issue?

Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraq security forces should be the military's primary roles, the military can also play a role in addressing other concerns associated with IDPs and refugee return. Key tasks the military can perform that may help to address this issue include coordinating or executing humanitarian assistance when asked to do so by the Iraqi Government (at local as well as national levels) and partnering with provincial reconstruction teams to monitor and track the status of displaced persons and related issues.

Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and murders of non-Muslim religious leaders. In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at significant risk of being the victims of violence as a result of their religious status? Are there any of these groups that are particularly vulnerable?

Answer. There are a number of ethno-sectarian fault lines throughout Iraq, including in Baghdad and some other areas of mixed population. In some of these areas, groups within the population may be local minorities. When tensions are high, these groups (Muslim or non-Muslim) may be at greater risk. In addition, there are a number of smaller minority communities of Christians, Turkmen, Yezedas, etc., throughout Iraq that either are—or perceive themselves to be—in environments in which power and resources are controlled along sectarian lines and where their security is threatened. Attacks on a number of these communities bear out the threats. It is encouraging, however, that the government has devoted greater attention to security in such areas. For example, the murder of the Chaldean Archbishop Rahho was detained by Iraqi and Coalition forces on 5 March and sentenced to death in an Iraqi trial on 18 May.

Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military in addressing their vulnerability?

Answer. MNF–I partners with Iraqi Government and security force officials, ensuring constant communication and close cooperation on security concerns. This same cooperative approach is important in dealing with all population security concerns.

HORN OF AFRICA

Question. One of CENTCOM's significant subregions is the Horn of Africa. Until a new U.S. African Command is stood up later this year, CENTCOM will continue to be responsible for this region, which will likely experience continued instability and humanitarian crises as demonstrated by recent events in Somalia. What is the strategic importance of this region to the United States?
Answer. U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa include: denying terrorists a sanctuary in which to train, plan, and prepare for attacks; maintaining unimpeded commerce and freedom of the seas as part of a viable global economy; and alleviating humanitarian crises and suffering.

In addition to terrorist activity and simmering humanitarian crises in Somalia and Sudan, there are several challenges to our interests in the region. These include lack of economic development, poorly governed and ungoverned areas, ethnic tensions, and vulnerable strategic maritime choke points.

Question. Over the last few weeks, the U.S. military has had a very public presence in Somalia.

What is your assessment of the situation in Somalia?

Answer. Somalia continues to be a weak and fragile state fraught with violence. Political and security conditions remain precarious as Islamic militants, clan militias, and al Qaeda-associated factions conduct insurgent activities against Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and the Ethiopian and African Union contingents supporting them. The TFG has made little headway in establishing effective ministries and, barring unforeseen circumstances, is unlikely to transition power to a permanent government in the near future. In addition, U.N.-led reconciliation talks are not expected to lower the level of violence in Somalia.

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. Government’s policy for Somalia and how U.S. military action there supports that policy?

Answer. Current U.S. policy is to support the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government and its efforts to establish capable ministries and move toward democratic elections. Militarily, our strategy is to contain threats that may emanate from Somalia. As I understand the current national policy, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa engagement within Somalia is not permitted. Presumably, the U.S. retains the right to strike terrorists wherever they operate and deny them sanctuary.

Question. In your view, where does a stable Somalia fall in our national security priorities and how does the limited availability of ground forces due to competing requirements affect our strategy?

Answer. A stable Somalia would be in the interest of the U.S. and its regional allies. Our current strategy in the Horn of Africa is not limited by the availability of ground forces. We have adopted a low-profile approach focused on working with partners in the region to build their capacity to deal with ungoverned spaces, even as we conduct precision operations against terrorist groups in the region.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

Question. Over the last year or so, the U.S. Government has mobilized more of its resources to focus on the strategic importance of Africa. DOD has played an important role through two combatant commands—EUCOM via the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Program and CENTCOM via the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

What impact will the transfer of responsibility for operations in the Horn of Africa have on the conduct of anti-terrorism and other operations in that region?

Answer. It is my understanding that CENTCOM has been working closely with AFRICOM, as well as with the Joint Staff, to ensure that the transfer of responsibility for the Horn of Africa is as seamless as possible and causes minimal impact on operations.

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure a smooth transition and to manage the seams between CENTCOM and the new African Command?

Answer. Extensive coordination for this transition is currently underway. Staffs are currently working several issues, including responsibility for maritime security off the coast of Africa, coordination for activities in Egypt and in Yemen, and provision of uninterrupted intelligence collection and command and control during the transition. AFRICOM and CENTCOM will continue to work together closely following official transfer. As AFRICOM builds capacity, CENTCOM and its components will continue to support AFRICOM and its requirements as necessary.

SYRIA

Question. In recent weeks, the United States and Israel have publicly disclosed information relating to the September 6, 2007, bombing in northern Syria, and asserted North Korean and Syrian cooperation on nuclear technology. Recent weeks have also seen reporting on ongoing negotiations between Israel and Syria on a peace agreement, similar to those Israel has signed with Egypt and Jordan.

In your assessment, what should be our military posture vis-à-vis Syria?
Answer. Our military posture should be an integrated part of a comprehensive strategy. If confirmed, I anticipate that we will conduct a strategy review at CENTCOM, and the posture of our forces will obviously be an important element of that review.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Syria to U.S. national security interests in the Middle East?

Answer. Syria has tended to take positive steps when it suits Syrian interests. Syrian activities have generally had a destabilizing effect on security in the region, particularly its continued hosting of groups committed to armed opposition to the legitimate governments of several of its neighbors. As the Syrian regime seeks to maintain its hold on power, it also aims to counter U.S. influence in Lebanon, limit U.S. support of Israel, and increase its influence in the region. Syria’s damaging activities include the failure to adequately address foreign fighter flow through Syria into Iraq, the sponsorship of terrorist activities in Lebanon and Israel, and the potential pursuit of a clandestine nuclear program.

Question. Are there actions the United States could take to encourage a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement? If so, what are they?

Answer. The United States has taken recent steps to encourage a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, including hosting the Annapolis Conference in late 2007. U.S. leaders have also made recent diplomatic visits to key Arab states to encourage forward movement in the peace process. Unfortunately, Syria’s method has been to create leverage in pursuit of its aims by taking actions that destabilize some of its neighbors, including Lebanon and Iraq. Defeating the extremist groups that Syria supports would help create better conditions for the peace process to move forward, as would countering the Syrian regime’s anti-U.S. propaganda in the region.

ISRAEL

Question. While Israel is not part of the CENTCOM AOR, it does play an important role in the AOR.

In your assessment, what are the most significant threats facing Israel in the Middle East?

Answer. The most significant threats currently facing Israel are a combination of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian rejectionists and the proliferation of weapons, technology, and tactics among those elements. Over the past several years, military and political cooperation between Iran and Syria has strengthened. Iran, and to a lesser degree Syria, continue to provide increasingly sophisticated weaponry, equipment, and training to Lebanese Hezbollah, which has likely reconstituted and expanded its weapons stockpiles and capabilities since its summer 2006 conflict with Israel. Additionally, Iran provides training to Palestinian rejectionist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Damascus continues to harbor the leadership of Hamas, PIJ, and other affiliated organizations.

Question. The Iraq Study Group report suggested the most significant hurdle to broader peace in the Middle East was a final status agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian governments.

Do you agree with this conclusion of the Iraq Study Group? If not, why not?

Answer. A just and fair agreement that offers peace and security to the Palestinians and Israel would certainly aid the achievement of broader peace in the Middle East and negate the perception of inequity in the Arab world. However, the effort to secure broader peace in the region also must address the challenge of interstate conflicts and extremist movements that are not directly connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

EGYPT

Question. Egypt has been criticized for its perceived failure to act along the Egypt-Gaza border to counter the smuggling threat posed by cross-border tunnels. Egypt has also played an important role, however, in ensuring peace on the southern border of Israel.

What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to regional stability?

Answer. Egypt is a key leader in regional stability. Their decision 3 decades ago to break from the Arab bloc that opposed Israel’s existence and sign a peace treaty was courageous but unpopular, and it cost them politically and financially for years. Despite being initially ostracized, Egypt stood firm on its peace agreement with Israel and continues to lead the way in seeking regional stability. Egypt is one of the major contributors of peacekeepers to the United Nations African Mission in Darfur and on numerous occasions has provided humanitarian and military assistance to neighboring countries during times of crisis. Egyptian leaders have been and
continue to be key mediators between Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel, and they provide valuable leadership within the Arab League.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egyptian military relationship?

**Answer.** The U.S.-Egyptian military relationship is very strong. Egyptian forces have long participated in regional combined military exercises, and Egypt is a coalition member of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Since July 2003, it has supplied a field hospital in Bagram, which has treated thousands of patients and provided training to dozens of Afghan doctors. They have also provided tons of humanitarian supplies, ammunition, and weapons to the Afghan National Army. Although Egypt does not directly participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has supported U.S. operations by granting oversight rights and expediting Suez Canal transits. It has also provided training for Iraqi security personnel in Egypt. Additionally, Egypt receives Foreign Military Financing, totaling $1.3 billion annually; this military assistance has helped Egypt modernize its armed forces and strengthen regional security and stability.

**LEBANON**

**Question.** The United States has played an active role vis-à-vis Lebanon over the last few years, particularly following the war between Israel and Hezbollah. More recently, a U.S. aircraft carrier was ordered to maintain a position off the coast of Lebanon.

**Question.** What are the U.S. national security interests in Lebanon?

**Answer.** U.S. interests lie in a strong, sovereign, and democratic Lebanese Government that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force inside Lebanon’s borders. Such a government would increase stability along its borders and therefore improve regional stability. We also have an interest in supporting the Lebanese Government’s efforts to reduce extremist activity, counter malign influence by external actors, and reduce the flow of foreign fighters in the region.

**Question.** Given Lebanon’s strategic geographic position in the Middle East, in your opinion, what is the appropriate role for CENTCOM in Lebanon?

**Answer.** As with so many of the region’s challenges, the situation in Lebanon is best approached comprehensively, through regional partnership and varied methods. Political and diplomatic methods are already being pursued at the U.S. national level to isolate Syria diplomatically and economically for its actions in Lebanon; Congress passed multiple laws toward this end, and national leaders continue to support U.N. Security Council Resolutions and other international efforts to influence Syria’s actions. The U.S. has provided military training and assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in an effort to bolster the government’s ability to control violence inside its borders; the LAF is a potential unifying force in the country, given the broad support it enjoys from the population and its multi-ethnic, cross-sectional makeup. Though the relative inaction of the LAF during Lebanon’s recent spike in violence raises concerns, these military assistance efforts will likely remain an important part of a comprehensive strategy. The struggle in Lebanon is essentially a competition for power and resources, and progress may lie in political incorporation of disenfranchised elements of the population. If confirmed, I would seek opportunities for CENTCOM to support all of these efforts.

**SAUDI ARABIA**

**Question.** In your assessment what threat does a more regionally assertive Iran, including the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, pose to Saudi Arabia, and what do you believe to be Saudi Arabia’s options should Iran gain a nuclear weapon?

**Answer.** The interests of Saudi Arabia are certainly threatened by Iranian activities. There is a long history of animosity between these two states; since 1979, Iran has consistently attacked the legitimacy of the Saudi Government’s custodianship of the Two Holy Mosques. Although the Kingdom maintains diplomatic relations with Iran, a variety of events and activities have convinced the Saudis to be wary of Iran’s intentions, including: Iran’s military expansion, its nuclear program, and its destabilizing activities throughout the region. Saudi Arabia has expressed an interest in acquiring a peaceful nuclear power program, and there is inevitably the possibility that Saudi Arabia, like other countries in the region, could reevaluate its non-nuclear weapons policy in response to Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the U.S.-Saudi military-to-military relationship? What are the pluses and minuses of this relationship?

**Answer.** The U.S. enjoys a strong military-to-military relationship with Saudi Arabia. Cooperation has led to greater interoperability, and a training exchange program results in officers and senior NCOs who have been exposed to U.S. military
values, are well trained, and are well-versed in the rule of law. The Kingdom gains increased internal and external security capability through U.S. training, equipment, and information sharing. Finally, U.S. industry and military departments benefit from a robust Foreign Military Sales Program. We understand that there are constraints on this relationship due to regional sensitivities, and we will continue to work through them.

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

**Question.** Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki recently forced the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea out of Eritrea by cutting off all supplies to the mission. In response to the departure of this mission, both Eritrea and Ethiopia have repositioned their respective militaries in a manner that would seem to indicate that these two countries may reengage one another in military conflict.

In your assessment, what threat does a war between Eritrea and Ethiopia pose to the security of the broader Horn of Africa region?

**Answer.** A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would likely have a destabilizing effect in the region. If these two nations were to return to war, Ethiopia would divert leadership focus and key assets away from their forces in Somalia. This action could further undermine Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, which is heavily dependent upon Ethiopian military support. Ethiopia would also likely pull out of its pending commitment to provide peacekeeping troops to the Sudan AU/U.N. Mission in Darfur. Djibouti could also be affected by a return to hostilities in the form of refugees, mostly from Eritrea, who could present local security and humanitarian concerns.

MARITIME SECURITY

**Question.** In the past 2 years, there have been a growing number of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia—some ending in death and others ending in the payment of ransom. The shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia are some of the most economically and strategically important in the world.

In your opinion, what is the most appropriate maritime strategy in this region of the world, given the threats of weapons trafficking, human trafficking, and piracy?

**Answer.** Piracy off the coast of Africa is a critical issue in the region, in particular because extremist groups often directly participate in and financially benefit from these activities. As with most strategies for this region, the strategy to counter piracy must be comprehensive. This includes the legal efforts already underway to pass a U.N. Security Council Resolution to allow international vessels to counter pirates operating within Somalia’s territorial waters and to adjust international maritime standards to prevent the registration of “phantom ships.” This strategy may also include economic development assistance in nations like Somalia to reduce the draw of illegal activities. Of course, it involves military maritime cooperation with countries of the region.

IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the status of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq?

**Answer.** Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab States, with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991–2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the OSD Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF BSO has assisted Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or materially increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded projects, specifically targeted to restart or increase production, range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize SOEs have resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled or underemployed workers.

In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of standard business investment management practices to the process of allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories. Coalition personnel also
instruct factory managers in business plan preparation, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans.

The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private investment awards to international consortiums—for three cement factories. Two of these deals, which average over $100 million each, were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating employment for 5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern, profitable business model for investors and for Iraq. In combination with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking, budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these are small but positive steps toward market economy development in Iraq.

The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important first step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be the standard for U.S. and Coalition forces to adhere to in regard to the handling of detainees at all levels. In fact, as commander of the 101st Airborne Division, I directed that detainees would be handled in accordance with the Geneva Convention, as those were the standards our soldiers understood at the time. Since then, FM 2–22.3 has been published and we adhere to its standards.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined in one document adds clarity. The FM clearly articulates what is and what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability.

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention in wartime in a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the requirements outlined in Common Article 3. In fact, in drafting the current Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual, we ensured human rights organizations participated in discussions and provided input on this issue.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in the CENTCOM AOR comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. If confirmed, I would place my personal and command emphasis on ensuring that forces in the CENTCOM AOR fully comply with the letter and spirit of these important standards.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Question. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have proved to be an extremely deadly threat to U.S. troops in Iraq. In your assessment, what threat do IEDs pose to the broader CENTCOM AOR, and what is the most effective way to prevent the spread of these deadly devices?

Answer. Over the past few years, we have witnessed the spread of IED technology throughout the CENTCOM AOR. Though not as prolific as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the IED has become the low cost, weapon of choice of militants and extremist groups in many countries. The most disturbing trend has been the material support and
training in the employment of advanced IEDs, known as Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), provided by Iran. We can expect militant groups to continue to use this technology to advance their goals and to intimidate government forces and local populaces.

Countering this threat requires comprehensive action to defeat the networks that produce and employ IEDs, technology and training to detect and render IEDs ineffective, and advanced armor systems to protect our troops.

**UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES**

*Question.* CENTCOM has articulated an increasing requirement for additional aircraft with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. Although recently the Air Force has “surged” a large number of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM, this surge and other activities will not close the gap between available and required resources. The main problem appears to be that there are bottlenecks in fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled with a reluctance to seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-record.

Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired immediately from the commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to CENTCOM’s intelligence platform shortage?

*Answer.* Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are essential to our operations. Persistent surveillance is required to identify, track, target, and kill or capture insurgents and minimize civilian casualties.

Small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector are, in fact, being employed to help fill the ISR platform shortage, and we will continue to take advantage of such options where they make sense. They are not, however, the complete answer to our ISR shortfalls. Comprehensive solutions are required, and these must take into account the platform’s support infrastructure; sensor capabilities; communications bandwidth; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination architectures.

*Question.* Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been adequately considered?

*Answer.* On 18 April, Secretary Gates created an Operational ISR Task Force to tackle the challenge of delivering more ISR to the CENTCOM Theaters of Operations. Secretary Gates has been a staunch supporter of our ISR requirements, and I am pleased he has taken this step to help meet our ISR needs.

**SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM**

*Question.* Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 and section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 authorized a special immigrant visa program for Iraqi translators and interpreters. This program has enabled the Department to aid those Iraqis who have assisted the United States in Iraq.

What is your view of the utility of this program?

*Answer.* While there is a clear need for the Special Immigration Visa Program, we have encountered obstacles in utilizing the program. Our understanding is that the quota under Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is nearly filled for fiscal year 2008 and USCIS has stopped scheduling Visa interviews. Furthermore, while Section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 broadened the scope to other Iraqis who are U.S. Government employees or contractors, there is not yet implementing guidance, and USCIS is not currently accepting applications. In order to overcome these challenges, we would benefit from Congress affirming the technical instructions agreed upon by the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security so that USCIS can begin accepting applications.

*Question.* Is it beneficial for the military to have the ability to recommend certain Iraqis who have worked with us for special immigrant visas?

*Answer.* Yes, our Iraqi interpreters provide valuable support to coalition operations on a daily basis and often at great risk to themselves and their families. Many interpreters have to relocate their families due to harassment, threats, and even the possibility of death at the hands of extremists because they provide help to the U.S. and our coalition partners. For those trusted interpreters who are eligible, the special immigrant visa is a useful tool to reward these courageous individuals who risk so much to assist Coalition efforts.

**REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS AND RESPONSE**

*Question.* Iran has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the CENTCOM AOR. Syria also has an inventory of ballistic missiles that pose a threat to the region. A joint capabilities mix study conducted by the Joint
Staff for U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the U.S. military needs about twice the number of Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors as are currently planned to provide even the minimum capability needed by our regional combatant commanders to defend against such existing threats.

Do you agree with the conclusion of the joint capabilities mix study that we need to acquire more of these near-term systems to provide our regional combatant commanders with the capability to defend our forward-deployed forces and allies against existing missile threats?

Answer. Yes. These systems are important to counter both the existing threat and that of 2015, upon which the joint capabilities mix study was based.

Question. Do you agree there is a high priority need in CENTCOM for additional SM–3 and THAAD interceptors to defend against existing short- and medium-range missiles within the AOR?

Answer. Yes. However, THAAD interceptors are not yet fielded, and SM–3-capable platforms (i.e., Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships) are limited by the number of available interceptors. Effectively defending our forward-deployed forces and allies against the existing missile threat in the CENTCOM AOR will also require a greater number of Patriot PAC3 interceptors, SM–2 BLK IVs, and SM–3s.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual assaults against military personnel and civilians throughout the CENTCOM AOR. What lessons have Army leaders in Iraq learned regarding sexual assault prevention, response, and reporting protocols that can be applied across the entire CENTCOM?

Answer. The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness campaign that reaches every servicemember and that provides integrated response services, including medical care, counseling, victim advocacy, chaplain programs, law enforcement (investigation, detention, etc.), legal measures (prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness liaison), reporting processes (assault reporting and data collection), and program assessment. It is widely recognized in today’s Services that such a program must receive command emphasis to be effective, and I would continue to give it that emphasis if confirmed as the commander of CENTCOM.

Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be addressed to ensure that prevention, reporting, medical treatment (including mental health care), and victim support are available for military personnel and civilians in the operational environments of Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan include combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, joint service and civilian population. With regard to the last of these challenges, civilians constitute a considerable percentage of force on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and are critical contributors to mission success. The availability of response services for DOD civilian and contractor personnel should be similar to the services available to servicemembers. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and resource challenges associated with extending program response provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel which should be addressed.

With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in the CENTCOM AOR to remain cognizant of the welfare of their fellow servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs of difficulty to receive help.

Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of such resources in the CENTCOM AOR?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I would consult with commanders in the field, who are directly responsible for these programs and most familiar with their requirements. I would also welcome external and internal audits of our programs and resources. The Sexual Assault and Prevention Program is critical for the well-being of our troopers, and I would support it in every way possible.

DEPLOYED CIVILIANS IN THE CENTCOM AOR

Question. The President has called on all agencies of the executive branch to encourage the assignment of highly qualified Federal civilian employees in support of CENTCOM operations. If confirmed, what would be your objectives for improving and sustaining the support of Federal civilians in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. I am fully committed to the DOD policy for building increased civilian deployment capacity. Our civilian employees who deploy in support of missions in the CENTCOM AOR are capable and committed to supporting the Department’s highest mission priorities. In Iraq, I have witnessed first-hand the capabilities and dedication our civilian employees bring to bear.

We must take advantage of the synergistic effect that the wide range of skill sets and talents resident in our civilian force can achieve. If I am confirmed, we would continue to review our global force employment planning to expand those opportunities.

We must execute the intent of Congress and the DOD in ensuring our civilian employees receive appropriate benefits and recognition when they volunteer to serve overseas and especially in war zones. We should also make every effort to assist civilian deployees in the same manner we do our deploying military personnel—from pre-deployment through deployment, as well as redeployment.

As outlined in counterinsurgency doctrine and by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, unity of effort is essential to winning the wars in which our Nation is engaged—and fully utilizing and caring for deploying civilian employees within the CENTCOM AOR is absolutely essential.

MENTAL HEALTH IN THEATER

Question. The Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT V, found that stress and mental health problems increased with each subsequent month of deployment, and that “soldiers on their third or fourth deployment were at significantly higher risk” for mental health problems. These types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and other mental health problems.

What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such actions?

Answer. The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on what is transpiring with servicemembers’ psychological health and also valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation to cross-train Army medics in behavioral health concepts, are already being implemented at the DA level; others, such as the recommendation to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed, I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently actionable at the CENTCOM level and engage with the Services on those in their purview.

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure ongoing mental health assessments of all U.S. forces in Iraq?

Answer. I would encourage and fully support future MHAT assessments if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) providing full access to information and staff input and feedback as appropriate.

Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?

Answer. My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments.

Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting servicemembers and their families before servicemembers deploy; this includes tough training at home station that builds camaraderie in units and gives troopers confidence that they can accomplish their tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between deployments for troopers to ‘reset’ with their families are also important.

Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater. Medics in theater are being trained on behavioral health topics so they can assist in identifying troopers who need help, and Suicide Risk Management Teams have been created to ensure troopers having difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most critically, commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle buddies’ mental health.

Question. Do you believe that mental health support and resources in theater are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers and at home for their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would conduct an assessment of mental health requirements and resources in theater. The extensive work completed by the MHAT will provide a good starting point for this assessment.

Question. If confirmed, would you request additional behavioral health resources from the services, if needed, to meet the needs of current and future units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. If a specific need was validated, I would absolutely request additional support. Our troopers serve bravely and selflessly, and we owe it to them to understand their needs and then act with all due haste to provide for those needs.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, CENTCOM?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

1. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, each of you have noted in different places and times that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current threat is the intercommunal fight over power. What do you mean by the communal fight over power?

General PETRAEUS. I have long described the nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This has been the case since Iraq’s liberation in 2003 and remains the case today. Many groups in Iraq vie to determine who will have a voice in, and whose voice will most influence, the future of Iraq, and the competition is often heavily tied to concerns over economic opportunity.

The competition between communities for resources and power is something that happens in every nation. In our Nation, this competition takes place in the political arena, in legal structures, via the media, and through democratic processes; the fault lines in the debate are often economic and ideological. In Iraq, the competition has taken place through violence and intimidation on the streets, and the fault lines have often been ethnic or sectarian. Iraq’s competition used to be primarily inter-sectarian, with Shiite and Sunni elements vying with each other for power and economic opportunity; Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) violence sparked widespread sectarian violence throughout Iraq. As coalition and Iraqi forces stemmed the violence and increased security, the fault lines within Shiite and Sunni communities came to the fore; AQI turned its violence on its Sunni brethren, and Shiite militias—particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and its splinter Special Groups (SG)—waged violence on the Shiite-led government in an effort to increase its power.

One of the most important trends in Iraq has been the increasing rejection of violence by the Iraqi people—first with Sunnis refusing to accept the indiscriminate violence, oppressive practices, and extremist ideology of AQI and then with Shiite
communities tiring of the mafia-like violence and activities of JAM/SG criminals. There is still an intercommunal struggle over power and resources, but Sunnis and Shiites alike are increasingly opting to make their voice heard through the political process rather than through violence.

2. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, how has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
General Petraeus. While the fundamental nature of this competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources has not changed, it has played out differently over time. Over the past year, we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence. However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing challenges in the area of intra-sectarian conflict have periodically surfaced. Iraq continues to face a complex array of destabilizing forces, including terrorism and regional interference; however, security incidents are now at the lowest level we have seen since March 2004.

3. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control?
General Petraeus. Coalition forces support the elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Iraqi leaders have largely united around the aim of defeating extremists and disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in that effort.

PAKISTAN

4. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, the newly-elected Pakistani Government has limited offensive military operations in the tribal areas, choosing instead to negotiate a peace agreement with the tribal leader accused by the Pakistani Government of being responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. It's been reported that the Pakistani Government is not seeking an end to cross-border attacks into Afghanistan as a condition of the accord. Officials report that cross-border incursions increased in April as the peace agreement was being negotiated. Are you troubled at the prospect of a peace agreement that doesn't seek to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a modification of the government's approach to combating terrorism. The newly-elected government, seeking to address the ongoing problem of extremism and terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and subsequently began thinning out its forces in the region. This appears to reflect an effort by the new Pakistani Government to determine the best way to address the longstanding problem of control over its western areas and shows that the government is trying to develop a political solution. While it is true that a purely military approach would likely not be successful, it is also unlikely that a purely political approach would have the desired effect—as demonstrated by what is generally assessed to be the failure of the negotiated “permanent peace” in Waziristan in 2006—and thus we must closely monitor this situation as we work with the new Pakistani Government and seek ways to help it deal with the challenge of the FATA to it and to Afghanistan.

The cross-border terrorism issue is complex and likely requires a comprehensive solution. We should continue working with Pakistan to further increase coordination of border enforcement efforts, and we should also seek to strengthen the capacity of the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps—and the willingness of the Pakistani Government—to control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any long-term solution must also address the root causes of terrorism's growth in Pakistan and must include initiatives to increase economic and educational opportunity in the generally poor and isolated communities of the region.

5. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are we seeing a decrease in the level of cooperation the United States is receiving from the Government of Pakistan in the conflict with al Qaeda and other extremists?
General Petraeus. The newly-elected Government in Pakistan seems to have modified its approach to combating terrorism in the Pakistani borderlands, as the government recently negotiated with tribal groups and began thinning out its forces in the FATA. The United States and Pakistan continue to have mutual concerns and goals where terrorism is concerned, and the change appears to be one of methodology rather than of a decrease in cooperation with the United States. Neverthe-
less, it is incumbent upon us as Pakistan’s partners to help Islamabad adopt a realistic approach to terrorism, and one of my first trips, if confirmed, will be to Pakistan in order to assess the situation there and to talk to the Pakistani leaders and our personnel on the ground.

At the same time, opportunities exist to deepen U.S.-Pakistan cooperation against al Qaeda and other extremists, such as through our efforts to build the capabilities of the Pakistani military and the Frontier Corps. These efforts, in concert with other programs to promote development in the frontier areas, can place further pressure on the al Qaeda network in Pakistan.

6. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what more can be done to eliminate these safe havens for violent extremists?

General Petraeus. The problem of safe havens in the Pakistani borderlands is a complicated one that demands a comprehensive solution. The Government of Pakistan faces a difficult situation in which multiple actors in its borderlands benefit from illicit cross-border trade, while traditional tribal laws and customs in the border region foster a spirit of fierce independence and provide for a great deal of autonomy from the central government. As a result, the government is often seen more as outside force to be resisted than as a force to be embraced. In some areas, these same tribal laws and customs offer protection and respect to extremist elements.

Given these circumstances, we should work with Pakistan to further increase coordination of border enforcement efforts, both internal to Pakistan and with the Afghan National Security Forces, while strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps—and willingness of the Pakistani Government—to control and disarm militants in the borderlands. We should also help the Government of Pakistan address the root causes of terrorism in Pakistan, which include conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and alienation from the government. We should support Government of Pakistan initiatives to increase economic and educational opportunity in at-risk regions of the country, to include supporting the new FATA Development Plan and other initiatives aimed at education reform and rural development.

Meanwhile, our own whole-of-government approach to assisting Pakistan should include the fostering of foreign direct investment, targeted economic aid, and debt forgiveness. We must recognize that a good lot of the heavy lifting for this problem lies in the economic and political spheres, and our efforts there need to move more rapidly.

7. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what role should U.S. military forces play with respect to the tribal areas?

General Petraeus. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will undoubtedly be a topic of discussion between the United States and Pakistan. Before speculating on what roles U.S. forces should play, I would want to discuss the situation with Pakistani and U.S. leaders. My understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders are understandably reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements employed in the FATA.

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

8. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in response to a question from Senator Sessions, you expressed concern about section 841 of S. 3001, which addresses the performance of inherently governmental functions by private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The language of section 841 is modeled on paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 1100.22, which defines certain functions to be performed in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas outside the United States as inherently governmental and designated for military performance. You promised to review the provision and get back to us with your detailed views. I would appreciate your response to some specific questions. Do you support the standard in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22 for determining which functions to be performed in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas outside the United States are inherently governmental and designated for military performance?

General Petraeus. I will respond collectively to questions 8–12 since they all relate to the same subject and the responses are clearly interrelated. I support the standards set forth in DOD Instruction 1100.22, including paragraph E2.1.4.1.4, and do not believe that this paragraph prohibits the use of private security contractors in high threat areas outside the United States. My reading of this DOD Instruction suggests that paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 should not be interpreted...
in isolation. The section’s opening paragraph (E2.1.4.1) cites it only as an example, not as a statement of DOD policy prohibiting PSC operations in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas. Immediately following paragraph E2.1.4.1.4, the next paragraph (E2.1.4.1.5) affirms that “a defense contractor may be authorized to provide security services, provided its services do not involve substantial discretion,” and defines the conditions under which contractors providing security services are not considered to be performing inherently governmental functions.1

I take seriously the responsibility for limiting PSC roles and missions to those permitted in the DFARS and DOD policies, including DOD Instruction 1100.22. PSCs are not permitted to operate in areas where active combat operations are contemplated or underway. Moreover, policies and procedures are in place to divert PSC operations away from areas in which combat operations may potentially be launched or in which a high risk exists of hostile action or an encounter with civilian activities that could represent a threat to a PSC movement or operation. Based upon the above, it is my view that paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 does not prohibit the use of private security contractors in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas outside the United States provided that the requirements and conditions of paragraph E2.1.4.1.5 are implemented and the conduct of PSCs is subject to regular oversight by military commanders.

You also asked about significant differences between the wording of Section 841 of the Senate Bill and paragraph E2.1.4.1.4. The most significant difference is the one I identified above—paragraph E2.1.4.1.4. is only an illustrative example of a potentially inherently governmental function, further clarified by the succeeding paragraph, which defines the conditions under which PSC operations would not be considered inherently governmental. Section 841 would create a new statutory standard, redefining the boundaries of permissible activity for PSC operations. Section 841 also changes the term of “substantial discretion” to “immediate discretionary decisions,” the significance of which is to eliminate all armed PSC operations almost anywhere, because the nature of defensive/self protection responses to emerging threats requires immediate discretionary decisions, even within a very constrained set of rules. Draft section 841, paragraph (b)(1)(A), also modifies the phrase from the DOD Instruction, “could require deadly force that is more likely to be initiated by U.S. forces than occur in self defense,” to “could reasonably be expected to require deadly force that is more likely to be initiated by personnel performing such security operations than by others.” This modification essentially expands the standard to include any use of force—even that which occurs in self-defense. In application, this modification would bar security contractors from any hostile area regardless of actual function.

With regard to standards for other Federal agencies operating with PSCs in a contingency operation area, I believe the policies, standards, procedures, and oversight should be closely aligned, presenting a common perception among host country nationals of U.S. Government PSC operations. Having said that, there could be occasions in which other U.S. Government departments and agencies may need to operate under different policies on the use of PSCs. For example, various contractors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), involved in reconstruction and development programs may feel strongly about the need not to be associated with PSC operations, particularly those provided by DOD contractors, and more specifically those provided by U.S. military forces. In such cases they may adopt more restrictive conditions for the deployment of civilian personnel or the movement of re-

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1 Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) complies with these standards identified in paragraph E2.1.4.1.5. The command has established strict, comprehensive rules on the conditions under which PSC operations can be conducted, obviously delimiting their mission to defensive operations. These and other rules are defined in the MNF-I Fragmentary Order 07–428, “Overarching Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) for Requirements, Procedures, Responsibilities for Control Coordination and Management and Oversight of Armed Contractors, DOD civilians, and PSCs.” In addition, all DOD contract solicitations and contracts implemented in Iraq properly describe the environment in which contractors will be operating. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/ Afghanistan ensures that both the description of environmental conditions and the requirement for compliance with FRAGO 07–428 are incorporated into all contracts being implemented in Iraq.

In short, DOD PSCs in Iraq are not allowed to perform inherently governmental functions. All contract solicitations and awards are conducted under Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) rules. These DFARS rules prohibit DOD contractors from participating in offensive operations and from using the combat-oriented Rules of Engagement. Instead, the DFARS requires that contractors use the more restrictive defensive/self-protection oriented Rules on the Use of Force. I am advised that the Comptroller General noted in a decision in 2006, that “the Services sought under the solicitations appear to comport with the DOD policies and regulations that state that security contractors are not allowed to conduct direct combat activities or offensive operations.”
construction materials and equipment than those currently implemented under DOD Instruction 1100.22.

While I cannot speak to every scenario that may involve other Federal agencies, the Departments of Defense and Department of State signed a Memorandum of Agreement which improved interagency transparency and established common standards and procedures for security contractor performance in Iraq. As such, the functions of security contractors for those two agencies in Iraq are essentially identical. This effort has produced significant improvements in the management and oversight of PSC operations in Iraq. With the implementation of Section 862 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, we will achieve even broader and more effective oversight of all U.S. Government PSCs.

In responding to your question, I also need to provide you with an assessment of the impact of the proposed language of Section 841 on military operations in Iraq. My reading of the language of Section 841, confirmed by my Staff Judge Advocate, is that Section 841 would effectively forbid the use of U.S. Government armed private security contractors in Iraq, and presumably also in Afghanistan. Replacing DOD contractors with military personnel would significantly delay the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, requiring approximately 7,300 additional military personnel to be trained and deployed to Iraq, plus additional forces to provide the expanded logistical support required. These figures do not include the requirements for the dedication and training of additional military personnel to support rotational requirements, nor the addition of equipment and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles needed by our combat forces to replace armored tactical vehicles used by contractors. By adding significantly to the military forces required in Iraq, Section 841 could also delay the ability of the Army to reduce combat tours from 15 months to 12 months. It would also require a special training and certification program to be developed and implemented, which would take up to a year to execute.

For the reasons stated above, the requirements proposed under Section 841 of the Senate Bill would be counterproductive to the work we already have underway, and would be enormously disruptive to our efforts to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq.

9. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in your view, does paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22 prohibit the use of private security contractors in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas outside the United States?

General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.

10. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are you aware of any significant differences between section 841 of S. 3001 and paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22? If so, what are the differences and why do you believe that they are significant?

General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.

11. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are you aware of any reason why private security contractors employed by Federal agencies other than DOD should operate under a standard different from that provided in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22?

General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.

12. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are there functions that are inappropriate for performance by DOD contractors in an uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat area outside the United States, but are appropriate for performance by contractors of other Federal agencies in the same area? If so, why?

General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

CENTRAL COMMAND

13. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have highlighted the lack of economic development in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) as one of the biggest challenges facing the region's security and stability. You have, in my opinion, correctly identified the link between poverty and potential for violent activities—an area in which you are a recognized expert. If confirmed as Commander, what ideas do you have for using CENTCOM's authority to facilitate a government-wide approach to stimulating economic development in the region?
General Petraeus. There are a number of successful programs CENTCOM can use as models throughout its AOR to facilitate a government-wide approach to stimulating economic development. A good example is CENTCOM's support to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are playing a critical role in stimulating development, improving governance, and increasing government capacity at the local level in Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM's role in supporting the PRTs has been to help provide security, to synchronize the efforts of PRTs and local U.S. military organizations, and to contribute skilled military personnel to fill PRT positions when necessary. It may be possible for the PRT model to be applied in other areas in the CENTCOM AOR that are in need of development assistance, based on local conditions.

CENTCOM and its subordinate commands have also played a role in helping partner nations increase government capacity at the ministerial level. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, CENTCOM organizations have undertaken large-scale efforts to increase the capacity of the host nations' security ministries and to assist in security sector reform. These efforts can help stimulate economic development and improved governance by enabling host nations to establish secure environments in which government agencies, NGOs, and private businesses can more easily operate. CENTCOM organizations have also assisted in extensive efforts to build capacity in non-security ministries. Where desired by U.S. policymakers, CENTCOM and other governmental agencies could expand such capacity-building efforts elsewhere in the AOR to bolster security, economic, and good governance growth in the region.

Finally, commanders throughout CENTCOM have learned over the past several years that money—along with economic development—is an essential weapon in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns. Our commanders in Iraq in particular have learned to very skillfully use such resources as Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to address urgent economic and governance needs at the local level, thereby helping to alleviate some of the grievances and conditions of poverty that give rise to violence. We should consider applying the successful CERP model in other areas of the CENTCOM AOR when necessary.

14. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander's responsibilities are necessarily broader and more strategic in nature than those required in your current position. One of the main challenges with respect to resource allocation in the AOR is the balance between Iraq and Afghanistan. This committee has heard from military and civilian leaders, as well as independent experts, who identify the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts in Afghanistan as an under-resourced conflict. Given the importance of combating a resurgent al Qaeda and its leadership in the FATA of neighboring Pakistan, how do you plan to address these shortfalls should security conditions in Iraq warrant the maintaining of current troop levels for a longer period?

General Petraeus. I would, if confirmed, work in consultation with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that CENTCOM's force posture remains consistent with national priorities. It would be my responsibility to make clear the resources necessary to achieve national policy goals and objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the CENTCOM AOR. I would also intend to make clear how and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the force or mission objectives.

I would also work with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to encourage that all feasible means of meeting the requirements in Afghanistan were pursued, including increasing NATO and, if needed, U.S. contributions and increasing the capability and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Over the long term, the latter will be the most important means of fulfilling Afghanistan's security requirements.

15. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have advocated a “whole of government” approach for CENTCOM that would include effective and improved coordination between various civilian diplomatic and relief agencies with the military component of the U.S. presence. What role does CENTCOM need to take with regards to working with these civilian diplomatic and relief agencies, and what specifically would you do as its commander to actively promote these efforts?

General Petraeus. CENTCOM and its subordinate commands already promote some important efforts to improve coordination among civilian diplomatic agencies, relief agencies, and the militant component of U.S. presence. Most notably in the CENTCOM AOR, numerous Joint Interagency Task Forces and PRTs have put the “whole of government” approach into practice in order to promote development in all areas—political, social, and economic. In addition, CENTCOM headquarters has long employed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group with representatives from
numerous agencies. If confirmed, I would seek to sustain, empower, and expand such efforts. If confirmed, I would also seek to further integrate CENTCOM’s efforts with those of other government agencies by working closely with our ambassadors in the region who supervise U.S. activities in each country. I would also work closely with the State Department Bureau Chiefs and other corresponding government officials to ensure that our activities are coherent, integrated, and responsive to the changing needs of the AOR.

16. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, is improvement in coordination between these various agencies a pre-condition for achieving security in Iraq and elsewhere in the AOR?

General Petraeus. Effective coordination among government agencies is an absolutely essential condition for achieving sustainable security in Iraq and in other areas in the CENTCOM AOR. I have mentioned before that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has succeeded in making our military forces more interoperable today than they ever have been before and this interoperability has been a critical element of our progress in establishing security. The next step, however, is to ensure the ability of military and civilian departments to work closely together. In Iraq, Ambassador Crocker and I have partnered closely to ensure unity of effort within the U.S. effort and, to the extent possible, with the efforts of our coalition partners, through the development of a Joint Campaign Plan and through regular joint assessments to evaluate our progress.

The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has been given the lead by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD44) in developing the Interagency Management System and a draft U.S. Government Planning Framework. These will provide a viable process and framework within which we can enhance and align military and civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. The State Department has also begun to stand up the Civilian Response Corps system to provide increased civilian expeditionary capacity to complex operations.

The United States will be well served by having available various tools like these to promote unity of effort across the U.S. Government, and by the development of interagency doctrine for the use of these tools in the conduct of counterinsurgency and stability operations. If confirmed, I will continue to stress the importance of such coordination to promote unity of effort in the application of our “whole of government” approach to the security issues in the CENTCOM AOR.

17. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have made it clear that actively engaging with Iraq’s neighbors is essential to achieving long-term internal and external stability in the country. You and others have also mentioned Iran’s malign influence in covertly supporting elements of the insurgency. As one of Iraq’s influential neighbors, it would appear that diplomatic engagement with Iran is a pre-condition to any long-lasting security gains. However, Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technologies complicates the diplomatic equation. What recommendations would you make, if confirmed as commander of CENTCOM, concerning how the U.S. Government should navigate its dealings with Iran?

General Petraeus. I embrace Secretary of Defense Gates’ view that we should seek leverage in our relations with Iran in order to have a constructive basis for engagement. If confirmed, my recommendations would be built upon the idea that our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating international cooperation and building regional consensus to counter malign Iranian influence and destabilizing activities, while also striving to promote more productive engagement, if that is possible. We have strong alliances and partnerships in the Gulf and throughout the broader region upon which we can build a common cause that may help dissuade Iran from its subversive activities and encourage legitimate statecraft and economic interchange. At the same time, we should continue to work with the international community to demonstrate to Iran that there are consequences for its illegitimate influence in the region, especially for the destabilizing actions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and Iranian intelligence services.

In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage by use of the “whole of government,” developing further leverage rather than simply targeting discrete threats. One particular lever may be the ongoing international diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran to end its nuclear program; such pressure seems to be affecting the Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran to focus on longer-term, less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq, rampant terrorism in the region, and a nuclear armed Middle East are not in any nation’s long-term interest, including Iran’s. Along these lines, the international community can reach out to help moderate, pragmatic elements that might influence the internal Iranian debate over
Iran’s foreign policy and long-term security interests. As Admiral Mullen has noted, furthermore, our approach should consist of “using all elements of national power, whether it’s economic or financial, international, diplomatic, and not taking any military options off the table.” We should retain, as a last resort, a range of military options to counter Iran’s activities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

18. Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, improvised explosive device casualties are on the rise in Afghanistan. As a result, units in support of Operation Enduring Freedom are receiving operation orders with a fragmentary order for mandated MRAP fielding. Our forces are therefore required to allocate appropriate combat power to employ these vehicles even though they cannot be used throughout the AOR because of their inability to maneuver or traverse incompatible and difficult terrain. How do you plan to employ this “political” mandate but still keep you soldiers safe?

General Petraeus. The improved protection provided by MRAPs has saved lives in Iraq, and certainly has the potential to do so in many areas in Afghanistan. However, it is true that MRAPs cannot be used everywhere in Afghanistan because, despite road improvements and routine maintenance, certain areas remain inaccessible for some larger vehicles. In response to these conditions, the plan as I understand it is to replace approximately two-thirds of the Up-Armored HMMWs with MRAPs, retaining the balance of Up-Armored HMMWs to allow access to areas not reachable by MRAPs. I also understand that units deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom have recently requested additional MRAPs for the Afghanistan Theater of Operations. If confirmed as the Commander, CENTCOM, I would continue to consult closely with the Commander of the International Security Assistance Command-Afghanistan to assess requirements and resource the needs of units operating in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

19. Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, how many MRAPs are needed in the region?

General Petraeus. I have not had the opportunity to conduct a detailed assessment of the need for MRAPs throughout the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed, I would consult closely with the Commander, MNF-I and the Commander, International Security Force-Afghanistan to assess requirements and resource established needs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

20. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, I am particularly interested in the Iraqis shouldering greater responsibility for the costs of the war, including paying, training, and equipping their own security forces, the salaries of the Sons of Iraq, and helping the United States pay for the costs of fuel used by U.S. troops operating in Iraq. Asking the Iraqis to take more responsibility for their own security and the rebuilding of their country will give them a sense of ownership and only makes sense given Iraq’s growing budget surplus. Senators Nelson, Bayh, and I authored language that would: prohibit American tax dollars from being spent on major reconstruction projects in Iraq; direct the administration to ensure that the Iraqi Government pays the costs of the salaries, training, equipping of ISF, and for the salaries of the Sons of Iraq; and direct the administration to negotiate an agreement with the Iraqi Government for reimbursement of some of the costs of joint operations between U.S. and Iraqi troops. The Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously approved our proposal, which represents possibly the first significant bipartisan change in direction in Iraq. This language is also included in the Senate supplemental bill. In addition, I have met with the Iraqi Ambassador who stated the commitment of the Government of Iraq to take on more of these costs. In fact, Prime Minister Maliki recently stated in Brussels that Iraq is a rich country and is not asking for direct assistance to fund its reconstruction. What are your thoughts on this important topic?

General Petraeus. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility and an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in Iraq, and it is making progress in picking up a greater share of this fiscal load. As Ambassador Crocker recently stated before Congress, “The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure
projects is over.” As Iraq continues to spend more and the United States spends less, a period of transition is needed because Iraqi capacity is still limited. However, Iraqi capacity is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by a solid increase in budget execution last year. In the meantime, we are looking for additional ways to help Iraq to leverage our capacity to spend its own funds. A good example of this is the Iraqi Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which we call “I-CERP.” The Iraqis have already allocated $300 million for this fund, of which $270 million has been deposited in an account on which coalition forces can draw. Coalition forces have already made substantial progress in using this money to deliver schools, health clinics, community centers, and other projects on behalf of the Iraqi Government to the Iraqi people.

21. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, are you committed to shifting some of these costs to the Government of Iraq—costs that the Iraqis themselves say they would like to undertake?

General Petraeus. Yes. Long-term sustainability of Iraqi security and economic development ultimately depends on the Iraqi Government’s ability to provide, and we are committed to helping Iraqi leaders build the governmental capacity to do so. The Government of Iraq is already assuming more responsibility for reconstruction and security efforts. For example, Iraq’s 2008 budget contains $13 billion for reconstruction, with an additional multi-billion dollar reconstruction spending package in the works. In terms of security spending, we anticipate Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and a 2008 supplemental of $4.3 billion for security spending has been proposed. As Iraqi spending on reconstruction and Iraqi security forces (ISFs) continues to increase, U.S. spending will continue to decrease. As an example, increased Iraqi spending on the ISFs has enabled us to decrease our budget request for the ISFs fund for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. This trend will continue over time, and it is one that I support.

AFGHANISTAN

22. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, at a hearing before this committee on April 10, I asked Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about the situation in Afghanistan. During his opening statement that day, he stated that the United States cannot repeat the mistakes of the past from United States policy regarding that country. That comment reminded me of a trip that I took to Afghanistan with some of my colleagues in 2003, including Senator Levin. When we met President Karzai at Bagram Air Base, he had a message for us, even back then. It was “don’t abandon us; don’t make the same mistakes that were made decades ago.” On subsequent visits to his country, President Karzai has repeated his plea. That is why I’m concerned about the reports from the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council that warned, very bluntly, that we are under-resourcing Afghanistan, as well as NATO. The Atlantic Council’s report goes so far as to say, “Make no mistake. NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.” I am very concerned about having to send more American troops; that it will make it impossible for us to, in the long-term, sustain the 12-month deployments that all of us are desperate to see us return to. Could you give me your best assessment of whether you expect other NATO countries to step up to the plate and provide the troops that are necessary?

General Petraeus. As the Commander of MNF-I, I have not been in a position to assess the likelihood of NATO countries providing additional troops to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However, I am concerned about the existence of requirements in Afghanistan that have not been fully sourced. If confirmed as the Commander of CENTCOM, I would work in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, the U.S. Joint Chiefs, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense to assess the force protection and mission risks produced by shortfalls in resources in Afghanistan, and to pursue ways of addressing those shortfalls. Generally speaking, it appears clear that the Afghanistan mission would benefit from greater contributions from participating nations, with fewer national caveats, as well as from continued and expanded-efforts to build the strength and capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

23. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, while a considerable amount of time has been spent discussing Iraq and the subject of troop levels, we may be missing the big picture. We can’t lose sight of what we are ultimately trying to accomplish in
Iraq and how our future force structure supports these goals. We need to focus on the
discussion on coming up with a constructive solution and way ahead. I believe that the
entire region of southwest Asia is of vital strategic importance to the United
States. Beyond the situation in Iraq, we have a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghan-
istan, a tenuous political situation at best in Pakistan, and Iranian nuclear ambi-
tions. Can you tell us what you believe the United States’ geopolitical strategic pri-
orities in this region should be and why?

General Petraeus. A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals a wide array of chal-
lenges. An important priority, as recently emphasized by the Secretary of Defense,
must be to win the wars in which we are currently engaged. The United States
must continue to focus on the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure U.S. national policy objectives are met. In addition to these conflicts, several transnational concerns affect many or all of the countries within the CENTCOM
AOR. These concerns are interrelated and create significant challenges for regional
stability and for U.S. policy and interests in the region. Our strategic priorities in-
clude five areas. Deterring state-based aggression. The destabilizing effects of the
Iranian regime’s attempts to increase its influence in the region, Syrian efforts to
influence Lebanese politics, and Eritrean antagonism aimed toward Ethiopia are all
significant concerns. Defeating violent extremist networks. Though al Qaeda is the
highest visibility and priority terrorist organization, there are many other extremist
groups throughout the region. They constitute threats to their home governments
as well as to people across the globe. Countering the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, including related components and technical expertise, in the re-
gion. Iran and Syria’s non-transparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities could de-
stabilize the region and spark a regional arms race. The need to secure existing nu-
clear material is a related and critical concern. Promoting economic development in
many of the region’s countries. This is both a humanitarian issue and a security
issue, as poverty and lack of opportunity are often enablers to successful terrorist
recruiting. Countering transnational piracy and narcotics and arms smuggling. In
addition to being criminal and destructive activities, these practices threaten stra-
tegic resources and are often lucrative sources of funding for terrorists.

24. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, what is the best way to achieve these
strategic priorities?

General Petraeus. Although it is premature to have specific and comprehensive
plans, there are several concepts that would guide my approach to the region’s chal-
lenge, if I am confirmed. First, we would seek to build partnerships in the region,
pursuing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in identifying and working together
toward mutual interests. This involves extensive engagement with leaders in the re-
gion, and I would see this as one of my primary responsibilities as the CENTCOM
commander. Second, we would aim for a whole-of-government approach in address-
ing the region’s challenges. This approach recognizes that solutions for the region’s
challenges should be as multifaceted as the challenges themselves. Rather than en-
gaging in purely military solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and capa-
bilities resident in the whole of government. Third, we would pursue comprehensive
approaches and solutions, addressing the roots of issues and not just their mani-
festations. This entails efforts varying from spurring economic development and
educational opportunities to strengthening governments’ ability to combat terrorism
and extremism. Fourth, we would maintain focus on readiness to conduct contin-
gency operations, whether crisis response, deterrent action, or defeating aggressors.

TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ

25. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, I continue to be concerned about the neg-
ative effects of repeated and extended deployments to Iraq on our soldiers and ma-
rines. The surge in U.S. forces during the last year increased the Army’s presence
in Iraq to 20 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level of 15.
The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, has said, “Today’s Army is
out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds
the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contin-
gencies.” When do you foresee the ISF will be ready to step up in significant num-
bers so that you will be able to reduce your force level requirements to fewer than
15 BCTs?

General Petraeus. The ISF is already stepping up in significant numbers and en-
abling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have recently made significant
security progress in Iraq, as the level of security incidents for the past month is the
lowest it has been for more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even
as three BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in coalition facilities by over 3,500 detainees, and a continuing decline will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even as we have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the ISFs, as well as the Iraqi Government’s determination in meeting security challenges throughout Iraq.

Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size and capability. In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior have generated 51 new combat battalions, an increase of over 30 percent. This intensive effort to increase ISF numbers involved recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new police and soldiers. Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow even further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq.

As important as the ISF’s growth in size is its growth in capability. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100—a 15 percent increase since January 2007. Ongoing ISF operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical competence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major operations throughout the country. The enablers that coalition forces provide are in line with expectations and generally involve capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support capability). The performance of many units has been solid, and some formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely capable. Thanks to improved security and ISF capability, eight of sixteen Iraqi provinces are under Provincial Iraqi Control, with two more provinces due to transition by the end of June 2008.

Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the major conditions that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition forces in Iraq while sustaining our security gains. My sense is that after a brief period of consolidation and evaluation this summer, conditions on the ground will be such that I will be able to make a recommendation for some further reductions. My recommendation may not be for a BCT or major combat formation, though it could. But I do believe that there will be assets that we will be able to recommend can be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater. Beyond the initial decision on post-surge force levels, we will continually assess security conditions in Iraq and seek to identify further possible force withdrawals.

REALIGNMENT IN IRAQ

26. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, you testified in March that the security situation in Iraq has improved since the implementation of the surge and that there has been substantial progress in training and equipping the ISF. You also testified that operation against Shiite militias in southern Iraq indicates an increased capability of the ISF. The report issued by the Independent Commission on the ISFs, chaired by retired Marine Corps General and former Commandant of the Marine Corps, James Jones, suggests that coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, and retasked as the ISF become increasingly capable. General Jones’ report stated that U.S. forces could soon be retasked to better ensure territorial defense of the state by concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of critical infrastructures essential to Iraq. This is very similar in many ways to the transition of mission proposed by the Iraq Study Group, and also proposed in legislation by Senator Ben Nelson and myself. We have suggested that our troops transition their mission and focus on border security, counterterrorism operations, training and equipment of Iraqi troops, and protecting Americans and American infrastructure. Under what conditions should the U.S. military begin a realignment of the mission in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. As the Commander, MNF–I, or if confirmed, as the Commander, CENTCOM, my responsibility is to execute the policy that has been decided upon by my chain of command. The current strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic, and Federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror. Achieving this goal requires a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, working along security, economic, diplomatic, and political lines of operation, to help the Iraqi Government secure its citizens, develop capacity, grow its economy, and strengthen its relations with other countries in the region. Border security, counterterrorism operations, training and
equipping Iraqi troops, and protecting our troops and infrastructure are all important aspects of our counterinsurgency efforts, but limiting U.S. troops to these actions would not enable us to achieve the United States’ strategic goal in Iraq. Accomplishing this goal remains a complex and difficult undertaking, but our view is that we are on the right path. Significant security progress has been made, as the level of security incidents across Iraq for the past month is the lowest it has been for more than 4 years, and we continue to transition additional responsibilities to the Iraqi Government and ISFs. This transition is evident in the fact that we have sustained our security gains even as three BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in coalition facilities by a net of 3,500 detainees and this reduction, as well as our continuing detainee releases, will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the detainee mission. We continually assess the conditions on the ground, and after a period of consolidation and evaluation this summer, we will seek to identify further possible force withdrawals.

It is possible that the U.S. strategy and policy for Iraq could change. If that were to happen, I would work with other U.S. Government agencies to develop the comprehensive plans, including risk management, required to implement that strategy.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN

27. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, the work of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Stuart Bowen, has revealed an extraordinary litany of contracting waste, fraud, and abuse coming out of that country. His 336 investigations related to Iraq contracting have resulted in 5 convictions; 14 indictments pending trial; 14 arrests; 52 debarments or suspensions; $17 million in court ordered fines, forfeitures, and restitutions; and nearly $58 million saved through audits. In addition, the SIGIR is currently conducting audits of companies such as Halliburton’s former subsidiary, Kellogg Brown and Root. Last year’s National Defense Authorization Act created a new position, the Inspector General for Afghanistan, called the SIGAR. If confirmed as Commander of CENTCOM, what support will you provide to the SIGAR to ensure that office can provide adequate oversight to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in contracting practices in Afghanistan?

General Petraeus. If confirmed as the Commander, CENTCOM, I would provide my full support to the efforts of the SIGAR. Today's military operations require significant financial and contractor support, and audit and oversight agencies serve a critical role in ensuring that taxpayer money is well spent. As the Commander of MNF-I, I have fully supported and encouraged special reviews as I rely on oversight and audit processes to provide me essential information on the health of the organization. During my tenure, MNF-I has welcomed the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction as well as personnel from the Government Accountability Office, the DOD Inspector General, the Army Audit Agency, and the Army Criminal Investigation Command. As the Commander of CENTCOM, I would continue to provide my full support for oversight and review processes.

[The nomination reference of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, follows:]
The biographical sketch of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:

RéSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Senior Service College Fellowship—Georgetown University.

Educational degrees:

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

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Major duty assignments:

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<td>Jan 79</td>
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<td>Assistant S–3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 79</td>
<td>May 81</td>
<td>Commander, A Company, later S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 81</td>
<td>May 82</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp to the Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 82</td>
<td>Jun 83</td>
<td>Student, Command and General Staff Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 83</td>
<td>Jun 85</td>
<td>Student, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 85</td>
<td>Jun 87</td>
<td>Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 87</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
<td>Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Belgium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 88</td>
<td>Aug 89</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, later 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 89</td>
<td>Aug 91</td>
<td>Aide/Assistant Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 91</td>
<td>Jul 93</td>
<td>Commander, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 93</td>
<td>Jul 94</td>
<td>G–3 (Operations/Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 94</td>
<td>Jan 95</td>
<td>Senior Service College Fellow, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 95</td>
<td>Jun 95</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Mission in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 95</td>
<td>Jun 97</td>
<td>Commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 97</td>
<td>Sep 97</td>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 97</td>
<td>Aug 99</td>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 99</td>
<td>Jul 00</td>
<td>Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Kuwait, Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 00</td>
<td>Aug 00</td>
<td>Acting Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 00</td>
<td>Jun 01</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 01</td>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SFOR and Deputy Commander, United States joint Intergency Counterterrorism Task Force, Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From | To | Assignment
--- | --- | ---
Jul 02 | May 04 | Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell, Fort Campbell, KY, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
May 04 | Sep 05 | Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Oct 05 | Feb 07 | Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Summary of joint assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Belgium (Cumulative Joint Credit).</td>
<td>Jun 87–Jun 88 Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Mission in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti (No Joint Credit).</td>
<td>Jan 95–Jun 95 Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Director, The Joint Staff, later Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
<td>Jun 97–Aug 99 Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Kuwait, Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait (No Joint Credit).</td>
<td>Aug 99–Sep 99 Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SFOR and Deputy Commander, United States Joint Interagency Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (No joint credit).</td>
<td>Jun 01–Jun 02 Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.</td>
<td>May 04–Sep 05 Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>Feb 07–Present General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. decorations and badges:
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal with “V” Device
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Achievement Medal
- Army Achievement Medal
- Combat Action Badge
- Expert Infantryman Badge
- Master Parachutist Badge
- Air Assault Badge
- Ranger Tab
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   David H. Petraeus.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Commander, United States Central Command.

3. **Date of nomination:**
   30 April 2008.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, NY.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Anne, 25; Stephen, 21.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    - Council on Foreign Relations.
    - Association of the United States Army.
    - Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy.
    - 82d Airborne Division Association.
    - 101st Airborne Division Association.
    - 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
    - Static Line Association.
    - 555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
    - 187th Infantry Regiment Association.
    - SHAPE Alumni Association.
    - 7th Armored Division Association.
    - Princeton Alumni Association.
    - United States Parachute Association.
    - Command and General Staff Foundation.
11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS.

[The nomination of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

Please provide any updates or modifications to the answers to advance policy questions that you submitted in connection with your recent nomination to the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army that you believe to be necessary to ensure that your views are fully and accurately reflected.

**DUTIES**

*Question.* What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF–I)?

*Answer.* The Commanding General of MNF–I commands forces within Iraq and is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of Mission. MNF–I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control (OPCON) to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). MNF–I conducts operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission, and other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical Control of non-U.S. coalition forces and OPCON of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC–I). MNF–I is a strategic level command.

*Question.* What are the differences between the duties and functions of the Commander, MNF–I and the Commander, MNC–I?

*Answer.* The Commanding General of MNC–I is the senior operational level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting operations to restore order and security in Iraq.

The Commanding General of MNF–I has a wider responsibility. He is responsible for all strategic issues and the political-military interface, working with the U.S. Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the campaign to include security, governance, economic development, communication, and transition.

*Question.* What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

*Answer.* During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have served the Army and the Nation from the tactical through the strategic level. I have been as-
signed in tactical and operational units for 22 years and have commanded soldiers from company to Corps level while participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a tour of duty as the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/Multinational Corps Iraq for the last 24 months. My professional military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into what is needed to command coalition forces in support of the strategic goals outlined by the U.S. Mission Iraq. In particular, my recent tours of duty in Iraq have provided me with unique insights into the complicated situation and requirements needed to be successful in our mission in Iraq.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander, MNF–I?

Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

- Continually update my military and civilian chain of command of our analysis and assessment
- Stay connected with my subordinate commanders and higher headquarters
- Lead and challenge all of MNF–I to continue to learn, change, and adjust to the environment, in order to attain our end state as quickly as possible
- Continually assess the progress of our campaign and make adjustments when necessary to ensure success
- Establish mechanisms to incorporate the lessons learned over the last 5 years
- Maintain focus on the warrior ethos—Always place the mission first; never accept defeat; never quit; never leave a fallen comrade
- Demand high moral and ethical behavior by all U.S. forces
- Be aggressive–tackle challenges as they arise and mitigate the risk involved

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?

Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position to achieve success in Iraq than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The security situation is improved, with overall attacks, civilian deaths, and ethno-sectarian violence all down. Progress remains uneven and difficult challenges remain, specifically the continued presence of militias and Iran’s malign involvement in training, equipping, and funding these militias. Second, AQI maintains the capability to conduct high profile attacks in some areas, although their capability is diminished. They will continue to attempt to de-legitimize the Government of Iraq. Iraqi security forces continue to improve and are increasingly taking the lead. However, all of this progress is still fragile. To achieve long-term sustainable security tough work still remains. The gap between needs of the Iraqi people and the capacity of the government has been reduced, but is not yet self-sustainable by the Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on some very difficult issues and has passed some critical legislation, but implementation of this legislation is what is needed. There appears to be better cooperation among many political parties which has provided some unified positions across sectarian lines. However, Iraq’s governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas. Overall, we are moving in the right direction and progressing toward a stable and representative state in Iraq. However, for it to be sustainable we must continue U.S. involvement across all US Governmental agencies and continue to pressure the Iraqi Leaders to move forward economically, politically, and diplomatically.

Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

Answer. As U.S. forces in theater drawdown, we must ensure that malign influences are unable to reestablish themselves through violence. ISF and Coalition forces must continue to protect the Iraqi people while continuing to build Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as we assist in providing security, we must enable Iraqi
security forces to increasingly assume the lead in securing their country. They must expand their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage and support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the local and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the challenges associated with internal and external stability and security in Iraq cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must continue to engage with Iraq’s neighbors and seek to get those neighbors to support political compromise and stability in Iraq.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, MNF–I?

Answer. In my opinion, the number one threat to Iraq is the communal struggle for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) with malign outside influences (predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying to effect the outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the greatest threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security forces to increasingly take the lead against these challenges without creating significant risks to short- and long-sustainable security.

There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political, and diplomatic realms. Gains made in security will be easier to preserve in an environment in which people have ready access to essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to move forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be important milestones in this process. The Iraqi Government must not only be representative, but also continue to grow in capability and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face challenges from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory. Iraq’s Arab neighbors must do more to reach out and engage Iraq in a positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek to partner with the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these diplomatic and political challenges.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish and what actions would you initially take as Commander, MNF–I?

Answer. The gap between the Iraqi individual needs and desires and the ability of the Government of Iraq to provide for those needs and desires still exists. The role of coalition forces is to support the Government of Iraq in building capacity to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi citizens. We will assist the Government of Iraq by working to make the communal struggle for power less violent, helping them to develop legitimate Iraqi institutions and mitigate the negative effects created by those trying to exploit the gap. MNF–I basic objectives will be:

- Provide security for the local populace
- ISF is professionalized and self-sustaining and is able
  - to move towards police primacy
  - to protect its borders
  - to maintain security with less and less reliance on coalition forces
- Assist the Government of Iraq in providing a more legitimate and capable central, provincial, and local government that has:
  - Credible and effective control with provincial and local civil institutions
  - is accountable to the people of Iraq
  - has established the rule of law
  - delivers adequate services
  - increases employment through economic development

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. How would you characterize the effectiveness of the military tactics employed by the division under your command in Tikrit in 2003? What were the results of those tactics and what lessons did you, the theater command, and the Army learn from that experience?

Answer. As is the case now, all areas in Iraq in 2003 faced significantly different challenges. In 2003 and the beginning of 2004, the 4th ID area of operations was the heart of the Sunni-Triangle and the Baathist Regime itself. This area of operations was probably most affected by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and potentially lost more than any other group in Iraq. They were the privileged—therefore, the regime change followed by the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, as well as the implementation of debathification measures by the interim Iraqi Government, put
thousands upon thousands of military, education, medical and local government employees out of work. This created an extremely tense environment and a corresponding increase in reaction and violence to these decisions. In the fall of 2003 this was the most violent area within Iraq. From November to March of 2004, we were able to significantly reduce the level of violence through a combination of lethal and non-lethal means and re-establish stability throughout the region. During this time, the division captured nearly 20 of the top 55 high value targets to include Saddam Hussein in December of 2003. Additionally, we established standing provincial governments in Salah-ah-Din, At Tamim, and Diyala provinces and started several job programs as well as began numerous reconstruction efforts. In the beginning of 2004 through our transition of authority on 15 March 2004, we reduced the level of violence in the region to its lowest levels that have yet to be re-achieved. However we learned many lessons. It took us much too long to recognize the true nature of the insurgency. We did not have the capacity or expertise to fully understand the underlying cultural or tribal underpinnings of the region. We were unable to establish longstanding relationships and trust with the local tribal and religious leaders. We underestimated the relevance of justice and honor to the Iraqis and the necessity of creating honorable work not just jobs. Lastly, reconciliation had not yet become a viable concept. It took us 4 more years to see this take hold.

**Question.** What were the major lessons you learned from your more recent experience as Commander, MNC–I, that are most applicable to the duties you are about to assume?

- Securing the population comes first
- Understand the complexity of the conflict—“COIN-plus”
- Fundamental concepts
  - Secure the people where they sleep
  - Give the people justice and honor
  - Make the people choose
- Integrate civilian and military efforts to “mass effects”. It is the combination of interagency and combined arms
  - Embedded PRTs with the BCTs better leverages the appropriate expertise and allows for increase integration and synchronization
  - Total integration SOF and conventional forces across the battlespace
  - Improved significantly our overall intel capacity and our ability to synchronize the “INTs” at the lowest level—ISR integration is more critical than ever
- Knowing the threat isn’t enough . . . understand the environment holistically
- “Aggressive pursuit” continues even after the threat recedes
- Pushing the ISF as they grow in capacity and take on responsibility
- Pushing governance and economic development as security improves
- Building ISF capacity—there is no substitute for partnership
- Empowering ground-owning commanders (decentralization of efforts)
- Importance of headquarters elements
- Importance of enablers as force multipliers and “risk mitigators”
- What leaders do makes a critical difference . . . everyday, at every level
- Be first with the truth
- “Supporting the troops” involves funding OGAs—CERP is not enough

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?

**Answer.**

1. Inadequate post-war planning to exploit the military success of the initial invasion. We underestimated/misunderstood the environment.
2. Disbanding of the Iraqi Army and further de-Baathification efforts threw thousands upon thousands of Iraqis out of work.
3. It took us too long to recognize the insurgency and all of its underpinnings, which allowed extremist groups to establish themselves and gain passive support of the population.
4. We attempted to turn complete control over to the Iraqis too early when they did not yet have the capacity to govern or secure the population. This resulted in a significant increase in ethno-sectarian violence on that was exploited by Sunni/Shia extremist groups.

**Question.** Which of these mistakes, if any, still impact U.S. operations?

**Answer.** They all to some extent still effect our operations, but we have made adjustments at the strategic, operational, and tactical level which is the beginning to have an impact.
What corrective action, if any, will you take if confirmed?

Answer. I will ensure that we are a learning organization that is able to adjust its operations in order to meet the Nation’s stated objectives. We will push the Iraqis to assume more control across the security, diplomatic, and governance lines of operation to include the investment of their wealth into their own country. We will continue to assess and analyze the strategic and operational environment and make adjustments.

Question. During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?

If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the actions that you took in response to these incidents.

Answer. Unfortunately, due to the nature of our operations, allegations of detainee or civilian abuse occur frequently against both coalition forces and Iraqi security forces (ISF). For alleged abuse by U.S. forces, I require that all allegations be reported through the chain of command to me. I also require that each allegation be thoroughly and impartially investigated, evidence gathered and evaluated. Each case of confirmed abuse is treated as misconduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, adverse administrative procedures, or both. Each case is handled on its own merits at the appropriate level after due process is afforded to any soldier accused of such conduct. Known victims of confirmed abuse are compensated as part of our counter-insurgency strategy and our moral obligation to do right by our host country’s citizens. We take our lessons learned from such incidents and refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as retrain our soldiers in the importance of following the Law of Armed Conflict, respecting Iraqi civilians, and treating detainees humanely.

For allegations of abuse by ISF, I require that reports be made by U.S. inspectors of Iraqi military, police, and detention facilities, as well as anyone in my command who has information of this type of alleged conduct. The reports are forwarded to the appropriate liaison authority who can engage the right Iraqi leaders in order for them to address the allegations of Iraqi-on-Iraqi abuse.

ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW IRAQ STRATEGY

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007?

Answer. After my arrival in Iraq in December 2006 as the MNC–I Commander, General Casey challenged me to take a look at different ways to break the cycle of sectarian violence in Baghdad. As a result of the assessment, we confirmed that Baghdad was the most important piece of terrain and ethno-sectarian violence, fueled by extremist elements was the primary cause of the problem. We conducted crisis action planning and through our assessment and analysis determined that we must first and foremost protect the population first in Baghdad and then the other ten cities. We also determined that there was an opportunity in Anbar to exploit some initial success that was created by the reconciliation efforts with the tribes. We developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to push coalition and ISF forces out into the neighborhoods in small Joint Security Stations (JSS) and combat outpost (COP). In the past we would clear areas but would not be able to hold these areas. We knew we must secure the population; we must deny the enemy sanctuaries and eliminate the support zones in the so called Baghdad Belts. We then developed the operational plan and requested the surge forces. This plan was briefed to General Casey and the Secretary of Defense for approval, and later to General Petraeus upon his arrival.

U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN IRAQ

Question. The President has said that following the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July there will be a 45-day consolidation and evaluation period, after which an assessment of conditions on the ground would begin to determine when recommendations for further reductions in U.S. forces in Iraq could be made.

To your knowledge, aren’t conditions on the ground in Iraq being continuously assessed?

Answer. Commanders at all levels continually assess, both formally and informally, conditions in Iraq.

Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days to assess the conditions on the ground and determine when to make recommendations?
Answer. The recommendation to reduce our forces by five combat Brigades and two Marine Battalions, back down to pre-surge levels was made based on our best judgment and analysis of many factors.

The environment in Iraq is complex and constantly changing across security, economic, and diplomatic lines. One of our key considerations is to ensure that we do not give back gains we have made. We learned the lesson the hard way in 2006. In order to make informed decisions it is important to understand the risk involved and how you can best mitigate this risk. This 45 day period following a 25 percent reduction in combat brigades allows us to adequately and more accurately evaluate the risk and ensure that tactical, operational, and strategic risk mitigation techniques are sufficient.

Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in Iraq. All four lines of operation—security, economic, diplomatic, and political—are mutually reinforcing and thus must be an important part of any long-term solution in Iraq. While the political line of operation, the effort to create political accommodation and good governance, is the main effort, it cannot be pursued to the exclusion of reinforcing efforts. We have seen in the past year that Iraqi leaders are more likely to make the type of compromise seen in February’s legislative package when they and their communities are feeling more secure rather than less.

Question. Do you believe that compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Compromise among Iraqi Political leaders is a necessary condition for any successful solution in Iraq.

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the compromises necessary for a political solution?
Answer. We must continue to apply the right amount of pressure in order to ensure constant and consistent progress. I also believe constant communications between leaders in MNF–I and the Embassy with all Iraqi political leaders is essential. Iraqi leaders are under enormous pressure from internal and external sources and they have begun to make some progress with legislation as well as other areas. However, the importance of implementation will be the underpinning of long-term sustainable success, and we must continue to coach, teach, mentor, and pressure the Iraqi leadership along the way.

Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Answer. We must throw all means available; push, pull and convince Iraqi leaders that political solutions must be found by helping them find those solutions, coaching them, and urging them throughout the process. We must sustain our robust engagement, working with the Government of Iraq to identify mutual interests amongst Iraqi leaders and convincing them to make the hard decisions that are in the best interests of security and stability in Iraq.

Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would allow for a recommendation to make further reductions in U.S. forces?
Answer. There is no simple metric or calculation that can give us a green or red light on further reductions. However, if confirmed as Commander of MNF–I, I will focus on a number of variables such as the level of security, level of threat, capacity of the ISF, capacity of the ministries, capacity of the provincial and local governments, economic development, and improvement of basic services. We will use a variety of objective and subjective systems. However, I will rely most heavily on my subordinate commanders’ recommendations and my own independent judgment.

INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT

Question. You have noted that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current threat is the intercommunal fight over power.

How has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This has played out differently over time, with inter- and later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward it will continue to be a complex problem set.

Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to this change in the nature of the conflict?
Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address this conflict over power and resources. As commander of MNC–I, I had a hand in the development
of the Joint Campaign Plan. It addresses not just the manifestation of this conflict (security) but its roots (economic, political) and a comprehensive approach to address it (security, economic, diplomatic, and political). The strategy also involves directly addressing sectarian division, engaging with dissonant factions and individuals to bring reconcilable enemies to the realization that the best means of change is the political process and not armed conflict. We have also worked to bring together rivaling religious and political leaders to work together for their communities. Our efforts have been reinforced by the general population’s increasing rejection of violence and those who would cause it. Although there is a long way to go, our strategy to address the conflict in Iraq is helping to enable progress by the Iraqi Government.

**Question.** What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control, particularly in southern Iraq?

**Answer.** The role of coalition forces is to support the elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of arms. It is my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in that effort.

**Question.** Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.

**Answer.** In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at greater risk?

**Answer.** I believe the non-Muslim religious minorities are not at greater risk from the majority of Iraqis. However, there are extremist elements that target several groups to include non-Muslim religious minorities in order to maintain their own legitimacy.

**Question.** Are there any groups that are particularly vulnerable?

**Answer.** Recent events in Basra and Sadr City indicate that low level Iraqi Government officials and Iraqi security forces are at the greatest risk when traveling outside established safe zones.

**Question.** If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military in addressing their vulnerability?

**Answer.** The U.S. must ensure that threat reporting and information is shared with Iraqi counterparts to ensure widest possible dissemination; this allows individuals (of all religions and sects) who are at risk to take property security measures.

**CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS**

**Question.** Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking the steps it must to confront and control the militias?

**Answer.** The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in recent months toward confronting criminal militias. Prime Minister Maliki made the courageous decision in March to confront militia elements in Basra that were carrying out acts of intimidation and murder, threatening peace and the rule of law. Reports state that Prime Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the Government of Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of arms, and the government and ISF are attempting to enforce this point in Baghdad, particularly Sadr City. It appears the government is more willing to use its forces to confront militia elements. This must be followed by diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. However, this is only the first step in reducing militia influence. It will take a concerted effort over time to have long-term success.

**Question.** What role would you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?

**Answer.** I will continue to work with the Iraqi Government to assist them in confronting militias by using all the tools available to them (military, diplomatic, and humanitarian.) Coalition forces will continue to support and enable Iraqi forces in their kinetic and non-kinetic operations against militias through partnership and the use of coalition advisors.

**Question.** What has been the role of American troops with respect to recent operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that U.S. support for the Sadr City and Basra operations has been generally in line with the support coalition forces regularly provide to Iraqi operations.

In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in Multi-National Division—Southeast, the coalition has continued to support Iraqi-led operations with planning, some logistic enablers, close air support, and ISR. U.S. and U.K. Military Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi units on the ground play an integral role in these support efforts.

It is my understanding that U.S. forces in Baghdad are playing a more robust role in planning and executing operations in the Baghdad Security Districts than in
Basra. They are conducting extensive surveillance operations in Sadr City and partnering with Iraqi units on the ground, using ISR and Air Weapons Team assets to conduct targeted operations in response to attacks originating in Sadr City. As typical in the “partner” phase of the lead-partner-overwatch transition to ISF control, coalition forces operate alongside and in coordination with Iraqi Army, Special Operations, and Police units.

PERFORMANCE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. As part of the new strategy in Iraq, the Iraqi Government agreed to send three additional Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad.

Answer. In January 2007, the Government of Iraq committed to providing sufficient forces to conduct operations in support of the Baghdad Security Plan (Benchmark #9—Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq). In February 2007, the Government of Iraq established an Iraqi Army (IA) battalion rotation plan in support of Fardh al Qanoon to provide three additional brigades (9 additional battalions) of combat power to Baghdad. On 1 December 2007, the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 11th IA Division completed force generation and assumed responsibility for battlespace within the Baghdad Province, allowing six of the rotational battalions to return home. The 4th Brigade of the 11th Division is scheduled to complete the force generation process in November 2008, which will allow the 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division and its battalions to return home to Anbar Province. 4/11 IA will fulfill the requirement to have three additional IA brigades permanently stationed in Baghdad (in accordance with Benchmark #9). Over the past year and a half, there have been as many as six additional battalions—above and beyond the requirement for three brigades—temporarily deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations.

Question. How many additional Iraqi Army brigades are there now?

Answer. The 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division will remain deployed to Baghdad until completion of the force generation of 4th Brigade, 11th IA Division, thus fulfilling the requirements of the Baghdad Security Plan. Currently, there are six additional battalions deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations in Sadr City.

Question. How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi forces in the conduct of recent security operations in and around Baghdad?

Answer. It is difficult for me to comment on recent security operations since I have not been in theater for about 90 days. But when I was there, we were seeing steady progress in planning and execution at battalion and brigade level by the ISF. Progress is still not uniform, and there are still some significant NCO and officer shortages, as well as some small pockets of sectarian behavior.

Question. As U.S. surge forces are withdrawn, are Iraqi Army brigades assuming the areas and missions of these units?

Answer. As local conditions vary, so does Iraqi force capability on the ground. In general, our intent is to thin out U.S. presence rather than withdraw it from a given area. In many cases, we are spreading out our presence as troops leave and continuing to partner with ISF. In other cases, ISF units on the ground—to include Iraqi Police, National Police, and Iraqi Army elements—are assuming a greater role. Several provinces are scheduled to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control in the coming months. The specific arrangement varies not only province to province, but city to city and in some cases neighborhood to neighborhood.

Question. If so, are gains in reduced violence and increased stability achieved by U.S. forces being effectively maintained in the areas for which Iraqi Army forces have assumed responsibility?

Answer. It is imperative that we preserve hard won gains. We must take an approach that allows us to preserve these gains by ensuring that Iraqi forces are capable and supported so they not only take responsibility, but are successful. In general, our intent is to thin out U.S. presence over time rather than completely withdraw from a given area.

Question. In March 2008, the Iraqi Army launched a major offensive aimed at forcing the Mahdi Army out of Basra.

What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and security forces’ strategic and operational planning and preparation for the operation in Basra?

Answer. It is very difficult to make an assessment from afar. From reporting, it appears Iraqi operations in Basra began much more quickly than originally planned and thus suffered initially from a lack of sufficient strategic and operational planning and conditions setting. But as operations have continued, with our coaching and assistance, Iraqi planning has seen growth in capability.
What is encouraging is that Iraq Security Forces demonstrated they have the ability to deploy over a division’s worth of personnel and equipment across the country and then employ them upon arrival—a feat which was not possible in 2006.

Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces’ tactical performance during operations in Basra?

Answer. I have not personally observed these operations and cannot make an accurate assessment.

Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi Government’s strategic and the Iraqi security forces’ operational objectives?

Answer. Through reporting, it is my view that it is too early to talk about operational or strategic success. However, it appears the militia’s grip on Basra’s neighborhoods has been affected, and significant caches have been found throughout the city. The operation appears to be garnering support from citizens of Basra, but any conclusions at this time about the operation’s overall tactical and strategic accomplishments would be premature.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. What is the command and control relationship between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan?

Answer. Iraqi security forces in the Baghdad area receive all orders through national command channels, and U.S. forces operate under the command and control of Multi-National Corps Iraq. The relationship between these two chains of command is one of constant coordination and cooperation.

Question. What concerns, if any, have you had about command and control relationships with Iraqi forces, and what have been the lessons learned in this regard over the last year of combined operations?

Answer. The issue of command and control relationships is an important one, and the most critical imperative has been to ensure unity of effort. Over the past year, we have gained a great deal of experience as a result of our partnership between transition teams and Iraqi units and our close cooperation at the tactical level. The operations of the last year particularly have reaffirmed the value of our training and transition teams. These elements have been critical in providing coalition forces with situational awareness and in helping the coalition to support Iraqi operations with enablers such as logistics, intelligence, and close air support.

COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Question. According to Field Manual 3–24, the new counterinsurgency manual, “20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations.” Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, requires a force of 120,000–130,000 personnel to meet the minimum requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces.

Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and remains sufficient and if so, why?

Answer. While every commander would like additional resources, the 80,000 troops that were in or moved to Baghdad were sufficient given the political-military situation and phased conduct of operations. Counterinsurgency requires local security forces and not just soldiers. At the same time, the Baghdad police were expanded and now have an authorization of over 39,000. In addition, it is important to recognize the security contribution of 30,000 Sons of Iraq assisting U.S. forces in Baghdad alone. As the Baghdad security plan has progressed, these forces proved to be sufficient to allow gradual but steady progress in efforts to clear and hold Baghdad’s neighborhoods. I would also add that the critical increase in the enablers such as ISR platforms, intelligence teams, and aviation, as well as many other enablers, has a significant impact.

Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation from doctrine?

Answer. As the former commander of MNC–I, I can attest that risk assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a continuous process in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and undertaken, commanders consider the risk to our own as well as Iraqi forces, as well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas which we currently hold. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that risk assessment occurs on a continuous basis.

LENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has said that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years.
How long do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last? Do you have reason to believe that this campaign will be shorter than the typical effort cited by General Casey?

Answer. I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will depend on a variety of factors about which it is very difficult to make judgments. While the support of the United States will be important for some time to come, ultimately the Government of Iraq must win this fight. Therefore, while the counterinsurgency campaign could last 9 years, it is not necessarily the case that U.S. forces would be involved in substantial numbers for the duration of that period.

SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop levels in Iraq of approximately 140,000 troops at their current operational tempo?

Answer. Over the past few years, we have seen definitive indications that the force is strained. Stress on soldiers and units resulting from increased time deployed and decreased time at home are visible in several different areas including training, readiness, and recruitment. However, the Army has a plan that will, with congressional assistance, restore balance to our force. The Army has identified four imperatives that we must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.

We have and will continue to make significant progress in these areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will continue to recruit enough soldiers to meet our end strength requirements. The Army also has received authorization to accelerate our growth plan to 2011, which will assist in restoring balance to preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels.

While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers into combat to meet the national strategy.

STATE OF TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and equipping of Iraqi security forces?

Answer. Over two-thirds of Iraqi Army units are leading security operations throughout Iraq, and over half of the police units of the Ministry of Interior are capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency operations. However, numerous challenges remain in logistics and other enablers. The single most important area that still needs improvement relates to shortages in the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.

Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces progress toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security?

Answer. Iraqi security forces have made important progress, but are not yet ready to assume full responsibility throughout Iraq on their own. Over the past 16 months, an increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled Iraqi security forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police, and this still-expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 73,000 soldiers and police through the rest of 2008. Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. Despite these gains, however, recent operations have underscored the considerable work that remains to be done in the areas of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control.

BURDEN SHARING

Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi Government to assume the cost of training, equipping, and operations for its security forces?

Answer. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility, and also the increasing capability, to assume the training, equipping, and operations costs for the Iraqi security forces. In 2006 and 2007, Iraq’s security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi security forces fund. Iraq is expected to spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year. The trend of Iraq spending more for its own defense and the United States paying less will continue over time. However, it is important that this occur in a somewhat
gradual manner rather than all at once to avoid major disruptions and delays in the development of more capable Iraqi security forces.

Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi Government to share the cost of combined operations with Multi-National Force-Iraq forces and stability programs throughout Iraq?

Answer. The Government of Iraq is responsible for sharing the cost of security operations and stability programs throughout Iraq, and it is increasingly doing so. As an encouraging example, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 million for the coalition forces to manage as Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds. This initiative has enabled coalition forces to execute projects for the Iraqi people while the Iraqi Government continues to build its own capacity to do so.

PERMANENT BASING

Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.

Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq’s oil resources?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree that it is important for the Government of Iraq to assume greater responsibility for paying the costs of reconstruction throughout Iraq, including paying for all large-scale infrastructure projects?

Answer. Yes.

FORCE PROTECTION

Question. The Baghdad security plan distributed American units with Iraqi units over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.

What is the status of American forces’ distribution to small local bases throughout Baghdad?

Answer. Coalition forces have nearly completed the establishment of planned stations and outposts in Baghdad. 53 of 55 Joint Security Stations (JSS) and 22 Combat Outposts (COPs) are established.

Question. If confirmed as Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, how would you ensure the protection of those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them on a daily basis?

Answer. Force protection and sustainment of JSS and COPs is always a major concern. If confirmed, I will ensure constant assessments are made of our current force protection measures and constant adjustments are made to improve our operational, tactical, and technical measures of force protection; ensuring we do all possible for the protection of all U.S. and coalition forces.

AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Question. CENTCOM issued a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS) in December of 2006, for a large number of additional aircraft with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. Since that JUONS was issued, even larger requirements for such intelligence platforms have been articulated by commanders in the theater. It appears that the Department of Defense (DOD) has been slow to respond to these requirements, although recently the Air Force has “surged” a large number of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM. However, this surge and other activities will not close the gap between available and required resources. The main problem appears to be that there are bottlenecks in fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled with a reluctance to seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-record.

Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to CENTCOM’s intelligence platform shortage?

Answer. As we develop our requirements we normally do not focus on specific platforms. We try to identify the operational and strategic needs and define shortfalls in capability and capacity. Then we seek needed capabilities and practical solutions rather than specific platforms and technologies.

Question. Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been adequately considered?

Answer. Yes. I believe that MNF–I and CENTCOM, in coordination with the DOD Task Force on ISR, are considering all possible solutions to ISR shortfalls.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES

Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the national intelligence agencies have developed effective equipment, tactics, and intelligence dissemination practices to target al Qaeda personnel and personnel from other related terrorist networks. The effectiveness of these tools and their utility for regular ground forces in battling militias and IED networks are now more widely recognized. As a result, some of these tools and capabilities are migrating to Army and Marine Corps ground forces. Do you believe that regular Army and Marine Corps ground forces can replicate the capabilities developed by Special Forces?

Answer. Special Operations Forces and conventional Army and Marine Corps units do have some overlapping capabilities. However, they also have unique characteristics based on their missions. For example, conventional forces are specifically designed to be able to hold terrain—a task for which Special Operations Forces are ill-suited. Conversely, Special Operations Forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct foreign internal defense, strategic reconnaissance, and specific counterterrorism missions typically beyond the capabilities of conventional units. Both conventional and Special Operations Forces are needed as part of the comprehensive approach necessary to defeat organizations such as the al Qaeda network. One of the positive developments we have seen in Iraq is an increasing sophistication in the ability of our conventional forces to work closely with Special Operations Forces to synchronize efforts and achieve a greater effect. Conventional and Special Operation Force capabilities continue to mature; which has created substantially more cooperation and synergy and improved capacity.

Question. Are MNF-I commanders now attempting to accomplish this?

Answer. During my time as MNC-I Commander, one of our greatest successes was the synchronization and interaction of conventional and Special Operations Forces. Conventional force commanders in Iraq continually adapted to accomplish their missions in diverse and complex local environments. Some of the tasks that they undertook, such as partnering with local Iraqi security forces, resembled missions historically associated with Special Forces. However, these efforts complement rather than duplicate the work done by Special Operations Forces. Similarly, Special Operations Force commanders recognize that their missions must complement the efforts of conventional force commanders who are responsible for maintaining security in the areas in which Special Operations Forces conduct missions. Our gains in effectiveness have come not from merging the two different types of units, but from increasing the coordination and synchronization of their efforts.

Question. Has DOD provided the resources to acquire the equipment and intelligence dissemination support to enable Army and Marine Corps ground forces to adopt or adapt these tactics, techniques, and procedures?

Answer. A critical enabler for the success of coalition operations in Iraq, particularly as we have drawn back down from surge force levels, has been a robust intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) posture. ISR assets have increased operational effectiveness and improved force protection capabilities. Platforms such as the armed Predator have also enabled precision targeting, which allows the elimination of threats, such as an enemy indirect fire team, while avoiding civilian casualties and damage to property. But this must be a continuous and dynamic process. The enemy will adapt and we must continue to adapt.

MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS

Question. Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi security forces need to be changed in any way? If so, what would you recommend?

Answer. The current military transition teams, composed of 10–15 personnel, do not require any significant changes, as they have proven to be highly successful during major operations across the battlefield. A team’s composition is the result of battlefield assessments, commander’s recommendations, and feedback from teams themselves. Recently, the Iraq Assistance Group, in conjunction with the Multi-National Division Commanders and division-level Transition Team chiefs, reviewed all transition team manning and requirements. This allowed Human Resources Command to modify the rank and specialty of selected positions within Transition Teams. This provided greater flexibility for the Army to assign team members who are qualified to coach, teach, and mentor Iraqi security forces.

The Iraqi Army will continue to increase in size over the next year and a half; however, this does not generate a need to increase the number of external Transition Teams. As Coalition Forces move toward operational overwatch, fewer forces will be involved in direct conflict, allowing more focus on the training and prepara-
tion of Iraqi forces. Coalition Forces will gradually shift to operational overwatch as threat levels decrease, more ISF units achieve ORA level one status, and Iraq moves towards sustainable security.

