[Senate Hearing 110-666]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                        S. Hrg. 110-666
 
        NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
                     SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                                   on

                             NOMINATIONS OF

GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG WALTER L. 
 SHARP, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; 
HON. NELSON M. FORD; JOSEPH A. BENKERT; SEAN J. STACKLEY; FREDERICK S. 
   CELEC; MICHAEL B. DONLEY; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF; AND GEN. 
                         DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF

                               ----------                              

          FEBRUARY 6; APRIL 3; MAY 22; JUNE 26; JULY 22, 2008

                               ----------                              

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services


NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 
                             110TH CONGRESS

                                                        S. Hrg. 110-666

        NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
                     SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                                   on

                             NOMINATIONS OF

GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG WALTER L. 
 SHARP, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; 
HON. NELSON M. FORD; JOSEPH A. BENKERT; SEAN J. STACKLEY; FREDERICK S. 
   CELEC; MICHAEL B. DONLEY; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF; AND GEN. 
                         DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF

                               __________

          FEBRUARY 6; APRIL 3; MAY 22; JUNE 26; JULY 22, 2008

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services


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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                     CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi

                   Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

              Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director

                                  (ii)
?

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                    CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

                                                                   Page

                            february 6, 2008

Vote on Certain Pending Military Nominations.....................     1

                             april 3, 2008

Nominations of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Commander, International 
  Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan; LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 
  USA, for appointment to the Grade of General and to be Vice 
  Chief of Staff, United States Army; and LTG Walter L. Sharp, 
  USA, for appointment to the Grade of General and to be 
  Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/
  United States Forces Korea.....................................     5

Statement of:

McKiernan, GEN David D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Commander, International Security Assistance 
  Force, Afghanistan.............................................    12
Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army......    13
Sharp, LTG Walter L., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined 
  Forces Command/United States Forces Korea......................    13

                              may 22, 2008

Nominations of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Central 
  Command; and LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for Appointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-
  Iraq...........................................................   101

Statement of:

Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Commander, United States Central Command.....   105
Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.........   111

                              may 22, 2008

To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations.................   215

                                 (iii)
                             june 26, 2008

Nominations of Hon. Nelson M. Ford to be Under Secretary of the 
  Army; Joseph A. Benkert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 
  for Global Security Affairs; Sean J. Stackley to be Assistant 
  Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
  Acquisition; and Frederick S. Celec to be Assistant to the 
  Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 
  Defense Programs...............................................   219

Statement of:

Ford, Hon. Nelson M., to be Under Secretary of the Army..........   223
Benkert, Joseph A., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Global Security Affairs........................................   224
Stackley, Sean J., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
  Research, Development, and Acquisition.........................   225
Celec, Frederick S., to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
  for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.......   225

                             july 22, 2008

Nominations of Michael B. Donley to be Secretary of the Air 
  Force; Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, for Reappointment to the 
  Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air 
  Force; and Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States 
  Transportation Command.........................................   339

Statement of:

Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska.........   344
Donley, Michael B., to be Secretary of the Air Force.............   346
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force......   348
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Commander, United States Transportation 
  Command........................................................   348
Conrad, Hon. Kent, U.S. Senator from the State of North Dakota...   368

APPENDIX.........................................................   485


              VOTE ON CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2008

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:46 a.m. in room 
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Reed, 
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner, 
Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and 
Martinez.
    Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and 
Mary J. Kyle, legislative clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., 
professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 
Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff 
member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; 
Creighton Green, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, 
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. 
Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional 
staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; 
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional 
staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, 
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional 
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. 
Kiley, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, 
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff 
member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G. 
Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, 
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff 
member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, 
professional staff member.
    Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L. 
Rubin, and Brian F. Sebold.
    Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and 
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, 
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to 
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; 
Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and 
Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. 
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, 
assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to 
Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; 
Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, 
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to 
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants 
to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator 
Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; 
Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant 
to Senator Cornyn; John L. Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh, 
assistants to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, 
assistant to Senator Wicker.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Since a quorum is now present, before I 
call on you, Secretary Gates, I will ask the committee to 
consider a list of 782 pending military nominations. They've 
all been before the committee the required length of time. Is 
there a motion to favorably report those nominations?
    Senator Warner. So moved.
    Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
    Senator Inhofe. Second.
    Chairman Levin. It's been moved and seconded. All in favor 
say aye? [A chorus of ayes.]
    Opposed, nay? [No response.]
    The motion carries and those nominations will be reported 
to the Senate. Thank you.
    [The list of nominations considered and approved by the 
committee follows:]
 MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
  WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 6, 
                                 2008.
    1. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of 
major (Lester W. Thompson) (Reference No. 902).
    2. In the Army there are 16 appointments to the grade of colonel 
(list begins with Gerald K. Bebber) (Reference No. 968).
    3. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain 
(Thomas J. Harvan) (Reference No. 1104).
    4. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain 
(John G. Bruening) (Reference No. 1105).
    5. In the Air Force there are three appointments to the grade of 
brigadier general (list begins with Col. Mark A. Ediger) (Reference No. 
1142).
    6. In the Army there are two appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Manuel Pozoalanso) 
(Reference No. 1174).
    7. MG Joseph F. Fil, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general and 
Commanding General, Eight U.S. Army/Chief of Staff, United Nations 
Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea (Reference No. 1192).
    8. Brig. Gen. Cecil R. Richardson, USAF, to be major general 
(Reference No. 1201).
    9. Col. Robert G. Kenny, USAFR, to be brigadier general (Reference 
No. 1202).
    10. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the 
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Daniel P. Gillen) 
(Reference No. 1203).
    11. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the 
grade of major general (list begins with Robert Benjamin Bartlett) 
(Reference No. 1204).
    12. In the Air Force Reserve, there are nine appointments to the 
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Robert S. Arthur) 
(Reference No. 1205).
    13. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Chevalier P. Cleaves) (Reference No. 1207).
    14. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade 
of colonel (Jawn M. Sischo) (Reference No. 1208).
    15. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade 
of colonel (Joaquin Sariego) (Reference No. 1209).
    16. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with John A. Calcaterra, Jr.) (Reference 
No. 1210).
    17. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Jerry Alan Arends) (Reference No. 
1211).
    18. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Donnie W. Bethel) (Reference No. 
1212).
    19. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 11 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Paul A. Abson) (Reference No. 1213).
    20. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Mari L. Archer) (Reference No. 
1214).
    21. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with William A. Beyers III) (Reference 
No. 1215).
    22. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Robert R. Cannon) (Reference No. 
1216).
    23. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 176 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Vito Emil Addabbo) (Reference No. 
1217).
    24. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Azad Y. Keval) (Reference No. 
1218).
    25. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Lance A. Avery) (Reference No. 1219).
    26. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to the grade of 
colonel and below (list begins with Billy R. Morgan) (Reference No. 
1220).
    27. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of 
major (Inaam A. Pedalino) (Reference No. 1221).
    28. In the Air Force, there are 62 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Demea A. Alderman) (Reference No. 1222).
    29. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of 
major (Theresa D. Clark) (Reference No. 1223).
    30. In the Air Force, there are 113 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Lee E. Ackley) (Reference No. 1224).
    31. In the Air Force, there are 129 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Said R. Acosta) (Reference No. 1225).
    32. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Jason E. MacDonald) (Reference No. 1226).
    33. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major 
(Jeffrey P. Short) (Reference No. 1227).
    34. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major 
(Saqib Ishteeaque) (Reference No. 1228).
    35. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Wanda L. Horton) (Reference No. 1229).
    36. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of 
colonel and below (list begins with David J. Barillo) (Reference No. 
1230).
    37. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel 
(Joseph B. Dore) (Reference No. 1231).
    38. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
colonel (William J. Hersh) (Reference No. 1232).
    39. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
colonel (James C. Cummings) (Reference No. 1233).
    40. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Eugene W. Gavin) (Reference No. 1234).
    41. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Bruce H. Bahr) (Reference No. 1235)
    42. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with David A. Brant) (Reference No. 1236).
    43. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Harold A. Felton) (Reference No. 1237).
    44. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Anne M. Bauer) (Reference No. 1238).
    45. In the Army Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Deborah G. Davis) (Reference No. 1239).
    46. In the Army Reserve, there are 37 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Ruben Alvero) (Reference No. 1240).
    47. In the Army Reserve, there are nine appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Ronald L. Bonheur) (Reference No. 1241).
    48. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Gerard P. Curran) (Reference No. 1242).
    49. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Jeffrey A. Weiss) (Reference No. 1243).
    50. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Charles S. Oleary) (Reference No. 1244).
    51. In the Army Reserve, there are 10 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Patrick S. Allison) (Reference No. 1245).
    52. In the Army Reserve, there are 30 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Edward B. Browning) (Reference No. 1246).
    53. In the Army Reserve, there are 51 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Sandra G. Apostolos) (Reference No. 1247).
    54. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Russell L. Bergeman) (Reference 
No. 1248).
    55. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain 
(John M. Dorey) (Reference No. 1250).
    56. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant commander (list begins with Thomas P. Carroll) (Reference 
No. 1252).
    57. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of 
commander and below (list begins with David J. Robillard) (Reference 
No. 1253).
    58. Lt. Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, to be lieutenant general and 
Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Reference No. 1260).
    59. RADM Mark E. Ferguson III, USN, to be vice admiral and Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and 
Education, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of 
Naval Personnel (Reference No. 1261).
    60. VADM John C. Harvey, Jr., USN, to be vice admiral and Director, 
Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference 
No. 1262).
    61. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Orlando Salinas) (Reference No. 1263).
    62. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Debra D. Rice) (Reference No. 1264).
    63. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Robert J. Mouw) (Reference No. 1265).
    64. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major 
(Rabi L. Singh) (Reference No. 1266).
    65. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander 
(Michael V. Misiewicz) (Reference No. 1267).
    66. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant commander (John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1268).
    67. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant commander (John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1269).
    Total: 782.

    [Whereupon, at 9:47 a.m., the committee adjourned.]


 NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE 
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
FORCE, AFGHANISTAN; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE 
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY; AND 
 LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND 
TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED 
                          STATES FORCES KOREA

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Warner, 
Inhofe, Graham, Cornyn, and Thune.
    Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director.
    Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 
Daniel J. Cox, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, 
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional 
staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. 
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, 
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, 
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional 
staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; Lucian L. 
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, 
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff 
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
    Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. 
Cronin, and Ali Z. Pasha.
    Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and 
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, 
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to 
Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; 
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, 
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to 
Senator Inhofe; Brian Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn; 
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, 
assistant to Senator Martinez.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
    Today the committee considers the nominations of three 
distinguished senior military officers: General David 
McKiernan, the nominee for Commander, International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan; Lieutenant General 
Raymond Odierno, the nominee for Vice Chief of Staff, United 
States Army; and Lieutenant General Walter Sharp, the nominee 
for Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, 
and United States Forces Korea.
    We all know that the long hours and the hard work put in by 
our senior military officials at the Department of Defense 
(DOD) require commitment and sacrifice not only from our 
nominees, but also from their families. We appreciate your and 
their willingness to bear that burden.
    Each of our nominees has served this country in the 
military for more than 30 years. Their successful careers can 
be seen in the positions in which they serve today: Commanding 
General, U.S. Army Europe, and 7th Army Germany; Commanding 
General, III Corps and Commander Multi-National Corps-Iraq; and 
Director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.
    When confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible 
for helping DOD face critical challenges. General McKiernan 
will take command of the ISAF, Afghanistan, at a time when 
independent reviews indicate that the mission to stabilize 
Afghanistan is faltering, leading to a strategic stalemate 
between coalition forces and the Taliban-led insurgency, and 
that in the words of one of those independent reviews, the 
violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen 
dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its 
international partners falls.
    The next ISAF commander will face significant challenges 
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance 
as well. The Bucharest Summit has resulted in some additional 
troop commitments by allies to the Afghan conflict, but 
shortfalls remain in NATO members' commitments to provide the 
troops, helicopters, and other assets needed to meet ISAF 
mission requirements.
    In addition, some nations place restrictions on the use of 
their national forces, which reduce the ISAF commander's 
ability to deploy these forces as necessary.
    General Odierno will become Vice Chief of Staff at a time 
when the Army is highly stressed by continuing operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Equipment and people are increasingly 
worn out, and the readiness of our nondeployed units has 
steadily declined.
    General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff, has said, 
``Today's Army is out of balance. The current demand for our 
forces exceeds the sustainable supply.''
    Earlier this week, General Richard Cody, the current Vice 
Chief of Staff, testified before our Readiness and Management 
Support Subcommittee that ongoing deployments are inflicting 
``incredible stress on soldiers and families and pose a 
significant risk'' in his words to the All-Volunteer Army.
    As daunting as it will be to meet current readiness needs, 
the next Vice Chief of Staff will also be faced with the 
necessity to modernize the Army to meet national security 
requirements of the future. It will not be easy to modernize 
and transform the Army to meet these future requirements while 
improving current readiness and sustaining an Army fully 
engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Finally, General Sharp will be the first U.S. Commander to 
assume command in Korea since North Korea became a nuclear 
weapons state. It will be his responsibility to ensure that 
U.S. conventional forces continue to provide a strong deterrent 
to North Korean military action and that the military alliance 
with South Korea remains robust.
    I know our nominees look forward to these challenges.
    We look forward to these hearings, and also we would 
welcome each of our nominees introducing any of their family 
members who might be with them today.
    Senator Warner.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

    Senator Warner. I think General Sharp is the only one that 
has family with him this morning. General, would you introduce 
your wife of 34 years?
    General Sharp. Thank you, sir. I am honored to be joined 
today by my wife, Joanne, of 34 years. We were married right 
out of West Point, and I definitely would not be sitting here 
today without her support.
    Sir, with your indulgence, I would also like to introduce 
my executive assistant, Cherylanne Anderson, who is also here 
today with my wife and to thank her and really the thousands of 
others like her that work and make sure that our offices run 
smoothly so that we do what we can do to protect and defend. I 
would like to thank her and recognize her also.
    Chairman Levin. We welcome both of them and thank both of 
them.
    Senator Warner. General McKiernan, I believe your family is 
still in Europe, that is your residence at this time. Is that 
correct?
    General McKiernan. Yes, Senator Warner. My immediate family 
could not join me today, but I am very proud that my sister, 
Kathe Carney, and one of her sons, Sean Carney, are here today. 
She is a special education teacher here in Northern Virginia. I 
am very proud of her.
    Senator Warner. We thank you.
    General Odierno, in my visits with you, you always make 
reference to your family. They are somewhere today. Back at 
your post, I believe?
    General Odierno. Yes, sir. My wife of 32 years, Linda, who 
is my high school sweetheart and who has been through a lot and 
volunteered much of her time and her efforts to the Army and 
our soldiers and their families. I could not do it without her, 
as well as the dedication of my children, who have always been 
dedicated to the Army themselves.
    Senator Warner. Your son, sir? How is he?
    General Odierno. Sir, he is doing very well. He is 
currently getting his masters degree at New York University in 
New York City, has done very well recovering from his injury, 
and I am very proud of his service and how he has handled his 
injury as part of the Iraq war.
    Senator Warner. Thank you, General.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to say much of my statement will 
go in the record. I have not too strong a voice here this 
morning, but I recognize 100 years of service to America in 
uniform before us and we are fortunate in this country to have 
individuals, together with their families, that provide this 
dedication. It is the very foundation of our national security, 
the men and women who proudly wear their arms and uniforms and 
their families.
    General McKiernan, we had a very excellent consultation 
when you visited my office. We have visited together on 
previous assignments you have had. In fact, Senator Levin and I 
visited you on one of our trips to Kuwait and the Iraqi 
situation.
    Now, in Afghanistan, General, as I talked with you, there 
is the problem, of course, of the force levels. The President 
of France, to his great credit, I think, is announcing today an 
augmentation of forces. Two battalions of marines are going 
over as a consequence of the shortfall of other nations in 
their force levels. That was directly testified to before this 
committee here not long ago in another hearing.
    But there is growing concern about the Taliban's resurgence 
and the presence of the cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan. 
The easy access that the insurgents have to cross various parts 
of that border severely complicate the ability not only to 
protect our forces but to conduct the campaigns over there to 
return to the people of Afghanistan this country.
    I also addressed to you the question of narcotics related 
by our distinguished chairman. I have spent a great deal of 
time in the past couple of months on this subject. I have had 
the opportunity to consult with prime ministers, ambassadors, a 
lot of senior officers of our uniformed forces, and junior 
officers. What concerns me is that each year this level of 
narcotics has gone up. Now, that is hardly the image, the 
picture, a benchmark of achievement that our forces, together 
with NATO and the other combatant forces, want to send to the 
world. We went there to enable that country to reestablish 
itself to have a democracy.
    My most severe concern is that the increase each year 
allows increases in money that is drained off from the farmer's 
field to the ultimate destination of those drugs. Those monies 
are providing arms. The Taliban and other insurgent groups are 
able to take their cut and buy arms and use those weapons 
against our forces.
    There is not a one of us in this room who have not gone to 
the funerals of our brave men and women who have lost their 
lives, and visited others who are wounded. When we try to 
comfort them, I find it particularly difficult with this 
Afghani situation when I say to myself this soldier could well 
have lost his life, his limb as a consequence of weaponry 
directed at him and paid for out of this drug trade.
    I wrote the President a letter--I do not intend to release 
it at this time--urging that at this ongoing NATO conference, 
he ensure that is becoming a top-level agenda item. I will soon 
find out whether, in fact, without that letter those NATO heads 
of state address this problem. I think it is unconscionable not 
only for the United States but of all governments involved in 
this Afghani operation not to address full-level attention to 
it.
    It is primarily a problem that should be confronted by the 
Karzai government. I understand that there has been a battalion 
established to be in training to work on this problem at this 
time, but that should have been done years ago.
    I urge you, General McKiernan, as you take up your 
responsibilities, to unrelentlessly bring this to the attention 
of your superiors wherever they may be.
    The national caveat issue is a subject at the NATO 
conference. Let us see what is provided because it puts an 
instability in the command and control of these forces where it 
is well recognized and known that certain nations do not have 
caveats and they are undertaking the majority of the high-risk 
operations. To me it conveys a completely inaccurate image of 
NATO and its ability to do out-of-area operations if some 
forces are going to be responsible for the heavy lifting and 
others to do whatever their countries permit them to do.
    I commend Secretary Robert Gates. I think he is one of the 
finest Secretaries of Defense we have ever had; I have had the 
privilege of working with and have known almost a dozen now, 
and I would put him at the very top in the way he has stood up 
for his forces and the principles for which we are fighting in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq.
    General Jim Jones, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
and Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; and 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering of the Afghan Study Group sponsored 
by a distinguished organization, the Center for the Study of 
the Presidency, under the direction of David Abshire, published 
reports on these questions, and I am going to quote General 
Jones' report: ``Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in 
Afghanistan.'' I hope you have the opportunity to review those 
reports. They are very clear in the concerns that they have.
    I have also, Mr. Chairman, had the privilege of meeting 
with the Ambassador from Denmark and others connected with that 
country, and I want to say for the record here today Denmark 
has more than 600 troops in southern Afghanistan standing side 
by side with the British in one of the most dangerous areas in 
Afghanistan.
    Again, Secretary Gates went by on his way to this NATO 
conference and visited the country of Denmark. He singled it 
out because it is a small country, but those forces are an 
integral part of the fighting force. They are there with no 
caveats. Unfortunately, some have mixed them in with that group 
of nations which have caveats. But let us make it clear on our 
record today. As Secretary Gates said, ``This is an ally who, 
in my opinion, is really punching above its weight, and I want 
to visit and basically thank them for that.''
    General McKiernan, we wish you good luck, your 
distinguished career ably qualifies you to take on this 
responsibility and to move it towards achievement of our goals, 
and part of that will be the commencement of a significant 
lessening of the drug trade. It is not going to go away 
overnight, but it has been rising in output production every 
single year for the last 4 years.
    General Odierno, Senator Levin and I have had the 
opportunity to visit you many times. I remember on my first 
trip, you were in the room. At that time, you did not have 
quite as many stars as you have now, and you were among the 
general officers who were in the back row, but I remember your 
impressive statements to us at that time. It is funny how you 
can remember those days to this day. Your career has won the 
hearts and minds of the soldiers and the families that you have 
been associated with these many years, and you will join the 
Chief of Staff of the Army in this challenging task of 
rebuilding our Army.
    I would like to say at this time, Mr. Chairman and members 
of the committee, I think General Cody has done a fine job. One 
of the things I admire about General Cody is he grabs that 
telephone, certainly in the 6 years I was chairman, and he 
rifles through his messages without hesitation. I hope you will 
follow on in that same way.
    All the members of this committee and I think throughout 
Congress, other members, are very conscious of the need to put 
a lot of emphasis on rebuilding this Army, to do what we can to 
see that our forces who are deployed not only have all the 
equipment they need, but have some certainty as to the time of 
that commitment of how long they will be overseas.
    While you may not be able to speak with specificity this 
morning, I did hear the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs last night 
state that in his professional judgment, we monitor daily the 
situation over there, but thus far, the turbulence that we have 
experienced--I say ``we''--all the Afghan fighting forces 
experienced here in the past month or so in the Basra region--
is not going to change the schedule to bring back those 
brigades and take it down to 15 brigades in July.
    Now, he had to leave the door open, as any prudent chairman 
would, and I am sure you would. I hope we can achieve that, and 
simultaneously with achieving that, I hope we can go from the 
15-month tour to the 12-month tour and probably a slightly 
larger period of time than 12 months back at home in retraining 
and spending some time with the family.
    Mr. Chairman, I will close out here with a comment or two 
about General Sharp. I have had the privilege of visiting with 
him. You are taking on an interesting job in an area which I 
spent a little time as a youngster many years ago at age 22. It 
is still as cold over there today as it was when I was there, 
and I expressed that to your lovely wife.
    It has been a half a century that our forces have been in 
there. We went in there in 1950. I left in 1952. What troubles 
me about that situation over there is that we have been working 
a half century-plus, and yet we still cannot get their command 
and control, their training of the South Korean forces up to a 
level where they can take operational control (OPCON). As I 
told you, the latest estimate is 2012. 2012. That is 62 years 
if you add it up from the date that we went into South Korea to 
help liberate that country.
    I find that unacceptable and I hope that perhaps you, 
together with our diplomatic representatives over there, can 
shorten that time and let them get on with it because the 
people of our country, while we are ready to make the 
sacrifices to help others achieve their freedom and stability--
certainly South Korea has an enormous economic stability. It 
ranks in the top 10 nations of the world in terms of their 
gross national product, and they ought to be able to have a 
commensurate military establishment to support the growth and 
progress of that country. I hope you will accept my comments 
this morning as a challenge to work on reducing that date down 
from 2012.
    I thank the chair and the indulgence of the members as I 
have chatted a few minutes here.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

    Thank you, Senator Levin.
    I join you in welcoming General McKiernan, General Odierno, and 
General Sharp. The breadth and depth of experience possessed by these 
nominees--both in the Army and while serving in joint commands--is 
extraordinary. I thank each of them for their service and their 
commitment to continue serving in these key positions.
    General McKiernan, you bring a most impressive professional record 
to one of the most demanding military positions.
    Success in Afghanistan remains a critical national security 
requirement for not only the United States, but the international 
community. Today, there is no doubt that progress has been made in 
Afghanistan since 2001.
    U.S. efforts, together with the service of 25 North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) allies and 15 partner countries have assisted the 
Afghan people in securing their freedoms and rebuilding their nation.
    However, there is growing concern about the Taliban's resurgence; 
the presence of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan; the commitment of 
our NATO allies to what is likely be a longer military presence in 
Afghanistan; and the capacity of the Afghan government to achieve self 
governance. However, in my opinion, the greatest concern is the 
escalating opium economy. You should be prepared to discuss the 
counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan.
    August 2008 marks the fifth anniversary of NATO's presence in 
Afghanistan. In the session of the NATO Heads of State and Government 
summit held today, the agenda item is Afghanistan.
    President Karzai, Secretary-General of the U.N., and other major 
international organizations working in Afghanistan, including the 
European Union and the World Bank will be present. The broad 
international participation demonstrates that the way ahead in 
Afghanistan requires a comprehensive approach in bringing together 
improvements in governance, reconstruction, development, and security.
    There is also unease about the security situation in Afghanistan, 
the size of the NATO military commitment in Afghanistan, and the 
performance of NATO member countries in International Security 
Assistance Force. This committee has often addressed the troubling 
issue of national caveats and commended Secretary Gates for his warning 
in February that ``the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in 
which some are willing to fight and die to protect people's security, 
and some are not.''
    General Jim Jones, the former NATO supreme allied commander, and 
co-chair--with Ambassador Thomas Pickering--of the Afghanistan Study 
Group Report which was sponsored by the Center for the Study of the 
Presidency, went even further and said: ``Make no mistake; NATO is not 
winning in Afghanistan.'' You should be prepared to discuss the 
findings of the Afghanistan Study Group, among other studies.
    Mr. Chairman, I would also like to join Secretary Gates in this 
recent praise of Denmark. Denmark has more than 600 troops in southern 
Afghanistan, standing side by side with British in one of the most 
dangerous areas in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates said, ``This is an ally 
who, in my opinion, is really punching above its weight, and I want to 
visit and basically thank them for that.''
    General Odierno, you have been referred to in at least one media 
account as the ``Patton of Counterinsurgency''--the leader who took the 
theory and vision and put them into action. The war continues, but your 
record as the Commander of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006 
to February of this year brought welcome success in putting al Qaeda 
forces on the defensive, providing protection to the civilian 
population, engaging the Sunni population in Anbar province, and 
significantly lowering the rates of violence.
    Your personal and professional experiences make you perhaps the 
best qualified officer in the Army to join General Casey and Secretary 
Geren in carrying out the critically important tasks of recruiting, 
training, equipping, and organizing our great Army at a time of 
enormous stress on the force. General Cody, the current Vice Chief, 
testified before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee 2 
days ago. He testified about a ``resilient'' Army, but one that is 
stressed to the maximum and lacking shock absorbency--that is--the 
capability to respond to emergent crises or additional demands.
    I brought with me the famous James Montgomery Flagg recruiting 
poster that was introduced in World War I and relied on again in World 
War II to urge young men and women to join the Army. I'd note that a 
similar poster that appeared at that time for the Navy and Marines 
stated ``I need you.'' I think we all have a duty to turn to those 
eligible to serve today in our magnificent All Volunteer Army, and 
their families, and convey this message in the strongest terms. We want 
them and we need them--we want them for service to country.
    General Sharp, you have served since August 2005 as Director of the 
Joint Staff and undoubtedly are eager to get back to the field. The 
joint mission in Korea has not waned in importance since I took my turn 
on Active Duty over 50 years ago. I am encouraged by the commitment to 
turn operational control of the Republic of Korea armed forces over to 
the South Korean military leaders in 2012, as testified to recently by 
General Bell, but I wish it would happen sooner. I wish you great 
success in your new assignment as Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

    Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Warner.
    General McKiernan?

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO 
    THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL 
             SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AFGHANISTAN

    General McKiernan. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, other 
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I 
am truly honored to be here today.
    I would like to thank the Secretary of Defense and the 
President for nominating me for this important NATO command 
position. If confirmed by the United States Senate, I can 
pledge to you that every ounce of my leadership ability will go 
into what is certainly a continuing tough, challenging mission 
set in Afghanistan, to include, as Senator Warner rightfully 
points out, the counternarcotics challenges.
    I also would like to take this opportunity to thank the 
Senate Armed Services Committee for your steadfast and truly 
magnificent support to all our men and women in uniform these 
past several years. We could not be doing what we are doing 
globally without your support.
    With that, I will stand by for any questions from the 
committee this morning.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General McKiernan.
    General Odierno?

 STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO 
  THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED 
                          STATES ARMY

    General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and 
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I 
appreciate the opportunity to be here with you this morning.
    As Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, I had the honor 
of speaking with many of you during a number of congressional 
visits to the Iraqi theater of operations, and I am so well 
aware of your dedicated support to our soldiers serving there, 
your faith in their outstanding abilities, and your 
understanding of the many sacrifices they and their families 
endure for the sake of their country, comrades, and loved ones. 
For all of this, I thank the members of the committee for your 
support and steadfast commitment of them.
    I am humbled and honored on my nomination to be the next 
Army Vice Chief of Staff. I serve with a tremendous sense of 
awe for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, leaders, and 
families who have served alongside of me, and I am inspired by 
what they have accomplished. I am hopeful for what they will be 
able to accomplish in the years ahead. It is truly, without a 
doubt, the best army in the world. I consider myself blessed 
with the chance to continue serving in its ranks, and if 
confirmed, I will do so with the integrity, commitment, and 
drive that such a special position of trust and responsibility 
demands.
    Thank you so much for allowing me to be here today. With 
that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Odierno.
    General Sharp?

 STATEMENT OF LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE 
 GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/
       COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

    General Sharp. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished 
members of this committee, I also thank you for the opportunity 
to appear here today.
    I am deeply honored to be nominated by the President and 
the Secretary of Defense for the responsibility to serve as the 
next Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic of 
Korea, United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander of 
U.S. Forces Korea.
    I would also like to thank this committee for your 
continued support to our men, women, and their families who 
selflessly serve our great Nation both at home and around the 
world.
    Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working 
closely with this committee and its members and with our strong 
partner in the Republic of Korea during the challenges that we 
face in the months and years ahead.
    Sir, I stand by for your questions.
    Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for a 
minute?
    Accompanying General Sharp today is Mrs. Abell, the wife of 
Charlie Abell, who was a former soldier and former presidential 
appointee to DOD, and most importantly, he was the Staff 
Director of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I 
welcome you, Mrs. Abell. Please pass on the very best to your 
husband. We may have to recall him.
    Chairman Levin. Give him the good news, though, would you? 
[Laughter.]
    Let me ask you the standard questions first to each of our 
witnesses. You can respond together.
    First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    General Sharp. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the 
confirmation process?
    General McKiernan. No, sir.
    General Odierno. No, sir.
    General Sharp. No, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies 
with deadlines established for requested communications, 
including questions for the record in hearings?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    General Sharp. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    General Sharp. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from 
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    General Sharp. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 
testify, upon request, before this committee?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    General Sharp. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views 
when asked before this committee to do so even if those views 
differ from the administration in power?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    General Sharp. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, 
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a 
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or 
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good 
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    General Sharp. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you all.
    We will have a 10-minute round for our first round.
    Admiral Michael Mullen was quoted in the press yesterday as 
saying, ``Having forces in Iraq at the level that they're at 
doesn't allow us to fill the need that we have in 
Afghanistan.''
    Let me ask both General Odierno and General McKiernan. Do 
you agree with Admiral Mullen? General Odierno?
    General Odierno. Sir, what I would say initially is we do 
understand that what the Army is able and the Marine Corps are 
able to provide now is about at the level we can sustain over 
time. In order to provide additional forces, there would be 
some give and take between priorities in other contingencies. I 
think we would have to consider that as we continue to provide 
forces, if an increase in forces is necessary.
    Chairman Levin. When you say there has to be some give and 
take, in other words, you are saying, in terms of the 
allocation of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that what you 
are referring to?
    General Odierno. Yes, sir, or other contingencies as well.
    Chairman Levin. What would the other contingencies be?
    General Odierno. For example, Korea. If we would decide to 
take risk there or some other place where we might have to have 
forces available in the future. But as of today, Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
    Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, do you agree with 
Admiral Mullen?
    General McKiernan. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with Admiral 
Mullen, and the challenge is exacerbated by the current 
shortfalls in filling the combined joint statement of 
requirements by NATO.
    Chairman Levin. Now, in terms of more troops going to 
Afghanistan, is that going to be difficult to pull off if the 
force levels in Iraq are maintained at the pre-surge level of 
about 140,000 troops, General McKiernan?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I think it will continue to be a 
challenge for all the reasons that General Odierno just 
mentioned.
    Chairman Levin. What about trying to reduce the deployment 
tours from 15 months to 12 months? If all we are going to have 
is a 12-month dwell time for the Army, is that going to be 
difficult? Is that going to be possible if we are going to have 
more troops going to Afghanistan or if we keep our force level 
in Iraq at 140,000, General McKiernan?
    General McKiernan. Sir, the senior leadership I think 
unanimously agrees that 15-month deployments are too long, and 
they are not sustainable. Our goal is certainly to reduce the 
boots-on-the-ground time to 12 months and try to get eventually 
to a 1 to 2 ratio, but with the requirements as they are today, 
that is extremely hard with the size of the military we have.
    Chairman Levin. Will that be extremely hard if we keep that 
troop level in Iraq at the pre-surge level of 140,000?
    General McKiernan. I think it will be challenging, sir. I 
cannot answer whether we can get it down to 12 months.
    Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, the deployment of an 
additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan was announced as a one-
time deal for the next 7 months. If there are no further large 
troop reductions in Iraq, will there be U.S. forces available 
to replace those marines at the end of the current 7-month 
deployment?
    General McKiernan. Sir, in terms of brigade combat teams or 
replacement for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, not to my 
knowledge is there a force that can be missioned for that 
following the deployment of the marines.
    Chairman Levin. General Odierno, General Cody yesterday 
testified before our Readiness and Management Support 
Subcommittee that the ongoing deployments are inflicting 
``incredible stress on soldiers and families,'' and in his 
words, ``pose a significant risk to the All-Volunteer Army.'' 
He said also that he has never seen our lack of strategic depth 
to be where it is today.
    Do you agree with General Cody?
    General Odierno. What I would say is I have had a chance to 
experience this in my most recent assignment, first as the 
Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander and also as III Corps 
Commander as a force provider, that we are, in fact, out of 
balance. What I have seen as the Commander, Multi-National 
Corps-Iraq is that we receive forces that are, in fact, well 
trained, equipped, and at the proper levels, but as the III 
Corps Commander, I also see that the forces that are left 
behind do not have all the equipment they need. They do not 
have the people they need to help to respond to other 
contingencies. So there is a stress there on the force that is 
fairly consistent.
    Chairman Levin. Fairly consistent. What does that mean? You 
mean fairly heavy?
    General Odierno. Fairly heavy, yes, sir.
    I would also say that one of the hardest recommendations I 
had to make as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander was the 
extension of the surge forces that I knew would lead to 15-
month tours in Iraq as I made that recommendation up my chain 
of command. I realized that, in fact, 12 months is our goal and 
12 months is what we need to try to get to in order to have a 
viable, sustainable Army over the long-term. We have to 
continually work to move towards that. There are a number of 
ways we can do that, by reducing the requirements and also to 
continue to grow the Army, that it gives us the additional 
forces in order to continue to meet the needs of our national 
security.
    Chairman Levin. General Odierno, when these recent events 
took place in Basra, I think you were already gone, but I think 
you have enough background and you were close enough to it to 
perhaps be able to answer this question. Do you know whether or 
not Prime Minister Maliki took the steps that he took in Basra 
after consultation with the U.S. Army?
    General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, I do not know for sure. I 
really only know about the reports that we both have probably 
read in the newspapers. I have not talked to any of the leaders 
there to know, in fact, if he did operate independently without 
consultation or not.
    Chairman Levin. Do you think it would have been wise for 
him to consult with us prior to his venture into Basra, if in 
fact he did not?
    General Odierno. Yes, I think it is important, the 
partnership with us working these issues. First, it is a 
positive step that we want to try to deal against these 
nongovernmental groups, militias. That is a very important 
piece. But it is also important with the partnership that we 
have full consultation as we conduct operations within Iraq.
    Chairman Levin. That consultation take place sufficiently 
prior to the action on his part so that he can consider 
whatever advice we give him?
    General Odierno. Yes, it should. We should be part of that 
process.
    Chairman Levin. General Odierno, do you think it is useful 
to keep pressure on the Iraqi political leaders to reach 
political settlements on the outstanding key issues?
    General Odierno. I think it is important. As I have stated 
before, Mr. Chairman, we have security at a certain level now. 
In order to continue to improve the security in Iraq, it not 
only takes the use of continued military forces, but also 
improvement in economic, political, and basic services, and it 
is important that the Government of Iraq and its leaders step 
up and continue to work these very significant issues to the 
Iraqi people themselves. I believe by doing this, it would 
continue to reduce the passive support for any insurgent forces 
or militias that are left within Iraq.
    Chairman Levin. Do you think it is useful for us to remind 
them of the importance of their doing that?
    General Odierno. I think it is always important to do that, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, I want to discuss the 
drug issue in Afghanistan with you. Senator Warner has laid out 
the problem, and that problem is real and apparently growing.
    Part of the solution relates to going after the labs that 
produce these drugs. The small farmers are looking for small 
amounts of money that they get, which is more than they are 
able to get from other crops, and we obviously want to try to 
work with them to substitute crops. But the big money is made 
by the people who run these laboratories, the higher-ups, and 
we have not gone after the labs. There have been some rumors 
that some of these labs are off limits because of some kind of 
political connections with leaders in Kabul.
    I am wondering whether you are willing to look at that 
issue to report to us whether or not there is any reluctance, 
restraint, or restriction on our forces in terms of going after 
those labs where most of the problem resides and where most of 
the money is being produced? Would you make an independent 
assessment of that and give us your assessment as to whether 
there is any truth to the fact that there is some reluctance or 
restraint upon our forces, the Afghan forces or any other 
forces in terms of shutting down those labs?
    General McKiernan. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you, if 
confirmed, I will certainly make that assessment and provide 
that information back to this committee. I share your concern 
and Senator Warner's concern that this problem is a problem for 
the international community. It is a problem for Afghanistan. 
ISAF has a mandate to provide certain support to the Afghan 
Government to work the counternarcotics problem, and if we have 
actionable intelligence of opium labs, I certainly think that 
should be part of the ISAF mandate. I will make that assessment 
and come back to this committee.
    Chairman Levin. That is very important that you do that, 
and we are counting on you to do that. Thank you.
    Senator Warner.
    Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to accommodate 
our colleague from Texas, as I will be here with you until the 
conclusion of the hearing.
    Chairman Levin. I am happy to do that.
    Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator 
Warner, I appreciate your usual courtesy.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Again, let me 
reiterate what we have all said, but we cannot say enough. 
Thank you for your service to our country and the people that 
serve under your command. We are in their debt.
    I wanted to ask two lines of questions. First, General 
McKiernan, perhaps as Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, 
you would be able to comment on a story that appeared today in 
the New York Times where the President had secured the backing 
of NATO for a robust missile defense system. NATO leaders 
adopted a communique saying that ballistic missile 
proliferation poses an increasing threat to allied forces' 
territory and populations. It will also recognize the 
substantial contribution to the protection of allies to be 
provided by the U.S.-led system, according to senior officials 
who spoke on condition of anonymity ahead of the statement's 
release.
    First, do you agree that ballistic missile proliferation 
poses a threat to the United States, as well as our allies?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I certainly agree with that 
statement. I have not worked personally with the theater 
missile defense question in Europe to any great degree. So I am 
not familiar with too many of the specifics about that. But the 
threat is certainly there.
    Senator Cornyn. I appreciate that very much.
    General Odierno, let me ask you. We talked briefly about 
this in my office when you were kind enough to drop by. Welcome 
back to the United States.
    General Odierno. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you for your service in the III Corps 
and Fort Hood, as well as Commander of Multi-National Forces in 
Iraq.
    I asked you in my office, when you were kind enough to come 
by about the Iraqi assault on Basra, how you viewed that. I 
mentioned to you that while there is some indication in the New 
York Times today that the Iraqis did not necessarily consult 
with their American allies, that it actually, to my perception, 
demonstrated the sort of acceptance of responsibility and an 
Iraqi initiative against these Iranian-backed militias that 
could be viewed as a positive development, while we recognize 
they were not able to handle this independently and required 
U.S. support, which is frankly not a surprise.
    Could you tell me whether you believe that this sort of 
initiative against Iranian-backed militias, euphemistically 
called ``special groups,'' is a positive or a negative?
    General Odierno. If I could just say as the conflict in 
Iraq continues to evolve, it changes over time. Although there 
is still terrorism and insurgency, it is much less than it was. 
The bigger threat is the communal struggle for power which in 
my view is being fueled by Iranian support to the special 
groups. One of the things that will have to be tackled is these 
militias that are equipped, funded, and trained by either 
Iran's Quds Force or Iranian surrogates within Iraq.
    The Government of Iraq stepping up to take action against 
these groups in my mind is an important step of eliminating 
these nongovernmental security organizations that are trying to 
sustain control over the population. So I think for that, it is 
a very important step forward. Obviously, we would much rather 
be able to resolve these through reconciliation and peaceful 
ways instead of having to use force. In that way, I think it is 
a positive step forward.
    Senator Cornyn. Prime Minister Maliki called these militias 
criminals and gang leaders. Would you agree or disagree with 
his comments?
    General Odierno. I think there is a mixture. I think as we 
continue to analyze the threat, there are some that I believe 
are clearly Iranian surrogates that have a very specific 
purpose to destabilize the Government of Iraq because Iran 
thinks a weak Government of Iraq is in their best interest. 
Then there are criminals that are out there that, in fact, are 
thugs, have organized crime, and are flat-out criminals trying 
to extort money from the population. So it is a mixture of 
both.
    Senator Cornyn. I have just two more questions for you, 
General Odierno.
    First of all, let me just quote the words of President John 
F. Kennedy who once remarked that ``the cost of freedom is 
always high, but Americans have always paid it. One path we 
shall never choose and that is a path of surrender or 
submission.''
    There are some who suggest that the cost of the war in Iraq 
is too high, and that we should spend the money that we are 
spending supporting the troops and on ongoing operations in 
Iraq on other things here domestically. But as a military 
leader, without commenting maybe on the specifics, I would like 
for you to comment on how you view the cost of protecting our 
freedom and that of our allies and whether you feel like we can 
put a cost/benefit analysis on that from a strictly financial 
point of view.
    General Odierno. Senator Cornyn, first of all, I want to 
make sure it is clear that I understand the costs involved, the 
cost monetarily, but more importantly to me, the costs in lives 
of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, as well as those 
who have been wounded and who will forever have a scar to bear 
because of this war and will never forget their sacrifices.
    But it is always difficult to put a price tag on what I 
believe to be the security of our Nation. I do believe that the 
Middle East is an extremely important place for us to ensure 
that we maintain the security of our country. I will leave it 
at that, sir.
    Senator Cornyn. My last question really has to do with 
that. I think there are some who have suggested that what we 
are doing in Iraq is irrelevant to our security here on the 
mainland of the United States. What is your opinion?
    General Odierno. I would say that Iraq is an important 
place, as well as Afghanistan, in the Middle East. The Middle 
East is a place that we all know there has been a lot of 
violence over the last several years. It has created violence 
around the entire world. I think it is important for us to 
establish what I believe to be a self-reliant government that 
is stable, that is committed to governance representing all its 
people, denied as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated 
into the national community as an engine of security and 
economic development. I believe establishing a strategic 
partnership within the Middle East with these countries is 
extremely important for the security of the United States.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, each of you, and good 
luck. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Warner.
    Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKiernan, when I look back on the history of the 
United States' participation in terms of operating as a part of 
a coalition force, we certainly did it in France. We did it in 
World War II. We did it in Korea, as a matter of fact.
    NATO evolved out of that concept of coalition forces 
operating together. It took a long time before NATO realized 
that it had to expand its authority to what we term ``out-of-
area operations.'' You know the history of that as well as I 
do. Europe had certainly a comparative period of stability that 
enabled NATO to take on these out-of-area operations.
    The first was the Balkans, and I believe on the whole that 
the record of NATO's performance there was quite good. It 
continues to some extent.
    But this question in Afghanistan has not worked as we had 
all hoped. I am wondering if you would join me in saying that 
if we do not succeed--I do not call it winning and victory, but 
just succeed with the basic goals of enabling the Afghan 
government to establish a democratic form of government. They 
have it in framework now and they are trying to work the pieces 
together.
    As a matter of fact, in my last trip over there, they just 
finished putting the legislature together. I remember President 
Karzai grumbling about the insubordinate members of their 
legislature. Do you recall that, Senator?
    Chairman Levin. I do and it reminded me of home.
    Senator Warner. Yes, yes, it did.
    But I fear that if NATO does not enable this country to 
succeed in its goals, that the commitment of the nations of the 
world to continue NATO will be truly tested. Or to put it in a 
blunt way, this could end up with the demise of NATO as we have 
known it these many years, a half century.
    Where do you rank the seriousness of attaining the goals in 
Afghanistan in relation to the continuation of NATO?
    General McKiernan. First of all, I share your sentiments. I 
think that the success of the NATO mission of ISAF in 
Afghanistan is directly linked really to the relevancy of NATO 
as a global security means in the 21st century. As you know, 
sir, I served in the NATO headquarters in the early days in the 
Balkans, and I think NATO was successful and continues to be 
successful in the Balkans, specifically Kosovo, today.
    I think there is certainly the capacity and the capability 
for NATO to succeed in Afghanistan. However, there is a 
question of will in terms of getting all the right 
contributions so that we build the right capacity to execute 
the mission.
    Senator Warner. I would go so far as to say that that will, 
which you properly and carefully pointed out, is not among the 
uniformed persons of NATO. It, frankly, resides in the several 
governments that train, equip, and send those troops to NATO. I 
am not about to open up all the chapters of European history, 
but frankly, their legislatures, the heads of state and 
government of many of the European nations simply are not able. 
They may well have the will, the heads of those governments, 
but the legislatures, for whatever reason, are not giving those 
heads of State and governments the type of support they need.
    I think, from time to time, some of us have to sound the 
alarm because while NATO is the most extraordinary and the most 
successful military alliance in the history of mankind in my 
judgment, there could well be a reexamination of the very 
significant participation, about 25 percent, of this Nation in 
NATO.
    I can remember--and I am sure the chairman can remember, if 
you will listen to what I am saying here, when we were young 
Senators, I can recall going to the floor to defend NATO. There 
were some of our most distinguished colleagues questioning the 
continuation of NATO at a great cost to the American people and 
the major portions of our military. I will not name the names, 
but it is in the record if anybody wants to look at it. They 
said NATO has finished its mission. Europe is secure and it is 
time that we redirected those expenditures and those forces to 
other requirements of the United States.
    So maybe out of this hearing can come some little message 
to NATO. They are not there forever. They are there only so 
long as they can perform and achieve the goals that we have 
assigned to them. I say ``we.'' I mean collectively the 25 
member nations.
    Unless you have a comment, I will move to another question. 
Do you basically endorse what I had to say?
    General McKiernan. I do, Senator Warner.
    Senator Warner. Thank you.
    General Odierno, another great institution we have is the 
All-Volunteer Force, and some of us are getting somewhat 
concerned about the absolute necessity of the Army to begin to 
somewhat lower the requirements of those recruits coming in to 
meet the needs as established by quotas. I for one--and I would 
state it right here--would rather have a smaller Army composed 
of the right people who can continue to preserve the concept of 
the All-Volunteer Force than to begin to bring in people that 
fall considerably below the standards that we have been able to 
maintain for this Army and the other military forces, the Navy, 
the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, these many years.
    First, your own view about the All-Volunteer Force.
    General Odierno. Senator Warner, first, I think it is 
critical that we continue to maintain an All-Volunteer Force. I 
think it has proven over time the quality of the force that we 
have been able to put together and the dedication of the 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that are a part of it 
and how they have been able to perform over, specifically here 
recently, the last 7 years. I think it is important that we 
want to maintain that for the long term, sir.
    Senator Warner. I can just speak for myself. You will 
recall in World War II, the draft was adopted by Congress by 
one vote. Today, I do not think Congress would consider, under 
the current circumstances and the commitments we have abroad 
now, any concept of returning to compulsive military training, 
be it a draft or some other concoction that we might come up 
with. That is not going to be the case.
    That puts a special responsibility on your shoulders. You 
are a trustee of that Army. You are not just the Vice Chief. 
The long-term view of what you are doing today is going to 
shape that Army of tomorrow and the future. I, frankly, urge 
you to make certain that whatever requirements you have to 
readjust, let us say, in terms of recruiting will not result in 
any risk to the All-Volunteer Force or bring the perception and 
quality of the Army down.
    After all, the concept of military training, military 
operations is very simple. It is dependent on the person that 
you are working with. You call it an ``Army of One,'' which is 
quite a good slogan, but it is really in that foxhole. One 
sleeps while the other is on duty. Aboard ship, some sleep 
while the others are on duty. You are dependent on your fellow 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to do their duties at 
such times as you may have to get the needed rest that you need 
to carry out. If you begin to put into that foxhole people who 
cannot establish that mutual trust and bond, I think you will 
see this thing getting worse. It is a problem.
    How would you judge the morale of the Army today? It is 
really interesting, the quotes of Eisenhower and George 
Marshall. I love history. Marshall said morale is a state of 
mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is 
confidence and zeal and loyalty. Eisenhower once said in war 
morale is everything. After 6 years of now conflict, what is 
your judgment as to the morale of the United States Army?
    General Odierno. I would just comment, Senator Warner, that 
over the last 15, 16, 17 months, as I have observed up close 
and personal the performance of all our servicemembers of all 
the Services in Iraq, their dedication, their steadfast 
commitment, their loyalty to their mission, and their 
dedication to complete their mission has never wavered. We can 
talk a lot about how you show morale, but how you show it is 
doing your job every single day without hesitation, the fact 
that you want to follow your leaders, the fact that you will do 
anything for your teammates, the person to your right, the 
person to your left, under very difficult conditions. We 
witness that every single day.
    I used to tell people when I was the corps commander over 
there that when I was feeling bad or I thought I was down, the 
first thing I would do is go visit our soldiers or our marines.
    Senator Warner. That would build you back up.
    General Odierno. It built me back up when I had a chance to 
hang out with them because of their dedication and loyalty.
    Senator Warner. Let me close out here on my time. We have 
talked this morning about the necessity to go from the 15-month 
to the 12-month tour. To what extent can you say now your level 
of confidence that we can achieve that transition from 15 to 12 
by early this summer?
    General Odierno. Senator, I am going to leave that to 
others to make that determination, but I would just say that--
--
    Senator Warner. Well, you will be a part of that 
decisionmaking.
    General Odierno. I will.
    I would just say our goal is to get down to 12-month tours 
as soon as we possibly can. We fully realize that 12-month 
tours is the maximum length that we should have our tours, and 
so our goal is to push that as fast as we possibly can.
    Senator Warner. Good.
    General McKiernan, back to the drug problem in Afghanistan. 
We have had programs here in American agriculture where we put 
land into retirement and pay farmers a certain amount of money 
for keeping it in retirement.
    Now, it seems to me that we could establish sort of a delta 
between what that farmer is getting for an opium crop and what 
he would get for another crop which is less cash, and we would 
just go in there and subsidize the difference between those two 
crops. If you look at the dollars involved, it is nickels and 
dimes compared to the overall value of that crop as it begins 
to move up and eventually is dispersed, a lot of it, into 
Europe.
    I cannot understand why Europe does not see this 
Afghanistan operation as central to their security not only 
from the standpoint of a breeding ground for terrorism, but 
also the drugs that are infiltrating into Europe.
    Start with some very simple program. Stop the poppies. Try 
turnips, whatever, potatoes. Whatever you get for that crop of 
potatoes, if it is less than the poppy crop, here is the cash. 
If we can choke it off right there in the field, I think we 
could make some progress.
    I do not feel that we should do the spraying because I have 
done some agriculture myself. That could result in working to 
the detriment of the water supply for human consumption if you 
put that much spray around in some of those provinces.
    I just think we ought to come up with some innovative 
ideas, and I am ensured by our discussions together and your 
testimony this morning you are going to devote your time to it. 
But as one old farmer who lost a lot of money farming, I can 
tell that is one way to get at it. Retire that land or pay them 
the delta between the crops.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
    Senator Thune.
    Senator Warner. There is a man down there that understands 
agriculture, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Thune. Not tobacco farming, however, Senator.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to associate myself 
with the remarks of the Senator from Virginia.
    Senator Warner. We had a lot of peanuts, and you have eaten 
those.
    Senator Thune. That is exactly right.
    But I do want to associate myself with the comments from 
the Senator from Virginia with regard to NATO. NATO is a club 
that everybody wants to be in but nobody wants to do the work. 
The numbers keep getting larger. We keep adding member nations 
to that organization, but its effectiveness I think is very 
much in question if we are not able to step up to some of the 
challenges we face around the world, particularly in places 
like Afghanistan.
    General McKiernan, General Odierno, and General Sharp, 
thank you. Each of you has had incredibly impressive and 
distinguished careers, and we thank you for your service to the 
country. Each of you has spent a long time overseas in support 
of your country, and we thank you for your and your families' 
sacrifice. We appreciate everything you do for our country's 
freedoms.
    General McKiernan, you stated in your response to the 
committee's advance policy questions that some of the 
challenges that you will face as Commander of ISAF are under-
resourcing and constrained forces. You also go on to state that 
fully resourcing military requirements and removing remaining 
caveats will be a major focus, and that we should look closely 
at options for deploying additional brigade combat teams to 
Afghanistan.
    How many more brigade combat teams do you anticipate you 
will need to continue the mission?
    General McKiernan. Sir, if confirmed, I would need to be on 
the ground to make an assessment for specific numbers, but 
again, it is a fact that the requirements stated by current 
commanders there in Afghanistan--that those requirements have 
not been filled through the NATO force generation process. So 
specific numbers of brigades or other military capabilities--I 
cannot give you the exact numbers today. It would be part of an 
assessment I would need to make. But we certainly need to build 
more capacity not just in the military line of operation, but 
also in the developmental and governance lines of operation. 
There is more capacity that has to be built there in 
Afghanistan.
    Senator Thune. What else do you anticipate requesting that 
has not already been identified, if confirmed in the position?
    General McKiernan. Senator, I am not sure if there is 
anything besides what has already been identified, but what has 
already been identified, as you correctly state, is more than 
just ground combat capability, but it is also more aviation, 
more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, 
additional operational mentoring and liaison teams, Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams, et cetera. So those requirements that are 
already validated and are waiting to be filled I think is the 
starting point.
    Senator Thune. You also stated that there have been recent 
reductions in the number and severity of caveats with regard to 
some of our NATO allies in Afghanistan. Could you describe in 
more detail what those reductions are?
    General McKiernan. I really do not think there necessarily 
have been reductions in caveats. I think what I meant to say in 
that statement, if I did not, is that we need to continue to 
work to remove caveats because what they end up ultimately 
doing is degrading NATO's advantages in terms of mobility, fire 
power, sustainment, and intelligence. We have to, I think, work 
to continue to remove those caveats.
    Senator Thune. Are some of the caveats worse than others?
    General McKiernan. I think so. Certainly military 
contributions that are precluded really from conducting combat 
operations make it very difficult for those same forces to be 
effective in a counterinsurgency environment.
    Senator Thune. General Odierno, General Casey has argued 
that we are in an era of persistent conflict. Assuming that he 
is correct, do you see any utility to the concept of standing 
provincial reconstruction teams, in other words, teams that are 
ready to deploy on a moment's notice?
    General Odierno. One of the recommendations I made coming 
out of Iraq was that we should take a look at how we might do 
that so they can be deployable, no notice, as we continue to 
look at potential contingencies in the future because I believe 
with any contingency we might run into, it would be important 
for us to immediately be able to have an interagency team on 
the ground to help us work the socioeconomic, political issues 
that ultimately are linked to operations.
    Senator Thune. What about standing operational mentor teams 
or standing embedded training teams? Is that something you 
foresee?
    General Odierno. The one thing I would say is what I want 
is the Army has centered around brigade combat teams, and I 
believe our brigade combat teams we want to be full spectrum in 
nature where they can accomplish a variety of missions. It is 
important for us to do that to get the efficiency out of our 
Army. So in order to get the efficiency out of our Army, what 
we want is units that can do a number of things. I think 
through task organization and other kinds of things, they can 
conduct those type of operations as well as combat operations. 
We want that flexibility within our force so we get the most 
out of our leaders and our soldiers.
    Senator Thune. General Sharp, one of the questions that was 
posed to you by the committee in its advance policy questions 
regarded the missile defense systems and capabilities that you 
believe are needed to meet the operational needs of U.S. Forces 
Korea and Combined Forces Command. That is, I think, on page 6 
of your advance policy questions responses. You responded that 
among other things, continued development of the airborne laser 
is needed to provide the layered, systematic missile defense 
capability required to protect critical United States 
facilities in the Republic of Korea.
    Could you expand a little bit further on why you believe 
development of the airborne laser is needed to meet the 
operational needs of U.S. Forces Korea?
    General Sharp. Sir, I think as you look across the entire 
missile defense spectrum, you have to have a layered defense 
that starts from space and works all the way down to Aegis and 
other ground-based systems to intercept the missiles. I believe 
the airborne laser is a critical part of that ballistic missile 
enterprise to be able to allow for that effective defense.
    Senator Thune. Looking at the readiness challenge, what do 
you see as the major challenge to readiness? Are the challenges 
with personnel, equipment, or training, and given events in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, are we resourcing our forces in Korea 
correctly?
    General Sharp. Sir, the forces that are in Korea today, the 
U.S. forces that are there today, are properly trained and 
equipped to be able to accomplish the task and the mission that 
we have working with our Republic of Korea allies to defend the 
peninsula. Likewise, the Republic of Korea forces are also very 
well trained and very well equipped. They are an outstanding 
military, and they are also prepared to defend the Republic of 
Korea.
    The forces that we would deploy from the United States, if 
we had to go do that conflict today, are not as well trained, 
as General Casey has said, because they are training on the 
missions that they have to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are 
counter-insurgency experts of the world. But we are confident 
that we would be able to deploy those forces and we would be 
able to win in the Republic of Korea with our Republic of Korea 
allies.
    One other point I would like to make. Because of the amount 
of Reserve Forces that we have deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Reserve and National Guard, I personally believe 
right now they are the best trained that they have ever been 
trained because we have used them in combat environments. They 
would be also a key component of any conflict in Korea.
    Senator Thune. Do you have any major concerns with 
transferring wartime OPCON to the Republic of Korea?
    General Sharp. General Bell has worked very closely with 
our allies, and I believe that he has an excellent plan of 
exercises. He has an excellent plan working with the Republic 
of Korea to make sure that they have the capabilities that they 
need from surveillance to command and control to the ability to 
be able to, at a high level, command the fight. I am confident 
that by 2012, which is the currently agreed upon time to 
transfer, we will be ready and the Koreans will be ready to 
take control of that fight.
    Senator Thune. Thank you all very much and thanks again for 
your service. We look forward to a speedy confirmation process, 
and godspeed in your new endeavors. Thank you for what you do.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
    Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I came at the beginning of this and then left and went to 
the floor and talked for 30 minutes, having just come back 3 
days ago from Iraq and from Africa, giving my assessment of it. 
This was my 18th trip into that theater. So I do not think I am 
going to ask you what you have already been asked before 
because my staff has kind of gone over some of the interests 
that I had.
    I would like to start off with General McKiernan--and I 
appreciate your coming by so we had a chance to visit before 
this meeting. A lot of reports claim that the insurgency is 
growing in Afghanistan and that the security situation is 
deteriorating. However, in December, General McNeil said--and I 
was there at that time in December--``My view of the security 
situation is that it is not deteriorating like other people 
say. It is showing exactly what it is. There is insurgency 
here. There is a strong international and indigenous force 
going after it, and you are going to have contacts.'' Do you 
generally agree with that statement?
    General McKiernan. I do generally agree with that, sir. I 
think there are certainly no signs that the insurgency is ready 
to collapse, and I believe that the environment there in 
Afghanistan today reflects an interlinkage between the 
insurgency, terrorism, corruption at various levels, and 
criminal activity. I think all of those have to be factored 
into the approach that ISAF takes in the mission.
    Senator Inhofe. When you say the criminal activity, it is 
my observation that one of the differences between Iraq and 
Afghanistan is that there is just no central authority there. 
Afghanistan is kind of a convoluted grouping of cities and 
local administrations, and there is a lot of corruption there 
and there is no central place where you can really attack this. 
Is that accurate?
    General McKiernan. I would agree that the history of 
Afghanistan is really a history of local autonomy. So a strong 
central government is not exactly the historical trend in 
Afghanistan.
    Senator Inhofe. Does that not create a problem, though? You 
do not have a strong Federal Government where you can go to one 
place as opposed to trying to work around the edges.
    General McKiernan. I think it is part of the challenge. The 
challenge is not only building capacity and coherence between 
governance development and security. But it is developing 
institutions that were not there previously.
    Senator Inhofe. A few months ago I was privileged to go 
with General Jones. It was his last trip there. That is 
essentially the assessment that he had of the situation.
    When I was over there 3 days ago, I met with your 
replacement at the Multi-National Corps, General Austin, and we 
talked about the recent violence down in Basra. I know you have 
already talked about this before I came in. But we were down at 
Buka, which is right next to Basra, and we had talked to an 
awful lot of people, even a lot of the troops on the ground. 
The response that Prime Minister Maliki had down there and the 
fact that he took a level of control I thought was good, but 
some people are criticizing the fact that he was the one who 
went down and did it and he did not do the job properly.
    What is your assessment of what he did on that crackdown in 
Basra?
    General Odierno. Sir, I would just say again, as I said 
earlier, the communal struggle for power is growing more and 
more within Iraq. We still have some terrorism and insurgency. 
But it is about Shia-on-Shia violence. It is about those 
nongovernmental entities that are trying to exert their 
influence. Some of them are Iranian-supported and backed by 
funding, weapons, and equipment from Iran. It is important that 
the government understands that they have to take action 
against these groups in order for the governmental entities, 
the police force, the army, and others, to be the ones who in 
fact provide security. So from that aspect, I think it is 
important that they understand this problem and they understand 
that action has to be taken.
    Having not been there, I am not sure what the level of 
coordination was that went on, but I do believe it is a 
partnership and we should do all of these things as partners.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes. It appeared that that is the first 
time they really did take the initiative. At least, it seemed 
that way to me.
    Just for a minute--I was talking about this on the floor a 
minute ago--the Iranian threat that is over there. Back when 
there were a lot of resolutions about leaving, it got a lot of 
attention there. About that time, Ahmadinejad made the 
statement that when we leave--at that time, he was convinced 
that we would leave and that would create a vacuum and he would 
be able to fill that vacuum. I agree that he would like to do 
it.
    But what would the Iraqi people's response be if they were 
to look at the Iranians coming in and filling that vacuum?
    General Odierno. My assessment is that I believe the Iraqi 
people, the large, large, large majority, are very 
nationalistic, and they want Iraqis to solve Iraqi problems. 
They do not want interference from Iran and want them filling 
any vacuums. So I believe, for the most part, the Iraqis want 
to be involved in the solutions.
    I would just say that I get some concern because you could 
make the argument that, in fact, through some of the Iranian 
support that goes on in Iraq, they are creating the 
instability. Then they are saying they want to come in and fill 
the vacuum to correct the instability. So I think we have to 
make sure we understand that very carefully, and I think we 
have to watch that extremely carefully.
    Senator Inhofe. It was not too many years ago that they 
were launching missiles back and forth on each other, killing 
hundreds of thousands of people.
    I heard Senator Thune talking to you, General Sharp, a 
little bit about some of the things that were going on over 
there in terms of Korea and Korea's capability. I have always 
been concerned about their capability. I always remember, 
because I was on this committee, and I remember in August 1998 
when we were trying to get an assessment. We had come out with 
our assessment at that time--that was 1998--as to how long 
would it be until the North Koreans would have a multistage 
rocket that could reach the United States, and they came back. 
I have the documentation. It was around 12 to 15 years. That 
was on August 24, 1998. On August 31, 7 days later, they fired 
one.
    I say that because how comfortable are you and our 
intelligence as to exactly what capability they have and what 
they are going to do with it.
    General Sharp. Sir, we are never comfortable that we have 
enough intelligence. They do continue to surprise us. That is 
why we and the Koreans need robust capability in order to be 
able to defend that peninsula. You have seen--and I think we 
have fairly good evidence--that we do believe there is enough 
plutonium that they could have and probably have created some 
nuclear weapons that are in North Korea right now.
    In a closed session, we could go into more details of 
exactly what we do know and where we think we have holes in 
that intelligence. But there are holes, and as I said, we need 
to make sure that we, the United States and the Republic of 
Korea, are prepared to win that conflict, which I do believe we 
are today, but it requires the continued commitment of all of 
us and the Koreans.
    Senator Inhofe. The other day in a subcommittee hearing, I 
commented that I did not think they were making the progress 
they should be making with the Czech Republic and Poland. I 
found out later that it appears that they are making great 
progress right now, and I am glad I was wrong.
    Finally, General Sharp, several of the programs that I have 
really pushed hard are the 1206, 1207, 1208, 1210 train and 
equip programs and the International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) programs. In fact, it was our attitude up till 
the last reauthorization bill that when we invite people to 
come over--and I do not think there is anything that solidifies 
for the future better relations for their officers, whatever 
the country is, Africa or anyplace else, to be training with 
ours. I think the IMET program has been very successful.
    But we had the attitude that we are doing them a favor when 
we do that, and that is because we had this restriction that 
you cannot come over unless they sign an Article 98. I put 
language in last time with the argument that they are doing us 
a favor more than we are doing them a favor because if they are 
not over here training with us, there is always the Chinese and 
others who would like to get their hands on them and 
participate in that kind of training activity. So we have taken 
away that requirement.
    Lastly, we want to increase that program.
    What is your feeling about that program and the success of 
it?
    General Sharp. Sir, thanks to your leadership, I agree 
completely with the way you are going. I think it is critical 
for us and really for the world. One of the critical things 
that came out of the findings of the last Quadrennial Defense 
Review was that we really need to build partnership capacity 
around the world. We are no longer having programs just to give 
money away to buy friends. We need to have programs so that 
militaries around the world are prepared, capable, and willing 
to be able to go and help in all types of conflicts from 
peacekeeping operations to what we are doing in Iraq and 
Afghanistan today. The programs that you mentioned are critical 
to that.
    IMET is critical specifically because of its ability to be 
able to fund military officers and noncommissioned officers to 
be able to come to the United States to go to our schools so 
that we can learn from each other and to be able to better 
interoperate in present and future conflicts.
    Sir, I thank you for your leadership.
    Senator Inhofe. Those relationships endure.
    Do you agree generally with what General Sharp is saying?
    General McKiernan. I do, sir, absolutely.
    Senator Inhofe. The last thing I would say--my time has 
expired--would be on the Commanders Emergency Relief Program 
(CERP) which we have been wanting to expand both in the funding 
level as well as the geographic level, to be able to get other 
places. Would each one of you agree that that is a good idea?
    General Sharp. Absolutely.
    General Odierno. If I could, sir. I would just say it 
becomes even more important as we look at the reduction of our 
forces, that in fact the use of our money in order to move 
forward, as I talked earlier about continued economic 
revitalization of basic services becomes more important. So the 
money that the commanders have to do that becomes an important 
tool.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I get to walk in 
and ask questions. That is great.
    To all of you, thank you for your service.
    General Odierno, congratulations on what I think is going 
to be seen in history as a very eventful tour of duty regarding 
the last year.
    The one thing that I have on my mind is this tension we 
have with the pressure on the Army and the outcome in Iraq. 
From a morale point of view, I know that the force has been 
strained, but generally speaking, how does the force feel, from 
your point of view as a commander, about the operations and the 
reasons we are there?
    General Odierno. What I would say first is, again, I judge 
morale on how soldiers, marines, and others perform on the 
ground, and every day that they are there, they are dedicated 
to doing their job. They are dedicated to protecting each 
other. I would say that over the last 12 months for sure, that 
they really have seen some viable progress going on inside of 
Iraq, and they understand that, in fact, that progress has been 
made. They feel that they can continue to make that progress.
    Senator Graham. Regarding Iran, as I understand Iraq in the 
last year, Anbar Province has substantially changed for the 
better. Is that correct?
    General Odierno. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Graham. The awakening, as it is being called, the 
Sunni Awakening--I think the event that started it was a sheik 
came to a colonel and said, I have had it with these al Qaeda 
guys. I am ready to help you. Is that generally what happened?
    General Odierno. Much communication. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Graham. The colonel, pretty much on his own 
initiative, said, okay, we are going to put a tank in front of 
your house.
    General Odierno. That is pretty close, sir.
    Senator Graham. The point is that you had al Qaeda 
overplaying their hand, driving the population toward us, and 
the reaction of the colonel was to provide that individual 
better security, to reinforce his willingness to fight al 
Qaeda. Is that correct?
    General Odierno. It is, sir.
    Senator Graham. That general model was used in Anbar that 
we would increase military capacity and try to peel people away 
from al Qaeda. From that, we have gotten now what is called the 
Sons of Iraq. Is that correct?
    General Odierno. Yes, sir.
    Senator Graham. Tell me how the Sons of Iraq has changed 
things in Anbar?
    General Odierno. First, I would say, again, people are 
willing to come forward and looking for security, rejecting al 
Qaeda. The change that occurred was the rejection of al Qaeda 
throughout Iraq, starting in Anbar, the elimination of the 
passive support that al Qaeda had for a long time. What I mean 
by passive support is not that you supported them, but you did 
not do anything to help us to get after them. That changed. 
Like you said, they got tired of how al Qaeda was treating them 
and rejected their ideologies and what they stood for.
    So what happened was once they were able to get security 
provided to them and they came to the coalition forces to help, 
once we continued to provide security for them, they then 
continued to come forward more and more and they wanted to be 
part of the process of going after al Qaeda in Anbar Province.
    Senator Graham. Would you say there is a direct link 
between our willingness to reinforce and provide security to 
Anbar Province and the population's boldness to say no to al 
Qaeda?
    General Odierno. As we became more aggressive in what I 
call liberating the major cities in Anbar, finishing with 
Ramadi in March/April 2007, they started to come more and more 
forward. One of the key components, as we asked for additional 
forces, was the addition of two Marine battalions that we would 
put in Anbar so we could control the Euphrates River Valley and 
all of the population centers along the Euphrates River Valley 
in order to exploit the success that had begun by this action 
you talked about.
    Senator Graham. Let us talk about Baghdad. The strategy in 
Baghdad, as I understand it, was to get troops out into joint 
security stations, out behind the walls into neighborhoods. Is 
that correct?
    General Odierno. It is, Senator.
    Senator Graham. Can you tell us about a joint security 
station? Why such a thing exists, and how that has affected the 
battle in Baghdad?
    General Odierno. Not only was it additional forces but it 
was our change in strategy to get our forces among the 
population to create confidence between the population and 
security forces.
    The joint security stations were established so we could 
have a place where coalition forces, Iraqi Army, and Iraqi 
police would operate together, would operate among the 
population. So they felt more secure so they could come forward 
with information, feel more secure about opening shops, feel 
more secure about their daily lives, and then also build 
confidence between Iraqis and their own security forces, 
confidence with their own police and their own army over time.
    It also developed better relationships between coalition 
forces and the Iraqi population because on a daily basis, they 
would interact with each other, and it made a very significant 
difference as we continued to move forward in Baghdad.
    Senator Graham. Now, there is a statement being made that 
sectarian violence in the last year of Sunni and Shia violence 
has dramatically been reduced. Is that an accurate statement?
    General Odierno. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Graham. What do you account for that?
    General Odierno. It is a number of things. I think, again, 
it is first providing security to each other. It is a fact that 
people realize that in the beginning of 2007, we would not 
tolerate sectarian violence from either side, either Shia or 
Sunni. Most Iraqis are not sectarian. There were a few 
conducting many of the operations.
    We went after the leaders who in fact were, in my mind, 
encouraging sectarian violence for their own gains. Al Qaeda 
was trying to accelerate sectarian violence because they saw 
that as a way to continue to destabilize Iraq as it continued 
to move forward. So we went after al Qaeda. We had some Shia 
extremists that were supported by Iranians and others who were 
conducting sectarian violence. We went after them.
    The population realized this and they started to understand 
this. They realized that we were going to eliminate this 
sectarian violence. Since then, it has dropped dramatically.
    Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to take much 
time. How long do we have? 5 minutes?
    Chairman Levin. 10 minutes.
    Senator Graham. 10 minutes, okay. Thank you.
    Economic activity in Iraq. I flew over Baghdad with General 
Petraeus in February, just a little over a month ago. You said 
you saw 180 soccer games? I stopped counting, but it was a lot. 
We all know Baghdad. There is no place in Iraq that is 
completely normal in terms of what we would like it to be. But 
it was astonishing to me, in flying over Baghdad, the amount of 
activity.
    Have you seen an economic improvement as a result of better 
security?
    General Odierno. Obviously, we have seen the markets grow. 
In fact, most of the time, it is about 10-fold. We saw places 
where, frankly, there were no shops open to where now there are 
300 to 400, whether it be the Doura market in southern Baghdad, 
Shorja market in eastern Baghdad, and Shula in western Baghdad. 
So a significant increase. What you had was an increase in 
goods being sold, but also, obviously, a precipitate increase 
in retail goods that would be developed.
    Senator Graham. As you know, I have been very interested in 
the prisoner issue, and I want to compliment you and General 
Stone for coming up with--I think it will be seen in history as 
one of the most novel approaches to dealing with the prison 
population, having a counterinsurgency program in the prison 
where you educate prisoners. We are providing education to 
every prisoner at Camp Buka and Camp Crawford. Exposure to 
moderate influences in terms of the Koran, and basically trying 
to give people a second chance on life for those that we feel 
like we can let go. I just want to recognize your work there 
and compliment you.
    On the political front, the amnesty law, the 
deBaathification law, the provincial elections, and a $48 
billion budget. In your opinion, what does that mean, if 
anything, for the future of Iraq? What would account for these 
breakthroughs?
    General Odierno. First, again, I believe the fact that we 
improved the security, it enabled the political factions within 
the Iraqi Government now to start focusing on what I believe to 
be significantly important political issues. One is, obviously, 
the distribution of the wealth to all of the provinces through 
the budget, through the allocation of reconstruction funds. 
Second was the passing of the provincial election law. In 
addition, the accountability and justice law, which was 
basically the old de-Baathification law, then the amnesty law.
    Now what we have to continue to focus on is the 
implementation of these laws, which is the next step. We have 
the laws passed. It is now most important that we go through 
the implementation of these.
    Senator Graham. Very briefly, as I understand the law about 
a limited amnesty, the Shias and the Kurds are saying to at 
least some Sunnis, we are going to create a process where you 
were fighting us last year, but we are going to let you go home 
and start over.
    General Odierno. That is right. Not only Sunnis, but also 
Shia and other people. That is correct.
    Senator Graham. In the south, the Iranian influence in Iraq 
is constructive or not?
    General Odierno. For the most part, I would say that it is 
clear to me that they continue to fund. They continue to train. 
They continue to provide weapons to extremist groups in order, 
in my mind, to destabilize and weaken the Government of Iraq.
    Senator Graham. Finally, if Iran were engaging in 
constructive behavior as a neighbor, what impact would it have 
on Iraq, if any?
    General Odierno. It could have significant impact. They are 
neighbors. They can help each other. It is important for 
stability of the region. I see it as a critical piece as we 
move forward, that they become much more constructive in their 
help with Iraq.
    Senator Graham. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
    Senator Warner.
    Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to 
ask this additional question.
    General McKiernan, as we look back over the history of our 
operations in Afghanistan--I say ``our,'' that is the combined 
operation of forces that are aligned with us--we see, I think, 
an ever-increasing dependence upon support, a strong 
partnership with Pakistan. The relationship between Karzai and 
Musharraf was not the best at times. It is a little early, I 
expect, for us to try and assess how the new government is 
going to work in this area.
    But I think this record should reflect what you know very 
well. Our supply lines are dependent in large measure on the 
cooperation of the Pakistani Government and people. We use its 
ports, its airfields to logistically care for our forces and, I 
presume, the greater proportion of the NATO forces.
    Now, you are going to have to be a part-time ambassador. 
Let me ask that question. Are you prepared to become a part-
time ambassador? Should we call the Foreign Relations Committee 
up and just have you have a second hearing on this?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I am not advocating a second 
hearing on anything. [Laughter.]
    But there is a quarterly Tripartite Commission which as you 
know, the Commander of ISAF and the Chief of Defense in 
Afghanistan and the Chief of Staff of the Army in Pakistan get 
together and talk about mutual security interests along the 
border. I for one--and I know General McNeil agrees that there 
can be no successful, by any metrics, outcome in Afghanistan 
without dealing with the sanctuaries right across the border in 
the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the 
northwest frontier province.
    Senator Warner. We currently have in the United States a 
very competent U.S. Ambassador, Ambassador William Wood, a 
personal acquaintance, as I understand, of our Staff Director, 
Mike Kostiw. We were talking about him yesterday. Have you 
worked with him thus far?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I have not, but I could tell you, 
if confirmed, I would hope to have an absolutely linked-at-the-
hip relationship with the United States Ambassador.
    Senator Warner. I appreciate that. I think one of the great 
high water marks has been General Petraeus and our U.S. 
Ambassador in Iraq, and I think it is essential that you have a 
comparable relationship with Ambassador Wood.
    Thank you very much and good luck to each of you. I think 
the record should also show--how much time have you spent in 
your area of responsibility (AOR) before your new AOR, 
Afghanistan?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I have probably made about half a 
dozen trips over there to see U.S. forces that we have provided 
from Europe that are operating in Afghanistan.
    Senator Warner. General Odierno?
    General Odierno. I have spent a little over 30 months in 
Iraq over the last several years both serving there, then also 
several months visiting around the region.
    Senator Warner. When you were in your capacity as a 
Military Advisor to the Secretary of State, you spent a lot of 
time there?
    General Odierno. I have spent a lot of time in the Middle 
East, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, all of those countries, 
sir.
    Senator Warner. General Sharp, you had a tour in Korea?
    General Sharp. Yes, sir, almost 2\1/2\ years working for a 
former boss. General John H. Tilleli, Jr., was the commander in 
chief there at that time, and then also 17-18 months up in the 
2nd Infantry Division as an assistant division commander.
    Senator Warner. Thank you. We are fortunate, Mr. Chairman, 
of that background of experience.
    I thank the chair.
    Chairman Levin. We are, indeed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
    General Odierno, I think what you testified to, if I 
understand it, is that there is a number of reasons for the 
reduction in violence in terms of sectarian violence that we 
saw, one of them being the increase in the number of U.S. 
forces, another one being the change in the strategy for those 
forces, another one being the ability to exploit the success of 
the event that took place when the Sunni Awakening took place. 
Is that fair?
    General Odierno. That is fair, sure.
    Chairman Levin. So there is a number of reasons for the 
reduction in that sectarian violence?
    General Odierno. That is fair.
    Chairman Levin. At the same time, you told us today that 
the biggest threat now in many parts of Iraq is the increase in 
the communal struggle for power. Would you describe that 
struggle and why that is the biggest threat?
    General Odierno. I would. Mr. Chairman, as we have been 
able to reduce the threat of al Qaeda, although they are still 
capable of conducting attacks in Iraq--I do not want to ever 
downplay that at all. They are still capable, but their 
capacity has been reduced. The insurgency in itself, as it was 
in 2004-2005, is reduced.
    What we are seeing now is a struggle for power as the 
country moves forward, a struggle between Shia communities, 
some struggle between Shia and Sunni, struggle between the 
Kurds and the Sunnis. It is about controlling parts of the 
country or having influence in parts of the country for the 
future as the country continues to move forward.
    Our goal in all of this is for that to happen peacefully 
through communication, through diplomatic efforts internal to 
the country. However, the history of the Middle East and Iraq 
in some cases causes them sometimes to want to use violence, 
and we have to be able to continue to work that issue. I think 
as we continue to make progress in Iraq, again the threat will 
evolve. This is what I believe to be how it is evolving today 
as a communal struggle.
    The only other thing I would caveat, Mr. Chairman, is you 
have the external influences from Iran and also from other 
forces such as al Qaeda and other forces still trying to 
influence using Syria and other places.
    Chairman Levin. For that violence to be resolved, is it 
still true that there needs to be a political settlement?
    General Odierno. It does. A big part of it has to do with 
the political piece of it.
    Chairman Levin. There has been some progress, a couple 
steps forward and then some steps back, on the political side, 
but is it still true that for there to be an election on 
October 1, that there has to be a provincial elections law 
passed? Is that still true?
    General Odierno. It is, Mr. Chairman. They really have to 
pass the specifics of how they will conduct the election, and 
it is about implementation, as I have talked about.
    Chairman Levin. As well as implementation of the laws that 
have been passed. Is it still true that there has not been a 
provincial elections law passed? I think you misspoke. I think 
what has passed--and correct me if I am wrong. There is a 
provincial powers law.
    General Odierno. I misspoke. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. That has passed. That is the one which 
requires implementation?
    General Odierno. That is right.
    Chairman Levin. That specified that there would be an 
election on October 1, but without a provincial elections law, 
that election will not take place.
    General Odierno. That is correct.
    Chairman Levin. So we still have to put some pressure on 
the Iraqis to pass the critical provincial elections law for 
those elections of October 1 to occur.
    How important is it that there be elections on October 1?
    General Odierno. I think, first, the provincial elections 
are one of the most important things that must take place. As 
most of us remember, there are Sunnis that did not participate, 
and in fact, there were many Shia who did not participate in 
the last set of elections that currently elected the provincial 
leaders. So the provincial elections happening as soon as 
possible in my mind will make people in the provinces believe 
they are represented by those who truly are part of their 
province and represent the people. Therefore, it is extremely 
important it happens as soon as possible.
    Chairman Levin. But the date specified in the other law is 
October 1. Is that correct?
    General Odierno. That is correct, sir.
    Chairman Levin. It is important that that date be met?
    General Odierno. I think it is very important we try to 
meet that date.
    Chairman Levin. As I gather, there is a real possibility 
that that date will not be met. Would you say that that is a 
real possibility?
    General Odierno. I cannot comment, Mr. Chairman. I do not 
know that.
    Chairman Levin. All right.
    There are also constitutional changes which are supposed to 
have been considered by now. Is that correct?
    General Odierno. They are supposed to continually review 
the constitution.
    Chairman Levin. Has that commission met and made 
recommendations yet?
    General Odierno. It is unclear. I can get back to you for 
the record on that.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Mr. Chairman, at the time of my testimony, the Iraqi Constitutional 
Review Committee had not yet met.

