[Senate Hearing 110-665]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-665
THE NORTH KOREAN SIX-PARTY TALKS AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 31, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The North Korean Six-Party Talks and Implementation Activities
july 31, 2008
Page
Hill, Hon. Christopher R., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State................. 5
Tobey, Hon. William H., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy........................................... 14
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas....... 19
(iii)
THE NORTH KOREAN SIX-PARTY TALKS AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES
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THURSDAY, JULY 31, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:42 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Warner, Sessions, Collins, Thune, and Martinez.
Other Senator present: Senator Brownback.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member, and
Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Benjamin L.
Rubin, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: David E. Bonine,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
Reed; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to
Senator Webb; Jennifer Cave, assistant to Senator Warner;
Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator
Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III,
assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. First, we welcome
our witnesses this morning. On the panel that we'll have in
this room, we have Ambassador Chris Hill, Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and William Tobey,
Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation, National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), of the Department of
Energy.
Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey, we look forward to hearing
from you today on the current status of the Six-Party Talks and
efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. We look forward
to understanding how the U.S. and other members of the Six-
Party Talks will be able to obtain a full and complete
declaration of all North Korean nuclear programs, how that
declaration will be verified, and then how the facilities and
materials will be disabled and destroyed.
Resumption of the efforts to denuclearize North Korea is
most welcome, but long overdue. The administration is almost
back to where our country was when we pulled out of the Agreed
Framework, except that we are worse off. North Korea has
produced more plutonium and more nuclear warheads. It has
conducted a nuclear test and has withdrawn from the
Nonproliferation Treaty. That means that Ambassador Hill and
Mr. Tobey are left with the difficult task of trying to turn
back the clock and once again not only halt plutonium
production, but also to get an accurate accounting of all of
the plutonium that's been produced by North Korea, determine
the status of the uranium enrichment program, and get the
plutonium that is there under safeguards and their bombs
destroyed.
What cannot be undone, however, is the knowledge that North
Korea has gained in their nuclear development program since
2002. Through its nuclear weapons test, North Korea clearly
proved that it has the ability to produce nuclear weapons. That
knowledge will always exist and with it the concern that a
weapons program could be resumed or the knowledge proliferated.
When we complete the first panel, we are going to move to a
closed session in room S-407 of the Capitol. Ambassador Hill
and Mr. Tobey will be joined by Ambassador Joseph DeTrani,
who's the North Korean Mission Manager; and Vann Van Diepen,
National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction,
both of whom are from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
Good morning. Welcome to our witnesses this morning. On the first
panel we have Ambassador Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of Slate
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and William Tobey, Deputy
Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), Department of Energy. Ambassador Hill and Mr.
Tobey we look forward to hearing from you on the current status of the
Six-Party Talks with North Korea and efforts to denuclearize the Korean
peninsula.
Most importantly we look forward to understanding how the US and
the other members of the Six-Party Talks will be able to obtain a full
and complete declaration of all North Korean nuclear programs, how that
declaration will be verified, and then how the facilities and materials
will be disabled and destroyed.
Resumption of the efforts to denuclearize North Korea is most
welcome but long overdue. The administration is almost back to where
our country was when we pulled out of the Agreed Framework except that
we are worse off--North Korea has produced more plutonium and more
nuclear warheads, it conducted a nuclear test and withdrew from the
Nonproliferation Treaty.
Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey you are left with the difficult task
of trying to turn back the clock and once again not only halt plutonium
production but also get an accurate accounting of all the plutonium
produced, determine the status of the uranium enrichment program, get
the plutonium under safeguards and the bombs destroyed. What cannot be
undone, however, is the knowledge that North Korea gained in their
nuclear development program since 2002. Through its nuclear weapons
test North Korea clearly proved that it has the ability to produce
nuclear weapons. That knowledge will always exist and with it the
concern that a weapons program could be resumed or the knowledge
proliferated.
When we complete the first panel we will move to a closed session
in room S-407 of the Capitol. Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey will be
joined by Ambassador Joseph Detrani, North Korean Mission Manager, and
Vann Van Diepen, National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass
Destruction, both of whom are from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Ambassador Hill we will begin with you. Please proceed with your
opening statement.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. I welcome all my colleagues and others
who are here today.
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask that I put my whole
statement in the record, but I want to talk about a couple of
aspects of this very important hearing this morning. I had the
opportunity to consult with Ambassador Hill and I asked that he
address this morning the subject of human rights as a part of
his presentation in the opening statement and then respond to
such questions as may be propounded on this issue.