In the short-term, MNC–I remains focused on security and stability operations, using a combination of internal and external Transition Teams, in conjunction with aggressive coalition partnering, to maintain current gains and continue to build towards Iraqi security autonomy. MNF–I and MNC–I continue to assess the optimal size and role of transition teams and the adjustments required to the Coalition Brigade and Division force structure for the future. Teams will likely remain 10–15 man elements. Coalition units will frequently augment teams based on operational need.

The size, structure, and operating procedures of Police Transition Teams (PTTs) are sufficient. PTTs have a core element of 11–16 individuals, though BCT commanders frequently augment the team based on their specific needs. The size of the PTTs allows partnering with Coalition units, which fosters continual improvement of the Iraqi Police Service.

The total number of personnel serving on PTTs is not sufficient. Because of manning levels, coalition forces currently have 252 Police Transition Teams in the 9 Provinces that have not yet transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control. This is only 83 percent of the 305 total PTTs required to provide coverage to all Police districts and stations within those provinces.

Question. What is your view of the potential transition of this mission to contractors?

Answer. I support the DOD policy that prohibits contractors from serving in roles in which they are an integrated part of a combat force and from direct participation in offensive combat operations. In order to be effective in developing ISF capability, Transition Teams serve with Iraqi forces in day-to-day operations as advisors and trainers. This constant presence with ISF units provides a link to Coalition enablers and allows the ISF to learn by observing our fine officers and noncommissioned officers in action on the battlefield everyday. Some contracted personnel play a properly limited but valuable role in Iraq by serving as advisors to Transition Team leaders on issues such as military doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Question. What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty, to include dissemination of “lessons learned” to incoming teams?

Answer. Prior to serving as advisors to Iraqi security forces, Army and Marine Corps teams undergo extensive training regarding cultural awareness, advisor skills, ground maneuver tactics, individual and crew served weapons, foreign weapons, fire support, logistics, intelligence, and communications. Externally sourced Army teams attend training at Fort Riley, KS and then Camp Beuhring, Kuwait, while Marine teams train at Twentynine Palms, CA. Internally sourced Army teams conduct training at home station with their Brigade Combat Team and participate in training exercises to include Combat Training Center rotations and Mission Readiness Exercises. All teams, regardless of sourcing, attend training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq, before conducting a 10-day transition with outgoing teams.

The mission to train Transition Teams (TTs) is currently supported by over 25 major external agencies, including the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Defense Language Institute, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. Additionally, the IAG runs two very effective programs, the alumni program and the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) program. The alumni program sends current TT members back to Fort Riley during their mid-tour leave to discuss lessons learned and link up with incoming team members. The PDSS program brings every team leader undergoing training at Ft. Riley to Iraq to colocate and operate with the team they will replace for a 7–10 day period. They gain valuable insight into their area of operations and bring lessons learned back to their team’s training program at Fort Riley.
Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?
Answer. I will support aggressive assessment and adjustment to Transition Team training and lessons learned proliferation. It is critical to continue to adjust and improve the critical component of our strategy.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 must be the standard for U.S. and Coalition Forces to adhere to in regards to the handling of detainees at all levels. How we treat detainees reflects upon us as a nation.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2510.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. The FM clearly articulates what is and what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability while at all times ensuring humane treatment. Having one interrogation standard outlined in one document adds clarity.

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes. I agree that the way we treat detainees may affect how our captured U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated. We adhere to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a baseline for treatment, regardless of whether our enemies afford us that treatment.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, mandates compliance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Treating detainees in compliance with the Geneva Conventions is an integral part of counterinsurgency operations.

IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq?
Answer. Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab States, with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991–2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF BSO has assisted Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or materially increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded projects, which were specifically targeted to restart or increase production, range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize SOEs have directly resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled or underemployed workers.

In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of standard business investment management practices to the process of allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories. Coalition personnel also instruct factory managers in business plan preparation, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans.

The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private investment awards to international consortiums—for three cement factories. Two of these deals, which average over $100 million each, were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating employment for
5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern, profitable business model for investors and for Iraq. In combination with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking, budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these are small but positive steps toward market economy development in Iraq.

The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important first step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries. I would seek to encourage further development of these initiatives if confirmed.

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that over 2 million Iraqis have been displaced, of which 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries while some 500,000 have left their homes to find safer areas within Iraq.

What is your assessment of the refugee problem in Iraq? Are more Iraqis returning home?

Answer. Although refugee and displacement issues remain a serious concern, there are indicators that the situation has begun to improve. According to U.S. Agency for International Development reporting, the rate of displacement of Iraqi citizens has been slowing for at least the last 4 months. In addition, some Iraqis (primarily those from ethnically and religiously homogenous areas) are returning to their homes. These returns are motivated by a variety of factors, including: deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, increased restrictions in neighboring countries, tribal reconciliation, and reports of improved security in places of origin. It is encouraging that the Iraqi Government has begun to take a more proactive approach to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the drafting of a national policy on internally displaced persons and a Basic Law for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration.

Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in addressing this issue?

Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraqi security forces should be the military's primary roles, the military can also play a limited role in addressing other concerns associated with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee return.

What the Military Can Do
- Execute humanitarian assistance when asked to do so by the Iraqi Government.
- Liaise with USAID for humanitarian assistance coordination.
- Track IDPs in the AOR in so far as they affect security operations.
- Utilize PRTs/ePRTs as requested to identify and relay IDP-related issues.

What the Military Cannot Do
- Assist IA and ISF with forcibly removing squatters and IDPs.
- Provide security for IDP camps of movements of IDPs.
- Move or clear IDPs from government or private property.

Question. What should the role of the U.S. military be, in your view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their homes occupied by others?

Answer. In addition to the capabilities and limitations discussed above, the U.S. military can continue to assist with key leader engagement on this issue and to help develop the governmental capacity that will be necessary to handle refugee and IDP returns.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations which are valuable to Congress.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to support the audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGIR?

Answer. The reports of the SIGIR provide valuable insights to the Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I supported the activities of the SIGIR as the MNC–I Commander and, if confirmed, I will support them as the commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I).
MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER

**Question.** The Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT V, found that stress and mental health problems increased with each subsequent month of deployment, and that “soldiers on their third or fourth deployment were at significantly higher risk” for mental health problems. These types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post traumatic stress disorder, depression, and other mental health problems.

What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such actions?

**Answer.** The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on what is transpiring with servicemembers’ psychological health and valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation to cross-train Army medics in behavioral health concepts, are already being implemented at the DA level; others, such as the recommendation to authorize the assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed, I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently actionable at the MNF–I level.

**Question.** If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure ongoing mental health assessments of U.S. forces in Iraq?

**Answer.** I would strongly encourage and fully support future MHAT assessments if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) providing full access to information and staff input and feedback as appropriate.

**Question.** Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?

**Answer.** My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments. We must continue to learn and study to ensure the welfare of our soldiers.

Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting servicemembers and their families before servicemembers deploy; this includes tough training at home station that builds camaraderie in units and gives soldiers the confidence that they can accomplish their tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between deployments for troopers to ‘reset’ with their families are also important.

Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater. Medics in theater are already being trained on behavioral health topics so they can assist in identifying soldiers who need help, and Suicide Risk Management Teams have been created to ensure servicemen and women having difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most critically, commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle buddies’ mental health.

**Question.** Do you believe that mental health resources in theater are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers?

**Answer.** My understanding is that MNF–I is currently reassessing the adequacy of mental health resources in theater to ensure soldiers’ needs are met. One possibility being considered is requesting 30 additional behavioral health personnel in theater, including mental health professionals and behavioral health technicians.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

**Question.** If confirmed as Commander, MNF–I, you will be responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual assaults in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

What lessons did you learn while implementing sexual assault training, reporting protocols, and command awareness while serving as Commander, MNC–I that can help improve any of these policies or their implementation in theater?

**Answer.** The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness campaign that reaches every servicemember and that provides integrated response services, including medical care/counseling, victim advocacy, chaplain, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.), legal (prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness liaison), reporting (assault reporting and data collection), and program assessment. I know that such a program must receive a commander’s emphasis to be effective, and I would continue to seek to give it that emphasis if confirmed as the commander of MNF–I.
Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical treatment (including mental health care), and victim support are available in the operational environment of Iraq?

Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq include combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, joint service and civilian population. With regard to the last of these challenges, civilians constitute approximately 50 percent of the force on the ground in Iraq and are critical contributors to mission success. The availability of response services for DOD civilian and contractor personnel should be similar to the services available to servicemembers. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and resource challenges associated with extending program response provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel which should be addressed.

With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in theater to remain cognizant of the welfare of their fellow servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs of difficulty to receive help.

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of sexual assault prevention and response resources currently available in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?

Answer. Sexual assault is a serious crime that adversely impacts the physical and psychological readiness of our combat fighting force in Iraq. In my experience as the MNC–I Commander, I found the sexual assault and response program and resourcing to be robust. However, if confirmed as the MNF–I Commander, I would continue to assess our efforts in this area to ensure we continue meeting the needs of our deployed servicemembers and civilians. It is important for a commander to constantly monitor organizational climate and to foster the development of a culture that is intolerant of sexual assault.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, MNF–I?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

1. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, each of you have noted in different places and times that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current threat is the intercommunal fight over power. What do you mean by the communal fight over power?

General Odierno. In my opinion, the #1 threat to Iraq is the communal struggle for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) with malign outside influences (predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying to effect the outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other
Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the greatest threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security forces (ISF) to increasingly take the lead against these challenges without creating significant risks to short and long-sustainable security.

There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political, and diplomatic realms. Gains made in security will be easier to preserve in an environment in which people have ready access to essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to grow in capability and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face challenges from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory. Iraq’s Arab neighbors must do more to reach out and engage Iraq in a positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek to partner with the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these diplomatic and political challenges.

2. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, how has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?

General Odierno. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This has played out differently over time, with inter- and later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward it will continue to be a complex problem set. In May 2008, however, security incidents are now at the lowest level we have seen since March 2004.

3. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, what is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control?

General Odierno. The role of coalition forces is to support the elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of arms. It is my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, which must include influence from external entities and we seek to support them in that effort.

4. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Odierno, after frustrations experienced with a top-down strategy to reconciliation and security efforts, the policy shifted to more of a bottom-up approach, as evidenced by the success of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Anbar Province and elsewhere. Recently the Maliki Government has asserted its influence by lashing out against armed militia groups both in the south and around Baghdad, and it is the opinion of some that the ISF are steadily improving their capabilities. In your new position, would you be an advocate of shifting once again to a more top-down approach, rather than the current bottom-up approach to solving power struggle differences, and if so, when should such a shift take place?

General Odierno. The current struggle in Iraq is complex, dynamic, and waged by ethno-sectarian groups, extremist elements, and criminal gangs from the local level to the national. Any strategy that the coalition would pursue in the context of this struggle must therefore include all elements of national power in order to be successful, with a particular emphasis applied to reconciliation and security efforts in support of political objectives. Key to future reconciliation and legitimacy of the government is the successful conduct of fair and transparent Provincial Elections in late 2008. Military leaders at all levels will continue to coach, mentor, and dialogue with associated Iraqi counterparts in the ISFs and civilian sectors, in cooperation with civilian members of the interagency community. Civilian personnel, either working as member of Provincial Reconstruction Teams or as part of military organizations, are an integral part of this strategy. While greater progress has been realized at the local and provincial level, MNF-I and the American Embassy-Baghdad (AMEMB-Baghdad) have observed progress within ministerial agencies as well. For example, the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed key budget and provincial
powers legislation in February 2008, and the Iraqi Government has pledged significant funding to advance reconstruction both nationwide, and to specifically target civil capacity for Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul. If confirmed, conditions on the ground after I assume my new position will dictate the most prudent approach; and this approach will be comprehensive in nature. It would be premature for me to advocate either a top down or bottom up approach uniformly throughout Iraq.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

LENGTH OF COMBAT TOURS

5. Senator Pryor, Lieutenant General Odierno, what is your opinion of legislation dictating the length of combat tours for the Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard to 365 days, and 210 days for the Marine Corps and Marine Reserve?

General Odierno. I believe that tours longer than 365 days for the Army and 210 days for the Marine Corps are difficult for soldiers, marines, and their families. We should, whenever possible, ensure tour lengths are not longer. However, flexibility is important in order to address emergency situations, and react quickly to problems around the world, and I do not believe this should be legislated.

6. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, what effect does this have on a commander’s ability to employ combat power?

General Odierno. Under emergency conditions this could prevent changes to strategy or employment of additional forces as conditions on the ground dictate. I do not believe it would be prudent to limit the flexibility to react to operational and strategic changes on the ground.

7. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, can you give me an example of how such legislation could have an adverse effect on operations?

General Odierno. Had legislation as stated in question 5 been in place in 2007 we would not have been able to sustain the surge in order to set conditions to curtail the sectarian violence in Iraq, thus allowing the Iraq Government and ISFs to grow in capacity and capability while protecting and securing the people of Iraq. Once the brigades of the surge were employed we had the flexibility to extend the tours to 15 months verse 12 months, which allowed us to establish the conditions on the ground to deliberately and successfully sustain progress and then draw back down to pre-surge levels.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

TRAINING

8. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, recently I was at an event in Maine and afterwards a constituent came up to me and said that he was a former Marine Corps officer and that it took the Marine Corps only 10 weeks to transform him from a Bates College graduate to a 2nd Lieutenant. He asked me why it is taking so long for the Iraqis to become trained. Why is it taking so long to get the Iraqis trained to be an effective, cohesive force?

General Odierno. The strategic transition from a coalition-led counterinsurgency to an Iraqi-led counterinsurgency requires ISFs capable of assuming greater responsibility from coalition forces. No nation or coalition of nations has ever attempted to rebuild the entire security apparatus of a sovereign country, on as large a scale, in a shorter time, and in more difficult security conditions. Nonetheless, to understand why it takes so long to get the Iraqis trained to be an effective, cohesive force, one needs perspective on the magnitude of the problem. In calendar year 2007, the United States Army grew by approximately 11,600 soldiers, or 2.3 percent. The Iraqi Army grew by over 60,600 soldiers, or 61 percent—while at war and while the government and other institutions that support it were still forming. By comparison, the Iraqi-equivalent growth percentage of 61 percent applied to the United States Army in 2007 would result in our Army growing by over 310,000 soldiers in 1 year.
Such growth would challenge the United States Army’s mature institutional processes and force management systems in peacetime. The fact the Iraqis have rapidly grown their security forces while fighting a determined and ruthless enemy—and establishing nascent ministerial and institutional capacity to generate and replenish those forces—is even more remarkable. As evidenced in Basrah, Sadr City, and Mosul, the ISFs are making progress and demonstrating real capability. However, much work remains to be done, particularly in the area of providing the ISFs with key enabling capabilities such as aviation, intelligence, logistics, and command and control.

**TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ**

9. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, I continue to be concerned about the negative effects of repeated and extended deployments to Iraq on our soldiers and marines. The surge in U.S. forces during the last year increased the Army’s presence in Iraq to 20 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level of 15. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, has said, “Today’s Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.” When do you foresee the ISF will be ready to step up in significant numbers so that you will be able to reduce your force level requirements to fewer than 15 BCTs?

General Odierno. The ISF is already stepping up in significant numbers and enabling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have recently made significant security progress in Iraq, as the level of security incidents for the past month is the lowest it has been for more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even as three BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in coalition facilities by over 3,500 detainees, and a continuing decline will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even as we have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the ISFs, as well as the Iraqi Government’s determination in meeting security challenges throughout Iraq.

Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size and capability. In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior have generated 51 new combat battalions, an increase of over 30 percent. This intensive effort to increase ISF numbers involved recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new po-
lice and soldiers. Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow even further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq.

As important as the ISF’s growth in size is its growth in capability. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100—a 15-percent increase since January 2007. Ongoing ISF operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical competence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major operations throughout the country. The enablers that coalition forces provide are in line with expectations and generally involve capabilities that take more time to build (i.e., close air support capability). The performance of many units has been solid, and some formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely capable.

Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the major conditions that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition forces in Iraq while sustaining our security gains. If confirmed I will evaluate the consolidation this summer, to see if conditions on the ground will be such that I will be able to make a recommendation for some further reductions. Beyond the initial decision on post-surge force levels, we will continually assess security conditions in Iraq and seek to identify further possible force withdrawals.

IRAQ SECURITY FORCES

10. Senator COLLINS. Lieutenant General Odierno, there are roughly 90,000 mostly Sunni fighters that are now part of the so-called “awakening movements,” or “SOI,” that are aligned with the United States and defending their home villages against both al Qaeda in Iraq and Shiite militias. This has been a very positive development in improving the security situation in Sunni parts of Iraq. The next step is to translate that success into true integration at the national level. According to the White House, the Government of Iraq and coalition forces have agreed that 20 to 30 percent of these forces will be incorporated into the ISF, and the rest will be found jobs in the public or private sector. Some reports, however, indicate the Maliki Government is resistant to further integration of these forces, fearing that incorporating many are veterans of Saddam Hussein’s army and Republican Guard, incorporating these fighters will result in a Sunni-led coup. Do you agree with this assessment?

General ODIERNO. No, I think this is an inaccurate assessment. It is important that we work with the GOI to reduce illiteracy and develop job training programs to improve workers skills. Therefore we have increase vocational training targeted at the requirements for needed skills throughout Iraq. Many training programs do evolve into jobs for many of the students as some are immediately hired by contractors or public works projects that they trained on.

Though the “Awakening Movement” did inspire the anti-al Qaeda movement, of which some elements have been formed into formal “SOI” programs, the two are not the same. It is an important distinction as we have the formal “SOI” who are working with the coalition forces and in full support of the Government of Iraq—some still on U.S. funded contracts and some either already transitioned to formal ISF jobs or some on their way to being formally integrated into the security apparatus. Then we have many other Sunni and Shia, as noted, who are not formally part of the “SOI”-funded programs but still are aligned in support of the larger “Awakening” movement—has been emanating from all sects of Iraqi society. We’re seeing both Sunni and, as of late, Shia elements express interest in joining forces with the Government of Iraq in some capacity to assist in taking control of the situation in Iraq’s cities and provinces. So this new phase of the overall movement, which is cross-sectarian in composition, is now referred to in Iraq as “Isnad”—or support—to denote the intention of the members of this movement to operate totally in support of the Government of Iraq to restore stability.

Incorporating these “SOI” fighters into the ISFs will not lead to a Sunni-led coup.” When we approved this program when I was the Commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq, there was a concern that some of these “SOI,” who had previously supported and/or participated in armed conflict against the then nascent Government of Iraq and coalition forces, might revert back to their prior insurgent identities and use their new-found influence with the Government of Iraq Security Forces to attempt some type of armed rebellion. This was a known and calculated risk taken by myself, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker when we first decided to pur-
sue this endeavor. One of the key reasons we initially agreed to pursue the “SOI” was to fill a void as we eliminated former safe havens and sanctuaries. They assisted in forming neighborhood watch elements that would provide CF and ISF intelligence to help sustain our gains. We soon realized that many wanted to participate once again and be included in the future of Iraq. Some reasons for their state of exclusion were due to in part to sectarian bias and a certain level of corruption on the part of some Iraqi bureaucrats. Yet another reason for that was self-imposed on themselves by their voluntary boycott of the 2005 elections. Since then, the Sunni population writ large has come to see their decision to boycott the election—shaped largely by corrupt religious political parties and intimidation—was a mistake. The reconciliation process and the existence of the “SOI” program is an example of their change in mindset and they have continued to demonstrate their commitment to the Government of Iraq as an institution and to the rule of law. There is a highly scrutinized vetting process conducted by CF which includes the collection of biometrics and spans all ministries in the Government of Iraq before these “SOI” can be accepted into formal Iraqi Government positions. This vetting process was approved by Prime Minister Maliki’s and one which has been described as slow, but prudent to ensure the integrity of the Iraqi Governmental services and of each member of the “SOI” integrated into Government posts. Most recently, as you may know, an 11-member delegation of Iraqi tribal and governmental leaders—to include Sheikh Ahmad Albu Risha of the Anbar-based Sahawa al Iraq movement and political party—travelled to Washington recently on their second State Department-sponsored trip in 7 months. During their trip they held a number of meetings with senior U.S. officials to include audience with the President, the National Security Council, Senators and Congressmen. The delegation was comprised of both Sunni and Shia Iraqi leaders whom reaffirmed their support for improved Iraqi governance, rule of law, and a view toward creating an environment in Iraq focused on improved political participation. I believe these signs are encouraging; that the motives and intentions of the “SOI” and all those supporting these Sheikhs and Iraqi leaders who are leading the political outreach on behalf of their Iraqi constituencies will continue to pursue their political objectives via engagement with Government of Iraq leaders. With continued U.S. support both to the Government of Iraq, to the “SOI” program, and to the overall national reconciliation efforts which is ongoing, combined with the demonstrated goodwill on the part of the coalition, Government and Iraqi Awakening leaders, there is little evidence to suggest the movement—or those former disenfranchised elements of Iraqi society, will attempt to achieve its political objectives via the use of force.

11. Senator COLLENS. Lieutenant General Odierno, what happens to those Sunni fighters who are not integrated into the ISF, but cannot find jobs?

General ODIERNO. Only 25 percent of the SOI want to be integrated into the ISF. Approximately 50 percent of the SOI do not want to be integrated into the ISF and another 25 percent cannot be integrated into the ISF because they are physically or mentally unqualified. Therefore, MNC/F in conjunction with the GOI target the SOI who do not make it into the ISF for integration into capacity building programs that provide the transitioning either vocational training in a discipline/skill of their choice or apprentice style, on-the-job training in various disciplines and skills (mostly construction oriented) that meet needs/shortages of the local area with the goal being that once the programs are complete that the local area will absorb some or all of the newly skilled and transitioned SOI into employment.
LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

RESUME OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
- Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
- United States Naval Command and Staff College
- United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
- United States Military Academy - BS - No Major.
- North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects.
- United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategy.

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

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<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>2 Jun 76</td>
<td>Support Platoon Leader, later Firing Platoon Leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>2 Jun 78</td>
<td>Survey Officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1 Aug 80</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1 Dec 86</td>
<td>Student, Field Artillery Advanced Course, Fort Sill, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Feb 92</td>
<td>Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Sep 95</td>
<td>Commander, Service Battery, later A Battery, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 Jul 99</td>
<td>Student, United States Naval Command and Staff Course, Newport, RI</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Nov 02</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>1 Jan 05</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander, 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, CA (relocated to Fort Lewis, WA)</td>
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<td>Commander, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
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From
Jun 97 .......  Aug 98 ....
Aug 98 .......  Jul 99 .....  Chief of Staff, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 99 .......  Jul 01 .....  Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and
    Seventh Army, Germany to include duty as Deputy Commanding General for Ground Oper-
    ations, Task Force Hawk, Operation Allied Force, Albania
Oct 01 ......  Aug 04 .....  Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
    United States Army, Washington, DC
Oct 04 ......  May 06 .....  Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX and Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, Iraq
May 06 ......  Dec 06 .....  Special Assistant to Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC
Dec 06 ......  Feb 08 .....  Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III
    Corps
Feb 08 ......  Present .....  Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX

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<td>Sep 86–Jun 89</td>
<td>Captain/Major</td>
<td>Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 04–May 06</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 06–Feb 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III Corps.</td>
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Summary of joint assignments

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<td>Captain/Major</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 06–Feb 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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U.S. decorations and badges:
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal
- Army Achievement Medal
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAphICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) Raymond T. Odierno.

2. Position to which nominated: Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.


4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 8 September 1954; Dover, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name is Burkarth).


8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

American Legion (Member)
Association of the United States Army (Member)
4th Infantry Division Association (Member)
8th Field Artillery Regimental Affiliation (Member)
9th Infantry Regiment Association (Member)
1st Cavalry Division Association (Member)

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.
12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
   Yes, I do.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
   Yes, I do.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO.

This 30th day of April, 2008.

[The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.]
TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Breon N. Wells, receptionist.

Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha.

Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J. Lazarzki, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the committee to consider a list of 142 pending military nominations. All of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time.

Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations?

Senator WARNER. I so move.

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Second.

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]

Opposed, nays. [No response.]

The ayes have it. The motion carries.

Thank you. [Pause.]

Let me correct the record. I read 142 pending nominations. The correct number is 144 pending nominations, and if there's no objection, that will be the action of the committee. I think everybody who voted here before is still here.

Senator WARNER. Without objection.

Chairman LEVIN. Without objection, we will correct the record in that way.

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON MAY 22, 2008.

1. RADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN to be Vice Admiral and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks, N6, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1286).
2. In the Navy Reserve there are three appointments to the grade of rear admiral (list begins with Julius S. Caesar) (Reference No. 1343).
3. LTG Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, to be Lieutenant General and Director, Joint Staff (Reference No. 1352).
5. RADM Michael C. Vitale, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, Navy Installations Command (Reference No. 1355).
6. RADM(lh) Raymond E. Berube, USN, to be Rear Admiral (Reference No. 1432).
7. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (list begins with Richard R. Jeffries) (Reference No. 1433).
8. In the Air Force, there are five appointments to the grade of Colonel (list begins with Lonnie B. Barker) (Reference No. 1465).
10. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower half) (list begins with David F. Baucom) (Reference No. 1518).
11. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower half) (list begins with David C. Johnson) (Reference No. 1519).
12. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower half) (list begins with Donald E. Gaddis) (Reference No. 1520).
13. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower half) (list begins with Michael H. Anderson) (Reference No. 1521).
15. Capt. William E. Leigher, USN, to be Rear Admiral (lower half) (Reference No. 1524).
16. MG Mark D. Shackelford, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (Reference No. 1565).
17. BG John F. Mulholland, Jr., USA, to be Lieutenant General and Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Reference No. 1567).
18. MG Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and Commander, Third Air Forces in Europe (Reference No. 1590).
19. MG Charles E. Stenner, Jr., USAFR, to be Lieutenant General and Chief of Air Force Reserve (Reference No. 1600).
20. RADM William E. Gortney, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, Fifth Fleet (Reference No. 1601). 
21. VADM Melvin G. Williams, Jr., USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, Second Fleet (Reference No. 1602). 
22. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major (Cheryl Amyx) (Reference No. 1603). 
23. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major (Deborah K. Sirratt) (Reference No. 1604). 
24. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of Major (list begins with Mark A. Cannon) (Reference No. 1605). 
25. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel (list begins with Gene Kahn) (Reference No. 1606). 
26. In the Army, there are seven appointments to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel and below (list begins with Lozay Foots III) (Reference No. 1607). 
27. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel and below (list begins with Phillip J. Caravella) (Reference No. 1608). 
28. RADM David J. Dorsett, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Director of Naval Intelligence, N2, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1612). 
29. In the Navy, there are 21 appointments to the grade of Commander and below (list begins with Stanley A. Okoro) (Reference No. 1613). 
30. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of Colonel (list begins with Eric L. Bloomfield) (Reference No. 1615). 
31. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of Colonel (Jimmy D. Swanson) (Reference No. 1616). 
32. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of Colonel (Ronald J. Sheldon) (Reference No. 1617). 
33. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of Lieutenant Commander (Robert S. McMaster) (Reference No. 1618). 
34. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of Lieutenant Commander (Christopher S. Kaplafka) (Reference No. 1619). 
35. In the Army Reserve, there are 26 appointments to the grade of Major General and below (first name is Stephen E. Bogle) (Reference No. 1639). 
36. LTG Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, to be General and Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Reference No. 1642). 
37. RADM(lh) Kevin M. McCoy, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (Reference No. 1657). 
39. RADM Peter H. Daly, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (Reference No. 1659). 
40. In the Army, there are 11 appointments to the grade of Major (list begins with Brian M. Boltdt) (Reference No. 1665). 
41. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of Major (list begins with Mary J. Bernheim) (Reference No. 1670). 
42. In the Air Force, there are eight appointments to the grade of Colonel and below (list begins with James E. Ostrander) (Reference No. 1671). 
43. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major (James K. McNeely) (Reference No. 1672). 
44. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of Lieutenant Commander (David R. Eggleston) (Reference No. 1673). 
45. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain and below (list begins with Katherine A. Isgrig) (Reference No. 1674). 
46. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain and below (list begins with Robert D. Younger) (Reference No. 1675). Total: 144. 
Whereupon, at 10:36 a.m., the committee adjourned.
NOMINATIONS OF HON. NELSON M. FORD TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY; JOSEPH A. BENKERT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; SEAN J. STACKLEY TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; AND FREDERICK S. CELEC TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Warner, Thune, and Martinez.

Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Benjamin L. Rubin.

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Peg Gustafson, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Samuel Zega, assistant to Senator Warner; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Jason
Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; David Brown, John L. Goetchius, and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

Today, the committee considers the nominations of Nelson Ford to be Under Secretary of the Army, Joseph Benkert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, Fred Celec to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Sean Stackley to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition.

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials put in every day. We appreciate the sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve their country. We also know that they will not be alone in making those sacrifices. So, we thank in advance the family members of our nominees for the support and the assistance that all those family members will be needing to provide, and I know will be willingly providing.

Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to make important contributions to our national defense.

If confirmed, Mr. Ford will take over as Under Secretary of the Army at a time when our soldiers and equipment are worn out and our Army families are stressed by extended and repeated deployments. The next Under Secretary has a critical role to play in restoring the readiness of the force and ensuring that our Army has the strategic depth needed to face the challenges of the decade ahead. In addition, section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 gives the Under Secretary a new role as the Chief Management Officer of the Army. Now, what that means is that the next Under Secretary will also be expected to play a leading role in addressing longstanding deficiencies in the Army's business systems and management practices.

If confirmed, Mr. Benkert will be the first person to serve in the new position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. In that capacity, he will be responsible for coalition affairs, technology security policy, security cooperation, counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and countering global threats, detainee affairs, and prisoner of war/missing-in-action issues. Any one of those issues—detainee affairs, for example—would appear to be a full-time job. Mr. Benkert is currently serving as Acting Assistant Secretary, and we look forward to his assessment of the responsibilities of the new position and how he intends to carry them out.

The position to which Mr. Celec has been nominated, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, has been vacant for 2 years. This longstanding vacancy was cited by General Larry Welch, in his report on Nuclear Weapons Security, as emblematic of the inattention of DOD to nuclear security and command-and-control. This neglect, as reported earlier this month by Admiral Kirkland Donald, has resulted in inattention to detail, lack of discipline, and a degradation of authority, technical competence, and standards of excellence in
the handling of our nuclear weapons. We look forward to Mr. Celec’s thoughts on how to address these problems, along with the other important issues in his portfolio, which will include chemical-weapons destruction and chemical and biological defense programs.

Finally, Mr. Stackley, if confirmed, will take over as the senior acquisition executive with the Department of the Navy at a time when the major defense acquisition programs of the DOD are overrunning their budgets by an aggregate total of $295 billion. Less than a year ago, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Navy had experienced a cumulative cost growth of almost $5 billion on just 41 ships. According to the GAO, the Navy pushed programs forward, “without a stable design and without realistic cost estimates, resulting in higher costs, schedule delays, and quality programs.” If anyone is prepared to answer these problems, it should be Mr. Stackley, who has served our committee as the principal Republican staffer responsible for overseeing Navy and Marine Corps programs for more than 2 years. The Senate Armed Services Committee has benefited tremendously from the knowledge and the experience that Mr. Stackley brings to bear on Navy and Marine Corps programs and on acquisition programs generally. Should he be confirmed, our loss will be the Navy’s gain.

These are extremely important positions. They merit the attention that we will be giving them today.

Senator Warner.
form to regain a place in the civilian community and trying to acquire the education to do their jobs. You’ll hopefully forgive me for that.

But, I wish each of you well. Again, I look back on my period there as one of the most exciting in my life. I often tell the story—there was an old fellow there—this is 1969—who wore a green eyeshade, and he actually came there with Jim Forrestal when he was in the comptroller’s office. We all liked him. He used to wander around the hall and kibbitz with us about the “good old days,” as he said in those days. He said, “You know, you’d better always remember, you have a front row seat on the greatest and most important show on Earth.” That, you have, because it is the men and women in uniform, and their families, that are the guardians of the freedoms we have today. I know each of you, in your respective responsibilities, will ensure that they can do that as best they can.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin.

I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families. I have been advised that all of them claim the Commonwealth of Virginia as their home State, and are looking to me to vouch for their qualifications. I am prepared to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Each of these nominees has served, or is currently serving, with distinction in the Department of Defense (DOD). We are fortunate that they are willing to assume the duties of these vitally important positions at such a challenging time.

Mr. Ford, you have worked your way up since 2002 from the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller in 2005, and, since December 2007, as Acting Under Secretary of the Army. Secretary Geren has given you his highest recommendation, which counts greatly in your favor.

The Army’s senior leaders have stated that the Army is stressed and out of balance, but not broken. I hope you will be able to provide us today with current information about how the Army is ensuring that its combat units are fully trained, manned, and ready for their missions, and that Army families are receiving the support they need and deserve.

Mr. Celec, you are returning to the office you previously served in as the Deputy Assistant for Nuclear Matters from 1996 through 2003. With your experience there, and for 21 years before that in the Air Force, I anticipate you will be greatly relied on in the Department’s further responses to the report of Admiral Donald and in working with Dr. Schlesinger’s task force in identifying the Department’s nuclear weapons policies and safeguards.

Mr. Benkert and Mr. Stackley you have similar backgrounds—both distinguished graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy and both having many accomplishments as Navy career officers.

Mr. Benkert, if you are confirmed, you will be the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs with a complex portfolio of responsibilities, including building international, interagency, and partner capabilities, overseeing DOD policies for coalition and multinational operations, counternarcotics and counter-proliferation policies, and detainee affairs—among others. You have been working in this arena for several years, and you are clearly well qualified.

We look forward to hearing your assessment of the challenges we face in this area and your views on what our strategy and policy toward them should be.

Mr. Stackley, it is always a pleasure to see members of the committee’s professional staff selected for nomination to positions of great responsibility in the Department. You joined the committee in 2005 and, in the great tradition of this committee, have worked closely with Creighton Greene, Peter Levine, and other counterparts in a collegial and bipartisan way in order to ensure appropriate oversight, support, and when necessary, scrutiny of the Department’s programs. I thank you and your family for the excellent service you have given us.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Let me now ask the standard questions of each of our nominees. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? [All four witnesses answered in the negative.]

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you.

As I call upon each of you for your opening statement, we’d be delighted if you would introduce any members of your family that might be with you.

Secretary Ford?

STATEMENT OF HON. NELSON M. FORD, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. FORD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee, it is both an honor and a privilege to be here this morning as the President’s nominee for the Under Secretary of the Army. I want to thank Secretary Gates and Secretary Geren for their confidence in me, and for the Army’s staff in their help in preparing for this hearing.

I’d like to introduce my wife, Cecilia, who’s behind me. She has been my partner and my number-one supporter during our many years together. She recently retired after 35 years as a Federal attorney, mostly with the Department of Health and Human Services. Her service continues as a strong supporter of our two sons on Active Duty. Aidan, our oldest, is a doctor in the Air Force, and Alex, who will graduate next month from Army Special Forces training, spent a year in Afghanistan with the 82nd Airborne. Their service is a great inspiration to me.

I expect that my daughter, Mary, who is a senior at the University of Virginia and interested in medicine and public health, will follow them into public service, but I haven’t had any luck, so far, convincing her to join the Navy. [Laughter.]
The soldiers of our Army are a precious gift to the Nation. I am in awe of the soldiers’ commitment and the sacrifice of Army families who demonstrate their resilience in communities across the Nation and around the world. It has been humbling to help lead such a tremendous organization over the past 3 years, and I look forward to continuing my contribution as the Under Secretary of the Army.

In this era of persistent conflict, during the 6th year of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is stretching to meet our assigned tasks. We are balancing the requirements of today’s deployments with needed investments in new capabilities to ensure our future security.

Our soldiers and our Nation are counting on us to provide the direction and resources needed for the Army to succeed in its mission.

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be working on the challenges facing the Army today. If confirmed, I will work diligently to serve the Nation and the Army to the best of my ability.

Finally, I would like to thank the committee for all it has done for the men and women, the soldiers and families of our Army. Your generous support and unwavering commitment to the Army’s needs has been instrumental to our success. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staff in the months ahead. I believe that partnership and collaboration will be crucial to keeping the Army strong.

I am happy to take your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Secretary Ford.

Mr. Benkert?

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. BENKERT, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. BENKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today for this confirmation hearing. It is a great privilege and an honor to appear before you as the President’s nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs and, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the first nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.

I’d like to thank the President for nominating me for this position, and Secretary Gates for his confidence and support. I’d also like to thank the committee for what you’ve done, and continue to do, to support our Armed Forces, and, in particular, the men and women of our Armed Forces.

Finally, I’d like to thank my family for their support as I pursue continued public service. With me this morning, seated behind me—are my wife, Gail—we’ve been married for 26 years through a career in the Navy, as well as public service following that—her mother, Jean Deveure, and my son, Stephen.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee, the United States Senate, and your colleagues in the House of Representatives, to advance the security of the United States.

The issues within the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs can only be addressed by working
closely together with Congress. I hope, if confirmed, to be able to work constructively with the committee to meet the many challenges facing us.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Benkert.

Mr. Stackley?

STATEMENT OF SEAN J. STACKLEY, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION

Mr. STACKLEY. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of the committee, thank you for your time and for the efforts of the committee in preparing this hearing today. I'm greatly honored that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy have put forth my nomination, providing this opportunity to appear before you today.

I would like to take a moment to introduce my wife and three of my four children who are joining me here today. My wife, Terry, has been keeping me out of trouble for the past 28 years. My oldest daughter, Erin, joins me—she currently works for Congressman “Bob” Goodlatte in the House of Representatives; my son, Scott, and daughter, Maura.

It has been my utmost privilege to serve the Senate Armed Services Committee these past few years. During this time, I've had the opportunity to work with, and learn from, the distinguished members of the committee, as well as my dedicated, very professional staff colleagues. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee in helping to resolve the challenges before the acquisition community in the Department of the Navy.

Before coming to the committee, I had the privilege of fulfilling a career in the Navy. When I consider the prospects of departing the committee to return to the Department, I'm equally humbled by, and focused on, this next opportunity to serve our sailors and marines, to provide them with the ships and aircraft, the systems and equipment that they require to train and deploy, to succeed in their missions, and to return home safely.

If confirmed, I will work, with the best of my ability, to fulfill my duties and execute responsible leadership for research, development, and acquisition matters in the Department of the Navy.

Again, I thank you for your time and look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Celec?

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK S. CELEC, TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Mr. CELEC. Thank you, sir.

Senator Levin, Senator Warner, and members of the committee, I am honored to be here today, and appreciate your personal time at this critical point in your legislative calendar. I also wish to thank the President for having sufficient faith in me to nominate me for this important position.
I have a few remarks, but, before I make them, I’d like to introduce my family—my wife of 47 years, Irene, who’s behind me here; my daughter, Christine Gold, and her husband, Jonathan; their children and two of my four grandchildren, Adam and Hannah; and my son, Ken.

Senators, if I am confirmed, I am already aware of several critical issues that I will have to address, simply from following the national news. I’m sure there are others that I’m not aware of that need resolving.

Perhaps the most urgent is restoring the culture for nuclear safety and security in the Air Force. That culture was very much a part of the Air Force I served in for 21 years, and I will work hard to ensure its restoration.

Another is supporting the congressionally mandated commission on our strategic posture, with the expectation that they will make recommendations that will help obtain bipartisan support for the future of our nuclear enterprise.

Yet another is ensuring, to the best of our ability, that we destroy our chemical munitions as rapidly as possible and attempt to meet the treaty-mandated 2012 date for completion.

Finally, there are issues surrounding the way ahead for the entire nuclear enterprise as systems continue to age, and many are approaching their end of useful service life.

If confirmed, I will work to get each of these issues on track toward resolution. But, I recognize that I will need the support and encouragement from both the administration and Congress in order to be successful. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with you and your staffs as we seek to resolve these difficult, but strategically important, issues of national security.

This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, sir. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Again, thanks to all of your family, whether they’re here or whether they’re unable to be here.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I put my questions into the record and, thus, let them reply to them that way?

Again, forgive me. We’re going to announce the GI Bill, which is going to help the very men and women, after they leave the service, that you’re working with.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. The questions will be asked, for the record, and our witnesses will be asked to promptly answer the questions of Senator Warner or other Senators who may not be here; some cases, those of us who are able to be here.

Secretary Ford, let me start with you. The Army has three major modernization initiatives that are going to shape the force over the next several years, and perhaps over the next several generations. Those are growing the Army’s end strength, restructuring units to the modular design, and transformation to the Future Combat System (FCS). All three have very expensive investment implications for the Army’s current and future budget. However, it’s uncertain that the Army will be able to afford all three modernization initiatives at the same time. Could you give us your thoughts on that,
as to the affordability of these initiatives within the current and projected Army budgets?

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We believe that we do have enough financial wherewithal to complete all three initiatives. Of course, the FCS program will not reach its full acquisition until after the end of the upcoming budget cycle, and so, the out-year fiscal guidance for that system hasn't yet been given. But, over the next 6 years, out through fiscal year 2015, we think that we're able to afford all three programs, in balance, to keep the Army a balanced force, going forward. Our budget planning will reflect that when it's submitted to Congress.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, ongoing operations supporting the global war on terror put a huge amount of wear and tear on Army equipment throughout the force. So, now there's going to be a real challenge to reset the force, not only as current operations continue, but for as many as 3 to 5 years after they conclude. Could you give us your view, Secretary Ford, as to whether the Army's current equipment reset program meets the requirements of the global war on terror as well as the requirements for changing to a modular force?

Mr. FORD. The plans that we've had over the last several years to reset the Army have been largely based on supplemental funding, and it's been our position that we will require substantial supplemental funding, on the order of $15 to $17 billion a year, for several years after the deployments diminish. Of course, we need that amount of money every year, with the deployments at the current rate, so it's about a $17-billion-a-year investment that's required to sustain the wear and tear on the equipment, based on current deployment levels.

We think that those are appropriate expenses to be included in the supplemental, and we look forward to working with Congress to help Congress understand why those are valuable and important expenses to be appropriated.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild-and-repair requirements for the reset?

Mr. FORD. Our depots are running at full capacity, but not at maximum capacity. If there was more money, we could run three shifts, or two long shifts each day, 6 days a week, with downtime on the weekends for equipment maintenance. But, they are running at very full capacity, and they are running commensurate with the amount of funds that we have available to support them. The labor hours are up almost 100 percent over the predeployment period.

Chairman LEVIN. Would you give us, for the record, what maximum capacity could produce and what its cost would be?

Mr. FORD. We can certainly do that, yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Army's maintenance depots have surged to more than double their output since 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They have done this by increasing their workforce (both contract and Federal employees), working multiple shifts and increased overtime, and becoming more efficient (through numerous efficiencies derived from Lean Six Sigma and other management initiatives). We can surge still further if Army requirements so dictate—around half of our fiscal year 2008 execution level of 27 million direct labor
hours, or a little over 40 million direct labor hours total—with our current physical infrastructure. To do so, we would require ample time to hire and train additional personnel (6 to 9 months), and to obtain long lead repair parts to support increased production (up to 18 months for some systems such as the Bradley and M1 Abrams).

We currently have personnel plans and long lead items in the supply pipeline to continue production at planned levels through fiscal year 2009. As OIF/OEF requirements change beyond fiscal year 2009, our personnel resourcing and long lead item planning will adjust accordingly. Because our depots are Army Working Capital Fund industrial organizations, they are self-sustaining through the rates they charge to customers. Thus, there is no "cost" to surge other than the additional cost of the funded reset programs themselves. The cost of additional funded reset programs would vary depending upon the systems being reset—for example, additional Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems workload would cost much more than additional small arms workload.

Chairman LEVIN. By the way, we'll have a 10-minute round here for the first round, if that's all right. Does that work for you, Senator Martinez?

Secretary Ford, the Army's practice of using supplemental appropriations to fund parts of its annual modernization or routine maintenance costs obscures the real growth in the Army base budget. That's because of supplemental appropriations. We may, in fact, be losing sight of what a trained and ready Army will realistically cost on an annual basis after the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan draw down.

Secretary Ford, give us your views on how supplemental appropriations have been used over the years, and its potential impact, if any, on our ability to estimate the annual baseline costs of a trained and ready Army.

Mr. FORD. Senator Levin, we are very mindful of the effect of supplemants on the training and reset requirements in the Army, and we track very carefully what activities have been transferred from the base program to the supplemental. They're mostly in the areas of equipment reset and in training costs, where the training costs specific to the deployments that we're entering into have been transferred to the supplemental at the direction of the Department. But, we are monitoring that very carefully, and we understand that as the deployments draw down, we're going to have a challenge in transferring this activity back to the base. We are doing that planning now. We understand. We're building a base budget that's based on fiscal guidance at historic rates, not at substantially-greater-than-historic rates, and we are paying very careful attention to that issue.

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Ford, if confirmed as Under Secretary, you'll also become the Chief Management Officer of the Army, with responsibility for improving the Army's outdated business systems and processes. One of the keys to successful business transformation is a sound business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide investment decisions.

Last month GAO reported that the Army has fully satisfied only 1 of 31 core elements of a sound business enterprise architecture. Moreover, the GAO reported that the Army has "experienced a 29-percent decrease in those core elements that it had partially satisfied a year ago." In other words, not only has the Army not made any discernible progress towards an enterprise architecture, it is actually going backward.
What steps would you take to reverse this trend and ensure that
the Army has a sound foundation for business transformation?

Mr. FORD. Senator Levin, we've been working very diligently,
since I joined the Department 3 years ago, on improving our busi-
ness systems. We have three major efforts ongoing. We have the
General Fund Accounting System, that's in development, that will
give us a good realtime view of the financial transactions of the De-
partment, not only the income statement, but the balance sheet.
It's in test now, and it's scheduled to go to full, live operation in
the next couple of years. We are using our logistics system, and we
are marrying that with our financial system, so that we will be
able to track both our equipment and its financial aspects at the
same time. We are leading the Department's effort in implementing
the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, which
is the new payroll/personnel system for DOD, and we're doing a
test of that late this year, with full implementation scheduled for
next year.

I've spent a significant part of my career working on information
systems and information systems implementations. They are com-
plicated, difficult to do, particularly in an enterprise the size of the
Army, with $150 billion worth of base activity and a million people.
But, we are working at it—we work at it every day—with great se-
riousness of purpose.

Chairman LEVIN. Would you agree that the Army business trans-
formation has not been well served by the existing stovepipe orga-
nization and that the Department needs a single office responsible
for managing the effort to reform business systems and processes?

Mr. FORD. I would agree with that conclusion. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning.

Senator MARTINEZ. I wanted to begin by thanking all of you for

for your willingness to serve, and, again, to add my word of congratu-
lations and thanks to your families, as well.

I particularly wanted to single out Mr. Stackley, who I've had the
privilege of working with in the Seapower Subcommittee. We are,
again, very proud of your career as a naval officer, and, particu-
larly, we appreciate your service to the United States Senate. As
was mentioned earlier, the Navy's gain is certainly our loss, and
we will miss you greatly, but we wish you the very best and are
proud of what you have done and what you will continue to do.

On that vein, I wanted to just follow through and ask Mr.
Stackley a couple of questions along the lines of the things that
we've been working on having to do with the Navy and our shared
concern about low rates of production that have been experienced
lately, and how that relates also to an industrial base that will suf-
ferr if we don't resolve these issues. I wonder if you might address
that for us.

Mr. STACKLEY. Thank you, Senator Martinez, and thank you for
the kind words.

Let me start in addressing that important question by going back
to the Navy shipbuilding plan itself. If you look back, a couple of
years ago, the Navy shipbuilding plan, in fact, was changing annu-
ally. So, each year, a new 30-year shipbuilding plan would emerge which would have a different forecast for the numbers and types of ships to support the Navy’s requirements, as well as the industrial base.

When Admiral Mullen took over as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), he recognized that this churn in planning for shipbuilding was harming both the Navy’s ability to meet its requirements, as well as the industrial base’s ability to facilitate, to equip their workforce, to efficiently meet the Navy’s requirements. Therefore, he chartered a group that took a look at the long-term requirements, and included in the plan the Navy’s commitment to stabilize that plan.

I think the committee is well aware of what’s referred to as the 313-ship Navy. Incorporated in this plan is an attempt to, one, provide stability, and, two, to procure the ships at a rate that balances the Navy’s requirements, the Navy’s resources, and the industrial base’s needs to be able to stabilize around that plan.

It continues to be a challenge. The rates at which we’ve been procuring ships over the past 10 to 15 years has been about six, seven, eight per year. Taking a metric, where you take the number of ships per year that you procure, versus the number of shipyards that you have, it’s been just about one ship per year per shipyard.

The future plan looks at increasing that rate, to get up to a 313-ship Navy, as well as to improve upon the base for the shipyards. The challenge remains to accomplish that affordably within the resources that are available to the Navy.

Senator MARTINEZ. Do you think that we have a realistic plan that can get us to that 313-ship Navy? Do we have a realistic approach to getting that done?

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me answer that question in terms of historical and then future projections.

Historically, over the last 10 to 15 years, the Navy’s investment in shipbuilding has averaged $10 to $12 billion per year. When you look out to the end of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) and beyond, the investment that’s required to meet the 313-ship plan is on the order of $18 to $20 billion per year. Right there, you have a 50-percent increase in the investment required to meet the plan.

That challenge is significant, and that investment is going to be required at the same time that other bills are coming to the Department. Would I call it realistic? I think it requires significant effort, between now and the end of the FYDP, to retire the risk associated with both cost projections and the inherent challenges associated with ship construction.

Senator MARTINEZ. Finally, let me ask you, in the area of concerns that we share—the DDG–1000 and its future—what do we need to do to get that program back on track, as well as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program?

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me start with the DDG–1000. The DDG–1000 program represents a significant investment in research and development in establishing requirements for the capability that the ship brings to the fleet. Up to this point in time, the Navy has done a credible job, a thorough job, of establishing the requirements, identifying the risks, and putting together a development plan to
retire those risks through a series of engineering development models for the top-10 technology risks for the program. The two lead ships—authorized and appropriated in the 2007 budget—were awarded design and construction contracts earlier this year. By all measures, they are currently on track, at this very nascent stage of design and construction, there appears to be a robust plan in place to manage the risk, but the fact remains that the capabilities that are brought to that platform are, in fact, leading-edge, and the investment in those 10 engineering development models still has in front of it the integration of those technologies on the platform.

I believe that, at this stage, proper planning has gone into the lead ships. We are at the front end of execution and need to maintain discipline in managing the risk to the program, discipline in managing design and requirements so we don't introduce disruption. We need to provide the oversight required, not just in the shipyard, but in the systems development arena, to ensure that the risk management plan holds true to its intentions.

The LCS program is at a similar stage, but arrived here at a much different path. As opposed to the DDG-1000 program, which had a lengthy development period, the LCS program placed an emphasis on accelerating design and construction to deliver a capability that is needed in the fleet today. Risk was assumed in the design and construction phase. Risk was not retired through the development phase. As a result, you had a lot of parallel development/design/construction taking place; and, as soon as disruption was introduced into the program, through design change, snowballing effect took place and costs grew significantly.

Today, the first two lead ships—one is getting ready for trials; the second ship, in the water, 6 to 9 months behind the first ship. At this stage, we have to push these ships to completion of their tests and trials. We have to clean up the design on those ships to enable a more orderly construction process for follow-on ships. There's much left to be learned on the programs. The third, fourth, and fifth ships have been solicited. Those bids are in the hands of the Navy. They're evaluating those proposals. There's an understanding of the cost cap that was introduced by Congress. I think, at this stage, we complete the evaluation of the proposals and complete the design, test, and trials for those ships. The CNO has been emphatic—the past three CNOs have been emphatic—that this is an important requirement. They are wrestling with the cost growth to ensure that we continue to meet the requirement. But, there's much information to be learned in completing these first ships before building the path for the follow-on ships.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Benkert, I want to just ask you if you might have any comment on the proliferation issue as it relates to the announcement this morning on North Korea that the President made—obviously, the concern was their potential involvement in Syria and what was discovered there just a few weeks ago, and whether you feel that this announcement today is significant, in terms of ameliorating or decreasing the threat to the world, of proliferation from North Korea.

Mr. BENKERT. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
I would just note, first of all, that our Department, and this job to which I’ve been nominated, in particular, have been very much in a mode, here, of supporting the lead, when it comes to North Korea, of the Secretary of State and Ambassador Christopher Hill. We are full participants in this process, and, in particular, in evaluating how one would go about verifying North Korean declarations. I think, as this process has continued, the prospect, obviously, is for a significant reduction in the proliferation threat as we go forward. But, again, within the scope of my competence here, I am in the business of helping to support this process as it moves forward and to help ensure that we can verify what is declared in the process.

Senator Martinez. Thank you. My time’s expired. Thank you all very much. I congratulate all of you on your future assignments, and look forward to working with you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Secretary Ford, I’m concerned that the Army is still not investing enough in developing next-generation technologies to reduce the Army’s fuel-related costs and logistics burdens. The Army is not moving aggressively, still, to develop and adopt advanced energy technologies and systems, including vehicles, that could increase performance, enhance military capabilities, and reduce costs to the taxpayer, and reduce the use of fossil fuel. If confirmed, what proposals would you make to put the Army on a more aggressive path in developing and adopting advanced energy technologies?

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Just this past week, Secretary Geren asked to have a meeting on this issue, and we addressed several ideas.

First, the majority of our spending on fuel is for nontactical vehicles and for energy on our posts, camps, and stations. The first efforts, and the efforts where we think we can have some almost immediate impact, are moving to acquisition of hybrid vehicles for the nontactical vehicles on posts, camps, and stations, and looking for pilot ways to look at solar power, wind power, energy conservation in the buildings here in the United States.

FCS is based on the theory that the common platform will be a hybrid vehicle, I believe, diesel/electric vehicle. So, we are investing in the technology for the tactical vehicles to reduce our fuel consumption.

Our current tactical vehicles consume great amounts of fuel, and we understand that the logistic tail required to get that fuel to the tactical vehicles is a real problem. We are looking at it both in the tactical and nontactical areas.

Chairman Levin. We have some laws on the books that require the military to look at alternative fuel systems for the nontactical vehicles. Instead of doing what we said that the Army and the other Services should do throughout the years, there usually is a waiver signed that is simply waiving it, because the comparable cost isn’t there. Are you going to take a different kind of a view of the need to do this now?

Mr. Ford. I’m not aware of any waivers that have been signed in the past. It wasn’t under my purview, I don’t believe. But, in the future, with gas at north of $4 a gallon, the economics of energy, particularly with regard to nontactical vehicles, has clearly
changed, and we will look at that very carefully. But, our plan is to almost immediately take advantage of General Services Administration’s offering of significant numbers of hybrid vehicles.

Chairman Levin. I hope you would not just look at the current economies, but also the future. The problem is that when gas was cheap, they always said, “Well, it doesn’t pay.” It would have paid. We could have kept gas cheap if we had taken the pressure off buying more and more oil. I understand what you’re saying about the current cost of gas making it easier to justify economically, but I think we have to take a longer view. Even if a miracle happened and gas prices came down, the same truth would be there. We’ll count on you to take a look at that.

We also would invite you to come out and take a look at the ways in which the Army is working on dual-use technologies, including vehicle designs and batteries, but also how that can be increased, that dual-use approach. Would you be willing to come out and take a look at that?

Mr. Ford. Very interested in doing that, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Secretary Ford, in the aftermath of the problems with outpatient care in facilities at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the Army established Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) to which all injured or ill soldiers were assigned. The exclusive mission of these units is to heal. While we certainly commend the Army for the work done thus far to help improve the quality of care and case management of these wounded warriors, high operational tempo and recent redeployments of large combat units have increased the size of many of these transition units, to the point where case manager staffing no longer meets the ratios of case managers to wounded warriors which were established by the Army. Additionally, we’ve heard that the Army expects that these WTUs will grow by as much as 900 soldiers per month for the foreseeable future.

The most alarming case that we’ve heard about is at Fort Hood, where the number of nurse case managers to soldiers is far beyond the Army’s established ratio. Are you familiar with that situation at Fort Hood?

Mr. Ford. I am.

Chairman Levin. Can you tell us what is being done to help increase the number of case managers to support the wounded-warrior population?

Mr. Ford. At the beginning of this year, we expanded the definition of who would be included in WTUs. In January, we had a caseload of about 5,000; our current caseload is almost 13,000. So, in a 6-month, almost 7-month period, it’s more than doubled.

We believe, at this point, that we have identified almost everybody that is going to be included in the WTUs. The key, at this point, is to make sure that we are providing the right services to each of those folks, as they are needed. Some of those folks have never deployed—actually, 40 percent have never deployed. Anyone who is in a medical limited-duty status has been, kind of, wrapped under the WTU label. What we need to do now is to figure out which of our soldiers need simply to be monitored, that they’re making their medical appointments, and which need the serious physical rehabilitation, mental-health services required so that
they can heal and either get back to their unit or move on with the rest of their lives.

We are looking at this very carefully. The chief of staff intends to deliver new guidance, I think, in the next couple of days on this issue. Brigadier General Gary Cheek has just taken over as the head of the WTU. He’s a very able leader and really, I think, has his hands around the administrative—or the management problems that currently have been created by this explosive growth.

We don’t think that there will be much more growth from current levels. So, really, at this point, it’s about figuring out how to take care of the wounded warriors in the best possible way.

Chairman LEVIN. It’s your continuing goal, as I know it is ours, that all wounded and injured soldiers will be assigned to WTU?

Mr. FORD. Oh, yes. They’ll be assigned to WTUs.

Chairman LEVIN. Congress authorized, last year at the request of the Department, an increase to the maximum monthly amount of hardship duty pay from $750 to $1,500. The Army’s proposing to use this authority to institute an umbrella pay program, called Warrior Pay, that will reward servicemembers for lengthy or repeated deployments to certain high-risk areas. Will any servicemember, at the end of the day, receive, under your approach, less money under the Warrior Pay Program than they are now, under the various special and incentive pays?

Mr. FORD. I am not familiar with the details of that program sufficiently so that I could assure you that there is no situation in which someone would get paid less. But, clearly the intention is that pay for warriors who are deployed in theater would be greater than it is today. That is our intention.

Chairman LEVIN. Can you double check with people who are familiar with the details, so that you can give us the assurance that there won’t be any reduction as a result of this new program?

Mr. FORD. We’ll be happy to look into it further.

[The information referred to follows:]

No soldier will receive less money under the Warrior Pay concept than they receive with special and incentive pays authorized today. The Army intends to continue paying soldiers the current incentives until Warrior Pay is implemented. No soldier will be adversely affected by the implementation of this new program. At this time, soldiers are not rewarded for frequent and lengthy tours in a fair and equitable manner. Some soldiers who are in units that have been involuntarily extended in theater by the Secretary of Defense are receiving $1,000 per month Assignment Incentive Pay for 1 to 3 months. Under the Warrior Pay concept, soldiers would be eligible for the pay once they have served greater than 365 days in a combat zone—or $2,400 in additional compensation for the second tour in a combat zone. The proposed pay structure would then increase the monthly amount paid for each additional 365 days deployed. We believe Warrior Pay will provide a more equitable and predictable system to compensate for deployments. All components would receive the same amount of pay for deploying.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Benkert, you made reference, now, to the announcement this morning about North Korea, and I have a number of questions on that, but I also want to just announce—staff can carry this back to the Senators—that we are going to be having a hearing on this announcement today. We’ll have a hearing sometime in July, before this committee, going into the issues in detail. But, I just want to ask you a few questions this morning.
Do you know what the plan is for the plutonium that has been produced in North Korea? What commitment has been made or insisted upon by us?

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I don't know.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

Mr. Celec, would you know, by any chance?

Mr. CELEC. No, sir, I do not.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

Do you know what role, Mr. Benkert, the Defense Department's going to play in assisting the disablement and dismantlement of the nuclear program?

Mr. BENKERT. The role the Defense Department is going to play obviously is constrained, at this point, by the Glenn Amendment. The Department has been supportive of the lead that State Department has had. I think that the Department will be involved in the verification, and the Department will be involved, as is necessary, in other aspects. But, we have not been asked, at this point, to support the dismantlement.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know what information, if any, was provided by North Korea, relative to its alleged enriched uranium program?

Mr. BENKERT. Sir, I do not.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

Mr. Celec, would you know?

Mr. CELEC. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

Mr. Celec, just on this subject, let me move to you—do you have any understanding that's different from what we heard from Mr. Benkert about the actions that DOD may undertake to implement the disablement or the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear program?

Mr. CELEC. Historically, the Department has provided the logistics necessary to move things for the Department of Energy and the Department of State. I would assume that that's the role that they will continue to provide in this operation.

Chairman LEVIN. The President said this morning, “a moment of opportunity for North Korea. If North Korea continues to make the right choices, it can repair its relationship with the international community. If North Korea makes the wrong choices, the United States and our partners in the Six-Party Talks will respond accordingly. If they do not fully disclose and end their plutonium, their enrichment, and their proliferation efforts and activities, there will be further consequences.”

Do you know what the President was referring to, Mr. Benkert?

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I don't know.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know, Mr. Celec?

Mr. CELEC. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

Mr. Benkert, you stated, in your responses to the advance policy questions, that there's a need for better coordination between DOD's counternarcotics program and the security assistance program. One area where DOD will encounter, could encounter, a duplication of efforts is in the West Africa region, where the counter-
narcotics program has requested expanded authorities, and where DOD has utilized, extensively, it's section 1206 authorities.

But, on the same issue of coordination, earlier this month I sent a letter to Secretary Gates regarding the $75 million in funding for the Pakistan Frontier Corps, requesting that it be made conditional on the inclusion in any peace deals that are struck between the Government of Pakistan and the tribal militants of a commitment to stop cross-border incursions into Afghanistan and a strong mechanism to enforce that commitment.

It's my understanding that, in addition to that funding, DOD also planned to expend approximately $54 million in funding from the counternarcotics program in fiscal year 2008. In your view, what should be the status of that $54 million? Should that funding be conditioned—indeed, should the $75 million in funding that I previously referred to be conditioned—on a peace agreement between the Government of Pakistan and the tribal leaders, including a commitment to stop cross-border incursions with strong enforcement mechanisms?

Mr. BENKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would just note that the $54 million that you had mentioned in counternarcotics funding was very closely coordinated with the plans for the $75 million so as to avoid duplication of effort and also to stay in the proper lanes.

I would also note that one of the intents—among the intent of the counternarcotics program is to assist in creating border surveillance centers—initially on the Afghan side of the border, but potentially also on the Pakistan side, later on. In addition to our personnel, these border surveillance centers would be staffed with Afghan and Pakistan personnel, as well, precisely to assist in being able to monitor what may be going back and forth across the border.

So, from that point of view, I do not think that it would be necessary—or wise—to make the funding contingent on some sort of an agreement with the Pakistanis, since, in part, the purpose of this funding is to assist in stopping the cross-border operations.

Chairman LEVIN. The problem is that there's some evidence that Pakistan doesn't care about those cross-border operations, and could easily be supporting militants crossing into Afghanistan between those posts that you talk about. Unless we have an understanding from the tribal leaders that they're going to put an end to this and that they're going to give us some metrics that we can measure putting that to an end, we would potentially be spending $75 million of taxpayer dollars to support a Pakistan Frontier Corps, which is the opposite goal that we have. That's the concern that I've raised with Secretary Gates. The mere presence of some posts along the border—I don't know how many you're talking about—doesn't solve the problem, unless there's an intent, on the Pakistan side, to put an end to the militants crossing the border into Afghanistan, where they're attacking our troops.

Do you have any opinion, then, about the importance of getting the commitment of those tribal leaders? Our military people and our diplomats have said it's critically important that we get those commitments as part of any peace agreements. I'm just wondering what your view is on it.
Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I think the concern that you have expressed is known, and there is an understanding of this concern. This issue—it's on the Secretary's agenda, as well as the Chairman's and the senior military leaders, including the Commander of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. I think I would defer to them on the answer of whether some additional restrictions might be necessary based on their discussions with their Pakistani counterparts.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Since I've stated publicly that we sent this letter to Secretary Gates, I'll state publicly that we are anxiously awaiting a response to that letter.

I understand that you, as Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs, would be overseeing the Office of Detainee Affairs. Is that correct?

Mr. BENKERT. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. The office that formulates defense policies in support of strategic defense affairs objectives, including that office. I visited one of those detention operations at Camp Cropper, in Baghdad, when I was there in March. It was a very impressive operation, with standards which I consider to be really important standards, with a new reintegration effort being made for the detainees, with programs that included family visits, religious discussion, literacy, and vocational training. Are you familiar with that approach?

Mr. BENKERT. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you support it?

Mr. BENKERT. Very much so. I think one of the very positive developments in detention operations in Iraq over the past year or so, under the leadership of Major General Doug Stone, who was the commander of the Detainee Task Force, was a shift in focus from simply holding detainees off the battlefield, to a focus on what he called counterinsurgency within the wire, which is to ensure the fact that they had been put into a detainee facility did not make jihadis or insurgents out of individuals who were not radical to start with, and then to provide a way to reintegrate them into society when they left. I think the track record has been very good. The intent now, obviously, is to try to apply what we've learned in this process elsewhere, such as Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it your intent that the lessons learned from these positive operations would be incorporated into DOD doctrine and procedures and training?

Mr. BENKERT. Absolutely. We need to capture these lessons learned.

Chairman LEVIN. As a Nation, we have a long way to go to cleanse the stain of Abu Ghraib, and this is an important part of that shift of the perception of us in our dealing and handling of detainees.

Al Qaeda has a safe haven in Pakistan. What can we do to try to eliminate that safe haven, more than what we're already doing?

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, again, within the competence of the position to which I've been nominated, I would note that the Office of Global Security Affairs is in the position of looking at the tools that are available to carry out the intent that is determined by the Secretary and the military commanders. I think that, again,
at the level that we support these operations, we are fortunate to have a set of tools available to us, that you have given us, that allow us to put together a package that addresses the issue of the safe haven.

I would also note that there are issues here, in the world of counterterrorism, that I would not be able to talk about in this hearing, but I think the principle point is that we have the ability to put together the necessary set of support mechanisms that would assist the Pakistani military in dealing with this. We also have measures that are available to our forces, as well.

Chairman Levin. Mr. Benkert, we face a huge number of global security challenges. In order to address many of them, we're going to need a sustained cooperation, internationally, and that includes cooperation with Russia; Iran just being one example, but one of the bigger ones. We have a number of successful areas of cooperation with Russia, but we also have some significant strains in the relationship. Can you give us your assessment as to the future of cooperation with Russia on a number of international security challenges? Can we improve that security cooperation with Russia?

Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think we can. I appreciate the fact that you've noted that we have examples of successful cooperative programs, as well as strains, in the relationship. I think it's unfortunate that attention is sometimes only paid to the strains. I think some of those are well known; for example, in the area of missile defense.

Let me just note several areas where I think we have very productive relationships with Russia that continue and on which we want to expand.

First, I think, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the Nunn-Lugar program, I think, is a real example of a program of solid cooperation with Russia that has continued over many years, despite whatever ups and downs in the overall relationship may take place. I think it's a very strong program. We continue to have very good working relationships with the Russian counterparts in this program.

Second, there have been some joint initiatives that the U.S. and Russia have undertaken. I would note the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an initiative that Presidents Bush and Putin announced a couple of years ago, is a program under which any nation that ascribes to the principles of the Global Initiative can become a member, and we're now up over 70 members. In the space of the time that this program has existed, it has helped to generate a greater focus on combating nuclear terrorism and an opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to work together to promote best practices, exercises focused on dealing with this matter, and so forth, in the international community.

I think that those opportunities have continued, despite the challenges in other aspects of the relationship.

Chairman Levin. I want to go back to North Korea just for a moment, Mr. Benkert. In your written response to the advance policy questions, you made reference to a letter that I received from Secretary Gates, responding to my question as to when operations in North Korea would resume to recover the remains of unaccounted-for American servicemen. The letter that you referred to says that
operations will resume at an “appropriate time.” Is it not now appropriate, given this breakthrough that’s been announced by the President today, to resume these operations and to press the North Koreans for us to be allowed to look for those remains?

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I think we have been—and I say “we,” it’s not just the Department, but in consultation with other agencies of the Government as well. We have been looking at the circumstances and the progress within the Six-Party Talks and the activities related to that; and, I think, now with this announcement we will go back and, again, in consultation with our partners in the interagency, look at the impact of this and when might be the appropriate time.

Chairman LEVIN. There’s a lot of interest in this, and I just hope that it won’t just be inquiring “When?” but asking, “Hey, isn’t it time now to get this high up on this agenda?”

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I think we are very attuned to the desires of the families for a full accounting of those who are missing in North Korea. We talk to the families—and I personally do, as well—and their representatives frequently. I’m very much aware of the desire and the need to get this process started again at an appropriate time.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Stackley, we have a situation, which you’re very personally familiar with, that the F/A–18 and the AV–8B aircraft are continuing to age. There could be, now, a shortfall of 125 strike fighter aircraft in the next decade, according to the Navy prediction, which would increase the concern about the schedule for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). In response to the pre-hearing questions, you indicated that one of the options available to the Navy would be “extending procurement of the F/A–18 aircraft.” Some have asserted that the JSF program is threatened by continuing procurement of legacy aircraft. I’m wondering if you can give us your view as to whether the continued procurement of those legacy aircraft to address near-term inventory shortfalls will threaten the JSF program.

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir.

First, the timeframe in which we’re discussing, the F/A–18 procurement proceeds out through 2011—correction, aircraft delivers from the current multiyear procurement for the F/A–18 goes out through 2011, and then there are an additional 3 years, outside of the multiyear procurement, 2012 through 2014 where the program winds down. That program, today, is in—call it “hot production,” stable, delivering at economic rates.

JSF is at the other end of the spectrum, the front of the program. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for Marine Corps is 2012; IOC for the Navy, 2015. There’s this critical period between shutting down the F/A–18 production line and ramping up the JSF program. Between now and that point in time, we expect risk to be retired on the JSF program, we expect to have greater understanding, in terms of the service life extension program for the F/A–18 to determine exactly where we will be relative to the magnitude and the duration of shortfall for strike fighter aircraft. There is opportunity, if there is a need, to continue procurement of F/A–18s, and that decision will need to be made based on avail-
able resources and what we understand about the JSF program at that point in time.

I would not try to indicate that F/A–18s would be procured instead of JSFs with those resources; but, rather, if we can’t get to the procurement rate that’s needed for JSF in that timeframe, then an option is to continue procurement of F/A–18s.

Chairman Levin. You don’t have an opinion, at this time, given what we now know, as to whether that option should be exercised?

Mr. Stackley. The Department is clearly committed to the JSF program. Again, the magnitude and duration of the shortfall will depend on what happens with the extension program, with the ability to ramp up JSF, and with—call it “workaround plans” for the fleet, to ensure they can meet the requirements. I think we have to march further down that path to understand if the problem will get worse or if it will stay stable at the current projections.

Chairman Levin. You may have partly addressed this question before, Mr. Stackley, but let me put it slightly differently. When the LCS program was announced by the CNO, he indicated that we could afford $220 million per ship. Since that time, the Navy has requested, and Congress has approved, an increase in the cost cap up to $460 million per ship for the sea frame. What would you propose to do to get better cost estimates for complex construction and development programs, since that estimate for the sea frame turned out to be so wildly wrong?

Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.

I understand that the basis of the estimate for LCS was centered on commercial design. In other words, the two shipbuilders in the program have comparable commercial ships that they used for their bids, and the Navy’s cost estimates were linked to commercial experience. LCS is not a commercial ship. In going from—call it “those commercial designs” to the current warship design, significant change was introduced in what’s referred to as “naval vessel rules,” as well as combatant features and requirements associated with reduced manning and other Navy requirements for survivability. There is significant deviation on the LCS program from whatever the basis of estimate was and the current platform.

If you look at major defense programs, and you look at cost growth, in most cases cost growth will trace back to poor-quality cost estimates. The Navy has a cost estimating group that is working on improving its cost-estimating, modeling techniques, et cetera. As well, DOD relies on the cost analysis improvement group to provide some outside independent cost estimating. I think we need to beef these efforts. I think we need to take a harder look at the cost models that we’re using. The complexity of Navy warships today far exceed what the earlier cost models used for determining cost estimates for Navy programs.

Step 1, improve the cost modeling. Step 2, ensure that the correlation between the requirements and the estimates are tightly coupled. Step 3, ensure discipline in the process, so you don’t see growth in requirements, growth in design, outside of the estimates that were provided for the program.

Chairman Levin. Mr. Stackley, shortcomings in the acquisition workforce are faced by all of the military Services. Earlier this month the Navy announced the establishment of a new position of...
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Acquisition Workforce. That would be a deputy who would work for you, if you're confirmed. Do you agree that the Navy has significant shortcomings in its acquisition workforce? Do you support the establishment of that new position?

Mr. Stackley. The answer is yes to both questions, Mr. Chairman. The acquisition workforce has seen steady reduction over the past 10 or 15 years, and I think it's inarguable that the pendulum has swung too far in that regard.

In the discussion on cost estimates, I discussed discipline. An important part of discipline in the process is a qualified workforce. The appointment of the principal deputy that will have responsibilities for strengthening the acquisition workforce, I think, is a good, strong move. There has traditionally been a senior civilian in the Navy who has had ad hoc responsibilities in that regard. This goes beyond ad hoc; this assigns someone with principal responsibilities, and ensures that that individual has the credibility and the experience that's required to do the job.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Mr. Celec, one of the concerns that has arisen from the blue-ribbon report and the other reports coming from the B-52 flight from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base, as well as the more recent Donald report, is that the various security and operational inspections of nuclear forces do not find, and are not designed to fix, deficiencies. How are you going to work with the Services, the Nuclear Weapons Council, and the National Security Administration to improve the quality of these inspections if you are confirmed?

Mr. Celec. Thank you, Sir.

The problems in the Air Force, I think, are cultural in nature. They didn't develop overnight, and they obviously won't be cured overnight. It's going to require leadership attention, not only in the Air Force, but in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where I hope to be. I know, for example, that the Air Force is currently reviewing its policies and procedures to ensure that they're current. The real question is, "will the leadership insist that they be followed to the letter of the law," if you will. In the past, leadership focus has just been diverted elsewhere. They're involved in, obviously, fighting two wars right now. However, it's going to take the focus of the leadership of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense—and that's where I hope to participate—to oversee that they will make some tremendous strides over the next couple of months, but the question is, "Will this be sustained?" It's going to take oversight and leadership to sustain the return of the culture that we knew in the past.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Celec, you made reference, in your opening remarks, to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires us to destroy all the chemical weapons no later than April 2012. Now, DOD has not notified Congress that the United States will not be able to meet that extended treaty deadline. You've indicated that we have an obligation to take our treaty obligations seriously. We expect other nations to do that. If you're confirmed, will you make mighty efforts to ensure that the Department provides the adequate funding either to meet that deadline
or, if that proves impossible, to come within as close a distance as possible to it?

Mr. CELEC. Absolutely. I think it’s important that we meet our treaty obligations, to the best of our ability. I would work very hard to make sure we do.

Chairman LEVIN. In 2003 and 2004, Mr. Celec, Congress debated, at length, whether to fund the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) and the development of small nuclear weapons, which were sometimes referred to as “mini nukes.” Before you retired from DOD, in August 2003, you were the Deputy for Nuclear Matters, reporting to the then-Assistant to the Secretary, the position for which you’ve now been nominated.

The Department supported the development and the fielding of an RNEP capability, and, in your previous capacity at the Department, according to statements that you made at the time, you, too, supported the development of RNEP. Congress eventually declined to fund that program. Are you going to resume your advocacy of the RNEP program if you’re confirmed?

Mr. CELEC. My personal view certainly has not changed. Whether or not that view is the administration’s or the Secretary’s prevailing view, I don’t know, and I will find out once I get there.

I do know that there are a number of underground structures that exist in the world today that we cannot attack with conventional weapons, even the weapons that we project out into the far future of their capabilities. I know that many of these underground structures have multiple entrances, and whether or not we know where all of the entrances are or not is a problematical question. I know that we could close the entrances that we know of conventionally, although they could be reopened within a matter of a few tens of hours.

Finally, many of these underground structures are command-and-control facilities. By closing the adits—or the entrances—to these things, the facility itself will continue to function. In that time, an awful lot of people could die.

So, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator gives the President an opportunity to end that issue right now, and I think he—my personal view, not necessarily supported by the Secretary—is that he ought to have that capability.

Chairman LEVIN. In your written responses, Mr. Celec, you state that, “There are serious issues with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that need to be resolved.” Could you give us just a couple of examples of those?

Mr. CELEC. I’ll be glad to. First off, the treaty was signed some 15 years ago, and a lot has occurred in the world, particularly with the threat, and particularly in the nuclear arena; three nations have actually tested nuclear weapons that weren’t nuclear powers when that treaty was signed—North Korea, Pakistan, and India. In addition, part of our verification system that we had intended to use in the CTBT was actually installed in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). Those stations have been dismantled; and so, our verification problems are going to increase. We can’t change those verification technologies without going back and renegotiating, certainly, the TTBT.
Perhaps the most critical issue that I have is the issue of, what is “zero yield” in the CTBT? The United States tabled the definition of “zero yield” during the negotiations in the treaty. The Russians said, “Thank you very much. We understand your position.” But, they didn’t accept it, and it didn’t enter into the treaty.

There’s only one treaty that actually defines “yield,” and that’s the TTBT. In that treaty, it says “yield” is what comes out of the explosive cannister. The explosive cannister is a big container that you put the nuclear device in when you detonate it.

Now, it is possible, with that language, if unchanged, that the Russians could put small, low-yield nuclear weapons into very large containers, detonate them, and still be in compliance with the CTBT. One further thing, the Russians have said that part of their weapons development program are these low-level tests. They’ve admitted that in public. I believe there’s some serious concern, because of history—that is, the number of years since the treaty was negotiated, and some of the technologies—that need to be addressed when we go back. I think we need to go back and do it, because I think the treaty is the right thing to do, but we have to be careful.

Chairman Levin. Let me ask you both, Mr. Celec and Mr. Benkert—each of you have a responsibility for the CTR program. Will each of you commit to work cooperatively on the CTR programs? Since you both have some responsibility there, do either of you have any thoughts about the need to work cooperatively? Any impediments to that?

Mr. Benkert, why don’t we start with you?

Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To the first part of your question, I will absolutely commit to working cooperatively on the CTR program. I think the cooperation goes in several dimensions. One is, I think we’ve had a very cooperative relationship with your staff and your colleagues on the House side as well as we’ve advanced this program, and we greatly appreciate that relationship and the developments—for example, the flexibility that you’ve provided us to move the program—to begin moving the program outside the former Soviet Union. So, I commit that we will continue that cooperative relationship.

I think, as we move the program forward, I have discussed a bit, before the strong level of cooperation we have with the Russians in this program. I think we have cooperative relationships, as well with the other countries that are in the program. There are problems, but generally we work through them. Again, they help build very strong relationships at various levels with these countries.

The issue we have is, over time, moving the program from one that is an assistance program in a lot of ways, to one that is more defined by partnership—both partnership with the Russians, partnership with other countries, and particularly partnerships outside the former Soviet Union. Over time, I think we want to move in that direction.

I think the second thing that we are trying to do—and, again, in cooperation with your staff and the flexibility you’ve given us—is find ways to make the program more flexible, nimble, and responsive as we move outside the former Soviet Union, so that we are able to seize opportunities for cooperation and partnership, perhaps
more rapidly than was the case in the way we developed the CTR program.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, Mr. Celec?

Mr. CELEC. I agree. I have a personal interest in that program, because when it was initiated as the Nunn-Lugar program, it was sent to the operations directorate of the Defense Nuclear Agency for execution. I was the Deputy Director for Operations at the time, and so, I helped see that program born, if you will, and I think it’s been tremendously successful, and I will continue enthusiastically to support that program and to make sure that it continues to make the progress that it has. It has destroyed more missiles than the Strategic Air Command ever thought about doing.

Chairman LEVIN. We welcome that enthusiasm. We wish you were a little bit less enthusiastic about RNEP. [Laughter.]

You gave us your honest opinion, and that’s what we ask for.

We thank you all. We thank your families.

If I can single out your grandchildren, Mr. Celec, since I’m a proud grandfather, you have two of them here. We have Adam and Hannah. I just want to let you kids know how important it is to a grandpa to have his grandkids standing behind him, and sitting behind him so patiently, and looking like you’re following every single thing that you heard. It’s amazing to me how beautifully you two did, there. I know it’s important that your grandpa have you here. We thank you, particularly, and we thank all of the families.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Nelson M. Ford by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions based on your experience in the Department of Defense (DOD)?

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive change in the operation of DOD. While I believe that the framework established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved interservice and joint relationships and clarified responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. This milestone legislation has served our Nation well for more than 2 decades. If confirmed, I would certainly work with Congress to determine whether the act should be revised to better address the requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and challenges confronting the military departments in today’s security environment. It also may be appropriate to assess whether the law might be modified to allocate roles and responsibilities more effectively among the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, the military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). One particular issue that merits review is accountability for the conduct of deployed forces.
Question. Section 3015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under Secretary of the Army shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to be assigned?

Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as the principal assistant and senior civilian advisor to the Secretary of the Army and will support him in his leadership of the Department as he fulfills the duties and responsibilities accorded him by law and regulation. I envision the Secretary will also assign to me specific duties and responsibilities that will support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with which it has been entrusted. Further, pursuant to Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, I expect that the Secretary of the Army will designate the Under Secretary as the Chief Management Officer of the Department with the primary management responsibility for business operations. I expect the Secretary to assign me such duties and responsibilities in my role as Chief Management Officer as are necessary to organize and administer the business operations of the Army effectively and efficiently, in accordance with the policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will carry out my duties to the best of my ability, with honor and integrity.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. For most of my career, I have served in a variety of senior management positions responsible for financial management, policy development, program evaluation and productivity. I am currently the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)), having been confirmed by the Senate in October 2006 after serving for 2 years as the Principal Deputy to the ASA(FM&C). Previously, I served in DOD as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy with responsibility for the financial management, policy development and program evaluation of the Defense Health Program. External to government service, I served as Chief Operating Officer for Georgetown University Medical Center and was a partner in Coopers & Lybrand. These experiences have afforded me the opportunity to understand how large organizations function, particularly within the parameters of plans, programs and budgets, to face and overcome challenges on a continuing basis. My work in financial management for the Army has afforded me the privilege of building strong, effective relationships with other senior leaders and staff within the Army, the other military departments, and DOD.

My experience with the Defense Health Program is beneficial to the Army, particularly at this point in time when we are working with DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide quality, comprehensive care to Wounded Warriors and Warriors in Transition. In fact, most of my career has been in the health care field, which has given me a broad base of knowledge that benefits the Army in developing processes and policies to support a wide range of health care initiatives.

Further, I am familiar with the fiduciary responsibilities of Federal officials, particularly those that are applicable to Army personnel, and feel confident that I can positively contribute toward establishing and maintaining management controls and high fiscal and ethical standards. Much of my experience has been in mission-driven organizations, both as a manager and board member, so I understand the challenges of matching large and complicated missions in resource constrained environments. My experience includes organizational service in times of both growth and cutbacks, both of which are relevant for today’s Army. I feel I am very well prepared to continue leading from the strategic level and with the strategic capabilities the position of Under Secretary of the Army requires.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army?

Answer. I expect that there are. Although I am serving as Acting Under Secretary of the Army and look forward with confidence to performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army, any new position presents new challenges and opportunities for learning. Should the Senate confirm me, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of consultation with Army leaders, others in DOD, and Congress, to pursue opportunities for improvement. I have to say though, that my experience for the past 4 years in the Army has significantly strengthened my knowledge of the Army, its history, its culture, and its needs to continue to support the Nation in its assigned missions.
RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with:

The Secretary of the Army.

Answer. As head of the Department of the Army, Secretary Geren is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the Department. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the Army will be close, direct, and supportive; my actions always will be subject to the Secretary's authority, direction, and control.

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him by law as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is extremely important that all leaders of the Department of the Army, civilian and military, work closely together as one team as we face the many challenges confronting our institution. I anticipate that I will work closely and collaboratively with the Chief of Staff to supervise the implementation of the Secretary's decisions throughout the Department of the Army.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the Department's strategic direction by formulating and overseeing policies and programs within their functional areas of responsibility, consistent with law, regulation, and the objectives of the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with each of the Assistant Secretaries and seek to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork as we work together on the day-to-day management and long range planning needs of the Army.

Question. The General Counsel of the Army.

Answer. The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. His duties include providing legal and policy advice to all members of the Army as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the General Counsel and will actively seek his guidance to ensure that Army policies and practices are in strict accord with the law and the highest principles of ethical conduct.

Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe for him. If confirmed, I will work with the Vice Chief of Staff to further the Secretary of the Army's policies and to advance the interests of the Army. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Vice Chief of Staff and communicate directly and openly with him on matters involving the Department of the Army.

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal adviser of the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance of their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views about any legal matter under consideration.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will face the next Under Secretary of the Army?

Answer. As the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff have stated previously, the Army is out of balance due to current operational demands. Our increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on soldiers and their families. Part of regaining that balance is reducing the stress on the force caused by repeated, extended-duration deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Another crucial challenge is obtaining predictable and adequate funding. As the Army modernizes to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, while continuing the current operational pace as required by the combatant commanders, reestablishing our strategic depth will be a major effort requiring close collaboration with Congress.
Answer. The Army is faced with many other challenges, including providing proper support to soldiers and families in time of war, enhancing readiness, providing quality housing, modernizing our Cold War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting and retention goals, just to name a few. The Army must transform its support infrastructure and integrate Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions. The Army must provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of soldiers’ service and provide high quality care for those who have become ill, injured, or wounded, particularly for those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injuries. Finally, the Army must transform Army contracting, growing leaders, increasing personnel and providing appropriate training in this critically important area.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide my assistance to Secretary Geren and Chief of Staff Casey in pursuing several critical initiatives, including growing the Army and making necessary readiness improvements; building momentum and continuity of our modernization efforts; completing the transition of the Reserve component to an operational force; and adapting our institutional processes to support an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering from the cumulative effects of 5 years at war. In the birth of the soldier is the Family, and in an All-Volunteer Force, we must remain committed to supporting our soldiers and their families through Installation and Soldier Readiness, and Soldier and Family Quality of Life. Of special interest to me will be leading the Secretary’s effort to transform Army contracting, developing solutions to address the challenges facing the Department in this area.

If confirmed, I will focus on programs and efforts to reduce the stress on the soldiers and their families. I will work closely with Congress to ensure these programs are defined to meet the objectives and requirements in support of our national defense. A major part of addressing these challenges will be to work collaboratively with members of this committee, the entire Congress, the President, and the Army leadership. I share Secretary Geren’s commitment to maintain the Army as the dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am confident we can succeed.

ARMY BUDGET SHARE

Question. Last year’s Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25 percent. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army’s budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the Army’s overall share of DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air Force. The result is that “the Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.”

What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the Army?

Answer. Today’s Army is out of balance. Our equipment, procured through Congress’ vigorous support to the Army, has been used hard during this period of prolonged and persistent conflict. This means that we are using up equipment at a much faster rate than anticipated, requiring our Army to reset or recapitalize this equipment at an accelerated pace. This impacts ammunition stocks, maintenance depots, and manufacturing capacities, and is further complicated by America’s shrinking industrial base. We must restore the necessary breadth and depth of Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity for the future demands on our Expeditionary Force.

Question. What do you intend to do if confirmed as the Under Secretary to address this funding discrepancy?

Answer. Foremost, it is imperative for us to receive supplemental funding in a timely manner to prosecute the global war on terror and provide our soldiers with the equipment needed to meet current operational demands. If confirmed, I will continue to try to match Army resources to strategic requirements as I did when serving as the ASA(FM&C). During the build of the fiscal year 2009 budget, we worked closely with OSD and the Office of Management and Budget to help them better understand the Army’s challenges. Additionally, we are examining the relationship of activities funded in the base budget and supplemental. We have identified and resourced currently funded through the supplemental that would be more appropriately resourced in the base budget. We are looking forward to working within the
administration to ensure an understanding of what activities should migrate back from the supplemental to the base program. To ensure we are good stewards of the Nation's resources, I will continue to work closely with Congress and the administration to address the Army's current readiness issues that have resulted from previous funding shortfalls.

Question. What is your understanding of what, if anything, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense intend to do to address this discrepancy?

Answer. While building the President's fiscal year 2009 budget, we explored the impact of budgetary shortfalls with OSD. I believe we effectively communicated and quantified the challenges the Army faces in preparing for current and future conflicts and other emerging requirements. The Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to meet readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources necessary to support the National Military Strategy.

POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next two or three decades?

Answer. The Army's future threats are defined in the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the FCS will help posture the Army to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.

Question. Do you believe that these initiatives are affordable within the projected Army budget?

Answer. Yes, Grow the Force and Modularity are affordable within the projected Army budget. These requirements reflect what is needed to restore balance in the Army. Our budget requests reflect our comprehensive plan to restore balance and build the full spectrum capable Army we need in the 21st century. The acquisition program anticipated for FCS extends well beyond current budget planning timeframes but resources roughly in the amounts described in the long-range planning documents will be essential to modernizing Army equipment for future fights.

Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army pursue in this regard if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army?

Answer. As mentioned above, Secretary Geren and Chief of Staff Casey are working to advance a list of initiatives that seek to provide better support to Army families. Of particular interest to me is our disability system, which having been built over generations, has become a bureaucratic maze and needlessly complex. It is a system that frustrates, and often stymies, the best intentions of dedicated public servants and compromises the Army Values we pledge to uphold. A soldier who fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home. I look forward to working with OSD and the Veteran's Administration to revamp this antiquated disability system.

Question. The Government Accountability Office reported last year that the cost of the Army's largest acquisition program—the FCS—is expected to grow from the $160 billion estimated in 2006 to between $203 billion and $234 billion (an increase of as much as 45 percent). Earlier this month, Secretary Gates acknowledged the existence of a substantial gap in funding for the Army's Global Force Initiative and testified that "it is hard to see" how DOD can afford to complete the FCS.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Army needs to take to control costs on the FCS and ensure that the system is affordable?

Answer. The Army can afford FCS. The cost estimates referenced above are the total costs for FCS, operating costs and procurement, over its lifecycle, a 27-year period (2003–2030). FCS procurement costs are substantially less and, even during the peak procurement period, are projected to be less than a third of the Army's investment (RDA) account. As the investment account is about a quarter of the total budget, FCS procurement cost is unlikely to exceed 10 percent of the Army's budget in any year. The Army took steps in 2007 to adjust the scope of the program (from 18 systems to 14), and slowed the pace of procurement. This program adjustment was designed to reduce the costs of fielding FCS to a more manageable level. Finally, we believe that FCS brigades will have lower operating costs than the legacy brigades they replace and will be more effective when deployed, providing significantly more "bang for the buck" once the program is completed.
LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from OEF and OIF which you would seek to address if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army?

Answer. Lessons learned from OEF/OIF have caused the Army to adjust its training and equipment to fight an adaptable, determined enemy. On the homefront, the pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families and we have had to build programs to better support our families. We have also had to expand language skills and enhance cultural awareness to be successful in the operations and missions we are engaged in today and likely will be engaged in the future. The Army must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers, home station training, and institutional training. Detention operations have improved over the course of the conflict, but we must continue to look for ways to enhance our capabilities in this area.