    Chairman Levin. All right. It is my understanding they have 
not, but you can confirm that for the record.
    General McKiernan, you have spoken a lot about Afghanistan. 
I wonder if you can summarize where we are on it. Would you say 
that the overall level of security among the Afghan people is 
moving forward, backward, or sideways?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I think it depends on the 
geography. I think where we have most of our U.S. forces in 
Regional Command East, I think it is moving forward. I think in 
Regional Command South, specifically in the Helmand/Kandahar 
area, I think it is in question. I think there is continued 
need, as I have said this morning, for building capacity, 
coherence, and dealing with the problem along the Pakistani-
Afghan border.
    Chairman Levin. Would you say that the insurgency has yet 
been contained in Afghanistan?
    General McKiernan. Sir, until I have the opportunity to 
make an assessment on the ground, I do not know if I could say 
that it has been contained.
    Chairman Levin. General, you and I spoke in my office about 
this question of decoupling the Iraqi and the Afghanistan issue 
because of the problem which exists in some countries in Europe 
where popular support has been lost for the Afghan mission 
based on opposition to the war in Iraq and that there might be 
value in decoupling rhetorically, perhaps budget-wise, but at 
least rhetorically, and in terms of diplomacy, for both 
reasons, we could perhaps get greater support in Europe, a 
greater focus on Afghanistan, if we made that decoupling. Would 
you comment on that?
    I believe you also in your answer to prehearing questions 
stated that the public opposition in a number of European 
countries has contributed to the loss of support for engagement 
in Afghanistan. Would you comment on that?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I think from my experience in the 
last 2\1/2\ years in Europe, in terms of decoupling Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the minds of our European allies, I think that 
is certainly something we ought to try to do in our strategic 
communications.
    I also think that we have to continue to encourage our 
European allies to understand that the threat in Afghanistan 
and across the border to the south is their threat as well. I 
do see a need to decouple in the international community. Our 
discussions also were whether we decouple in some of our 
processes back here in the United States. My statement at that 
time--and I continue to believe it--is in terms of application 
of resources, we have to balance, at least in the DOD, 
globally. So it is very hard to decouple Iraq from Afghanistan.
    Chairman Levin. In that sense.
    General Odierno. In that sense.
    Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, the Atlantic Council has 
found that less than 10 cents of every dollar of aid for 
Afghanistan goes directly to the Afghan people. Assistant 
Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher at this committee's 
hearing in February endorsed a program that is intended to 
empower rural Afghan communities to manage their own 
development projects. It is called the National Solidarity 
Program. This program is within the Afghanistan Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development and provides small block 
grants directly to locally elected community development 
councils. They are responsible for identifying, planning, and 
managing their own development projects. Funding for the 
National Solidarity Program comes from the World Bank and the 
International Development Association, bilateral donors through 
the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
    According to a press release last December, the National 
Solidarity Program has provided $400 million in payments which 
were disbursed to 16,000 local community development councils 
in Afghanistan, and those payments have financed more than 
30,000 community development subprojects, which have improved 
access to infrastructure, markets, and services. Those councils 
are being established in all 34 provinces and the vast majority 
of the districts throughout Afghanistan.
    A University of York study in Great Britain said that the 
National Solidarity Program has the potential to be a beacon of 
good practice among community-driven development programs.
    So a couple questions. Are you familiar with the National 
Solidarity Program? In your judgment, is it a good program?
    General McKiernan. Sir, I have done a lot of reading about 
it, and the people that I have talked to that work it in 
Afghanistan--I would conclude that it has huge potential as a 
bottom-up approach for development. Coupled with programs like 
CERP and what provincial reconstruction teams do, I think in a 
bottom-up sense, it has huge potential.
    Chairman Levin. Will you, when you get to Afghanistan, take 
a personal look at them? If you continue to be satisfied with 
their value, can you find ways to encourage the support for 
those programs?
    General McKiernan. Yes, sir, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    General Sharp, Senator Warner commented on this 2012 date, 
and I happen to agree with him. As I mentioned to you in the 
office, I think that the Korean Army is capable to take command 
earlier and that the fears of symbolism when that happens are 
not justified by any actions which we have taken and that it is 
essential that you continue to see if that cannot be pushed 
forward. I know that date has been set, but that is a long way 
off. There is no reason for 4 more years to pass in my 
judgment--and I concur with Senator Warner on this--before that 
OPCON is transferred to the South Korean forces.
    I do not need you, unless you would like to, to respond, 
but I just simply want to add my voice to Senator Warner on 
that point and give you an opportunity, if you would like to 
comment on it.
    General Sharp. Sir, if confirmed, I do pledge to work with 
the Republic of Korea, Chairman General Kim Tae-Young, to 
continually push to make sure that they have the capabilities, 
the training necessary in order to be able to take OPCON change 
and to continually assess that between now and 2012 to make 
that goal.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
    The Six Party Talks. Would you view them, from what you 
know of them, as constructive?
    General Sharp. Sir, they are constructive. They would be a 
lot more constructive if the North Koreans lived up to what 
they promised and gave a complete and open declaration, as they 
were supposed to do and they pledged to do by the end of last 
calendar year, which they have yet to do. But they are 
constructive.
    Chairman Levin. Do you see value in military-to-military 
contacts with North Korea?
    General Sharp. Sir, I do. I see that military-to-military 
contacts make sure that each side understands where each other 
stands so that there is less of a chance of missteps because of 
miscommunications, and I encourage that. The North Koreans cut 
off general officer-level talks several years ago, and I would 
encourage that to start back up again.
    Chairman Levin. Do you believe the right number of ground 
forces are postured--and I am talking here to U.S. ground 
forces--to meet any warfighting requirements on the Korean 
peninsula?
    General Sharp. Sir, I believe what we currently have on the 
peninsula--that General Bell has worked very hard, not just 
numbers, but more importantly the capabilities that we have 
there, in order to be able to do the requirements in order to 
be able to, with our Republic of Korea allies, win the war, win 
any conflict. We do have the right number and the right 
capabilities there at this time.
    Chairman Levin. You would not support further reductions?
    General Sharp. Sir, again, if confirmed, I will continually 
assess that, but from what I have seen so far working with the 
Army, the capabilities that are there now are the ones that we 
need for the future.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you. We thank all of you and, again, 
your families for your service, for their service to this 
country, and we look forward to a speedy confirmation process.
    We will stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to GEN David D. McKiernan, 
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers 
supplied follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                                 DUTIES

    Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of 
the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)?
    Answer. The Commander International Security Assistance Force 
(COMISAF) is responsible for executing NATO's strategy in Afghanistan 
as delineated in Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10302. My responsibility is to 
ensure that ISAF accomplishes its objectives and meets the reporting 
requirements of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (as Commander 
of NATO Operations).
    Question. What background and experience do you possess that you 
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
    Answer. As a U.S. general officer with multiple deployment and 
multinational experiences, I have been closely involved with or in 
command of NATO and coalition military operations. I feel thoroughly 
qualified and prepared to lead this complex effort in Afghanistan.
    Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to 
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, 
ISAF?
    Answer. Since nomination by the Secretary of Defense for this 
assignment, I have been able to take advantage of several opportunities 
to engage with key leaders and organizations that contribute to the 
campaign in Afghanistan. I will continue to do everything possible to 
prepare for this assignment in the 2 months to follow.

                             RELATIONSHIPS

    Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of 
the Commander, ISAF, to the following:
    U.S. Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. As a U.S. Army general officer, I would be required to 
ensure that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is advised and informed on 
the progress of my operation in ISAF and any issues that need to be 
resolved from a U.S. perspective. While I would be a NATO Commander who 
obviously has a NATO chain of command thru Joint Force Commander (JFC) 
Brunssum and then Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), I 
also would be prepared to keep U.S. Secretary of Defense familiar with 
appropriate operational issues.
    Question. NATO Secretary General.
    Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the NATO 
Secretary General is an indirect one. As the senior international 
statesmen for the Alliance, he is responsible for promoting and 
directing the process of consultation and decisionmaking within the 
Alliance.
    Question. NATO North Atlantic Council.
    Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the ISAF Commander. The NAC is the 
principal decisionmaking body within NATO. It is comprised of high-
level national representatives (Ambassadors, Defense Ministers, Foreign 
Ministers, and Heads of State and Government) from each member country 
that discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective 
decisions. The NAC provides guidance to SACEUR for all NATO military 
operations and SACEUR subsequently passes operational military 
direction to subordinate commands.
    Question. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an indirect one. He is one of 
26 NATO Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), who combine to form the NATO 
Military Committee, which serves as the senior military authority in 
NATO. The CHODs in the Military Committee are responsible for 
recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered 
necessary for the common defense of the NATO area and for the 
implementation of decisions regarding NATO's operations and missions.
    Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
    Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and NATO's 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe is a chain of command one. SACEUR is 
one of NATO's two strategic commanders and is the head of Allied 
Command Operations. He is responsible to NATO's Military Committee, the 
highest military authority in NATO, for the command, planning and 
conduct of all NATO military operations. SACEUR also identifies forces 
required for the mission and requests those forces from NATO countries, 
as authorized by the NAC and as directed by NATO's Military Committee. 
As COMISAF, I would report directly to JFC Brunssum (Land Component 
Commander under SACEUR for ISAF), who subsequently reports directly to 
SACEUR.
    Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation.
    Answer. Both NATO's Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied 
Commander Transformation (SACT), carry out roles and missions assigned 
to them by the NAC or in some circumstances by NATO's Defense Planning 
Committee. SACEUR and SACT work together to ensure the transformation 
of NATO's military capabilities and necessary interoperability. As an 
operational commander in NATO, I will coordinate with SACT to ensure we 
are leveraging the capability of his staff and command to maximize the 
effectiveness of our training efforts and NATO operational capabilities 
in theater.
    Question. NATO Military Committee.
    Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO 
Military Committee and the ISAF Commander. The Military Committee 
coordinates military advice to the NAC on policy and strategy. As an 
operational commander in NATO I will ensure SHAPE has the best military 
advice possible.
    Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command.
    Answer. The Commander of United States Central Command exercises 
authority over U.S. Forces assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom, 
including forces assigned to Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A). As the ISAF operates within the U.S. Central 
Commander area of responsibility, it is essential that both commanders 
closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
    Question. Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 82, Afghanistan
    Answer. Operational control of forces assigned to ISAF is exercised 
through the Regional Commanders. The U.S. is the designated lead for 
Regional Command East, and as such, COMISAF exercises control over U.S. 
forces assigned to RC East via Combined Joint Task Force-82. The 101st 
Airborne Division is currently transitioning with the 82nd Airborne 
Division and is expected to complete transfer of Authority (TOA) by 10 
Apr 08.
    Question. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command 
Afghanistan.
    Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between CSTC-A 
commander and COMISAF. It is a coordinating relationship with CSTC-A 
which is a force provider to ISAF operations. The coordination of our 
efforts is absolutely critical to mutual success. CSTC-A is a force 
provider in the role of developing Afghan National Security Force 
capability. Our coordinating relationship will remain focused on 
ensuring that well trained and equipped Afghan security forces are 
produced, sustained and provided to the Afghan people.
    Question. United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan.
    Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.N. 
Special Representation of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Commander, 
ISAF; however, productive coordination is essential. The ISAF Commander 
must ensure that ISAF operations are creating necessary security and 
working in conjunction with international organizations toward 
necessary development and reconstruction. My relationship with the U.N. 
SRSG will focus on developing and implementing comprehensive regional 
and national strategies to benefit the Afghan government and its 
people.
    Question. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
    Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S. 
Ambassador and Commander, ISAF but the requirement for close 
coordination and synchronization of activities is critical. The ISAF 
Commander and U.S. Ambassador cooperate on the development and 
implementation of regional and national strategy in Afghanistan and I 
will work to ensure the effectiveness of that relationship.

                            MAJOR CHALLENGES

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems 
you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, ISAF?
    Answer. Under-resourcing and constrained forces confront the 
Commander today and I anticipate facing the same challenges in my 
initial months as COMISAF. Coherency among the many international and 
interagency actors is also a primary concern that is being addressed 
most notably with the recent nomination of the Senior Representative to 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ambassador Kai Eide. 
Additionally, the security situation in Afghanistan is directly linked 
to security conditions in Pakistan.
    Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these 
challenges and problems?
    Answer. Fully resourcing military requirements and removing 
remaining caveats that constrain effectiveness will be a major focus. 
It is critical for ISAF to maximize its contribution to Afghanistan's 
ability to provide and maintain a secure environment with the forces 
and resources provided, despite any known shortfalls. As for coherency, 
we must address the need for unity of effort through organizational 
structure, coordinated planning, responsive resourcing, useful measures 
of success and transparency among the many national and international 
actors. I will also strive to improve mutual Afghan-Pakistan security 
challenges through such means as the Tripartite Commission.

                   SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

    Question. Recently-released independent reports have found that 
NATO is not achieving ISAF goals in Afghanistan and that the Taliban-
led anti-government insurgency has grown over the last 2 years.
    What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan 
and the nature, size, and scope of the anti-government insurgency?
    Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan is very complex, and 
reflects blurred linkages between criminal, corruption and insurgency 
based activities. While it is certainly true that violence, 
particularly suicide attacks, is up in comparison to the past several 
years, the raw statistics may not tell the entire story. Raw total 
measures of violence can increase when a greater portion of that 
violence is initiated by ISAF forces. The insurgency has suffered 
significant casualties in the past year, including numerous mid- and 
high-level Taliban leaders. The Taliban have been repeatedly defeated 
at the tactical level since operations in Afghanistan began, and are no 
closer to their strategic goal of recapturing Kandahar than they were 2 
years ago. The current assessment of ISAF from the past year's 
activities is that aggressive ISAF actions in the spring of 2007 
significantly degraded insurgent tempo and preempted operations. That 
will be repeated in 2008. Some analysts even assess that the Taliban 
adoption of suicide tactics is less of an indicator of success than an 
indicator of desperation and an opportunity for us to further alienate 
them from the people of Afghanistan. All said though, the insurgency is 
not on the verge of collapse, but we are not in danger of losing. 
Progress is being made, albeit at a pace that is not as great as we 
would like. The Afghan National Security Forces continue to improve 
capabilities and grow capacity, from having no national forces in 2001 
to over 124,000 uniformed members today, and our allies continue to 
renew or increase their commitments to the mission.
    Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in ISAF 
operations to respond to the evolving insurgency threat?
    Answer. Despite all the outstanding work that has already been 
achieved in Afghanistan, there is still room for improvement. Counter-
Insurgency (COIN) doctrine tells us that one of the key elements of a 
successful COIN campaign is establishing a strong national security 
infrastructure and connecting the population to its government. A 
strong national force is critical to holding ground and denial of 
insurgent access to the population. The true long-term solution to the 
insurgency in Afghanistan is an Afghan one and it includes a strong 
national security force. Accordingly, one of our top priorities must be 
increasing and improving the Afghan National Security Force by focusing 
significant resources and effort on them. Creating a national army and 
police force is not a quick or easy process. The Afghan National Army 
continues to make huge gains in capability and is a respected by the 
Afghan population. Progress in development of the Afghan National 
Police has not been as successful. There is significant momentum, but 
it will continue to require our highest priority. Police initiatives 
such as Focused District Development and plans to field over 2,000 
additional military personnel in a training role show promise.
    Another cornerstone of a comprehensive COIN strategy is the 
necessity to protect the population. To this end, we should look 
closely at options for deploying additional brigade combat teams to 
Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the turbulent southern part of 
the country. The focus should be on traditional COIN operations, 
safeguarding key populations centers, securing roads and 
infrastructure, pursuing insurgents in their traditional sanctuaries 
and defeating them.
    Finally, we must continue to focus on refining the strategy to 
ensure it is comprehensive, fully coordinated and understood by all the 
allied partners. ISAF, International Community and, most importantly, 
Afghan success will rely on development and good governance as well as 
security.

                         NATO ISAF CAPABILITIES

    Question. Do you believe that the current level of ISAF troops and 
equipment in Afghanistan is sufficient to carry out the mission? If 
not, what are the current shortfalls in troops and/or equipment 
required for the ISAF mission?
    Answer. ISAF certainly needs what was already stated as the CJSOR 
requirements and the forces need to have critical caveats removed. The 
underresourced condition of ISAF affects its ability to control battle-
space, maintain enduring effects and accelerate Afghan National 
Security Force development. Additionally, the ability to support the 
Government of Afghanistan in other than purely military lines of 
operation is limited. Among the specific shortfalls identified by the 
current ISAF commander are the unfilled requirement for three maneuver 
battalions, strategic Reserves, fixed and rotary wing aviation, 
Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Embedded Training 
Teams (ETTs), Afghan Security Force trainers, Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance assets and Provincial Reconstruction Team assets.
    Question. Do you believe our NATO allies should do more to 
eliminate the shortfalls in resources for the ISAF mission?
    Answer. Yes, but the ability to do more is limited by the 
willingness of the populations of some countries. We need to better 
make the case in these nations that this mission is important to their 
own strategic interests and the right thing to do for the people of 
Afghanistan.
    Question. What is your assessment of the military capabilities of 
the NATO member states participating in ISAF, and of NATO ISAF as a 
whole? In what specific areas is more improvement needed? In what areas 
has there been the most progress?
    Answer. Capabilities vary widely by nation. I cannot yet give a 
complete personal observation or assessment as to either ISAF's current 
capabilities or its effectiveness until I have been on the ground for a 
while. However, I have seen that ISAF forces have conducted themselves 
very well in the most contested portions of the south and east. I am 
extremely impressed by ISAF performance and fully respect the 
sacrifices made and burdens borne by all throughout Afghanistan. As 
Commander of U.S. Army Europe, I have assisted the training and 
preparation of many of the forces that make up ISAF and have seen great 
commitment and progress in the understanding of Counterinsurgency 
Operations and the importance of Afghan National Security Force 
development. Let me be clear, however, in stating that these training 
and readiness efforts must continue and strengthen in the future.

                            NATIONAL CAVEATS

    Question. To what extent have national caveats limited the ISAF 
Commander's ability to deploy effectively the forces under his command 
in Afghanistan?
    Answer. I believe that COMISAF is definitely hampered by caveats. 
NATO forces possess superior mobility, sustainability and firepower. 
Caveats tend to negate some of those advantages and cause a level of 
command friction that makes planning and execution of flexible 
operations either very difficult or prone to enemy exploitation. Again, 
I can better assess the operational effects of caveats once I am on the 
ground.
    Question. What do you believe should be done to encourage our NATO 
allies to remove national caveats?
    Answer. At the most fundamental level, the argument has to be made 
and accepted by the leadership and citizenry of each member nation that 
ISAF and Afghanistan are important; that the sacrifices required to 
defeat extremists, build a better life for the Afghans and safeguard 
our own security are worth it. Also, and very fundamental to this 
issue, national caveats usually increase the risk to ISAF 
servicemembers and to mission success.

                             NATO COHESION

    Question.Secretary Gates has expressed concern that NATO could 
become a ``two-tiered alliance'' composed of some countries who are 
willing to fight and others who are not. A recent independent report 
warns that if NATO is unable to produce the forces required to fight in 
the southern region of Afghanistan, NATO's credibility and cohesion 
will be harmed.
    Do you believe that NATO's credibility and cohesion are at stake in 
the conduct of the ISAF mission?
    Answer. NATO's credibility and cohesion in the 21st century could 
certainly be affected.
    Question. How confident are you that NATO will be able to sustain 
its commitment to ISAF given the challenging security situation in 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. I am optimistic, despite the challenges. Several heads of 
state have confirmed commitment to NATO, ISAF and Afghanistan. The 
military leaders I talk to in Europe recognize the importance of the 
campaign. There have been recent reductions in the number and severity 
of caveats, certain new troop commitments are likely to be made and the 
results of the NATO summit in Bucharest could signal increased support. 
Effective strategic communications that inform our respective 
populations and political leadership on the stakes and value of the 
campaign in Afghanistan will also help. Credible success will also add 
to popular support.

                    DECOUPLING IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

    Question. Secretary Gates reportedly indicated that among some 
European publics, opposition to the war in Iraq has contributed to a 
loss of support for the conflict in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Study 
Group recommended the administration ``de-couple'' Afghanistan and 
Iraq, in terms of funding and diplomacy, to enable more coherence and 
focus on Afghanistan.
    Do you believe that opposition to the war in Iraq has led to a loss 
of support among some European publics for the effort in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Yes, I believe that to be true in a number of European 
countries.
    Question. Would you support de-coupling Afghanistan and Iraq to 
improve the focus on Afghanistan?
    Answer. Yes, internationally that would be helpful.
    I believe that our efforts in Afghanistan would not stand to gain 
by ``decoupling'' it from Iraq in the U.S. defense budget process. 
Requirements for funding Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
Afghanistan are developed and approved independent of those funding 
requirements for OEF, and the Department has consistently received the 
levels of funding it has requested for the mission in Afghanistan.
    I also believe that our force capabilities and the process to 
provide trained and ready joint forces to both Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and OEF (and other requirements) ``couple'' our commitments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.

                       COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY

    Question. A recent report from the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime finds that Afghanistan provides over 90 percent of the 
world's illicit opium and that poppy cultivation levels for the coming 
spring are expected to remain at or near last year's levels.
    Should ISAF have a drug interdiction mission in Afghanistan, 
including capturing drug lords and dismantling drug laboratories?
    Answer. No, I believe the responsibility should remain with Afghan 
and international law enforcement organizations. However, supporting 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
counternarcotics programs is a validated ISAF task. ISAF should not 
conduct direct military action against narcotics producers, except for 
self defense or force protection reasons. I support General McNeil's 
recent commitment to support the GIRoA's counter-narcotics efforts 
within the means and capabilities of ISAF, specifically by helping to 
coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the Poppy Eradication Force, 
enabling support to Afghan Government and international law enforcement 
interdiction operations and employing a holistic provincial engagement 
approach in the context of counterinsurgency operations. (mirroring the 
U.S. efforts in Nangahar as a model for success).

                    TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

    Question. Current plans call for training and equipping the Afghan 
National Army to a level of 80,000 and building the Afghan National 
Police to a level of 82,000 in the next few years. A recent independent 
report by the Afghanistan Study Group recommended that NATO could take 
over the mission of training the Afghan National Army, currently led by 
the United States, once NATO members have committed enough resources 
for this purpose.
    Do you believe that NATO should do more to assist in building the 
capacity of the Afghan Security Forces? Should NATO take over the 
training mission for the Afghan National Army?
    Answer. NATO is contributing to the training mission through the 
contribution of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams and personnel 
assigned to the CSTC-A staff, but more could be done. I would not be 
opposed to NATO taking over the training mission in the future and 
suspect that the U.S. would need to pledge continued resourcing of the 
program in order to gain NATO consensus and support for addition of 
this task. The key principle is unity of effort and there is a clear 
advantage to greater consolidation of the related missions of the 
current ISAF and CSTC-A.
    Question. Should NATO allies play a greater role in providing these 
embedded training teams? If so, what should be done to encourage NATO 
allies to provide more of these teams?
    Answer. The U.S. Secretary of Defense and NATO civilian and 
military leadership have recently been very clear about desiring 
increased Allied contributions to the development of the Afghan 
National Security Forces in the form of Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Teams (OMLTs). OMLTs must, however, be totally trained and capable when 
they assume their mission. Until those requirements are sourced, I 
think NATO's primary focus should be on partnering forces with the ANA 
units in the field and working with these units in that way to improve 
their capabilities.
    Question. What is your assessment of the Afghan National Police? 
What more can NATO do to improve the effectiveness of the police?
    Answer. Progress is being made in the development of the Afghan 
National Police, but police development is more problematic than 
military reform at this point. Current initiatives in rank and pay 
reform are promising as are the already mentioned approaches to Focused 
District Development. NATO countries could certainly assist by 
contributing more law enforcement expertise and training/sustainment 
resources. Ultimately, the Afghan National Police effect will only be 
as good as their credibility with the Afghan population.

       RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

    Question. What is your role as Commander, ISAF, in reconstruction 
efforts in Afghanistan?
    Answer. The ISAF commander's most important contribution to 
reconstruction is security. Besides personal engagement and 
coordination with Afghan and international agencies whose primary 
mission is reconstruction, the ISAF commander co-chairs, along with the 
Minister of Interior, the ambassador--minister-level Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) Executive Steering Committee. PRT support for 
elements of security sector reform, reconstruction and development are 
a major focus for ISAF. PRTs report to the ISAF Commander through the 
Regional Commands.
    Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are an 
essential part of our development efforts in Afghanistan, and the 
primary means by which the ISAF acts to improve the capacity of the 
Government of Afghanistan to govern itself and develop essential 
quality of life services at the subnational level. From what I have 
seen, I think they have been exceptionally effective overall.
    Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe need to be made 
in the operations or coordination of the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Each PRT is established and run by a Lead Nation, often 
with the assistance of one or more Partner Nations. So coherency will 
continue to be a challenge. The PRTs have only been under the command 
of COMISAF since the completion of NATO's four-stage geographic 
expansion in October 2006. Since that time, NATO has identified and 
initiated actions to maintain a positive momentum of change for PRTs in 
Afghanistan. Better integration between the PRTs and the ISAF maneuver 
unit commanders in the Province, and more importantly the Regional 
Commands, could produce the same coherence and success of the PRTs that 
is currently experienced by those in Regional Command East. Funding 
mechanisms should also be reviewed. Instead of National Capitols 
financing the development, governance and security sector reform 
efforts of only ``their PRTs,'' the funds for PRTs, or a portion 
thereof, could be pooled at the regional level so the Regional 
Commander's could allocate the funds in support of better-coordinated, 
regional counterinsurgency goals and objectives.

            LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM

    Question. A key component of the Afghan Government's development 
strategy is to strengthen local governance capacity. One program that 
contributes to enhancing development and empowering governance at the 
local level is the National Solidarity Program (NSP). This program, 
within the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development, provides block grants directly to locally-elected 
Community Development Councils, which are responsible for identifying, 
planning and managing their own development projects. Funding for the 
NSP comes from the World Bank/International Development Association, 
bilateral donors, and through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund. According to its website, the NSP has provided $400 million in 
payments to 16,000 Community Development Councils, which have financed 
more than 30,600 subprojects to improve access to infrastructure, 
markets, and services.
    What is your understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
NSP in Afghanistan?
    Answer. My understanding of the NSP is that it reflects the right 
intent from the bottom-up perspective to develop Afghan capacity. An 
important feature of the program is that it is Afghan-led. The rural 
development projects including irrigation, transportation, education, 
water supply and sanitation are all very important and consistent with 
ISAF objectives at the local level. Anything that contributes to Afghan 
government effectiveness, credibility and governance is positive. The 
NSP demonstrates clear advantages of the Afghan government in contrast 
to the destructive activity of the insurgency.
    Question. Would you support expanding the NSP as a means of 
building local governance and strengthening development?
    Answer. I see potential to an expansion of the program at this 
point so long as it retains the current principles, is nested in the 
overall strategy to develop Afghan capacity and does not become a 
program of inefficiency or corruption.

                          CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

    Question. Recent United Nations reports have found that there were 
over 1,500 civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2007 and that almost 
half of the non-combatant casualties recorded by the United National 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan were attributed to combat operations 
by Afghan national and international security forces.
    What measures have been taken to reduce the levels of civilian 
casualties resulting from combat operations by Afghan national and ISAF 
security forces?
    Answer. Avoiding civilian casualties is a priority within the 
Alliance, because of the moral and legal imperatives, but also because 
civilian casualties are counter to the principles of a successful 
counter-insurgency campaign.
    Question. What more needs to be done to address the level of 
civilian casualties in Afghanistan?
    Answer. The U.S. and all Allies clearly consider minimizing 
civilian casualties an imperative. Any civilian casualties are a cause 
for concern, particularly in a COIN campaign where one of our 
preeminent tasks is to protect the population and engender their 
support for the Government. NATO needs to continue to take measures, in 
concert with the Afghan Government and Afghan Security Forces, to 
prevent any unnecessary casualties. Continued adherence to the law of 
armed conflict and strict application of proper procedures for attack 
aviation are also critical. We must continuously adapt operating 
procedures in accordance with changing conditions and enemy tactics to 
prevent unnecessary casualties. When tragic casualties do occur, we 
must conduct deliberate reviews and learn from them. Unfortunately, our 
foes do not share our moral values and have made it a general practice 
to occupy positions adjacent to or inside civilian structures, in an 
attempt to shield themselves from our forces and cause more civilian 
casualties. This makes the task more difficult, but no less important.

                        SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN

    Question. The Intelligence Community assesses that Pakistan's 
Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) along the border with 
Afghanistan provide a safe haven for al Qaeda and other extremists 
supporting the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan.
    What can be done to prevent cross-border incursions by al Qaeda and 
the Taliban from Pakistan into Afghanistan?
    Answer. Preventing cross-border incursions from Pakistan into 
Afghanistan requires close cooperation between Afghan, Pakistan and 
ISAF security forces so that we can interdict enemy elements as a team. 
Another imperative is improvement of Pakistan military and paramilitary 
force capability. U.S. support to Pakistan's border area strategy 
including training and equipping Pakistan's Frontier Corps will help. 
Economic assistance to the people in the FATA and a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency campaign on the Pakistan side would also help.
    Question. What role, if any, should ISAF forces play in countering 
this threat?
    Answer. ISAF should play a significant role in the tri-partite 
program. ISAF could also act to facilitate and support effective Afghan 
border security management within the guidance of the NATO OPLAN.
    Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing 
more to prevent these incursions?
    Answer. Yes, but they need the help of the others in the region and 
the international community to help work on the causes of instability 
in the FATA. In other words, incursions are only a part of the larger 
security challenges inside Pakistan.

                      REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

    Question. Recent independent reports by the Atlantic Council and 
the Afghanistan Study Group call for adopting a regional approach to 
promoting stability in Afghanistan by bringing Afghanistan's neighbors 
together to discuss common issues.
    What is your understanding of NATO ISAF's position regarding 
establishing a regional process for engaging Afghanistan's neighbors on 
promoting security in Afghanistan?
    Answer. NATO, ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan have an established process and strategy for engaging 
Afghanistan's neighbors to promote security in Afghanistan. This 
process and strategy, through constructive, cooperative, and productive 
dialogue, is designed to improve bilateral political and economic 
relations, enhance border security, and seek bilateral and multilateral 
solutions to combating the narcotics trade. There are numerous 
mechanisms through which this strategy, which is reviewed every 6 
months by NATO, is executed:

         ISAF and NATO's Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) 
        in Afghanistan engaging representatives from neighboring 
        countries in Kabul;
         NATO's SCR visiting select embassies of neighboring 
        states;
         ISAF Participation in the Tripartite Commission, 
        comprised of senior Afghan, Pakistani, and Afghanistan/Pakistan 
        border, and
         NATO-Afghan consultations with NATO's Central Asian 
        Partners to discuss regional issues.

         If confirmed, would you support including Iran in such 
        a position?
    Answer. Yes, from a purely military perspective, I would support 
including Iran in ISAF's regional process for engaging Afghanistan's 
neighbors on promoting security in Afghanistan. While it would be 
inappropriate for me to try to give an assessment on the current 
situation, I support any approved way for NATO to leverage the 
international community with the Government of Afghanistan to find more 
effective means to integrate Afghanistan's neighbors into the 
development and stabilization of Afghanistan. However, the decision 
regarding the extent and means through which NATO and ISAF will engage 
Iran is a political one that NATO's NAC must make with input provided 
from NATO's military authorities. That said, I can tell you that 
currently, NATO and ISAF may engage Iranian officials in Kabul for 
tactical military coordination of border issues.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, 
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, ISAF?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                  January 22, 2008.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment in the United States 
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance 
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                             To be General.

    GEN David D. McKiernan, 8864.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of GEN David D. McKiernan, which 
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 
referred, follows:]
           Biographical Sketch of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA
Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended:
    Infantry Officer Basic Course
    Armor Officer Advanced Course
    United States Army Command and General Staff College
    United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
    College of William and Mary - BA - History
    Shippensburg University - MPA - Public Administration

Foreign languages: None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Promotions                      Dates of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.......................................  28 Aug 72
1LT.......................................  28 Aug 74
CPT.......................................  28 Aug 76
MAJ.......................................  1 Dec 81
LTC.......................................  1 Feb 88
COL.......................................  1 Aug 93
BG........................................  1 Oct 96
MG........................................  1 Feb 00
LTG.......................................  6 Nov 01
GEN.......................................  14 Dec 05
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              From                        To              Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 73..........................  Jul 75............  Scout Platoon
                                                       Leader, Combat
                                                       Support Company,
                                                       later Executive
                                                       Officer, B
                                                       Company, 4th
                                                       Battalion, 63d
                                                       Armor, 1st
                                                       Infantry
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Riley, KS
Jul 75..........................  Sep 76............  Executive Officer,
                                                       B Troop, later C
                                                       Troop, 4th
                                                       Squadron, 7th
                                                       Cavalry, 2d
                                                       Infantry
                                                       Division, Eighth
                                                       United States
                                                       Army, Korea
Jan 77..........................  Jul 77............  Student, Armor
                                                       Officer Advanced
                                                       Course, United
                                                       States Army Armor
                                                       School, Fort
                                                       Knox, KY
Jul 77..........................  Oct 79............  Motor Officer,
                                                       later Commander,
                                                       B Company, 2d
                                                       Battalion, 33d
                                                       Armor, 3d Armored
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe, Germany
Oct 79..........................  May 80............  Assistant S-3
                                                       (Air), 1st
                                                       Brigade, 3d
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe,
                                                       Germany
May 80..........................  May 81............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       2d Battalion, 33d
                                                       Armor, 3d Armored
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe, Germany
May 81..........................  Jun 82............  Student, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Command and
                                                       General Staff
                                                       College, Fort
                                                       Leavenworth, KS
Jun 82..........................  May 84............  Operations
                                                       Training Staff
                                                       Officer, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Training and
                                                       Doctrine Command,
                                                       Fort Monroe, VA
May 84..........................  Sep 85............  S-3, 1st Brigade,
                                                       3d Armored
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe, Germany
Sep 85..........................  May 86............  Executive Officer,
                                                       2d Battalion, 32d
                                                       Armor, 3d Armored
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe, Germany
May 86..........................  Dec 86............  Assistant G-3
                                                       (Training), 3d
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe,
                                                       Germany
Jan 87..........................  Jun 88............  Assignment
                                                       Officer,
                                                       Colonel's
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Total Army
                                                       Personnel
                                                       Command,
                                                       Alexandria, VA
Jun 88..........................  Jul 90............  Commander, 1st
                                                       Battalion, 35th
                                                       Armor, 1st
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe,
                                                       Germany
Jul 90..........................  Dec 90............  Senior Task Force
                                                       Observer/
                                                       Controller,
                                                       Combat Maneuver
                                                       Training Center,
                                                       7th Army Training
                                                       Center, United
                                                       States Army,
                                                       Germany
Dec 90..........................  Apr 91............  Assistant G-3
                                                       (Operations), VII
                                                       Corps, Operations
                                                       Desert Shield/
                                                       Storm, Saudi
                                                       Arabia
Apr 91..........................  Jun 91............  Senior Task Force
                                                       Observer/
                                                       Controller,
                                                       Combat Maneuver
                                                       Training Center,
                                                       7th Army Training
                                                       Center, United
                                                       States Army,
                                                       Germany
Jun 91..........................  Jun 92............  Student, United
                                                       States Army War
                                                       College, Carlisle
                                                       Barracks, PA
Jun 92..........................  May 93............  G-3, 1st Cavalry
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Hood, TX
May 93..........................  Jun 95............  Commander, 1st
                                                       Brigade, 1st
                                                       Cavalry Division,
                                                       Fort Hood, TX
Jun 95..........................  Aug 96............  Executive Officer
                                                       to the Commanding
                                                       General, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Forces Command,
                                                       Fort McPherson,
                                                       GA
Aug 96..........................  Nov 97............  Deputy Chief of
                                                       Staff, G-2/G-3,
                                                       Allied Command
                                                       Europe Rapid
                                                       Reaction Corps,
                                                       Germany and
                                                       Sarajevo
Nov 97..........................  Aug 98............  Assistant Division
                                                       Commander
                                                       (Maneuver), 1st
                                                       Infantry
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Aug 98..........................  Oct 99............  Deputy Chief of
                                                       Staff for
                                                       Operations,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Oct 99..........................  Oct 01............  Commanding
                                                       General, 1st
                                                       Cavalry Division,
                                                       Fort Hood, TX
Oct 01..........................  Sep 02............  Deputy Chief of
                                                       Staff, G-3,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army, Washington,
                                                       DC
Sep 02..........................  Sep 04............  Commanding
                                                       General, Third
                                                       United, States
                                                       Army/Commander,
                                                       United States,
                                                       Army Forces
                                                       Central Command,
                                                       Fort McPherson,
                                                       GA, to include
                                                       duty as
                                                       Commanding
                                                       General,
                                                       Coalition Forces
                                                       Land Component
                                                       Command,
                                                       Operation Iraqi
                                                       Freedom, Kuwait
Oct 04..........................  Nov 05............  Deputy Commanding
                                                       General/Chief of
                                                       Staff, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Forces Command,
                                                       Fort McPherson,
                                                       GA
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Dates               Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2/G-3,   Aug 96-Nov 97.....  Brigadier General
 Allied Command Europe Rapid
 Reaction Corps, Germany and
 Sarajevo.
Commanding General, Third         Nov 02-Sep 04.....  Lieutenant General
 United, States Army/Commander,
 United States, Army Forces
 Central Command, Fort
 McPherson, GA, to include duty
 as Commanding General,
 Coalition Forces Land Component
 Command, Operation Iraqi
 Freedom, Kuwait (No Joint
 Credit).
Commanding General, United        Dec 05-Present....  General
 States Army Europe and Seventh
 Army, Commander, Allied Land
 Component Command Heidelberg,
 North Atlantic Treaty
 Organization, Germany.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
    Defense Distinguished Service Medal
    Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Defense Superior Service Medal
    Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Bronze Star Medal
    Defense Meritorious Service Medal
    Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Army Commendation Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Parachutist Badge
    Ranger Tab
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David D. 
McKiernan, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    David D. McKiernan.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Commander, International Security Assistance Force.

    3. Date of nomination:
    January 22, 2008.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    December 11, 1950; Atlanta, GA.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Carmen Dittrich.

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Michelle, 30; Michael, 29; Stephanie, 19.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary 
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local 
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract 
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    N/A

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business 
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    N/A.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).

    11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    Honorary Doctorate (College of William and Mary), Public Service.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, 
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly 
constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

    13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly 
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                David D. McKiernan.
    This 18th day of January, 2008.

    [The nomination of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, was 
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008, 
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The 
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.]
                              ----------                              

    [Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers 
supplied follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly 
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities 
and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also 
vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant 
commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of 
requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of 
military operations.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved our ability to 
conduct joint operations. I believe it is important to review and 
update based on the changing environment. There should be a requirement 
to constantly review and adjust to ensure it continues to meet the 
desired intent.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. There is good reason to consider the development of 
Goldwater-Nichols Act-like legislation to delineate roles and 
responsibilities of Federal agencies in support of contingency 
operations.

                                 DUTIES

    Question. Section 3034 of title 10, U.S.C., states that the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army has such authority and duties with respect 
to the Department of the Army as the Chief of Staff, with the approval 
of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe for him.
    Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to 
be assigned?
    Answer. Oversee day-to-day operations of the Army involving a wide 
variety of activities from serving as a principal advisor to the Chief 
of Staff of the Army on recommendations and plans of the Army Staff, to 
ensuring the care of soldiers and their families and ensuring the Army 
continues to be sensitive to their needs. Maintain our relevance to 
future contingencies and ensure we incorporate lessons learned 
throughout the institution. Establish priorities to meet demands and 
synchronize and focus the Army Staff to ensure strategic relevance.
    Question. What background and experience do you possess that you 
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
    Answer. During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have 
served the Army and the Nation from the tactical thru the strategic 
level. I have been assigned in tactical and operational units for 22 
years and have commanded soldiers from company to Corps level while 
participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have 
served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and 
multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and 
combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms 
Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a tour of duty 
as the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of 
the Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia 
operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania 
during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor 
to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/
Multi-National Corps-Iraq for the last 23 months. My professional 
military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have 
provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into the business 
of running the Army in support of the requirements of the national 
security strategy. In particular, my tours of duty in Iraq have 
provided me with unique insights into the leadership, training, manning 
and equipping requirements that will make our Army successful on the 
battlefields of today and tomorrow.
    Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to 
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Vice Chief of Staff 
of the Army?
    Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

         Stay connected to the field commands,
         Stay attuned to the ever changing needs of our 
        soldiers and their families,
         Ensure we incorporate the lessons learned over the 
        last 5 years,
         Maintain focus on the warrior ethos,
         Demand high moral and ethical behavior,
         Be aggressive--tackle challenges as they arise.

                             RELATIONSHIPS

    Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be 
with:
    The Secretary of the Army.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary of the Army in 
his duties to communicate the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary of 
the Army and to supervise the implementation of the Secretary and 
Chief's decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and 
agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the 
authority, direction, and control of the Chief of Staff, and the 
Secretary of the Army. In my capacity as a member of the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), I would also be responsible for 
appropriately informing the Secretary of the Army about conclusions 
reached by the JROC about significant requirements. I anticipate that I 
would at all times work closely and in concert with the Chief of Staff 
and the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the 
Army in light of national interests.
    Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army
    Answer. The Chief of Staff performs his duties under the authority, 
direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly 
responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff of the Army presides 
over the Army Staff, transmits the plans and recommendations of the 
Army Staff to the Secretary, advises the Secretary with regard to such 
plans and recommendations; and acts as the agent of the Secretary in 
executing them. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties 
prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I enjoy a 
close working relationship with the Chief of Staff of the Army and if 
confirmed, I will assist him as required in the execution of his 
duties.
    Question. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff
    Answer. If confirmed, it would be my duty, as a member of the JROC, 
to review and validate all Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System documents for Acquisition Category I and IA 
programs, and other high-interest programs. I look forward to a 
collaborative and frank relationship with the other Service Vice Chiefs 
in this role, and on all actions of national interest.
    Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
    Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's 
principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises 
such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His 
responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and 
direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the 
Secretary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary 
of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, for the operation of the 
Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with 
the Under Secretary of the Army to ensure that the policies established 
by the Office of the Secretary of the Army are properly implemented. I 
will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary of the 
Army in articulating the views of the Army Staff, Army commands, and 
Army agencies.
    Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
    Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional 
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of 
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I 
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each 
of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative 
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal 
together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning 
requirements facing the Army.
    Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
    Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the 
Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other 
Secretariat officials. His duties include coordinating legal and policy 
advice to all members of the Army regarding matters of interest to the 
Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any 
legal questions or procedures. If confirmed, I will establish and 
maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel.
    Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
    Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor of the 
Chief of Staff of the Army, member of the Army Staff, and members of 
the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The 
Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the 
Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the 
members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of 
their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal 
advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish 
and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge 
Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views 
about any legal matter under consideration.

                            MAJOR CHALLENGES

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
face the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. We must maintain a balance between our ability to meet our 
requirements and the resources available. Soldiers and units in the 
Active and Reserve components have been hard at work serving the Nation 
in the war on terror. Despite our Army's remarkable performance, this 
has had an undeniable effect on equipment, training, and overall 
preparedness--not to mention the impact on families and the men and 
women of the All-Volunteer Force themselves. Maintaining a high-quality 
force able to excel in the current campaigns is a tough, multi-faceted 
challenge made more formidable by the imperative to be ready for other 
contingencies or conflicts the Army may undertake in support of our 
national security. This tension between meeting the priorities of the 
present while preparing for the future--in light of existing and 
emerging threats along a broad spectrum of conflict; the extent to 
which we do one at the expense of the other; and managing the 
associated costs and risks are fundamental to the decisions the 
Nation's military and civilian leaders will shape and make.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for 
addressing these challenges?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of the Army and 
the Chief of Staff of the Army to restore balance through the Army's 
four imperatives. I will work to sustain our soldiers and their 
families to insure that they have the quality of life they deserve and 
that we recruit and sustain a high quality force. To prepare our 
solders, units, and equipment we must maintain a high level of 
readiness for the current operational environments, especially in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. To reset our force we must prepare our soldiers, 
units, and equipment for future deployments and other contingencies. 
Finally, to transform our force, we must continuously improve our 
ability to meet the needs of the combatant commanders in a changing 
security environment. I intend to work closely with the Secretary of 
the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, and appropriate agencies in 
both executive and legislative branches to develop and execute these 
plans.

                           ARMY BUDGET SHARE

    Question. Last year's Army Posture Statement points out that the 
defense budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with 
the Air Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25 
percent. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel 
costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army's 
budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared 
to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the 
Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, 
as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air 
Force. The result, according to the posture statement, is that ``the 
Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a 
rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.''
    What is your understanding of the effects of this funding 
discrepancy on the Army?
    Answer. The effect is the Army is out of balance as demand has out 
paced our ability to provide trained and ready soldiers to the 
combatant commanders. Through supplemental funding for the global war 
on terror, we've been able to meet the immediate demands, but our 
soldiers are stressed and our equipment has been used hard. We must 
restore the necessary breadth and depth of Army capabilities to support 
and sustain essential capacity for the future demands on our 
Expeditionary Force. The solution lies not just in the Army's share of 
the defense budget but, more importantly, in the size of the overall 
defense budget.
    Question. What is your understanding about what, if anything, the 
Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the 
Secretary of Defense intend to do to address this discrepancy?
    Answer. I saw first hand the results of the hard work and personal 
commitment of the Army and DOD leadership as well as Congress to 
immediately address any shortfall. We received the equipment we needed 
along with trained, ready and capable soldiers in Iraq. They've taken a 
step toward correcting this discrepancy by increasing the strength of 
the Army funded from the base budget in the fiscal year 2009 
President's budget rather than relying on supplemental appropriations. 
I understand the Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to 
achieve readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources 
necessary to support the National Military Strategy.

                         POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

    Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow 
the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems 
(FCSs) adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of 
the next 2 or 3 decades?
    Answer. The Army's future threats are defined in the National 
Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, 
Modularity, and Transformation to the FCSs will help posture the Army 
to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, 
we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad 
range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army 
versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military 
operations, across the major operational environments, in support of 
our National Security Strategy. The Army Initiatives are designed to 
give the Army required capabilities and adequate capacity providing 
maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats 
over the next 30 years.
    Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army 
pursue in this regard if confirmed as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. As our Nation's Army, we must always stay focused on our 
soldiers and their families. They are the centerpiece of our capacity 
to meet our future requirements.

                            LESSONS LEARNED

    Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in 
particular concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army, which 
you intend to address if confirmed?
    Answer. First, the importance of environmental analysis which 
encompasses the entire geo-political, socio-economic, and global 
communications spectrums as they relate to the current conflict. Next, 
we must remember that it takes a network to defeat a network. 
Integration of conventional forces and special operations forces must 
continue to improve. We must also continue to integrate asymmetric 
warfare capabilities into our full spectrum operations. Finally, our 
leader training programs must emphasize the key tenets of adaptability, 
ingenuity, warrior ethos, and moral-ethical conduct.

                    IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

    Question. Many soldiers are on their third or fourth major 
deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were 
extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 
months.
    What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of 
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly 
among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial 
obligated service has been completed?
    Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had 
an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of 
officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The 
recently instituted Captains' retention program, which offers a number 
of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention 
bonus, has enhanced retention of officers at historic rates through 
fiscal year 2010.
    The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in 
deploying units has remained between 120-140 percent since fiscal year 
2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on 
Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army 
Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, 
on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th 
Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units 
currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates 
averaging 110-120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant 
indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that 
soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers 
value the tradition of service to the Nation.
    Question. What are the key indicators of stress on the force, and 
what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently?
    Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but 
they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of 
individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes 
to address negative trends. As an example, rates of substantiated 
spouse abuse have declined steadily since fiscal year 2001 and child 
abuse since fiscal year 2004. In addition to programs like ``Strong 
Bonds,'' the Army is committed to providing programs and services that 
support soldiers and their families. The overall health of the Force 
reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still 
maintaining a solid foundation.
    Question. In addition to any other stress indicators that you 
address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol 
abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.
    Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but 
they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of 
individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes 
to address negative trends.
    We see the following trends:
    The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-
disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and adapting our 
awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of soldiers 
and commanders.
    Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates 
trended upward from fiscal years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or 
equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted 
female soldiers, and deployed soldiers divorce at a higher rate than 
those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-
sponsored ``Strong Bonds'' training program to help soldiers and 
families build and maintain stronger relationships.
    Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in 
deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued its aggressive 
drug education, awareness, and testing programs.
    Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward 
trend. The Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at 
the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training. 
Alcohol abuse rates are monitored continuously via the Army's Risk 
Reduction Program. We are also developing and implementing preventative 
intervention programs for soldiers at the first sign of trouble. 
``Prevention of Alcohol Abuse'' messages are incorporated in Army-wide 
prevention of substance abuse campaigns like ``Warrior Pride.''
    Rates for absence without leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates 
are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL 
based on the facts and circumstances of the soldier's individual case.
    In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-
Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest post-fiscal year 
2001 rates.
    Substantiated rates of spouse and child abuse have declined 
steadily since fiscal year 2001. In addition to programs like ``Strong 
Bonds,'' the Army continues to focus resources on programs and services 
that support soldiers and their families.
    The overall health of the force reflects a resilient Army, strained 
by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.
    Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments, 
in particular the 15 month deployments for combat units, can continue 
before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?
    Answer. Over the past few years we have seen definitive indications 
that the force is strained. Stress on soldiers and units resulting from 
increased time deployed and decreased time at home are visible in 
several different areas including training, readiness and recruitment. 
However, we have a plan that will, with congressional assistance, 
restore balance to our force. We have identified four imperatives that 
we must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain, 
prepare, reset, and transform.
    We have and will continue to make significant progress in these 
areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will 
continue to recruit and retain enough soldiers to meet our end strength 
requirements. We also have received authorization to accelerate our 
growth plan to 2011, which will assist the Army in restoring balance to 
preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic 
depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of 
forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels.
    While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment 
times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of 
global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels 
for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy 
only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers into combat 
to meet the national strategy.

                    POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS

    Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the undertaking of extensive 
efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces 
based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.
    If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that 
the Army uses available data--and generates additional data--on the 
health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is 
available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or 
potential illnesses are identified?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are 
referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that 
additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require 
improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.
    The addition of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment and the new 
annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to 
monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers 
after initial redeployment, and long before they start preparing for 
their next deployment.
    The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency 
is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed 
``Battlemind'' training products to increase this resiliency and have 
several different training programs available for pre, during and post-
deployment.
    Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to 
educate all soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs 
and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us 
all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these 
conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army 
education and training system to share the information with our new 
soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and 
symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is 
absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.

                     MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM V

    Question. The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraq 
and Afghanistan theaters have been valuable in identifying the extent 
of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being 
experienced in OIF and OEF.
    Based on the findings of the Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V 
that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and 
lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to 
ensure that appropriate kinds and amounts of mental health resources 
are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?
    Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT 
assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and 
distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to 
meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the 
Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health 
providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To 
date, we have hired 162 providers who are already making a difference 
in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the 
Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill 
all of our behavioral health care requirements.
    Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of 
the Army's mental health advisory teams, and what are the lessons which 
can be applied to future deployments?
    Answer. MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape 
existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more 
flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to 
predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for 
current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been 
utilized to create a training program known as ``Battlemind,'' which 
changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for 
high stress deployments.

              TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES

    Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Department of 
Defense assumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on its proposal to 
implement increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, 
including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their 
families.
    If these fee increases are implemented, what do you see as the 
likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army?
    Answer. The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees 
and civilian visit co-payments for TRICARE Prime and initiate 
enrollment fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard ``working 
age'' retirees under 65 and their families. For these beneficiaries, 
some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual 
military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise co-payments 
for all beneficiaries on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. 
While the budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD 
accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would 
lessen pressure on the total Defense budget and begin to address 
benefit inequities between military retirees and other Federal 
retirees.
    Question. What is your personal view of the DOD justification 
provided for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are 
there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?
    Answer. We must maintain world-class medical support for our 
retirees, but must be realistic in establishing costs and planning for 
the future.

                          STOP LOSS AUTHORITY

    Question. How many soldiers do you expect to be on active duty, 
retained under stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2008?
    Answer. The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers 
retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of 
fiscal year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for 
September 2008 is approximately 6,000.
    Question. What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it 
increases its end strength through 2012?
    Answer. Department of Defense guidance directs the Services to 
discontinue Stop Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. The 
plan to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a 
reduction in demand and a return to a cycle of ``1 year deployed with 2 
years at home.'' The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of 
additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a 
cycle of ``1 year deployed with 2 years at home.''

                  RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

    Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and 
systems have been characterized as ``inefficient and rigid,'' and 
readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay behind, 
cross-leveling, and reset policies.
    What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve 
component forces in meeting combat missions?
    Answer. To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders' 
requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three 
components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing 
solutions. Each component plays a critical role in meeting our 
operational requirements. Transformation continues from a strategic to 
an Operational Reserve. It is an operational, expeditionary and 
domestic force that is an essential piece of our Army. The Army will 
continue to select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and 
combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's 
ability to carry out its assigned mission.
    Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current 
Reserve Force management policies?
    Answer. The Army has made considerable progress in ``total force'' 
management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 
process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known 
operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and 
reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff 
continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging 
Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping and 
readiness decisions. Over the past few years, the Army has made 
considerable funding commitments to the Reserve components for re-set 
and re-equipping actions, and our Chief's initiatives and imperatives 
include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for 
effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining 
America's Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and 
overseas.
    Question. Do you support assigning any combat, combat support, or 
combat service support missions exclusively to the Reserve?
    Answer. Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are 
organized and arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of 
combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. In 
today's operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and 
capabilities across all components of the Army. There are opportunities 
to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare for 
future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully 
engaged in such an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across 
the Army so that operational demands are fully met.
    Question. What is the appropriate role for the Army Reserve and 
National Guard in homeland defense and homeland security missions?
    Answer. The National Guard forces respond to a natural disaster or 
provide assistance to civil authorities under control of the Governor 
in title 32 status or under Federal control in a title 10 status. The 
National Guard Bureau (NGB) supports the channel of communications 
between the State and Federal forces.
    The Army Reserve plays a unique role since it commands a highly-
skilled, flexible force that provides 50-100 percent of the entire 
Army's force structure for 21 specialized capabilities such as water 
supply, medical, transportation, signal, and chemical units.
    When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, 
or nuclear attack, the affected Governor(s) shall first employ their 
Air and or Army National Guard with State authority, as the State 
response forces, if required. In the event of a catastrophic event, the 
States will likely request Federal military assistance. The Army will 
provide the majority of that assistance with capabilities allocated to 
Northern Command from Active, Guard, and Reserve components in a title 
10 status, both to support Homeland Defense, and provide Defense 
Support to Civil Authorities.

                 INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY

    Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR 
databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on 
IRR members who may be recalled to serve.
    What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that 
applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?
    Answer. The Army has programmed for and has developed plans to 
optimize the operational and strategic value of the IRR by improving 
individual deployment readiness levels to ensure timely availability; 
maintaining a reliable database of mobilization assets; and promoting 
continuum of service by managing expectations throughout a soldier's 
career life-cycle. Human Resource Command (HRC) is accomplishing by 
implementing the following:
    Select soldiers attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability 
Musters at local Reserve Centers and execute personnel updates, medical 
readiness evaluations, and training briefings. Executing musters each 
year will ensure that individual expectations are being established, 
soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for 
mobilization, as well as educated on how to build upon a military 
career while assigned to the IRR. In fiscal year 2007 over 8,400 IRR 
soldiers were mustered and over 720 IRR soldiers transferred to the 
Selected Reserves (SELRES). HRC is planning on mustering 10,000 IRR 
soldiers in fiscal year 2008 and anticipates similar number of 
transfers to the SELRES.
    Educate and raise awareness at time of transition. Soldiers are 
counseled and provided information regarding their assignment to the 
IRR. The IRR Orientation Handbook has been developed and is provided to 
newly assigned IRR soldiers in order to establish expectations, provide 
key information regarding their assignment and annual requirements, 
promotions, training opportunities, as well as continued service in the 
Selective Reserves.
    Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization 
database?
    Answer. In the last 3 years the IRR has decreased in size by 33 
percent. HRC has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database 
to reconcile existing records (blank and erroneous data fields, 
obsolete military occupational skills, bad addresses); identify non-
mobilization assets (passed over for promotion, security violation, 
physically disqualified, determined hardship, adverse character of 
service); and separated those soldiers who no longer have further 
potential for useful military service if mobilized. Incorrect IRR 
addresses have been the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are 
at a 10-year low overall. Approximately 9 percent of those ineligible 
for mobilization are excluded for an incorrect address.
    DOD established a policy in July 2005 mandating the discharge of 
officers in the IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation 
(MSO) unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR. 
Officers who have fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to 
elect to remain in the IRR shall be transferred to the Standby Reserve 
and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date approximately 14,000 
IRR officers have been affected by this policy: 2,800 officers elected 
to transfer to the Standby Reserve and 2,900 have been honorably 
discharged.
    HRC has developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal 
(IW-VSP) for IRR soldiers to update their contact information and 
verify their readiness level without having to report to a physical 
location. HRC screens all information submitted through the website, 
reconciles deficiencies, and contacts soldiers that require additional 
assistance.
    Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the 
All-Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the 
IRR should play in the future?
    Answer. Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in 
the IRR is important to managing our operational and strategic 
capability. The Army recognizes the value of keeping trained and 
motivated members in the service and we continue to offer opportunities 
for continued service. The IRR is an important and critical source of 
personnel resources to fill deploying units and individual 
requirements.

                           OFFICER SHORTAGES

    Question. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) in July 2006 concluded that the Army projected an officer 
shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute 
shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of 
service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages 
will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention 
improves.
    What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and 
what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer 
shortfall?
    Answer. Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased 
attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates. 
The officer shortfalls are due to the growth of officer requirements of 
10,000 ACC officers from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2012. Nearly 
6,200 of these requirements are in the grades of Captain and Major. To 
address this shortfall, we have increased accessions and will have 
produced nearly 5,000 additional officers by fiscal year 2009.
    The Army instituted a precommissioning retention incentives program 
that is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent our retention of 
high performing USMA and ROTC scholarship officers by offering them 
graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in exchange for 
additional active duty service. The Army has sought officers 
aggressively from outside the Active Army and has accessed nearly 1,500 
officers from the inactive Reserve and from the other services through 
the ``Blue to Green Program.''
    The Army's biggest success has been the institution of an 
unprecedented Captains' retention program that offers a number of 
incentives, including attendance at graduate school or a retention 
bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers to remain on active 
duty. This program has guaranteed the retention, already within a few 
hundred officers of historic rates, of our valuable force of heavily 
combat-experienced officers through fiscal year 2010 and beyond.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure 
adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on 
active duty over the next 10 years?
    Answer. The Army has developed policies to retain our ``best and 
brightest,'' combat-experienced officers and NCO's. We will not allow 
the Army to drift into a post-conflict setting or mindset. This will 
require refocusing the Army and a commitment to leveraging combat-
experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as in the 
schools and battlelabs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
    The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and 
develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers. 
To aid our retention efforts we also must continue resourcing programs 
to support Families in an expeditionary Army during a period of 
persistent conflict.

                OFFICER RETENTION FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT

    Question. After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in 
force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the 
best and brightest junior officers from active duty who, after serving 
in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had 
difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan--small unit actions where junior officers are not 
only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where 
they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives--may 
produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly-
trained and experienced junior officers.
    Do you fear a similar syndrome once the current deployment cycle 
slows? If so, what do you believe should be done to preclude that from 
happening?
    Answer. It is something that we must constantly monitor. We have 
established several programs to retain our combat experienced NCOs and 
officers and allow for their continued growth.

               MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

    Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically 
needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components. Growing 
medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of BCTs, growth 
Army end strength, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may 
compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and 
retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel.
    Do you think a comprehensive review of the medical support 
requirements for the Army is needed?
    Answer. Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support 
requirements on a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews 
medical support requirements as a part of its ongoing internal 
processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army 
validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the 
operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified 
over 2,500 new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new 
civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are 
other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to 
civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic brain injury, to 
name just a few.
    Question. Does the Army have sufficient mental health resources to 
handle the redeployment of large combat units?
    Answer. The Army is committed to ensuring all redeploying soldiers 
receive the behavioral health care they need. We anticipate that 
repeated and extended deployments will lead to increased distress and 
anxiety, and a higher demand for behavioral health services, and are 
planning to respond to that demand. An extensive array of behavioral 
health services has long been available to address the strain on our 
soldiers and families who have experienced multiple deployments. 
However, especially at our larger power projection platforms, the 
mental health resources are strained. The TRICARE purchased care 
network is also variable in its ability to support the mental health 
needs of our soldiers and their families. Currently we are focused on 
the needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg, but all installations with large 
numbers of returning soldiers will need resources.
    We have a variety of initiatives in place to garner additional 
behavioral health resources. Most significantly, last year we 
identified a gap between behavioral health staffing and the increased 
needs of our patient population. As a result, we initiated an effort to 
hire 265 behavioral health providers to meet this gap in the U.S. The 
number of requirements has increased to about 330 providers, both in 
the U.S. and at our overseas locations. As of March 28, 2008, we have 
162 new behavioral health contract providers working in our treatment 
facilities.
    Question. What plans does the Army have in place to ensure that a 
surge capability of mental health professionals is available to 
returning soldiers and their families?
    Answer. Through our Regional Medical Commands we shift our assets 
to fill needs. For example, the North Atlantic Regional Medical Command 
has been providing behavioral health staff from Walter Reed to support 
needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg. However, our behavioral health 
resources are strained across the Army, so we have only limited 
flexibility to shift resources. Our strategy is to enhance our 
behavioral health infrastructure throughout the system rather than 
providing surge teams, which can be inefficient and cumbersome. We also 
use tele-psychiatry to augment our outreach capacity. Walter Reed has 
long supported the Northeast with tele-psychiatry and recently has 
begun to support Fort Hood. Madigan Army Medical Center is currently 
supporting Fort Irwin and Alaska through tele-psychiatry. Finally, in 
coordination with the TRICARE Management Activity, we are encouraging 
civilian providers to join the TRICARE network.
    Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think 
are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill 
medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?
    Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the 
changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008, we are optimistic that further policy and legislative 
changes will not be needed. We will monitor these important resources 
closely to ensure our goals are realized.

                 SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

    Question. The Department of the Army has implemented changes in 
policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately 
to incidents of sexual assault.
    What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and 
civilian leaders in the Department of the Army in overseeing the 
effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual 
assault?
    Answer. Sexual assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks. 
The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational 
climate where such behavior is not tolerated, and where victims feel 
free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and 
Army Staff oversee and implement the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Response Program, which is now more than 3 years old. The 
Secretary, in fact, has taken a personal interest in this issue and has 
directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase 
emphasis on sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will 
assist him in this vitally important effort.
    As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review 
the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to 
DOD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit 
an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of 
Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and Department of 
Defense policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector 
Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with 
statutory and regulatory requirements.
    management and development of the senior executive service (ses)
    Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with 
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward 
thinking management of senior executives.
    What is your vision for the management and development of the Army 
senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important 
areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and 
technical fields?
    Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and 
direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue 
this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for 
military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, 
financial management, science, engineering, and human resource 
management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets 
to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is 
reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with 
evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and 
development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that 
possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move 
between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission 
needs of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional 
development and management of our civilian executives in ways 
consistent with what the Army has done for its General Officer Corps 
for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if 
confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing 
the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and 
to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

                        ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN

    Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in 
identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.
    What do you consider to be the most important family readiness 
issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to 
ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately 
resourced?
    Answer. The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army 
families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that 
challenge by making the commitments set forth in the Army Family 
Covenant, a promise to provide soldiers and families a quality of life 
commensurate with their voluntary service and daily sacrifices. The 
Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs and 
services; health care; soldier and family housing; excellent schools, 
youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education 
opportunities for Family members. I will also work to help further 
standardize the support being provided to soldiers and families and to 
obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of 
particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and 
burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they 
support our families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving 
our ability to address soldier-family reintegration and reunion issues. 
The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army 
spouses who volunteer as Family Readiness Group Leaders, Unit 
Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. The FRSA helps mitigate 
volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between families 
and support programs.
    Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in 
light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the 
planned growth of the Army?
    Answer. The Installation Management Command works extensively with 
garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and 
programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of families 
as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans 
include maintaining support to our soldiers and families throughout the 
process. At the installations that are expected to grow, we have 
programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness 
facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our soldiers and 
families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor 
these efforts to ensure that our families' needs are met as the Army 
undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment, 
deployment.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve 
component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family 
readiness?
    Answer. The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will 
provide a comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support 
and services to meet the needs of the Army's geographically dispersed 
population. This effort is crucial in supporting Army National Guard 
and Army Reserve Families. The baseline services are: information, 
referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services; 
school transition services; employer support to the Guard and Reserve 
services; wounded warrior program services; survivor support services; 
transition assistance services; employment; home and family life 
management services; financial services; medical care services; and 
legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 249 Army National 
Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. AIFSN will 
provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar 
facilities, and access to public and private programs and services. 
AIFSN will ensure services and support are available throughout the 
full spectrum of the mobilization process. Additionally, the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2008 requires the OSD to establish a reintegration program 
for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon 
Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs 
and services that specifically address the needs of our Guardsmen and 
their Families. If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs 
are implemented fully and assessed properly to insure we attain 
expected outcomes.

                    MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

    Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are 
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their 
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
    What are the challenges in sustaining Army MWR programs that you 
foresee, and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to 
achieve?
    Answer. Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of 
life of our military families. Their continued vitality depends on 
consistent appropriated and non-appropriated funding to support all of 
our MWR activities. The Army increased funding for family and MWR 
programs by $739 million with supplemental funds in fiscal year 2008 
and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of 
soldiers and families. The Army's MWR funds are currently in sound 
financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of 
solvency through the use of best business practices and enterprise 
purchasing. This allows us to increase the value of our programs by 
eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be passed on 
in the form of higher prices.
    The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while 
transforming to a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force. 
However, the needs of individual servicemembers and their families must 
still be met, particularly as soldiers return from combat. We are 
developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a means of 
adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment 
and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will 
continue to explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs 
to ensure we are meeting the needs of soldiers and families and 
contributing positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness. We 
will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the 
basis for investment capital development to fund an $85 million Capital 
Program annually for the next 10 years to build Travel Camps, Bowling 
Centers, Water Parks, Youth Centers, Single Soldier Entertainment 
Centers, and other facilities for our highly deserving soldiers and 
families. We will begin privatizing our lodging programs this summer by 
transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations to a 
highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest 
$450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will 
insure the quality of the lodging we provide our soldiers and families 
is equal to the quality available in the communities from which we 
recruit America's sons and daughters. We appreciate your support of 
these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we 
implement these far-reaching and enduring changes.

                   RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE

    Question. Heavy demand on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve 
since the attacks of September 11 have significantly changed the 
expectation of Reserve and Guard soldiers about their participation in 
an operational Army Reserve. The Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserve recently submitted its final report calling for formal 
recognition of this new and developing role for the Reserve components 
and recommending changes in career patterns to facilitate development 
of the Operational Reserve.
    In your view, how should the Army's Reserve component forces best 
be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq?
    Answer. The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and Combatant 
Commanders' requests for forces and capabilities by considering all 
three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution. 
The Guard and the Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, 
Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are regarded as fully capable for 
combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities in a superb 
manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum 
of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers in our 
Reserve components. The Army will continue to select the best units 
capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with 
full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned 
mission.
    Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to avoid 
excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand 
specialties whose skills are found primarily in the Reserve, such as 
civil affairs, military police, and logistics?
    Answer. The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by 
taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing 
capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand 
on low density, high demand specialties. The Grow the Army Plan 
approved in fiscal year 2007 increases the Army end strength by 74,200, 
a growth of 65,000 in the Active component (AC), 8,200 in the Army 
National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 in the United States Army Reserve 
(USAR). With associated redistribution of Reserve component (RC) 
Generating Force structure to build Operating Force capabilities, the 
Plan will increase Army Operating Force capabilities by over 80,000. 
Since fiscal year 2003, the Army has undertaken rebalance initiatives 
to achieve the proper mix of capabilities across all three components, 
eliminate involuntary mobilization of the RC, eliminate manning 
shortfalls in the AC, eliminate over-structure in the RC and minimize 
high demand/low density shortfalls. By the close of fiscal year 2007, 
the Army had completed rebalance of 53,600 structure spaces and will 
rebalance an additional 88,700 spaces by fiscal year 2013, bringing the 
Army rebalance total, since fiscal year 2003, to 142,300 spaces. The 
combination of the Grow the Army Plan and ongoing rebalance initiatives 
has addressed persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by 
24,700; Military Police by 16,700, Engineers by 11,400, Military 
Intelligence by 9,100, and adds 11,200 of structure to SOF (to include 
growth in PSYOP by 2,200, Special Forces by 1,600 and Civil Affairs by 
400). The combined impact of rebalance and growth will build strategic 
and operational depth across all three components to meet Combatant 
Commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent 
shortfalls, and enable strategy.

                        RECRUITING AND RETENTION

    Question. What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach 
its recruiting goals for the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National 
Guard in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009?
    Answer. Recruiting America's All-Volunteer Force will continue to 
be a challenge because of the growing percentage of youth ineligible 
for military services (disqualified for medical, fitness, aptitude, 
etc,), the increased competition with private industry and other 
governmental agencies, and the decreasing propensity to serve the 
Nation through military service. Despite these challenges, we remain 
confident that all Army components will attain the accession targets 
necessary to sustain or grow end strength.
    Question. What is your assessment of the impact multiple 
deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, 
particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their 
initial obligated service has been completed?
    Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had 
an adverse impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, fiscal year 
2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year 
average.
    The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in 
deploying units has remained between 120-140 percent since fiscal year 
2005. Recently deployed units or units currently deployed to 
Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110-120 percent of 
their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of 
leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what 
they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of 
service to the Nation.
    Question. The administration has requested that Congress authorize 
an active-duty end strength of 532,400 for fiscal year 2009 and intends 
to grow the active-duty Army to 547,400 soldiers over the next several 
years.
    Has the Army increased its recruiting goal from fiscal year 2008?
    Answer. The Army has not increased its recruiting goals from fiscal 
year 2008. Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals 
is not necessary to meet our planned growth in Army end-strength.
    Question. If not, how does the Army plan to grow the force an 
additional 7,000 soldiers with no increase in recruiting?
    Answer. In addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss 
management tools as levers to manage end-strength. Throughout fiscal 
year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, the Army has focused 
on retaining more initial term soldiers and has seen attrition drop to 
record lows. The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to 
grow strength without increasing recruiting goals.
    Question. When will the Army achieve an active end strength of 
547,400, and once it does, do you foresee requesting additional end 
strength increases based on current and anticipated operational 
requirements?
    Answer. The Army will achieve a strength of 547,400 by 30 September 
2010. While we grow the Army, we will continue to work the 
transformation, move soldiers into high demand specialties, and examine 
how effectively we can operationalize the Guard and Reserve. Then we 
will make a decision regarding whether the Army can meet the needs of 
the future.
    Question. According to Army data, retention of U.S. Military 
Academy graduates is lower than historical norms. The West Point class 
of 2000, for example, saw 34.2 percent leave the Service as soon as 
they were able, and according to press accounts, 54 percent of that 
class had left Active Service by the 5 year point. The Class of 2001 
saw 35.3 percent of its graduates leave Active Service as soon as they 
reached their 5 year point, and within the next year, a total of 46 
percent of that class had left the Service.
    How can the Army reverse this trend?
    Answer. The West Point Class of 2000 saw 35.5 percent leave the 
Service by the 5 year point. The Class of 2001 saw 38.3 percent leave 
by the 5 year point. A year later (the 6 year point) 48.9 percent of 
Class of 2000 and 49.5 percent of Class of 2001 had separated. These 
trends are not statistically different than previous Classes 1991-1999. 
In fact, there is not currently a statistically significant difference 
in the Army Competitive Category (ACC) Company Grade loss rates for any 
source of commission. The losses through the first 5 months of fiscal 
year 2008 are lower than previous years except for 2003, where losses 
were lower than normal due to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 
fact, the success of recent captain and pre-commissioning retention 
incentives has already guaranteed the retention above historic rates of 
our valuable force of heavily combat-experienced junior officers 
through fiscal year 2010 and beyond.
    Question. What resources, if any, does the Army need to better 
manage the early- and mid-career officer population?
    Answer. The Army has been given the authority through September 
2009 to conduct an unprecedented Captains' retention program that 
offers a number of incentives, including attendance at graduate school 
or a retention bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers to 
remain on active duty. Though it may be too early to directly tie the 
program to recent retention trends, the Army has recently experienced 
increased retention among our captains over past years, with loss rates 
over the first 5 months of fiscal year 2008 lower than all but 1 of the 
previous 9 years for the same time period. Analysis of our initial 
phase of execution of the retention program compared to recent Defense 
Military Data Center surveys indicates that our incentive program has 
made a significant impact on the retention behavior of our captains. 
Prior surveys indicated that 52 percent of captains polled intended to 
separate or were undecided about continuing in a military career. Of 
those officers, 54 percent took a menu incentive and will now retain to 
fiscal year 2011. The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer 
attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly 
performing officers.
    Question. Army data also shows a large increase over the past 4 
years of new recruits lacking a high school diploma. In fiscal year 
2003, 94 percent of all new recruits graduated from high school; in 
fiscal year 2007, that number dropped to 79 percent.
    In your opinion, has the Army sacrificed quality for quantity?
    Answer. No, the Army has not lowered recruiting standards, but they 
have become more difficult to meet because of declining high school 
graduation rates and the toughest recruiting environment in the 34+ 
year history of the All-Volunteer Force. We remain focused on attaining 
Department of Defense Quality Benchmarks as our recruiting standards. 
Without exception, soldiers who enlist into the Army are qualified for 
their skill/job.
    Question. How does the Army intend to reverse this trend?
    Answer. The Army has and will continue to implement measures to 
reduce this challenge through programs and policies that increase the 
potential market. The Army is also utilizing enlistment bonuses and 
other incentives, such as the Army College Fund, Loan Repayment, and 
Army Advantage Fund to attract quality recruits. However, the Army will 
only enlist soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this 
Nation.
    Question. How many Category IV soldiers did the Army recruit for 
the Active-Duty Force and Army Reserve in fiscal year 2007, and what 
percentage of the total number of 2008 recruits is made up of Category 
IV soldiers?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2007 the Active component accessed 2,738 
(3.97 percent) Category IV soldiers. The Army Reserve accessed 782 
(3.94 percent) Category IV soldiers. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008 
(thru February 2008) the Active component has accessed 1,953 Category 
IV soldiers (5.5 percent) and the Army Reserve has accessed 431 
Category IV soldiers (4.61 percent). Quality Marks are measured on an 
annual basis. The number of Category IV recruits is closely monitored 
throughout the year. As Non-Prior Service volume increases, the 
Category IV percent will decrease. The Active Army and the Army Reserve 
will be within the Category IV benchmark of 4 percent by the end of 
fiscal year 2008.
    Question. According to the Army Times, a new Army assessment has 
concluded that recruits who receive moral, medical, or other waivers 
are less likely to drop out of basic training, have lower rates of 
personality disorder, and re-enlist in higher numbers than other 
recruits. The assessment also noted, however, that recruits who receive 
waivers are more likely to desert, experience more drug and alcohol 
issues, and have higher rates of misconduct, including an increased 
likelihood of receiving a bad conduct discharge.
    Please describe the Army's current use of waivers, and how these 
rates compare historically.
    Answer. The Army utilizes the recruit waiver process to extend the 
opportunity to serve the Nation to applicants who fall outside the 
medical, conduct, drug/alcohol, or administrative screening parameters 
established for Army recruits. Army leaders and physicians review the 
files of disqualified applicants to determine if an applicant's 
previous medical, conduct, or drug/alcohol history will adversely 
affect his/her likelihood of serving successfully as a soldier. This 
comprehensive process allows the Army (and the other military services) 
to expand the pool of applicants willing to answer the Nation's call to 
service. The percentage of recruits enlisting with waivers has 
increased over the past several years. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008 
(thru February 2008) overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with 
a waiver for the Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) combined is 
19.8 percent. In fiscal year 2007, the overall percentage of personnel 
who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and AR combined is 18.8 percent. 
In fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2004, the overall percentage of 
personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and AR combined was 
13.7 percent and 11.2 percent respectively. The Army will only enlist 
soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.
    Question. What changes, if any, have been made in tracking and 
documenting the performance and impact, positive or negative, of 
recruiting more individuals requiring waivers for enlistment?
    Answer. The Army--through the Center for Accessions Research, the 
RAND Corporation and the Army G-1--is conducting ongoing longitudinal 
analyses of recent Fiscal Year Recruiting Cohorts to determine any 
significant trends and differences of those soldiers accessed with a 
waiver (i.e., medical, conduct, etc.) and those soldiers accessed not 
requiring a waiver. To date, results indicate soldiers with waivers 
perform comparable or better in most areas observed (e.g., promotions, 
awards, reenlistment). These studies, the comments of leaders in the 
field, and the overall performance of young soldiers during this 
protracted conflict indicate that the Army waiver process is 
functioning properly in its role of screening in willing applicants to 
join America's All-Volunteer Force.
    Question. Have the increased use of waivers for criminal offenses 
had any impact to date on the good order and discipline in the units to 
which these soldiers have been assigned?
    Answer. The number of recruits requiring enlistment waivers has 
increased over the last few years, in an era of persistent conflict and 
growth of the Army. However, commanders consistently tell us how proud 
they are of the young volunteer, combat proven soldiers who are serving 
under them. Army mechanisms for screening these individuals are 
designed to mitigate risk and have proven very effective in the past 
and today. A recent study comparing trends of waivered soldiers and 
non-waivered soldiers who entered the Army from fiscal year 2003 
through fiscal year 2006 indicates that they perform comparably in most 
areas. At this time there is no indication to suggest that waivered 
soldiers are a detriment to the force. We will continue to conduct 
studies and analyze the trends.

          SUPPORT FOR ARMY FAMILIES IN THE REBASING INITIATIVE

    Question. Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the 
Department's rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to 
the continental United States (CONUS) installations and their 
surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources, 
including housing and schools, are made available.
    What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to 
ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and 
receiving communities?
    Answer. The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with 
increased community needs, such as schools, housing, and community 
activities, associated with Army stationing and growth. Garrison 
commanders and staff regularly engage with community leaders and have 
school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local 
education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and growth. 
Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the 
Army provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on 
projected school-age dependent growth.
    The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of 
family housing and will privatize or build family housing at U.S. 
locations only where necessary. To support Army Growth, Congress 
approved $266 million in fiscal year 2008 for government equity 
contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Carson, and 
Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting $334 million in fiscal year 
2009 for government equity contributions for additional housing at 
Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in 
fiscal year 2010 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at 
other gaining installations.
    Question. What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that 
the challenges associated with rebasing are met?
    Answer. The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized 
stationing plan that links Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005, 
Global Defense Posture Realignment, Army Modular Force Transformation, 
and Grow the Force. The Army's BRAC plan supports these major 
stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions and national 
security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011 
statutory BRAC implementation deadline.
    The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained 
a significant decrease in BRAC funding, of which $560 million was 
reduced from the Army's BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the 
difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we 
implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the $560 million decrement is 
not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with all 
aspects of the BRAC Law.
    If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully 
vetted and work with Congress to garner the resources to implement our 
BRAC and stationing requirements in a timely and efficient manner.