Mr. Ambassador, I have read through the testimony that you
are submitting before the committee and I commend you for that
action. I also commend you for what I think is one of the great
chapters in the contemporary history of the Department of State
and indeed, under the direction of the President and others, in
achieving the current status with regard to North Korea, and
indeed it's the whole Korean Peninsula that we're addressing.
We're anxious to hear about the further progress we hope that
you can make on the ground over there.
I want to say a word about the President's nominee to be
Ambassador to South Korea. As I understand, she was a principal
deputy. Her name is Kathy Stephens. I have met with her, talked
with her at length. She has an extraordinary background. In my
judgment, she is very, very capable of taking on this heavy
responsibility.
I hope that the Senate--and I will so address the Senate on
the floor--can proceed to a confirmation before the August
recess to enable her to be there for the important visit, as I
understand, scheduled by the President.
I say that, Mr. Chairman, with a deep sense of humility
because in 1951-1952 I was a young officer in the Marine Corps
stationed for a brief period in Korea during that conflict.
That conflict is one that's very important to me. My
participation was of no great consequence, but I certainly
served alongside others who gave their full measure, their life
and their limb, to see that South Korea would be preserved as a
free and sovereign nation.
Of course, we had the United Nations (U.N.) forces in
there. 37,000 Americans lost their life in enabling South Korea
to survive as a sovereign nation. I think it's just important,
the progress that's been made to maintain peace on that
peninsula and to limit the capabilities of North Korea to
project in one way or another either its influence or through
the sales of weaponry or other issues, project beyond the
shores of that peninsula and place in harm's way innocent
people, wherever they may be, on the planet today.
I think the steps that you've achieved thus far are to be
commended. Once again, I'll have further to say on the floor of
the Senate, but I ask the chairman if part of my allocation of
time on questions could be yielded to Senator Brownback, whom
you know very well, of the Foreign Relations Committee. He, as
well as some other Senators, have understandable concerns on
the issue of human rights and I do hope that a colloquy between
the two of you can occur as a part of this hearing, which would
underlie the hopeful confirmation by the Senate before the
August recess of Ambassador Stephens.
I thank the chair.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
I join Chairman Levin in welcoming our witnesses today. Given
recent developments in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, it is
important that the committee receive this update on the negotiations
and the prospects for continued progress in persuading North Korea to
disable, dismantle, and ultimately abandon its nuclear weapons program.
Ambassador Hill, you have faced many challenges in negotiating with
a most difficult adversary--North Korea, in coordinating with our
foreign partners in this effort, and in navigating a delicate political
landscape right here in the U.S. Government and Congress. I thank you
for your dedicated service, and commend you for the success you have
achieved to date. The committee is keenly interested in your report
this morning.
We are also eager to hear about the progress being made on the
ground in North Korea, to include the role the National Nuclear
Security Administration is playing in implementation and verification
of North Korea's denuclearization commitments. In addition, we welcome
our witnesses from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
who we hope will shed light on North Korea's intentions, its nuclear
declaration, and its nuclear and missile programs.
Mr. Chairman, a word about a chapter in the history of the Korean
Peninsula. I note the 55th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice. I
acknowledge, with a deep sense of humility, that I was privileged to
serve in Korea with the U.S. Marine Corps for a brief time during the
1951-1952 period of the Korean War. I bring a unique and heartfelt
perspective to the past and present American involvement, with other
nations, on the Korean Peninsula. Last week, I attended a solemn
ceremony on the occasion of the 55th Anniversary of the Korean War
Armistice. This event, sponsored by Senator Cardin and House Majority
Leader Hoyer, honored the sacrifice and service of our Armed Forces in
that war, where over 36,000 Americans gave their lives. Over 100,000
were wounded and today, a number of prisoners of war are still missing.
American forces were a part of a United Nations force structure. Fifty-
five years later, the Republic of Korea remains a free democracy and
faithful ally to our Nation.
Because of my deep and abiding interest in Korea, and the
relationship between our two nations, I requested a meeting with Ms.
Kathleen Stevens, the President's nominee to be the next U.S.
Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. I was impressed to hear that she
started her distinguished career as a Peace Corps volunteer serving in
rural South Korea. Her impressive experience rising through the ranks
of the Foreign Service, up to and including her service as Principal
Deputy and Political Advisor in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs at the Department of State, combined with her fluency in the
Korean language, make her uniquely and immensely qualified to be our
next Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. If confirmed, she would
succeed another outstanding Foreign Service Officer--Ambassador Sandy
Vershbow--who has served with distinction, but is slated to leave Seoul
in September.