With growth in the Army’s force structure and the challenges this places on training, the Army needs to continue to assess ways to train efficiently, using training resources from all Army Components, as appropriate. As the Army develops its operational rhythm, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to play a critical role in synchronizing cyclic training, while placing focus on theater-specific training requirements, such as training to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Because of the large load that the Reserve component (Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve) is pulling, the Army needs to assess continually its mobilization policies, balancing training requirements to meet the appropriate level of Reserve component operational readiness with domestic missions and requirements.

Question. More specifically, what are the lessons learned concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army which you intend to address if confirmed?

Answer. The Army needs to expand the force to its authorized levels as quickly as possible without compromising the quality of our recruits, and with the goal of reducing the length and frequency of deployments. The Army must build on its distance learning program to enable soldiers in the field to train individually on skills not otherwise available when deployed. Further, the Army must take appropriate measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems (TSS) at Army installations to support full spectrum training. Units must have greater capabilities at home stations to train across the full spectrum of conflict in a training environment replicating the Contemporary Operating Environment. One equipping lesson learned is that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking steps to transition the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract from one to three contractors to increase capabilities and generate the competition necessary to reduce cost and improve service. We must find ways to respond immediately to the stress and demands placed on our military families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy.

Question. What are the Army’s lessons learned from detainee abuse incidents at Guantanamo, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan?

Answer. The primary lessons learned from the detainee abuse incidents are: first, we must clearly communicate through the establishment of standards, meaningful and realistic training, and constant vigilance, our commitment to ensuring that all soldiers live up to our values and the law of war, regardless of the circumstances; and second, we must act to ensure that any soldier who engages in detainee abuse is held accountable.

As the executive agent for the administration of DOD detainee operations policy, the Army continues to gather detention operations lessons learned for incorporation into Army and joint policy and doctrine. Another major lesson learned has been that DOD needs more detention operations force structure, particularly in the Military Police and Military Intelligence specialties. We continue to work with OSD and the other Services to assess and refine force structure needed to support the combatant commanders’ detention operations missions with success.

Although our policies have always prohibited detainee abuse, Army detention operations policy and doctrine required revisions to reflect the current operational situation. Policy and doctrine across the full spectrum of detention operations has been revised and published. Some key revisions include the designation of a single commander for detention operations, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for detainee care, custody, and interrogations, and finally, very specific guidance for identifying and reporting detainee abuse. New policy also mandates that our forces receive additional law of war and cultural awareness training. The Army has enhanced detention operations training for soldiers, units, and civilians, not only as an annual requirement, but also institutionally and during pre-deployment.
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 months. What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The recently instituted captains’ retention program, which offers a number of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, has guaranteed retention of officers at historic rates through fiscal year 2010.

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates averaging 110–120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.

Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends.

We see the following trends:

- The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of soldiers and commanders.
- Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates trended upward from fiscal years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted female soldiers, and deployed soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-sponsored “Strong Bonds” training program to help soldiers and families build and maintain stronger relationships.
- Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued its aggressive drug education, awareness, and testing programs.
- Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward trend. The Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training. Alcohol abuse rates are monitored continuously via the Army’s Risk Reduction Program. We are also developing and implementing preventative intervention programs for soldiers at the first sign of trouble. “Prevention of Alcohol Abuse” messages are incorporated in Army-wide prevention of substance abuse campaigns like “Warrior Pride.”
- Rates for Absence Without Leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL based on the facts and circumstances of the soldier’s individual case.
- In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest post-fiscal year 2001 rates.
- Substantiated rates of Spouse and Child Abuse have declined steadily since fiscal year 2001. In addition to programs like “Strong Bonds,” the Army continues to focus resources on programs and services that support soldiers and their families.
- The overall health of the force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.

Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

Answer. The Army can sustain Iraq and Afghanistan deployments at the pre-surge levels as long as there is no additional growth in other global requirements.
As demands reduce beyond the pre-surge levels, stress on the Army, our soldiers and our families will be reduced further, and we will be able to restore strategic depth and flexibility.

Question. General Casey has stated that the Army is “out of balance.” What is your understanding of this statement and what do you think can or should be done to correct that imbalance?

Answer. The Army’s balance is the relationship between the demands placed on the Army and the ability to generate ready forces in a resource-limited environment, with an All-Volunteer Force. To meet current global demands, the Army has assumed risks in readiness and strategic flexibility that are not sustainable indefinitely. This imbalance stresses all of the Army—soldiers, families, and organizations—and impacts our ability to meet future challenges. Ultimately, current global operational demands in support of the global war on terrorism exceed the supply of forces that the Nation’s strategic guidance requires. The Army is addressing the imbalance; but it will take both time and resources. The Army is moving closer to completing its capabilities transformation into a modular construct, while simultaneously growing additional end strength. These actions will increase the global force pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational force. As time between deployments (dwell) continues to increase, readiness will improve and the Army can move from primarily a counterinsurgency ready force to one ready for the full spectrum of military operations. Increased dwell will also reduce some of the stress on soldiers and families and safeguard the volunteer force. Any effort to restore balance, however, is dependent on full, timely, and predictable funding.

SOLDIERS’ POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS

Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at congressional direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Army uses available data on the health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.

The addition of the Post Deployment Health Reassessment and the new annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers after initial redeployment, redeployment, and long before they start preparing for their next deployment.

The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed “Battlemind” training products to increase this resiliency and have several different training programs available for pre, during, and post-deployment.

Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to educate all soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army education and training system to share the information with our new soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT TEAM IV (MHAT IV)

Question. The Army’s mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in OIF.

Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health...
providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To date, we have hired 147 providers who are already making a difference in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill all of our behavioral health care requirements.

**Question.** What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army’s mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

**Answer.** MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been utilized to create a training program known as “Battlemind,” which changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for high stress deployments.

**TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES**

**Question.** In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, DOD assumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on implementing increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families. What is your understanding of the Department’s proposals for changes in TRICARE fees for retired soldiers, and, if they are implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army?

**Answer.** The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees and civilian visit copayments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard “working age” retirees under 65 and their Families. For these beneficiaries, some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise copayments for all beneficiaries (except Active Duty) on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. While the budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total defense budget and begin to address benefit inequities between military retirees and other Federal retirees.

**Question.** What is your personal view of the justification for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?

**Answer.** I support any reasonable strategy to protect the TRICARE program for our beneficiaries without jeopardizing Army readiness or modernization programs. Even with reasonable cost increases, TRICARE will continue to be among the most affordable and highest quality health plans in the country.

**STOP LOSS AUTHORITY**

**Question.** How many soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2008?

**Answer.** The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of fiscal year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for September 2008 is approximately 6,000.

**Question.** What is the Army’s plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end strength through the out-years?

**Answer.** DOD guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a reduction in demand and a return to a cycle of “1 year deployed with 2 years at home.” The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a cycle of “1 year deployed with 2 years at home.”

**RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION**

**Question.** In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?

**Answer.** To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders’ requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing solutions. The Guard and Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) that are fully qualified and
combat ready. They have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner over the past few years. The same is true for Reserve Component Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. The Army will continue to select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each unit’s ability to carry out its assigned mission.

*Question.* What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?

*Answer.* The Army has made considerable progress in “total force” management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping, and readiness decisions.

Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding commitments to the Reserve components for re-set and re-equipping actions, and our Chief’s initiatives and imperatives include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining America’s Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and overseas.

*Question.* Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

*Answer.* Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are organized and arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of combat, combat support, and combat-service support operations. In today’s operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and capabilities across all components of the Army. There are opportunities to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare for future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully engaged in such an effort with the aim of Arraying capabilities across the Army so that operational demands are fully met.

**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY**

*Question.* A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?

*Answer.* The U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database to reconcile existing records (blank and erroneous data fields, obsolete military occupational skills, bad addresses); identify non-mobilization assets (soldiers passed over for promotion or with security violations, physical disqualifications, determined hardships, or adverse characterizations of service); and separate those soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military service if mobilized. These efforts have reduced the number of IRR soldiers

*Question.* What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?
by a third and provided the Army with a more reliable database. For example, incorrect IRR addresses were the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are now at a 10-year low, with only about 9 percent of those ineligible for mobilization being excluded because of an incorrect address.

A DOD policy established in July 2005 mandated the discharge of officers in the IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation (MSO), unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR. Officers who fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to elect to remain in the IRR are transferred to the Standby Reserve and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date, approximately 10,000 IRR Officers have been transferred to the Standby Reserve; 2,900 of these have been honorably discharged.

HRC developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal (IW-VSP) for IRR soldiers to update their contact information and verify their readiness level without having to report to a physical location. HRC screens all information submitted through the website, reconciles discrepancies, and contacts soldiers that require additional assistance.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future?

**Answer.** The IRR is very important to our attempts to restore balance in the All-Volunteer Force. Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in the IRR is important to managing our operational and strategic capability. The Army recognizes the value of keeping trained and motivated members in the Service, and we continue to offer opportunities for continued service. The IRR will continue to play a vital role in the Army’s mission in the future.

**OFFICER SHORTAGES**

**Question.** After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from Active Duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—small unit actions where junior leaders are not only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives—may produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly trained and experienced junior officers. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?

**Answer.** Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates. The officer shortages are due to the growth of officer requirements of 9,000 officers by fiscal year 2012. Nearly 6,800 of these requirements are in the grades of captain and major. To address this shortfall, we have increased accessions and will produce nearly 5,000 additional officers by fiscal year 2009.

The Army instituted a pre-commissioning retention incentives program that is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent our retention of high performing USMA and ROTC scholarship officers by offering them graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in exchange for additional Active-Duty service. The Army has sought officers aggressively from outside the active Army and has accessed nearly 1,500 officers from the inactive Reserve and from the other Services through the “Blue to Green Program.”

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly-qualified captains and majors are serving on Active Duty over the next 10 years?

**Answer.** The Army has developed policies to retain our “best and brightest,” combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers. We must not allow the Army to drift into a post-conflict mindset. This will require refocusing the Army and a commitment to leveraging combat-experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as in the schools and battle labs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components. Medical support requirements caused by the stand-up of BCTs, potential growth of the Army, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse and behavioral health personnel.

Do you believe that a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army is necessary and should be accomplished this year?

Answer. Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews medical support requirements as a part of its ongoing internal processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified over 2,500 new military requirements and over 2,400 new civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic brain injury, to name just a few.

Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?

Answer. Policy initiatives implementing the authorities provided by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 are required in areas such as the authority to reduce mandatory service obligations from 8 to 2 years in critically short health specialties. Further, DOD is currently developing and evaluating legislative proposals relating to enhanced direct hire authorities for civilian medical personnel. Finally, section 721 of the NDAA, which effectively prohibits the conversion of military medical and dental positions to civilian positions, constrains the Department’s ability to meet changing requirements with Army civilian employee and contractor employee medical professionals and impacts Army plans to reshape its medical workforce better to meet operational medical requirements and the needs of our beneficiaries. We understand that this concern is being addressed by a USD(P&R) legislative repeal proposal.

INTERSERVICE TRANSFERS

Question. At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are working harder than ever to achieve recruiting goals, the Navy and the Air Force are planning for significant reductions in military personnel. Section 327 of title 37, U.S.C., authorizes a $10,000 bonus for certain interservice transfers. Additional incentives may be necessary, however, to encourage “blue to green” transfers in order to retain sailors and airmen with valuable military training, skills, and experience.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of existing incentives for interservice transfers?

Answer. The existing incentive system is achieving good results. To date, the program has produced over 500 officer interservice transfers for the Army. These experienced professionals have been crucial to meeting our growing need for leaders, particularly in our combat units. It continues to be in our national defense interest to promote interservice transfers. The military departments must work together to make this program a success.

Interservice transfer financial incentives alone may not be sufficient to make the program succeed. Service-specific force shaping tools may need to be redesigned to support the effort. The requirement for the Army to recoup from a candidate for interservice transfer any voluntary separation incentive the individual has received is a disincentive for an officer to transfer to the Army. The voluntary separation incentives, therefore, have had a negative impact on Army recruiting of officers from sister Services by creating a greater incentive to leave the Service than to transfer between Services. However, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service now follows a policy of not recouping separation pay until the officer concerned qualifies for retired pay. This mitigates somewhat the disincentive of forced recoupment. An officer who receives separation pay and then transfers to the Army will repay that separation pay at the end of his/her active service via a monthly deduction from retired pay. Army G–1 supports this DOD recoupment policy, and will actively recruit separating officers from our sister Services to offer them the opportunity to continue to serve their country.

If confirmed, and subject to the direction of Secretary Geren, I will continue to work with Department leadership and Congress to identify and establish programs to attract quality personnel from the other Services.
Question. The Department of the Army has implemented changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

Answer. The Secretary and the Chief have clearly stated that sexual assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks. The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational climate where such behavior is not tolerated, and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and Army Staff oversee and implement the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, which is now more than 3 years old. The Secretary, in fact, has taken a personal interest in this issue and has directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase emphasis on sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will assist him in this vitally important effort.

As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to DOD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and DOD policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and human resource management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional development and management of our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has done for its General Officer Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

Question. Over the last 10 years, the Army budget has almost doubled, but the number of senior executives in the Department of the Army has remained almost unchanged.

Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department into the future?

Answer. The Department of the Army projects a greater need for executive resource allocations in the near term. The need to convert General Officer billets to senior executive billets and the ever expanding mission of the Army has created a potential requirement for more senior executives. The Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, controls the allocation of senior executive resources to all government agencies. Federal agencies can request additional senior executive allocations on a biennial or ad hoc basis, but there is no guarantee that such requests will be granted. This year, the Army was successful in obtaining additional executive resources for its most pressing requirements.

The Department is currently undertaking a study of executive resource allocations in response to section 1102 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. Congress mandated that the Department develop a strategic plan for shaping and improving the senior management, functional, and technical workforce, including an assessment of whether current allocations and position types meet all DOD needs. An interim re-
port was provided by the Department on July 13, 2007. An update is due in April 2008.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense promulgated a new policy in October 2007, identifying the new requirements for executives for the 21st century. These new policies will be the foundational doctrine to guide and conduct the baseline evaluation of executive resources. The Army supports the Department’s concept to leverage better career civilian executive leadership capabilities. The Army recognized this critical need several years ago, and set out to create a deliberate executive management system that will develop, grow and sustain executives who are prepared for a broader range of leadership, particularly in the joint environment, and who are exerting influence and supporting the most substantive national security matters.

**ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN**

**Question.** The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

**Answer.** The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that challenge by making the commitments set forth in the Army Family Covenant, a promise to provide soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with their voluntary service and daily sacrifices. The Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs and services; health care; soldier and family housing; excellent schools, youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education opportunities for family members. I will also work to help further standardize the support being provided to soldiers and families and to obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they support our Families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving our ability to address soldier-family reintegration and reunion issues. The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army spouses who volunteer as Family Readiness Group Leaders, Unit Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. The FRSA helps mitigate volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between families and support programs.

**Question.** How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the Army?

**Answer.** The Installation Management Command works extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of families as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans include maintaining support to our soldiers and families throughout the process. At the installations that are expected to grow, we have programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our soldiers and families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these efforts to ensure that our families’ needs are met as the Army undergoes this dramatic era of growth, repositioning, realignment, and deployment.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness?

**Answer.** The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will provide a comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support and services to meet the needs of the Army’s geographically dispersed population. This effort is crucial in supporting Army National Guard and Army Reserve families. The baseline services are: information, referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services; school transition services; employer support to the Guard and Reserve services; wounded warrior program services; survivor support services; transition assistance services; employment; home and family life management services; financial services; medical care services; and legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 249 Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. AIFSN will provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar facilities, and access to public and private programs and services. AIFSN will ensure services and support are available throughout the full spectrum of the mobilization process. Additionally, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requires OSD to establish a reintegration program for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs and services that specifically address the needs of our guardsmen and their families.
If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs are implemented fully and assessed properly to insure we attain expected outcomes.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active-Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees. What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

Answer. Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of life of our military families. Their continued vitality depends on consistent appropriated and non-appropriated funding to support all of our MWR activities. The Army increased funding for family and MWR programs by $739 million with supplemental funds in fiscal year 2008 and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of soldiers and families. The Army's MWR funds are currently in sound financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of solvency through the use of best business practices and enterprise purchasing. This allows us to increase the value of our programs by eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be passed on in the form of higher prices.

The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while transforming to a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force. However, the needs of individual servicemembers and their families must still be met, particularly as soldiers return from combat. We are developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a means of adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will continue to explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs to ensure we are meeting the needs of soldiers and families and contributing positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness. We will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the basis for investment capital development to fund an $85 million Capital Program annually for the next 10 years to build travel camps, bowling centers, water parks, youth centers, single soldier entertainment centers, and other facilities for our highly deserving soldiers and families. We will begin privatizing our lodging programs this summer by transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations to a highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest $450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will insure the quality of the lodging we provide our soldiers and families is equal to the quality available in the communities from which we recruit America's sons and daughters. We appreciate your support of these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we implement these far-reaching and enduring changes.

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Deployments completed since the attacks of September 11 of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve for a time significantly depleted the number of soldiers available for involuntary mobilization under the Department's previous policy limiting involuntary recalls of Reserve personnel to 24 cumulative months. While this policy has changed, sensitivity about overuse of the Reserve component continues.

How should the Army's Reserve component forces best be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Answer. The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders' requests for forces and capabilities by considering all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution. The Guard and the Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are regarded as fully capable for combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers in our Reserve components. The Army will continue to select the best units capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned mission.

Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to avoid excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand specialties whose skills are found primarily in the Reserve, such as civil affairs, military policy, and logistics?

Answer. The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand on low density, high demand specialties. The
Grow the Army Plan increases the Army end strength by 74,200, a growth of 65,000 in the Active component (AC), 8,200 in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 in the United States Army Reserve. By the close of fiscal year 2007, the Army had completed rebalance of 53,600 structure spaces and will rebalance an additional 88,700 spaces by fiscal year 2013, bringing the Army rebalance total to 142,300 spaces. The combination of growth and rebalance addresses persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by 47,400; Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Operations Forces by 12,700; Military Police by 7,400, Military Intelligence by 4,500, and Engineers by 11,800. The combined impact of rebalance and growth will build strategic and operational depth across all three components to meet combatant commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent shortfalls, and enable strategy.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s ability to reach its recruiting goals by component in fiscal year 2008?

Answer. I believe that the Army will reach its recruiting and accession goals for fiscal year 2008. Both the Active component and the National Guard are above their recruitment targets to date. The Army Reserve, although short of its year-to-date recruiting goal, has met its overall year-to-date recruiting goal (which includes IRR to Troop Program Unit transfers and Active component to Reserve component missions). The current recruiting environment remains challenging. Not only are we competing with industry, but the qualified youth population of High School Diploma Graduates is dwindling. In addition, illegal drug use and poor physical fitness is on the rise, further limiting the qualified population. We continue to use the resources authorized and additional recruiters to assist in meeting our goal.

Question. What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. Recently deployed units or units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110–120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

SUPPORT FOR ARMY FAMILIES IN THE REBASING INITIATIVE

Question. Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the Department’s rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to the continental United States (CONUS) installations and their surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources, including housing and schools, are made available.

What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and receiving communities?

Answer. The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with increased community needs, such as schools, housing, and community activities, associated with Army stationing and growth. Garrison commanders and staff regularly engage with community leaders and have school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and growth. Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the Army provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on projected school-age dependent growth.

The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of family housing and will privatize or build family housing at U.S. locations only where necessary. To support Army Growth, Congress approved $266 million in fiscal year 2008 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Carson, and Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting $334 million in fiscal year 2009 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in fiscal year 2010 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at other gaining installations.

Question. What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the challenges associated with rebasing are met?

Answer. The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized stationing plan that links BRAC 2005, Global Defense Posture Realignment, Army Modular Force Trans-
formation, and Grow the Force. The Army's BRAC plan supports these major stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions and national security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011 statutory BRAC implementation deadline.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained a significant decrease in BRAC funding, of which $560 million was reduced from the Army's BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the $560 million decrement is not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with all aspects of the BRAC Law.

If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully vetted and work with Congress to garner the resources to implement our BRAC and stationing requirements in a timely and efficient manner.

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Wounded soldiers from OEF and OIF deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now in place to care for the wounded, including the Warrior Transition Brigade?

Answer. The Army has made and continues to make significant improvements in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes as part of our Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past 12 months, execution of the AMAP has seen the creation of 35 Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) at installations across the Army. These WTUs are staffed by more than 2,300 personnel who provide care and support to over 13,000 soldiers and their families. Although I believe these programs are a significant improvement over past practices, we need to continue tracking and monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue this transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers and their families.

Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs?

Answer. The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded personnel who have separated from active service. In close coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans Affairs advisors at major medical treatment facilities to facilitate the process of applying for benefits and finalizing arrangements for follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that everything is in place when soldiers transition to civilian status.

The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative, which will allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then return to the Army to work in assignments in the Institutional Army where their education and personal experiences can be put to the best use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting the Warrior Transition Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort Bragg, NC. This program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the Soldier Family Assistance Centers—which support Warrior Transition Units and are operated by the Army Installation Management Command—to receive education and training in the development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills.

Through this program, Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors from the Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and the staff of the Army Career and Alumni Program to develop a winning approach to obtaining employment when they leave the Army.

I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program, which assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured soldiers and their families throughout their lifetimes, wherever they are located. AW2 currently serves more than 2,300 soldiers, 600 on Active Duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program case-workers work with soldiers and their families to address and mitigate proactively any issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be my honor to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much for their country know that the Army will always be there for them.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to civilian life?

Answer. I think we have some terrific programs in place to support our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers, including some recent pilot programs. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the success of these pilot programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and
Congress to find innovative ways to return all of our warriors to productive civilian lives as proud veterans.

Question. What is the Army’s view of the Military Severely Injured Center?

Answer. I support any program that helps our wounded warriors get back on the track to success. If confirmed, my efforts will focus on getting programs and services such as the Military Severely Injured Center and the AW2 Program fully integrated with each other so as to provide comprehensive, uniform support to all servicemembers. To this end, I would work to see that the recently approved Department of the Army Office of Warrior Care and Transition integrates all of our Army programs into a streamlined and effective approach to care for soldiers and their families.

RELIABLE REPORTING OF HEALTH CARE COSTS

Question. In June 2007, a congressionally-mandated Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care, which was formed to evaluate proposed increases in TRICARE fees, found that financial statement information for the medical departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy are not auditable because of financial and information system problems, inadequate business processes, and internal controls. The same was true for DOD purchased health care, TRICARE operations, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Together these comprise two out of three stand-alone financial statements for the Department’s nearly $40 billion a year defense health program.

During your tenure as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Budgets and Programs, and also as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, what problems did you identify in the financial management of military health care programs, and what actions did you initiate, both for the Department as a whole and within the United States Army, to establish more effective internal controls on health care costs?

Answer. While serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy, I implemented performance-based budgeting to tie resource requirements to health care production under a prospective payment system. This system helps align resources to outputs instead of basing resources on costs. It is still being used successfully by the Military Health System to align incentives and control costs. Questions regarding the auditability of the defense health program focus largely on legacy financial systems that are not Federal Financial Management Improvement Act compliant and do a poor job of tracking program assets and liabilities. The cost of health care for DOD beneficiaries is driven by the entitlement of our patients to extensive health care services. We worked with both the TRICARE contractors and the military departments to make sure that the amounts paid for those services were comparable to the prices paid by the Federal Government’s largest health benefit program, Medicare.

Question. If confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army, what additional steps would you take to ensure and accelerate the reliable reporting of health care costs?

Answer. The primary responsibility of the Army in reporting health care costs is to make sure that the resources provided to the Army by the Defense Health Program (DHP) are managed according to the standards set by the DHP. While I believe that reporting to be both timely and accurate, any future improvements required would be the responsibility of the DHP.

Question. In your view, is the administration justified in seeking additional fee increases for military retirees before it corrects problems in health care cost reporting?

Answer. Yes. Although the DHP financial statements are not auditable, they do represent a reasonably accurate picture of the costs of the current benefit structure. I agree with the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care that additional fee increases are appropriate.

FULLY MANNING THE ARMY’S WARRIOR TRANSITION UNITS

Question. Full resourcing of the Warrior Training Units (WTU) is critical to the successful recovery of injured and ill soldiers.

What is your understanding of the current manpower requirement for the WTUs, and what portion of that requirement has been filled?

Answer. The current manpower requirements are based on U.S. Army Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) that were created for 35 Warrior Transition Units. There are currently 2,434 positions authorized for the WTUs. There are 2,509 personnel on hand, for a total of 103 percent of positions filled. This fill rate includes borrowed military manpower.
Question. Have reservists and National Guardsmen been mobilized to fill leadership positions?
Answer. Yes, Army reservists and National Guardsmen have been mobilized to fill key leadership positions in the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs). A board was conducted to select Army reservist and National Guardsmen as WTU Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders, Command Sergeants Major and First Sergeants. All authorized U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard leadership positions are currently filled.

Question. If confirmed, what level of priority would you accord the WTUs, and how would you monitor and resolve any problems in resourcing that occur?
Answer. Priority of fill is based on the three priorities established in the Army Manning Guidance. The WTUs are a priority 1 mission—the highest priority for fill. Other than providing units in response to Combatant Commanders' Requests For Forces, caring for our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers is our highest priority. Army leadership monitors WTU manning regularly. If confirmed I would resolve any problems in resourcing according to the established priorities of the Army.

HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR SOLDIERS IN THE WTUS

Question. The Army has established special health care access standards for servicemembers assigned to the WTUs, which should reflect the high priority assigned to these soldiers. What is your understanding of the standards and how well they are being met at this time?
Answer. The Army has established standards to ensure the WTU soldiers have expedited access to medical services. These standards assist in reducing the time our soldiers are in a transition status, and help facilitate a quick return to duty or separation to active citizenship. The enhanced standards apply to WTU soldiers receiving either primary or specialty care in our Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). Over the past several months, the Army has hired new care providers and adjusted additional resources to meet these enhanced standards. We use an automated system to measure and track trends related to these unique access standards. The Army currently meets the new standards for approximately 80 percent of WTU appointments. This is below our objective of 90 percent. Additionally, the Army tracks access through a WTU satisfaction survey. This survey asks WTU soldiers several questions related to their ability to access both doctors and therapists. The most recent survey results indicate that approximately 75 percent of WTU soldiers are satisfied with their ability to access medical care, a satisfaction level that is comparable to civilian benchmarks for access. A number of initiatives are ongoing to ensure processes and resources align to meet the access standards and improve patient satisfaction.

Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor performance on all standards, including health care, staffing and facility standards, as well as timely medical and physical evaluation board processing for soldiers assigned to the Army's WTUs?
Answer. Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting, and resourcing WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports and other measures to track short-, near-, and long-term objectives. These measures show specific details, to include day-to-day operations, but also provide aggregate trending information to ensure the organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on all standards.

JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS [ASA–ALT]

Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter?
Answer. There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the critical start-point for a joint program is a "joint" requirement. Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint acquisition program will be cost effective.

Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the Services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems?
Answer. Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area. Key national strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids provide incentives for the Services to collaborate to define and produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At the same time, it is very important for the Services to maintain separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities within
a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or increasing program costs.

*Question.* If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to implement more joint program acquisition?

*Answer.* DOD has an established process for the development and approval of joint capability documents. This process includes oversight at the Joint Service level through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As these capabilities are evaluated, a joint service designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities documents, DODI 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be approved, and any changes therein must be approved, by the USD(AT&L). Further, as the Services and DOD prepare their budget submissions, resourcing decisions can be made by the Service or OSD. Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions to the OSD leadership.

**REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING PROCESSES**

*Question.* As rising personnel and operations and maintenance costs consume an increasing portion of the Army’s budget authority, and as competing demands for Federal dollars increase in the future years, it is possible that the Army will have to address the challenges of modernization and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.

*Answer.* Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are accounting for a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This growth naturally increases the tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed dramatically, requiring our Nation’s Army to reorganize, grow, restation, and transform while fighting the war on terrorism. These demands have caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals. While increases in our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond to and request support for, largely through requests for supplemental appropriations.

I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound resourcing scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the Nation. However, without a reduction in expected missions or increased resources to match increased missions, the Army will eventually lose the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990s, Army investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment shortages in our forces that we have been scrambling to correct with new procurement, just-in-time fieldings and retention of theater-provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using the lessons from today’s fight, we are transforming to a future force with even more robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to providing the best protection to our soldiers today and in the future.

**BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS**

*Question.* The military Services are in the process of developing business plans for the implementation of the 2005 Defense BRAC decisions.

*What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?*

*Answer.* The Army is responsible for executing both the Army’s BRAC recommendations and a portion of the joint cross Service group recommendations, as assigned by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The Army has developed business plans and budget justification materials, and is executing the program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.

*Question.* What do you see as the priorities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?

*Answer.* The Army’s priority is to complete the construction projects required to enable unit and organizational moves from closing and realigning installations to meet the timeframe directed by the law. The bulk of construction funds ($13 billion) will be used in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. If the Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will be significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended.
Question. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community may not be compatible with proposals considered by DOD. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, DC, will present opportunities for both the local community and the Federal Government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans. If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?

Answer. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State and Local officials to accelerate the property disposal process whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening and has made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations except for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local Redevelopment Authorities are submitting their redevelopment plans, and they will be integrated into the Army property disposal process.

Question. What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?

Answer. I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to execute BRAC 2005.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?

Answer. The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs of record and the laboratories and Research, Development, and Engineering Centers (RDECs) which are developing and evaluating technology options for these programs. The Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However, because of the demands of the ongoing global war on terror, the Army has not been able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the technology that has been matured.

The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been through a formal acquisition development, and the Army must deal with the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even for those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of operation, the Army has procedures to assess the military utility of those technologies for full spectrum Army-wide applications.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter?

Answer. The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry, academia, and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore technology options for the soldier. As discussed above, the Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. These agreements document what products the Science and Technology (S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for that technology. The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program evaluation offices and program managers. We must guard against pressures for technology solutions from the nontechnical community that reads the popular press and thinks that they are “discovering” technology opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect disciplined technology development and technology maturity assessments towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to withstand rigorous evaluation.

Question. What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

Answer. The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the current force through several initiatives, including the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid
Fielding Initiative. The Army's number one priority is force protection of our soldiers with individual weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade and modernize existing systems to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they need. I would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army S&T program, and from FCS's development. I would field the FCS BCTs. FCS is the core of the Army's modernization effort and will provide our soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will be to have our soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the world with full-spectrum capabilities.

ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS AND LABORATORIES

Question. Among the roles the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the development of innovative systems and technologies supporting their transition to the warfighter, and supporting the Army in making technically sound acquisition decisions.

Do you feel that the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories are sufficiently resourced in funding, personnel, and equipment to perform these missions?

Answer. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism the Army has been able to maintain its S&T investment at over $1.7 billion for each of the past three budget requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T investment to $1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is sufficient to support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment consistent with our broad resource demands.

Question. What in your view are the biggest deficiencies in the performance of the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories?

Answer. The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their inability to effectively modernize their laboratory infrastructure.

Question. What do you plan to do to address those deficiencies?

Answer. To the maximum extent possible, the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the flexibility provided in title 10, U.S.C., section 2805, to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the associated minor construction limit to $2.5 million, with a $3 million limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide laboratory/center directors the ability to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on military construction to meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits to account for major increases in the cost of laboratory construction over more common forms of construction.

Question. Do you feel that the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly-qualified technical workforce?

Answer. Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly-qualified technical workforce. The laboratories and centers have already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. Section 904 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 provides for the Under Secretary of each military department to be designated as the Chief Management Officer of the department.

What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities that you would assume, if confirmed, as Chief Management Officer of the Department of the Army?

Answer. Section 904 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the Chief Management Officer of DOD and designates the Service Under Secretaries as Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments. This designation makes sense, and if confirmed to this position, I will discharge my duties in providing oversight and leadership across the broad range of the Army’s business functions.
Question. What priorities would you establish in your capacity as Chief Management Officer, and what would you hope to accomplish in that position?

Answer. Instituting a cost culture is essential to the success of the Army. Integrating cost as a variable in our decisionmaking process will help us ensure that scarce resources are used wisely and efficiently. Working with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, I would ensure effective execution of our enterprise architecture and modernization efforts across all business domains. I would ensure that progress is realized in implementing a comprehensive financial improvement and audit readiness plan to guide financial modernization activities.

Question. If confirmed, would you expect to establish a strategic management plan for the Department of the Army?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to develop a strategic management plan for the Army that is consistent and aligns with the DOD management plan. The Army’s enterprise architecture aligns with the Department’s federated approach to business system modernization.

Question. If so, what issues would you expect to address in that plan, and how would you go about addressing them?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that progress is realized on the Army’s three key financial improvement activities. The first is to complete development and fielding of General Fund Enterprise Business System Increment 2. The second is to complete all testing, fielding, and organizational restructuring in support of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System. Our third key activity is to implement a pilot program supporting electronic payments for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq. I would work to ensure that progress is made in establishing business system transition plans and that systems architecture aligns with the Department’s Enterprise Transition Plan and Business Enterprise Architecture.

COMMISSION ON ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

Question. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations concluded that “the Army sent a skeleton contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our warfighters.” According to the Commission, “Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; but they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported and, most important, under-valued.”

Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission?

Answer. The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and is in full agreement with the Commission’s general recommendations for improvement. Indeed, many of the Commission’s recommendations are consistent with the issues identified by the Army Contracting Study completed in 2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was co-chaired by Ms. Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson. To date, the Army has taken action on 21 of the 22 Gansler Commission recommendations specific to the Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified to improve current and future expeditionary contracting activities. Our actions stretch across the Army and include an ongoing, comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities.

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in addressing these concerns?

Answer. Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the Army Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused commitment to implement changes across the Army to ensure that our doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. Mr. Geren has directed me to implement specific recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting Task Force as expeditiously as possible.

Question. The Commission report states that “The Army’s difficulty in adjusting to the singular problem of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan is in large part due to the fact that there are no generals assigned to contracting responsibilities.” The Commission recommends that Congress authorize “a core set of 10 additional general officers for contracting positions.”

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

Answer. The Army plans to continue to grow additional military contracting structure in the Active Force and civilian contracting workforce in line with the Gansler Commission recommendations. To that end the Army has approved and is standing up a two-star level Army Contracting Command (ACC) under the AMC, including two subordinate commands; a one-star expeditionary contracting command; and a
The Army is seeking additional officer authorizations to provide the leadership for those new commands as well as provide career path progression to help retain and promote much needed uniformed leadership.

**Question.** In your view, is legislation required to implement this recommendation, or can the Army assign new general officers to contracting functions without legislation?

**Answer.** There is flexibility to assign general officers to contracting functions within the Army’s current general officer allocations. The key question is, given the current optempo and the stress on Army leadership, both military and civilian, does the Army need more general officers to meet the leadership demands for the force? The Army is working closely with OSD to assess whether legislation to increase the number of general officers to lead DOD’s future contracting workforce is the best way to meet the identified requirements in this area.

**Question.** The Commission report states that “The number and expertise of the military contracting professionals must be significantly increased” to address the problems we have experienced in theater. The Commission recommends that the Army hire 2,000 new contracting personnel.

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

**Answer.** The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the last decade while the number of dollars that we are executing in the Army has increased by more than 80 percent. The Army has never fought an extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and empower our contracting personnel to support the full range of military operations.

**Question.** What steps have you taken, if any, in your capacity as Acting Under Secretary to address this issue?

**Answer.** Contingency contracting force structure increases were being incorporated in the Army’s modular force design even prior to the establishment of the Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now established a contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support Brigades (commanded by a colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions, and Contingency Contracting Teams. An increase of 295 contingency contracting officers to fill this new force structure has already been approved. A further growth of 167 military and 804 civilians in the institutional Army is still undergoing analysis.

**Question.** What additional steps do you expect to take, if confirmed?

**Answer.** As the point person for the Army Contracting Campaign plan, I plan to examine the entire contracting process in the Army, from requirements definition to the final receipt and payment for goods and services received. We will look at everything, from how we are identifying what we need to how we raise and train our young officers to become our future contracting experts. As best practices emerge from these efforts, they will be shared across the entire contracting workforce.

**Question.** The Commission report states that most civilians working on contracting issues in Iraq were “volunteers, often with inadequate or wrong skill sets for the job at hand, and often getting their required contracting experience on-the-job as part of their deployment.” The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These include the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and long-term medical care for injuries incurred in theater.

Do you support the recommendations of the Commission?

**Answer.** The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who agree to deploy deserve the benefits and professional opportunities commensurate with their skills, hardships, and contributions. We are working with OSD to examine the entitlements, compensation, and benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. As we identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with OSD and the administration to seek legislative changes.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to implement these recommendations?

**Answer.** The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a team led by OSD. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been identified to improve the benefits for deployed civilians and we have initiated the staffing process in these areas.

**Question.** The Commission report states that some DOD and Army policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example, the report states that volunteers are required to be sent on ‘detail’, so that the providing office has to pay salary and expenses of deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any
reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports, managers in the
U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from volunteering.

Do you agree with the Commission’s findings on this issue?
Answer. The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees have been
discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however, organizations have been
required to continue paying salary and other expenses of deployed employees. With
the current tight budget situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed
civilian. We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce the
organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian personnel.

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or
plans to take, to address this problem?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject “Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity.” In the memo and attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the deployment of DOD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to deploy civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will continue to review recommendations for resolving the issue.

Question. The report states that Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) are an “essential part of contract management”, because they are responsible for ensuring contract performance. According to the report, however, “CORs are assigned as . . . an ‘extra duty,’ requiring no experience. . . . The COR assignment is often used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base when a commander does not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally, little, if any, training is pro-
vided. . . . Despite this, there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage.”

Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment of the CORs assigned in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Answer. A Contracting Officer Representative (COR) townhall meeting in Kuwait led by Army Constructive Training Federation leadership in October 2007 identified both individual COR training and execution shortcomings. CORs stated that they lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee complex theater contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel, they are the “eyes and ears” of the contracting officer and the customer and must be viewed with the appropriate level of authority across the Army.

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or
plans to take, to address this problem?
Answer. A standard, minimum training requirement has been established for Army CORs. They must complete the Defense Acquisition University online continuous learning module, “COR with a Mission Focus,” prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4,500 Army personnel have completed this course.

MILITARY ROLE IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES

Question. The shortfalls in the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina along
the Gulf Coast have resulted in debate about the appropriate role of DOD and the
Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies.

In your view, should the Army have a more expansive role in responding to nat-
ural disasters?
Answer. Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army—Active, Guard,
and Reserve—has been a leader in this war and has been fully engaged in Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, and defending the homeland. The Army has always supported requests
for military assistance and will continue to do so. However, the “role” of the Army
in domestic emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in
support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal agency.

Question. In your view, what should the Army’s role be in responding to domestic
emergencies, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks?
Answer. DOD and United States Northern Command have worked in concert with
the Department of Homeland Security to plan and prepare for response to domestic
emergencies. United States Army North is the dedicated Army Service Component
Command to the United States Northern Command for Homeland Defense and De-
fense Support to Civil Authorities for the continental United States and Alaska.
Northern Command is DOD’s conduit to each Federal Emergency Management
Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The Command collocates
within the Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters and builds syn-
ergetic and habitual relationships with Federal Emergency Management Agency staff,
other Government Agencies, state emergency responders, state Adjutant Generals,
and potential base support installations.
When a domestic emergency, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, occurs, the affected Governor or Governors shall first employ their Air and/or Army National Guard with State authority, if required. Each State and Territory has its own Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification). Moreover, 17 States have created federally funded National Guard Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages (commonly known as CERFP) for search and rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and force protection. These force packages are designed to support all States within their FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country.

In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely request Federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of assets to Northern Command for the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment teams and enhances the civil authority’s ability to provide command and control, medical, logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security, public affairs, and mortuary affairs.

Question. What is your assessment of the Army National Guard’s ability to meet its contingency and homeland defense missions, given its operational commitments overseas and current equipment shortfalls?

Answer. The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its ability to respond to State contingency and homeland missions as well as to its operational commitments.

The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement.

Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating resources to the Total Army—the Active component and the Reserve components. The Army is currently executing and programming unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve components. The Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements resulting in an improved total force.

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over $49 billion in Army National Guard procurement (for fiscal years 2001–2013). Funding and equipment distributions are firewalled; promises made are promises kept. For fiscal years 2001–2007, the Army resourced $15.3 billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over the next 24 months, the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to the Army National Guard, valued at $17.5 billion—36 percent of Total Army distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night vision devices, and 86,000 weapons.

Question. What is your view of the recommendation of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves to provide Governors the authority to direct all military forces within their States when responding to domestic emergencies?

Answer. States have effectively responded to numerous disasters and have done well. A catastrophic domestic emergency will likely be a multi-state event overwhelming the ability of the State or States to respond. In that situation, forces from outside the disaster area, not burdened by an immediate danger to themselves and their families, are the best assets to respond.

While I understand the need to provide the Governors with access to military forces in response to domestic emergencies, I disagree with the means identified in the recommendation. A Governor’s perspective is primarily his or her State. After use of local and State first responders, each Governor has Army and Air National Guard forces under state authority available to respond to State emergencies. Further, most of the States and territories participate in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact which enables them to provide additional support to each other.

When the Governors request Federal assistance, DOD provides the military portion of that support to the designated lead Federal agency. In the event of multiple, near simultaneous terrorist attacks, the Federal Government must maintain the flexibility and agility to employ forces to manage and sustain an effective response force.
FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS

Question. Over the past several years, the Army, with the assistance of Congress, has spent billions of dollars on force protection measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, uparmored high mobility multipurpose vehicles, counter-IEDs measures) primarily using supplemental appropriations.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army continues to support and fund force protection programs, even in the absence of supplemental appropriations provisions?

Answer. I appreciate the assistance of Congress in protecting our soldiers by supporting these critical Force Protection programs. I can assure you that equipment necessary to protect the lives of soldiers will always be a high priority for funding. The Army has become increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet war-related requirements and many programs funded through supplemental appropriations—like force protection—have become enduring. As your question implies, we must continue funding enduring programs even if supplemental appropriations go away. Funding from supplemental appropriations for enduring programs must move to the base program. So in addition to ensuring that Force Protection programs receive a high priority for funding within the Army, I will also advocate strongly that the missions assigned to the Army are resourced commensurately.

EQUIPMENT RESET

Question. The ongoing requirements of the global war on terror have significantly increased usage rates on the Services’ equipment. As a result, we know there will be a requirement to ‘reset’ the force not only as the current operations continue but for some time after they conclude as well. However, given the ongoing nature of both the war in Iraq, and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready to respond to whatever contingencies are required.

Do you think that the Army’s equipment reset program meets the requirements of the global war on terror, as well as the requirements for changing to a modular force?

Answer. The Army’s reset program has been meeting the requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness with rates at more than 90 percent for ground equipment and more than 75 percent for aviation equipment. The Army expects to have its BCTs fully equipped by 2015 and its combat support and combat service support units by 2019 provided it receives adequate funding.

Question. In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the Army’s reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or mitigate that risk?

Answer. Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk to the Army’s reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of the fiscal year allows for the early purchase of long lead parts which reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays in replacing battle losses, and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the depots. To mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant and open communication with OSD, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress, so that they clearly understand our requirements and the reasoning behind them.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient resources are programmed and requested to meet the Army’s requirements to provide trained and ready forces across the spectrum of military operations?

Answer. The development of the Army’s reset requirements is driven by current wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational tempo; equipment stress; battle losses; lessons learned; and the need to reconstitute equipment readiness for the next contingency, which could be any mission along the spectrum of conflict from low intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset requirements are a cost of war and should be entirely funded by supplemental dollars.

Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

Answer. Depots are not operating at maximum capacity but are operating at a level that theater equipment retrograde and funding will support. In peacetime, our depots expend approximately 12 million direct labor hours annually. Depots are currently executing 27 million direct labor hours and have the capacity to expand up to 40 million. Each depot’s production capacity is being optimized by equipment type and commodity. Our depots have enabled deployed forces to maintain equipment readiness for the last 5 years at 90 percent or better for ground equipment and 75 percent or better for aviation, and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of the next deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots
could do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts, increased workforce, and more retrograded equipment.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

Answer. Timely and adequate funding is essential. It enables depots to procure long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace and repair maintenance equipment, and set the conditions for resetting our redeploying forces. In addition, we are putting in place several logistics initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset visibility, reduce transportation time, and target certain equipment for direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the Reset Pilot Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots are implementing Lean Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous success in improving production rates and reducing turn around times.

ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Question. The Army has long included as a critical element of its strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks around the world and afloat to accelerate the deployment and employment of forces in response to crises. However, Army prepositioned stocks are nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or options. What changes to policies regarding use of prepositioned equipment stocks would you recommend if confirmed?

Answer. No changes are recommended to the current policy for the use of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) at this time. The last 4 years demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army’s ability to deploy forces in support of combatant command requirements and to adapt to changing strategic requirements. The Army carefully monitors the use of APS assets and closely coordinates their use with the combatant commanders. Whenever use of APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates the strategic risk and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to replenish our APS stocks with “modernized” equipment that meets the needs of the modular force.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment to re-establish this strategic capability?

Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The Army has developed “APS Strategy 2015” which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and contingent on available resources and operational requirements, the Army has an executable timeline within which to reset its APS sets in accordance with “APS Strategy 2015.”

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support the predeployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF?

Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No soldier will go into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.

Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand predeployment training equipment shortfalls occur with force protection-related
equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG–31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home station training and at our Combat Training Centers so soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of our soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems.

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific areas which are driven by the Army’s desire to get the most modern and capable systems immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat Training Centers.

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need arise.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need in time to train before deploying and as well as for operations in Iraq?

Answer. The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the global war on terrorism, and to replace critical equipment destroyed in battle. The Army is also prioritizing and managing procurements and distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat.

MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLES

Question. In September 2007, the JROC capped Mine-Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) procurement at 15,374 vehicles with about 3,700 going to the Marine Corps and approximately 10,000 to the Army. In November 2007, the marines decreased their requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles—citing, in part, an improved security situation in Iraq and the MRAP’s unsuitability in some off-road and urban situations. Reports suggest that the Army may follow suit and reduce its overall MRAP requirement.

Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs, and if the Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is this the Army’s final requirement or can we expect the requirement to change again?

Answer. The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army units is 12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be 17,770. To ensure this assessment met our emerging requirements, the Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and OSD to continuously reassess and raise the procurement quantity in a stairstep fashion to ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to theater while remaining good stewards of our Nation’s resources. Recently, based on input from theater, the Army was able to reduce its estimate from 17,770 down to a range of between 15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do not overstate our requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to almost 12,000 and, after working with OSD, the Joint Staff and the Joint Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet warfighters needs for protected mobility; preserve options for commanders in the field to make adjust-
ments as force levels and situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately.

Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts?

Answer. The MRAP has addressed the Army's most critical current battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against IEDs) with a capable, survivable and sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. However, with the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance and explosive ordnance disposal teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into tomorrow's force structure.

Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a tactical wheeled vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles, threats, and capabilities of the various fleets. This analysis includes the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial results will influence program objective memorandum decisions, the Force Mix Brief to Congress, and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging threats.

SPECIAL UNITS FOR STABILIZATION AND TRAINING/ADVISORY MISSIONS

Question. On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the role that "unconventional warfare" will play in the Army's future as well as the need to organize and prepare for training and advisory role. Some, both inside and outside of the Army, have suggested that special units or organizations should be established to address these mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best handled by the Army's full-spectrum BCTs and their supporting forces.

Do you believe that there is any merit in establishing special units—such as a Training and Advisory Corps?

Answer. Future requirements to train and advise foreign security forces will be addressed with a combination of special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, embassy military groups, and Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict security cooperation activities will emphasize Special Operations Forces, small scale specialized forces, and small deployments of full spectrum modular forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post conflict efforts will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces.

A new small scale specialized force the Army is studying is the Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group—Future, which would provide three 22-man security cooperation detachments working directly for the Combatant Command and conducting preconflict security cooperation training and advising. The Army is considering piloting the Theater Military and Advisory Group—Future in United States Army South.

Army modular forces are ideally suited to train and advise. For all these forces, the key consideration is expertise in their core function. For example, U.S. Army infantry, medical, or engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime function and can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer companies. However, before Army forces conduct a training or advising mission, they must prepare for the unique aspects an advising mission entails. To that end the Army is creating an enduring advising institution. This institution will reside at Fort Polk and will have the capability to prepare individuals or units to serve as trainers and advisors.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The Special Operations Command, pursuant to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) guidelines, is currently expanding the size of its Army component. It is also working to raise the language proficiency of its Army special operators.

If confirmed, will you support U.S. Army Special Operations Command's (USASOC) end strength growth?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support USASOC's end strength growth. QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions be increased by one-third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be increased by 33 percent. The Army has already programmed and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, the Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this growth and ensure it meets operational requirements.

Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and specialized tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by these specially selected and trained forces. Growth of Special Operations Forces is within programmed end
strength of 547,400 (Active), 358,200 (National Guard), and 206,000 (Reserve). The growth in Special Operations Forces will greatly contribute to the Army’s ability to confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations.

**Question.** What steps do you believe the Army should take to ensure that proficiency pays for language create the appropriate incentives to Army special operators to learn, improve, and retain language skills?

**Answer.** The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to increase language capability across the force. The Army goal is to train our language cadre to the minimum level of 2 for language proficiency. Currently, Active component and Reserve component soldiers may earn up to $400 per month per language depending on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum rate of $1,000 per month. Soldiers who are in language dependent military operation skills, such as special operators, are paid the highest rate for their primary language. This is true even for languages such as Spanish, which has been identified as “dominant in the force” and is not usually authorized for language pay for other Army soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to soldiers to maintain their proficiency.

**CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**Question.** In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Army?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

**Answer.** Yes, to the extent of my authority.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA**

**TRANSFORMING THE RESERVES**

1. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, one of the challenges you have highlighted for the Army is the transitioning of the Reserve component to an operational force rather than a Strategic Reserve. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves reached the same conclusion in their last report before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February of this year. What elements of this report do you feel are the most important for Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) to address immediately, and what obstacles do you foresee as being the most problematic in beginning the official transformation of our Reserve Forces?

**Mr. FORD.** At this time, the Army, as well as the other Services and DOD stakeholders, are participating in a comprehensive review of 95 recommendations in the Commission’s final report, including a full evaluation, their relationship to other programs and initiatives, their cost (if approved), and how they will be funded (if approved).

The Commission noted that, as the Nation uses its Reserve Forces for current operations to an unprecedented degree, there is “no reasonable alternative to increased reliance on the Reserve component as an operational force for missions at home and abroad.”

We fully concur. The Commission’s recommendations validate numerous strategic initiatives that the Army has been pursuing for several years, to include transitioning the Army’s Reserve component from Strategic Reserve to part of the sustainable operational force, committing units to providing military support to civil authorities and other domestic operations, and providing soldiers with service op-
tions under a continuum of service personnel management construct. The Army appreciates continued congressional and department support in these areas. However, the degree to which we transition the Army’s Reserve components depends on a move towards institutionalizing budget policy and support for making the Reserve component part of the operational force.

AVIATION SURVEILLANCE BATTALION

2. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, a recent article in the New York Times described the Army’s new Aviation Surveillance Battalion in Iraq, named Task Force Odin. It was reported that the order to stand up this unit was in response to frustration with Army requests for both combat air power and surveillance assets while conducting ground operations in Iraq, and the unit has been successful enough that there is a plan to stand up a similar battalion in Afghanistan. It was further stated that this signals a clear shift for the Army away from joint operations, and toward more self-sufficient operations. To what extent do you agree with this statement?

Mr. FORD. The New York Times opinions about assets and joint support to the Army do not reflect the policy or opinions of the United States Army. Task Force Odin supports battalion and brigade reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition requirements and provides actionable intelligence directly to the warfighter. Experience with Task Force Odin shows having the sensor assets and the engagement assets under the same command provides a dynamic real time ability to persistently view and engage elusive insurgents. Similar reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition requirements exist in Afghanistan and the Army plans to meet those needs.

3. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what steps will be taken by the Army to address conflicts in roles and missions between Army and Air Force assets conducting operations in both areas of responsibility?

Mr. FORD. The Army and the Air Force will continue recently initiated efforts intended to enhance their joint warfighting capabilities. Several initiatives are underway including a series of warfighter talks convened by both the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. These talks resumed in January 2008 to synchronize Service concepts, roles and missions, and improve joint interoperability and interdependence. As a result of the most recent talks the Army-Air Force Board (AAFB) was formed to address bilateral issues of concern. The goal of the AAFB is to make recommendations to improve service integration, interdependence, and warfighting capabilities as they relate to the current conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to future warfighting requirements. Issues currently being addressed include concepts, doctrine, joint capabilities, requirements, and programs and span a wide range of initiatives relative to current and future operations.

In addition to the Warfighter Talks, the Services have established the Army-Air Force Integration Forum (AAFIF) to identify and recommend prioritized Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities solutions to enable complementary and seamless interoperability between the two Services. The AAFIF targets issues to be resolved at the Air Combat Command and Training and Doctrine Command level. The AAFIF provides recommended solutions to the AAFB and, thereby, to the respective Service Headquarters Staffs, for review and implementation.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

4. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS), like many other DOD programs, is expected to undergo as much as 45 percent cost growth, as highlighted by last year’s Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. You have indicated that this may be an overestimation, since the figures take into account operating costs over the service life of the system, and that the FCS Brigades will cost less to operate than older brigades they replace. What factors are you using to calculate lower operating costs, especially considering the degree of technical complexity of the elements of FCS once fielded when compared to older systems?

Mr. FORD. There are three factors used in the Program Manager’s (PM) current Operations and Support (O&S) cost estimate that drive the projection of lower operating cost. The first is the number of military personnel planned for a FCS Brigade Combat Team (FBCT) as compared to a current Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT). The second is the anticipated reliability of the FBCT platforms and subsystems. The third is the planned lower training operational tempo that is due to
an embedded training capability. It should be noted that these benefits are some-
what offset by the increased hardware costs of individual subsystems/platforms (as
compared to currently fielded systems). These hardware costs reflect the higher de-
gree of complexity alluded to in this question. As a final point, it is noted that the
PM’s estimate does not yet reflect the anticipated benefits of other planned FCS ca-
pabilities that are intended to reduce support costs. These include: the FCS support
concept (i.e., performance based logistics, brigade centric support), logistic support
software/network products (i.e., Platform Soldier—Mission Readiness System, Logis-
tics Decision Support System), and the reduced brigade “footprint” (which likely has
second order cost benefits). Once the cost benefits of these other planned capabilities
are quantified, it is anticipated that the operating cost benefit of FCS will grow larg-
er.

5. Senator A KAKA. Secretary Ford, how will the recent decision to shift the focus
on fielding FCS program spinout technologies from HBCTs to Infantry BCTs impact
cost projections both now and in the future?

Mr. FORD. The Army is reviewing the Programmed Objective Memorandum and
upcoming decisions to determine the proper spin out of FCS technologies to the cur-
rent force. The fielding of FCS technologies to the current configurations of the In-
fantry BCTs in fiscal year 2011 would be less expensive than the previously planned
HBCTs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

READINESS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

6. Senator B ILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, you will be principally re-
sponsible for oversight of the Army’s comptroller and financial management. The
equipment goal for the Florida National Guard, indeed all Guard units, is at least
75 percent. The Florida Guard is far from that goal. If confirmed, what would be
your plan to reset the Army and provide for the equipment needs of the National
Guard?

Mr. FORD. The equipping goal for all Army units is 100 percent but few of our
units, Active or Reserve component, meet that goal unless deployed. The Florida
Army National Guard (and for all other units) is either assigned to the unit, being
repaired or rest, or else not yet in the Army inventory. The Army ensures that de-
ploying units are properly equipped and trained. We must also modernize, grow,
and rebalance the force to meet current and anticipated missions. In light of these
initiatives, and our overall equipping posture, we have had to accept lower equipp-
ing levels in nondeployed units. The Army fully recognizes the dual mission of the
Army National Guard to perform Federal and State missions. To this end, the De-
partment of the Army has ensured that the Army National Guard has sufficient
equipment necessary to meet the demands of those missions.

As an example, we have made special efforts to ensure hurricane prone States
have the equipment that they need to be prepared for each hurricane season. No
Governor or State Adjutant General has identified a capability gap that precludes
them from being ready to respond to an emergency. If such a gap is identified, we
would certainly respond appropriately. In the fiscal year 2010–2015 Program Obje-
tive Memorandum, we will field most of the equipping requirements in support of
actions to equip units to modular designs, and to grow and rebalance the Army. In
fact, through the end of 2009, we are fielding over 400,000 pieces of equipment to
the Army National Guard, valued at over $17.5 billion. This represents 36 percent
of all Army equipment distributions.

As for resetting the Army, we are committed to resetting soldiers and units into
deployment ready condition as quickly as practicable after they have redeployed.
Congressional support for continued and timely reset funding requirements will go
a long way toward ensuring our ability to do this. Rapid and effective reset efforts
will provide more equipment, in better condition, to all Army units, including the
units of the Army National Guard.

7. Senator B ILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, how does our presence in Iraq impede
your ability to reset the force, equip the Guard, and provide for emergencies here
at home?

Mr. FORD. With the support of Congress, our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan
has not significantly impaired our ability to reset equipment, equip the Guard, or
provide for emergencies here at home. These requirements are considered,
prioritized, and equipment is distributed to meet requirements of the National Mili-


8. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what would be your role in planning for the Future Years Defense Plan funding request and how would that meet the goal of getting to at least 75 percent of its equipment requirements?

Mr. Ford. The Future Years Defense Plan is the Department’s, and thus the Army’s, projection of resources required to provide trained and ready forces to the Nation—sustaining current capabilities while building our future force. My role in Army leadership is to ensure a balance in the program to meet current and future challenges. The Army National Guard is an essential part of the Army’s warfighting mission and has a critically important title 32 mission. This is part of the balance consideration. The Army will only deploy forces if they have the equipment they need to accomplish their mission. This includes critical civil support equipment requirements. With your continued support the Army can meet its warfighting equipment requirements, and the goal of at least 75 percent of Army National Guard equipment requirements.

9. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, the Army insists that the Governor and local Mayors in the State of Florida sign covenants that support the Guard and their families by providing adequate facilities and services for Guard members while they’re deployed. However, while Guard personnel are in training at locations throughout the Nation, the Army refuses to support these deploying members’ efforts to return home and visit their family members before they depart to Iraq and Afghanistan. Oftentimes, there are training flying missions en route to Florida that are available to transport Guardsmen, but the Army refuses to let them go. If confirmed, would you support the Army’s ability to allow these Guardsmen to travel on training flying missions on a space available basis?

Mr. Ford. First Army is mobilizing, training, and deploying tens of thousands of Reserve component (RC) soldiers every year (88,357 in fiscal year 2008 mobilized Reserve component soldiers, 2,105 units) at 9 Active Mobilization Training Centers (MTC) throughout the continental United States.

• In accordance with the First Army Standard Operating Procedure, mobilized Reserve component forces are authorized pass or block leave prior to deployment based on the number of post-mobilization days at their MTCs.
• Units that train at an MTC for less than 90-days are authorized up to a 4-day pass prior to deployment.
• Units that train for 90-days or more are authorized either a 4-day pass or 5- to 7-day block leave prior to deployment.
• Units that train over the Christmas holiday period are authorized to take leave from December 23 to January 2.

The Reserve component deployment Expeditionary Force Commander determines the dates the unit will take some, all, or none of their authorized post-mobilization pass or leave. This decision is codified in a memorandum during the unit’s joint assessment in-process review (minimum of 180 days from the unit’s mobilization date) in order for First Army to finalize the unit’s post-mobilization deployment training plan. In all cases, a unit’s pass and block leave activities must conclude not later than 24-hours prior to the unit’s ready-to-load date for personnel.

First Army has no control over the means (space available travel, Air Guard training missions; commercial air, etc.) used by soldiers or units to execute their post-mobilization pass or block leave and, as Reserve component soldiers in this situation are in a title 10 (Active Army) status, the individual soldier is responsible for all travel costs incurred while on pass or leave.

MODELING AND SIMULATION

10. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, what are your views on the use of modeling and simulation technologies to reduce the costs of Army acquisition programs?

Mr. Ford. The Army Modeling and Simulation (M&S) strategy was developed to address issues and complement published Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) 2006–2023. The ASPG states, “as the Army’s institutional strategy, (ASPG)
represents the Army senior leadership's vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. It also communicates the Army's priorities for employing available resources. As the Army executes the process of re-examining and challenging basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, policies, and procedures to better serve the Nation, M&S will play an increasingly important role in decisionmaking processes, doctrine, and capabilities development in the emerging network-enabled environment. Both Army and Joint Capstone Concepts provide the strategic context that will drive future M&S efforts in development of both materiel and institutional capabilities required to realize full spectrum dominance. Expectation of an increasingly resource constrained future requires that the Army leverage M&S more than ever to minimize cost and do more with fewer resources to make informed, fact-based decisions and provide more relevant and ready forces and capabilities to the Army and Joint Team.

11. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, how will you work to promote the use of these types of technologies to reduce Army test, training, and acquisition costs?

Mr. Ford. I will ensure that the different communities such as Advance Concepts and Requirements; Research, Development and Acquisition; and Training Exercises and Military Operations are working together and integrating their M&S efforts to reduce cost but increase capabilities to support our soldiers in the current fight and future. The Army has many examples where M&S is used to reduce Army test, training, and acquisition costs. The testing community uses M&S to validate testing procedures prior to a test. For example, the testing community will employ live, virtual, and constructive M&S to properly display the capabilities and test the FCSs. Today, Army installations, schools, and units use training aids, devices, simulators, simulations, and gaming technologies to train soldiers and units for Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom deployments. These M&S tools reduce costs and enhance live training events. For the Army acquisition community, it is very important to integrate M&S technology into acquisition functions (requirements generation, design, development, test and evaluation, training, manufacturing, and fielding) and programs. The benefits reduce process time, required resources, and risks associated with acquisition functions, as well as increase quality and supportability of fielded systems.

UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CENTERS

12. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, the Army has established a number of university research centers to perform basic research in support of Army missions. These centers have some advantages, but they also limit the Army’s ability to invest in innovative research in a broad range of university programs across the Nation. How will you work to balance the Army’s basic research portfolio so that it is not overly focused on a few, select university research centers?

Mr. Ford. The Army’s current and future basic research portfolio will not be focused on a few select university research centers. In fiscal year 2008, approximately 15 percent of the Army’s basic research portfolio is executed through university centers. In fiscal year 2009, the percentage of the portfolio executed at university centers is projected to drop to approximately 13.7 percent. The remainder of the Army’s basic research portfolio is balanced across a broad range of capability areas important to the Army’s mission and needs and is executed by more than 250 research and educational institutions across the Nation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

WOUNDED WARRIOR CARE

13. Senator Warner. Secretary Ford, the Army established Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) to improve the care, rehabilitation, and disability evaluation of wounded and injured soldiers. The increasing number of soldiers in this status has caused staffing shortfalls at some locations. What are the challenges facing the WTUs at this time?

Mr. Ford. The rapid growth of soldiers in WTUs has made it difficult to maintain appropriate cadre-to-soldier ratios in our WTUs. This growth, a result of the expanded mission of the WTUs to cover more soldiers, has presented the Army with a variety of challenges. These include:

• managing the high tempo of deploying and redeploying units and the consequent growth in wounded, ill, or injured soldiers;
keeping pace with a growing requirement for nurse case managers and mental health professionals, especially in locations such as Fort Hood and Fort Drum;
• providing sufficient and appropriate facilities to house, manage, and support the growing population of Warriors in Transition (WTs);
• executing and sustaining efficient, fair and expeditious processes such as Medical and Physical Evaluation Boards (PEBs);
• developing and expanding capabilities to ensure soldiers and families receive the support they require to either transition back to duty or to prepare for productive civilian careers, to include assisting in arranging for authorized medical care and benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs.

14. Senator WARNER. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what actions would you undertake to ensure that apart from the war itself, care for soldiers and families remains the Army’s highest priority?

Mr. FORD. While Army leadership is pleased with how far we have come in a short time, we need to continue our efforts to provide world-class care for our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. To accomplish this, Secretary Geren and General Casey directed the following enhancements to our Warrior Transition program:

a. To allow immediate care to our wounded and severely ill or injured soldiers who require comprehensive care, senior commanders will ensure that WTU cadre levels meet the designated ratios for warrior care. To this end, senior commanders have been directed to establish a triad of leadership at installations with WTUs that includes the senior commander and command sergeant major, along with the commanders and senior noncommissioned officers of the installation’s military treatment facility and WTU. This triad is empowered and directed to immediately fill all remaining WTU cadre positions by transferring all necessary installation personnel to ensure and maintain 100 percent staffing of WTUs at levels that ensure comprehensive care and support for all WTs and their families.

b. Senior commanders are further directed to evaluate the effectiveness of installation execution of the Physical Disability Evaluation System and provide their findings in writing to the Warrior Care and Transition Office no later than August 29, 2008. From these reports an action plan will be developed to streamline the disability process, establish achievable timeline metrics for medical evaluation board and PEB processing, and minimize the time required for PEB disposition by aggressively processing orders.

c. The Army leadership has empowered the triad of leadership with more options in management of our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. This includes more flexible exit criteria and careful use of medically nondeployable soldiers in appropriate cadre positions. We will continue efforts to eliminate the stigma attached to mental health conditions and will continue to embrace innovations and best practices in the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury.

[The nomination reference of Hon. Nelson M. Ford follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
January 22, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Nelson M. Ford, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of the Army, vice Preston M. Geren.

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Nelson M. Ford, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF HON. NELSON M. FORD

Nelson Ford currently serves as both the Acting Under Secretary of the Army and as the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller.
His previous position was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller. From 2002 through 2004, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets & Financial Policy in the Department of Defense, where he was responsible for financial management, policy development, and program evaluation for the Defense Health Program. Prior to returning to Federal service, Mr. Ford held senior management positions in academic medicine, medical manufacturing, and health insurance. From 1997 to 2000, he was President and CEO of Clinipad, a manufacturer of disposable medical products. During the 1990s, he was Chief Operating Officer of Georgetown University Medical Center, with responsibility for Georgetown Hospital and financial oversight of faculty practice plans, research activities and the medical and nursing schools. Earlier in his career, Mr. Ford was a partner with Coopers & Lybrand, providing strategic and financial consulting services to a wide range of health care clients. During the 1970s, he was the Executive Secretary of the Health Care Financing Administration and worked on health policy matters in the Office of Management and Budget. He has served on numerous not-for-profit boards and advisory committees. Mr. Ford holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Duke University, a master’s in education from the University of Delaware, and has completed additional professional training at the University of Pennsylvania. He lives in McLean, VA, with his wife Cecilia. They have three grown children.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Nelson M. Ford in connection with his nomination follows:]
Married to Cecilia Sparks Ford (Maiden Name: Sparks).

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Aven Walker Ford, 29; Alexander Sparks Ford, 26; and Mary Bartlett Ford; 20.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   - Alexis I DuPont HS (9/1959–6/1965) HS Diploma, June 1965
   - University of Pennsylvania (9/1975–6/1977) no degree

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   - Acting Under Secretary of the Army, 12/2007-present.
   - Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&Ca), Department of Army, Pentagon 10/2006-present
   - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C), Department of the Army, Pentagon, 6/2005-10/2006.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
    None.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    - President, American Society of Military Comptrollers.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    - Washington Golf and Country Club, member.
    - George Washington University, Adjunct Associate Professor.
    - American Society of Military Comptrollers, member.
    - AcademyHealth, member.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
    Republican Party, member.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
    None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
    - Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Civilian Service
    - USOE Fellowship

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
    - Article - “Transforming Resource Management to Support an Army at War” The Public Manager LMI Research Institute Winter 2007-2008, Volume 36, Number 4 (A slightly modified version of this article will appear in Resource Management)

I was listed as a co-author on two HEW publications on the cost of educating handicapped children in the early 1970s but do not remember their titles.
16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

STEVE R. FORD.

This 29th day of January, 2008.

[The nomination of Hon. Nelson M. Ford was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]

**Questions and Responses**

**Defense Reforms**

*Question.* The goals of Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms can be summarized as: strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense (DOD).

Do you agree with these goals?

*Answer.* Yes, I agree with these goals.

*Question.* Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

*Answer.* No, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

**Duties**

*Question.* What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD/GSA)?

*Answer.* The ASD/GSA is a new position, created to centralize DOD’s policy apparatus for dealing with global threats and the tools we have to address those threats. In this capacity, the ASD/GSA is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for development and execution of strategies, policies and procedures on the following matters: building partner national capacity to maintain security and stability; overseeing security cooperation and foreign military sales programs; countering transnational threats including narcotics and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and related networks of contraband; security of U.S. technology; maintenance of coalitions in support of
multinational operations; policies for humanitarian and disaster assistance; recovery of U.S. personnel and prisoners of war (POW)/missing-in-action (MIA) issues; and detainee affairs.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you anticipate that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you?

Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate that the Secretary would direct me to manage the Global Security Affairs (GSA) organization, including the day-to-day tasks associated with the duties noted in my response to the previous question. He would likely ask that I provide him and the Under Secretary for Policy with policy recommendations on issues within my area of responsibility, and that I monitor and provide policy advice on operations with these areas. I would also expect the Secretary to ask that I represent him and the Under Secretary for Policy in the interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations dealing with my assigned areas of responsibility.

Question. What impact has the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had on the functions and duties of the ASD/GSA? What challenges has the reorganization created for carrying out those functions and duties, and if confirmed, what steps would you take to address those challenges?

Answer. The reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy created the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs. The functions of this new organization were performed previously by disparate elements of the Policy Organization. The purpose of creating ASD/GSA was to place under a central management structure the policy specialists who address many types of global threats—for example, counternarcotics, proliferation and detainees, and the policy tools to address those threats. These tools include the security assistance and building-partnership capacity programs implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the personnel recovery and accountability activities of the Defense POW/MIA Organization, and the technology security activities of the Defense Technology Security Administration. This Defense Agency and two Defense Field Activities, respectively, were also realigned under the new ASD/GSA as part of the reorganization.

Centralization of DOD's policymakers who work on global issues has broken old stovepipes of information and permitted better synchronization of DOD policies and activities. For example, we are better able to coordinate building partnership activities with the work of counternarcotics and combating WMD programs by having all of these activities report to a single Assistant Secretary. The span of responsibilities for this new organization is admittedly broad. If confirmed, one step that I will take to mitigate this factor is to seek to ensure that all key leadership positions in the organization are filled.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What do you see as the relationship between the ASD/GSA and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services
The Combatant Commanders
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Director, Defense Technology Security Administration

Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will work closely with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain close working relationships with the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of DOD, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders. I would expect to maintain a close
relationship on programs related to combating WMD with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the Defense POW/MIA Office; and the Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration and with the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs.

The position requires close coordination with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy, as appropriate. Examples of this coordination would include working with the Assistant Secretaries for International Security Affairs, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and Homeland Defense and Americas Security in their areas of responsibility to synchronize building partnership capacity activities and countering global threats; and working with the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on combating WMD terrorism.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I believe that I am qualified for this position, if confirmed, by virtue of leadership experience in a broad range of organizations responsible for national security policy, program formulation and implementation; and a broad base of substantive knowledge regarding U.S. national security priorities and issues.

I have served as the Principal Deputy ASD/GSA since December 2006, when the organization was established. I managed the establishment of the organization and its day-to-day affairs, and in the absence of a duly appointed and confirmed Assistant Secretary, have performed many of the non-statutory duties of the Assistant Secretary. I believe that I am well versed in GSA’s issues and in the requirements to lead the organization.

Since 2003, I have served in the Department in several civilian leadership positions. I assisted in establishing the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) Washington organization and served as its Deputy and Chief of Staff. Upon the CPA’s dissolution, I led the standup of a follow-on organization to support the Department’s role in Iraq reconstruction and stabilization programs and activities. Prior to my current position, I served as the acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

In my current and previous positions, I have testified before Congress on issues under my responsibility, and have established effective working relationships with DOD and interagency counterparts.

Prior to my civilian service, I was a career Navy officer with leadership experience in command at sea and in Washington. As a naval officer, I had over 3 years of experience in the OSD Policy organization as a senior military assistant and as the Director of European Policy. I also served earlier in my career as a legislative liaison officer for the Department of the Navy, which I believe has facilitated working with Congress since then.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASD/GSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be confronted with at least four primary challenges during my tenure. First, the office of GSA needs to consolidate and institutionalize the “toolkit” of programmatic and related options available for advancing the Department’s strategy of building partner capacity. Second, we will need continued focus on preventing the proliferation of WMD, and in particular the connections between the combating WMD and counterterrorism missions. Third, we need to continue to focus on transition paths for current detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, in Iraq, and Afghanistan. Finally, I believe we can drive improvements in our understanding of how various networks of transnational threats might intersect or converge, and how to address these threats to U.S. national security.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the work I have begun while Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary with respect to rationalizing processes for security cooperation development. Our system is currently not as flexible as it should be for post-September 11 challenges and we can use the GSA structure to improve. I also believe we need to continue to develop new processes to ensure better integration within DOD of the combating WMD and counterterrorism missions. With respect to the challenge of “networked threats,” we are truly in a learning mode. We have been working with various policy and intelligence elements of the Department to help de-
fine this new mission space, and GSA will host a conference along with the National Counterproliferation Center and the Monterrey Institute this autumn to broaden participation in this effort.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority ("section 1206") and the security and stabilization assistance authority ("section 1207").

What are DOD’s strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

Answer. The Department’s objectives for building partner capacity are tied to our broader regional and functional objectives for each of the regional and functional combatant commands as prescribed by the National Defense Strategy and the Guidance for Employment of the Force. Our intention is to build a network of like-minded, capable security partners who face mutual security threats and can operate alongside, or in lieu of, U.S. forces to combat these threats. Because U.S. forces and resources are finite, and given the nature of the threats we face, it is essential that we work to build partner capabilities to effectively counter evolving security threats. DOD guidance documents, strategies, and operational and contingency planning now reflect the reality that providing security must be a cooperative endeavor conducted by, through, and with our partners. As Secretary Gates made clear in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, “building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement—irrespective of the capacity of other departments—and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality. DOD would no more outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission.”

Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the global train and equip authority, and what is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?

Answer. I believe the global train and equip authority, commonly known as “section 1206” authority, is an important new tool for building partner-nation operational capacity. By law, the purpose of the global train and equip authority is two-fold. Any program conducted under this authority must build the capacity of partner nation security forces to either: (1) conduct counterterrorist operations, or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. For either purpose, DOD’s focus is the same: build operational capacity that meets U.S.-identified partner capability gaps that, if filled, may reduce near-term stress on U.S. forces and the long-term risk of U.S. military intervention, as partners increasingly address threats within their borders and become security exporters.

My assessment is that “section 1206” has a solid implementation track record. Although the program is only in its second full fiscal year of implementation, it is in many ways already a model of interagency cooperation. The program requires both State and DOD to formally approve each proposal, both in the field and in Washington, DC. The approach recognizes DOD’s core military requirement for operational partners, while simultaneously recognizing the State Department’s core competency in ensuring that all actions are in accord with U.S. foreign policy, international agreements, human rights vetting, and other legal requirements. There has been an enthusiastic response from embassies and combatant commands, culminating in program requests. I thank the committee for extending and expanding this authority in its draft National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and will work to ensure our processes and guidance fully reflect congressional intent.

Question. What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

Answer. The Global Train and Equip authority, as noted previously, fills two very specific requirements to build capacity to counter terrorism and instability. These purposes can complement other DOD and U.S. Government authorities, but also serve discrete needs apart from them.

DOD counternarcotics authorities allow DOD to support U.S. Government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. While some regions of the world—notably Latin America and southwest Asia—face significant counternarcotics challenges, the threat of terrorism exists there as well, and terrorists seek to exploit many of the same gaps used by those who seek to smuggle drugs across our borders. 1206 is deliberately designed to build capacity to meet such transnational threats early, before they metastasize into more significant problems.
I strongly support congressional desire to keep these programs separate and distinct, using them only for their legislatively-directed purposes. The best way to ensure 1206 programs meet defined counterterrorism or stability operations needs is to tie them directly to objectives established in the Department’s planning guidance. In my current capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, I have tasked my staff to review 1206 and counternarcotics proposals together to identify potential overlap in individual programs, and to ensure 1206 guidance reflects that projects are only appropriate when the proposal’s primary mission is counterterrorism or stability operations, not to backfill lower priority counternarcotics needs. Proposals are deconflicted by individual country teams, which must follow 1206 guidance that requires deconfliction with foreign military financing (FMF). Once submitted, this deconfliction is validated by Department of State.

Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”)? What is your assessment of how this authority has been utilized?

Answer. I believe that 1207 fills an urgent gap in the State Department’s ability to provide stabilization and reconstruction assistance. Secretary Gates made clear in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee the Department’s view of the purpose of “Section 1207” authority: bringing civilian resources to bear in complex security environments where their expertise is needed. In his words: “A touchstone for the Defense Department is that 1207 should be for civilian support for the military—either by bringing civilians to serve with our military forces or in lieu of them.”

In my view, the 1207 authority’s utility has been growing. We have made progress in improving the coordination with the State Department and Congress, importing several 1206 implementation “best practices” that have proven themselves valuable. Program quality and execution have improved. Since its inception, improved DOD and State coordination has led to the identification of more programs that met the legislation’s intent, and in fiscal year 2007, State and DOD ultimately approved programs totaling virtually all of the authority. It is likely that the full authority will again be used in fiscal year 2008.

Question. What is the process by which DOD reviews requests from the Department of State for security and stabilization assistance funding?

Answer. Section 1207 projects must originate in the field, and require formal concurrence from both the relevant Chief of Mission and Combatant Commander. Once finalized in the field, DOD, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) review projects simultaneously.

Question. Secretary Gates has called for an expansion of the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military “soft power”—civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to expand the Government’s resources devoted to the ability of civilian departments and agencies to engage, assist, and communicate with partner nations?

Answer. Advancing Secretary Gates’ efforts to expand “soft power” tools is a key element of the ASD/GSA’s mission. If confirmed, I would continue to advance this agenda, including:

1. Continued focus on the utilization of “Section 1207” security and stabilization assistance authority;
2. Continued advocacy for increases to State and USAID’s topline, as well as support for State’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative;
3. Oversee the implementation of the congressionally-mandated study of the National Security Interagency System, the Interagency elements of the Congressionally-Mandated Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, and advising the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on additional interagency initiatives or requirements;
4. Seeking additional ways that DOD can effectively support U.S. Government initiatives led by civilian agencies, including counternarcotics, public diplomacy, security sector reform, humanitarian assistance and disaster response; and
5. I would add, however, that only Congress has the authority to significantly expand the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military “soft power” and civilian agency capacity to engage, assist, and communicate with our partners. If confirmed, I stand ready to work with you on legislative initiatives to address this challenge.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?
Answer. As Secretary Gates said during his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University last November, “if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.” The threats we face today require that we strengthen our capacity to use “soft” power and to better integrate it with “hard” power.

An essential element of DOD’s role vis-à-vis other agencies in the exercise of the instruments of soft power is that the department remain supportive of those agencies with appropriate statutory authority and core competencies in foreign policy (State), development and humanitarian response (USAID). For example, we are working closely with State and other agencies to provide assistance as available and appropriate in support of the national security strategy. Such involvement may include providing logistical support and expertise to State/USAID leadership in response to a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis. We are working closely with State and other agencies to promote multiagency coordination and cooperation to develop more comprehensive approaches to problems before they become crises.

Question. In your view, which department should have the lead in setting U.S. Government security assistance policy?

Answer. The State Department has had and should retain the lead in setting U.S. Government security assistance policy. In developing processes for new tools like section 1206, and reforming processes for traditional tools like FMF, both Departments have taken additional steps to enhance collaboration and jointly formulate plans and programs, while fully respecting the State Department’s primacy in security assistance.

GLOBAL AND EMERGING THREATS

Question. The position of ASD/GSA includes responsibilities for formulating strategy and policy for countering global threats and emerging threats. What are the global and emerging threats that you believe pose the most significant challenge to our security, and what approach would you take, if confirmed, to address these threats?

Answer. For the foreseeable future, I believe that our Nation will face an environment defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. Violent extremist movements such as al Qaeda and its associates reject the rules and structures of the international system. Their adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny self-determination and human dignity wherever they gain power. These extremists opportunistically exploit respect for these norms for their own purposes, hiding behind international norms and national laws when it suits them, and attempting to subvert them when it does not.

Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to violent extremists and international criminal networks frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity. Ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional security. If left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states.

A particular concern in this environment is the potential for proliferation of WMD (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear). WMD in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.

Addressing the problem will require effective international partnerships and cooperation, and creative approaches to prevent proliferation and deny armed sub-national groups the opportunity to gain footholds in ungoverned spaces.

Question. How do you believe we can most effectively reduce or minimize proliferation of the technology for WMD and their means of delivery?

Answer. To reduce or minimize proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, overlapping multilateral and national tools are the most effective approach. This is not a threat that can be solved by any one country or process alone. The treaties on WMD (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)) provide the legal underpinnings of preventing the proliferation of WMD. In conjunction with this legal basis, the export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group for Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons technologies, and the Missile Technology Control Regime) provide a common basis for countries to work together. To stop WMD/missile-related shipments (whether to state actors or non-state actors), over 90 countries are work-
ing together through the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict such threatening movements of dual-use goods before they get to proliferators. The U.N. Security Council has addressed the problem through resolution 1540, which requires all countries to take steps against WMD/missile proliferation, to include export control laws in these areas. In addition, to specifically address the Iranian and North Korean threats, the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions 1718, 1737, 1747, and 1803. To stop the financial aspects of WMD/missile proliferation, the President has implemented Executive Order 12958.

**Question.** Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been described by Lieutenant General Metz, Director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), as a strategic weapon and one that we should expect to see in future wars. The United States has already seen IEDs proliferate from Iraq to Afghanistan, and there are reports about IEDs being used against Ethiopian forces in Somalia. What do you believe the Department should do to counter the spread of IED technology?

**Answer.** The Department’s JIEDDO continues to develop new, innovative ways to rapidly find, develop, and deliver emerging capabilities to counter IEDs and the transnational networks that facilitate the funding and building of IEDs. The Department is also focusing on operational initiatives that disrupt IED networks, including tracking financiers, trainers and the supporting infrastructure.

I believe that limiting the availability of components, and effective policing action to find the terrorist cells before they act, are the most effective measures against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Limiting the availability of components, through export controls and other means, is however difficult. For example, terrorists can pick and choose from a large variety of fusing mechanisms, which can range from very simple such as a hand held switch or a pressure plate switch to more sophisticated methods such as cellular telephones or other commercially available communications devices.

**COMBATANT COMMANDS AND THE INTERAGENCY**

**Question.** If confirmed, you will play an important role in developing interagency coordination with DOD. Two of the Department’s geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command—are in the process of developing and implementing an interagency model that incorporates into their respective command structures personnel from other agencies of government. Both commanders have touted this interagency approach as a model for the future. What is your opinion of these new interagency models for these two combatant commands?

**Answer.** Both of these efforts are evolutionary in nature. We are working closely with the State Department to develop new structures in an attempt to deal with new threats and challenges. The goal is to promote interagency coordination in such a way that we can better prevent rather than simply react to problems before crises, and crises before they become catastrophes.

**Question.** Do you believe the other agencies of government, particularly the U.S. Department of State and USAID, will be able to provide adequate support for these interagency commands?

**Answer.** We continue to work with both State and USAID in meeting the evolving staffing requirements. The intent of this approach is to achieve a level of State and USAID participation so that the commands can better support State’s lead in foreign policy and USAID’s lead in development. The intended purpose is for improved interagency cooperation and coordination that remains supportive of the statutory lead roles as well as core competencies of both State and USAID.

**STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ**

**Question.** What is the role of the ASD/GSA, if any, in the negotiations of a Strategic Framework Agreement and a status of forces agreement with Iraq?

**Answer.** The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs does not have a direct role in the negotiations of a Strategic Framework or the status of forces agreement with Iraq. We review and provide suggestions regarding specific aspects of the negotiations that relate to matters under the authority of the ASD/GSA.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the basic authorities that the United States is seeking as part of these agreements, absent which we would not sign the agreements?

**Answer.** GSA does not have a direct role in the negotiations; nor were we part of the interagency discussions developing U.S. negotiating strategies.
COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS

Question. Since 2001, DOD has provided billions of dollars in Coalition Support Fund payments to reimburse key partner nations for support provided to U.S. military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. What is the role of the ASD/GSA, if any, in overseeing the use of Coalition Support Funds?

Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the applicable combatant commander have primary responsibility for administering Coalition Support Funds activities. The role of ASD/GSA is to assist in resolving issues when necessary.

Question. What is your assessment of the process for reviewing claims presented for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds? What steps, if any, would you recommend for improving this process?

Answer. My assessment of the process for reviewing claims presented for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds is that it appears to work reasonably well. I understand that timely submission of requests for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds is a factor, but the responsibility of our coalition partners.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Do you support accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

Answer. Yes, I support the United States’ accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Question. In your view, would ratification of this convention be in the national security interest of the United States?

Answer. Joining the Convention will give the United States a seat at the table when rights vital to our national interests are debated and interpreted, and will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. The navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms codified in the Convention are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces and the sustainment of our combat forces overseas. As the world’s foremost maritime power, our security interests are intrinsically linked to freedom of navigation. America has more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world’s oceans than any other country. By joining the Convention, we provide the firmest possible legal foundation for the rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure friends and deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain combat forces in the field, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN DARFUR

Question. The United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is suffering from a variety of equipment shortfalls, which have essentially made it impossible to deploy additional peacekeepers to this region. Some have argued that DOD, despite the demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, ought to provide the helicopters, trucks, and lift needed to make this mission a success.

In your view, what is the appropriate role for DOD in supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions?

Answer. The U.S. Government is the largest contributor of financial resources to U.N. peacekeeping missions in general and to Darfur in particular. DOD has over 30 U.S. military personnel assigned to multiple peacekeeping missions. In partnership with the State Department, DOD provides training, financial resources and, when required, lift to countries contributing troops in Darfur and other U.N. peacekeeping missions. In my view, current DOD involvement in supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions is consonant with U.S. interests in those missions.

Question. Would you support DOD providing a greater level of support to U.N. peacekeeping missions and specifically to the mission in Darfur?

Answer. DOD recently approved assignment of eight U.S. military personnel to serve in Darfur. The Department is in the process of adding DOD staff officers to the U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq and to the mission in Chad and the Central African Republic. I would support a comprehensive review of U.S. military personnel deployed to U.N. peacekeeping missions to ensure appropriate distribution and representation.

In partnership with the State Department and other U.S. Government agencies, DOD has been actively involved in efforts to identify countries with the capacity to fill critical UNAMID shortfalls such as helicopters and other enabling capabilities. We are making progress with particular countries such as Jordan, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, and Ethiopia. We are currently researching the availability of financial resources to assist these and perhaps other countries in their efforts to meet U.N. specifications.

Question. Would you support NATO providing a greater level of support to the U.N. mission in Darfur?

Answer. Secretary Gates has made clear his position that Afghanistan must remain a top NATO priority. There have been substantial challenges meeting operational requirements in Afghanistan. I would not advocate any NATO involvement in Darfur that might jeopardize the Alliance’s capacity to fully support operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, the U.N. mission in Darfur was conceived as an African Union—United Nations hybrid operation. The Government of Sudan (GoS) agreed to the presence of a U.N. mission on its soil with the understanding that it would consist primarily of African forces, and has consistently obstructed the involvement of non-African and particularly Western countries. I would support specific UNAMID contributions from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries that did not conflict with priorities in Afghanistan.

GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE AND MANAGEMENT

Relocation of Forces to Guam

Question. What is your assessment of the implementation to date of the agreement between the United States and the Government of Japan to relocate a substantial portion of our Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam, and what is your assessment of the prospects for the ultimate success or failure of this effort? What do you see as the major obstacles to the full implementation of this agreement?

Answer. The U.S. and the Government of Japan are committed to implementing the Realignment Roadmap for force posture changes in the Pacific as negotiated. The Roadmap addresses both the realignments from Okinawa to Guam and an interconnected set of realignments of U.S. forces within Japan.

Both sides have done extensive planning for these relocations, including initiation of the required environmental impact analysis on Guam. DOD is working with our interagency colleagues on ways to improve Guam’s capacity to absorb the volume of construction the program envisions. The Realignment Roadmap makes the Guam relocation contingent upon the Government of Japan successfully relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa prefecture to a new facility adjacent to Camp Schwab. To that end, the Government of Japan has initiated an environmental impact study for that.

The Government of Japan is currently building its next budget (April 2009–March 2010), and we are in discussions with the Government of Japan regarding the Guam construction programs that budget would cover as part of Japan’s $6.09 billion total commitment for the Guam relocation. Overall, both governments remain committed to this complex effort and the prospects for success remain good.

Headquarters for Africa Command

Question. It appears that few nations in Africa are eager to see a permanent U.S. military presence on their soil. In the near term, the Department is establishing a headquarters for the Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany.

Do you believe an Africa Command is viable over the long run if we cannot reach an agreement with a host nation in Africa to establish a headquarters for that command on the African continent?

Answer. Viability of the new command is not necessarily determined by location; there are examples of unified command headquarters located both within and outside of the regions for which they are responsible. At present DOD has opted to put aside the issue of a location for an on-continent HQ while it conducts an analysis of the logistical and personnel footprint required to support the new command.

Control of Special Operations Forces

Question. There has been disagreement among senior military leaders in recent years about whether Special Operations Forces (SOFs) should be a globally managed force that is largely based in the United States under the control of the Special Operations Command, or whether some portion of these forces should be stationed in, and under the control of, regional combatant commands.

What are your views on this matter? What do you believe maximizes our military capability and builds the best relationships with partner nations?

Answer. Under DOD’s Global Force Management (GFM) system, SOF are a globally managed force. Under this system, SOCOM manages the deployment of its forces around the world, regardless of their source location. SOF units with a particular regional focus are routinely deployed to operate with or train partner nation units in theater. Once in theater, they are employed under the command of the uni-
fied combatant commander in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted. This system gives DOD the strategic flexibility to use such units for other operational assignments outside of their primary area of responsibility—as is the case of the situation in Iraq today.

The majority of SOF units are based in the U.S. SOF units stationed overseas are assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, but are also globally available under the GFM system. This overall arrangement for managing SOF provides the Department with the ability to allocate capability against the full range of demands, and sustain the necessary partnerships to conduct special operations globally.

“Permanent” Bases

*Question.* In a written response to a question for the record in connection with your testimony before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee last year, you provided a definition of “permanent” versus “enduring” bases.

Would you agree that your response indicates the difference between the two is not a function of the length of time that United States forces maintain a presence at the installation in question, but rather depends on how robust that United States presence is, such as whether forces are permanently stationed or only assigned to that location on a rotational basis, or whether such tours are accompanied and the installation provides the family support facilities necessary to support accompanied tours?