                      SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

    Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and 
Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support 
services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for 
return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and 
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.
    What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now 
in place to care for the wounded, including the Wounded Warrior 
Program, and programs for soldiers in Warrior Transition Units (WTUs)?
    Answer. The Army has made and continues to make significant 
improvements in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes 
as part of our Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past 12 
months, execution of the AMAP has seen the creation of 35 WTUs at 
installations across the Army. These WTUs are staffed by 2,655 
personnel who provide care and support to over 9,339 soldiers and their 
families. Although I believe these programs are a significant 
improvement over past practices, we need to continue tracking and 
monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external 
feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue this 
transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and 
injured soldiers and their families.
    Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded 
personnel who have separated from active service?
    Answer. The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded 
personnel who have separated from active service. In close coordination 
with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans 
Affairs advisors at major medical treatment facilities to facilitate 
the process of applying for benefits and finalizing arrangements for 
follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that 
everything is in place when soldiers transition to civilian status.
    The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative, 
which will allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then 
return to the Army to work in assignments in the Institutional Army 
where their education and personal experiences can be put to the best 
use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting the Warrior Transition 
Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort Bragg, NC. This 
program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the Soldier 
Family Assistance Centers--which support WTUs and are operated by the 
Army Installation Management Command--to receive education and training 
in the development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills. 
Through this program, Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors 
from the Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and 
the staff of the Army Career and Alumni Program to develop a winning 
approach to obtaining employment when they leave the Army.
    I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program 
(AW2) which assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured 
soldiers and their families throughout their lifetimes, wherever they 
are located. AW2 currently serves more than 2,300 soldiers, 600 on 
active duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program caseworkers work with 
soldiers and their families to address and mitigate proactively any 
issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be 
my honor to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much 
for their country know that the Army will always be there for them.
    Question. How is the Army seeking to measure and ensure the 
effectiveness of these programs?
    Answer. Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting, 
and resourcing WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports 
and other measures to track short-, near-, and long-term objectives. 
These measures show specific details, to include day-to-day operations, 
but also provide aggregate trending information to ensure the 
organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would 
continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on 
all standards.
    Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and 
resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for 
wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to 
civilian life?
    Answer. I think we have some terrific programs in place to support 
our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers, including some recent pilot 
programs. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the success of these pilot 
programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to 
continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and Congress 
to find innovative ways to return all of our Warriors to productive 
civilian lives as proud veterans.

                       JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

    Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, 
such as the Joint Tactical Radio System?
    Answer. There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs 
as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the 
advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares 
inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the 
critical start-point for a joint program is a ``joint'' requirement. 
Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint 
acquisition program will be cost effective.
    Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the Services to conduct 
more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and 
unmanned systems?
    Answer. Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area. 
Key national strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids 
provide incentives for the Services to collaborate to define and 
produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At 
the same time, it is very important for the Services to maintain 
separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities 
within a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or 
increasing program costs.
    Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to 
implement more joint program acquisition?
    Answer. DOD has an established process for the development and 
approval of joint capability documents. This process includes oversight 
at the Joint Service level through the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC). As these capabilities are evaluated, a joint service 
designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities documents, 
DOD Initiative 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be 
approved, and any changes therein must be approved, by the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD(AT&L)). Further, as the Services and DOD prepare their budget 
submissions, resourcing decisions can be made by the Service or OSD. 
Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at 
the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions to the 
OSD leadership.

                  REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING PROCESSES

    Question. As rising personnel and operation and maintenance costs 
expend an increasing portion of the Army's budget authority, and as 
competing demands for Federal dollars increase in the future years, it 
is likely that the Army will have to address the challenges of reset, 
modernization, and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.
    What changes, if any, would you recommend to the way the Army 
prioritizes resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation?
    Answer. Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are 
accounting for a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue 
to do so in the foreseeable future. This growth naturally increases the 
tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to 
transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed 
dramatically, requiring our Nation's Army to reorganize, grow, 
restation, and transform while fighting the war on terrorism. These 
demands have caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals. 
While increases in our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they 
have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond 
to and request support for, largely through requests for supplemental 
appropriations.
    I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound 
resourcing scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the 
Nation. However, without a reduction in expected missions or increased 
resources to match increased missions, the Army will eventually lose 
the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have 
experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990s, Army 
investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment 
shortages in our forces that we have been scrambling to correct with 
new procurement, just-in-time fieldings and retention of theater-
provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would 
be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force 
structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using 
the lessons from today's fight, we are transforming to a future force 
with even more robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to 
providing the best protection to our soldiers today and in the future.

                     BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

    Question. The military Services are in the process of developing 
business plans for the implementation of the 2005 Defense Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions.
    What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the 
Army in implementing BRAC decisions?
    Answer. The Army is responsible for executing both the Army's BRAC 
recommendations and a portion of the joint cross service group 
recommendations, as assigned by the USD(AT&L). The Army has developed 
business plans and budget justification materials, and is executing the 
program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.
    Question. What do you see as the priorities of the Department of 
the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?
    Answer. The Army's priority is to complete the construction 
projects required to enable unit and organizational moves from closing 
and realigning installations to meet the timeframe directed by the law. 
The bulk of construction funds ($13 billion) will be used in fiscal 
years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. If the 
Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will 
be significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended.
    Question. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC 
decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected 
local community in order to allow these communities an active role in 
the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community 
may not be compatible with proposals considered by the Department of 
Defense. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical 
Center in Washington, DC, will present opportunities for both the local 
community and the Federal Government to re-use the land based on 
potentially competing plans.
    If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist 
affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-
use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?
    Answer. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I 
will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local 
Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State 
and local officials to accelerate the property disposal process 
whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening and has 
made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations 
except for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local 
Redevelopment Authorities are submitting their redevelopment plans, and 
they will be integrated into the Army property disposal process.
    Question. What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process 
that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?
    Answer. I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current 
BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with 
Congress to execute BRAC 2005.

                         TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

    Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition 
technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the 
last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition 
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons 
systems and platforms.
    What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?
    Answer. The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs 
of record and the laboratories and Research, Development and 
Engineering Centers (RDECs) which are developing and evaluating 
technology options for these programs. The Army's key advanced 
technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology 
transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However, 
because of the demands of the ongoing global war on terror, the Army 
has not been able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the 
technology that has been matured.
    The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid 
Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies 
transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been 
through a formal acquisition development, and the Army must deal with 
the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and 
logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even 
for those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of 
operation, the Army has procedures to assess the military utility of 
those technologies for full spectrum Army-wide applications.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are 
rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the 
warfighter?
    Answer. The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry, 
academia, and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore 
technology options for the soldier. As discussed above, the Army's key 
advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a 
technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. 
These agreements document what products the Science and Technology 
(S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of 
performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for 
that technology. The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated 
needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program 
evaluation offices and program managers. We must guard against 
pressures for technology solutions from the non-technical community 
that reads the popular press and thinks that they are ``discovering'' 
technology opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations 
about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect 
disciplined technology development and technology maturity assessments 
towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to 
withstand rigorous evaluation.
    Question. What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of 
technology transition efforts?
    Answer. The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the 
current force through several initiatives, including the Rapid 
Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army's number 
one priority is force protection of our soldiers with individual 
weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade and modernize 
existing systems to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they need. I 
would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army Science and 
Technology program, and from Future Combat System (FCS) development. I 
would field the FCS Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). FCS is the core of the 
Army's modernization effort and will provide our soldiers an 
unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased 
precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will 
be to have our soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and 
equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the world 
with full-spectrum capabilities.

  ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS AND LABORATORIES

    Question. Among the roles the Army's Research, Development, and 
Engineering Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the 
development of innovative systems and technologies, supporting their 
transition to the warfighter, and supporting the Army in making 
technically sound acquisition decisions.
    In your opinion, are the Army's Research, Development, and 
Engineering Centers and Laboratories sufficiently resourced in funding, 
personnel and equipment to perform these missions?
    Answer. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism 
the Army has been able to maintain its Science and Technology (S&T) 
investment at over $1.7 billion for each of the past three budget 
requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T 
investment to $1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is 
sufficient to support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment 
consistent with our broad resource demands.
    Question. In your view, do the Army's Research, Development, and 
Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel 
systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of 
their needed highly qualified technical workforce?
    Answer. Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration 
program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and 
authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly 
qualified technical workforce. The laboratories and centers have 
already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by 
Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-
performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and 
development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is 
fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and 
retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.
    Question. Do the Army's Research, Development and Engineering 
Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate flexibility for 
technology transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory 
research in order to help them best support their missions?
    Answer. Yes the Army has sufficient authority for the technology 
transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory research. What in 
your view are the biggest deficiencies in the performance of the Army's 
Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories?
    Answer. The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army's 
Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their 
inability to effectively modernize their laboratory infrastructure.
    Question. If confirmed, what would you plan to do to address those 
deficiencies?
    Answer. To the maximum extent possible, the Army's Research, 
Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the 
flexibility provided in title 10, U.S.C., section 2805, to recapitalize 
critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the 
Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the 
associated minor construction limit to $2.5 million, with a $3 million 
limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide 
laboratory/center directors the ability to recapitalize critical 
mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on military construction to 
meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits 
to account for major increase in the cost of laboratory construction 
over more common forms of construction.

COMMISSION ON ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN EXPEDITIONARY 
                               OPERATIONS

    Question. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management 
in Expeditionary Operations concluded that ``the Army sent a skeleton 
contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary 
to adequately support our warfighters.'' According to the Commission, 
``Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is 
not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; 
but they are understaffed, overworked, undertrained, undersupported 
and, most important, undervalued.''
    Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission?
    Answer. The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and 
is in full agreement with the Commission's general recommendations for 
improvement. Many of the Commission's recommendations are consistent 
with the issues identified by the Army Contracting Study completed in 
2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was Co-Chaired by 
Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson, U.S. Army. The Army is currently 
addressing structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified in the 
reports with a view to improving both current and future expeditionary 
contracting operations. The Army is conducting in-depth analysis of all 
areas. Significant action has already been taken against most of the 22 
findings of the Gansler Commission recommendations specific to the 
Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the structural weaknesses and 
shortcomings identified to improve current and future Army contracting 
activities. Our actions stretch across the Army and include an ongoing, 
comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leader development, personnel, and facilities
    Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in 
addressing these concerns?
    Answer. Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the 
establishment of the Army Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused 
commitment to implement changes across the Army to ensure that our 
doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are 
comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. Secretary Geren 
directed Under Secretary of the Army, Hon. Ford, to implement specific 
recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting 
Task Force as expeditiously as possible. The Army is committed to 
finishing the development and then implementing an Army-wide 
contracting campaign plan to improve doctrine, organization, training, 
leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities. Achieving this 
objective will require resources, time, and sustained leadership focus. 
The contracting campaign plan will continue the initiatives already 
underway in the Army. The VCSA is the conduit for ensuring the 
consistency in coordination necessary to implement and institutionalize 
changes across the Army as related to doctrine, manning, training and 
support structure changes.
    Question. The Commission report states that ``The Army's difficulty 
in adjusting to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
is in large part due to the fact that there are no Generals assigned to 
contracting responsibilities.'' The commission recommends that Congress 
authorize ``a core set of ten additional General Officers for 
contracting positions.''
    Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?
    Answer. I support the Army's plans to continue to grow additional 
military contracting structure in the Active Force and civilian 
contracting workforce in line with the Gansler Commission 
recommendations. Specifically, Secretary Geren directed the realignment 
of the U.S. Army Contracting Agency (ACA) to the U.S. Army Materiel 
Command (AMC) and the establishment of the U.S. Army Contracting 
Command (ACC) (Provisional) under AMC. The ACC (Provisional) stand-up 
ceremony on March 13, 2008 is in keeping with the Gansler Commission's 
second recommendation--to restructure Army contracting organizations 
and restore responsibility to better facilitate contracting and 
contract management in expeditionary and U.S.-based operations. The ACC 
is a two-star level command with two one-star level subordinate 
commands--an Expeditionary Contracting Command and an Installation 
Contracting Command. The Army is seeking five additional general 
officer authorizations to lead these commands and to fill additional 
contracting leadership needs outside of AMC. This recommendation will 
restore Uniformed Contracting General Officer positions cut as part of 
Acquisition drawdowns in the 1990s.
    Question. In your view, is legislation required to implement this 
recommendation, or can the Army assign new General Officers to 
contracting functions without legislation?
    Answer. There is flexibility to assign General Officers to 
contracting functions within the Army's current General Officer 
allocations. Given the current optempo and the stress on Army 
leadership, both military and civilian, the Army's current allotment of 
General Officers cannot support the new contracting requirements. 
Therefore, the Army is working closely with OSD to obtain authority for 
five additional Army General Officer billets for contracting.
    Question. The Commission report states that ``The number and 
expertise of the military contracting professionals must be 
significantly increased'' to address the problems we have experienced 
in theater. The Commission recommends that the Army hire 2,000 new 
contracting personnel.
    Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?
    Answer. The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the 
last decade (25 percent cut mandated by Congress in National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996) while the number of dollars we 
are executing in the Army has increased more than 4-fold ($23.3 
billion-1992 vs. $100.6 billion-2006). The Army has never fought an 
extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We 
are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and 
empower our contracting personnel to support the full range of military 
operations. To date, the Army has identified the need to increase Army 
contracting and support personnel by 906 military positions and 1,327 
civilian positions. These numbers are organizational assessments and 
may go up or down as our Army Contracting Campaign Planning analysis 
continues.
    Question. What is your understanding of the steps being taken to 
implement this recommendation?
    Answer. Contingency Contracting force structure increases were 
being incorporated in the Army's modular force design even prior to the 
establishment of the Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did 
not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now established a 
contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support 
Brigades (commanded by a Colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions, 
and Contingency Contracting Teams. Recommended increases of 906 
military and 1,327 civilians are now under review as part of Army 
Contracting Campaign Plan process to fill the new Army contracting 
structure.
    Question. The Commission report states that most civilians working 
on contracting issues in Iraq were ``volunteers, often with inadequate 
or wrong skill sets for the job at hand, and often getting their 
required contracting experience on-the-job as part of their 
deployment.'' The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who 
agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These 
include the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and 
long-term medical care for injuries incurred in-theater.
    Do you support the recommendations of the Commission?
    Answer. The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who 
agree to deploy deserve the benefits and professional opportunities 
commensurate with their skills, hardships and contributions. We are 
working with OSD to examine the entitlements, compensation, and 
benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. As we 
identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with 
the OSD and the administration to seek legislative changes.
    Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has 
taken, or plans to take, to implement these recommendations?
    Answer. The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits 
that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a 
team led by OSD. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been 
identified to improve the benefits for deployed civilians and we have 
initiated the staffing process in these areas. To enhance incentives 
for civilian contracting personnel to ``pre-volunteer'' for 
expeditionary operations, OSD has taken the lead to request a 
legislative change to waive the annual limitation on premium pay and 
the aggregate limitation on pay for Federal civilian employees. In 
addition, OSD is working with the U.S. Department of Labor to ensure 
there are no conflicts with Workers' Compensation Laws. The Office of 
Management and Budget disapproved a proposal to provide combat zone tax 
benefits for civilian employees; OSD is considering an appeal of this 
decision.
    Question. The Commission report states that some DOD and Army 
policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example, 
the report states that volunteers are required to be sent on `detail' 
so that the providing office has to pay salary and expenses of 
deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any 
reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports, 
managers in the U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from 
volunteering.
    Do you agree with the Commission's findings on this issue?
    Answer. The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees 
have been discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however, 
organizations have been required to continue paying salary and other 
expenses of deployed employees. With the current tight budget 
situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed civilian. 
We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce 
the organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian 
personnel. The Army Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force is also 
studying options to assist CONUS organizations that lose deployed 
civilian volunteers, by activating Reserve component soldiers, enabling 
them to get much needed contracting experience prior to an overseas 
deployment.
    Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has 
taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?
    Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness) issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject 
``Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity.'' In the memo and 
attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the 
deployment of DOD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The 
Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to deploy 
civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will 
continue to review recommendations for resolving the issue.
    Question. The report states that Contracting Officer's 
Representatives (CORs) are an ``essential part of contract 
management'', because they are responsible for ensuring contract 
performance. According to the report, however, ``CORs are assigned as 
an `extra duty,' requiring no experience the COR assignment is often 
used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base when a 
commander does not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally, 
little, if any training is provided despite this, there are still too 
few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps 
in contract coverage.''
    Do you agree with the Commission's assessment of the CORs assigned 
in Iraq and Afghanistan?
    Answer. Yes, a Contracting Officer Representative (COR) town hall 
in Kuwait led by ACTF leadership in October 2007 identified both 
individual COR training and execution shortcomings. CORs stated that 
they lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee 
complex theater contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel, 
they are the ``eyes and ears'' of the contracting officer and the 
customer, and must be viewed with the appropriate level of authority 
across the Army. The customer in most cases is also a Commander. The 
COR is also the ``eyes and ears'' of the Commander. Today's commanders 
get much of their warfighting support from contractors. As we train and 
educate our leaders to understand the implications of predominantly 
contracted-support to operations vs. traditional military support they 
will fully understand and acknowledge the importance of the COR.
    Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has 
taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?
    Answer. A standard, minimum training requirement has already been 
established for Army CORs. CORs must complete the Defense Acquisition 
University on-line continuous learning module, ``COR with a Mission 
Focus,'' prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4500 Army 
personnel have completed this course. Since October 1, 2007, 190 CORs 
have been trained in Kuwait. All contracts awarded now by the Kuwait 
Contracting Office have a trained COR performing surveillance.

                 MILITARY ROLE IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES

    Question. Shortfalls in the Nation's ability to respond to national 
and manmade disasters, including terrorist attacks, as discussed in the 
final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, have 
resulted in debate about the appropriate role of the Department of 
Defense and the Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies.
    In your view, should the Army have a larger role in responding to 
domestic emergencies that require military support?
    Answer. Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army--
Active, Guard, and Reserve--has been a leader in this war and has been 
fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The 
Army has always supported requests for military assistance and will 
continue to do so. However, the ``role'' of the Army in domestic 
emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in 
support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal 
agency.
    Question. What do you believe the Army's role should be in 
supporting U.S. Northern Command in homeland defense and civil support 
missions, including consequence management of a domestic WMD attack?
    Answer. The Department of Defense and United States Northern 
Command have worked in concert with the Department of Homeland Security 
to plan and prepare for response to domestic emergencies. United States 
Army North is the dedicated Army Service Component Command to the 
United States Northern Command for Homeland Defense and Defense Support 
to Civil Authorities for the CONUS and Alaska.
    Northern Command is the Department of Defense's conduit to each 
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities. The Command collocates within the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual 
relationships with Federal Emergency Management Agency staff, other 
government agencies, State emergency responders, State Adjutant 
Generals, and potential base support installations.
    When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, 
or nuclear attack, the affected Governor or Governors shall first 
employ their Air and/or Army National Guard with state authority, if 
required. Each State and Territory has its own Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification). 
Moreover, 17 States have created federally-funded National Guard 
Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced 
Response Force Packages (commonly known as CERFP) for search and 
rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and force protection. 
These force packages are designed to support all States within their 
FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country.
    In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely 
request Federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of 
assets to Northern Command for the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and 
high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly 
known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment teams and enhances the 
civil authority's ability to provide command and control, medical, 
logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security, 
public affairs and mortuary affairs.
    Question. What is your assessment of the Army National Guard's 
ability to meet its state contingency and homeland defense missions, 
given its operational commitments overseas and current personnel and 
equipment shortfalls?
    Answer. The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its 
ability to respond to state contingency and homeland missions as well 
as to its operational commitments.
    The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively 
through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. 
As you know, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a 
congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure 
to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted 
state can request and receive assistance from other member states 
quickly and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: 
liability and reimbursement.
    Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been 
effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating 
resources to the Total Army--the Active component and the Reserve 
components. The Army is currently executing and programming 
unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve components. The Director 
of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 
are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. 
Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA 
staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements 
resulting in an improved total force.
    Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over $49 billion 
in Army National Guard procurement (for fiscal years 2001-2013). 
Funding and equipment distributions are firewalled: promises made are 
promises kept. For fiscal years 2001-2007, the Army resourced $15.3 
billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over the next 24 months, 
the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to the Army 
National Guard, valued at $17.5 billion--36 percent of Total Army 
distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night 
vision devices, and 86,000 weapons.

                    TRANSITION OF THAAD TO THE ARMY

    Question. The Army currently produces and operates the Patriot air 
and missile defense system, including the PAC-3 system. The Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is being developed and initially 
fielded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), with the plan that it will 
be transitioned and transferred to the Army at some point.
    What is your view of the best approach to transitioning the THAAD 
system to the Army?
    Answer. The Army and MDA have been working plans to transition and 
transfer those Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements 
including the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system for 
which the Army is the lead Service. We have collaborated on the past 
two annual Transition and Transfer Plans and participate in Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs) for each element to work the specific details 
associated with transition and transfer. Transition and transfer was 
the main topic of a recent Army/MDA Board of Directors meeting where it 
was decided that the best approach for transitioning the THAAD system 
was to develop and sign an overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
that incorporates individual, event-driven element annexes to further 
guide the transition and transfer process.
    Question. When do you believe it should happen, and where should 
the initial funding come from?
    Answer. The Army and MDA will be collaborating on defining a series 
of event driven milestones which are designed to minimize cost and 
reduce risk, while transitioning an operational capability to the Army. 
This operational capability will be verified through participation in 
Force Development Experimentation (FDE) and Limited User Test (LUT). At 
that point I believe an informed decision to transition can be made.
    Initial funding should come from a Defense Wide account. The 
funding would stay within the DOD agency. MDA would use the account to 
fund R&D, Procurement and sustainment activities. The services will 
program for military pay, and specific O&M costs. Detailed funding 
responsibilities will be specified in the MOA and the annexes.
    Question. Do you have any concerns, including resource concerns, 
about transitioning THAAD to the Army?
    Answer. Our primary concern with the transition and transfer of 
BMDS elements to the Army is long term affordability. Element 
transitions must only occur when full funding is secured. The 
procurement and operations and support costs anticipated at transfer 
are beyond the Army's ability to program and fund without a total 
obligation authority (TOA) increase.

                       FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS

    Question. Over the past several years, the Army, with the support 
of Congress, has concentrated on the procurement of force protection 
measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, uparmored high mobility 
multipurpose vehicles, counterimprovised explosive device measures) 
primarily relying on supplemental appropriations.
    If confirmed, what problems do you foresee and what priority would 
you place on continuing to expand and fund force protection programs, 
even in the absence of supplemental appropriations legislation?
    Answer. I appreciate the assistance of Congress in protecting our 
soldiers by supporting Army critical Force Protection programs. I can 
assure you that equipment necessary to protect the lives of soldiers 
will always be my highest priority for funding. The Army has become 
increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet war-related 
requirements and many programs funded through supplemental 
appropriations, like force protection, have persisted--a symptom of 
finding ourselves in an era of persistent conflict. As your question 
implies, we must continue critical enduring programs even if 
supplemental appropriations go away. Finally, the Army must be prepared 
for full spectrum operations globally in an era of persistent conflict. 
While doing so it is important to balance current force needs against 
modernizing so our soldiers are never in a fair fight.

                            EQUIPMENT RESET

    Question. The ongoing requirements of the global war on terror have 
significantly increased usage rates on the Army's equipment. As a 
result, we know there will be a requirement to ``reset'' the force not 
only as the current operations continue but also for some time after 
they conclude. Given the ongoing nature of both the war in Iraq and the 
larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready to 
respond to whatever contingencies arise.
    Do you think that the Army's equipment reset program meets the 
requirements of the global war on terror, as well as the requirements 
for transition to a modular force?
    Answer. The Army's reset program has kept pace with the 
requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness 
with rates at more than 90 percent for ground equipment and more than 
75 percent for aviation equipment. As you know, our reset efforts are a 
significant element of our efforts to maintain readiness across the 
force. Timely and predictable funding is key to ensuring that these 
reset requirements are met.
    Question. In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the 
Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or 
mitigate that risk?
    Answer. Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk 
to the Army's reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of 
the fiscal year allows for the early purchase of long lead parts which 
reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays in replacing battle losses, 
and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the depots. To 
mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant 
and open communication to ensure that our requirements and the 
reasoning behind them are understood.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient 
resources are programmed and requested in the Army's budget to meet 
reset requirements and provide trained and ready forces across the 
spectrum of military operations?
    Answer. The development of the Army's reset requirements is driven 
by current wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational 
tempo; equipment stress; battle losses; lessons learned; and the need 
to reconstitute equipment readiness for the next contingency, which 
could be any mission across the full spectrum of conflict from low 
intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly 
increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset 
requirements must be funded to ensure Army readiness.
    Question. What is your understanding regarding the capacity at 
which our repair depots are operating to meet recapitalization, 
modernization, rebuild, and repair requirements for reset?
    Answer. Depots are not operating at full/maximum capacity but are 
operating at a level that theater equipment retrograde will support. In 
peace time our depots expend approximately 12 million direct labor 
hours annually. They are currently executing 27 million and have the 
capacity to expand up to 40 million. Each depot's production capacity 
is being optimized by equipment type/commodity. Our depots have enabled 
deployed forces to maintain equipment readiness for the last 5 years at 
90 percent or better for ground equipment and 75 percent or better for 
aviation and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of 
the next deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots could 
do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available 
spare parts, increased work force and more retrograded equipment.
    Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be 
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it 
available for operations and training?
    Answer. Timely and adequate funding is essential. It enables depots 
to procure long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace 
and repair maintenance equipment and set the conditions for resetting 
our redeploying forces. In addition, we are putting in place several 
logistic initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset 
visibility, reduce transportation time and target certain equipment for 
direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the CSA 
Reset Pilot Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots 
are implementing Lean Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous 
success in improving production rates and reducing turn around times.

                      ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

    Question. The Army has long included as a critical element of its 
strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks 
around the world and afloat to accelerate the deployment and employment 
of forces in response to crises. However, Army Prepositioned Stocks 
(APS) are nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq 
leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or 
options.
    What changes, if any, to policies regarding use of prepositioned 
equipment stocks would you recommend if confirmed?
    Answer. No changes are recommended to the current policy for the 
use of APS at this time. The last 4 years demonstrated that the APS 
program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability to 
deploy forces in support of COCOM requirements and adapt to changing 
strategic requirements. The Army carefully monitors the use of APS 
assets and closely coordinates their use with the Combatant Commanders. 
Whenever use of APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates the 
strategic risk and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to 
replenish our APS with ``modernized'' equipment that meets the needs of 
the modular force.
    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current 
plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment to re-establish 
this strategic capability?
    Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the 
maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The 
Army has an APS Strategy 2015 which articulates the afloat and ashore 
equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the 
combatant commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and the 
Army has an executable timeline to reset its APS sets according to the 
APS Strategy 2015, contingent on available resources and operational 
requirements.

                         EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

    Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to 
fully support the pre-deployment training and operations for the next 
rotation to OIF/OEF?
    Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are 
adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/
OEF. No soldier will go into combat without the proper training and 
equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that 
require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are 
fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed 
at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units 
to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to 
schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the 
mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each 
synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee 
works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel 
and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training 
Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have 
all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and 
are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.
    Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for 
training and operations?
    Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment 
before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified 
as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit 
readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to 
compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most 
common Active and Reserve component high-demand pre-deployment training 
equipment shortfalls occur with some types of mission-specific 
organizational equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to 
meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these 
items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand. 
These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical 
trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG-31, 
Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised 
explosive device warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of 
these systems for home station training and at our Combat Training 
Centers so soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they 
deploy. Additionally, a large number of our soldiers already have one 
or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience 
with these systems.
    Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station 
training include kits designed to increase the survivability of 
standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban 
Survivability Kits, and uparmored highly-mobile multipurpose wheeled 
vehicle fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater. 
Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific 
areas which are driven by the Army's desire to get the most modern and 
capable systems immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat 
operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army 
Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced 
intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to 
get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into 
the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat 
Training Centers.
    Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in 
transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that 
units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment. 
Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve 
the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in 
their ability to support other contingencies around the world should 
the need arise.
    Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these 
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need in time to train 
before deploying and as well as for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
    Answer. The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory 
and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the 
global war on terrorism, and to replace critical equipment destroyed in 
battle. The Army is also prioritizing and managing procurements and 
distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are 
organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard 
quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the 
use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of 
equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the 
optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required 
training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat.

            MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

    Question. In September 2007, JROC capped MRAP procurement at 15,374 
vehicles, with about 3,700 going to the Marine Corps and approximately 
10,000 to the Army. In November 2007, the Marines decreased their 
requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles--citing, in 
part, an improved security situation in Iraq and the MRAP's 
unsuitability in some off-road and urban situations. Reports suggest 
that the Army may follow suit and reduce its overall MRAP requirement.
    Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If the Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is 
this the Army's final requirement or can we expect the requirement to 
change again?
    Answer. The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army 
units is 12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on 
requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be 
17,770. To ensure this assessment met our emerging requirements, the 
Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and OSD to continuously re-
assess and raise the procurement quantity in a stair-step fashion to 
ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to Theater while 
remaining good stewards of our Nation's resources. Recently, based on 
input from Theater, the Army was able to reduce its estimate from 
17,770 down to a range of between 15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of 
nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do not overstate our 
requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to almost 
12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff and the Joint 
Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet 
warfighters needs for protected mobility; preserve options for 
commanders in the field to make adjustments as force levels and 
situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately.
    Question. Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts?
    Answer. The MRAP has addressed the Army's most critical current 
battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against 
improvised explosive devices) with a capable, survivable and 
sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. However, with 
the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance 
and EOD teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into 
tomorrow's force structure. Training and Doctrine Command is conducting 
a tactical wheeled vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles, 
threats, and capabilities of the various fleets. This analysis includes 
the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial 
results will influence POM decisions, the Force Mix Brief to Congress, 
and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle 
strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our soldiers receive the best 
capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and 
emerging threats.

     SPECIAL UNITS FOR STABILIZATION AND TRAINING/ADVISORY MISSIONS

    Question. On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized 
the role that ``unconventional warfare'' will play in the Army's future 
as well as the need to organize and prepare for a training and advisory 
role. Some, both inside and outside of the Army, have suggested that 
special units or organizations should be established to address these 
mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best 
handled by the Army's full-spectum BCTs and their supporting forces.
    Do you believe special units--such as a Training and Advisory 
Corps--should be established? Please explain.
    Answer. No, I believe future requirements to train and advise 
foreign security forces should be addressed with a combination of 
special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, embassy 
military groups, and Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict 
security cooperation activities will emphasize Special Operations 
Forces, small scale specialized forces, and small deployments of full 
spectrum modular forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post 
conflict efforts will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces.
    The key consideration for training and advising is expertise in 
your core function. For example, U.S. Army infantry, medical, or 
engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime function and 
can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer 
companies. With some additional training and minor task organization 
changes, Army modular forces can be ideally suited to train and advise.

                  U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

    Question. The U.S. Special Operations Command, pursuant to QDR 
guidelines, is currently expanding the size of its Army component. It 
is also working to raise the language proficiency of its Army special 
operators.
    If confirmed, how would you support U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command's (USASOC) end strength growth?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will support USASOC's end strength growth 
as currently planned. QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions 
be increased by one-third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations be increased by 33 percent. The Army has already programmed 
and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, the 
Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this 
growth and ensure it meets operational requirements.
    Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and 
specialized tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength 
will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by 
these specially selected and trained forces. Growth of Special 
Operations Forces is within programmed endstrengh of 547,400 (Active), 
358,200 (National Guard), and 206,000 (Reserve). The growth in Special 
Operations Forces will greatly contribute to the Army's ability to 
confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations.
    Question. What do you see as the best way to enhance language 
skills among Army special operators?
    Answer. The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to 
increase language capability across the force, to include Special 
Operations. The Army trains our language cadre to the minimum 
Interagency Language Roundtable level of 2 for language proficiency, 
with a goal to reach a proficiency of 3. Currently Active component and 
Reserve component soldiers may earn up to $400 per month per language 
depending on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum rate of $1000 
per month. Soldiers who are in language dependent military operation 
specialties, such as special operators, are paid the highest rate based 
on their proficiency for their primary language. This is true even for 
languages such as Spanish, which has been identified as ``dominant in 
the force'' and is not usually authorized for language pay for other 
Army soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to soldiers to 
maintain their proficiency.

                         FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

    Question. FCS is the largest modernization program in the Army. 
Total cost of the program is expected to be $162 billion. The Army's 
FCS includes both manned and robot-controlled weapons linked together 
by a communications network. Army leaders have strongly advocated for 
continued funding and support for FCS, but, in February 2008, Secretary 
of Defense Gates told this committee: ``It is hard for me to see how 
that program can be completed in its entirety. I think that in light of 
what are inevitably going to be pressures on the defense budget in the 
future, I think that that one is one we will have to look at 
carefully.''
    How would you respond to those who question the feasibility and 
affordability of FCS, and who call it ill-defined and technologically 
risky?
    Answer. FCS's precursor technologies have already made a difference 
today in combat. FCS precursor Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and 
robotics show the promise of these emerging capabilities in vital IED 
defeat and route clearance missions. The Army currently is fielding FCS 
Spin-out 1 to the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at Fort Bliss, TX. 
The Army established the AETF so that combat-tested soldiers can test 
and evaluate FCS technologies. Through rigorous testing and phased 
software development the Army is mitigating risk to this ambitious plan 
to deliver needed capabilities.
    FCS is currently less than 3 percent of the Army's base budget. At 
its peak (fiscal year 2015) FCS is projected to be less than a third of 
the Army's investment (RDA) account. That would be less than 8 percent 
of the overall Army budget, assuming that budget stays constant.
    The FCS BCT is designed to be an integrated combat formation that 
delivers the full spectrum. As an adaptive force, we will rigorously 
apply the lessons of combat to the development of the FCS BCT.
    Risk is being carefully managed. The standup of the AETF at a cost 
of 900 soldiers during a time of war is an example of the Army's 
commitment to bring FCS technologies to soldiers for rigorous 
evaluation prior to program decisions.
    Question. Can you explain how FCS addresses the imbalance in the 
Army to which Army leaders have spoken in defending the requirement for 
the capabilities the FCS offers?
    Answer. The current imbalance in the Army is caused by our 
inability to meet the demands placed on the Army to generate the ready 
forces we need to meet global demand.
    The Army is addressing the imbalance by completing its capabilities 
transformation into modular formations, while simultaneously growing 
the size of deployable formations. These actions will increase the 
global force pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training, 
and reduce stress on the current operational force.
    In parallel with these efforts, FCS is our core effort to complete 
the transformation of the Army by providing modular formations vastly 
increased capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. FCS 
achieves these goals by providing the Army increased abilities to 
project our forces, connect soldiers to the network, and protect 
soldiers in this century's complex operating environments. Spin outs 
ensure that we speed these improvements to the Army to meet the needs 
of warfighters who can't wait for needed capabilities.

                          JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

    Question. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) regarding merging two separate small cargo 
aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA).
    In your opinion, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between 
the Army and the Air Force in the JCA program?
    Answer. No. The primary mission of the Army JCA is to transport 
Army time-sensitive mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and personnel to 
forward deployed units, often in remote and austere locations, commonly 
referred to as ``the last tactical mile''. Because of the critical 
nature of this cargo to the success of the tactical ground commander's 
mission and the short-notice of its need (usually less than 24 hours), 
lift assets must be in a direct support relationship to provide the 
necessary responsiveness.
    For sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation performs those 
missions which lie between the strategic and intra-theater missions 
performed by the USAF and the tactical maneuver and movement performed 
by Army rotary wing or ground assets. The JCA will provide point to 
point distribution where effectiveness vice efficiency is critical to 
meeting the ground tactical mission needs, while simultaneously 
continuing to push the majority of supplies forward, maintaining the 
potential synergistic affect between efficiency and effectiveness. The 
JCA, Army and Air Force, is meant to be a complimentary asset.
    The Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
have agreed to examine Intra-theater Air Lift Roles and Missions as 
part of the QDR. In the most recent Air Force-Army Warfighter talks, we 
recommitted our Services to the success of the C-27 program in its 
current format, on the current fielding timeline, and in accordance 
with the current beddown plan. Together, both services will work any 
roles and missions issues that may arise.

           MEDIUM AND HIGH ALTITUDE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

    Question. In a March 5, 2007, memorandum, the Air Force Chief of 
Staff spelled out the case for the Air Force to become the Executive 
Agent (EA) for all medium and high altitude UAVs. General Moseley 
stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive plan to optimize 
the Nation's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.
    What is your understanding of the Army's position regarding the Air 
Force proposal that it be assigned as the EA for medium and high 
altitude UAVs?
    Answer. The Army does not support a single Service as executive 
agent for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The Army supports the Joint 
Staff's 2005 and 2007 decisions to not establish an executive agent for 
UAS (JROC memorandums 043-08 and 136-05), as well as, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense 13 September 2007 decision that, in lieu of a 
single Service designation as executive agent for UAS, directs a UAS 
Task Force (TF) led by the OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (AT&L) to coordinate critical UAS interoperability issues and 
develop a common acquisition path forward.

                        ARMY MEDICAL ACTION PLAN

    Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 
Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) requires the Secretary of Defense to 
report to Congress bi-annually on implementation of the Army Medical 
Action Plan to correct deficiencies identified in the condition of 
facilities and patient administration for wounded and ill soldiers.
    If confirmed, what would be your responsibilities with respect to 
the implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan and compliance with 
the requirements included in the (NDAA)?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the smooth transition of the 
highly effective Army Medical Action Plan Cell to the new Warrior Care 
and Transition Office under the supervision of the Director of the Army 
Staff. The Warrior Care and Transition Office will provide 
Headquarters, Department of the Army oversight, policy, and direction 
to synchronize and integrate the array of Army warrior care initiatives 
and related programs dedicated to the support, care, and healing of 
wounded, injured, and ill soldiers and their families. Through numerous 
monitoring and oversight mechanisms, including the Medical Strategic 
Review Group, I will ensure Army complies with all requirements of the 
NDAA. The Army has prepared an initial report to Congress, which 
details the extraordinary effort and accomplishments made in the first 
year of the Army Medical Action Plan. I look forward to continuing to 
work with Congress on behalf of our wounded, ill, and injured warriors.
    Question. In September 2007 the GAO reported that over half of the 
Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) had significant personnel/staffing 
shortfalls.
    If confirmed, how would you ensure that WTUs are adequately 
resourced to meet the medical and mental health needs of wounded and 
ill soldiers returning from deployments now and in the coming years?
    Answer. In follow-up testimony, February 2008, GAO reported on the 
significant progress the Army has made staffing the 35 WTUs established 
as part of the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Currently 2,655 WTU 
staff members are caring for 9,339 Warriors in Transition and their 
families. If confirmed, I will continue to demand the right level of 
support for our brave men and women whose sacrifice demands no less. I 
also look forward to working with Congress to fund the rapid 
construction, furnishing, and ongoing support of Warrior Transition 
complexes. These healing complexes will co-locate fully accessible 
housing, administrative facilities, and Soldier Family Assistance 
Centers near our Military Treatment Facilities to provide better 
support for our Warriors in Transition and their families.

                   RISE IN SUICIDE RATES IN THE ARMY

    Question. In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Army's current suicide prevention program?
    Answer. We are continuously strengthening and revitalizing our 
suicide prevention efforts. This has never been more important, given 
the higher than normal suicide rates we are experiencing. While engaged 
leadership is key to our efforts, just as important is informing 
soldiers and family members about the risk factors associated with 
suicide, how to identify suicidal behavior, and what actions are needed 
to help at-risk soldiers.
    Our multifaceted approach includes increasing awareness about 
suicide, reducing the stigma associated with seeking care, and 
providing leaders with relevant information they can use to improve 
their suicide prevention efforts at the unit level.
    We recently formed a suicide prevention steering committee composed 
of general officers from across the Army that includes those with 
expertise in the personnel, health care, spiritual, and legal 
communities to provide senior-level oversight of our suicide prevention 
efforts. This group will ensure we have a program that provides robust, 
evidence and research-based resources, programs, and services for all 
aspects of the program.
    The bottom-line is that we must constantly renew our focus on 
leadership and battle buddy involvement both in prevention and 
intervention. It is crucial for all leaders to have access to lessons 
learned from suicide cases (both completions and attempts) to effect 
new programs, services, and policies. We are in the process of creating 
an analysis cell to collect suicide data, analyze trends, develop 
lessons learned, and provide that information up and down the chain on 
a continuous basis.
    We are keenly aware that, despite our efforts, the suicide rate has 
continued to climb. We know that we have to change the culture in the 
Army to reshape attitudes toward those with behavioral health issues.
    Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to 
reduce the incidence of suicide in the Army?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the newly-formed suicide 
prevention flag officer panel. The first priority of this 
multidisciplinary group is to reduce the perceived stigma of soldiers 
seeking help for mental health issues. It is also focused on building 
in our leaders at every level the understanding of the need to 
carefully monitor the welfare of their soldiers and then ensure they 
have the necessary skills to knowledgeably question and intervene when 
they see a soldier who may be at-risk. This involves training that 
begins when soldiers enter the Army and continues through every 
leadership course. Leaders know that it is within their responsibility 
to check on a soldier's living conditions, ask about his/her family, 
and, when he senses that something is not right, to professionally, but 
caringly determine what is going on. I would reemphasize the importance 
of leadership involvement.
    We must also increase our research into the factors that will 
reduce suicide risk in the Army. I'm not convinced that what we know 
about civilian suicides can be translated directly into an actionable 
plan for our population and research in the Army on this issue is 
incomplete. I would task the General Officer Steering Committee to do a 
bottom-up study of the factors related to suicide to ensure that our 
strategy is complete and sufficient.
    We must also help our soldiers and their families to build great 
lives. I am told that four out of five soldiers who commit suicide do 
so because of relationship issues or because of a poor personal 
decision that led to legal problems in his or her life. We must expand 
life skills and relationship training so that soldiers make good 
decisions and avoid the cascade of negative events that is so often the 
precursor to suicide. It is also important to enforce the battle buddy 
in the total Army, emphasizing in interpersonal relationships, 
mentorship, and counseling at first line leader level.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure that senior 
Army leaders take steps to eliminate the stigma associated by soldiers 
with seeking mental health care?
    Answer. We must continue to change our culture that does not place 
a shame on those soldiers who seek mental health assistance. If 
confirmed, I would look at a number of ways in which to continue to 
address this issue. Again, it starts with informed and engaged 
leadership. Leaders who are aware of the impact of uninformed, 
judgmental attitudes on those at risk for suicide are in the best 
position of shifting the culture toward one that better supports those 
in crisis.
    We must increase the number of health care professionals to ensure 
they are present and available to soldiers in units. This includes 
behavioral health professionals and chaplains.
    We have to do better at ensuring that soldiers are completely aware 
of the process, risks, and limits when they access behavioral health 
care. I'm convinced that soldiers don't really understand how low their 
risk is when they seek help and we need to change that paradigm.

           FULL RESOURCING OF WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

    Question. Under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) 
adequate funding must be provided for the operation and sustainment of 
the current Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) until new 
facilities are completed and operational at both National Naval Medical 
Center, Bethesda, MD, and Fort Belvoir in Northern Virginia.
    If confirmed, how would you ensure that all support requirements 
are identified and supported, to include facilities, personnel, 
installation support and medical operations and maintenance?
    Answer. The Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has a very effective 
budgeting system that allocates resources based on workload and 
population health. The MEDCOM will continue to resource WRAMC as a 
fully operational medical center until the fiscal year of closure. The 
budget will not be decremented for any closure-related actions. In 
addition, through the Army Medical Action Plan, we have identified and 
remedied the circumstances that led to problems highlighted at WRAMC 
last year. All support requirements are routinely monitored by the 
MEDCOM, the Army's Installation Management Command, and the Office of 
Warrior Care and Transition.

                          ARMY FAMILY COVENANT

    Question. In the fall of 2007, senior military and civilian leaders 
and installation commanders throughout the Army agreed to the Army 
Family Covenant, a pledge to provide soldiers and their families with 
the level of support that they need and which their level of service 
deserves. The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated that the covenant 
represents a $1.4 billion commitment in 2008 and that Army leadership 
is working to include a similar level in the budget for the next 5 
years.
    What do you view as the most essential quality of life needs 
addressed by the Army Family Covenant?
    Answer. The most essential aspect of the Army Family Covenant is 
its unprecedented level of commitment. Last year, Secretary Geren and 
General Casey asked our soldiers and families to tell us how well the 
Army's systems were supporting them. Soldiers and their families asked 
for more consistent standards and better access throughout the Army to 
Family programs and services, physical and mental healthcare, better 
housing, education, child and youth services, and employment 
opportunities for spouses. The needs addressed in the Army Family 
Covenant represent the voices of soldiers and their families. Each 
facet of the Covenant is interwoven in our Army communities and that is 
what creates a supportive environment in which soldiers and their 
families can live and thrive. We will continue to ask our soldiers and 
families to identify their needs.
    Question. What are the greatest challenges which the Army faces in 
making good on the promises made by the Army Family Covenant, and what 
would you do, if confirmed, to overcome them?
    Answer. The greatest challenges associated with fulfilling the 
promises made in the Army Family Covenant are maintaining a predictable 
level of funding after the next 4 years and at the same time, managing 
the expectations created by our commitment to address the needs of Army 
families. To preserve the All-Volunteer Force, the Army is committed to 
providing soldiers and families a full range of essential services to 
support readiness and retention and enhance family resiliency. The 
Family Covenant is our promise to provide a strong supportive 
environment and our families want to trust and believe in the Family 
Covenant and Army Leadership's commitment. As we enter year seven of 
the war, we must also maintain our ability to respond to the 
unpredictable family requirements the changing environment will 
present. To overcome these challenges, we will balance our requirements 
within the Army to provide for our soldiers and their families and we 
will continue to focus on their specific needs. Taking care of our 
soldiers and their families is essential if we are to sustain our Army 
throughout this era of persistent conflict.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to 
appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of 
Congress and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary 
security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                  February 5, 2008.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chief of 
Staff, United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a 
position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., 
sections 601 and 3034:

                             To be General.

    LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 8425.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, which 
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 
referred, follows:]
           Biographical Sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
    Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
    United States Naval Command and Staff College
    United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
    United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
    North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects
    United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and 
Strategy

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Promotions                      Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.......................................  2 Jun 76
1LT.......................................  2 Jun 78
CPT.......................................  1 Aug 80
MAJ.......................................  1 Dec 86
LTC.......................................  1 Feb 92
COL.......................................  1 Sep 95
BG........................................  1 Jul 99
MG........................................  1 Nov 02
LTG.......................................  1 Jan 05
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              From                        To              Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oct 76..........................  Jan 78............  Support Platoon
                                                       Leader, later
                                                       Firing Platoon
                                                       Leader, C
                                                       Battery, 1st
                                                       Battalion, 41st
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       56th Field
                                                       Artillery
                                                       Brigade, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jan 78..........................  Aug 78............  Survey Officer,
                                                       1st Battalion,
                                                       41st Field
                                                       Artillery, 56th
                                                       Field Artillery
                                                       Brigade, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Aug 78..........................  Oct 79............  Aide-de-Camp to
                                                       the Commanding
                                                       General, 56th
                                                       Field Artillery
                                                       Brigade, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Nov 79..........................  Jul 80............  Student, Field
                                                       Artillery
                                                       Advanced Course,
                                                       Fort Sill, OK
Aug 80..........................  Dec 80............  Liaison Officer,
                                                       1st Battalion,
                                                       73d Field
                                                       Artillery, XVIII
                                                       Airborne Corps,
                                                       Fort Bragg, NC
Dec 80..........................  Dec 82............  Commander, Service
                                                       Battery, later A
                                                       Battery, 1st
                                                       Battalion, 73d
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       XVIII Airborne
                                                       Corps, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC
Dec 82..........................  May 83............  Assistant S-3
                                                       (Operations), 1st
                                                       Battalion, 73d
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       XVLII Airborne
                                                       Corps, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC
Jun 83..........................  May 84............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       3d Battalion, 8th
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       XVIII Airborne
                                                       Corps, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC
Jun 84..........................  Aug 86............  Student, North
                                                       Carolina State
                                                       University,
                                                       Raleigh, NC
Sep 86..........................  Jun 89............  Nuclear Research
                                                       Officer, later
                                                       Chief,
                                                       Acquisition
                                                       Support Division,
                                                       Defense Nuclear
                                                       Agency,
                                                       Alexandria, VA,
                                                       later detailed as
                                                       Military Advisor
                                                       for Arms Control,
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Secretary of
                                                       Defense,
                                                       Washington, DC
Jun 89..........................  Jun 90............  Student, United
                                                       States Naval
                                                       Command and Staff
                                                       Course, Newport,
                                                       RI
Jul 90..........................  Dec 90............  Executive Officer,
                                                       2d Battalion, 3d
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       3d Armored
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Dec 90..........................  Jun 91............  Executive Officer,
                                                       Division
                                                       Artillery, 3d
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany and
                                                       Operations Desert
                                                       Shield/Storm,
                                                       Saudi Arabia
Jun 91..........................  May 92............  Executive Officer,
                                                       42d Field
                                                       Artillery
                                                       Brigade, V Corps,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jun 92..........................  Jun 94............  Commander, 2d
                                                       Battalion, 8th
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       7th Infantry
                                                       Division (Light),
                                                       Fort Ord, CA,
                                                       (relocated to
                                                       Fort Lewis, WA)
Jun 94..........................  Jun 95............  Student, United
                                                       States Army War
                                                       College, Carlisle
                                                       Barracks, PA
Jun 95..........................  Jun 97............  Commander,
                                                       Division
                                                       Artillery, 1st
                                                       Cavalry Division,
                                                       Fort Hood, TX
Jun 97..........................  Aug 98............  Chief of Staff, V
                                                       Corps, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Aug 98..........................  Jul 99............  Assistant Division
                                                       Commander
                                                       (Support), 1st
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany to
                                                       include duty as
                                                       Deputy Commanding
                                                       General for
                                                       Ground
                                                       Operations, Task
                                                       Force Hawk,
                                                       Operation Allied
                                                       Force, Albania
Jul 99..........................  Jul 01............  Director, Force
                                                       Management,
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Deputy Chief of
                                                       Staff for
                                                       Operations and
                                                       Plans, United
                                                       States Army,
                                                       Washington, DC
Oct 01..........................  Aug 04............  Commanding
                                                       General, 4th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Hood, TX,
                                                       and Operation
                                                       Iraqi Freedom,
                                                       Iraq
Aug 04..........................  Oct 04............  Special Assistant
                                                       to Vice Chief of
                                                       Staff, United
                                                       States Army,
                                                       Washington, DC
Oct 04..........................  May 06............  Assistant to the
                                                       Chairman of the
                                                       Joint Chiefs of
                                                       Staff, Office of
                                                       the Joint Chiefs
                                                       of Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
May 06..........................  Feb 08............  Commanding
                                                       General, III
                                                       Corps/Commander,
                                                       Multi-National
                                                       Corps-Iraq,
                                                       Operation Iraqi
                                                       Freedom, Iraq
Feb 08..........................  Present...........  Commanding
                                                       General, III
                                                       Corps and Fort
                                                       Hood, Fort Hood,
                                                       TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Dates               Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Research Officer, later   Sep 86-Jun 89.....  Captain/Major
 Chief, Acquisition Support
 Division, Defense Nuclear
 Agency, Alexandria, VA, later
 detailed as Military' Advisor
 for Arms Control, Office of the
 Secretary of Defense,
 Washington, DC.
Assistant to the Chairman of the  Oct 04-May 06.....  Lieutenant General
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office
 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


U.S. decorations and badges:
    Defense Distinguished Service Medal
    Distinguished Service Medal
    Defense Superior Service Medal
    Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Bronze Star Medal
    Defense Meritorious Service Medal
    Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Army Commendation Medal
    Army Achievement Medal
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
    Army Staff Identification Badge
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Raymond T. 
Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.

                    Part A--Biographical Information

    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Raymond T. Odierno.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.

    3. Date of nomination:
    February 5, 2008.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    September 8, 1954; Dover, NJ.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name: Burkarth).

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Anthony, 29; Kathrin, 27; Michael, 21.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary 
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local 
governments, other than those listed above.
    None.

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    American Legion (Member), Association of the United States Army 
(Member), 4th Infantry Division Association (Member), 8th Field 
Artillery Regimental Affiliation (Member), the 9th Infantry Regiment 
Association (Member), and the 1st Cavalry Division Association 
(Member).

    11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, 
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly 
constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes, I do.

    13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly 
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes, I do.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                Raymond T. Odierno.
    This 4th day of February, 2008.

    [The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was 
withdrawn by the President on April 30, 2008.]
                              ----------                              

    [Prepared questions submitted to LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, 
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied 
follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly 
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities 
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These 
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and 
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and 
education and in the execution of military operations.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. The current transformation of DOD--the largest since World 
War II, as prescribed in our national defense and military strategies 
and quadrennial defense reviews since 2001, was in many ways enabled 
through Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act of 1986--in this regard I 
would assess that the provisions continue to remain relevant and 
effective. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the conduct of our 
joint operations and make recommendations as required. It is 
imperative, however, to apply similar reform to interagency authorities 
and relationships we must apply and integrate effectively all elements 
of our national power to the challenges that face the Nation today and 
tomorrow.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. The emerging strategic environment presents more complex 
asymmetrical challenges, regionally and globally, that demand broader 
and more integrated cooperation of agencies within our own government, 
and with those of our partners around the world. The employment of all 
elements of our national power, and that of our partners, must be 
applied in an integrated fashion. We should seek to continue efforts 
such as Beyond Goldwater Nichols, the Project for National Security 
Reform, and Project Horizon, so we can codify a framework of 
interagency authorities, relationships, and capabilities that more 
effectively bring to bare all elements of national power to strategic 
challenges facing us now and in the future.

                                 DUTIES

    Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of 
the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United 
States Forces Korea?
    Answer. The Commander, United Nations Command (CDRUNC), serves as 
commander of an international command and is responsible for 
maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDRUNC 
acts in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and 
directives. The CDRUNC also acts in accordance with directives from the 
U.S. Government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense 
through the Chairman, keeping CDRUSPACOM informed. The CDRUNC is 
responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control 
of forces, conduct of combat operations and acceptance and integration 
of UNC member nations' forces during contingencies. This includes 
enabling access to the seven UNC bases in Japan.
    The Commander, Combined Forces Command (CDRCFC), as commander of a 
binational command, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters 
hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, 
should deterrence fail, defeat an external armed attack. In this 
position, he is responsible for receiving strategic direction and 
missions from the ROK-U.S. Military Committee, which acts as the 
strategic coordinating interface for ROK and U.S. national authorities. 
The missions and functions for the CDRCFC are prescribed in the Terms 
of Reference for the Military Committee and in the US/ROK Military 
Committee Strategic Directive No. 2.
    The Commander, United States Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), as a sub-
unified commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), is responsible 
for all duties and functions associated with title 10, U.S.C., the 
Unified Command Plan, and CJCSI 5130. This role provides the U.S. with 
the means to provide forces to CDR UNC/CFC as required, and to support 
these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy 
initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.
    Question. What background and experience, including joint duty 
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform 
these duties?
    Answer. The situation in Korea reflects all aspects of both the 
asymmetrical challenges of the new strategic environment, and our need 
to transform plans, posture, capabilities and relationships with our 
partners and allies to better meet those challenges. Our alliance in 
Korea is one that is transforming into a broad strategic relationship 
that has peninsular, regional, and global components to better meet 
each of those challenges. I have served in Korea at times when we 
focused predominately on the traditional and symmetrical threat of 
North Korea, and I am very familiar with that aspect of the threat that 
remains on the peninsula. I have also served in a number of 
Peacekeeping and Multinational assignments that would be beneficial in 
my role as UNC Commander, and would also allow me to develop further 
our global partnership with the ROK--a steadfast and significant 
contributor to stability and security operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Most recently, my positions on the Joint Staff provide me 
the background and expertise on the transformation of our military to 
meet traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges 
that face us today and tomorrow--and North Korea is a prime example of 
a threat that has evolved asymmetrically over the last few decades. 
This experience positions me well to continue assessment, integration, 
and implementation of plans to transform the alliance with South Korea 
and maximize the strategic relevance and value of that alliance. If 
confirmed, I will effectively apply U.S. policies and strategies with 
our ROK Ally, and will provide valuable assessments and recommendations 
to our defense and national leadership to better shape those policies 
and strategies.
    Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to 
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, 
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, United States Forces 
Korea?
    Question. If confirmed, I intend to conduct in-depth discussions 
and assessments with key personnel and analysts from relevant ROK and 
U.S. Government agencies as well as non-governmental specialists. 
Throughout my time in command, I will continue this dialogue with ROK 
and U.S. leaders to improve my understanding of all aspects of the 
evolving situation within the Korean theater.

                             RELATIONSHIPS

    Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the 
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense 
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant 
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, 
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please 
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, 
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces 
Korea with the following officials:
    The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commands, the Inspector 
General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DOD 
Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, and 
commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by 
the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices 
are assigned by the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. CDR 
UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense, and through him to the 
President, while at the same time keeping the Commander, USPACOM, 
informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A 
validated binational ROK-U.S. document provides further guidance on CDR 
CFC's unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military 
Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
    Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of 
Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.
    Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
    Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the 
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and 
advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional 
areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within 
their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda 
that implement policy approved by the Secretary.
    Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
    Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the 
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and 
advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional 
areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within 
their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda 
that implement policy approved by the Secretary.
    Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal 
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and 
the Secretary of Defense. CDR UNC communicates through the Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.
    Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
    Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., provides that, subject to authority, 
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the 
authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces 
that are assigned to unique and specified commands.
    Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
    Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the 
organization, training, and equipping of the Services, under Title 10, 
U.S.C. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. They also 
provide military advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff 
and the Secretary of Defense as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Question. The other combatant commanders, especially the Commander, 
United States Pacific Command
    Answer. COMUSKOREA, as commander of a sub-unified command of 
USPACOM, reports directly to the Commander, USPACOM, on matters 
directly pertaining to U.S. Forces Korea areas of responsibility. CDR 
UNC and CDR CFC keeps the Commander, USPACOM, informed of any 
communications with U.S. national authorities.

                     MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces 
Command/United States Forces Korea?
    Answer. The major challenges include maintaining readiness and 
deterrence, while implementing the transformation of U.S. forces in 
Korea and implementation of the plan to transfer wartime operational 
control to the ROK. Readiness of U.S. forces will be my primary near-
term focus if confirmed for this position. The ROK-U.S. Alliance must 
be ``ready to fight tonight'' due to the proximity and lethality of the 
threat. A highly trained and ready force provides stability and 
mitigates risk. Sustaining readiness requires tough, realistic 
training; appropriate levels of manning and modern equipment; training 
infrastructure; and a quality of life which supports and sustains our 
people. I am personally committed to ensuring that the combat readiness 
of our forces in Korea.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for 
addressing these challenges and problems?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our forces remain vigilant 
and well-prepared, by maintaining readiness and rigorous training and 
exercises. If confirmed I will immediately review these elements to 
ensure that we are as strong and as ready as we can possibly be. I will 
devote myself to maintaining the strong Alliance between the United 
States and the Republic of Korea. A strong, healthy, and capable 
Alliance is necessary to meet the challenges we face on the Korean 
Peninsula. Should deterrence fail, combined forces must be, and will 
be, ready to defeat North Korean aggression.

                              NORTH KOREA

    Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near term 
threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia.
    What is your assessment of the current security situation on the 
Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to 
verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?
    Answer. North Korea remains the primary threat to security in 
Northeast Asia. Notwithstanding progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks 
and the ongoing disablement of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor 
facility, North Korea's historical opposition to meaningful reform and 
its long-term pattern of provocative behavior and proliferation present 
significant challenges to achieving lasting regional and global 
stability. In addition to North Korea's nuclear threat, its missile 
program, coupled with its aging but still lethal and forward positioned 
conventional force, continues to present significant challenges. All 
elements of U.S. and partner national power must be applied to achieve 
our combating WMD objectives. Nonproliferation diplomatic efforts, such 
as the Six-Party Talks negotiations, in addition to 
Counterproliferation, and Consequence Management plans, capabilities, 
and posture, are part of a comprehensive strategy to combat WMD. We 
must maintain readiness across this spectrum and employ our 
capabilities consistently and appropriately.
    Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South 
Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile 
and weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the export of those 
capabilities?
    Answer. The October 2006 nuclear test at the Punggye facility 
supported previous assessments that North Korea had produced nuclear 
weapons. Prior to the test, it is assessed that North Korea produced 
enough plutonium jars for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons. 
According to recent assessments, North Korea pursued a Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) capability at least in the past, and the Intelligence 
Community (IC) judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort 
continues today. If fully developed, an HEU capability could provide an 
alternative method of nuclear weapons development independent of its 
plutonium production facility at Yongbyon. The IC remains uncertain 
about Kim Jong-Il's commitment to full denuclearization, as he promised 
in the October 2007 Six-Party Agreement.
    North Korea continues to build missiles of increasing range, 
lethality, and accuracy, bolstering its current stockpile of 800 
missiles for its defense and external sales. With its test of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile that can possibly reach the western 
United States, conducted in July 2006, and preparations underway to 
field a new intermediate range missile capable of striking Okinawa, 
Guam and Alaska, North Korea's missile development program presents a 
threat which cannot be ignored.
    Question. What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional 
capabilities and readiness?
    Answer. Despite economic hardship, North Korea retains the fourth 
largest armed Force in the world with 1.2 million active duty and 5 
million Reserves, devoting up to one third of its available resources 
to sustain its conventional and asymmetric military capabilities. 
Though aging and unsophisticated by U.S. and ROK standards, its 
military arsenal, which includes 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and 
over 13,000 artillery systems, still constitutes a substantial threat. 
Seventy percent of North Korea's ground forces are located within 90 
miles of the Demilitarized Zone, with up to 250 long range artillery 
systems capable of striking the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area, a 
thriving urban area of over 20 million inhabitants. North Korea still 
has the capacity to inflict major destruction and significant military 
and civilian casualties in South Korea, with little to no warning.
    Question. What, if anything, should be done to strengthen 
deterrence on the Korean peninsula?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage both the U.S. and ROK to 
sustain the ongoing transformation initiatives and capabilities 
enhancement programs. This includes implementation of the Strategic 
Transition Plan, signed by General Bell and the ROK CJCS in June 2007, 
which establishes a roadmap to achieve OPCON transition in 2012, while 
maintaining an effective deterrent and warfighting capability. Our 
transformation and realignment initiatives ongoing throughout the 
Pacific, enhance deterrence on the peninsula, in the region, and align 
us more effectively globally--we must continue these efforts.

                  BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES

    Question. The current Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, recently 
testified that there is a current need for additional PAC-3 missile 
defense systems to counter North Korea's missile inventory.
    What is your assessment of the missile defense priorities of U.S. 
Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?
    Answer. PAC-3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved 
munitions have significantly enhanced our ability to protect critical 
United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. However, there is a 
significant shortage of PAC-3 missiles currently available on the 
peninsula to counter the North Korean missile threat.
    The Republic of Korea does not currently possess a Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) capability that can fully integrate with U.S. BMD 
systems. The ROK recently announced plans to purchase eight 
Configuration-2 Patriot firing units. When fielded, these firing units 
will possess a localized theater ballistic missile defensive capability 
for key sites.
    In the near term, the Republic of Korea must develop a systematic 
missile defense solution to protect its critical civilian and military 
command capabilities, critical infrastructure and population centers. 
South Korean military and civilian facilities are currently highly 
vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks.
    Question. What missile defense systems and capabilities do you 
believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of 
these commands?
    Answer. Continued production of PAC-3 missiles and development of 
the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Airborne Laser, and 
AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense are needed to provide the layered, 
systematic missile defense capability to required protect critical 
United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. The ROK has 
announced plans to purchase much needed Configuration-2 Patriot firing 
units and will begin the process of integration with U.S. BMD systems.

                  NORTH KOREA-POW-MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS

    Question. From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North 
Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American 
servicemembers who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the 
spring of 2005, the United States unilaterally halted the program.
    In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to 
repatriate the remains of American servicemembers found in North Korea? 
If so, when, or under what conditions, should the United States resume 
such cooperation?
    Answer. The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) 
has responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of 
Korean War remains and provides DOD oversight over the entire personnel 
accounting process. The United Nations Command (UNC) assists DPMO and 
the USPACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) in arranging 
operational and logistics support to remains recovery operations in 
North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts repatriation ceremonies after 
remains are transferred to UNC control at the joint security area at 
the end of each operation.
    Once national policymakers determine that conditions permit 
reengagement with North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. negotiating 
team. If U.S. and North Korean representatives can reach a mutually 
agreeable arrangement that provides the necessary process and 
procedures to conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this 
humanitarian effort. The arrangement must address the safety and 
security of U.S. personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea. 
When U.S. commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to 
U.S. personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North 
Korea.
    Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart 
cooperation with North Korea on the POW-MIA remains recovery program?
    Answer. National policymakers will decide when to restart remains 
recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.-North 
Korea policy issue. However, when the decision is made, the United 
Nations Command will continue to play a key role in supporting remains 
recovery operations in North Korea.

                     MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS

    Question. In your view, what is the value of military-to-military 
relations, in general?
    Answer. Military-to-military relations are an essential part of 
establishing and maintaining overall relationships with our partners. 
They help to develop mutual respect and facilitate security cooperation 
amongst partner nations to better meet challenges that impact our 
common national interests and values. Additionally, often from our 
military relationships emerge stronger socio-political and economic 
ones--as recently symbolized by our U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement, 
signed on June 30, 2007.
    Military-to-military relationships with countries that present 
significant security and stability challenges, as in the case of North 
Korea, are mandatory and critical to crisis management and tension 
reduction.
    Question. What is your assessment of the current climate in 
military-to-military professional relationships and interoperability at 
all levels between U.S. and ROK forces?
    Answer. The current military relationship is one of mutual respect 
and trust, bolstered by the very professional nature of both of our 
militaries. ROK officers regularly attend our professional development 
schools and U.S. officers do the same in ROK schools. U.S. doctrine not 
only forms the basis of our combined defense system, epitomized by the 
Combined Forces Command, but it is also the basis for much of the ROK's 
military doctrine. Our doctrine also allows us to operate effectively 
with partners through independent parallel command structures, as we 
will achieve with the Republic of Korea in 2012, and in multinational 
command structures as what currently exists under United Nations 
Command or in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In large part, this is 
of great credit to the professionalism, training, expertise, and 
experience of the ROK military. ROK and U.S. forces have exercised and 
operated together for over 50 years, providing a foundation of shared 
experience that solidifies a professional bond that only continues to 
grow and will flourish under any command relationship. This has been 
proven time and again in our relationship on the peninsula, and in our 
relationship with the ROK military as strategic partners in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
    Operationally, while interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces 
has improved, there are issues that must be resolved. For instance, 
advanced U.S. warfighting capability has resulted in greater employment 
of precision-guided munitions. The ROK military needs to invest to 
balance its ability to put airborne weapons on target to provide more 
effective use of these assets. Many similar interoperability issues 
have been identified and the ROK military endeavors to resolve these 
matters. If confirmed, I will assess interoperability further and seek 
to reduce, if not eliminate, any interoperability shortfalls.
    Question. What would be the value, in your opinion, of military-to-
military relations with North Korea?
    Answer. The United States and North Korea currently maintain 
limited relations through representatives of the United Nations Command 
side of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) and the (north) 
Korean People's Army at Panmunjom. This channel gives the U.S., through 
the U.N. Command, an opportunity to discuss any issue of relevance, but 
is limited by North Korea's intransigence toward meetings on 
substantive issues. These relations are vital to maintaining the 1953 
Armistice Agreement. Issues of an administrative and operational nature 
must be worked out through the United Nations Command Military 
Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. This is a consistent and proven 
channel with which the two countries can and do maintain military 
communications.
    Question. If confirmed, what, if any, action would you take to 
increase the quality and quantity of military contacts between the 
United States and North Korea?
    Answer. The starting point for improvement in U.S. and North Korean 
mil-to-mil contacts is North Korea's return to active participation in 
Military Armistice Commission (MAC) General Officer Talks, as called 
for by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. In 1991 North Korea unilaterally 
stopped participating in these talks. General Officer Talks between the 
UNCMAC, which includes a U.S. General Officer, and the Korean People's 
Army at Panmunjom can provide an opportunity and appropriate level for 
discussing matters of mutual military concern.

                 REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)--U.S. ALLIANCE

    Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has 
been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This 
relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.
    What is your understanding of the current U.S. security 
relationship with the ROK?
    Answer. The current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is 
governed by the Mutual Defense Treaty as entered into force from 
November 1954. In particular, the treaty's requirement that both the 
U.S. and ROK maintain and develop appropriate means to deter and, if 
deterrence should fail, defeat an armed external attack continues to 
serve as the cornerstone of the relationship. Both the U.S. and the ROK 
remain fully committed to the treaty's provisions and the mutual 
defense of both nations. We are also an alliance that is currently 
evolving into a broader strategic partnership based on common interests 
in the peninsula, region, and world.
    Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to 
improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that I maintain the strong 
U.S.-ROK security relationship that has preserved stability, promoted 
democracy, and deterred external aggression for the past 55 years. I 
will also continue to help develop our alliance into a broader 
strategic partnership that is reflective of our two nations' common 
interests and concerns in the region and globally.
    Question. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability 
trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in 
ROK equipment and training of their personnel?
    Answer. Answer is combined with the response to the question below.
    Question. What is your assessment of ROK current and projected 
military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater 
role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for 
commanding and controlling the warfighting, readiness, and operations 
of their own forces in wartime (``OPCON Transfer'')?
    Answer. The ROK military is fully capable, highly professional and 
competent. The ROK currently exercises daily command and control of all 
of its 677,000-man armed forces, and is working to assume primary 
responsibility for the lead role in its defense in 2012.
    ROK Defense Reform 2020 plan will create a more modern and agile 
fighting force. The ROK military modernization goal is to develop a 
self-reliant, technology-oriented, qualitative defense force. As a 
result of its emphasis on technology under this plan, the ROK plans to 
reduce its total (Active and Reserve) Army ground forces by 
approximately 45 percent over the next 12 years leading up to its 
target date of 2020. The overall Active and Reserve Forces will be 
reduced from about 3.7 million to about 2 million.
    In September 2006, the Presidents of the United States and the 
Republic of Korea agreed that South Korea should assume the lead for 
its own defense. In early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK 
Minister of National Defense determined that South Korea will assume 
wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 2012. The ROK 
military will assume responsibility/or commanding and controlling the 
warfighting readiness and operations of their own forces in wartime/or 
the first time since the end of the Korean War. The ROK will form a 
national warfighting headquarters provisionally described as the ROK 
Joint Forces Command (JFC). U.S. Forces Korea will transform into a new 
joint warfighting command provisionally described as Korea Command 
(KORCOM). KORCOM will be a fully capable and resourced complementary 
U.S. joint warfighting command in a doctrinally supporting role to the 
ROK JFC. The current U.S.-led combined warfighting command, Combined 
Forces Command, will be disestablished. If confirmed, I will ensure 
that U.S. and ROK combined capabilities continue to maintain a strong 
and credible deterrent, and remain highly capable, should deterrence 
fail, of defeating a North Korean attack quickly and decisively during 
the transition period.

            DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

    Question. In the last decade, domestic opinion in the ROK with 
regard to the American presence and relations with the North Korea has 
increasingly split along generational lines, with younger Koreans being 
more skeptical of relations with the United States while the older 
generation is much more content with the status quo.
    If confirmed, how would you see your role and responsibility in the 
light of these changes in the ROK body politic?
    Answer. If confirmed, my role and duties as Commander, United 
Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea will 
remain as described by appropriate governing U.S., ROK-U.S., and U.N. 
documents. My requirement to maintain the Armistice; deter or, should 
deterrence fail, defeat external aggression; and discharge all title 10 
and Unified Command Plan duties and responsibilities will remain the 
same throughout my tenure, despite any changes to the ROK body politic. 
I would also add that an enduring, but transformed U.S. presence in and 
alliance with South Korea is recognized by both nations as essential to 
our common interests--the transformation of our alliance keeps it a 
relevant and valuable enabler, not obstacle, to maintaining peace and 
stability on the peninsula and in the region. President Lee in recent 
speeches supports enduring U.S. presence on the peninsula, and has 
stated a desire to expand our relationship into a broader alliance 
reflective of our common interests on the peninsula, in the region, and 
globally.

                            REGIONAL POSTURE

    Question. In your opinion, how should the U.S. employ its forces in 
Korea to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best 
respond to military threats, provide support for out-of-area 
contingencies, and maintain readiness?
    Answer. Transformation and realignment of forces in Korea is not 
something that has occurred outside of DOD transformation and global 
defense posture initiatives, but a highly successful example of our 
strategy. Our ongoing bilateral transformation and realignment efforts 
in Korea and Japan--and the rest of the Pacific, ensure we maintain the 
right balance and integration of command and control, and capabilities 
in the region to meet bilateral defense obligations, enhance regional 
security cooperation, and better meet global challenges. U.S. Forces in 
Korea should possess the capability to meet our mutual defense treaty 
commitments to the Republic of Korea, while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to deploy forces to meet regional and global contingency 
requirements. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA) continually 
assesses force requirements on the Korean peninsula through CDRUSPACOM 
to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will ensure that I gain a 
full understanding of the security environment on the peninsula so that 
I can provide my assessment and recommendations to continue proper 
shaping of our ongoing transformation and realignment efforts.

                      CONSOLIDATION OF U.S. FORCES

    Question. The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the 
combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in 
and around Camp Humphrey, South of Seoul. New construction of 
facilities and infrastructure required to support the consolidation is 
being carried out using funds from both the Host Nation and United 
States military construction accounts. The Yongsan Relocation Plan 
proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan 
compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey, Korea, as well. This relocation is 
to be largely funded by the Korean Government.
    What is your assessment of the current status of the two 
consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?
    Answer. Both the LPP and YRP are being executed simultaneously and 
are proceeding ahead. To consolidate 2nd Infantry Division, the U.S. 
goal is to close a total of 63 facilities and areas, comprising two 
thirds of all land granted under the SOFA, and totaling more than 
38,000 acres. To date, the U.S. has closed 37 installations 
encompassing over 17,208 acres with a tax assessed value of over $500 
million and returned 35 installations to the Republic of Korea. Both 
sides are working together to develop the land and construct the 
facilities under our internationally agreed plans to relocate U.S. 
forces in support of both U.S. and ROK national objectives.
    Question. What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be 
incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations'?
    Answer. As part of the YRP signed by the U.S. and the ROK in 2004, 
the Republic of Korea agreed to provide at their expense the majority 
of the required buildings and infrastructure at a cost of billions of 
dollars. The ROK is aggressively pursuing their agreed to requirements, 
already spending nearly $2 billion in pursuit of project goals. For our 
part, the United States agreed to provide the majority of required 
family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force, 
at a cost we estimate to be between $1 and $2 billion. Regarding the 
relocation of the 2ID under the LPP, the United States intends to fund 
the requirements using both appropriated funds and host nation provided 
burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of the total cost to carry out the 
two consolidations will be approximately $2.4 billion.

                  HOST NATION BURDEN-SHARING PROGRAMS

    Question. Two programs supported by the Republic of Korea, the 
Combined Defense Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded 
Construction Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. 
military facility and infrastructure requirements.
    What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the 
burden-sharing arrangement?
    Answer. In principle, both the U.S. and the Republic of Korea agree 
to the goal of reaching an equitable level of commitment to allied 
burden sharing. The U.S. Department of Defense position is that to 
achieve equitability, South Korea should share approximately 50 percent 
of U.S. costs of stationing forces on the peninsula excluding military 
pay. This year the ROK provided the United States with $787 million in 
burden sharing funds, which is expected to offset approximately 43 
percent of U.S. non-personnel stationing costs. While this year's 
contribution did not meet DOD's goal, the ROK and the U.S. continue to 
negotiate toward a more equitable level of burden sharing.
    Question. What priorities would you establish for U.S. forces in 
Korea to make the best use of these programs?
    Answer. The next allied burden sharing agreement must be negotiated 
for a longer term than the 2-year agreements of the recent past to 
provide stability and predictability for both sides. In that agreement, 
it is vital to the Alliance to achieve an equitable level of cost 
sharing as well as the ability for the command to apportion host nation 
funds into the agreed categories to meet command priorities. Over the 
next several years, as U.S. forces in Korea transform and consolidate 
south of Seoul, if confirmed, I will have to balance my construction 
priorities with labor and logistics requirements. Our highest priority 
will be to apply burden sharing funds against the requirement to move 
2ID south of Seoul under the Land Partnership Plan.

            TRAINING OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

    Question. In the past few years as U.S. forces in Korea have drawn 
down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army and Air 
Force units based on the peninsula has emerged as a significant 
concern.
    Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to 
training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close 
air support missions and other Air Force operations?
    Answer. The ground training requirements for U.S. forces in Korea 
are currently being met. Current access to air-to-ground training 
ranges in the Republic of Korea has improved significantly in the past 
2 years. Additional arrangements must still be made with the South 
Korean Government to further improve access; however, I understand USFK 
is pleased with the progress being made. If confirmed, I will continue 
to work closely with our ROK ally to facilitate access that provides 
the training opportunities necessary to maintain the combat readiness 
of our entire force.
    Question. In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet 
the training requirements of U.S. forces?
    Answer. The current inventory and facility replacement plan for 
ground maneuver training ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground 
forces training requirements. We are working closely with the Republic 
of Korea to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for 
our air component. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our ally 
to improve and modernize all available training facilities to ensure 
force readiness requirements are met.

                        FAMILY HOUSING IN KOREA

    Question. The Commander of United States Forces in Korea has 
proposed to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea on 
accompanied tours, thereby increasing the number of families in Korea. 
This would require the construction of additional housing and community 
support facilities at U.S. installations in Korea.
    To what extent, if any, do you believe the percentage of personnel 
sent to Korea on accompanied tours should be increased?
    Answer. In 55 years, the Republic of Korea has transformed from a 
war ravaged country to one of the most modern, progressive, and 
democratic countries in the world. Unfortunately. the U.S. still 
rotates servicemembers on 1 year unaccompanied assignments as though 
South Korea remains an active combat zone. While supporting other long-
term contingency operations, the U.S. needlessly contributes to family 
separations with the current 1 year unaccompanied rotation policy in 
Korea. Additionally, the ROK-U.S. Alliance is emerging into a broader 
strategic partnership and it is in our mutual interests to maintain 
enduring, but transformed presence on the peninsula--more reflective of 
that partnership. Normalized tours offer many benefits and contribute 
greatly to enhancing our broad strategic alliance with Korea. We should 
maximize the number of accompanied tours and normalize U.S. 
servicemember tour lengths in Korea to 3-year family accompanied tours 
and 2-year unaccompanied tours for our married and single 
servicemembers, similar to our policies in Japan and Europe. This new 
policy can be implemented with an infrastructure expansion plan over 10 
to 15 years, with costs being supported by burden sharing contributions 
from the Republic of Korea.
    The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved 
continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional, 
institutional, and cultural knowledge. The end-state will result in 
reduced entitlement costs and an overall savings as we decrease the 
number of servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements 
resulting from family separations.

                            QUALITY OF LIFE

    Question. Through recent investment in quality of life amenities, 
to include housing, health care and recreation, the Department has 
worked to achieve the goal of making Korea an ``assignment of choice'' 
for U.S. Forces.
    What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life 
programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if 
confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard'?
    Answer. I believe the three most essential elements supporting 
military life in any assignment are quality living and working 
conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational 
opportunities for dependent family members. General Bell made 
tremendous efforts to make improvements in these areas for our 
servicemembers. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate, as my 
predecessors have, for the best possible conditions for all three so 
that our men and women have the quality of life that they deserve while 
serving so far from home.

                     KOREA ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY

    Question. Assignment incentive pay was approved in 2003 for 
soldiers who agreed to extend their tours of duty in Korea. Since that 
time, payment of an overseas cost-of-living allowance was also 
approved.
    In your opinion, is eligibility for assignment incentive pay for 
duty in Korea still necessary and cost-effective?
    Answer. With the authorization of a cost-of-living allowance (COLA) 
and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) in Korea, pay disparity for our 
servicemembers in the ROK has been greatly improved. By extending tours 
through AIP, we improve readiness and increase stability. From a fiscal 
standpoint, the incentive pay a servicemember receives for extending 
his or her tour is less than the costs borne by the government to move 
two servicemembers (one to Korea, one from Korea). The combined effect 
of reduced PCS costs, increased readiness and greater stability in 
Korea is a win/win situation. AIP has been a huge success with over 
19,000 soldiers and airmen signing up for incentive pay with an 
estimated net savings of $112 million in reduced PCS costs. However, 
while AIP has been a major success from a fiscal perspective, for our 
unaccompanied servicemembers--over 80 percent of our authorized force 
in Korea-accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in the 
States. Rather than providing incentives to unaccompanied personnel to 
stay longer in Korea, we should focus on enabling servicemembers to 
bring their families to Korea and establish a more family oriented 
environment. With tour length normalization in Korea, in accordance 
with DOD overseas basing policies such as those in Europe and Japan, we 
could end the Assignment Incentive Pay program.

                 MEDICAL CARE FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

    Question. One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea 
is ensuring access to high quality medical care for servicemembers of 
all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of 
command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-
command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other 
factors, have presented challenges. Reforms proposed have included: (1) 
establishment of a joint military medical command for Korea to 
streamline command and control of health care delivery for all 
personnel, (2) development of a managed care support contract for 
Korea, and (3) offering a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members 
and DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship.
    If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the 
management and delivery of health care services in Korea?
    Answer. Quality health care is essential for all servicemembers, 
regardless of where they serve. However, this is even more important 
for our servicemembers who serve in Korea--thousands of miles from 
home. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful and thorough review of the 
availability of quality health care for our servicemembers and their 
families.
    Question. What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding 
support to non-command sponsored family members should be reconsidered 
and revised by the Department of Defense?
    Answer. General Bell has made extraordinary strides for non-command 
sponsored family members by ensuring access and availability of the 
full range of services, entitlements and privileges for all dependent 
family members who reside with their military, DOD civilian employee, 
or invited contractor sponsor in Korea. If confirmed, I will continue 
General Bell's efforts by placing special emphasis on critical areas of 
support for servicemember families such as TRICARE medical and dental 
programs as well as tuition assistance for dependent children. This may 
require addressing current DOD policies on non-command sponsored 
dependents.