Our President will travel to Asia next week for the Olympics,
stopping first in Seoul. I think it is critically important that he be
able on that visit to announce the confirmation of the next U.S.
Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.
Therefore, I am urging my colleagues in the Senate to allow Ms.
Stephens' nomination to be called up and voted upon before the Senate
leaves for the summer recess.
With that I will conclude my remarks and look forward to our
witnesses' testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Ambassador Hill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Hill. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin. Thank
you very much, Senator Warner and distinguished members of this
committee, for inviting me to come here and give you an update
on the status of our efforts to achieve verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through this Six-Party
process.
I have a lengthy statement which, with your permission, I'd
like to submit for the record, but make some comments drawing
on that.
Chairman Levin. We thank you for that. The entire statement
will be made a part of the record.
Ambassador Hill. Mr. Chairman, in addition to discussing
what we are doing to try to achieve denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, I would also like to talk today about our
broader vision, as outlined in the 2005 joint statement, for
the overall region and to ensure that region enjoys the
benefits of human rights protection and also economic
development that would accompany this denuclearization.
Senator Warner has spoken of his sacrifice, of his time in
the Korean War. Some 55 years ago this month was the armistice.
Senator Warner, I want to say to you, as someone who has spent
a good bit of time on the Korean Peninsula, how important your
efforts have been to that part of the world. South Korea today
is one of the world's most vibrant economies, but, more
importantly than that, it's one of the world's most vibrant
democracies. It provides freedoms for its people. It provides
human rights for its people. I think if you trace that human
rights record, which wasn't easy to achieve and wasn't achieved
overnight, but when you go back through the decades, when you
look back at what happened in the 1990s, especially what
happened in the 1980s with the student movement there, with the
movement to release political prisoners--and I might mention in
that regard, Senator Warner, that the candidate to become our
next ambassador was very much involved as the Human Rights
Officer of those times.
They were very difficult times. But none of this would have
been possible without the sacrifice of your fellow soldiers and
sailors, the efforts during that terrible war to maintain
freedom there. So I think for all people who participated in
that war, they can be very, very proud of what was achieved.
Our duty now is to see if we can achieve that, not only for
the Republic of Korea, South Korea, but now to bring some of
those freedoms to the people in North Korea. To get to that
point, we need to focus very heavily on this, on
denuclearization. But I want to stress, that is not the only
area of our focus.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I wish to note, Mr. Chairman and others, that it is the
55th anniversary of that conflict, and we had two very solemn
ceremonies here on Capitol Hill to allow veterans and others
who participated in that conflict--I've always said mine was
very modest compared to the others. But it is well remembered
across America the sacrifices that this country and those other
nations of the U.N. at that time--it was a U.N. force
structure--that participated in providing the security for
South Korea.
Chairman Levin. One of the most extraordinary memorials in
Washington is the Korean War Memorial, which too many people
don't even know about, but when they go there they are
absolutely stunned by its impact.
Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Hill. If I could also mention that I'm very
pleased to be joined here today by my colleague Will Tobey from
the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy has a very
key role in this process of denuclearization. Will and I have
done some traveling together out there to the region. We've
done some negotiating together, and I'm very pleased to have
Will here today.
Mr. Chairman, we have made some important progress on the
Six-Party Talks, but I must tell you as a person involved in it
that we have a lot more to be done in order to implement the
September 2005 joint statement, that is to achieve verifiable
denuclearization and to achieve a better life on the Korean
Peninsula.
Before turning, however, to the specific status of
implementation of the Six-Party Agreements, I do want to
reflect a little on the Six-Party process. In October 2002,
President Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin discussed
creating a Six-Party framework to deal with this, with the
problem of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Our President made
it very clear that the United States alone cannot solve this
problem. We need partners. We need to work with others. Indeed,
we need to make sure that others understand that this is a
problem that doesn't just threaten the U.S.; it threatens them
as well.
Over the past 6 years we have seen the strategic importance
of this framework, not only for dealing with the nuclear issue,
but also for Northeast Asia more generally. Multilateral
diplomacy takes time and effort, as President Bush has said
from time to time. Merging the interests of six parties is not
easy. I must say, as I've said before, it offers no refuge for
those in need of instant gratification. It requires concerted
efforts. I think in working with our partners we have achieved
some accomplishments.
I would say our close cooperation with China in the Six-
Party Talks has had implications beyond the Korean Peninsula
and Northeast Asia. I believe it's had an important impact on
China's emergence as a responsible stakeholder in the region.
It is very important that we find ways to work with China. We
hold China to certain international standards, whether it be in
the proliferation area or the human rights area, and I think
one of the best ways we've been able to do that is through the
Six-Party process.