*Answer.* “Enduring” is a term often used to describe a location where the U.S. intends to develop and sustain a longstanding host-nation relationship and from which DOD expects there to be long-term demand to support critical missions. “Permanency” is generally a function of the nature of the footprint at a location—e.g., we tend to describe as “permanent” those locations with permanently assigned forces, substantial infrastructure, and dependent and family support facilities. In that sense, “permanent” generally would mean a very robust presence. It is often the case that locations described as “permanent” are also considered “enduring” in terms of host-nation relationship and mission needs.

*Question.* Does DOD use the term “permanent bases” in its internal decision-making processes? If so, what meaning does that term have inside DOD?

*Answer.* DOD uses a three-tiered lexicon for facility types: Main Operating Bases, Forward Operating Sites, and Cooperative Security Locations. How specific locations are designated using this lexicon is a function of the nature of the host-nation relationship, the activities and missions the location supports, and the physical footprint at a location.

Enduring Presence at Baumholder, Germany

*Question.* The Department recently decided to maintain our base at Baumholder, Germany, as an “enduring” base in support of our global strategy and of U.S. Army forces in Europe.

What units does the Department envision retaining at Baumholder, and how would the training areas at Baumholder be used by such forces or by other U.S. forces stationed in, or rotating through, Europe?

*Answer.* Support units, or “enablers” (e.g., military police and sustainment units), will likely be the predominant force presence at Baumholder over the long-term. EUCOM and its Army component are finalizing plans that identify the types of units to be stationed there and the nature of training activities to be conducted.

*Question.* In your opinion, is the change in the status of the Baumholder indicative of a larger reassessment of the ground force posture in Europe?

*Answer.* No. Since 2004 when the initial footprint requirements for a military presence in Germany were identified, the Department has determined that it would not have enough basing capacity in Germany to meet its needs if Baumholder were closed. Estimates of future footprint capacity needs are based upon emerging force structure changes (based on the new modular Army brigades), the need for additional support units, and evolved infrastructure requirements tied to supporting these other changes.

*Question.* Does this change signal a departure from the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy announced by the President in August 2004?

*Answer.* No.

Change in Status of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea

*Question.* The Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, has advocated for the authorization to increase the number of, and length of accompanied tours for U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea in order to provide a more stable U.S. military presence on the peninsula.

In your view, what are the costs and benefits to this request?
Answer. As Secretary Gates stated recently, DOD is interested in pursuing the approach of extended, accompanied tours in Korea. The benefits of normalizing tour, include improved continuity, stability, and readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge; as well as reduced costs and an overall savings as the number of servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements resulting from family separations. The military departments are conducting detailed assessments to determine the best way to implement this initiative over the course of the next 10 to 15 years.

Question. In your opinion, would this increase require a renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement with the Republic of Korea?

Answer. DOD must conduct further detailed assessments to determine the full implications of the initiative, to include any possible impacts on agreements provisions. However, the initiative to normalize tour lengths in Korea has the broad support of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

HOST NATION BURDENSHARING

Question. How would you assess the current trends in burden-sharing arrangements and residual value recovery with nations currently hosting U.S. forces?

Answer. Burden-sharing arrangements with host-nation partners should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Key factors affecting these arrangements include the context of regional political-military and operational dynamics, the nature of the specific host-nation relationship, and related U.S. presence goals.

Residual value recovery policy is managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L).

Question. Is the willingness of host nations to share in the costs of basing U.S. forces increasing or decreasing?

Answer. As I indicated earlier, I am reluctant to generalize about host-nation cost-sharing for the U.S. presence globally. As the Department realigns its defense posture globally, it continues working with host-nation partners to develop suitable arrangements for supporting long-term U.S. presence goals. In many cases host-nation consultations and negotiations that determine cost-sharing arrangements are still ongoing.

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to maintain a healthy burden-sharing and residual value recovery program?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department continues pursing global defense posture changes with our allies and partners that strengthen our access relationships and forward capabilities. In pursuit of these two aims, I would certainly work to make burden sharing an important element of our negotiations with potential host-nation partners.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Question. The DOD has been involved extensively in counternarcotics missions for many years, involving both Active and Reserve component forces. In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in interdicting illegal drugs bound for the United States, in reducing drug cultivation, and in reducing demand?

Answer. The counternarcotics (CN) authorities and responsibilities assigned to the DOD by law provide useful and flexible ways to support the National Drug Control Strategy, as well as achieve national security goals around the world. DOD conducts CN activities in support to U.S. local, State, and Federal counternarcotics agencies, as well as foreign counternarcotics forces. In many cases, this support is carried out by DOD-sponsored Joint Task Forces and Joint Interagency Task Forces, several of which have increased their international liaison and operational coordination roles.

Question. In recent years, the Department has shifted its focus from interdicting illegal drugs bound for the United States to interdicting illicit trafficking (including trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, and money) bound for the United States. What is your opinion of this expanded focus?

Answer. As it has become increasingly apparent that the global illegal drug trade has connections to terrorism, financial crimes, corruption of governmental systems, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, major gang networks, insurgency and instability in many places worldwide. As a general premise, illicit trafficking, whatever the commodity, undermines partner nations’ authority and government structures; and provides transnational criminal organizations and terrorists revenue to purchase weapons and plan operations that threaten U.S. security interests. By widening the Department’s focus to trafficking networks—drugs, weapons, people or money—the Department provides critical support to undermine transnational networks that threaten the Nation.
Question. In the legislative proposals the committee received from DOD for the upcoming fiscal year, the counternarcotics program requested a significant expansion in the number of countries eligible to receive support from the Department, including an expansion to West Africa.

In your assessment, is the drug trafficking threat from Africa sufficient enough to justify a major expansion of the counternarcotics program into West Africa?

Answer. Africa, especially West Africa, has seen a dramatic increase in drug smuggling and associated corruption and intimidation that turns weakly-governed areas into nearly ungoverned spaces. Currently, the threat of the expanding illicit drug trade threatens Africa’s fragile future. Working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities, while partnering with European allies, is one way to approach the dilemma. Additionally, profits realized by Colombian narcoterrorists in Africa, sustain continued assaults against the Government of Colombia and others in the Western Hemisphere.

COUNTERNARCOTICS, COUNTER PROLIFERATION, AND GLOBAL THREATS

Question. You have responsibility for counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation activities. A growing concern is the connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorists.

What actions do you believe are appropriate to identify, track, and stop funding sources that could be used by terrorists to obtain nuclear or other WMD weapons or equipment?

Answer. I agree that there is concern over the possible connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorists, and that undermining an adversary’s ability to finance hostile activities against U.S. interests is a critical priority for the Department. The Department supports counterthreat finance interoperability with other government agencies to achieve national security objectives. If confirmed as ASD for GSA, I will be responsible for developing the Department’s counterthreat finance policy guidance and developing counterthreat finance requirements. It is critical to develop and include integrated capabilities designed to exploit financial networks that support activities that are hostile towards U.S. interests. The Department will work in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies to counter adversaries’ funding networks and undermine terrorists’ ability to obtain nuclear or other WMD.

COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS

Question. SOFs have been deeply involved in training forces in Colombia to conduct unified counterdrug-counterterrorism missions.

In your view, what has been the success of training missions in Colombia?

Answer. In my view DOD’s training has been successful. The Colombian military and police forces are achieving battlefield superiority over illegal groups that traffic in drugs and have terrorized Colombia’s people and threatened its sovereignty. SOF counternarcoterrorism training missions have been instrumental in helping the Colombian military and national police gain professional skills, improve combat techniques, and develop tactics and procedures. Equally important, SOF training has resulted in intangible results such as increased respect for human rights, an appreciation for civil-military operations, and professionalization of the force.

Question. Are these appropriate missions for SOFs?

Answer. These missions are appropriate and beneficial for SOF. By undertaking these training missions, SOF increase their proficiency at working with foreign partners to conduct their core missions of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense.

Question. What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-counterterrorist training missions in Colombia and counterdrug-training missions worldwide provide to SOFs?

Answer. These training missions provide a realistic scenario for SOF to hone their skills such as: teaching through interpreters; organizing, training, equipping, and leading an indigenous force; and operating in austere environments not easily replicated in training locations in the U.S.

DETAINEE AFFAIRS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.


**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

**Answer.** Yes. Humane treatment is the bedrock principle of DOD policy, regulations, and detention operations. By treating all detainees humanely, we hope that our adversaries will reciprocate with our servicemembers. It should be noted however that al Qaeda and the Taliban are not bound by international regimes, and have demonstrated a prodigious disregard for the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the Department remains steadfastly committed to its obligations under the law of armed conflict, and detains members of al Qaeda and the Taliban within its custody and control humanely and consistent with international standards of treatment.

**Question.** Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** In the past year and a half, Task Force 134 in Iraq has made significant changes to the way in which detention operations are conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.

What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq over the past year and a half?

**Answer.** In order to be successfully integrated into an effective counterinsurgency campaign, detention operations in Iraq have moved beyond simply detaining individuals that remain a security threat to coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. Besides removing insurgents from the battlefield, successful detention operations now focus on successfully reintegrating and rehabilitating detainees so that when they are released, they will not re-engage in hostilities.

Task Force 134 has adopted a number of measures, called counterinsurgency inside the wire, which focus on these reintegration and rehabilitation efforts. These lessons learned have included more thorough screening of detainees so as to isolate the extremists elements from more moderate Iraqis, family involvement and visitations, and voluntary educational and vocational programs, including voluntary exposure to moderate Islamic teaching, so as to better equip detainees to find jobs upon release and help them resist extremist influences.

**Question.** What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned into the DOD’s doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?

**Answer.** Each theater of operations will have some unique detention requirements, tailored to the nature and scope of operations. However the Department is applying lessons learned from detention-centered counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and incorporating best practices in Afghanistan. For example, the Department is planning to implement voluntary educational and vocational training programs at Theater Internment Facilities in Afghanistan. The Department is also examining ways to incorporate some of these practices at Guantanamo, such as expanding family contact through telephone calls.

Building on these successes will require a review of DOD’s internal directives and policy guidance as it pertains to detention, and issuing or modifying new guidance as appropriate.

**DOD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM**

**Question.** The CTR program has several key objectives including: (1) reducing strategic nuclear weapons; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material; (3) eliminating and preventing biological and chemical weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging military reductions and reforms to reduce proliferation threats.

In your view, how has the CTR program benefited U.S. national security?

**Answer.** The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has reduced the threat of WMD proliferation by securing possible sources of WMD, destroying or deactivating threat systems, and improving the capability to detect and interdict WMD or related materials in transit. CTR’s “scorecard” during the 16-year history of the program speaks for itself: 7,292 warheads deactivated with CTR support; 1,529
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) eliminated; 796 silos eliminated; 131 mobile ICBM launchers eliminated; 155 strategic bombers eliminated; 906 nuclear Air-to-Surface missiles eliminated; 456 submarine launch tubes eliminated from 30 missile submarines which were eliminated by CTR. In addition, a fissile material storage facility was constructed in Russia which we believe is being loaded with plutonium derived from dismantled weapons; CTR has provided inventory control and physical security for Russian warhead storage sites. The forgoing comprises key elements of the “scorecard,” but do not include CTR’s work in WMD border security and bio-security.

Many of these activities were initially conducted during a period when cooperating governments were unable to provide adequate security for the weapons and related systems. Thus, the data reflects not merely specific weapons or delivery systems eliminated, but rather elimination of threats which in many cases were vulnerable to misappropriation.

In addition to the “scorecard” data, CTR has also provided a vehicle for cooperation with governments with whom communication with the U.S. was sometimes tense in other venues. The value of maintaining areas of cooperation on difficult issues is difficult to measure but no less intrinsic. Moreover, CTR specifically and U.S. national security interests more broadly have benefited greatly from the willingness of its founders, Senators Nunn and Lugar, to continue being emissaries for WMD nonproliferation cooperation.

**Question.** What is your view of the CTR program’s chemical and biological weapons elimination efforts?

**Answer.** CTR’s chemical weapons elimination efforts marked a milestone in 2007, when Albania became the first State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention to complete elimination of its declared chemical weapons stockpile. This effort was completed with CTR assistance. In 2008/2009, CTR’s chemical weapons elimination efforts will mark another milestone with commissioning of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch’ye, in the Russian Federation. CTR is committed to successful completion of this project, which has had a very complex history. CTR will remain well-positioned to conduct chemical weapons elimination work, or related activities, over the long term due its ability to draw on expertise of the U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps and Chemical Materials Agency.

CTR’s biological weapons elimination work is based currently on a flexible model which incorporates bio-security, dangerous pathogen surveillance, cooperative research, and disease reporting/information sharing. It is titled formally the “Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP).” BTRP can be adapted to meet the needs of new partner nations, or to limit the risk DOD chooses to take on. BTRP is the fastest growing area of the CTR program, reflecting the threat posed by weak bio-security worldwide.

**Question.** Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., the State Department and the Department of Energy?

**Answer.** Yes. Examples of CTR’s coordination can be found in the area of nuclear warhead security in Russia and the bio-security area. With respect to nuclear warhead security, CTR and a companion program at the Department of Energy have coordinated closely to accelerate U.S. efforts to complete work by the end of calendar 2008. That work is proceeding on schedule with robust communication between CTR and DoE to resolve problems or pursue opportunities. With respect to bio-security, CTR staff has participated fully in an interagency effort led by the Department of State to develop a global strategy for coordination of U.S. bio-security and related assistance.

For fiscal year 2008, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program received additional funding and new authority to conduct threat reduction activities outside of the former Soviet Union.

**Question.** What actions have you taken to implement this new authority?

**Answer.** The Department appreciates the streamlining of CTR authorities, as well as the initial allocation of $10 million for fiscal year 2008 that was provided for activities outside states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). During my April 12, 2008 testimony to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, I noted that the program was evaluating potential programs in several countries outside the FSU with the goal of developing in 2008 CTR activities with those countries that could begin in 2009. If confirmed, I would offer to brief the committee on the results of our evaluation and the way ahead.

Expansion of CTR outside the FSU has received much focus, but I should also note that 2008 is a year of intense activity for CTR inside the FSU; the complex Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility and nuclear warhead security projects in Russia will conclude this year; nonproliferation activities in Kazakhstan are being
accelerated; and entirely new bio-security engagement activities are beginning in Armenia and Turkmenistan.

Question. Are there any impediments that you have encountered in implementing this new authority and if so what are those impediments and what is your plan for addressing any such impediments?

Answer. New initiatives in a program like CTR are inherently labor intensive to develop. Therefore, a principal impediment has been prioritizing among CTR activities. We have added additional staff to help with this reprioritization. We also appreciate congressional support for streamlining CTR authorities which will help improve flexibility and efficiency in operation of the program.

Question. In your view, what are the key opportunities and challenges over the next 5 years that the CTR Program should address?

Answer. Among the specific opportunities or challenges that I see in the next 5 years for CTR are the following: (1) adapt CTR's nonproliferation policy goals and program business practices to be able to function effectively outside the Former Soviet Union; (2) add a more flexible, rapid mode of operations should circumstances warrant, but without overlapping with the State Department's Nonproliferation/Disarmament Fund; (3) move CTR's relationship with the cooperating countries from an assistance-based model to one of partnership.

More broadly, since its inception, CTR's priority has been to address WMD and related materials "at there source." This is the most reliable means of dealing with the threat posed by WMD proliferation. In 2004, with the 2001 terrorist attacks in mind, CTR added the problem of WMD and related materials "on the move" as a goal to be addressed. For CTR, this has meant undertaking new activities in the area of WMD border security and expanding its bio-security work. CTR will always be ready to address WMD at the source. However, expanding the program's impact on nonproliferation priorities will demand continued creativity with the challenge of WMD "on the move."

Question. Clearly the Russian economy has changed since the creation of the CTR programs, as has the nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship.

In your view, how should these changes be reflected in future of U.S.-Russian programs under the CTR program?

Answer. As I testified on April 2, 2008, I believe it is important to remember that CTR in Russia remains in the U.S. interest. However, CTR's role in Russia is changing as the Russian economy has improved and progress has been made on the initial programs of accounting for and securing the vast complex of Soviet-era WMD. CTR's role in Russia is declining today as Russia has new resources to fulfill its legal and other responsibilities. In 2008, more CTR funds will be obligated for activities outside Russia than inside Russia. This milestone begins a trend in CTR's program plan which will continue. Our goal is to fulfill promises and contracts that the CTR program has made in Russia, but also to shift our relationship to a different footing.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which Russia co-chairs, is an example of Russia bringing its own expertise to the worldwide fight against WMD. This partnership with the United States has been beneficial for both countries.

Question. What is your view of the advantages of the recently signed U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement from a nonproliferation perspective?

Answer. In my view, the recently signed U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement may have a benefit in the nonproliferation area, in that it helps codify cooperation with agencies of the Russian Federation which also have responsibility for security of some nuclear materials. At a time when U.S.-Russian relations are complex, new venues for cooperation can be helpful in a mission as broad as nonproliferation.

ARMs CONTROL

Question. Arms control has been a prominent feature in U.S. security policy in the past, but clearly the international security landscape has changed dramatically in the past decade.

What is your view of the current arms control efforts and the proper role of arms control in U.S. national security strategy?

Answer. Arms control remains an effective tool for combating the proliferation of WMD. The National Strategy to Combat WMD identifies nonproliferation and arms control as one of its three principle pillars, and as such, calls for the enhancement of arms control measures to impede proliferant states and terrorist networks. The National Security Strategy also calls for compliance with existing nonproliferation regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Agreements such as
these not only call for the complete destruction of certain classes of WMD, but also possess the framework for addressing emerging threats.

**Question.** What opportunities exist for advancing arms control with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery?

**Answer.** The U.S. is currently leading international efforts to agree to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which would ban the production of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes. If ratified by all countries, this treaty could be a major step forward in nonproliferation and arms control. DOD supports current negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.

In addition to negotiation of an FMCT, full implementation of the NPT, CWC, and BWC, along with efforts at universalization of these treaties, would contribute to security and stability. We are also working with the Department of State to conclude a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

**EXPORT CONTROL**

**Question.** Do you believe that a review is necessary of the implications for the U.S. satellite industry of retaining or removing satellites from munitions list for export purposes and the range of satellite and satellite components that are controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations?

**Answer.** The Department of State, which has the statutory authority for administering the International Traffic in Arms Regulation, including items on the U.S. Munitions List, would need to determine that such a review is necessary. If a review was initiated, DOD would assist in providing technical expertise and programmatic insight needed to determine whether the export controls protect U.S. national security.

**Question.** If so, what questions should be addressed in such a review?

**Answer.** The scope of any review would be determined in coordination with the Department of State.

**COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)**

**Question.** If confirmed, what would be your role, if any, in policy formulation and implementation of the PSI?

**Answer.** I would be an active participant in the interagency policy formulation for PSI. In addition, I would provide guidance and oversight to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation, Counternarcotics, and Global Threats, who leads U.S. Government efforts in PSI's Operational Experts Group. The PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG), a group of military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts from 20 PSI participating states, meets regularly to develop operational concepts, organize the PSI exercise program, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with key industry sectors. The OEG works on behalf of all PSI partners and strives to share its insights and experiences through bilateral and multilateral outreach efforts.

**Question.** In your view, what are the benefits of the PSI?

**Answer.** First, PSI channels international commitment to stopping WMD-related proliferation by focusing on interdiction as a key component of a global counterproliferation strategy.

Second, PSI provides participating countries with opportunities to improve national capabilities and strengthen authorities to conduct interdictions. PSI partners have developed and sustained one of the only global, interagency, and multinational exercise programs, conducting over 30 operational air, maritime, and ground interdiction exercises involving over 70 nations.

Third, PSI provides a basis for cooperation among partners on specific actions when the need arises. Interdictions are information-driven and may involve one or several participating states, as geography and circumstances require. By working together, PSI partners combine their capabilities to deter and stop proliferation whenever and whenever it takes place.

**Question.** Have the participants in the PSI actually interdicted a shipment of items associated with WMD that were being shipped illegally? If so, please provide examples of these actions including what nations participated and the legal authorities utilized to interdict the shipment and under which it was determined that the shipment was illegal.

**Answer.** PSI partners define “interdiction” broadly, as any action, based on sufficient information and consistent with national authorities and international legal frameworks, that results in the denial, delay, or disruption of a shipment of proliferation concern. Shipments of concern may be transported by air, sea, or land.

The United States has worked successfully with multiple PSI partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to prevent transfers of equipment and materials to WMD
and missile programs in countries of proliferation concern. Details of specific successes are classified, and could be provided in a separate briefing.

**Question.** How is funding to support PSI efforts, including exercises, determined and allocated and to what entities is such funding provided? What is the source of the funds and the amount utilized for PSI activities in fiscal year 2007 and planned for in fiscal years 2008 and 2009?

**Answer.** PSI is not budgeted currently in a traditional, programmatic sense. The PSI was conceived as a flexible, adaptive initiative that leverages existing capabilities, activities, authorities and resources rather than creating new ones. For example, PSI-related interdiction scenarios are often injected into existing military exercises, as was the case with SOUTHCOM’s Panamax 2007 exercise. DOD’s PSI activities are funded out of existing budgets, such as Operations and Maintenance when a U.S. vessel executes a “hail-and-query.” As a result, we have not previously tracked PSI expenditures separately. However, in response to legislative requirements, GSA staff is preparing a more detailed analysis of PSI funding.

In addition, beginning in 2007, the Department requested funding specifically for support to combatant commands for PSI-related activities. The 2008 request is $800,000.

**Question.** Is funding or in-kind assistance provided to international partners? If so please provide a list of countries which have received assistance and the nature or amount of the assistance provided on an annual basis?

**Answer.** The Department has not provided funding or in-kind support to international partners specifically for PSI. I understand that the Department of State has provided financial support to PSI partners under State authorities.

### Cluster Munitions

**Question.** Last month more than 110 countries, including the United Kingdom—but not the United States—approved the text of an agreement banning the use, production, and sale of cluster munitions. What is your view of the treaty on cluster munitions?

**Answer.** Cluster munitions are effective weapons, provide distinct advantages against a range of targets and can, against some targets, result in less collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure than unitary weapons. The Oslo Convention’s ban on cluster munitions, if we were to join it, would result in a capability gap for indirect fire of area targets that would require an increase in other resources and could put at risk our airmen and ground forces.

The U.S. shares the concerns about unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure caused by the use of cluster munitions. In July, at the next negotiation session of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States will work to complete a new cluster munitions protocol. The CCW includes all of the major producers and users of cluster munitions, many of which will not sign the Oslo Convention; thus, an agreement in the CCW is likely to have a greater practical effect. We have called for completion of a new cluster munitions protocol by the end of 2008.

**Question.** What impact do you believe U.S. opposition to the cluster munitions treaty will have on our relations with other nations who support the treaty and on future operations with coalition partners?

**Answer.** The Oslo Convention contains specific provisions that would allow parties to the Convention to cooperate militarily and to operate with non parties such as the United States. Military cooperation and operations includes transit of and storage of cluster munitions on the territory of countries that accede to the Oslo Convention. Without a single, broad interpretation of these provisions, the U.S. ability to uphold treaty commitments and for countries to participate with us in international peacekeeping operations could be in jeopardy. We believe that all countries that accede to the Oslo Convention can agree on a single, broad interpretation which provides for needed interoperability.

### Prisoner of War/Missing-In-Action Personnel

**Question.** Recovery of remains operations in North Korea are a humanitarian effort, and arguably should not be tied to the larger political and strategic issues surrounding North Korea. Since its inception in 1996 until its suspension in 2005, this program was seen by both parties as humanitarian in nature. The program is critically important to the families of these missing servicemembers.

What is the status of resumption of recovery operations in North Korea?

**Answer.** The Department temporarily suspended remains recovery operations in May 2005 due to concern for our personnel during a period of heightened tensions between the U.S. and North Korea; however, we are prepared to return once condi-
tions are appropriate. The Department will ensure that before any personnel conduct future remains recovery operations in North Korea we have taken all possible precautions to ensure their safety. These precautions will include access to urgent medical care if required, and availability of adequate communications systems. Additionally, the Department will require North Korea to permit our teams access to key sites where suspected remains may be recovered.

Question. Does the Department intend to wait until pending political and nuclear issues are resolved before approaching North Korea about the resumption of recovery operations?

Answer. As the Secretary wrote in his 21 May 2008 letter to Chairman Levin, the Department shares the desires of families and veterans to resume remains recovery operations in North Korea, and we are prepared to do so at the appropriate time. Unfortunately, we cannot predict when conditions will be conducive to resuming discussion on this humanitarian program. We are monitoring the situation closely. As soon as we believe it is appropriate to reengage with North Korea on these recovery efforts, we will ensure that Congress is informed. The Six-Party Talks are currently at an especially sensitive point. Should we deploy U.S. personnel in re-stated recovery operations, their efforts could be put in jeopardy if the talks fail.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reported to Congress last year on the organization, management, and budgeting of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). The report essentially supported the status quo.

Question. What is your view of the organization, management, and budget structure of JPAC?

Answer. I believe JPAC’s current organization, management, and budget structure aligned under PACOM and funded by the Department of the Navy meets its current needs and requirements. The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has formed a Senior Study Group comprised of principals within the POW/MIA personnel accounting community to study continually this and other issues within the personnel accounting community.

Question. Is JPAC sufficiently funded to maximize progress in identifying the remains of missing servicemembers?

Answer. JPAC is fully funded for its approved missions and its current operations tempo, which includes fielding 70 worldwide missions per year. Their biggest challenge has been insufficient workspace. The JPAC commander has taken action to increase work space, which will enhance their ability to establish identifications. The PACOM commander has ranked the JPAC MILCON in his top requirements; design begins in fiscal year 2009, and construction begins in fiscal year 2010. Additionally, JPAC is working with the military and civilian human resource offices to increase their percentage of assigned personnel. These actions will allow the command to be more effective in accomplishing its mission.

Although JPAC is sufficiently funded to maintain its current operations tempo, if JPAC is able to resume operations in North Korea, the organization will require additional funding. JPAC’s latest estimate for fiscal year 2009 is that an additional $15.1 million would be required to resume operations. That estimate could change depending on market conditions when operations actually resume. We will keep the committee apprised of any changes in that assessment.

Question. Has the Department considered moving JPAC and its forensic capabilities to the mainland United States? If so, what were the results of that consideration? What are the obstacles to such a move?

Answer. The Department continues to look at a number of options to increase JPAC’s forensic remains identification capacity, to include another laboratory on the mainland, still under the command of JPAC and focused only on identifying remains. This is only one option under consideration, however. Currently, the JPAC commander is evaluating ways to improve the recruitment and retention of anthropologists and archaeologists, to include increasing pay and incentives, but the organization is still collecting data on these matters, and will make recommendations after evaluating the data.

A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study recommended that the Department undertake a formal needs assessment of the workload of the Defense POW/MIA Office to determine both what resources are needed and how they can best be allocated among the various mission areas.

Question. Has the Department performed a formal needs assessment as recommended by the GAO? If not, why not, and if so, what were the results?

Answer. In August 2007, OUSD Policy contracted with a private organization to analyze the current distribution of staff, identify areas for revised manpower distribution, and offer recommendations to improve the capacity of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to meet mission objectives. The analysis
included a review of, and recommendations for, the most effective use and distribution of civilian, military, and contract personnel.

The organizational assessment, which also included a needs assessment, was completed on December 28, 2007. The assessment recommended increased staffing for the operational support and personnel recovery mission areas. DPMO documented the recommended staffing requirements in developing the Department’s fiscal year 2010–2015 program.

**Question.** What is DOD doing to ensure sufficient outreach to family members to collect reference samples and that adequate resources are allocated to family reference sample collection? How will DOD ensure that it has collected as many family reference samples as possible?

**Answer.** We have 67 percent of family reference samples from Vietnam War families. For the Korean War, we have samples for 61 percent of all losses, but we have employed a strategy that prioritizes collection on losses in certain key areas. As a result, we have 90 percent of the reference samples for those lost in the principal areas that CPAC operated in North Korea and between 84–90 percent in areas where North Korea unilaterally recovered and repatriated a large number of remains that we are still working to identify. For World War II, our approach is to collect family reference samples for specific aircraft crews or casualties in individual engagements where we have recovered remains, and there too our methods have proven successful.

One of the major methods DPMO uses to solicit for reference samples is through our Family Update program. Annually, DPMO holds eight Family Update meetings in cities around the Nation. More than 40 percent of families at these meetings are first time attendees. DPMO will continue to explore creative ways to increase family reference donation.

**HUMAN TRAFFICKING**

**Question.** Human trafficking is a significant global humanitarian problem. If confirmed, you would serve as the focal point for the Secretary of Defense’s policies of interest within OSD.

What do you believe to be the appropriate role for DOD in supporting U.S. Government policies to prevent human trafficking?

**Answer.** Per DOD Instruction 2200.01, it is DOD policy to: oppose prostitution, forced labor, and any related activities that may contribute to the phenomenon of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) as inherently harmful and dehumanizing; deter activities of DOD servicemembers, civilian employees, indirect hires, contract personnel, and command-sponsored dependents that would facilitate or support TIP, domestically and overseas; educate all servicemembers and DOD civilians annually on the worldwide trafficking menace, national TIP policy, overseas theater TIP policy, and attendant personal responsibilities consistent with DOD core values and ethical standards; increase efforts by commanders and military police worldwide, within their authorities, to pursue indicators of TIP in commercial establishments patronized by DOD personnel, place offending establishments off-limits, and provide support to host-country authorities involved in the battle against TIP.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness serves as the DOD Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and develops overall policy and provides guidance for the DOD CTIP program. The Office of the ASD/GSA supports DOD efforts to combat TIP by representing the Department in the annual U.S. Government TIP sanction review process and working closely with the Office to Monitor and Combat TIP at the Department of State.

**PIRACY**

**Question.** Piracy is a major problem that affects U.S. interests. Some of the world’s key shipping lanes and offshore oil operations, for instance, off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Guinea, and in the Strait of Malacca have seen numerous incidents of piracy. The U.S. Navy and our allies in Europe have played an active role in protecting the shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia in recent years.

What do you believe to be the appropriate role for DOD in preventing and responding to the growing problem of piracy?

**Answer.** The President’s Piracy policy of June, 2007, provides that “The United States strongly supports efforts to repress piracy and other criminal acts of violence against maritime navigation. The physical and economic security of the United States—a major global trading nation with interests across the maritime spectrum—relies heavily on the secure navigation of the world’s oceans for unhindered legitimate commerce by its citizens and its partners. Piracy and other acts of vio-
lence against maritime navigation endanger sea lines of communication, interfere with freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, and undermine regional stability."

The policy calls for a multifaceted approach to piracy involving the missions and capabilities of various U.S. agencies, and the international community, in addition to DOD: "Piracy repression should include diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, and judicial actions. Effectively responding to piracy and criminal activity sends an important deterrent message and requires coordination by all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in order to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice in a timely manner." As this policy recognizes, DOD plays an important, but not the sole role in preventing and responding to piracy through the combined operational capabilities of our forces, and our coalition allies.

GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS

Question. One of your responsibilities will be to serve as the focal point for policies of interest relating to DOD's response to international health crises and humanitarian disasters. By all accounts, the world is in the midst of a decline in the availability of food and an increase in the price of food. Should this global food crisis continue, it is likely that DOD will be called upon to assist in a variety of places around the world.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in providing relief to this crisis and other resource crises around the world?

Answer. DOD has varied capabilities to assist in crises of different kinds, as was demonstrated during the December 2004 response to the tsunami in Asia. I would expect the Department to respond to any crisis in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. Government, but it is difficult to comment on an appropriate role for a hypothetical event that has not occurred.

HUMANITARIAN DISASTER

Question. In international humanitarian crises where the United States provides relief, DOD is often called upon to play a major role.

What do you see as the primary challenges for the Department in providing such relief, and what do you believe is the appropriate role for the Department in providing humanitarian relief?

Answer. Again, I would expect the Department to respond to any crisis in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. Government, but it is difficult to comment on challenges for a hypothetical event that has not occurred.

In general, DOD, through its combatant commands, participates in Foreign Disaster Relief efforts: (1) when directed by the President; (2) with the concurrence of the Secretary of State; and (3) in emergency situations in order to save lives. DOD plays a key role in disaster situations by offering unique assets for timely and effective response to foreign nations that request assistance. The Department also plays a key role in any overseas disaster relief effort when civilian authorities become overwhelmed as evident during the Indonesian Tsunami (2005), Pakistan Earthquake (2006), Hurricane Felix-Nicaraguan relief efforts (2007), Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh (2007), and Cyclone Nargis in Burma (2008).

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as ASD/GSA?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON
AFGHAN POLICE FORCE/ARMY

1. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Benkert, given your responsibilities for capacity building among partners and allies, what is your role in overseeing training of the Afghan police force and the Afghan army?

   Mr. Benkert. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs (GSA) in general deals with broad policy for training and equipping partner nation forces, and with the authorities used for training and equipping this provides the framework through which assistance to specific nations is provided. With respect to Afghanistan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs (APSA) provides policy oversight for training the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP). GSA is also responsible for policy oversight of the Department of Defense's (DOD) support to counternarcotics efforts worldwide and manages the counternarcotics Central Transfer Account. In this role, GSA provides policy oversight of the training, equipping, and infrastructure support for the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, as well as overseeing the advanced interdiction training of the Afghan Border Police, working closely with APSA, Central Command, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the State Department. In addition, GSA helps to identify and recruit coalition partners to provide training and equipment to the Afghan Security Forces and provides oversight and policy guidance supporting the efforts of participating coalition partners. This activity is executed in close coordination with the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense regional offices.

2. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Benkert, to your knowledge, what are the current capabilities of the Afghan police force and the Afghan army?

   Mr. Benkert. Primary policy oversight and guidance for DOD work with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—the Afghan Army and police—is developed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for APSA.

   I understand that the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) have been improving and the ANA is currently seen as one of the most trusted and respected institutions in Afghanistan. There are currently 63,000 ANA, growing towards an end strength of 80,000. The ANA has become increasingly capable and has taken the lead in over 30 major operations.

   The ANP is several years behind the ANA but is making progress. There are approximately 75,000 ANP and they are growing to their approved end strength of 82,000. The current focus in ANP development is on reforming and training the current force.

   Building the capabilities of the ANSF is one of the key priorities of the United States. The U.S. has spent over $10.1 billion in the last 2 years towards these efforts. The desired end state is a professional, capable, respected and multi-ethnic ANSF with competent ministries and staffs and sustaining institutions capable of directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training and supporting the ANSF.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER
COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

3. Senator Warner. Mr. Benkert, among the issues you would be responsible for, if you are confirmed, is that of DOD counterdrug policy in Afghanistan. It is critically important that we not permit the enemy in Afghanistan to fund hostile activities against our forces using drug money. So, I’d like to pose to you the same question I posed to Secretary Gates a few months ago: When it comes to taking responsibility for the counternarcotics mission in Afghanistan, where does the buck stop?

   Mr. Benkert. President Karzai has primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s narcotics problem, with the support of the international community. The Afghan Compact, agreed at the February 2006 London Conference, passed the lead to the Government of Afghanistan in all areas of reform and development, with international commitment to support Afghanistan in these areas. As Secretary Gates testified, at the Bucharest North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit the heads of government were direct with President Karzai on the narcotics issue.
4. Senator WARNER. Mr. Benkert, who is responsible for this matter ultimately? Who in the U.S. Government is responsible? Who in the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) structure is responsible?

Mr. BENKERT. Ultimately, President Karzai and the Government of Afghanistan are responsible for the narcotics problem in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government must have the political will to counter the narcotics threat. The majority of the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is taking place in the southern region of the country where the government’s authority is weak and the insurgency is strong.

Within the U.S. Government, the lead agency in dealing with the narcotics problem continues to be the Department of State. In August 2007, all relevant agencies of the U.S. Government approved the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, which sets forth roles and responsibilities. The Office of National Drug Control Policy, Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, along with the United States Agency for International Development and the Drug Enforcement Administration will continue to implement programs to build Afghan capacity to enable President Karzai to succeed against the narcotics problem, in support of the Counternarcotics Strategy.

The ISAF is providing counternarcotics support within the limits of the NATO operations plan. The ISAF commander’s military chain of command ultimately leads to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. ISAF has an important supportive role in the counternarcotics effort, given that the drug trade is a key destabilizer in Afghanistan, and that the narcotics trade helps fuel the insurgency.

[The nomination reference of Joseph A. Benkert follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 25, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Joseph A. Benkert, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Peter Cyril Wyche Flory, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Joseph A. Benkert, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOSEPH A. BENKERT

Joe Benkert became the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (GSA) in December 2006 upon the establishment of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for GSA. Previously, he served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, GSA’s predecessor. The GSA office is responsible for defense-related issues and programs that concern building the capability of partners and allies; coalition affairs; technology security policy; security cooperation; counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and countering global threats; detainee affairs; and prisoner of war/missing-in-action issues.

Mr. Benkert previously served as Deputy Director and Director of the Defense Reconstruction Support Office and its predecessor, the Defense Support Office-Iraq. Mr. Benkert was instrumental in establishing these offices to provide a single focus within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for coordination of the Defense Department’s support to stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to this appointment, he was the Deputy and Chief of Operations for the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Washington office. Before that, he was Chief of Staff for the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Mr. Benkert was a career Navy officer with extensive experience both in command at sea and in national security policy formulation and implementation in Washington. He commanded two destroyer squadrons; a guided missile cruiser, U.S.S. Josephus Daniels; and a frigate, U.S.S. McCloy. He was the Executive Director of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, an advisory group for the Navy’s senior uniformed leader; and served in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy both as a senior military assistant and as the Director of European Policy.
Mr. Benkert graduated with distinction from the United States Naval Academy and received the Master of Public Policy degree from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He and his wife Gail have two children and reside in Arlington, VA.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Joseph A. Benkert in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Joseph Albert Benkert.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs).

3. **Date of nomination:**
   February 25, 2008.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   January 17, 1951; Frankfort, KY.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Gail (DeVeuve) Benkert.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Suzanne Benkert, 23; Stephen Joseph Benkert, 21.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   Franklin County High School, Frankfort KY, Diploma, June 1969.
   U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis MD, Bachelor of Science, June 1973.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.


10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

None.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Member, St. Mary’s Episcopal Church, Arlington, VA
Member, U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
Member, U.S. Naval Institute
Member, Military Officers Association of America
Member, Smithsonian Associates

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

None.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

None.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

Military medals: Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Navy Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Coast Guard Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, unit and campaign awards.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

I authored one article for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in 1985.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

No formal speeches.

In my current position, I have made informal remarks to government audiences on several occasions on combating weapons of mass destruction. While serving with the Coalition Provisional Authority, I made informal remarks on several occasions at conferences on Iraq reconstruction.
In my current and previous positions, I have testified before Senate and House committees on several occasions. Transcripts are available. These appearances include:

- Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, “Use of Riot Control Agents,” September 2006
- Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, “Overseas Basing Plans,” April 2007
- Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,” April 2007

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

I agree.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JOSEPH A. BENKERT.

This 25th day of February, 2008.

[The nomination of Joseph A. Benkert reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Sean J. Stackley by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA))?

Answer. It is my understanding that, as currently designated by the Secretary of the Navy, the ASN(RDA) serves as the Service Acquisition Executive for the Department of the Navy with the authority, responsibility, and accountability for all acquisition functions and programs within the Department of the Navy. As such, the ASN(RDA) is responsible for managing the Department of the Navy’s acquisition workforce management structure and processes consistent with governing statute, DOD policies, and Navy regulations; making recommendations regarding milestone decisions for Acquisition Category ID programs; and serving as the decision authority for Acquisition Category IC and II programs.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. A strong technical background and an extensive Navy career have provided me with the opportunity to serve in a series of assignments in ship operations, design and construction, maintenance, logistics, system integration, acquisition policy, and Major Program management. Specifically, operational experience gained while deployed in a Navy destroyer; and subsequent assignments as project naval architect for a first of class frigate, shipyard production manager for a first of class destroyer, and director for maintenance and modernization for Atlantic Fleet cruisers and destroyers provided invaluable experience in the operation, design, construction, and life cycle support of complex warships. Later assignments in the Aegis Shipbuilding Program Office and the Office of the ASN(RDA) provided in-depth experience in procurement, financial management, policy formulation, and the business end of major defense programs. Subsequently, as the LPD 17 Program Manager, I had the opportunity to lead an organization of research centers, warfare centers, Systems Commands, industry, and the test and evaluation community while completing the Lead Ship’s design, software development, weapon system integration, production, test, and delivery. More recently, in the performance of my duties on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have gained critical insight to the role of Congress and the perspective of the committee while working closely with the Navy and Marine Corps on the full spectrum of acquisition matters that confront the ASN(RDA).

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASN(RDA)?

Answer. I believe that I am technically and professionally prepared to perform the duties of the ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I expect to have a close working relationship with the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), and I expect to coordinate on acquisition matters with the Secretariat and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) organizations. Ultimately, performance of the duties of the ASN(RDA) is measured by the performance of the acquisition workforce. There are a number of actions, initiated by the Department and with the support of Congress, intended to strengthen this workforce and the processes governing the management of major procurements. I believe that one of my priorities, if confirmed, will be to further the implementation of these initiatives.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy would prescribe for you?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy to assign me duties and functions commensurate with the ASN(RDA) position, and any others they may deem appropriate.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

The Secretary of the Navy/Under Secretary of the Navy.

Answer. By current instruction, the Secretary of the Navy has designated the ASN(RDA) as the Department of the Navy Service Acquisition Executive with responsibility for establishing acquisition policy and procedures, and for managing research, development and acquisition within the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy in the execution of the duties related to this function. Further, I will perform other duties as assigned by the Secretary.

Question. The Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Answer. The CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps are the principal advisors to the Secretary of the Navy in the allocation of resources to meet program requirements. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CNO and the Commandant.
in the planning and execution of acquisition programs to most effectively meet the warfighters’ requirements with available resources.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would represent the Department of the Navy to the Under Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to Navy acquisition policy and programs. In addition, as the Navy Acquisition Executive, I would provide recommendations on all Navy Acquisition Category ID programs to the Under Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Air Force for Acquisition.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I plan to establish close working relationships with my counterparts in the Army and the Air Force to ensure coordination on key acquisition issues.

**Question.** The General Counsel of the Navy.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I expect to seek advice and counsel from the Navy’s Chief Legal Officer on all relevant matters.

**Question.** The Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E).

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work with DDR&E in the coordination of Research and Development (R&D) efforts by the Department of the Navy.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)).

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work with the ASD(NII) as necessary to ensure Navy/Marine Corps system design and development meet interoperability exchange, information assurance, and further network requirements established by the ASD(NII).

**Question.** The Navy Chief Information Officer.

**Answer.** The Department of the Navy (DON) Chief Information Officer (CIO) reports directly to the Secretary for all matters on Information Management (IM) and Information Technology (IT). If confirmed, I will work closely with the DON CIO on acquisition of IM/IT systems, and IM/IT matters as they affect Navy acquisition.

**Question.** The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director in the development, approval, and execution of Test and Evaluation Master Plans for Navy acquisition programs.

**Question.** The Chief of Naval Research.

**Answer.** By current instruction, the Chief of Naval Research reports to the ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I would oversee the Chief of Naval Research execution and management of the Department of the Navy RDT&E appropriation.

**MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS**

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront, if confirmed as ASN(RDA)?

**Answer.** If confirmed as the ASN(RDA), my overarching challenge will be to oversee and integrate the Department of the Navy’s research, development and procurement functions within the available resources in order to provide the Nation’s Navy and Marine Corps with unmatched capability for the performance of their full range of missions. I believe some of the more specific challenges I would confront include:

- Meeting the urgent needs of the sailors and Marines in prosecuting the global war on terrorism;
- Ensuring the depth and breadth of skills and experience in the Navy’s acquisition workforce matches the requirements for managing the Navy’s acquisition programs;
- Improving performance in controlling cost and requirements in order to deliver programs within budget and schedule;
- Sustaining a robust science and technology program to ensure our technological advantage over future threats;
- Addressing industrial base challenges in an environment of sustained low rate production.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I expect to draw on my previous experiences as well as the advice and counsel of the Navy’s acquisition team, the CNO, and the Commandant in order to address these challenges. I intend to work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), industry, and Congress to develop and execute plans and initiatives that will advance our efforts on these challenges.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the ASN(RDA)?
Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any serious problems in the performance of the functions of the ASN(RDA).

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will address problems as they arise, establishing a plan of action and timeline appropriate to the nature, priority, and urgency of each problem.

PRIORITIES

Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASN(RDA)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the framework of objectives established by the Secretary of the Navy for the Department. I believe some of the more specific priorities I would need to address include:

- Meeting the urgent needs of the sailors and marines prosecuting the global war on terrorism;
- Developing, implementing, and executing acquisition plans to affordably modernize and procure the ships, aircraft, and related systems required to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy;
- Building and sustaining a highly capable acquisition workforce to manage acquisition of Navy/Marine Corps programs.

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the Navy and the other military Services continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability. Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

Answer. Yes. Studies by the Department, by third parties, and by oversight organizations, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), have consistently identified instability in funding and requirements as one of the root causes for cost growth and schedule delay on major programs.

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to address funding and requirements instability?

Answer. I believe that there is close coupling between the degree of stability in funding and requirements, the quality of cost estimates for major weapons systems, and the performance by the government and industry as they relate to program cost and schedule. As such, I believe that a first step in addressing funding and requirements instability is to ensure the reasonableness of the system requirements and to improve the quality of related cost and schedule estimates to ensure that decisionmakers are well informed of their full commitment of resources at the front end of major weapon systems programs. A commensurate step would include ensuring adherence to the Department’s standards for achieving the appropriate level of technology readiness prior to proceeding to the next acquisition phase to minimize the degree of uncertainty that would surround the cost estimate at each program milestone. If the Department properly funds the program, it is then incumbent upon the acquisition team to exercise discipline in tracing system design and specifications to performance requirements, and to employ the appropriate acquisition strategy to deliver the capability within the resources allocated. Throughout this process, it is essential that the acquisition organization working closely with the resources and requirements organization adheres to Navy acquisition policy governing contract changes. If adequate resources are not programmed, I believe it is incumbent upon the Acquisition Executive to ensure the Department is fully aware of the effect of such funding instability on program execution, including cost impacts to other programs and impact to the industrial base. For mature programs that meet appropriate criteria, multiyear contracting has historically proven effective in maintaining funding and requirements stability.

GAO has reported that the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted in significant cost and schedule growth in the MDAPs of the Navy and the other military departments. Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify that critical technologies at each program milestone. If the Department properly funds the program, it is then incumbent upon the acquisition team to exercise discipline in tracing system design and specifications to performance requirements, and to employ the appropriate acquisition strategy to deliver the capability within the resources allocated. Throughout this process, it is essential that the acquisition organization working closely with the resources and requirements organization adheres to Navy acquisition policy governing contract changes. If adequate resources are not programmed, I believe it is incumbent upon the Acquisition Executive to ensure the Department is fully aware of the effect of such funding instability on program execution, including cost impacts to other programs and impact to the industrial base. For mature programs that meet appropriate criteria, multiyear contracting has historically proven effective in maintaining funding and requirements stability.

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Question. Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Navy complies with the requirements of section 2366a?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review Navy acquisition policy and practice to ensure compliance with the requirements of section 2366a, assess the implementation of this policy in the course of reviewing major programs, and ensure adherence through continued program review and oversight. Consistent with milestone decision authority designated for the ASN(RDA), I will ensure compliance with the section 2366a certification requirements prior to Milestone B approval and provide notification to the congressional defense committees. If it is necessary to proceed with Milestone B approval prior to completing the 2366a requirements in order to meet national security objectives, I will submit in writing to the congressional defense committees a waiver to section 2366a requirements, my determination that the Department would be unable to meet critical national security objectives without the waiver, and the reasons for this determination.

GAO has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Navy and the other military departments is a major contributor to cost growth and program failure.

Question. Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What steps do you believe the Navy should take to ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent, and provide a sound basis for Navy programs?

Answer. I believe that the quality of cost and schedule estimates relies to a great extent on the cost models employed by the various estimating groups; access to data required to validate these models; the policies governing the treatment of risk, contract type, escalation, margin, and change management; and the estimating group’s degree of independence, experience, and skill at managing these and other factors in the formulation of cost and schedule estimates. I believe that steps to ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent include ensuring that the cost estimating groups responsible for these efforts are adequately staffed with a workforce skilled and experienced for the task, that their accountability is distinct from the program office, and that the governing policies described above reflect the degree of risk that the Department is willing to include in budgeting for the program. In formulating estimates for major programs, it is prudent to seek multiple independent estimates, compare the estimates, understand the differences, and ensure that the risk highlighted by this approach is either included in the program budget or mitigated through the program’s contract strategy and risk management plan.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has issued a memorandum directing the military departments to institute new “Configuration Steering Boards” to review and approve new requirements that could add significantly to the costs of major systems.

Do you support this requirement?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy complies with this new requirement?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the requirement addressed in this USD(AT&L) memorandum is captured by ASN(RDA) instructions governing Navy acquisition policy and procedures, I will ensure that these instructions have been properly promulgated, review results of the Configuration Steering Boards, and ensure adherence to this requirement in the course of overseeing management of major programs.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has also issued a memorandum directing that the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping to ensure technological maturity, reduce technical risk, validate designs, cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements.

Question. Do you support this requirement?

Answer. Yes. As noted, as major weapon systems trend towards increased complexity, competitive prototyping provides an effective means for controlling and reducing technical risk in major defense programs. Additionally, sustaining competition to later stages of development for these weapon systems should provide for increased innovation and affordability in meeting design requirements.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy complies with this new requirement?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the requirement addressed in this USD(AT&L) memorandum is captured by ASN(RDA) instructions governing Navy acquisition policy and procedures, I will ensure that these instructions have been properly promulgated, and I will assess the implementation of the requirement in the course of conducting reviews of major programs.
Numerous acquisition reviews over the last decade have identified shortcomings and gaps in the acquisition workforce of the DOD. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 establishes an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to provide the resources needed to begin rebuilding the Department's corps of acquisition professionals.

**Question.** Do you believe that a properly sized workforce of appropriately trained acquisition professionals is essential if the Navy is going to get good value for the expenditure of public resources?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** What steps do you expect to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy makes appropriate use of the funds made available pursuant to section 852?

**Answer.** As noted, the drawdown of the acquisition workforce has occurred over a protracted period. Similarly, a sustained campaign will be necessary in order to attract, train and retain the skilled professionals required by the Department to properly perform its mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor performance, and provide the best value for the taxpayer's dollars. If confirmed, I will review current metrics and results of the Department's most recent billet review in order to assess existing gaps in critical skills for the acquisition workforce. I will review guidance promulgated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) for the administration of the Fund, and consult with senior Navy civilian and military leadership to assess the implementation of this guidance and the current state of planning for use of these funds within the Department.

Another concern raised about MDAPs is that a number of factors, including promotion and rotation policies are causing the military Services to retain program managers for too short a time.

**Question.** Do you agree that shortened tours as program managers can lead to difficulties in Acquisition programs?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** If you agree, what steps would you propose to take to provide for stability in program management?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would review current policy and practice for assigning program managers to major programs with senior Navy military and civilian leaders, including such considerations as career flow points, tenure agreements, and succession planning for program managers. To the extent that existing policy warrants improvement to support both the function of program management and the career of the program manager, I will work within the Department to make these changes; and otherwise I will work to ensure that the Department adheres to established policy.

**CONTRACT MANAGEMENT**

**Question.** By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products. What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to improve the staffing, training and management of its acquisition of services?

**Answer.** I understand that the Department of the Navy has implemented a number of initiatives to improve the management of its acquisition of services and, if confirmed, I intend to review these initiatives. However, I believe that this issue must be addressed within the context and framework of previously noted concerns regarding the drawdown of the acquisition workforce.

**Question.** Do you agree that the Navy should develop processes and systems to provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85 percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The DOD Inspector General and others have identified a long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to ensure that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD requirements and is in the best interests of the Department?
MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS

Question. Section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 amended section 2306b of title 10, U.S.C., to ensure that DOD enters multiyear contracts only in cases where stable design and stable requirements reduce risk, and only in cases where substantial savings are expected. The revised provision requires that data be provided to Congress in a timely manner to enable the congressional defense committees to make informed decisions on such contracts.

What types of programs do you believe are appropriate for the use of multiyear contracts?

Answer. Multiyear contracts potentially provide substantial savings through improved production processes, optimized employment of workforce and facilities, and procurement of material at economic order quantities. I believe that programs that are characterized by stable requirements, mature design, and realistic cost estimates, and that are intended to be procured at an economic rate under a fixed price type contract, should be considered for multiyear procurement.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Navy and the Marine Corps fully comply with the requirements of section 2306b of title 10, U.S.C., as amended by section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) with respect to programs that are forwarded for authorization under a multiyear procurement contract?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What is your understanding of the requirement that a multiyear contract result in “substantial savings” compared to the cost of carrying out a program through annual contracts?

Answer. My understanding of the requirement that a multiyear contract result in “substantial savings” is, as defined by section 2306b, that the use of a multiyear contract will result in savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts. Exception to this criterion would be considered if the Department presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other requirements of section 2306b.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Navy and the Marine Corps fully comply with the requirements of section 2306b of title 10, U.S.C., as amended by section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) with respect to programs that are forwarded for authorization under a multiyear procurement contract?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What is your understanding of the new requirements regarding the timing of any DOD request for legislative authorization of a multiyear procurement contract for a particular program?

Answer. My understanding of the new requirements regarding the timing of any DOD request for authorization of a multiyear procurement contract is that the Secretary of Defense is to certify in writing by no later than March 1 of the year in which the Secretary requests the authority, that he has determined that each of the requirements of section 2306b(a) will be met by the multiyear procurement.

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) requires that the service acquisition executive of each of the military departments shall have a 3-star principal military deputy. The Senate report states that the purpose of this provision is to strengthen the performance of the service acquisition executive; improve the oversight provided military officers serving in acquisition commands; and strengthen the acquisition career field in the military. The provision requires that each principal military deputy be appointed from among officers who have significant experience in the areas of acquisition and program management, including a requirement that a nominee for this position have at least 10 years of direct acquisition experience.

If confirmed, will you ensure that officers assigned to the principal military deputy position meet the full qualifications of a critical acquisition position?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that officers assigned to the principal military deputy position are the best qualified for the position with regard to the requirements for this critical acquisition position.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to improve accountability in acquisition management and will you hold those acquisition officers accountable for failing to follow acquisition laws and regulations?

Answer. If confirmed, the steps I would consider for increasing accountability would include an assessment of qualifications required for critical acquisition billets, an assessment of succession planning to ensure qualified acquisition professionals are being developed for program management positions, and a review of policy and
practice to ensure program managers are being expected to commit to tenure agreements that align to the program's needs for continuity and stability. I would review current practice regarding ‘turnover’ letters, and consider the value of using these opportunities for the incoming program manager to identify the current status of the program and to identify the program objectives for his tenure. Further, I would work with the program managers to identify the tools, resources and support they require in order to successfully manage their programs and would consider it to be my responsibility to ensure that these needs are met. If an acquisition official were to violate law or regulations, I would thoroughly review the facts and findings and work with counsel to determine appropriate actions in holding the individual accountable.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to improve oversight in the requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition management processes?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are well advised on cost, schedule and risk associated with developing new capabilities, and that related programs are funded through the Program, Planning, Budgeting and Execution system. I will review existing Navy acquisition policy and practice governing changes to system requirements to ensure appropriate discipline in the management of contract changes. I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has implemented a series of initiatives, primarily a Gate Review process, to improve oversight and coordination in requirements determination and resource allocation leading to acquisition of major programs. If confirmed, I will take the necessary steps to ensure the effectiveness of these processes.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate use of fixed-price contracts in major defense acquisition programs? If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department of the Navy fully implements the requirements of section 818 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007?

Answer. My view is that fixed-price contracts are appropriate for major defense acquisition programs when the system being procured can be described in sufficient detail to ensure complete understanding of the requirements and the inherent risks of performance by both the government and the contractor. If confirmed, I will review the current status of the Department of the Navy's implementation of the requirements of section 818 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 and, as necessary, take appropriate steps to fulfill the requirements.

Question. GAO has reported that since the mid-1990s, the acquisition costs for major weapons programs has increased almost 120 percent and that current programs are experiencing, on average, nearly a 2-year delay in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter.

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to reduce or eliminate cost overruns and delays for major weapon programs, such as what the department experienced in the Littoral Combat Ship and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?

Answer. Common causes for cost overruns and delays of major programs include invalid cost estimates, requirements instability, funding instability, excess technical risk, ineffective contract strategies, disruption caused by contract change, and inadequate government oversight. If confirmed, I will review related acquisition policy, processes, standards and practices to ensure their effectiveness at addressing these issues; I will review major programs to assess their risk for overrun or delay; and I will review the current health of the acquisition workforce, including the staffing of critical billets for the management of these major programs. To the extent that deficiencies, weaknesses, or opportunities for improvement are identified during these reviews, I'll work within the Department to identify and implement appropriate corrective action.

Question. Recently GAO released a report entitled, “Defense Contracting, Post-Government Employment of Former DOD Officials Needs Greater Transparency.” GAO found that a large number of former DOD officials may have worked on defense contracts related to their former agencies, and some may have worked on the same contracts for which they had oversight responsibilities or decisionmaking authorities while at DOD.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that acquisition officials in the Department of the Navy do not violate statutes and regulations regarding conflicts of interest and post-government employment?

Answer. I am aware that the Department conducts training and counseling regarding post-government employment for acquisition officials. If confirmed, I would consult with the Office of General Counsel regarding the Department's further responsibilities for ensuring compliance by former DOD officials in post-government employment, and determine any necessary further steps.
Question. The poor performance of many major defense acquisition programs has been attributed to the failure of the military departments to make tough decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued, to ensure that requirements are reasonable achievable and programs are executable, and to hold senior officials accountable when responsibilities are not fulfilled.

Would you agree that the existing acquisition culture in DOD leads the military Services, including the Department of the Navy, to over-promise on capability and underestimate costs in order to buy new programs and capture funding?

Answer. Yes. Basing program decisions on unrealistic cost and schedule estimates is routinely cited as a root cause for poor cost and schedule performance in the procurement of major defense programs.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to change that culture?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review related acquisition policy, processes, standards, and practices to ensure their effectiveness at addressing these issues; I will review major programs to assess their risk for overrun or delay; and I will evaluate current tools and practices for ensuring the reasonableness of system requirements and place priority on ensuring the quality of related cost and schedule estimates. A commensurate step would include ensuring adherence to the Department’s standards for achieving the level of technology appropriate to each major milestone. To the extent that deficiencies, weaknesses, or opportunities for improvement are identified during these reviews, I’ll work within the Department to identify and implement appropriate corrective action. Further, I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has implemented a series of initiatives, primarily a Gate Review process, to improve oversight and coordination in requirements determination and resource allocation leading to acquisition of major programs. If confirmed, I will take the necessary steps to ensure the effectiveness of these processes.

NAVY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What are the current major strengths and weaknesses of the Navy science and technology enterprise in supporting Navy and defense missions?

Answer. The Navy science and technology enterprise has underpinned the technological superiority of the U.S. Navy. The extensive network of laboratories and institutions comprising this enterprise provide a broad base of expertise and world class facilities that succeed in bringing innovation and leading edge technologies to the design of today’s U.S. Navy ships, aircraft and weapon systems.

Question. What metrics would you use to judge the value of Navy science and technology investments and the level of resource investment in them?

Answer. Metrics for judging the value of science and technology investments must be careful in defining ‘return on investment.’ By its nature, the development of leading edge technologies requires a higher tolerance for risk and failure. However, there should be a measure of correlation between the future naval capabilities envisioned for ‘the Navy after next,’ the projects comprising the science and technology portfolio, the dollars invested, and relative measures of risk, payback, priority, and potential value to the warfighter. If confirmed, I would consult with the Chief of Naval Research regarding the enterprise’s current metrics to determine if further measures are warranted.

Question. What methodology will you use to assess the appropriateness of the current balance between short- and long-term research to meet current and future Navy and Marine Corps needs?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current and historical balance between short and long term Navy and Marine Corps research with the Chief of Naval Research and other key stakeholders in the science and technology enterprise in the context of near and long term requirements to determine whether the current balance and trends best support the warfighter.

Question. What role do Navy science and technology investments play in reducing technical risk for major acquisition programs?

Answer. Ultimately, these investments are fundamental to the acquisition team’s ability to provide the advance technologies that are critical to sustaining naval superiority. Further, as weapon systems tend toward increasing complexity, it is increasingly important that major programs seek to retire technical risk by leveraging science and technology efforts in the early acquisition phases.

Question. How should Navy science and technology investments be planned, programmed, and coordinated with respect to major acquisition efforts to help reduce risk and keep programs on budget and on schedule?

Answer. A well-developed acquisition plan will include a technology roadmap that identifies the risk factors, key development efforts, technology readiness levels appropriate to each phase of acquisition, and estimated costs in order to support the
program’s budget and schedule. The program plan needs to establish well-documented exit criteria at decision points to ensure risk is managed in each of these phases, and the management structure must bridge the science and technology, acquisition, and requirements organizations to manage progress and ensure close coordination throughout the process.

**NAVY LABORATORIES AND TECHNICAL CENTERS**

**Question.** In general, what are the greatest current strengths and weaknesses of the Navy’s laboratories and technical centers?

**Answer.** The technical expertise and facilities comprising the network of Navy laboratories and technical centers are a strategic, national asset. These centers have been at the core of every major innovation in naval systems and are well suited for the unique demands of naval operations. I believe that the challenges associated with sustaining these capabilities and expertise are inherently significant, made more so when confronting issues with resource constraints, competition from outside industry, and aging workforce issues.

**Question.** How would you compare the quality of the Navy’s labs and technical centers with respect to other defense laboratories and national laboratories?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would consult with the Chief of Naval Research to determine how the Navy laboratories and technical centers could benefit from benchmarking these other defense and national laboratories.

**Question.** What initiatives would you consider to improve the ability of Navy laboratories and technical centers to support Navy and defense missions?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will review with the Chief of Naval Research and key stakeholders the current state of Navy laboratories and technical centers, as well as ongoing and planned initiatives prior to considering further initiatives.

**NAVY TEST AND EVALUATION CAPABILITIES**

**Question.** What are the greatest strengths and weaknesses in the Navy’s Test and Evaluation (T&E) to ensure adequate development and operational testing of systems?

**Answer.** The Navy’s T&E program has been extremely effective at ensuring major weapon systems are operationally effective and suitable when fielded. One of the more significant challenges to the T&E program is the completion of development of advanced threat-representative weapon targets for live-fire testing.

**Question.** Do you feel that the Navy’s test infrastructure, including facilities and personnel, are adequate to support current and future Navy needs?

**Answer.** Yes. As noted, target development efforts remain a challenge, but I believe that the Navy has employed acceptable methods to continue testing while development proceeds.

**TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION**

**Question.** The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. What challenges to transition do you see within the Department of the Navy?

**Answer.** There is a natural tension that exists between the desire to field the most advanced technologies available for the warfighter and the need to effectively manage risk to ensure that programs meet performance requirements within budget and schedule. The USD(AT&L) and the Navy have established policies for balancing these competing factors through such approaches as competitive prototyping, such policies as the establishment of configuration steering boards and establishment of technology readiness level criteria for milestone decisions, and such processes as Gate Reviews for major programs.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies rapidly transition from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter? What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work within the framework described above for standard acquisition programs. Regarding rapid acquisition programs, or similar efforts to meet urgent needs of the warfighter, I will assess the effectiveness of current efforts with the program managers, systems commands, and warfare centers to determine what further support or guidance they need to improve on these transition efforts.
TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. What is your current assessment of the quality and sustainability of the DOD S&T workforce and the management of the Navy’s laboratory and technical center infrastructure?

Answer. I believe that DOD has historically been successful at attracting an extremely skilled science and technology workforce. However, the drawdown of the Department and acquisition workforce has impacted the Department’s ability to sustain this depth and breadth of skills. This is compounded by increasing demand for these skills in private industry.

Question. If confirmed, what plans would you pursue to ensure an adequate supply of Navy and Marine Corps experts in critical disciplines in the Department’s R&D commands? What role will you in play in ensuring that the Navy laboratories and technical centers have the proper personnel tools necessary to recruit and retain a world class technical workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the Chief of Naval Research and the leadership of the Navy warfare centers to gain a better assessment of the current state of critical skills in the Department’s R&D commands and, in concert with review of the acquisition workforce, determine what further plans are appropriate to sustain these critical skills.

NAVY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. What steps do you feel the Navy needs to take to ensure the success of the Next Generation Enterprise Networks (NGEN) program?

Answer. I believe that the first and most important step is to ensure the Department has effectively determined a reasonable set of requirements for NGEN, and has balanced these requirements with the resources available for the program. The Department needs to identify the risks, obstacles, and costs it will incur when transitioning from Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) to NGEN, and it will need to work closely with industry as it defines its requirements to ensure the solicitation process is fair and timely and that performance requirements are well understood.

Question. How will you work to ensure a seamless transition between the NMCI and NGEN programs so that Navy missions are not adversely affected during the transition process?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current strategy for transition between NMCI and NGEN and ensure appropriate priority is placed on a seamless transition, including contract schedules and incentives, phasing and communication of the rollout plan, and an accompanying risk mitigation plan.

Question. How will you work to ensure that Navy IT investments, in both tactical and businesses systems, are coordinated and interoperable with joint efforts and Department-wide enterprise initiatives?

Answer. The Department of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have parallel organizations responsible for these concerns. If confirmed, I will work with these organizations to ensure that acquisition of these systems meet their requirements for interoperability.

NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING RESEARCH PROGRAM—ADVANCED SHIPBUILDING ENTERPRISE

Question. The Advanced Shipbuilding Enterprise of the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP–ASE) is a collaborative effort between the Navy and shipbuilding industry to improve processes with the objective of reducing the costs to build ships. Modest funding from both partners is projected to more than pay for itself. With the current criticism of increasing costs for Navy ships, it does not seem prudent for the Navy to cease supporting this program, but funding for the program was not requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget request.

If confirmed, what steps would you propose in working with the shipyards to reduce the costs of Navy shipbuilding?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure shipbuilding requirements are well-defined, reasonable, and stable; that contracts are appropriately structured to incentivize cost performance; and that appropriate measures are in place to ensure discipline in managing contract changes. I will work within the Department to maintain stable funding for shipbuilding programs and look for opportunities to stabilize shipyard workload, including use of multiyear contracts when conditions are met for substantial savings. Beyond shipbuilder costs, I will work with Integrated Warfare Systems to improve understanding of the cost drivers in naval weapons system development, integration and testing in order to identify opportunities to improve on costs in these areas. I will seek to leverage competition where possible, and employ fixed type contracts where appropriate.
SHIPBUILDING

Question. The committee has repeatedly heard testimony from the Navy and industry leadership that stability in the shipbuilding program is essential if costs are to be controlled. Although there has been some progress on this front lately, the Navy has changed the acquisition profiles and strategies for shipbuilding programs numerous times in recent years. Do you agree that stability of acquisition profiles and strategies are essential to shipbuilding cost control?

Answer. Yes

Question. If confirmed, how would you attempt to ensure this stability?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the shipbuilding program is built upon realistic cost estimates and reasonable, efficient procurement profiles; that platform requirements are well understood and the development of key technologies is on a path to support these requirements; that competition plans and contract types, terms, and conditions appropriately incentivize performance within budget; that appropriate policy is in place to ensure discipline in the management of contract changes; and that multiyear contracts are employed when conditions are met to achieve substantial savings. Further, I will advocate this stability throughout the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution process to ensure that the Department, in evaluating changes to the shipbuilding program, is well informed of related impacts to cost, schedules, and the industrial base.

ALTERNATIVE FUNDING FOR SHIPBUILDING

Question. On numerous occasions, Navy leaders have testified that identifying an acceptable alternative to the full funding policy for shipbuilding is necessary to avoid increases in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account brought about by the purchase of large ships. Methods such as split funding and incremental funding have been used on certain ships. Another method that has been discussed is advance appropriations.

In your opinion, what is the best way to fund Navy ships?

Answer. I believe that the current full-funding policy for Navy ships, with noted exceptions for funding of large ships, has proven sufficiently effective in meeting Navy acquisition objectives.

Question. If confirmed, what alternative methods, if any, for shipbuilding funding, that would still allow congressional oversight, would you recommend?

Answer. I have no recommendations at this time for alternative funding methods for shipbuilding.

Question. What is your view of the long-term impact of split funding or incremental funding on the availability of funds for Navy shipbuilding accounts?

Answer. In my view, when properly planned, programmed and executed, I believe that incremental funding for high cost ships, such as aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious ships, serves to improve stability in the shipbuilding account by reducing associated spikes to the shipbuilding budget.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Question. The committee has great concerns about cost problems in the shipbuilding arena, most notably with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Last year, the Navy canceled the contract for the second ship at both of the two LCS contractors.

Changing requirements, poor cost estimates, inexperienced program managers, and poor supervision of the contractors’ performance were among the causes of the overrun. For many years, numerous studies have recommended against changing requirements after signing a contract because that will inevitably lead to cost and schedule problems. The committee does not understand why the Department of the Navy has not taken this lesson to heart.

What, in your opinion, are the reasons for poor cost and schedule performance of the LCS program?

Answer. In my opinion, the Navy incurred significant cost and schedule risk in the LCS program by placing priority on accelerating the design and construction of the first of class LCSs, and by placing inadequate emphasis on cost realism and cost control in the award and execution of the design and construction contracts. As a result, immature cost estimates were locked into the budget before the Navy had developed the ship specifications, contracts were awarded before the contractors had incorporated newly developed Naval Vessel Rules into their respective designs, and program execution compromised on cost performance in the effort to meet the first ships’ critical path schedules. These factors led to significant disruption at the front
end of this new ship program, caused significant impact to production planning and construction of the first of class ships, and ultimately drove poor cost and schedule performance.

**Question.** Are there other reasons for cost and schedule performance issues on Navy shipbuilding contracts?

**Answer.** Cost and schedule performance issues on Navy shipbuilding contracts often refer to performance on first of class ships. Many, varied factors contribute to these issues, and while each lead ship confronts a unique set of issues, I believe common factors include:

• Challenges associated with properly estimating cost for completing design, development of related technologies, software development, system integration, and construction of complex first of class warships.
• Technological challenges inherent to a first of class ship generally result in employment of cost-plus contracts which place cost risk on the government.
• Competitively awarded first of class ships are very aggressively priced.
• The increasing complexity of Navy warships and the limited ability to retire risk through prototyping results in cost growth and schedule delay through ‘discovery’ in the course of completing lead ship design, first of class production planning, development and integration of ship systems, construction, and testing of the lead ship.
• The long duration required to complete detail design, construction, and test for a first of class ship—typically 5 to 7 years—inherently increases cost risk.
• Government-responsible changes emerge through the course of the lead ship as specification deficiencies are identified and as new requirements are incorporated into the design;
• Low rate production for shipbuilding has resulted in sub-optimal utilization of shipbuilding facilities, and changes to the shipbuilding program cause significant impacts to overhead costs.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Navy avoids making these same mistakes on current and future shipbuilding contracts?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will ensure policy and practice on shipbuilding contracts emphasize cost realism and cost control by way of program estimates, contract award criteria, and contract type, incentives, terms and conditions. I will review execution of current shipbuilding programs to ensure that program budgets support current estimates; that programs are executing effective risk management plans to retire technical risk and contain cost; and that contracts appropriately incentivize cost performance. I will review the acquisition organization to ensure that shipbuilding programs are properly staffed, and I will review acquisition policy to ensure implementation of USD(AT&L) policy regarding Configuration Steering Boards and related discipline in the management of contract changes.

**TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS**

**Question.** As Navy and the Marine Corps F/A–18 and Marine Corps AV–8B aircraft continue to age, the Navy is now predicting that there may be a shortfall of 125 strike fighter aircraft in the next decade, which only increases the concern about the schedule for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

What are your views regarding the current risk to the JSF program schedule during its System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase?

**Answer.** The technical risks inherent to any new aviation program during its SDD phase are compounded on the JSF program by the complexity of the system and the multi-service/multi-nation requirements the JSF variants must meet. Appropriate to the investment in this capability, I believe the program has received the highest priority within DOD to ensure effective management of this risk and, if confirmed, I will review the program in detail to gain a current assessment by the Navy program office.

**Question.** If there were to be new schedule difficulties with the JSF program, what course of action would you recommend to maintain sufficient strike assets within our Carrier Strike Groups?

**Answer.** If there are new schedule difficulties with the JSF program, the alternatives for maintaining sufficient strike assets would potentially include continuing efforts to extend the service life for current strike/fighter aircraft, extending procurement of F/A–18 aircraft, or otherwise evaluating operating cycles for inventory aircraft to determine potential interim measures to mitigate the shortfall to strike requirements. If confirmed, I would work with the CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Naval Air Systems Command to evaluate these and other po-
tential alternatives and make recommendations based on the balance of require-
ments, risk, and resources.

**MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES**

**Question.** Secretary Gates has said “There is no failsafe measure that can prevent
all loss of life and limb on this or any other battlefield. That is the brutal reality
of war. But vehicles like mine-resistant ambush-protected, combined with the right
tactics, techniques, and procedures, provide the best protection available against
these attacks.”

In your view, what steps must the Department take to stay ahead of the involving
insurgent threat in Iraq and Afghanistan?

**Answer.** In my view, the Department needs to ensure that it is responsive to Ur-
gent Needs Statements and pro-active in translating threat assessments to require-
ments, and the acquisition organization needs to be innovative and in close coordi-
nation with the user in the development of technologies to defeat the threat—and
equally innovative and agile in mobilizing the defense industrial base to produce
these new capabilities to the rate needed to meet rapid fielding requirements.

**ARMY AND MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND ACQUISITION PROGRAMS**

**Question.** Although the Army and Marine Corps have different missions and capa-
bilities, their equipment, should have some degree of commonality. Throughout Op-
erations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the Army and Marine Corps have
worked together on acquiring equipment for Army and Marine Corps forces. How-
ever, for equipment such as helicopters and heavy wheeled vehicles, the Army and
the Marine Corps have pursued divergent acquisition paths.

What are your views regarding the joint development and acquisition of Army and
Marine Corps equipment?

**Answer.** In general, Joint development of equipment reduces acquisition costs and
provides for significant benefits associated with commonality throughout the sys-
tem’s life cycle. To the extent that there is alignment between respective require-
ments, then Army and Marine Corps equipment should be jointly developed.

**Question.** What role should the ASN(RDA) and the Secretary of the Navy play in
synchronizing Army and Marine Corps requirements and synchronizing service pro-
grams?

**Answer.** In my view, the Department of the Navy should evaluate opportunities
to jointly develop new systems in conjunction with reviewing material solutions for
warfighting requirements. I envision that the ASN(RDA) would coordinate with the
Army Service Acquisition Executive to evaluate the technical suitability for joint de-
velopment of a system to fulfill the Service requirements. For those programs des-
ignated for joint development, the program management, milestone decision author-
ity, and roles of the respective Service Acquisition Executives should be outlined by
memorandum of understanding.

**JOINT PROGRAMS**

**Question.** In the last few years, the Navy and the Air Force have both withdrawn
from joint weapons programs. The Air Force withdrew from the Joint Standoff
Weapon system, and the Navy withdrew from the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Mis-

cle system.

In your opinion, what are the key reasons that joint programs are initiated, but
one or more of the partners withdraws?

**Answer.** I cannot comment on the specific programs cited, but in my opinion the
requirements, budgeting, and acquisition processes pose inherent challenges to the
successful fielding of a new capability, and this is more true when adding the di-
mension of jointness.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you recommend changing the system so that
the Navy and Marine Corps would participate in only those programs in which it
would follow through?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will review current Department acquisition policy and
practice regarding participation in joint programs and consult with key stakeholders
in the requirements, budgeting, and acquisition processes to determine the history,
lessons learned, and potential changes to policy that need to be implemented to im-
prove results in joint programs.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASN(RDA)?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION

1. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Stackley, the newly directed Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs), along with competitive prototyping, are two of the ways in which the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) hopes to achieve more realistic program cost estimates and ensure a more stable acquisition process. Requirement changes and immature technologies, however, still pose problems to these goals even once a program has made it past the prototyping stage. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to improve the processes the Navy uses both to minimize the use of immature technologies and help freeze program requirements?

Mr. STACKLEY. The Department of the Navy (DON) has implemented a Gate Review process for major programs with the specific intent of ensuring that system requirements are well-defined, applied program technologies are mature, program costs are properly estimated, and contract type, terms, and conditions incentivize desired performance. Gate Reviews are conducted in conjunction with major milestones and key decision points throughout the life of major programs. The review process encompasses the CSBs in its scope, and includes participation by stakeholders in the requirements, budget, and acquisition organizations. In conjunction with my leadership role in the Gate Review process, I will work closely with the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure operational requirements are defined, stable, and fully funded; and will be deliberate in meeting my responsibility for ensuring adherence to these requirements in the course of overseeing management of major programs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

MODELING AND SIMULATION

2. Senator B ILL NELSON. Mr. Stackley, the Navy and Marine Corps Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Offices serve as the single points of contact for M&S for the Navy and Marine Corps. There are two naval activities in Orlando, FL: (1) the Navy Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division; and (2) the Marine Corps Program Manager for Training Systems. There is a great hub of technology in Orlando that provides great synergies between Government, academic, and industry to develop cutting edge training systems using M&S technology. What aspects of the Navy and Marine Corps’ efforts in research and development are currently utilizing Orlando’s M&S expertise?

Mr. STACKLEY. Orlando’s M&S expertise are used in many aspects of the Navy and Marine Corps’ research and development efforts. Both of these naval activities work in partnership with the other resources in Orlando to design, develop, and acquire training systems throughout the Navy and the Marine Corps. Both activities perform research and development to improve future simulation-based training systems.
3. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Stackley, if confirmed, what are your plans to utilize the expertise that exists in Orlando’s Technology Corridor to enhance the Navy’s mission?

Mr. STACKLEY. Team Orlando consists of the combined resources from all four Department of Defense (DOD) Services, academia, and industry. I plan on utilizing the naval activities to research, develop, and acquire training solutions for our naval forces in a joint environment. I will promote continued cooperation between these naval activities and the other Orlando resources to ensure that the desired synergies are realized to the fullest practical extent.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

SUPPLY CHAIN RISK

4. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, what kind of strategies or approaches would you implement to reduce the supply chain related risk associated with the measured decline in the electronics industrial base?

Mr. STACKLEY. Supply chain related risks are a significant issue and will continue to increase as our weapon systems incorporate more commercial off-the-shelf micro-electronics and assemblies. To mitigate these risks, the DON has a robust Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) policy that requires each program to forecast and plan preventive measures. I will promote the various organic and commercially available forecasting tools, and collection of metrics to support policy and budget decisions. To assess risk, the DON applies its Independent Logistics Assessment (ILA) process, which provides an independent assessment of supportability design and planning (such as supply chain, DMSMS, etc.) at key program milestones. The ILA is a critical input to ensuring supportability risk is understood and mitigated. I intend to continue leveraging these policies and processes in managing supply chain management risks.

5. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, do these strategies include methods to address related electronic technology issues, such as foreign dependency on electronic circuit boards, the move to prohibit lead in solder, as well as more recent Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) expansion efforts in the European Union?

Mr. STACKLEY. The DON’s approach to mitigating supply chain management risk addresses the prohibition of leaded solder and components, as governed by the European Union’s RoHS legislation. While there are many efforts studying the impacts of RoHS legislation, the DON has joined with industry to form the Executive Lead Free (ELF) Integrated Product Team (IPT). I have personnel on this IPT to determine the most viable solution in addressing RoHS issues. This IPT is comprised of management from the large DOD suppliers, as well as each of the Services and DOD agencies. The IPT has already developed a RoHS training course, which has been provided to Defense Acquisition University for implementation, as well as draft guidance/policy for USD(AT&L) approval. While RoHS may impact the reliability of our systems, there is currently a lack of adequate statistical data (e.g. fleet failure data resulting from lead free restrictions) to effectively assess the risks. I will support data gathering and analysis concerning these risks.

While there is a potential for reliability impacts, RoHS also presents DMSMS-related issues as globally the electronics industry moves toward adopting EU restrictions. Currently, DOD’s electronics requirements equate to approximately 1 percent of industry sales so it is critical that ASN RD&A work in concert with other DOD activities to ensure an adequate supplier base is maintained. Finally, industry is telling us that counterfeiting of electronics and electronic components is becoming an area of concern. The IPT is exploring the potential impact of this threat. Accordingly, I intend to continue to support the efforts of the joint DOD/Industry IPTs, such as the ELF IPT, to determine the best solution, and support those decisions.

6. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, would you take the lead with the Office of Secretary of Defense for AT&L and the other Service Acquisition Executives to make sure that DOD has a uniform policy to address these extremely high risk issues?

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes. I have a voting member on the Office of the Secretary of Defense-chartered DMSMS and ELF IPTs and the goal of both IPTs is to standardize RoHS and DMSMS guidance and policy as applicable across DOD.
NUCLEAR POWER

7. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, will you support the development of the next class of cruisers, CG(X), with nuclear power?

Mr. STACKLEY. The Navy’s analysis of alternatives (AoA) for the Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces capability, which includes an assessment of CG(X) alternatives, examines both fuel efficient conventional power plants and nuclear power alternatives. I will work closely with the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure that the decision as to whether or not nuclear power propulsion will be incorporated in future surface combatants is based on a thorough examination of both requirements and acquisition considerations as they pertain to ‘national interest’, in compliance with statute.

8. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, do you believe nuclear power is the best way to accommodate the high energy demands of future weapon systems?

Mr. STACKLEY. I believe it is critical that future ships be designed with the ability to accommodate higher electric energy demands associated with future weapon and sensor systems. The ability to accommodate these higher demands is a function of electrical generation capacity, which can be introduced into either nuclear or fossil fuel propulsion plant designs. The Navy’s recent study on Alternative Propulsion Methods for Surface Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships concluded that ships with high demands for energy benefit from the operational advantages provided by nuclear propulsion. However, a design decision for a particular class should be based on a thorough examination of alternatives to satisfy specific mission requirements, in compliance with statute.

313-SHIP NAVY

9. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, should Congress be exploring different ways to budget funding for ship procurement to ensure the 313-ship Navy is achievable in the near future?

Mr. STACKLEY. The Navy’s budget policy for ship procurement requires that ships be fully funded in the first year of procurement. In view of the long duration required for design and construction of complex warships (5 years on average), this policy has proven effective in ensuring that DOD and Congress understand and budget for the full ship construction costs at the front end of this procurement process.

There are three notable exceptions to the full funding policy which, with the support of Congress, have proven to be extremely helpful to the Navy’s ability to mitigate budget spikes and perturbations in the shipbuilding program. The Navy has utilized incremental funding to finance the significant costs related to construction of large, complex warships, such as nuclear aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships, across multiple years. The Navy has utilized advance procurement where it proves beneficial to the government as a tool to reduce the impact of long lead times for critical shipbuilder materials, or otherwise to provide stability for the industrial base. For those programs that are stable in design and requirements, and are to be procured at efficient rates over an extended period, the Navy has employed multiyear procurement contracts when substantial savings can be achieved.

As the Navy Acquisition Executive, I will continue to work with the Department and with Congress to employ these funding mechanisms to improve the affordability of the 313 ship Navy. As well, I will consider alternative funding mechanisms, and those that offer significant benefit to the government will be brought forward to the Department for further consideration.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

NAVY’S ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

10. Senator Warner. Mr. Stackley, the Navy has been criticized for its management of acquisition and its ability to successfully manage shipbuilding and acquisition programs. What is your assessment of the Navy’s acquisition workforce?

Mr. STACKLEY. Along with a capable workforce, successful acquisition programs depend upon support from basic research, disciplined requirements, clear responsibilities, sufficient resources including financial reserves and incremental budgeting
to milestones, accepting prudent risks, controlling cost and appropriate business and technical strategies.

My assessment of the Navy's acquisition workforce is that the drawdown of the workforce has occurred over a protracted period without a corresponding reduction in acquisition workload. We must balance the workforce with the acquisition workload and attract, train and retain the skilled professionals required by the Department to properly perform its mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor performance, and provide the best value for the taxpayer's dollars. The Department must also rebuild its in-house Systems Engineering capability. It is important that we have an organic ability to perform requisite engineering tradeoffs to ensure we are pursing the right balance of requirements and risks, before we request proposals for a ship or system.

11. Senator WARNER. Mr. Stackley, is sufficient emphasis being placed on developing the skills and experience needed to successfully manage shipbuilding programs?

Mr. STACKLEY. As you are aware, the drawdown of the acquisition workforce has left the Department with a smaller aging workforce. In support of recent initiatives to reenergize this professional corps, the Secretary of the Navy has approved establishment of a senior executive position, Principal Civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (PCDASN), responsible to ASN(RDA) for professional development and community management of the Navy's acquisition workforce. The PCDASN is in the process of assessing the acquisition workforce billet structure, qualifications, and career paths to determine strengths and weaknesses of the acquisition workforce.

This baseline assessment will provide important insight for the Department's strategy to implement the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. The Fund provides a mechanism to reenergize the workforce and develop an effective transition strategy as those eligible for retirement choose to leave Federal service. Planned use of the Fund includes hiring of highly-qualified experts to serve as senior mentors as well as journeymen and interns to bring in new and fresh ideas; recruiting and retention incentives; and training and development.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS
NAVY/MARINE CORPS WEAPONS SYSTEMS

12. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Stackley, I've appreciated your service on the Senate Armed Services Committee and we are going to miss you. I wanted to ask you about an issue that is not completely within your proposed portfolio but one that I know you will not need to deal with, and that is the issue of how we plan for logistics and sustainment in the process of acquiring new weapons systems. Unfortunately, the Services have often approached acquisition and sustainment separately when they should be approached together. It is a fact that, for most weapons systems, the cost of sustaining them over the life of the system is larger than the cost of acquiring the system in the first place. I am concerned that, in some cases, the Services rely too much on maintenance and sustainment by the contractor who builds the system which in the end often costs more and is not in the best interests of the Government. Can you explain your vision of how this should work, how you will ensure that the Navy plans jointly for acquisition and sustainment of new weapons systems, and can I have your assurances that, if confirmed, you'll work to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps look first to develop an organic, in-house capability for sustaining military weapons systems rather than relying on the private sector to provide this capability for the Government?

Mr. STACKLEY. I will work to ensure that the DON requirements for new or upgraded weapon systems will emphasize design traits of being logistically sustainable to high and affordable degrees of fleet readiness. DON has begun treating maintenance and sustainment as critical performance design characteristics; and ones that are not secondary to, or separated from, the process of acquiring major defense systems. The DON has several tools, by which to ensure that this design priority is established and maintained throughout the Acquisition process. They include: 1) Two Pass/Six Gate Reviews; 2) Independent Logistics Assessments (ILA); and 3) the Naval Logistics Integration (NLI) initiative.

The DON recently implemented its Two Pass/Six Gate Review process in an effort to improve governance and insight into the development, establishment, and execution of acquisition programs. Ensuring alignment between Service-generated capability requirement and acquisition, as well as improving senior leadership decision-
making through better understanding of risks and costs throughout the program’s entire life cycle is central to this significant process reform. Additionally, the DON implemented a standardized ILA process in 2004 in an effort to provide independent evaluation of a program’s logistics supportability planning at key acquisition milestones (B, C, and FRP). Fundamental to this review is the assessment of risks associated with the chosen logistics strategy which would also include organic versus contractor support. Since its implementation, the ILA process has been instrumental in revealing opportunities to enhance supportability prior to system deployment. Finally, the DON is leveraging its NLI initiative to integrate processes, policy, doctrine, resources, information, technologies and people (organizational) construct in support of enhanced naval logistics capability both afloat and ashore.

These three processes, along with adherence to 10 U.S.C. 2466(a) (i.e. the “50/50 Rule”), will be tools I will leverage to ensure the Department applies the proper mix of organic and contractor support to achieve effective and affordable logistics support for our programs.

[The nomination reference of Sean J. Stackley follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 1, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Sean Joseph Stackley, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice Delores M. Etter, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Sean J. Stackley, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF SEAN J. STACKLEY

Sean J. Stackley is a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is responsible for overseeing Navy and Marine Corps programs, Strategic Lift, and related policy for the Seapower Subcommittee. As Republican staff lead for the subcommittee, he has drafted and coordinated the committee position on Department of the Navy and United States Transportation Command matters for the National Defense Authorization Act. Additionally, he supports the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee and the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee; advising on Navy and Marine Corps operations and maintenance, science and technology, and acquisition policy. Mr. Stackley joined the committee in December 2005.

Mr. Stackley began his career as a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy, serving in engineering and combat systems assignments onboard the destroyer, U.S.S. John Young (DD 973). Upon completing his warfare qualifications, he was designated as an engineering duty officer and served in a series of industry, fleet, program office, and headquarters assignments in ship design and construction, maintenance, logistics, system integration, and acquisition policy, leading to major program management. Prior to joining the committee, Mr. Stackley served as LPD 17 Program Manager from 2001 to 2005, with responsibility for all aspects of procurement for this major ship program. His first duties in this position included restructuring the program in the wake of a Nunn-McCurdy breach, settling a series of outstanding industry claims, and brokering a realignment of industry teaming agreements to provide a path forward for the program. Through the course of his tour, he led the completion of ship design, software development, weapon system integration, production, test, trials, and delivery of the lead ship; start of construction for four follow ships; and planning and programming for the remaining ships of the Class.

Having served earlier in his career as Production Officer for the U.S.S. Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and Project Naval Architect overseeing design standards for the Canadian Patrol Frigate, H.M.C.S. Halifax (FFH 330), Mr. Stackley has the distinction of having performed a central role in the design, construction, test, and delivery of three first-of-class warships.
Mr. Stackley was commissioned and graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1979, with a Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering. He holds the degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of Science, Mechanical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mr. Stackley earned certification as Professional Engineer, Commonwealth of Virginia, in 1994. His military awards include the Legion of Merit with Gold Star.

Mr. Stackley is married to Teresa Mullin Stackley, and has four children.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Sean J. Stackley in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Sean Gerard Joseph Stackley.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition).

3. **Date of nomination:**
   May 1, 2008.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   August 7, 1957; Baltimore, MD.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Teresa Mullin Stackley.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Erin Stackley, 24; Tess Stackley, 22; Scott Stackley, 19; Maura Stackley, 16.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   1972–1975, Towson Senior High School.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   2005–2008, Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate.
   1998–2001, Chief of Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ships).
   1995–1998, DDG–51 Production Officer, Aegis Shipbuilding Program.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
    None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   Board of Professional Engineers, Commonwealth of Virginia.
   American Society of Naval Engineers.
   Action in Community Through Service (ACTS).
   Naval Academy Alumni Association.
   Military Officers Association of America.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
      None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
      None.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
      None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   Military Awards: Legion of Merit (two awards).
   Meritorious Service Medal (two awards).
   Navy Commendation Medal.
   Navy Achievement Medal.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.
    None.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.  

SEAN J. STACKLEY.

This 20th day of May, 2008.