                             SEXUAL ASSAULT

    Question. What is your assessment of the progress that the Army has 
made in the last 2 years in the promulgation of policy on sexual 
assault, and what do you think will be your biggest challenge in 
achieving the changes in programs, training and implementation if 
confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea?
    Answer. I believe that the Army has made great strides in ensuring 
the promulgation of its policy on sexual assault. General Bell has made 
preventing sexual assault a priority, as well as his policy which is to 
eliminate any occurrence of this crime within United States Forces 
Korea. If confirmed I will maintain General Bell's command focus upon 
awareness and prevention of sexual assault.

                    PREVENTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

    Question. Following media reports connecting prostitution and human 
trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, U.S. Forces 
Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal 
activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, 
all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and 
their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including 
observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and 
establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.
    What effects on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking 
have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented 
by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking 
in Korea?
    Answer. Changes in U.S. policy have decreased the incidents of 
prostitution and human trafficking in Korea. General Bell has 
instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding prostitution and human 
trafficking within United States Forces Korea. The current USFK 
strategy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement has 
been a success, and, if confirmed, I will continue this approach.
    Question. What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment 
to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
    Answer. I believe that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
extant military regulations are sufficient to ensure the efficacy of 
the zero tolerance policy. I would be willing to offer any 
recommendations to this committee should I see the need to do so in the 
future.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to further 
enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue General Bell's zero tolerance 
policy and strategy of awareness, identification, reduction and 
enforcement. I will maintain command focus to further enhance the 
policy's effectiveness.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, 
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations 
Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                 February 14, 2008.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment in the United States 
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance 
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                             To be General

    LTG Walter L. Sharp, 4862.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, which 
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 
referred, follows:]

            Biographical Sketch of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
    Armor Officer Basic Course
    Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course
    United States Army Command and General Staff College
    United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
    United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
    Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute - MS - Operations Analysis/
Engineering

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Promotions                      Dates of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.......................................  5 Jun 74
1LT.......................................  5 Jun 76
CPT.......................................  8 Aug 78
MAJ.......................................  1 Jan 85
LTC.......................................  1 Apr 90
COL.......................................  1 Sep 93
BG........................................  1 Oct 97
MG........................................  1 Jan 01
LTG.......................................  10 Mar 03
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              From                        To               Assigment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apr 75..........................  May 77............  Platoon Leader, A
                                                       Company, later
                                                       Executive
                                                       Officer, B
                                                       Company, 1st
                                                       Battalion, 67th
                                                       Armor, 2d Armored
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Hood, TX
May 77..........................  Jul 77............  S-3 (Air), 1st
                                                       Battalion, 67th
                                                       Armor, 2d Armored
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Hood, TX
Jul 77..........................  Aug 78............  Assistant G-3
                                                       (Operations), 2d
                                                       .Armored
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Hood, TX
Aug 78..........................  Apr 80............  Commander, A
                                                       Company, 1st
                                                       Battalion, 67th
                                                       Armor, 2d Armored
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Hood, TX
Apr 80..........................  Aug 81............  Student,
                                                       Rensselaer
                                                       Polytechnic
                                                       Institute, New
                                                       York
Aug 81..........................  Jun 84............  Combat Development
                                                       Analysis Officer,
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Director for
                                                       Combat
                                                       Developments,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Armor
                                                       School, Fort
                                                       Knox, KY
Jun 84..........................  May 85............  Combat Development
                                                       Analysis Officer,
                                                       Deep Attack
                                                       Programs Office.
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Deputy Chief of
                                                       Staff for
                                                       Operations and
                                                       Plans,
                                                       Washington, DC
May 85..........................  Jun 86............  Student, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Command and
                                                       General Staff
                                                       College, Fort
                                                       Leavenworth, KS
Jul 86..........................  Jun 88............  Executive Officer,
                                                       2d Squadron, 11th
                                                       Armored Cavalry
                                                       Regiment, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jun 88..........................  Jun 89............  Combat Development
                                                       Analysis Officer,
                                                       A3 Task Force,
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Chief of Staff,
                                                       Army, Washington,
                                                       DC
Jun 89..........................  Jul 90............  Director of
                                                       Analysis, Force
                                                       Developments
                                                       Division, Office
                                                       of the Deputy
                                                       Chief of Staff
                                                       for Operations
                                                       and Plans,
                                                       Washington, DC
Jul 90..........................  Jul 93............  Commander, 7th
                                                       Cavalry Squadron,
                                                       1st Cavalry
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Hood, TX and
                                                       Operations Desert
                                                       Shield/Storm,
                                                       Saudi Arabia
Jul 93..........................  Jul 94............  Director, Models
                                                       and Simulations
                                                       Directorate,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Combined
                                                       Arms Command,
                                                       National
                                                       Simulations
                                                       Center, Fort
                                                       Leavenworth, KS
Jul 94..........................  Jun 96............  Commander, 2d
                                                       Armored Cavalry
                                                       Zone V, United
                                                       Nations Mission
                                                       in Haiti,
                                                       Operation Uphold
                                                       Democracy, Haiti
Jun 96..........................  Mar 97............  Executive Officer
                                                       to the Commander
                                                       in Chief, United
                                                       Nations Command/
                                                       Combined Forces
                                                       Command/United
                                                       States Forces
                                                       Korea, Korea
Mar 97..........................  Oct 98............  Assistant Division
                                                       Commander
                                                       (Maneuver), 2d
                                                       Infantry
                                                       Division, Eighth
                                                       United States
                                                       Army, Korea
Oct 98..........................  Nov 99............  Deputy Director
                                                       for Global/
                                                       Multilateral
                                                       Washington, DC
Dec 99..........................  Nov 01............  Commanding
                                                       General, 3d
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized) and
                                                       Fort Stewart, GA,
                                                       to include duty
                                                       as Commander,
                                                       Multinational
                                                       Division (North),
                                                       Operation Joint
                                                       Forge, Bosnia-
                                                       Herzegovina
Nov 01..........................  Mar 03............  Vice Director for
                                                       Force Structure,
                                                       Resources and
                                                       Assessment, J-8,
                                                       The Joint Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
Mar 03..........................  Aug 05............  Director for
                                                       Strategic Plans
                                                       and Policy, J-5.
                                                       The Joint Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
Aug 05..........................  Present...........  Director, The
                                                       Joint Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Assignments                   Dates               Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Officer to the          Jun 96-Mar 97.....  Colonel
 Commander in Chief, United
 Nations Command/Combined Forces
 Command/United States Forces
 Korea, Korea.
Deputy Director for Global/       Oct 98-Nov 99.....  Brigadier General
 Multilateral Issues/
 International-American Affairs,
 J-5, The Joint Staff,
 Washington, DC.
Vice Director for Force           Nov 01-Mar 03.....  Major General
 Structure, Resources and
 Assessment, J-8, The Joint
 Staff, Washington, DC.
Director for Strategic Plans and  Mar 03-Aug 05.....  Lieutenant General
 Policy, J-5, The Joint
 Staff,Washington, DC.
Director, The Joint Staff,        Aug 05-Present....  Lieutenant General
 Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


U.S. decorations and badges:
    Distinguished Service Medal
    Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Bronze Star Medal
    Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Army Commendation Medal
    Army Achievement Medal
    Parachutist Badge
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
    Army Staff Identification Badge
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Walter L. 
Sharp, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Walter L. Sharp.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United 
States Forces Korea.

    3. Date of nomination:
    February 14, 2008.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    27/09/52, Morgantown, WV.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Joanne Sharp (Caporaso).

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Elizabeth Weyrach, 32; Steven Sharp, 26; Kevin Sharp, 23.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary 
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local 
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract 
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business 
enterprise, educational or other institution.
    None.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    2nd Armored Cavalry Association, Member.
    1st Cavalry Division Association, Member.
    Association of the United States Army, Member.

    11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, 
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly 
constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

    13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly 
constituted committee of congress, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                   Walter L. Sharp.
    This 19th day of February, 2008.

    [The nomination of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, was reported 
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008, with the 
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 
was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.]


  NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE 
 GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; 
   AND LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF 
         GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room 
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, Webb, 
Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, 
Martinez, and Wicker.
    Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and 
Breon N. Wells, receptionist.
    Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 
Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. 
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. 
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, 
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and 
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, 
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional 
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. 
Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority 
counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. 
Rusten, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, 
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff 
member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, 
professional staff member.
    Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha.
    Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney, 
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to 
Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; 
Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill 
Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben 
Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M. 
Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, 
assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to 
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants 
to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator 
Collins; Kevin Bishop and Andrew King, assistants to Senator 
Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, 
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant to Senator 
Thune; David Brown and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator 
Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator 
Wicker.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee 
meets today to consider the nomination of General David 
Petraeus for reappointment to the grade of general and to be 
Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM); and the 
nomination of Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno for 
appointment to the grade of general and to be Commander, Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).
    If confirmed, these two officers will continue to lead our 
military operations in Iraq, where we have 160,000 American 
troops deployed in the middle of a protracted and bloody 
sectarian battle.
    As CENTCOM Commander, General Petraeus will also assume 
responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, where an 
increasing level of violence poses new hazards to the Afghan 
Government and the American troops who help support it.
    Every member of this committee recognizes that the long 
hours and hard work put in by our senior military officials at 
the Department of Defense (DOD) require commitment and 
sacrifice, not only from our nominees, but also from their 
family members. The sacrifice is particularly striking in the 
case of General Petraeus and General Odierno. Not only has each 
of these officers served more than 30 years in the military, 
each has already served multiple tours of duty in Iraq, and is 
volunteering to return.
    Over the last 5 years, General Petraeus has served three 
tours of duty in Iraq, spending almost 4 years there, first as 
Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, then as Commander of 
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and most 
recently as Commander of the MNF-I.
    Similarly, General Odierno has served two tours of duty and 
more than 2 years in Iraq, first as Commanding General of the 
4th Infantry Division, and more recently as Commander, Multi-
National Corps-Iraq.
    Over the last year and a half, General Petraeus has been 
the leading architect of a new tactical approach in Iraq which 
has brought about some stability in a situation that, a year 
ago, was far more violent and unstable. General Odierno has 
been his able partner in executing that new approach. If 
confirmed, these two officers will bring in an unprecedented 
continuity of senior military leadership to a military 
operation, providing unparalleled knowledge of the situation on 
the ground and fully utilizing the working relationships that 
they've developed with Iraqi political and military leaders 
over the years.
    Regardless of one's view of the wisdom of the policy that 
took us to Iraq in the first place and has kept us there over 5 
years, we owe General Petraeus and General Odierno a debt of 
gratitude for the commitment, determination, and strength that 
they've brought to their areas of responsibility (AORs). 
Regardless how long the administration may choose to remain 
engaged in the strife in that country, our troops are better 
off for the leadership that these two distinguished soldiers 
provide.
    We appreciate the sacrifices that you and your families 
have already made in the service of our Nation. We thank you in 
advance for your willingness to bear the burden of continued 
service.
    The committee has a long tradition of recognizing the 
families of our nominees. I know that General Petraeus's family 
was unable to make it here today. General Odierno does have a 
number of family members present.
    General Odierno, we'd very much like for you to introduce 
your family to the committee.
    General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 
opportunity to do that.
    First, as are many soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines, 
we're indebted to our families and all that they've sacrificed, 
as you've mentioned. First, I'd like to introduce my wife, 
Linda, we've known each other since high school, went through 4 
years of West Point, 32 years in the military, where she has 
volunteered for countless hours for our soldiers and families, 
and led family readiness groups at the company, battalion, 
brigade, division, and the corps level. I am indebted to her 
for not only taking care of our family, but taking care of our 
soldiers and their families, as well.
    I'd also like to introduce my son, Anthony, and his fiance, 
Daniella. Tony's a 2001 graduate of West Point, served in Iraq. 
He's an Airborne Ranger infantryman who earned the Combat 
Infantry Badge, the Purple Heart, and the Bronze Star Medal for 
Valor for his service in Iraq. He currently is attending New 
York University to get his MBA.
    I'd also like to introduce my daughter, Katie, and her 
husband, Nick. Katie lives in Baltimore. She's an interior 
architect. Nick is a construction engineer, and they're, just, 
great young people.
    I'm very proud of all of them. Thank you, sir.
    My son, Michael, who's not here today, attends Texas Tech 
University, and I also appreciate all his support.
    Thank you, sir.
    Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask 
General Odierno where his son's fiance lives. [Laughter.]
    General Odierno. She is from Greenwich, CT.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Levin. I had a hunch we knew the answer to that 
one. [Laughter.]
    We thank you and your families, both, whether they are here 
in person--we're grateful to them--or whether they're not able 
to be here in person--we're very grateful, and we hope you'll 
extend, General Petraeus, our gratitude to your family.
    General Petraeus. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Now, Senator Warner, I know, is stuck in 
traffic. Senator Inhofe, would you like to make an opening 
statement?
    Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening 
statement. I would only say that we've been real pleased, 
recently, to even get from some of the generally unfriendly 
press the successes that are going on. I think the two of you 
have a lot to do with that. We are very proud of you.
    I don't have a formal statement, sir. I would submit the 
opening statement of my colleague, Senator Warner.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

    Thank you, Senator Levin.
    I join you in welcoming General Petraeus and General Odierno and 
congratulating them on their nominations. I thank each of them for 
their service and their commitment to continue serving in these key 
positions.
    General Petraeus, I recall well your nomination hearing on January 
23, 2007, for your current assignment, and the stark situation that 
you, General Odierno, the Multi-National Corps Commander, and, of 
course, the men and women of your magnificent force, confronted at that 
time. You returned to testify about conditions in Iraq on September 11, 
2007, and again on April 8, 2008.
    No military officer understands the challenges we face in Iraq 
better than you, and no officer has a better foundation to take on the 
complex responsibilities you will have as Commander, United States 
Central Command (CENTCOM).
    In your responses to the committee's advance questions, you 
acknowledge the many challenges that you will face throughout the 
CENTCOM AOR if you are confirmed, but I believe that despite the 
problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iran, 
and elsewhere--there are opportunities for us to engage and make this a 
better, more secure region.
    In his testimony to this committee on March 4, 2008, Admiral Fallon 
testified positively about the security situation in Iraq noting it was 
on an ``upward vector.'' Similarly, with respect to Afghanistan, the 
Admiral praised the Afghan Security Forces' leadership, determination, 
and willingness to go out and engage, and cited the broad support that 
the Government of Afghanistan enjoys.
    If confirmed, this will be your fourth assignment in Southwest Asia 
since March 2003. You led the 101st Airborne Division with great 
distinction in northern Iraq in 2003, and you were later recognized for 
making significant improvements from June 2004 through September 2005 
in the training of the Iraqi security forces as Commander, Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq.
    After commanding the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort 
Leavenworth, where you led the development of the Army's doctrine for 
military operations in a counterinsurgency environment, you returned to 
Iraq to Command the Multi-National Force, and you achieved levels of 
stability that while fragile, are nonetheless real.
    I believe you are the best qualified officer in the Armed Forces 
for this critically important position, and I thank you and your family 
for the sacrifices they and you have made during your outstanding 
service.
    General Odierno, just last month you came before this committee in 
connection with your nomination to be the Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army. I noted then that your career of service has won the hearts and 
minds of the soldiers and families that you have associated with over 
these many years. You testified on April 3 that when you found yourself 
becoming discouraged, the first thing you would do is go visit soldiers 
or marines and that would build you back up because of their dedication 
and loyalty. Well, I believe this probably works equally well on the 
morale of those whom you come in contact with, and I know it will 
continue.
    Army leaders have come before us and testified about a 
``resilient'' Army, but one that is stressed to the maximum and lacking 
shock absorbency and the capability to respond to emergent crises or 
additional demands. I urge you to keep these considerations in mind as 
you fulfill your new responsibilities.
    General Odierno, in the foreword to the new field manual on 
counterinsurgency, General Petraeus wrote that ``conducting a 
successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive 
force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.'' As 
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006 through February 
2008, you proved that you possess these qualities and that you will 
continue to build upon your success in putting al Qaeda forces on the 
defensive, providing protection to the civilian population, engaging 
the Sunni population in Anbar province, and significantly lowering the 
rates of violence. You formed a remarkable working relationship over 
the last 2 years. I'm sure that it will continue.
    I thank you and your families again for the sacrifices you have 
made. I look forward to your testimony today.
    Senator Levin.

    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    Now we have standard questions that we ask of our nominees, 
and you can answer together:
    Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest? [Both witnesses answered in 
the affirmative.]
    Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which 
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation 
process? [Both witnesses answered in the negative.]
    Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines 
established for requested communications, including questions 
for the record in hearings? [Both witnesses answered in the 
affirmative.]
    Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in 
response to congressional requests? [Both witnesses answered in 
the affirmative.]
    Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their 
testimony or briefings? [Both witnesses answered in the 
affirmative.]
    Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon 
request, before this committee? [Both witnesses answered in the 
affirmative.]
    Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before 
this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the 
administration in power? [Both witnesses answered in the 
affirmative.]
    Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when 
requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with 
the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or 
denial in providing such documents? [Both witnesses answered in 
the affirmative.]
    Thank you.
    General Petraeus?

 STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO 
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL 
                            COMMAND

    General Petraeus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, 
members of the committee. Thank you for your swift scheduling 
of this hearing.
    I'm honored to have been nominated to command CENTCOM and 
to have an opportunity, if confirmed, to continue to serve our 
Nation in a critical region.
    Beyond that, I'm delighted that Lieutenant General Ray 
Odierno has been nominated to command the MNF-I, and I'm 
grateful to him for his willingness to take on this position, 
and to his family for their sacrifice, as well.
    As has been noted already in recent days, one of this 
committee's senior members has just had a big rock added to his 
rucksack, and I want to take this opportunity to applaud 
Senator Kennedy's inspirational spirit as he embarks on a 
course of treatment that we all hope will lead to a quick 
return to full duty.
    As the members of this committee know, CENTCOM is in its 
7th consecutive year of combat operations, and the CENTCOM AOR 
contains numerous challenges. The AOR includes 27 states and 
some 650 million people from at least 18 major ethnic groups. 
Stability in the region is threatened by a variety of 
religious, ethnic, and tribal tensions, not to mention 
transnational terrorist organizations, insurgent elements, 
piracy, and inadequate economic development. The region is rich 
in oil reserves, but poor in fresh water. Economic conditions 
vary enormously, with annual per-capital incomes ranging from a 
low of $200 to a high of over $70,000. In 22 of 27 states in 
the AOR, young people aged 15 to 29 constitute over 40 percent 
of the population, and economic opportunities are often 
insufficient to meet their expectations.
    Although the region is diverse, several transnational 
concerns affect many of its states, and I'd like to quickly 
review these, and then discuss specific challenges and 
opportunities within the subregions, concluding by outlining 
concepts I'll use, if confirmed, to guide the refinement of 
CENTCOM's regional security strategy.
    A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals four primary 
transnational concerns. The first is violent extremism. Al 
Qaeda is, of course, the highest-priority terrorist threat to 
many states in the region, as well as to the United States and 
many of our allies around the world. However, other extremist 
groups also threaten security in the CENTCOM region. In 
addition, Tehran and Damascus support militant groups and 
proxies that challenge the stability and sovereignty of several 
states in the AOR.
    The second transnational concern is the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of WMD-related components 
and technical expertise. The lack of transparency and efforts 
by countries such as Iran and Syria to develop their nuclear 
programs is a major concern to states in the region, and could 
spark a destabilizing regional arms race. Nuclear proliferation 
also, of course, creates fears about the acquisition of nuclear 
devices by transnational terrorist groups.
    A third concern is the lack of sustainable economic 
development in a number of the region's countries. This is not 
just a domestic social or humanitarian issue, it is a serious 
security concern, as well; for, without economic opportunity, 
poor and disenfranchised communities can serve as hotbeds for 
the spread of violent extremism. We have seen this in a number 
of areas in the region in recent years.
    A fourth transnational concern encompasses narcotics and 
arms trafficking, piracy, and smuggling. These damage 
societies, threaten legitimate commerce and the flow of 
strategic resources, and often benefit terrorist networks. 
These activities must be addressed if international efforts to 
combat terrorist financing are to succeed.
    These transnational concerns are interrelated and have 
different manifestations across the subregions of the CENTCOM 
AOR. While they constitute far from an exhaustive list of the 
challenges in the AOR, they do provide perspective as we turn 
to the subregions and their challenges.
    The CENTCOM region can, in fact, be described as a region 
of regions, consisting of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf 
states, Central and South Asia, the Levant, and the Horn of 
Africa.
    The Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf states comprise a region 
of vast complexity and strategic importance. In Iraq, Iraqi and 
coalition forces continue to build on the security gains of the 
past 15 months, as we also continue to reduce U.S. forces and 
transition responsibility to Iraqi security forces (ISF), 
strive to maintain the conditions necessary for political 
progress, help build governmental capacity, and seek to foster 
economic development.
    I should note here that the number of security incidents in 
Iraq last week was the lowest in over 4 years, and it appears 
that the week that ends tomorrow will see an even lower number 
of incidents. This has been achieved despite having now 
withdrawn three of the five brigade combat teams (BCTs) 
scheduled to redeploy without replacement by the end of the 
July, and also with the reduction of the two marine battalions 
and marine expeditionary unit.
    Recent operations in Basrah, Mosul, and now Sadr City, have 
contributed significantly to the reduction in violence, and 
Prime Minister Maliki, his government, the ISFs, and the Iraqi 
people, in addition to our troopers, deserve considerable 
credit for the positive developments since Ambassador Ryan 
Crocker and I testified, a month and a half ago.
    In the months ahead, coalition forces will continue to work 
closely with the ISFs in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq and their 
extremist partners and the militia elements that threaten 
security in Iraq. As always, tough fights and hard work lie 
ahead. Nonetheless, I believe that the path we are on will best 
help achieve the objective of an Iraq that is at peace with 
itself and its neighbors, that is an ally in the war on terror, 
that has a government that serves all Iraqis and that is an 
increasingly prosperous and important member of the global 
economy and community of nations.
    Iran continues to be a destabilizing influence in the 
region. It persists in its nontransparent pursuit of nuclear 
technology, and continues to fund, train, and arm dangerous 
militia organizations. Iran's activities have been particularly 
harmful in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and 
Afghanistan. In each location, Tehran has, to varying degrees, 
fueled proxy wars in an effort to increase its influence and 
pursue its regional ambitions. [Audience interruption.]
    Chairman Levin. Excuse me. Excuse me, ma'am. We're going to 
have to ask you to--we're going to have to ask you to--we're 
going to have to ask you to take your seat. Please take your 
seat. We're going to--I'm sorry that we're going to have to ask 
that you leave the room now. Please leave the room. Thank you. 
Please--please--we're going to have to ask you to now please--
the room. Please. Thank you. Please leave the room. We're going 
to have--you'll have to be removed if you demonstrate that way 
we've just heard. [Momentary pause while Capitol Police removed 
protester.]
    General, please continue
    General Petraeus. Even as we work with leaders in the 
region to help protect our partners from Iranian intimidation 
or coercion, however, we must also explore policies that, over 
the long term, offer the possibility of more constructive 
relations, if that is possible. Together with regional and 
global partners, we need to seek ways to encourage Iran to 
respect the integrity of other states, to embrace 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and to contribute to 
regional stability rather than regional instability.
    Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and the 
United Arab Emirates are important partners in efforts to 
promote regional stability and improve regional economic and 
military cooperation. Our relationships with these states 
present many opportunities for advancing common economic and 
security interests, such as engagement via the Gulf security 
dialogue. We need to continue our strong, productive 
relationships with each of them as we strive to deal with the 
challenges that confront them and the Gulf region.
    The countries of Central and South Asia face a variety of 
economic and security challenges, but they, too, offer abundant 
engagement and partnership opportunities. In Afghanistan, our 
focus is on helping the elected government expand governance, 
security, and economic opportunity, while defeating insurgent 
and terrorist threats.
    In assessing the situation in Afghanistan, it is important 
to recognize that we and our coalition partners are helping 
that country build, not merely rebuild, for, even before its 30 
years of war, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in 
the world. Exploiting the security provided by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security 
Assistance Force, many coalition countries are striving to help 
Afghanistan achieve sustainable economic development in 
assisting with the provision of basic services, the development 
of infrastructure, and the creation of legitimate alternatives 
to poppy farming. Due to the scale of the challenges involved, 
and the difficulties in the security arena in particular, we 
should expect Afghanistan to require substantial international 
commitment and support for many years to come.
    Afghanistan's neighbor, Pakistan, has been an important 
partner in efforts to combat terrorism. However, the newly-
elected government faces serious economic difficulties and 
energy shortages, and it is still solidifying its coalition and 
coming to grips with how to respond to internal threats that 
have global implications.
    We have seen, for example, growth in Taliban and al Qaeda 
capability and control in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) in the Northwest Frontier Province. Foreign 
fighters continue to flow from Pakistan into Afghanistan, where 
they're a violent and destabilizing influence. One of our 
challenges will be to increase the capability of Pakistani 
security forces, which are not adequately trained or equipped, 
to secure their border or to deal with the growth of terrorist 
elements and the insurgency in the FATA. It is clear that we 
and other countries supporting Pakistan should support 
Islamabad as Pakistani leaders develop a comprehensive approach 
to countering extremist and insurgent activity.
    In Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Kazakhstan, abundant opportunities exist for building security, 
political, and economic partnerships, and for pursuing common 
interests. To varying degrees, we have, in fact, partnered in 
security efforts in encountering terrorism with these countries 
in the past, and we will have similar opportunities in the 
future.
    U.S. partnerships can also help these countries' efforts to 
build governmental capacity and continue economic growth, while 
also reducing the prospects that extremism will gain influence 
and be exported.
    In the Levant, we see continuing challenges of instability 
and terrorist activity and facilitation in Lebanon and Syria, 
even as we enjoy robust security partnerships with Jordan and 
Egypt.
    In Lebanon, the government is grappling with the political 
and militia activities of Lebanese Hezbollah. Recently, 
Hezbollah attempted to break the political deadlock through 
violent action, forcing Sunni Arabs from some neighborhoods in 
Beirut, and intimidating the government and Lebanese armed 
forces. Yesterday's agreement between the Lebanese government 
and the Hezbollah-led opposition needs to be seen in that 
context, as it highlights the need to support regional efforts 
to help Lebanon as it seeks to deal with destabilizing Syrian 
and Iranian influences.
    Syria presents another set of challenges. Of particular 
concern to Iraq, the Syrian government has taken inadequate 
measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters through Syria to 
join al Qaeda elements in northern Iraq. Damascus also 
continues to undermine stability in Lebanon by encouraging and 
enabling violent opposition to the elected government. Finally, 
Syria's apparent effort to develop secret nuclear facilities is 
also very troubling. The region obviously would be more secure 
were Syria to realize that neither harboring terrorist 
facilitators nor sparking a regional arms race is in Syria's 
best interest.
    As with Iran, the challenge with Syria will be to find 
approaches that can convince Syrian leaders that they should be 
part of the solution in the region rather than a continuing 
part of the problem. Hopefully, yesterday's announcement of 
renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel marks a first step 
toward that end.
    Jordan and Egypt are important partners in U.S. 
counterterrorist efforts, and they help to promote regional 
stability by encouraging neighboring states to participate 
constructively in the Middle East peace process. In addition, 
Jordan plays an influential role in helping inform attitudes in 
the Arab world on the situation in Iraq. Maintaining our robust 
partnerships with these countries can enable us to sustain 
mutually beneficial security and economic ties.
    As it currently stands, the Horn of Africa is another 
subregion in the CENTCOM AOR. With responsibility for this 
region which includes Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Seychelles scheduled for transfer to 
the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) this fall, CENTCOM's 
challenge will be to provide a seamless transition of 
responsibilities, and to establish effective coordination and 
liaison with AFRICOM to ensure unity of effort in the conduct 
of various counterterrorist and counterpiracy missions.
    Having quickly addressed transnational challenges and the 
challenges in the regions of the AOR, I'd like to briefly 
discuss some broad principles that will guide our efforts if 
I'm confirmed. These approaches are consistent with those 
pursued by CENTCOM under the leadership of Admiral William 
``Fox'' Fallon and now General Martin Dempsey.
    First, we'll seek to strengthen international partnerships. 
We will continue to pursue strong bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships and to identify, further develop, and pursue 
mutual interests. Regional partnerships and consensus can 
create leverage and deter destabilizing actors. Of course, the 
pursuit of common interests requires robust, two-way 
engagement, understanding, and accommodating the concerns of 
others even as we understandably seek to pursue our own. 
Engagement will be a central aspect of my responsibilities as 
the CENTCOM Commander, if confirmed.
    Second, in most, if not all, of our activities, we will 
partner with other departments and agencies within the U.S. 
Government, taking a whole-of-government approach to the 
challenges and opportunities of the CENTCOM AOR. In most of the 
issues we'll address, a purely military approach is unlikely to 
succeed, and our strategy must recognize that. Indeed, many of 
you will recall that the campaign plan in Iraq is a joint U.S. 
Embassy-Iraq and MNF-I product, not merely a military one. A 
combined approach should also be a central feature of our 
efforts in the CENTCOM AOR.
    Third, and related to that, if I'm confirmed we will pursue 
comprehensive efforts and solutions in the region. Attempting 
to address, with our partners, not just the symptoms of current 
conflicts, but also their underlying causes.
    Last month in my testimony, I explained the strategy we 
have adopted in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq, acting along multiple 
lines of operation and employing a variety of kinetic and 
nonkinetic approaches. We'll seek to apply a similar strategy, 
writ large, in the CENTCOM AOR, recognizing that enduring 
security and stability require comprehensive economic, 
political, social, and diplomatic efforts, as well as military 
means.
    Finally, we should both support the ongoing operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and ensure readiness for possible 
contingency operations in order to be prepared to assist in the 
event of natural disasters, to ensure sufficient deterrence of 
actions that might threaten regional partners, and, if 
necessary, to be ready to defeat aggressors that threaten our 
vital interests in the region.
    If I'm confirmed, these concepts will guide our approach at 
CENTCOM and inform the refinement of the strategy employed to 
address the challenges and opportunities in the CENTCOM region.
    In closing, I want to thank each of you, once again, for 
the tremendous support you continue to provide to our men and 
women in uniform and to their families. Nothing means more to 
the wonderful Americans serving in harm's way or waiting for a 
loved one at home than knowing that their service and 
sacrifices are appreciated by their fellow citizens.
    I also want to assure you that, if confirmed, I will work 
tirelessly to meet my responsibilities as a combatant commander 
to partner with you, the Service chiefs and secretaries, the 
Chairman and the Secretary, to help ensure that those serving 
our Nation in uniform have the best equipment available, the 
best care possible for those wounded or injured, and the best 
preparation for the challenging tasks we ask our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen to perform in 
combat. This is a sacred obligation that I take very seriously.
    This committee knows well the extraordinary performance of 
our troopers downrange. Their selfless commitment to duty has, 
in fact, been foremost in my mind as I have considered the 
responsibilities of the CENTCOM Commander. Command of CENTCOM 
would likely mean carrying the heaviest rucksack I've ever 
shouldered; but, given our servicemembers' repeated willingness 
to shoulder their own heavy rucksacks in the toughest, most 
complex situations imaginable, there can be no alternative but 
to soldier on with them, drawing strength from them, striving 
to give energy to them, and pressing on together with them to 
accomplish our assigned missions. If confirmed, it will be an 
honor to do that with them.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Petraeus.
    General Odierno?

 STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO 
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-
                              IRAQ

    General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    I want to, first, personally pass along my best wishes to 
Senator Kennedy and his family. We're all rooting and praying 
for him, his quick return back here to the Senate.
    Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt you for just a moment.
    Thank you and General Petraeus for your reference to 
Senator Kennedy. This is a Senate family, which is a very 
strong, cohesive family, and he is a very important part of 
that cohesion. We're never a tighter family than when something 
like this happens to somebody that has such huge respect as 
Senator Kennedy. That's true on both sides of the aisle. We 
very much appreciate your reference to him. As we note the seat 
next to us, which is empty, we are all praying and hoping and 
believing that that seat will be occupied by Senator Kennedy in 
the near future.
    Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I associate myself with 
those remarks and thank the generals. I've had the wonderful 
opportunity to know Senator Kennedy for over 40 years. His 
older brother, Bobby Kennedy, and I were in law school 
together, back in the late 1940s, and I got to know him at that 
time, and we've been close working partners and good friends 
ever since. We thank you for that acknowledgment.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
    General Odierno?
    General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, 
distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee, I 
appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning.
    Most recently, as the Commander of Multi-National Corps-
Iraq, I had the honor of speaking with many of you during a 
number of congressional visits to the Iraqi theater of 
operations. I want to thank you for your dedicated support to 
our forces serving there, your faith in their outstanding 
abilities, and your understanding of the many sacrifices they 
and their families endure for the sake of country, comrades, 
and their loved ones. For all of this, I thank the members of 
the committee.
    As I reflect on my nomination to be appointed the next MNF-
I Commander, I'm both humbled and honored. I understand the 
great cost that our Nation has endured in Iraq. I also 
understand the importance of our mission there and the 
responsibility that comes with this position. I am inspired, 
and I feel a tremendous sense of awe for the soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and marines and their families for their demonstrated 
resilience and accomplishments and commitment to the tasks at 
hand. I consider myself blessed that I've had a chance to 
continue to serve in their ranks. If confirmed, I will do so 
with integrity, commitment, and drive that such a special 
position of trust and responsibility demands.
    With that, I'd look forward to answering your questions. 
Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Excuse this slight delay here. We're trying 
to schedule a vote of the committee on nominations. If we can 
get a quorum, we will interrupt our questions in order to act 
on those nominations this morning.
    We're going to have to limit our question period to a 6-
minute round, because I understand we have up to four votes, 
starting at 11:30. Whether we can function through that or not, 
we will have to determine as we proceed, but, at least, we're 
going to try to get one round each before that time. So, we're 
going to, in order to do that, have to have a 6-minute round.
    Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, we've 
discussed--those are the nominations of General McChrystal and 
Admiral McRaven to----
    Chairman Levin. There's a number of other nominations. 
They're included with that list.
    Senator Warner. Right.
    Chairman Levin. General Petraeus, when you appeared before 
the committee, on April 8, you said that your recommendation at 
that time was that, after the drawdown of the five brigades of 
surge troops that would be finished in July, that you would 
first undertake a 45-day period of evaluation, and that would 
take us through August, and that then, following that, you 
would commence a process of assessment to examine the 
conditions on the ground and, over time, determine when you 
could make recommendations for further reductions. In response 
to my questions at the time, you said that you could not say 
how long that period of assessment would take, whether it would 
be 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, or more. Is it now your 
intention to make a recommendation, relative to further troop 
reductions, before you change command, presumably in September?
    General Petraeus. It is, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Can you tell us what has caused that 
change?
    General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, what I was trying to 
explain, last month, was that the period of consolidation and 
evaluation would include assessments, and that, at the end of 
that time, if conditions allowed, that there would be 
recommendations at that time. My sense is that I will be able 
to make a recommendation at that time for some further 
reductions. I don't want to imply that that means a BCT or 
major combat formation, although it could. But, I do believe 
that there will be certain assets that, as we are already 
looking at the picture right now, we'll be able to recommend, 
can be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater in the 
fall.
    Chairman Levin. All right. That, I think, is good news to 
most of us.
    What role are U.S. forces playing in the operations in Sadr 
City?
    General Petraeus. We are providing a variety of enabler 
support for the operations. Now we're really talking about that 
portion of Sadr City in which we do not have forces right now. 
We have, as you may know, Mr. Chairman, up to a certain line in 
Sadr City, about one-fifth of the way from the southwest toward 
the northeast, forces together with Iraqi elements. In the 
remaining portion of Sadr City, which the Iraqi forces just 
entered a couple of days ago, we do not have forces on the 
ground, although we do provide a variety of enablers, in terms 
of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, attack 
helicopter teams, and, again, other assets. Although those have 
not been required to be actively engaged in that other part of 
Sadr City.
    Chairman Levin. General Petraeus, at the present time, only 
9 of 18 provinces have been turned over to Iraqi control. It's 
been 157 days since the last province, Basrah, was turned over 
to Iraqi control, and 157 days is the longest stretch between 
the turnover of a province to Iraqi control since the first 
province was turned over in July 2006. The December 2007 DOD 
report, titled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,'' 
stated that, ``The current projection is that all provinces 
could transition to provincial Iraqi control as early as July 
2008.'' Three months later, the December 2007 Defense 
Department report stated that, ``All remaining provinces are 
expected to transition in 2008.'' Is that still the 
Department's expectation, that all provinces now are expected 
to transition in this year, of 2008?
    General Petraeus. It is not, Mr. Chairman. There are 
several additional provinces already scheduled for transition 
in the next few months. Interestingly, Anbar Province, once the 
most violent province in Iraq, and now one of the most peaceful 
provinces, will be transitioning, mostly likely, in June. The 
final approval has not yet been given by the Ministerial 
Committee on National Security, but I believe that that will be 
dealt with, perhaps later this week or next week.
    I expect Qadisiyah Province, which has Diwaniyah as its 
capital, to go through a similar process later this summer, and 
then there are others racked up behind it for which we have 
projections, and we reassess those projections about every 
month. Frankly, the developments of the last month and a half 
are causing us to look, perhaps, for earlier transition, in 
some cases, with some provinces, while still others will be, 
undoubtedly, in the 2009 timeframe.
    Chairman Levin. What happened since December 2007, when the 
Department said that all remaining provinces are expected to 
transition in 2008, and now, when apparently a number of 
provinces will not be transitioned? What has changed? There 
seems to be greater stability on the ground and progress on the 
ground.
    General Petraeus. There is now, Mr. Chairman, but, again, 
you have to go back to that timeframe. We were still, in some 
cases, extending the benefits of the security progress that 
resulted from the additional coalition and Iraqi forces, still 
trying to determine how that was going to go, and, in some 
cases, grappling with some tough issues. Ninawa Province, for 
example, the only province actually of the 18 in Iraq that did 
not see violence go down, had to be slid further to the right 
in that regard. Now all of a sudden there is a major operation 
there in Mosul and in western Ninawa Province, that appears to 
be improving the security there substantially. We'll be doing 
assessments during the course of this year, but I don't think 
that all of them will be done, by any means, by the end of the 
year.
    Chairman Levin. Just a brief final question. Is it your 
expectation that the October 1, 2008, date for holding 
provincial elections will be met?
    General Petraeus. I do not believe that they will be in 
October, sir, based on the very latest. However, the provincial 
elections law has had its second reading, which is the step 
just before the conduct of a vote in the Council of 
Representatives. That could take place as early as this next 
week. If all of that goes--they've transferred the money to the 
higher electoral committee, they're doing the security 
assessments, and a variety of other actions to prepare for the 
voter registration and then the conduct of the elections--
Ambassador Crocker's assessment most recently is that probably 
November is a more accurate prediction. But, again, there's 
every intention to have elections in the fall, and that is our 
expectation, still.
    Chairman Levin. Yes. That delay is not good news, 
obviously, to us, or most of us, I think, but thank you for 
your answer.
    Senator Warner.
    Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I welcome both of you and thank you and your families for 
your service to the country.
    Both of you represent not only two of the citizens of this 
country, but you represent our military, two career patterns 
which, I think, incentivize the generations behind you to stay 
and try and achieve some of the successes that each of you have 
had. That's important at this time.
    On the question of Iraq, this morning's paper carried a 
very interesting article on operations in Sadr City, and it 
indicated that, where operations are being conducted now, 
there's very few, if any, U.S. forces; and that's, in a way, 
helping the Iraqi forces to perform their mission, because 
there's less retaliation from the insurgents over there. Can 
you comment on that? Is that a new development? It looks like a 
very encouraging one.
    General Petraeus. Senator, it is an encouraging one, but it 
is one that has been brought about by, very much, joint action 
by coalition, as well as ISFs. It was that joint action, and 
also, frankly, political dialogue, discussion, negotiation, 
deals, and compromises, that led to the point where the major 
``special group'' leaders, these elements that are funded, 
trained, equipped, and supported by the Iranian Quds Force, 
largely left Sadr City. Some of them were killed, by the way. A 
number of the major other militia leaders also departed, and 
there was an order for the militia essentially to stand down. 
That is an important development. The fact that it is Iraqi 
forces that then can patrol the streets of Sadr City--and they 
have found some significant weapons caches already, including a 
very large one in a hospital, I might add, in Sadr City--again, 
this is encouraging.
    It is not a model for everywhere. In Basrah, for example, 
we have no ground combat elements with the forces there. We do 
have transition teams, and we do, again, provide enablers. In 
Mosul, we're very much partnered with them, but they outnumber 
us greatly.
    Senator Warner. General Odierno, do you have a comment on 
that? Because it seems to me that's one of the most encouraging 
signs that I've seen, that the Iraqis are able to handle these 
operations, and has left combat as a consequence of the absence 
of what they view us, as occupiers.
    General Odierno. I think, obviously, Senator, that each 
place of Iraq has different solutions. In Sadr City and in 
Basrah, I would argue, it's important for the Iraqis to lead in 
those areas, and take on the majority of the responsibility. In 
my mind, it is very important that that's occurring. But the 
other thing is, we help them significantly, behind the scenes, 
continue to plan. I see that as a model for the future on how 
we want to do things. What we want to do is provide them----
    Senator Warner. I hope you could encourage it in every way 
possible, because the goal is to have the Iraqi forces take 
over the responsibility of this sovereign nation, such that we 
can return home.
    The Strategic Framework Agreement and the other Status of 
Forces Agreement, are you being consulted on that, General 
Petraeus?
    General Petraeus. I am, Senator. We provided input to that. 
The lead for that is the Department of State, and, in fact, 
Ambassador Crocker, with a good deal of support from State. 
But, I have been consulted. We did provide input.
    Senator Warner. General Odierno, will you, likewise, be 
consulted, or are you getting up to speed on those two 
agreements now? Because we don't want to see them put in place 
as an impediment for the U.S. military from carrying out what 
it believes is the best operational situation to get ourselves 
out of there.
    General Odierno. Senator, obviously it's very important to 
us. We will continue to provide input. We will watch it very 
closely to make sure that it's crafted in such a way which 
allows us to continue to meet the goals of our mission.
    Senator Warner. Right now you're being consulted, and, once 
you take command, I would hope that you would be further 
consulted, to the extent that those agreements have not been 
concluded. There's some optimism they could be concluded before 
you move on up to CENTCOM. Is that right?
    General Petraeus. I think that is certainly possible, 
Senator. Again, I'm always cautious about events in Iraq.
    Senator Warner. All right. Back to Afghanistan, one of the 
major concerns that I've had is this drug trade. The dollars 
flowing from that drug trade, which, incidentally, I think they 
are now the largest provider, worldwide, of these types of 
drugs--the dollars that are coming from that are being used to 
purchase weapons, and those weapons are being used against our 
forces and other partners in the NATO Alliance. What do you 
hope to do to try and end that, General?
    General Petraeus. Senator, a country's economy can't be 
built on illegal activity, obviously.
    Senator Warner. But, in this country it's over half of 
their economy.
    General Petraeus. No question about it. There is clear 
recognition of it. Obviously, over time there has to be an 
alternative provided to those who are currently farming the 
poppy, and it's as simple as that. But, it is also, as you very 
well know, extraordinarily difficult and complex to make that 
transition.
    Senator Warner. I realize that, but it seems to me you can 
have a very strong voice--I think Admiral Fallon did his best, 
but we cannot just leave this to the Afghan Government and turn 
our backs on it, because our people are on the other end of 
those weapons systems.
    General Petraeus. I agree.
    Senator Warner. On the question of NATO--while that 
operation in Afghanistan is largely under the command of NATO--
we, of course, have a U.S. commander there--NATO survivability 
depends on a measure of success in that country. What can you 
do to further facilitate NATO's ability to carry out that 
success and to deal with these really difficult situations, 
where some of the countries in those forces will not allow 
their forces, their troops on the ground, to participate in 
combat?
    General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, of course, what we 
are doing already, and likely will do a bit more of, which is 
our contribution of forces to that mission--you rightly point 
out that the Commander of the International Security Assistance 
Force is American, but he is a NATO commander.
    Senator Warner. That's correct.
    General Petraeus. He is not a commander in that billet. 
Knowing General David McKiernan very well, though, obviously 
I'll partner with him as closely as possible, and with NATO's 
Supreme Allied Commander, and also knowing many of the 
coalition-country leaders, who also contribute troops in Iraq, 
to work with them to do what has been done, and that recently 
resulted in the pledges of some increases of forces. 
Additionally, we can help with the lessons that we have learned 
and, I think, have institutionalized effectively in our 
military services in the United States, in terms of the 
doctrine, the education of our leaders, the training and 
preparation of our forces, and even the equipping of them. We 
can help with that, as well.
    Senator Warner. But, the national caveats of some of those 
countries to prohibit their forces from engaging in risk-taking 
operations that ours and others are performing, to me, is a 
dichotomy that you just can't tolerate.
    Thank you. My time is up.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
    Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good morning, and thank you, General Odierno and General 
Petraeus, for your service. Thanks for agreeing to take on 
these additional assignments, which are not the easiest for 
you, personally, or for your families. We thank them, as well.
    I appreciate that you responded that your future daughter-
in-law is from Greenwich, CT, because it shows that your son 
has her good judgment. I would also say that he carries on a 
family tradition of heroic service to our country and is 
characteristic of the tens of thousands of Americans who have 
served under your command. Both of you have acknowledged that.
    I think the two of you and those who have served in Iraq 
wearing the uniform of our country have really represented the 
best of our country, and really, if we look at the record here, 
ought to give the whole country tremendous pride, no matter 
what one thought about the original reasons we went into Iraq. 
You have been a force that has been principled, understanding 
America's values, you've been personally strong, you've been 
resilient, in the sense that when something wasn't working, in 
characteristic American fashion you figured out a way to make 
it work. I personally believe that, in doing so, you have 
greatly brightened the future for the Iraqi people, increased 
the prospects of stability in the Middle East, and protected 
the security and values of the American people. I can't thank 
you enough for that.
    The military historians and analysts Fred and Kim Kagan 
recently wrote, ``Great commanders often come in pairs: 
Eisenhower and Patton, Grant and Sherman. Generals David 
Petraeus and Raymond Odierno can now be added to that list.'' 
That's heavy stuff, but it happens to be true, in my opinion. I 
think the two of you have now earned your place into the ranks 
of the most impressive military commanders in American history, 
and I thank you for it.
    General Petraeus, I continue to be very angry about the 
role that Iran is playing in training and equipping Shiite 
extremists who are coming into Iraq and are responsible for the 
murder of hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi 
soldiers and citizens. I wanted to ask you--and I know you 
share that view, of course--I wanted to ask you what the 
current state, to the best of your knowledge, is, of Iranian 
support of these special groups and others in Iraq.
    General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, we know that 
support has continued well after Iran's most senior leaders 
made promises to Iraq's most senior leaders that they would 
stop the training, funding, arming, and directing of the so-
called ``special group'' leaders and elements, and also support 
for the militia. We know that, because we have detained 
individuals who were recipients of that training, funding, and 
arming. They have explained, in great detail, the process for 
that. We had previously captured the deputy commander of 
Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, which was created to 
support this effort and to use the lessons that they had 
learned with Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
    We know, from having captured, and from Iraqi troops having 
captured, massive weapons caches in Basrah, some of which bear 
markings that denote that they were made in January or February 
of 2008, some which contain fuses made only in Iran, others 
which followed a chain to get to Iran and then into the hands 
of other special groups from Syria through Lebanese Hezbollah, 
in the case of RPG-29s. This is all very clear. It's evidence; 
it's not supposition.
    We have laid this out for Iraqi leaders in the past. We're 
going to do it with an update again with their intelligence 
agencies, as well. Their leaders have laid it out for the 
public in Iraq. Frankly, it has galvanized a degree of 
opposition, resentment, and so forth, by a government that 
views that it's a sovereign government of a sovereign country 
that is being interfered with by its neighbor to the east, a 
neighbor that should, by rights, want to see it succeed, to see 
a Shiite-led government in Iraq succeed, given that Iran is 
also Shiite, given the common interests they have, the 
commercial interests, economic interests, religious tourism, 
with Najaf and Karbala being in Iraq, and so forth.
    Delegations have recently gone to Iran and shared the 
concerns of the Iraqi Government. It is our hope that this will 
lead to some change in the activities, that there will be a 
recognition that this has been very destabilizing, that it has 
challenged, again, a sovereign nation and the government of 
Prime Minister Maliki. We are looking for signs of that, 
frankly. We know, though, that a number of the ``special 
group'' leaders have gone back to Iran. That's where they are 
seeking refuge as they have been put under pressure in, first, 
Basrah, then other areas in southern provinces, and now in Sadr 
City. Over time, again, it is our hope that those two 
countries, which will always be neighbors of each other can 
reach an understanding that the kind of lethal activities that 
have been undertaken in recent years are not in the interest of 
either country.
    Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. I think the 
most significant part of it--I mean, the most disappointing 
part, of course, is the Iranians are still doing what they've 
been doing, resulting in deaths of Americans in Iraq, but the 
most significant part is that Prime Minister Maliki is now, 
from what you've said, recognizing that this is not only an 
attack on us, it's an attack on the sovereignty of Iraq and is 
asserting that with the Iranians, and we can only hope that it 
draws a response.
    In the time I have left, I want to ask you something else 
about Prime Minister Maliki. When you were here before the 
committee 6 weeks ago, the offensive the Prime Minister 
initiated and ordered in Basrah had just begun, and there was a 
sense then, widely shared here in Congress and in the public, 
that the offensive had failed, that it was further proof of the 
inadequacy of ISFs, that Sadr was the winner, that Maliki was 
the loser. Obviously it looks a lot different, 6 weeks later. 
Give us your own sense of what the status on the ground is in 
Basrah now and what it says about the ISF, Maliki, and the 
extremists in the south of Iraq.
    General Petraeus. Senator, you are correct that the 
operation in Basrah did have a shaky start. But, it has since 
seen enormous progress that has produced very positive tactical 
and strategic results. The tactical results are the return of 
control to legitimate security forces in Basrah, something for 
which the Basrawis, the people of that city and province, are 
quite grateful and they're pleased about.
    The ISFs, again, after that shaky start, very much 
stiffened. They were reinforced by two additional brigades 
brought down from Anbar Province. By the way, our support here 
has been nothing more than transition teams, the so-called 
advisor teams, with their conventional and Special Operations 
Forces and the provision of enablers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance, attack helicopter teams on 
occasion, and so forth. They have continued to expand their 
areas of control. They conducted operations this past week, 
some 50 or 60 kilometers north of Basrah City, in Al Kerna--
where the two rivers come together--and the parent site of the 
Garden of Eden, according to some historians--and then even 
turned left and have now gone 20 or so kilometers in another 
direction. This is moving up towards Maysan Province in the 
marshes and in the city of Amarah, where there have also been 
some operations by Iraqi forces after quite a long absence 
there, as well.
    On the strategic side, this has all been important, because 
there has been a degree of support for Prime Minister Maliki in 
this subsequent period that is unparalleled during the time 
that Ambassador Crocker and I have been in Iraq. It appears 
that the Sunni coalition will return to government. Touch wood 
on that, but that does look likely. The level of Kurdish 
support from the two senior Kurdish leaders is much solidified. 
Prime Minister Maliki then demonstrated that he's willing to go 
after al Qaeda, as well, with Iraqi forces, in a very 
substantial offensive launched in Mosul, which is one that took 
place after about 3 months of very careful condition-setting, 
of the establishment of the infrastructure--combat outposts, 
joint security stations, the intelligence baseline, and all the 
rest of that logistical stockpiling. That operation is also off 
to a good start, tactically. We'll have to see, over time, 
because al Qaeda will try to come back and try to regenerate. 
But, they have also launched operations on the so-called ``rat 
lines'' along which foreign fighters enter Iraq from Syria, and 
that's a very important development, as well.
    The result is, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that 
last week's level of incidence was the lowest in over 4 years, 
and this week's is even significantly lower, and it's a result 
of these different operations, plus now Sadr City.
    Meanwhile, in the Council of Representatives, the focus on 
the provincial elections law has been good, and, as I 
mentioned, we hope to see a vote on that in the next week or 
so, it having had its second reading. Then they can start to 
focus, we believe, on the hydrocarbon law package on which 
there has been much greater coordination between the different 
factions, as well, already; and there are new prospects for 
progress there that were not at all seen prior to the operation 
in Basrah. So, it's had a political impact that is very 
significant, in addition to the tactical military progress that 
has been made there.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that very encouraging 
report, which I find nothing short of thrilling.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In my brief opening comment, I made reference to an 
article, ``Success in Iraq: A Media Blackout,'' 2 days ago in 
the New York Post, and I'd like to ask that this be entered 
into the record at this point.
    Chairman Levin. It will become part of the record.
    [The information referred to follows:]
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    Senator Inhofe. In there they talk about how the Iraq and 
the coalition forces are piling up one success after another, 
the media is not giving you a fair shake on this, which is 
something not too surprising. But, we're now seeing the lowest 
violence indicators since April 2004, and the Iraqi Government 
is asserting more control.
    I was honored to be right outside of Basrah when that took 
place, and, in fact, I talked to you at that time, and there is 
kind of a mixed feeling as to how the performance was of the 
ISFs. It was interesting that our forces that I talked to 
personally were very complimentary--we've talked about how they 
are now expanding into areas, and we're real pleased with that. 
That's more of a functional thing.
    I'd like to ask each one of you how you're seeing, since 
you've been there a long time, the progress in the training, in 
the performance of the Iraqis as soldiers.
    General Petraeus. There has been a significant increase in 
the capacity, as well as the capability, of the Iraqi forces. 
Even though, for example, the operation in Basrah got off to a 
shaky start, what preceded it was unprecedented, and that is 
the deployment, really throughout that week, of over a 
division's worth of Iraqi forces. That's a very substantial 
movement, and something that would have been thought impossible 
a year ago.
    Senator Inhofe. Which they really did on their own, too.
    General Petraeus. They did do it on their own, and they 
then had their C-130s turning several times a day (each of the 
two of their three) typically, that were operating on a given 
day. Again, not all smooth, not all the way we might do it, but 
it all got done, and the result, over time, after the initial, 
again, slow start, was that the units performed quite well.
    Indeed, some of the units that did not do well--among them 
were a brigade that had just literally come out of the unit set 
fielding, the whole process of basic training and so forth; 
that unit has actually been provided additional replacements, 
it has gone through a retraining process, and its elements are 
starting to reenter the operations in Basrah, and, so far, have 
done well.
    Again, there's been considerable progress in this regard, 
and you see it also in a variety of the other southern 
provinces, in Mosul now, in Diyala Province, Anbar, and also, 
of course, in Baghdad.
    Senator Inhofe. Good.
    General Odierno?
    General Odierno. Senator, if I could just----
    Chairman Levin. Excuse me for interrupting you, General. We 
have a quorum here, and we have to take advantage of it, as I 
indicated. [Recessed.]
    General Odierno, you were about to say something. Thank you 
for your patience.
    Senator Warner. May I say thank you, though, Mr. Chairman, 
for that expedited process.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator Inhofe. General?
    General Odierno. Sir, I would just add, to what General 
Petraeus said, what we've seen consistently over the last 12 to 
14 months is an improvement in the command and control, the 
ability of the Iraqi forces--the learning. They're starting to 
understand the command-and-control at brigade, battalion, 
company level. We've seen significant improvements in that, in 
their ability to do some planning.
    Of course, the issue always becomes capacity, and we still 
have to work on their full capacity to do this across the 
entire force. But, we are seeing consistent improvement in 
these areas, and that's where we have to continue--why it's so 
important for us to continue to have transition teams, continue 
to be partnered with them, continue to liaise with them, and 
we'll continue to see this improvement.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes. That's why I wanted to mention it. 
Quite frankly, I've been over there quite a few times, and what 
I always try to do is get the reports of our troops that are 
over there participating and training and working with these 
guys. It's been favorable. They're a different standard from 
us, but dramatic improvements are taking place.
    I've long supported the idea of the independent AFRICOM, 
and I've had a lot of conversations with General William Ward 
and his predecessor. I really think it's going to come along 
fine. I am concerned, however, because, when you think about 
right now AFRICOM is parts of Pacific Command, European 
Command, CENTCOM, but the most aggressive part comes out of 
CENTCOM. Now, you have that whole corner up there. You have 
Somalia, you have Ethiopia, which has been very good in 
supporting our efforts in Somalia; then you have Eritrea, just 
right down there on the water, and the Sudan. That's where, 
really, things are very active, and a smooth transition is 
going to be necessary.
    I recognize that they're talking about standing that up on 
October 1st, but I also realize, or suspect, and would like to 
have your comments, that there's going to be a transitional 
period. If it's going to be seamless, it's going to take quite 
a bit of effort beyond the October 1st date. What do you think?
    General Petraeus. Senator, I agree. There is a conference 
ongoing right now--in fact, in Tampa--between the CENTCOM and 
AFRICOM staff, to work out--there are a host of different tasks 
and functions, dozens and dozens of these identified, that will 
be transitioned, and they are working out that process of 
transition in ensuring that AFRICOM will have, for example, the 
command-and-control operational center capabilities, and those 
types of capabilities to take over the missions that CENTCOM is 
performing in the Horn of Africa, in particular.
    Senator Inhofe. Well, and we'd like to have----
    General Petraeus. They----
    Senator Inhofe. Please go ahead.
    General Petraeus. They may make a recommendation on how to 
phase that over time as this process continues.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes. I would hope, also, we look at the 
resources that they have, and that they need, that General Ward 
will have to have, particularly if he stays up in Frankfurt and 
tries to run the thing from there.
    Finally, I always bring up, the Commanders' Emergency 
Response Program (CERP), it's been working real well, although 
every time I get used to one thing, they change the name, so 
now it's CCIF--I guess, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. 
But, as far as in the areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, it's my 
understanding that the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 
million for that program, and I'd like to get a response from 
both of you as to how well that program's going and your 
feelings about the future of the CERP.
    General Petraeus. Sir, the CERP is of enormous importance 
to our commanders and troopers on the ground in Iraq. It's 
hugely important that it continue. It saves lives. It enables 
commanders--when you reach that point where money becomes the 
most important ammunition because of security progress, it 
enables them to achieve small, but quick and important, wins on 
the ground in small reconstruction projects where we have 
enormous capacity. In fact, it was in recognition of that 
capacity that the Iraqi Government did provide that to us, 
although they're also doing that with their own ministries, 
provinces, and elements, as well.
    Senator Inhofe. Good. Good.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
    General Odierno. Senator, I would just add that it gives us 
flexibility, leverage, and influence at the lowest levels, at 
the company, battalion, and brigade level. It's an extremely 
important program, and that needs to continue. We publish a 
manual that says, ``Money is a weapon that we give to all of 
our young leaders.'' It has significant impacts, and I hope 
that we'll be able to continue that in the future.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. [Recess for 
brief continuation of the business meeting.]
    Senator Akaka.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Petraeus, let me add my welcome to you to the 
panel.
    General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Akaka. General Odierno, welcome, to you and your 
lovely family here.
    General Odierno, I've always thought of culture as 
important to people. Cultural awareness of our soldiers has 
become a strategic center of gravity in the Iraq conflict. The 
daily interaction of American service men and women with both 
their Iraqi counterparts and civilian population has really 
expanded the skills required of our military personnel far 
beyond which existed just a few years ago.
    Given the importance of these skills, what cultural or 
language training do units arriving in theater undergo that 
helps them to conduct these nontraditional aspects of the 
operations? Do you believe this training is adequate?
    General Odierno. It's a very important part, sir, of all 
the training that we conduct today, and it's done at the 
individual level, it's done at the collective level. We do it 
at all our schools now. It's been incorporated into all of our 
warrior leader courses, our basic noncommissioned-officer 
courses. It is incorporated in our unit training at home 
station. We've incorporated a large portion of this at our 
National Training Centers, Joint Readiness Training Centers. It 
is critical to continue to do this as we move forward. But, we 
have to continue to adjust, because we continue to learn more, 
we continue to understand it better, and we have to continue to 
change and continue to expand this program. It is one that is 
extremely important, it's one that we have to continue, it's 
one that we must continue to learn from, adjust, so we can 
continue to give our soldiers the best tools possible to be 
successful.
    Senator Akaka. General Odierno, your position with respect 
to Iraq's neighbors is that they are an important element of 
achieving ultimate stability on the ground. I agree that the 
ability to get other nations in the region to actively support 
political compromise, reconciliation, and stability in Iraq, 
will be even more important for the coalition effort in the 
months to come. General, what are the best approaches to use in 
achieving cooperation with Iraq's neighboring countries? Should 
these approaches be any different when dealing with Iran?
    General Odierno. I would just say, sir, that, of course, we 
want to continue to have dialogue with many of the countries. 
General Petraeus, I think, could tell you that we have tried to 
have dialogue with the Ambassador in Iraq three different 
times, with Iran, reaching out to them at that level. So far, 
it, unfortunately, has not yielded the results we want. 
However, I would suggest that as we move forward, if we believe 
it could yield results, we'd like to, at the ambassador level, 
continue to have those discussions, if we think it'll be 
fruitful.
    We also should obviously reach out to many of the other 
countries--Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt--and I'll work with 
General Petraeus on that, if confirmed, to make sure we work 
together with those countries, to make sure they are helping us 
to solve the problems, and to help us with reconciliation, 
which, in my mind, is an extremely important piece as we 
continue to move forward, is getting many of these elements to 
reconcile. We've seen a good beginning in that, Senator, and we 
want to continue that.
    Senator Akaka. General Odierno, you have identified the 
communal struggle for powers as the number-one threat to Iraq, 
and asserted that sectarian conflicts fueled from both within 
and outside Iraq's borders poses the greatest challenge to 
lasting security. The membership of the Sons of Iraq, which has 
been a significant part of recent security gains on the ground, 
stems from local militia groups, many of whom were former 
insurgents and are now being integrated into the ISFs. Given 
the tentative nature of the alliance between these groups and 
coalition forces, is there a plan to continue transitioning the 
Sons of Iraq into government-controlled units so that they 
don't serve as a base for future sectarian conflict?
    General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. That's a very 
important question as we move forward. Obviously, we are going 
to try to integrate them as much as possible. What we've found 
is, we believe somewhere between 25 and 30 percent are capable 
and want to be integrated sometime into the ISFs, are either 
physically/mentally capable, or will have the desire to do 
that. With the other portion, we have to develop other programs 
to ensure that they can be employed. We are working with the 
Iraqis to do that. We were doing that several months ago. That 
policy has continued, where we're trying to develop work 
programs, we're trying to have public works units that help, 
not only to then employ them, but to continue to rebuild the 
infrastructure, as well as deliver basic services. We think 
this is a key, as we move forward, and we must continue to work 
with the Government of Iraq to fund this program, as well as 
helping us to get that instituted. We will work that extremely 
hard, sir.
    Senator Akaka. Do you feel this is an essential element of 
long-term stability that would help legitimize the Iraqi 
national government?
    General Odierno. I do. Many of these individuals, as we've 
talked with them and dealt with them, what they're really 
looking for is legitimacy, and they want to be part of the 
government--future of Iraq. So, this is their way of reaching 
out, volunteering to first provide security in these areas, and 
then become a permanent part of the government and part of the 
Nation as it moves forward.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. My time is expired, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
    Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'd like to associate myself with a statement you made 
earlier, at least in part--I thought it was a very eloquent 
statement that these two gentlemen represent continuity at a 
time when America needs it the most.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator Graham. To both of you, I just can't tell you how 
proud we are of the job that you and those under your command 
have done. It was a enormous challenge that you both took on. A 
year and a half ago, this thing looked very bleak. Your 
personal dedication, and those under your command, I think will 
go down in history, quite frankly, as one of the most 
successful counterinsurgency operations ever.
    But, we're not here to talk about just the good news, we're 
here to talk about where we go. I want to congratulate the 
President for nominating you both, and, to Senator Levin, for 
holding these hearings as quickly as possible.
    General Petraeus, as you go into your new job, it seems to 
me that one of the biggest problems we face in Afghanistan is, 
we have many forces over there from different areas of the 
world, NATO has assumed this fight; to me, this is a test of 
NATO. Are you concerned about the rules of engagement that some 
countries have imposed on NATO forces? What do you intend to do 
about that, if it is a concern?
    General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, this is, indeed, a 
test of NATO, and the caveats that are put on the uses of 
various national forces are a challenge for the NATO commander 
there. I think General Dan McNeill, the current commander about 
to hand off to General David McKiernan, has been very clear 
about that. It's not unprecedented. I was the Assistant Chief 
of Staff for Operations for the Stabilization Force mission in 
Bosnia, and had a matrix on my desk of which forces were 
allowed to do which nonstandard tasks, if you will, or 
different tasks, and that was challenging. It is the same 
situation in Afghanistan, except more difficult, because, of 
course, they're in tough combat operations, not just 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement.
    I think that continued dialogue with NATO authorities, with 
the Supreme NATO Commander, General John Craddock, and the 
other authorities with the coalition countries, many of whom 
also contribute forces to Iraq and, therefore, have been able 
to get to know them and so forth, is going to be part of the 
answer. I think, also, some additional provision of U.S. 
forces, and of those forces from those NATO countries that are 
willing and capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations 
in the way that is required, will also be important in the 
months and years ahead.
    Senator Graham. As you hand off command here, in a few 
short months, in Iraq, is it fair to say, from the America 
public's point of view, that we can expect, in the future, the 
Iraqis to fight more and to pay more for the cost of 
operations?
    General Petraeus. It is, Senator.
    Senator Graham. What would you attribute to the turnaround? 
I think all of us have met Prime Minister Maliki and some of 
the key players over in Iraq and have come away a bit 
frustrated at times. Last year, I think I visited with him in 
July--I had very little hope that anything was going to happen 
over there in a positive way. I'm quite astonished at the 
amount of reconciliation that's happened in the last 90 to 100 
days in the operations in Basrah and Sadr City. If you could 
give us some insight, what happened? What changed?
    General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, very significant, 
of course, was the decision that he made to take on the militia 
in Basrah. This is a Shiite-led government taking on a Shiite 
militia. It made an enormous statement about his willingness to 
serve all Iraqis. The result was increased support from those 
who had criticized him for a long time for turning a blind eye 
to the militia or not taking action against them in the way 
that he did in Basrah. He's followed that up, of course, 
courageously, inside Baghdad itself. Then also, to show all 
he's willing to go after all parties that are threatening the 
security and stability of Iraq, he has, of course, launched the 
operation in Mosul and Ninawa Province to go after al Qaeda and 
its Sunni extremist partners. There has been success in a 
number of these different areas. It's not solidified yet. As 
always, Ambassador Crocker and I are cautious in our 
assessments. But, there is significant progress, and, at the 
end of the day, nothing succeeds like a little bit of 
significant progress.
    Senator Graham. Conversely, how is Sadr's standing among 
the Iraqi people?
    General Petraeus. Senator, Muqtada al Sadr is still 
certainly seen as the embodiment of a very important movement 
in that country. The Sadr movement, which was founded on the 
martyr Sadr, his father, is a very important political element 
in Iraqi society. It is one that was founded on serving those 
most disadvantaged in the society. It stayed in Iraq during the 
Saddam era. It suffered enormously under it. So, it still has 
enormous influence. However, Sadr himself has recognized--in 
fact, by issuing the cease-fire order last fall in the wake of 
the violence precipitated by the militia in the holy city of 
Karbala, and after the militia elements and ``special group'' 
elements were linked to the assassination of two southern 
governors and police chiefs--that the armed elements associated 
with the movement were creating problems. In fact, it is that 
kind of assessment, we believe, that has prompted, over time, 
this directive to cease fire, to take a knee and so forth, 
because the people in Basrah were rejoicing at being freed from 
the grip of the militia. In fact, a man in Basrah told me that 
now he'd been liberated twice in recent years; once by the 
coalition forces, from Saddam; and now by the ISFs, from the 
militia.
    Senator Graham. My time is expired. One very brief 
question. General Odierno, thank you for what you've done and 
what you're about to do. The force structure that we have in 
place and the drawdowns that we're planning to implement over 
the summer, are you comfortable with what we're about to do and 
how we're going to do it?
    General Odierno. I am, Senator. I provided recommendations 
to General Petraeus as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander. 
I stand behind those recommendations, which is what is going on 
right now. So, I feel extremely comfortable with what I 
continue to see as the progress we're making over there, that 
we'll be able to continue with those reductions, as planned, 
through the summer.
    Senator Graham. Thank you both, and your families.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
    Senator Ben Nelson.
    Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General Odierno and General Petraeus and your 
families, for your continued willingness to serve and the 
excellence of your service in the past. We've come to expect 
that from you, but I want you to know we don't take it for 
granted, and we truly appreciate that. I know the American 
people do, as well.
    In terms of finding options, General Petraeus--I can talk 
in football analogies, because Nebraska football may be on its 
way back--you remind me of an options quarterback who has to 
figure out all the options that are available and adjust to 
conditions on the ground before you make a determination.
    Senator Collins and I have been pushing, for some time, the 
idea, which seems to have gained favor, to transition the 
mission for the combat troops, the coalition combat troops, but 
particularly the U.S. forces, in Iraq--in Baghdad to fighting 
counterterrorism activities, which I think is what they've been 
doing, so that the Iraqi forces could take more responsibility 
for their own security. Apparently, that's part of what the 
plan is right now. Is it because we've come to understand that 
that's necessary, and/or is it because Prime Minister al Maliki 
seems poised and prepared to do that now?
    General Petraeus. Senator, again, to continue the analogy, 
you have to make the read at the line when you have the ball in 
each particular play, in each particular case, in each 
particular area. As you recall, when I last testified before 
the committee, I laid out the so-called Anaconda approach or 
strategy that we have employed to focus on al Qaeda-Iraq, and 
it employs much, much more than just what we have traditionally 
known as counterterrorist forces, our special mission units, 
the high-end Special Operations Forces. Critical to it has been 
conventional forces that have cleared and then been able to 
help hold cities like Baqubah, large neighborhoods in Baghdad, 
Ramadi, and so forth, and are now, in fact, doing the same to 
lesser degrees, slightly different approach--in Mosul.
    That has enabled us, if you will, when the level of 
violence is reduced, to have ISFs shoulder more of the burden, 
and allowed us to focus a bit more discretely on some of the, 
again, al Qaeda or Sunni extremist elements that try to come 
back into those areas and try to re-establish roots in them, 
while Iraqi soldiers and police can handle some of the more 
day-to-day activity in those areas. That's really what is going 
on, that this transition, if you will, has been the product of 
some tremendously tough, hard work and fighting by coalition 
and Iraqi forces, much of it, I might add, during the time that 
Lieutenant General Odierno was the operational architect of the 
so-called ``surge'' of coalition and Iraqi forces.
    Senator Ben Nelson. If Senator Graham's right, that the 
goal is to get Iraq to pay more and to fight more, we may be 
succeeding in that. Of course, Senator Bayh, Senator Collins, 
and I have worked to get Iraq in a position to pay more of the 
costs for the costs of the war; many of them being our costs, 
which we have been underwriting for these several years--do you 
believe that that will put them more in charge, not only of 
their own destiny, but feel more committed to their destiny, 
not only in charge, but stronger commitment?
    General Petraeus. Again, Senator, I think that transition--
some of that is very much well underway. You'll recall 
Ambassador Crocker, here, saying the days of the big 
reconstruction effort are over.
    Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
    General Petraeus. We're still finishing them and all the 
rest of that, but that is largely over.
    Senator Ben Nelson. I knew that was his position, but we--
--
    General Petraeus. In fact, this past week alone, Prime 
Minister Maliki announced a $5-billion reconstruction effort, 
and also they are working on a supplemental that will provide 
additional funds to all of their provinces, ministries, and 
other activities. They have long since reached the point where 
they are paying a good bit more for their Iraqi forces 
development than we are, and that will just continue. Our line 
goes down, and theirs goes up very dramatically.
    When it comes to them fighting, their casualties continue 
to be well over, right now, three times our losses, and that 
does not include the Sons of Iraq, who are really a different 
category, who are also targeted continually by, in particular, 
Sunni extremists, because they represent the communities 
turning against these extremists. That's a very difficult 
situation for those extremists.
    Senator Ben Nelson. The query I would leave you with, in 
terms of Iraq and its future, is the question of, what if 
Muqtada al Sadr ends up with the majority in the next 
elections? But, we don't need to go into that; that's purely 
speculative. We certainly hope that that's not the case.
    I'd like to turn to Afghanistan for just a moment. I'm 
leading a congressional delegation there next week, as we spoke 
the other day. Given the challenges that there are in 
Afghanistan today, do we have any idea, or any vision, of what 
victory in Afghanistan will consist of? I'm not talking about 
when, but can we describe what would be victory in Afghanistan?
    General Petraeus. Certainly it would be a situation where 
security is much improved, it does not have these pockets in 
which reconstruction is challenged, and, of course, where the 
economy is gradually starting to get to a self-sustaining 
stage. The differences between Iraq and Afghanistan could not 
be starker. You have one country which has what now may be the 
largest oil reserves in the world--it certainly is number two 
or number three--and pumping oil at substantial rates, and 
another country that generates, I believe it's about $700 
million in a year toward its own budget. So, Afghanistan 
clearly is going to require very substantial assistance from 
the international community for a number of years, and very 
important that we continue it, remembering what it was that 
took place on that soil and the reason that we went there.
    Senator Ben Nelson. Sort of reminds us of a war on poverty, 
but it's a war getting over poverty, to be able to sustain 
their own government and their own future. That's not going to 
be very easy to solve simply with guns or butter.
    General Petraeus. Absolutely, Senator, that's, again, why I 
went to some length--and I appreciate your allowing me to 
provide an opening statement of that length--but to describe 
the comprehensive approach that's needed, the whole-of-
government effort, and the effort of very much partnering with 
all like-minded countries around the world, because that's what 
it's going to take.
    Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you both, and good luck to both 
of you.
    Thank you very much.
    General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    I just would quickly note that, while we welcome the $5-
billion announcement, by the Iraqi Government, of 
reconstruction funds, they've announced before reconstruction 
funding, they've budgeted reconstruction funding, but, when it 
comes to spending it, their budgeted amount, it's been very 
slow. So we assume you'll keep on top of that.
    General Petraeus. Absolutely. It has improved, Senator, 
from year to year, but there's no question but that it has to 
improve a great deal more.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator Dole.
    Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Petraeus and General Odierno, I want to just 
underscore what Senator Graham had to say about both of you, 
and to express my heartfelt thanks for your service to our 
country. It's really impossible to adequately express how much 
we appreciate the service that both of you are giving.
    General Petraeus, you've probably learned as much or more 
about the need for improving interagency cooperation over the 
past 16 months as anyone, and I hope, if confirmed, that you 
will speak on the need for improving interagency cooperation, 
and to stress the consequences if we fail to heed the lessons 
learned from our efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is 
a topic that we simply cannot just pass along to the next 
administration.
    With those thoughts in mind, would you share with us some 
examples of where improvements must be made and what, in your 
professional opinion, are the potential consequences of merely 
maintaining the status quo?
    General Petraeus. Senator, I think you know that a number 
of us in uniform and Secretary Gates are among the biggest 
champions for providing additional resources for the State 
Department, for U.S. Agency for International Development, and 
for some of our other interagency partners, so that they can, 
in fact, do just what you were talking about. We have learned 
an enormous amount about this over time, and the increase in 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the embedded 
PRTs has been a hugely important development, and a very 
significant part of the progress that has been made, not just 
in the security front, but, again, then, in the establishment 
of local governments, revival of local economies and markets, 
and reconstruction efforts, again, that were possible because 
of the improved security situation.
    I mentioned, during my opening statement, that the campaign 
plan that we are executing in Iraq is not just a military 
campaign plan, it is the joint product of the U.S. Mission-
Iraq, the Embassy, and the MNF-I, and it is signed by both the 
Ambassador and myself. By the way, the main effort--and you 
always identify a main effort in any such campaign plan--is 
actually the political line of operation, not the security 
line. While the security line is a crucial enabler to it, the 
ultimate solution, as we all recognize, has to come in the 
political arena.
    Now, recognizing that is of enormous significance, and I 
think it's very important. In the answers to the advance policy 
questions, I discussed a bit about steps that are being taken, 
and further steps should be taken, to improve, in terms of 
developing doctrine--just as we have in the military--to 
develop doctrine for kind of interagency cooperation and 
efforts that are required in the endeavors such as those in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the theater, that there 
then has to be an education process for those; you actually 
have to practice it, try it somewhere. Ideally, we would 
welcome interagency partners joining us, for example, as our 
BCTs, division, and corps headquarters undergo the mission 
rehearsal exercises that we conduct for several weeks for each 
of these deploying units. Those are great opportunities, in 
fact, to get ready to perform the missions that are performed, 
again, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Then you need a 
feedback mechanism, a lessons-learned center.
    A fair amount of this is actually now being done. It's led 
by the State Department. It is at the Foreign Service 
Institute. That's the right place for it. I think that 
developments in that area will be very important in helping the 
interagency do better what it is we have learned they must do 
to enable military forces to be successful in these very 
complex contingency operations.
    Senator Dole. Thank you.
    General Odierno, earlier this year General Petraeus 
answered questions concerning a reassessment phase following 
the drawdown in U.S. forces to the pre-surge end strength in 
July. That assessment will, I presume, now become your 
responsibility. How long do you anticipate that security 
assessment will take to complete before you decide if you 
should hold at the pre-surge level or, at some point, resume 
redeployment?
    General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.
    General Petraeus and I have talked about this. If I'm 
confirmed for the position, I think General Petraeus will make 
an assessment prior to his leaving, and we will have some 
discussion about that as he does it. We'll confer about that. 
We'll agree to that, that he will make some sort of an 
assessment as he leaves, and I will then execute that 
assessment, and then continue to assess and identify and make 
further decisions.
    Senator Dole. Okay. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and to 
the Army, your extraordinary service, and thank you for your 
families' support.
    I want to particularly recognize Captain Odierno, because 
his service is emblematic of the service of so many young 
Americans whose courage, many times, compensates for some lack 
of wisdom. Thank you for your service.
    General Petraeus, you now have responsibility for a whole 
theater of operations. It's interesting, the last Director of 
National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment suggested that 
al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in the FATA, in Pakistan. In 
fact, Admiral Mullen has stated, ``If we were going to pick the 
next attack to the United States, it would come out of the 
FATA.'' Do you agree with these intelligence assessments?
    General Petraeus. I do, Senator. Clearly, al Qaeda senior 
leadership has been strengthened in the FATA, even though their 
main effort still is assessed to be in Iraq, by them, as well 
as by us. But, the organization of an attack, if you will, 
would likely come from the FATA.
    Senator Reed. What does that say about our strategy? We 
have focused extraordinary resources in Iraq, and, in the 
intervening years since we began our operations there, al 
Qaeda, by our own intelligence estimates, have re-established 
themselves, strengthened themselves, they have higher 
operational capacity today. We have under-resourced 
Afghanistan, which is the closest theater of our operations to 
Pakistan. We've been failing to engage the Pakistan military in 
effective counterinsurgency operations. Recently, the 
Government of Pakistan has entered into another stand-down 
agreement with the tribal leaders there. It seems to me that if 
that's the existential threat, we haven't made it the main 
effort in our campaign plan for your theater of operations. 
What's your thought?
    General Petraeus. As I mentioned in my opening statement, 
Senator, clearly we have to provide additional assistance to 
the new Pakistani Government, which, as you mentioned, is still 
solidifying its coalition, is developing essentially, a 
counterinsurgency strategy, what approach it is going to take 
for dealing with the FATA, a significant problem that they have 
inherited and that was causing extraordinary violence in their 
country before they were elected. We have very substantial 
programs in that area. I had a very long conversation with 
Ambassador Anne Patterson, with the station chief, with others, 
who are working that issue, about 2 weeks ago in Qatar. There 
are very substantial programs, but I think that the key need is 
to assess whether the overall concept that is guiding those--on 
the Pakistani side, in particular, of course--is adequate or 
not.
    One of the first trips that I would make, if confirmed as 
the CENTCOM Commander, would be to Pakistan to sit down with a 
fellow U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate, 
General Ashfag Parvez Kayani, to talk, at some length, about 
that, and obviously to do the same with the leaders of the 
Pakistani Government. That is a problem that has to be 
addressed. As I mentioned, it is a problem that has global 
implications, not just local extremist implications for 
Pakistan.
    Senator Reed. If your conclusion is, you need further 
resources in Afghanistan and further resources in support of 
the Pakistani forces within their own country, where are you 
going to get them, except from further reductions in Iraq?
    General Petraeus. Again, that would be, if confirmed, 
something I would have to discuss with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, with the Service Chiefs, and so forth, and 
perhaps with the current MNF-I Commander.
    Senator Reed. I appreciate what you're going to bring to 
this task, which is incredible skill and insight as to what's 
going on in the AOR, but I think it's a serious, serious 
comment, if our own intelligence agencies are suggesting that, 
in the intervening several years of our great effort in Iraq, 
our existential enemies have become stronger and perhaps even 
more capable.
    Let me switch gears briefly to an issue within Iraq, for 
both you and General Odierno. The status of the Sunni Concerned 
Local Citizen group, the Sons of Iraq--I know you responded to 
Senator Akaka that approximately 25 to 30 percent will be 
integrated. My guess is that the easy part of the integration 
has already taken place.
    I mean, I was out in Anbar with the Iraqi Highway Patrol, 
which probably, a year ago, were Iraqi insurgents. The harder 
part is the remaining 70-plus percent. It doesn't seem that the 
administration of Maliki has come to grips with this issue. Is 
that a fair assessment? We're still paying them, they haven't 
paid them. I know the response is, ``we have to get them all to 
employment,'' but they're still on our payroll.
    General Petraeus. Senator, actually there has been a 
transition of, again, well over 20,000 to a variety of 
different ISFs or other governmental employment, and that has 
been supported by Prime Minister Maliki.
    There will be additional ones that do get integrated. But, 
as General Odierno pointed out, one challenge is that not by 
any means do all of them want to go into the security forces; 
many of them want to have jobs in their own communities; they 
just want to help with security until that's possible. Then, 
substantial numbers do not qualify, because they don't meet the 
literacy or physical requirements. That's why we've generally 
said between 20 and 30 percent might ultimately end up in some 
form of ISFs.
    There are numerous other efforts that are now being, in 
some cases, piloted, in other cases starting to really gain 
traction, in terms of job programs for them, funded by, in some 
cases dual by the U.S. and the Iraqi Government, and in some 
cases by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Iraqi 
Government solely. These are starting to take off. They're 
something that we have to push very aggressively, so that there 
are opportunities provided for these individuals who have stood 
up and helped to protect their communities when they were 
really needed.
    Senator Reed. My time is expired, but if I could make a 
comment and then, perhaps in subsequent discussions informally, 
you might respond. But, my impression--in brief encounter with 
the Prime Minister--is that he viewed these Sunni Armed Forces 
as just as much a threat as the Shiite armed militias, and he 
may very well choose to deal with them, as he's dealt in the 
last few weeks with the Shiite, which is a military response 
which prompts some type of political reaction. That could be a 
serious challenge, General Odierno, to your tenure and your 
stability.
    I don't want to monopolize the time, but I will look 
forward to discussing this issue in detail with both of you.
    Again, thank you for your extraordinary service.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Sessions.
    Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to join with my colleagues in expressing my 
appreciation for your magnificent service.
    Captain Odierno, thank you, and for so many of your 
brothers and sisters in arms who have served our country under 
difficult circumstances. But, you two generals represent the 
leadership that has proven itself under most difficult 
circumstances, have helped position us in a way that I think, 
today, we can believe, with confidence, that we have a 
realistic opportunity to establish a very decent good 
government in Iraq, which will be so important for our 
strategic interests and the people of Iraq. I can't tell you 
how appreciative we are and how much admiration we have for 
both of you.
    General Odierno, you were there at the critical point of 
developing this new surge strategy. General Petraeus, your 
leadership and planning were just superb.
    General Odierno, I asked General Petraeus, when he took 
command in Iraq, before he left, did he believe our forces 
could be successful in that country and achieve our essential 
national goals. He said that he did, he wouldn't have taken the 
job if he did not. How do you feel? Just tell the American 
people honestly how you feel about our opportunity for a 
successful result.
    General Odierno. First, as General Petraeus, sir, I would 
not take this job if I didn't think that we could be 
successful. Senator, I believe that we have made significant 
progress, specifically over the last 18 months or so, and I do 
believe that we are headed in the right direction.
    I will not say that we are out of the woods yet, but I 
would say that we are clearly headed in the right direction. I 
believe a self-reliant Government of Iraq that is stable, one 
that is committed to governance and protecting its own people 
and serving all its people, a place that's denied as a safe 
haven for terrorists and extremists, and one that is integrated 
into the international community and a partner on the war on 
terror, is absolutely possible in Iraq. I think it's closer 
today than it has been.
    Senator Sessions. Maybe you would tell those who don't know 
your involvement in our effort there, and how long you've been 
there--why don't you give just a brief summary of what you've 
seen and how you've come to reach that conclusion.
    General Odierno. I would just say--having been there two 
separate tours and then several times in between, asked to 
conduct assessments both as an advisor to the Secretary of 
State, but also as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, I've spent close to 31 months in Iraq. What's 
been encouraging is, we understand the dynamics better than we 
did, we understand the environment, but the progression of the 
Iraqis is really now starting to show. It started by, first, 
enabling them, by providing additional security in some key 
areas, and then allowing the fact that they've decided to 
reject al Qaeda initially, starting in Anbar, where they 
understood that they did not want to live under the control of 
al Qaeda, and that they chose to work with the coalition and 
the Iraqi Government to expel al Qaeda and defeat al Qaeda. I 
think that was significant.
    As other Iraqis saw what happened in Anbar, they realized 
that the bright future for them is to reject these extremist 
groups, and that they did not want to be controlled by 
militias. I think we're starting to see that play out now with 
operations in Basrah and Sadr City.
    The most important thing to me over the last few months has 
been the evenhandedness of going after all of the enemies of 
Iraq, those militias, as well as al Qaeda. But, again, I would 
say we still have quite a bit of work to do, and they will do 
everything they can to try to re-establish their influence 
inside of Iraq, and it's important for us that we're able to 
build up the ISFs and the governmental capacity so that they 
can, themselves, not allow them to rebuild any influence at all 
inside of Iraq.
    Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
    General Petraeus, you made brief reference to the fact that 
we've now seen, this past week, the lowest incidence of 
violence in Iraq in 4 years, and that maybe this week would be 
even lower. I know you don't want to be overconfident, but tell 
us what that means to you and what's been happening there.
    General Petraeus. Senator, what it means, of course, is 
that other activities can proceed. The whole idea has been to 
achieve a security environment in which individuals can go 
about their daily lives with much less fear than they had 
previously. This is not to say there are not still violent 
activities taking place in Iraq, there aren't still people 
trying to blow up other Iraqis, and so forth. But, it does say 
that again, the incidence of violence is significantly reduced, 
and to a level, again, that has not been seen in over 4 years, 
back to 23 April 2004.
    When you think about where we were, again, in November, 
December, January, February, and well into, really, the spring 
and early summer of 2007--2006 into 2007--that is a very 
significant development.
    Senator Sessions. It went from almost 1,600 incidents, a 
little over a year ago, to under 400, so that's a 75-percent 
reduction, really, a transformative event, I think. We are 
proud of that.
    General Petraeus, my time is about up, but I know that the 
Senate Armed Services Committee reported out our full 
authorization bill. It contains language that would ensure 
private security contractors are not authorized to perform 
inherently government functions in a combat area. It's my 
understanding that departments rely on these contractors for 
many things. Can you tell us what kind of impact this might 
have and if we should reconsider that language?
    General Petraeus. It would have a very significant impact, 
Senator, because these private security contractors--do perform 
very important missions. They are securing a variety of 
different activities in Iraq, and those are so important that 
we would likely have to use U.S. or other forces to secure 
them.
    The reason we have them there is that we don't have the 
forces to perform some of those missions, and so, this would be 
a significant drain on our combat power if it were carried out.
    If I could add that, in the wake of the incident last year, 
there has been significant progress also in the coordination 
and cooperation between private security contractors and those 
forces that--if you will, own the terrain--are responsible for 
the areas. There are much closer efforts between the 
contractual units and our forces; and, in fact, a lot of this 
was on General Odierno's watch, and the incidence of escalation 
of force from private security contractors has been reduced 
very dramatically.
    There are also new authorities that you provided to DOD, 
which were subsequently delegated to me, where I have Uniform 
Code of Military Justice authority over those DOD private 
security contractors, and there are other provisions for those 
who are under contract for the Department of State. So, I think 
that the unfortunate incident last year has actually led to a 
very considerable and good focus in this area that has helped 
enormously to improve the way these missions are conducted.
    Senator Sessions. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
    Senator Webb.
    Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, if I may add my personal thanks to Captain 
Odierno for your service, and tell you how much I personally 
value it. You're getting a lot of comments today, but you're 
here symbolically on behalf of a lot of people, I think, and I 
have very strong feelings about people like yourself, like my 
son, like Senator McCain's son, who stepped forward, moved into 
harm's way at a time when the country needed you, and I think 
we're going to be wanting to benefit from the counsel and the 
experiences of people like you in the long future. I just 
wanted to personally add my own thanks.
    I would also like to expand a little bit on something that 
Senator Warner said earlier when he was asking you two 
gentlemen about this Strategic Framework Agreement that is 
being negotiated. It's a very important agreement, and he had 
asked if you were being consulted. I would like to emphasize 
again for the record, I'd like to see the Senate consulted on 
this matter. We had meetings, at a staff level, on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and our staff did not 
receive any of the specific information in this agreement. I 
think that it's an agreement that's going to have a potentially 
long-term impact, presently constructed as an executive 
agreement. I'm going to be among those who are going to be 
attempting to insist that we have the right kind of 
participation in accordance with the Constitution on that.
    General Odierno, if I may, my view, having spent a lot of 
time in my life thinking about military issues, strategic 
issues, and policy issues, is that one of the most essential 
components of laying down a strategy is the need to be able to 
articulate clearly what the endpoint of that strategy is. I 
believe that the failure of the administration to be able to do 
that, or to be required to do that, is one of the reasons we've 
had so much confusion and debate after the initial invasion. In 
that vein, I would like to hear from you as to, in military 
terms, what do you see as the endpoint in our strategic 
direction here with respect to our involvement in Iraq?
    General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.
    First, I believe one of the most important pieces is to be 
a self-reliant government that is stable, a government that 
will contribute inside of the regional context and the 
international context. Obviously that means we need a 
professionalized ISF, one that could handle those missions, 
which I think we're moving forward toward; obviously, we need a 
place where we do not allow safe haven for terrorists or 
extremists that can affect the security, not only of the 
region, but also of the United States; and then, obviously one 
that is integrated, politically and economically, and is an 
economic engine for continued improvement for its people. I 
think those are the things that I think we look forward to.
    From a military perspective, it's their ability to secure 
themselves, it's their ability to do it in such a way where 
their government is allowed to continue to grow. We will do 
that by providing less and less assistance to them.
    Senator Webb. If I may, General, because I have a very 
short period of time here, all that being said, and those 
political goals for the Iraqis, what does the United States 
military in Iraq look like when that happens?
    General Odierno. Over time, I think it'll adjust. We will 
have less and less responsibility for direct combat, more for 
assisting them in conducting their missions. Over time, that 
would change into an advisory mission, as we felt more and more 
comfortable with them being able to do that on their own.
    Senator Webb. How long do you think we should be there, if 
those conditions are met?
    General Odierno. It is unknown how long we would be there 
once all those conditions are met.
    Senator Webb. Right.
    General Odierno. I think that would be a policy decision on 
how long we would want to have some sort of contact with the 
Iraqi Government in the future, and so, I think we'd have to 
have some discussions on that.
    Senator Webb. What is the endpoint of the United States 
involvement in Iraq? Let's say that Iraq meets the conditions 
you just talked about. Should there be a United States military 
presence in Iraq?
    General Odierno. I think that's a discussion we would have 
along several levels, not only from the MNF-I, Commander of the 
CENTCOM level, and obviously our civilian leadership, to decide 
what their policy would be in the future towards Iraq.
    Senator Webb. Do you believe that, if those conditions are 
met, there would be a need for United States military in Iraq?
    General Odierno. I do not. I believe what we would want, 
though, is to maintain, obviously, military contacts, as we do 
with many countries around the world, over time.
    Senator Webb. Right. Thank you for that. That's a very 
important clarification.
    General Petraeus, there's some language in response to 
questions that were submitted to you for the record that go to 
Iran that I would like to get some clarification, or give you 
the opportunity to clarify. You used the word ``malign'' as an 
adjective. As someone who's written nine books, I'm trying to 
struggle with how this fits into what you're saying here.
    You say, ``We will continue to expose the extent of Iran's 
malign activities in Iraq,'' and then you say, on the next 
page, ``Our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating 
international cooperation in building consensus to counter 
malign Iranian influence.'' You then speak about, ``There are 
consequences for its illegitimate influence in the region.'' 
Can you clarify for us how you're using those words?
    General Petraeus. I can, Senator. What I'm talking about 
there, I am characterizing that influence. It is malign, and it 
is lethal, and it is illegitimate. The arming, training, 
funding, and directing of militia extremists who have killed 
our soldiers, have killed Iraqi forces, and have killed Iraqi 
civilians----
    Senator Webb. I've heard all of that.
    General Petraeus. It is very malign, indeed. It's the same 
situation with what they're doing in----
    Senator Webb. In the interest of time, here, because you've 
given those answers, would you agree that, historically, one of 
the realities that we have to deal with is the notion that 
there will be some sort of Iranian influence in the region? I'm 
not talking about the specific military incidents, I'm talking 
about the reality of dealing with the region.
    General Petraeus. Senator, I'm not----
    Senator Webb. We cannot discount Iran.
    General Petraeus. I have always----
    Senator Webb. Would you agree with that?
    General Petraeus. I have always stated, in fact, that there 
will be Iranian influence, and that the hope is that that 
Iranian influence is constructive influence--commercial 
influence, economic influence, perhaps political influence, and 
cultural influence, religious, and so forth--but not this kind 
of contribution to lethal activities. That's exactly----
    Senator Webb. All right, there would be no disagreement 
from me on the last part of what you just said. The difficulty 
that a lot of people in this country, including myself, have is 
that we would hope that we would be able to see some creative 
leadership, in terms of how to bring a different set of 
diplomatic circumstances into play. Probably the best example 
of that, that I would just encourage you to consider while 
you're going through this, is the way that we were dealing with 
China in the early 1970s. China was a rogue nation with nukes, 
with an American war on its borders. We had no contact with 
this country for more than 20 years, after the communists took 
over in 1949. When we aggressively moved forward diplomacy with 
China, we took nothing off the table--and, by the way, the 
Chinese were directly involved in Vietnam at the time. They 
were providing military hardware, the same as you're talking 
about with Iran. They had military activities in Vietnam. We 
took nothing off the table. We didn't abandon any of our 
alliances. But, we, through diplomatic process, tried to reach 
something that also embraced the historic realities of that 
region.
    General Petraeus. Senator, I think, if you'll read my 
statement, that you will see that kind of spirit in it. If you 
want to use the international relations theorist concept that 
what you would want to do is to try, through every means 
possible, help Iran evolve from a revolutionary state--i.e., 
one that is not satisfied with the general status quo--to one 
that is more of a status quo regional power.
    In fact, as I have testified before this body before, 
Ambassador Crocker and I supported the conduct of the three 
rounds of negotiations that have taken place, the trilateral 
talks between Iraq, the United States, and Iran. Regrettably, 
it does not appear that there was progress as a result of 
those. That doesn't mean that you should necessarily stop them, 
but I certainly think that what Secretary Gates said the other 
day about determining how we can gather more leverage, again, 
more whatever kinds of support that we can, because right now, 
I think, as he said it, it's an open question as to whether, 
with the current circumstances, additional rounds of 
negotiations would be productive.
    Senator Webb. Thank you. My time is up, but I'm glad we 
were able to get that on the record. Thank you.
    General Petraeus. I am, too, Senator. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
    By the way, Senator Webb, Secretary Gates has committed to 
consult with us on those agreements that you talked about, and 
I just want to reinforce your point, Senator Warner's point, on 
that, that commitment is out there, it's public, and it's 
important.
    Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator Martinez.
    Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    Gentlemen, I want to extend my word of thanks to both of 
you for your service, and to make that extend to your families, 
as well. I also want to commend you both for the undeniable 
success that you have achieved militarily in Iraq, and the 
benefits that it has had to what we hope will be a more stable 
region, and certainly to make our country more secure.
    General Petraeus, when you were speaking, earlier, of the 
incidents, I wonder if you have the chart that shows--this 
chart, here.
    General Petraeus. I don't think we brought any of the big 
boards this time, Senator.
    Senator Martinez. Okay.
    I love your charts. But when you look at the pattern, it 
clearly shows a steep decline, which I would say corresponds to 
the new initiative and the offensive that we went on in 
February 2007. Would you agree that has had the kind of effect 
that we see now in the lessened violence?
    General Petraeus. It is certainly exactly what has 
happened. We had to have the surge of offensives to take away--
with our Iraqi partners--some of the sanctuaries and safe 
havens that al Qaeda and its Sunni extremist partners had, and, 
in some cases, also that militia extremists were employing. 
That has enabled, over time, the increase of control by 
legitimate security forces of areas that were at one time 
beyond their control, and has brought down the level of 
security incidents. It is a very significant reduction, as you 
note.
    Senator Martinez. First of all, as you undertake your new 
command, I want to welcome you to Florida, to MacDill, and to 
Tampa. We're awfully proud that you're going to be one of our 
residents, and we will welcome you there. It will be an honor 
to have you as a resident of Florida. But, in this broader 
responsibility, we know that there are problems in Lebanon and 
continue to see Syria's activities in the region, including 
their own very obvious, now, nuclear ambitions, which would be 
hugely destabilizing to the region.
    In the broader Middle Eastern situation, it does appear 
that the arm of Iran is ever-present in all of these 
situations, and I know you discuss our diplomatic initiatives 
who have really borne no fruit. How do you anticipate that we 
will deal with the continuing challenges that Iran poses to 
peace and security in the Middle Eastern region?
    General Petraeus. Senator, starting inside Iraq, we will 
certainly continue what we have done now, increasingly, in 
support of our Iraqi partners. As I mentioned, one of the 
results of the operation in Basrah is, they have seen these 
massive caches of weapons--for example, over 2,000 rounds of 
artillery and mortar rounds, hundreds and hundreds of rockets, 
thousands of pounds of explosives, rocket propelled grenades 
(RPGs), and all the rest--is to realize that their neighbor to 
the east has been undermining their security, and they have, 
indeed, generated enormous concerns as a result, sent their 
delegation, had other talks, and so forth.
    More broadly, we have to assist the government in Lebanon 
as it comes to grips with what to do with a similar militia 
issue there. We have just seen Lebanese Hezbollah, as I mention 
in my statement, carrying out a very intimidating activity in 
West Beirut and challenging, again, the sovereignty of that 
government.
    We need to do the same with respect to Syria, which 
partners with Iran in some of these activities. We believe, for 
example, that RPG-29s, that were originally sold to Syria back 
in 1999, eventually made their way to Lebanese Hezbollah, to 
Iran, and then into the hands of the Iranian-supported 
``special groups'' and were used in Iraq. Combating that 
trafficking is also very important.
    Ultimately, it will take unified action. Ideally, you would 
like to do it, as Senator Webb rightly is encouraging, with a 
variety of different engagements and so forth, if that is 
possible. As I said, I would agree, right now, with the 
Secretary of Defense, when he said that it's an open question 
as to the value of negotiations in the current circumstances. 
But, that's not to say that you can't try to change those 
current circumstances, try to develop some additional 
leverage--and it's about leverage--with the community of 
nations, many of whom share concerns about the issues of 
nuclear proliferation and the possibility of a regional arms 
race with respect to Iran, that, again, you can galvanize 
action that could encourage Iran, again, to be a more 
responsible partner of the Nations in the region and cease some 
of this activity that has been so damaging and destabilizing in 
various countries in the region.
    Senator Martinez. I believe you mentioned that you also had 
incredible finds of caches in the Sadr City area as the Iraqi 
forces, as well as ours, have moved through that area. Did I 
hear you say that earlier?
    General Petraeus. If I could clarify, Senator.
    Senator Martinez. Please.
    General Petraeus. There are significant finds. They are not 
yet of the scale of Basrah, but, of course, they've only been 
going at it for a couple of days. Now, there have also been 
significant caches in other areas in which militia elements 
were located, in and around Baghdad, and in other southern 
provinces, as well.
    Senator Martinez. Did I hear you mention, earlier, that one 
of these caches had been found in Sadr City in a hospital?
    General Petraeus. Yes, it was, Senator. That was used as a 
location where quite a substantial amount of weaponry, 
explosives, and other devices was stored by the militia.
    Senator Martinez. General Odierno, one last question. My 
time is about to expire. I know that General Petraeus testified 
before the committee in answer to one of my questions, he 
indicated that 107-millimeter rockets that the Sadrists and 
Shiites ``special groups'' were firing into the International 
Zone, and now I'm told that prior to this most recent cease-
fire, these have been as large, now, as 240 millimeters. I 
wonder what your plan, as you take over this command, is, in 
terms of protecting the border with Iran better, to enable the 
Iraqi forces, as well as ours, to impede the flow of weaponry 
from Iran directly?
    General Odierno. Senator, I would just say we've been 
working very diligently over the last several months to improve 
the ports of entry along the Iranian border by adding a 
significant amount of transition teams and our individuals to 
help train and provide oversight to the Iraqis.
    First what we want to do is close these ports of entry, 
make it very difficult for anybody to get through--illegal 
weapons and other things through these ports. We've done that 
by a series of other measures, collecting biometrics and other 
things on individuals who come through there. In addition, 
we'll work with the Iraqis in order, then, to also secure the 
areas in between these ports of entry, and assist them with 
intelligence capacity, and allow them, then, to help to shut 
down, hopefully, these networks that are longstanding networks, 
very complex, and very difficult. Many of these networks have 
been established for many years and have used to transit other 
goods besides weapons. So, it will take a lot of hard work for 
us to get inside of those. But, we are working with the Iraqis 
on that, and I believe that is one of our major tasks as we 
continue to move forward.
    General Petraeus mentioned earlier that there's been a 
significant amount of work done along the Syrian border here in 
the last month or so, going after the ``rat lines'' there, and 
we've learned some good lessons there that I think we'll be 
able to also utilize on the Iranian border, as well, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez. I'm afraid 
we're going to have to end it there.
    Senator Martinez. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you. This will give Senator Pryor a 
chance to have his turn, and then, Senator Pryor, would you 
recess us until my return?
    My return will be sometime between this vote and the second 
vote.
    Senator Pryor. I'll be glad to.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator Pryor [presiding]. Thank you.
    Thank you both for being here, and thank you for your 
service and all the things that you do. It's good to see both 
of you again.
    General Petraeus, let me start with you, if I may. I have 
some questions, not about Iraq, but about Afghanistan. Not to 
get into all the background and all the details, because we do 
have a vote, so I'll try to keep my questions short, but 
Admiral Fallon said that we have a need for 2,000 additional 
soldiers and marines to conduct training and security missions 
inside Afghanistan. I know that General James T. Conway has 
stated that he has enough to go in and clear, but not enough to 
hold certain areas in Afghanistan. My first question to you is, 
do you think we need 2,000 additional troops inside 
Afghanistan?
    General Petraeus. I do. I think that General McNeill may 
assess the requirement even larger. However, I would point out 
that, actually, there are over 2,000 additional forces that 
have been provided, I believe, since Admiral Fallon made that 
statement, and they're on the ground, the marines. In fact, the 
withdrawal of the Marine Expeditionary Unit from Iraq helped 
reduce some of the pressure and allowed that.
    Senator Pryor. Just to clarify that, I know that at one 
point there were 3,400 additional that were sent.
    General Petraeus. That's actually the number that's on the 
ground right now.
    Senator Pryor. Okay.
    General Petraeus. It's a good bit larger than just the 
2,000.
    Senator Pryor. Okay. Now, my understanding is, the request 
or the statements were in the context of 2,000 additional, on 
top of that 3,400. Do you know?
    General Petraeus. I do not know that for a fact. I would 
agree, however, that there is a requirement for additional 
forces, that NATO is providing some additional forces, and that 
we likely will have to come to grips if and when additional 
U.S. forces are provided, as well.
    Senator Pryor. Do we have those forces available today to 
do that?
    General Petraeus. It depends on the level of risk that we 
would assign. It would be an enormous challenge for our 
Services. They would have to come out of cycle, in most cases, 
because, as the Service Chiefs and Vice Chief of the Army have 
forthrightly reported, there is little strategic flexibility 
until this recocking process, if you will, following the 
drawdown of the surge, is complete.
    Senator Pryor. Right now, there are 3,500 marines that went 
in March into Afghanistan, and they're going to be there for 7 
months, if I'm not mistaken. You would know more about the 
details than I do. So, that would put them in until October 
2008. Do we have the forces to replace those 3,500 and then do 
the additional on top of that?
    General Petraeus. First of all, I have to get a good bit 
better into the details of those kinds of specific deployments, 
but, in general, the campaign season starts to end around that 
time. As the snow sets in, the tactical activity in the winter 
is dramatically reduced. I think that there would be a degree 
of comfort with not replacing them at that time, although there 
clearly would need to be a replacement when the springs comes, 
either by NATO or U.S. or a combination of both.
    Senator Pryor. You understand the concern, though, that if 
we don't have the adequate forces there--maybe, for example, we 
can go in and clear, but not hold----
    General Petraeus. Absolutely.
    Senator Pryor. Yes. That's a big concern that I know the 
Senate will have.
    General Petraeus. It's why they're trying to build the 
Afghan national security forces, as well.
    Senator Pryor. Right.
    Let me change gears here a little bit. The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 had a provision in 
there--we call it section 1206--that has to do with our ability 
to help foreign military forces conduct counterterrorism 
operations and support the growth of those capabilities for 
other militaries. However, there was a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report that said that DOD and the 
Multi-National Force in Iraq cannot fully account for the Iraqi 
forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Do you have any 
comments on that? Do you know anything about that?
    General Petraeus. We've had GAO, and we've also invited the 
DOD Inspector General in to look at the specific case of 
accountability of weapons, especially those that were issued to 
the forces during some pretty tough days in the 2004 and early 
2005 timeframe. Over time, actually, the Multi-National 
Security Transition Command-Iraq, which has worked hard over 
the past year to do this, has actually re-established 
accountability, if you will, for a substantial portion of the 
weapons that initially were reported as not being accounted 
for. They continue that effort.
    Beyond that, there have been substantial changes made over 
time, but really started in the spring of 2005, as we were able 
to build the logistics and property accountability teams that 
were needed in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq, but not available early on, to enable the Iraqis to track 
their property, their most important property, in a manner that 
is closer to the way that we track ours. Now we actually even 
use biometrics with the issue of the M-16s and M-4 rifles that 
have been purchased--U.S. weapons that have been purchased for 
them--with their money, I might add, through Foreign Military 
Sales.
    Senator Pryor. I think what I'm hearing you say is, the 
accountability is very important, to make sure that we know 
where the weapons are going.
    General Petraeus. Absolutely, and also that there have been 
significant changes to improve the accountability process over 
time during our time in Iraq.
    Senator Pryor. Right.
    With that, I'm going to have to end my questioning because 
I need to get over for this vote. Again, I want to thank you, 
and I know that Senator Levin will be back here in just a few 
moments. Thank you for your service and all that you do and 
your testimony today.
    With that, what I'll do is, I'll recess this hearing, 
subject to the call of the chair, which I understand will be in 
just a few minutes.
    General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you. [Recessed.]
    Chairman Levin [presiding]. The committee will come back to 
order.
    Senator Clinton.
    Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank both General Petraeus and General Odierno 
for their service, which has now extended in Iraq over a number 
of years. When I was in Iraq in 2003, I was hosted by General 
Odierno, and here we are in 2008, talking about the way forward 
and trying to determine how best to resolve the difficulties we 
face. I congratulate both of you on the work that you've done 
and the incredible leadership you've provided.
    I want to turn, General Petraeus, to your broader AOR, 
should you be confirmed to head CENTCOM. I know that you've had 
some questions, during the course of the morning, about 
Afghanistan, but I want to just focus on that for a minute.
    I have been increasingly concerned that we have lost the 
initiative, both militarily and diplomatically. The recent 
announcement by the new Pakistani Government with respect to 
the agreement reached with the Taliban is concerning to me. 
Obviously, we have to have as much of a focus as we can bring 
to Afghanistan.
    I would ask you, General Petraeus, based on your assessment 
at this moment in time, do we have enough troops to achieve 
success, however ``success'' is defined, in Afghanistan?
    General Petraeus. Senator, I think that General McNeill has 
been on the record, and so has Admiral Fallon, about the 
requirement for additional forces in Afghanistan. Some have 
been provided by the United States, in the form of the marines 
that have gone on the ground. Then there are also pledges from 
NATO nations, as a result of the recent meetings, for some 
additional forces.
    I am not sure that will be all that is required, and one of 
the early efforts that I have to undertake will be, in fact, a 
trip to the Afghan-Pakistan region to spend some time on the 
ground. I've recently, actually, met with our U.S. commanders 
who are in Afghanistan, also the Ambassador and others. I think 
that, in the areas of the U.S. forces, that we generally have 
the initiative, but it's in some of the other areas, 
particularly in the southern part of the country, where, in 
fact, we may need to regain that initiative, and that may, 
indeed, take additional forces, and that's something that I 
have to look very hard at.
    Also, you alluded to Pakistan and the situation in the 
FATAs in the Northwestern Frontier Province. Clearly, concerns 
are there as well. That is, of course, where al Qaeda senior 
leadership is resident. Their ability and the ability of the 
Taliban to send fighters from those areas into Afghanistan is 
very destabilizing. Clearly there has to be a good deal of 
provision of assistance to the Pakistani Government by the 
United States and other coalition partners throughout the world 
to help this new government as it solidifies its coalition and 
comes to grips with how to deal with those problems in the FATA 
and in the Northwestern Frontier Province.
    Senator Clinton. I certainly urge a much greater amount of 
attention, because I agree with Central Intelligence Agency 
Director Michael V. Hayden that if the U.S. is going to suffer 
another attack on our own soil, it will most certainly 
originate from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In your 
advance policy question responses, you talked about al Qaeda 
and associated groups being the greatest terrorist threats we 
face, and clearly that's not confined to Afghanistan or 
Pakistan, but also Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and other places 
that will now be in your AOR.
    If we accept that, which I do, that there is a greater 
threat coming from there than anywhere else, what are you going 
to do to help elevate the attention that is paid to that area? 
It has been the forgotten front lines in the war against 
terrorism, and we have allowed what was an initial success to, 
if not deteriorate, certainly stagnate, and I'm concerned that 
we need to engage the country again in this effort against al 
Qaeda. How large a priority do you believe tracking down Osama 
bin Laden should be?
    General Petraeus. It should be a very high priority. Having 
met with Director Hayden, actually, recently, about 2 weeks ago 
in Qatar, together with the U.S. Ambassadors to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
Commander, and the current CENTCOM Commander, Lieutenant 
General Marty Dempsey, it is very clear that there is a very 
considerable focus on that.
    Again, having said that, I think there clearly is more that 
can and should be done in helping the new government in 
Pakistan, because this is a Pakistani problem that has both 
repercussions and does create enormous violence inside 
Pakistan, but, as you point out, has global implications, as 
well.
    You mentioned the other areas in the region. I am actually 
fairly well acquainted, because of the location of Lieutenant 
General McChrystal in my current AOR of a number of the 
activities that are ongoing in these other areas that you 
mentioned, all of which are, indeed, concerning.
    I would also, though, point out that al Qaeda has been 
quite open about the fact that it sees its main effort to be in 
Iraq, and that, of course, it is appropriate, again, to do 
everything that we can there to pursue al Qaeda-Iraq. That is, 
in fact, what is ongoing. There has been substantial progress 
against al Qaeda in Iraq, and that is an effort that we also do 
want to continue very much, and, in fact, has benefited 
considerably from the recent offensive directed by Prime 
Minister Maliki in Mosul and in the greater province of Ninawa.
    Senator Clinton. I know that we may not agree about what 
the principal emphasis should be with respect to our efforts 
against al Qaeda, because certainly the ongoing threat to the 
United States on our soil emanates from outside of Iraq, in my 
opinion, and I think that we have to raise the visibility of 
our efforts with respect to al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, particularly along the border, its efforts to set 
up subsidiaries in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, because, from 
the perspective of a Senator from New York now 6\1/2\ years 
after September 11, it is deeply troubling that we have not 
captured or killed or essentially decapitated the capacity of 
al Qaeda under the leadership it had in 2001, which is still 
the leadership it has today.
    I just wanted to ask one question, if I could, of General 
Odierno, because obviously the cycle of repeated and extended 
deployments are ones that we hear a lot about--the use of 
National Guard, and the Reserves. The last time I was there, 
with Senator Bayh, we saw a lot of people, who were born 
approximately the same time I was, who had been called back up 
in the Individual Ready Reserve pool. How many troops, General 
Odierno, do you plan to have in Iraq for the provincial 
elections in October? Will you request a temporary increase in 
troops?
    General Odierno. Senator, I will never say ``never,'' but 
my assessment now is, with the progress we're making, the 
progress we're seeing in the ISFs, and what I'm seeing as the 
security environment on the ground, currently, I do not believe 
we will need an increase. I think we'll be able to do it with 
the forces that are on the ground there now, or what we'll get 
to in July.
    Now, I feel fairly comfortable with that. Obviously, the 
environment and the enemy has a vote. But, currently, I believe 
we should not need an increase.
    Senator Clinton. Finally, General, if there were a decision 
by the President, in your professional estimation, how long 
would a responsible withdrawal from Iraq take?
    General Odierno. Senator, it's a very difficult question. 
The reason is because there's a number of assumptions and 
factors that I would have to understand first, based on how do 
we want to leave the environmental issues within Iraq, what 
would be the final end state, what is the affect on the ground, 
what is the security mission on the ground. I don't think I can 
give you an answer now, but I certainly, at the time, if asked, 
we would do--and we do planning--we do a significant amount of 
planning to make sure that an appropriate answer is given, and 
we would lay out a timeline in order to do that.
    Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, thank you to the witnesses and their families.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
    Let me thank our witnesses.
    Just one quick question of General Petraeus. You were asked 
about the security contractors. These are complicated 
provisions that are very carefully laid out, in terms of 
discretionary action that could affect the international 
relations of the United States. I'm wondering whether you've 
read all those particular provisions.
    General Petraeus. Sir, I have not. All I was responding to 
was the question, as I understood it here today.
    Chairman Levin. All right. Well, I'm wondering if you could 
take a look at them--it takes up 2 pages of our bill--and then 
give us your comment, for the record, because I think you would 
find these to be very carefully set forth. Would that be okay?
    General Petraeus. I'll do that, Senator.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Statutory language that defines the functions of private security 
contractors (PSC) as inherently governmental and thus precludes using 
PSCs for security-related tasks would have a negative impact on our 
operations. The use of PSCs to perform perimeter security, convoy 
security, and personnel security is important to our mission 
accomplishment. If we were unable to use contractors for these tasks, 
we would be required to use U.S. military personnel. The primary 
missions of the U.S. military in Iraq are to help the Iraqi security 
forces (ISF) secure the population and develop the ISF to take on 
security missions for themselves. Diverting U.S. military forces from 
these primary missions would adversely affect our operations. Today in 
Iraq there are nearly 7,300 PSCs protecting individuals and property. 
The removal of these PSCs would initially require an equal number of 
U.S. military personnel (boots on the ground). Based on force 
deployment models, sustaining our force over time would increase this 
number by a factor of three. I assume the draft statutory guidance 
would also generate additional force requirements in Afghanistan. These 
numbers would grow further if U.S. military personnel were also 
required to replace the approximately 1,500 PSCs who provide security 
for State Department personnel in Iraq alone.
    As I noted in my recent confirmation hearing, there have been 
significant improvements in the operation of PSCs in Iraq over the past 
6-8 months. Strengthened oversight and increased authority provided to 
military commanders has enabled us to use PSCs to fulfill more 
effectively their security roles in a fully accountable manner that 
supports mission accomplishment. Last December, the Departments of 
Defense and State signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which 
standardized PSC operations in Iraq. Since implementing the MOA's 
provisions, we have observed a greater than 60 percent reduction in 
escalation of force incidents involving PSC contractors. This oversight 
is being further strengthened through the development of an umbrella 
regulation as required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
for Fiscal Year 2008. This regulation is in final coordination now, and 
will further codify and extend the oversight and management policies of 
the MOA to all U.S. Government PSCs operating in a designated area of 
combat operations. Moreover, since the publication of the Secretary of 
Defense's March 10, 2008, memorandum on Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction over Department of Defense (DOD) contractor 
personnel, commanders in Iraq have begun to use the authority provided 
by Congress in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 to subject contractor 
personnel to the UCMJ.
    I understand that DOD is currently assessing the interpretation of 
relevant regulations and the proposed legislative language. I recommend 
that DOD be given the opportunity to make a recommendation based on 
their work. I believe it would be wise for there to be dialogue on the 
definition of what constitutes an ``inherently governmental'' function 
and on the impact of that definition on our operations and our force.