The Six-Party framework works because each nation
represented at the table has a shared interest in a peaceful,
stable, and denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and it makes North
Korea accountable not just to us, but to all of its neighbors.
The process is based on the principle of action for action.
This was very much embodied in the September 2005 joint
statement. That statement lays out the goals for the process,
requiring that all the parties undertake to promote economic
cooperation in the field of energy, trade, and investment. It
also looks to bring the international standards in all areas to
this Korean Peninsula, in particular to the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK).
To be sure, this is a broad vision and full implementation
of this joint statement would not only offer the North Korean
people a better future, but it would provide a foundation for
regional peace and stability based on recognized norms of
international relations, including human rights.
Of course, this ambitious agenda cannot be realized all at
once. The parties agreed to take a phased approach to reaching
these goals. Each of these phases have been challenging, but we
are making some progress. The action-for-action process has
allowed us to build trust as each side knows that the process
will only move forward when each side fulfills its commitments.
Under the framework, DPRK receives something from the other
parties only as it moves forward in its own commitments.
So what is the status of these agreements? The initial
phase was concluded in 2007 and we're currently completing the
second phase actions and we hope moving into the third phase of
implementation. In the first two phases, we've made some
important progress. Under the February 2007 agreement on
initial actions, the DPRK shut down and sealed its core nuclear
facility and invited the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) personnel to conduct monitoring and verification. IAEA
personnel have remained in place, monitoring the shutdown and
sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, since July 2007.
Indeed, it was only 1 year ago this month that North Korea shut
down its production of plutonium.
Under the October 2007 agreement on second phase actions,
the DPRK took significant steps to disable its three core
Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and on June 26, just about a month
ago, it provided a declaration of all of its nuclear programs
to the Chinese chair. On June 27, in an important symbol of its
commitment to the process, it collapsed the cooling tower at
Yongbyon to make clear that it has no intention of reviving
this facility, this nuclear facility, in the future.
Since November 2007, a rotating team of U.S. experts has
been on the ground overseeing disablement of the three core
nuclear facilities. North Korea is no longer able to produce
weapons-grade plutonium at Yongbyon. It's completed some eight
out of eleven agreed disablement tasks. It's discharged more
than half of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the reactor. When
it completes all of these 11 steps, it would have to expend
significant time and effort, upwards of 12 months, maybe more,
if it ever wanted to reconstitute the facilities. Our experts--
and Mr. Tobey can speak in far greater detail on this--continue
to report good working cooperation with the DPRK experts on the
site.
The declaration package that the DPRK provided to the
Chinese on June 26 addresses its nuclear program and
acknowledged our concerns about uranium enrichment and its past
nuclear proliferation activities, specifically with Syria.
The DPRK's declaration is not an end point, however, in our
efforts to understand their nuclear program. Frankly, it's the
basis now of a rigorous process of verifying all of their
nuclear programs. We have reviewed copies of 18,000 pages of
documents handed over to us by the North Koreans, consisting of
operating records from its 5-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon going
back to 1987, and the reprocessing facility that they gave us
in May, and already it's producing some results.
The six parties have agreed on general principles for
verification that are guiding the ongoing discussions of a
verification mechanism. These principles include access to
facilities, documents, and interviews with personnel, and other
measures as agreed by the Six Parties.
In response to the North Korean actions to fulfil its
commitments, the U.S. has also moved on fulfilling our second
phase commitments. On June 26, President Bush announced that he
was terminating the exercise of authorities under the Trading
With the Enemy Act with respect to North Korea and notified
Congress of his intent to rescind designation of North Korea as
a state sponsor of terrorism following a minimum 45-day
congressional notification period.
The President made very clear that during this 45-day
period we would use that period to assess the DPRK cooperation,
including on reaching an agreement on a verification protocol.
Indeed, one cannot talk about a declaration without
verification. They go hand-in-hand.
North Korea is also receiving some energy assistance in
return for its denuclearization actions. To date they've
received some 420,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and equivalent
assistance, including 134,000 tons of heavy fuel oil provided
by the U.S. heavy fuel oil, equivalent material, and equipment
provided has also been consistent with U.S. laws controlling
exports to the DPRK.
On July 12, the six parties announced agreement to work in
parallel to complete all of the disablement work at Yongbyon
and to contract to deliver remaining energy assistance by the
end of October. That means that if the DPRK wants more energy
assistance they will have to do more denuclearization.