[The nomination of Sean J. Stackley was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Frederick S. Celec by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]  

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the war fighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations. Do you see a need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?  
Answer. At this point I do not. However, if confirmed I will remain sensitive to the goals that Goldwater-Nichols set forth to facilitate jointness in operations, command and control, and acquisition.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?  
Answer. If confirmed I will work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and their staffs to periodically review the implementation policies to insure they remain current and are being implemented.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?  
Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) has several key duties and functions. First and foremost is to insure that our nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. If confirmed, I will work with the Service chiefs and responsible commanders to ensure that the high standards of safety and security are maintained. I will work with the Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to insure that the stockpile remains reliable. The ATSD oversees Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. In addition, the ATSD is responsible for the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program, serves as the Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council and treaty management

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?  
Answer. I am aware of several independent studies by organizations like the Defense Science Board that have made recommendations designed to enhance the ability of the ATSD to meet his responsibilities. If confirmed, I will review these recommendations, and working with the Secretary and the Nuclear Weapons Council, make the appropriate recommendations.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?  
Answer. If confirmed I expect the Secretary to charge me with assisting the Air Force in returning the culture and attention to detail that was the hallmark of that service in maintaining nuclear weapons. In addition, he will expect the ATSD to
oversee the CTR and Counterproliferation Programs, the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program, and the Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the following officials in carrying out your duties:
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to report to USD(AT&L), and through him and the Deputy Secretary, to the Secretary himself. On matters directly affecting my technical responsibilities (safety, security, reliability, etc.), I expect to have direct access to the Secretary if needed.
I expect to work closely with USD(P) to insure our nuclear policies, both home and abroad, are understood and implemented. I expect to work closely with the USD(C) to insure nuclear weapons programs are adequately funded and with PA&E to insure that sufficient follow-on weapons are in the pipeline as current weapons systems approach end of life.

Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. If confirmed I will work with the Service secretaries to insure that nuclear programs are provided sufficient priority to be funded at a level and in time to maintain safety, security, system reliability, and end of life issues.

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with each combat commander with nuclear responsibilities to insure that he has the systems he needs in the numbers and with the capability he needs to execute his mission.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. If confirmed I would expect to insure that DTRA programs support ASD(HD) requirements.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) and Independent Capabilities.
Answer. The ASD(SOLIC) and the AFSD both have policy responsibilities for our Nations nuclear weapons. If confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SOLIC) to insure our nuclear policies are consistent, understood by our forces and allies, and are being properly implemented.

Question. The Director of the DTRA.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to have daily contact with the Director DTRA in assisting him in executing his responsibilities in Combat Support, CTR, counterproliferation, on-site inspection, research and development, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating (SCC) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Chemical and Biological defense programs.

Question. The Secretary of Energy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work with the Secretary of Energy through the Administrator of NNSA.

Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
Answer. As partners in the nuclear weapons program, if confirmed, I would expect to work closely and personally with both the Administrator and Deputy Administrator to ensure that we have sufficient reliable, safe, and secure weapons to support our combat commanders, and that we have the capability to maintain them.

Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities for nuclear, chemical, and biological homeland defense matters.
Answer. DTRA and Homeland Security are partners in a number of areas such as nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, and counterproliferation. DTRA focuses on the DOD mission, which often means overseas, while the DHS focus is more on domestic issues. If confirmed, I will work with both organizations to insure their programs are not duplicated, but mutually supportive, and are funded and prioritized at the required level.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I spent 39 years in the Federal service, all in nuclear and chemical weapons. Twenty-one of those years were in the Air Force where I performed nuclear survivability tests on nuclear delivery systems to include underground nuclear testing. I spent several Air Force assignments developing the simulation tools needed to be able to check the survivability of those systems without nuclear tests. I developed nuclear weapons requirements and assigned specific weapons to specific targets. I
had an assignment to the State Department where I worked both nuclear and Chemical Weapons issues, writing a paper (with others) widely distributed throughout the world by the State Department on Soviet Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. I completed my Air Force career in OSD Policy working on NATO nuclear issues.

I then joined the Defense Nuclear Agency (now renamed DTRA) where I became Deputy Director for Operations with oversight responsibilities for nuclear accident response, the CTR Program, and NATO nuclear weapons security. I then joined the ATSD office as the Deputy for Nuclear Matters. I completed my Federal Service as the ATSD Deputy for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. I then joined The Institute for Defense Analysis as an Adjunct Research Associate working nuclear issues, where I remain today. Thus I have spent 44 years working nuclear and chemical weapons issues.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?

Answer. There are several. First, restoring the pride, interest, and attention to detail to maintaining Air Force nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manner. Second, supporting the congressionally-mandated Commission on our Strategic Posture and Secretary Gates Task Force on WMD in order to gain bipartisan support for the future of our nuclear stockpile in national security. Third, insuring the quick and safe demilitarization of our chemical weapons stockpile. Fourth, continuing and expanding the CTR program beyond the Former Soviet Union to help prevent proliferation. Fifth, strengthen the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. To meet the first challenge I intend to focus on meeting with the appropriate Air Force officials to review the actions they have taken to date, review the DTRA conducted inspection reports to insure the actions are effective and work with the Air Force wherever necessary to insure the proper focus on nuclear policies and procedures at every level in the command structure. For the second priority, I intend to meet regularly and frequently with members of the two commissions to insure that they are getting useful, timely, and accurate information. For the third priority, I intend to insure that the schedule, funding, and priority within the Department are all consistent and if changes or additions are necessary, to make the appropriate recommendation. For the fourth priority I intend to work with OSD Policy and DTRA to insure that appropriate objectives are defined for CTR support beyond the Former Soviet Union and that funding is available to support those objectives. For the fifth priority I will personally review and insure that information and presentations provided to the NWC are timely and sufficiently informative so as to warrant the members time.

Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?

Answer. Gaining bipartisan support for the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy and then developing the institutional structure and obtaining the funding to support that role.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. Particular attention to the findings of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States will hopefully begin the process to resolve the issue. Their timelines are established by Congress.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?

Answer. First, restoring the pride, interest, and attention to detail to maintaining Air Force nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manner. Second, supporting the congressionally-mandated Commission on our Strategic Posture and Secretary Gates Task Force on WMD in order to gain bipartisan support for the future of our nuclear stockpile in national security. Third, insuring the quick and safe demilitarization of our chemical weapons stockpile. Fourth, continuing and expanding the CTR program beyond the Former Soviet Union to help prevent proliferation. Fifth, strengthen the Nuclear Weapons Council.
REPORTING CHAIN

Question. Section 142 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs “advise the Secretary of Defense on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological defense.” The responsibilities for chemical and biological defense were added to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs in 1996. The position was originally created as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense to ensure direct access to the Secretary of Defense in the event that any matter implicating the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile needed to be immediately provided to the Secretary.

What is your understanding of to whom you would report, if confirmed, within the Department of Defense (DOD), and who would report to you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to report to USD(AT&L), and through him and the Deputy Secretary, to the Secretary himself.

Question. If confirmed, would you expect to have direct access to the Secretary of Defense for matters pertaining to the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. Section 179 of title 10, U.S.C., designates the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as the Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council. The chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Would it be your expectation, if confirmed, to have direct responsibility, authority, direction, and control of all the assets, resources, and personnel needed to fulfill the responsibilities of Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, how frequently would you expect the Nuclear Weapons Council to meet and, in your view, would that be sufficient to meet the obligations of the Council?
Answer. I would expect to meet as necessary, and as Executive Secretary, it will be my responsibility to insure that the agenda, presentations, and issues for those meetings warrant the time that the members need to devote in order to attend.

Question. If confirmed as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, how would you ensure that the Nuclear Weapons Council carries out its statutorily mandated duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work personally with each of the members to insure that the NWC carries out its statutorily mandated duties.

Question. Are there any changes that you would recommend to the membership, organization, or structure of the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Answer. It would be premature to make any such recommendations.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

Question. What is your understanding of the organizational structure of the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. My understanding is that there is a Principal Deputy who is also responsible for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Treaty Management, a Nuclear Matters Deputy, a Chemical and Biological Defense Programs and Chem Demil Deputy, and the Director of DTRA, who reports to the ATSD. In addition, there are supporting staff to enable the functions of those deputies.

Question. Do you believe this structure is adequate or would you make any changes if confirmed?
Answer. At this time it would be premature to recommend any changes.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. Do you believe that there are any technical reasons to resume nuclear weapons testing at the present time or at any foreseeable time in the future?
Answer. No.

Question. Do you believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program is capable for the foreseeable future of supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. Yes.
**Question.** Do you support the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** What are your views on the current moratorium on nuclear weapons testing?

**Answer.** I support the moratorium.

**Question.** What are your views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

**Answer.** The CTBT can be an effective treaty to prevent proliferation. That said, there are serious issues with the treaty that need to be addressed and resolved.

**Question.** In your view, are there any additional capabilities that the Stockpile Stewardship program should develop?

**Answer.** The production complex is aging considerably and needs attention.

**Question.** What are your views on the feasibility and certifiability (without nuclear testing) of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)?

**Answer.** My understanding is that a cornerstone of the RRW program is that it be developed and certified without the need for testing.

**Question.** If confirmed, how quickly and under what circumstances would you inform Congress in the event there is ever any problem with any nuclear warhead?

**Answer.** As quickly as possible consistent with national security requirements.

**Question.** If confirmed, what role, if any, do you anticipate you will play in reviewing the size and makeup of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would expect to be a major voice in recommending to the Secretary and the President the size and makeup of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

**SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE**

**Question.** If you are confirmed, what role would you have and do you believe the Nuclear Weapons Council should have in developing, implementing, and overseeing implementation of nuclear security orders and regulations?

**Answer.** Both the ATSD and the NWC have responsibilities to insure that our nuclear weapons are secure. Monitoring security operations and implementation policies, reviewing inspection reports, and insuring sufficient funding for Service security programs are some of those responsibilities.

**Question.** If confirmed, what role would you play in nuclear security and nuclear operational inspections?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would expect to review all DTRA conducted inspections. I would expect the Service Secretary’s to review Service conducted inspections and inform me of any issues that they find. Finally, I would expect the unit commanders to inform me personally, of the results of the Mighty Guardian Force on Force exercises.

**DEGRADATION IN NUCLEAR EXPERTISE, TECHNICAL RIGOR AND COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS, RULES, AND ORDERS**

**Question.** Over the course of the last 12 months there have been a number of instances within DOD of inattention, sloppiness, and intentional disregard for nuclear rules, orders, and regulations. The reviews that have been conducted as a result of these incidents have identified degradation in the attention to nuclear matters as one of the root causes of the many incidents.

**Answer.** Since the end of the Cold War the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy has not been clearly defined. Absent that clearly defined role, the Air Force in particular, allowed itself to lose focus on the policies, procedures, and attention to detail demanded of the stewards of nuclear weapons. Congress has recognized this problem and has established the Strategic Posture Commission and challenged it to define the role of nuclear weapons in our post Cold War National Security Strategy. The Commissions findings will hopefully lead to bipartisan support for the way ahead. If confirmed, I expect to support the Commission with regular briefings and meetings with the Commission and individual members to ensure that they have the most complete and credible information available to prepare their report.

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADMIRAL DONALD REPORT**

**Question.** If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in implementing corrective actions recommended by Admiral Donald in his recently submitted report on the security of nuclear weapons in the Air Force?

**Answer.** I have not seen the Admiral Donald Report, and it would not be appropriate to comment on it.
STRATEGIC COMMISSION

Question. The Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. If confirmed, would you fully cooperate with and support the work of the Commission in preparing its report?
Answer. Yes.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Question. Section 142 of title 10, U.S.C., states that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs shall advise the Secretary of Defense on chemical and biological defense, as well as on nuclear matters. Your background is primarily in nuclear technology and related issues. If confirmed, how would you plan to become familiar with the issues and technology associated with chemical and biological defense matters?
Answer. While I have some familiarity with chemical and biological defense matters having served for a short period of time as the Deputy ATSD for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, I will certainly become much more familiar with the current program through briefings from the Deputy ATSD, the Director of DTRA, the Director of the JPEO for Chemical Biological Defense, and actual visits to many of the program sites.

VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION

Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring that vaccines needed to ensure medical treatment and protection of deployed U.S. servicemembers are developed and acquired?
Answer. My understanding is that the anthrax is the most urgent.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE MATTERS

Question. If you are confirmed, what do you expect your roles and responsibilities would be with respect to chemical and biological defense matters?
Answer. The ATSD is the principal staff advisor to the Secretary on Chemical and Biological Defense matters. The ATSD is responsible for oversight, coordination, and integration of the joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with the Services, JPEO, and DTRA to meet those responsibilities.

Question. If confirmed, would you review the chemical and biological defense program and make any needed recommendations to Congress for improving the program?
Answer. Yes.

Question. What are your general priorities with respect to the Chemical and Biological Defense Program?
Answer. The general priorities for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program are: contamination avoidance, protection, and restoration.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATTERS

Question. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services play important roles in planning and implementing U.S. policy and programs for protecting the United States against biological and chemical threats, including the development and stockpiling of vaccines and therapeutic products.
If confirmed, how would you work with these agencies to ensure the effective coordination and collaboration of efforts to improve U.S. security against chemical and biological threats?
Answer. If confirmed I would work with each of these agencies to ensure that programs are mutually supportive, avoid duplication, and share results.

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION ISSUES

Question. Since 2001, responsibility and oversight for the chemical demilitarization program within DOD have been under the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
If confirmed, would responsibility for and oversight of the chemical demilitarization program remain within your office?
Answer. Yes.

**Question.** The United States is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is obligated to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile by no later than the extended deadline of April 2012. Do you agree that the United States should take all necessary steps to meet its obligations under the CWC?
Answer. Consistent with safety and security, yes.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate funding is requested to permit the most expeditious destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, consistent with the legal requirement to protect public health, safety, and the environment?
Answer. If confirmed I will review the current program to insure that priorities, funding, and operations are consistent within the program. If additional funding is needed, I will ensure that it is requested.

**Question.** On April 10, 2006, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld notified Congress that the United States would not meet the extended deadline under the CWC for destruction of the United States chemical weapons stockpile, but would “continue working diligently to minimize the time to complete destruction without sacrificing safety and security,” and would also “continue requesting resources needed to complete destruction as close to April 2012 as practicable.”
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure the full implementation of those commitments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the program against those commitments and make any necessary changes or recommendations needed to ensure full implementation.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the timeline for the destruction that the Department expects to meet under the current projections and the currently planned expenditures for this program?
Answer. I am not familiar with the current details of the program in terms of schedule and funding, so it would not be appropriate for me to comment.

### CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, OR HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS

**Question.** DOD has the mission of providing support to civil authorities for consequence management of domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents, if requested. Since 2002, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command have had responsibilities for planning and executing that mission. If confirmed, how would you expect to work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command on issues related to the Department’s capabilities to provide support to civil authorities for CBRNE consequence management, as well their homeland defense missions related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or materials?
Answer. DTRA has a number of programs designed to provide CBRNE responders world wide with equipment, training, command and control support, logistical planning, and technical support. If confirmed I will insure that the DTRA program is responsive to the needs of ASD (HD) and CONCOM.

**Question.** The Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency for planning, coordinating, and implementing consequence management of CBRNE incidents in the United States, in conjunction with the States and territories.
If confirmed, what relationship would you expect to have with the Department of Homeland Security and its component entities?
Answer. If confirmed I would expect to oversee the coordination of DTRA programs with DHS for planning, coordinating, and implementing consequence management of CBRNE incidents.

**Question.** What do you believe is the appropriate role for DOD in providing support to civil authorities for CBRNE consequence management?
Answer. A CBRNE event would constitute a national emergency. DOD’s role should be to provide whatever support and assets that the President requested in order to save lives, minimize damage, and facilitate recovery.

**Question.** What are your views on the adequacy of the numbers of WMD-civil support teams, and do you believe that the training and equipping of these teams is appropriate?
Answer. I am not aware of the details, and so it would not be appropriate for me to comment.
Question. Do you support the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs?
Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, would you support joint research programs between Russia and the United States in the areas of chemical or biological weapons defense?
Answer. Yes.

Question. What is your understanding as to your responsibilities with respect to the CTR programs?
Answer. The ATSD has oversight responsibility for the implementation of the CTR program.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

THE DONALD REPORT

1. Senator Warner. Mr. Celec, the Secretary of Defense cited leadership failures associated with the control of nuclear weapons and equipment as the proximate cause for his decision to request the resignations of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff. In your view, were these security lapses mainly a failure of leadership within the Air Force, or would you view complacency on nuclear matters within the senior Department of Defense (DOD) leadership as a contributing factor?

Mr. Celec. While I have not seen the Donald Report, I am aware of its existence, and have seen other reports on the subject. The two issues you ask about are related. Clearly the leadership in the Air Force has focused on other issues since the end of the Cold War, including two current active wars and flying combat missions constantly for over the past 15 years. Like most organizations, if the boss doesn’t pay attention, the troops quickly lose focus, and that appears to be what happened in the Air Force. It is going to require that the leadership in the Air Force, from the very top, down to the individual airman on the ramp or at the missile silo be continually reminded that our nuclear deterrent is the most important job they can do to maintain the security and freedom of the United States.

For my part, if confirmed I hope to assist the Air Force in restoring that culture of perfection and importance, and in the process gather the support of the senior leadership in DOD to insure it continues long after we are all gone.

2. Senator Warner. Mr. Celec, what role, if any, would you envision for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) in ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent forces?
Mr. CELEC. Safety, reliability, and an equally important third factor, effectiveness are the key factors in maintaining our Nuclear Deterrent so that potential enemies respect and fear it, our Allies continue to rely on it, and the American people continue to support it. The primary responsibility of the ATSD(NCB) is to insure that our Deterrent remains safe, reliable, and effective, and if confirmed I will work closely and very personally with the Services, DOD, combatant commanders, National Nuclear Security Administration, and our Allies to ensure that the standards for these factors are maintained, and where possible, improved.

[The nomination reference of Frederick S. Celec follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,

Senate of the United States,

June 10, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Frederick S. Celec, of Virginia, to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, vice Dale Klein, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Frederick S. Celec, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Frederick S. Celec

Upon joining the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) in 2003, Mr. Celec became part of the IDA staff working for the congressionally-mandated Electromagnetic Pulse Commission. While at IDA he has worked on a variety of tasks including the U.S. capability to exercise treaty monitoring rights under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Physical Security Program to protect our Nations nuclear weapons, and development of an Interagency Program to secure radiological and nuclear materials of potential threat to the U.S. worldwide. In 2005 he became an adjunct member of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense staff.

Mr. Celec retired from government service in August 2003 as the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs for Nuclear Matters with 18 years as a civil servant and 21 years in the Air Force. Upon retirement he joined IDA as a consultant.

Mr. Celec originally joined the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as the Deputy for Nuclear Matters in 1996 in the Pentagon. In this position he was responsible for overseeing all U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery programs. Among those were U.S. programs to recover lost or stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear weapons, as well as security programs to prevent unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear weapons.

From 1985 until his Pentagon assignment, Mr. Celec was part of the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) staff and worked security issues associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Senior Level Weapons Protection Group and the Air Force Weapon Storage Security System. He became Deputy Director for Operations at DNA in 1987, and was responsible for stockpile management, CINC Nuclear Support, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Verification Technology, Nuclear Weapon Accident Exercises, and the Department of Energy Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Previously Mr. Celec spent 21 years in the Air Force where most of his assignments were associated with the nuclear weapons area. His last assignment before retiring from the Air Force was as a member of the policy staff in Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) working stockpile size in Europe, NATO High Level Group and Nuclear Planning Group issues.

Prior to his OSD assignment he had assignments on the Air Staff in Studies and Analysis, where he worked strategic force structure issues and Single Integrated Operations Plan/weapon effectiveness. At the State Department, where he worked both nuclear and chemical issues, and was a principal author of the “Yellow Rain” chemical warfare report to Congress. At SHAPE, where he planned nuclear operations—including target identification, weaponizing, and deconfliction of operational missions. He also wrote the annual Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study
and the European Deployment Plan, which formed the basis for force structure, numbers and types of nuclear weapons needed in Europe during the Cold War: At Headquarters Air Force Systems Command, where he managed nuclear research programs throughout the Air Force Research and Development community, including the building of the Trestle Emp simulator. At the Defense Atomic Support Agency (later called DNA), he served as the U.S./U.K. liaison officer for the U.K. Polaris Improvement Program, and finally at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, where he developed nuclear simulators—including underground nuclear tests to evaluate strategic systems. He has participated in almost two dozen underground nuclear tests.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Frederick S. Celec in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Frederick (Fred) Stephen Celec.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

3. Date of nomination:
June 10, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
June 8, 1941; Youngstown, OH.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Irene Aurelia (Dagys) Celec.

7. Names and ages of children:
Christine Gold, 46; Kenneth Celec, 42.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
The Ohio State University, 1959–1964, BS Engineering Physics.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

2003–Present, Adjunct Research Associate, Institute for Defense Analysis, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA.
1996–2003, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs for Nuclear Matters, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

1964–1985, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.).

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None, other than Institute for Defense Analysis.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

None.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the last 5 years.

None.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Award, March 1997.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

Government Reports and technical reports while at Institute for Defense Analysis for the Federal Government.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

FREDERICK S. CELEC.

This 13th day of June 2008.

[The nomination of Frederick S. Celec was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]
NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY TO BE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; AND GEN. DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 2008

U.S. Senate,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SR–325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Other Senators present: Senators Conrad and Stevens.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. This morning the committee considers the nominations of Michael Donley to be Secretary of the Air Force, General Norton Schwartz to be Air Force Chief of Staff, and General Duncan McNabb to be Commander, United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials put in every day. We appreciate the sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make for our country. We also know that they’re not going to be alone in making these sacrifices, so we thank in advance the family members of our nominees for the support and assistance that we know that they’re going to need to provide to our nominees.

Each of our nominees has a long career of public service. Mr. Donley has served in the Army, on the staff of the National Security Council, as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He served for 4 years on the staff of this committee from 1981 to 1984, and many of us and many of our staffs know him well and we hold him in high regard.

General Schwartz has served in the Air Force for 35 years, most recently as Director of the Joint Staff and as Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command.

General McNabb has served in the Air Force almost as long, most recently as Director of the Joint Staff and as Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command.

If confirmed, Mr. Donley and General Schwartz will assume leadership positions in the Department of the Air Force at a very difficult time. Over the last year, the Air Force has been severely criticized for its handling of nuclear weapons security and command and control, which according to Admiral Kirkland H. Donald has been characterized by inattention to detail, lack of discipline, and a degradation of authority, technical competence, and standards of excellence.

Reports on the mistaken movement of nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base confirmed that Air Force nuclear procedures reflected a “breakdown in training, discipline, supervision, and leadership.” The challenge facing the next Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff will be to fix the underlying problems and not just to address the obvious symptoms.

Also of great concern to the continuing problems in the Air Force is acquisition systems. Earlier this month the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found serious defects in the Air Force’s
evaluation of proposals for new tanker aircraft and the Secretary of Defense has been required to step in and take over the program for the second time in 4 years. In addition, the DOD’s Inspector General has found disturbing evidence of favoritism and the award of a series of contracts to companies closely linked to high-ranking Air Force officials. We have asked the Inspector General to make recommendations as to accountability of those officials.

A few months ago, GAO reported that unit costs on the Air Force’s largest acquisition program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), have grown by almost 40 percent, costing us an extra $36 billion. This cost growth is symptomatic of problems in Air Force acquisition programs, which are all too frequently subject to overly optimistic cost estimates and overly ambitious performance expectations, resulting in programs that are technically challenged, behind schedule, and over budget.

To address these problems, the Air Force leadership will have to live up to its commitments to establish reasonable requirements, ensure the use of mature technologies, and ensure the programs are adequately and accurately funded from the outset.

The next Secretary and Chief of Staff will have their work cut out for them to address these problems and restore public confidence in the ability of the Air Force leadership to handle its critical national security and fiscal responsibilities.

If confirmed, General McNabb will also face critical challenges in his new position. The strategic mobility of our Armed Forces enables us to project power anywhere around the globe. The U.S. TRANSCOM, which encompasses the Air Force’s Mobility Command, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, is the linchpin of that strategic mobility.

At a time when our forces remain engaged at high operating tempos around the globe, it is critical that we fully leverage the capabilities of these commands. These are all extremely important positions which merit the attention that we give them today.

I will submit for the record a copy of statements of support for General Schwartz and General McNabb from our colleague from the House of Representatives, Representative Jerry Costello.

[The prepared statements of Representative Costello follow:]

**Prepared Statements by Representative Jerry F. Costello**

Thank you, Chairman Levin for holding this hearing. I am pleased to support the nomination of General Norton A. Schwartz, currently Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) at Scott Air Force Base (AFB), IL, to Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

I have known General Schwartz since he became Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM in 2005 and I am proud of the work TRANSCOM has done under his command. Early on, General Schwartz integrated himself in the community, attending many local events, and sought input from civic and business leaders. He has consistently worked with the local community to help shape the future of Scott AFB. As a result, he has made the base and our area stronger. General Schwartz has a record of listening to and working with all stakeholders, a quality that is extremely important for the Air Force Chief of Staff job.

General Schwartz has had a distinguished career. In 1973, he graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy. Since that time, he became a command pilot with more than 4,200 flying hours in a variety of aircraft. He participated as a crewmember in the 1975 airlift evacuation of Saigon, and in 1993 served as Chief of Staff of the Joint Special Operations Task Force for Northern Iraq in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
General Schwartz is also an alumnus of the National War College, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a 1994 Fellow of Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Seminar XXI. He has served as Commander of the Special Operations Command-Pacific, the Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and the 11th Air Force. Prior to coming to Scott AFB, General Schwartz, was Director of the Joint Staff here in Washington, DC.

General Schwartz's awards are too numerous to mention all of them, but I will highlight a few. He has received the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; the Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters; the Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, and the Army Commendation Medal.

His impressive career shows General Schwartz is a man that rarely if ever takes time for himself. His motto at U.S. TRANSCOM is "a promise made will be a promise kept" which captures his remarkable commitment to excellence, service, and sacrifice, all the hallmarks of true leadership.

In my view, General Schwartz possesses the necessary qualities to be an outstanding Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I strongly support his nomination and urge the Senate to do so as well.

Thank you, Chairman Levin, for holding this hearing today. I am pleased to support the nomination of General Duncan J. McNabb, currently Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, to Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM.

U.S. TRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense and I am proud to have U.S. TRANSCOM at Scott AFB, in my hometown, and the congressional district I am privileged to represent.

General McNabb was formerly the Commander of Air Mobility Command (AMC) from 2005–2007. It was during this period that I worked closely with him on issues important to the local area and our Nation's defense. At AMC, General McNabb was responsible for global mobility, including air refueling, operational support airlift, and aeromedical evacuation and he did a superb job of leading 134,000 airmen in that mission.

Prior to that assignment, he held numerous positions, including a variety of planning, programming, and logistical duties. To name just a few, he was commander of the 89th Operations Group at Andrews AFB, commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing which earned the Riverside Trophy as the 15th Air Force's outstanding wing, and commander of the Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott AFB. He accomplished each of his missions with distinction.

General McNabb graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1974 and since then has served the Air Force and our country with pride. He has made a difference in the lives of millions of people worldwide through implementation of his policies and vision for the Air Force.

General McNabb has had three prior tours at Scott AFB and during that time, he has gotten to know the local community and its business and civic leaders. Through that working relationship, we have all put forth a unified vision for the future of Scott AFB. The base would not be where it is today without this strong relationship and vision. I believe the characteristics of true leadership are desire, vision, creativity, expertise, and respect and General McNabb embodies all of these. Scott AFB and the Nation will benefit immensely from his service as Commander of TRANSCOM. I strongly support this nomination and urge you to do the same.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our distinguished presidential nominees this morning and our great friend and colleague Senator Stevens, who will soon participate in the introductions.

I think we really should pause for a minute here this morning to reflect that the Nation, and most specifically the Department of the Air Force, lost some brave men here in that B–52 airplane loss. It's an old airplane. I checked it out yesterday. The oldest one is 59 years old, almost twice the age of the young men and those women who are flying those aircraft. So we must remember even
in times in that particular theater, with no conflict in progress, these operational accidents always pose a great danger to the uniformed people, and our hearts go out to the families of these victims.

I've had the privilege to have been associated with the Pentagon since 1969 and through the many years on this committee. The Department of the Air Force has recently undergone some of the most extraordinary chapters in the history of DOD in terms of its reorganization and the withdrawing of senior leadership at the decision of Secretary Robert Gates.

I'd like to say a word about Secretary Gates. I've known him for a very long time. I think he's doing an absolutely extraordinary job as Secretary of Defense. This was not an easy decision. I can think of few parallels, very few parallels in the history of DOD since it was formed many years ago. But he made it and, presumably with the backing and support of the President, and in the place of those two individuals specifically he has selected you, Mr. Donley, to be the new Secretary and you, General Schwartz, to be the new Chief of Staff, the two key positions.

Your charter quite clearly is to restore the Department of the Air Force to its rightful place as a coequal among the military branches of our United States. How proud we are of you, Mr. Donley. You're one of our own, as we might say, thoroughly trained by this committee at a time when the distinguished chairman and I were somewhat junior, but nevertheless you were a part of the great teams of John Stennis and Henry Jackson, and Barry Goldwater and John Tower, and many others, Sam Nunn and the like.

You come with the experience that is needed to take this outfit by the bootstraps and bring it right back up just as fast as you can.

Equally important, as the chairman touched upon, is the need to go forward with the modernization program, most specifically the tanker program, which would be in large part under your cognizance, General McNabb, if confirmed by the Senate. There again, it's an old aircraft. I suppose that fleet of aircraft is second in aging perhaps to the B-52s. Would that be about right, somewhere right along in there? We're asking an awful lot of those young aviators, night and day, any place in the world, roll them out, take them down that runway, and take them off, and hope and pray they come back with a good safe landing.

I hope we can proceed with the resolution of the contract consistent with law and other applicable regulations and we can put that behind us.

But I really believe that the Congress of the United States is going to give you the strongest of support. We recognize the situation the Department’s in and consequently I think this committee is going to give strong support, Senator Stevens’ committee will give strong support, and I hope the other body will do likewise, to help it, under your leadership, subject to confirmation, bring this Department back to its rightful place.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

We’re always delighted to have Senator Stevens with us. Again, we welcome you, our friend and colleague, to make an introduction
here this morning. Senator Stevens, why don't you proceed and then we'll go in our regular order after that.

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I'm delighted to be here with my good friend General Norty Schwartz, Norty's been a friend for many years and I think Secretary Gates has made a great decision when he decided to recommend Norty to become the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He and his wife Suzie, who is behind us here now, have been good friends with Catherine and me for several years. He was Commander of the 11th Air Force and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at the Alaska Command, and we've worked with him to a great extent. He has, I think, a wonderful record in the Air Force. When he's confirmed, he'll be the first non-fighter, non-bomber pilot to be the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. His principal service has been the Special Operations Command and the Air Mobility Command. He's a C–130 pilot and he's the right man to lead our Air Force at this time in terms of people in uniform.

I do believe he has an uncanny ability to improve morale wherever he goes. He has earned the respect and admiration of his civilian and military counterparts wherever he's been. I have enjoyed his vast intellect and quiet, confident manner. Particularly when he was, on September 11, 2001, the leader of the Alaska Command and NORAD airspace. He's a graduate of the Air Force Academy and the National War College. His combat experience included being involved in the airlift evacuation of Saigon in 1975. He was Chief of Staff of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Northern Iraq in Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm. Since 2005 he's done an impressive job heading TRANSCOM as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. He's focused on delivering resources to Iraq and Afghanistan, and he brought really a fresh look at the concepts of fulfilling that job.

I think his experience has given us the skills and ideas necessary to face the challenges of the Air Force in the days ahead. I do urge the committee to confirm General Schwartz expeditiously. I think our Air Force very much needs the leadership now. There's been sort of a traumatic change of command and it's not going to be helped if there's a delay in confirming my good friend Norty Schwartz.

I appreciate your giving me the time to be here and make comments upon his abilities and really urge you to act as quickly as possible. Thank you all very much.

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you, Senator Stevens, very much for that introduction. It's an important statement. We know the schedule that you have to keep. So you of course are leaving us, as we understand.

Now we'll ask the standard questions of our three nominees, and we would ask that you respond to these together. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir.
General McNABB. Yes, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
General SCHWARTZ. No, sir.
General McNABB. No, sir.
Mr. DONLEY. No, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
General McNABB. Yes, sir.
Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir.
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir.
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
General McNABB. Yes, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General McNABB. Yes, sir.
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear to testify upon request before this committee?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir.
General McNABB. Yes, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir.
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
General McNABB. Yes, sir. [Pause.]
Chairman LEVIN. This question is asked of our two uniformed officers. In order to exercise our legislative oversight, this is the traditional question we ask. The reason it was left out was because this is not generally asked of our civilian nominees, but it should be asked of our general officers here.

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. My question: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress, and do you agree when asked to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
General McNABB. Yes, sir.
Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Donley, let me call upon you first. We believe that each of you have some family members, and of course we would be delighted to have you introduce those members as you give us your opening statements. Mr. Donley?

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY TO BE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, and thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. I want to first thank you for your reference to the importance of family. Without my wife Gail and the support of my three daughters over the last 30 years, this would have been an incredibly difficult journey. They have been supportive every step of the way and I want to thank them for being here today to be with me.

Let me also express my thanks to Secretary Gates for his confidence and to the President for nominating me to lead America’s Air Force. As a former staff member of this committee, it is truly an honor to be back testifying before you today. I have great respect for the indispensable role that Congress fulfills in shaping our Nation’s defenses, as well as the vital support you provide to our men and women in uniform.

I especially appreciate your steadfast support for the nearly 700,000 total force airmen, regular, Reserve, Guard, and civilians, who continue to distinguish themselves in joint operations around the world and in the global war on terror. Indeed, in the 15 years since I last served as Acting Secretary of the Air Force our Nation’s airmen have been continuously deployed and in the joint fight. If confirmed, it will be an honor and a privilege to once again serve with these dedicated men and women.

The circumstances that brought General Schwartz and me to this table are indeed difficult and unprecedented. I wish to acknowledge, as did Secretary Gates, that former Secretary Mike Wynne and General Buzz Moseley have given decades of faithful service to the Nation, and we are all grateful for that service. In particular, I want to thank them for their assistance in this recent transition.

I also want to acknowledge the other Air Force nominees here today. Both General Schwartz and General McNabb bring the broad defense-wide perspectives that are so essential to joint operations and effective collaboration in DOD’s headquarters. If confirmed I would consider it a privilege to work with them and especially with General Schwartz in leading the world’s finest Air Force.

Unusual circumstances place me in the position of Acting Secretary while I await your deliberations on this nomination. I appreciate your understanding as I step forward to address the urgent business confronting the Air Force. At the highest level, I believe the most urgent tasks for the new leadership are to steady this great institution, restore its inner confidence, and your confidence in the leadership team, and rebuild our external credibility.

My immediate focus has been on the nuclear enterprise. On June 26 I directed the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff to establish a Nuclear Task Force to synchronize corrective actions underway across major commands and to unify these efforts at the strategic level. The task force is charged to deliver a comprehensive road map by
the end of September, fully recommitting the Air Force to this critical national mission.

The Secretary of Defense has also asked former Secretary Jim Schlesinger to provide recommendations in this area. I have met with Dr. Schlesinger and his panel and the Air Force schedule is structured so that we can incorporate their recommendations as we move forward.

The KC–X tanker issue has also received my attention. I support Secretary Gates’ decision to reopen the request for proposal and address the issues raised by GAO and move source selection authority to the Under Secretary of Defense, John Young. Secretary Young will have whatever support he needs from the Air Force to continue forward.

The Air Force needs a new tanker. The joint warfighters need a new tanker. This is a critical capability that facilitates the projection of U.S. influence around the globe.

At the same time, I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition to assess lessons learned from GAO’s decisions on the KC–X and to ensure appropriate adjustments are made as the Air Force prepares for future program decisions and source selection. We need to strengthen confidence in the Air Force and DOD’s capability to manage these large, complex competitions and successfully withstand contractor protests.

In addition to these matters, I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress in the weeks ahead to resolve outstanding issues in the authorization and appropriations processes.

Mr. Chairman, over the past 4 weeks I have spoken with all of the Air Force’s senior civilian and military leadership and conducted town hall meetings at four installations. Without exception, leadership and airmen at all levels are ready to put the difficulties of the past few months behind them, to learn the appropriate lessons from these experiences, and to move forward.

The way ahead includes a recommitment to upholding the high standards of excellence that have always been the Air Force’s hallmark, and for our core values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do, to underpin every action by every airman at all times.

The men and women of the Air Force are volunteers all and there is no quicker recovery of our inner confidence and credibility than the power of tens of thousands of airmen recommitting to our own high standards. Our values and our high standards form the core of all Air Force actions. They serve us well in today’s joint fight and I believe they point the way to a bright future.

If confirmed, I commit to the men and women of the Air Force and to you all my energies in these efforts.

Mr. Chairman, my door is always open and I thank you again for your continued support of the men and women of the United States Air Force. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Donley.

General Schwartz?
STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'd like to introduce my wife of 27 years, Suzie. She's my best friend and there is absolutely no doubt that I would not be sitting here today were it not for her love and her support.

Chairman Levin and distinguished members of the committee: It is an honor to be nominated by our Commander in Chief and recommended by Secretary Gates to be the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. Their expression of confidence is humbling. For more than 35 years, I have been fortunate to serve the United States of America in uniform. It represents an Air Force that serves as the cornerstone of the Nation's defense, capable of delivering combat power and support to the joint warfighter any time, any place.

I fully understand and appreciate the enormous responsibility to lead and sustain those capabilities on behalf of the Air Force and the Nation. I will not lose sight of this responsibility.

The circumstances that have placed Mr. Donley and me here today have been difficult and I truly believe that the Air Force is still fundamentally a healthy organization, comprised of dedicated professionals. Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed I will personally champion the Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilians, and all who serve the Air Force in defense of our great Nation around the world. These men and women are a national asset and together we will recommit ourselves to our core values and uphold the highest standards of excellence that have made our Air Force the best in the world. Our Nation deserves nothing less.

Furthermore, I will strive to improve and transform processes, organizations, and systems, and maintain the highest standards of performance to enhance the effectiveness and the efficiency of our service. We will be ready if called upon.

We will, at the same time, be mindful of cost, be good stewards of our country's treasure, and be worthy of the Nation's trust and confidence. All that I do will be based on the absolute knowledge that protection of our Nation and support of our joint warfighters is our number one priority.

If confirmed, sir, Suzie and I will serve with dedication, with optimism, with enthusiasm, and a profound sense of purpose. I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for allowing me to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General.

General McNabb?

STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, NOMINATED FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General McNABB. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the committee: Thank you. I am humbled and honored to be nominated by the President and recommended by the Secretary of Defense for the position of Commander of U.S. Trans-
poration Command, to be considered by the Senate, and to be with you here today.

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to take the opportunity to introduce my wife Linda and son Duncan. Linda is the love of my life and I would not be here today without the joy that she brings to me every day. For the last 29 years she has been an Air Force family patriot, just like so many wonderful loved ones across our country who allow our great soldiers, sailors, marines, Coast Guardsmen, and airmen to serve. My son Duncan is a tremendous young man who is working on the ground floor of the biodiesel industry. I very much appreciate you allowing them to be here today.

From my earliest days flying C–141s in the Pacific to being the aide to the first Commander of TRANSCOM, to recently serving as General Schwartz’s air component commander as the Commander of the AMC, I have been part of the great transportation enterprise. Sir, I believe our global mobility is one of our Nation’s true crown jewels. It gives us the strategic ability to move. No other nation can match it, which gives us a true asymmetric advantage on the global stage, whether delivering our warfighters to the fight or our compassion to those in need.

I know TRANSCOM’s success depends on the strength of the total force and of our industry partners. Sir, if confirmed I will work to continue to strengthen and leverage these partnerships across the entire joint deployment and distribution enterprise.

Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the committee: I fully understand and appreciate the enormous responsibilities and trust that go with this command. If confirmed, I will never lose sight of these responsibilities and I will give you all I have to be worthy of that trust.

We are a Nation at war and supporting our warfighters will be my number one priority. I’m grateful to you, sir, and the committee for having me here today and I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.

Let’s try a 7-minute round for the first round. I believe we have a vote at 10:30.

Senator Warner. 11 o’clock, I think.

Chairman Levin. At 11 o’clock, that’s right. The vote is at 11 o’clock.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I ask an administrative question first? This committee under your leadership recently had a closed door hearing with Admiral Donald on the issues of the nuclear programs and the problems associated with the U.S. Department of the Air Force. Also, we now have former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger working on that problem. It would seem to me wise that the chairman consider a closed hearing and that our members know that that will be available if they desire to pursue that or other issues that could be in the form of classified information.

What’s the chair’s disposition on that?

Chairman Levin. I thought I would ask a few questions about that which could be answered in an unclassified setting, and then if any of us wish a classified continuation we would do that, of course we would consider that. Let’s start with a few questions that
I'm going to ask about those reports, see if they can answer them in a way which is satisfactory, and then of course if you or any other member of the committee wishes to proceed in classified we could do that. Would that be all right?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

On that subject, let me address to Secretary Donley and General Schwartz this question. The Air Force nuclear program has suffered from a lack of oversight and attention, leading to a general devaluing of the mission within the Service, according to several of the investigations and reports dealing with the Air Force. Whatever the political view one has as to the size of the stockpile or the appropriate role for nuclear deterrence, there can be no debate about the fact that nuclear weapons and all related components must be absolutely safe and secure.

General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, have you had discussions with the authors of the various reports and investigations, including General Larry Welch and Admiral Donald, as to what they see as the key problems that need to be fixed? Secretary Donley, let me start with you.

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir, I have. I've met both with General Welch and with Admiral Donald on their respective reports.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Have you, General Schwartz, met with them?

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, I have not, pending confirmation.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you read their reports?

General SCHWARTZ. I have read the portion of the Donald report which was made available to me, less chapter 7.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask you first then, Secretary Donley. Do you agree with their conclusions?

Mr. DONLEY. I do.

Chairman LEVIN. General Schwartz, do you agree?

General SCHWARTZ. I certainly do, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Donley, in the few weeks you've had, what steps have you taken to fix the problems, if you can tell us in an unclassified setting?

Mr. DONLEY. If I can summarize, Mr. Chairman. When I arrived I received several briefings on the current status of Air Force actions, ongoing actions to address both the Minot-Barksdale incident and also the Taiwan nose cone issue. In being briefed on the status of those actions, it was apparent to me that the Air Force had been working on both of these for a number of months and had under way perhaps over 100 individual actions, first in response to the Minot-Barksdale incident, those were sort of underway, then in a serial fashion to address the Taiwan incident as the facts of that situation became known.

What I felt was appropriate and necessary to take the next step for the Air Force was to pull together this information and all these activities and pull them up to the strategic level to begin to address the more systemic issues that were outlined in the Donald report. These individual incidents, as I think Admiral Donald alluded to, are evidence of some deeper systemic issues that need to be addressed by the Air Force.
What I’ve asked from the Nuclear Task Force is that they prepare a strategic road map that will collate and synchronize all the individual activities underway, but pull them up to the strategic level so we can see all the training, all the procurement, all the personnel, all the leadership issues, all the doctrinal issues, all the sustainment issues that need to be addressed to ensure we are fully recommitted to our stewardship of the nuclear enterprise.

There must be no question about the Air Force’s support for this fundamental national mission.

Chairman Levin. Secretary Donley, chapter 7 of the Donald report deals with accountability. Secretary Gates has charged the Air Force leadership with the responsibility for implementing that chapter within the Air Force. Can you tell us what the schedule is for review and action?

Mr. DONLEY. I have set in motion a review of the accountability of officers associated with the Taiwan incident in particular, following the lead of the Donald report in these areas. I have asked for a report or advice in 30 days and expect to address appropriate action at that point.

I would also add that there already had been disciplinary actions taken in both of these incidents. Some 17 officers or officials had been relieved of their duties, 11 had been reassigned, and 5 received Article 15s. So action had already been taken, but we are following——

Chairman Levin. Below a certain level, is that correct?

Mr. DONLEY. That’s correct.

Chairman Levin. But there’s a review at all levels; is that correct?

Mr. DONLEY. That’s correct.

Chairman Levin. General Schwartz, in response to the pre-hearing questions regarding the Air Force’s aircraft inventory, you said that DOD’s revised fiscal guidance for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) beginning in fiscal year 2010 authorized an approximately $5 billion boost for our recapitalization efforts, and that will certainly help. You went on to say that “The additional resources that we receive will be used in part to increase the F–35s annual production rate.”

Now, is increasing the F–35 JSF production rate the best way for dealing with the potential Air Force fighter inventory shortfalls, or should we continue to buy F–22A aircraft to deal with inventory shortfalls?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is the major strategy for addressing the inventory shortfalls as we go out toward 2025. That is, increasing the production rate from 48 per year to as high as 110 per year. That is the key strategy for achieving that outcome, sir.

Chairman Levin. Is there any less-than-key strategy which you would recommend in addition?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it seems to me, first of all with regard to the F–22, that is an essential part of the force mix. As you’re aware, there are many who think that the F–22 is only an air-to-air platform. In fact it has important capability for destruction of enemy air defenses in an era when surface-to-air missile threats are available from the commercial market and are increasingly lethal.
So for the F–22 in particular, there are a number of studies, sir, that talk about inventories in the range of 180 to 381. If confirmed, I will delve deeply into that analysis and the assumptions associated with that, and I will be happy and be able to come back to the committee with my best recommendation on the total procurement for F–22.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have any current position as to whether we should continue production of the F–22? Are you awaiting those——

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the position of the Department——

Chairman LEVIN. I mean your personal position.

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, my personal position is that I believe that 183 is not the ceiling on the low end, but that 381 is too high on the high end. So yes, I think we should preserve production at least for the near term.

Chairman LEVIN. My time is up.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Donley, in recent years GAO protests by bidders have resulted in the reversal of a number of significant Air Force contract award decisions, including those of the KC tanker replacement, combat search and rescue helicopter replacement, and the C–130 avionics modernization program.

In your remarks on July 9 at a DOD press briefing with Secretary Gates, you stated that: “The underlying Air Force acquisition system is not somehow fatally flawed.” Now, how do you square that conclusion with the facts?

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, the KC–X announcement by GAO was made just a few days before I was appointed Acting Secretary. As I looked at the facts associated with that particular decision, I did not see mismanagement by the Air Force. I did not see misconduct or gross incompetence in the acquisition process.

As GAO looked at the protests, they evaluated over 100 items that were brought to them and were at issue in terms of how the Air Force conducted its business. The Air Force was sustained on the majority, the vast majority of those items.

Senator WARNER. You still stand by your statement, then, that you do not think there is any fatal flaws in the system?

Mr. DONLEY. No, sir. I think the Air Force acquisition system is the DOD acquisition system, it is the Federal acquisition system that we all have lived with, with its many complexities, for over 50 years. Generally speaking, my experience in this area is that we do not throw the whole thing overboard and start over.

Senator WARNER. No one’s suggesting that. But it’s a fairly tight statement you made, that it’s not fatally flawed, and I think on reflection you feel that there’s some strong—maybe it’s a question of semantics. But to me when you make a statement that it’s not fatally flawed against a background of a lot of problems, I find a disconnect. Maybe we respectfully have differences of point. But I think you’ve assured the committee this morning it’s high on your agenda to get things straightened out.

Mr. DONLEY. It is, Senator. We do have lots of work to do and I have set that in motion with the acquisition community.

Senator WARNER. I mentioned that this committee had a briefing by Admiral Donald and I intend to go into that to some extent, Mr.
Chairman. But I would first just ask you, General Schwartz. As I look through your very distinguished career and assignments, you never had any real command authority over those areas of the Department of the Air Force that have been brought to the attention in the Donald report. Would I be correct in that?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Warner, in fact when I was the commander of the 36th Tactical Airlift Squadron at McChord Air Force Base in the State of Washington in the late 1980s, we were the only C-130 unit that had the primary nuclear airlift force mission, that is for transporting America's nuclear weapons and components. So I have had experience in terms of the rigor and the attention to detail required to transport nuclear weapons in that context.

Senator WARNER. I presume at that time you felt that there were adequate checks and balances in the system, and I believe that to be correct because I think most of the problems outlined in the Donald report were subsequent to that period. But subsequent to that assignment you had, you had no direct responsibility?

General SCHWARTZ. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. Therefore I just assume you were not aware of these problems, many of which are cultural, in that area.

General McNabb, your career, pretty much I do not see any direct area of responsibility (AOR). Nevertheless, when you were Vice Chief—now, I have some familiarity with that position. It really is just as broad as the Chief's, and perhaps there are specific areas that the Chief and you work out together you'll handle. But you have the Air Force across the board, wouldn't that be correct?

General MCNABB. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. How do you feel about the Admiral Donald report with respect to the performance of your functions? Did you at any time encounter some of those problems, and if you did what did you do or not do to correct them as Vice Chief?

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. As the Vice Chief, I got to see specifically the blue ribbon panel recommendations following the General Welch review as well as the accident investigation board that General John D.W. Corley did following the Minot to Barksdale movement. The consolidation of those findings and the recommendations that came out of that, I got to see how our Air Force—they would come and brief me on what they recommended and what they were doing. I got to see the Air Force as they tried to get at this problem.

I will say that since that time Secretary Donley as he came in, and after reading the Donald report, one of the things that there is no question is that, as we look deeper into these issues, there was in fact some cultural problems. There were some other problems, that every time you look in one place you would realize that from a cultural and oversight standpoint there were some very deep issues.

The Air Force was trying to get at that and I would say that the part that Secretary Donley has done, has said, let's bring all of that together and let's make sure that we look at all parts of it, and that's that integrated road map that he is asking.

Senator WARNER. Quite frankly, we're trying to sit here and judge your qualifications to take on your next important command.
But bearing on that is when you were Vice Chief these problems were out there, but you at this time represent to us that you were just not aware of them, they were not brought to your attention, and therefore you did not take any action remedial to correct them?

General McNabb. Senator Warner, in fact what we did was we looked at the 128 findings and aggressively moved out on fixing those issues, I think that what we had to do is go in deeper. I think that was ongoing. I just think that it wasn’t as quick as we needed to do it.

Senator Warner. There’s been a recent series of articles regarding these executive containers to be put into planes for various individuals to utilize or better utilize their abilities as they’re in the air. I remember very well, Mr. Chairman, in our early days when we took congressional delegations we used the old Air Force tankers and there were no windows. Do you remember that? There was a little window in the back and that was about it.

We did have plywood encasements that were put into the plane. I remember vividly sharing one with old Hal Heflin. Remember him? He was 6 foot 3 and slightly large around the girth, and he was a big man to share a little compartment with, but he was a wonderful man. We all loved him a great deal.

Chairman Levin. A great man.

Senator Warner. A great Senator.

So I've had some familiarity with this issue. We also know only too well on this committee in the years that we've been on it—we had the very unfortunate history of the procurement of the comode situation, and then the hammer situation, whether it was a $400 or $500 hammer. I mean, these problems have been out there, regrettably, through the years.

Along comes this one. You had some responsibility, as I understand from the record, with regard to that program. I'd like to give you the opportunity now to clarify what your understanding of your responsibility was and, to the extent that you, in exercising your official duties, took any corrective actions or in any way otherwise tried to avoid what is a very unfortunate story out here, which—these are the sort of stories that trouble the American public so greatly, when they give of their taxes to provide for the defense of this country.

I can tell you from long years of experience, and all of us on this committee know, that when we go back home we're not asked the complicated questions that we're covering here this morning. They just shake their fist at us: You're responsible and you're on that Armed Services Committee; how could you have let this happen?

This is your opportunity.

General McNabb. Yes, thank you, Senator. One of our most important missions is the movement of our national leadership, both military and civilian. We take that very seriously. We have two ways of doing that. We have about 31 dedicated airplanes that we use to move our leadership around. Those are shared assets, so they're prioritized.

The other way that we do it, depending on the threat that we face, is we may put them on combat airlift airplanes or tankers, as you mentioned, and we will take them in, again because of the nature of the threat, where we have to have a reduced signature or
where the threat requires defensive systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures that our combat Air Force——

Senator WARNER. I don’t question the advisability and the need for some sort of system. It’s how this system was evolved and the trappings and so forth that were associated with it, which I think the public is just standing in awe of as to how this happened. To what extent were you personally responsible for those decisions, which now are under careful public scrutiny?

General McNABB. Yes, sir. I was the AMC Commander. I had been the J–4 on the Joint Staff, and as the AMC Commander I said that, given September 11, given the tremendous additional need for our leadership to go to the theater and then come back out—what I ended up tasking was, let’s come up with a prototype, a one to two-pallets, kind of much smaller capsule, that we could put on any of our airlift or tanker airplanes and therefore satisfy this requirement.

The idea was that this module could be placed in theater as well, so that you could take advantage of any organic opportunities available as well.

What we wanted to do is I asked them to make sure that it met the security, the communications, the work environment, and most importantly the safety, the Federal Aviation Administration standards that need to be met. Sir, I believe that we have done that. Obviously, I left the AMC Commander position about a year ago and I have not dealt with that since.

Senator WARNER. So in your capacity as Vice Chief you didn’t look back on one of your responsibilities to see if it was moving along in a manner you felt was consistent with the best interests of the Department?

General McNABB. Sir, as the Vice Chief I did not deal with this issue.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my welcome to the nominees who are here and also to your families that are here.

I’d like to direct my first question to Mr. Donley and General Schwartz. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed into conflicts where the Army and the Marine Corps comprise the main effort. The Air Force has played more of a supporting role, yet critically needed, but a role in a very ground-centric counterinsurgency effort over the past 5 years.

My question is, do you believe that the Air Force should continue to build its capacity and capabilities in the counterinsurgency support mission, or do you believe that this kind of support-specific focus would adversely affect the preparation for the future of the Air Force?

Mr. Donley?

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, this is a very good question and it strikes to the heart of what the Air Force leadership is responsible for addressing, and that is the balance of capabilities across the many warfighting missions that we support.
A couple of points of reference, if I might. The Air Force’s contribution to OIF and OEF and the global war on terrorism is comprehensive. The Air Force is operating some 60-plus satellites that are supporting the communications, the weather, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) work. We’re supporting the air bridge that General McNabb and General Schwartz are so familiar with, that links us so easily and so facilely from the continental United States (CONUS) and all the bases of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps here in the CONUS and North America, all the way across the world to that theater of operations. That is a huge mission that we do seamlessly with the other Services on a daily basis.

The Air Force is committed to this in the intelligence area. We are flying unmanned aerial systems that 10 years ago were hardly even in the inventory. We are fully committed on the Special Operations side. So the Air Force is contributing to the global war on terror with these operations across a range of capabilities.

In addition, we are also sending airmen, about 4,000 to 6,000 at any given time, to assist with convoy duty and other ground operations to relieve pressure on the Army and the Marine Corps. So we are fully committed to this fight, and I believe Secretary Gates, and I believe most members of this committee who follow military operations recognize those contributions.

That is our first priority right now as we build capability. We need to continue to make decisions about how we spread resources across these many mission areas that the joint warfighters need and balance the here and now with potential future threats. That is something that we have always done and we will continue to try to do to the best of our ability.

Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka, forgive me for interrupting, but we have a quorum now present and that gives us an opportunity to consider a list of 1,981 pending military nominations. They’ve all been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report these 1,981 military nominations to the Senate?

Senator Warner. So moved.

Chairman Levin. Is there a second?

Senator Ben Nelson. Second.

Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]

The motion carries.

Now, a couple other items. One is the vote is now scheduled for 11:20 instead of 11:00.

Second, I’m going to have to leave, so the following order would be followed: After Senator Akaka would be Senator Inhofe and then Senator Ben Nelson. Are you going to be here for a few minutes? Then Senator Warner can make any changes in that if necessary.

Excuse the interruption, Senator Akaka.

Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schwartz, would you comment on that?

General Schwartz. Senator Akaka, thank you for that question. Fundamentally, I do not believe it is an either-or condition; that the United States Air Force, like the other Services, needs to be a full spectrum capability. At the moment, as Secretary Donley suggested, our focus obviously is in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have
provided the kinds of capabilities on which the ground forces that you addressed depend: lift, resupply, strike, ISR, even evacuation of the wounded. Those are important missions.

We have people who are running detention facilities. There are members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and they are involved in transportation and ground convoys and so on.

The bottom line, Senator, is that we as an Air Force can provide both the kind of concentrated effort required by the joint team in Central Command today and posture ourselves for future potential adversaries at the same time.

Senator AKAKA. General Schwartz, the number five priority on the Air Force's procurement list is the development of the so-called Next Generation Long-Range Strike Aircraft. According to the Air Force, the plan is to have a three-pronged approach in modernizing the Nation's bomber fleet: first, upgrade our aging B-52s and B-1s; second, field a new bomber by 2018 with existing technologies; and third, develop a bomber representing a quantum leap forward in capability by 2035.

Ahead of this priority includes the new air refueling tanker, the new combat search and rescue helicopter, and F-35 fighter bomber, and upgrades to space systems.

My question to you, General, is what is the role of the 2018 bomber or the second pronged approach? What is that 2018 bomber supposed to fill, given that the kinds of missions it would carry out could also be fulfilled by the new F-35 fighter bomber scheduled to be fully operational in a few years prior to that time?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, they perform similar missions, strike missions, but the question is how do you access the target set. In some cases that is possible from relatively close in. In other cases it's much more desirable to be able to reach out from a distance. The new bomber will enable us to maintain the capability to engage targets at a distance, and recognizing again the threat environment is likely to become more complex and more demanding and thus we'll need an airplane that's properly designed to perform in that environment.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator, for your questions.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schwartz, I think that was an excellent answer you gave and I think it points out the complexity of the various vehicles that we have.

Senator Warner in his opening statement talked about the B-52 situation, about the aging aircraft. I think we talk about it, we touch on it, and then nothing ever seems to happen. Yet we've flown some 96,000 sorties in the last year. Our equipment is old. We know what's happening in terms of the average age and the flight hours of fighter aircraft is 20 years and 5,400 hours; bombers, 32 years, 11,000 hours.

I've had numerous experiences over there. I look over and see my good friend Senator Martinez, who was with me when we had a little surface-to-air missile (SAM) problem coming out of Baghdad. This was one in an old beat-up C-130E model. Actually, the trip before we didn't lose one engine in an E model, we lost two engines in an E model. I keep telling them, work on some of these other
guys, not on me. I want more and I want bigger ones and I want J models and H models.

But nonetheless, this is the problem. We recalculated the problem that we had when Senator Martinez and a few others were taking off. It was about 7 minutes after takeoff. If we had been in even an H model, we would have been at an altitude where we would not have been vulnerable. I have to say, though, in that incident, with the flares and the responses, you would have been very proud, Senator Warner, of our pilots and the way they conducted themselves.

But the bottom line is these are life-threatening things. There’s something where someone could have been killed only because they’re not performing as to the minimum expectations, at least of me and several others on this committee.

We have these problems up there and we all seem to think, well, how do we get through the next 3 months? I’m thinking on down the road.

What is your solution to what we’re going to ultimately have to do to get rid of this aging aircraft problem that we have, General?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there is only one way that I am aware of to address this, and that is that you have to embark on a recapitalization profile that will reduce the average age of the fleet. As you suggested, the average age now is about 24 years. In order to sustain that level, you have to have about 160 aircraft a year in terms of procurement of the various kinds.

To drive that average age down could require somewhere toward 200 aircraft a year. We’re currently purchasing about 110 or so. The way to address this is, number one, we have to, I think, identify what our priorities are. We have said that it’s the tanker first that is the appropriate first priority. But I think we have to look across the fleet and dialogue with you, make sure that each of the members of the committee appreciates the risks and the opportunities, and then gain consensus on a program for recapitalizing that fleet.

Senator INHOFE. I want to get to a couple of specific vehicles in a minute. But in the mean time, we saw this coming. At least I saw it coming. Many other members did. During the 1990s when we had this euphoric attitude that the Cold War is over, we don’t need a military any more, and during that time we actually for all practical purposes reduced our procurement, our modernization, our end strength, by about 40 percent.

At the same time, the Chinese during that same period of time were increasing their procurement by 1,000 percent. I’d like to get out of the mentality of just taking care of what’s bleeding today. What do you think, Mr. Donley, about the long-term future? What should we be doing now? Was Secretary Rumsfeld right in his first confirmation hearing when he said that we need to get back up to what we did during the 20th century, 5.7 percent of our gross domestic product, as opposed to down to 3 percent?

Mr. DONLEY. There’s no question, Senator, that the recapitalization challenge for all the military departments is one of the most critical issues that we face, because it is not, as you appreciate, it is not just in one aircraft series or in one mission area. It is across a full range of activities. It is in some cases in the tactical airlift
fleet, it’s in the search and rescue fleet, it’s in the tanker fleet, it’s in the bomber fleet. There are big numbers in the fighter fleet as well.

So how to do this is going to be a neat trick. We need more resources to get it all done in the time that we would be most comfortable getting it done.

Senator INHOFE. We need more resources.

Mr. DONLEY. But I have been in this town for 30 years and we always live in a resource-constrained environment, where we have to make these tradeoffs. We are not always able to choose and implement the most effective acquisition profile for every program at the same time.

Senator INHOFE. I’m sorry, my time is running out. I agree with what you’re saying. I think that is a problem. But when you name all the missions and the vehicles to accommodate, to address these missions, we don’t have any idea—in 1994 they testified that in 10 more years we wouldn’t need ground troops. You’re going to be relying on very smart generals, General McNabb and others, but you’re going to be wrong in trying to anticipate what our needs are going to be.

It would appear to me that the American people do expect our guys going out there, and gals, that they’re going to have the best of equipment. I want to specifically talk about the F–22. I think others are going to bring this up also. But when we had to ground some 600 of the F–15s after one broke up there—now I guess they’re going back up; maybe the F–15Es were never completely grounded—you start looking at the numbers. The F–15s right now, 426; the E models, 224; the F–16s, 1,214.

Now, if we were to cut this off with the F–22s right now that would be 183. I think you answered the question, General Schwartz, that’s not adequate and maybe something more than that is. When you look at the sheer numbers and let me just ask you the question: Did all three of you agree with the statement that General John Jumper made back in 1998 when he said that we have to do something about our modernization program because the Su–27, Su–30 vehicles in Russia that they’re cranking out are better in some ways than our best strike vehicles, which were the F–15 and F–16? Did anyone take issue with that? [No response.]

Nonetheless, I guess what I’m saying is that we are going to end up with 183, as opposed to, just look at China alone. They have bought some 1,744 vehicles from, Su series vehicles, from China. Does this concern you folks, that we’d only have 183 strike vehicles competitive with a potential adversary?

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, we have to be attentive to numbers, but the United States, and particularly the Air Force, has relied on technologies and operational concepts that we have been able to meld into giving us increased capabilities, even though we have been shrinking the number of airframes over the years. We have a smaller Air Force than we had in the past and in most cases it’s much more capable.

But I share your concern to keep an eye on those potential threats that might develop around the world. Technology continues to move abroad both in Russia and in China in ways that we need to be attentive to.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. Let me just ask one more question. I agree with you, Mr. Donley, in terms of the F-35 and the F-22; those are—they fall in the category that you're talking about. I'm just concerned that we stay ahead of the curve so that some other adversary—right now they're talking about a fifth generation Su series, I think it's the Su-35, and we don't want to wait until we find out we're in the same situation we were in 1998.

One last question to General McNabb. On the Africa Command (AFRICOM), we have made, in our authorization bill, we have made requests, transportation requests, vehicles, assets. Are you supportive of and on line to try to direct these assets to the AFRICOM?

General McNABB. Yes, sir, absolutely. General Ward actually came by and saw me early on. I know he talked to General Schwartz as well. But basically, as he outlines what he needs in AFRICOM, both from the standpoint of long-range airplanes that he can get his hands on, we talked about a C-37 and a C-40, but also so that we would make sure that we give him the ability to get to the long-range lift, given the distances on that continent.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator. An important line of questions and I think the record should reflect that you've had a distinguished career as a civilian aviator. You understand airplanes. How many hours have you flown?

Senator INHOFE. A little over 10,000.

Senator WARNER. That qualifies you, my good friend.

Senator Nelson, you're up.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your willingness to take on new responsibilities, but for your previous service. We appreciate it so much, and that of your families, and of course all the men and women in uniform here and abroad.

You take over the Air Force at a very critical point in time, not simply because of the manner of the change and the timing of the change, but also because it's an opportunity to take a look at transformation and transition for the Air Force. As you consider the questions of the type of airframes and aircraft and the numbers of aircraft, aren't there going to be questions about when was the decision made establishing the number of required aircraft? Is that current today? Are we faced with an Air Force that is based on fighting the last war, the perceived next war, as opposed to the most likely war involving cyber space, involving terrorism?

Based on that, are you in a position to go back and evaluate all of those assumptions about the number of aircraft, the type of aircraft? Because that's going to be very helpful to us in deciding what we help fund for the present and the future. If we always do what we've always done, we'll end up right where we are today tomorrow, trying to replace aircraft without asking the question, do we need all those, do we need others, what do we need?

Mr. Donley, could you respond first, and then of course General Schwartz?

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, that's a very astute observation, I think, in the sense that the numbers that we look at now in terms of what's required going forward are built on study after study, which
have attempted to assess what the new requirement is for a given airplane. As we get to critical decisions on F–22, critical decisions on C–17 and other airframes which we have built out——

Senator BEN NELSON. There certainly are some airframes that we know what the future is going to be required for lift and for transportation. We certainly know that. But when we get to some of the other aircraft, would that be the same?

Mr. DONLEY. I would take slight issue, sir, in the sense that the requirements for these airframes continue to change. They continue to change in the operational environment, and they also change in our assumptions about what kind of threat we might need to face in the future. The assessments that are put together to evaluate individual airframes are often not as helpful as those assessments that look at airframes in combination.

So the combination of the F–22 and the F–35 together are the right kinds of things to look at, I think. The combination of that combat air fleet with ISR assets in comparison. Those are the kind of good tradeoffs that help us find the right balance across different kinds of capabilities, whether it be attack aircraft, the ISR that goes with it and informs air to ground decisions, or even air to air engagement decisions.

We’re developing comprehensive capabilities, systems of systems, not just one airframe at a time.

Senator BEN NELSON. I understand that and I’m not trying to talk the Air Force out of airplanes. I don’t want you to have to change your name, among other things. But aren’t there new emerging areas that are critically important, such as unmanned aerial vehicles?

Mr. DONLEY. Absolutely, and this is——

Senator BEN NELSON. Is that on an accelerated level or can you tell us something about that?

Mr. DONLEY. It is. I believe—and I would stand corrected by my colleagues, but I believe half of the airframes requested by the Air Force in this year’s budget are for unmanned aerial systems. That is a trend that as I understand it is probably going to continue. This has been one of the most thorough going and remarkable evolutions I think since I was Acting Secretary in 1993, the introduction of unmanned aerial systems and their use, not just in an ISR capacity, but also in an attack capacity.

This is a new and growing area for DOD and the United States Air Force, and we are smack dab in the middle of that.

We’re also growing and getting more serious about the cyber threats to this country, which is clearly an area of concern. So the Air Force has been working on that. We need to recapitalize and add new capabilities in space. These are the new and growing areas which offer opportunities for transformation. They’re based on sort of new demands coming from the warfighters based on our current experience and also what we forecast going forward as providing the best balance of capabilities across this attack, situational awareness spectrum of activity.

Senator BEN NELSON. Has there been any change in assumptions as to the number of F–22s required in the last, let’s say, the last 10 years? Or is it the same number?
Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I would defer to my uniformed colleagues, but I believe there are at this point probably six or seven different studies on the table over the last roughly 10 years that have spoken to sort of what is the right number for the F–22.

Senator BEN NELSON. General Schwartz?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, clearly I think it is important for any new leadership team in any discipline to come in and look at an organization and sort of revisit all the assumptions, the sort of business model, if you will, to assure that it’s viable going forward. If confirmed, I commit to you and to the committee to revisiting those assumptions on all those things that drive requirements. It needs to be done. As I suggested, certainly in the F–22 area there are other studies that we need to nail down.

But Senator, you're absolutely correct, and I think your notion of transformation and looking at new ways of doing things suggests that the old way of sort of packaging is not correct. I think the Secretary has it exactly right. There is trade space between strikers and ISR. There is trade space between air and surface lift. This is what we have to become more sophisticated at, and if confirmed you certainly will see me endeavoring to do that.

Senator BEN NELSON. My time is up, and I hope that you'll take a look at what your predecessor said, General Schwartz, when I think he said that even with the budget that was submitted for authorization that it was $100 billion short that had to be made up over the next 5 years. I assume you'll have a sharp pencil to tell us how we're going to be able to do that as well.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator, very much.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, General McNabb, thank you very much for your distinguished service to our country and to your families. Thank you all for your sacrifices that you make and for all that collectively you’ve accomplished for our country. You’ve all served with distinction and we appreciate very much your service.

General Schwartz, I want to come back to some questions that Senator Akaka touched on regarding long-range strike and the bomber and ask you if you are committed to long-range strike and bomber roles in terms of the missions of the Air Force?

General SCHWARTZ. I am, sir, absolutely.

Senator THUNE. Are you committed to fielding a new bomber by 2018, which is right now what the—

General SCHWARTZ. That is the plan and if that is physically achievable we will do so.

Senator THUNE. Could you talk a little bit about the role that the current bombers have played in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General SCHWARTZ. Certainly, sir. As you're aware, we have operated with bombers in the theater since 2001, and in fact it was bombers that began the strike operations in Afghanistan in October of 2001 and in the days that followed. The bottom line is that these are very important platforms for reaching out, as I suggested
earlier, to engage target sets. We have done that in Afghanistan repeatedly. We continue to have long duration, long dwell platforms above the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan for on-call delivery of precision munitions in support of the joint team, and that certainly will continue. That has been extremely useful and I am certain that will continue, sir.

Senator THUNE. I assume that, because of that continued need for that sort of requirement, the next generation bomber obviously is going to have to step in and fill that role for the current generation?

General SCHWARTZ. That is certainly my view, Senator.

Senator THUNE. With regard to Air Force energy matters, just last week the Air Force asked to reprogram $72 million to buy more jet fuel due to increased costs that were not foreseen. Could you discuss the impact of higher fuel costs on the Air Force and your views on the Air Force’s current synthetic fuels program?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, I know there is much here that the members of the committee are concerned about for our Air Force. One of the areas, though, that I think represents the excellence and the genius of our people is the effort to find alternative ways to operate. Certainly in the area of fuel, this is the case.

There is no question that the Air Force and air forces generally are the largest consumer of hydrocarbons in DOD. In our case, it’s a difference in terms of $600 million or more associated with the change in the price of oil. So there are three components to it, sir. One is the basic operational approaches that we take. There are ways, just like driving our cars more slowly, there are ways to operate aircraft more efficiently and we have to do that in order to conserve resources.

Second is to look at alternatives, such as Fischer-Tropsch and other ways to enable use of alternative fuels. As you are aware, we have the B–52, the C–17, and the B–1 have all been tested with blended alternative fuels successfully and the B–52 has been certified to operate in that fashion.

Finally, there is a longer term issue of platforms that are more fuel efficient than the current generation. This is something that we need to keep in our technology focus, which is thinking about ways that machines can do the job and be less hydrocarbon intensive.

Senator THUNE. I appreciate the answer to that, and I might ask maybe Secretary Donley to react to that as well. I want to follow up with a question regarding the Air Force’s goal to have all aircraft certified on synthetic fuels by 2011 and to acquire 50 percent of its domestic aviation fuel requirement from a domestically sourced synthetic fuel blend by 2016, if that continues to be the goal. The Air Force being the biggest user of fuels in this country, if we are going to break this dependence on foreign sources of energy, it really starts I think with a lot of the procurement that we do for the Government. I’m just curious to know what your thoughts are with regard to that, at least what has been a stated goal of the Air Force.

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I’m currently reviewing the Air Force’s energy policy. It’s been on my desk for just a few days now. I am, like General Schwartz, impressed with the ingenuity and the scope
of this effort after 3 or 4 years of work. It’s gotten great attention in the Air Force and I do believe it is a success story.

I think we ought to remain fully committed to getting all our air frames certified for blended synthetic fuels by 2011. I intend to follow through with that if confirmed.

Looking ahead, one question I have going forward that I believe requires a little bit more discussion, collaboration with this and other committees of Congress, is figuring out how and where this change and reshaping of Air Force demand is going to be met, where is the supply going to come from for synthetic fuels in high volume, probably commercially connected, in ways that will drive down the cost, because as we approach this problem going forward synthetic and blended fuels, even at the higher costs per barrel that we’re experiencing today, as I understand it will be higher yet per gallon for us to operate with these synthetic fuels. So we need a market-based solution across the Government and across the commercial aviation sector that will help drive that change and push down the cost.

Senator Thune. My time has expired. Could you react quickly, though. One of the things that in the years since September 11 that we’ve really seen is the Guard and Reserve provide an incredibly important part of our national defense capability. Could you just discuss briefly your views on the Air Force’s total force initiative?

Mr. Donley. My colleagues I know are well versed in this as well, but I would just like to say that, as I come back to the Air Force after being gone for 15 years, this remains a real strength of the Air Force and the collaboration across the Active, Guard, and Reserve components in associating themselves with each other in progressively more collaborative and creative ways in bringing joint warfighting capability to the table in ways that we had never imagined before, and doing it in a fairly seamless way. I’m impressed with what I have seen thus far.

General Schwartz. Senator, I certainly agree. The Air Force for 50 years has been using associations with the Guard and Reserve and maintaining the identical levels of readiness. I think that’s exactly the way to go forward. We are capitalizing on the experience and the community association of the National Guard, for example, and bringing Active Duty personnel in an associate arrangement, so that we get the benefits of the National Guard experience and community setting as well as the productivity that comes with full-time Active Duty—important principle. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.

General McNabb. If I could—I’m sorry, sir.

Chairman Levin. No, that’s all right, if you have a quick comment to add.

General McNabb. Sir, I was going to add that I think the Air Force does total force better than anybody. I believe that we continue to look for innovative ways. Especially if I think about the TRANSCOM and AMC, obviously that’s something that I would really push across the board. I think the total force is what gives us that great synergy to meet those needs at a reduced fraction of the cost of what it would do to have Active Duty do all of this. The sharing of airplanes in the associate relationship that General
Schwartz mentioned is one of the best ways. As we bring new aircraft on, it is something that's worked for many years in the mobility world and now we're doing the same thing in the combat air forces and so forth. We think it's absolutely essential.

Senator THUNE. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning, gentlemen.
General Schwartz, the Washington Post is reporting that Russia has stated that they would consider basing their nuclear-capable bombers in Cuba if the U.S. installs a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. What would be your recommendation if that were to occur?

General SCHWARTZ. I certainly would offer my best military advice that we should engage the Russians not to pursue that approach, and if they did I think we should stand strong and indicate that is something that crosses a threshold, crosses a red line for the United States of America.

Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, in an 8-month period between March 2003 and October 2003 you testified to this committee over a number of times in closed classified sessions regarding issues that were happening in Iraq before the war started and all the way up to October after the war had started. Do you want to share with the committee, do you feel that you were adequately forthcoming with the committee during those classified sessions?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Nelson, it is painful to know that one or more members of the committee feels that I didn't measure up with my testimony in 2003. I fully appreciate the necessity for committees of Congress to receive answers that are crisp, responsive, and that are serious answers to serious questions.

At the time I attempted to do my best to be loyal to the needs of the committee and to my own reluctance to speculate on matters in which I did not have personal or professional experience. I am well aware, sir, of the gravity of the position for which I have been nominated and your need and the committee's need for crisp military advice and answers to your questions.

Sir, I ask you to judge my performance since 2003. I have grown since that time and I ask you to accept my assurance that, if confirmed, I will provide answers and best military advice worthy of a Chief of Service.

Senator Bill NELSON. Do you feel that you were not adequately forthcoming with this committee in that testimony over that 8-month period?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Nelson, I did not answer your questions directly and by definition that is not sufficiently forthcoming.

Senator BILL NELSON. By "your questions," you're referring to several members of the committee's questions?

General SCHWARTZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, under your guidance we will pursue this in executive session. Do I still have some time remaining?
Chairman Levin. I think you do. There has been a request for an executive session on a number of issues and so there will be an executive session following this.

Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, you and I had visited when you were kind enough to come by about the deplorable situation in the housing for airmen at Patrick Air Force Base and other bases, basically where the Government has been fleeced, where the Government has given away 100 acres of oceanfront barrier island land worth $17 million, and now where the Government is about to give away its remaining interest in another 200 acres that was supposed to be housing for airmen and their families, 560 some units, and the only thing that has been built is about 160 units.

Of course, I’ve raised a fuss about this. Since we spoke about this issue, why don’t you reflect on what you think we can do to straighten it out.

Mr. Donley. Senator, I have had one meeting with the environmental office, the Installations and Environment Office, to discuss this matter. We have not been able to resolve completely your concerns and I continue to work this issue, as I pledged to do.

Senator Bill Nelson. What are the other options other than going through with this give-away that the Air Force has proposed and which we have as a part of our National Defense Authorization Bill, we have included a part in that there needs to be a cost-benefit analysis before the Air Force would move? What do you think are the other options that the Air Force could exercise?

Mr. Donley. I’m trying to uncover what the options are. I’m also trying to uncover what the fact base is here, because I believe we may have a disconnect with your office on what the facts are. So I’m trying to get that straight.

You have sent a letter on this subject and I’ve asked the staff to begin drafting an answer. I do not have all the answers I need to be responsive today, but will continue to work this issue.

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Nelson, I share your concerns and thank you for your continued advocacy for our airmen and their families.

As I understand it, 101 acres of property, was sold previously for $25 million by the Patrick Family Housing LLC to a third party developer to provide cash equity to assist in construction of the new housing units.

With respect to the remaining acreage, the Air Force still retains all rights on the undeveloped portion of the 172 acre project site, and development is currently restricted solely to military family housing. The Air Force is currently conducting a cost-benefit analysis, in accordance with section 2805 of the Senate report to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which requires that I submit this cost-benefit analysis before dissolving the Patrick Family Housing LLC. We are currently working to complete that cost benefit analysis and we will discuss the results with you and the committee before any final action is taken.

I am currently reviewing possible courses of action and I have asked my staff to meet with you and your staff during the week of July 28, 2008 to go over possible courses of action being considered. Like you, my goal remains to provide quality housing for airmen and their families at all of our military installations. Thank you again for you continued support of our Air Force.

Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly strongly suggest that we come up with some answers that will fix the problem for Moody Air Force Base and Little Rock, but would also get more housing for the airmen at Patrick. Otherwise they’re left holding the bag with 400 less units and a give-away of all of the remaining 200 acres
there on oceanfront barrier island, and no recovery of damages from the defaulting developer.

I have been handed the card, Mr. Chairman, that my time is up. I will pursue this later.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Wicker.

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Warner mentioned the age of the B–52 aircraft. Of course, it’s also a fact that the KC–135 is also an aging aircraft and needs to be replaced. I just want to comment briefly about the tanker rebid. Mr. Secretary, I understand and fully agree with your statement in your testimony about rebidding these eight items that need to be looked at. But I would also state that Congress should not intervene in the process of setting the requirements for the Air Force tanker program. We’re not experts on the military requirements. There are professional military men and women who are and they know how best to satisfy those needs.

I want to quote Under Secretary Young’s recent comments before the House Armed Services Committee, where he said: “Grounded in the warfighter’s requirements and the pursuit of best value for the taxpayer, the Defense Department is the only organization that can fairly and knowledgeably conduct this competition.”

I want to associate myself with those remarks, to say that I hope that the process will move quickly. Of course, if the Northrop Grumman bid eventually succeeds I’ll be delighted. I suspect that Senator Sessions will be delighted. But we want it called straight and called by the numbers, and we want the best aircraft for our troops, and we need to move forward quickly because it’s an old aircraft.

Having said that, I want to move to a matter in my own State of Mississippi. I have the honor of representing many military installations. But I want to call the attention of the committee and the witnesses to the 186th Air Refueling Wing of the Mississippi Air National Guard in Meridian, MS. The 186th’s mission has included training, maintenance, and operation of the KC–135R.

By way of background, Key Field, home of the 186th in Meridian, is literally the birthplace of air-to-air refueling. It is the site of Al and Fred Key’s 27-day refueling flight in 1935, which still stands as a record. I will say to the witnesses that I recall as an advanced Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps cadet at the University of Mississippi having the opportunity to hear Al Key come and speak at our dining-in on the Ole Miss campus.

Now, the problem is this. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decision removes the KC–135s from the 186th and from Meridian. We’re slated to receive a warfighting headquarters in the near future and possibly a joint cargo aircraft mission. But I’m concerned about a potential gap of 3 to 5 years that would exist between the tankers leaving Meridian and the arrival of a follow-on flying mission. This would be devastating to the facility and to the community of Meridian, and I don’t think it would be in the national interest.

I understand there are discussions concerning a bridge mission. I hope we can find an answer which will maintain the 186th’s high level of proficiency.
Also in that regard, I would like to take this opportunity to invite all three of you to visit this impressive installation with me. It has a great history, as I’ve said. Its physical assets are impressive and are a tribute to the leadership over some 30 years of my late colleague, Representative and Chairman Sonny Montgomery. The 186th houses a plus-85,000 square foot maintenance hangar. I believe it to be the only double-bay hangar in the Air National Guard. It has ramp capacity to accommodate 18 KC–135s. I think it’s worth a visit, gentlemen. We could combine that with a facility that I know General McNabb is familiar with, the 172nd flying C–17s in Jackson, MS. So I hope each of you will work with my staff and with me in seeing if we can schedule a visit and a solution to this potentially devastating gap.

Having said that, let me move on. Mr. Chairman, you can now begin my 7 minutes of questions.

Chairman LEVIN. You’re already at 8 minutes. [Laughter.]

Senator WICKER. Then I’ve said my peace.

Let me follow on with Senator Thune on the synthetic fuels, Mr. Secretary. By 2016, how much of a component of that is coal to liquid, and would you comment about your understanding so far of the cost effectiveness of that component of the new synthetic fuels?

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, first of all, thank you for the invitation and the piece of history on the 135s and aerial refueling.

Senator WICKER. It’s a remarkable achievement for 1935.

Mr. DONLEY. It sounds to be so.

I’m not familiar with the liquid coal piece of the synthetic fuel options, I just have not gotten into that level of detail, but I’d be happy to do so.

Senator WICKER. Okay. Are either one of you other witnesses able to comment on that?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, likewise I do not have that readily available. I’d be happy to report that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

I have not had a chance yet to thoroughly review the Air Force Energy program, but I do support the ongoing initiative to certify all of the Air Force aircraft to operate on a 50/50 blend of Fischer-Tropsch and JP8 fuel by 2011.

As I understand it, there are many possible feed-stocks for the Fischer-Tropsch process. For the original tests on the B–52, the feed-stock was natural gas, but I understand that many companies are currently considering or pursuing the use of coal as their feed-stock.

With respect to cost, I understand that domestically produced Fischer-Tropsch fuels are currently more expensive than petroleum fuels. I would defer to the Department of Energy on projected costs for Fischer-Tropsch fuel in the future, but I understand that companies would need to pursue market-scale domestic production in order to make this fuel cost competitive.

Senator WICKER. All right. Then I thank the chair for his indulgence.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.

Senator Pryor, you are next and I understand you, graciously as always, yielded a bit of your time to Senator Conrad. We welcome Senator Conrad, chairman of our Budget Committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENT CONRAD, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Senator CONRAD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I just very briefly wanted to come by and put in a word for General
McNabb. We have two very large Air Force bases in North Dakota at Grand Forks and Minot. General McNabb was head of AMC and in that role we had a relationship with him, and I just want to report how impressed our entire delegation was with General McNabb and how he conducted himself in that position.

I also want to say that Secretary-designate Donley enjoys a very fine reputation, as does General Schwartz. I graduated from high school from American Air Force Base in Tripoli, Libya, Wheelus Air Force Base, North Africa. I've had a long association with the Air Force, and we are very lucky to have people of this quality and character who are willing to serve. I just wanted to have a chance to make that statement.

I thank the chairman. I thank very much the members of the committee, and special thanks to Senator Pryor for his allowing me this time.

Chairman Levin. We thank you very much for your comments, Senator Conrad.

Senator Warner. I'd like to join the chairman in thanking you for coming up to speak. I judge that your father was then in the Air Force?

Senator Conrad. Actually, I lived with a family. The family I lived with, the man was the vice president of Mobil Oil in Libya when that was the hot spot in the world, and I was allowed to, as were all American dependents at that time, allowed to go to the Air Force base high school.

Senator Warner. That's very interesting. Thanks for joining us.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.

Senator Pryor.

Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me pick up, if I may, where Senator Nelson of Florida left off, and that is on the military housing on the bases. It was recently announced that the Air Force has reached an agreement in principle for the sale of a renegotiated housing privatization contract for Little Rock Air Force Base, for Moody, Hanscomb, and Patrick Air Force Bases. As this issue has progressed, I just want you to know I've spoken with Secretary Michael Wynne, met with Assistant Secretary William Anderson, sat down with bondholder representatives and the current project owners involved in this initiative, and I look forward to working with you to get this over the finish line, and I just stand ready to help in any way that I can.

You don't have to comment on that, but it's something that's very important to the men and women in uniform on those bases that we get that right.

Let me talk about something very briefly that the Senate Armed Services Committee heard on June 3 of this year, and that is relating to DOD acquisitions of major weapons systems. GAO reported to us at that time that there's a current portfolio of 95 major defense acquisition programs that has experienced a cost growth of $295 billion. That's 95 programs that are $295 billion over budget. Many of these are overdue as well in terms of they're behind schedule.
I would like to hear your thoughts on what you can do to try to fix this acquisition problem where we see these cost overruns and where timetables seem to chronically slip. I will note that of the 95 programs, not all of them are in the Air Force. Those are systemwide. I know only a portion are Air Force. But I would like to hear from you what you can do to try to rein in the spending and get us back on track.

Mr. DONLEY. Certainly, Senator, I would bring no silver bullets to this longstanding issue. I have some experience in this area. To me, the core of the issues is back to basics: making sure that we understand and can justify the requirements that we are setting for these systems; that we are proceeding with technologies that are mature and well understood; that we are using reliable cost estimates that reflect the true scope of costs as best as we can understand them; that we have the acquisition work force in place that is bringing the experience, properly trained in the right areas, to not only prepare but evaluate proposals, and to push these programs along, keep them on schedule.

So it’s basics. I think it’s basic blocking and tackling. I think the Department’s record is when those things occur we get capability, we’re more likely to get capability on cost and on schedule.

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, there are some good examples of that occurring. The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a case in point. The Global Positioning System 3 is a case in point. It is back to basics. I would only add to what the Secretary said that I also believe there is some merit perhaps in assuring that there is sufficient uniform representation in the acquisition process as well, and that is something that, if confirmed, he and I certainly will work together.

Senator PRYOR. I’m glad to hear you say that, General Schwartz, because that’s one thing I picked up on, is that apparently in some branches of the Service they’re having trouble recruiting and retaining the right mix of people there because of the way the overall system works. So I would love for you to spend some time and maybe address that if it makes sense inside the Air Force.

We really have to get control of spending. Again, it’s not just the Air Force. It’s the other branches of Service as well.

Let me change gears if I can and ask about close air support in Afghanistan. I guess this might be for you, General Schwartz. Do you believe we have adequate close air support assets in Afghanistan to complete the mission we have there?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I believe we have adequate close air support in theater. By the way, this is not just Air Force assets. This is the joint team, naval aviation, and so on. It’s not just fighter aircraft. As we spoke earlier, it also includes the bomber platforms that support the mission.

Importantly, there’s a ground component to this. These are the folks that guide the weapons onto targets, and they’re an unsung part of our Air Force.

So in short, Senator, I believe we have the resources that are required at this time, and if more are requested more will be provided.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor.

This is the current schedule, after consulting with Senator Warner. First of all, we're going to try to work right through the vote, see if we can do that so Senators who haven't had a chance to ask questions can hopefully arrange it so they can ask questions, vote, or go vote and come back and ask questions.

Second, if we can finish this open session by noon; if we do, we'll go directly into executive session and hope to finish by 12:45 or so. If we don't finish by noon, we'll begin our executive session immediately after the caucuses, and we'll do that at 2:15. Or if we begin the executive session before caucus, but can't complete it, then we would come back and complete the executive session after the caucuses.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your leadership in moving us through these issues.

Certainly the Air Force is facing many challenges. I think we've had some difficult times in recent months. I know each one of you are going to be faced with some difficult choices. So we would expect that within the constraints of budgeting you give us the kind of priorities that are critical for the Air Force, and we'll do our best in Congress to fund that, what you need, in the right way. There's just not an unlimited source of money, as you well know.

I would also note that Secretary Gates has proven to be an exceptionally fine leader. I believe he has unusual support throughout Congress on both sides of the aisle. We've had some criticism in the past that when errors have occurred higher level people have not been held to account, and Secretary Gates has made some decisions that I'm sure people could disagree with. But he made some decisions and as a result you're here today.

I guess I would say to my colleagues that I do believe that the decisive action that Secretary Gates has undertaken puts us in a position of fulfilling our responsibilities decisively, which means we need to finish these hearings and get you people into place. I just don't think it's good in these months, with the war going on and all the challenges the Air Force faces, that we go weeks and weeks without getting you fine nominees into place. We'll examine any questions and Chairman Levin will ensure that occurs, and then if you meet the standards I think you should be confirmed, and I hope that we will confirm you.

General Schwartz, you have mentioned, I believe, the tanker being the number one priority for the Air Force. We're already maybe 5 or 6 years behind schedule. Do you believe it's important that competition go forward promptly and not be unnecessarily delayed?

General Schwartz. Absolutely, Senator. Few disagree with the essentiality of the modernization program and it is my view that we have to keep the timeliness of this foremost in our minds as we go forward.

Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley, do you share that view?

Mr. Donley. I do, sir.

Senator Sessions. Congress mandated this be bid by statute after the Air Force had quite a difficult time and the top civilian procurement officer actually later went to jail. But we wanted a
competition. We asked for a competition. I’ll just ask you plainly: If you have a competition, should not the best aircraft be the one selected, General Schwartz and Secretary Donley?

General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir, we want the best tanker for the warfighter and the best value for the taxpayer.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s what we told you to do and that’s what we’ll have to expect. I hope and trust that you will make that on a meritorious basis and not any pressure or anything else that would come up, although in truth this decision now will be above the Air Force’s level. It will be at the Secretary of Defense level, is that right, Mr. Donley?

Mr. DONLEY. You’re correct, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. But I guess your information, technical information, will be shared with the Defense Department?

Mr. DONLEY. Yes. Secretary Young will have all the support he needs and wants from the Air Force in the course of his work.

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the fuel question, I was very proud of the Air Force. They had taken steps to utilize synthetic fuels from energy sources, particularly coal, and seemed to be on track to utilizing a substantial portion of jet fuel from synthetic fuels, proving that it works already in most aircraft. I think you’ve already tested and proven that.