    Chairman Levin. Also, we have been in touch with you about 
the situation with the Christian communities in Iraq. We thank 
you for your awareness of that problem, their security issues, 
and we would ask you, particularly, I guess, General Odierno, 
to pick up that sensitivity and keep that concern very much in 
your mind.
    General Odierno. Yes, Senator, I understand.
    Chairman Levin. We thank you both. We hope that we'll bring 
your nominations to the floor as promptly as possible.
    We will now stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to GEN David H. Petraeus, 
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers 
supplied follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly 
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities 
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These 
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and 
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and 
education and in the execution of military operations.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more 
interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation's history. 
This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the 
ability of military and civilian departments to work closely together. 
Some progress has been made in this regard. The State Department's 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who has been given 
the lead by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD44), 
``Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and 
Stabilization,'' has developed the Interagency Management System and a 
draft U.S. Government Planning Framework. These tools provide a viable 
process, within existing authorities, to enhance and align military and 
civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. They 
have also designed and begun to stand up the Civilian Response Corps 
system to provide increased civilian expeditionary capacity to complex 
operations. This system holds impressive potential. DOD has developed a 
working plan to support the implementation of NSPD44. The U.S. will be 
well-served by having available the various tools to promote unity of 
effort across the U.S. Government.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of 
interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and 
stability operations. Counterinsurgency requires the commitment of both 
military and civilian agencies, and unity of effort is crucial to 
success. NSPD44 represents a good overall start, and new military 
doctrine helps as well. The State Department Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. In addition, 
the Consortium for Complex Operations has been stood up to serve as an 
intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices on the many 
facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, high-payoff 
initiative.
    Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders 
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies 
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
    Answer. Yes, although, as mentioned above, further development of 
interagency capacity and doctrine is required.
    Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with 
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
    Answer. Combatant commanders have increasingly focused on 
addressing the root causes of conflict in their regions in order to 
prevent the outbreak of violence and to mitigate the conditions that 
allow extremism to take hold. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining 
this important focus. This focus requires investment in long-term 
economic and political development, makes whole-of-government 
approaches more important than ever, and requires even more 
coordination with civilian activities in combatant commands' AORs.

                             RELATIONSHIPS

    Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the 
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense 
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other 
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important 
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your 
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, Central Command 
(CENTCOM), to the following officials:
    The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander, 
CENTCOM performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of 
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commander, CENTCOM is 
responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the 
command to carry out its missions.
    Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
    Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information 
with the Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM 
priorities and requirements for support.
    Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
    Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information 
with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet 
CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.
    Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the 
President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section 
163 of title 10, U.S.C., allows communication between the President or 
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through 
the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed 
by the Unified Command Plan, I would communicate with the Secretary 
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. I would communicate and coordinate with the Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
    Answer. I would also communicate and coordinate with the Director 
as necessary and expect the Deputy Commander, CENTCOM or Chief of 
Staff, CENTCOM would communicate regularly with the Director of the 
Joint Staff.
    Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
    Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible 
for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant 
commands. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates closely with the Secretaries 
to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip forces for 
CENTCOM are met.
    Question. The Service Chiefs.
    Answer. Commander, CENTCOM communicates and exchanges information 
with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, 
training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of the CENTCOM 
mission responsibilities requires close coordination with the Service 
Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Service Chiefs 
to understand the capabilities of their Services and to ensure 
effective employment of those capabilities in the execution of the 
CENTCOM mission.
    Question. The other combatant commanders.
    Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains close relationships with the 
other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the 
execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by 
mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of 
information on key issues.
    Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
    Answer. I would necessarily have a relationship with the U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq, in close coordination with the commander, Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), in order to ensure unity of effort between 
U.S. military and other U.S. Government activities in Iraq and in the 
CENTCOM region.
    Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
    Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with 
the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in close coordination with the U.S. 
commander there, in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. 
military and other U.S. Government activities in Afghanistan and in the 
CENTCOM region.
    Question. Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.
    Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with the 
Commander, MNF-I to support and resource the effort in Iraq to meet 
national policy goals. It is critical that the relationship between the 
Commander, CENTCOM and the Commander, MNF-I be close, candid, and 
productive to meet this end.
    Question. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan.
    Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with 
Commander, NATO-ISAF to support and resource the effort to achieve the 
goals of the NATO mandate in Afghanistan. There is no formal command 
relationship (though there are such relationships with the Combined 
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Commander, 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Afghanistan). However, robust communications 
and coordination are necessary to ensure the achievement of strategic 
goals.

                             QUALIFICATIONS

    Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important 
position at a critical time for CENTCOM.
    What background and experience do you have that you believe 
qualifies you for this position?
    Answer. First, I have extensive combat and command experience in 
the CENTCOM AOR. Having served in Iraq for over 3\1/2\ years (as a 
division commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 
(MNSTC-I)/NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) commander, and, now, MNF-I 
commander), I have a good understanding of the country's culture, its 
leaders, and its challenges. My current position as MNF-I Commander, in 
particular, has provided me with extensive knowledge about our 
operations in Iraq, ideas on best-practices that would be useful 
elsewhere, and relationships with leaders throughout the Middle East 
and with leaders of Coalition countries. Though I have not served in 
Afghanistan, I did conduct a 5-day assessment there in September 2005 
at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and my experience with 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations would, I hope, be 
useful in supporting General McKiernan and coalition forces operating 
there.
    Second, I have had a number of relatively high-level joint 
assignments, including serving as a TDY Special Assistant to CINCSOUTH, 
as Military Assistant to the SACEUR, as Operations Chief of the U.N. 
Force in Haiti, as Executive Assistant to the CJCS, as the temporary 
duty commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)-
Forward in Kuwait, as ACOS OPS of SFOR in Bosnia, as commander of 
MNSTC-I/NTM-I, and, now, as commander of MNF-I.
    Third, I believe I have an academic background that has 
intellectually prepared me for the challenges of high-level command and 
complex environments, as I have studied--as well as served in--major 
combat operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping 
operations, and peace enforcement operations. My doctoral dissertation 
at Princeton University was titled, ``The American Military and the 
Lessons of Vietnam.'' Most recently, while at Fort Leavenworth, I 
oversaw the development of the Army/Marine Corps manual on 
counterinsurgency and also changes to other Army doctrinal manuals, 
branch school curricula, leader development programs, combat training 
center rotations, the ``Road to Deployment'' concept, and other 
activities that support the preparation of our leaders and units for 
deployment to the CENTCOM AOR.
    Fourth, I have in the past year, as part of my MNF-I duties, met 
with leaders in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, 
and Bahrain, as well as with many of the leaders of the countries 
contributing forces in Iraq, many of whom also contribute forces in 
Afghanistan and the Gulf.
    Finally, I believe that I have a solid understanding of the 
requirements of strategic-level leadership.

                            MAJOR CHALLENGES

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting 
the next Commander, CENTCOM?
    Answer. Although there are numerous country-specific challenges in 
the region, a survey of the CENTCOM AOR as a whole reveals several 
transnational concerns that affect many or all of the region's 
countries. These concerns are interrelated and create significant 
challenges for regional stability and for U.S. interests in the region.
    First is the violent extremism that poses a significant threat 
throughout the region. Though al Qaeda is the highest visibility and 
priority terrorist organization, there are also many other extremist 
groups in the region.
    Another concern in the region is the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, including related components and technical expertise. 
Iran's and Syria's nontransparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities 
could destabilize the region and spark a regional arms race. The need 
to secure existing nuclear material is a related and critical concern.
    A lack of economic development in many of the region's countries is 
another transnational concern. This is both a humanitarian issue and a 
security issue, as poverty and lack of opportunity are often enablers 
of successful terrorist recruiting.
    Another concern is the prevalence of piracy, narcotics trafficking, 
and arms smuggling in the CENTCOM AOR. In addition to being criminal 
and destructive activities, these practices threaten strategic 
resources and are often lucrative sources of funding for terrorists.
    Because of the region's importance to the global economy, another 
concern is the free flow of strategic resources and international 
commerce through the region.
    Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these 
challenges?
    Answer. Although it is premature to have specific and comprehensive 
plans, there are several concepts that would guide my approach to the 
region's challenges, if I am confirmed.
    First, we would seek to build partnerships in the region, pursuing 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in identifying and working 
toward mutual interests. This involves extensive engagement with 
leaders in the region, and I would see this as one of my primary 
responsibilities as CENTCOM commander.
    Second, we would aim for a whole-of-government approach in 
addressing the region's challenges. This approach recognizes that 
solutions for the region's challenges should be as multifaceted as the 
challenges themselves. Rather than engaging in purely military 
solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and capabilities 
resident in the whole of government.
    Third, and related, we would pursue comprehensive approaches and 
solutions, addressing the roots of issues and not just their 
manifestations. This entails efforts varying from spurring economic 
development and educational opportunity to strengthening governments' 
abilities to combat terrorism and extremism.
    Fourth, we would posture our forces and maintain focus on readiness 
to conduct contingency operations, whether crisis response, deterrent 
action, or defeating aggressors.
    These concepts can be applied to each of the transnational threats 
listed in the answers to the previous question, and they are also 
important in addressing and preventing the spread of inter- and intra-
state conflicts in the CENTCOM AOR.
    Signaling U.S. resolve to address the region's challenges is one of 
the important roles of any combatant commander, and active pursuit of 
these concepts would also serve that purpose.

                         MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

    Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in 
the performance of the functions of Commander, CENTCOM? What management 
actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?
    Answer. Having not yet performed those functions, I cannot say at 
this time what the most serious problems are. Until I have been 
confirmed and made an assessment, it would be premature to establish 
management actions or timelines.

                          READINESS OF FORCES

    Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces 
that have been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom?
    Answer. Units arrive in theater well prepared for the operations in 
Iraq. Indeed, I continue to believe that our current force is the best 
trained, best equipped force in America's history. Leaders at every 
level, many of whom are on their second or third combat deployments, 
are using their experience from previous deployments to prepare and 
train their units well, and U.S. forces in Iraq remain disciplined, 
spirited, and adaptable in the face of challenging, ever-changing 
battlefield conditions.
    Question. Have you observed any significant trends in apparent gaps 
with respect to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in units' 
upon arrival in theater?
    Answer. There are not currently any significant gaps in the 
readiness of units as they arrive in Iraq. The equipment and training 
they receive in preparation for deployment are excellent. As in all 
counterinsurgency operations, though, tactics--both those of the enemy 
and our own--constantly change, and the winning side is generally that 
which learns faster. We have strived to be a learning organization and 
have adapted well in the past; with Congress's support, for example, we 
have effectively employed increasing ISR capability and fielded MRAPs 
to protect our forces from increasingly lethal IEDs. We have also 
worked to push lessons learned back to units so they can integrate them 
into their training. As enemy tactics evolve and new equipment and 
training requirements arise, I would see it as my responsibility to 
address those needs, if I am confirmed.
    Question. What are your views on the growing debate over whether 
the Army is putting too much emphasis on preparing for 
counterinsurgency operations or too little emphasis on preparing for 
high intensity force-on-force conflict?
    Answer. Although I understand the concern, I believe that the 
distinction between the requirements of counterinsurgency and those of 
high intensity combat can be overstated. Indeed, Army doctrine explains 
that all operations (including counterinsurgency) are a mix of 
offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. Forces in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have performed--and continue to perform--very well 
in intense combat, gaining new sophistication in the use of fires 
(increasingly precise) and air-weapons teams, the integration of 
counterfire radar and unmanned aerial vehicles, the teamwork between 
conventional and Special Operations Forces, the fusion of intelligence, 
and the command and control of complex operations. The past year, for 
example, included significant combat operations to clear Ramadi, 
Baqubah, various Baghdad neighborhoods, and now Mosul. Beyond that, 
leaders are explicitly trained and educated in our branch schools in 
how to think rather than what to think, and they are more adaptive as a 
result. The Army is now full of experienced leaders (as are all our 
Services), and it has shown that it is a learning organization, rapidly 
institutionalizing lessons learned. Finally, it has a more robustly 
equipped force, including vehicles that offer better protection, which 
would serve well in a variety of high intensity conflicts.

                                  IRAQ

    Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing 
the United States in Iraq?
    Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position in Iraq 
now than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The security situation is 
much improved, with overall attacks, civilian deaths, and ethno-
sectarian violence all down substantially. The week ending 16 May 2008 
had the lowest level of security incidents since the week that ended 23 
April 2004. Having noted that, progress is uneven and difficult 
challenges remain, including Iran's malign involvement in Iraq and the 
fact that AQI and other Sunni extremists and illegal Shiite militias 
retain the ability in some areas to carry out lethal attacks and 
regenerate. Iraqi security forces continue to improve and are 
increasingly taking the lead. Nonetheless, the gains of the past 15 
months remain fragile, and much tough work remains on the security 
front.
    The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on some very 
difficult issues and has passed some critical legislation. We have seen 
more unity across sectarian lines at the national level, and this 
presents opportunities for further political progress. Iraq's 
governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas but is 
improving. Overall, Iraq is moving in the right direction and making 
progress. However, it will take continued U.S. involvement and 
commitment to ensure that the gains are not reversed.
    Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned 
from our experience in Iraq?
    Answer. Recent experience in Iraq has shown us the value of 
pursuing a comprehensive approach in response to complex challenges and 
of focusing on key counterinsurgency concepts. In Iraq, we operate 
along multiple lines of operation. Our strategy recognizes that 
enduring security and stability rest on economic, political, social, 
and diplomatic, as well as military, efforts and thus require 
simultaneous pursuit of a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic 
operations. Our application of a joint USM-I/MNF-I campaign plan has 
required an immense amount of coordination among governmental 
departments and agencies and reinforced the lesson that the military 
cannot accomplish its mission on its own. As an example, we have begun 
to address the foreign fighter problem in Iraq through a series of 
video teleconferences in which more than 25 organizations from the 
interagency, Intelligence Community, and DOD participate; this forum 
has allowed key leaders across all agencies and departments to share 
current assessments and activities and to discuss future plans.
    Because of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, we have already 
seen some progress in interagency cooperation. After September 11, 
every regional combatant commander stood up a new doctrinal Joint 
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) that was originally focused on 
counterterrorism operations. Over the past few years, these JIACGs have 
begun to evolve into interagency enablers for full-spectrum operations. 
Just this month, CENTCOM formally announced the evolution of its JIACG 
into an Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare to confront the 
complex challenges of its region. If I am confirmed, I would seek to 
build on these initiatives as CENTCOM commander.
    Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes 
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
    Answer. First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments 
that did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that 
Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and 
resume their functions as soon as interim governmental structures were 
in place; that obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi 
infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it 
was (a challenge compounded, of course, by looting). Additionally, 
although most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators (and that was 
true even in most Sunni Arab areas), there was an underestimation of 
the degree of resistance that would develop as a Shiite majority 
government began to emerge and the Sunni Arabs, especially the 
``Saddamists,'' realized that the days of their dominating Iraq were 
over. Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by other actions noted 
below.
    A number of other situations did not develop as envisioned, 
including:

        - There was a feeling that elections would enhance the Iraqi 
        sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian 
        positions, as Iraqis who did vote did so largely based on 
        ethnic and sectarian group identity; major sections of the 
        population boycotted the political process and thus have been 
        underrepresented ever since.
        - There was an underestimation over time of the security 
        challenges in Iraq, particularly in the wake of the 2006 
        bombing of the mosque in Samarra, coupled with an 
        overestimation of our ability to create new security 
        institutions, in the midst of an insurgency, following the 
        disbandment of the Iraqi security forces.
        - It repeatedly took us too much time to recognize changes in 
        the security environment and to react to them. What began as an 
        insurgency, gradually evolved into a conflict that included 
        insurgent attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent 
        crime. Our actions had to evolve in response to these changes, 
        and that was not always easy.

    A number of other mistakes were made during the course of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, including:

        - The very slow execution of the reconciliation components of 
        de-Baathification by the Iraqi de-Baathification Committee left 
        tens of thousands of former Baath Party members (many of them 
        Sunni Arabs, but also some Shiite) feeling that they had no 
        future opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To 
        be fair to the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador 
        Bremer intended to execute reconciliation (or exceptions to the 
        de-Ba'athification order) and, for example, gave me permission 
        to do so on a trial basis in Ninewa Province; however, when we 
        submitted the results of the reconciliation commission 
        conducted for Mosul University and subsequent requests for 
        exception issued by Iraqi processes with judicial oversight, no 
        action was taken on them by the Iraqi de-Ba'athification 
        Committee in Baghdad. As realization set in among those 
        affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we could feel 
        support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab majority areas.
        - Disbanding the Iraqi Army without simultaneously announcing a 
        stipend and pension program, a plan for Iraq's future security 
        forces, and ways to join those future forces left hundreds of 
        thousands of Iraqi men angry, feeling disrespected, and worried 
        about how they would feed their families. The stipend plan 
        eventually announced did help, but it did not cover senior 
        officers, who then remained influential critics of the new 
        Iraq. This action likely helped fuel the early growth of anti-
        coalition sentiment and of the insurgency.
        - We took too long to develop the concepts and structures 
        needed to build effective Iraqi security forces to assist in 
        providing security for the Iraqi people.
        - Misconduct at Abu Ghraib and in other less sensational, but 
        still damaging, cases inflamed the insurgency and damaged the 
        credibility of Coalition Forces in Iraq, in the region, and 
        around the world.
        - We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an 
        inadequate military headquarters structure. In hindsight, it is 
        clear that it took too long to transform V Corps Headquarters 
        into CJTF-7 Headquarters and that even after that 
        transformation the headquarters was not capable of looking both 
        up and down (e.g., performing both political-military and 
        strategic functions and also serving as the senior operational 
        headquarters for counterinsurgency and stability operations). 
        The result was the eventual creation of the MNF-I headquarters. 
        Moreover, it is clear that we should have built what eventually 
        became MNSTC-I headquarters and TF134 headquarters (which 
        oversees detainee/interrogation operations) and other 
        organizations (e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region 
        Division Headquarters) much sooner.
        - Although it was not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division 
        AOR during my time as the 101st Cdr, it is clear that in 
        certain AORs there were more tasks than troops--especially in 
        Anbar Province during at least the first year of operations.
        - Finally, the effort in the wake of the al-Askariya Mosque 
        bombing in Samarra in February 2006, was unable to stem the 
        spiraling ethno-sectarian violence. Repeated operations in 
        Baghdad in the summer and fall of 2006, in particular, did not 
        prove durable due to a lack of sufficient Iraqi and coalition 
        forces for the hold phase of clear-hold-build operations.

    Question. Which of these do you believe are still having an impact?
    Answer. Although it is difficult after 5 years of developments in 
Iraq to attribute specific current challenges to particular past 
activities, it is likely that we are still feeling the effects of many 
of these activities. For instance, groups that chose not to participate 
in Iraq's 2005 elections are still underrepresented in government at 
the provincial and national levels. For this reason, free and fair 
provincial elections this year will be very important in pulling an 
increasing proportion of Iraqi society into the political process.
    Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the 
United States needs to take in Iraq?
    Answer. As U.S. forces in theater draw down, our most important 
steps are those that protect the Iraqi people while continuing to build 
Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as we assist in providing security, 
we must also enable Iraqi security forces increasingly to assume the 
lead in securing their country. We must work to help the Iraqis expand 
their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage and 
support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the local 
and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the challenges 
associated with internal and external stability and security in Iraq 
cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must thus continue to engage with 
Iraq's neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to support political 
compromise and stability in Iraq.
    Question. How has the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence 
changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
    Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a 
competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and 
resources. While the fundamental nature of this struggle has not 
changed, it has played out differently over time. Over the past year, 
we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence. 
However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing 
challenges in the area of intra-sectarian conflict have risen to the 
fore. Iraq continues to face a complex array of destabilizing forces, 
including terrorism and regional interference; however, as noted 
earlier, the level of security incidents in the past week was the 
lowest in over 4 years.
    Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to 
this change in the nature of the conflict?
    Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address 
this conflict over power and resources. As commander of MNF-I, I 
participated in the development of the Joint Campaign Plan with the 
U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad. This plan lays out a comprehensive 
approach, along security, economic, diplomatic, and political lines of 
operation, to achieve the aim of an independent, stable, and secure 
Iraq. Although there is a long way to go, our strategy to address the 
conflict in Iraq is achieving progress.
    Question. What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in 
response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among 
militant groups vying for control, particularly in southern Iraq?
    Answer. Coalition forces support the elected government and help 
that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
Iraqi leaders have largely united around the aim of disarming all 
militias, and we seek to support them in that effort.
    Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the 
new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007?
    Answer. The day after Secretary Gates took office, immediately 
before his first trip to Iraq, I met with him to discuss the situation 
in Iraq. We talked again subsequent to his trip. I also talked to the 
CJCS several times during that period, noting that an emphasis on 
population security, particularly in Baghdad, was necessary to help the 
Iraqis gain the time and space for the tough decisions they faced and 
also contributing my input on the general force levels likely to be 
required. As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions to 
LTG Ray Odierno to confirm that his troop-to-task analysis required the 
force levels called for by the new strategy; I relayed my support for 
those levels to the CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the 
strategy's additional emphasis on the advisory effort and additional 
resources for the reconstruction effort (both in terms of funding and 
personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Teams and governmental ministry 
capacity development).
    Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution 
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
    Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in 
Iraq. All four lines of operation--security, economic, diplomatic, and 
political--are mutually reinforcing and thus must be pursued to achieve 
a long-term solution in Iraq. Though the pursuit of political 
reconciliation and good governance along the political line of 
operation is the main effort, success in this area depends on security 
conditions that enable and foster compromise. Enduring domestic 
political progress will also rest on supporting economic and diplomatic 
developments.
    Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi 
political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders 
to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
    Answer. Iraq leaders have put themselves under enormous personal 
pressure and are also under the collective pressure of various 
political elements in Iraq to create stability and long-term solutions 
for Iraq. Indeed, they have already worked together and compromised on 
a number of difficult issues in order to pass important pieces of 
legislation earlier this year. They recognize that in order to succeed 
in a political process, they will need to produce results, and 
producing results requires compromise. With regard to expectations 
about the pace of progress, it is important to recognize that Iraq's 
political leaders are still struggling with fundamental questions such 
as the degree of devolution to the provinces of various authorities and 
powers in Iraq. Iraq's political leaders have already begun to make 
progress in these areas, and they are continuing to move forward on 
issues such as the provincial elections scheduled for later this year.
    Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
    Answer. Although U.S. forces and reconstruction funding are being 
reduced, the U.S. still has considerable leverage and influence in the 
form of U.S. forces, the large U.S. diplomatic presence, and the 
comprehensive effort to increase governmental capacity. Having said 
that, Iraq is a sovereign country and, understandably, its leaders seek 
to exercise that sovereignty--and we seek to encourage that. Beyond 
that, supporting political solutions in Iraq is not purely a matter of 
leverage and convincing Iraqi leaders of the importance of compromise. 
It is also a matter of helping Iraqi leaders to set conditions that 
enable progress. There again, our leverage lies in our robust 
engagement, working with the Government of Iraq, and helping its 
leaders to make and implement the hard decisions that are in the best 
interests of all the Iraqi people.
    Question. To your knowledge, aren't conditions on the ground in 
Iraq being continuously assessed?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days 
to assess the conditions on the ground and determine when to make 
recommendations?
    Answer. The withdrawal of over one-quarter of our combat power from 
Iraq will significantly reshape the battlefield. Our goal is to thin 
out our presence, not simply withdraw from areas, to ensure we help the 
ISF hold the security gains we have achieved together and set the 
conditions for additional progress. A period of 45 days will enable us 
to reposture our forces, if needed, evaluate the effect of required 
adjustments, and avoid premature judgments about the impact of these 
changes. After this period of consolidation and evaluation, we can then 
complete an informed assessment and make appropriate recommendations.
    Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would 
allow for a recommendation that further reductions be made in U.S. 
forces?
    Answer. There is no simple metric or equation that can be used to 
determine the appropriate pace of force reductions. A number of 
variables are examined as we conduct assessments. Reductions are not 
merely a question of battlefield geometry; they involve complex 
political and military calculus. We look primarily at security and 
local governance conditions--at the enemy situation and the capability 
of Iraqi security forces, at the capacity of local officials, and at a 
host of other factors. Though we have metrics to assist in assessing 
the situation in various locations, in many cases it is the commander 
on the ground who has the best feel for the situation; it is as much 
art as it is science.
    Question. In the fiscal year 2008 defense authorization and 
appropriation acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek 
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
    Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the 
United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to 
exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of 
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
    Answer. As is currently the case in Iraq, construction efforts 
should be focused on supporting the counterinsurgency concept of living 
among the people rather than on the expansion of large operating bases. 
Toward this end, we continue to complete some Joint Security Station 
and Combat Outpost facilities that are necessary for current missions--
though the vast majority of these facilities have already been 
completed. Over time, a few headquarters may be shifted as well, and 
this may require a few facility changes. Much of our future effort 
will, however, be focused on reducing the size of our facilities. As we 
continue to withdraw forces, we will follow a ``shrink and share'' 
strategy that reduces base perimeters and maximizes opportunities to 
share bases with ISF and Government of Iraq users. Eventually, these 
facilities will either be transferred to the Government of Iraq or 
closed.
    Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of 
the Iraqi Government to assume greater responsibility for paying the 
costs of reconstruction and security activities throughout Iraq, 
including paying for all large-scale infrastructure projects; the costs 
of combined operations between Iraqi and MNF-I forces; the costs of 
training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces; and the costs 
associated with the Sons of Iraq?
    Answer. The Government of Iraq has an increasing responsibility and 
an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in 
Iraq, and it is making progress in picking up a greater share of the 
load. As Ambassador Crocker recently stated before Congress, ``The era 
of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over.'' Instead, we are 
focusing our efforts on helping build Iraqi governmental capacity so 
that Iraqis can better leverage their own resources. For example, 
Iraq's 2008 budget contains $13 billion for reconstruction; beyond 
that, we anticipate Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this 
year and $11 billion next year, and a supplemental Iraqi budget is in 
the works. An important limiting factor is Iraqi governmental capacity, 
but this is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by a solid 
increase in budget execution last year.
    Question. What are your views on the concept circulated over the 
last year that would make Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan a 
Marine Corps mission and end the rotation of Marine units in support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom?
    Answer. In my current position in Iraq, I have not been a part of 
the discussions surrounding this issue (other than those related to its 
impact in Iraq). If I am confirmed, it is an issue I will discuss with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in Afghanistan.

                        CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS

    Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking 
the steps it must to confront and control the militias? What role would 
you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?
    Answer. The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in 
recent months to confront criminal militias. Prime Minister Maliki made 
the decision in March to confront militia elements in Basra that were 
carrying out violent crimes and mafia-like activities. That operation 
is still ongoing, but Iraqi security forces have made impressive 
progress in improving security conditions in Basra's neighborhoods as 
well as in the strategic Port of Umm Qasr and in other areas in Basra 
Province.
    The government's success in Basra has also led to a greater degree 
of unity among Iraqi leaders regarding the issue of armed militias. 
Prime Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the 
Government of Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
(an issue on which a public statement of backing was issued by Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani), and the government and ISF have worked to enforce 
this point in Baghdad, particularly in Sadr City. In general, the 
government has been more willing to use its forces to confront militia 
elements, but it also realizes that the militia issue cannot be 
addressed with a purely military solution. In an effort to win popular 
support, Iraqi leaders have actively pursued humanitarian assistance 
efforts in areas affected by militia violence and have reached out to 
tribal and political leaders as well.
    There is obviously a long way to go in reducing militia violence, 
but there does seem to be positive momentum toward addressing these 
difficult issues and drawing dissident factions into the political 
process. If confirmed, I would continue to support the MNF-I 
Commander's efforts to partner with the Iraqi Government to combat 
these militias. In addition, I would seek to assist with regional 
engagement efforts to dissuade Iran and Syria from fostering violence 
and instability in Iraq and seek to encourage Iraq's Arab neighbors to 
play a more constructive role.
    Question. What has been the role of American troops with respect to 
operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra?
    Answer. U.S. support for the Sadr City and Basra operations has 
been generally in line with the support Coalition Forces regularly 
provide to Iraqi operations.
    In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in 
Multi-National Division--Southeast, we continue to support Iraqi-led 
operations with planning, logistics, close air support, intelligence, 
and embedded transition teams. These efforts are typical of our role in 
provinces transitioned to Iraqi control, where Iraqi forces plan and 
execute operations and are supported by specific Coalition enablers.
    Because Baghdad is not yet transitioned to Provincial Iraqi 
Control, U.S. forces are playing a more robust role in planning and 
executing operations in the Baghdad Security Districts than they are in 
Basra. We are conducting extensive surveillance operations in Sadr City 
and partnering with Iraqi units on the ground. Using intelligence 
elements, ground forces, and air weapons teams, U.S. forces also 
conducted very targeted operations in response to attacks originating 
in Sadr City. As is typical in the ``partner'' phase of the lead-
partner-overwatch transition to ISF control, Coalition forces operate 
alongside and in coordination with Iraqi Army, special operations, and 
police units.
    Question. What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and 
security forces' strategic and operational planning and preparation for 
the operation in Basra?
    Answer. Iraqi operations in Basra were launched more quickly than 
was originally planned and were hampered initially by incomplete 
planning and conditions-setting. As operations have continued, we have 
seen steady growth in ISF planning capability, and recent operations 
have been impressive.
    Once the hasty initial planning issues were resolved, Iraq security 
forces demonstrated impressive growth in operational capability, and it 
is notable that, on short notice, they were able to deploy over a 
division's worth of personnel and equipment to Basra from across the 
country and to quickly employ them upon arrival--a feat which certainly 
would not have been possible 1 year ago.
    Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces' 
tactical performance during operations in Basra?
    Answer. As operations in Basra began, performance of the ISF was 
uneven, with some units performing quite well and others performing 
poorly. However, the Iraqi Government reacted aggressively to 
shortcomings identified in early operations and quickly removed 
underperforming leaders and troopers and flew in replacements. Many of 
the units--such as a brigade of the 14th Iraqi Army Division--that 
originally performed poorly have already been retrained and are back in 
the fight as operations in Basra continue, though progress with 
reconstituting police elements that performed inadequately has been 
slower.
    As I noted above, performance of the ISF has improved over the 
course of the ongoing operation in Basra. The ISF have, for several 
weeks now, been conducting orderly clear-hold-build operations 
incrementally through the city and outside the city with sound tactical 
planning and execution. They have, for example, captured weapons caches 
that total over 2800 mortar and artillery rounds, nearly 700 rockets, 
1,300 rocket propelled grenades, 21 surface-to-air missiles, and over 
500 mines, bombs, and improvised explosive devices.
    Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi 
Government's strategic and the Iraqi security forces' operational 
objectives?
    Answer. Operations in Basra City and Province are still ongoing; 
however, they do appear to have achieved the Iraqi Government's 
military objectives, strategically as well as operationally. The 
accomplishments to date have been impressive and have bolstered Prime 
Minister Maliki's standing with various political elements. The ISF 
have made significant progress in eliminating the militia's grip on 
Basra's neighborhoods, and they have cleared numerous huge caches 
throughout the city. The operation seems to be garnering support from 
Basrawi citizens and has already had positive effects on Iraqi 
political unity. Also, the ISF have successfully detained several 
militia leaders who returned to Basra after fleeing in the early days 
of the operation.

                       ACCOUNTING FOR ISF WEAPONS

    Question. A July 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
found that the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-
I) could not fully account for the receipt by the Iraqi security forces 
(ISF) of over 190,000 weapons provided by the United States. One of the 
report's findings is that the lapse in accounting for weapons provided 
by the United States to the ISF was due to the failure of MNSTC-I to 
maintain a central record of all equipment distributed from June 2004 
to December 2005, including during the period you commanded MNSTC-I.
    Have you reviewed the July 2007 GAO report on accounting for 
weapons provided by the United States to the ISF? If so, what is your 
assessment of the report's findings?
    Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report. Taking into account the 
caveats listed in the GAO report (including the fact that the GAO 
review utilized an incomplete sample), I found the findings to be as 
accurate as they could have been. The security situation in Iraq in 
2004-2005 was very challenging, and the priority was to provide arms to 
ISF who were preparing to enter the fight. Indeed, Members of Congress, 
DOD, and the administration repeatedly emphasized the need to 
accelerate the arming and training of the ISF. On several occasions, we 
had to provide arms to the ISF in the middle of ongoing major combat 
operations (e.g., Fallujah, Najaf, and Mosul in the fall of 2004). Many 
of our challenges stemmed from an insufficient number of logistical 
personnel in the train and equip effort and in the newly formed Iraqi 
units, and also from the lack of a fully operational distribution 
networks and property accountability systems across Iraq. 
Accountability has since been achieved by MNSTC-I for a portion of the 
weapons assessed as unaccounted for in the GAO report, and the effort 
to achieve further accountability continues.
    Question. What has been done to address the accountability for 
weapons provided by the United States in the course of training and 
equipping the ISF? What additional steps, if any, are needed to improve 
accountability for these weapons?
    Answer. Accountability procedures have been significantly improved. 
We have worked to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the 
accountability and control of munitions under U.S. control from entry 
into Iraq to issuance to the ISF. We have increased the number of 
logistics and property accountability specialists in country (in MNSTC-
I, in particular) and increased security procedures throughout the 
chain of custody. We have also worked with the ISF to build their 
property accountability systems and structures. In July 2007, we 
partnered with the ISF to establish an M-16 Biometrics Program that 
links individual soldiers to the particular weapons they are issued. 
Prior to weapons issue, each soldier is required to provide biometric 
data in the form of a retinal scan, a voice scan, and fingerprints. In 
addition, soldiers' personnel and payroll data are verified before a 
weapon is issued. The final step in the process is to take a picture of 
each soldier holding his new weapon with the serial number visible. 
Similar biometric procedures have been implemented for Iraqi police 
badge and weapon issue, as well. The fidelity of data and level of 
detail captured in these accountability procedures are significant. 
Even as we continue these important initiatives, we must plan for 
future transitions by ensuring that the ISF can adequately provide 
security and accountability at key logistics hubs as they assume 
responsibility for these facilities.

                     SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

    Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of 
readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop 
levels in Iraq of approximately 140,000 troops at their current 
operational tempo?
    Answer. There is clearly a strain on the Active and Reserve 
components. Many soldiers have completed or are in the midst of second 
or third deployments. This is obviously difficult for them and their 
families. My own family is well acquainted with this challenge, as I 
have now been deployed for more than 4\1/2\ years since 2001. Reset of 
equipment also remains a challenge. Having said that, it is more 
appropriate for the Joint Staff and the Services to determine how long 
we can sustain given troop levels, though the Army Chief of Staff has 
said the Army can maintain a 15-Brigade Combat Team level in Iraq and 
Afghanistan--i.e., the post-surge level. As CENTCOM commander, it would 
be beyond my brief to determine the overall health of the Army and 
Marine Corps, though it would be something about which I would be very 
concerned and on which I would have dialogue with the Service Chiefs. 
These concerns are somewhat allayed by the ongoing effort to increase 
the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps and by the ongoing 
reduction of forces in Iraq. Clearly, the conflict in Iraq (and 
Afghanistan) has been hard on our ground forces, and I am grateful for 
Secretary Gates' efforts and Congress' support to ensure we have the 
forces we need for what are very frequently people-intensive 
operations.

                       COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

    Question. According to Field Manual 3-24, the new counterinsurgency 
manual, ``20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often 
considered the minimum troop density required for effective 
counterinsurgency operations.'' Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, 
requires a force of 120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum 
requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for 
Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces.
    Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and 
remains sufficient and if so, why?
    Answer. First, the recommended force ratio is a ``rule of thumb'' 
distilled for simplicity's sake from numerous complex cases of 
counterinsurgency operations. These cases may differ significantly in 
terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy strength. As with many 
aspects of counterinsurgency, this is an art, not a science.
    Having said that, troop levels in Baghdad have been sufficient. 
Counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host nation police and 
army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special operating 
forces and other security elements. Added to those, the thousands of 
ministry security forces and similarly large numbers of civilian (often 
third party) contracted guard forces protecting key sites in Baghdad 
contribute to security in the capital city. In addition, nearly 30,000 
Sons of Iraq are currently contracted to help provide security in the 
Baghdad area. Taking into account these additional security forces in 
Baghdad, the force ratio is sufficient; significantly increased 
security in Baghdad over the last year bears out this analysis.
    Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of 
the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation 
from doctrine?
    Answer. Risk assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a 
continuous basis in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and 
undertaken, commanders consider the risk to our own forces as well as 
Iraqi forces, as well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas that 
we currently hold.

                              AFGHANISTAN

    Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in 
Afghanistan and the nature, size, and scope of the anti-government 
insurgency?
    Answer. I have not had the opportunity to personally assess the 
security situation in Afghanistan since 2005. However, the Afghan 
Government and the Coalition clearly face a resilient enemy that seeks 
to force withdrawal of the international coalition, to overthrow the 
country's legitimate government, and to turn Afghanistan into a safe 
haven for terrorists once again.
    Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
Mullen, has repeatedly called our military operations in Afghanistan an 
``economy of force'' operation and said that there are requirements in 
Afghanistan that cannot be filled and likely won't be filled until 
conditions improve in Iraq.
    Do you agree with Admiral Mullen that requirements in Afghanistan 
are going unfilled?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree that these requirements are unlikely to be 
met until conditions improve in Iraq?
    Answer. There are several ways to meet the requirements in 
Afghanistan, including increasing NATO contributions and increasing the 
capability and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. But 
clearly a reduction of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq will make 
available forces that could help meet the need in Afghanistan.
    Question. If confirmed as Commander, CENTCOM, how would you intend 
to balance the requirements of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
    Answer. In consultation with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of 
Defense, I would, if confirmed, work to ensure that CENTCOM's force 
posture remains consistent with national priorities, with force levels, 
and resources reflecting those priorities. It would be my 
responsibility to make clear the resources necessary to achieve the 
national policy goals and objectives; I would also intend to make clear 
how and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the 
force or mission objectives.
    Question. If additional troops and equipment are withdrawn from 
Iraq, do you believe that some of those resources should go to enhance 
military operations in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Yes; in fact, that has already been the case, with 
additional Marine forces being provided to Afghanistan some months 
after the Marine Expeditionary Unit was withdrawn from Iraq.
    Question. In your view, what additional military or other 
assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a 
stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?
    Answer. I would rely on the commanders on the ground in Afghanistan 
to determine their requirements; we would then analyze and determine 
how best to resource those requirements. Ultimately, resolution of 
Afghanistan's complex and diverse challenges will require more than 
just a military solution, though security activities provide an 
essential foundation for enduring economic and political solutions. 
Coalition forces in Afghanistan already work alongside civilians on 
issues such as counternarcotics, economic development, border 
enforcement, and training of the Afghan Police. More such whole-of-
government efforts are likely to be essential in the future.
    Question. What is your assessment of efforts to train and equip the 
Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police? What changes, if 
any, would you recommend for this mission?
    Answer. I have not had the opportunity to assess our progress in 
training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces since 2005. 
If confirmed, I will work with Major General Robert W. Cone and the 
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan to evaluate our 
efforts in this critical area and to determine what changes to the 
mission, if any, are required.
    Question. What needs to be done to address concerns voiced by 
President Karzai and others regarding the number of civilian casualties 
in Afghanistan?
    Answer. The death of innocent civilians in wartime is a tragedy. 
The welfare of the civilian population is a critical concern, not only 
from a humanitarian perspective but also from a mission perspective. 
Indeed, counterinsurgency doctrine highlights the importance of 
protecting the population as part of the key effort to win over the 
people, convince them of the government's legitimacy, and provide for 
their welfare. Based on conversations with General McNeill, it is clear 
that Coalition forces in Afghanistan take this concern very seriously 
and employ all possible means to limit the effect of violence on the 
civilian population. Efforts to minimize civilian casualties clearly 
must continue to be given high priority in Afghanistan and our other 
operational areas.
    Question. Are there additional steps that need to be taken?
    Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the systems and 
procedures in place in Afghanistan to be able to recommend at this time 
specific steps to be taken. Our near-term responsibility includes 
protecting the civilian population from insurgents and terrorists and 
also limiting the adverse effects of our military operations on the 
civilian population. It is important to keep sight of the fact that 
minimizing civilian casualties can be a very difficult endeavor, as we 
face an enemy who deliberately places innocents in harm's way. But it 
is an endeavor we must emphasize.
    Question. Afghanistan is in CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR). 
U.S. European Command, however, oversees the NATO International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
    In your view, does this ``seam'' present any problems for the 
coordination and effectiveness of the NATO ISAF and Operation Enduring 
Freedom missions in Afghanistan?
    Answer. All seams present challenges for commanders, and I am sure 
this seam presents coordination challenges in a variety of areas such 
as security operations, reconstruction, economic development, and 
counternarcotics efforts. If I am confirmed, one of my priorities would 
be to enhance coordination and cooperation between CENTCOM, EUCOM, and 
ISAF in order to ensure the greatest possible unity of effort on the 
ground in Afghanistan.

                     AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED GROUPS

    Question. Within the CENTCOM AOR, where do you consider the 
greatest terrorist threats from al Qaeda and associated groups to be 
located?
    Answer. The greatest threats from al Qaeda (AQ) in the CENTCOM AOR 
are in Iraq and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 
Pakistan. The AQ threat in Iraq is important because Iraq is where AQ 
has chosen to achieve its fundamental objective of establishing an 
Islamic state in the heart of the Arab world. AQ in the FATA is a 
critical concern because AQ's senior leadership is located there, 
exerts malign influence against our operations in Afghanistan from 
there, and prepares for future global attacks from there. Another area 
of growing concern is the Levant, where AQ is attempting to increase 
its presence, particularly as Iraq and Saudi Arabia have proven 
increasingly inhospitable to AQ activities. There are additional such 
efforts in Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
    Question. Which of these threats do you believe constitute the 
highest priority for efforts to counter al Qaeda's influence and 
eliminate safe havens for al Qaeda and affiliated groups?
    Answer. Defeat of al Qaeda is a priority for the United States. 
Because AQ is a global, distributed terrorist network that is 
interlinked, we cannot attempt to address individual portions of the 
network and expect to have a major operational or strategic impact 
against it. This requires a comprehensive approach that is 
appropriately balanced and tailored to address specific threats. 
Clearly, however, the threats posed by the AQ leadership and elements 
in the FATA and by those in Iraq must rank at the top of the list.

                                PAKISTAN

    Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-
Pakistan military cooperation?
    Answer. My understanding is that military cooperation between the 
U.S. and Pakistan has been robust since September 11. This cooperation 
includes Foreign Military Sales, military-to-military assistance in 
training and advising, and border enforcement efforts. The new 
Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani (a U.S. Army CGSC 
graduate) has instituted several positive military reforms and sought 
constructive engagement with the U.S. military. These are all 
initiatives I would seek to support and further if I am confirmed.
    Question. Press reports indicate that incursions across the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increased in recent weeks as the 
Government of Pakistan seeks to negotiate a peace agreement with 
militants in the border region.
    What is your assessment of the level of cooperation the United 
States has received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?
    Answer. On the issue of terrorism, the U.S. and Pakistan have 
mutual concerns and goals. Recognizing the threat posed by terrorism, 
the Government of Pakistan strongly supported U.S. activities in the 
region following the attacks of September 11. Pakistan supported, and 
continues to support, our mission in Afghanistan by allowing the flow 
of logistical support through Pakistan into Afghanistan. The government 
has also in the past demonstrated a willingness to pursue wanted 
terrorists within its borders.
    Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a modification of the 
government's approach to combating terrorism. The newly elected 
government, seeking to address the ongoing problem of extremism and 
terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with extremists in 
the FATA and subsequently began thinning out its forces in the region. 
This appears to be a change in methodology rather than in cooperation. 
The new Pakistani Government is trying to determine the best way to 
address the longstanding problem of control over its western areas and 
is trying to develop a political solution. While it is true that a 
purely military approach would likely not be successful, it is also 
unlikely that a purely political approach would have the desired 
effect--as demonstrated by what is generally assessed to be the failure 
of the negotiated `permanent peace' in Waziristan in 2006.
    Question. What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions 
by the Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan?
    Answer. This is a complicated problem that likely requires a 
comprehensive solution. Aspects of that solution might include: 
strengthening the ANSF to assist Afghanistan in securing its borders; 
working with Pakistan to further increase coordination of border 
enforcement efforts; and strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani 
Army and the Frontier Corps--and willingness of the Pakistani 
Government--to control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any 
long-term solution must also address the root causes of terrorism's 
growth in Pakistan and must include initiatives to increase economic 
and educational opportunity in the generally poor and isolated 
communities of the region.
    Question. In your view, should the Government of Pakistan be doing 
more to prevent these cross-border incursions?
    Answer. Certainly increased and more effective efforts by the 
Pakistani Government to control the border would be helpful to our 
interests and coalition activities in Afghanistan, and we are working 
with Islamabad to strengthen its capability to do so. The danger posed 
by extremists in the FATA, though, is not limited to the threat to our 
troops and interests in Afghanistan. FATA extremists also pose a 
serious threat to Pakistan itself. Beyond that, an even more serious 
and enduring problem is that AQ leadership will continue to use the 
safe haven provided by Pakistan's borderlands to plan and prepare 
global terrorist attacks. Our assistance to Pakistan's counterterrorism 
efforts must also address this important issue and, as mentioned above, 
be comprehensive.
    Question. What more can be done to eliminate safe havens for 
violent extremists in the FATAs and the North West Frontier Province?
    Answer. The U.S. Government needs to develop a comprehensive 
approach, in coordination with other countries, to support Government 
of Pakistan efforts to eliminate extremist sanctuaries in the FATA and 
Northwest Frontier Province. Based on our experiences in Iraq, it seems 
clear that resolution of the challenges emanating from these areas 
cannot be achieved by application of military force alone--though the 
security component is critical. Rather, resolution demands a strategy 
grounded in proven counterinsurgency practices that is adequately 
resourced, tailored to the Pakistani operating environment, and focused 
on producing an enduring political solution. At the end of the day, 
however, the challenges posed by the FATA can only be resolved by 
Pakistani initiatives, albeit with support from the U.S. and other 
partners.
    Question. What role do you believe U.S. forces should play?
    Answer. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will 
undoubtedly be a topic of discussion between the U.S. and Pakistan. 
Before speculating on what roles U.S. forces should play, I would want 
to discuss the situation with Pakistani and U.S. leaders. My 
understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders understandably 
are reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements employed in the 
FATA.
    Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with 
regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?
    Answer. Lingering tensions between Pakistan and India provide cause 
for concern. At various times since the establishment of Pakistan, open 
war, insurgency, and terrorism have marked their relations. The 
unresolved dispute over Kashmir, regional terrorism, the possibility of 
crisis escalation, and preparations by the armed forces on each side 
for major war have all fueled mistrust and suspicion. Naturally, the 
situation has often precluded Pakistani leaders from focusing more 
attention on the challenge in the FATA and the Northwest Frontier 
Province. Recently, however, we have seen some indications of improved 
political and economic relations between the two countries, as they 
have been cooperating on cross-border commerce and transportation, 
border control safeguards, and governmental procedures to ease cross-
border friction. In addition, shortages of a viable electrical energy 
supply in the region have led to several conferences and meetings among 
regional leaders to discuss solutions to a looming energy crisis.

                                  IRAN

    Question. What in your assessment are Iran's goals with respect to 
Iraq's stability and security?
    Answer. Based on Iranian interference in Iraq, it appears that Iran 
seeks a Shiite Iraqi Government that is not only friendly to Iran but 
is subject to the Iranian influence that derives not just from 
political, economic, and social ties, but also from the presence in 
Iraq of Iranian trained, funded, equipped, and directed militia forces. 
Iranian activities also seem aimed at producing just enough instability 
to keep the Government of Iraq weak. Ambassador Crocker has assessed 
that Iran has sought to ``Lebanonize'' Iraq, and there are many 
indicators that support that assessment.
    Question. What options are available to the United States and its 
allies for influencing Iran's activities towards Iraq?
    Answer. There are a number of diplomatic, economic, and military 
options available to the U.S. and its allies. On the diplomatic front, 
we will continue to expose the extent of Iran's malign activities in 
Iraq in order to build regional and international consensus against 
Iran's actions. We also seek to fully inform Iraqis of the nature and 
extent of the Iranian threat to Iraqi national interests, as official 
Iraqi condemnation of malign Iranian activities in Iraq sends a 
powerful signal to Tehran and encourages normal statecraft and 
relations between the two countries. In addition, we will continue to 
encourage a substantive show of support for Iraq by regional states, 
which would be an important counterbalance to Iranian influence in 
Iraq. This support could include further debt relief for Iraq and the 
reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations through an exchange of 
ambassadors with Baghdad. On the economic front, we could seek 
international support for sanctions, to include travel restrictions, 
against the Iranian regime for the malign activities of the Quds Force 
and Iranian intelligence services. On the military front, we will 
continue to target and expose Iranian malign actors and extremist 
surrogates operating in Iraq and taking actions--often lethal--against 
Iraqi and Coalition interests.
    Question. What in your view are Iran's goals in the region?
    Answer. Iran seeks to guarantee the survival of its regime and, it 
appears, to establish a degree of Iranian hegemony over the northern 
Gulf and also Iranian influence in various states in the region through 
the use of surrogate militias. The presence of U.S. and Coalition 
forces in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan provides a significant 
counter to Iranian aspirations. To pursue its strategic objectives, 
Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily 
with ballistic missiles and naval power, with the goal of intimidating 
the Gulf states and deterring any potential attack on the Iranian 
regime. In addition to employment of such conventional means, Iran also 
appears to want to exert its influence throughout the broader region by 
pursuing a nuclear capability and by supporting terrorist proxies and 
surrogates in the Palestinian territories, southern Lebanon, Iraq, and 
western Afghanistan.
    Question. What options do you believe are available to the United 
States to counter Iran's growing influence in the region?
    Answer. Our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating 
international cooperation and building regional consensus to counter 
malign Iranian influence and destabilizing activities, while also 
striving to promote more constructive engagement, if that is possible. 
We have strong alliances and partnerships in the Gulf and throughout 
the broader region upon which we can build a common cause that may help 
dissuade Iran from its subversive activities and encourage legitimate 
statecraft and economic interchange. At the same time, we should 
continue to work with the international community to demonstrate to 
Iran that there are consequences for its illegitimate influence in the 
region, especially for the destabilizing actions of the Quds Force and 
Iranian intelligence services.
    In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage 
by use of the whole of government, developing further leverage rather 
than simply targeting discrete threats. As noted earlier, one 
particular lever may be the ongoing international diplomatic and 
economic pressure on Iran to end its nuclear program; such pressure 
seems to be affecting the Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran 
to focus on longer-term, less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq, 
rampant terrorism in the region, and a nuclear armed Middle East are 
not in any nation's long-term interest, including Iran's. Along these 
lines, the international community can reach out to help moderate, 
pragmatic elements that might influence the internal Iranian debate 
over Iran's foreign policy and long-term security interests. At the 
same time, we should retain, as a last resort, the possibility of a 
range of military actions to counter Iran's activities. As Admiral 
Mullen has noted, our approach should consist of ``using all elements 
of national power, whether it's economic or financial, international, 
diplomatic, and not taking any military options off the table.''
    Question. Could a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq 
strengthen Iran's influence in the region?
    Answer. On the contrary, one impact of the U.S. effort in Iraq has 
been to bring into focus Iran's destabilizing regional impact. The 
presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and elsewhere in the region has the 
potential to counter malign Iranian influence against the Government of 
Iraq, build common cause in the region, and expose the extent of malign 
Iranian activities to the world.
    Question. Iran is clearly going to remain a significant factor in 
the CENTCOM AOR. One of the critical objectives for the U.S. in this 
region is to determine how to achieve a more manageable and stable 
situation with respect to Iran for the future.
    How do you believe we could best encourage or achieve a more 
manageable relationship with Iran in the future?
    Answer. The consensus-building, comprehensive approaches described 
above (two questions previous) are constructive ways to improve 
relations with Iran. Such approaches would seek to create leverage and 
make possible constructive engagement in the region.

                       FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES

    Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in 
supporting the U.S. and coalition forces in the global war on 
terrorism.
    What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with 
these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan?
    Answer. The military relationship with most of our Central Asian 
counterparts is good and improving. Soon after the September 11 
attacks, Uzbekistan offered basing access and overflight rights to the 
U.S. for operations in Afghanistan. While this particular access ended 
late in 2005 after the Andijon events, recently there have been modest 
signs of improvement in the relationship. Since the U.S. left Kharshi-
Khanabad Airbase in Uzbekistan, Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan has become 
more important as the remaining northern Central Asia base. The Kyrgyz 
have been willing to expand and solidify that relationship, and 
improvements to the infrastructure and capabilities of Manas Airbase 
continue. Kazakhstan has aggressively pursued strengthening of the 
bilateral relationship with the U.S., recently signing a 5-year plan of 
military cooperation with the U.S. Turkmenistan's new President 
Berdimukhammedov continues to allow U.S. humanitarian overflights and 
refueling operations. Recent gestures toward improving the 
international investment climate suggest positive development toward 
possible future bilateral military relationships with Turkmenistan. 
Tajikistan remains a solid partner, steadfast in its support for 
coalition operations and willing to expand the relationship.
    Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of 
the CENTCOM AOR?
    Answer. Central Asian States share our concerns about religious 
extremism and consider it a threat to regional stability. We are 
working with partners in the region to improve the collective ability 
to interdict the movement of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 
materials, and also to exercise control of national borders to counter 
terrorism and illegal trafficking.
    The Central Asia region is relatively stable; however, potential 
migration of militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan presents a latent 
threat. Political and economic challenges in some areas provide a 
potential atmosphere for extremism exploitable by foreign and domestic 
extremist organizations. Also, the region has become a transit route 
for human and drug trafficking and is becoming vulnerable to the 
domestic consumption of narcotics. Contentious borders fuel tension 
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the Fergana Valley. The Caspian 
Sea littoral dispute and resultant access to energy fields and 
fisheries remains unresolved. Finally, water management, which is 
linked to hydro-electric power, is an ongoing area of contention, as a 
diminishing Aral Sea, pollution, and irrigation programs threaten 
shared river resources.

                             IRAQI REFUGEES

    Question. The United Nations estimates that over two million Iraqis 
have been displaced; 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries, 
while some 500,000 have vacated their homes for safer areas within 
Iraq.
    What is your assessment of the refugee problems in Iraq? Are more 
Iraqis returning home?
    Answer. Refugee and displacement issues remain a serious concern. 
There are, however, indicators that the situation has begun to improve. 
According to U.S. Agency for International Development reporting, the 
rate of displacement of Iraqi citizens has been slowing considerably 
for at least the last 4 months, and some Iraqis (in significant numbers 
in some areas) are returning to their homes. These returns are 
motivated by a variety of factors, including: improved security in 
places of origin, deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, 
increased restrictions in neighboring countries, and tribal 
reconciliation. It is encouraging that the Iraqi Government has begun 
to give more attention to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the 
drafting of a national policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and a Basic Law for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration.
    Question. What should be the role of the U.S. military in your 
view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their 
homes occupied by others?
    Answer. The U.S. military can assist with key leader engagement on 
this issue and help partner with Iraqis to assist in their development 
of the governmental capacity needed to handle refugee and IDP returns.
    Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in 
Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in 
addressing this issue?
    Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraq security 
forces should be the military's primary roles, the military can also 
play a role in addressing other concerns associated with IDPs and 
refugee return. Key tasks the military can perform that may help to 
address this issue include coordinating or executing humanitarian 
assistance when asked to do so by the Iraqi Government (at local as 
well as national levels) and partnering with provincial reconstruction 
teams to monitor and track the status of displaced persons and related 
issues.
    Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and 
murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.
    In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at 
significant risk of being the victims of violence as a result of their 
religious status? Are there any of these groups that are particularly 
vulnerable?
    Answer. There are a number of ethno-sectarian fault lines 
throughout Iraq, including in Baghdad and some other areas of mixed 
population. In some of these areas, groups within the population may be 
local minorities. When tensions are high, these groups (Muslim or non-
Muslim) may be at greater risk. In addition, there are a number of 
smaller minority communities of Christians, Turkmen, Yezedis, etc., 
throughout Iraq that either are--or perceive themselves to be--in 
environments in which power and resources are controlled along 
sectarian lines and where their security is threatened. Attacks on a 
number of these communities bear out the threats. It is encouraging, 
however, that the government has devoted greater attention to security 
in such areas. For example, the murderer of the Chaldean Archbishop 
Rahho was detained by Iraqi and Coalition forces on 5 March and 
sentenced to death in an Iraqi trial on 18 May.
    Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military 
in addressing their vulnerability?
    Answer. MNF-I partners with Iraqi Government and security force 
officials, ensuring constant communication and close cooperation on 
security concerns. This same cooperative approach is important in 
dealing with all population security concerns.

                             HORN OF AFRICA

    Question. One of CENTCOM's significant subregions is the Horn of 
Africa. Until a new U.S. African Command is stood up later this year, 
CENTCOM will continue to be responsible for this region, which will 
likely experience continued instability and humanitarian crises as 
demonstrated by recent events in Somalia.
    What is the strategic importance of this region to the United 
States?
    Answer. U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa include: denying 
terrorists a sanctuary in which to train, plan, and prepare for 
attacks; maintaining unimpeded commerce and freedom of the seas as part 
of a viable global economy; and alleviating humanitarian crises and 
suffering.
    In addition to terrorist activity and simmering humanitarian crises 
in Somalia and Sudan, there are several challenges to our interests in 
the region. These include lack of economic development, poorly governed 
and ungoverned areas, ethnic tensions, and vulnerable strategic 
maritime choke points.
    Question. Over the last few weeks, the U.S. military has had a very 
public presence in Somalia.
    What is your assessment of the situation in Somalia?
    Answer. Somalia continues to be a weak and fragile state fraught 
with violence. Political and security conditions remain precarious as 
Islamic militants, clan militias, and al Qaeda-associated factions 
conduct insurgent activities against Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) forces and the Ethiopian and African Union contingents supporting 
them. The TFG has made little headway in establishing effective 
ministries and, barring unforeseen circumstances, is unlikely to 
transition power to a permanent government in the near future. In 
addition, U.N.-led reconciliation talks are not expected to lower the 
level of violence in Somalia.
    Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. Government's 
policy for Somalia and how U.S. military action there supports that 
policy?
    Answer. Current U.S. policy is to support the internationally 
recognized Transitional Federal Government and its efforts to establish 
capable ministries and move toward democratic elections. Militarily, 
our strategy is to contain threats that may emanate from Somalia. As I 
understand the current national policy, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn 
of Africa engagement within Somalia is not permitted. Presumably, the 
U.S. retains the right to strike terrorists wherever they operate and 
deny them sanctuary.
    Question. In your view, where does a stable Somalia fall in our 
national security priorities and how does the limited availability of 
ground forces due to competing requirements affect our strategy?
    Answer. A stable Somalia would be in the interest of the U.S. and 
its regional allies. Our current strategy in the Horn of Africa is not 
limited by the availability of ground forces. We have adopted a low-
profile approach focused on working with partners in the region to 
build their capacity to deal with ungoverned spaces, even as we conduct 
precision operations against terrorist groups in the region.

                          U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

    Question. Over the last year or so, the U.S. Government has 
mobilized more of its resources to focus on the strategic importance of 
Africa. DOD has played an important role through two combatant 
commands--EUCOM via the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Program and 
CENTCOM via the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 
Africa.
    What impact will the transfer of responsibility for operations in 
the Horn of Africa have on the conduct of anti-terrorism and other 
operations in that region?
    Answer. It is my understanding that CENTCOM has been working 
closely with AFRICOM, as well as with the Joint Staff, to ensure that 
the transfer of responsibility for the Horn of Africa is as seamless as 
possible and causes minimal impact on operations.
    Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure a smooth 
transition and to manage the seams between CENTCOM and the new African 
Command?
    Answer. Extensive coordination for this transition is currently 
underway. Staffs are currently working several issues, including 
responsibility for maritime security off the coast of Africa, 
coordination for activities in Egypt and in Yemen, and provision of 
uninterrupted intelligence collection and command and control during 
the transition. AFRICOM and CENTCOM will continue to work together 
closely following official transfer. As AFRICOM builds capacity, 
CENTCOM and its components will continue to support AFRICOM and its 
requirements as necessary.

                                 SYRIA

    Question. In recent weeks, the United States and Israel have 
publicly disclosed information relating to the September 6, 2007, 
bombing in northern Syria, and asserted North Korean and Syrian 
cooperation on nuclear technology. Recent weeks have also seen 
reporting on ongoing negotiations between Israel and Syria on a peace 
agreement, similar to those Israel has signed with Egypt and Jordan.
    In your assessment, what should be our military posture vis-a-vis 
Syria?
    Answer. Our military posture should be an integrated part of a 
comprehensive strategy. If confirmed, I anticipate that we will conduct 
a strategy review at CENTCOM, and the posture of our forces will 
obviously be an important element of that review.
    Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Syria to 
U.S. national security interests in the Middle East?
    Answer. Syria has tended to take positive steps when it suits 
Syrian interests. Syrian activities have generally had a destabilizing 
effect on security in the region, particularly its continued hosting of 
groups committed to armed opposition to the legitimate governments of 
several of its neighbors. As the Syrian regime seeks to maintain its 
hold on power, it also aims to counter U.S. influence in Lebanon, limit 
U.S. support of Israel, and increase its influence in the region. 
Syria's damaging activities include the failure to adequately address 
foreign fighter flow through Syria into Iraq, the sponsorship of 
terrorist activities in Lebanon and Israel, and the potential pursuit 
of a clandestine nuclear program.
    Question. Are there actions the United States could take to 
encourage a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement? If so, what are they?
    Answer. The United States has taken recent steps to encourage a 
Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, including hosting the Annapolis 
Conference in late 2007. U.S. leaders have also made recent diplomatic 
visits to key Arab states to encourage forward movement in the peace 
process. Unfortunately, Syria's method has been to create leverage in 
pursuit of its aims by taking actions that destabilize some of its 
neighbors, including Lebanon and Iraq. Defeating the extremist groups 
that Syria supports would help create better conditions for the peace 
process to move forward, as would countering the Syrian regime's anti-
U.S. propaganda in the region.

                                 ISRAEL

    Question. While Israel is not part of the CENTCOM AOR, it does play 
an important role in the AOR.
    In your assessment, what are the most significant threats facing 
Israel in the Middle East?
    Answer. The most significant threats currently facing Israel are a 
combination of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian 
rejectionists and the proliferation of weapons, technology, and tactics 
among those elements. Over the past several years, military and 
political cooperation between Iran and Syria has strengthened. Iran, 
and to a lesser degree Syria, continue to provide increasingly 
sophisticated weaponry, equipment, and training to Lebanese Hezbollah, 
which has likely reconstituted and expanded its weapons stockpiles and 
capabilities since its summer 2006 conflict with Israel. Additionally, 
Iran provides training to Palestinian rejectionist groups such as Hamas 
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Damascus continues to harbor the 
leadership of Hamas, PIJ, and other affiliated organizations.
    Question. The Iraq Study Group report suggested the most 
significant hurdle to broader peace in the Middle East was a final 
status agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian governments.
    Do you agree with this conclusion of the Iraq Study Group? If not, 
why not?
    Answer. A just and fair agreement that offers peace and security to 
the Palestinians and Israel would certainly aid the achievement of 
broader peace in the Middle East and negate the perception of inequity 
in the Arab world. However, the effort to secure broader peace in the 
region also must address the challenge of interstate conflicts and 
extremist movements that are not directly connected to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.

                                 EGYPT

    Question. Egypt has been criticized for its perceived failure to 
act along the Egypt-Gaza border to counter the smuggling threat posed 
by cross-border tunnels. Egypt has also played an important role, 
however, in ensuring peace on the southern border of Israel.
    What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to 
regional stability?
    Answer. Egypt is a key leader in regional stability. Their decision 
3 decades ago to break from the Arab bloc that opposed Israel's 
existence and sign a peace treaty was courageous but unpopular, and it 
cost them politically and financially for years. Despite being 
initially ostracized, Egypt stood firm on its peace agreement with 
Israel and continues to lead the way in seeking regional stability. 
Egypt is one of the major contributors of peacekeepers to the United 
Nations African Mission in Darfur and on numerous occasions has 
provided humanitarian and military assistance to neighboring countries 
during times of crisis. Egyptian leaders have been and continue to be 
key mediators between Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel, and 
they provide valuable leadership within the Arab League.
    Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egyptian military 
relationship?
    Answer. The U.S.-Egyptian military relationship is very strong. 
Egyptian forces have long participated in regional combined military 
exercises, and Egypt is a coalition member of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Afghanistan). Since July 2003, it has supplied a field 
hospital in Bagram, which has treated thousands of patients and 
provided training to dozens of Afghan doctors. They have also provided 
tons of humanitarian supplies, ammunition, and weapons to the Afghan 
National Army. Although Egypt does not directly participate in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has supported U.S. operations by granting 
overflight rights and expediting Suez Canal transits. It has also 
provided training for Iraqi security personnel in Egypt. Additionally, 
Egypt receives Foreign Military Financing, totaling $1.3 billion 
annually; this military assistance has helped Egypt modernize its armed 
forces and strengthen regional security and stability.

                                LEBANON

    Question. The United States has played an active role vis-a-vis 
Lebanon over the last few years, particularly following the war between 
Israel and Hezbollah. More recently, a U.S. aircraft carrier was 
ordered to maintain a position off the coast of Lebanon.
    What are the U.S. national security interests in Lebanon?
    Answer. U.S. interests lie in a strong, sovereign, and democratic 
Lebanese Government that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
inside Lebanon's borders. Such a government would increase stability 
along its borders and therefore improve regional stability. We also 
have an interest in supporting the Lebanese Government's efforts to 
reduce extremist activity, counter malign influence by external actors, 
and reduce the flow of foreign fighters in the region.
    Question. Given Lebanon's strategic geographic position in the 
Middle East, in your opinion, what is the appropriate role for CENTCOM 
in Lebanon?
    Answer. As with so many of the region's challenges, the situation 
in Lebanon is best approached comprehensively, through regional 
partnership and varied methods. Political and diplomatic methods are 
already being pursued at the U.S. national level to isolate Syria 
diplomatically and economically for its actions in Lebanon; Congress 
passed multiple laws toward this end, and national leaders continue to 
support U.N. Security Council Resolutions and other international 
efforts to influence Syria's actions. The U.S. has provided military 
training and assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in an effort 
to bolster the government's ability to control violence inside its 
borders; the LAF is a potential unifying force in the country, given 
the broad support it enjoys from the population and its multi-ethnic, 
cross-sectional makeup. Though the relative inaction of the LAF during 
Lebanon's recent spike in violence raises concerns, these military 
assistance efforts will likely remain an important part of a 
comprehensive strategy. The struggle in Lebanon is essentially a 
competition for power and resources, and progress may lie in political 
incorporation of disenfranchised elements of the population. If 
confirmed, I would seek opportunities for CENTCOM to support all of 
these efforts.

                              SAUDI ARABIA

    Question. In your assessment what threat does a more regionally 
assertive Iran, including the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, pose 
to Saudi Arabia, and what do you believe to be Saudi Arabia's options 
should Iran gain a nuclear weapon?
    Answer. The interests of Saudi Arabia are certainly threatened by 
Iranian activities. There is a long history of animosity between these 
two states; since 1979, Iran has consistently attacked the legitimacy 
of the Saudi Government's custodianship of the Two Holy Mosques. 
Although the Kingdom maintains diplomatic relations with Iran, a 
variety of events and activities have convinced the Saudis to be wary 
of Iran's intentions, including: Iran's military expansion, its nuclear 
program, and its destabilizing activities throughout the region. Saudi 
Arabia has expressed an interest in acquiring a peaceful nuclear power 
program, and there is inevitably the possibility that Saudi Arabia, 
like other countries in the region, could reevaluate its non-nuclear 
weapons policy in response to Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear 
capability.
    Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Saudi military-to-
military relationship? What are the pluses and minuses of this 
relationship?
    Answer. The U.S. enjoys a strong military-to-military relationship 
with Saudi Arabia. Cooperation has led to greater interoperability, and 
a training exchange program results in officers and senior NCOs who 
have been exposed to U.S. military values, are well trained, and are 
well-versed in the rule of law. The Kingdom gains increased internal 
and external security capability through U.S. training, equipment, and 
information sharing. Finally, U.S. industry and military departments 
benefit from a robust Foreign Military Sales Program. We understand 
that there are constraints on this relationship due to regional 
sensitivities, and we will continue to work through them.

                            ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

    Question. Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki recently forced the 
United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea out of Eritrea by 
cutting off all supplies to the mission. In response to the departure 
of this mission, both Eritrea and Ethiopia have repositioned their 
respective militaries in a manner that would seem to indicate that 
these two countries may reengage one another in military conflict.
    In your assessment, what threat does a war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia pose to the security of the broader Horn of Africa region?
    Answer. A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would likely have a 
destabilizing effect in the region. If these two nations were to return 
to war, Ethiopia would divert leadership focus and key assets away from 
their forces in Somalia. This action could further undermine Somalia's 
Transitional Federal Government, which is heavily dependent upon 
Ethiopian military support. Ethiopia would also likely pull out of its 
pending commitment to provide peacekeeping troops to the Sudan AU/U.N. 
Mission in Darfur. Djibouti could also be affected by a return to 
hostilities in the form of refugees, mostly from Eritrea, who could 
present local security and humanitarian concerns.

                           MARITIME SECURITY

    Question. In the past 2 years, there have been a growing number of 
pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia--some ending in death and 
others ending in the payment of ransom. The shipping lanes off the 
coast of Somalia are some of the most economically and strategically 
important in the world.
    In your opinion, what is the most appropriate maritime strategy in 
this region of the world, given the threats of weapons trafficking, 
human trafficking, and piracy?
    Answer. Piracy off the coast of Africa is a critical issue in the 
region, in particular because extremist groups often directly 
participate in and financially benefit from these activities. As with 
most strategies for this region, the strategy to counter piracy must be 
comprehensive. This includes the legal efforts already underway to pass 
a U.N. Security Council Resolution to allow international vessels to 
counter pirates operating within Somalia's territorial waters and to 
adjust international maritime standards to prevent the registration of 
``phantom ships.'' This strategy may also include economic development 
assistance in nations like Somalia to reduce the draw of illegal 
activities. Of course, it involves military maritime cooperation with 
countries of the region.

                     IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status 
of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to 
increase employment in Iraq?
    Answer. Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab 
States, with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide 
range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991-
2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to 
meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of 
goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories 
shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq 
revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the OSD Task 
Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF 
BSO has assisted Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or 
materially increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded 
projects, specifically targeted to restart or increase production, 
range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement 
of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize 
SOEs have resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled or 
underemployed workers.
    In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to 
restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on 
agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern 
Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To 
ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of 
standard business investment management practices to the process of 
allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories. 
Coalition personnel also instruct factory managers in business plan 
preparation, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans.
    The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private 
investment awards to international consortiums--for three cement 
factories. Two of these deals, which average over $100 million each, 
were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the 
private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility 
and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating 
employment for 5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern, 
profitable business model for investors and for Iraq. In combination 
with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking, 
budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these 
are small but positive steps toward market economy development in Iraq.
    The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important 
support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this 
has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of 
economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist 
elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important first 
step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries.

                      DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

    Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 
2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating 
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and 
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions?
    Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be 
the standard for U.S. and Coalition forces to adhere to in regard to 
the handling of detainees at all levels. In fact, as commander of the 
101st Airborne Division, I directed that detainees would be handled in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention, as those were the standards our 
soldiers understood at the time. Since then, FM 2-22.3 has been 
published and we adhere to its standards.
    Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment 
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD 
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
    Answer. Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined 
in one document adds clarity. The FM clearly articulates what is and 
what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure 
accountability.
    Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that 
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of 
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that 
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines are 
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective 
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the 
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
    Answer. Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention 
in wartime in a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the 
requirements outlined in Common Article 3. In fact, in drafting the 
current Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual, we ensured human rights 
organizations participated in discussions and provided input on this 
issue.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in 
the CENTCOM AOR comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the 
DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international 
law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would place my personal and command 
emphasis on ensuring that forces in the CENTCOM AOR fully comply with 
the letter and spirit of these important standards.

                      IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

    Question. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have proved to be an 
extremely deadly threat to U.S. troops in Iraq.
    In your assessment, what threat do IEDs pose to the broader CENTCOM 
AOR, and what is the most effective way to prevent the spread of these 
deadly devices?
    Answer. Over the past few years, we have witnessed the spread of 
IED technology throughout the CENTCOM AOR. Though not as prolific as in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the IED has become the low cost, weapon of choice 
of militants and extremist groups in many countries. The most 
disturbing trend has been the material support and training in the 
employment of advanced IEDs, known as Explosively Formed Penetrators 
(EFPs), provided by Iran. We can expect militant groups to continue to 
use this technology to advance their goals and to intimidate government 
forces and local populaces.
    Countering this threat requires comprehensive action to defeat the 
networks that produce and employ IEDs, technology and training to 
detect and render IEDs ineffective, and advanced armor systems to 
protect our troops.

                        UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

    Question. CENTCOM has articulated an increasing requirement for 
additional aircraft with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. 
Although recently the Air Force has ``surged'' a large number of 
Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM, this surge and 
other activities will not close the gap between available and required 
resources. The main problem appears to be that there are bottlenecks in 
fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled with a reluctance to 
seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-record.
    Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired immediately from 
the commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to 
CENTCOM's intelligence platform shortage?
    Answer. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
platforms are essential to our operations. Persistent surveillance is 
required to identify, track, target, and kill or capture insurgents and 
minimize civilian casualties.
    Small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector are, in 
fact, being employed to help fill the ISR platform shortage, and we 
will continue to take advantage of such options where they make sense. 
They are not, however, the complete answer to our ISR shortfalls. 
Comprehensive solutions are required, and these must take into account 
the platform's support infrastructure; sensor capabilities; 
communications bandwidth; and processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination architectures.
    Question. Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been 
adequately considered?
    Answer. On 18 April, Secretary Gates created an Operational ISR 
Task Force to tackle the challenge of delivering more ISR to the 
CENTCOM Theaters of Operations. Secretary Gates has been a staunch 
supporter of our ISR requirements, and I am pleased he has taken this 
step to help meet our ISR needs.

                     SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM

    Question. Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 and section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal 
Year 2008 authorized a special immigrant visa program for Iraqi 
translators and interpreters. This program has enabled the Department 
to aid those Iraqis who have assisted the United States in Iraq.
    What is your view of the utility of this program?
    Answer. While there is a clear need for the Special Immigration 
Visa Program, we have encountered obstacles in utilizing the program. 
Our understanding is that the quota under Section 1059 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is nearly filled for fiscal year 2008 
and USCIS has stopped scheduling Visa interviews. Furthermore, while 
Section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 broadened the scope to 
other Iraqis who are U.S. Government employees or contractors, there is 
not yet implementing guidance, and USCIS is not currently accepting 
applications. In order to overcome these challenges, we would benefit 
from Congress affirming the technical instructions agreed upon by the 
Department of State and Department of Homeland Security so that USCIS 
can begin accepting applications.
    Question. Is it beneficial for the military to have the ability to 
recommend certain Iraqis who have worked with us for special immigrant 
visas?
    Answer. Yes, our Iraqi interpreters provide valuable support to 
coalition operations on a daily basis and often at great risk to 
themselves and their families. Many interpreters have to relocate their 
families due to harassment, threats, and even the possibility of death 
at the hands of extremists because they provide help to the U.S. and 
our coalition partners. For those trusted interpreters who are 
eligible, the special immigrant visa is a useful tool to reward these 
courageous individuals who risk so much to assist Coalition efforts.

            REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS AND RESPONSE

    Question. Iran has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic 
missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. 
forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the CENTCOM AOR. Syria 
also has an inventory of ballistic missiles that pose a threat to the 
region. A joint capabilities mix study conducted by the Joint Staff for 
U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the U.S. military needs about 
twice the number of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors as are currently planned to 
provide even the minimum capability needed by our regional combatant 
commanders to defend against such existing threats.
    Do you agree with the conclusion of the joint capabilities mix 
study that we need to acquire more of these near-term systems to 
provide our regional combatant commanders with the capability to defend 
our forward-deployed forces and allies against existing missile 
threats?
    Answer. Yes. These systems are important to counter both the 
existing threat and that of 2015, upon which the joint capabilities mix 
study was based.
    Question. Do you agree there is a high priority need in CENTCOM for 
additional SM-3 and THAAD interceptors to defend against existing 
short- and medium-range missiles within the AOR?
    Answer. Yes. However, THAAD interceptors are not yet fielded, and 
SM-3-capable platforms (i.e., Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships) 
are limited by the number of available interceptors. Effectively 
defending our forward-deployed forces and allies against the existing 
missile threat in the CENTCOM AOR will also require a greater number of 
Patriot PAC3 interceptors, SM-2 BLK IVs, and SM-3s.

                             SEXUAL ASSAULT

    Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for ensuring 
compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual 
assaults against military personnel and civilians throughout the 
CENTCOM AOR.
    What lessons have Army leaders in Iraq learned regarding sexual 
assault prevention, response, and reporting protocols that can be 
applied across the entire CENTCOM?
    Answer. The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command 
issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness 
campaign that reaches every servicemember and that provides integrated 
response services, including medical care, counseling, victim advocacy, 
chaplain programs, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.), 
legal measures (prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness 
liaison), reporting processes (assault reporting and data collection), 
and program assessment. It is widely recognized in today's Services 
that such a program must receive command emphasis to be effective, and 
I would continue to give it that emphasis if confirmed as the commander 
of CENTCOM.
    Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be 
addressed to ensure that prevention, reporting, medical treatment 
(including mental health care), and victim support are available for 
military personnel and civilians in the operational environments of 
Iraq and Afghanistan?
    Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq and 
Afghanistan include combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, 
joint service and civilian population. With regard to the last of these 
challenges, civilians constitute a considerable percentage of force on 
the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and are critical contributors to 
mission success. The availability of response services for DOD civilian 
and contractor personnel should be similar to the services available to 
servicemembers. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and 
resource challenges associated with extending program response 
provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel which should be 
addressed.
    With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important 
to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in the 
CENTCOM AOR to remain cognizant of the welfare of their fellow 
servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs 
of difficulty to receive help.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of such 
resources in the CENTCOM AOR?
    Answer. If I am confirmed, I would consult with commanders in the 
field, who are directly responsible for these programs and most 
familiar with their requirements. I would also welcome external and 
internal audits of our programs and resources. The Sexual Assault and 
Prevention Program is critical for the well-being of our troopers, and 
I would support it in every way possible.

                 DEPLOYED CIVILIANS IN THE CENTCOM AOR

    Question. The President has called on all agencies of the executive 
branch to encourage the assignment of highly qualified Federal civilian 
employees in support of CENTCOM operations.
    If confirmed, what would be your objectives for improving and 
sustaining the support of Federal civilians in the CENTCOM AOR?
    Answer. I am fully committed to the DOD policy for building 
increased civilian deployment capacity. Our civilian employees who 
deploy in support of missions in the CENTCOM AOR are capable and 
committed to supporting the Department's highest mission priorities. In 
Iraq, I have witnessed first-hand the capabilities and dedication our 
civilian employees bring to bear.
    We must take advantage of the synergistic effect that the wide 
range of skill sets and talents resident in our civilian force can 
achieve. If I am confirmed, we would continue to review our global 
force employment planning to expand those opportunities.
    We must execute the intent of Congress and the DOD in ensuring our 
civilian employees receive appropriate benefits and recognition when 
they volunteer to serve overseas and especially in war zones. We should 
also make every effort to assist civilian deployees in the same manner 
we do our deploying military personnel--from pre-deployment through 
deployment, as well as redeployment.
    As outlined in counterinsurgency doctrine and by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, unity of effort is essential to winning the wars 
in which our Nation is engaged--and fully utilizing and caring for 
deploying civilian employees within the CENTCOM AOR is absolutely 
essential.

                        MENTAL HEALTH IN THEATER

    Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made 
five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the 
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. 
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT V, found that 
stress and mental health problems increased with each subsequent month 
of deployment, and that ``soldiers on their third or fourth deployment 
were at significantly higher risk'' for mental health problems. These 
types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of 
troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post-traumatic stress 
disorder, depression, and other mental health problems.
    What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous 
MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, 
and the effect of such actions?
    Answer. The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on 
what is transpiring with servicemembers' psychological health and also 
valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V 
produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation 
to cross-train Army medics in behavioral health concepts, are already 
being implemented at the DA level; others, such as the recommendation 
to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat 
Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed, 
I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently 
actionable at the CENTCOM level and engage with the Services on those 
in their purview.
    Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure 
ongoing mental health assessments of all U.S. forces in Iraq?
    Answer. I would encourage and fully support future MHAT assessments 
if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) providing full 
access to information and staff input and feedback as appropriate.
    Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental 
health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?
    Answer. My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health 
professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments.
    Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting 
servicemembers and their families before servicemembers deploy; this 
includes tough training at home station that builds camaraderie in 
units and gives troopers confidence that they can accomplish their 
tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between 
deployments for troopers to `reset' with their families are also 
important.
    Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater. 
Medics in theater are being trained on behavioral health topics so they 
can assist in identifying troopers who need help, and Suicide Risk 
Management Teams have been created to ensure troopers having 
difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most critically, 
commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of 
strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle 
buddies' mental health.
    Question. Do you believe that mental health support and resources 
in theater are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed 
servicemembers and at home for their families?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would conduct an assessment of mental 
health requirements and resources in theater. The extensive work 
completed by the MHAT will provide a good starting point for this 
assessment.
    Question. If confirmed, would you request additional behavioral 
health resources from the services, if needed, to meet the needs of 
current and future units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan?
    Answer. If a specific need was validated, I would absolutely 
request additional support. Our troopers serve bravely and selflessly, 
and we owe it to them to understand their needs and then act with all 
due haste to provide for those needs.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, 
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, CENTCOM?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                     INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

    1. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, each of you have noted in 
different places and times that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and 
that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current 
threat is the intercommunal fight over power. What do you mean by the 
communal fight over power?
    General Petraeus. I have long described the nature of the conflict 
in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for 
power and resources. This has been the case since Iraq's liberation in 
2003 and remains the case today. Many groups in Iraq vie to determine 
who will have a voice in, and whose voice will most influence, the 
future of Iraq, and the competition is often heavily tied to concerns 
over economic opportunity.
    The competition between communities for resources and power is 
something that happens in every nation. In our Nation, this competition 
takes place in the political arena, in legal structures, via the media, 
and through democratic processes; the fault lines in the debate are 
often economic and ideological. In Iraq, the competition has taken 
place through violence and intimidation on the streets, and the fault 
lines have often been ethnic or sectarian. Iraq's competition used to 
be primarily inter-sectarian, with Shiite and Sunni elements vying with 
each other for power and economic opportunity; Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
violence sparked widespread sectarian violence throughout Iraq. As 
coalition and Iraqi forces stemmed the violence and increased security, 
the fault lines within Shiite and Sunni communities came to the fore; 
AQI turned its violence on its Sunni brethren, and Shiite militias--
particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and its splinter Special Groups 
(SG)--waged violence on the Shiite-led government in an effort to 
increase its power.
    One of the most important trends in Iraq has been the increasing 
rejection of violence by the Iraqi people--first with Sunnis refusing 
to accept the indiscriminate violence, oppressive practices, and 
extremist ideology of AQI and then with Shiite communities tiring of 
the mafia-like violence and activities of JAM/SG criminals. There is 
still an intercommunal struggle over power and resources, but Sunnis 
and Shiite alike are increasingly opting to make their voice heard 
through the political process rather than through violence.

    2. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, how has this changed the 
fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
    General Petraeus. While the fundamental nature of this competition 
among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources has not 
changed, it has played out differently over time. Over the past year, 
we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence. 
However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing 
challenges in the area of intra-sectarian conflict have periodically 
surfaced. Iraq continues to face a complex array of destabilizing 
forces, including terrorism and regional interference; however, 
security incidents are now at the lowest level we have seen since March 
2004.

    3. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what is the appropriate role of 
coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal 
violence among militant groups vying for control?
    General Petraeus. Coalition forces support the elected government 
and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force. Iraqi leaders have largely united around the aim of defeating 
extremists and disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in 
that effort.

                                PAKISTAN

    4. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, the newly-elected Pakistani 
Government has limited offensive military operations in the tribal 
areas, choosing instead to negotiate a peace agreement with the tribal 
leader accused by the Pakistani Government of being responsible for the 
assassination of Benazir Bhutto. It's been reported that the Pakistani 
Government is not seeking an end to cross-border attacks into 
Afghanistan as a condition of the accord. Officials report that cross-
border incursions increased in April as the peace agreement was being 
negotiated. Are you troubled at the prospect of a peace agreement that 
doesn't seek to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan?
    General Petraeus. Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a 
modification of the government's approach to combating terrorism. The 
newly-elected government, seeking to address the ongoing problem of 
extremism and terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with 
tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 
subsequently began thinning out its forces in the region. This appears 
to reflect an effort by the new Pakistani Government to determine the 
best way to address the longstanding problem of control over its 
western areas and shows that the government is trying to develop a 
political solution. While it is true that a purely military approach 
would likely not be successful, it is also unlikely that a purely 
political approach would have the desired effect--as demonstrated by 
what is generally assessed to be the failure of the negotiated 
``permanent peace'' in Waziristan in 2006--and thus we must closely 
monitor this situation as we work with the new Pakistani Government and 
seek ways to help it deal with the challenge of the FATA to it and to 
Afghanistan.
    The cross-border terrorism issue is complex and likely requires a 
comprehensive solution. We should continue working with Pakistan to 
further increase coordination of border enforcement efforts, and we 
should also seek to strengthen the capacity of the Pakistani Army and 
the Frontier Corps--and the willingness of the Pakistani Government--to 
control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any long-term solution 
must also address the root causes of terrorism's growth in Pakistan and 
must include initiatives to increase economic and educational 
opportunity in the generally poor and isolated communities of the 
region.

    5. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are we seeing a decrease in the 
level of cooperation the United States is receiving from the Government 
of Pakistan in the conflict with al Qaeda and other extremists?
    General Petraeus. The newly-elected Government in Pakistan seems to 
have modified its approach to combating terrorism in the Pakistani 
borderlands, as the government recently negotiated with tribal groups 
and began thinning out its forces in the FATA. The United States and 
Pakistan continue to have mutual concerns and goals where terrorism is 
concerned, and the change appears to be one of methodology rather than 
of a decrease in cooperation with the United States. Nevertheless, it 
is incumbent upon us as Pakistan's partners to help Islamabad adopt a 
realistic approach to terrorism, and one of my first trips, if 
confirmed, will be to Pakistan in order to assess the situation there 
and to talk to the Pakistani leaders and our personnel on the ground.
    At the same time, opportunities exist to deepen U.S.-Pakistani 
cooperation against al Qaeda and other extremists, such as through our 
efforts to build the capabilities of the Pakistani military and the 
Frontier Corps. These efforts, in concert with other programs to 
promote development in the frontier areas, can place further pressure 
on the al Qaeda network in Pakistan.

    6. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what more can be done to 
eliminate these safe havens for violent extremists?
    General Petraeus. The problem of safe havens in the Pakistani 
borderlands is a complicated one that demands a comprehensive solution. 
The Government of Pakistan faces a difficult situation in which 
multiple actors in its borderlands benefit from illicit cross-border 
trade, while traditional tribal laws and customs in the border region 
foster a spirit of fierce independence and provide for a great deal of 
autonomy from the central government. As a result, the government is 
often seen more as outside force to be resisted than as a force to be 
embraced. In some areas, these same tribal laws and customs offer 
protection and respect to extremist elements.
    Given these circumstances, we should work with Pakistan to further 
increase coordination of border enforcement efforts, both internal to 
Pakistan and with the Afghan National Security Forces, while 
strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani Army and the Frontier 
Corps--and willingness of the Pakistani Government--to control and 
disarm militants in the borderlands.
    We should also help the Government of Pakistan address the root 
causes of terrorism in Pakistan, which include conditions of poverty, 
illiteracy, and alienation from the government. We should support 
Government of Pakistan initiatives to increase economic and educational 
opportunity in at-risk regions of the country, to include supporting 
the new FATA Development Plan and other initiatives aimed at education 
reform and rural development.
    Meanwhile, our own whole-of-government approach to assisting 
Pakistan should include the fostering of foreign direct investment, 
targeted economic aid, and debt forgiveness. We must recognize that a 
good lot of the heavy lifting for this problem lies in the economic and 
political spheres, and our efforts there need to move more rapidly.

    7. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what role should U.S. military 
forces play with respect to the tribal areas?
    General Petraeus. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will 
undoubtedly be a topic of discussion between the United States and 
Pakistan. Before speculating on what roles U.S. forces should play, I 
would want to discuss the situation with Pakistani and U.S. leaders. My 
understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders are 
understandably reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements 
employed in the FATA.

                      PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

    8. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in response to a question from 
Senator Sessions, you expressed concern about section 841 of S. 3001, 
which addresses the performance of inherently governmental functions by 
private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
language of section 841 is modeled on paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of 
Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 1100.22, which defines certain 
functions to be performed in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat 
areas outside the United States as inherently governmental and 
designated for military performance. You promised to review the 
provision and get back to us with your detailed views. I would 
appreciate your response to some specific questions. Do you support the 
standard in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22 for 
determining which functions to be performed in uncontrolled or 
unpredictable high threat areas outside the United States are 
inherently governmental and designated for military performance?
    General Petraeus. I will respond collectively to questions 8-12 
since they all relate to the same subject and the responses are clearly 
interrelated.
    I support the standards set forth in DOD Instruction 1100.22, 
including paragraph E2.1.4.1.4, and do not believe that this paragraph 
prohibits the use of private security contractors in high threat areas 
outside the United States. My reading of this DOD Instruction suggests 
that paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 should not be interpreted in isolation. The 
section's opening paragraph (E2.1.4.1) cites it only as an example, not 
as a statement of DOD policy prohibiting PSC operations in uncontrolled 
or unpredictable high threat areas. Immediately following paragraph 
E2.1.4.1.4, the next paragraph (E2.1.4.1.5) affirms that ``a defense 
contractor may be authorized to provide security services, provided its 
services do not involve substantial discretion,'' and defines the 
conditions under which contractors providing security services are not 
considered to be performing inherently governmental functions.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) complies with these standards 
identified in paragraph E2.1.4.1.5. The command has established strict, 
comprehensive rules on the conditions under which PSC operations can be 
conducted, obviously delimiting their mission to defensive operations. 
These and other rules are defined in the MNF-I Fragmentary Order 07-
428, ``Overarching Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) for Requirements, 
Procedures, Responsibilities for Control Coordination and Management 
and Oversight of Armed Contractors, DOD civilians, and PSCs.'' In 
addition, all DOD contract solicitations and contracts implemented in 
Iraq properly describe the environment in which contractors will be 
operating. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan ensures that 
both the description of environmental conditions and the requirement 
for compliance with FRAGO 07-428 are incorporated into all contracts 
being implemented in Iraq.
    In short, DOD PSCs in Iraq are not allowed to perform inherently 
governmental functions. All contract solicitations and awards are 
conducted under Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) rules. 
These DFARS rules prohibit DOD contractors from participating in 
offensive operations and from using the combat-oriented Rules of 
Engagement. Instead, the DFARS requires that contractors use the more 
restrictive defensive/self-protection oriented Rules on the Use of 
Force. I am advised that the Comptroller General noted in a decision in 
2006, that ``the Services sought under the solicitations appear to 
comport with the DOD policies and regulations that state that security 
contractors are not allowed to conduct direct combat activities or 
offensive operations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I take seriously the responsibility for limiting PSC roles and 
missions to those permitted in the DFARS and DOD policies, including 
DOD Instruction 1100.22. PSCs are not permitted to operate in areas 
where active combat operations are contemplated or underway. Moreover, 
policies and procedures are in place to divert PSC movements away from 
areas in which combat operations may potentially be launched or in 
which a high risk exists of hostile action or an encounter with 
civilian activities that could represent a threat to a PSC movement or 
operation. Based upon the above, it is my view that paragraph 
E2.1.4.1.4 does not prohibit the use of private security contractors in 
uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas outside the United 
States provided that the requirements and conditions of paragraph 
E2.1.4.1.5 are implemented and the conduct of PSCs is subject to 
regular oversight by military commanders.
    You also asked about significant differences between the wording of 
Section 841 of the Senate Bill and paragraph E2.1.4.1.4. The most 
significant difference is the one I identified above--paragraph 
E2.1.4.1.4. is only an illustrative example of a potentially inherently 
governmental function, further clarified by the succeeding paragraph, 
which defines the conditions under which PSC operations would not be 
considered inherently governmental. Section 841 would create a new 
statutory standard, redefining the boundaries of permissible activity 
for PSC operations. Section 841 also changes the term of ``substantial 
discretion'' to ``immediate discretionary decisions,'' the significance 
of which is to eliminate all armed PSC operations almost anywhere, 
because the nature of defensive/self protection responses to emerging 
threats requires immediate discretionary decisions, even within a very 
constrained set of rules. Draft section 841, paragraph (b)(1)(A), also 
modifies the phrase from the DOD Instruction, ``could require deadly 
force that is more likely to be initiated by U.S. forces than occur in 
self defense,'' to ``could reasonably be expected to require deadly 
force that is more likely to be initiated by personnel performing such 
security operations than by others.'' This modification essentially 
expands the standard to include any use of force--even that which 
occurs in self-defense. In application, this modification would bar 
security contractors from any hostile area regardless of actual 
function.
    With regard to standards for other Federal agencies operating with 
PSCs in a contingency operation area, I believe the policies, 
standards, procedures, and oversight should be closely aligned, 
presenting a common perception among host country nationals of U.S. 
Government PSC operations. Having said that, there could be occasions 
in which other U.S. Government departments and agencies may need to 
operate under different policies on the use of PSCs. For example, 
various contractors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
involved in reconstruction and development programs may feel strongly 
about the need not to be associated with PSC operations, particularly 
those provided by DOD contractors, and more specifically those provided 
by U.S. military forces. In such cases they may adopt more restrictive 
conditions for the deployment of civilian personnel or the movement of 
reconstruction materials and equipment than those currently implemented 
under DOD Instruction 1100.22.
    While I cannot speak to every scenario that may involve other 
Federal agencies, the Departments of Defense and Department of State 
signed a Memorandum of Agreement which improved interagency 
transparency and established common standards and procedures for 
security contractor performance in Iraq. As such, the functions of 
security contractors for those two agencies in Iraq are essentially 
identical. This effort has produced significant improvements in the 
management and oversight of PSC operations in Iraq. With the 
implementation of Section 862 of the 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act, we will achieve even broader and more effective 
oversight of all U.S. Government PSCs.
    In responding to your question, I also need to provide you with an 
assessment of the impact of the proposed language of Section 841 on 
military operations in Iraq. My reading of the language of Section 841, 
confirmed by my Staff Judge Advocate, is that Section 841 would 
effectively forbid the use of U.S. Government armed private security 
contractors in Iraq, and presumably also in Afghanistan. Replacing DOD 
contractors with military personnel would significantly delay the 
drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, requiring approximately 7,300 
additional military personnel to be trained and deployed to Iraq, plus 
additional forces to provide the expanded logistical support required. 
These figures do not include the requirements for the dedication and 
training of additional military personnel to support rotational 
requirements, nor the addition of equipment and Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicles needed by our combat forces to replace 
armored tactical vehicles used by contractors. By adding significantly 
to the military forces required in Iraq, Section 841 could also delay 
the ability of the Army to reduce combat tours from 15 months to 12 
months. It would also require a special training and certification 
program to be developed and implemented, which would take up to a year 
to execute.
    For the reasons stated above, the requirements proposed under 
Section 841 of the Senate Bill would be counterproductive to the work 
we already have underway, and would be enormously disruptive to our 
efforts to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq.

    9. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in your view, does paragraph 
E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22 prohibit the use of private 
security contractors in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas 
outside the United States?
    General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.

    10. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are you aware of any 
significant differences between section 841 of S. 3001 and paragraph 
E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22? If so, what are the differences 
and why do you believe that they are significant?
    General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.

    11. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are you aware of any reason 
why private security contractors employed by Federal agencies other 
than DOD should operate under a standard different from that provided 
in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22?
    General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.

    12. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are there functions that are 
inappropriate for performance by DOD contractors in an uncontrolled or 
unpredictable high threat area outside the United States, but are 
appropriate for performance by contractors of other Federal agencies in 
the same area? If so, why?
    General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                            CENTRAL COMMAND

    13. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have highlighted the lack 
of economic development in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of 
responsibility (AOR) as one of the biggest challenges facing the 
region's security and stability. You have, in my opinion, correctly 
identified the link between poverty and potential for violent 
activities--an area in which you are a recognized expert. If confirmed 
as commander, what ideas do you have for using CENTCOM's authority to 
facilitate a government-wide approach to stimulating economic 
development in the region?
    General Petraeus. There are a number of successful programs CENTCOM 
can use as models throughout its AOR to facilitate a government-wide 
approach to stimulating economic development. A good example is 
CENTCOM's support to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that 
are playing a critical role in stimulating development, improving 
governance, and increasing government capacity at the local level in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM's role in supporting the PRTs has been to 
help provide security, to synchronize the efforts of PRTs and local 
U.S. military organizations, and to contribute skilled military 
personnel to fill PRT positions when necessary. It may be possible for 
the PRT model to be applied in other areas in the CENTCOM AOR that are 
in need of development assistance, based on local conditions.
    CENTCOM and its subordinate commands have also played a role in 
helping partner nations increase government capacity at the ministerial 
level. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, CENTCOM organizations have 
undertaken large-scale efforts to increase the capacity of the host 
nations' security ministries and to assist in security sector reform. 
These efforts can help stimulate economic development and improved 
governance by enabling host nations to establish secure environments in 
which government agencies, NGOs, and private businesses can more easily 
operate. CENTCOM organizations have also assisted in extensive efforts 
to build capacity in non-security ministries. Where desired by U.S. 
policymakers, CENTCOM and other governmental agencies could expand such 
capacity-building efforts elsewhere in the AOR to bolster security, 
economic, and good governance growth in the region.
    Finally, commanders throughout CENTCOM have learned over the past 
several years that money--along with economic development--is an 
essential weapon in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns. 
Our commanders in Iraq in particular have learned to very skillfully 
use such resources as Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
funds to address urgent economic and governance needs at the local 
level, thereby helping to alleviate some of the grievances and 
conditions of poverty that give rise to violence. We should consider 
applying the successful CERP model in other areas of the CENTCOM AOR 
when necessary.

    14. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander's 
responsibilities are necessarily broader and more strategic in nature 
than those required in your current position. One of the main 
challenges with respect to resource allocation in the AOR is the 
balance between Iraq and Afghanistan. This committee has heard from 
military and civilian leaders, as well as independent experts, who 
identify the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) efforts in Afghanistan as an under-resourced conflict. Given the 
importance of combating a resurgent al Qaeda and its leadership in the 
FATA of neighboring Pakistan, how do you plan to address these 
shortfalls should security conditions in Iraq warrant the maintaining 
of current troop levels for a longer period?
    General Petraeus. I would, if confirmed, work in consultation with 
the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that CENTCOM's 
force posture remains consistent with national priorities. It would be 
my responsibility to make clear the resources necessary to achieve 
national policy goals and objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and elsewhere in the CENTCOM AOR. I would also intend to make clear how 
and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the force or 
mission objectives.
    I would also work with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of 
Defense to encourage that all feasible means of meeting the 
requirements in Afghanistan were pursued, including increasing NATO 
and, if needed, U.S. contributions and increasing the capability and 
capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Over the long term, 
the latter will be the most important means of fulfilling Afghanistan's 
security requirements.

    15. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have advocated a ``whole 
of government'' approach for CENTCOM that would include effective and 
improved coordination between various civilian diplomatic and relief 
agencies with the military component of the U.S. presence. What role 
does CENTCOM need to take with regards to working with these civilian 
diplomatic and relief agencies, and what specifically would you do as 
its commander to actively promote these efforts?
    General Petraeus. CENTCOM and its subordinate commands already 
promote some important efforts to improve coordination among civilian 
diplomatic agencies, relief agencies, and the militant component of 
U.S. presence. Most notably in the CENTCOM AOR, numerous Joint 
Interagency Task Forces and PRTs have put the ``whole of government'' 
approach into practice in order to promote development in all areas--
political, social, and economic. In addition, CENTCOM headquarters has 
long employed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group with 
representatives from numerous agencies. If confirmed, I would seek to 
sustain, empower, and expand such efforts. If confirmed, I would also 
seek to further integrate CENTCOM's efforts with those of other 
government agencies by working closely with our ambassadors in the 
region who supervise U.S. activities in each country. I would also work 
closely with the State Department Bureau Chiefs and other corresponding 
government officials to ensure that our activities are coherent, 
integrated, and responsive to the changing needs of the AOR.

    16. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, is improvement in coordination 
between these various agencies a pre-condition for achieving security 
in Iraq and elsewhere in the AOR?
    General Petraeus. Effective coordination among government agencies 
is an absolutely essential condition for achieving sustainable security 
in Iraq and in other areas in the CENTCOM AOR. I have mentioned before 
that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has succeeded in making our military 
forces more interoperable today than they ever have been, and this 
interoperability has been a critical element of our progress in 
establishing security. The next step, however, is to ensure the ability 
of military and civilian departments to work closely together. In Iraq, 
Ambassador Crocker and I have partnered closely to ensure unity of 
effort within the U.S. effort and, to the extent possible, with the 
efforts of our coalition partners, through the development of a Joint 
Campaign Plan and through regular joint assessments to evaluate our 
progress.
    The State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization has been given the lead by National Security Presidential 
Directive 44 (NSPD44) in developing the Interagency Management System 
and a draft U.S. Government Planning Framework. These will provide a 
viable process and framework within which we can enhance and align 
military and civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization 
scenarios. The State Department has also begun to stand up the Civilian 
Response Corps system to provide increased civilian expeditionary 
capacity to complex operations.
    The United States will be well served by having available various 
tools like these to promote unity of effort across the U.S. Government, 
and by the development of interagency doctrine for the use of these 
tools in the conduct of counterinsurgency and stability operations. If 
confirmed, I will continue to stress the importance of such 
coordination to promote unity of effort in the application of our 
``whole of government'' approach to the security issues in the CENTCOM 
AOR.

    17. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have made it clear that 
actively engaging with Iraq's neighbors is essential to achieving long-
term internal and external stability in the country. You and others 
have also mentioned Iran's malign influence in covertly supporting 
elements of the insurgency. As one of Iraq's influential neighbors, it 
would appear that diplomatic engagement with Iran is a precondition to 
any long-lasting security gains. However, Tehran's pursuit of nuclear 
technologies complicates the diplomatic equation. What recommendations 
would you make, if confirmed as commander of CENTCOM, concerning how 
the U.S. Government should navigate its dealings with Iran?
    General Petraeus. I embrace Secretary of Defense Gates' view that 
we should seek leverage in our relations with Iran in order to have a 
constructive basis for engagement. If confirmed, my recommendations 
would be built upon the idea that our efforts in regard to Iran must 
involve generating international cooperation and building regional 
consensus to counter malign Iranian influence and destabilizing 
activities, while also striving to promote more productive engagement, 
if that is possible. We have strong alliances and partnerships in the 
Gulf and throughout the broader region upon which we can build a common 
cause that may help dissuade Iran from its subversive activities and 
encourage legitimate statecraft and economic interchange. At the same 
time, we should continue to work with the international community to 
demonstrate to Iran that there are consequences for its illegitimate 
influence in the region, especially for the destabilizing actions of 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and Iranian 
intelligence services.
    In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage 
by use of the ``whole of government,'' developing further leverage 
rather than simply targeting discrete threats. One particular lever may 
be the ongoing international diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran 
to end its nuclear program; such pressure seems to be affecting the 
Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran to focus on longer-term, 
less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq, rampant terrorism in the 
region, and a nuclear armed Middle East are not in any nation's long-
term interest, including Iran's. Along these lines, the international 
community can reach out to help moderate, pragmatic elements that might 
influence the internal Iranian debate over Iran's foreign policy and 
long-term security interests. As Admiral Mullen has noted, furthermore, 
our approach should consist of ``using all elements of national power, 
whether it's economic or financial, international, diplomatic, and not 
taking any military options off the table.'' We should retain, as a 
last resort, a range of military options to counter Iran's activities.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

                MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

    18. Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, improvised explosive device 
casualties are on the rise in Afghanistan. As a result, units in 
support of Operation Enduring Freedom are receiving operation orders 
with a fragmentary order for mandated MRAP fielding. Our forces are 
therefore required to allocate appropriate combat power to employ these 
vehicles even though they cannot be used throughout the AOR because of 
their inability to maneuver or traverse incompatible and difficult 
terrain. How do you plan to employ this ``political'' mandate but still 
keep you soldiers safe?
    General Petraeus. The improved protection provided by MRAPs has 
saved lives in Iraq, and certainly has the potential to do so in many 
areas in Afghanistan. However, it is true that MRAPS cannot be used 
everywhere in Afghanistan because, despite road improvements and 
routine maintenance, certain areas remain inaccessible for some larger 
vehicles. In response to these conditions, the plan as I understand it 
is to replace approximately two-thirds of the Up-Armored HMMWVs with 
MRAPs, retaining the balance of Up-Armored HMMWVs to allow access to 
areas not reachable by MRAPs. I also understand that units deployed to 
Operation Enduring Freedom have recently requested additional MRAPs for 
the Afghanistan Theater of Operations. If confirmed as the Commander, 
CENTCOM, I would continue to consult closely with the Commander of the 
International Security Assistance Command-Afghanistan to assess 
requirements and resource the needs of units operating in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.

    19. Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, how many MRAPs are needed in 
the region?
    General Petraeus. I have not had the opportunity to conduct a 
detailed assessment of the need for MRAPs throughout the CENTCOM AOR. 
If confirmed, I would consult closely with the Commander, MNF-I and the 
Commander, International Security Force-Afghanistan to assess 
requirements and resource established needs.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

                          IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

    20. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, I am particularly interested 
in the Iraqis shouldering greater responsibility for the costs of the 
war, including paying, training, and equipping their own security 
forces, the salaries of the Sons of Iraq, and helping the United States 
pay for the costs of fuel used by U.S. troops operating in Iraq. Asking 
the Iraqis to take more responsibility for their own security and the 
rebuilding of their country will give them a sense of ownership and 
only makes sense given Iraq's growing budget surplus. Senators Nelson, 
Bayh, and I authored language that would: prohibit American tax dollars 
from being spent on major reconstruction projects in Iraq; direct the 
administration to ensure that the Iraqi Government pays the costs of 
the salaries, training, equipping of ISF, and for the salaries of the 
Sons of Iraq; and direct the administration to negotiate an agreement 
with the Iraqi Government for reimbursement of some of the costs of 
joint operations between U.S. and Iraqi troops. The Senate Armed 
Services Committee unanimously approved our proposal, which represents 
possibly the first significant bipartisan change in direction in Iraq. 
This language is also included in the Senate supplemental bill. In 
addition, I have met with the Iraqi Ambassador who stated the 
commitment of the Government of Iraq to take on more of these costs. In 
fact, Prime Minister Maliki recently stated in Brussels that Iraq is a 
rich country and is not asking for direct assistance to fund its 
reconstruction. What are your thoughts on this important topic?
    General Petraeus. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility and 
an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in 
Iraq, and it is making progress in picking up a greater share of this 
fiscal load. As Ambassador Crocker recently stated before Congress, 
``The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over.'' As 
Iraq continues to spend more and the United States spends less, a 
period of transition is needed because Iraqi capacity is still limited. 
However, Iraqi capacity is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by 
a solid increase in budget execution last year. In the meantime, we are 
looking for additional ways to help Iraq to leverage our capacity to 
spend its own funds. A good example of this is the Iraqi Commander's 
Emergency Response Program, which we call ``I-CERP.'' The Iraqis have 
already allocated $300 million for this fund, of which $270 million has 
been deposited in an account on which coalition forces can draw. 
Coalition forces have already made substantial progress in using this 
money to deliver schools, health clinics, community centers, and other 
projects on behalf of the Iraqi Government to the Iraqi people.

    21. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, are you committed to 
shifting some of these costs to the Government of Iraq--costs that the 
Iraqis themselves say they would like to undertake?
    General Petraeus. Yes. Long-term sustainability of Iraqi security 
and economic development ultimately depends on the Iraqi Government's 
ability to provide, and we are committed to helping Iraqi leaders build 
the governmental capacity to do so. The Government of Iraq is already 
assuming more responsibility for reconstruction and security efforts. 
For example, Iraq's 2008 budget contains $13 billion for 
reconstruction, with an additional multi-billion dollar reconstruction 
spending package in the works. In terms of security spending, we 
anticipate Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and 
$11 billion next year, and a 2008 supplemental of $4.3 billion for 
security spending has been proposed. As Iraqi spending on 
reconstruction and Iraqi security forces (ISFs) continues to increase, 
U.S. spending will continue to decrease. As an example, increased Iraqi 
spending on the ISFs has enabled us to decrease our budget request for 
the ISFs fund for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. 
This trend will continue over time, and it is one that I support.

                              AFGHANISTAN

    22. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, at a hearing before this 
committee on April 10, I asked Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about 
the situation in Afghanistan. During his opening statement that day, he 
stated that the United States cannot repeat the mistakes of the past 
from the Unites States policy regarding that country. That comment 
reminded me of a trip that I took to Afghanistan with some of my 
colleagues in 2003, including Senator Levin. When we met President 
Karzai at Bagram Air Base, he had a message for us, even back then. It 
was ``don't abandon us; don't make the same mistakes that were made 
decades ago.'' On subsequent visits to his country, President Karzai 
has repeated his plea. That is why I'm concerned about the reports from 
the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council that warned, very 
bluntly, that we are under-resourcing Afghanistan, as well as NATO. The 
Atlantic Council's report goes so far as to say, ``Make no mistake. 
NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.'' I am very concerned about having 
to send more American troops; that it will make it impossible for us 
to, in the long-term, sustain the 12-month deployments that all of us 
are desperate to see us return to. Could you give me your best 
assessment of whether you expect other NATO countries to step up to the 
plate and provide the troops that are necessary?
    General Petraeus. As the Commander of MNF-I, I have not been in a 
position to assess the likelihood of NATO countries providing 
additional troops to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However, 
I am concerned about the existence of requirements in Afghanistan that 
have not been fully sourced. If confirmed as the Commander of CENTCOM, 
I would work in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 
the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense to assess the 
force protection and mission risks produced by shortfalls in resources 
in Afghanistan, and to pursue ways of addressing those shortfalls. 
Generally speaking, it appears clear that the Afghanistan mission would 
benefit from greater contributions from participating nations, with 
fewer national caveats, as well as from continued-and expanded-efforts 
to build the strength and capabilities of the Afghan National Security 
Forces.

                             SOUTHWEST ASIA

    23. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, while a considerable amount 
of time has been spent discussing Iraq and the subject of troop levels, 
we may be missing the big picture. We can't lose sight of what we are 
ultimately trying to accomplish in Iraq and how our future force 
structure supports these goals. We need to focus the discussion on 
coming up with a constructive solution and way ahead. I believe that 
the entire region of southwest Asia is of vital strategic importance to 
the United States. Beyond the situation in Iraq, we have a resurgence 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a tenuous political situation at best in 
Pakistan, and Iranian nuclear ambitions. Can you tell us what you 
believe the United States' geopolitical strategic priorities in this 
region should be and why?
    General Petraeus. A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals a wide array 
of challenges. An important priority, as recently emphasized by the 
Secretary of Defense, must be to win the wars in which we are currently 
engaged. The United States must continue to focus on the ongoing 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure U.S. national policy 
objectives are met. In addition to these conflicts, several 
transnational concerns affect many or all of the countries within the 
CENTCOM AOR. These concerns are interrelated and create significant 
challenges for regional stability and for U.S. policy and interests in 
the region. Our strategic priorities include five areas. Deterring 
state-based aggression. The destabilizing effects of the Iranian 
regime's attempts to increase its influence in the region, Syrian 
efforts to influence Lebanese politics, and Eritrean antagonism aimed 
toward Ethiopia are all significant concerns. Defeating violent 
extremist networks. Though al Qaeda is the highest visibility and 
priority terrorist organization, there are many other extremist groups 
throughout the region. They constitute threats to their home 
governments as well as to people across the globe. Countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including related 
components and technical expertise, in the region. Iran's and Syria's 
non-transparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities could destabilize 
the region and spark a regional arms race. The need to secure existing 
nuclear material is a related and critical concern. Promoting economic 
development in many of the region's countries. This is both a 
humanitarian issue and a security issue, as poverty and lack of 
opportunity are often enablers to successful terrorist recruiting. 
Countering transnational piracy and narcotics and arms smuggling. In 
addition to being criminal and destructive activities, these practices 
threaten strategic resources and are often lucrative sources of funding 
for terrorists.

    24. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, what is the best way to 
achieve these strategic priorities?
    General Petraeus. Although it is premature to have specific and 
comprehensive plans, there are several concepts that would guide my 
approach to the region's challenges, if I am confirmed. First, we would 
seek to build partnerships in the region, pursuing bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in identifying and working together toward 
mutual interests. This involves extensive engagement with leaders in 
the region, and I would see this as one of my primary responsibilities 
as the CENTCOM commander. Second, we would aim for a whole-of-
government approach in addressing the region's challenges. This 
approach recognizes that solutions for the region's challenges should 
be as multifaceted as the challenges themselves. Rather than engaging 
in purely military solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and 
capabilities resident in the whole of government. Third, we would 
pursue comprehensive approaches and solutions, addressing the roots of 
issues and not just their manifestations. This entails efforts varying 
from spurring economic development and educational opportunities to 
strengthening governments' ability to combat terrorism and extremism. 
Fourth, we would maintain focus on readiness to conduct contingency 
operations, whether crisis response, deterrent action, or defeating 
aggressors.

                         TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ

    25. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, I continue to be concerned 
about the negative effects of repeated and extended deployments to Iraq 
on our soldiers and marines. The surge in U.S. forces during the last 
year increased the Army's presence in Iraq to 20 Brigade Combat Teams 
(BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level of 15. The Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General George Casey, has said, ``Today's Army is out of balance. 
The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the 
sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for 
other contingencies.'' When do you foresee the ISF will be ready to 
step up in significant numbers so that you will be able to reduce your 
force level requirements to fewer than 15 BCTs?
    General Petraeus. The ISF is already stepping up in significant 
numbers and enabling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have 
recently made significant security progress in Iraq, as the level of 
security incidents for the past month is the lowest it has been for 
more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even as three 
BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left 
without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space 
and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by 
the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in 
coalition facilities by over 3,500 detainees, and a continuing decline 
will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the 
detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even as we 
have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the 
ISFs, as well as the Iraqi Government's determination in meeting 
security challenges throughout Iraq.
    Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size 
and capability. In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense 
and Interior have generated 51 new combat battalions, an increase of 
over 30 percent. This intensive effort to increase ISF numbers involved 
recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new police and soldiers. 
Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow even 
further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in 
numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq.
    As important as the ISF's growth in size is its growth in 
capability. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead 
in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well 
over 100--a 15 percent increase since January 2007. Ongoing ISF 
operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have 
demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical 
competence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major 
operations throughout the country. The enablers that coalition forces 
provide are in line with expectations and generally involve 
capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support 
capability). The performance of many units has been solid, and some 
formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely 
capable. Thanks to improved security and ISF capability, eight of 
sixteen Iraqi provinces are under Provincial Iraqi Control, with two 
more provinces due to transition by the end of June 2008.
    Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the 
major conditions that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition 
forces in Iraq while sustaining our security gains. My sense is that 
after a brief period of consolidation and evaluation this summer, 
conditions on the ground will be such that I will be able to make a 
recommendation for some further reductions. My recommendation may not 
be for a BCT or major combat formation, though it could. But I do 
believe that there will be assets that we will be able to recommend can 
be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater. Beyond the initial 
decision on post-surge force levels, we will continually assess 
security conditions in Iraq and seek to identify further possible force 
withdrawals.

                          REALIGNMENT IN IRAQ

    26. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, you testified in March that 
the security situation in Iraq has improved since the implementation of 
the surge and that there has been substantial progress in training and 
equipping the ISF. You also testified that the operation against Shiite 
militias in southern Iraq indicates the growing capability of the ISF. 
The report issued by the Independent Commission on the ISFs, chaired by 
retired Marine Corps General and former Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
James Jones, suggests that coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, 
realigned, and retasked as the ISF become increasingly capable. General 
Jones' report stated that U.S. forces could soon be retasked to better 
ensure territorial defense of the state by concentrating on the eastern 
and western borders and the active defense of critical infrastructures 
essential to Iraq. This is very similar in many ways to the transition 
of mission proposed by the Iraq Study Group, and also proposed in 
legislation by Senator Ben Nelson and myself. We have suggested that 
our troops transition their mission and focus on border security, 
counterterrorism operations, training and equipment of Iraqi troops, 
and protecting Americans and American infrastructure. Under what 
conditions should the U.S. military begin a realignment of the mission 
in Iraq?
    General Petraeus. As the Commander, MNF-I, or if confirmed, as the 
Commander, CENTCOM, my responsibility is to execute the policy that has 
been decided upon by my chain of command. The current strategic goal of 
the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic, and Federal 
Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the 
war on terror. Achieving this goal requires a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency campaign, working along security, economic, 
diplomatic, and political lines of operation, to help the Iraqi 
Government secure its citizens, develop capacity, grow its economy, and 
strengthen its relations with other countries in the region. Border 
security, counterterrorism operations, training and equipping Iraqi 
troops, and protecting our troops and infrastructure are all important 
aspects of our counterinsurgency efforts, but limiting U.S. troops to 
these actions would not enable us to achieve the United States' 
strategic goal in Iraq.
    Accomplishing this goal remains a complex and difficult 
undertaking, but our view is that we are on the right path. Significant 
security progress has been made, as the level of security incidents 
across Iraq for the past month is the lowest it has been for more than 
4 years, and we continue to transition additional responsibilities to 
the Iraqi Government and ISFs. This transition is evident in the fact 
that we have sustained our security gains even as three BCTs, a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left without 
replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space and 
will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by the 
end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in 
coalition facilities by a net of 3,500 detainees and this reduction, as 
well as our continuing detainee releases, will allow me to recommend 
reductions in units programmed for the detainee mission. We continually 
assess the conditions on the ground, and after a period of 
consolidation and evaluation this summer, we will seek to identify 
further possible force withdrawals.
    It is possible that the U.S. strategy and policy for Iraq could 
change. If that were to happen, I would work with other U.S. Government 
agencies to develop the comprehensive plans, including risk management, 
required to implement that strategy.

               SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN

    27. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, the work of Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Stuart Bowen, has 
revealed an extraordinary litany of contracting waste, fraud, and abuse 
coming out of that country. His 336 investigations related to Iraq 
contracting have resulted in 5 convictions; 14 indictments pending 
trial; 14 arrests; 52 debarments or suspensions; $17 million in court 
ordered fines, forfeitures, and restitutions; and nearly $58 million 
saved through audits. In addition, the SIGIR is currently conducting 
audits of companies such as Halliburton's former subsidiary, Kellogg 
Brown and Root. Last year's National Defense Authorization Act created 
a new position, the Inspector General for Afghanistan, called the 
SIGAR. If confirmed as Commander of CENTCOM, what support will you 
provide to the SIGAR to ensure that office can provide adequate 
oversight to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in contracting practices 
in Afghanistan?
    General Petraeus. If confirmed as the Commander, CENTCOM, I would 
provide my full support to the efforts of the SIGAR. Today's military 
operations require significant financial and contractor support, and 
audit and oversight agencies serve a critical role in ensuring that 
taxpayer money is well spent. As the Commander of MNF-I, I have fully 
supported and encouraged special reviews as I rely on oversight and 
audit processes to provide me essential information on the health of 
the organization. During my tenure, MNF-I has welcomed the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction as well as personnel from the 
Government Accountability Office, the DOD Inspector General, the Army 
Audit Agency, and the Army Criminal Investigation Command. As the 
Commander of CENTCOM, I would continue to provide my full support for 
oversight and review processes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                    April 30, 2008.
    Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment in the United States 
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance 
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                             To be General.

    GEN David H. Petraeus, 1960.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, 
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the 
nomination was referred, follows:]
         Resume of Service Career of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
    Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,
    Armor Officer Advanced Course,
    United States Army Command and General Staff College,
    Senior Service College Fellowship--Georgetown University.

Educational degrees:
    United States Military Academy--BS--No Major.
    Princeton University--MPA--International Relations.
    Princeton University--PHD--International Relations.

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.......................................  5 Jun 74
1LT.......................................  5 Jun 76
CPT.......................................  8 Aug 78
MAJ.......................................  1 Aug 85
LTC.......................................  1 Apr 91
COL.......................................  1 Sep 95
BG........................................  1 Jan 00
MG........................................  1 Jan 03
LTG.......................................  18 May 04
GEN.......................................  10 Feb 07
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              From                        To              Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 75..........................  Jan 79............  Platoon Leader, C
                                                       Company, later S-
                                                       4 (Logistics),
                                                       later S-1
                                                       (Personnel),
                                                       509th Airborne
                                                       Battalion Combat
                                                       Team, Vicenza,
                                                       Italy.
Jan 79..........................  Jul 79              Assistant S-3
                                                       (Operations), 2d
                                                       Brigade, 24th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Stewart, GA.
Jul 79                            May 81............  Commander, A
                                                       Company, later S-
                                                       3 (Operations),
                                                       2d Battalion,
                                                       19th Infantry,
                                                       24th Infantry
                                                       Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Stewart, GA.
May 81..........................  May 82............  Aide-de-Camp to
                                                       the Division
                                                       Commander, 24th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Stewart, GA.
May 82..........................  Jun 83............  Student, Command
                                                       and General Staff
                                                       Officer Course,
                                                       Fort Leavenworth,
                                                       KS.
Jun 83..........................  Jun 85............  Student, Princeton
                                                       University,
                                                       Princeton, NJ.
Jul 85                            Jun 87............  Instructor, later
                                                       Assistant
                                                       Professor,
                                                       Department of
                                                       Social Sciences,
                                                       United States
                                                       Military Academy,
                                                       West Point, NY.
Jun 87..........................  Jun 88............  Military Assistant
                                                       to the Supreme
                                                       Allied Commander
                                                       Europe, Supreme
                                                       Headquarters,
                                                       Allied Powers
                                                       Europe, Belgium.
Jun 88..........................  Aug 89............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       2d Battalion,
                                                       30th Infantry,
                                                       later 1st
                                                       Brigade, 3d
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe,
                                                       Germany.
Aug 89..........................  Aug 91............  Aide/Assistant
                                                       Executive Officer
                                                       to the Chief of
                                                       Staff, United
                                                       States Army,
                                                       Washington, DC.
Aug 91..........................  Jul 93              Commander, 3d
                                                       Battalion, 187th
                                                       Infantry, 101st
                                                       Airborne Division
                                                       (Air Assault),
                                                       Fort Campbell,
                                                       KY.
Jul 93                            Jul 94              G-3 (Operations)/
                                                       Director of
                                                       Plans, Training,
                                                       and Mobilization,
                                                       101st Airborne
                                                       Division (Air
                                                       Assault), Fort
                                                       Campbell, KY.
Aug 94..........................  Jan 95............  Senior Service
                                                       College Fellow,
                                                       Georgetown
                                                       University,
                                                       Washington, DC.
Jan 95..........................  Jun 95............  Chief Operations
                                                       Officer, U.N.
                                                       Mission in Haiti,
                                                       Operation Uphold
                                                       Democracy, Haiti.
Jun 95..........................  Jun 97............  Commander, 1st
                                                       Brigade, 82d
                                                       Airborne
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC.
Jun 97..........................  Sep 97............  Executive
                                                       Assistant to the
                                                       Director of the
                                                       Joint Staff, The
                                                       Joint Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC.
Oct 97..........................  Aug 99............  Executive
                                                       Assistant to the
                                                       Chairman, Joint
                                                       Chiefs of Staff,
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Joint Chiefs of
                                                       Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC.
Aug 99..........................  Jul 00              Assistant Division
                                                       Commander
                                                       (Operations), 82d
                                                       Airborne
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Bragg, North
                                                       Carolina and
                                                       Commanding
                                                       General, Combined
                                                       Joint Task Force-
                                                       Kuwait, Operation
                                                       Desert Spring,
                                                       Kuwait.
Jul 00                            Aug 00............  Acting Commanding
                                                       General, 82d
                                                       Airborne
                                                       Division, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC.
Aug 00..........................  Jun 01............  Chief of Staff,
                                                       XVIII Airborne
                                                       Corps, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC.
Jun 01..........................  Jun 02............  Assistant Chief of
                                                       Staff for
                                                       Operations, SFOR
                                                       and Deputy
                                                       Commander, United
                                                       States Joint
                                                       Interagency
                                                       Counterterrorism
                                                       Task Force,
                                                       Operation Joint
                                                       Forge, Sarajevo,
                                                       Bosnia-
                                                       Herzegovina.
Jul 02                            May 04............  Commanding
                                                       General, 101st
                                                       Airborne Division
                                                       (Air Assault) and
                                                       Fort Campbell,
                                                       Fort Campbell,
                                                       KY, and Operation
                                                       Iraqi Freedom,
                                                       Iraq.
May 04..........................  Sep 05............  Commander,
                                                       Multinational
                                                       Security
                                                       Transition
                                                       Command-Iraq/
                                                       Commander, NATO
                                                       Training Mission-
                                                       Iraq, Operation
                                                       Iraqi Freedom,
                                                       Iraq.
Oct 05..........................  Feb 07............  Commanding
                                                       General, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Combined Arms
                                                       Center and Fort
                                                       Leavenworth, Fort
                                                       Leavenworth, KS.
Feb 07..........................  Present...........  Commander, Multi-
                                                       National Force-
                                                       Iraq, Operation
                                                       Iraqi Freedom,
                                                       Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Dates               Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Assistant to the Supreme     Jun 87-Jun 88  Major
 Allied Commander Europe, Supreme
 Headquarters, Allied Powers
 Europe, Belgium (Cumulative
 Joint Credit).
Chief Operations Officer, U.N.        Jan 95-Jun 95  Lieutenant Colonel
 Mission in Haiti, Operation
 Uphold Democracy, Haiti (No
 Joint Credit).
Executive Assistant to the            Jun 97-Aug 99  Colonel
 Director, The Joint Staff, later
 Executive Assistant to the
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 Washington, DC.
Commanding General, Combined          Aug 99-Sep 99  Colonel
 Joint Task Force-Kuwait,
 Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait
 (No Joint Credit).
Assistant Chief of Staff for          Jun 01-Jun 02  Brigadier General
 Operations, SFOR and Deputy
 Commander, United States Joint
 Interagency Counter-Terrorism
 Task Force, Operation Joint
 Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-
 Herzegovina (No joint credit).
Commander, Multinational Security     May 04-Sep 05  Lieutenant General
 Transition Command-Iraq/
 Commander, NATO Training Mission-
 Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
 Iraq.
Commander, Multinational Force-      Feb 07-Present  General
 Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
 Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
    Defense Distinguished Service Medal
    Distinguished Service Medal
    Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
    Defense Meritorious Service Medal
    Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Joint Service Commendation Medal
    Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Joint Service Achievement Medal
    Army Achievement Medal
    Combat Action Badge
    Expert Infantryman Badge
    Master Parachutist Badge
    Air Assault Badge
    Ranger Tab
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
    Army Staff Identification Badge
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David H. 
Petraeus, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    David H. Petraeus.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Commander, United States Central Command.