I guess my concern is that Congress intervened, has it not, and that language was slipped in the energy bill that barred the Air Force from long-term contracts, which is the kind of long-term contract that would be necessary for this fuel to be manufactured at a commercially feasible rate. I was told by the Air Force procurement officer that they expected the costs to come in below the current world price of jet fuel.

Would either one of you comment on that first? Are you now being stopped in that program essentially by being denied the right to a long-term contract, and do you expect the price to be competitive?

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I need to take that for the record. I’m not familiar with the provision that you have cited that may be out there.

[The information referred to follows:]

Currently, Department of Defense (DOD) contracting authority is limited to 5 years for the procurement of fuel, with options for up to an additional 5 years, not to exceed 10 years in total.

I am told that industry has indicated that DOD long-term contract authority with a 10–20 year range could reduce uncertainty for initial entrants to the synthetic fuels production market by mitigating risks associated with return on capital.

With respect to new language regarding fuel procurement, Section 526 of the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act restricts the Federal Government from purchasing commercial quantities of alternative and synthetic fuels that have greenhouse gas emissions that are greater than currently available fuels, on a lifecycle basis. This does not affect the Air Force aircraft synthetic fuel-blend certification program, as section 526 exempts research/test quantities of fuel from application of the statute. I understand, however, that DOD is concerned that this statute may be overly restrictive, particularly with respect to purchasing fuel overseas for deployed forces and from the perspective of quantifying/certifying a fuel’s lifecycle greenhouse emissions.

With respect to cost, I understand that domestically produced Fischer-Tropsch fuels are currently more expensive than petroleum fuels. I would defer to the Department of Energy on projected costs for Fischer-Tropsch fuel in the future, but I
understand that companies would need to pursue market-scale domestic production in order to make this fuel cost competitive.

Senator SESSIONS. I just feel like it’s another example of denying ourselves domestic energy, putting us on the world stage of having to buy from the world market at high prices, which may continue to go up, who knows. I really think the Air Force deserves a lot of credit for being innovative and creative in looking to do that.

General Schwartz, you have previously noted that you hope that this tanker aircraft would be the kind of aircraft that would be a game-changer and that you believe its capabilities with regard to personnel, transport, and cargo are important factors in that evaluation; is that correct?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, its primary mission will be air refueling, but we can no longer afford to have platforms that are sort of single mission, point mission focused. So the versatility of being able to carry passengers and cargo is also important.

Senator SESSIONS. In fact, the fuel is in the wings, with the main cargo compartment available for cargo and personnel in these aircraft; is that generally correct?

General SCHWARTZ. That’s generally correct, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Air Force Air War College, I’m extremely impressed with that institution and believe that for the Air Force to meet its future, which is uncertain, it requires constant study and evaluation. I guess I would agree. How do you see the role of the Air War College at Maxwell in Montgomery, AL, in the future of helping to establish the kind of doctrine and to identify the capabilities we need for the future?

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, Air University is a great asset to the Air Force and it provides not only the good training to officers as they’re coming up through the ranks, but it also provides a research arm for us to address future innovative ways of doing business, new mission areas, in a research environment. I view it as a great resource for Air Force leadership, as well as a teaching institution.

Senator SESSIONS. I agree.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Clinton, would you when you’re completed, if there’s nobody back, recess us until somebody is back, because there is a vote on.

Senator CLINTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. There’s only 6 or 7 minutes left.

Senator CLINTON. Would you mind telling them I’m on my way as soon as I finish my questions?

Chairman LEVIN. I will do that.

Senator CLINTON. I appreciate that.

Thank you, gentlemen. I’m looking forward to your leadership. I think that in fact the Air Force and the country are looking forward to your leadership.

I’d like to take just a minute to run through quickly the New York installations. The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station, home to the Reserve 914th Airlift Wing and the Air National Guard 107th Aerial Refueling, survived the last base closing round, but a recommendation was made to convert the 107th to an airlift wing that
would be associated with the Reserve wing at the base. Thus far, four C–130s have been identified for the 107th, but I'm eager to work with you to identify additional aircraft for the 107th or additional ways to keep the 107th viable going into the future.

Second, Hancock Field Air National Guard Base in Syracuse is transitioning from the 174th Airlift Wing to a Predator mission. Again, I'm eager to work to ensure that the transition is smooth and that the base does not experience any gaps in service during the transition.

Stratton Air National Guard Base in Schenectady is home to the 109th Airlift Wing, which has the Polar Ski Bird mission. I think these pilots do remarkable work on their skis on the ice and the snow, and I think there are additional capabilities for search and rescue that should be explored.

The Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh is home to the 105th Airlift Wing, which currently has aging C–5As. Now, Stewart itself is a modern, well-equipped installation, and again I'd like to work with you to make sure that the mission assigned to Stewart can be performed to the highest level of capacity.

Dublinski Air National Guard Base in Westhampton, Long Island, is home to the 106th Rescue Wing. We successfully obtained funding for the first phase of a new pararescue training facility in last year's military construction appropriations bill. We're in the process of obtaining the second phase. But this is so critical along the east coast, not only for search and rescue at sea, but also for homeland security and weather incidents in terms of providing that capacity.

Now, we also are home to the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, NY, and the Northeast Air Defense Sector Air National Guard unit, also in Rome. The work that is being done at the lab in Rome is absolutely amazing in respect to the cyber security and support of our men and women in uniform, and I look forward to working to develop a very close relationship between the research lab and the newly created Cyber Command.

I would invite each of you to visit with me New York's Air Force installations as your schedule permits and to make sure that we meet these tremendous opportunities and resolve any of the challenges that we face.

Second, when the Air Force announced its tanker refueling contract award to Airbus A–330 last February, I was struck when the spokesperson indicated that the Air Force could not and did not take into consideration the impact of the award on the U.S. industrial base. Yet title 10 of the U.S. Code requires the Secretary of Defense to do just that for "each major defense acquisition program."

If you look at title 10, which is in our laws for a purpose, I have to ask you to please respond both now and perhaps in writing how you will comply with title 10 in regards to the tanker refueling contract process that the Secretary has put into motion. Could I start with you, Mr. Donley?

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your listing the Guard installations in New York. I've had a conversation with the Director of the Air Guard, who's briefed me on the Air Force's overall plans in response to BRAC to pursue total force initiatives and
associate units in some of these cases. So while I’m not familiar with all the details, I have gotten a first cut at that, and in fact I have been invited to Niagara already.

Senator CLINTON. Good.

Mr. DONLEY. So thank you for that.

With respect to KC–X, I would defer to the acquisition experts on the issues of foreign content. But I would just note as a general observation that we live in a global economy, in which most of these national companies that we regard as U.S. companies have international connections. So attempting to go with U.S. sources only in particular situations where it seems to advantage one company over another is really sort of a temporary perspective on I think where all of these companies are headed. Aerospace is an international business.

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Donley, it won’t surprise you to hear that I disagree. But more important than my disagreement are the very specific requirements within title 10, subtitle A, part 4, chapter 144, section 2440, which reads: “The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations requiring consideration of the national technology and industrial base in the development and implementation of acquisition plans for each major defense acquisition program.”

So I would appreciate receiving in writing from each of you the specific answer to my question in relation to title 10. I’m very well aware that we live in an international economy, but I’m also extremely conscious of the impact of decisions made by our Government with taxpayer dollars that undermine our competitiveness for the long run and eliminate jobs and thereby undermine technical skill acquisition in a way that I think will come back to haunt us. This is something that I take very seriously.

In addition, I will submit some other questions for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. DONLEY. Senator Clinton, if confirmed, I can assure you that the Air Force will make every effort to comply with all statutes, regulations, and policy guidance for every acquisition program. With regard to your specific question concerning consideration of the industrial base in the KC–X contract process, I defer to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as Secretary Gates has appointed him to serve as the Source Selection Authority for the KC–X, and he will be conducting the remaining competition activity.

General SCHWARTZ. I echo Secretary Donley’s comments. On behalf of the Secretary, I will ensure that our KC–X acquisition team complies with this, and all other, title 10 requirements as we move ahead with the KC–X acquisition effort. It’s my understanding that under the relevant Department of Defense regulations, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the person charged with ensuring compliance with §2440 and determining whether the KC–X program has properly considered national industrial base capabilities in the acquisition planning process. We will work with the Under Secretary’s office to ensure this takes place as the KC–X acquisition effort unfolds.

General McNABB. Senator Clinton, regarding your concerns for the industrial base in the KC–X contract process, I respectfully defer to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Secretary Gates has appointed him to serve as the Source Selection Authority for the KC–X, and he will be conducting the remaining competition activity.

Senator CLINTON. I ask that we now stand in recess until someone else returns to continue the questioning, and I thank each of you for your willingness to serve. [Recess.]

Senator WARNER [presiding]. We’ll continue our questions here. Chairman Levin is anxious to have us work right through the vote,
and I believe he announced the fact that we're going to have the executive session. Senator Levin and I have discussed it. We're going to try and hold an executive session following this open session, and that way hopefully wrap up this hearing today. But I'll leave to the chairman the specifics on that.

General Schwartz—staff will advise me if a member comes and I will stop—one of the most difficult aspects of military life is the permanent change of stations, and TRANSCOM is in charge of contracting with movers who pack and deliver household goods. We're here talking about weapons systems and so forth, but we have to focus on family issues. I think you've had a well-deserved contribution to making this happen when you were TRANSCOM Commander. You devoted a great deal of your personal time and energy to ensuring that promises for improved moves made by the predecessors in TRANSCOM and the “Family First” program were delivered. In doing so, you kept the promise you made when you were confirmed, and we're grateful for the progress you led in that regard.

Now, General McNabb is subject to confirmation as the future commander. Will you devote similar emphasis on the quality of life in the moving?

So first a comment from General Schwartz, to be followed by General McNabb's observations.

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Warner, you are absolutely correct that one of those activities that happens in any military family every so often is relocating. Ways that we can make that relocation less stressful, less costly to our personnel, and to raise the level of performance of those who provide this service to DOD is an obligation. With the Senate's and the House's assistance, we found a way to go about doing that, and we'll be rolling it out this fall, something I think we can be proud of.

Senator WARNER. Briefly, General McNabb?

General McNABB. Senator Warner, absolutely, sir. It's one of those real plusses as I watched General Schwartz and TRANSCOM do this, really take it on with the Family First, full replacement value, those kinds of initiatives. There's no question that we recruit the individual, but we retain the family, and this is very important to all of our DOD families to make sure that they can continue to serve.

Senator WARNER. Momentarily I'll recognize Senator Chambliss, but I want to say that I will provide for the record a series of questions to follow up on this issue of the executive package. There was the famous compartment to transport senior officers and civilians. We need to have that record tightened up and have clarity of some of the issues, because they're important issues, and we're going to do it by way of putting in questions for the record for you to respond.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Gentlemen, first of all, to each of you, thank you for your service. Secretary Donley, the first time you and I had an opportunity to meet was when you came by my office, but obviously, General Schwartz, General McNabb, I've known both of you for many years and I appreciate the service of each and every one of you.
Secretary Donley, we’ve had some questions asked to General Schwartz about the F–22, but I want to see where you are on this issue. Have you had a chance to look and see with respect to the number of tactical aircraft that we have, where the F–22 comes down, and formulate an opinion as to what you think with respect to the total number that we ought to have in inventory?

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I have not had an opportunity to formulate a particular number. I am aware that this is an active issue and I do support Secretary Gates’ decision to kick this over, essentially, to the new administration for their consideration as well.

In the mean time, I’m focused on the potential need to provide bridge funding between the 2009 and the 2010 years that are at play here, that will look to providing some bridge capability for suppliers to leave this option open. In general, if we delay a decision on the future of the F–22 too far into next year or even late next year and we have not provided for this bridge funding, it’ll be sort of almost a cold start for many of the sub-tier suppliers, and that would be a more expensive option for restarting the line if somebody wanted to do that.

I’m focused for the next few months on getting the bridge funding in place.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I appreciate your comment relative to the potential increase in cost that might occur if we don’t have this bridge funding and, frankly, if it doesn’t get spent. I look back on some testimony by General Donald Hoffman before Senator Lieberman’s Airland Subcommittee on April 9 of this year. At the conclusion of that hearing Senator Lieberman said to General Hoffman: “So what you’re saying is that there is time and money to be saved by doing the advanced procurement in November of this year”—which is the bridge funding you’re talking about—“and that’s your understanding of Secretary Gates’ position about giving the next administration an option, basically meaning that they can stop the process if they choose.”

General Hoffman said: “Yes, sir. Depending on what the next administration would form as a team to build and get that decision through Congress as well.”

So my question to both you and General Schwartz is: Do you agree with the concept that if we don’t have this bridge funding and if we don’t spend the money—and it’s about $550 million that will have to go to the subcontractors out there—that will immediately increase the cost per copy of the F–22 and will in effect mean that we’re operating with a cold line versus an operating line if we don’t spend that money during this period of time going into the next administration?

Mr. DONLEY. Yes.

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I don’t want to get into much detail relative to the issue at Patrick, at Little Rock, and at Moody Air Force Base, except, Secretary Donley, to say that this has been a very difficult process. It’s obviously been a very sensitive process. In my case at Moody, for example, we’re going to have a significant increase in men and women coming to Moody beginning next year. The housing, the privatization housing initiative, was supposed to have a certain number of houses available for those men and
women coming. Now that's not going to be available. There's no way under the best scenario it can be.

I think that the way that the issue has been handled by the Air Force was very poor initially. I think some very bad decisions were made by the Air Force. But to the credit of the Air Force, since this issue has been elevated to the top level I think the issue has been addressed very appropriately. I think there has been an agreement reached that what's in the best interests of all the men and women that wear the uniform of the United States Air Force ought to be taken into account and housing provided, better housing across the board at all four of these installations that are in question.

I applaud the Air Force for moving, for entering into an agreement that we hope will be completed by September of this year. You're going to have this on your plate initially and we may have some disagreement within this committee from a parochial standpoint, but I think that the sales agreement that is proposed is fair and reasonable across the Air Force and will work.

General Schwartz, let me just get into a little bit with you an issue which you and I have talked about in my office, because I don't want there to be any misunderstanding or anything left on the table, either from your perspective or our perspective. It regards some conversations that you as the J–2 had back in the 2003–2004 timeframe relative to certain ammunition sites that were located in Iraq and action taken by you relative to the securing of those sites.

First of all, as the J–2 what was your responsibility with respect to activities going on inside of Iraq during that timeframe of 2003–2004?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, I actually was serving as the J–3 at the time.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I'm sorry. J–3.

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. But I had no operational responsibility inside Iraq at that time. As the J–3, I acted on behalf of the Chairman, who was General Dick Myers at the time, and worked in my channel with the J–3 at Central Command and the counterpart at the time at the Combined Joint Task Force 7. But I had no directive authority, if you will, for activity that occurred on the ground in Iraq.

Senator CHAMBLISS. You became aware of the ammunition sites that were unsecured in Iraq during the course of that period of time, early 2003, I believe; is that a fair statement?

General SCHWARTZ. It was post-major combat operations, so it was in the summer of 2003 onward.

Senator CHAMBLISS. The issue was obviously very sensitive. It was discussed within this committee both in classified settings as well as otherwise with you and with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What action did you take to ensure that the information relative to the fact that there were a number of sites that were unsecured were in fact going to be secured so that there could not be pilferage of the ammunition sites and the consequences of that being insurgents would have the munitions with which to make improvised explosive devices, which in fact they did?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, we received information from a Member of the House of Representatives on the existence of caches
that had pilferable munitions. We devoted analytical resources to
that information to try to confirm the locations and what have you,
and in fact much of that information did prove valid.

I provided that information to my counterparts at Central Com-
mand and Combined Joint Task Force 7 and expressed our view
that those sites which were pilferable, in other words small arms
and such, that were more easily carted away, rather than other lo-
cations that had larger weapons that were more difficult to move,
should be addressed first.

We passed that information. We passed the intelligence work
that we had done and certainly encouraged the commanders that
had tactical control of the battle space to accord that, those loca-
tions, appropriate priority for what, how, and how much to protect.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Did you follow up to see that the informa-
tion that you passed on to Central Command was in fact acted
upon?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I confirmed that the information was re-
ceived and understood and that the commander was aware and
again had made a judgment based on the resources at his disposal
what he was going to do.

Senator CHAMBLISS. As the J–3, did you have any chain of com-
mand control over any officers on the ground in Iraq during that
period of time?

General SCHWARTZ. No, sir, I did not, Senator.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I think the remainder of my
questions will be for executive session.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you. There will be questions
asked for the record, additional public session questions. Senator
Warner has an additional question or two. We’re going to I think
be able to conclude in the next 5 minutes. We do have another Sen-
ator on her way, which means we may not be able to get to execu-
tive session. Let me withhold that comment about executive session
and see if Senator McCaskill is able to get here.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this
is a subject that the two of us have worked on for many years. In
fiscal year 2001—I think I was the chairman; we’ve gone back and
forth—we put into law a framework that established goals that
within 10 years one-third of the U.S. military operational deep
strike aircraft would be unmanned. I’m sure that each of you are
familiar with that. I look back on that with a sense of pride at
what the committee did at that point in time, because it really en-
ergized a lot of the systems that are being utilized today in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, the unmanned surveillance vehicles and the
like.

I’d like to have your comment, Mr. Secretary. Do you support
that goal that Congress established and will you take affirmative
actions to implement your Department to achieve them? This is a
subject I think Secretary Gates—again I commend him for specifi-
cally expressing his concerns about the Department of the Air
Force and their emphasis on the unmanned vehicle program.

First you, Mr. Secretary. Then we’ll have General Schwartz.

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Senator. This is a very important issue
and I think a very laudable goal that the committee has laid out
General Schwartz. Sir, it is clear that that’s the path we are on, and in fact we have migrated from the Predator now to the Reaper, a more capable, multi-mission platform for either the strike or the surveillance mission. In fact, the first Reaper mission was executed yesterday in the Central Command AOR, and that clearly will continue.

[The information referred to follows:]

“In fact, the first Reaper mission was executed yesterday in Central Command area of responsibility, and that clearly will continue.”

While that statement is correct, it would be more factually accurate to say the Reaper mission was executed in Iraq. I wanted to clarify that point for the record.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. On the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) question, are there adequate UAVs in both Iraq and Afghanistan to meet the requirements in each country, do you know, Secretary Donley?

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I would defer to my military colleagues on the specific requirements. I will say my understanding is the requirements have been increasing because as the capability gets there the commanders ask for more. We’ve been working hard with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to put together an ISR task force, challenging the Air Force and the other military departments to deliver more capability more quickly to the theater.

Chairman LEVIN. General?

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, we currently have 26 orbits of unmanned capability in theater, growing to 31 by the end of this year. The truth of the matter is that there is more demand than we are able to provide supply. But my sense is, based on what I know, we’re acting aggressively in that regard, and if confirmed I will continue to do so.

Chairman LEVIN. We need you both to look to make sure that we are going 24–7 on this production of these capabilities. They’re absolutely essential and we’re still short. Senator Warner’s leadership back in the early 1990s should have led to a much greater capability by this time. But without that leadership, we wouldn’t even
be as advanced as where we are. That was an important initiative of his and this committee’s, and it is something that we’re proud of because there was a lot of foresight involved in it. But again, we’re going to keep the pressure on you folks to come across with the capability that we need to meet the requirements.

Senator McCaskill is now here and I’ve already announced that we would go into executive session if we could get there by noon. We obviously won’t be there by noon now and I’m wondering whether Senator McCaskill—will you be using your full 7 minutes, so I can make a judgment?

Senator McCaskill. I probably can do it in less than 7 minutes.

Chairman Levin. All right. I don’t think there are any additional questions. Do either of you have additional questions?

Senator Warner. We’ll submit them for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. All right. The record will be kept open for questions. When Senator McCaskill finishes we will go to executive session, even though it’ll be about 12:15. Would all the staff notify members who want to participate? We’ll try to finish that in a half an hour. If we can’t do it, we’ll have to continue after the caucuses.

Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the committee showing the courtesy of allowing me to run over here as quickly as possible.

I do not want to let this hearing conclude without sounding a note of contract accountability and contract overruns. As you are very aware, General Schwartz and Mr. Donley, your predecessors, there were some significant questions about a contract that was let for the public relations contract for the Thunderbirds.

General McNabb, for you, I was embarrassed about changing the color of the leather in the comfort pods. Blue leather doesn’t show less dirt than brown leather. I’m a mom; brown leather is your best friend. I would like to start with you speaking to a culture that would take funds from the global war on terror and think it was appropriate to spend money changing the color of the leather on the comfort pods for the highest levels of the Air Force from brown to blue.

General McNabb. Senator, I am not aware of that decision to change brown to blue, other than what I’ve read in the Post. The part that I would say is that the whole idea of the comfort pod was to save money versus dedicated airplanes. It was directly to try to get to something that we could put on our 900 sorties a day that we have in airlift airplanes and be able to take advantage of that, to include in the theater, but also to the theater, for our senior leaders. It’s military and civilians, it’s all Services.

As the discussion has gone through and we’ve developed the prototype, there have been decisions made. I left Scott last August and so I would just say that as this prototype has developed there have been additional decisions that have been made.

Senator McCaskill. This decision was made while you were there. This was a decision that was while you were there. This wasn’t as if we’re picking it ahead of time. They’d already been done in brown and someone decided it was appropriate to rip off the brown leather and go to the expense of changing it to blue.
This is just one little thing, but it speaks to a culture, and that's what strikes fear in my governmental accountability heart, that there was a culture that said: Rip off the brown leather, take off the brown seat belts; there's not a pocket in the side for our reading material. We would spend money on that kind of item. That's what I'm trying to get to.

Maybe, General Schwartz and Mr. Donley, you can speak to this and to that culture. That is offensive to the American taxpayer. It seems capricious. It seems arbitrary. It seems like folks up there have lost touch with the fact that this isn't monopoly money. I know it's a little bit of money compared to a tanker. It's a little bit of money compared to the budget. But it is in fact a culture that shows that there is not the level of accountability that I think the American taxpayer and our men and women in uniform deserve.

General Schwartz, Mr. Donley?

General SCHWARTZ. A strong ethical culture in the United States Air Force is a personal priority, ma'am. If confirmed I will deal decisively with identified deviations, ethical lapses, if you will, while strengthening education and training related to ethical conduct. If confirmed, ma'am, I will make it clear to all commanders, senior noncommissioned officers, and civilians that they have an obligation to live an ethical lifestyle each and every day in our Air Force.

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I am firmly of the belief that accountability at all levels is essential for the daily operation of the Air Force in all the missions that we do. So none of this makes sense to me as a taxpayer. I will say that, to just echo General McNabb's point and to elaborate just briefly on the cost effectiveness of this approach overall, the Air Force does operate a fleet of 30 aircraft to support the executive operations of this government 24–7—the President and the Vice President, the members of the Cabinet, the DOD leadership, and Members of Congress. This is a mission that we have, that we will continue to perform.

These pallets are a very cost effective way of going about that mission for a fleet that is tightly controlled and in high demand.

But this color issue, none of this makes sense to me.

Senator McCASKILL. Right. I have no problem with the pallets if it's going to make it more cost effective and I'm assuming there was a cost-benefit analysis that was done that bore that out. I certainly get it that you guys have to fly around all the muckety-mucks, including us, and that's understandable.

But I will tell you, if there's anybody that's going to complain about the color of the leather on the seat and if we're going to change and spend taxpayer money to change the color of the seat, they don't deserve to be in that airplane.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

What we'll do now is we're going to adjourn and we will go to executive session, go to our regular committee room, Russell 222, and take 5 minutes to do it. So we'll start right at 20 minutes after 12:00.

We thank you, we thank your families, and we will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Michael B. Donley by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. I strongly supported these reforms from my early days on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff through my service at the National Security Council where I fought for their enactment in what eventually became the Goldwater-Nichols Act. If confirmed, I will be mindful of the need to periodically review organizational and management frameworks to ensure their continued validity and consistency with the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and Congress to continually review Goldwater-Nichols and implement any changes that may be needed.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I have no suggested modifications at this time.

Question. Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

Answer. I do believe that the roles of the service chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols are appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?

Answer. I do not see a need to modify the roles of the service chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols, particularly as that regards the resource allocation process.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 8013 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of the Air Force. Other sections of law and traditional practice also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Secretary of the Air Force to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all matters within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of the Air Force is subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed I look forward to working closely with the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and performs those duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by law. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) is DOD's most senior acquisition official. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this official on all matters related to acquisition, technology and logistics programs impacting the Department of the Air Force.

Question. Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, presides over the Air Staff, and is a principal advisor to the Secretary. In addition, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he is a military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. There is no more important relationship within the Air Force than that between the Secretary and the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the Chief of Staff to ensure that policies and
resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Air Force and respect his additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of the Air Force.

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject to the Secretary of the Air Force’s direction and control, to act for and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters for which the Secretary is responsible; that is to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. In addition, the Under Secretary of the Air Force has duties and responsibilities, when delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force, as the DOD Executive Agent for Space.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Answer.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all joint matters affecting the Air Force.

**Question.** The Combatant Commanders.

**Answer.** I will work with the Chief of Staff to ensure that the Air Force is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide the capabilities the combatant commanders need to execute their missions. This goal can be achieved through forthright dialogue which I will encourage.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.

**Answer.** The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition acts as the Senior Acquisition Executive for the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary on acquisition matters. I will also ensure that military views are well represented in the Air Force acquisition process and that the Chief of Staff is fully informed on acquisition matters.

**Question.** The General Counsel of the Air Force.

**Answer.** The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief ethics official of the Department of the Air Force and serves as the senior legal advisor to Air Force leaders. She is responsible, on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I would look forward to developing a good working relationship with the General Counsel.

**Question.** The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force.

**Answer.** The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per 10 U.S.C. § 8037, is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. He is also responsible for directing judge advocates in the performance of their duties. If confirmed I will endeavor to maintain the close working relationship the Secretary of the Air Force has historically enjoyed with TJAG.

**Question.** The Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy.

**Answer.** The United States Air Force Academy is an invaluable institution that continues to attract the brightest young women and men from across the United States. The Academy functions as a separate Field Operating Agency reporting through the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Superintendent to address issues faced by the Academy and to promote the Academy’s sustained commitment to excellence and fulfillment of its mission to train and educate future Air Force leaders.

**Question.** The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

**Answer.** Under current organizational relationships, the Under Secretary of the Air Force is no longer dual-hatted as the Director, NRO. However, a strong collaborative relationship between the Air Force and the NRO remains essential to facilitate continuing Air Force technical and personnel support for the NRO’s mission. If confirmed, I will work to foster a close working relationship with the Director, NRO.

**Question.** The Director of National Intelligence.

**Answer.** It is also vital that a strong collaborative working relationship exist between the Air Force and the Director of National Intelligence. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of National Intelligence to foster that relationship, particularly in coordination of national security space matters.

**DUTIES**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Air Force?

**Answer.** Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. section 8013 and subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for all matters necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force. These functions include organizing, supplying, equipping, training, maintaining, and administering the Air Force. The Secretary of the Air Force is also per-
forming the duties of the DOD Executive Agent for Space in the absence of an
Under Secretary to whom these duties had previously been delegated.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect
that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I would expect the Sec-
retary of Defense to assign me duties consistent with the responsibilities outlined
above.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your
ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. Title 10 provides for two staffs in the same headquarters, a predomi-
nantly military Air Staff and a predominantly civilian Secretariat. My intention is
that these two staffs will function effectively together as a single headquarters team
supporting the needs of both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, while protecting
the Chief of Staff’s independent advisory role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. I will foster close working relationships between the civilian and military
staffs and work with them on matters within their areas of responsibility in order
to more effectively lead and manage the Department of the Air Force.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies
you for this position?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring 30 years of experience in the national security
community. I have served on the professional staff of this committee, on the staff
of the National Security Council, and held various leadership positions within DOD
and the defense industry. Most recently, I served as Director of Administration and
Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with broad responsibilities in
the Pentagon and the National Capital Region. In 1993, I served as Acting Sec-
retary of the Air Force for 7 months, after serving 4 years as the Assistant Sec-
retary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller).

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Sec-
retary of the Air Force?
Answer. The joint nomination of both a new Secretary and new Chief of Staff
under the current circumstances is unprecedented. The immediate challenges are to
restore confidence in the Air Force among those to whom we are responsible, build
personal and institutional relationships with Congress and the national security
community, and undertake actions to address the issues—such as re-establishing
focus on the nuclear enterprise—that brought us to this point.

Other key challenges include: Maintaining focus on support to current operations
while also planning to meet potential future threats; maintaining aging fleets of air-
craft while conducting recapitalization; migrating supplemental funding to the Air
Force’s base budget; rising operational costs, especially in personnel support, med-
cal care, and fuel; meeting new mission requirements in intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance, space, and cyber domains; and preparing for transition to a new
administration.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing
these challenges?
Answer. Working with the Chief of Staff and the Air Force leadership team, and
OSD and the Joint Staff, I plan to address these issues within DOD’s existing plan-
ning, programming, and budgeting cycles.

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the perform-
ance of the functions of the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. The immediate challenge is to build trust and confidence in the Air Force
leadership team.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you estab-
lish to address these problems?
Answer. I am a strong believer in the Air Force core values of Integrity First,
Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. If confirmed, I will work with the
Air Force leadership team to define specific plans to meet these challenges that
build on these core values and enable the Air Force to support joint, interagency,
and coalition operations when and where needed.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. As Acting Secretary since June 21, following Admiral Donald’s report to
the Secretary of Defense, I have directed preparation of a strategic roadmap within
90 days for rebuilding the Air Force nuclear enterprise and also set in motion a review of related accountability matters. In addition, I have directed a review of acquisition lessons learned from the GAO's sustainment of Boeing's protest on the KC-X program.

Going forward, my broad priorities will be consistent with those set by the Secretary of Defense for DOD as a whole—Prevail in Global War on Terror; Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities; Focus on People; and Transform Enterprise Management.

READINESS LEVELS

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to execute its assigned missions?

Answer. I have not yet had time to make a fully informed assessment of current readiness.

Question. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next 5 years, and, if confirmed, how will you approach these issues?

Answer. My initial impression is that we have a high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), aging aircraft, personnel shortages, and several stressed career fields. I plan to review these matters during ongoing Air Force and DOD discussions on the fiscal year 2010 program and budget.

PERSONNEL AND HEALTH BENEFIT COSTS

Question. The cost of the Defense Health Program, like the cost of medical care nation-wide, is escalating rapidly. Similarly, the cost of personnel as a key component of the Services' budgets has risen significantly in recent years.

If confirmed, how would you approach the issue of rising health care and personnel costs?

Answer. One of our top priorities is to take care of our airmen and their families. As a retention force, quality of health care is of critical concern to our airmen and any degradation of benefits or service risks hurting our recruiting and retention.

If confirmed, I will continue efforts from the past 10 years to streamline our organic medical infrastructure and take advantage of advancements in the field of medicine. I also understand that the Air Force is continuing to work with DOD and the other military services to streamline medical infrastructure; leveraging civilian trauma centers and other Service/Veterans Administration medical facilities to reduce the number of facilities/personnel required to reduce costs. We will continue to optimize the use of our assets and those of our partners to ensure the greatest return on our investments.

With regard to personnel costs, increasing pay and benefits, along with other efforts to recruit and retain our high quality airmen, have resulted in increasing personnel costs. I believe that these benefits are appropriate, particularly in light of our high OPTEMPO. If confirmed I would expect to continue to budget for all authorized personnel pay and health care benefits in our President's budget submission. If necessary, these nondiscretionary accounts will be paid first before deciding on programmatic funding levels.

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED AIRMEN

Question. Wounded airmen from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Air Force for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

What policies and practices does the Air Force have in place to deal with severely wounded and injured airmen?

Answer. The Air Force runs two main programs that work together for our wounded airmen and their families: the Survivor Assistance Program and the Wounded Warrior Program. The Survivor Assistance Program tracks the wounded Airman from the time of injury and arranges for a sister unit to assign a Family Liaison Officer (FLO) at each en-route stop and treatment location. The FLO serves as the personal representative of the member's commander, a bond between the Air Force and the family members, and a link to the array of Air Force assistance and support services. FLOs play an important role in taking care of the needs of the wounded airmen: keeping their families informed, arranging to reunite family members with the wounded at the earliest opportunity, and providing whatever assistance the wounded or families need for lodging, transportation, or administrative chores.
Our first priority is to retain those seriously wounded airmen who want to remain a part of the Active-Duty Force. We may do this by offering a limited duty assignment to the airman, or through retraining opportunities into a career field for which the airman is otherwise qualified. Our combat wounded airmen have a wealth of experience to offer and I strongly support the retention of these heroes in our Air Force.

Wounded airmen may elect to accept a medical retirement, or due to the severity of their injuries, may not be able to remain on Active Duty. In these cases, our Wounded Warrior program will step in to offer a host of services, including employment assistance, financial counseling, and to serve as an advocate with numerous Federal, State, and private organizations. We owe our airmen who have made tremendous sacrifices for our country every ounce of support we can provide to ensure they have an opportunity to lead a fulfilling life despite their severe injuries.

**Question.** How does the Air Force provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs?

**Answer.** The Air Force Wounded Warrior program provides follow-up for a minimum of 5 years to those airmen who have separated as a result of their wounds. This support includes regular contact with the wounded member, a variety of services including resume writing, job placement assistance, serving as a liaison with the Veterans Administration, and a host of other services based on the needs of the airman and family. The personalized service provided seems very effective, and if confirmed, I will keep my fingers on the pulse of the program by giving it a fresh look on a regular basis and personally visiting Air Force Wounded Warriors.

**Question.** If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Air Force’s support for wounded personnel, and to support their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

**Answer.** The joint DOD–DVA Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) has laid the groundwork for added improvements to the wounded warrior program for all of the Services. If confirmed, I’d like to see these improvements implemented expeditiously and plan for the Air Force to be both a leader and a partner with our sister Services in making this happen. Support of the families of our wounded is a fundamental responsibility where we as a country cannot fail. For example, families who provide nonmedical attendant care for a loved one, in many cases, do so at the expense of their job and that lost income is crucial to the financial well-being of the family. This is the type of situation where we must do better and is one of the many areas being addressed by the SOC. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with our sister Services to continue improving programs and policies that serve our wounded airmen and their families.

**SURGE CAPABILITY FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES**

**Question.** The Army Mental Health Advisory Team’s reports, which look at the mental well-being and morale of Army soldiers deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan each year, have stated that soldiers on their third or fourth deployments were at high risk for mental health problems. In addition, reports have stated that deployment length was related to higher rates of mental health problems. In light of the fact that many Army units have endured multiple deployments, it is anticipated that there will be a sharp increase in the need for behavioral health services to help returning servicemembers and their families cope with reintegration into a non-combat environment.

If confirmed, will you assess the sufficiency of Air Force behavioral health assets to support the Army on a temporary basis during these surge periods when Army combat teams return from their deployments and provide such support to the extent that Air Force assets are sufficient to do so?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would want the Air Force to extend our support of the Army by assessing the mental health needs of deployed and returning personnel and assist in determining how best to utilize all available resources to support those needs, to the maximum extent that our assets would allow. Roughly 40 percent of deployed Air Force mental health personnel currently support joint missions.

**POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS**

**Question.** The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at congressional direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Air Force uses available data on the health of returning airmen to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential
illnesses (including post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury) are identified and documented in health records?

Answer. The health and well-being of our airmen are the cornerstone of our mission readiness. We aggressively assess, track and manage physical and mental readiness upon accession; during yearly health assessments; prior to deployments; immediately following deployments; and again 90–180 days post-deployment. Each assessment provides an opportunity for airmen to discuss any and all health concerns with their healthcare provider. Traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder and other combat related health concerns are assessed during these health assessments. If confirmed, I would expect to continue these practices.

MEDICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

Question. The military medical and dental corps of all three Services are facing unprecedented challenges in the recruitment and retention of medical and dental personnel needed to support DOD’s medical mission.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address recruitment and retention challenges in the Air Force Medical Services including the Air Force Reserve?

Answer. In response to the challenging recruiting and retention environment for health professionals, the AF stood up the Recruiting and Retention Investment Strategy Council (RRISC). The RRISC is chartered to review, integrate and approve policies and strategies that drive recruiting and retention programs and funding requirements and to approve the prioritization of programming inputs to the AF Corporate Structure for those programs. The initial focus has been on critically manned health professionals, specifically defining the optimal investment strategy for the Dental Corps and select AFSCs of the Medical Corps. If confirmed, I would expect to continue this approach and to seek others that will assist in recruiting and retention of medical professionals.

Question. Are you confident that the Department has sufficient tools to achieve goals for recruitment and retention of highly-skilled health care personnel? If not, what additional tools should be considered?

Answer. I do not have a fully formed opinion on this question, but will consider those tools best suited to this challenge, such as accessions bonuses for fully qualified healthcare providers and an increase in medical and dental scholarships.

BATTLEFIELD AIRMEN

Question. Operations in Iraq have required Air Force personnel to provide direct support to ground forces, including participation in convoy duty. The training provided to deployed airmen who may be required to defend a convoy and installations against insurgents must be sufficient to prepare them for combat.

What nontraditional roles and missions can the Air Force assume to assist the ground forces?

Answer. Currently 93 percent of airmen who perform in-lieu-of (ILO) duties do so within their core-competency in 34 distinct skill sets. These include civil affairs, public affairs/legal/chaplain, Intel/counter-intel, medical, communications, logistics, civil engineers, and security forces. Some airmen (7 percent of ILO) form Ad Hoc teams and provide individual skills that no Service is organized, trained, or equipped to perform. By continually assessing and modifying ILO training to meet the ever-changing threat, we ensure airmen have the most current skill sets necessary to perform their assigned mission. If confirmed, I will expect the Air Force to aggressively assess ways that we can continue to support the ground forces.

Question. What training is being provided to airmen who are assigned to, or who volunteer to perform, convoy duty, or other duties requiring proficiency in small arms or crew served weapons?

Answer. Airmen that perform convoy duty attend Basic Combat Convoy Course (BC3) training at Camp Bullis, TX. Other ILO airmen attend training at various Army Power Projection Platforms tailored to their specific mission. Additionally, Second Air Force established a Training and Equipment Review Board (TERB) to monitor and modify training to meet the gaining commander’s needs and ensure ILO airmen can operate and survive in their deployed environment.

Question. What is your assessment of the sufficiency of the training currently being given to Aerospace Expeditionary Force airmen deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue but, if confirmed, would expect to do so in advance of AEF rotations scheduled for later this year.
AIR FORCE END STRENGTH

Question. The Secretary of Defense recently announced he would halt the reduction in Air Force Active-Duty end strength, and keep the Active Air Force at 330,000. For fiscal year 2008, Congress authorized an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 329,563 and for fiscal year 2009, the Department requested, and budgeted for, an Active-Duty end strength of 316,600.

How does the Air Force plan to fund the extra end strength?

Answer. In the near-term, the Air Force is halting the previously planned drawdown. By stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, force shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay, will not be needed in fiscal year 2009 as originally budgeted. The Air Force will apply those funds to cover costs associated with fiscal year 2009 manpower increases. The long-term manpower increases supporting ongoing, new and emerging missions are being addressed in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

Question. Does the Air Force plan to formally request Congress to authorize an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 330,000 for fiscal year 2009, or does it plan to rely on its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war or national emergency?

Answer. I understand the Air Force included in its fiscal year 2009 Unfunded Priority List to Congress a request for funding end strength at 330,000 in fiscal year 2009. If funded, then the Air Force expects to receive authorization. If not funded, then the Air Force will consider exercising its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war.

Question. Does the Air Force plan to identify and formally request reprogramming authority to pay for the end strength of 330,000?

Answer. The Air Force is committed to resource the manpower within fiscal year 2009 funding. While a reprogramming cannot be ruled out completely, right now we do not believe it will be necessary.

Question. Are there any increases to the Air Force Reserve or Air Guard planned in addition to the increases in the Active component?

Answer. Yes, there is a commensurate increase to Air Force Reserve end-strength planned. Both Reserve and Regular staffs are working to ensure we are adding back the correct mix of part-time and full-time reservists.

There are currently no plans to increase Air National Guard (ANG) end strength. As part of their planned reductions under Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720, the ANG elected to accept budget offsets versus manpower reductions. While this offered a temporary solution to funding their portion of PBD 720, the budgetary offsets will have direct impact to their overall declining readiness. We intend to seek solutions through either reimbursement or through the use of associate constructs to maximize the capability of all components.

Question. Your predecessor said earlier this year that the reductions in end strength, even to 316,600, were not enough to allow the Air Force to realize its recapitalization goals.

How does keeping Air Force Active end strength at 330,000 impact recapitalization?

Answer. The Air Force initiated a manpower drawdown from 360,000 to 316,000 in an effort to free up funding to self finance the recapitalization effort.

Looking at ongoing missions and the expected growth in new mission areas, the Air Force realized it needed to stop the drawdown at 330,000.

The drawdown halt will keep us at 330,000, but the content of people/skill sets within the 330,000 will need to be shaped in order to meet evolving mission requirements.

We are looking to utilize Defense Department’s revised fiscal guidance for the FYDP beginning in fiscal year 2010, to help sustain 330,000 and minimize the impact on our recapitalization efforts.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. Legislative proposals introduced in 2008, and recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves submitted on March 1, 2007, and January 31, 2008, are currently under consideration.

How do you assess the proposed changes in the roles and mission of the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau?

Answer. I supported the broad intent of this legislation to better connect the National Guard Bureau with DOD and joint leadership, while maintaining necessary connectivity with the Army and Air Force.

Question. Do you think the Air Force processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard? What is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
Answer. Yes. The Director of the Air National Guard has been, and will remain, a valued, active participant in Air Force Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes. The Air National Guard is a full participant in the Total Force approach to our missions, and its requirements accommodate our planning, programming and budgeting.

The Chief National Guard Bureau participates in Joint Staff capability-based planning and assessments, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and DOD PPBE process deliberations and actions pertaining to National Guard capabilities, including but not limited to homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are fully considered and resourced through the Air Force Budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the Air National Guard maintain their highly influential roles within the corporate structure of the Air Force, and that the Chief, National Guard Bureau remains well-connected to Air Force resourcing decisions. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard advisors are fully integrated throughout the entire structure of the Air Force and actively participate in resourcing discussions. I would expect this to continue.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of the National Guard Bureau in relation to the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will look forward to working with the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in executing the new National Guard Bureau Charter. The Air Force will maintain connectivity to joint matters involving the National Guard Bureau through established Joint Staff processes.

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid” and insufficiently integrated with Active-Duty units and personnel, and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What are your views on the optimal role for the Air Force Reserve and Air Guard in meeting combat missions?

Answer. I believe the Air Force is the model for melding Guard, Reserve, and civilians with its Active-Duty elements through a Total Force philosophy in essentially all Air Force mission areas. To meet the needs of the Nation, we continue to develop concepts, force management policies and practices, capitalizing on legal authorities to access sufficient Air Reserve component forces. The Air Force seamlessly provides the joint warfighter right, ready, and trained Active, Reserve, or Guard Forces today, with little to no additional training required to support this Nation in times of war or national emergency and at such other times as national security requires. The Air Force is actively updating our Air Expeditionary total force generation construct in line with the Secretary of Defense’s current force utilization policies.

Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to form an opinion on this matter.

Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve Forces?

Answer. In general, I do not support assigning support missions exclusively to the Reserve Forces. We need to retain flexibility to provide the right mix of Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces, at the right time, to meet the wide ranging, and changing needs of the combatant commanders. The few Air Force missions that currently are solely Reserve missions, such as WC–130 weather mission at Keesler AFB (“the Hurricane Hunters”) and the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System C–130s, have a very small footprint and are not required all the time, which has made them excellent missions for the Air Force Reserve.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department of the Air Force has implemented changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.

What is your view of the responsibility of senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Air Force staff in overseeing the implementation of policies relating to sexual assault?
Answer. Senior Air Force leaders, including the Chief and me, form the leadership team that must set the tone for the rest of the institution: sexual assault is criminal behavior that cannot and will not be tolerated. I am aware of commander focused programs in place to address prevention/education efforts, a robust victim response program (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and victim advocates). There is a strong emphasis on accountability at all levels.

Responsibility lies with me and all of our senior leaders to ensure that we have sound policies that are resourced and implemented effectively. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure that we monitor implementation and respond effectively.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. In your view, does the Air Force have adequate programs in place to ensure support for Active and Reserve component families, particularly those who live great distances from military installations?

Answer. The Air Force has world-class programs, but I understand resources continue to be a challenge. For example, we have expanded our efforts to provide child care options close to home for dispersed members located far from military installations: people like Air Guard, Air Reserve, recruiters, Reserve Officer Training Corps instructors, Military Entrance Processing Station personnel, and others on independent duty assignments.

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to enhance family support to airmen?

Answer. Family support and child care are important components of quality of life. They are top priorities for our airman and their families, and ultimately support personnel retention and a motivated, experienced workforce. If confirmed, I would continue to support these programs, particularly those which support the total force and families of deployed personnel.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active-Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees. What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

Answer. I understand that competing requirements to modernize our weapon systems have forced commanders at all levels to make some hard decisions on funding for MWR and other Quality of Life programs, with cutbacks in fitness, food service, child care, libraries, and other areas. However, I have not had the opportunity to review this issue. If confirmed, I will revisit the status of these programs to ensure we strike the right balance in resource allocation between support for equipment and support to people.

GENERAL OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and findings of inspectors general and other command-directed investigations are documented in various ways in each of the Services. Procedures for including and forwarding adverse and alleged adverse information in connection with the promotion selection process are set forth in title 10, U.S.C. and in DOD Instruction 1320.4. How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law and regulation regarding the review of adverse information?

Answer. The Air Force is required by law and DOD policy to present all adverse information of a credible nature to general officer promotion and Federal recognition boards. Upon receipt of the names of officers meeting a general officer promotion or Federal recognition board, SAF/IG initiates a review of Air Force, DOD, and other Government investigative files for potential adverse information. If substantiated adverse information is uncovered that does not already exist in the officer’s selection record, a summary of the adverse information, plus any written comments from the officer, are placed in a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the officer’s selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or Federal recognition, this file stays with the officer’s nomination package through its coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and the Senate. If unfavorable information is discovered about an officer after selection for promotion or Federal recognition, that information will be presented to a promotion review board. The promotion review board will consider the adverse information and
make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force whether to continue to support the officer for appointment to the next higher grade. If the Secretary continues to support the officer, the information will be added to the nomination package.

**Question.** What standards and procedures are in place in the Air Force to ensure that allegations of adverse information relating to a nominee for promotion are brought to the attention of the Department and the Committee in a timely manner?

**Answer.** The Air Force has rigid procedures in place to ensure any adverse or potential adverse information is presented with the nomination packages. Prior to the promotion selection board the Air Force conducts an initial screening for adverse information as outlined in the response to the question immediately above. The Air Force performs additional such checks following the selection board, and every 60 days throughout the nomination process.

For 1- and 2-stars, if there is substantiated adverse information, the selection board will review the information as part of the process and that information will be included in the nomination package. If allegations or adverse information arise after the board is complete the Air Force typically will separate the individual's name from the list until the investigation is complete and if necessary, until command action is complete, and then convene a promotion review board to determine if the individual should continue to be a nominee for promotion to the next higher grade. The Air Force always includes substantiated adverse information with its nomination packages through OSD to the Senate.

For 3- and 4-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is included in the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse information checks every 60 days throughout the nomination process from OSD to the Senate.

**MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)**

**Question.** The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Air Force's senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

**Answer.** The Air Force has implemented a corporate approach to overall management of the senior executive corps, which facilitates recruitment, development, compensation, and succession planning for about 280 senior civilian leaders. I subscribe to this approach. Senior leaders are matched to developmental opportunities based on gaps in training related to their current responsibilities or their ability to meet future corporate requirements identified in succession plans. The methodology focuses limited resources on those individuals who demonstrate potential to assume higher levels of responsibility.

**Question.** Do you believe that the Air Force has the number of senior executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department in the future?

**Answer.** While I believe our current executive workforce is highly competent and effective, today's emerging missions may drive the need for additional executive resources.

The Air Force has several emerging missions requiring previously unforeseen civilian leadership assignments across numerous functional areas. Additional SES allocations will be necessary to provide support to the combatant commands and Joint Staff or to back-fill positions previously filled by general officers when the uniformed officer is needed in a uniquely military assignment.

Over the last 3 fiscal years, the Air Force has requested significantly higher numbers of additional allocations, while also ensuring that existing allocations were consistently filled.

**NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM**

**Question.** What are your views on the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) within the Department thus far?

**Answer.** I understand that the Air Force has successfully completed implementation of NSPS for nearly all eligible, no bargaining unit, title 5 employees (approximately 39,000 employees or 32 percent of total Air Force civilian workforce). By law, the Air Force Research Laboratory cannot convert to NSPS before October 1, 2011. Title 5 employees of the Air National Guard are planned to convert with the rest of the National Guard. We will not convert bargaining unit General Schedule (GS) employees until DOD gives us the green-light. The Air Force's network of NSPS
champions at major command and base levels, robust training program for employees and supervisors, and practice conversions, have ensured a smooth transition.

From my recent experience outside the Air Force, the strengths of NSPS are in its pay for performance features and the increased communication between managers and employees. Weaknesses relate mostly to the extra efforts required to learn a new personnel system, including introduction of new electronic tools and implementation of a new annual cycle.

**Question.** What do you believe will be the benefits of NSPS when implemented, and what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure both a smooth transition and effective employee support?

**Answer.** The key benefit of NSPS is increased communication between employees and their supervisors on goals, objectives, and expectations. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of communication, accountability, and the link between performance and pay and mission accomplishment.

**SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACCOUNTABILITY**

**Question.** While representative of a small number of individuals, revelations of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures to perform to accepted standards are frequently reported. Victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also frequently heard.

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department?

**Answer.** Accountability is an essential element of a well-disciplined force. Leadership requires accountability and our senior leaders must be ready and willing to accept responsibility for things that happen on their watches. An organization that fails to hold its senior leaders accountable for failures to perform to accepted standards or for misusing their authority sends the wrong message to our Air Force personnel and to the public. It is important that all Air Force personnel feel comfortable in exercising their obligation to bring issues forward—this is a basic element of an ethical culture.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders of the Air Force are held accountable for their actions and performance?

**Answer.** If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will take all appropriate steps to ensure timely accountability of individuals at all levels within the Air Force for their actions and their performance, including senior leaders as warranted. I will make the fullest use of the various tools available to me both to ascertain the facts and to deal effectively with problems that are identified. All accountability actions will be executed in strict adherence to fairness and due process as provided by law and regulation.

**ACQUISITION ISSUES**

**Question.** Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) in the Air Force and the other military Services continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability. Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

**Answer.** Yes. Funding instability can drive up costs but cost growth is also a consequence of changing requirements, relying on immature technologies when committing to new programs or underestimating the amount of systems engineering work that will be required (the integration/test/trouble-shoot/fix/retest loop). The Department has learned how important it is to carefully vet weapon system requirements and eliminate “requirements creep” to minimize cost growth.

**Question.** What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to address funding and requirements instability?

**Answer.** I believe that programs perform better both for cost and schedule when programmatic risk is reduced through overarching systems engineering, the use of mature technologies proven in a realistic operational environment, and programs are funded to high-confidence cost estimates. It is also critical to establish and hold constant the performance requirements once they are validated and approved. I understand the Air Force has also implemented senior level configuration steering boards, as directed by USD(AT&L), to balance emerging requirements with funding during program execution.

**Question.** The Government Accountability Office has reported that the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted in significant cost and schedule growth in the MDAPs of the Air Force and the other military departments. Section 2366a
of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval.

Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

Answer. Yes, working to mature technology at the same time it is being integrated with other technologies in a development effort is a significant contributor to increased program cost and schedule delays.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Air Force complies with the requirements of section 2366a?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all Air Force MDAPs for which I am the Milestone Decision Authority are in compliance with the law before giving Milestone B approval. For those MDAP programs where I am not the Milestone Decision Authority, I will ensure they are in compliance with the law before they go forward to their Milestone Decision Authority for a Milestone B approval. I will also ensure that the Air Force has incorporated this requirement into our acquisition policy.

Question. The Government Accountability Office has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Air Force and the other military departments is a major contributor to cost growth and program failure. Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems?

Answer. Yes, using unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates can lead to cost, schedule and performance baselines that are unexecutable and potentially lead to Nunn-McCurdy breaches.

Question. What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent and provide a sound basis for Air Force programs?

Answer. The Air Force has taken several steps to ensure better cost and schedule estimates, from higher confidence levels for cost estimates to in-depth Air Force Review Boards to review program schedules and acquisition strategies. If I am confirmed, we will continue to review these processes and make adjustments to ensure sound estimates and to fund programs at the appropriate confidence level.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has issued a memorandum directing the military departments to institute new “Configuration Steering Boards” to review and approve new requirements that could add significantly to the costs of major systems. Do you support this requirement?

Answer. Yes, I support this requirement.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force complies with this new requirement?

Answer. The Air Force has already instituted Configuration Steering Boards in compliance with the policy and, if confirmed, I will ensure that these boards continue so that all programs are reviewed on a regular basis.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has also issued a memorandum directing that the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping to ensure technological maturity, reduce technical risk, validate designs, cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements. Do you support this requirement?

Answer. USD(AT&L) has implemented a competitive prototyping philosophy which I support for all appropriate acquisitions; but in some instances, such as large, complex satellite acquisitions, the cost to carry two vendors may be prohibitive. While we cannot typically afford to prototype a complete space system with all competitors, we do prove the critical technologies in their relevant performance environment before we enter full scale development.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force complies with this new requirement?

Answer. The level of prototyping varies with each program. For commercially derived items, the basic article is already in use and the prototyping should focus on the risk areas associated with military adaptation. For new development items, risk areas should certainly be prototyped, but the entire system may have to be prototyped before selecting the winning vendor. If confirmed, I will work with OSD through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to clearly set prototyping guidance as we tailor acquisition strategies for each program.
Workforce Development Fund to provide the resources needed to begin rebuilding the Department’s corps of acquisition professionals.

Do you believe that a properly-sized workforce of appropriately trained acquisition professionals is essential if the Air Force is going to get good value for the expenditure of public resources?

Answer. Yes, it is absolutely essential that we have a properly sized and trained acquisition work force. If confirmed, I will expect the Department to use this recent legislation to enhance our ability to attract, recruit, develop, and retain qualified personnel.

Question. What steps do you expect to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force makes appropriate use of the funds made available pursuant to section 852?

Answer. I understand the Air Force is working closely with USD (AT&L) on numerous initiatives enabled by Section 852, “Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund,” which provides funding for recruiting, training, and retention. I also understand there is pending legislation in both Senate and House authorization bills to provide expedited hiring authority for the Defense Acquisition Workforce, which would improve our ability to hire and retain the right people.

Question. Five years ago, Air Force leadership failed to follow acquisition statutes and regulations and ensure good stewardship of taxpayer funds in the proposed tanker lease. Last month, the DOD Inspector General released a report indicating that senior Air Force leaders had improperly influenced the award of a contract to a company managed by individuals with close personal ties to the Air Force leadership. Last week, the Government Accountability Office recommended that a new contract to replace the Air Force’s tanker fleet be set aside because of serious errors in the evaluation process.

Do you believe that there are serious problems in the Air Force acquisition system?

Answer. The three examples provided each involve different circumstances. In the first two cases where criminal or improper behavior—or even the appearance of such behavior, was involved the individuals have been sanctioned and held accountable. We need to constantly reiterate the importance of adherence to the core values of the Air Force and individual accountability. This applies not only to the acquisition process but to all other areas of Air Force operations.

In its recent decision on KC–X, the GAO validated the Air Force’s decisions in roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems in 8 areas that caused them to sustain Boeing’s protest. While I do not believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally flawed, GAO’s findings are troubling. They indicate the need for changes that will ensure we are better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully withstand protests and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition process.

Question. What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to address such problems and restore the confidence of Congress and the public in Air Force acquisition?

Answer. I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO decision on KC–X, and previous decisions in which protests were sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will strengthen the major program and source selection decisions pending for later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend opportunities for longer-term improvement.

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of services?

Answer. I understand the Air Force has established a credentialing system for individuals who award and manage services contracts so that their authority to manage larger programs is based on their track record of success with smaller programs. In addition, the Air Force is working with the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to enhance training courses and opportunities for nontraditional acquisition parties often involved in the acquisition of services.

Question. Do you agree that the Air Force should develop processes and systems to provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis?
Answer. The Air Force currently uses the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS–NG) to pull data for spending analysis. I am advised that, while not perfect, we can get sufficient insight into our spending rates to do some strategic decision making and that the Air Force is improving its abilities to do so.

Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85 percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The DOD Inspector General and others have identified a long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to ensure that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD requirements and is in the best interests of the Department?

Question. In August 2007, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) issued a guide titled “Air Force Purchases Using Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs).” The guide applies to all purchases to non-DOD agencies using interagency contracts and agreements. I am advised that this guide implements DOD policies directed in response to audit findings and is closely aligned with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy guide on interagency acquisitions published in June 2008.

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION SYSTEM FLAWS

Question. Over the last 4 years, GAO protests have resulted in the reversal of a number of significant Air Force contract award decisions, including award decisions on the KC–X tanker replacement contract; the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program (CSAR-X) contract; the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) contract; the Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video contract; and a contract for F–15 training simulators.

In your remarks at the July 9, 2008, DOD press briefing with Secretaries Gates and Young on the Department’s path forward on the KC–X contract you concluded “that the underlying Air Force acquisition system is not somehow fatally flawed.” Do you believe that there are significant problems in the Air Force acquisition system today?

Answer. In its recent decision on KC–X, the GAO validated the Air Force’s decisions in roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems in eight areas that caused them to sustain Boeing’s protest. While I do not believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally flawed, GAO’s findings are troubling. They indicate the need for changes that will ensure we are better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully withstand protests and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition process.

Question. If so, what are those problems and how would you propose to address them?

Answer. I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO decision on KC–X, and previous decisions in which protests were sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will strengthen the major program and source selection decisions pending for later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend opportunities for longer-term improvement.

Question. If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been the subject of so many adverse bid protest decisions?

Answer. Although I believe that the Air Force acquisition system is not fatally flawed, I agree there are opportunities for improvement. Major weapon systems contracts require complex, in-depth evaluations across many functional areas. The Air Force is continuing to examine processes and factors to ensure fair evaluations of these highly complex proposals that protect the interests of both the warfighter and the taxpayer. Because of the consolidation of the defense industrial base, especially in the aerospace sector, major contracts can be make-or-break events for the remaining companies, which I believe is a factor in explaining an increase in the number of protests.

ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICIALS

Question. Over the last several years, senior Air Force officials are alleged to have advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the Presi-
dent’s budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement. These programs include the procurement of additional C–17s, the continuation of the C–130J multi-year contract, and the multiyear procurement of additional F–22 aircraft. Senior Air Force officials are also alleged to have advocated a legislative proposal that would overturn a decision of the base realignment and closure commission relative to Joint Basing.

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officials to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in the President’s budget and for which there is no currently validated joint requirement?

Answer. There are established processes for informing Congress of the Air Force’s funding needs and priorities. I believe it is inappropriate for Air Force officials to step outside of those procedures to advocate for funding of items that are not included in the President’s budget and especially in cases where there is no validated joint requirement.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts?

Answer. As Acting Secretary I have made my views on this subject known to the staff and have had private conversations with individuals where necessary. If confirmed as Secretary of the Air Force, I intend to use established procedures for advocating program funding and priorities. In addition, I will reinforce with Air Force Legislative Liaison and Appropriations Liaison personnel those procedures for responding to congressional requests for information, and providing professional military advice, in a manner consistent with DOD decisions reflected in the President’s budget.

DEFENSE BUDGETING

Question. On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on internal Air Force briefing slides which included statements that: “the Air Force is targeting the other Services;” the “Budget Battle” is a “Zero Sum Gain” and a “Non-Permissive Environment;” and “some Services are going to win and some are going to lose.”

What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they appear to be intended to communicate?

Answer. Competition for resources is as old as Washington itself. While I am not familiar with the details of these slides or the context in which they were presented, they seem a bit ‘over the top’ and not helpful.

PILOT PROGRAM ON COMMERCIAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE AIR REFUELING

Question. Section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the Air Force to establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of using commercial fee-for-service air refueling tankers for Air Force operations.

What is the status of implementation of the pilot program, and, if confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the program meets the elements set forth in section 1081?

Answer. I understand that there was no fiscal year 2008 appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is working on reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008–2009. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be released in first quarter of fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. The program requires industry commitment and investment to develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. The Air Force must determine the feasibility of executing a program based on industry responses. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and integration. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal year 2012–2016.

If confirmed, I will monitor progress on this plan to ensure we meet the pilot program objective.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, you would play an important role in the ongoing process of transforming the Air Force to meet new and emerging threats.

If confirmed, what would your goals be for Air Force transformation?
Answer. While I have begun to assess major Air Force challenges and priorities, I have not yet had the opportunity to assess past progress on, or future goals for, Air Force transformation.

Question. In your opinion, does the Air Force POM have adequate resources identified to implement your transformation goals?
Answer. N/A.

UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES

Question. In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Congress set a goal that within 10 years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft would be unmanned.

Do you support the 10-year goal established by Congress?
Answer. The rapid increase in research, development, and fielding of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in multiple roles is without question among the most dramatic changes since I last served with the Air Force in 1993. Though I am not yet clear on where the Air Force currently stands in relation to the stated congressional goal, the application of UASs in support of the global war on terror and other current missions has clearly been a success; and continuing the development and fielding of unmanned aerial systems is a trend I fully support.

Do you believe the current level of investment in the various Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs is sufficient to the program objectives and schedules of these programs and to comply with the 10-year goal?
I am advised that the 10-year goal set in 2001 is not yet achievable. However, the current POM is aggressively pursuing UASs in greater numbers than any previous POM submission with vehicles having greater capabilities in range, altitude and payload than their predecessors.

Thanks to Congress’ supplemental funding, nearly 30 percent of our strike capable platforms procured during fiscal year 2008 were UASs, including MQ–1s and MQ–9s. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget procurement reflects that over 50 percent of the strike capable platforms requested were UASs. We anticipate the same percentage of manned versus unmanned procurement in fiscal year 2010 for strike capable platforms.

Question. If not, what recommendations would you make to comply with the statute?
Answer. I have not yet had time to review the status of currently planned investments in relation to the statutory goal.

JOINT BASING

Question. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission directed, at the request of DOD, the establishment of 12 joint bases. Nine of these recommendations involve the Air Force.

Does the Air Force support or oppose this joint basing effort?
Answer. The Air Force fully supports joint basing and is committed to making it a success.

Question. Does the Air Force support joint basing in cases where the Air Force will not be the lead Service for the joint base?
Answer. Yes. To accomplish this, we advocated for and in conjunction with the other Services and OSD, established installation support common output level standards. Our airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, DOD civilians, and their families will benefit from efficient, consistent installation support services. Such standards will ensure the Air Force and our sister Services continue to provide all personnel with the level of installation support services they deserve.

If I am confirmed, we will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and our sister Services to ensure all Joint Basing initiatives contribute to DOD’s ability to perform its mission.

Question. What concerns, if any, does the Air Force have about establishing joint bases?
Answer. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their missions and provide the highest standards for all warfighters and their families. We want joint bases to be so efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for every servicemember.

Question. What effort is the Air Force making inside DOD, at both the senior and working group levels, to find solutions for these concerns?
Answer. The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward common goals in a joint environment—joint basing will be no different. To guarantee success, each joint base should be required to provide a suitable setting to all of its
assigned personnel, their families, and other customers within the local communities our bases support. To accomplish this, we have successfully advocated for the establishment of 265 common joint base quality of life standards that are the “highest standards” for all Services.

**Question.** In your opinion, can the joint basing decision be carried out in a manner that will result in significant cost savings and will not adversely impact the Air Force?

**Answer.** I believe joint basing will likely result in greater efficiencies in installation management and can be carried out in a manner that will not adversely impact the Air Force.

**ENCROACHMENT ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS**

**Question.** Various Air Force Bases (AFBs) have encroachment issues, some of which are significant. These include population growth near military installations, environmental constraints on military training ranges, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, and conflicts with civilian users over the use of radio frequency spectrum.

In your opinion, how serious are these problems for the Department of the Air Force?

**Answer.** I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue, but recognize that encroachment can be a critical matter for the safety and effectiveness of flight operations, and that it also impacts community relations.

**Question.** If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to curtail the various encroachment issues?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will support the policy initiative already underway to institutionalize operational sustainability across the Air Force. This naturally involves focused implementation and follow-up to adapt the initial policy and guidance to changing regional circumstances and new challenges.

**ENERGY CONSERVATION AND USE OF ALTERNATE FUELS**

**Question.** In the past year, the Department of the Air Force has assumed a leadership role within the Federal Government for the advocacy, research, and testing of alternate fuels for use in military aircraft. In addition, the Air Force has encouraged proposals for the use of Federal property to construct refineries and power plants to include nuclear power.

In your view, which energy alternatives offer the greatest potential for benefit to Air Force programs and operations?

**Answer.** I am still reviewing the Air Force energy program. In general, I support the program’s three-part strategy of reducing energy demand and consumption, increasing supplies from alternative sources, and shaping the Air Force culture to increase energy awareness in all we do. I also support the focused effort to certify Air Force aircraft on a synthetic aviation fuel blend by 2011.

Do you support the goals adopted by the Air Force related to the increased use of alternate fuels?

**Answer.** I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the specific goals outlined in the Air Force energy program.

**Question.** In your opinion, what constraints does the Air Force face in carrying out initiatives to reduce reliance on fossil fuels?

**Answer.** My initial assessment is that it would be difficult for the Air Force alone to economically convert to a synthetic fuel blend for aircraft without broader market forces for commercial aviation fuel in place to make this viable. In addition, the potential hosting of nuclear power sites on Air Force installations has broad policy implications extending well beyond the immediate responsibilities of the Air Force. In my opinion, moving beyond the level of technical and economic feasibility studies in both of these areas will require more comprehensive consultation and coordination within DOD, across the executive branch, and with Congress and industry.

**INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES**

**Question.** Air Force leaders have stated in testimony, “MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk in facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment.”

In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force?

**Answer.** I understand that the Air Force has managed or mitigated risk by balancing limited resources among Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Moderniza-
tion, and MILCON accounts. Taking manageable risk in infrastructure seems prudent given the Air Force’s previous investment in infrastructure combined with its current investment in maintaining our facilities by increasing Facility Sustainment to 90 percent of the DOD requirements and increasing restoration and modernization (R&M) by $160 million compared to fiscal year 2008. While these actions help to manage risk in the short run, higher levels of investment will likely be required to support new missions and capabilities as they enter the total force.

**Question.** If confirmed, would you support goals established by DOD for certain levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and sustainment of facilities?

**Answer.** Yes. The Air Force supports the existing DOD goal for Facility Sustainment by funding our program to at least 90 percent of the modeled requirement. If I am confirmed, I will support Facility Recapitalization efforts because installations provide a critical capability to the Air Force—we fight from our bases, they are our Installation Weapon Systems.

**Question.** What is your position on the use of public-private ventures to address critical deficiencies in family housing and utility infrastructure?

**Answer.** Congress provided the Services public-private venture authorities designed to attract private sector financing, expertise and innovation to improve the quality of life for our airmen and their families; enable our utility infrastructure to meet current standards; and improve mission capability by leveraging existing real estate assets faster and more efficiently than traditional Military Construction and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) processes would allow. Consistent with the conditions outlined by Congress, I would continue to take advantage of these powerful authorities because they enable us to obtain private capital to leverage government dollars, making efficient use of limited resources to build, renovate and operate our military housing and infrastructure.

**LONG-RANGE BOMBERS**

**Question.** The B–1s, B–2s, and B–52s will begin to be retired in the 2030 timeframe. When do you believe that the United States needs to develop a new manned bomber?

**Answer.** The current bomber fleet (B–1, B–2, and B–52) is already being modernized through various sustainment, electronic warfare, and communications initiatives in order to close emerging capability gaps and remain relevant through 2030. Current air-launched weapons also face similar performance issues and the Air Force is committed to increasing the lethality of its Long Range Strike force through advanced weapons. While I understand the Air Force does not have a formal position on future status for the current inventory, it is developing a new generation of scalable weapons with improved accuracy, standoff, penetration, and stealth. Available in the near to mid-term, these weapons would help to mitigate the risks now evolving.

Based on the current projections, a Next Generation Bomber would achieve initial operational capability in 2018. This date is directed by the 2006 QDR based on the realization that the current bomber fleet has projected capability gaps in the anti-access environment for the 2015–2020 timeframe.

**Question.** At a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics indicated that the next generation long range bomber is already over budget and behind schedule. Do you agree with this statement?

**Answer.** I have not yet had the opportunity to review this program in detail.

**NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE AIR FORCE**

**Question.** The responsibilities of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) were once included in the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Dual-hatting the Under Secretary ensured that there was close cooperation between the NRO and the Air Force.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD space programs and NRO programs are managed in a coordinated fashion?

**Answer.** I understand that in June 2006, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Director of the NRO implemented a Statement of Intent documenting the specific responsibilities and actions the Air Force and NRO will take to ensure our historical relationship remains strong, while continuing to effectively achieve mission success and meet user needs. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the NRO to ensure we coordinate efforts in areas of joint interest, such as development and acquisition, space com-
mand, control and operations, space launch, defensive space operations, and professional development of our personnel.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

*Question.* The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office stood up just about a year ago. One of the primary goals of the office is to provide military commanders with an ability to utilize small satellites to rapidly augment or reconstitute capabilities for such things as communications and surveillance.

*Answer.* Yes, ORS was established to develop concepts for surge, augmentation, and reconstitution. It is a vital element of our space protection strategy in the contested space environment and I understand is strongly supported by the commander of the United States Strategic Command.

*Question.* Do you believe there are other opportunities for ORS including support to research and development?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that ORS is already providing the launches for Tactical Satellites (TacSats) being developed by the scientific and technology (S&T) community. ORS is also leveraging past research and development investments, as well as advancing specific technologies to support the development of enabling technologies for responsive satellite building, launch, on-orbit operations, and direct links to the warfighter. These activities will ultimately mature ORS into a national strategic capability able to rapidly develop and deploy smaller, single-purpose, shorter-lived platforms tailored to a specific warfighter need or to augment or reconstitute our core space capabilities.

SPACE ACQUISITION

*Question.* Virtually all current space acquisition programs are suffering from cost overruns and schedule slips.

*Answer.* Ensuring future space systems are delivered within promised cost and schedule requires an intense focus on affordable and executable acquisition strategies, realistic cost estimates, stable requirements and funding, and sound systems engineering practices. Implementing policies which ensure continuity of program leadership, coupled with thorough upfront program planning, should create a balance between cost, schedule and performance that can be sustained throughout a program’s life cycle.

*Question.* Milestone decision authority for space programs currently resides with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. If confirmed will you seek to return this authority to the Air Force or are you comfortable with this authority residing with the Under Secretary?

*Answer.* I believe the Air Force should be taking steps internally to raise confidence in its ability to manage space programs and carry out its responsibilities as DOD Executive Agent for Space such that Milestone Decision Authority for space Major Defense Acquisition Programs would be returned to the Air Force at the earliest opportunity.

EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE

*Question.* The Secretary of the Air Force has previously been designated as the DOD Executive Agent for Space.

*Answer.* If confirmed will you retain this designation?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I intend to exercise all responsibilities and authorities assigned to this office, including those associated with the DOD Executive Agent for Space consistent with DOD Directive 5101.2. This includes planning, programming, and acquisition of space systems within DOD in concert with the heads of DOD components, and the USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), USD (Policy), and USD (Intelligence).

AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

*Question.* What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of the Air Force S&T programs?

*Answer.* One of the best metrics to assess S&T effectiveness is to measure technology transition into developmental programs and, ultimately, into operational use. There is solid evidence that past investments in S&T have resulted in a significant number of technologies being incorporated into fielded systems, thereby, securing
the Air Force’s position as the premier air force in the world. To maintain this legacy of success into the future will depend on ensuring programs are in place to transition mature laboratory technologies into developing and fielded systems.

**Question.** What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of the Air Force’s basic research programs?

**Answer.** The very nature of basic research makes it difficult to determine effective measures of merit. However, indicators such as the number of referred journal publications, certificates of research merit, and other awards and publications can provide a general sense of how well the basic research program is laying the foundation for future military capabilities.

**Question.** Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs?

**Answer.** I have not yet had time to review details of the R&D program.

**Question.** What metrics will you use to assess the adequacy of investment levels in Air Force S&T programs?

**Answer.** The Air Force uses a number of different inputs to determine the adequacy of the total S&T investment beginning with overall national strategy followed by Guidance for the Development of the Force, the Air Force Strategic Plan, Advanced Air Force Planning Guidance, and guidance from the Air Force S&T Executive. This entire determination process revolves around identifying capability gaps to determine what breakthrough technologies might be required in the future.

**Question.** What role do investments in S&T play in reducing costs and technical risk of acquisition programs?

**Answer.** The S&T Program is a key element in making demonstrated mature technologies available for transition into development programs. The manufacturing technology program is also a key to reducing costs and risks to acquisition programs. The S&T Program provides a strong foundation for reducing technical risk and costs.

**TEST AND EVALUATION**

**Question.** What are your views on the effectiveness of the Air Force’s test and evaluation (T&E) activities?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that Air Force T&E activities are sufficient to support testing requirements and that the T&E budget has been certified as adequate each year by OSD's Test Resource Management Center.

**Question.** What are the major weaknesses and deficiencies with the Air Force T&E enterprise in meeting current and emerging Air Force testing requirements?

**Answer.** The development of weapon systems with increased technical complexity and capabilities is challenging Air Force T&E organizations to be technically innovative and resourceful. I understand that the T&E budget has been certified as adequate each year by OSD's Test Resource Management Center.

**Question.** The Air Force has recently contemplated a number of steps to reorganize both development and operational test activities. Some of these proposals included significant government and contractor workforce reductions and potential closures of test assets.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that any reorganizations or closure of test assets or reductions in test workforce result in actual cost reductions and do not entail undue risk to Air Force or other DOD current or future acquisition programs?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would expect the Air Force T&E community, like other functional areas, to continually pursue efficiencies that add value to acquisition and promote needed test capabilities. Any proposals for significant reorganizations or realignments would require thorough analysis and consultation with stakeholders and Congress.

**Question.** I have recently reviewed a report prepared in response to congressional guidance, assessing the potential realignment of functions between Edwards AFB and Eglin AFB. The report discusses the benefits of having test capabilities at both locations and concludes that previously planned realignments would not result in significant savings or benefits and therefore should not go forward.

What is your view of the role of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Director of the Test Resource Management Center in ensuring that such reductions do not undermine the ability of the Air Force to carry out needed test programs?

**Answer.** The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Director of the Test Resource Management Center are responsible to ensure our Nation’s T&E infrastructure, processes, and workforce are adequate, responsive, and available to
support the development of the technologically advanced weapon systems that our warfighters need.

**Question.** The Air Force has some unique requirements with regard to prompt global reach and affordable, responsive space lift missions.

**Answer.** In your view, are changes in current test range structure, operations, and mission assurance parameters required to accommodate Air Force experimentation and small launch needs?

**Answer.** I have not yet had time to review this area.

**AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORIES**

**Question.** What are the major challenges facing the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)?

**Answer.** I recognize the value of Air Force labs and the technical expertise of that workforce as critical resources for the Air Force. However, I have not yet had time to review the current status of AFRL.

**Question.** How do you plan to address these challenges?

**Answer.** N/A.

**Question.** Are you supportive of efforts of the AFRL to expand and enhance their unique laboratory personnel demonstration program to ensure that they can attract and retain the finest technical workforce?

**Answer.** I recognize and support the need to attract and retain the finest technical workforce, but have not had time to review this area.

**AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE**

**Question.** The airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets developed and operated by the Air Force form an indispensable part of the Nation's overall intelligence architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, low density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and high OPEMPO on their systems and crews.

**Question.** In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR assets to meet current and projected requirements?

**Answer.** The Air Force is striving to meet current ISR demand by rapidly increasing actual numbers of ISR platforms, integrating nontraditional ISR means, and establishing mechanisms to improve analysis, processing, targeting, and systems to expand ISR dissemination. For example, I understand the Air Force is currently increasing combat air patrols (CAPs) of our unmanned airborne systems (UAS). Our JPAC-approved UAS requirement is 21 CAPs, and we are already flying 26 today to meet the additional needs of the combatant commanders. We are also working to increase the number of CAPs to 31 by December 2008. Continued production will increase the density of these assets but demand will continue to be high. We will find ways to satisfy this demand both in capability terms and, importantly, execute the function in a manner that meets supported commander expectations.

**Question.** What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to current plans for the development and acquisition of airborne ISR platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the "high demand, low density" category?

**Answer.** I have no changes to recommend at this time. My initial impressions are that more widespread arming of UAVs recently considered as ISR platforms, along with the availability of sensors and targeting pods on new fighter/attack aircraft, are two trends further blurring functional lines between intelligence and operations. Both of these trends are positive and present opportunities; and as they are fully integrated, should increase operational capability and flexibility for the warfighter. At the same time, these trends will force questions about how air vehicles should be classified and where they should be assigned.

**Question.** If confirmed, will you review the necessity for requiring rated pilots for the operation of ISR assets?

**Answer.** Yes.

**AFRICA COMMAND**

**Question.** In the committee-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the committee expressed concern that the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lacks the necessary air support to execute effectively his mission in a continent comprised of 53 countries, spanning a geographic area larger than the United States, China, and Western Europe combined. The Commander of AFRICOM recently indicated before the Air Force Defense Strategy Seminar this shortage of aircraft remains.

**Question.** If confirmed, what would you do to support AFRICOM, given the demand on existing assets within other geographic combatant command AORs?
Answer. My understanding is General Ward is satisfied with our proposed Air Force component support, but has expressed concern over airlift requirements for his command.

For component support, we are establishing and assigning a Numbered Air Force—17th Air Force—consisting of a two-star general, his staff, and a tailored air and space operations center to provide command and control capabilities. We are committed to declaring initial operational capability this fall.

The near-term plan for airlift support to AFRICOM is not yet certain. In the absence of validated requirements, the Air Force submitted a $30 million O&M request in fiscal year 2009. I understand there is a $20 million mark against that request and this will likely be a conference issue. If the request is not fully funded by Congress, there will be some risk associated with the shortfall. General Ward is in a better position to describe the risk.

Our long-term plan for airlift is becoming clearer. TRANSCOM recently completed an airlift analysis for AFRICOM and recommended 2 key actions. First, TRANSCOM recommended we acquire or assign a C-37 and a C-40 to AFRICOM. Second, they recommended we allocate O&M funds for common user airlift requirements. I understand the Air Force plans to support those recommendations in its POM 10 submission and the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum.

NUCLEAR MATTERS

Question. Over the course of the last year substantial systemic problems have surfaced with the ability of the Air Force to manage all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs. These problems have generated several reports highlighting very serious shortfalls and setting forth over 100 recommendations to address the problems.

If confirmed, what would you do to identify the various problems and restore credibility to the ability of the Air Force to manage nuclear weapons and systems?

Answer. I believe most of the problems concerning the Air Force’s stewardship of its nuclear enterprise have been identified and documented in both external and internal reports over the past few years. As outlined below, restoring Air Force credibility in our stewardship of the nuclear mission has been a high priority since my first day as Acting Secretary. I have reviewed the situation with four major command (MAJCOM) commanders who have nuclear-related missions, visited four bases, and spoken to airmen regarding the need to recommit ourselves to high standards of excellence. In our approach to the nuclear mission, we should not be ‘managing risk’, but eliminating risk.

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to review all of the recommendations that have been made by the various review teams to put these recommendations in place and then ensure that these recommendations do, in fact, fix and resolve the many problems?

Answer. Upon arrival as Acting Secretary, I set in motion a Nuclear Task Force to coordinate and synchronize the corrective actions underway across various MAJCOMs and prepare a strategic roadmap for improvement that fully recommits the Air Force to this critical mission. This roadmap will be comprehensive, covering all dimensions of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and inspection regimes. The roadmap will be prepared in coordination with other DOD components, including STRATCOM, and the Department of Energy; and will incorporate appropriate recommendations from the panel established under former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. I expect to see a final version of this roadmap by the end of September.

Question. Do you disagree with any of the recommendations, and if so, which ones and why?

Answer. While I am not personally tracking every recommendation from all the relevant reports, the Nuclear Task Force support staff is performing this function and MAJCOM commanders are leading implementation plans within their respective commands.

I understand that one of the recommendations from the Air Combat Command Commander Directed Investigation was not implemented because it would have been in violation of current DOD security requirements and may have resulted in increased vulnerability to our nuclear security response posture.

I am advised that all other recommendations have either been implemented or are in the works at this time. The Air Force has much more work that needs to be done.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions will you take to assess, sustain, and improve the professional development and experience base of Air Force personnel supporting nuclear systems and operations?

Answer. I expect to receive recommendations in this area from the Nuclear Task Force that will be included in our roadmap for the nuclear enterprise.
Question. What specific resources do you believe are most urgently needed to restore the Air Force’s stewardship of its nuclear mission?
Answer. We are currently evaluating the established unfunded requirements as well as the resourcing requirements resulting from the findings and recommendations of the Donald Report and the internal Air Force Inventory and Assessment Report. This work is in progress.

Meeting funding requirements, however, is just one aspect of rebuilding the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Daily mission success in this most vital mission area demands unwavering focus that results in rigid adherence to standards. Ensuring our great airmen have resources, policies, procedures, engaged leadership and strict accountability at all levels will restore credibility and confidence in Air Force stewardship of its nuclear mission. We are actively working all of these related areas to ensure success.

NUCLEAR TASK FORCE

Question. In a memorandum you sent as Acting Secretary on June 26, 2008, to the Air Force Chief of Staff and all major commands, you discussed rebuilding of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. You directed the establishment of a Nuclear Task Force to perform key functions including an organizational review to assess and recommend options for alternative assignments of responsibility and/or command arrangements. You have required the Task Force to submit a draft roadmap, including recommendations for organizational adjustments, in 60 days.

What are your expectations of the effect this Task Force will have on the Air Force’s nuclear-related policies and procedures, logistics, sustainment, organization, and personnel force shaping?
Answer. The task force is a means to integrate related ongoing efforts and ensure we have a comprehensive way ahead to rebuild the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. This will necessarily include nuclear-related policies and procedures, logistics, sustainment, organization, and personnel force shaping.

Question. When do you intend to provide this committee with the results of this review?
Answer. I will provide the defense committees with the results upon completion of this activity, which I expect to be early this fall.

AIR FORCE REORGANIZATIONS

Question. In recent years the Air Force has reorganized to create warfighting headquarters and to place maintenance squadrons under air combat wings. Both initiatives have been criticized as creating unnecessary bureaucracy and attempting to create more general officer or command billets than is necessary.

What is the status of the implementation of these initiatives?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review the status of the warfighting headquarters implementation, which I understand is well underway.
Likewise, I have not had the opportunity to review the Global Wing maintenance initiative. Because this initiative was scheduled to be implemented beginning 1 July, as the recently arrived Acting Secretary, I put this initiative on hold for further review by the incoming leadership team.

Question. What is your personal view of the merits and justification for these organizational changes?
Answer. N/A.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION

1. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, Congress established the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008. The Commission is chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and is tasked to make recommendations on the future strategic posture of the United States including the nuclear posture. Will you cooperate fully with the Commission and the various working groups established by the Commission?

Mr. Donley. Yes.

AIR FORCE END STRENGTH

2. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, the Air Force previously announced that it was not going to reduce end strength to the previously planned level of 316,000; rather it was going to maintain an end strength of 330,000. We understand that the Air Force plans to use available funds in fiscal year 2009 to support this level of end strength even though the funds for this level were not requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget request. What is the plan to identify the source of the funds to sustain the 330,000 end strength in fiscal year 2009?

Mr. Donley. The Air Force is committed to fund the 330,000 end strength requirement within existing fiscal year 2009 funding. This funding will almost exclusively come from two sources. First, by stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year 2009 funding that was originally programmed for force shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay will be freed up. Second, end strength at the beginning of fiscal year 2009 will be lower than originally planned, which will free up additional funding.

3. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, this 330,000 end strength level is also not sustained in the out year budget request. In your answers to the advance policy questions, however, you indicate that this out year funding shortfall will be fixed in the fiscal year 2010 budget request. How do you intend to fix this problem and where will the additional funds come from?

Mr. Donley. The Air Force intends to address this issue within the context of the fiscal year 2010 Program Review deliberations with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). At present, the Air Force has established an OSD/Air Force End Strength Issue Team to formally address any funding shortfall concerns.

4. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, will this be an increase to the previously planned Air Force top line or will reductions be made to procurement or other investment accounts?

Mr. Donley. We will work with OSD to find the appropriate resources to fund our 330,000 end strength requirement. Until this review is complete, we will not know if the funding will be from additional top line or from realigning funds within the current Air Force top line.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

5. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, the Air Force can repair the housing privatization projects at Moody, Little Rock, and Hanscom Air Force Bases (AFBs) (the “American Eagle projects”) without sacrificing the Air Force’s property rights to 200 acres of Government land, foregoing legal rights to recover damages, or giving away rights to 389 houses that were never built by defaulting developer American Eagle (a partnership between The Shaw Group and Carabetta Management). Unfortunately, the current Air Force plan to repair the American Eagle projects will result
in a windfall for American Eagle, which has already received and sold 100 acres of Government-owned, barrier island property, valued by the Air Force at $26 million. On April 30, 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 22–0 to require the Air Force to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before executing this plan. As clarified by the committee, the evaluation should include an analysis of all options available to the Air Force to repair all American Eagle projects, including Patrick AFB. If confirmed, what steps will you take to review the housing privatization projects at these four bases before executing the current Air Force plan?

Mr. DONLEY. I share your concerns and thank you for your continued advocacy for our airmen and their families.

As I understand it, 101 acres of property was sold previously for $25 million by the Patrick Family Housing LLC to a third party developer, with a substantial portion of the proceeds of that sale coming into the housing privatization deal as the Air Force’s cash equity contribution to build houses at Patrick AFB.

With respect to the remaining acreage, the Air Force still retains all rights on the undeveloped portion of the 172 acre project site, and development is currently restricted solely to military family housing. The Air Force is currently conducting a cost-benefit analysis, in accordance with Section 2805 of Senate bill S. 3001 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), which requires the Secretary of the Air Force to submit this cost-benefit analysis before dissolving the Patrick Family Housing LLC. We are currently working to complete that cost benefit analysis and we will discuss the results with you and the committee before any final action is taken.

I am currently reviewing possible courses of action and I have asked my staff to meet with you and your staff during the week of July 28, 2008, to go over possible courses of action being considered. Like you, my goal remains to provide quality housing for airmen and their families at all of our military installations. Thank you again for your continued support of our Air Force.

6. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you execute any plan involving Patrick AFB before the completion of all Federal investigations into housing privatization at Patrick AFB?

Mr. DONLEY. As part of any sale transaction, the Air Force will provide a Release to the project owners that specifically excludes environmental, suspension and debarment, and any criminal matters from the release. If the sale occurs before any Federal investigation is completed, the exemptions in the release protect the interests of the Government.

7. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you execute any plan to transfer the American Eagle project at Patrick AFB to another developer before all Federal investigations involving the project have concluded, with findings presented to Congress?

Mr. DONLEY. As part of any sale transaction, the Air Force will provide a release to the project owners that specifically excludes environmental, suspension and debarment, and any criminal matters from the release. If the sale occurs before any Federal investigation is completed, the exemptions in the release protect the interests of the Government.

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, aside from its current plan, has the Air Force explored other options to repair the American Eagle projects? Please describe all such options and explain why they were rejected.

Mr. DONLEY. As I understand it, the Air Force has worked closely with the project owners and bondholders on the proposed sale of all four projects together, but also looked at other options including other groupings of the projects, such as: (1) three bases without the Moody project; (2) Air Force termination of the lease and use agreement; (3) allowing the bondholders to foreclose on the projects; and (4) the Project Owners declaring bankruptcy.

The other groupings considered for the sale all included Patrick AFB because of the value of the project, but were rejected because they did not address the problems at Moody AFB. The other options were rejected because of the uncertain timelines from potential litigation, the failure to address payment of liens and claims at each of the four projects, and the fact that the Air Force would be required to take over the operations and maintenance and development responsibility for the projects.

In no case does the Air Force intend to give up its current legal or contractual rights absent favorable consideration. The Air Force’s goal remains providing quality housing for the airmen and their families.
9. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, a major initiative of the Air Force is the creation of a Cyber Command, whose purpose as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the “use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.” If confirmed, will you continue to support the creation of this command according to the current timeline including stand up date of October 1, 2008?

Mr. DONLEY. I do not yet have a fully formed opinion on this question, but it is an area that I will focus on in the near future. I do agree that this is an increasingly important domain, and that Air Force efforts in this area need to be coordinated, not only within the Air Force, but with similar DOD and Service initiatives.

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, the previous Secretary of the Air Force had responsibility to be the Defense Department Executive Agent for Space. If confirmed, will you also be charged with this responsibility and what do you see as your highest priorities in that role?

Mr. DONLEY. If confirmed, I intend to exercise all responsibilities and authorities assigned to this office, including those associated with the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for Space, consistent with DOD Directive 5101.2. This includes evaluating and advising OSD on the planning, programming, and acquisition of space systems within DOD, in concert with the Heads of DOD Components, and the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), USD (Policy), and USD (Intelligence). I have not yet had time, however, to develop a prioritized list in this area.

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, as Executive Agent, what role would you have in reviewing space programs of the Missile Defense Agency?

Mr. DONLEY. The Missile Defense Agency is not subject to oversight by the Executive Agent for Space. However, if confirmed, I would continue to work to foster the strong collaborative relationship that has been developed with the Missile Defense Agency, to include participating in the Missile Defense Executive Board.

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, space acquisition programs are behind schedule, over budget, and often plagued with technical problems. What is your assessment of the root causes of these problems and what will you continue or change to improve the acquisition process if confirmed?

Mr. DONLEY. It appears that many of our legacy space acquisition programs suffered from overly optimistic cost estimates, development based on immature technologies, and a shortfall in overarching systems engineering. I believe that programs perform better both for cost and schedule when programmatic risk is reduced through overarching systems engineering, the use of mature technologies proven in a realistic operational environment, and programs are funded to high-confidence cost estimates. It is also critical to establish and hold constant the performance requirements once they are validated and approved. I understand the Air Force has also implemented senior level configuration steering boards, as directed by USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)), to balance emerging requirements with funding during program execution, and has implemented a “Back to Basics” approach for space acquisition that stresses the factors above.

13. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, many of the space programs that the Air Force funds and operates are used to support a wide variety of military and other users. As a result, there is periodically a concern that the Air Force may underfund these programs to ensure that Air Force funding goes to more Air Force-focused programs. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that Air Force meets its broad commitments?

Mr. DONLEY. I am mindful of the vast reliance on space capabilities for which the Air Force maintains stewardship. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Air Force meets its broad commitments, in air, space, and cyberspace, in the most effective way possible within the funding available.

14. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, what is your reaction to a recent proposal to create a space directorate that reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence?