    3. Date of nomination:
    30 April 2008.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, NY.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Anne, 25; Stephen, 21.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, 
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, 
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    Council on Foreign Relations.
    Association of the United States Army.
    Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy.
    82d Airborne Division Assosciation.
    101st Airborne Division Association.
    504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
    Static Line Association.
    555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
    187th Infantry Regiment Association.
    SHAPE Alumni Association.
    7th Armored Division Association.
    Princeton Alumni Association.
    United States Parachute Association.
    Command and General Staff Foundation.

    11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions 
for outstanding service or achievements.
    None.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, 
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted 
committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

    13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly 
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                 David H. Petraeus.

    [The nomination of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported 
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the 
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 
was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.]
                              ----------                              

    [Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers 
supplied follow:]
                        Questions and Responses
    Please provide any updates or modifications to the answers to 
advance policy questions that you submitted in connection with your 
recent nomination to the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 
that you believe to be necessary to ensure that your views are fully 
and accurately reflected.

                                 DUTIES

    Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of 
the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)?
    Answer. The Commanding General of MNF-I commands forces within Iraq 
and is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of Mission. 
MNF-I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control (OPCON) 
to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). MNF-I conducts 
operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission, and 
other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical Control of 
non-U.S. coalition forces and OPCON of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq 
(MNC-I). MNF-I is a strategic level command.
    Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions 
of the Commander, MNF-I and the Commander, MNC-I?
    Answer. The Commanding General of MNC-I is the senior operational 
level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting 
operations to restore order and security in Iraq.
    The Commanding General of MNF-I has a wider responsibility. He is 
responsible for all strategic issues and the political-military 
interface, working with the U.S. Ambassador and Government of Iraq to 
integrate all aspects of the campaign to include security, governance, 
economic development, communication, and transition.
    Question. What background and experience, including joint duty 
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform 
these duties?
    Answer. During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have 
served the Army and the Nation from the tactical through the strategic 
level. I have been assigned in tactical and operational units for 22 
years and have commanded soldiers from company to Corps level while 
participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have 
served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and 
multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and 
combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms 
Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a tour of duty as 
the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of the 
Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia 
operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania 
during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor 
to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/
Multinational Corps Iraq for the last 24 months. My professional 
military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have 
provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into what is 
needed to command coalition forces in support of the strategic goals 
outlined by the U.S. Mission Iraq. In particular, my recent tours of 
duty in Iraq have provided me with unique insights into the complicated 
situation and requirements needed to be successful in our mission in 
Iraq.
    Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to 
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander, 
MNF-I?
    Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

         Continually update my military and civilian chain of 
        command of our analysis and assessment
         Stay connected with my subordinate commanders and 
        higher headquarters
         Lead and challenge all of MNF-I to continue to learn, 
        change, and adjust to the environment, in order to attain our 
        end state as quickly as possible
         Continually assess the progress of our campaign and 
        make adjustments when necessary to ensure success
         Establish mechanisms to incorporate the lessons 
        learned over the last 5 years
         Maintain focus on the warrior ethos--Always place the 
        mission first; never accept defeat; never quit; never leave a 
        fallen comrade
         Demand high moral and ethical behavior by all U.S. 
        forces
         Be aggressive--tackle challenges as they arise and 
        mitigate the risk involved

                                  IRAQ

    Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing 
the United States in Iraq?
    Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position to 
achieve success in Iraq than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The 
security situation is improved, with overall attacks, civilian deaths, 
and ethno-sectarian violence all down. Progress remains uneven and 
difficult challenges remain, specifically the continued presence of 
militias and Iran's malign involvement in training, equipping, and 
funding these militias. Second, AQI maintains the capability to conduct 
high profile attacks in some areas, although their capability is 
diminished. They will continue to attempt to de-legitimize the 
Government of Iraq. Iraqi security forces continue to improve and are 
increasingly taking the lead. However, all of this progress is still 
fragile. To achieve long-term sustainable security tough work still 
remains. The gap between needs of the Iraqi people and the capacity of 
the government has been reduced, but is not yet self-sustainable by the 
Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on 
some very difficult issues and has passed some critical legislation, 
but implementation of this legislation is what is needed. There appears 
to be better cooperation among many political parties which has 
provided some unified positions across sectarian lines. However, Iraq's 
governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas. Overall, we 
are moving in the right direction and progressing toward a stable and 
representative state in Iraq. However, for it to be sustainable we must 
continue U.S. involvement across all US Governmental agencies and 
continue to pressure the Iraqi Leaders to move forward economically, 
politically, and diplomatically.
    Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the 
United States needs to take in Iraq?
    Answer. As U.S. forces in theater drawdown, we must ensure that 
malign influences are unable to reestablish themselves through 
violence. ISF and Coalition forces must continue to protect the Iraqi 
people while continuing to build Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as 
we assist in providing security, we must enable Iraqi security forces 
to increasingly assume the lead in securing their country. They must 
expand their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage 
and support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the 
local and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the 
challenges associated with internal and external stability and security 
in Iraq cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must continue to engage 
with Iraq's neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to support 
political compromise and stability in Iraq.
    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
confront the next Commander, MNF-I?
    Answer. In my opinion, the number one threat to Iraq is the 
communal struggle for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-
Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) with malign outside influences 
(predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying to effect the 
outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other 
Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the 
greatest threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security 
forces to increasingly take the lead against these challenges without 
creating significant risks to short- and long-sustainable security.
    There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political, 
and diplomatic realms. Gains made in security will be easier to 
preserve in an environment in which people have ready access to 
essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local 
and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to move 
forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and 
the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be 
important milestones in this process. The Iraqi Government must not 
only be representative, but also must continue to grow in capability 
and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face challenges 
from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to 
surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures 
to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory. 
Iraq's Arab neighbors must do more to reach out and engage Iraq in a 
positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the 
establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek to partner with 
the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these 
diplomatic and political challenges.
    Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish 
and what actions would you initially take as Commander, MNF-I?
    Answer. The gap between the Iraqi individual needs and desires and 
the ability of the Government of Iraq to provide for those needs and 
desires still exists. The role of coalition forces is to support the 
Government of Iraq in building capacity to meet the basic needs of the 
Iraqi citizens. We will assist the Government of Iraq by working to 
make the communal struggle for power less violent, helping them to 
develop legitimate Iraqi institutions and mitigate the negative effects 
created by those trying to exploit the gap. MNF-I basic objectives will 
be:

         Provide security for the local populace
         ISF is professionalized and self-sustaining and is 
        able

                 to move towards police primacy
                 to protect its borders
                 to maintain security with less and less 
                reliance on coalition forces

         Assist the Government of Iraq in providing a more 
        legitimate and capable central, provincial, and local 
        government that has:

                 Credible and effective control with provincial 
                and local civil institutions
                 is accountable to the people of Iraq
                 has established the rule of law
                 delivers adequate services
                 increases employment through economic 
                development

                            LESSONS LEARNED

    Question. How would you characterize the effectiveness of the 
military tactics employed by the division under your command in Tikrit 
in 2003? What were the results of those tactics and what lessons did 
you, the theater command, and the Army learn from that experience?
    Answer. As is the case now, all areas in Iraq in 2003 faced 
significantly different challenges. In 2003 and the beginning of 2004, 
the 4th ID area of operations was the heart of the Sunni-Triangle and 
the Baathist Regime itself. This area of operations was probably most 
affected by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and potentially lost more 
than any other group in Iraq. They were the privileged--therefore, the 
regime change followed by the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, as well as 
the implementation of debathification measures by the interim Iraqi 
Government, put thousands upon thousands of military, education, 
medical and local government employees out of work. This created an 
extremely tense environment and a corresponding increase in reaction 
and violence to these decisions. In the fall of 2003 this was the most 
violent area within Iraq. From November to March of 2004, we were able 
to significantly reduce the level of violence through a combination of 
lethal and non-lethal means and re-establish stability throughout the 
region. During this time, the division captured nearly 20 of the top 55 
high value targets to include Saddam Hussein in December of 2003. 
Additionally, we established standing provincial governments in Salah-
ah-Din, At Tamim, and Diyala provinces and started several job programs 
as well as began numerous reconstruction efforts. In the beginning of 
2004 through our transition of authority on 15 March 2004, we reduced 
the level of violence in the region to its lowest levels that have yet 
to be re-achieved. However we learned many lessons. It took us much too 
long to recognize the true nature of the insurgency. We did not have 
the capacity or expertise to fully understand the underlying cultural 
or tribal underpinnings of the region. We were unable to establish 
longstanding relationships and trust with the local tribal and 
religious leaders. We underestimated the relevance of justice and honor 
to the Iraqis and the necessity of creating honorable work not just 
jobs. Lastly, reconciliation had not yet become a viable concept. It 
took us 4 more years to see this take hold.
    Question. What were the major lessons you learned from your more 
recent experience as Commander, MNC-I, that are most applicable to the 
duties you are about to assume?

         Securing the population comes first
         Understand the complexity of the conflict--``COIN-
        plus''
         Fundamental concepts

                 Secure the people where they sleep
                 Give the people justice and honor
                 Make the people choose

         Integrate civilian and military efforts to ``mass 
        effects''. It is the combination of interagency and combined 
        arms

                 Embedded PRTs with the BCTs better leverages 
                the appropriate expertise and allows for increase 
                integration and synchronization
                 Total integration SOF and conventional forces 
                across the battlespace
                 Improved significantly our overall intel 
                capacity and our ability to synchronize the ``INTs'' at 
                the lowest level--ISR integration is more critical than 
                ever

         Knowing the threat isn't enough . . . understand the 
        environment holistically
         ``Aggressive pursuit'' continues even after the threat 
        recedes

                 Pushing the ISF as they grow in capacity and 
                take on responsibility
                 Pushing governance and economic development as 
                security improves

         Building ISF capacity--there is no substitute for 
        partnership
         Empowering ground-owning commanders (decentralization 
        of efforts)
         Importance of headquarters elements
         Importance of enablers as force multipliers and ``risk 
        mitigators''
         What leaders do makes a critical difference . . . 
        everyday, at every level
         Be first with the truth
         ``Supporting the troops'' involves funding OGAs--CERP 
        is not enough

    Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes 
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
    Answer.

          1. Inadequate post-war planning to exploit the military 
        success of the initial invasion. We underestimated/
        misunderstood the environment.
          2. Disbanding of the Iraqi Army and further de-Baathification 
        efforts threw thousands upon thousands of Iraqis out of work.
          3. It took us too long to recognize the insurgency and all of 
        its underpinnings, which allowed extremist groups to establish 
        themselves and gain passive support of the population.
          4. We attempted to turn complete control over to the Iraqis 
        too early when they did not yet have the capacity to govern or 
        secure the population. This resulted in a significant increase 
        in ethno-sectarian violence on that was exploited by Sunni/Shia 
        extremist groups.

    Question. Which of these mistakes, if any, still impact U.S. 
operations?
    Answer. They all to some extent still effect our operations, but we 
have made adjustments at the strategic, operational, and tactical level 
which is the beginning to have an effect.
    Question. What corrective action, if any, will you take if 
confirmed?
    Answer. I will ensure that we are a learning organization that is 
able to adjust its operations in order to meet the Nation's stated 
objectives. We will push the Iraqis to assume more control across the 
security, diplomatic, and governance lines of operation to include the 
investment of their wealth into their own country. We will continue to 
assess and analyze the strategic and operational environment and make 
adjustments.
    Question. During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were 
there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of 
alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?
    If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the actions 
that you took in response to these incidents.
    Answer. Unfortunately, due to the nature of our operations, 
allegations of detainee or civilian abuse occur frequently against both 
coalition forces and Iraqi security forces (ISF). For alleged abuse by 
U.S. forces, I require that all allegations be reported through the 
chain of command to me. I also require that each allegation be 
thoroughly and impartially investigated, evidence gathered and 
evaluated. Each case of confirmed abuse is treated as misconduct under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, adverse administrative 
procedures, or both. Each case is handled on its own merits at the 
appropriate level after due process is afforded to any soldier accused 
of such conduct. Known victims of confirmed abuse are compensated as 
part of our counter-insurgency strategy and our moral obligation to do 
right by our host country's citizens. We take our lessons learned from 
such incidents and refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures, as 
well as retrain our soldiers in the importance of following the Law of 
Armed Conflict, respecting Iraqi civilians, and treating detainees 
humanely.
    For allegations of abuse by ISF, I require that reports be made by 
U.S. inspectors of Iraqi military, police, and detention facilities, as 
well as anyone in my command who has information of this type of 
alleged conduct. The reports are forwarded to the appropriate liaison 
authority who can engage the right Iraqi leaders in order for them to 
address the allegations of Iraqi-on-Iraqi abuse.

              ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW IRAQ STRATEGY

    Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the 
new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007?
    Answer. After my arrival in Iraq in December 2006 as the MNC-I 
Commander, General Casey challenged me to take a look at different ways 
to break the cycle of sectarian violence in Baghdad. As a result of the 
assessment, we confirmed that Baghdad was the most important piece of 
terrain and ethno-sectarian violence, fueled by extremist elements was 
the primary cause of the problem. We conducted crisis action planning 
and through our assessment and analysis determined that we must first 
and foremost protect the population first in Baghdad and then the other 
ten cities. We also determined that there was an opportunity in Anbar 
to exploit some initial success that was created by the reconciliation 
efforts with the tribes. We developed tactics, techniques, and 
procedures to push coalition and ISF forces out into the neighborhoods 
in small Joint Security Stations (JSS) and combat outpost (COP). In the 
past we would clear areas but would not be able to hold these areas. We 
knew we must secure the population; we must deny the enemy sanctuaries 
and eliminate the support zones in the so called Baghdad Belts. We then 
developed the operational plan and requested the surge forces. This 
plan was briefed to General Casey and the Secretary of Defense for 
approval, and later to General Petraeus upon his arrival.

                     U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN IRAQ

    Question. The President has said that following the withdrawal of 
the last surge brigade combat team in July there will be a 45-day 
consolidation and evaluation period, after which an assessment of 
conditions on the ground would begin to determine when recommendations 
for further reductions in U.S. forces in Iraq could be made.
    To your knowledge, aren't conditions on the ground in Iraq being 
continuously assessed?
    Answer. Commanders at all levels continually assess, both formally 
and informally, conditions in Iraq.
    Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days 
to assess the conditions on the ground and determine when to make 
recommendations?
    Answer. The recommendation to reduce our forces by five combat 
Brigades and two Marine Battalions, back down to pre-surge levels was 
made based on our best judgment and analysis of many factors.
    The environment in Iraq is complex and constantly changing across 
security, economic, and diplomatic lines. One of our key considerations 
is to ensure that we do not give back gains we have made. We learned 
the lesson the hard way in 2006. In order to make informed decisions it 
is important to understand the risk involved and how you can best 
mitigate this risk. This 45 day period following a 25 percent reduction 
in combat brigades allows us to adequately and more accurately evaluate 
the risk and ensure that tactical, operational, and strategic risk 
mitigation techniques are sufficient.
    Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution 
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
    Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in 
Iraq. All four lines of operation--security, economic, diplomatic, and 
political--are mutually reinforcing and thus must be an important part 
of any long-term solution in Iraq. While the political line of 
operation, the effort to create political accommodation and good 
governance, is the main effort, it cannot be pursued to the exclusion 
of reinforcing efforts. We have seen in the past year that Iraqi 
leaders are more likely to make the type of compromise seen in 
February's legislative package when they and their communities are 
feeling more secure rather than less.
    Question. Do you believe that compromise among Iraqi political 
leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
    Answer. Compromise among Iraqi Political leaders is a necessary 
condition for any successful solution in Iraq.
    Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders 
to make the compromises necessary for a political solution?
    Answer. We must continue to apply the right amount of pressure in 
order to ensure constant and consistent progress. I also believe 
constant communications between leaders in MNF-I and the Embassy with 
all Iraqi political leaders is essential. Iraqi leaders are under 
enormous pressure from internal and external sources and they have 
begun to make some progress with legislation as well as other areas. 
However, the importance of implementation will be the underpinning of 
long-term sustainable success, and we must continue to coach, teach, 
mentor, and pressure the Iraqi leadership along the way.
    Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
    Answer. We must throw all means available; push, pull and convince 
Iraqi leaders that political solutions must be found by helping them 
find those solutions, coaching them, and urging them throughout the 
process. We must sustain our robust engagement, working with the 
Government of Iraq to identify mutual interests amongst Iraqi leaders 
and convincing them to make the hard decisions that are in the best 
interests of security and stability in Iraq.
    Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would 
allow for a recommendation to make further reductions in U.S. forces?
    Answer. There is no simple metric or calculation that can give us a 
green or red light on further reductions. However, if confirmed as 
Commander of MNF-I, I will focus on a number of variables such as the 
level of security, level of threat, capacity of the ISF, capacity of 
the ministries, capacity of the provincial and local governments, 
economic development, and improvement of basic services. We will use a 
variety of objective and subjective systems. However, I will rely most 
heavily on my subordinate commanders' recommendations and my own 
independent judgment.

                         INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT

    Question. You have noted that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and 
that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current 
threat is the intercommunal fight over power.
    How has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in 
Iraq?
    Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a 
competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and 
resources. This has played out differently over time, with inter- and 
later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex 
mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional 
interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward 
it will continue to be a complex problem set.
    Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to 
this change in the nature of the conflict?
    Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address 
this conflict over power and resources. As commander of MNC-I, I had a 
hand in the development of the Joint Campaign Plan. It addresses not 
just the manifestation of this conflict (security) but its roots 
(economic, political) and a comprehensive approach to address it 
(security, economic, diplomatic, and political). The strategy also 
involves directly addressing sectarian division, engaging with 
dissonant factions and individuals to bring reconcilable enemies to the 
realization that the best means of change is the political process and 
not armed conflict. We have also worked to bring together rivaling 
religious and political leaders to work together for their communities. 
Our efforts have been reinforced by the general population's increasing 
rejection of violence and those who would cause it. Although there is a 
long way to go, our strategy to address the conflict in Iraq is helping 
to enable progress by the Iraqi Government.
    Question. What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in 
response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among 
militant groups vying for control, particularly in southern Iraq?
    Answer. The role of coalition forces is to support the elected 
government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the 
legitimate use of arms. It is my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely 
begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, and we seek 
to support them in that effort.
    Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and 
murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.
    In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at 
greater risk?
    Answer. I believe the non-Muslim religious minorities are not at 
greater risk from the majority of Iraqis. However, there are extremist 
elements that target several groups to include non-Muslim religious 
minorities in order to maintain their own legitimacy.
    Question. Are there any groups that are particularly vulnerable?
    Answer. Recent events in Basra and Sadr City indicate that low 
level Iraqi Government officials and Iraqi security forces are at the 
greatest risk when traveling outside established safe zones.
    Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military 
in addressing their vulnerability?
    Answer. The U.S. must ensure that threat reporting and information 
is shared with Iraqi counterparts to ensure widest possible 
dissemination; this allows individuals (of all religions and sects) who 
are at risk to take property security measures.

                        CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS

    Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking 
the steps it must to confront and control the militias?
    Answer. The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in 
recent months toward confronting criminal militias. Prime Minister 
Maliki made the courageous decision in March to confront militia 
elements in Basra that were carrying out acts of intimidation and 
murder, threatening peace and the rule of law. Reports state that Prime 
Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the Government of 
Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of arms, and the 
government and ISF are attempting to enforce this point in Baghdad, 
particularly Sadr City. It appears the government is more willing to 
use its forces to confront militia elements. This must be followed by 
diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. However, this is only the first 
step in reducing militia influence. It will take a concerted effort 
over time to have long-term success.
    Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if 
confirmed?
    Answer. I will continue to work with the Iraqi Government to assist 
them in confronting militias by using all the tools available to them 
(military, diplomatic, and humanitarian.) Coalition forces will 
continue to support and enable Iraqi forces in their kinetic and non-
kinetic operations against militias through partnership and the use of 
coalition advisors.
    Question. What has been the role of American troops with respect to 
recent operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra?
    Answer. It is my understanding that U.S. support for the Sadr City 
and Basra operations has been generally in line with the support 
coalition forces regularly provide to Iraqi operations.
    In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in 
Multi-National Division--Southeast, the coalition has continued to 
support Iraqi-led operations with planning, some logistic enablers, 
close air support, and ISR. U.S. and U.K. Military Transition Teams 
embedded with Iraqi units on the ground play an integral role in these 
support efforts.
    It is my understanding that U.S. forces in Baghdad are playing a 
more robust role in planning and executing operations in the Baghdad 
Security Districts than in Basra. They are conducting extensive 
surveillance operations in Sadr City and partnering with Iraqi units on 
the ground, using ISR and Air Weapons Team assets to conduct targeted 
operations in response to attacks originating in Sadr City. As typical 
in the ``partner'' phase of the lead-partner-overwatch transition to 
ISF control, coalition forces operate alongside and in coordination 
with Iraqi Army, Special Operations, and Police units.

                  PERFORMANCE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

    Question. As part of the new strategy in Iraq, the Iraqi Government 
agreed to send three additional Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad.
    How many additional Iraqi Army brigades have been deployed and 
participated in operations in Baghdad since January 2007?
    Answer. In January 2007, the Government of Iraq committed to 
providing sufficient forces to conduct operations in support of the 
Baghdad Security Plan (Benchmark #9--Securing, Stabilizing, and 
Rebuilding Iraq). In February 2007, the Government of Iraq established 
an Iraqi Army (IA) battalion rotation plan in support of Fardh al 
Qanoon to provide three additional brigades (9 additional battalions) 
of combat power to Baghdad. On 1 December 2007, the 2nd and 3rd 
Brigades of the 11th IA Division completed force generation and assumed 
responsibility for battlespace within the Baghdad Province, allowing 
six of the rotational battalions to return home. The 4th Brigade of the 
11th Division is scheduled to complete the force generation process in 
November 2008, which will allow the 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division and 
its battalions to return home to Anbar Province. 4/11 IA will fulfill 
the requirement to have three additional IA brigades permanently 
stationed in Baghdad (in accordance with Benchmark #9). Over the past 
year and a half, there have been as many as six additional battalions--
above and beyond the requirement for three brigades--temporarily 
deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations.
    Question. How many additional Iraqi Army brigades are there now?
    Answer. The 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division will remain deployed to 
Baghdad until completion of the force generation of 4th Brigade, 11th 
IA Division, thus fulfilling the requirements of the Baghdad Security 
Plan. Currently, there are six additional battalions deployed to 
Baghdad in support of ongoing operations in Sadr City.
    Question. How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi 
forces in the conduct of recent security operations in and around 
Baghdad?
    Answer. It is difficult for me to comment on recent security 
operations since I have not been in theater for about 90 days. But when 
I was there, we were seeing steady progress in planning and execution 
at battalion and brigade level by the ISF. Progress is still not 
uniform, and there are still some significant NCO and officer 
shortages, as well as some small pockets of sectarian behavior.
    Question. As U.S. surge forces are withdrawn, are Iraqi Army 
brigades assuming the areas and missions of these units?
    Answer. As local conditions vary, so does Iraqi force capability on 
the ground. In general, our intent is to thin out U.S. presence rather 
than withdraw it from a given area. In many cases, we are spreading out 
our presence as troops leave and continuing to partner with ISF. In 
other cases, ISF units on the ground--to include Iraqi Police, National 
Police, and Iraqi Army elements--are assuming a greater role. Several 
provinces are scheduled to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control in the 
coming months. The specific arrangement varies not only province to 
province, but city to city and in some cases neighborhood to 
neighborhood.
    Question. If so, are gains in reduced violence and increased 
stability achieved by U.S. forces being effectively maintained in the 
areas for which Iraqi Army forces have assumed responsibility?
    Answer. It is imperative that we preserve hard won gains. We must 
take an approach that allows us to preserve these gains by ensuring 
that Iraqi forces are capable and supported so they not only take 
responsibility, but are successful. In general, our intent is to thin 
out U.S. presence over time rather than completely withdraw from a 
given area.
    Question. In March 2008, the Iraqi Army launched a major offensive 
aimed at forcing the Mahdi Army out of Basra.
    What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and security 
forces' strategic and operational planning and preparation for the 
operation in Basra?
    Answer. It is very difficult to make an assessment from afar. From 
reporting, it appears Iraqi operations in Basra began much more quickly 
than originally planned and thus suffered initially from a lack of 
sufficient strategic and operational planning and conditions setting. 
But as operations have continued, with our coaching and assistance, 
Iraqi planning has seen growth in capability.
    What is encouraging is that Iraq Security Forces demonstrated they 
have the ability to deploy over a division's worth of personnel and 
equipment across the country and then employ them upon arrival--a feat 
which was not possible in 2006.
    Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces' 
tactical performance during operations in Basra?
    Answer. I have not personally observed these operations and can not 
make an accurate assessment.
    Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi 
Government's strategic and the Iraqi security forces' operational 
objectives?
    Answer. Through reporting, it is my view that it is too early to 
talk about operational or strategic success. However, it appears the 
militia's grip on Basra's neighborhoods has been affected, and 
significant caches have been found throughout the city. The operation 
appears to be garnering support from citizens of Basra, but any 
conclusions at this time about the operation's overall tactical and 
strategic accomplishments would be premature.

                          COMMAND AND CONTROL

    Question. What is the command and control relationship between 
American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan?
    Answer. Iraqi security forces in the Baghdad area receive all 
orders through national command channels, and U.S. forces operate under 
the command and control of Multi-National Corps Iraq. The relationship 
between these two chains of command is one of constant coordination and 
cooperation.
    Question. What concerns, if any, have you had about command and 
control relationships with Iraqi forces, and what have been the lessons 
learned in this regard over the last year of combined operations?
    Answer. The issue of command and control relationships is an 
important one, and the most critical imperative has been to ensure 
unity of effort. Over the past year, we have gained a great deal of 
experience as a result of our partnership between transition teams and 
Iraqi units and our close cooperation at the tactical level. The 
operations of the last year particularly have reaffirmed the value of 
our training and transition teams. These elements have been critical in 
providing coalition forces with situational awareness and in helping 
the coalition to support Iraqi operations with enablers such as 
logistics, intelligence, and close air support.

                       COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

    Question. According to Field Manual 3-24, the new counterinsurgency 
manual, ``20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often 
considered the minimum troop density required for effective 
counterinsurgency operations.'' Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, 
requires a force of 120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum 
requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for 
Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces.
    Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and 
remains sufficient and if so, why?
    Answer. While every commander would like additional resources, the 
80,000 troops that were in or moved to Baghdad were sufficient given 
the political-military situation and phased conduct of operations. 
Counterinsurgency requires local security forces and not just soldiers. 
At the same time, the Baghdad police were expanded and now have an 
authorization of over 39,000. In addition, it is important to recognize 
the security contribution of 30,000 Sons of Iraq assisting U.S. forces 
in Baghdad alone. As the Baghdad security plan has progressed, these 
forces proved to be sufficient to allow gradual but steady progress in 
efforts to clear and hold Baghdad's neighborhoods. I would also add 
that the critical increase in the enablers such as ISR platforms, 
intelligence teams, and aviation, as well as many other enablers, has a 
significant impact.
    Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of 
the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation 
from doctrine?
    Answer. As the former commander of MNC-I, I can attest that risk 
assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a continuous process 
in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and undertaken, 
commanders consider the risk to our own as well as Iraqi forces, as 
well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas which we currently 
hold. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that risk assessment 
occurs on a continuous basis.

                       LENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY

    Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has said 
that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years.
    How long do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq 
could last? Do you have reason to believe that this campaign will be 
shorter than the typical effort cited by General Casey?
    Answer. I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency 
campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will 
depend on a variety of factors about which it is very difficult to make 
judgments. While the support of the United States will be important for 
some time to come, ultimately the Government of Iraq must win this 
fight. Therefore, while the counterinsurgency campaign could last 9 
years, it is not necessarily the case that U.S. forces would be 
involved in substantial numbers for the duration of that period.

                     SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

    Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of 
readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop 
levels in Iraq of approximately 140,000 troops at their current 
operational tempo?
    Answer. Over the past few years, we have seen definitive 
indications that the force is strained. Stress on soldiers and units 
resulting from increased time deployed and decreased time at home are 
visible in several different areas including training, readiness, and 
recruitment. However, the Army has a plan that will, with congressional 
assistance, restore balance to our force. The Army has identified four 
imperatives that we must accomplish to place ourselves back into 
balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.
    We have and will continue to make significant progress in these 
areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will 
continue to recruit and retain enough soldiers to meet our end strength 
requirements. The Army also has received authorization to accelerate 
our growth plan to 2011, which will assist in restoring balance to 
preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic 
depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of 
forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels.
    While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment 
times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of 
global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels 
for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy 
only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers into combat 
to meet the national strategy.

        STATE OF TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

    Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and 
equipping of Iraqi security forces?
    Answer. Over two-thirds of Iraqi Army units are leading security 
operations throughout Iraq, and over half of the police units of the 
Ministry of Interior are capable of planning and executing 
counterinsurgency operations. However, numerous challenges remain in 
logistics and other enablers. The single most important area that still 
needs improvement relates to shortages in the officer and 
noncommissioned officer corps.
    Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces progress 
toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security?
    Answer. Iraqi security forces have made important progress, but are 
not yet ready to assume full responsibility throughout Iraq on their 
own. Over the past 16 months, an increasingly robust Iraqi-run training 
base enabled Iraqi security forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and 
police, and this still-expanding training base is expected to generate 
an additional 73,000 soldiers and police through the rest of 2008. 
Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their 
ability to execute their budgets. Despite these gains, however, recent 
operations have underscored the considerable work that remains to be 
done in the areas of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff 
development, and command and control.

                             BURDEN SHARING

    Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of 
the Iraqi Government to assume the cost of training, equipping, and 
operations for its security forces?
    Answer. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility, and also the 
increasing capability, to assume the training, equipping, and 
operations costs for the Iraqi security forces. In 2006 and 2007, 
Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United 
States provided through the Iraqi security forces fund. Iraq is 
expected to spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion 
next year. The trend of Iraq spending more for its own defense and the 
United States paying less will continue over time. However, it is 
important that this occur in a somewhat gradual manner rather than all 
at once to avoid major disruptions and delays in the development of 
more capable Iraqi security forces.
    Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of 
the Iraqi Government to share the cost of combined operations with 
Multi-National Force-Iraq forces and stability programs throughout 
Iraq?
    Answer. The Government of Iraq is responsible for sharing the cost 
of security operations and stability programs throughout Iraq, and it 
is increasingly doing so. As an encouraging example, the Iraqi 
Government recently allocated $300 million for the coalition forces to 
manage as Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds. This initiative 
has enabled coalition forces to execute projects for the Iraqi people 
while the Iraqi Government continues to build its own capacity to do 
so.

                            PERMANENT BASING

    Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation 
Acts for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek 
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
    Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the 
United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to 
exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree that it is important for the Government of 
Iraq to assume greater responsibility for paying the costs of 
reconstruction throughout Iraq, including paying for all large-scale 
infrastructure projects?
    Answer. Yes.

                            FORCE PROTECTION

    Question. The Baghdad security plan distributed American units with 
Iraqi units over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.
    What is the status of American forces' distribution to small local 
bases throughout Baghdad?
    Answer. Coalition forces have nearly completed the establishment of 
planned stations and outposts in Baghdad. 53 of 55 Joint Security 
Stations (JSS) and 22 Combat Outposts (COPs) are established.
    Question. If confirmed as Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, how 
would you ensure the protection of those forces and the forces which 
would have to resupply them on a daily basis?
    Answer. Force protection and sustainment of JSS and COPs is always 
a major concern. If confirmed, I will ensure constant assessments are 
made of our current force protection measures and constant adjustments 
are made to improve our operational, tactical, and technical measures 
of force protection; ensuring we do all possible for the protection of 
all U.S. and coalition forces.

                    AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

    Question. CENTCOM issued a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement 
(JUONS) in December of 2006, for a large number of additional aircraft 
with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. Since that JUONS 
was issued, even larger requirements for such intelligence platforms 
have been articulated by commanders in the theater. It appears that the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has been slow to respond to these 
requirements, although recently the Air Force has ``surged'' a large 
number of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM. However, 
this surge and other activities will not close the gap between 
available and required resources. The main problem appears to be that 
there are bottlenecks in fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled 
with a reluctance to seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-
record.
    Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired from the 
commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to 
CENTCOM's intelligence platform shortage?
    Answer. As we develop our requirements we normally do not focus on 
specific platforms. We try to identify the operational and strategic 
needs and define shortfalls in capability and capacity. Then we seek 
needed capabilities and practical solutions rather than specific 
platforms and technologies.
    Question. Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been 
adequately considered?
    Answer. Yes. I believe that MNF-I and CENTCOM, in coordination with 
the DOD Task Force on ISR, are considering all possible solutions to 
ISR shortfalls.

                 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES

    Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM) and the national intelligence agencies have 
developed effective equipment, tactics, and intelligence dissemination 
practices to target al Qaeda personnel and personnel from other related 
terrorist networks. The effectiveness of these tools and their utility 
for regular ground forces in battling militias and IED networks are now 
more widely recognized. As a result, some of these tools and 
capabilities are migrating to Army and Marine Corps ground forces.
    Do you believe that regular Army and Marine Corps ground forces can 
replicate the capabilities developed by Special Forces?
    Answer. Special Operations Forces and conventional Army and Marine 
Corps units do have some overlapping capabilities. However, they also 
have unique characteristics based on their missions. For example, 
conventional forces are specifically designed to be able to hold 
terrain--a task for which Special Operations Forces are ill-suited. 
Conversely, Special Operations Forces are organized, trained, and 
equipped to conduct foreign internal defense, strategic reconnaissance, 
and specific counterterrorism missions typically beyond the 
capabilities of conventional units. Both conventional and Special 
Operations Forces are needed as part of the comprehensive approach 
necessary to defeat organizations such as the al Qaeda network. One of 
the positive developments we have seen in Iraq is an increasing 
sophistication in the ability of our conventional forces to work 
closely with Special Operations Forces to synchronize efforts and 
achieve a greater effect. Conventional and Special Operation Force 
capabilities continue to mature; which has created substantially more 
cooperation and synergy and improved capacity.
    Question. Are MNF-I commanders now attempting to accomplish this?
    Answer. During my time as MNC-I Commander, one of our greatest 
successes was the synchronization and interaction of conventional and 
Special Operations Forces. Conventional force commanders in Iraq 
continually adapted to accomplish their missions in diverse and complex 
local environments. Some of the tasks that they undertook, such as 
partnering with local Iraqi security forces, resembled missions 
historically associated with Special Forces. However, these efforts 
complement rather than duplicate the work done by Special Operations 
Forces. Similarly, Special Operations Force commanders recognize that 
their missions must complement the efforts of conventional force 
commanders who are responsible for maintaining security in the areas in 
which Special Operations Forces conduct missions. Our gains in 
effectiveness have come not from merging the two different types of 
units, but from increasing the coordination and synchronization of 
their efforts.
    Question. Has DOD provided the resources to acquire the equipment 
and intelligence dissemination support to enable Army and Marine Corps 
ground forces to adopt or adapt these tactics, techniques, and 
procedures?
    Answer. A critical enabler for the success of coalition operations 
in Iraq, particularly as we have drawn back down from surge force 
levels, has been a robust intelligence, reconnaissance, and 
surveillance (ISR) posture. ISR assets have increased operational 
effectiveness and improved force protection capabilities. Platforms 
such as the armed Predator have also enabled precision targeting, which 
allows the elimination of threats, such as an enemy indirect fire team, 
while avoiding civilian casualties and damage to property. But this 
must be a continuous and dynamic process. The enemy will adapt and we 
must continue to adapt.

                       MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS

    Question. Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and 
operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams 
embedded with Iraqi security forces need to be changed in any way? If 
so, what would you recommend?
    Answer. The current military transition teams, composed of 10-15 
personnel, do not require any significant changes, as they have proven 
to be highly successful during major operations across the battlefield. 
A team's composition is the result of battlefield assessments, 
commander's recommendations, and feedback from teams themselves. 
Recently, the Iraq Assistance Group, in conjunction with the Multi-
National Division Commanders and division-level Transition Team chiefs, 
reviewed all transition team manning and requirements. This allowed 
Human Resources Command to modify the rank and specialty of selected 
positions within Transition Teams. This provided greater flexibility 
for the Army to assign team members who are qualified to coach, teach, 
and mentor Iraqi security forces.
    The Iraqi Army will continue to increase in size over the next year 
and a half; however, this does not generate a need to increase the 
number of external Transition Teams. As Coalition Forces move toward 
operational overwatch, fewer forces will be involved in direct 
conflict, allowing more focus on the training and preparation of Iraqi 
forces. Coalition Forces will gradually shift to operational overwatch 
as threat levels decrease, more ISF units achieve ORA level one status, 
and Iraq moves towards sustainable security.
    In the short-term, MNC-I remains focused on security and stability 
operations, using a combination of internal and external Transition 
Teams, in conjunction with aggressive coalition partnering, to maintain 
current gains and continue to build towards Iraqi security autonomy. 
MNF-I and MNC-I continue to assess the optimal size and role of 
transition teams and the adjustments required to the Coalition Brigade 
and Division force structure for the future. Teams will likely remain 
10-15 man elements. Coalition units will frequently augment teams based 
on operational need.
    The size, structure, and operating procedures of Police Transition 
Teams (PTTs) are sufficient. PTTs have a core element of 11-16 
individuals, though BCT commanders frequently augment the team based on 
their specific needs. The size of the PTTs allows partnering with 
Coalition units, which fosters continual improvement of the Iraqi 
Police Service.
    The total number of personnel serving on PTTs is not sufficient. 
Because of manning levels, coalition forces currently have 252 Police 
Transition Teams in the 9 Provinces that have not yet transferred to 
Provincial Iraqi Control. This is only 83 percent of the 305 total PTTs 
required to provide coverage to all Police districts and stations 
within those provinces.
    Question. What is your view of the potential transition of this 
mission to contractors?
    Answer. I support the DOD policy that prohibits contractors from 
serving in roles in which they are an integrated part of a combat force 
and from direct participation in offensive combat operations. In order 
to be effective in developing ISF capability, Transition Teams serve 
with Iraqi forces in day-to-day operations as advisors and trainers. 
This constant presence with ISF units provides a link to Coalition 
enablers and allows the ISF to learn by observing our fine officers and 
noncommissioned officers in action on the battlefield everyday. Some 
contracted personnel play a properly limited but valuable role in Iraq 
by serving as advisors to Transition Team leaders on issues such as 
military doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
    Question. What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine 
Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty, 
to include dissemination of ``lessons learned'' to incoming teams?
    Answer. Prior to serving as advisors to Iraqi security forces, Army 
and Marine Corps teams undergo extensive training regarding cultural 
awareness, advisor skills, ground maneuver tactics, individual and crew 
served weapons, foreign weapons, fire support, logistics, intelligence, 
and communications. Externally sourced Army teams attend training at 
Fort Riley, KS and then Camp Beuhring, Kuwait, while Marine teams train 
at Twentynine Palms, CA. Internally sourced Army teams conduct training 
at home station with their Brigade Combat Team and participate in 
training exercises to include Combat Training Center rotations and 
Mission Readiness Exercises. All teams, regardless of sourcing, attend 
training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq, before conducting a 10-
day transition with outgoing teams.
    The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), a directorate of MNC-I, Fort 
Riley, and Twentynine Palms, conduct quarterly training conferences to 
review all training programs. Also, if major changes in enemy tactics, 
techniques, and procedures occur, that information is immediately 
transmitted to Fort Riley for input into training plans for deploying 
teams. Sixty days into their deployment, teams conduct an initial 
review that is designed to provide direct feedback on the training they 
received and allow immediate adjustments to training at Fort Riley. IAG 
compiles and posts on its website lessons learned and best practices 
from over 200 teams in the field to allow easy access. These lessons 
learned are discussed during quarterly conferences to ensure the data 
is incorporated into future training and is easily accessible for all 
teams.
    The mission to train Transition Teams (TTs) is currently supported 
by over 25 major external agencies, including the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned, the Defense Language Institute, and the Joint Center 
for International Security Force Assistance. Additionally, the IAG runs 
two very effective programs, the alumni program and the Pre-Deployment 
Site Survey (PDSS) program. The alumni program sends current TT members 
back to Fort Riley during their mid-tour leave to discuss lessons 
learned and link up with incoming team members. The PDSS program brings 
every team leader undergoing training at Ft. Riley to Iraq to colocate 
and operate with the team they will replace for a 7-10 day period. They 
gain valuable insight into their area of operations and bring lessons 
learned back to their team's training program at Fort Riley.
    Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?
    Answer. I will support aggressive assessment and adjustment to 
Transition Team training and lessons learned proliferation. It is 
critical to continue to adjust and improve the critical component of 
our strategy.

                      DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

    Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating 
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and 
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions?
    Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 must be the 
standard for U.S. and Coalition Forces to adhere to in regards to the 
handling of detainees at all levels. How we treat detainees reflects 
upon us as a nation.
    Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment 
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD 
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
    Answer. Yes. The FM clearly articulates what is and what is not 
authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability 
while at all times ensuring humane treatment. Having one interrogation 
standard outlined in one document adds clarity.
    Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that 
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of 
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that 
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are 
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
    Answer. Yes. I agree that the way we treat detainees may affect how 
our captured U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated. 
We adhere to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a baseline 
for treatment, regardless of whether our enemies afford us that 
treatment.
    Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective 
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the 
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
    Answer. Yes. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, mandates compliance with 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Treating detainees in 
compliance with the Geneva Conventions is an integral part of 
counterinsurgency operations.

                     IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status 
of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to 
increase employment in Iraq?
    Answer. Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab 
States, with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide 
range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991-
2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to 
meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of 
goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories 
shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq 
revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the Task Force 
to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF BSO 
has assisted Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or materially 
increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded projects, 
which were specifically targeted to restart or increase production, 
range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement 
of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize 
SOEs have directly resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled 
or underemployed workers.
    In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to 
restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on 
agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern 
Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To 
ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of 
standard business investment management practices to the process of 
allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories. 
Coalition personnel also instruct factory managers in business plan 
preparation, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans.
    The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private 
investment awards to international consortiums--for three cement 
factories. Two of these deals, which average over $100 million each, 
were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the 
private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility 
and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating 
employment for 5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern, 
profitable business model for investors and for Iraq. In combination 
with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking, 
budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these 
are small but positive steps toward market economy development in Iraq.
    The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important 
support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this 
has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of 
economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist 
elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important first 
step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries. I would seek to 
encourage further development of these initiatives if confirmed.

                             IRAQI REFUGEES

    Question. The United Nations estimates that over 2 million Iraqis 
have been displaced, of which 1.8 million have fled to surrounding 
countries while some 500,000 have left their homes to find safer areas 
within Iraq.
    What is your assessment of the refugee problem in Iraq? Are more 
Iraqis returning home?
    Answer. Although refugee and displacement issues remain a serious 
concern, there are indicators that the situation has begun to improve. 
According to U.S. Agency for International Development reporting, the 
rate of displacement of Iraqi citizens has been slowing for at least 
the last 4 months. In addition, some Iraqis (primarily those from 
ethnically and religiously homogenous areas) are returning to their 
homes. These returns are motivated by a variety of factors, including: 
deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, increased 
restrictions in neighboring countries, tribal reconciliation, and 
reports of improved security in places of origin. It is encouraging 
that the Iraqi Government has begun to take a more proactive approach 
to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the drafting of a national 
policy on internally displaced persons and a Basic Law for the Ministry 
of Displacement and Migration.
    Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in 
Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in 
addressing this issue?
    Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraqi 
security forces should be the military's primary roles, the military 
can also play a limited role in addressing other concerns associated 
with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee return.
What the Military Can Do
        - Execute humanitarian assistance when asked to do so by the 
        Iraqi Government.
        - Liaise with USAID for humanitarian assistance coordination.
        - Track IDPs in the AOR in so far as they affect security 
        operations.
        - Utilize PRTs/ePRTs as requested to identify and relay IDP-
        related issues.
What the Military Cannot Do
        - Assist IA and ISF with forcibly removing squatters and IDPs.
        - Provide security for IDP camps of movements of IDPs.
        - Move or clear IDPs from government or private property.

    Question. What should the role of the U.S. military be, in your 
view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their 
homes occupied by others?
    Answer. In addition to the capabilities and limitations discussed 
above, the U.S. military can continue to assist with key leader 
engagement on this issue and to help develop the governmental capacity 
that will be necessary to handle refugee and IDP returns.

                       SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

    Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction 
(SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations 
which are valuable to Congress.
    If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to support the 
audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGR?
    Answer. The reports of the SIGIR provide valuable insights to the 
Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I 
supported the activities of the SIGIR as the MNC-I Commander and, if 
confirmed, I will support them as the commander of Multi-National 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

                  MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER

    Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made 
five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the 
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. 
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT V, found that 
stress and mental health problems increased with each subsequent month 
of deployment, and that ``soldiers on their third or fourth deployment 
were at significantly higher risk'' for mental health problems. These 
types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of 
troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post traumatic stress 
disorder, depression, and other mental health problems.
    What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous 
MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, 
and the effect of such actions?
    Answer. The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on 
what is transpiring with servicemembers' psychological health and 
valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V 
produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation 
to cross-train Army medics in behavioral health concepts, are already 
being implemented at the DA level; others, such as the recommendation 
to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat 
Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed, 
I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently 
actionable at the MNF-I level.
    Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure 
ongoing mental health assessments of U.S. forces in Iraq?
    Answer. I would strongly encourage and fully support future MHAT 
assessments if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) 
providing full access to information and staff input and feedback as 
appropriate.
    Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental 
health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?
    Answer. My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health 
professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments. We must continue 
to learn and study to ensure the welfare of our soldiers.
    Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting 
servicemembers and their families before servicemembers deploy; this 
includes tough training at home station that builds camaraderie in 
units and gives soldiers the confidence that they can accomplish their 
tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between 
deployments for troopers to `reset' with their families are also 
important.
    Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater. 
Medics in theater are already being trained on behavioral health topics 
so they can assist in identifying soldiers who need help, and Suicide 
Risk Management Teams have been created to ensure servicemen and women 
having difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most critically, 
commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of 
strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle 
buddies' mental health.
    Question. Do you believe that mental health resources in theater 
are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers?
    Answer. My understanding is that MNF-I is currently reassessing the 
adequacy of mental health resources in theater to ensure soldiers' 
needs are met. One possibility being considered is requesting 30 
additional behavioral health personnel in theater, including mental 
health professionals and behavioral health technicians.

                             SEXUAL ASSAULT

    Question. If confirmed as Commander, MNF-I, you will be responsible 
for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response 
to sexual assaults in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
    What lessons did you learn while implementing sexual assault 
training, reporting protocols, and command awareness while serving as 
Commander, MNC-I that can help improve any of these policies or their 
implementation in theater?
    Answer. The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command 
issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness 
campaign that reaches every servicemember and that provides integrated 
response services, including medical care/counseling, victim advocacy, 
chaplain, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.), legal 
(prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness liaison), reporting 
(assault reporting and data collection), and program assessment. I know 
that such a program must receive a commander's emphasis to be 
effective, and I would continue to seek to give it that emphasis if 
confirmed as the commander of MNF-I.
    Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be 
addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical 
treatment (including mental health care), and victim support are 
available in the operational environment of Iraq?
    Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq include 
combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, joint service and 
civilian population. With regard to the last of these challenges, 
civilians constitute approximately 50 percent of the force on the 
ground in Iraq and are critical contributors to mission success. The 
availability of response services for DOD civilian and contractor 
personnel should be similar to the services available to 
servicemembers. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and 
resource challenges associated with extending program response 
provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel which should be 
addressed.
    With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important 
to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in 
theater to remain cognizant of the welfare of their fellow 
servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs 
of difficulty to receive help.
    Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of sexual assault 
prevention and response resources currently available in the CENTCOM 
area of responsibility?
    Answer. Sexual assault is a serious crime that adversely impacts 
the physical and psychological readiness of our combat fighting force 
in Iraq. In my experience as the MNC-I Commander, I found the sexual 
assault and response program and resourcing to be robust. However, if 
confirmed as the MNF-I Commander, I would continue to assess our 
efforts in this area to ensure we continue meeting the needs of our 
deployed servicemembers and civilians. It is important for a commander 
to constantly monitor organizational climate and to foster the 
development of a culture that is intolerant of sexual assault.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, 
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, MNF-I?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                     INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

    1. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, each of you have 
noted in different places and times that the conflict in Iraq has 
evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the 
current threat is the intercommunal fight over power. What do you mean 
by the communal fight over power?
    General Odierno. In my opinion, the #1 threat to Iraq is the 
communal struggle for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-
Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) with malign outside influences 
(predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying to effect the 
outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other 
Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the 
greatest threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security 
forces (ISF) to increasingly take the lead against these challenges 
without creating significant risks to short and long-sustainable 
security.
    There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political, 
and diplomatic realms. Gains made in security will be easier to 
preserve in an environment in which people have ready access to 
essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local 
and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to move 
forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and 
the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be 
important milestones in this process. The Iraqi Government must not 
only be representative, but also must continue to grow in capability 
and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face challenges 
from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to 
surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures 
to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory. 
Iraq's Arab neighbors must do more to reach out and engage Iraq in a 
positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the 
establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek to partner with 
the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these 
diplomatic and political challenges.

    2. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, how has this changed 
the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
    General Odierno. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has 
been a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and 
resources. This has played out differently over time, with inter- and 
later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex 
mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional 
interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward 
it will continue to be a complex problem set. In May 2008, however, 
security incidents are now at the lowest level we have seen since March 
2004.

    3. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, what is the 
appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and 
conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for 
control?
    General Odierno. The role of coalition forces is to support the 
elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the 
legitimate use of arms. It is my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely 
begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, which must 
include influence from external entities and we seek to support them in 
that effort.
                                 ______
                                 
             Question Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                            CENTRAL COMMAND

    4. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Odierno, after frustrations 
experienced with a top-down strategy to reconciliation and security 
efforts, the policy shifted to more of a bottom-up approach, as 
evidenced by the success of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Anbar Province 
and elsewhere. Recently the Maliki Government has asserted its 
influence by lashing out against armed militia groups both in the south 
and around Baghdad, and it is the opinion of some that the ISF are 
steadily improving their capabilities. In your new position, would you 
be an advocate of shifting once again to a more top-down approach, 
rather than the current bottom-up approach to solving power struggle 
differences, and if so, when should such a shift take place?
    General Odierno. The current struggle in Iraq is complex, dynamic, 
and waged by ethno-sectarian groups, extremist elements, and criminal 
gangs from the local level to the national. Any strategy that the 
coalition would pursue in the context of this struggle must therefore 
include all elements of national power in order to be successful, with 
a particular emphasis applied to reconciliation and security efforts in 
support of political objectives. Key to future reconciliation and 
legitimacy of the government is the successful conduct of fair and 
transparent Provincial Election in late 2008. Military leaders at all 
levels will continue to coach, mentor, and dialogue with associated 
Iraqi counterparts in the ISFs and civilian sectors, in cooperation 
with civilian members of the interagency community. Civilian personnel, 
either working as member of Provincial Reconstruction Teams or as part 
of military organizations, are an integral part of this strategy. While 
greater progress has been realized at the local and provincial level, 
MNF-I and the American Embassy-Baghdad (AMEMB-Baghdad) have observed 
progress within ministerial agencies as well. For example, the Iraqi 
Council of Representatives passed key budget and provincial powers 
legislation in February 2008, and the Iraqi Government has pledged 
significant funding to advance reconstruction both nationwide, and to 
specifically target civil capacity for Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul. If 
confirmed, conditions on the ground after I assume my new position will 
dictate the most prudent approach; and this approach will be 
comprehensive in nature. It would be premature for me to advocate 
either a top down or bottom up approach uniformly throughout Iraq.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

                         LENGTH OF COMBAT TOURS

    5. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, what is your opinion 
of legislation dictating the length of combat tours for the Army, Army 
Reserve, and National Guard to 365 days, and 210 days for the Marine 
Corps and Marine Reserve?
    General Odierno. I believe that tours longer than 365 days for the 
Army and 210 days for the Marine Corps are difficult for soldiers, 
marines, and their families. We should, whenever possible, ensure tour 
lengths are not longer. However, flexibility is important in order to 
address emergency situations, and react quickly to problems around the 
world, and I do not believe this should be legislated.

    6. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, what effect does this 
have on a commander's ability to employ combat power?
    General Odierno. Under emergency conditions this could prevent 
changes to strategy or employment of additional forces as conditions on 
the ground dictate. I do not believe it would be prudent to limit the 
flexibility to react to operational and strategic changes on the 
ground.

    7. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, can you give me an 
example of how such legislation could have an adverse effect on 
operations?
    General Odierno. Had legislation as stated in question 5 been in 
place in 2007 we would not have been able to sustain the surge in order 
to set conditions to curtail the sectarian violence in Iraq, thus 
allowing the Iraq Government and ISFs to grow in capacity and 
capability while protecting and securing the people of Iraq. Once the 
brigades of the surge were employed we had the flexibility to extend 
the tours to 15 months verse 12 months, which allowed us to establish 
the conditions on the ground to deliberately and successfully sustain 
progress and then draw back down to pre-surge levels.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

                                TRAINING

    8. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, recently I was at 
an event in Maine and afterwards a constituent came up to me and said 
that he was a former Marine Corps officer and that it took the Marine 
Corps only 10 weeks to transform him from a Bates College graduate to a 
2nd Lieutenant. He asked me why it is taking so long for the Iraqis to 
become trained. It has now been over 3 years since the United States 
began its full effort to train Iraqi citizens for service in their 
military and police force. Why is it taking so long to get the Iraqis 
trained to be an effective, cohesive force?
    General Odierno. The strategic transition from a coalition-led 
counterinsurgency to an Iraqi-led counterinsurgency requires ISFs 
capable of assuming greater responsibility from coalition forces. No 
nation or coalition of nations has ever attempted to rebuild the entire 
security apparatus of a sovereign country, on as large a scale, in a 
shorter time, and in more difficult security conditions. Nonetheless, 
to understand why it takes so long to get the Iraqis trained to be an 
effective, cohesive force, one needs perspective on the magnitude of 
the problem. In calendar year 2007, the United States Army grew by 
approximately 11,600 soldiers, or 2.3 percent. The Iraqi Army grew by 
over 60,600 soldiers, or 61 percent--while at war and while the 
government and other institutions that support it were still forming. 
By comparison, the Iraqi-equivalent growth percentage of 61 percent 
applied to the United States Army in 2007 would result in our Army 
growing by over 310,000 soldiers in 1 year.
      
    
    
      
    Such growth would challenge the United States Army's mature 
institutional processes and force management systems in peacetime. The 
fact the Iraqis have rapidly grown their security forces while fighting 
a determined and ruthless enemy--and establishing nascent ministerial 
and institutional capacity to generate and replenish those forces--is 
even more remarkable. As evidenced in Basrah, Sadr City, and Mosul, the 
ISFs are making progress and demonstrating real capability. However, 
much work remains to be done, particularly in the area of providing the 
ISFs with key enabling capabilities such as aviation, intelligence, 
logistics, and command and control.

                         TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ

    9. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, I continue to be 
concerned about the negative effects of repeated and extended 
deployments to Iraq on our soldiers and marines. The surge in U.S. 
forces during the last year increased the Army's presence in Iraq to 20 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level of 15. The 
Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, has said, ``Today's 
Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to 
provide ready forces for other contingencies.'' When do you foresee the 
ISF will be ready to step up in significant numbers so that you will be 
able to reduce your force level requirements to fewer than 15 BCTs?
    General Odierno. The ISF is already stepping up in significant 
numbers and enabling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have 
recently made significant security progress in Iraq, as the level of 
security incidents for the past month is the lowest it has been for 
more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even as three 
BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left 
without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space 
and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by 
the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in 
coalition facilities by over 3,500 detainees, and a continuing decline 
will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the 
detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even as we 
have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the 
ISFs, as well as the Iraqi Government's determination in meeting 
security challenges throughout Iraq.
    Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size 
and capability. In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense 
and Interior have generated 51 new combat battalions, an increase of 
over 30 percent. This intensive effort to increase ISF numbers involved 
recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new police and soldiers. 
Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow even 
further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in 
numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq.
    As important as the ISF's growth in size is its growth in 
capability. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead 
in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well 
over 100--a 15-percent increase since January 2007. Ongoing ISF 
operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have 
demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical 
competence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major 
operations throughout the country. The enablers that coalition forces 
provide are in line with expectations and generally involve 
capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support 
capability). The performance of many units has been solid, and some 
formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely 
capable.
    Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the 
major conditions that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition 
forces in Iraq while sustaining our security gains. If confirmed I will 
evaluate the consolidation this summer, to see if conditions on the 
ground will be such that I will be able to make a recommendation for 
some further reductions. Beyond the initial decision on post-surge 
force levels, we will continually assess security conditions in Iraq 
and seek to identify further possible force withdrawals.

                          IRAQ SECURITY FORCES

    10. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, there are roughly 
90,000 mostly Sunni fighters that are now part of the so-called 
``awakening movements,'' or ``SOI,'' that are aligned with the United 
States and defending their home villages against both al Qaeda in Iraq 
and Shiite militias. This has been a very positive development in 
improving the security situation in Sunni parts of Iraq. The next step 
is to translate that success into true integration at the national 
level. According to the White House, the Government of Iraq and 
coalition forces have agreed that 20 to 30 percent of these forces will 
be incorporated into the ISF, and the rest will be found jobs in the 
public or private sector. Some reports, however, indicate the Maliki 
Government is resistant to further integration of these forces, fearing 
that because many are veterans of Saddam Hussein's army and Republican 
Guard, incorporating these fighters will result in a Sunni-led coup. Do 
you agree with this assessment?
    General Odierno. No, I think this is an inaccurate assessment. It 
is important that we work with the GOI to reduce illiteracy and develop 
job training programs to improve workers skills. Therefore we have 
increase vocational training targeted at the requirements for needed 
skills throughout Iraq. Many training programs do evolve into jobs for 
many of the students as some are immediately hired by contractors or 
public works projects that they trained on.
    Though the ``Awakening Movement'' did inspire the anti-al Qaeda 
movement, of which some elements have been formed into formal ``SOI'' 
programs, the two are not the same. It is an important distinction as 
we have the formal ``SOI'' who are working with the coalition forces 
and in full support of the Government of Iraq--some still on U.S. 
funded contracts and some either already transitioned to formal ISF 
jobs or some on their way to being formally integrated into the 
security apparatus. Then we have many other Sunni and Shia, as noted, 
who are not formally part of the ``SOI''--funded programs but still are 
aligned in support of the larger ``Awakening'' movements who support, 
in general, the Government of Iraq's interest in preventing foreign 
entities--via proxy groups--to engage in terrorism or other criminal 
actions inside of Iraq. This larger `anti foreign influence' movement--
which is the essence of the ``Awakening'' movement--has been emanating 
from all sects of Iraqi society. We're seeing both Sunni and, as of 
late, Shia elements express interest in joining forces with the 
Government of Iraq in some capacity to assist in taking control of the 
situation in Iraq's cities and provinces. So this new phase of the 
overall movement, which is cross-sectarian in composition, is now 
referred to in Iraq as ``Isnad''--or support--to denote the intention 
of the members of this movement to operate totally in support of the 
Government of Iraq to restore stability.
    Incorporating these ``SOI'' fighters into the ISFs will not lead to 
a Sunni-led coup.'' When we approved this program when I was the 
Commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq, there was a concern that some 
of these ``SOI,'' who had previously supported and/or participated in 
armed conflict against the then nascent Government of Iraq and 
coalition forces, might revert back to their prior insurgent identities 
and use their new-found influence with the Government of Iraq Security 
Forces to attempt some type of armed rebellion. This was a known and 
calculated risk taken by myself, General Petraeus and Ambassador 
Crocker when we first decided to pursue this endeavor. One of the key 
reasons we initially agreed to pursue the ``SOI'' was to fill a void as 
we eliminated former safe havens and sanctuaries. They assisted in 
forming neighborhood watch elements that would provide CF and ISF 
intelligence to help sustain our gains. We soon realized that many 
wanted to participate once again and be included in the future of Iraq. 
Some reasons for their state of exclusion were due to in part to 
sectarian bias and a certain level of corruption on the part of some 
Iraqi bureaucrats. Yet another reason for that was self-imposed on 
themselves by their voluntary boycott of the 2005 elections. Since 
then, the Sunni population writ large has come to see their decision to 
boycott the election--shaped largely by corrupt religious political 
parties and intimidation--was a mistake. The reconciliation process and 
the existence of the ``SOI'' program is an example of their change in 
mindset and they have continued to demonstrate their commitment to the 
Government of Iraq as an institution and to the rule of law. There is a 
highly scrutinized vetting process conducted by CF which includes the 
collection of biometrics and spans all ministries in the Government of 
Iraq before these ``SOI'' can be accepted into formal Iraqi Government 
positions. This vetting process was approved by Prime Minister Maliki's 
and one which has been described as slow, but prudent to ensure the 
integrity of the Iraqi Governmental services and of each member of the 
``SOI'' integrated into Government posts. Most recently, as you may 
know, an 11-member delegation of Iraqi tribal and governmental 
leaders--to include Sheikh Ahmad Albu Risha of the Anbar-based Sahawa 
al Iraq movement and political party--travelled to Washington recently 
on their second State Department-sponsored trip in 7 months. During 
their trip they held a number of meetings with senior U.S. officials to 
include audience with the President, the National Security Council, 
Senators and Congressmen. The delegation was comprised of both Sunni 
and Shia Iraqi leaders whom reaffirmed their support for improved Iraqi 
governance, rule of law, and a view toward creating an environment in 
Iraq focused on improved political participation. I believe these signs 
are encouraging; that the motives and intentions of the ``SOI'' and all 
those supporting these Sheikhs and Iraqi leaders who are leading the 
political outreach on behalf of their Iraqi constituencies will 
continue to pursue their political objectives via engagement with 
Government of Iraq leaders. With continued U.S. support both to the 
Government of Iraq, to the ``SOI'' program, and to the overall national 
reconciliation efforts which is ongoing, combined with the demonstrated 
goodwill on the part of the coalition, Government and Iraqi Awakening 
leaders, there is little evidence to suggest the movement--or those 
former disenfranchised elements of Iraqi society, will attempt to 
achieve its political objectives via the use of force.

    11. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, what happens to 
those Sunni fighters who are not integrated into the ISF, but cannot 
find jobs?
    General Odierno. Only 25 percent of the SOI want to be integrated 
into the ISF. Approximately 50 percent of the SOI do not want to be 
integrated into the ISF and another 25 percent cannot be integrated 
into the ISF because they are physically or mentally unqualified. 
Therefore, MNC/F in conjunction with the GOI target the SOI who do not 
make it into the ISF for integration into capacity building programs 
that provide the transitioning either vocational training in a 
discipline/skill of their choice or apprentice style, on-the-job 
training in various disciplines and skills (mostly construction 
oriented) that meet needs/shortages of the local area with the goal 
being that once the programs are complete that the local area will 
absorb some or all of the newly skilled and transitioned SOI into 
employment.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                    April 30, 2008.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment in the United States 
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance 
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                             To be General.

    LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the 
nomination was referred, follows:]
                 Resume of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
    Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
    United States Naval Command and Staff College
    United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
    United States Military Academy - BS - No Major.
    North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear 
Effects.
    United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and 
Strategy.

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Dates of
                                                          appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.................................................           2 Jun 76
1LT.................................................           2 Jun 78
CPT.................................................           1 Aug 80
MAJ.................................................           1 Dec 86
LTC.................................................           1 Feb 92
COL.................................................           1 Sep 95
BG..................................................           1 Jul 99
MG..................................................           1 Nov 02
LTG.................................................           1 Jan 05
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              From                        To              Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oct 76..........................  Jan 78............  Support Platoon
                                                       Leader, later
                                                       Firing Platoon
                                                       Leader, C
                                                       Battery, 1st
                                                       Battalion, 41st
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       56th Field
                                                       Artillery
                                                       Brigade, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jan 78..........................  Aug 78............  Survey Officer,
                                                       1st Battalion,
                                                       41st Field
                                                       Artillery, 56th
                                                       Field Artillery
                                                       Brigade, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Aug 78..........................  Oct 79............  Aide-de-Camp to
                                                       the Commanding
                                                       General, 56th
                                                       Field Artillery
                                                       Brigade, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Nov 79..........................  Jul 80............  Student, Field
                                                       Artillery
                                                       Advanced Course,
                                                       Fort Sill, OK
Aug 80..........................  Dec 80............  Liaison Officer,
                                                       1st Battalion,
                                                       73d Field
                                                       Artillery, XVIII
                                                       Airborne Corps,
                                                       Fort Bragg, NC
Dec 80..........................  Dec 82............  Commander, Service
                                                       Battery, later A
                                                       Battery, 1st
                                                       Battalion, 73d
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       XVIII Airborne
                                                       Corps, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC
Dec 82..........................  May 83............  Assistant S-3
                                                       (Operations), 1st
                                                       Battalion, 73d
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       XVIII Airborne
                                                       Corps, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC
Jun 83..........................  May 84............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       3d Battalion, 8th
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       XVIII Airborne
                                                       Corps, Fort
                                                       Bragg, NC
Jun 84..........................  Aug 86............  Student, North
                                                       Carolina State
                                                       University,
                                                       Raleigh, NC
Sep 86..........................  Jun 89............  Nuclear Research
                                                       Officer, later
                                                       Chief,
                                                       Acquisition
                                                       Support Division,
                                                       Defense Nuclear
                                                       Agency,
                                                       Alexandria, VA,
                                                       later detailed as
                                                       Military Advisor
                                                       for Anns Control,
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Secretary of
                                                       Defense,
                                                       Washington, DC
Jun 89..........................  Jun 90............  Student, United
                                                       States Naval
                                                       Command and Staff
                                                       Course, Newport,
                                                       RI
Jul 90..........................  Dec 90............  Executive Officer,
                                                       2d Battalion, 3d
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       3d Armored
                                                       Division, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Dec 90..........................  Jun 91............  Executive Officer,
                                                       Division
                                                       Artillery, 3d
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany and
                                                       Operations Desert
                                                       Shield/Storm,
                                                       Saudi Arabia
Jun 91..........................  May 92............  Executive Officer,
                                                       42d Field
                                                       Artillery
                                                       Brigade, V Corps,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jun 92..........................  Jun 94............  Commander, 2d
                                                       Battalion, 8th
                                                       Field Artillery,
                                                       7th Infantry
                                                       Division (Light),
                                                       Fort Ord, CA
                                                       (relocated to
                                                       Fort Lewis, WA)
Jun 94..........................  Jun 95............  Student, United
                                                       States Army War
                                                       College, Carlisle
                                                       Barracks, PA
Jun 95..........................  Jun 97............  Commander,
                                                       Division
                                                       Artillery, 1st
                                                       Cavalry Division,
                                                       Fort Hood, TX
Jun 97..........................  Aug 98............  Chief of Staff, V
                                                       Corps, United
                                                       States Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Aug 98..........................  Jul 99............  Assistant Division
                                                       Commander
                                                       (Support), 1st
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       United States
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany to
                                                       include duty as
                                                       Deputy Commanding
                                                       General for
                                                       Ground
                                                       Operations, Task
                                                       Force Hawk,
                                                       Operation Allied
                                                       Force, Albania
Jul 99..........................  Jul 01............  Director, Force
                                                       Management,
                                                       Office of the
                                                       Deputy Chief of
                                                       Staff for
                                                       Operations and
                                                       Plans, United
                                                       States Army,
                                                       Washington, DC
Oct 01..........................  Aug 04............  Commanding
                                                       General, 4th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Hood, TX and
                                                       Operation Iraqi
                                                       Freedom, Iraq
Aug 04..........................  Oct 04............  Special Assistant
                                                       to Vice Chief of
                                                       Staff, United
                                                       States Army,
                                                       Washington, DC
Oct 04..........................  May 06............  Assistant to the
                                                       Chairman of the
                                                       Joint Chiefs of
                                                       Staff, Office of
                                                       the Joint Chiefs
                                                       of Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
May 06..........................  Dec 06............  Commanding
                                                       General, III
                                                       Corps and Fort
                                                       Hood, Fort Hood,
                                                       TX
Dec 06..........................  Feb 08............  Commander, Multi-
                                                       National Corps-
                                                       Iraq, Operation
                                                       Iraqi Freedom,
                                                       Iraq/Commanding
                                                       General, III
                                                       Corps
Feb 08..........................  Present...........  Commanding
                                                       General, III
                                                       Corps and Fort
                                                       Hood, Fort Hood,
                                                       TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary of joint assignments

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Dates               Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Research Officer, later   Sep 86-Jun 89.....  Captain/Major
 Chief, Acquisition Support
 Division, Defense Nuclear
 Agency, Alexandria, VA, later
 detailed as Military Advisor
 for Arms Control, Office of the
 Secretary of Defense,
 Washington, DC.
Assistant to the Chairman of the  Oct 04-May 06.....  Lieutenant General
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office
 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 Washington, DC.
Commander, Multi-National Corps-  Dec 06-Feb 08.....  Lieutenant General
 Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
 Iraq/Commanding General, III
 Corps.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


U.S. decorations and badges:
    Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Distinguished Service Medal
    Defense Superior Service Medal
    Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Bronze Star Medal
    Defense Meritorious Service Medal
    Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Army Commendation Medal
    Army Achievement Medal
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
    Army Staff Identification Badge
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Raymond T. 
Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Raymond T. Odierno.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.

    3. Date of nomination:
    April 30, 2008.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    8 September 1954; Dover, NJ.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name is Burkarth).

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Anthony, 29; Kathrin, 27; Michael, 21.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary 
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local 
governments, other than those listed int eh service record extract 
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business 
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    American Legion (Member)
    Association of the United States Army (Member)
    4th Infantry Division Association (Member)
    8th Field Artillery Regimental Affiliation (Member)
    9th Infantry Regiment Association (Member)
    1st Cavalry Division Association (Member)

    11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 
service or achievements other than those lited on the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, 
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly 
constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes, I do.

    13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly 
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes, I do.

                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                Raymond T. Odierno.
    This 30th day of April, 2008.

    [The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was 
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with 
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The 
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.]


            TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 
Ben Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, 
Thune, Martinez, and Wicker.
    Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and 
Breon N. Wells, receptionist.
    Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken, 
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. 
Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff 
member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, 
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional 
staff member.
    Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, 
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional 
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. 
Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority 
counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Diana G. 
Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority 
counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
    Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha.
    Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney, 
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to 
Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; 
Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill 
Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben 
Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M. 
Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, 
assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to 
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants 
to Senator Sessions; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; 
Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant 
to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant to Senator Thune; 
Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. 
Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the 
committee to consider a list of 142 pending military 
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the 
committee the required length of time.
    Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations?
    Senator Warner. I so move.
    Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
    Senator Lieberman. Second.
    Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
    Opposed, nays. [No response.]
    The ayes have it. The motion carries.
    Thank you. [Pause.]
    Let me correct the record. I read 142 pending nominations. 
The correct number is 144 pending nominations, and if there's 
no objection, that will be the action of the committee. I think 
everybody who voted here before is still here.
    Senator Warner. Without objection.
    Chairman Levin. Without objection, we will correct the 
record in that way.
 Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee 
 which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on May 22, 2008.
    1. RADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN to be Vice Admiral and Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks, N6, Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1286).
    2. In the Navy Reserve there are three appointments to the grade of 
rear admiral (list begins with Julius S. Caesar) (Reference No. 1343).
    3. LTG Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, to be Lieutenant General and 
Director, Joint Staff (Reference No. 1352).
    4. RADM William H. McRaven, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, 
Joint Special Operations Command/Commander, Joint Special Operations 
Command Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command (Reference No. 1354).
    5. RADM Michael C. Vitale, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, 
Navy Installations Command (Reference No. 1355).
    6. RADM(lh) Raymond E. Berube, USN, to be Rear Admiral (Reference 
No. 1432).
    7. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear 
Admiral (list begins with Richard R. Jeffries) (Reference No. 1433).
    8. In the Air Force, there are five appointments to the grade of 
Colonel (list begins with Lonnie B. Barker) (Reference No. 1465).
    9. Col. Kimberly A. Siniscalchi, USAF, to be Major General 
(Reference No. 1485).
    10. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear 
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with David F. Baucom) (Reference No. 
1518).
    11. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear 
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with David C. Johnson) (Reference No. 
1519).
    12. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear 
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with Donald E. Gaddis) (Reference No. 
1520.)
    13. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear 
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with Michael H. Anderson) (Reference 
No. 1521).
    14. Capt. Norman R. Hayes, USN, to be Rear Admiral (lower half) 
(Reference No. 1522).
    15. Capt. William E. Leigher, USN, to be Rear Admiral (lower half) 
(Reference No. 1524).
    16. MG Mark D. Shackelford, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and 
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition (Reference No. 1565).
    17. BG John F. Mulholland, Jr., USA, to be Lieutenant General and 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Reference No. 
1567).
    18. MG Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and 
Commander, Third Air Forces in Europe (Reference No. 1590).
    19. MG Charles E. Stenner, Jr., USAFR, to be Lieutenant General and 
Chief of Air Force Reserve (Reference No. 1600).
    20. RADM William E. Gortney, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, 
U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, Fifth Fleet 
(Reference No. 1601).
    21. VADM Melvin G. Williams, Jr., USN, to be Vice Admiral and 
Commander, Second Fleet (Reference No. 1602).
    22. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major 
(Cheryl Amyx) (Reference No. 1603).
    23. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major 
(Deborah K. Sirratt) (Reference No. 1604).
    24. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of Major 
(list begins with Mark A. Cannon) (Reference No. 1605).
    25. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of 
Lieutenant Colonel (list begins with Gene Kahn) (Reference No. 1606).
    26. In the Army, there are seven appointments to the grade of 
Lieutenant Colonel and below (list begins with Lozay Foots III) 
(Reference No. 1607).
    27. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of 
Lieutenant Colonel and below (list begins with Phillip J. Caravella) 
(Reference No. 1608).
    28. RADM David J. Dorsett, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Director of 
Naval Intelligence, N2, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Reference No. 1612).
    29. In the Navy, there are 21 appointments to the grade of 
Commander and below (list begins with Stanley A. Okoro) (Reference No. 
1613).
    30. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the 
grade of Colonel (list begins with Eric L. Bloomfield) (Reference No. 
1615).
    31. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
Colonel (Jimmy D. Swanson) (Reference No. 1616).
    32. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of 
Colonel (Ronald J. Sheldon) (Reference No. 1617).
    33. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of 
Lieutenant Commander (Robert S. McMaster) (Reference No. 1618).
    34. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of 
Lieutenant Commander (Christopher S. Kaplafka) (Reference No. 1619).
    35. In the Army Reserve, there are 26 appointments to the grade of 
Major General and below (first name is Stephen E. Bogle) (Reference No. 
1639).
    36. LTG Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, to be General and Vice Chief of 
Staff, U.S. Army (Reference No. 1642).
    37. RADM(lh) Kevin M. McCoy, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, 
Naval Sea Systems Command (Reference No. 1657).
    38. VADM William D. Crowder, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1658).
    39. RADM Peter H. Daly, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Deputy 
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (Reference No. 1659).
    40. In the Army, there are 11 appointments to the grade of Major 
(list begins with Brian M. Boldt) (Reference No. 1663).
    41. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of 
Major (list begins with Mary J. Bernheim) (Reference No. 1670).
    42. In the Air Force, there are eight appointments to the grade of 
Colonel and below (list begins with James E. Ostrander) (Reference No. 
1671).
    43. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major 
(James K. McNeely) (Reference No. 1672).
    44. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of 
Lieutenant Commander (David R. Eggleston) (Reference No. 1673).
    45. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain 
and below (list begins with Katherine A. Isgrig) (Reference No. 1674).
    46. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain 
and below (list begins with Robert D. Younger) (Reference No. 1675).
    Total: 144.

    [Whereupon, at 10:36 a.m., the committee adjourned.]