Mr. DONLEY. I do not yet have a fully formed opinion on this proposal, but I do believe that space related efforts across DOD must be synchronized with those of
the DNI. If confirmed, in my role as the DOD Executive Agent for space, I would work to continue to foster a strong, collaborative relationship between the DOD agencies and components, USD(P), USD(AT&L), USD(I), as well as the DNI on national security space matters.

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES

15. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, in the Air Force posture statement in March 2008, your predecessor said that the Air Force was committed to reducing its consumption of fossil fuels. One of the goals was to have all aircraft certified to use synthetic fuels by 2011. Another was to have the Air Force to continue to lead the U.S. Government in green power for base operations. What plans, if any, would you put in place to have the Air Force develop and procure alternative energy technologies and alternative fuels to reduce energy costs? For example, what plans does the Air Force have now and what would you do to accelerate the use of alternate energy support vehicles (hybrids, etc.) on AFBs in order to reduce costs?

Mr. DONLEY. I am still reviewing the Air Force energy program. In general, I support the program's three-part strategy of reducing energy demand and consumption, increasing supplies from alternative sources, and shaping the Air Force culture to increase energy awareness in all we do. I also support the focused effort to certify Air Force aircraft on a 50/50 blend of Fischer-Tropsch and JP–8 fuel by 2011, and to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels.

I support the innovative efforts such as current Air Force initiative to convert 30 percent of its light duty vehicles to low-speed vehicles by 2012, with the goal to convert the entire fleet by 2015, as well as the efforts to increase the procurement of renewable energy—such as the Photovoltaic Solar Array at Nellis AFB and the Waste-to-Energy project at Eielson AFB—as well as the pursuit of advanced engine technology to develop more efficient jet engines.

MISSILE INDUSTRIAL BASE

16. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, in fiscal year 2009, for the first time the United States will no longer have intercontinental ballistic missiles in production, or active plans for a future replacement. Have you thought about any plans to sustain this industrial base to ensure the U.S. could meet any future production capability for a land-based strategic deterrent?

Mr. DONLEY. The U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) production concluded with Peacekeeper in the early 1990s. Since that time, the ICBM industrial base has supported various modernization efforts for the deployed ICBM fleet. By exercising unique strategic missile skills, the current ICBM Demonstration/Validation program is one of the several a gap between the completion of the ICBM Modernization programs and the beginning of a follow-on ICBM or Minuteman III life extension program.

The Air Force is also currently working, in response to Senate Report 110–155, to provide a “Report on ICBM Industrial Base Capabilities to Maintain, Modernize, and Sustain Minuteman III through 2030 and Provide a Replacement Land-Based Strategic Deterrent System After 2030,” which will address these issues in greater detail. This report is due to Congress in August 2008.

SPACE PROTECTION

17. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, protecting our space assets is an important mission of the Air Force as well as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). To that end Congress has required a joint space protection be developed. The Air Force and the NRO have recently established a joint protection program. Will you ensure that this program is adequately funded including the highest priority of ensuring that the United States has adequate space situational awareness (SSA)?

Mr. DONLEY. Given our national dependence on our space systems, Space Protection and SSA continue to be of great concern to the Air Force. The joint AFSPC/NRO Space Protection Program was established to preserve national security space effects through an integrated strategy to articulate vulnerabilities, assess threat impacts, identify options and recommend solutions leading to comprehensive space protection capabilities. Once determined, these solutions will then be implemented to provide the most cost effective capability for protecting the space environment.

As I understand it, AFSPC conducted a Best Value Architecture Study for SSA to determine where the near/far-term investments in SSA should occur. Based on these results, they determined that first we have to do a better job in exploiting the
data we already have. This means in the near-term fusing the data to obtain more precise and accurate information we can use efficiently. Second, they determined we need to increase our sustainment efforts to support the infrastructure and systems keeping those sources of data online. Finally, we need to look at developing better/more sensors to improve our capabilities in the far-term.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

18. Senator C LINTON. Mr. Donley, the Air Force is now developing the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010. With the new guidance from the Secretary of Defense to protect end strength as well as re-examine the proposed modernization accounts to meet the needs of the Total Force, what are your plans to ensure in the POM the adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard from its equipment, personnel, and sustainment perspectives?

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force’s budget submission included a detailed review of all applicable guidance, and is the result of a careful review of Total Force modernization, personnel, and sustainment. The Air Force remains committed to Total Force Integration and in the 2010 POM will expand on the progress we have made to integrate the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total Force in all areas including equipment, personnel, and sustainment.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

19. Senator C LINTON. Mr. Donley, Secretary Gates has stressed the importance of the Air Force providing a more robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to the warfighter. How will you enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary's objectives, and within what timeframe will you be able to do so?

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force has been responsive to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan by innovating means to rapidly put ISR data directly into the hands of our joint and combined force at all levels. For example, the Air Force fielded 4,000 remotely operated video enhanced receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive unmanned aircraft system (UAS) pictures; accelerated MQ–1 Predator operations well beyond the DOD-directed program of record, and introduced the MQ–9 Reaper into combat a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS capability at maximum capacity with near-term focus, and we're proud of the dedicated airmen around the globe who are making this happen.

The original Predator UAS requirement was 21 CAPs by 2010, but the Air Force is currently flying 26 CAPs today, and planning to further increase Predator CAPs to 31 by December 2008. The Air Force is pushing ISR capability into the field as soon as it is becomes available. We have issued a request for proposal (RFP) for new UASs, and we are shifting our UAS procurement from the older MQ–1 to the more capable MQ–9. When equipped with the new wide area airborne surveillance pod, our MQ–9 UASs will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than a single MQ–1 Predator.

In addition, the Air Force has pushed legacy ISR “workhorses”—the U–2s, RC–135s, and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)—to the maximum tempo possible to get as much collection capability to the fight as possible. We are also embedding ISR liaison teams at division and brigade combat team levels to tailor ISR capabilities for the specific tactical fights of these units. Further, we are also capitalizing on important technical advances in our ISR analysis enterprise, to turn data into actionable intelligence. These advances-coupled with upgrades to our Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS—our primary imagery analysis capability) and increased efficiency through reachback to continental United States resources—ensure that joint warfighters get the maximum ISR support possible.

Finally, the Air Force is working as part of the Secretary of Defense’s ISR Task Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight in the near term, through both additional buys of equipment (such as RC–12 aircraft tailored to the irregular warfare fight) and creative concepts that will add value in the near term. The Air Force and our airmen are committed to winning the current fight, and our ISR posture reflects that commitment.
C–5 FLEET

20. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Donley, the recently signed Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C–17s for the Air Force to meet its strategic airlift requirements. The Air Force has continued to state its need to balance the cost of sustaining the C–5 fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for additional C–17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C–5 fleet.

Mr. DONLEY. Our first priority is always to provide the best overall airlift capability to the joint warfighter. There are two issues with respect to the proper balance between the C–5s and C–17s that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The first is the total number of tails. The current requirement of 299 tails was set by the 2007 NDAA, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009 program of record for strategic airlift is 190 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 59 C–5As.

The second issue is the minimum number of million ton miles per day (MTM/D) available in our total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy certification, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated a requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C–5s and C–17s). A fleet of 190 C–17s and 111 C–5s does not meet the 33.95 MTM/D goal. The addition of 15 C–17s in the Global War on Terrorism Supplemental bill allows the Air Force to meet the 33.95 MTM/D requirement. A fleet of 205 C–17s and 111 C–5s meets both these requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the U.S. Transportation Command Commander and cited in the USD(AT&L) Nunn-McCurdy Acquisition Decision Memorandum.

The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and retirement of portions of the C–5A fleet. The C–17 has proven itself to be a highly reliable and versatile strategic airlift platform that will serve the Nation well across the full range of military operations. We will continue to analyze the overall requirement and make sure we maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available in the spring of 2009, is the next big force design milestone.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

PILOT PROGRAM ON COMMERCIAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE AIR REFUELING

21. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, in your advance policy question responses you state, “The Air Force must determine the feasibility of executing a program based on industry responses. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and integration. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal year 2012–2016. If confirmed, I will monitor progress on this plan to ensure we meet the pilot program objective.” Understanding the final fee-for-service air refueling RFP is planned for the first quarter fiscal year 2009, please provide the committee with the anticipated date for the draft RFP. In addition, please provide the anticipated pilot program contract award date.

Mr. DONLEY. The planned date for the draft RFP will be 45 days prior to final RFP release and is anticipated no later than 15 Nov 08. The planned contract award date, pending successful completion of competitive source selection, is anticipated no later than 12 months after receipt of proposals or approximately second quarter fiscal year 2010. This will begin the industry funded boom integration and certification effort, which is required prior to start of the 5-year evaluation period.

22. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, given the success of the U.S. Navy commercial fee-for-service aerial refueling program since 2001, the committee does not foresee any impediments to the feasibility of executing a commercial fee-for-service Air Force pilot program to demonstrate and validate Air Force air refueling in the mission areas identified in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, pending industry ability to provide boom capable aircraft. Please confirm to the committee that the Air Force fee-for-service RFP will specifically demonstrate “a pilot program on commercial fee-for-service air refueling support for the Air Force” as required in section 1081 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, and will not require passenger and cargo capability.

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force intends to execute the pilot program as directed in section 1081 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008. I have not yet had time to review the actual implementation plan, but I understand that section 1081 requires that all tanker mission areas be evaluated and specifically lists Aeromedical Evacuation as a mission area to include in the pilot program evaluation. I also understand that industry will likely find it more difficult to field boom technology on derivative air-
craft, as compared with the current probe and drogue configuration used for the U.S. Navy commercial fee-for-service aerial refueling program, but I will look into this program in the near future.

AIR FORCE LOBBYING ON BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE JOINT BASING DECISION

23. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, in recent months, this committee has expressed concerns about a legislative provision inserted in the recent enacted 2008 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act that would undermine the Secretary of Defense’s authority to carry out a 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) decision related to the establishment of 12 joint bases. In a May 28, 2008, letter responding to my concerns about lobbying efforts by senior Air Force leaders related to this provision, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England stated, “The Secretary of the Air Force has been asked to conduct an internal investigation of this matter and to recommend appropriate actions.” Are you aware of this internal investigation?

Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

24. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, what is the status of this investigation?

Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

25. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, if not yet completed, when will the investigation be completed?

Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

26. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, when the investigation is complete, will you promptly provide to this committee the findings and who is accountable for the lobbying efforts within the Air Force to undermine this BRAC joint basing recommendation?

Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

JOINT BASING

27. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, as one of the prime sponsors of the BRAC process, I am very concerned about the negative precedent established by a legislative provision to allow a Service Secretary to interfere with the implementation of a BRAC recommendation. I noticed from your answers to the advance policy questions that you did not specifically reply whether, in your view, the joint basing BRAC decision will result in significant cost savings. This is important because current law, absent any future actions by Congress, requires you to certify this fact to Congress before the Secretary of Defense can carry out the BRAC decision. In your opinion, will the BRAC decision that directs the establishment of 12 joint bases result specifically in significant cost savings?

Mr. Donley. I believe joint basing will likely result in greater efficiencies in installation management and can be carried out in a manner that will not adversely impact the Air Force. I have not yet seen DOD’s specific cost analyses associated with the Joint Basing initiatives, but it is my experience that similar initiatives in the past have provided savings over time.

28. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, in your opinion, will the establishment of joint bases not negatively impact the morale of members of the Air Force?

Mr. Donley. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their missions and provide the highest standards for all warfighters and their families. We want joint bases to be so efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for every servicemember.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

29. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Donley, Congress appropriated $16 million in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222) to demonstrate the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS) electro-optical sensor on the
E–8 JSTARS in support of the requirement for a combat identification capability on JSTARS, to reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline. I understand the Air Force has issued an urgent operational need for a stand-alone combat identification capability on E–8C JSTARS. In light of the Secretary of Defense’s call for more intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to support the warfighter, what are the Air Force’s plans for expeditiously executing this demonstration program so that the E–8C JSTARS platform can more effectively and efficiently prosecute targets of interest in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Mr. DONLEY. The JSTARS program office has researched how the $16.0 million SYERS congressional add could best be utilized. The program office concluded the most reasonable approach is to conduct a feasibility study to determine how to install and employ SYERS on JSTARS without hindering other systems and to accurately estimate the costs associated with the effort. The JSTARS program office awarded the contract on July 11, 2008, to initiate the feasibility study. The study is expected to take approximately 4 months.

30. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Donley, the current TF–33–102C engines on the JSTARS do not satisfy desired safety margins or meet operational needs, and also limit JSTARS’ operational parameters. I am pleased that the Air Force has contracted for the first two ship sets to re-engine the JSTARS aircraft. Re-engining the JSTARS fleet will increase mission efficiency as well as significantly reduce maintenance and fuel costs. Given the expected savings and increased capability that new engines will provide to this critical high demand asset, can you provide your assurance of the Air Force’s commitment to fully re-engine the JSTARS fleet?

Mr. DONLEY. The JSTARS program office awarded an Undefinitized Contract Action for the first two ship sets in May 2008, with deliveries scheduled for November–December 2010. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget funds retrofit of 10 aircraft out of 17. Funding for the remaining seven operational aircraft remains an Air Force Priority and is being considered in the fiscal year 2010 POM process within the DOD.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAX BAUCUS AND SENATOR JON TESTER

UNIT/INVENTORY RETIREMENTS

31. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, the Air Force’s General Counsel has determined that the Air Force may retire an aircraft squadron as soon as a BRAC direction to establish a squadron is achieved. Under the General Counsel’s definition, the term “establish” includes the assignment of personnel and construction of military construction (MILCON) necessary for the unit’s operation. Do you believe it is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars to retire a squadron when the Air Force has spent scarce funds to assign personnel and conduct MILCON activities for that squadron?

Mr. DONLEY. The situation you describe results from BRAC decisions that directed changes to the Air Force’s force structure plan. Changing mission requirements and follow-on analyses have identified additional options to consolidate aircraft by type and location to maximize combat capability and achieve efficiencies in our operations. If confirmed, we will review those mission assignments directed by the 2005 BRAC legislation, and subsequent POM and budgetary decisions to assure we are making the very best use of taxpayer resources.

32. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, understanding the need for the Air Force to retain discretion to move or retire units as needed to organize, train and equip, do you believe that it is consistent with the spirit and intent of BRAC law to move or retire Air Force units within a year or 2 of their BRAC-required establishment?

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force is committed to complying with the BRAC law. I have not yet had time to review this area, but I will look into it in the near future to ensure that any potential adjustments due to evolving mission requirements or economic factors are thoroughly reviewed and discussed with Congress prior to taking action.

33. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, please describe your understanding of the Air Force’s plans to reduce the F–15 aircraft inventory. What in your view is the strategic and operational risk associated with this reduction in the near- and mid-term as well as the potential impact on pilot readiness, especially in
the Air National Guard. Is this risk acceptable? At what level is it unacceptable? A classified reply is acceptable for the questions relating to risk level.

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force’s long-range plan is to ramp down the F–15 force to 177 aircraft and base them with Total Force Integration (TFI) units. The impact to risk and readiness with respect to a reduction in force structure is being evaluated. However, based on proposed F–15 force structure and the TFI construct, preliminary analysis shows there will be no impact to pilot readiness and risks are acceptable.

34. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you rapidly re-examine all scenarios under consideration by the Air Force for inclusion in the fiscal year 2010 POM that proposes to move or retire aircraft and units that were established by the 2005 law? Will you share with Congress your assessment, including analysis of costs or savings associated with these moves or retirements?

Mr. DONLEY. If confirmed, we intend to perform a thorough review of the Air Force’s fiscal year 2010 POM submission to ensure compliance with BRAC implementation. We will identify in our fiscal year 2010 budget submission any BRAC implementation issues that may arise, and will discuss these issues with Congress as appropriate.

[The nomination reference of Michael B. Donley follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report
As in Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Michael Bruce Donley, of Virginia, to be Secretary of the Air Force, vice Michael W. Wynne, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Michael B. Donley, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Michael B. Donley

Michael B. Donley is the Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC. He was designated by the President to perform the duties of this position, effective June 21, 2008. His formal nomination to be Secretary is pending in the U.S. Senate. He is responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its over 300,000 men and women on Active Duty, 180,000 members of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, 160,000 civilians, and their families. He also oversees the Air Force’s annual budget of approximately $110 billion.

Mr. Donley has 30 years of experience in the national security community, including service in the Senate, the White House, and the Pentagon. Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Donley served as the Director of Administration and Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He oversaw organizational and management planning for the Department of Defense (DOD) and all administration, facility, information technology, and security matters for the Pentagon.

From 1996 to 2005, Mr. Donley was a Senior Vice President at Hicks and Associates, Inc., a subsidiary of Science Applications International Corporation, and a consultant to DOD and the State Department on national security matters.

From 1993 to 1996, Mr. Donley was Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses. During this period he was a Senior Consultant to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and participated in two studies on the organization of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Prior to this position, he served as the Acting Secretary of the Air Force for 7 months, and from 1989 to 1993 he served as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller).

Mr. Donley supported two Presidents and five National Security Advisors during his service at the National Security Council (NSC) from 1984 to 1989. As Deputy Executive Secretary he oversaw the White House Situation Room and chaired inter-
agency committees on crisis management procedures and continuity of government. Earlier, as Director of Defense Programs, Mr. Donley was the NSC representative to the Defense Resources Board, and coordinated the President’s quarterly meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He conceived and organized the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission), coordinated White House policy on the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, and wrote the National Security Strategy for President Reagan’s second term.

He was also a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee (1981–1984). Mr. Donley served in the United States Army from 1972 to 1975 with the XVIII Airborne Corps and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), attending the Army's Intelligence and Airborne Schools and the Defense Language Institute.

Mr. Donley earned both Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees in international relations from the University of Southern California. He also attended the Senior Executives in National Security Program at Harvard University.

Résumé of Career Service of Michael B. Donley

Education:
1972 U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.
1973 Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA.
1974 U.S. Army Airborne School, Fort Benning, GA.
1977 Bachelor of Arts degree in international relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.
1978 Master of Arts degree in international relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.
1986 Senior Executives in National Security Program, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Career chronology:
1972–1975, U.S. Army, XVIII Airborne Corps and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC.
1978–1979, Editor, National Security Record, Heritage Foundation, Washington DC.
1981–1984, Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC.
1984–1987, Director of Defense Programs, National Security Council, the White House, Washington DC.
1987–1989, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, the White House, Washington DC.
1989–1993, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Controller), Washington DC.
1993, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC.
1993–1996, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA.
1996–2005, Senior Vice President at Hicks and Associates, Inc., a subsidiary of Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA.
2005–2008, Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC.
2008–present, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Michael B. Donley in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Michael Bruce Donley.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Secretary of the Air Force.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   October 4, 1952; Hamilton Air Force Base, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Gail Louise Ellestad Donley.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Katherine Marie Donley, age 28.
   Cameron Rice Donley, age 26.
   Jacqueline Suzanne Donley, age 25.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   Georgetown University—PhD Coursework—09/02–06/03
   University of Southern California—Master of Arts—06/77–06/78
   University of Southern California—Bachelor of Arts—09/75–06/77

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   05/05–Present, Director, Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Robert M. Gates.
   04/96–05/05, Senior Vice President, Hicks & Associates, Inc., SAIC, McLean, VA, Richard Mies.
   09/93–03/96, Senior Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA, Larry D. Welch.
   11/89–09/93, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force, Pentagon, Donald B. Rice.
   01/88–11/89, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, White House, G. Phillip Hughes.
   06/84–01/88, Director, Defense Programs, National Security Council, White House, Robert Linhard.
   01/81–06/84, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Rhett B. Dawson.
10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

1995—Senior Consultant, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.
2005—Co-Chair, Interagency Panel, Defense Science Board Summer Study on Transformation.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Elder, Westminster Presbyterian Church, Alexandria, VA.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

None.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

None.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

Air Force Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service (1993)
Army Commendation Medal (1975)
National Defense Service Ribbon

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

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**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

Michael B. Donley.

This 26th day of June, 2008.

[The nomination of Michael B. Donley was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 26, 2008, with the recommenda-
tion that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on October 2, 2008.

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. In my prior assignments I have had ample opportunities to observe the implementation and impact of Goldwater-Nichols and the Special Operations reforms on all Services, including the Air Force. I completely agree with the goals of those defense reforms; they remain essential to the effective employment of our Nation's military forces. Most importantly, these reforms have yielded a demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. I have no specific modifications that I would recommend based on my prior assignments. However, if confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and other senior leaders of our Nation's military forces, as well as Congress, to continually review Goldwater-Nichols and implement any changes that may be needed.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. At this time I have no suggested modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. However, if confirmed, I look forward to the opportunities to further explore and assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of a Chief of Service.

Question. Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

Answer. Over the two plus decades since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols "jointness" has been institutionalized in the Armed Forces of the United States. Service chiefs have played a critical role in those efforts. Their roles and responsibilities are critical to further progress in integrating unified, interdependent action within the Armed Forces. Based upon my years of service, I believe that Goldwater-Nichols appropriately establishes those roles and that policies and processes in existence allow the fulfillment of them. However, if confirmed, I look forward to the opportunities to further explore and assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of Chief of Service and would welcome the opportunity to share my thoughts and ideas with the committee as appropriate.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?

Answer. At this time I have no suggested modifications to roles of the service chiefs in the resource allocation process. While there may be areas that could benefit from legislative or policy changes (funding for the Unified Commands, for example), I would like to reserve judgment until after I have further studied the resource allocation process, as it has been more than 10 years since I personally participated in those Air Force processes. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to share my thoughts and ideas with the committee as appropriate.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 8033 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the composition and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the authority of the Chairman of the Air Force, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also es-
tablish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the following officials:

Question. The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense serves as the principal assistant to the President on all Department of Defense matters. Senior Air Force leadership operates subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will work closely with the other members of the Joint Chiefs to provide the best possible military advice to the Secretary of Defense, particularly with regard to matters of air and space operations, policy, and strategy.

Question. The Secretary of the Air Force.

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and performs duties subject to his authority, direction, and control. For the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders in their mission accomplishment. The Chief of Staff oversees members and organizations across the Air Force advising the Secretary on plans and recommendations, and, acting as an agent of the Secretary, implements upon approval. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I will work very closely with the Secretary to ensure our ability to rapidly provide forces tailored to meet the needs and objectives of our combatant commanders.

Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, to act for and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters for which the Secretary is responsible; that is to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. In addition, the Under Secretary of the Air Force has duties and responsibilities as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the individual serving as the Under Secretary when one is appointed.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with and through the Chairman in formulating military advice as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by advising him on Air Force capabilities and our preparations to support the combatant commanders in the conduct of military operations. I look forward to performing the duties assigned to the Chief of Staff by law to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces as needed by the combatant commanders and to providing military advice on matters within my expertise, as required.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and obligations of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When performing duties as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will assist the Vice Chairman to execute the duties prescribed by law or otherwise directed by Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The Chiefs of the other Services.

Answer. A whole host of factors underscore the importance of close cooperation among the Services in order to ensure the preparation, equipping and availability of the military forces our Nation needs, perhaps more so now than at any other time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chiefs of the other Services to capitalize on our individual strengths, complement our capabilities and enhance mutually beneficial relationships as we carry out our responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I know each of them well. My goal will be to work with each of them to enhance joint interoperability and other joint warfighting capabilities in order to provide the force mix desired by the combatant commanders.

Question. The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command.

Answer. I am keenly aware of the importance of a strong close working relationship between the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and the Air Force, its primary source of airlift. The Air Force remains a key contributor to TRANSCOM’s success in meeting national military requirements. If confirmed, I will work to further enhance the Air Force’s support to the Commander of TRANSCOM.

Question. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

Answer. A very close working relationship with the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commander will be essential to identifying and implementing effective and enduring solutions to any issues that remain regarding the Air Force’s role and
ability to support our Nation's nuclear deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the STRATCOM commander is constantly apprised on the readiness of Air Force air and space forces required to support STRATCOM's missions, and will strive, in particular, to collaborate on Service efforts to maintain the highest standards of performance in the nuclear and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission areas.

Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will work with the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that the Air Force is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide the capabilities the combatant commanders need to execute their missions. This goal can be achieved through forthright and direct dialogue with the combatant commanders which I will undertake.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition serves as the Air Force's Senior Acquisition Executive. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force and Assistant Secretary on matters affecting the acquisition of the resources needed to train and equip of Air Force, and strive to ensure military expertise is readily available in accomplishing his or her responsibilities.

Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief ethics official of the Department of the Air Force and serves as the senior legal advisor to Air Force leaders. She is responsible, on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I would look forward to developing an excellent working relationship with the General Counsel.

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per 10 U.S.C. § 8037, is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force and I would use him as such. He is also responsible for directing judge advocates in the performance of their duties. If confirmed I will endeavor to maintain the close and important working relationship the Chief of Staff has historically enjoyed with the Judge Advocate General.

Answer. I have a strong affinity for the United States Air Force Academy. It remains a key source of and venue for the development of tomorrow's leaders of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Superintendent to address issues faced by the Academy and to promote the Academy's sustained commitment to excellence and fulfillment of its very important character building mission.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force fulfills a number of duties and functions. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he or she serves as a military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of Staff is also subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, providing plans and recommendations to the Secretary, implementing policy, overseeing the Air Staff and other members and organizations of the Air Force. He is a principal advisor to the Secretary. Working for and through the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders' accomplishment of their missions.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I would expect the Secretary of the Air Force to assign me duties consistent with the responsibilities outlined above to ensure that the Air Force is appropriately organized, trained, and equipped to meet its institutional obligations and force provider responsibilities.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to section 8034 of title 10, U.S.C., relating to the Air Staff and its composition and functions?
Answer. Based on my military service and experience to date, I do not believe changes are necessary to section 8032 of title 10, U.S.C., which outlines the general duties of the Air Staff. It has, however, been 10 years since my last service on the Air Staff. I would, therefore, like to reserve judgment until I have observed Air Staff performance, if confirmed.

Question. What do you believe are your qualifications to assume this office?
Answer. In the 35 years that I have been on Active Duty in the Air Force, I have served in a range of positions and have enjoyed a variety of opportunities and experiences which helped prepare me to serve as Chief of Staff, if I am confirmed. During that time I have been privileged to serve with and learn from a host of exceptional service men and women, including members of our sister Services and many in joint positions of trust.

Prior to my current assignment I served in Joint Staff positions that involved direct and frequent contact with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and other Service Chiefs on an array of major issues confronting our Nation and our military.

As the TRANSCOM commander, I have been on the "receiving" end of the efforts of Air Force leaders to organize, train and equip the great men and women of the Air Force. In addition, this position gave me a broad leadership perspective on the interaction of the Department of Defense, the combatant commands (COCOMs), and our Services in executing our National Military Strategy. These experiences and perspectives will be invaluable if I am confirmed to serve as Chief of Staff.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff I will need a complete understanding of the issues and challenges facing the Air Force. I will work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force to identify, assess, and address these challenges and to ensure the readiness and relevance of our Air Force and the safety and well-being of our people. I will strive every hour of every day to ensure I am prepared to help lead the military service to which I have dedicated my life's work.

**MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS**

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

Answer. The next Chief of Staff must restore the national trust and confidence in the U.S. Air Force to organize, train, and equip forces proficient across the spectrum of peacetime and wartime missions. In order to accomplish this, we must reinvigorate our nuclear enterprise, refine and adapt our ways and means for winning today's irregular fight, take good care of airmen and their families, and prepare our organizations, training, and equipment for an uncertain future.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately focus on implementing recommendations of the various reports and studies on the Air Force nuclear enterprise. I will ensure that we take proper action with respect to the findings detailed in the Donald Report, the Welch report, the Blue Ribbon Review, and the forthcoming Schlesinger report. Additionally, the other major challenges we face in the Air Force are similar to the ones facing the other Services: managing the competing imperatives of current readiness versus longer term modernization, instituting continuous process improvements and caring for people. If confirmed, I expect to be heavily engaged with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Services, combatant commanders, and Congress to address these challenges.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

Answer. The most serious problem facing our Service is the restoration of trust and confidence in the U.S. Air Force. To do this we must work with our joint and coalition partners to fight and win today's irregular conflict while maintaining excellence across the spectrum of peacetime and wartime operations, especially our nuclear and ISR forces, and in our acquisition functions. The Air Force remains committed to providing Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power for and with our joint partners.

**Question.** If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. We face immediate challenges today, and there are significant challenges ahead. If confirmed, I will prioritize and focus on these concerns and develop solutions for the nuclear enterprise, ISR and acquisition in the near term, others to follow.

**PRIORITIES**

**Question.** If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

Answer. My priorities are: (1) reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear enterprise, (2) partnering with the joint and coalition team to win today's fight, (3) developing and caring for our airmen, and (4) modernizing our organizations, training and equip-
ment for 21st century challenges. If confirmed, my emphasis will be on providing Total Force Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power for the joint team.

HEALTH BENEFIT COSTS

Question. The cost of the Defense Health Program, like the cost of medical care nation-wide, is escalating rapidly. If confirmed, how would you approach the issue of rising personnel costs, including health care costs, as a component of the annual Air Force budget?

Answer. Over the past 10 years, my sense is we have worked diligently to streamline our medical infrastructure and take advantage of advancements in the field of medicine. This has resulted in rightsizing many of our facilities without compromising the care we provide our airmen and their families. It hasn’t been pain free, but in my own experience at Scott AFB, it is working. We currently are leveraging strategic partnerships with civilian trauma centers, university medical centers, the VA, and other DOD facilities such as Landstuhl to provide the broadest range of clinical opportunities for our entire medical team. I understand we have maintained our ability to support the Air Force mission, broadened the scope of practice for our health care professionals, and ensured our beneficiaries received the highest quality care. Our medical coverage at Balad and Bagram on behalf of the joint team reflects this sense of conviction of our medical professionals.

One of our top priorities is to take care of our airmen and their families. As a retention force, quality of health care is of critical concern to our airmen and any degradation of benefits or service will hurt our recruiting and retention. I fully expect to properly budget for all appropriate personnel pay and health care costs in our PB submission.

LEADERSHIP

Question. The resignation of the Secretary of the Air Force and the retirement of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force resulted from a failure of leadership related to nuclear safety. There have also been a number of other problems relating to administrative, acquisition and operational matters that point to a failure of leadership and lack of accountability.

If confirmed, what plans do you have to restore confidence in the uniformed leadership of the Air Force to deal with these problems?

Answer. Air Force core values—Integrity First, Service before Self, and Excellence in All We Do—will see us through this critical transition as we recommit ourselves to the sacred trust of this great Nation. If confirmed, I will follow these core values and hold myself and our airmen accountable as we restore our Nation’s confidence.

I will expect Air Force leaders to embrace and enforce accountability, especially in the focus areas of our nuclear enterprise, winning today’s fight, and Air Force acquisition programs. We will match our words with our actions. In doing so, we will achieve our priorities as well as reclaim and uphold the reputation which has sustained our Air Force through the years.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Question. The airborne ISR assets developed and operated by the Air Force form an indispensable part of the Nation’s overall intelligence architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, low density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and high operational tempo on their systems and crews.

In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR assets to meet current and projected requirements?

Answer. The Air Force is striving to meet current ISR demand by rapidly increasing actual numbers of ISR platforms, integrating nontraditional ISR means, and establishing mechanisms to improve analysis, processing, targeting, and systems to expand ISR dissemination. For example, I understand the Air Force is currently increasing combat air patrols (CAPs) of our unmanned airborne systems (UAS). Our JROC-approved UAS requirement is 21 CAPs, and we are already flying 26 today to meet the additional needs of the combatant commanders. We are further increasing CAPs to 31 by December 2008. Continued production will increase the density of these assets but demand will continue to be high. We will find ways to satisfy this demand both in capability terms and, importantly, execute the function in a manner that meets supported commander expectations.

Question. What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to current plans for the development and acquisition of airborne ISR platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the “high-demand/low-density” category?

Answer. I believe we need to move away from the notion of discrete ISR operations in separate domains and focus on integration of ISR capabilities to meet cur-
rent and future ISR demand. This includes integrating nontraditional ISR capabilities such as targeting pods and sensors on fighters, new UAVs, exploring the potential of airships with sensors, and then merging the ISR from all sources in networks that can be accessed by any warrior.

Question. Secretary Gates has publicly complained that the Air Force has not put sufficiently high priority on fielding unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to provide ISR support for the forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air Force answers Secretary Gates’ concerns and provides greater priority to providing ISR support of field operations?

Answer. I would ensure that our Air Force ISR experts continue to work closely with the supported commanders and the recently-established OSD ISR Task Force. By increasing the number of MQ–9 vehicles, pursuing the “Liberty Ship” construct for acquisition of more “light” manned ISR aircraft, and accelerating the development of the Wide Area Airborne Surveillance sensor system, the Air Force is working very hard to get more ISR capability to the combatant commanders in support of ongoing operations. If confirmed, this will have my personal attention from day one.

Question. The Air Force has indicated that the limiting factor in accelerating the fielding of UAV assets to provide ISR support for field operations has been the availability of trained operators, who, under current Air Force policy, must be rated pilots.

If confirmed, will you review the necessity for requiring rated pilots for the operation of ISR assets?

Answer. I’ll need time to assess the arguments. With respect to who flies UAS, the Air Force has both non-rated enlisted operators and as rated officer pilots accomplishing that function. The level of responsibility involved and the flight regime of the UAS system influences the appropriate level of qualification required. For instance, UAS that operate at the local level, versus theater level, are operated by both USAF and U.S. Army non-rated personnel.

Multi-mission, weapons delivery capable UAS such as MQ–1 Predator and MQ–9 Reaper, are part of a complex kill chain. To complete that kill chain often involves real-time command and control of lethal assets, and time-sensitive decision making for the delivery of ordnance in closely packed, dense environs, where the enemy is purposely hiding or shielding his whereabouts, and where collateral damage assessments, weaponeering calculations, and sensitive intelligence are necessary for making a targeting decision. Qualified rated pilots generally have the training and experience that is crucial to the success of this effort. Finally, the Air Force operates high and medium altitude UAS in and through positive-control airspace—by FAA and ICAO rules—that currently requires an instrument-qualified pilot. It may well be that a blend of rated and non-rated operators makes the most sense. If confirmed, I will come to a conclusion on this issue quickly.

TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES

Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Department of Defense assumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on implementing increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families.

What is your understanding of the Department’s proposals for changes in TRICARE fees for retired airmen, and, if they are implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Air Force?

Answer. I am told the Air Force supports the findings and recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care and will continue to work with our counterparts to find responsible, equitable adjustments to TRICARE fees that maintain commitments previously made to our retirees.

Question. What is your personal view of the justification for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees, and are there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?

Answer. As health care costs continue to rise we anticipate increasing pressure on other vital programs if we cannot control costs. I am not an expert in this discipline but, if confirmed, will quickly avail myself of information related to alternative means to assure availability of services at affordable cost.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff and the Air Staff, particularly in the areas of military justice and operational law?
Answer. I believe it is critical that the CSAF receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocates. Our senior uniformed lawyers bring a wealth of experience and perspective shaped by years of working with commanders in the field. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 8051 and 8037, the Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. TJAG also responds to CSAF direction and directs and supervises the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in providing legal advice and related services to commanders, agencies, and people Air Force-wide. TJAG’s ability to provide independent legal advice is not only statutorily guaranteed, it is important to Air Force senior leader decision making. Senior leaders are better equipped to make the best decisions when they are aware of both judge advocate advice and the advice from the Office of the General Counsel.

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of Staff Judge Advocates (SJAs) throughout the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to military commanders in the field and throughout the Air Force establishment?

Answer. SJAs are essential to the proper functioning of both operational and support missions. SJAs have a major responsibility to promote the interests of a command by providing relevant, timely, and independent advice to commanders, and this independence is reflected in statute (10 U.S.C. § 8037(f)(2)). Commanders are required by statute (10 U.S.C. § 806) to communicate with their SJAs on issues related to military justice matters, which is critical to disciplined mission execution. In addition, commanders and other leaders rely on their staff judge advocates for advice on all types of legal and policy matters. SJAs understand the rhythm; they understand the commander’s thought process; they know what his or her priorities are; and they understand what is happening in the field. They can offer advice and are somewhat independent of other policy concerns that might apply, so there is no pre-emption of the thought process. I think that it is very important, that commanders continue to receive uniformed legal advice.

AIR FORCE FUTURE TOTAL FORCE PLANNING

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant barriers to effective integration of Air Force Reserve and Active component personnel and units?

Answer. The Air Force has always operated as a Total Force, operating seamlessly in peacetime as well as war. In fact, the highly successful Classic Associate model has been in use for almost 40 years and is the baseline as we continue to optimize what each component brings to the fight.

Legally, title 10 and title 32 of United States Code have presented some of the more difficult challenges to the Total Force mission. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 has helped knock down many of the barriers between title 10 Federal and title 32 State chains of command impeding successful integration. Continued discussion of legislative and policy changes are occurring and will need to continue to ensure that the Air Force is able to operate as a Total Force with the most effective use of resources.

Question. What do you consider to be the most appropriate and achievable goal for integrating units of the Air National Guard into the operational missions, including homeland defense missions, of the U.S. Air Force?

Answer. The Guard and Reserve continue to be full partners in Total Force Integration (TFI) and will be involved in all new missions as they come on line. In fact, Air National Guard airmen are flying the first operational F–22s as part of a classic associate unit at Langley AFB. They are also performing high tech emerging missions: operating Predators, flying satellites, and processing battlefield intelligence which is providing direct support to the joint warfighter. We are integrating our Guard and Reserve components into many new weapon systems as well as continuing to explore ways to better associate the components in our enduring missions, capitalizing on the tremendous experience levels resident in the Guard and Reserve. We are standing up a number of classic, active, and ARC associate units in a variety of missions, stationing inexperienced Active Duty members at Guard and Reserve locations to be trained by seasoned pilots and maintainers. Of current note, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve airmen help protect the homeland through the aerial firefighting capability they provide in cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service. Every Air Force mission and platform can benefit from the experience and knowledge of our citizen airmen and the community connection they bring to the Air Force.

Question. What role and mission do you expect the Air Force Reserve to perform now and in the future?
Answer. In our Total Force Air Force we consider the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve to be equal partners and as such the previous answer applies to this question also.

**Question.** How would you assess the progress being made in further integrating the Air Force Reserve into the operational mission of the Air Force?

**Answer.** Integration of both the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard into operational missions continues to go very well. In fact, the first Associate unit was an Air Force Reserve unit back in 1968. Over the past 4 years we have expanded from 6 to over 130 Total Force Initiatives and developed additional organizational constructs. The Air Force has formalized the Total Force Integration process through official policy, guidance and oversight. These efforts have accelerated the transformation to a smaller, more capable, and more affordable Air Force composed of Regular, Guard, and Reserve airmen that magnify the unique assets of each component.

**AIR FORCE END STRENGTH**

**Question.** The Secretary of Defense recently announced he would halt the reduction in Air Force Active Duty end strength, and keep the Active Air Force at 330,000. For fiscal year 2008, Congress authorized an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 329,563 and for fiscal year 2009, the Department requested, and budgeted for, an Active-Duty end strength of 316,600.

How does the Air Force plan to pay for the extra end strength?

**Answer.** In the near-term, the Air Force is halting the previously planned drawdown. By stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, force shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay, will not be needed in fiscal year 2009 as originally budgeted. The Air Force will apply those funds to cover costs associated with fiscal year 2009 manpower increases. The long-term manpower increases supporting ongoing, new and emerging missions are being addressed in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum.

**Question.** Does the Air Force plan to formally request Congress to authorize an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 330,000 for fiscal year 2009, or does it plan to rely on its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war or national emergency?

**Answer.** The Air Force included in its fiscal year 2009 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) to Congress a request for funding end strength at 330,000 in fiscal year 2009. If funded, then Air Force expects to receive authorization, if not then the Air Force will exercise its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war and will readdress the program with the Department and Congress in the fiscal year 2010 cycle.

**Question.** Are there any increases to the Air Force Reserve or Air Guard planned in addition to the increases in the Active component?

**Answer.** Yes, there is a commensurate increase to Air Force Reserve end strength planned. We have worked extensively across our staffs to ensure we are adding back the correct mix of part-time and full-time reservists. I understand the Air Force Reserve proposes to increase end strength by 7,095 military personnel to a total of 74,795 by fiscal year 2015. This must be a total force solution as the Regular and Reserve components continue to associate over a wide variety of mission sets creating greater efficiencies for the total force.

There are currently no plans to increase Air National Guard (ANG) end strength. As part of their planned reductions, the ANG elected to accept budget offsets versus manpower reductions. While this offered a temporary solution, the budgetary offsets could have impact on overall readiness and, therefore, require continuing management attention.

**Question.** Air Force leaders said earlier this year that the reductions in end strength, even to 316,600, were not enough to allow the Air Force to realize its recapitalization goals.

How does keeping Air Force Active end strength at 330,000 impact recapitalization?

**Answer.** In 2006 we initiated a 40,000 reduction in Air Force end strength in order to fund recapitalization of our aging weapons systems. This action was partially successful, but based on loss of buying power and increases in personnel costs we have not been able to reach the needed levels of recapitalization to turn the corner on the increasing average age of our fleets. The Air Force was on a drawdown to reach 330,000 by the end of fiscal year 2009. The drawdown halt will keep us at 330,000, but the content in people and skill sets between the targeted 316,000 and the 330,000 requires adjustment to meet current and new mission requirements. Some of these requirements are a result of additional TOA (fiscal year 2010–
2015) provided to the AF for recapitalization. Other added manpower requirements include corrective actions associated with our nuclear enterprise.

**TRANSFORMATION**

*Question.* If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Air Force to meet new and emerging threats.

*Answer.* I have two near-term goals. First, we must act quickly and rigorously to implement the improvements in training, procedures, schooling, and organization required by the Nuclear Task Force and the Secretary of Defense to restore the integrity and credibility of the Nuclear Enterprise. I expect to see rapid and substantial improvement in this area.

Second, in light of the Secretary of Defense’s views, as well as my own, we must assess and implement quickly the measures needed to improve our support to the joint warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have already done a good deal, as evidenced by our increased UAS assets and the further increases programmed to come on line within the fiscal year 2010 FYDP. But, we have to be aggressive in exploring every avenue to further improve and provide more support in the conflicts we are waging right now. It is my personal view that being adaptive now will serve us well as other adversaries and challenges emerge.

**SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE**

*Question.* The Department of the Air Force has implemented changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.

*Answer.* Senior Air Force leaders, including the Secretary of the Air Force and me, form the leadership team that must set the tone for the rest of the institution: sexual assault is criminal behavior that cannot and will not be tolerated. It is a personal tragedy to the victim, her or his family and friends, and it affects our mission readiness. This is a multifaceted problem that will continue to have involvement by key Secretariat and Air Staff leaders: the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the General Counsel, the SAF Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Judge Advocate General, the Surgeon General and the Chief of Chaplains. In the Air Force, it is a commander-focused program. At each Wing, the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator reports to the Vice Wing Commander. If confirmed, I will ensure that, collectively, our senior leaders continue to promote our programs to ensure they are resourced and implemented effectively. In short, sexual assault is incompatible with our military mission.

**UNIFIED MEDICAL COMMAND**

*Question.* The Department’s 2005 Base Realignment and Closure recommendations include significant realignments in military medical capability and support the goal of achieving greater efficiency through joint organizational solutions. The proposed recommendations regarding Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, as well as other joint medical centers in Landstuhl, Germany, and San Antonio, TX, are based on the assumption that staffing in the future will be joint with personnel from all three military departments. While various studies have been done regarding the concept and feasibility of establishing a joint military medical command, very little progress has been made on implementing such a command.

*Answer.* We take pride in being part of a joint team and building ever greater interoperability between the Services. Our Air Force medical personnel are a key part of the Joint Theater Trauma System in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom... the most effective trauma system in the history of military medicine. Air Force, Army, and Navy medics are working together to save the lives of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at unprecedented rates in the face of the most severe wounding patterns in the history of warfare. At Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Air Force and Navy medical personnel have been fully incorporated into one of our busiest military hospitals at home or abroad. We are fully supportive of joint medical capabilities and do not see a Joint or Unified Medical Command as necessary to accomplish what is already being done. Such a command would add overhead and incur additional costs with an uncertain return on that investment.
**Question.** What functions, in your view, are unique to the Air Force and should remain within the Air Force management structure?

**Answer.** The Air Force Medical Service is a key component of the Air Force’s ability to meet title 10 responsibilities in assuring the health and well being of our airmen. Air Force medics work directly for their Line commanders in support of our Wing missions worldwide. Wing commanders are directly accountable to meet the mission and ensure the health of the force is preserved and sustained.

Air Force medical capabilities presented to the combatant commanders in support of the joint warfight are key elements of the "enroute care system." This includes the resuscitative trauma care in our Air Force theater hospitals, the aeromedical staging capability and the air evacuation and critical care aeromedical transport teams. All medical forces both home station and deployed are essential to the Air Force’s ability to prosecute our expeditionary mission in support of the AEF rotations and combatant commanders’ tasks.

**Question.** With or without a unified medical command, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to improve joint medical readiness requirements in support of contingency operations?

**Answer.** We can take great pride in the work our Air Force, Army and Navy medics are doing at home and deployed, but there is always room to improve. Sharpening and refining joint doctrine is essential to improving the interoperability and interdependence of our medical forces. The enabling platforms such as logistics, information management, education/training and research and development offer significant opportunity to improve our joint and interoperable capabilities. I will continue to work with my Service counterparts and combatant commanders to ensure interoperability. Our Air Force medics will remain fully supportive of joint medical requirements, planning, and training and will continue to fill leadership roles within the joint community.

**AIRCRAFT RECAPITALIZATION**

**Question.** At times, approximately one third of the current Air Force aircraft inventory has been under some type of flight restriction, mainly due to aging aircraft problems. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air Force recapitalizes its aircraft inventory and how would you prioritize the recapitalization effort?

**Answer.** The Air Force would continue to analyze emerging threats affecting warfighters to determine what is needed to sustain the force, to modernize when necessary, and to recapitalize ensuring we can fight the future fight. Currently, the average age of Air Force’s aircraft inventory is 24 years with some nearing 50 years. Our goal is reduce that average to 15 years by 2030. To maintain the current average requires the Air Force to acquire 165 aircraft per year, and, per the fiscal year 2009 President’s budget, we will be able to acquire only 115 aircraft per year. That will mean that the average age of Air Force’s inventory will grow to 27 years by 2020. The Defense Department’s revised fiscal guidance for the FYDP beginning in fiscal year 2010, authorized an approximately $5 billion boost for our recapitalization efforts, and that will certainly help.

Our priority is to bring F–35s into the Air Force as swiftly as possible. The additional resources we have received will be used in part to increase the F–35s annual production rate. Of equal priority in the near term, we must replace our aging tankers promptly, consistent with Under Secretary Young’s recent testimony. We will continue to modernize our space-based communications such as WGS, AEHF, and TSAT. Our ISR portfolio will continue to grow and mature. The Air Force will rapidly acquire increasingly unmanned ISR platforms to meet the growing demand of the combatant commanders.

**AIR FORCE BUDGET REQUEST**

**Question.** In recent years, the Air Force budget request has not included funding requests for various aircraft, including C–17 and F–22, but these items ranked high on the Air Force’s UPLs. Some have suggested that the Air Force deliberately declined to include funding for such aircraft, relying instead on Congress to add funding for them.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Air Force budget includes those items that you believe the Air Force needs?

**Answer.** I would continue to work the delicate balance between the priorities of winning the global war on terrorism and preparing for tomorrow’s fight. I am pleased, based on what I have read, with the direction of our fiscal year 2010 POM, particularly that we were able to bolster the nuclear enterprise, support the global war on terrorism, take good care of our people and make significant progress to-
wards recapitalization of our aging fleet. The additional topline we are expecting will help greatly to meet our manpower and recapitalization goals. We will continue to work closely with OSD to pursue these goals. But, as a consistent practice, if we truly wish for a program to be funded, we will fund it within the Air Force budget.

**JOINT BASING**

**Question.** The 2005 base realignment and closure commission directed, at the request of the Department of Defense, the establishment of 12 joint bases. Nine of these recommendations involve the Air Force.

Did the Department of the Air Force support or oppose this recommendation when it was being formulated inside the Department of Defense, prior to the transmission of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations to the commission?

**Answer.** I am told the Air Force supported and continues to support the goals of joint basing. The Air Force position has been and continues to be that we will achieve cost efficiencies without adversely impacting mission capability and quality of life. While complex and emotional endeavors, I believe we can attain the benefits and promise of joint basing with minimum disruption to mission and quality of life.

**Question.** Does the Air Force support or oppose this joint basing effort today?

**Answer.** The Air Force fully supports joint basing and is committed to making it a success.

**Question.** Does the Air Force support joint basing in cases where the Air Force will not be the lead Service for the joint base?

**Answer.** Yes. To accomplish this, we advocated for and in conjunction with the other Services and OSD, established installation support common output level standards. Our airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, DOD civilians, and their families will benefit from efficient, common, and consistent installation support services. Such standards will ensure the Air Force and our sister Services continue to enjoy the level of installation support services their people deserve.

**Question.** What concerns does the Air Force have about establishing joint bases?

**Answer.** The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform its missions and provide consistent standards of support for all warfighters and their families. Ideally, joint bases would be so efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for every servicemember.

**Question.** What effort is the Air Force making inside the Department of Defense, at both the senior and working group levels, to find solutions for these concerns?

**Answer.** The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward common goals in a joint environment to guarantee success, each joint base should be required to provide a suitable setting for all of its assigned personnel, their families, and other parties within the local communities our bases support. To accomplish this, the Air Force successfully advocated for the establishment of 265 common joint base quality of life standards that are the right standards for all Services.

**AIRC FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

**Question.** If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Air Force missions?

**Answer.** A critical Air Force priority is to recapitalize and modernize our air and space capabilities, while advancing new cyberspace capabilities. Innovative Science and Technology (S&T) efforts have and will continue to play an essential role towards this end. Drawing from national strategy followed by Guidance for the Development of the Force, the Air Force Strategic Plan, and in concert with the Air Force S&T Executive, I will provide direction that focuses and protects S&T investments that advance the state-of-the-art in areas critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and cyberspace.

**Question.** Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs?

**Answer.** Based on what I know, yes, the Air Force’s current S&T investment strategy of maintaining a balance between basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs.

**Question.** If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring research priorities that will meet the needs of the Air Force in 2020?

**Answer.** Having oversight of the Air Staff and Air Force Major Commands, and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I ultimately play an important role in the process of identifying future capabilities critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and cyberspace. It is vital that we understand and advance those game changing technologies most critical to today’s fight and the emerging fu-
ture threats. As stated before, I will draw upon national strategy and the Department’s Guidance for the Development of the Force to establish research priorities supporting both near- and far-term force needs.

Question. In the face of rising acquisition costs for programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter, and programs to support space operations, if confirmed, how do you plan to ensure the protection of funding for long-term science and technology investments?

Answer. The S&T Program is a key element in making mature technologies available for transition into development programs. The S&T Program provides a strong foundation for reducing risk and costs. As such, I will provide direction that focuses and protects S&T investments that mature and advance the state-of-the-art in areas critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and cyberspace.

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. The Air Force Research Laboratory relies on a strong technical workforce to conduct research for development of new weapons systems, platforms, and capabilities to meet its mission of: “leading the discovery, development, and integration of affordable warfighting technologies for our air and space force.”

Are you concerned about the current or future supply of experts in defense critical disciplines, particularly personnel with appropriate security clearances, to hold positions in defense laboratories?

Answer. I’m always concerned about the supply of experts in the critical defense disciplines needed in our laboratory and elsewhere in our acquisition enterprise. Today, the lab is able to meet its needs; however, given the current state of U.S. Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) resources, I expect this will become more difficult over time. Availability of technical talent will remain a key issue in and out of government.

AIR FORCE TEST AND EVALUATION CAPABILITIES

Question. What do you feel are the biggest deficiencies in Air Force test and evaluation capabilities?

Answer. Air Force test and evaluation must continue to develop test capabilities that keep pace with the development of our technically complex weapon systems. We need to strive to be efficient with our resources and at the same time responsive in meeting our test and evaluation requirements.

Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Air Force has a robust testing infrastructure and qualified test workforce?

Answer. The Air Force will work with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Director of the Test Resource Management Center, the Services and other DOD agencies, and industry to help shape the future of our Nation’s infrastructure and workforce. We will employ proven methodologies, like the Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century program, to develop efficiencies; support programs to recruit, train, and retain the necessary workforce; and focus our test infrastructure on supporting the current and future needs of the acquisition community and broader national interests.

GENERAL OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and findings of inspectors general and other command-directed investigations are documented in various ways in each of the Services. Procedures for including and forwarding adverse and alleged adverse information in connection with the promotion selection process are set forth in title 10, United States Code, and in DOD Instruction 1320.4. How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law and regulation regarding review of adverse information?

Answer. The Air Force is required by law and DOD policy to present all adverse information of a credible nature to general officer promotion and Federal recognition boards. Upon receipt of the names of officers meeting a general officer promotion or Federal recognition board, SAF/IG initiates a review of Air Force, DOD, and other government investigative files for potential adverse information. If substantiated adverse information is uncovered that does not already exist in the officer's selection record, a summary of the adverse information, plus any written comments from the officer, are placed in a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the officer’s selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or Federal recognition, this file stays with the officer's nomination package through its coordination with OSD, the White House, and the Senate. If unfavorable information is discovered about an officer after selected for promotion or Federal recognition that information will be presented to a promotion review board. The promotion review
board will consider the adverse information and make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force whether to continue to support the officer for appointment to the next higher grade. If the Secretary continues to support the officer, the information will be added to the nomination package.

Question. What standards and procedures are in place in the Air Force to ensure that allegations of adverse information relating to a nominee for promotion are brought to the attention of the Department and the committee in a timely manner?

Answer. The Air Force has procedures in place to ensure any adverse or potential adverse information is presented with the nomination packages. Prior to the promotion selection board the Air Force conducts an initial screening for adverse information. The Air Force performs additional such checks following the selection board, and every 60 days throughout the nomination process.

For 1- and 2-stars, if there is substantiated adverse information, the selection board will review the information as part of the process and that information will be included in the nomination package. If allegations of adverse information arise after the board is complete the Air Force typically will separate the individual from the list until the investigation is complete and if necessary, command action is complete and then convene a promotion review board to determine if the individual should continue to be nominated for the next higher grade. The Air Force always includes substantiated adverse information with its nomination packages thru OSD to the Senate.

For 3- and 4-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is included in the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse information checks every 60 days throughout the nomination process from OSD to the Senate.

**READINESS LEVELS**

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to execute its assigned missions?

Answer. Our Nation’s airmen are trained, equipped, ready, and are supporting joint force operations around the globe. The Air Force is constantly assessing lessons learned in operations, both combat and non-combatant, and making changes in how we train, equip, organize, and prepare our forces to better execute current and future operations. Whether integrating our ISR with ground operations to find the enemy, precisely delivering critical supplies or personnel to our joint partners, or increasing the number of air strikes against enemy positions, our airmen have continued to find ways to contribute to the effectiveness of the joint team.

Question. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next 4 years, and, if confirmed, how will you approach these issues?

Answer. High OPTEMPO combined with an aging fleet of aircraft and spacecraft continues to challenge readiness. We fly and maintain the oldest aircraft inventory in Air Force history. The Air Force has addressed aging aircraft issues by developing an overarching strategy for future fleet management. The Air Force has chartered the Air Force Fleet Viability Board to assess the viability of our inventories so that we posture ourselves to make the best informed modification, sustainment, and retirement decisions.

In terms of stressed career fields impacted by a continuing high OPTEMPO, the Air Force actively tracks our stressed career fields and uses this data to focus on the specialties that require the most management intervention. Solutions we have put in place include Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) banding to better manage tempo in highly stressed air force specialties and alternate sourcing strategies to use other air force specialties to augment stressed career fields. We are also reducing stress on some career fields by adding additional manpower. For example, we’ve added additional battlefield airmen, combat weather and joint tactical air control personnel, to support U.S. Army modernization and transformation. We will look at other highly stressed career fields, such as Security Forces, Intelligence, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal and assess whether to increase their numbers of personnel.

**INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**

Question. Air Force Leadership recently stated in testimony, “MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk in facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment.”

In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force?
Answer. We’ve managed or mitigated risk by balancing our approach between Facility Sustainment, Restoration & Modernization, and MILCON accounts. Taking manageable risk in infrastructure is prudent given the Air Force’s previous investment in infrastructure combined with our current investment in maintaining our facilities by increasing Facility Sustainment to 90 percent of DOD requirements and increasing Restoration & Modernization (R&M) by $160 million compared to fiscal year 2008. While these actions help us to manage risk in fiscal year 2009, we will likely re-invest in infrastructure in fiscal year 2010 to ensure we preserve the capability of our bases—our Installation Weapon Systems.

Question. If confirmed, would you support goals established by the Department of Defense for certain levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and sustainment of facilities?

Answer. Yes. The Air Force supports the existing Department of Defense goal for Facility Sustainment by funding our program to at least 90 percent of the modeled requirement. We will support any Facility Recapitalization goal if and when it is developed because installations provide a critical capability to the Air Force—we fight from our bases, they are our Installation Weapon Systems.

FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition testified last April that the Air Force is moving forward with a congressionally mandated plan to develop a Fee-For-Service Aerial Refueling Pilot Program. However, the Air Mobility Command Commander, General Arthur J. Lichte, has testified that he has questions “with regard to the operational procedures, FAA requirements and certifications, and legal issues that come up.”

In your view, is the Air Force doing everything it can to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out in implementing the fee-for-service pilot program?

Answer. The Air Force is providing the necessary groundwork to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out with respect to implementing the fee-for-service pilot program. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal (RFP) is planned to be released in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and airframe integration.

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the conduct and purpose of this pilot program?

Answer. I do have some concerns regarding the funding and operational impacts of this program. There was no fiscal year 2008 appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is working on reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008–2009. Unlike the Navy program which uses a probe and drogue refueling system, this program requires significant industry commitment and investment to develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal year 2012–2016.

We will assess progress and ensure we meet program requirements in the yearly reports submitted to Congress.

UAV ROADMAP

Question. In 2001, Congress established as a goal that by 2010 one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force should be unmanned. However, the recently issued Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007–2032 does not describe how it plans to achieve that goal, nor does it include striking targets as a key UAV role or mission in the future.

Given the varying positions the Air Force has held regarding unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs)—most recently removing itself from the joint UCAV program, do you see striking targets as a potential mission for UAVs? Why or why not?

Answer. I understand that the Air Force fully supports using UAVs to conduct strike operations and is increasing current investments in this area to significantly enhance this capability. The Air Force is now fielding the MQ–9 Reaper as a follow-on to the MQ–1 Predator. The MQ–9 is a multi-role Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) whose roles include hunter/killer strike and ISR. The MQ–9 can carry up to 3000 lbs of weapons (15 times more than the Predator) and is currently deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS HANDLING INCIDENT

Question. General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.), Chairman of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapons, testified earlier this year that the nuclear weapons handling incident which occurred in August 2007 resulted from long-term and systemic degradation of training and focus by the Air Force on the nuclear mission.

Given the nature and severity of the incident, and General Welch’s report, are you satisfied with the accountability actions taken within the Air Force thus far?

Answer. The invaluable assessment by the Defense Science Board’s Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, led by General Welch, has had far-reaching impact on the Air Force, though it was not an assessment of personnel accountability related to the unauthorized munitions transfer.

The Air Combat Command Commander Directed Investigation identified accountable individuals and a deliberate process followed resulting in a range of disciplinary actions. Subsequently, the Department of Defense Inspector General evaluated Air Force accountability actions related to this incident.

Regarding the findings of the Donald Report involving the misshipment of Mk 12 forward sections to Taiwan, the accountability review process is not complete and, if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure proper accountability.

All processes and procedures involving nuclear weapons are exacting. Perfection is the standard. There is no room for incomplete knowledge or substandard performance. Precision, compliance, personal responsibility and enforced accountability are foundational to success in this vital mission area.

Question. There are over $100 million in “unfunded requirements” related to the Blue Ribbon Review of the August 2007 incident on the Air Force’s unfunded priorities list for fiscal year 2009.

What actions would you expect to take, if confirmed, to modify this list and seek reprogramming authority?

Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the status of these associated unfunded requirements and take appropriate action, to include modifying the list, securing needed funding within our program and seeking reprogramming authority, if necessary.

AIR FORCE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES

Question. What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force’s ability to respond to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The Air Force is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to rapidly, flexibly, and precisely respond to worldwide contingencies. The Air Force has capabilities and manpower with specialized skills in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as airlift; ISR capabilities; explosive ordnance disposal; and security forces. Additional requirements in these areas will require the Secretary of Defense to allocate forces between Iraq, Afghanistan, in place Homeland Defense and global support missions, and another worldwide contingency.

Question. How much additional risk is the United States assuming in this regard?

Answer. The Air Force is fully supporting the Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders with in place and expeditionary forces. We have major commands and Component Numbered Air Forces who support all the Functional and Geographic Combatant Commanders in planning and executing operations. We use an AEF process to manage tempo and enable rapid and tailored responses to homeland and worldwide contingencies. For the Air Force, my sense is the risk is manageable.

“IN LIEU OF” AIRMEN IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Question. The Air Force has provided significant “in lieu of” (ILO) ground forces to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Are you satisfied with the type and amount of ground combat training and preparation airmen assigned these support missions are receiving before deploying?

Answer. We are confident that AEF airmen are receiving the required training to perform their AEF mission. The Air Force has developed Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 expeditionary training policy, guidance and curriculum standards to ensure our airmen are ready to accomplish their missions in the combat environment. Tier 1 training provides expeditionary skills for all airmen and is delivered through accessions, initial functional training, and in the foundational training curriculum for basic training. Air Education and Training Command has added 8.5 hours of train-
ing to Basic Military Training and is developing Common Battlefield Airman Training (CBAT) for select career fields.

To ensure every deploying Airman can achieve the same level of basic competencies in contingency skills, the Air Force developed Tier 2 “deployment-ready” standardized training. Expeditionary Combat Skills (ESC) includes weapons and body armor training and a field exercise to demonstrate their skills.

Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training (Tier 3) is enhanced predeployment training for select mission-ready airmen as determined by deployment location, threat assessment, specific mission, duty assignment, role, operation or special requirement. The Air Force offers a wide variety of predeployment expeditionary training courses and 60+ air mobility resident/web-based courses to Air Force, joint and coalition personnel to include Eagle Flag Exercise and Air Advisor training. Additionally, our airmen selected for ILO tasks are collectively trained alongside soldiers, sailors, and marines by the same combat skills training instructors and develop into cohesive teams at Army power projection platforms before deploying down range.

Lastly, the Air Force has established the Training and Equipment Review Board (TERB) to monitor the effectiveness of our training and modify that training to meet the gaining commander’s needs, to ensure airmen can operate and survive in their deployed environment.

**Question.** Are these airmen getting the right equipment necessary to operate in that environment, particularly force protection equipment?

**Answer.** This question specifically references the approximately 12,000 airmen who deploy annually in the ILO category. Yes, personnel are receiving the necessary force protection equipment to include the Advanced Combat Helmet and the Interceptor Outer Tactical Vest with Level IV Enhanced Small Arms Protective inserts.

**Question.** What have been the effects of these manpower requirements on morale and readiness of airmen, and do you believe that Air Force leaders have been effective in communicating the importance of the mission to their personnel?

**Answer.** In general, I don’t think we have sufficiently celebrated the contribution of our airmen performing non-traditional roles. The term ILO is itself, at least in some sense, pejorative. Those who have performed this duty are rightly proud of their service. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Air Force recognizes and properly honors nontraditional performance of duty in the ongoing global war on terrorism.

**JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT**

**Question.** In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the merger of two separate small cargo aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a plane that will be smaller than the Air Forces C–130, but larger than the Army’s C–23 Sherpa.

In your view, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the Army and the Air Force with respect to the JCA?

**Answer.** No. There are valid direct support lift requirements that call for Service organic fixed wing aircraft to meet a ground commander’s need for Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/MC) delivery of passengers and cargo.

**Question.** What changes to this program, if any, would you recommend?

**Answer.** Based on what I know, and prior exposure at the U.S. TRANSCOM, the Air Force supports the program of record.

**COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER (CSAR–X)**

**Question.** After Boeing won the contract for development of the Air Force’s next generation combat search and rescue helicopter, the Lockheed and Sikorsky corporations protested the award to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and prevailed.

What is your understanding of the Air Force’s way ahead on the CSAR–X program?

**Answer.** The Air Force amended the RFP to accommodate the GAO findings. The road ahead includes receiving final proposals based on ongoing discussions, finalizing our evaluation, and making the source selection decision. I understand the Air Force anticipates a fall 2008 contract award with full OSD (AT&L) program review prior to award.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the Air Force’s ability to achieve its goal of initial operating capability (IOC) by 2012?

**Answer.** The RFP amendment #6 was issued on 22 April 2008. In this amendment the IOC was changed to a period of time. The first quarter of fiscal year 2013 is the desired IOC and the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014 is the required IOC date.
AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND

**Question.** The Air Force established a provisional Cyber Command in September 2007 with the mission of training and equipping forces to conduct sustained global operations in and through cyberspace, fully integrated with air and space operations. How do you envision Cyber Command integrating and interacting with the Department and the other Services?

**Answer.** Cyber Command, if permanently established, will provide forces, in coordination with our joint partners and the Department, to combatant commanders to protect and defend U.S. interests in the cyber domain at home and abroad.

**Question.** What is your understanding of when a permanent headquarters will be established?

**Answer.** The headquarters will declare IOC by October 2008 using distributed locations. The Air Force is studying a list of potential permanent basing locations with an expected final decision in fiscal year 2009.

**Question.** How do you see the mission of the Cyber Command integrated into title 10?

**Answer.** Air Force Cyber Command’s (AFCYBER) primary mission will be to organize, train, and equip Air Force cyberspace forces to support joint operations. The Command will also be responsible for protecting Air Force networks. To that end, AFCYBER will be the Air Force’s lead advocate for cyberspace capabilities, and will drive related Air Force education and training.

**AIR FORCE IMPLEMENTATION OF “FAMILIES FIRST”**

**Question.** United States TRANSCOM has made great progress in implementing the promise of the “Families First” program, aimed at modernizing the system for moving household goods of servicemembers and their families pursuant to permanent change of station orders. One of the greatest challenges has been to replace the legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) with the web-based Defense Personal Property System (DPS). How would you assess the status of implementation of the Families First Program and DPS in the Air Force?

**Answer.** The Air Force is committed to the development and fielding of DPS, the automated system for Families First and replacement system for TOPS. The Air Force continues to work with USTC J5/4 and J6, SDDC, and the services to provide subject matter expertise for testing and business rule development. We are encouraged by recent developments, new timelines, and increasing momentum in the program. We consider DPS to be heading in the right direction and standby for implementation in the fall of 2008.

**Question.** What do you view as the most significant challenges that remain in the Air Force to ensuring that DPS and the modernized Families First system for contracting for the movement of household goods and responding to claims for damaged and missing property is successfully put into effect?

**Answer.** We believe the most significant challenge is the return rate of customer satisfaction surveys. These surveys are vital to the new program and if inputs are not received customer feedback will not be available for program analysis and the carriers will not be aware of deficiencies. We have worked to market the importance of the surveys with all concerned through a number of media sources in the Air Force. We will continue to encourage customers to return surveys so course corrections can be made. We will make use of available authority to tie full replacement value reimbursements to submission of the customer satisfaction survey.

**AIR FORCE ACQUISITION SYSTEM FLAWS**

**Question.** Over the last 4 years, GAO protests have resulted in the reversal of a number of significant Air Force contract award decisions, including award decisions on the KC–X tanker replacement contract; the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program (CSAR–X) contract; the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) contract; the Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video contract; and a contract for F–15 training simulators. Do you believe that there are significant problems in the Air Force acquisition system today?

**Answer.** These examples, while significant, need to be viewed in the context of the thousands of contracts the Air Force successfully executes every year. Nonetheless, confidence in our processes is lacking and we have to recommit to excellence in acquisition at every level and every discipline. This includes improved workforce management, training and job enrichment; maintaining a balance of civilian and mili-
tary expertise across the enterprise; and attracting additional, proven engineering
and management talent in supervisory roles.

**Question.** If so, what are those problems and how would you propose to address
them?

**Answer.** See above.

**Question.** If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been the subject of
so many adverse bid protest decisions?

**Answer.** Although I believe that the Air Force acquisition system is not fatally
flawed, I agree there are opportunities for improvement. Weapon systems require
complex, in-depth evaluations across many functional areas against both objective
and subjective criteria; we continue to examine processes and factors to arrive at
fair evaluation of these highly complex proposals to protect the interests of our
warfighter and the taxpayer. Representative actions outlined in the previous ques-
tion apply.

**ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICIALS**

**Question.** Over the last several years, senior Air Force officers are alleged to have
advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the Presi-
dent’s budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement.
These programs include the procurement of additional C–17s, the continuation of
the C–130J multi-year contract, and the multi-year procurement of additional F–22
aircraft. Senior Air Force officers are also alleged to have advocated a legislative
proposal that would overturn a decision of the Base Realignment and Closure Com-
mission relative to Joint Basing.

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officers to advo-
cate the funding of programs that are not included in the President’s budget and
for which there is no currently validated joint requirement?

**Answer.** Other than those occasions when individuals appear before appropriate
committees of Congress and are asked to give their personal views, the military
services cannot function effectively and credibly if senior officers advocate for pro-
grams or funding of requirements that are not a part of the President’s budget.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts?

**Answer.** If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I would work closely with the Secretary
of the Air Force both to foster a healthy debate within the Air Force on the alloca-
tion of valuable resources and to ensure an understanding that only established
processes and procedures for advocating program funding and priorities outside the
Air Force will be used. As a consistent practice, if we truly wish for a program to
be funded, we will fund it within the Air Force budget.

**DEFENSE BUDGETING**

**Question.** On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on internal Air
Force briefing slides, called “CSAF 2008 Leadership Forum Strategic Communi-
cation Update,” which included statements that: “the Air Force is targeting the other
Services;” the “Budget Battle” is a “Zero Sum Gain” and a “Non-Permissive Environ-
mant;” and “some Services are going to win and some are going to lose.”

What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they appear to be
intended to communicate?

**Answer.** I am told the 2 slides that appeared in the Washington Post were part
of a larger 10-slide internal briefing to Air Force retired senior leadership, to inform
them of a Communication Campaign Plan underway to better plan and execute the
message about the Air Force’s contribution to national security, and to encourage
their participation.

Articulating the Air Force contribution to national security and share of defense
resources is an appropriate institutional effort for the Air Force. All Services and
DOD agencies, to a greater or lesser extent, engage in similar activities. But, it is
my view that the net result is a joint force capability tied to the highest priority
needs of the Department of Defense. That, in my mind, is not zero sum for any par-
ticipant.

**CHIEF OF STAFF UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS LISTS**

**Question.** The so-called “wish lists” that have resulted from Congress’s request for
Service input on where to allocate funds added to the national defense budget have
mostly proven to be an effective means of ensuring that such funds are apportioned
appropriately in terms of what is best for the national interest. However, the Air
Force Chief of Staff’s fiscal year 2009 UPL includes 152 programs and activities to-
taling $18.75 billion—far in excess of amounts listed by any of the other military
Services. The Air Force’s UPL has more than four times the number of items that
are on the Army list—at five times the cost, eight times the number of items that are on the Navy list—at five times the cost, and seven times the number of items that are on the Marine Corps list—at more than six times the cost.

If confirmed, will you examine how the Air Force determines the Chief of Staff's UPL and take appropriate steps to ensure that in the future the Air Force provide lists to Congress that are limited to the items of greatest importance to the Air Force?

Answer. As Chief of Staff of the Air Force, if confirmed, I will continue to fund our most critical requirements in the President's budget. Furthermore, while recognizing that Service needs nearly always exceed the funds available, I understand the value in providing a more focused unfunded list to Congress. If Congress continues to offer the Services a chance to submit UPLs in the future, I will use that opportunity to submit a list highlighting our highest priority unfunded needs.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION

1. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, Congress established the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. The Commission is chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and is tasked to make recommendations on the future strategic posture of the United States including the nuclear posture. Will you cooperate fully with the Commission and the various working groups established by the Commission?

General Schwartz. Yes. Full cooperation is exactly what I will ensure this commission receives from my office and the Air Force at large.

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY IN THE AIR FORCE

2. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, in June 2005, the Headquarters Review Group Concerning the Religious Climate at the U.S. Air Force Academy found "a religious climate [at the Air Force Academy] that did not involve overt religious discrimination, but a failure to fully accommodate all members' needs and a lack of awareness over where the line is drawn between permissible and impermissible expression of beliefs." As a graduate of the Academy, you are aware of the influence of instructors, officers, and upper class cadets over junior cadets to conform in order not to jeopardize their military careers. What is the current status of policies and programs at the Air Force Academy to reinforce the religious liberty rights of each cadet, chaplain, and commander?
General SCHWARTZ. The Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy, established in October 2005 that “Respect for Human Dignity” is the overarching and foundational policy for all activities across the Academy. The United States Air Force Academy remains officially neutral regarding religious beliefs, neither officially endorsing nor disapproving any faith belief or absence of belief. The Air Force Academy’s policy mirrors those of the entire United States Air Force: to accommodate free exercise of religion and other personal beliefs, as well as freedom of expression while not endorsing any religion or belief over any others. Academy leaders, instructors, officers, and upper class cadets are trained and educated on their duties to ensure that requests for religious accommodation are welcomed and dealt with as fairly and consistently as practicable, through their commands and/or areas of responsibility. Every basic cadet that enters the United States Air Force Academy is trained on religious tolerance and the accommodations and venues the Academy offers for different faiths. In addition to the training provided to all basic cadets, the upper class cadets and every permanent party member are required to complete religious toleration and awareness training.

Leaders at every level, whether at the Air Force Academy or any other place in the Air Force, bear a special responsibility to ensure their words and actions cannot reasonably be construed to be officially endorsing nor disapproving any faith belief or absence of belief. In official circumstances or when superior/subordinate relationships are involved, superiors need to be sensitive to the potential that personal expressions may appear to be official or have undue influence on their subordinates. Subject to these sensitivities, superiors enjoy the same free exercise rights as all other airmen.

Bottom line: All Air Force personnel have an obligation to keep the workplace professional in all cases, and our commanders throughout the entire Air Force understand that the religious liberty rights of each person are part of what they have taken an oath to defend.

3. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, if you are confirmed, what is your commitment to promoting acceptance of religious diversity at the Air Force Academy and throughout the Air Force?

General SCHWARTZ. The very foundation of each of our Air Force’s core values (Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do) is respect... respect for oneself and each other. This respect includes each airman’s personal beliefs. Our airmen are Protestants, Jews, Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists, and many others, while some are Atheists and Agnostic, but all are airmen and all deserve respect. The right to worship or not to worship is enshrined in our Constitution. Additionally, operational necessity drives the importance of respect, because it enhances the trust that binds us together and that trust is critical to combat effectiveness.

We must, however, avoid any perception that could imply our Air Force supports any one religion over another or religion over no affiliation. This does not mean we must exclude religion from our professional lives. Free, open, and respectful discussion of our beliefs and our differences, including religious diversity, is valuable. But there is a time and place for such discussions—we must be sensitive and act accordingly to the fact that individuals have different beliefs. These discussions must be learning experiences, not attempts to force a particular point of view, and they must never imply Air Force sponsorship or disapproval of a particular belief. In fact, this diversity allows us to better understand each other and our varying needs and as an expeditionary Air Force, understanding our own diverse beliefs helps us better understand those of our allies and hosts around the world.

Leadership (to include commanders, supervisors, and first sergeants) must remain sensitive that their positions lend greater authority to their words and as such, it’s critical they be particularly careful when discussing religious issues and opinions with subordinates. As we speak to airmen, we must be inclusive rather than exclusive and use these situations to lighten the bonds and cohesion rather than promote a specific belief. Circumstances of each situation will be unique and our Chaplains and Staff Judge Advocates are available to provide advice. Ultimately, I will continue to emphasize acceptance of religious diversity and I will rely on our commanders’ good judgment and the broad range of options available to them to get this right for our airmen and their families.

AIR FORCE END STRENGTH

4. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, the Air Force previously announced that it was not going to reduce end strength to the previously planned level of 316,000;
rather it was going to maintain an end strength of 330,000. We understand that the Air Force plans to use available funds in fiscal year 2009 to support this level of end strength even though the funds for this level were not requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget request. What is the plan to identify the source of the funds to sustain the 330,000 end strength in fiscal year 2009?

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to fund the 330,000 end strength requirement within existing fiscal year 2009 funding. This funding will almost exclusively come from two sources. First, by stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year 2009 funding that was originally programmed for force shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay will be freed up. Second, end strength at the beginning of fiscal year 2009 will be lower than originally planned, which will free up additional funding.

5. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, this 330,000 end strength level is also not sustained in the out year budget request. In your answers to the advance policy questions, however, you indicate that this out year funding shortfall will be fixed in the fiscal year 2010 budget request. How do you intend to fix this problem and where will the additional funds come from?

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force intends to address this issue within the context of the fiscal year 2010 program review deliberations with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). At present, the Air Force has established an OSD/Air Force End Strength Issue Team to formally address any funding shortfall concerns.

6. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, will this be an increase to the previously planned Air Force top line or will reductions be made to procurement or other investment accounts?

General SCHWARTZ. We will work with OSD to find the appropriate resources to fund our 330,000 end strength requirement. Until this review is complete, we will not know if the funding will be from additional top line or from realigning funds within the current Air Force top line.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

TEST AND EVALUATION AT EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE

7. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, prior Air Force leadership halted all consideration of realigning Developmental Test and Evaluation Center (DTEC) leadership under a single center at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB). This was due in large part to the major base realignment and closure (BRAC)-mandated realignments taking place at Eglin AFB and the need for further study into the effects of a potential leadership shift. What is your position on any future reorganization of Air Force Developmental Test and Evaluation as it pertains to Eglin AFB?

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force Developmental Test and Evaluation Center (AFDTEC) model does not affect personnel or locations of testing and would not impact the integration of the multi-Service F-35 training mission and the Army 7th Special Forces Group into the Eglin range and base infrastructure. Instead, alignment with AFDTEC (located at Edwards AFB, CA) would normalize command lines by adjusting the reporting chain for three Commanders: the Arnold Engineering and Development Center, 46th Test Wing, and 412th Test Wing Commanders. The AFDTEC concept is similar to the current Army model instituted in 1999 and has the potential to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of Air Force test operations. No implementation would occur until the Air Force conducted appropriate preparation and notification activities.

E-8C JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM & MP-RTIP

8. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, the Air Force lists Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) in the fiscal year 2009 Unfunded Requirements List, and General Moseley was supportive of putting the improved technology, as an interim measure, on the E-8C until a suitable next-generation aircraft platform is selected. Understanding the Air Force’s significant budget pressures, the MP-RTIP technology is, nevertheless, a critical and needed capability for the ground, sea, and air warfighters due to its ability to cue other strike assets and detect enemy weapons. What is your plan to continue these development efforts, including appropriate funding to put MP-RTIP on the E-8C aircraft?

General SCHWARTZ. Development of a small MP-RTIP sensor is ongoing to provide enhanced capabilities for the Global Hawk. The Air Force is evaluating the
most viable platform to carry a larger, Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) variant of the MP–RTIP sensor as was previously planned for the E–10. Although WAS risk reduction activities were suspended in March 2008, funding appropriated in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental will allow the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and MP–RTIP programs to resume risk reduction and technology maturation related to the sensor, Operation and Control (O&C) of the sensor, and platform integration, including potential fielding on JSTARS or other larger aircraft.

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR COORDINATOR

9. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, a new position has been created in the Air Force to serve as the central coordinator for Air Force Nuclear issues. What is your vision for this new position?

General SCHWARTZ. The Director of Nuclear Operations, Plans, and Requirements (A3/5N) was created in response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Review and the Defense Science Board reports that stemmed from the B–52 incident in August 2007. “The Air Force Chief of Staff should establish an office within A3/5 in the Air Staff headed by a flag officer whose daily business is the nuclear enterprise.” (DSB report) This reorganization was made to overcome fragmentation on the air staff and unify staff focus on the nuclear mission.

This organization represents the Air Force to the Joint Staff, OSD, Department of Energy, the National Security Council, national laboratories as well as STRATCOM. It also is point of entry to the air staff for our Major Commands on all nuclear issues.

The directorate impacts nuclear career field development and training; assesses nuclear employment and concepts; integrates nuclear capabilities into Air Force and joint planning, operations and exercises while advocating for nuclear safety, security and operational capability.

Air Force success in the nuclear mission area depends upon sustained leadership focus and attention at all levels, all the time. This office will serve the Secretary and the Chief well by keeping nuclear issues in the forefront of our daily battle rhythm.

10. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, what responsibility and authority will it have?

General SCHWARTZ. If confirmed, I will evaluate the authorities of this office and ensure my vision of constant vigilance of the nuclear mission across the Air Force nuclear enterprise is achieved and that Air Staff focus is assured.

There may be requirements for further adjustments to our current organizational structures supporting the nuclear mission area. A critical measure in this end-to-end assessment is to ensure unambiguous linkage between field operations, sustainment and policy.

MISSILE INDUSTRIAL BASE

11. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, in fiscal year 2009, for the first time the U.S. will no longer have intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in production, or active plans for a future replacement. Have you thought about any plans to sustain this industrial base to ensure the U.S. could meet any future production capability for a land-based strategic deterrent?

General SCHWARTZ. The U.S. ICBM production concluded with Peacekeeper in the early 1990s. Since that time, the ICBM industrial base has supported various modernization efforts for the deployed ICBM fleet. By exercising unique strategic missile skills, the current ICBM Demonstration/Validation program is one of the several avenues which will help bridge the gap between the completion of the ICBM Modernization programs and the beginning of a follow-on ICBM or Minuteman III life extension program.

The Air Force is also currently working, in response to Senate Report 110–155, to provide a “Report on ICBM Industrial Base Capabilities to Maintain, Modernize, and Sustain Minuteman III through 2030 and Provide a Replacement Land-Based Strategic Deterrent System After 2030,” which will address these issues in greater detail. This report is due to Congress in August 2008.

SPACE PROTECTION

12. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, protecting our space assets is an important mission of the Air Force as well as the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO). To that end Congress has required a joint space protection be developed. The Air Force and the NRO have recently established a joint protection program. Will you ensure that this program is adequately funded including the highest priority of ensuring that the U.S. has adequate space situational awareness (SSA)?

General SCHWARTZ. Given our national dependence on our space systems, Space Protection and SSA continue to be of great concern to the Air Force. The joint AFSPC/NRO Space Protection Program was established to preserve national security space effects through an integrated strategy to articulate vulnerabilities, assess threat impacts, identify options and recommend solutions leading to comprehensive space protection capabilities. Once determined, these solutions will then be implemented to provide the most cost effective capability for protecting the space environment.

As I understand it, AFPSC conducted a Best Value Architecture Study for SSA to determine where the near/far-term investments in SSA should occur. Based on these results, they determined that first we have to do a better job in exploiting the data we already have. This means in the near-term fusing the data to obtain more precise and accurate information we can use efficiently. Second, they determined we need to increase our sustainment efforts to support the infrastructure and systems keeping those sources of data online. Finally, we need to look at developing better/more sensors to improve our capabilities in the far-term.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

13. Senator CLINTON. General Schwartz, the Air Force is now developing the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010; with the new guidance from the Secretary of Defense to protect end strength as well as re-examine the proposed modernization accounts to meet the needs of the Total Force, what are your plans to ensure in the POM the adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard from its equipment, personnel, and sustainment perspectives?

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force’s budget submission included a detailed review of all applicable guidance, and is the result of a careful review of Total Force modernization, personnel and sustainment. The Air Force remains committed to Total Force Integration and in the 2010 POM will expand on the progress we have made to integrate the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total Force in all areas including equipment, personnel, and sustainment.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

14. Senator CLINTON. General Schwartz, Secretary Gates has stressed the importance of the Air Force providing a more robust ISR to the warfighter. How will you enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary’s objectives, and within what time frame will you be able to do so?

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force has been responsive to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan by innovating means to rapidly put ISR data directly into the hands of our joint and combined force at all levels. For example, the Air Force fielded 4,000 remotely operated video enhanced receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive UAS pictures; accelerated MQ–1 Predator operations well beyond the DOD-directed program of record; and introduced the MQ–9 Reaper into combat a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS capability at maximum capacity with near term focus, and we’re proud of the dedicated airmen around the globe who are making this happen.

The original Predator UAS requirement was 21 CAPs by 2010, but the Air Force is currently flying 26 CAPs today, and planning to further increase Predator CAPs to 31 by December 2008. The Air Force is pushing ISR capability into the field as soon as it becomes available. We have issued a request for proposal for new UASSs, and we are shifting our UAS procurement from the older MQ–1 to the more capable MQ–9. When equipped with the new wide area airborne surveillance pod, our MQ–9 UASs will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than a single MQ–1 Predator.

In addition, the Air Force has pushed legacy ISR “workhorses”—the U–2s, RC–135s, and JSTARS—to the maximum tempo possible to get as much collection capability to the fight as possible. We are also embedding ISR liaison teams at division and brigade combat team levels to tailor ISR capabilities for the specific tactical fights of these units. Further, we are also capitalizing on important technical advances in our ISR analysis enterprise, to turn data into actionable intelligence.
These advances—coupled with upgrades to our Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS—our primary imagery analysis capability) and increased efficiency through reachback to continental United States resources—ensure that joint warfighters get the maximum ISR support possible.

Finally, the Air Force is working as part of the Secretary of Defense’s ISR Task Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight in the near term, through both additional buys of equipment (such as RC–12 aircraft tailored to the irregular warfare fight) and creative concepts that will add value in the near term. The Air Force and our airmen are committed to winning the current fight, and our ISR posture reflects that commitment.

C–5 FLEET

15. Senator CLINTON. General Schwartz, the recently signed Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C–17s for the Air Force to meet its strategic airlift requirements. The Air Force has continued to state its need to balance the cost of sustaining the C–5 fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for additional C–17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C–5 fleet.

General S CHWARTZ. Our first priority is always to provide the best overall airlift capability to the joint warfighter. There are two issues with respect to the proper balance between the C–5s and C–17s that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The first is the total number of tails. The current requirement of 299 tails was set by the 2007 NDAA, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009 program of record for strategic airlift is 190 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 59 C–5As.

The second issue is the minimum number of million ton miles per day (MTM/D) available in our total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy certification, the JROC validated a requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C–5s and C–17s). A fleet of 190 C–17s and 111 C–5s does not meet the 33.95 MTM/D goal. The addition of 15 C–17s in the Global War on Terrorism Supplemental bill allows the Air Force to meet the 33.95 MTM/D requirement. A fleet of 205 C–17s and 111 C–5s meets both these requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the TRANSCOM Commander and cited in the USD(AT&L) Nunn-McCurdy Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).

The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and retirement of portions of the C–5A fleet. The C–17 has proven itself to be a highly reliable and versatile strategic airlift platform that will serve the Nation well across the full range of military operations. We will continue to analyze the overall requirement and make sure we maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available in the spring of 2009, is the next big force design milestone.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS

16. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, in your advance policy question responses you state, “The Air Force is providing the necessary groundwork to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out with respect to implementing the fee-for-service pilot program. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be released in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and airframe integration.” Understanding the final fee-for-service air refueling RFP is planned the first quarter fiscal year 2009, please provide the committee with the anticipated date for the draft RFP. In addition, please provide the anticipated pilot program contract award date.

General SCHWARTZ. The planned date for the draft RFP will be 45 days prior to final RFP release and anticipated no later than 15 November 2008. The planned contract award date, pending successful completion of competitive source selection, is anticipated no later than 12 months after receipt of proposals or approximately second quarter fiscal year 2010. This will begin the industry funded boom integration and certification effort which is required prior to start of the 5-year evaluation period.

17. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, in your advance policy question responses you stated that you have some concerns regarding “operational impacts of this pro-
gram." Please elaborate on the specific operation impacts of concern. Do you believe any of these concerns are insurmountable?

General SCHWARTZ. I have concerns regarding the “negative training” aspects of Air Force aircraft refueling behind a “non-standard” Air Force tanker. I also have concerns with implementing an operational construct that requires integration of commercial boom/receptacle equipped refueling aircraft that have not yet been developed, so I want to proceed cautiously. Finally, there is concern with the potential cost of this fee-for-service pilot program that is not currently budgeted. None of these concerns is insurmountable.

18. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, given the success of the U.S. Navy commercial fee-for-service aerial refueling program since 2001, the committee does not foresee any impediments to the feasibility of executing a commercial fee-for-service Air Force pilot program to demonstrate and validate Air Force air refueling in the mission areas identified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, pending industry ability to provide boom capable aircraft. Please confirm to the committee that the Air Force fee-for-service RFP will specifically demonstrate “a pilot program on commercial fee-for-service air refueling support for the Air Force” as required in section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, and will not require passenger and cargo capability.

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force intends to execute the pilot program as directed in section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Section 1081 requires that all tanker mission areas be evaluated and specifically lists Aeromedical Evacuation as a mission area to include in the pilot program evaluation. Additionally, we do not believe that the Navy’s experience with a probe and drogue solution is an indicator of the challenges we will have with a boom solution. We expect that industry will find it more difficult to field the boom technology on derivative aircraft and obtain FAA certification.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

19. Senator WARNER. General Schwartz, on the issue of the risk taken in recent years by the Air Force on investments in facilities and infrastructure which we posed to you in the advance policy questions, I was encouraged by your acknowledgement in answers provided to this committee that the Air Force “will likely re-invest in infrastructure in fiscal year 2010 to ensure we preserve the capability of our bases—our Installation Weapon Systems.” In what areas of facilities and infrastructure do you perceive to have the most critical risk?

General SCHWARTZ. There is no single “most” critical area of risk. The risk we have had to take in facilities and infrastructure is broad and varies according to the need of each installation. We balance this risk across all installations by building our investment program from the bottom up, with wing commanders defining the needs of their installation. The Air Force has, however, given additional attention to single enlisted member living accommodations.

20. Senator WARNER. General Schwartz, will the reinvestment you have proposed include an increase in the amounts proposed for facility repairs and new construction?

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, we intend to increase our investment in the facility repairs and new construction in the fiscal year 2010 program and across the fiscal year 2011–2015 FYDP. The Air Force is currently vetting our fiscal year 2010–2015 POM through the corporate structure. We will know the exact level of investment in these areas after the final review and approval of our budget by OSD in December 2008.

21. Senator WARNER. General Schwartz, if so, do you have an idea of priorities you will propose for this increased investment?

General SCHWARTZ. The need of MILCON investment is across all facilities type, such as operational, training, maintenance hangars, R&D, and quality of life. MILCON projects included in the program will be based on individual project merits, meeting Air Force priorities, and staying within our top line constraints. The Air Force has, however, given additional attention to single enlisted member living accommodations.
22. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Schwartz, Congress appropriated $16 million in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222) to demonstrate the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS) electro-optical sensor on the E–8 JSTARS in support of the requirement for a combat identification (CID) capability on JSTARS, to reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline. I understand the Air Force has issued an urgent operational need for a stand-alone CID capability on E–8C JSTARS. In light of the Secretary of Defense’s call for more intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to support the warfighter, what are the Air Force’s plans for expeditiously executing this demonstration program so that the E–8C JSTARS platform can more effectively and efficiently prosecute targets of interest in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General SCHWARTZ. The JSTARS program office has researched how the $16.0 million SYERS congressional add could best be utilized. The program office concluded the most reasonable approach is to conduct a feasibility study to determine how to install and employ SYERS on JSTARS without hindering other systems and to accurately estimate the costs associated with the effort. The JSTARS program office awarded the contract on 11 July 2008 to initiate the feasibility study. The study is expected to take approximately 4 months.

23. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Schwartz, the current TF–33–102C engines on the JSTARS do not satisfy desired safety margins or meet operational needs, and also limit JSTARS’ operational parameters. I am pleased that the Air Force has contracted for the first two ship sets to re-engine the JSTARS aircraft. Re-engining the JSTARS fleet will increase mission efficiency as well as significantly reduce maintenance and fuel costs. Given the expected savings and increased capability that new engines will provide to this critical high demand asset, can you provide your assurance of the Air Force’s commitment to fully re-engine the JSTARS fleet?

General SCHWARTZ. The JSTARS program office awarded an Undefinitized Contract Action for the first two ship sets in May 2008, with deliveries scheduled for November–December 2010. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget funds retrofit of 10 aircraft out of 17. Funding for the remaining seven operational aircraft remains an Air Force Priority and is being considered in the fiscal year 2010 POM process within the Department of Defense.

24. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. General Schwartz, the Air Force’s General Counsel has determined that the Air Force may retire an aircraft squadron as soon as a BRAC direction to establish a squadron is achieved. Under the General Counsel’s definition, the term “establish” includes the assignment of personnel and construction of military construction (MILCON) necessary for the unit’s operation. Do you believe that it is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars to retire a squadron when the Air Force has spent scarce funds to assign personnel and conduct MILCON activities for that squadron?

General SCHWARTZ. The situation you describe results from BRAC decisions that directed changes to the Air Force’s force structure plan. Changing mission requirements and follow-on analyses have identified additional options to consolidate aircraft by type and location to maximize combat capability and achieve efficiencies in our operations. If confirmed, we will review those mission assignments directed by the 2005 BRAC legislation, and subsequent POM and budgetary decisions to assure we are making the very best use of taxpayer resources.

25. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. General Schwartz, understanding the need for the Air Force to retain discretion to move or retire units as needed to organize, train, and equip, do you believe that it is consistent with the spirit and intent of BRAC law to move or retire Air Force units within a year or 2 of their BRAC-required establishment?

General SCHWARTZ. As the Secretary implies, time does not stand still. New force structure and other military requirements have arisen since the Department of Defense and the BRAC Commission made their recommendations in 2005. In a fiscally constrained environment, the movement or retirement of any Air Force unit will be
carefully considered. Adjusting Air Force units where necessary to better meet current and future needs should be considered an appropriate use of public resources.

26. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. General Schwartz, please describe your understanding of the Air Force’s plans to reduce the F–15 aircraft inventory. What in your view is the strategic and operational risk associated with this reduction in the near- and mid-term as well as the potential impact on pilot readiness, especially in the Air National Guard. Is this risk acceptable? At what level is it unacceptable? A classified reply is acceptable for the questions relating to risk level.

General Schwartz. The Air Force’s long-range plan is to ramp down the F–15 force to 177 aircraft and base them with Total Force Integration (TFI) units. The impact to risk and readiness with respect to a reduction in force structure is being evaluated. However, based on proposed F–15 force structure and the TFI construct, preliminary analysis shows there will be no impact to pilot readiness and risks are acceptable.

27. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. General Schwartz, if confirmed, will you rapidly re-examine all scenarios under consideration by the Air Force for inclusion in the fiscal year 2010 POM that proposes to move or retire aircraft and units that were established by the 2005 law? Will you share with Congress your assessment, including analysis of costs or savings associated with these moves or retirements?

General Schwartz. If confirmed, we intend to perform a thorough review of the Air Force’s fiscal year 2010 POM submission to ensure compliance with BRAC implementation. We will identify in our fiscal year 2010 budget submission any BRAC implementation issues that may arise, and will discuss these issues with Congress as appropriate.

[The nomination reference of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 10, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 8033 and 601:

To be General

Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF.

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF

General Norton A. Schwartz is Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Scott Air Force Base, IL. U.S. TRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense.

General Schwartz attended the U.S. Air Force Academy and graduated in 1973. He is an alumnus of the National War College, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a 1994 Fellow of Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Seminar XXI. He has served as Commander of the Special Operations Command-Pacific, as well as Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and the 11th Air Force. Prior to assuming his current position, General Schwartz was Director, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

General Schwartz is a command pilot with more than 4,200 flying hours in a variety of aircraft. He participated as a crewmember in the 1975 airlift evacuation of Saigon, and in 1991 served as Chief of Staff of the Joint Special Operations Task Force for Northern Iraq in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 1997, he
led the Joint Task Force that prepared for the noncombatant evacuation of U.S. citizens in Cambodia.

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RéSUMÉ OF CAREER SERVICE OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF

Education:
1973 ...... Bachelor's degree in political science and international affairs, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.
1977 ...... Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
1983 ...... Master's degree in business administration, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant
1984 ...... Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA.
1989 ...... National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.
1994 ...... Fellow, Seminar XXI, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge

Assignments:
August 1973–September 1974 .. Student, undergraduate pilot training, Laughlin Air Force Base, TX.
October 1974–January 1975 ...... Student, C–130 initial qualification training, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR.
October 1977–December 1977 .. Student, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
July 1983–January 1984 ...... Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA.
August 1988–June 1989 ...... Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.
June 1995–May 1997 ............ Commander, 16th Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, FL.
October 2002–October 2004 ....... Director for Operations, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
October 2004–August 2005 .......... Director, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Flight information:
Rating: Command pilot.
Flight hours: More than 4,200.

Major awards and decorations:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Army Commendation Medal

Effective dates of promotion:
Second Lieutenant .................................................. June 6, 1973
First Lieutenant ..................................................... June 6, 1975
Captain ................................................................. June 6, 1977
Major ................................................................. November 1, 1982
Lieutenant Colonel ................................................ March 1, 1985
Colonel ................................................................. February 1, 1991
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Norton A. Schwartz.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

3. Date of nomination:
   July 10, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   December 14, 1951; Toms River, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Suzanne E. (Ptak) Schwartz.

7. Names and ages of children:
   None.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
- Air Force Academy Association of Graduates (member)
- Air Force Academy Athletic Association (member)
- Air Force Academy Society of Washington, DC (member)
- Air Force Association (member)
- Air Force Sergeants Association (member)
- Air Commando Association (member)
- Airlift/Tanker Association (member)
- National War College Alumni Association (member)
- National Defense Transportation Association (member)
- Order of Daedalians (member)
- Military Officers Association of America (member)
- Council on Foreign Relations (member)
- Concord Village Homeowners Association (member)

11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
- United Seamen’s Service Admiral of the Ocean Seas
- National Defense Transportation Association Leadership Award
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI (Air Force Fellow)
- Air Commando Association Hall of Fame
- Toms River High School Hall of Fame

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power.
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF.

This 12th day of June, 2008.

[The nomination of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 31, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2008.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**Questions and Responses**

**Defense Reforms**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant com-
manders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. I have served the majority of my Air Force career under Goldwater-Nichols provisions and have had ample opportunities to observe the implementation and the beneficial effects of Goldwater-Nichols reform on all Services, including the Air Force. I am also a product of the joint education system that stemmed from that legislation. I completely agree with the goals of those defense reforms; they remain essential to the effective employment of our Nation’s military forces. Most importantly, these reforms have yielded a demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. I realize that any legislation enacted 2 decades ago, in the context of the Cold War, might need to be modified to reflect the current national security environment. I also realize that some members of this committee are hard at work on what is widely known as Goldwater-Nichols II. If confirmed as a joint commander, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, my counterparts across the joint community, and other senior leaders, as well as Congress, to make sure that this seminal legislation continues to be suitable for the challenges our Nation faces.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. If confirmed as the Commander of United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), I look forward to the opportunity to further explore and assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of a Joint Combatant Commander.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?

Answer. The mission of the Commander, United States TRANSCOM is to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense (DOD), in peace and war. The Commander relies on his Component Commands—Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (MSDDC)—to accomplish this mission. The Commander also has the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) mission to improve the worldwide DOD distribution system. As DPO, the Commander works closely with the Defense Logistics Agency and the Services to identify inefficiencies, develop solutions and implement improvements throughout the end-to-end distribution system. The U.S. TRANSCOM team blends Active and Reserve Forces, civilian employees, and commercial industry partners to provide the mobility forces and assets necessary to respond to the full range of military operations.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. My career in operational and strategic lift, including Commander of the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), service as Joint Staff Director for Logistics (JLJ) and as Commander, AMC, qualifies me for this challenging assignment. My most recent experience as Vice Chief of the United States Air Force and my ongoing interactions with the entire joint community, most specifically the Chairman and Vice Chairman, and the Army, Navy and Marine Vice Chiefs, as well as my service as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) add to my qualifications.

If confirmed, I will be honored to lead the men and women of U.S. TRANSCOM as they continue—as true joint warfighters—to transform the logistics backbone that TRANSCOM provides the Nation and its allies in peace, crisis, and war.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?

Answer. As Commander, I need a complete understanding of current Defense Department and national transportation issues, including the challenges facing the commercial transportation industry and our national partners upon whom we so heavily rely. I will strive every hour of every day to ensure I am prepared for this critical duty.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM to the following offices:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense when serving as his designated representative. As such, the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM, will report to and through the Deputy Secretary when serving in that capacity.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, including combatant commands, which have collateral or related functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I will act accordingly.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to the law, in the chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant commander, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed as a Commander, I would keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I would be personally accountable.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and obligations of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, he chairs the Joint Requirement Oversight Committee—a critical function and a product of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. When performing duties as the acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will assist the Vice Chairman to execute the duties prescribed by law or otherwise directed by Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in managing the Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall within the combatant commander's chain of command; however, he enables important decisions to be made as the combatant commander's staff interacts with the Joint Staff.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment the Service Chiefs provide is an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM, I will pursue an open dialogue with the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage open dialogue with the other combatant commanders to foster trust and build mutual support. Today's security environment requires us to work together to execute U.S. national policy.

Major Challenges

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?
Answer. Looking ahead, I see two major challenges for U.S. TRANSCOM. The first is to preserve the viability of our commercial transportation partnerships—Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), in an era of high oil prices, industry consolidation and, at some point in the future, a post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) environment with a significantly reduced business base. The second is to ensure we have the appropriate global en route infrastructure to support future force projection and sustainment as we shift to a smaller overseas military presence with more deployments from U.S. bases. In the near term, I am mindful of balancing worldwide mo-
bility requirements and supporting our ongoing deployment, redeployment and dis-
tributing missions within CENTCOM.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. The CRAF and VISA programs are key components of the Nation’s ability to project combat power. To that end I will ensure that I maintain a strong relationship with our industry partners, that I am mindful of the trends affecting the airline and sealift industries and that our contracts with our commercial partners deliver what the Nation needs. If confirmed I will also work closely with your staffs for any legislative support we believe is necessary to ensure the future viability of these programs. With respect to global en route infrastructure, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the existing en route network, and to ensure we make the necessary investments to expand strategic reach into emerging areas of interest, such as Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to opportunities to explore and assess the challenges confronting U.S. TRANSCOM. Initially my priorities will be to ensure a viable surge capability for the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the Nation’s military forces at a time when our commercial transportation partners are facing high oil prices and industry consolidation. I’ll also work to preserve appropriate global en route infrastructure to support force projection and sustainment.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?
Answer. The first challenge is to continue to build a single unified Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). Unified enterprise efforts will enhance delivery of forces and sustainment to the Joint Force Commander, link the joint force to the DOD supply chain and improve trust and confidence in the distribution system. The second challenge is to balance our engagement with industry partners to keep this vital commercial capacity viable in time of need and to maintain military readiness. We must continue to incentivize our industry partners to maintain a robust commercial surge capability. At the same time, we must sufficiently employ our military assets to maintain their readiness. Managing the balance between industry readiness will be especially challenging in a post-OEF/OIF world.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize these concerns and then define specific actions, time lines and solutions to build a unified JDDE and find a balance between military readiness and industry partnerships.

DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER

Question. In September 2003, following a review of logistics operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM, the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). As the DPO, U.S. TRANSCOM was tasked to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities—deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war.

What is your understanding of U.S. TRANSCOM’s responsibilities as the DPO?
Answer. The mission of U.S. TRANSCOM as the DPO is two-fold: first, to coordinate and oversee the DOD distribution system to provide interoperability, synchronization and alignment of DOD wide, end-to-end distribution; and, second, to develop and implement distribution process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System.

Question. What is your assessment of the progress U.S. TRANSCOM has made in improving the distribution process?
Answer. The Command has made significant progress in transforming DOD distribution. U.S. TRANSCOM established a JDDE Community of Interest comprised of U.S. TRANSCOM and National Partners to develop a governance structure and measure performance framework, and to implement DOD distribution improvements. U.S. TRANSCOM now measures global DOD distribution performance from end-to-end using combatant commander defined measures of success. They then use those measures to make process improvements which increase distribution precision and reliability and decrease cost. For example, simple process changes in how ocean containers are booked has resulted in a 20 percent increase in velocity to the
CENTCOM AOR. Likewise, network changes and process improvements in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) have resulted in a 42 percent reduction in over-ocean costs and a 22 percent reduction in channel air costs with improved delivery times to the customers. Finally, improved coordination as a result of DPO initiatives since 2003 has achieved Total Validated Cost Avoidances of $1.9 billion.

**Question.** Do you believe that the current systems needs any changes to enhance the ability of U.S. TRANSCOM to execute the responsibilities of the DPO?

**Answer.** I believe the Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM has the necessary authorities to execute his responsibility as the DPO. If confirmed, I will continue to build on the hard work and successes achieved to date. I will also find new areas in the DOD supply chain that emphasize a total cost management view, that balance inventory costs with transportation costs and achieve best value for the warfighter.

**STRATEGIC AIRLIFT**

**Question.** The longstanding requirement for strategic airlift has been set at a level of 54.5 million ton-miles a day (MTM/D).

Based on your experience, do you perceive a continuing shortage in intertheater airlift?

**Answer.** The requirement for 54.5 MTM/D of combined organic and commercial capacity was set by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (released in 2000). Since then, the Mobility Capability Study (MCS) released in 2005 identified a range of 292–383 organic strategic lift aircraft necessary to meet the National Military Strategy in 2012. Furthermore during the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) Nunn-McCurdy process, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee took this one step further and certified 33.95 MTM/D as the organic portion of the requirement necessary to satisfy the MCS. Based on this 33.95 MTM/D requirement, I do not currently perceive there to be a shortage of inter theater airlift assuming we resource 205 C–17s, 52 RERP modified C–5Bs, and 59 Avionics Modernization Program modified C–5As. The upcoming Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16) will analyze whether or not the 33.95 MTM/D requirement is still valid.

**STRATEGIC AIRLIFT MODERNIZATION**

**Question.** Two years ago, you produced a briefing talking about the possibility of retiring some C–5A aircraft and buying a like number of C–17 aircraft to replace them. This briefing, which was called the “30/30 Plan,” followed on the heels of senior Air Force officers’ suggestions that the so-called worst actors in the C–5A fleet were not worth fixing or upgrading. This number of C–5A aircraft was estimated to be some 30 aircraft.

In making his certification following the Nunn-McCurdy breach of the C–5 RERP, Under Secretary Young evaluated this 30/30 option and found that this alternative was both more expensive and less able to meet the current requirement for strategic airlift than the existing force.

Did you, in your position as Commander of the AMC, support the “30/30 Plan”?

If so, why?

**Answer.** The “30/30 Plan” started as a “what if drill” at SECAF direction of what options we had if cost growth of the C–5 RERP drove a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The Nunn-McCurdy process would require developing alternatives to fully RERPing the whole C–5 fleet (111 aircraft) to meet overall strategic lift requirements. The drill was to see if payback was feasible and the needed capability was satisfied if we re-capitalized older C–5As with C–17s. The plan appeared to have merit and I supported further exploration. We found that there was potential for payback in life cycle costs in the out years. However, neither AMC nor the AF could afford the up-front bill and the SECAF and CSAF did not make it part of their 09–13 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submittal to OSD.

**Question.** Do you agree with Secretary Young’s testimony on this plan?

**Answer.** Yes, I do agree with Secretary Young’s decision to RERP the C–5Bs. By this time (post Nunn-McCurdy), the JROC had established 33.95 MTM/day as the minimum capacity for all N–M options to be measured against. This was in addition to the MCS requirement for 292–383 and NDAA 2007 language mandating the Air Force maintain a minimum 299 strategic lift aircraft. Mr. Young had a very collaborative process and chose the best option to meet all these requirements.

**STRATEGIC SEALIFT**

**Question.** Strategic sealift has always played a significant role in providing support to our forces overseas. Typically, we have seen strategic sealift delivering 95 percent of the equipment transported to overseas contingencies.
Are there any initiatives that you believe are necessary, if confirmed, in the area of strategic sealift?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Navy and our commercial sealift partners to develop initiatives such as Joint Seabasing and Joint High Speed Vessels, which may play a role in enhancing strategic sealift. Strategic Sealift continues to play a vital role in the transportation of equipment and supplies for the DOD. The MSC, the MSDDC, and U.S. Maritime Administration, working in partnership with the U.S. maritime industry, have done a superb job at meeting the performance requirements of strategic sealift as we execute OEF and OIF and support other military missions around the globe. Current initiatives, in particular the Maritime Security Program, help ensure the viability of the U.S. flag maritime industry. I look forward to the results of the Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study to define required changes in capability needed by the military to transport equipment and supplies in the future.

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

Question. With the expansion of military operations since September 11, 2001, the Air Force’s mobility requirements have increased. The Air Force has in the past, and may very well in the future, rely heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement its organic airlift.

Do the changes in the commercial airline industry, characterized by bankruptcies and a move toward smaller and shorter-range aircraft, bring into question the future viability of the CRAF system?

Answer. While it’s true that the industry is trending toward smaller aircraft for domestic service, several recent studies indicate that the airline industry will continue to provide sufficient numbers of large, long-range aircraft to meet our defense needs. However, the current trends in the U.S. commercial air industry are worrisome. The sudden jump in fuel costs has negatively impacted the industry and our CRAF partners as well. I am particularly concerned about the state of the passenger charter segment, the carriers who perform the bulk of our day-to-day personnel missions. If confirmed, I will work closely with this committee on legislative support like the CRAF Assured Business proposal currently under consideration by your staff. I will also work with our CRAF partners to ensure the business relationships are solid and the contracts support DOD requirements.

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. Initial reporting from recent military operations indicate joint command and control capabilities have greatly improved in recent years. What is your assessment of the performance of U.S. TRANSCOM’s global and theater command and control (C2) systems?

Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM’s global C2 systems work remarkably well, as evidenced by our timely support of warfighter requirements.

Question. What interoperability challenges remain between service-to-service and service-to-joint C2 systems?

Answer. An immediate challenge is to improve information exchanges across the various classification boundaries and between Services and combatant commanders, while simultaneously improving information sharing with our commercial and coalition partners. Information sharing is crucial to successful and safe mission accomplishment, but there are clear and dangerous security risks that require constant attention.

Finally, to enhance service-to-joint C2 systems, we are identifying key processes and information technology solutions that best integrate service unique or stand-alone applications to enhance the delivery of timely, accurate, and complete data. The U.S. TRANSCOM team is working with our commercial partners and individual services to ensure these interoperability risks are mitigated. If confirmed, I will maintain U.S. TRANSCOM’s superior service to our customers, and most importantly, our warfighters.

Question. What role should the U.S. TRANSCOM Commander play in ensuring the development of reliable, interoperable, and agile C2 systems?

Answer. As DPO, the U.S. TRANSCOM Commander must play a pre-eminent role in the integration of C2 systems across boundaries and domains from one end of the distribution chain to the other. Commercial partners, Defense Logistics Agency, Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and coalition partners all have unique logistics systems that serve their mission.

If confirmed, I will work with distribution partners and customers to make C2 improvements which will allow secure and unconstrained sharing of information across
these domains. This is a clear challenge, but necessary, if we are to maximize the combat multiplying effects of logistics for the warfighter.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

Question. Recently the Air Force has experienced several failures in its stewardship of nuclear weapons including the unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons from Minot to Barksdale and the shipment of nosecones to Taiwan.

As Vice Chief of Staff, did you play any role in supervising nuclear security, and command and control, and have you played any role in implementing corrective actions in response to the various reports and recommendations of these incidents?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If yes, please explain what role you played in each circumstance.

Answer. I assumed my position soon after the unauthorized munitions transfer back in September 2007.

I played no role in nuclear surety supervision or command and control regarding the unauthorized transfer of weapons from Minot to Barksdale or the shipment of nosecones to Taiwan. As both Vice Chief and now acting Chief, I am deeply involved in implementing actions and initiatives to respond to recommendations of the various reports and studies on the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. For example, I supported the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review. This independent review that looked across the entire AF Nuclear Enterprise. Out of that review, we took the initial steps to begin shifting resources to meet pressing requirements and address shortfalls we have identified. More work needs to be done—and that work is ongoing.

I also oversaw the revision of the Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group charter to broaden the membership and increase the level of leadership chairing the group to a three-star. The Air Force depends on this body to oversee the range of corrective actions underway and ensure the broadest application of best practices across the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. This entity, which includes more than 20 active duty general officers plus SES, is a vital component to the oversight of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.

Most recently, at the direction of the acting Secretary of the Air Force, I stood up the Air Force Nuclear Task Force whose responsibilities include:

- Coordinating and synchronizing the ongoing implementation of specific actions underway in response to the Minot/Barksdale and Taiwan incidents.
- Developing in coordination with STRATCOM, other DOD components and interagency partners, a strategic roadmap to rebuild and restore capabilities and confidence in our stewardship of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
- Undertaking an organizational review to assess and recommend options for alternative assignments of responsibility and/or command arrangements.
- Serving as Air Force focal point for coordination with and/or support to other nuclear-related panels, commissions or review groups outside the Air Force.

There is much work completed and even more underway, all benefiting from engaged leadership at all levels and dedicated airmen who are absolutely committed to this vital mission.

AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION

Question. Following the cancellation of the C–9A aircraft for medical evacuation in 2003, the AMC adopted a new operational approach to its worldwide mission of aeromedical evacuation. The new concept employs other airlift, such as cargo and aerial refueling aircraft, for the air evacuation of wounded and ill patients. The committee has concerns about the level and quality of aeromedical evacuation support for our severely injured or ill personnel.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the highest quality standard of aeromedical evacuation is provided for severely wounded and ill patients?

Answer. The transition to designated (vs. dedicated) aeromedical evacuation aircraft has transformed our global patient movement capability. This concept allows different C–17s to be rapidly configured for patient movement out of combat zones, a capability not offered by the C–9A. It includes newly designed patient support pallets and allows critical care teams to do intensive care of our wounded in flight if required. We have received tremendous support for this initiative across the board, including Congress. During 2007, over 11,000 patients—of which 2,700 were battle injuries—were moved to definitive care. Those patients categorized as urgent or priority were moved within 12–24 hours. Along with other medical improvements, this
timely movement has resulted in dramatically increased survival rates from combat injuries. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure the highest quality of care for our wounded and ill patients.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. U.S. TRANSCOM's budget includes funding for a research and development activity designed to allow for examination and improvement of the entire supply chain as part of U.S. TRANSCOM's role as DPO. What are the major capability gaps related to U.S. TRANSCOM's mission that need to be addressed through research and development efforts?

Answer. The major capability gaps are:

- Deployment and Distribution Velocity Management—Targeting optimized throughput at the nodes and through the conduits of the deployment and distribution supply chains, from origin to point of use and return.
- Cross Domain Planning—Improving decisionmaking and collaboration within the supply chain, from the planning stage to real-time execution and retrograde operations.
- End-to-End Visibility—Providing end-to-end visibility of all aspects of the projection and sustainment of forces and equipment to enable operations.
- Distribution Planning and Forecasting—Providing distribution planning, based on an understanding of aggregated customer requirements, for optimizing the end-to-end distribution process.
- Joint Transportation Interface—Synchronizing, through information exchange, strategic/theater delivery capabilities to meet increasingly dynamic customer needs.
- Distribution Protection/Safety/Security—Providing the appropriate security in a timely manner during deployment and distribution operations.

Question. What unique processes and technologies do you feel U.S. TRANSCOM needs to develop through its own program and investments?

Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM’s research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) projects should focus on processes and technologies to address challenges including:

- Command, Control, Computers, and Communications Information Operations—global C3 to include en route communications that support Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers, Port Opening Capabilities, Director of Mobility Forces, Very Important Personnel (VIP) airlift; requirements visibility, assessment, and planning; end-to-end in-transit visibility and improving container management.
- Mobility Air Forces All Weather Capability—next-generation joint precision airdrop system and autonomous landing and refueling.
- Defensive Systems—mobility asset protection to include protecting/mitigating risks of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
- Transportation and Connector Systems—synchronize strategic/theater delivery capabilities. Physical and command and control continuity in the DOD supply chain; optimize flow in the supply chain; improved visibility and synchronization with commercial lift providers.
- Fossil Fuel Dependency—collaborate with DOD and industry research for alternative solutions.

Question. How will you work with other research and development organizations to ensure that U.S. TRANSCOM's current and future capability gaps are addressed?

Answer. Nearly 75 percent of U.S. TRANSCOM RDT&E projects are collaboratively funded and most of our efforts result in tangible improvements in the hands of the warfighter within 2 to 3 years. The command uses annual announcements to solicit national and Service laboratories, as well as industry proposals. The proposals are vetted throughout the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise for concurrence. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. TRANSCOM’s program of collaborative partnership with the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, the combatant commanders and Joint Staff to identify, validate and recommend RDT&E projects to explore emerging technologies to close logistics gaps.

TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

Question. Serving the needs of the combatant commanders both in the near-term and in the future is one of the key goals of the Department's science and technology executives, who list outreach to commanders as an activity of continued focus. What do you see as the most challenging technological needs or capability gaps facing U.S. TRANSCOM in its mission to provide air, land, and sea transportation to the DOD?
Answer. Certainly, mitigating fossil fuel dependency is of utmost concern. As previously mentioned, there is a collaborative effort to identify capability gaps to determine the top technical and operational challenges (listed above) facing the distribution community. If confirmed, I will continue to address these gaps and shift resources as necessary to meet the most critical need. Additionally, I would look at such critical areas as information security and assurance as well as new cyber technologies to ensure greater efficiency and mission accomplishment.

Question. What would you do, if confirmed to make your technology requirements known to the department’s science and technology community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long term?

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus my efforts on the transitioning of successful technologies. I would continue to involve the JDDE in recommending technology investments, agreements with various Service labs, and annual announcements. I will continue U.S. TRANSCOM’s practice of advertising its RDT&E efforts by: (1) briefing projects to the Functional Capability Board community; (2) documenting efforts within Director Defense Research & Engineering R&D documents (e.g. Joint Warfighter Science & Technology Plan); (3) participation in government and industry sponsored technology symposiums; and (4) technology exchange visits with Service and national laboratories.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. U.S. TRANSCOM has been active in the Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) process. What are your views on the ACTD process as a means to spiral emerging technologies into use to confront changing threats and to meet warfighter needs?

Answer. I fully support the Department’s ACTD program and believe it continues to be the joint community’s best opportunity to quickly leverage mature technology to meet warfighter needs.

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts within your command and in cooperation with other Services and defense agencies?

Answer. If confirmed, I will push rapid technology transition to ensure we get the maximum return on our RDT&E investments. Specifically, I will include the Services, the COCOMs, the JDDE partners, OSD, and the Joint Staff in the project selection process to ensure buy-in and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Finally, I will ensure that proposals have a program of record for transition identified and that rapid fielding is emphasized from day one.

FAMILIES FIRST

Question. For over 10 years, U.S. TRANSCOM and its subordinate command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have been working to improve the process of moving servicemembers’ household goods and gaining the support of the transportation provider industry for needed changes. Implementation of the new system—‘Families First’—uses a “best value” approach to contracting with movers that focuses on quality of performance, web-based scheduling and tracking of shipments, servicemember involvement throughout the moving process, and a claims system that provides full replacement value for damaged household goods. Successful implementation of this system depends on replacement of the legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) with the web-based Defense Personal Property System (DPS).

What is your understanding of the status of TOPS and the progress that has been made in implementing the DPS?

• TOPS is a 20 year old system that is at the end of its life cycle and has both technical and information security issues.
• DPS will begin shipments at 18 selected Personal Property Shipment Offices on or about September 10, 2008. Full deployment to the remaining sites will follow by December 3, 2008 after completion of a new rate filing by Industry. TOPS will be decommissioned by April 30, 2009.

Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges that remain in fully implementing DPS?

Answer.

• Training is critical to system success. As part of DPS rollout, we must continue to provide worldwide training to the Services personnel.
• We have work remaining to mature the DPS system and Personal Property business processes for next summer’s peak season.
Industry buy-in to provide full replacement value (FRV) for household goods that remain in storage for extended periods and are handled by multiple industry partners remains a challenge.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the success in implementing the requirement for FRV for damaged or missing household goods claims?

**Answer.** FRV has been successfully implemented across the Services, and is now in place for all modes of shipments in support of Families First.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the adequacy of the response rate on customer surveys as a method for identifying best and worst performers?

**Answer.** Customer Satisfaction Survey response rates are 20 percent. It is clear the survey response rates are key to ensuring only quality service providers participate in the program. To that end, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs to increase the response rate.

**Question.** If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring that Families First is fully funded and implemented and would you make every effort to ensure this program is successful in meeting its goals?

- If confirmed, I will leverage DPS to continue to improve our business processes for household goods and services.
- I will continue General Schwartz’s efforts and fully fund the DPS program as an Information Technology enabler of Families First. Families First remains a team effort among U.S. TRANSCOM, the Service components and industry, and I will continue our close partnership to ensure success.

**FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS**

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition testified last April that the Air Force is moving forward with a congressionally-mandated plan to develop a Fee-For-Service Aerial Refueling Pilot Program. However, the AMC Commander, General Arthur J. Lichte, has testified that he has questions “with regard to the operational procedures, FAA requirements and certifications, and legal issues that come up.”

In your view, is the Air Force doing everything it can to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out in implementing the fee-for-service pilot program?

**Answer.** The Air Force is providing the necessary foundation to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out with respect to studying the fee-for-service pilot program. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be released in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and airframe integration.

**Question.** What concerns, if any, do you have about the conduct and purpose of this pilot program?

**Answer.** I do have some concerns regarding the funding and operational impacts of this program. There was no fiscal year 2008 appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is working on reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2009. Unlike the Navy program which uses a probe and drogue refueling system, this program requires significant industry commitment and investment to develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal years 2012–2016.

We will assess progress and ensure we meet program requirements in the yearly reports submitted to Congress.

**AIR FORCE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES**

**Question.** What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force’s ability to respond to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Our airmen have been vital to the success of the Joint team in the global war on terrorism, and have also provided global deterrence and assured our friends. The Air Force is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to respond rapidly, flexibly, and precisely to worldwide contingencies. The Air Force has capabilities and manpower with specialized skills in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as strike, airlift, aeromedical evacuation, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
explosive ordnance disposal, and security forces. Our airmen are honored to do their part, but our wartime tempo has had its effect on our people and our equipment. The high operations tempo accelerates the effects of aging on our inventory and erodes some skills necessary for future success. Despite these challenges, we are committed to our Nation’s defense and to the entire joint team, and we will keep our Air Force relevant, capable, and sustainable.

_Question._ How much additional risk is the United States assuming in this regard?

**Answer.** The Air Force is fully supporting the Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders with expeditionary and in place forces. Our Major Commands and Component Numbered Air Forces fully support all the Functional and Unified Combatant commanders in planning and executing operations. We use an AEF process to manage operational tempo and enable rapid and tailored responses to worldwide contingencies as well as protecting the homeland through Operation Noble Eagle. Our forces engaged in combat today are fully ready to perform their missions, but our future full spectrum readiness and dominance are at risk unless we continue to reset the force and recapitalize our aging fleet. We must continue to ensure the U.S. military is capable of setting conditions for America’s success against emerging threats in an uncertain future.

**JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT**

_Question._ In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the merger of two separate small cargo aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a plane that will be smaller than the Air Forces C–130, but larger than the Army’s C–23 Sherpa.

In your view, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the Army and the Air Force with respect to the JCA?

**Answer.** No. There are valid direct support lift requirements that call for Service Organic fixed wing aircraft to meet a ground commander’s need for Time Sensitive/ Mission Critical (TS/MC) delivery of passengers and cargo.

_Question._ What changes to this program, if any, would you recommend?

**Answer.** I support the program of record. However, if confirmed, I will take a hard look at lessons-learned from OEF and OIF to ensure the JCA is employed to support both the time sensitive needs of the Army and to maximize its utility to other users in theater. To that end, we will look at changes in doctrine and supporting capabilities to ensure the JCA can be used in multiple roles no matter which Service operates the aircraft.

**ACQUISITION OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN-TRANSIT CONFERENCE CAPSULES AND SENIOR LEADER IN-TRANSIT PALLETS**

_Question._ Since 2006, the AMC has pursued two programs to upgrade the level of accommodations for senior Air Force and Pentagon officials while in-transit on aircraft. These two programs are known as the Senior Leadership In-Transit Conference Capsule (SLICC) and Senior Leader In-Transit Pallet (SLIP). Currently the Air Force is seeking several million dollars in global war on terrorism supplemental funding for these programs.

Do you believe that these upgrades to senior leadership travel quarters are a legitimate use of global war on terrorism funding?

**Answer.** The global war on terrorism has raised new requirements across the board. Specifically, in the wake of September 11, there has been an ever-growing demand for Senior Leader transportation across the globe—especially into Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters of the global war on terrorism. Our efforts were aimed at responding as quickly and efficiently as possible to growing COCOM and senior leadership requirements, optimizing both dedicated aircraft and leveraging the existing air bridge whenever possible. Indeed, I started this initiative when I was the DJ–4 on the Joint Staff. My goal was to increase efficiency in the utilization of scarce assets, while safely accomplishing the mission. The concept was to take one to two pallet positions on an already tasked aircraft, integrating Senior Leader transport into pre-assigned missions. These missions could be from the continental United States or use prepositioned assets in theater to transport leaders who came by dedicated assets that did not have required defensive systems. By having these assets in theater, we could also take advantage of commercial flights into theater. Upon taking over as AMC/CC, I directed the development of prototypes that were built to the standards of Very Important Person Special Airlift Mission (VIPSAM) aircraft. At this point we have a prototype SLIP and just delivered the first operational pallet. We also have the prototype SLICC in development. These were done using baseline funding. We still need to complete operational test and evaluation of the systems to validate they meet the requirements.
In your view are these emergency or time-critical requirements?

Answer. While these are not emergency requirements in the traditional sense of the word, the need stems from the increased demand levied in the context of global war on terrorism. There is less of an urgent need now because, thanks to the efforts of Congress, more of the dedicated airlift aircraft have been equipped with the necessary defensive systems to fly senior leadership into higher threat areas.

Do you support these expenditures?

Answer. The Air Force funded the development of these prototypes through baseline funding in February 2007.

Have you determined this to be a priority within AMC?

Answer. When I was the AMC/CC, I thought the concept warranted the investment for prototyping and further evaluation. I'm confident that this requirement is being vetted through the normal resource allocation process within the Air Force and OSD.

Have you ensured that expenditures on SLICCs and SLIPs are reasonable and limited to only necessary costs?

Answer. Yes, the driving force behind this entire initiative was efficiency and cost savings. The prototypes were designed and built to the same standards as the existing VIPSAM fleet. Careful attention was given to scaling the requirements to maximize security, communications and the ability to work enroute, while adhering to FAA safety standards.

Over the last several years, senior Air Force officers are alleged to have advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the President's budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement. These programs include the procurement of additional C–17s, the continuation of the C–130J multi-year contract, and the multi-year procurement of additional F–22 aircraft. Senior Air Force officers are also alleged to have advocated a legislative proposal that would overturn a decision of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission relative to Joint Basing.

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officers to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in the President's budget and for which there is no currently validated joint requirement?

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts?

Answer. Our Nation was founded on the principle of civilian control of the military. That includes supporting the President's budget and legislative programs. Other than those occasions when individuals appear before appropriate committees of Congress and are asked to give their personal views, the military services cannot function effectively and credibly if senior officers advocate for programs or funding of requirements that are not a part of the President's budget. I am keenly aware of the responsibility I and others have to fully support the President's budget and provide candid, honest information to our superiors. That would include responding accurately to questions from Congress. If confirmed I would ensure that members of my command understand the responsibility to fully support the President's budget and always put answers in that context whether discussing present or future plans/requirements.

The two slides that appeared in the Washington Post were part of a larger 10-slide internal briefing to Air Force retired senior leadership, to inform them of a Communication Campaign Plan underway to better plan and execute the message about the Air Force's contribution to national security, and to encourage their participation.

Competition for funding is inherent in the Federal budgetary process; therefore, it does not seem unusual for the Air Force to communicate its contribution to National Security to obtain its share of defense resources. All Services and agencies engage in similar activities. If confirmed, my focus as the Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM, will be on joint strategic mobility and distribution programs which span all Service budgets.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

**Question.** In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

**Answer.** Yes.

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN**

**STRATEGIC AIRLIFT PROGRAMS**

1. **Senator Levin.** General McNabb, in response to the advance policy questions, you mentioned the requirement of having enough organic airlift aircraft to meet the 33.95 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) requirement. You also said that the current program of 205 C–17s, 52 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) modified C–5Bs, and 59 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) modified C–5As would meet that goal. Do you have reservations that the 33.95 MTM/D requirement is understated? If so, why?

**General McNabb.** Based on analysis completed to date, the 33.95 MTM/D requirement is adequate. Looking ahead, however, the Department’s Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, as well as a congressionally-directed analysis of airlift requirements and force mix, might develop a different MTM requirement. These studies are considering several new factors including revised Defense Planning Scenarios, emerging over-sized and out-sized requirements such as the Army’s Future Combat System, the reduction of our overseas footprint, Army and Marine troop-strength increases, and the standup of Africa Command (AFRICOM).

2. **Senator Levin.** General McNabb, if the Department were to decide that the total strategic airlift requirements (organic airlift plus commercial partners participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program) were larger, what would be the best way of meeting those needs?

**General McNabb.** This answer is based on understanding exactly how and why the requirement has changed. For example, if the new requirement relates to over-sized and out-sized capacity, then the solution might lie within our organic fleet, since this capability is generally not available in CRAF. If increased passenger or bulk cargo movement drive the requirement, our CRAF partners could likely provide an adequate solution. In general, the best way to meet the Nation’s continuing strategic airlift requirement is through our proven DOD capabilities backed up with an effective pool of commercial capacity to meet both peacetime surge requirements and support full mobilization.

3. **Senator Levin.** General McNabb, should we be concerned about the balance of capacity between our commercial partners in the CRAF program and the Air Force’s organic capability?

**General McNabb.** I believe the balance of organic and commercial capacity is correct, but I do have concerns about CRAF and our organic capability. On the CRAF side, we need to review the economic health of that program in light of likely trends.
in the national security environment as well as in the airline industry. Once this review is complete, we need to make appropriate changes in our business relationships and contracts with CRAF partners to ensure peacetime, surge, and mobilization requirements will be met. On the organic side, we must realize the programmed C-5 reliability improvements and the buy of C-17s because both are critical to meeting our strategic lift requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

C-27J SPARTAN, JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

4. Senator BILL NELSON. General McNabb, the Air Force will augment its fleet of intratheater transports and Air Force Special Operations Command, with U.S. Special Operations Command, will supplement its fleet of support aircraft with the C-27J. The Air Force’s initial order is for 24 aircraft, but it has projected a need for 70 to 100 more in future years. If confirmed, how will you support the Air Force’s efforts to procure the C-27J for the intratheater mission?

General McNABB. We will take into account lessons-learned from Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other recent operations to ensure that the C-27J supports the needs of all customers in the theater. Initial Air Force analysis indicates that the U.S. Air Force primary intratheater General Support mission may best be met with additional C-130J aircraft. However, there are other Direct Support and General Support missions such as homeland defense, disaster relief, medical evacuation, reducing convoy vulnerability to improvised explosive devices, or AFRICOM support that may drive the need for additional Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). Evaluating JCA capabilities across the full range of military operations will point the way to the optimal fleet mix which will maximize airlift efficiency across all platforms. A RAND analysis to address the broader set of missions is underway and will conclude by the end of 2008.

5. Senator BILL NELSON. General McNabb, explain how you will work with the Army to develop a comprehensive plan to provide inter- and intratheater lift in support of all military operations and contingencies.

General McNABB. I fully support all initiatives that embrace Service partnerships to enhance joint effectiveness and minimize unnecessary redundancy.

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is leading a comprehensive Mobility Capability Requirements Study to evaluate all Joint Force Commander movement requirements and the necessary military and commercial capacity to satisfy those needs. The study will conclude in May 2009, and it incorporates Army requirements for intertheater and intratheater deployment as well as distribution support for movement to the point of need.

The Air Force and the Army operate airlift capabilities in close proximity in intratheater airlift. If confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force and Army cooperate to maximize the utility of theater airlift assets. U.S. TRANSCOM is currently co-leading a Roles and Missions review of intratheater airlift operations with a focus on the JCA.

The results of these efforts will improve joint synergy and effectiveness while minimizing duplication of effort. Their focus is the traditional division of General Support provided by the Air Force through a common-user airlift service and Direct Support conducted by the Services with organic aviation assets to meet the time sensitive and mission critical needs. The C-27J offers short field performance for Direct Support operations while providing significant payload and range to accomplish theater-level General Support missions. Given the C-27J’s significant capability to accomplish both General Support and Direct Support mission sets, we must provide the Joint Force Commander the ability to swing from one mission area to the other regardless of the Service assignment of the Joint Cargo Aircraft. This is accomplished through shared visibility and management of movement requirements as well as the ability to use available airlift capacity.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

6. Senator CLINTON. General McNabb, the Air Force is now developing the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010; with the new guidance from the Secretary of Defense to protect end strength as well as re-examine the pro-
posed modernization accounts to meet the needs of the Total Force, what are your plans to ensure in the POM the adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard from its equipment, personnel, and sustainment perspectives?

General McNABB. If confirmed as U.S. TRANSCOM commander, I will have a very limited role in the Air Force’s POM submissions. The Air Force’s budget submission included a detailed review of all applicable guidance as well as a careful review of Total Force modernization, personnel, and sustainment. The Air Force remains committed to Total Force Integration and in the 2010 POM will expand on the progress we have made to integrate the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total Force in all areas including equipment, personnel, and sustainment.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

7. Senator CLINTON. General McNabb, Secretary Gates has stressed the importance of the Air Force providing a more robust ISR to the warfighter. How will you enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary’s objectives, and within what timeframe will you be able to do so?

General McNABB. We are working as part of the Secretary’s ISR Task Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight in the near-term through additional buys of equipment (such as RC–12 aircraft tailored to irregular warfare) and creative concepts that will add quantitative and qualitative value in the near-term. The Air Force and our airmen are committed to winning the current fight. Our ISR posture reflects that commitment.

The Air Force has adapted traditional capabilities to Joint Force Commander requirements by fielding innovative ISR solutions. For example, the Air Force invented and fielded 4,000 Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive UAS pictures. We have accelerated MQ–1 Predator operations well beyond the DOD-directed program of record. We also introduced the MQ–9 Reaper into combat a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS capability at maximum capacity with near-term focus, and we’re proud of the dedicated airmen around the globe who are making this happen. General David Petraeus recently attested, “Predator teams have just been doing unbelievable work down there [International Zone] and in Baghdad as well. I think there’s some path-breaking work ongoing here.”

The DOD-approved Predator UAS requirement is 21 Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) by 2010. The Air Force is already flying 26 today, and we will further increase Predator CAPs to 31 by December 2008. We are pushing ISR capability into the field as soon as it becomes available. We have issued a request for proposal for new UASs, and we are shifting our UAS procurement from the older MQ–1 to the more capable MQ–9. When equipped with the new Wide Area Airborne Surveillance pod (WAAS), our MQ–9 UASs will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than a single MQ–1 Predator.

In addition, we have pushed our legacy ISR “workhorses”—U–2s, RC–135s, and JSTARS—to the highest possible tempo to get as much capability to the fight as possible. Although still in development and procurement, our Global Hawk UAS is already a prized capability that is also deployed to the fight at the highest rate possible. To ensure that our ground partners are able to leverage Air Force ISR systems, we have embedded ISR liaison teams at the division and brigade levels to work hand-in-glove with ground commanders and with our battlefield airmen in tailoring ISR capabilities for specific tactical fights. Further, we have capitalized on technical analysis advances to accommodate rapidly growing collection capabilities and turn data into actionable intelligence. In light of these advances, we have reorganized globally through reachback for even more potency and efficiency through the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)—our primary imagery analysis capability. This global approach provides real time flexibility and ensures that our warfighters get the maximum value from ISR collection and data.

C–5 FLEET

8. Senator CLINTON. General McNabb, the recently signed Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C–17s for the Air Force to meet its strategic airlift requirements. The Air Force has continued to state its need to balance the cost of sustaining the C–5 fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for additional C–17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C–5 fleet.
General McNabb. Our first priority is always to provide the best overall airlift capability to the joint warfighter. There are two issues with respect to the proper balance between the C-5s and C-17s that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The first is the total number of aircraft. The current requirement of 299 aircraft was set by the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009 program of record for strategic airlift is 190 C-17s and 111 C-5s.

The second issue is the minimum number of MTM/D available in our total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy certification, the JROC validated a requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C-5s and C-17s). The recent Nunn-McCurdy acquisition decision memorandum signed by John Young, USD(AT&L), results in a fleet of 205 C-17s, 52 Reliability Enhancement Reengined Program (RERP) modified C-5s, and 59 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) modified C-5As. This fleet mix meets both requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the U.S. TRANSCOM commander and the JROC.

The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and retirement of portions of the C-5A fleet. The C-17 has proven itself to be a highly reliable and versatile strategic airlift platform that will serve the Nation well across the full range of military operations. We will continue to analyze the overall requirement and make sure we maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available in the spring of 2009, is the next big milestone in this continuing analysis.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN AND SENATOR JOHN WARNER

9. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, according to Air Force documents, the requirement for Senior Leader In-Transit Comfort Capsules (SLICC) was added as an in-scope task order to the Agile Eagle Program—an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory under the Air Force Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The Agile Eagle contract was expressly for the “design, development, fabrication, testing and upgrading” of “Specialized Airborne Communications Packages.” The Agile Eagle Program “called specifically for communications packages with multiple-channel/multiple-path satellite communications and comprehensive airborne networking capability into an existing communications facility.” Is SLICC a new start program?

General McNabb. SLICC is a new start program. Congress was notified of the new start in January 2007.

10. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, please explain how the SLICC task order is in-scope to the Agile Eagle contract for “Specialized Airborne Communications Packages?”

General McNabb. The SLICC is in-scope to the Agile Eagle contract for “Specialized Airborne Communications Packages” in that it was intended to be used in conjunction with the Steel Eagle Command and Control Module (CCM) to provide the end user with worldwide, secure communications and networking capabilities such as secure video teleconferencing and other advanced networking operations. The Conference Eagle Module was an existing Contract Line Item Number on the Agile Eagle contract for an accompanying capsule for the Steel Eagle CCM to provide the user with a dedicated work/rest travel compartment. The SLICC meets the same capabilities, allowing a task order to be executed within that contract.

11. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, according to e-mails provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the attached March 26, 2008 “SLICC/SLIP Financial Update” by the Air Force Research Laboratory, in June 2007 the “AMC request to implement ‘worldclass’ interior and changes to berthing module shelter and seating components,” led to cost increases of at least $493,000. (Please see attachment). As you were the Commander of Air Mobility Command (AMC) at the time of these changes, how can you answer, as you did, in your advance policy questions, that you ensured expenditures on the SLICC program are “reasonable and limited to only necessary costs?”
SLICC/SLIP
Financial Update

26 March 2008

SLICC / SLIP
Program Background

- In 2006, AMC approached AFRL with the SLICC program
  - Initial AFRL proposal in Nov 2006 covered only SLICC
  - Initial program concept was to re-use already engineered and already-approved Steel Eagle components
    (module shelters, wall materials, environmental systems, etc.) to reduce schedule and minimize cost
- In January 2007, AMC requested AFRL's assistance with SLIP
- SLICC eventually departed from the Steel Eagle baseline. AMC also placed emphasis on "world class" interior. Shelter, tables, environmental systems, wall coverings, power components, and other details had to be re-designed.
- Cost estimates have fluctuated over time as dictated by program requirements and as actual final costs for various components have been determined
- The following pages identify the various cost estimates that have been generated and describe the background for each revision.
- The following charts include baseline program costs and the 12 Mar 2008 AFRL letter addressing customization costs. The DER costs are not included in these charts because it is a separable effort somewhat unrelated to the core acquisition program. This document is targeted at tracking design-oriented decisions and costs. Updated charts reflecting the addition of the DER letter can be provided if desired.
SLICC Cost Estimates
Summary of Cost Revisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>SLICC</th>
<th>(Contract Total)</th>
<th>(Contract ODC)</th>
<th>(Dev/ Misc)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2004</td>
<td>AFRL Letter to AMC</td>
<td>$1,380,491</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>85,718</td>
<td>59,701</td>
<td>Initial Estimate. Based on re-use of already-designed four Eagle components (propulsion, environmental, tail materials, etc.) to estimate contract labor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2004</td>
<td>Matching to Model Definition</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>Verbally directed to contractor to model this project with AMC. Matching SLICC design to version of ODC generator module.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Official Coherence Proposal</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>Official content reviewed by AFRL that formed the basis for the actual project contract task order award.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2005</td>
<td>Matching to Model Definition</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>Update to matching driven by AMC requirement to match project and contract items to these models. Matching SLICC design to version of ODC generator module.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2005</td>
<td>Official Coherence Proposal</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>1,204,772</td>
<td>Official content reviewed by AFRL to incorporate changes made during ODC tasks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'ODC = Other Direct Costs = Materials and other non-labor costs.'

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

SLICC Cost History

[Graph showing SLICC cost history]
### SLIP Cost Estimates

#### Summary of Revisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>SLIP Total</th>
<th>Contract Labor</th>
<th>ODC</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Breaching 302cm McManus</td>
<td>$1138</td>
<td>(5000C)</td>
<td>(5000C)</td>
<td>Initial estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Official Contractor Proposal</td>
<td>$1137M</td>
<td>(5000C)</td>
<td>(5000C)</td>
<td>Official contractor proposal to APRL's contract task order for the actual baseline contract task order award.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2007</td>
<td>Breaching &amp; Nicos</td>
<td>$117M</td>
<td>(52110C)</td>
<td>(52110C)</td>
<td>Update to Nicos McManus driven by ANO's request to implement &quot;world class&quot; features. Due costs increased by $117M, but overall project reduced to $11.7M. Plan was for APRL-SladerTech to fabricate interior components (stairs, etc.) to eliminate the need for &quot;world class&quot; components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2007</td>
<td>Official Contractor Proposal</td>
<td>$2767M</td>
<td>(52110C)</td>
<td>(52110C)</td>
<td>Official contractor proposal to APRL to incorporate all changes since April 2007 award. Will extend to Nicos McManus with ANO's request to implement &quot;world class&quot; features. Notional $2767M for SLIP task for ANO's 2007-2008 budget year.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ODC = Other Direct Costs = Materials and other non-maneuver costs
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

---

### SLIP Cost History

[Graph showing SLIP cost history from March 2008 to November 2010.]
## Cost Summary

**SLICC/SLIP Total Cost**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>SLICC</th>
<th>SLIP</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>Briefing to 30C ASW Subareas</td>
<td>$3.2M</td>
<td>$1.0M</td>
<td>$4.2M</td>
<td>$1.0M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>Office Criteria Proposal</td>
<td>$2.0M</td>
<td>$1.25M</td>
<td>$3.25M</td>
<td>Contract award was officially awarded in April 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2007</td>
<td>Strategic Mobility Program</td>
<td>$2.71M</td>
<td>$1.7M</td>
<td>$4.41M</td>
<td>$1.7M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>Consequence Reorganization</td>
<td>$3.14M</td>
<td>$1.0M</td>
<td>$4.14M</td>
<td>This program is projected to absorb $1.0M of the funding provided by AMC (estimated at $2.7M of the contract award) as of 30 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2007</td>
<td>Consequence Reorganization</td>
<td>$2.09M</td>
<td>$1.25M</td>
<td>$3.34M</td>
<td>This program is projected to absorb $1.0M of the contract award as of 30 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## SLICC/SLIP

**Funding Distribution/Status**

- **Funds Provided by AMC:** $4.1M

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End</th>
<th>Consequence Reorganization</th>
<th>SLICC</th>
<th>SLIP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Estimated Obligated / Expected)</td>
<td>$3.14M</td>
<td>$1.0M</td>
<td>$4.14M</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Estimated / requested)</td>
<td>$3.2M</td>
<td>$1.25M</td>
<td>$4.45M</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Total including Gov/No-Cost)</td>
<td>$4.14M</td>
<td>$1.0M</td>
<td>$5.14M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Estimated and Obligated:** Current contractual estimate. These funds are obligated on contract.
- **Expenditure:** Current estimate of actual program expenditures as of 1 March 2008.
- **Final Estimate:** Includes baseline program and costs described in 12 March 2008 AFRL letter.
Cost Estimates

- Previous pages highlight that AFRL and SelectTech manpower costs have not significantly changed since March 2007 program award and kickoff.
- Cost increases have virtually all been in the area of materials and other non-labor costs due to the expense of SLICC/SLIP components and costs incurred by changing design details that were previously finalized.
- SLIP Examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Original Estimate</th>
<th>Current Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats (16 total)</td>
<td>$84K</td>
<td>$164K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Includes seat frames, NRE, testing, upholstery, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancillary Components</td>
<td>$15K</td>
<td>$187K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Table, other wood products)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Increase</td>
<td>+49K</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- AFRL and SelectTech have tried diligently to satisfy AMC's schedule and program objectives for SLICC and SLIP while making all reasonable efforts to keep costs within the budget provided.

General McNabb. Costs presented in November 2006 were initial estimates by the Air Force Research Lab. Since then, costs have been generated to: (1) cover airworthiness testing from modifying the original design from a communications module to a conference working space; (2) cover nonrecurring engineering to modify the SLICC design to a "two capsule" configuration; and (3) to meet current DV fleet appearance standards.

12. Senator McCain and Senator Warner, General McNabb, what role did you play in determining the furnishings of SLICCs?

General McNabb. In June 2006, I approved a broad statement of requirements for the SLICC as part of the Operational Requirements document, and in May 2007, I approved the selection of the original colors for the SLICC.

13. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, in your answers to the advance policy questions, you stated "the driving force behind this entire initiative was efficiency and cost savings." However, according to the attached "AF Form 1768," entitled "Staff Summary Sheet" signed by you in June 2006, the AMC requirements validated under your command were for "reclining first-class airline seats incorporating integral foot rests," "a couch capable of seating at least two adults (three desired)," "a flat panel monitor (TV screen)" with a "diagonal measurement of at least 37 inches," "a full length mirror," "internal illumination level [that] will automatically adjust to ambient lighting levels," "independent heating and cooling" units, and "aesthetically pleasing" walls, ceilings and carpets. (Please see attachment). Is this the description of a project where cost savings are the driving force?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>SIGNATURE DIVISION/SPACE &amp; DATE</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>SIGNATURE DIVISION/SPACE &amp; DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AMC/AA</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Senior, Col, 18 May 06</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>AM/CC</td>
<td>Approve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AMC/AAA</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Kepner, Capt (for Gen Woodward)</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AMC/AB</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Taylor, Capt, 17 May 06, 2nd in command (via E-SSS, ref Tab 3)</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AM/CC/CE</td>
<td>Info</td>
<td>Charles, Col, 7 May 06</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AM/CC/IV</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Frank, Maj, 7 May 06</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**STAFF SUMMARY SHEET**

Mr. Doyle Walker
AMC/3BP
256-7167

**PURPOSE:** Obtain AM/CC approval of the Senior Official Work and Rest Capsule (SWOC) Operational Capabilities.

**DISCUSSION:**

1. AM/CC identified the need to provide US Government Senior Officials (i.e., required MIAs) with responsive air transportation which not only meets the individual traveler's security requirements, but their need for a private conducive work and rest environment. At a minimum, these individuals must have access to secure communications and an environment in which to hold private conversations, accomplish work of a sensitive nature, conduct meetings, and rest while the aircraft is en-route. AM/CC requires the high-level requirements for a "DI Capsule" which would provide the necessary attributes (ref. Tab 2).

2. The high-level SWOC requirements served as the foundation for the detailed SWOC capabilities requirements (the term Senior Official Work and Rest Capsule is used in lieu of "DI Capsule" as it better captures the essence of this effort). The detailed requirements (ref. Tab 1) define a capsule that provides a private environment for the senior officials aboard ANEC C-5, C-17, KC-10, and C-5B aircraft, to work and rest while the aircraft is underway. The capsule must be compatible with the MAF's existing M3 aircraft handling system and be capable of being seated in the aircraft. The capsule should be compatible with any host aircraft baseline configuration to include electrical and environmental systems. The capsule will support two workstations with installation of two-class first-class seating and integrate the latest technology into the cabin for any purpose.

3. Upon approval of the detailed SWOC capabilities requirements, contracting actions will be initiated to acquire up to ten SWOCs.

**RECOMMENDATION:** CC approve detailed SWOC required operational capabilities at Tab 1.

[Signature]

QUENTIN L. PETERSON, Maj Gen, USAF
Project of Air, Space, and Information Operations

[Signature]

3 Steps
1. Detailed SWOC Capabilities Requirements
2. AM/CC High-Level Capsule Requirements
3. Impacts from AMC 2-Digit Staff Coordination
Senior Leader Intransit Pallet (SLIP)
Required Capabilities

For The

Senior Official Work and Rest Capsule (SOWRC)

1.0. Overview. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 4500.56 identifies those United States Government Senior Officials, both civilian and military, designated as "required users" of military aircraft (MI-AIR) in the conduct of their official duties. Commercial transportation is often unacceptable for use by "required users" due to their continuous requirement for secure communications, security requirements which exceed that available in the commercial sector, or their need for responsive transportation to satisfy exceptional scheduling requirements dictated by frequent short-notice travel. Today there are insufficient resources to meet "required user" travel needs; particularly in terms of secure communications and being able to provide an environment in which senior officials can hold private conversations, accomplish work of a sensitive nature, conduct meetings, and rest while the aircraft is en route.

1.1. This document defines the required operational capabilities needed to support "required user" travel aboard the Mobility Air Force (MAF) fleet when traveling on other than Operational Support Airlift (OSA) aircraft or Special Air Mission (SAM) aircraft. As a minimum, the Senior Official Work and Rest Capsule (SOWRC) must provide a private enclosed work and rest environment, physically separated from the flight crew and passengers, and capable of being used aboard MAF C-5, C-17, C-130, and KC-10 aircraft. The SOWRC must remain fully functional, with the exception of the video playback and display devices, in all environments in which the host aircraft (i.e., the aircraft on which the SOWRC is being used) is approved for operation to include unpressurized flight. The respective Mission Design Series (MDS) Sustainment Group (SG) for each host aircraft (e.g., C-5 Support Group) will provide engineering approval to use and/or operate the capsule aboard their respective aircraft. The Air Transportability Test Loading Agency (ATTLA) will certify the SOWRC airworthiness prior to employment of the capsule. The SOWRC will meet all safety and/or requirements applicable to the host aircraft on which it is used and/or transported.

1.2. The detailed SOWRC capabilities (requirements) are defined below and separated into two categories: thresholds - which are the minimum acceptable capability or level of performance designated by the symbol (T); and objectives - which denote a desired level of performance designated by the symbol (O).

2.0. Basic SOWRC Capabilities.
2.1. The SOWRC will:
2.1.1. Be compatible with the 463L cargo handling system. (T)
2.1.1.1. Be compatible with existing MAF Material Handling Equipment (MHE) such as 'K-Loaders' without requiring modification to the MHE or the host aircraft. (T)
AMC/CSC approved the following "Required Capabilities for the Senior Officer Work and Rear Cargo (SOWRC)" on 8 Jun 06. Document was Tab 1 to the "Senior Official Work and Rear Cargo (previously referred to as the DV-Capsule) Operational Capabilities" SSS. SOWRC name subsequently changed to Senior Leader In-transit Conference Capsule (SLICC).

2.1.1.2. Be compatible with existing MAF aircraft cargo restraint system(s) without requiring modification to the cargo restraint system(s) to include the floor rollers and pallet locks. (T)

2.1.1.3. Be certified for air transport on all AMC aircraft which are capable of transporting 463L pallet(s) up to and including 96 inches in height. (T)

2.1.1.4. Occupy no more than two standard 463L pallet positions. (T)

2.1.1.4.1. The SOWRC will permit loading along the 88 inch pallet bias on KC-10 aircraft.

Note on KC-10 aircraft, pallets must be rotated 90 degrees upon entry into the aircraft cargo compartment which physically limits the length of the pallet ‘train.’ This limitation must be considered in the development of the SOWRC. (T)

2.1.2. Be compatible with existing AMC aircraft electrical system(s) in terms of voltage, cycles, amperage, connectors, etc. . . . (T)

2.1.2.1. Within the SOWRC, the characteristics of the electrical power intended for use with 'carry-on' appliances (e.g., laptop power supplies) must be compatible with those appliances and the operation of those appliances must not be detrimentally impacted by use of SOWRC power. (T)

2.1.2.2. Within the SOWRC, the characteristics of the electrical power intended for use with appliances connected directly into the SOWRC power system (e.g., flat panel monitor, Digital Video Disk (DVD) player) must be compatible with those appliances and the operation of those appliances must not be detrimentally impacted by use of SOWRC power. (T)

2.1.2.3. All electrical appliances permanently attached to the SOWRC (e.g. Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLoS) communication components, video playback devices, etc. . . . ) and internal capsule electrical distribution networks will receive electrical power via a power distribution panel located either within the SOWRC or externally attached to the capsule. The power distribution panel will serve as the electrical power interface between the capsule and the host aircraft electrical power system. No permanently attached SOWRC appliance will connect directly to the host aircraft electrical power system. (T)

2.1.2.3.1. All electrical appliances permanently affixed to the SOWRC (e.g., flat panel monitor, communications equipment) and internal capsule electrical distribution networks will be protected by circuit breakers or similar electrical protection devices separate and apart from the host aircraft electrical protection devices. (T)

2.1.3. Be compatible with existing host aircraft Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems in terms of thermal loading; both with respect to the aircraft’s ability to provide the necessary HVAC capacity to support the capsule (if the aircraft HVAC system will be used to supply the SOWRC’s HVAC requirements) and the ability of the aircraft to handle (dissipate) the thermal load generated by the SOWRC. (T)

2.1.4. Incorporate provisions for the temporary storage of four M-9 handguns (i.e., 9mm handguns), four holsters with belts, and eight 15-round M-9 ammunition clips. (T)

2.1.5. Incorporate a lockable storage container, secured within the capsule, which is a minimum of 5 inches deep, 10 inches wide, and 16 inches long to provide a means for capsule occupants to temporarily secure materials (documents and electronic media) while aboard the aircraft; the intent is not to install a GSA approved safe. (T)

2.1.6. Maintain the same pressure altitude (PA) as the interior of the host aircraft. (T)

2.1.7. Maintain full operational capability, to include all sub-components (e.g., flat screen/flat panel monitor) at PA= equal to sea-level and up to and including 6,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) under Standard Day conditions. (T)
2.1.8. Maintain full operational capability of all safety features and safety related sub-components (e.g., emergency lighting) at PAs equal to -1000 feet MSL or to and including the maximum host aircraft operating altitude under Standard Day conditions. (T)

2.2. The SOWRC should utilize:

2.2.1. A single electrical connection between the SOWRC and the host aircraft. (O)

2.2.2. Occupy no more than 1.3 standard 463L pallet positions. (O)

3.0. Amenities.

3.1. The SOWRC will be equipped with:

3.1.1. Two work surfaces, one for each primary SOWRC occupant, located such that the work surface can be easily used by individuals occupying the first-class airline seats. (T)

3.1.1.1. Work surfaces must be adequately sized to fully support a laptop computer and two legal pads placed side by side. (T)

3.1.1.2. Work surfaces must be easy to stow and install by one person, if not permanently installed, without the use of any tools. (T)

3.1.2. One wall mounted flat screen/flat panel (non-CRT) monitor capable of being used to 'play back' Compact Disk (CD), DVD and/or video tapes (VHS® as a minimum), as well as serve as a computer monitor to support Windows based (A.K.A IBM®-compatible) personal computer (PC) presentations (e.g., Microsoft Office PowerPoint©). There is no requirement for the monitor and playback device(s) to be a single unit. (T)

3.1.2.1. The wall mounted flat screen/flat panel monitor must have a diagonal measurement of at least 37 inches. (T)

3.1.3. One DVD player permanently connected to the flat screen/flat panel monitor. There is no requirement for the monitor and playback device(s) to be a single unit. (T)

3.1.4. One pair of stereo speakers capable of supporting audio playback of CD, DVD, or video tapes while the aircraft is in flight. Speakers must be secured within the capsule to prevent movement during aircraft operations. (T)

3.1.5. A minimum of one 110 volt, 60 cycle, duplex outlet per wall in each occupied capsule compartment capable of powering laptop computer power supplies, cell phone chargers (there is no intent to use cell phones while airborne), etc. . . . without requiring modification to the existing appliance power plug. (T)

3.1.5.1. Two 110 volt, 60 cycle, duplex outlets located on the wall closest to the two first-class airline seats (such that one outlet is located in close proximity to each of the first-class airline seat capable of powering laptop computer power supplies, cell phone chargers, (there is no intent to use cell phones while airborne) . . . without requiring modification to the existing appliance power plug. (T)

3.1.6. Provisions for each first-class airline seat occupant to hang two garment bags. (T)

3.1.7. A full-length mirror. (T)

3.1.8. Provisions for each first-class airline seat occupant to store two ‘carry-on’ bags. (T)

3.1.9. Aesthetically pleasing wall-to-wall carpeting. (T)

3.1.10. Aesthetically pleasing wall treatments/coverings. (T)

3.1.11. Aesthetically pleasing ceiling treatments/coverings. (T)

3.1.12. “Sound proof” external capsule walls. (T)
AMC/CC approved the following “Required Capabilities for the Senior Officer Work and Rest Capsule (SOWRC)” on 8 Jun 06. Document was Tab 1 in the “Senior Officer Work and Rest Capsule (previously referred to as the D4 Capsule) Operational Capabilities” SSS. SOWRC name subsequently changed to Senior Leader In-transit Confinement Capsule (SLICC).

3.1.13. Trash receptacle in each occupied capsule compartment (trash receptacle must be capable of being secured within the capsule; however, be easily removed for servicing). (T)

3.1.14. Two digital wall clocks with internal battery back-up power to maintain correct time. (T)

3.1.14.1. Batteries used to power the wall clocks (if internal batteries are used as the primary clock power source) or to provide back-up power shall be able to be changed without having to remove the clock from the wall. (T)

3.1.14.2. The controls used to enter/correct clock time will be located on the front of the clock or easily accessible without having to remove the clock from the wall to adjust the time. (T)

3.1.14.3. Each wall clock will have internal illumination to allow occupants to determine the time under any internal capsule illumination levels. (T)

3.1.14.3.1. Internal illumination level will automatically adjust to ambient lighting levels. (T)

3.2. The SOWRC should utilize:

3.2.1. A wall mounted flat screen/flat panel monitor capable of being operated using a hand-held remote control unit. (O)

3.2.2. One DVD and video tape combination playback unit permanently connected to the flat screen/flat panel monitor. There is no requirement for the monitor and playback device(s) to be a single unit. (O)

3.2.3. A single remote control unit which controls operation and all functions of the video playback devices as well as the wall mounted flat screen/flat panel monitor. (O)

3.2.4. A design that has provisions for each first-class airline seat occupant to hang up two garment bags in a enclosed closet. (O)

3.2.5. A design that has provisions for a full-length mirror located on the inside of the garment bag storage closet. (O)

3.2.6. A design that has provisions for each first-class airline seat occupant to store two ‘carry-on’ bags in a closet. (O)

3.2.7. A design that has incorporates “sound proof” interior capsule walls (if there are any interior walls). (O)

3.2.8. A design that incorporates built-in shelves. (O)

3.2.9. A design that incorporates an end table located on one end of the couch. (O)

3.2.10. A design that incorporates an end table located on both ends of the couch. (O)

4.0. Berthing.

4.1. The SOWRC will be equipped with:

4.1.1. Berthing/sleeping arrangements for two adults. Berths will be stowed when not in use (first class airline seats will not be used to meet this requirement). (T)

4.1.1.1. Berths will incorporate a means to secure occupants in their berths. (T)

4.1.2. Sleeping surfaces which incorporate a ‘mattress’ with usable sleeping dimensions of at least 39 inches wide and 75 inches long. (T)

4.1.2.1. The mattress/pad thickness shall be able to accommodate a 95th percentile male with no more that 50% compression of the mattress pad material. (T)

4.1.3. A berthing/sleeping area separated from the rest of the SOWRC by the use of a sound deadening curtain. (T)

4.2. The SOWRC should utilize:
AMCC approved the following “Required Capabilities for the Senior Officer Work and Rest Capsule (SOWRC)” on 8 Jun 06. Document was Tab 1 to the “Senior Officer Work and Rest Capsule (previously referred to as the DV Capsule) Operational Capabilities” SSS. SOWRC name subsequently changed to Senior Leader In-transit Conference Capsule (SLICC).

4.2.1. Sleeping surfaces which incorporate a ‘mattress’ with usable sleeping dimensions at least 39 inches wide and 80 inches long. (O)
4.2.1.1. The mattress/pad thickness shall be able to accommodate a 95th percentile male with no more that 50% compression of the mattress pad material. (T)
4.2.2. A berthing/sleeping area located in a separate compartment within the SOWRC. (O)
4.2.3. Walls separating the berthing/sleeping area from the remainder of the capsule which contain sound proofing/deadening material. (O)

5.0. Communications
5.1. The SOWRC will be equipped with:
5.1.1. A global, beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) capability which shall provide non-secure and secure (up to and including ‘SECRET’) voice communications, accessible and useable by either occupant of the first-class airline seats, when airborne. (T)
5.1.1.1. BLOS capability shall be independent of the host aircraft communication systems. (T)
5.1.1.2. BLOS capability shall not interfere with host aircraft communication and navigation systems operations. (T)
5.1.1.3. BLOS capability will allow the caller to establish and receive commercial and Defense Switched Network (DSN) phone calls without any reliance on support from non-SOWRC occupants. (T)
5.1.1.4. The BLOS communication capability should provide, as a minimum, the same capabilities and level of quality in terms of voice communication that is currently available on MAF aircraft equipped with either an international Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) communication system or a DoD Satellite Communication (SATCOM) system. (T)
5.1.1.4.1. The BLOS solution chosen should be based on the capability of the host platform to support its operation with pre-existing infrastructure (i.e., antennas). (T)
5.1.1.4.2. If the BLOS solution utilizes a host aircraft communication system, the interfaces between the SOWRC and the host aircraft components will be certified for connectivity to the aircraft by the respective MDS SG. (T)

6.0. Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning (HVAC)
6.1. The SOWRC will be equipped with:
6.1.1. An Environmental Control System (ECS) capable of maintaining an internal capsule temperature between 65-80 degrees Fahrenheit (F) when temperatures outside the capsule range between 32 and 120 degrees F. (T)
6.1.2. An ECS capable of maintaining internal occupant selected capsule temperature ±3 degrees F. (T)
6.1.3. A thermostat will be located in the primary work area of the SOWRC which can display both ambient capsule temperature as well as desired capsule temperature. (T)

7.0. Lighting
7.1. The SOWRC will be equipped such that:
7.1.1. Each occupied SOWRC compartment shall be illuminated such that sufficient illumination is provided to perform all activities for which the capsule compartment is intended. (T)

7.1.2. The lighting intensity of all SOWRC lighting shall be fully controllable throughout the complete range of possible illumination levels. (T)

7.1.3. There is one work light available to illuminate the work surface of each first-class airline seat occupant. (T)

7.2. The SOWRC should be equipped such that:
7.2.1. There is a stowable work light for each occupant of the couch. (O)
7.2.2. There is a stowable work light for each berths/sleeping area occupant. (O)

8.0 Safety.
8.1. In the SOWRC there shall be a means of annunciation located on at least two external sides of the capsule that provide a visual warning whenever:
8.1.1. The capsule ECS is inoperative. (T)
8.1.2. The internal capsule emergency lighting system is in operation. (T)
8.2. The SOWRC will incorporate two entry/exit capsule doors. (T)
8.2.1. Entry/exit doors will be capable of being secured/locked from inside the capsule. (T)
8.2.2. Entry/exit doors will incorporate the capability of being unlocked from outside the capsule without requiring the use of electrical power. (T)
8.2.3. Entry/exit doors will have placards affixed describing door operation on both sides of the door. (T)
8.2.4. Emergency exits, or doors intended to be used as emergency exits, will be annunciated (emergency exit annunciation will not require host aircraft power). (T)
8.2.5. In the SOWRC at least one entry/exit door will open inward into the capsule. (T)
8.3. There shall be a self-contained emergency lighting system in each occupied capsule compartment. (T)
8.3.1. Internal capsule emergency lighting system shall incorporate a 'disarming' feature so during storage or extended periods when the capsule is in a non-powered state, the emergency lighting system will not operate. (T)
8.3.2. Internal capsule emergency lighting system shall be activated by the same acceleration/ deceleration forces that energize the host aircraft's emergency lighting system. (T)
8.3.3. Emergency lighting shall operate for a minimum of 20 minutes. (T)
8.4. There will be two-way communication between capsule occupants and the host aircraft flight crew. (T)
8.4.1. There shall be a combination audio and visual emergency annunciation capability operated by the host aircraft flight crew to notify the capsule occupants. (T)
8.4.2. There shall be a combination audio and visual emergency annunciation capability to allow capsule occupants to notify a member of the host aircraft flight crew should an emergency arise within the capsule. (T)
8.5. There shall be one in-capsule fire extinguisher in each occupied capsule compartment. (T)
8.6. There shall be a minimum of four in-capsule portable emergency escape breathing devices located within the capsule. The term emergency escape breathing device is being used in the
AMC/CC approved the following "Required Capabilities for the Senior Officer Work and Rest Capsule (SOWRC)" on 8 Jun 06. Document was Tab 1 to the "Senior Official Work and Rest Capsule (previously referred to as the DV Capsule) Operational Capabilities" SSS. SOWRC name subsequently changed to Senior Leader In-transit Conference Capsule (SLICC).

generic sense, if possible the capsule should use the standard MAF the emergency escape breathing device if one is so designated. (T)
8.7. If the capsule HVAC system fails there will be a means of providing aircraft cargo compartment air to the inside of the capsule. (T)
8.8. In the capsule there shall be a means of manually neutralizing the pressure differential between the capsule and the aircraft cargo compartment which is operable from both inside and outside of the capsule. (T)

8.2. The SOWRC should be:
8.2.1. Capable of being jetisoned from the host aircraft in flight (if the host aircraft is capable of jetisoning a like sized 463L pallet). (O)

9.0. Seating.
9.1. The SOWRC will be equipped with:
9.1.1 Two first-class airline seats, certified for use during en route flight operations, that swivel and recline, each seat will be equipped with an integral foot rest. (T)
9.1.1.1. The swivel action of the two first-class airline seats shall be such that the seats can be locked into a position where the longitudinal axis of the seat is parallel to the longitudinal axis of the aircraft regardless of capsule’s orientation (i.e., capsule longitudinal axis is loaded parallel or perpendicular to the aircraft’s longitudinal axis). (T)
9.1.2. A couch, located in the same compartment as the two first-class airline seats, capable of accommodating 2 adults. (T)
9.1.3. Seat belts suitable for use during all phases of flight at all seating positions. (T)

9.2. The SOWRC should be equipped with:
9.2.1. A swivel action on the two first-class airline seats shall be such that the seats can be locked into multiple positions. (O)
9.2.2. Two first-class airline seats which are certified for use during all phases of flight as well as being able to recline and have an integral foot rest. (O)

10.0 Engineering/Sustainment.
10.1. SOWRC Sustainment will utilize Contractor Logistic Support (CLS). (T)
10.2. The SOWRC will be warranted against defects in structure and manufacturing for a defined period of time; time period to be defined within acquisition/support contract(s). (T)
10.3. The SOWRC will be warranted against defects in structure and manufacturing for a period of 24 months. (O)

11.0 Threat/Operational Environment. The operational threat environment for the SOWRC will be the same as for the host aircraft. The SOWRC is not intended to provide any additional protection to its occupants over that already provided by the host aircraft with respect to antipersonnel weapons; anti-aircraft weapons; laser based weapons; electronic attack; conventional air-to-air, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface weapons; and nuclear, biological, and chemical contaminants.
AMO/C transformed the "Required Capabilities for the Senior Officer Work and Rest Capsule (SOWRC)" on 8 Jun 06. Document was Tab 1 in the "Senior Officer Work and Rest Capsule (previously referred to as the DV Capsule) Operational Capabilities." SOWRC name subsequently changed to Senior Leader In-transit Conference Capsule (SLICC).

12.0 Conceptual SOWRC Design/Layout. Note – The attached conceptual design/layout is provided for clarification purposes only and is not intended to be the final design/layout.
General McNABB. SLICC was designed to leverage a large portion of our current and future cargo and refueling fleet at a fraction of the cost of purchasing new dedicated VIP aircraft. The original requirements defined in June 2006 were intended to provide a work and rest area suitable for the national leaders who would be authorized to use the SLICC. These include senior civilian members of the executive branch, Members of Congress, and selected senior military flag officers. SLICC requirements reflect the same standards present in our existing fleet of VIP aircraft.
in a much smaller package. Further, although cost savings were a major consideration for the SLICC concept, it was not the only factor driving design. The design was a function of maintaining the current DV fleet standards given the intended occupants, providing FAA-certified materials to allow carriage on the KC–10, and an overriding need to ensure occupant safety and security.

14. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, why was the “first class seating” in SLICCs reupholstered from brown leather to blue leather? General Robert H. McMahon told the Washington Post that “it was probably because blue would not show dirt as much as tan or brown would.” Is this correct?

General McNabb. Neither General McMahon nor I were assigned to AMC when the change in color was made. General McMahon was speculating when he answered the Washington Post reporter. His response was incorrect. AMC made the color change to match the interior of the KC–10, a primary carrier of the SLICC, and to match the color of the other seat pallets that are used to move personnel on cargo aircraft.

15. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, in your advance policy questions you stated that when you were the AMC Commander, you were confident that this requirement was being vetted through the normal resource allocation process within the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). However, the Committee understands that this program was not vetted through the normal resource allocation process within OSD, but that the Air Force reprogrammed $3.5 million of fiscal year 2006 baseline dollars for the initial SLICC. Which statement is correct?

General McNabb. In my answers to the advance policy questions I stated that the concept warranted the investment in prototyping and further evaluation. To initiate this effort, the Air Force submitted a new start through OSD to the four Defense Committees for approval and identified baseline funding of $3.5 million for the required prototyping. Funding for any assets beyond the prototype is being vetted through the normal resource allocation process within the AF and OSD.

16. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, during your tenure as AMC Commander, the estimated cost of each SLICC grew from $1.7 million in November 2006 to $2.7 million in June 2007—a 66-percent cost increase in less than 2 years. Do you still think the SLICC is a cost effective program? How do you explain this mismanagement under your command?

General McNabb. SLICC was designed to leverage a large portion of the current and future cargo and refueling fleet at a fraction of the cost of purchasing new dedicated VIP aircraft and associated flying hours, crews, maintenance personnel, and support equipment. Keeping the required size as small as possible was critical. For instance, if we had seats that allow our senior leaders to rest, we could modify the berthing requirement and reduce the size of the couch. The growth in cost of the prototype over the timeframe identified was due primarily to modifying the SLICC from a single capsule for both working and berthing to a dual capsule design with separate capsules for working and for berthing. The flexibility to tailor the package for shorter trips would free up space for other needs. This change in design provided for greater acquisition flexibility when procuring production SLICCs, and for greater operational flexibility depending upon the size of the travel group. It also would allow us to take better advantage of theater assets without the need to position or deposition dedicated VIP aircraft to meet theater requirements.

17. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, under your tenure as AMC Commander and later as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, on three occasions, the Air Force requested to use global war on terrorism funds for the SLICC program. Is it not true that it is only because Congress has rejected these expenditures that no war supplemental funds have yet been used for SLICC?

General McNabb. Yes, this is true. However, the Air Force’s sole request for global war on terrorism funding was submitted as part of the Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism request. OSD and the Office of Management and Budget supported this request. The Air Force believed this to be a valid global war on terrorism requirement due to the increased demand for flying and protecting senior U.S. Government officials traveling in and out of high threat areas. While the Air Force requested the use of global war on terrorism funding for this requirement, there was never an intention to use global war on terrorism funds without the approval of Congress.
18. Senator McCaIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, why did the Air Force continue to request funding SLICCs under the Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on Terrorism Supplemental, given that you acknowledged in your response to the advance policy questions that “There is less of an urgent need now…”?

General McNABB. SLICC was developed to address the growing gap between DV lift requirements and lift capability in the wake of September 11. One key requirement was to provide nondescript DV transportation capability into high threat environments to ensure their safety and security. Although congressional support for defensive systems on large aircraft helped reduce the total SLICC requirement, it did not address the enduring need for nondescript movement. This is especially important given the proliferation of threats such as manportable surface-to-air missiles (manpads). As a result, SLICC remains a needed capability.

19. Senator McCaIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, how is the expenditure of global war on terrorism funds for SLICCs helping the troops on the ground?

General McNABB. Congress denied the use of global war on terrorism funds to meet this requirement, however it is very important for our national military and civilian leaders to assess theater progress first hand, and it is very motivating for the troops on the ground to see their leaders. Leaders strive to maximize their time on the ground with the troops, and SLICC would allow them to take full advantage of their en route time to work and rest.

20. Senator McCaIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, is it not true that senior leaders go where they are needed or ordered, whether they are flying coach or first class?

General McNABB. Absolutely true. Senior military and civilian leaders below the equivalent rank of four stars routinely travel on commercial aircraft, usually in coach. Senior leaders at or above four star equivalent are “required users” of military aircraft for travel purposes as directed by the Secretary of Defense in DOD Directive 4500.56.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

EN ROUTE STRATEGIC MOBILITY INFRASTRUCTURE

21. Senator WARNER. General McNabb, I noticed from your answers to the advance policy questions submitted to you by the Committee that you list as one of your major challenges to “ensure we have the appropriate global en route infrastructure to support future force projection and sustainment as we shift to a smaller overseas military presence with more deployments from U.S. bases.” The global reach of our Nation’s Armed Forces depends on the physical infrastructure of ports, airfields, rail, and other lines of logistics worldwide to be able to transport military personnel and equipment. How would you assess the capability of the en route mobility infrastructure to support new requirements as a result of the global realignment of the stationing of U.S. forces and the growth of our Nation’s ground forces?

General McNABB. In general terms, I am confident in U.S. TRANSCOM’s ability to project the Nation’s combat power along an east-west axis. As operations in U.S. Central Command illustrate, we have significant worldwide capabilities in terms of airfields, seaports, roads, and associated infrastructure. We are also continuously working to improve that infrastructure to increase the velocity across the transportation enterprise. I am less confident about our abilities to project power south into emerging areas of interest in Africa and South America. If confirmed I will make it a priority to: (1) preserve and optimize the existing network of infrastructure; and (2) work with the combatant commanders and DOD to determine future infrastructure requirements.

22. Senator WARNER. General McNabb, are there any specific areas of concern regarding en route infrastructure you would want to address?

General McNABB. I am most immediately concerned about our ability to reach locations in South America and Africa.

23. Senator WARNER. General McNabb, how would you propose addressing them?

General McNABB. If confirmed, I will continue to make maximum use of DOD’s study efforts, like the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study, to validate current and define emerging infrastructure requirements. I will work closely with the other combatant commanders so we can efficiently and effectively meet their warfighting deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment needs. In ad-
dition, I would continue to leverage U.S. TRANSCOM's Global En Route Infrastructure Committee structure. This committee includes members from each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and meets to define and prioritize worldwide mobility infrastructure requirements. Those prioritized requirements are then passed to the Services for programming and become part of U.S. TRANSCOM's Integrated Priority List.

[The nomination reference of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 10, 2008.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF

General Duncan J. McNabb is Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. As Vice Chief, he presides over the Air Staff and serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory Working Group. He assists the Chief of Staff with organization, training, and equipage of more than 710,000 Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas.

General McNabb graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1974. A command pilot, he has amassed more than 5,400 flying hours in transport and rotary wing aircraft. He has held command and staff positions at squadron, group, wing, major command and Department of Defense levels. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General McNabb commanded the 41st Military Airlift Squadron, which earned Military Airlift Command's Airlift Squadron of the Year in 1990. The General commanded the 89th Operations Group, overseeing the air transportation of our Nation's leaders, including the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. He then served as Commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing. The wing's performance in 1996 earned the Riverside Trophy as the 15th Air Force's outstanding wing.

He also commanded the Tanker Airlift Control Center where he planned, scheduled, and directed a fleet of more than 1,400 aircraft in support of combat delivery and strategic airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical operations around the world. Most recently, General McNabb was the Commander of Air Mobility Command, where he led 134,000 total force airmen in providing rapid global mobility, aerial refueling, special airlift and aeromedical evacuation for America's Armed Forces.

General McNabb's staff assignments have been a variety of planning, programming and logistical duties. These include serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs on the Air Staff and Chairman of the Air Force Board having oversight of all Air Force programs. He also served as the Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff where he was responsible for operational logistics and strategic mobility support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

RÉSUMÉ OF CAREER SERVICE OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF

Education:
1974 ... Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.
1977 ... Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
1983 ... Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
1984 ... Master of Science degree in international relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.
1993 ... Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.
1994 ... Air War College, by correspondence.
1995 ... Program for Senior Officials in National Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
2000 ... National Security Decisionmaking Seminar, Center for Strategic Education, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.

Assignments:
April 1979–April 1980 .......... Student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams Air Force Base, AZ.
June 1988–November 1990 .... Chief pilot, later, operations officer, 17th Military Airlift Squadron, Charleston Air Force Base, SC.
August 1992–June 1993 .......... Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.
July 1993–June 1995 .......... Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
August 1997–June 1999 .......... Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL.
June 1999–December 1999 ... Deputy Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.
December 1999–April 2002 ... Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.
August 2004–October 2005 .... Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
October 2005–September 2007 Commander, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL.

Flight information:
Rating: Command pilot, navigator.
Flight hours: More than 5,400.
Aircraft flown; T–37, T–38, C–141, C–17, C–20, and UH–IN.

Major awards and decorations:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Achievement Medal
Combat Readiness Medal with oak leaf cluster
National Defense Service Medal with two bronze stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
NATO Medal (Former Republic of Yugoslavia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait)

Other achievements:
Commander’s Trophy, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Air Training Command
Orville Wright Award for outstanding UPT graduate, Order of Daedalians
Order of the Sword, AMC

Effective dates of promotion:

Second Lieutenant ......................................................... June 5, 1974
First Lieutenant ............................................................. June 5, 1976
Captain ............................................................................ June 5, 1978
Major .............................................................................. October 1, 1985
Lieutenant Colonel ....................................................... June 1, 1989
Colonel ............................................................................. January 1, 1993
Brigadier General ........................................................... July 27, 1998
Major General ............................................................... February 26, 2001
Lieutenant General ......................................................... April 19, 2002
General .......................................................................... December 1, 2005

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Duncan J. McNabb.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, United States Transportation Command.

3. Date of nomination:
   July 10, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   August 8, 1952; Shaw Field, SC (Shaw AFB).

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Linda Worden McNabb (Maiden Name: Worden).

7. Names and ages of children:
   Kathryn W. Cochran, 25; Duncan J. McNabb, Jr., 24; Marvie L. McNabb, 22.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than
those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None, in addition to service record.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business, enterprise, educational or other institution.

Board of Directors, Sam Fox Association (89th Airlift Wing, Andrews Air Force Base, MD; an association of present and former Andrews Air Force Base personnel).

Member of the Nominating Committee for National Airlift and Tanker Association.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Associate of Graduates (AOG), USAF Academy, served as President of National Chapter AOG, Washington, DC

Order of Daedalians (served as Flight Captain, Gateway Flight 26, Scott AFB, IL)

Member of the Nominating Committee for National Airlift and Tanker Association

Sergeants Association

Air Force Association

Ordered Forces Escape and Evasion Society

Board of Directors, Sam Fox Association (89th Airlift Wing, Andrews AFB, MD; an association of present and former Andrews AFB personnel)

Logistics Officer Association (LOA)

National Defense Transportation Association

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School.

Undergraduate Pilot Training Outstanding Graduate (Commander’s Trophy).

Daedalians’ Orville Wright Award, Outstanding Undergraduate Pilot Training Graduate in the Air Force.

Commander, 41st Military Airlift Squadron; Air Mobility Command’s Airlift Squadron of the Year, 1990.

Commander, 62d Airlift Wing; Riverside Trophy for Outstanding Wing in 15th Air Force, 1996.

Air Mobility Command’s Public Affairs Achievement Award, 1996.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

DUNCAN J. MCNABB.

This 11th day of June, 2008.

[The nomination of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 31, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2008.]
APPENDIX

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

_____
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
   
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
   
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM**

**FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES**

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Information furnished in Parts B through F will be retained in the committee's executive files and will not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the committee.

**Name:**

**PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS**

1. Will you sever all business connections with your present employers, business firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If so, explain.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization?

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave government service?

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?
PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.
3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

PART F—FINANCIAL DATA

All information requested under this heading must be provided for yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of the trust agreement.

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or previous business relationships, professional services and firm memberships, employers, clients and customers.

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past 10 years? If not, please explain.

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed and paid) as of the date of your nomination?

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax return? If so, what resulted from the audit?

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed against you or against any real property or personal property which you own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman. They will not be available for public inspection.)

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

________________________________________.

This ——— day of ————, 20——.
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Certain Senior Military Nominees

United States Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050

Committee on Armed Services Form
Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees for Certain Senior Military Positions

Instructions to the Nominee:
Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph to the end:

“I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form ‘Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees for Certain Senior Military Positions,’ submitted to the committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all such commitments apply to the position to which I have been nominated and that all such information is current except as follows: . . . .” [If any information on your prior form needs to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the question number and set forth the updated information in your letter to the Chairman.]

Part A—Biographical Information

Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public:

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses. Also include your office telephone number.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including wife’s maiden name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM**

**FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES**

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Information furnished in Parts B through E will be retained in the committee's executive files and will not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the committee.

**Name:**

**PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS**

1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military service. If so, explain.

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave military service?

**PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?
PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

__________________________________________

This ———— day of ————, 20——.