 NOMINATIONS OF HON. NELSON M. FORD TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY; 
   JOSEPH A. BENKERT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL 
  SECURITY AFFAIRS; SEAN J. STACKLEY TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; AND FREDERICK S. CELEC 
 TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL 
                    AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2008

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room 
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Warner, Thune, 
and Martinez.
    Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 
and hearings clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, 
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; 
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, 
professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; 
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, 
professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, 
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff 
member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, 
professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff 
member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard 
F. Walsh, minority counsel.
    Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Benjamin L. 
Rubin.
    Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple, 
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to 
Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; 
Peg Gustafson, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Samuel Zega, 
assistant to Senator Warner; Mark J. Winter, assistant to 
Senator Collins; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; 
David Brown, John L. Goetchius, and Brian W. Walsh, assistants 
to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to 
Senator Wicker.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
    Today, the committee considers the nominations of Nelson 
Ford to be Under Secretary of the Army, Joseph Benkert to be 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, 
Fred Celec to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Sean 
Stackley to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition.
    We welcome our nominees and their families to today's 
hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of 
Defense (DOD) officials put in every day. We appreciate the 
sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve their 
country. We also know that they will not be alone in making 
those sacrifices. So, we thank in advance the family members of 
our nominees for the support and the assistance that all those 
family members will be needing to provide, and I know will be 
willingly providing.
    Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to 
make important contributions to our national defense.
    If confirmed, Mr. Ford will take over as Under Secretary of 
the Army at a time when our soldiers and equipment are worn out 
and our Army families are stressed by extended and repeated 
deployments. The next Under Secretary has a critical role to 
play in restoring the readiness of the force and ensuring that 
our Army has the strategic depth needed to face the challenges 
of the decade ahead. In addition, section 904 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 gives the Under 
Secretary a new role as the Chief Management Officer of the 
Army. Now, what that means is that the next Under Secretary 
will also be expected to play a leading role in addressing 
longstanding deficiencies in the Army's business systems and 
management practices.
    If confirmed, Mr. Benkert will be the first person to serve 
in the new position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Global Security Affairs. In that capacity, he will be 
responsible for coalition affairs, technology security policy, 
security cooperation, counternarcotics, counterproliferation, 
and countering global threats, detainee affairs, and prisoner 
of war/missing-in-action issues. Any one of those issues--
detainee affairs, for example--would appear to be a full-time 
job. Mr. Benkert is currently serving as Acting Assistant 
Secretary, and we look forward to his assessment of the 
responsibilities of the new position and how he intends to 
carry them out.
    The position to which Mr. Celec has been nominated, the 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical 
and Biological Defense Programs, has been vacant for 2 years. 
This longstanding vacancy was cited by General Larry Welch, in 
his report on Nuclear Weapons Security, as emblematic of the 
inattention of DOD to nuclear security and command-and-control. 
This neglect, as reported earlier this month by Admiral 
Kirkland Donald, has resulted in inattention to detail, lack of 
discipline, and a degradation of authority, technical 
competence, and standards of excellence in the handling of our 
nuclear weapons. We look forward to Mr. Celec's thoughts on how 
to address these problems, along with the other important 
issues in his portfolio, which will include chemical-weapons 
destruction and chemical and biological defense programs.
    Finally, Mr. Stackley, if confirmed, will take over as the 
senior acquisition executive with the Department of the Navy at 
a time when the major defense acquisition programs of the DOD 
are overrunning their budgets by an aggregate total of $295 
billion. Less than a year ago, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reported that the Navy had experienced a 
cumulative cost growth of almost $5 billion on just 41 ships. 
According to the GAO, the Navy pushed programs forward, 
``without a stable design and without realistic cost estimates, 
resulting in higher costs, schedule delays, and quality 
programs.'' If anyone is prepared to answer these problems, it 
should be Mr. Stackley, who has served our committee as the 
principal Republican staffer responsible for overseeing Navy 
and Marine Corps programs for more than 2 years. The Senate 
Armed Services Committee has benefited tremendously from the 
knowledge and the experience that Mr. Stackley brings to bear 
on Navy and Marine Corps programs and on acquisition programs 
generally. Should he be confirmed, our loss will be the Navy's 
gain.
    These are extremely important positions. They merit the 
attention that we will be giving them today.
    Senator Warner.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

    Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'll ask to place my statement in the record.
    You've covered, very accurately and carefully, the 
distinguished biological records of each of these nominees.
    I am so pleased to see that they're joined by a number of 
members of their family this morning. Even though they have 
served in DOD for some period of time, I have always thought 
that, at this hearing, I would tell the families that their 
respective spouses should be home by 8 o'clock, as every 
decision made in the Pentagon after 8 o'clock is usually 
changed the next day. Having spent many years in that building 
myself, I tell you, I look back on it as probably one of the 
most exciting and challenging chapters of my life.
    I thank you for the service to, not only the men and women 
in uniform, but directly and indirectly to their families. 
Today's military is very much of a family affair, and we should 
ever be mindful of their needs and their concerns, especially 
when their loved ones are sent on missions abroad.
    I will have to leave here shortly, which I rarely do, but, 
in this case, it's an important meeting for me. I join my 
colleague from Virginia, Senator Jim Webb, and we're discussing 
the new GI Bill, which, optimistically, will be passed by the 
United States Senate this afternoon and on its way with the 
House bill to the President for signature.
    I was--I say, with great sense of humility--the recipient 
of two GI Bills in my career, for different reasons, and 
wouldn't be sitting in this chair today had it not been for 
what our Nation did for me and millions of others as they came 
back from their period in uniform to regain a place in the 
civilian community and trying to acquire the education to do 
their jobs. You'll hopefully forgive me for that.
    But, I wish each of you well. Again, I look back on my 
period there as one of the most exciting in my life. I often 
tell the story--there was an old fellow there--this is 1969--
who wore a green eyeshade, and he actually came there with Jim 
Forrestal when he was in the comptroller's office. We all liked 
him. He used to wander around the hall and kibbitz with us 
about the ``good old days,'' as he said in those days. He said, 
``You know, you'd better always remember, you have a front row 
seat on the greatest and most important show on Earth.'' That, 
you have, because it is the men and women in uniform, and their 
families, that are the guardians of the freedoms we have today. 
I know each of you, in your respective responsibilities, will 
ensure that they can do that as best they can.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

    Thank you, Senator Levin.
    I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families. I have 
been advised that all of them claim the Commonwealth of Virginia as 
their home State, and are looking to me to vouch for their 
qualifications. I am prepared to do that, Mr. Chairman.
    Each of these nominees has served, or is currently serving, with 
distinction in the Department of Defense (DOD). We are fortunate that 
they are willing to assume the duties of these vitally important 
positions at such a challenging time.
    Mr. Ford, you have worked your way up since 2002 from the position 
of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Financial Management and Comptroller in 2005, and, since December 2007, 
as Acting Under Secretary of the Army. Secretary Geren has given you 
his highest recommendation, which counts greatly in your favor.
    The Army's senior leaders have stated that the Army is stressed and 
out of balance, but not broken. I hope you will be able to provide us 
today with current information about how the Army is ensuring that its 
combat units are fully trained, manned, and ready for their missions, 
and that Army families are receiving the support they need and deserve.
    Mr. Celec, you are returning to the office you previously served in 
as the Deputy Assistant for Nuclear Matters from 1996 through 2003. 
With your experience there, and for 21 years before that in the Air 
Force, I anticipate you will be greatly relied on in the Department's 
further responses to the report of Admiral Donald and in working with 
Dr. Schlesinger's task force in identifying the Department's nuclear 
weapons policies and safeguards.
    Mr. Benkert and Mr. Stackley you have similar backgrounds--both 
distinguished graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy and both having many 
accomplishments as Navy career officers.
    Mr. Benkert, if you are confirmed, you will be the first Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs with a complex 
portfolio of responsibilities, including building international, 
interagency, and partner capabilities, overseeing DOD policies for 
coalition and multinational operations, counternarcotics and 
counterproliferation policies, and detainee affairs--among others. You 
have been working in this arena for several years, and you are clearly 
well qualified.
    We look forward to hearing your assessment of the challenges we 
face in this area and your views on what our strategy and policy toward 
them should be.
    Mr. Stackley, it is always a pleasure to see members of the 
committee's professional staff selected for nomination to positions of 
great responsibility in the Department. You joined the committee in 
2005 and, in the great tradition of this committee, have worked closely 
with Creighton Greene, Peter Levine, and other counterparts in a 
collegial and bipartisan way in order to ensure appropriate oversight, 
support, and when necessary, scrutiny of the Department's programs. I 
thank you and your family for the excellent service you have given us.

    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
    Let me now ask the standard questions of each of our 
nominees.
    Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest? [All four witnesses answered 
in the affirmative.]
    Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the 
confirmation process? [All four witnesses answered in the 
negative.]
    Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies 
with deadlines established for requested communications, 
including questions for the record in hearings? [All four 
witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
    Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 
and briefers in response to congressional requests? [All four 
witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
    Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from 
reprisal for their testimony or briefings? [All four witnesses 
answered in the affirmative.]
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 
testify, upon request, before this committee? [All four 
witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, 
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a 
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, 
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any 
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? [All 
four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
    Chairman Levin. We thank you.
    As I call upon each of you for your opening statement, we'd 
be delighted if you would introduce any members of your family 
that might be with you.
    Secretary Ford?

STATEMENT OF HON. NELSON M. FORD, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE 
                              ARMY

    Mr. Ford. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members 
of the committee, it is both an honor and a privilege to be 
here this morning as the President's nominee for the Under 
Secretary of the Army. I want to thank Secretary Gates and 
Secretary Geren for their confidence in me, and for the Army's 
staff in their help in preparing for this hearing.
    I'd like to introduce my wife, Cecilia, who's behind me. 
She has been my partner and my number-one supporter during our 
many years together. She recently retired after 35 years as a 
Federal attorney, mostly with the Department of Health and 
Human Services. Her service continues as a strong supporter of 
our two sons on Active Duty. Aidan, our oldest, is a doctor in 
the Air Force, and Alex, who will graduate next month from Army 
Special Forces training, spent a year in Afghanistan with the 
82nd Airborne. Their service is a great inspiration to me.
    I expect that my daughter, Mary, who is a senior at the 
University of Virginia and interested in medicine and public 
health, will follow them into public service, but I haven't had 
any luck, so far, convincing her to join the Navy. [Laughter.]
    The soldiers of our Army are a precious gift to the Nation. 
I am in awe of the soldiers' commitment and the sacrifice of 
Army families who demonstrate their resilience in communities 
across the Nation and around the world. It has been humbling to 
help lead such a tremendous organization over the past 3 years, 
and I look forward to continuing my contribution as the Under 
Secretary of the Army.
    In this era of persistent conflict, during the 6th year of 
deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is stretching to 
meet our assigned tasks. We are balancing the requirements of 
today's deployments with needed investments in new capabilities 
to ensure our future security.
    Our soldiers and our Nation are counting on us to provide 
the direction and resources needed for the Army to succeed in 
its mission.
    Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be working on the challenges 
facing the Army today. If confirmed, I will work diligently to 
serve the Nation and the Army to the best of my ability.
    Finally, I would like to thank the committee for all it has 
done for the men and women, the soldiers and families of our 
Army. Your generous support and unwavering commitment to the 
Army's needs has been instrumental to our success. If 
confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staff in 
the months ahead. I believe that partnership and collaboration 
will be crucial to keeping the Army strong.
    I am happy to take your questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Secretary Ford.
    Mr. Benkert?

 STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. BENKERT, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
              DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

    Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you today for this confirmation hearing. It is a great 
privilege and an honor to appear before you as the President's 
nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Global Security Affairs and, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the 
first nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 
Security Affairs.
    I'd like to thank the President for nominating me for this 
position, and Secretary Gates for his confidence and support. 
I'd also like to thank the committee for what you've done, and 
continue to do, to support our Armed Forces, and, in 
particular, the men and women of our Armed Forces.
    Finally, I'd like to thank my family for their support as I 
pursue continued public service. With me this morning, seated 
behind me--are my wife, Gail--we've been married for 26 years 
through a career in the Navy, as well as public service 
following that--her mother, Jean Deveure, and my son, Stephen.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this 
committee, the United States Senate, and your colleagues in the 
House of Representatives, to advance the security of the United 
States.
    The issues within the purview of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Global Security Affairs can only be addressed by 
working closely together with Congress. I hope, if confirmed, 
to be able to work constructively with the committee to meet 
the many challenges facing us.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Benkert.
    Mr. Stackley?

STATEMENT OF SEAN J. STACKLEY, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 
        NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION

    Mr. Stackley. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of 
the committee, thank you for your time and for the efforts of 
the committee in preparing this hearing today. I'm greatly 
honored that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Secretary of the Navy have put forth my nomination, providing 
this opportunity to appear before you today.
    I would like to take a moment to introduce my wife and 
three of my four children who are joining me here today. My 
wife, Terry, has been keeping me out of trouble for the past 28 
years. My oldest daughter, Erin, joins me--she currently works 
for Congressman ``Bob'' Goodlatte in the House of 
Representatives; my son, Scott, and daughter, Maura.
    It has been my utmost privilege to serve the Senate Armed 
Services Committee these past few years. During this time, I've 
had the opportunity to work with, and learn from, the 
distinguished members of the committee, as well as my 
dedicated, very professional staff colleagues. If confirmed, I 
look forward to working closely with this committee in helping 
to resolve the challenges before the acquisition community in 
the Department of the Navy.
    Before coming to the committee, I had the privilege of 
fulfilling a career in the Navy. When I consider the prospects 
of departing the committee to return to the Department, I'm 
equally humbled by, and focused on, this next opportunity to 
serve our sailors and marines, to provide them with the ships 
and aircraft, the systems and equipment that they require to 
train and deploy, to succeed in their missions, and to return 
home safely.
    If confirmed, I will work, with the best of my ability, to 
fulfill my duties and execute responsible leadership for 
research, development, and acquisition matters in the 
Department of the Navy.
    Again, I thank you for your time and look forward to 
answering your questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Celec?

    STATEMENT OF FREDERICK S. CELEC, TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE 
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
                        DEFENSE PROGRAMS

    Mr. Celec. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Levin, Senator Warner, and members of the 
committee, I am honored to be here today, and appreciate your 
personal time at this critical point in your legislative 
calendar. I also wish to thank the President for having 
sufficient faith in me to nominate me for this important 
position.
    I have a few remarks, but, before I make them, I'd like to 
introduce my family--my wife of 47 years, Irene, who's behind 
me here; my daughter, Christine Gold, and her husband, 
Jonathan; their children and two of my four grandchildren, Adam 
and Hannah; and my son, Ken.
    Senators, if I am confirmed, I am already aware of several 
critical issues that I will have to address, simply from 
following the national news. I'm sure there are others that I'm 
not aware of that need resolving.
    Perhaps the most urgent is restoring the culture for 
nuclear safety and security in the Air Force. That culture was 
very much a part of the Air Force I served in for 21 years, and 
I will work hard to ensure its restoration.
    Another is supporting the congressionally mandated 
commission on our strategic posture, with the expectation that 
they will make recommendations that will help obtain bipartisan 
support for the future of our nuclear enterprise.
    Yet another is ensuring, to the best of our ability, that 
we destroy our chemical munitions as rapidly as possible and 
attempt to meet the treaty-mandated 2012 date for completion.
    Finally, there are issues surrounding the way ahead for the 
entire nuclear enterprise as systems continue to age, and many 
are approaching their end of useful service life.
    If confirmed, I will work to get each of these issues on 
track toward resolution. But, I recognize that I will need the 
support and encouragement from both the administration and 
Congress in order to be successful. If confirmed, I expect to 
work closely with you and your staffs as we seek to resolve 
these difficult, but strategically important, issues of 
national security.
    This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, sir. I will 
be happy to answer any questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Again, thanks to all of your family, whether they're here 
or whether they're unable to be here.
    Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I put my questions into 
the record and, thus, let them reply to them that way?
    Again, forgive me. We're going to announce the GI Bill, 
which is going to help the very men and women, after they leave 
the service, that you're working with.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. The questions 
will be asked, for the record, and our witnesses will be asked 
to promptly answer the questions of Senator Warner or other 
Senators who may not be here; some cases, those of us who are 
able to be here.
    Secretary Ford, let me start with you. The Army has three 
major modernization initiatives that are going to shape the 
force over the next several years, and perhaps over the next 
several generations. Those are growing the Army's end strength, 
restructuring units to the modular design, and transformation 
to the Future Combat System (FCS). All three have very 
expensive investment implications for the Army's current and 
future budget. However, it's uncertain that the Army will be 
able to afford all three modernization initiatives at the same 
time. Could you give us your thoughts on that, as to the 
affordability of these initiatives within the current and 
projected Army budgets?
    Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We believe that we do have enough financial wherewithal to 
complete all three initiatives. Of course, the FCS program will 
not reach its full acquisition until after the end of the 
upcoming budget cycle, and so, the out-year fiscal guidance for 
that system hasn't yet been given. But, over the next 6 years, 
out through fiscal year 2015, we think that we're able to 
afford all three programs, in balance, to keep the Army a 
balanced force, going forward. Our budget planning will reflect 
that when it's submitted to Congress.
    Chairman Levin. Now, ongoing operations supporting the 
global war on terror put a huge amount of wear and tear on Army 
equipment throughout the force. So, now there's going to be a 
real challenge to reset the force, not only as current 
operations continue, but for as many as 3 to 5 years after they 
conclude. Could you give us your view, Secretary Ford, as to 
whether the Army's current equipment reset program meets the 
requirements of the global war on terror as well as the 
requirements for changing to a modular force?
    Mr. Ford. The plans that we've had over the last several 
years to reset the Army have been largely based on supplemental 
funding, and it's been our position that we will require 
substantial supplemental funding, on the order of $15 to $17 
billion a year, for several years after the deployments 
diminish. Of course, we need that amount of money every year, 
with the deployments at the current rate, so it's about a $17-
billion-a-year investment that's required to sustain the wear 
and tear on the equipment, based on current deployment levels.
    We think that those are appropriate expenses to be included 
in the supplemental, and we look forward to working with 
Congress to help Congress understand why those are valuable and 
important expenses to be appropriated.
    Chairman Levin. Is it your understanding that our repair 
depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild-and-
repair requirements for the reset?
    Mr. Ford. Our depots are running at full capacity, but not 
at maximum capacity. If there was more money, we could run 
three shifts, or two long shifts each day, 6 days a week, with 
downtime on the weekends for equipment maintenance. But, they 
are running at very full capacity, and they are running 
commensurate with the amount of funds that we have available to 
support them. The labor hours are up almost 100 percent over 
the predeployment period.
    Chairman Levin. Would you give us, for the record, what 
maximum capacity could produce and what its cost would be?
    Mr. Ford. We can certainly do that, yes, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The Army's maintenance depots have surged to more than double their 
output since 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF). They have done this by increasing their 
workforce (both contract and Federal employees), working multiple 
shifts and increased overtime, and becoming more efficient (through 
numerous efficiencies derived from Lean Six Sigma and other management 
initiatives). We can surge still further if Army requirements so 
dictate--around half of our fiscal year 2008 execution level of 27 
million direct labor hours, or a little over 40 million direct labor 
hours total--with our current physical infrastructure. To do so, we 
would require ample time to hire and train additional personnel (6 to 9 
months), and to obtain long lead repair parts to support increased 
production (up to 18 months for some systems such as the Bradley and M1 
Abrams).
    We currently have personnel plans and long lead items in the supply 
pipeline to continue production at planned levels through fiscal year 
2009. As OIF/OEF requirements change beyond fiscal year 2009, our 
personnel resourcing and long lead item planning will adjust 
accordingly. Because our depots are Army Working Capital Fund 
industrial organizations, they are self-sustaining through the rates 
they charge to customers. Thus, there is no ``cost'' to surge other 
than the additional cost of the funded reset programs themselves. The 
cost of additional funded reset programs would vary depending upon the 
systems being reset--for example, additional Bradley Fighting Vehicle 
Systems workload would cost much more than additional small arms 
workload.

    Chairman Levin. By the way, we'll have a 10-minute round 
here for the first round, if that's all right. Does that work 
for you, Senator Martinez?
    Secretary Ford, the Army's practice of using supplemental 
appropriations to fund parts of its annual modernization or 
routine maintenance costs obscures the real growth in the Army 
base budget. That's because of supplemental appropriations. We 
may, in fact, be losing sight of what a trained and ready Army 
will realistically cost on an annual basis after the operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan draw down.
    Secretary Ford, give us your views on how supplemental 
appropriations have been used over the years, and its potential 
impact, if any, on our ability to estimate the annual baseline 
costs of a trained and ready Army.
    Mr. Ford. Senator Levin, we are very mindful of the effect 
of supplementals on the training and reset requirements in the 
Army, and we track very carefully what activities have been 
transferred from the base program to the supplemental. They're 
mostly in the areas of equipment reset and in training costs, 
where the training costs specific to the deployments that we're 
entering into have been transferred to the supplemental at the 
direction of the Department. But, we are monitoring that very 
carefully, and we understand that as the deployments draw down, 
we're going to have a challenge in transferring this activity 
back to the base. We are doing that planning now. We 
understand. We're building a base budget that's based on fiscal 
guidance at historic rates, not at substantially-greater-than-
historic rates, and we are paying very careful attention to 
that issue.
    Chairman Levin. Secretary Ford, if confirmed as Under 
Secretary, you'll also become the Chief Management Officer of 
the Army, with responsibility for improving the Army's outdated 
business systems and processes. One of the keys to successful 
business transformation is a sound business enterprise 
architecture and transition plan to guide investment decisions.
    Last month GAO reported that the Army has fully satisfied 
only 1 of 31 core elements of a sound business enterprise 
architecture. Moreover, the GAO reported that the Army has 
``experienced a 29-percent decrease in those core elements that 
it had partially satisfied a year ago.'' In other words, not 
only has the Army not made any discernible progress towards an 
enterprise architecture, it is actually going backward.
    What steps would you take to reverse this trend and ensure 
that the Army has a sound foundation for business 
transformation?
    Mr. Ford. Senator Levin, we've been working very 
diligently, since I joined the Department 3 years ago, on 
improving our business systems. We have three major efforts 
ongoing. We have the General Fund Accounting System, that's in 
development, that will give us a good realtime view of the 
financial transactions of the Department, not only the income 
statement, but the balance sheet. It's in test now, and it's 
scheduled to go to full, live operation in the next couple of 
years. We are using our logistics system, and we are marrying 
that with our financial system, so that we will be able to 
track both our equipment and its financial aspects at the same 
time. We are leading the Department's effort in implementing 
the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, which 
is the new payroll/personnel system for DOD, and we're doing a 
test of that late this year, with full implementation scheduled 
for next year.
    I've spent a significant part of my career working on 
information systems and information systems implementations. 
They are complicated, difficult to do, particularly in an 
enterprise the size of the Army, with $150 billion worth of 
base activity and a million people. But, we are working at it--
we work at it every day--with great seriousness of purpose.
    Chairman Levin. Would you agree that the Army business 
transformation has not been well served by the existing 
stovepipe organization and that the Department needs a single 
office responsible for managing the effort to reform business 
systems and processes?
    Mr. Ford. I would agree with that conclusion. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator Martinez.
    Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
    Chairman Levin. Good morning.
    Senator Martinez. I wanted to begin by thanking all of you 
for your willingness to serve, and, again, to add my word of 
congratulations and thanks to your families, as well.
    I particularly wanted to single out Mr. Stackley, who I've 
had the privilege of working with in the Seapower Subcommittee. 
We are, again, very proud of your career as a naval officer, 
and, particularly, we appreciate your service to the United 
States Senate. As was mentioned earlier, the Navy's gain is 
certainly our loss, and we will miss you greatly, but we wish 
you the very best and are proud of what you have done and what 
you will continue to do.
    On that vein, I wanted to just follow through and ask Mr. 
Stackley a couple of questions along the lines of the things 
that we've been working on having to do with the Navy and our 
shared concern about low rates of production that have been 
experienced lately, and how that relates also to an industrial 
base that will suffer if we don't resolve these issues. I 
wonder if you might address that for us.
    Mr. Stackley. Thank you, Senator Martinez, and thank you 
for the kind words.
    Let me start in addressing that important question by going 
back to the Navy shipbuilding plan itself. If you look back, a 
couple of years ago, the Navy shipbuilding plan, in fact, was 
changing annually. So, each year, a new 30-year shipbuilding 
plan would emerge which would have a different forecast for the 
numbers and types of ships to support the Navy's requirements, 
as well as the industrial base.
    When Admiral Mullen took over as Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), he recognized that this churn in planning for 
shipbuilding was harming both the Navy's ability to meet its 
requirements, as well as the industrial base's ability to 
facilitize, to equip their workforce, to efficiently meet the 
Navy's requirements. Therefore, he chartered a group that took 
a look at the long-term requirements, and included in the plan 
the Navy's commitment to stabilize that plan.
    I think the committee is well aware of what's referred to 
as the 313-ship Navy. Incorporated in this plan is an attempt 
to, one, provide stability, and, two, to procure the ships at a 
rate that balances the Navy's requirements, the Navy's 
resources, and the industrial base's needs to be able to 
stabilize around that plan.
    It continues to be a challenge. The rates at which we've 
been procuring ships over the past 10 to 15 years has been 
about six, seven, eight per year. Taking a metric, where you 
take the number of ships per year that you procure, versus the 
number of shipyards that you have, it's been just about one 
ship per year per shipyard.
    The future plan looks at increasing that rate, to get up to 
a 313-ship Navy, as well as to improve upon the base for the 
shipyards. The challenge remains to accomplish that affordably 
within the resources that are available to the Navy.
    Senator Martinez. Do you think that we have a realistic 
plan that can get us to that 313-ship Navy? Do we have a 
realistic approach to getting that done?
    Mr. Stackley. Let me answer that question in terms of 
historical and then future projections.
    Historically, over the last 10 to 15 years, the Navy's 
investment in shipbuilding has averaged $10 to $12 billion per 
year. When you look out to the end of the Future Years Defense 
Plan (FYDP) and beyond, the investment that's required to meet 
the 313-ship plan is on the order of $18 to $20 billion per 
year. Right there, you have a 50-percent increase in the 
investment required to meet the plan.
    That challenge is significant, and that investment is going 
to be required at the same time that other bills are coming to 
the Department. Would I call it realistic? I think it requires 
significant effort, between now and the end of the FYDP, to 
retire the risk associated with both cost projections and the 
inherent challenges associated with ship construction.
    Senator Martinez. Finally, let me ask you, in the area of 
concerns that we share--the DDG-1000 and its future--what do we 
need to do to get that program back on track, as well as the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program?
    Mr. Stackley. Let me start with the DDG-1000. The DDG-1000 
program represents a significant investment in research and 
development in establishing requirements for the capability 
that the ship brings to the fleet. Up to this point in time, 
the Navy has done a credible job, a thorough job, of 
establishing the requirements, identifying the risks, and 
putting together a development plan to retire those risks 
through a series of engineering development models for the top-
10 technology risks for the program.
    The two lead ships--authorized and appropriated in the 2007 
budget--were awarded design and construction contracts earlier 
this year. By all measures, they are currently on track, at 
this very nascent stage of design and construction, there 
appears to be a robust plan in place to manage the risk, but 
the fact remains that the capabilities that are brought to that 
platform are, in fact, leading-edge, and the investment in 
those 10 engineering development models still has in front of 
it the integration of those technologies on the platform.
    I believe that, at this stage, proper planning has gone 
into the lead ships. We are at the front end of execution and 
need to maintain discipline in managing the risk to the 
program, discipline in managing design and requirements so we 
don't introduce disruption. We need to provide the oversight 
required, not just in the shipyard, but in the systems 
development arena, to ensure that the risk management plan 
holds true to its intentions.
    The LCS program is at a similar stage, but arrived here at 
a much different path. As opposed to the DDG-1000 program, 
which had a lengthy development period, the LCS program placed 
an emphasis on accelerating design and construction to deliver 
a capability that is needed in the fleet today. Risk was 
assumed in the design and construction phase. Risk was not 
retired through the development phase. As a result, you had a 
lot of parallel development/design/construction taking place; 
and, as soon as disruption was introduced into the program, 
through design change, snowballing effect took place and costs 
grew significantly.
    Today, the first two lead ships--one is getting ready for 
trials; the second ship, in the water, 6 to 9 months behind the 
first ship. At this stage, we have to push these ships to 
completion of their tests and trials. We have to clean up the 
design on those ships to enable a more orderly construction 
process for follow-on ships. There's much left to be learned on 
the programs. The third, fourth, and fifth ships have been 
solicited. Those bids are in the hands of the Navy. They're 
evaluating those proposals. There's an understanding of the 
cost cap that was introduced by Congress. I think, at this 
stage, we complete the evaluation of the proposals and complete 
the design, test, and trials for those ships. The CNO has been 
emphatic--the past three CNOs have been emphatic--that this is 
an important requirement. They are wrestling with the cost 
growth to ensure that we continue to meet the requirement. But, 
there's much information to be learned in completing these 
first ships before building the path for the follow-on ships.
    Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Benkert, I want to just ask you if you might have any 
comment on the proliferation issue as it relates to the 
announcement this morning on North Korea that the President 
made--obviously, the concern was their potential involvement in 
Syria and what was discovered there just a few weeks ago, and 
whether you feel that this announcement today is significant, 
in terms of ameliorating or decreasing the threat to the world, 
of proliferation from North Korea.
    Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
    I would just note, first of all, that our Department, and 
this job to which I've been nominated, in particular, have been 
very much in a mode, here, of supporting the lead, when it 
comes to North Korea, of the Secretary of State and Ambassador 
Christopher Hill. We are full participants in this process, 
and, in particular, in evaluating how one would go about 
verifying North Korean declarations. I think, as this process 
has continued, the prospect, obviously, is for a significant 
reduction in the proliferation threat as we go forward. But, 
again, within the scope of my competence here, I am in the 
business of helping to support this process as it moves forward 
and to help ensure that we can verify what is declared in the 
process.
    Senator Martinez. Thank you. My time's expired. Thank you 
all very much. I congratulate all of you on your future 
assignments, and look forward to working with you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
    Secretary Ford, I'm concerned that the Army is still not 
investing enough in developing next-generation technologies to 
reduce the Army's fuel-related costs and logistics burdens. The 
Army is not moving aggressively, still, to develop and adopt 
advanced energy technologies and systems, including vehicles, 
that could increase performance, enhance military capabilities, 
and reduce costs to the taxpayer, and reduce the use of fossil 
fuel. If confirmed, what proposals would you make to put the 
Army on a more aggressive path in developing and adopting 
advanced energy technologies?
    Mr. Ford. Thank you, Senator Levin.
    Just this past week, Secretary Geren asked to have a 
meeting on this issue, and we addressed several ideas.
    First, the majority of our spending on fuel is for 
nontactical vehicles and for energy on our posts, camps, and 
stations. The first efforts, and the efforts where we think we 
can have some almost immediate impact, are moving to 
acquisition of hybrid vehicles for the nontactical vehicles on 
posts, camps, and stations, and looking for pilot ways to look 
at solar power, wind power, energy conservation in the 
buildings here in the United States.
    FCS is based on the theory that the common platform will be 
a hybrid vehicle, I believe, diesel/electric vehicle. So, we 
are investing in the technology for the tactical vehicles to 
reduce our fuel consumption.
    Our current tactical vehicles consume great amounts of 
fuel, and we understand that the logistic tail required to get 
that fuel to the tactical vehicles is a real problem. We are 
looking at it both in the tactical and nontactical areas.
    Chairman Levin. We have some laws on the books that require 
the military to look at alternative fuel systems for the 
nontactical vehicles. Instead of doing what we said that the 
Army and the other Services should do throughout the years, 
there usually is a waiver signed that is simply waiving it, 
because the comparable cost isn't there. Are you going to take 
a different kind of a view of the need to do this now?
    Mr. Ford. I'm not aware of any waivers that have been 
signed in the past. It wasn't under my purview, I don't 
believe. But, in the future, with gas at north of $4 a gallon, 
the economics of energy, particularly with regard to 
nontactical vehicles, has clearly changed, and we will look at 
that very carefully. But, our plan is to almost immediately 
take advantage of General Services Administration's offering of 
significant numbers of hybrid vehicles.
    Chairman Levin. I hope you would not just look at the 
current economies, but also the future. The problem is that 
when gas was cheap, they always said, ``Well, it doesn't pay.'' 
It would have paid. We could have kept gas cheap if we had 
taken the pressure off buying more and more oil. I understand 
what you're saying about the current cost of gas making it 
easier to justify economically, but I think we have to take a 
longer view. Even if a miracle happened and gas prices came 
down, the same truth would be there. We'll count on you to take 
a look at that.
    We also would invite you to come out and take a look at the 
ways in which the Army is working on dual-use technologies, 
including vehicle designs and batteries, but also how that can 
be increased, that dual-use approach. Would you be willing to 
come out and take a look at that?
    Mr. Ford. Very interested in doing that, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Secretary Ford, in the aftermath of the problems with 
outpatient care in facilities at Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center, the Army established Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) to 
which all injured or ill soldiers were assigned. The exclusive 
mission of these units is to heal. While we certainly commend 
the Army for the work done thus far to help improve the quality 
of care and case management of these wounded warriors, high 
operational tempo and recent redeployments of large combat 
units have increased the size of many of these transition 
units, to the point where case manager staffing no longer meets 
the ratios of case managers to wounded warriors which were 
established by the Army. Additionally, we've heard that the 
Army expects that these WTUs will grow by as much as 900 
soldiers per month for the foreseeable future.
    The most alarming case that we've heard about is at Fort 
Hood, where the number of nurse case managers to soldiers is 
far beyond the Army's established ratio. Are you familiar with 
that situation at Fort Hood?
    Mr. Ford. I am.
    Chairman Levin. Can you tell us what is being done to help 
increase the number of case managers to support the wounded-
warrior population?
    Mr. Ford. At the beginning of this year, we expanded the 
definition of who would be included in WTUs. In January, we had 
a caseload of about 5,000; our current caseload is almost 
13,000. So, in a 6-month, almost 7-month period, it's more than 
doubled.
    We believe, at this point, that we have identified almost 
everybody that is going to be included in the WTUs. The key, at 
this point, is to make sure that we are providing the right 
services to each of those folks, as they are needed. Some of 
those folks have never deployed--actually, 40 percent have 
never deployed. Anyone who is in a medical limited-duty status 
has been, kind of, wrapped under the WTU label. What we need to 
do now is to figure out which of our soldiers need simply to be 
monitored, that they're making their medical appointments, and 
which need the serious physical rehabilitation, mental-health 
services required so that they can heal and either get back to 
their unit or move on with the rest of their lives.
    We are looking at this very carefully. The chief of staff 
intends to deliver new guidance, I think, in the next couple of 
days on this issue. Brigadier General Gary Cheek has just taken 
over as the head of the WTU. He's a very able leader and 
really, I think, has his hands around the administrative--or 
the management problems that currently have been created by 
this explosive growth.
    We don't think that there will be much more growth from 
current levels. So, really, at this point, it's about figuring 
out how to take care of the wounded warriors in the best 
possible way.
    Chairman Levin. It's your continuing goal, as I know it is 
ours, that all wounded and injured soldiers will be assigned to 
WTU?
    Mr. Ford. Oh, yes. They'll be assigned to WTUs.
    Chairman Levin. Congress authorized, last year at the 
request of the Department, an increase to the maximum monthly 
amount of hardship duty pay from $750 to $1,500. The Army's 
proposing to use this authority to institute an umbrella pay 
program, called Warrior Pay, that will reward servicemembers 
for lengthy or repeated deployments to certain high-risk areas. 
Will any servicemember, at the end of the day, receive, under 
your approach, less money under the Warrior Pay Program than 
they are now, under the various special and incentive pays?
    Mr. Ford. I am not familiar with the details of that 
program sufficiently so that I could assure you that there is 
no situation in which someone would get paid less. But, clearly 
the intention is that pay for warriors who are deployed in 
theater would be greater than it is today. That is our 
intention.
    Chairman Levin. Can you double check with people who are 
familiar with the details, so that you can give us the 
assurance that there won't be any reduction as a result of this 
new program?
    Mr. Ford. We'll be happy to look into it further.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    No soldier will receive less money under the Warrior Pay concept 
than they receive with special and incentive pays authorized today. The 
Army intends to continue paying soldiers the current incentives until 
Warrior Pay is implemented. No soldier will be adversely affected by 
the implementation of this new program. At this time, soldiers are not 
rewarded for frequent and lengthy tours in a fair and equitable manner. 
Some soldiers who are in units that have been involuntarily extended in 
theater by the Secretary of Defense are receiving $1,000 per month 
Assignment Incentive Pay for 1 to 3 months. Under the Warrior Pay 
concept, soldiers would be eligible for the pay once they have served 
greater than 365 days in a combat zone--or $2,400 in additional 
compensation for the second tour in a combat zone. The proposed pay 
structure would then increase the monthly amount paid for each 
additional 365 days deployed. We believe Warrior Pay will provide a 
more equitable and predictable system to compensate for deployments. 
All components would receive the same amount of pay for deploying.

    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Mr. Benkert, you made reference, now, to the announcement 
this morning about North Korea, and I have a number of 
questions on that, but I also want to just announce--staff can 
carry this back to the Senators--that we are going to be having 
a hearing on this announcement today. We'll have a hearing 
sometime in July, before this committee, going into the issues 
in detail. But, I just want to ask you a few questions this 
morning.
    Do you know what the plan is for the plutonium that has 
been produced in North Korea? What commitment has been made or 
insisted upon by us?
    Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I don't know.
    Chairman Levin. Okay.
    Mr. Celec, would you know, by any chance?
    Mr. Celec. No, sir, I do not.
    Chairman Levin. All right.
    Do you know what role, Mr. Benkert, the Defense 
Department's going to play in assisting the disablement and 
dismantlement of the nuclear program?
    Mr. Benkert. The role the Defense Department is going to 
play obviously is constrained, at this point, by the Glenn 
Amendment. The Department has been supportive of the lead that 
State Department has had. I think that the Department will be 
involved in the verification, and the Department will be 
involved, as is necessary, in other aspects. But, we have not 
been asked, at this point, to support the dismantlement.
    Chairman Levin. Do you know what information, if any, was 
provided by North Korea, relative to its alleged enriched 
uranium program?
    Mr. Benkert. Sir, I do not.
    Chairman Levin. All right.
    Mr. Celec, would you know?
    Mr. Celec. No, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Okay.
    Mr. Celec, just on this subject, let me move to you--do you 
have any understanding that's different from what we heard from 
Mr. Benkert about the actions that DOD may undertake to 
implement the disablement or the dismantlement of North Korean 
nuclear program?
    Mr. Celec. Historically, the Department has provided the 
logistics necessary to move things for the Department of Energy 
and the Department of State. I would assume that that's the 
role that they will continue to provide in this operation.
    Chairman Levin. The President said this morning, ``a moment 
of opportunity for North Korea. If North Korea continues to 
make the right choices, it can repair its relationship with the 
international community. If North Korea makes the wrong 
choices, the United States and our partners in the Six-Party 
Talks will respond accordingly. If they do not fully disclose 
and end their plutonium, their enrichment, and their 
proliferation efforts and activities, there will be further 
consequences.''
    Do you know what the President was referring to, Mr. 
Benkert?
    Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I don't know.
    Chairman Levin. Do you know, Mr. Celec?
    Mr. Celec. No, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Okay.
    Mr. Benkert, you stated, in your responses to the advance 
policy questions, that there's a need for better coordination 
between DOD's counternarcotics program and the security 
assistance program. One area where DOD will encounter, could 
encounter, a duplication of efforts is in the West Africa 
region, where the counternarcotics program has requested 
expanded authorities, and where DOD has utilized, extensively, 
it's section 1206 authorities.
    But, on the same issue of coordination, earlier this month 
I sent a letter to Secretary Gates regarding the $75 million in 
funding for the Pakistan Frontier Corps, requesting that it be 
made conditional on the inclusion in any peace deals that are 
struck between the Government of Pakistan and the tribal 
militants of a commitment to stop cross-border incursions into 
Afghanistan and a strong mechanism to enforce that commitment.
    It's my understanding that, in addition to that funding, 
DOD also planned to expend approximately $54 million in funding 
from the counternarcotics program in fiscal year 2008. In your 
view, what should be the status of that $54 million? Should 
that funding be conditioned--indeed, should the $75 million in 
funding that I previously referred to be conditioned--on a 
peace agreement between the Government of Pakistan and the 
tribal leaders, including a commitment to stop cross-border 
incursions with strong enforcement mechanisms?
    Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, I would just note that the $54 million that 
you had mentioned in counternarcotics funding was very closely 
coordinated with the plans for the $75 million so as to avoid 
duplication of effort and also to stay in the proper lanes.
    I would also note that one of the intents--among the intent 
of the counternarcotics program is to assist in creating border 
surveillance centers--initially on the Afghan side of the 
border, but potentially also on the Pakistan side, later on. In 
addition to our personnel, these border surveillance centers 
would be staffed with Afghan and Pakistan personnel, as well, 
precisely to assist in being able to monitor what may be going 
back and forth across the border.
    So, from that point of view, I do not think that it would 
be necessary--or wise--to make the funding contingent on some 
sort of an agreement with the Pakistanis, since, in part, the 
purpose of this funding is to assist in stopping the cross-
border operations.
    Chairman Levin. The problem is that there's some evidence 
that Pakistan doesn't care about those cross-border operations, 
and could easily be supporting militants crossing into 
Afghanistan between those posts that you talk about. Unless we 
have an understanding from the tribal leaders that they're 
going to put an end to this and that they're going to give us 
some metrics that we can measure putting that to an end, we 
would potentially be spending $75 million of taxpayer dollars 
to support a Pakistan Frontier Corps, which is the opposite 
goal that we have. That's the concern that I've raised with 
Secretary Gates. The mere presence of some posts along the 
border--I don't know how many you're talking about--doesn't 
solve the problem, unless there's an intent, on the Pakistan 
side, to put an end to the militants crossing the border into 
Afghanistan, where they're attacking our troops.
    Do you have any opinion, then, about the importance of 
getting the commitment of those tribal leaders? Our military 
people and our diplomats have said it's critically important 
that we get those commitments as part of any peace agreements. 
I'm just wondering what your view is on it.
    Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think the concern that you 
have expressed is known, and there is an understanding of this 
concern. This issue--it's on the Secretary's agenda, as well as 
the Chairman's and the senior military leaders, including the 
Commander of International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan. I think I would defer to them on the answer of 
whether some additional restrictions might be necessary based 
on their discussions with their Pakistani counterparts.
    Chairman Levin. All right. Since I've stated publicly that 
we sent this letter to Secretary Gates, I'll state publicly 
that we are anxiously awaiting a response to that letter.
    I understand that you, as Assistant Secretary for Global 
Secretary Affairs, would be overseeing the Office of Detainee 
Affairs. Is that correct?
    Mr. Benkert. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. The office that formulates defense policies 
in support of strategic defense affairs objectives, including 
that office. I visited one of those detention operations at 
Camp Cropper, in Baghdad, when I was there in March. It was a 
very impressive operation, with standards which I consider to 
be really important standards, with a new reintegration effort 
being made for the detainees, with programs that included 
family visits, religious discussion, literacy, and vocational 
training. Are you familiar with that approach?
    Mr. Benkert. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Do you support it?
    Mr. Benkert. Very much so. I think one of the very positive 
developments in detention operations in Iraq over the past year 
or so, under the leadership of Major General Doug Stone, who 
was the commander of the Detainee Task Force, was a shift in 
focus from simply holding detainees off the battlefield, to a 
focus on what he called counterinsurgency within the wire, 
which is to ensure the fact that they had been put into a 
detainee facility did not make jihadis or insurgents out of 
individuals who were not radical to start with, and then to 
provide a way to reintegrate them into society when they left. 
I think the track record has been very good. The intent now, 
obviously, is to try to apply what we've learned in this 
process elsewhere, such as Afghanistan.
    Chairman Levin. Is it your intent that the lessons learned 
from these positive operations would be incorporated into DOD 
doctrine and procedures and training?
    Mr. Benkert. Absolutely. We need to capture these lessons 
learned.
    Chairman Levin. As a Nation, we have a long way to go to 
cleanse the stain of Abu Ghraib, and this is an important part 
of that shift of the perception of us in our dealing and 
handling of detainees.
    Al Qaeda has a safe haven in Pakistan. What can we do to 
try to eliminate that safe haven, more than what we're already 
doing?
    Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, again, within the competence of 
the position to which I've been nominated, I would note that 
the Office of Global Security Affairs is in the position of 
looking at the tools that are available to carry out the intent 
that is determined by the Secretary and the military 
commanders. I think that, again, at the level that we support 
these operations, we are fortunate to have a set of tools 
available to us, that you have given us, that allow us to put 
together a package that addresses the issue of the safe haven.
    I would also note that there are issues here, in the world 
of counterterrorism, that I would not be able to talk about in 
this hearing, but I think the principle point is that we have 
the ability to put together the necessary set of support 
mechanisms that would assist the Pakistani military in dealing 
with this. We also have measures that are available to our 
forces, as well.
    Chairman Levin. Mr. Benkert, we face a huge number of 
global security challenges. In order to address many of them, 
we're going to need a sustained cooperation, internationally, 
and that includes cooperation with Russia; Iran just being one 
example, but one of the bigger ones. We have a number of 
successful areas of cooperation with Russia, but we also have 
some significant strains in the relationship. Can you give us 
your assessment as to the future of cooperation with Russia on 
a number of international security challenges? Can we improve 
that security cooperation with Russia?
    Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think we can. I appreciate the 
fact that you've noted that we have examples of successful 
cooperative programs, as well as strains, in the relationship. 
I think it's unfortunate that attention is sometimes only paid 
to the strains. I think some of those are well known; for 
example, in the area of missile defense.
    Let me just note several areas where I think we have very 
productive relationships with Russia that continue and on which 
we want to expand.
    First, I think, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Program, the Nunn-Lugar program, I think, is a real example of 
a program of solid cooperation with Russia that has continued 
over many years, despite whatever ups and downs in the overall 
relationship may take place. I think it's a very strong 
program. We continue to have very good working relationships 
with the Russian counterparts in this program.
    Second, there have been some joint initiatives that the 
U.S. and Russia have undertaken. I would note the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an initiative that 
Presidents Bush and Putin announced a couple of years ago, is a 
program under which any nation that ascribes to the principles 
of the Global Initiative can become a member, and we're now up 
over 70 members. In the space of the time that this program has 
existed, it has helped to generate a greater focus on combating 
nuclear terrorism and an opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to 
work together to promote best practices, exercises focused on 
dealing with this matter, and so forth, in the international 
community.
    I think that those opportunities have continued, despite 
the challenges in other aspects of the relationship.
    Chairman Levin. I want to go back to North Korea just for a 
moment, Mr. Benkert. In your written response to the advance 
policy questions, you made reference to a letter that I 
received from Secretary Gates, responding to my question as to 
when operations in North Korea would resume to recover the 
remains of unaccounted-for American servicemen. The letter that 
you referred to says that operations will resume at an 
``appropriate time.'' Is it not now appropriate, given this 
breakthrough that's been announced by the President today, to 
resume these operations and to press the North Koreans for us 
to be allowed to look for those remains?
    Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think we have been--and I say 
``we,'' it's not just the Department, but in consultation with 
other agencies of the Government as well. We have been looking 
at the circumstances and the progress within the Six-Party 
Talks and the activities related to that; and, I think, now 
with this announcement we will go back and, again, in 
consultation with our partners in the interagency, look at the 
impact of this and when might be the appropriate time.
    Chairman Levin. There's a lot of interest in this, and I 
just hope that it won't just be inquiring ``When?'' but asking, 
``Hey, isn't it time now to get this high up on this agenda?''
    Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think we are very attuned to 
the desires of the families for a full accounting of those who 
are missing in North Korea. We talk to the families--and I 
personally do, as well--and their representatives frequently. 
I'm very much aware of the desire and the need to get this 
process started again at an appropriate time.
    Chairman Levin. Mr. Stackley, we have a situation, which 
you're very personally familiar with, that the F/A-18 and the 
AV-8B aircraft are continuing to age. There could be, now, a 
shortfall of 125 strike fighter aircraft in the next decade, 
according to the Navy prediction, which would increase the 
concern about the schedule for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 
In response to the pre-hearing questions, you indicated that 
one of the options available to the Navy would be ``extending 
procurement of the F/A-18 aircraft.'' Some have asserted that 
the JSF program is threatened by continuing procurement of 
legacy aircraft. I'm wondering if you can give us your view as 
to whether the continued procurement of those legacy aircraft 
to address near-term inventory shortfalls will threaten the JSF 
program.
    Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
    First, the timeframe in which we're discussing, the F/A-18 
procurement proceeds out through 2011--correction, aircraft 
delivers from the current multiyear procurement for the F/A-18 
goes out through 2011, and then there are an additional 3 
years, outside of the multiyear procurement, 2012 through 2014 
where the program winds down. That program, today, is in--call 
it ``hot production,'' stable, delivering at economic rates.
    JSF is at the other end of the spectrum, the front of the 
program. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for Marine Corps 
is 2012; IOC for the Navy, 2015. There's this critical period 
between shutting down the F/A-18 production line and ramping up 
the JSF program.
    Between now and that point in time, we expect risk to be 
retired on the JSF program, we expect to have greater 
understanding, in terms of the service life extension program 
for the F/A-18 to determine exactly where we will be relative 
to the magnitude and the duration of shortfall for strike 
fighter aircraft.
    There is opportunity, if there is a need, to continue 
procurement of F/A-18s, and that decision will need to be made 
based on available resources and what we understand about the 
JSF program at that point in time.
    I would not try to indicate that F/A-18s would be procured 
instead of JSFs with those resources; but, rather, if we can't 
get to the procurement rate that's needed for JSF in that 
timeframe, then an option is to continue procurement of F/A-
18s.
    Chairman Levin. You don't have an opinion, at this time, 
given what we now know, as to whether that option should be 
exercised?
    Mr. Stackley. The Department is clearly committed to the 
JSF program. Again, the magnitude and duration of the shortfall 
will depend on what happens with the extension program, with 
the ability to ramp up JSF, and with--call it ``workaround 
plans'' for the fleet, to ensure they can meet the 
requirements. I think we have to march further down that path 
to understand if the problem will get worse or if it will stay 
stable at the current projections.
    Chairman Levin. You may have partly addressed this question 
before, Mr. Stackley, but let me put it slightly differently. 
When the LCS program was announced by the CNO, he indicated 
that we could afford $220 million per ship. Since that time, 
the Navy has requested, and Congress has approved, an increase 
in the cost cap up to $460 million per ship for the sea frame. 
What would you propose to do to get better cost estimates for 
complex construction and development programs, since that 
estimate for the sea frame turned out to be so wildly wrong?
    Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
    I understand that the basis of the estimate for LCS was 
centered on commercial design. In other words, the two 
shipbuilders in the program have comparable commercial ships 
that they used for their bids, and the Navy's cost estimates 
were linked to commercial experience. LCS is not a commercial 
ship. In going from--call it ``those commercial designs'' to 
the current warship design, significant change was introduced 
in what's referred to as ``naval vessel rules,'' as well as 
combatant features and requirements associated with reduced 
manning and other Navy requirements for survivability. There is 
significant deviation on the LCS program from whatever the 
basis of estimate was and the current platform.
    If you look at major defense programs, and you look at cost 
growth, in most cases cost growth will trace back to poor-
quality cost estimates. The Navy has a cost estimating group 
that is working on improving its cost-estimating, modeling 
techniques, et cetera. As well, DOD relies on the cost analysis 
improvement group to provide some outside independent cost 
estimating. I think we need to beef up these efforts. I think 
we need to take a harder look at the cost models that we're 
using. The complexity of Navy warships today far exceed what 
the earlier cost models used for determining cost estimates for 
Navy programs.
    Step 1, improve the cost modeling. Step 2, ensure that the 
correlation between the requirements and the estimates are 
tightly coupled. Step 3, ensure discipline in the process, so 
you don't see growth in requirements, growth in design, outside 
of the estimates that were provided for the program.
    Chairman Levin. Mr. Stackley, shortcomings in the 
acquisition workforce are faced by all of the military 
Services. Earlier this month the Navy announced the 
establishment of a new position of Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for the Acquisition Workforce. That would be a deputy 
who would work for you, if you're confirmed. Do you agree that 
the Navy has significant shortcomings in its acquisition 
workforce? Do you support the establishment of that new 
position?
    Mr. Stackley. The answer is yes to both questions, Mr. 
Chairman. The acquisition workforce has seen steady reduction 
over the past 10 or 15 years, and I think it's inarguable that 
the pendulum has swung too far in that regard.
    In the discussion on cost estimates, I discussed 
discipline. An important part of discipline in the process is a 
qualified workforce. The appointment of the principal deputy 
that will have responsibilities for strengthening the 
acquisition workforce, I think, is a good, strong move. There 
has traditionally been a senior civilian in the Navy who has 
had ad hoc responsibilities in that regard. This goes beyond ad 
hoc; this assigns someone with principal responsibilities, and 
ensures that that individual has the credibility and the 
experience that's required to do the job.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Mr. Celec, one of the concerns that has arisen from the 
blue-ribbon report and the other reports coming from the B-52 
flight from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base, 
as well as the more recent Donald report, is that the various 
security and operational inspections of nuclear forces do not 
find, and are not designed to fix, deficiencies. How are you 
going to work with the Services, the Nuclear Weapons Council, 
and the National Security Administration to improve the quality 
of these inspections if you are confirmed?
    Mr. Celec. Thank you, Sir.
    The problems in the Air Force, I think, are cultural in 
nature. They didn't develop overnight, and they obviously won't 
be cured overnight. It's going to require leadership attention, 
not only in the Air Force, but in the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, where I hope to be. I know, for example, that the 
Air Force is currently reviewing its policies and procedures to 
ensure that they're current. The real question is, ``will the 
leadership insist that they be followed to the letter of the 
law,'' if you will. In the past, leadership focus has just been 
diverted elsewhere. They're involved in, obviously, fighting 
two wars right now. However, it's going to take the focus of 
the leadership of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense--
and that's where I hope to participate--to oversee that they 
will make some tremendous strides over the next couple of 
months, but the question is, ``Will this be sustained?'' It's 
going to take oversight and leadership to sustain the return of 
the culture that we knew in the past.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Celec, you made reference, 
in your opening remarks, to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
which requires us to destroy all the chemical weapons no later 
than April 2012. Now, DOD has not notified Congress that the 
United States will not be able to meet that extended treaty 
deadline. You've indicated that we have an obligation to take 
our treaty obligations seriously. We expect other nations to do 
that. If you're confirmed, will you make mighty efforts to 
ensure that the Department provides the adequate funding either 
to meet that deadline or, if that proves impossible, to come 
within as close a distance as possible to it?
    Mr. Celec. Absolutely. I think it's important that we meet 
our treaty obligations, to the best of our ability. I would 
work very hard to make sure we do.
    Chairman Levin. In 2003 and 2004, Mr. Celec, Congress 
debated, at length, whether to fund the Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator (RNEP) and the development of small nuclear weapons, 
which were sometimes referred to as ``mini nukes.'' Before you 
retired from DOD, in August 2003, you were the Deputy for 
Nuclear Matters, reporting to the then-Assistant to the 
Secretary, the position for which you've now been nominated.
    The Department supported the development and the fielding 
of an RNEP capability, and, in your previous capacity at the 
Department, according to statements that you made at the time, 
you, too, supported the development of RNEP. Congress 
eventually declined to fund that program. Are you going to 
resume your advocacy of the RNEP program if you're confirmed?
    Mr. Celec. My personal view certainly has not changed. 
Whether or not that view is the administration's or the 
Secretary's prevailing view, I don't know, and I will find out 
once I get there.
    I do know that there are a number of underground structures 
that exist in the world today that we cannot attack with 
conventional weapons, even the weapons that we project out into 
the far future of their capabilities. I know that many of these 
underground structures have multiple entrances, and whether or 
not we know where all of the entrances are or not is a 
problematical question. I know that we could close the 
entrances that we know of conventionally, although they could 
be reopened within a matter of a few tens of hours.
    Finally, many of these underground structures are command-
and-control facilities. By closing the adits--or the 
entrances--to these things, the facility itself will continue 
to function. In that time, an awful lot of people could die.
    So, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator gives the President 
an opportunity to end that issue right now, and I think he--my 
personal view, not necessarily supported by the Secretary--is 
that he ought to have that capability.
    Chairman Levin. In your written responses, Mr. Celec, you 
state that, ``There are serious issues with the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that need to be resolved.'' Could you 
give us just a couple of examples of those?
    Mr. Celec. I'll be glad to. First off, the treaty was 
signed some 15 years ago, and a lot has occurred in the world, 
particularly with the threat, and particularly in the nuclear 
arena; three nations have actually tested nuclear weapons that 
weren't nuclear powers when that treaty was signed--North 
Korea, Pakistan, and India. In addition, part of our 
verification system that we had intended to use in the CTBT was 
actually installed in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). 
Those stations have been dismantled; and so, our verification 
problems are going to increase. We can't change those 
verification technologies without going back and renegotiating, 
certainly, the TTBT.
    Perhaps the most critical issue that I have is the issue 
of, what is ``zero yield'' in the CTBT? The United States 
tabled the definition of ``zero yield'' during the negotiations 
in the treaty. The Russians said, ``Thank you very much. We 
understand your position.'' But, they didn't accept it, and it 
didn't enter into the treaty.
    There's only one treaty that actually defines ``yield,'' 
and that's the TTBT. In that treaty, it says ``yield'' is what 
comes out of the explosive cannister. The explosive cannister 
is a big container that you put the nuclear device in when you 
detonate it.
    Now, it is possible, with that language, if unchanged, that 
the Russians could put small, low-yield nuclear weapons into 
very large containers, detonate them, and still be in 
compliance with the CTBT. One further thing, the Russians have 
said that part of their weapons development program are these 
low-level tests. They've admitted that in public. I believe 
there's some serious concern, because of history--that is, the 
number of years since the treaty was negotiated, and some of 
the technologies--that need to be addressed when we go back. I 
think we need to go back and do it, because I think the treaty 
is the right thing to do, but we have to be careful.
    Chairman Levin. Let me ask you both, Mr. Celec and Mr. 
Benkert--each of you have a responsibility for the CTR program. 
Will each of you commit to work cooperatively on the CTR 
programs? Since you both have some responsibility there, do 
either of you have any thoughts about the need to work 
cooperatively? Any impediments to that?
    Mr. Benkert, why don't we start with you?
    Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    To the first part of your question, I will absolutely 
commit to working cooperatively on the CTR program. I think the 
cooperation goes in several dimensions. One is, I think we've 
had a very cooperative relationship with your staff and your 
colleagues on the House side as well as we've advanced this 
program, and we greatly appreciate that relationship and the 
developments--for example, the flexibility that you've provided 
us to move the program--to begin moving the program outside the 
former Soviet Union. So, I commit that we will continue that 
cooperative relationship.
    I think, as we move the program forward, I have discussed a 
bit, before the strong level of cooperation we have with the 
Russians in this program. I think we have cooperative 
relationships, as well with the other countries that are in the 
program. There are problems, but generally we work through 
them. Again, they help build very strong relationships at 
various levels with these countries.
    The issue we have is, over time, moving the program from 
one that is an assistance program in a lot of ways, to one that 
is more defined by partnership--both partnership with the 
Russians, partnership with other countries, and particularly 
partnerships outside the former Soviet Union. Over time, I 
think we want to move in that direction.
    I think the second thing that we are trying to do--and, 
again, in cooperation with your staff and the flexibility 
you've given us--is find ways to make the program more 
flexible, nimble, and responsive as we move outside the former 
Soviet Union, so that we are able to seize opportunities for 
cooperation and partnership, perhaps more rapidly than was the 
case in the way we developed the CTR program.
    Chairman Levin. Okay. Mr. Celec?
    Mr. Celec. I agree. I have a personal interest in that 
program, because when it was initiated as the Nunn-Lugar 
program, it was sent to the operations directorate of the 
Defense Nuclear Agency for execution. I was the Deputy Director 
for Operations at the time, and so, I helped see that program 
born, if you will, and I think it's been tremendously 
successful, and I will continue enthusiastically to support 
that program and to make sure that it continues to make the 
progress that it has. It has destroyed more missiles than the 
Strategic Air Command ever thought about doing.
    Chairman Levin. We welcome that enthusiasm. We wish you 
were a little bit less enthusiastic about RNEP. [Laughter.]
    You gave us your honest opinion, and that's what we ask 
for.
    We thank you all. We thank your families.
    If I can single out your grandchildren, Mr. Celec, since 
I'm a proud grandfather, you have two of them here. We have 
Adam and Hannah. I just want to let you kids know how important 
it is to a grandpa to have his grandkids standing behind him, 
and sitting behind him so patiently, and looking like you're 
following every single thing that you heard. It's amazing to me 
how beautifully you two did, there. I know it's important that 
your grandpa have you here. We thank you, particularly, and we 
thank all of the families.
    We stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Nelson M. Ford by 
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied 
follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly 
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities 
and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also 
vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant 
commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of 
requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of 
military operations.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions based on your experience in the Department of Defense (DOD)?
    Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive 
change in the operation of DOD. While I believe that the framework 
established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved 
interservice and joint relationships and clarified responsibilities, 
the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess the 
law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing 
organizational dynamics.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. This milestone legislation has served our Nation well for 
more than 2 decades. If confirmed, I would certainly work with Congress 
to determine whether the act should be revised to better address the 
requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and challenges 
confronting the military departments in today's security environment. 
It also may be appropriate to assess whether the law might be modified 
to allocate roles and responsibilities more effectively among the Joint 
Staff, the combatant commanders, the military departments, and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). One particular issue that 
merits review is accountability for the conduct of deployed forces.

                                 DUTIES

    Question. Section 3015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under 
Secretary of the Army shall perform such duties and exercise such 
powers as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe.
    Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to 
be assigned?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as the principal assistant and 
senior civilian advisor to the Secretary of the Army and will support 
him in his leadership of the Department as he fulfills the duties and 
responsibilities accorded him by law and regulation. I envision the 
Secretary will also assign to me specific duties and responsibilities 
that will support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army 
successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with 
which it has been entrusted. Further, pursuant to Section 904 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, I 
expect that the Secretary of the Army will designate the Under 
Secretary as the Chief Management Officer of the Department with the 
primary management responsibility for business operations. I expect the 
Secretary to assign me such duties and responsibilities in my role as 
Chief Management Officer as are necessary to organize and administer 
the business operations of the Army effectively and efficiently, in 
accordance with the policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. 
If confirmed, I will carry out my duties to the best of my ability, 
with honor and integrity.
    Question. What background and experience do you possess that you 
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
    Answer. For most of my career, I have served in a variety of senior 
management positions responsible for financial management, policy 
development, program evaluation and productivity. I am currently the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and 
Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)), having been confirmed by the Senate in October 
2006 after serving for 2 years as the Principal Deputy to the 
ASA(FM&C). Previously, I served in DOD as the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy with responsibility 
for the financial management, policy development and program evaluation 
of the Defense Health Program. External to government service, I served 
as Chief Operating Officer for Georgetown University Medical Center and 
was a partner in Coopers & Lybrand. These experiences have afforded me 
the opportunity to understand how large organizations function, 
particularly within the parameters of plans, programs and budgets, to 
face and overcome challenges on a continuing basis. My work in 
financial management for the Army has afforded me the privilege of 
building strong, effective relationships with other senior leaders and 
staff within the Army, the other military departments, and DOD.
    My experience with the Defense Health Program is beneficial to the 
Army, particularly at this point in time when we are working with DOD 
and the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide quality, 
comprehensive care to Wounded Warriors and Warriors in Transition. In 
fact, most of my career has been in the health care field, which has 
given me a broad base of knowledge that benefits the Army in developing 
processes and policies to support a wide range of health care 
initiatives.
    Further, I am familiar with the fiduciary responsibilities of 
Federal officials, particularly those that are applicable to Army 
personnel, and feel confident that I can positively contribute toward 
establishing and maintaining management controls and high fiscal and 
ethical standards. Much of my experience has been in mission-driven 
organizations, both as a manager and board member, so I understand the 
challenges of matching large and complicated missions in resource 
constrained environments. My experience includes organizational service 
in times of both growth and cutbacks, both of which are relevant for 
today's Army. I feel I am very well prepared to continue leading from 
the strategic level and with the strategic capabilities the position of 
Under Secretary of the Army requires.
    Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to 
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of 
the Army?
    Answer. I expect that there are. Although I am serving as Acting 
Under Secretary of the Army and look forward with confidence to 
performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army, any new 
position presents new challenges and opportunities for learning. Should 
the Senate confirm me, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of 
consultation with Army leaders, others in DOD, and Congress, to pursue 
opportunities for improvement. I have to say though, that my experience 
for the past 4 years in the Army has significantly strengthened my 
knowledge of the Army, its history, its culture, and its needs to 
continue to support the Nation in its assigned missions.

                             RELATIONSHIPS

    Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be 
with:
    The Secretary of the Army.
    Answer. As head of the Department of the Army, Secretary Geren is 
responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the 
Department. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the 
Army will be close, direct, and supportive; my actions always will be 
subject to the Secretary's authority, direction, and control.
    Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
    Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under 
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and 
is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff also 
performs the duties prescribed for him by law as a member of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. It is extremely important that all leaders of the 
Department of the Army, civilian and military, work closely together as 
one team as we face the many challenges confronting our institution. I 
anticipate that I will work closely and collaboratively with the Chief 
of Staff to supervise the implementation of the Secretary's decisions 
throughout the Department of the Army.
    Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
    Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the Department's 
strategic direction by formulating and overseeing policies and programs 
within their functional areas of responsibility, consistent with law, 
regulation, and the objectives of the Secretary of the Army. If 
confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional 
relationship with each of the Assistant Secretaries and seek to foster 
an environment of cooperative teamwork as we work together on the day-
to-day management and long range planning needs of the Army.
    Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
    Answer. The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the 
Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other 
Secretariat officials. His duties include providing legal and policy 
advice to all members of the Army as well as determining the position 
of the Army on any legal question or procedure. If confirmed, I will 
establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the 
General Counsel and will actively seek his guidance to ensure that Army 
policies and practices are in strict accord with the law and the 
highest principles of ethical conduct.
    Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
    Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties as 
the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may 
delegate to or prescribe for him. If confirmed, I will work with the 
Vice Chief of Staff to further the Secretary of the Army's policies and 
to advance the interests of the Army. I will establish and maintain a 
close and professional relationship with the Vice Chief of Staff and 
communicate directly and openly with him on matters involving the 
Department of the Army.
    Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
    Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal adviser 
of the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and 
members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General 
Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to 
the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the 
members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of 
their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal 
advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish 
and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge 
Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views 
about any legal matter under consideration.

                            MAJOR CHALLENGES

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
face the next Under Secretary of the Army?
    Answer. As the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff have 
stated previously, the Army is out of balance due to current 
operational demands. Our increased operational tempo and multiple 
combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on 
soldiers and their families. Part of regaining that balance is reducing 
the stress on the force caused by repeated, extended-duration 
deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF). Another crucial challenge is obtaining 
predictable and adequate funding. As the Army modernizes to meet the 
security challenges of the 21st century, while continuing the current 
operational pace as required by the combatant commanders, 
reestablishing our strategic depth will be a major effort requiring 
close collaboration with Congress.
    Answer. The Army is faced with many other challenges, including 
providing proper support to soldiers and families in time of war, 
enhancing readiness, providing quality housing, modernizing our Cold 
War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting and retention goals, just to 
name a few. The Army must transform its support infrastructure and 
integrate Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions. The Army must 
provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of soldiers' 
service and provide high quality care for those who have become ill, 
injured, or wounded, particularly for those suffering from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injuries. Finally, the 
Army must transform Army contracting, growing leaders, increasing 
personnel and providing appropriate training in this critically 
important area.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for 
addressing these challenges?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will provide my assistance to Secretary 
Geren and Chief of Staff Casey in pursuing several critical 
initiatives, including growing the Army and making necessary readiness 
improvements; building momentum and continuity of our modernization 
efforts; completing the transition of the Reserve component to an 
operational force; and adapting our institutional processes to support 
an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering from the cumulative 
effects of 5 years at war. The strength of the soldier is the Family, 
and in an All-Volunteer Force, we must remain committed to supporting 
our soldiers and their families through Installation and Soldier 
Readiness, and Soldier and Family Quality of Life. Of special interest 
to me will be leading the Secretary's effort to transform Army 
contracting, developing solutions to address the challenges facing the 
Department in this area.
    If confirmed, I will focus on programs and efforts to reduce the 
stress on the soldiers and their families. I will work closely with 
Congress to ensure these programs are defined to meet the objectives 
and requirements in support of our national defense. A major part of 
addressing these challenges will be to work collaboratively with 
members of this committee, the entire Congress, the President, and the 
Army leadership. I share Secretary Geren's commitment to maintain the 
Army as the dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am 
confident we can succeed.

                           ARMY BUDGET SHARE

    Question. Last year's Army Posture Statement points out that the 
defense budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with 
the Air Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25 
percent. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel 
costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army's 
budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared 
to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the 
Army's overall share of DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, as 
compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air Force. 
The result is that ``the Army has been unable to invest in the 
capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to 
prepare for emerging threats.''
    What is your understanding of the effects of this funding 
discrepancy on the Army?
    Answer. Today's Army is out of balance. Our equipment, procured 
through Congress' vigorous support to the Army, has been used hard 
during this period of prolonged and persistent conflict. This means 
that we are using up equipment at a much faster rate than anticipated, 
requiring our Army to reset or recapitalize this equipment at an 
accelerated pace. This impacts ammunition stocks, maintenance depots, 
and manufacturing capacities, and is further complicated by America's 
shrinking industrial base. We must restore the necessary breadth and 
depth of Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity 
for the future demands on our Expeditionary Force.
    Question. What do you intend to do if confirmed as the Under 
Secretary to address this funding discrepancy?
    Answer. Foremost, it is imperative for us to receive supplemental 
funding in a timely manner to prosecute the global war on terror and 
provide our soldiers with the equipment needed to meet current 
operational demands. If confirmed, I will continue to try to match Army 
resources to strategic requirements as I did when serving as the 
ASA(FM&C). During the build of the fiscal year 2009 budget, we worked 
closely with OSD and the Office of Management and Budget to help them 
better understand the Army's challenges. Additionally, we are examining 
the relationship of activities funded in the base budget and 
supplemental. We have identified requirements currently funded through 
the supplemental that would be more appropriately resourced in the base 
budget. We are looking forward to working within the administration to 
ensure an understanding of what activities should migrate back from the 
supplemental to the base program. To ensure we are good stewards of the 
Nation's resources, I will continue to work closely with Congress and 
the administration to address the Army's current readiness issues that 
have resulted from previous funding shortfalls.
    Question. What is your understanding of what, if anything, the 
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense intend to do to 
address this discrepancy?
    Answer. While building the President's fiscal year 2009 budget, we 
explored the impact of budgetary shortfalls with OSD. I believe we 
effectively communicated and quantified the challenges the Army faces 
in preparing for current and future conflicts and other emerging 
requirements. The Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to meet 
readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources 
necessary to support the National Military Strategy.

                         POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

    Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow 
the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems 
(FCSs) adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of 
the next two or three decades?
    Answer. The Army's future threats are defined in the National 
Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, 
Modularity, and Transformation to the FCSs will help posture the Army 
to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, 
we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad 
range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army 
versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military 
operations, across the major operational environments, in support of 
our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to 
give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and 
asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.
    Question. Do you believe that these initiatives are affordable 
within the projected Army budget?
    Answer. Yes, Grow the Force and Modularity are affordable within 
the projected Army budget. These requirements reflect what is needed to 
restore balance in the Army. Our budget requests reflect our 
comprehensive plan to restore balance and build the full spectrum 
capable Army we need in the 21st century. The acquisition program 
anticipated for FCSs extends well beyond current budget planning 
timeframes but resources roughly in the amounts described in the long-
range planning documents will be essential to modernizing Army 
equipment for future fights.
    Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army 
pursue in this regard if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army?
    Answer. As mentioned above, Secretary Geren and Chief of Staff 
Casey are working to advance a list of initiatives that seek to provide 
better support to Army families. Of particular interest to me is our 
disability system, which having been built over generations, has become 
a bureaucratic maze and needlessly complex. It is a system that 
frustrates, and often stymies, the best intentions of dedicated public 
servants and compromises the Army Values we pledge to uphold. A soldier 
who fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home. 
I look forward to working with OSD and the Veteran's Administration to 
revamp this antiquated disability system.
    Question. The Government Accountability Office reported last year 
that the cost of the Army's largest acquisition program--the FCS--is 
expected to grow from the $160 billion estimated in 2006 to between 
$203 billion and $234 billion (an increase of as much as 45 percent). 
Earlier this month, Secretary Gates acknowledged the existence of a 
substantial gap in funding for the Army's Global Force Initiative and 
testified that ``it is hard to see'' how DOD can afford to complete the 
FCS.
    What steps, if any, do you believe the Army needs to take to 
control costs on the FCS and ensure that the system is affordable?
    Answer. The Army can afford FCS. The cost estimates referenced 
above are the total costs for FCS, operating costs and procurement, 
over its lifecycle, a 27-year period (2003-2030). FCS procurement costs 
are substantially less and, even during the peak procurement period, 
are projected to be less than a third of the Army's investment (RDA) 
account. As the investment account is about a quarter of the total 
budget, FCS procurement cost is unlikely to exceed 10 percent of the 
Army's budget in any year. The Army took steps in 2007 to adjust the 
scope of the program (from 18 systems to 14), and slowed the pace of 
procurement. This program adjustment was designed to reduce the costs 
of fielding FCS to a more manageable level. Finally, we believe that 
FCS brigades will have lower operating costs than the legacy brigades 
they replace and will be more effective when deployed, providing 
significantly more ``bang for the buck'' once the program is completed.

                            LESSONS LEARNED

    Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from 
OEF and OIF which you would seek to address if confirmed as Under 
Secretary of the Army?
    Answer. Lessons learned from OEF/OIF have caused the Army to adjust 
its training and equipment to fight an adaptable, determined enemy. On 
the homefront, the pace of operations has placed great stress on Army 
families and we have had to build programs to better support our 
families. We have also had to expand language skills and enhance 
cultural awareness to be successful in the operations and missions we 
are engaged in today and likely will be engaged in the future. The Army 
must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers, 
home station training, and institutional training. Detention operations 
have improved over the course of the conflict, but we must continue to 
look for ways to enhance our capabilities in this area.
    With growth in the Army's force structure and the challenges this 
places on training, the Army needs to continue to assess ways to train 
efficiently, using training resources from all Army Components, as 
appropriate. As the Army develops its operational rhythm, Army Force 
Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to play a critical role in 
synchronizing cyclic training, while placing focus on theater-specific 
training requirements, such as training to defeat Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs). Because of the large load that the Reserve component 
(Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve) is pulling, the Army 
needs to assess continually its mobilization policies, balancing 
training requirements to meet the appropriate level of Reserve 
component operational readiness with domestic missions and 
requirements.
    Question. More specifically, what are the lessons learned 
concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army which you intend 
to address if confirmed?
    Answer. The Army needs to expand the force to its authorized levels 
as quickly as possible without compromising the quality of our 
recruits, and with the goal of reducing the length and frequency of 
deployments. The Army must build on its distance learning program to 
enable soldiers in the field to train individually on skills not 
otherwise available when deployed. Further, the Army must take 
appropriate measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems (TSS) 
at Army installations to support full spectrum training. Units must 
have greater capabilities at home stations to train across the full 
spectrum of conflict in a training environment replicating the 
Contemporary Operating Environment. One equipping lesson learned is 
that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase 
the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking 
steps to transition the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract 
from one to three contractors to increase capabilities and generate the 
competition necessary to reduce cost and improve service. We must find 
ways to respond immediately to the stress and demands placed on our 
military families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to 
succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy.
    Question. What are the Army's lessons learned from detainee abuse 
incidents at Guantanamo, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan?
    Answer. The primary lessons learned from the detainee abuse 
incidents are: first, we must clearly communicate through the 
establishment of standards, meaningful and realistic training, and 
constant vigilance, our commitment to ensuring that all soldiers live 
up to our values and the law of war, regardless of the circumstances; 
and second, we must act to ensure that any soldier who engages in 
detainee abuse is held accountable.
    As the executive agent for the administration of DOD detainee 
operations policy, the Army continues to gather detention operations 
lessons learned for incorporation into Army and joint policy and 
doctrine. Another major lesson learned has been that DOD needs more 
detention operations force structure, particularly in the Military 
Police and Military Intelligence specialties. We continue to work with 
OSD and the other Services to assess and refine force structure needed 
to support the combatant commanders' detention operations missions with 
success.
    Although our policies have always prohibited detainee abuse, Army 
detention operations policy and doctrine required revisions to reflect 
the current operational situation. Policy and doctrine across the full 
spectrum of detention operations has been revised and published. Some 
key revisions include the designation of a single commander for 
detention operations, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities 
for detainee care, custody, and interrogations, and finally, very 
specific guidance for identifying and reporting detainee abuse. New 
policy also mandates that our forces receive additional law of war and 
cultural awareness training. The Army has enhanced detention operations 
training for soldiers, units, and civilians, not only as an annual 
requirement, but also institutionally and during pre-deployment.

                    IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

    Question. Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth 
major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments 
were extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 
months.
    What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of 
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq having on retention, particularly among 
young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated 
service has been completed?
    Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had 
an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of 
officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The 
recently instituted captains' retention program, which offers a number 
of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention 
bonus, has guaranteed retention of officers at historic rates through 
fiscal year 2010.
    The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in 
deploying units has remained between 120-140 percent since fiscal year 
2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on 
Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army 
Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, 
on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th 
Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units 
currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates 
averaging 110-120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant 
indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that 
soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers 
value the tradition of service to the Nation.
    Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what 
do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In 
addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please 
discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and 
rates of indiscipline.
    Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but 
they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of 
individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes 
to address negative trends.
    We see the following trends:

         The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a 
        multi-disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and 
        adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources 
        in support of soldiers and commanders.
         Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted 
        divorce rates trended upward from fiscal years 2006 to 2007, 
        but remain below or equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates 
        have increased among enlisted female soldiers, and deployed 
        soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not 
        deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-sponsored ``Strong 
        Bonds'' training program to help soldiers and families build 
        and maintain stronger relationships.
         Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but 
        rates in deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued 
        its aggressive drug education, awareness, and testing programs.
         Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing 
        in an upward trend. The Army provides comprehensive education 
        packages directed at the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include 
        post deployment training. Alcohol abuse rates are monitored 
        continuously via the Army's Risk Reduction Program. We are also 
        developing and implementing preventative intervention programs 
        for soldiers at the first sign of trouble. ``Prevention of 
        Alcohol Abuse'' messages are incorporated in Army-wide 
        prevention of substance abuse campaigns like ``Warrior Pride.''
         Rates for Absence Without Leave (AWOL) show an upward 
        trend. Rates are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate 
        each instance of AWOL based on the facts and circumstances of 
        the soldier's individual case.
         In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special 
        Courts-Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest 
        post-fiscal year 2001 rates.
         Substantiated rates of Spouse and Child Abuse have 
        declined steadily since fiscal year 2001. In addition to 
        programs like ``Strong Bonds,'' the Army continues to focus 
        resources on programs and services that support soldiers and 
        their families.
         The overall health of the force reflects a resilient 
        Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a 
        solid foundation.

    Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments 
can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for 
the Army?
    Answer. The Army can sustain Iraq and Afghanistan deployments at 
the pre-surge levels as long as there is no additional growth in other 
global requirements. As demands reduce beyond the pre-surge levels, 
stress on the Army, our soldiers and our families will be reduced 
further, and we will be able to restore strategic depth and 
flexibility.
    Question. General Casey has stated that the Army is ``out of 
balance.'' What is your understanding of this statement and what do you 
think can or should be done to correct that imbalance?
    Answer. The Army's balance is the relationship between the demands 
placed on the Army and the ability to generate ready forces in a 
resource-limited environment, with an All-Volunteer Force. To meet 
current global demands, the Army has assumed risks in readiness and 
strategic flexibility that are not sustainable indefinitely. This 
imbalance stresses all of the Army--soldiers, families, and 
organizations--and impacts our ability to meet future challenges. 
Ultimately, current global operational demands in support of the global 
war on terrorism exceed the supply of forces that the Nation's 
strategic guidance requires. The Army is addressing the imbalance; but 
it will take both time and resources. The Army is moving closer to 
completing its capabilities transformation into a modular construct, 
while simultaneously growing additional end strength. These actions 
will increase the global force pool, enable sustainable periods of 
dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational force. 
As time between deployments (dwell) continues to increase, readiness 
will improve and the Army can move from primarily a counterinsurgency 
ready force to one ready for the full spectrum of military operations. 
Increased dwell will also reduce some of the stress on soldiers and 
families and safeguard the volunteer force. Any effort to restore 
balance, however, is dependent on full, timely, and predicable funding.

               SOLDIERS' POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS

    Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at congressional 
direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive 
health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment 
health surveys.
    If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that 
the Army uses available data on the health of returning soldiers to 
ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of 
deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are 
referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that 
additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require 
improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.
    The addition of the Post Deployment Health Reassessment and the new 
annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to 
monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers 
after initial redeployment, redeployment, and long before they start 
preparing for their next deployment.
    The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency 
is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed 
``Battlemind'' training products to increase this resiliency and have 
several different training programs available for pre, during, and 
post-deployment.
    Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to 
educate all soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs 
and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us 
all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these 
conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army 
education and training system to share the information with our new 
soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and 
symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is 
absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.

               MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT TEAM IV (MHAT IV)

    Question. The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi 
theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health 
conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in 
OIF.
    Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increased 
stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would 
you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental 
health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon 
their return?
    Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT 
assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and 
distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to 
meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the 
Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health 
providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To 
date, we have hired 147 providers who are already making a difference 
in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the 
Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill 
all of our behavioral health care requirements.
    Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of 
the Army's mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons 
which can be applied to future deployments?
    Answer. MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape 
existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more 
flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to 
predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for 
current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been 
utilized to create a training program known as ``Battlemind,'' which 
changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for 
high stress deployments.

              TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES

    Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, DOD assumed $1.2 
billion in cost savings based on implementing increases in TRICARE 
costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for 
military retirees and their families.
    What is your understanding of the Department's proposals for 
changes in TRICARE fees for retired soldiers, and, if they are 
implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on 
the Department of the Army?
    Answer. The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees 
and civilian visit copayments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment 
fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard ``working age'' 
retirees under 65 and their Families. For these beneficiaries, some 
cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual 
military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise copayments 
for all beneficiaries (except Active Duty) on prescriptions filled at 
retail pharmacies. While the budgetary impacts of these changes would 
be recognized in OSD accounts, reductions in expense for medical 
benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total defense budget 
and begin to address benefit inequities between military retirees and 
other Federal retirees.
    Question. What is your personal view of the justification for 
increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there 
alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?
    Answer. I support any reasonable strategy to protect the TRICARE 
program for our beneficiaries without jeopardizing Army readiness or 
modernization programs. Even with reasonable cost increases, TRICARE 
will continue to be among the most affordable and highest quality 
health plans in the country.

                          STOP LOSS AUTHORITY

    Question. How many soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under 
stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2008?
    Answer. The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers 
retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of 
fiscal year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for 
September 2008 is approximately 6,000.
    Question. What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it 
increases its end strength through the out-years?
    Answer. DOD guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop Loss 
policies as soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and 
eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a reduction in demand 
and a return to a cycle of ``1 year deployed with 2 years at home.'' 
The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of additional 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a cycle of ``1 
year deployed with 2 years at home.''

                  RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

    Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and 
systems have been characterized as ``inefficient and rigid'' and 
readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, 
cross-leveling, and reset policies.
    What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve 
component forces in meeting combat missions?
    Answer. To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders' 
requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three 
components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing 
solutions. The Guard and Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., 
Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) that are fully qualified and 
combat ready. They have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner 
over the past few years. The same is true for Reserve Component Combat 
Support and Combat Service Support units. The Army will continue to 
select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant 
command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's ability to 
carry out its assigned mission.
    Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current 
Reserve Force management policies?
    Answer. The Army has made considerable progress in ``total force'' 
management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 
process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known 
operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and 
reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff 
continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging 
Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping, and 
readiness decisions.
    Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding 
commitments to the Reserve components for re-set and re-equipping 
actions, and our Chief's initiatives and imperatives include the Total 
Army. Together, these efforts will