The U.S. remains very much concerned about outstanding
questions relating to North Korea's uranium enrichment efforts
and proliferation. We'll continue to engage the DPRK in
detailed and candid discussions on these issues until these
issues are resolved in a verifiable way. The six parties have
agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism, that all six
parties have agreed to, to track all parties' obligations,
including, and from our perspective especially,
nonproliferation. We will use this mechanism to hold the DPRK
to its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials,
technology, or know-how. This is a commitment they have made to
the other five. That commitment was in the October statement
and we will monitor it with great care.
We will continue to press the DPRK to address questions
about Japanese abductees. We'll continue to urge North Korea at
every opportunity to address Japan's concerns. Japan is an
important friend and ally of the United States. We'll continue
to consult closely with the Japanese Government as we move
forward. We have done this at every step of the way. Any move
we have made with respect to the DPRK, we have worked very
closely with the Japanese as our allies. Keep in mind that
Japan has some special concerns here, namely the fact that
several of their citizens, an undetermined number of citizens,
were actually abducted, in some cases right off the streets of
Japan, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Those citizens,
whether the number is 12 or 20 or whether it's more, as some
people do believe, there needs to be a proper accounting on
that, and we have pressed the DPRK and I can assure you we will
continue to press them because we consider that something that
has to be addressed if we're going to achieve this sense of
neighborhood in Northeast Asia that we're looking for.
But even as we make progress on these second phase actions
and begin to move into the third and final denuclearization
phase, significant work remains, including the abandonment of
North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, the dismantlement of
all of their facilities, and the removal of fissile material
from the country and the verification that indeed there is an
absence of fissile material. That is, once they have removed it
we need to make sure that all of it has been removed and taken
from the country.
In exchange, the United States is prepared to transform our
relationship with North Korea into a more normal relationship.
The U.S. and the DPRK are committed to improving bilateral
relations and working toward full diplomatic relations, and one
way we'll do this is by increasing bilateral exchanges aimed at
enhancing mutual trust.
The issue of human rights will be a key element of this
normalization process. We will continue to press the DPRK for
the kind of meaningful progress that will be necessary for the
DPRK to join the international community. The DPRK's human
rights records is, quite frankly, abysmal and every day that
the people of North Korea continue to suffer represents an
unacceptable continuation of oppression.
I have personally seen satellite images of the DPRK's
extensive prison camp system. This is truly a scar on the
Korean Peninsula, in which it is reported that North Koreans
suffer torture, forced abortion, and in some cases execution.
The dangers faced by North Korean refugees who flee their
country in search of a better life, often only to face
suffering or eventual repatriation with a very uncertain fate,
are similarly unacceptable.
The United States' dedication to improving the lives of the
North Korean people will never wane and we will continue to
seek all available opportunities to improve this heartbreaking
situation. We have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that human
rights is not only a U.S. priority, frankly it's an
international priority. It is part of the standard of joining
the international community. We've emphasized how much we value
the advancement of human rights in all societies and our need
to have this and other outstanding issues of concern discussed
in the normalization process.
We note, for example, that the Republic of Korea's National
Assembly is currently considering legislation that also
addresses North Korean human rights issues. Our Special Envoy
on Human Rights to North Korea, Jay Lefkowitz, plans to travel
to Seoul soon and we'll look for every opportunity to work with
our partners in the region on our shared goal for a better
future for the people of North Korea.
On a separate track, to respond to severe food shortages in
the DPRK, the United States has joined in an international
effort to provide food assistance to the DPRK in June, after
establishing a strong framework to ensure that food will reach
those most in need. The administration also shares the desires
of families and veterans from the Korean War to resume remains
recovery operations in North Korea and we're prepared to do so
at an appropriate time. The Department of Defense temporarily
suspended remains recovery operations in May 2005 due to
concern about our personnel and about heightened tensions
between the U.S. and North Korea. As soon as we believe it's
appropriate to reengage with North Korea on this to make sure
that once we reengage our engagement can be sustained and not
stopped again, we'll ensure that Congress is indeed informed.
Full implementation of the September 2005 joint statement
may also provide a way forward for the transformation of the
overall security relationships in Northeast Asia. The U.S.
believes that a discussion of a Korean Peninsula peace regime
could begin early in this next phase. We achieve a permanent
peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula once North Korea has
verifiably denuclearized.
We also hope to move forward in the development of a
Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism that could help
further solidify the cooperative relationships built through
the Six-Party process.
While we have made important progress toward full
implementation of the September 2005 joint statement, much work
remains to be done to verifiably denuclearize DPRK. We must
continue to work forward in the Six-Party process to realize
their abandonment of all nuclear weapons, existing nuclear
programs in accordance with all their commitments, as well as
to have them return to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and IAEA safeguards. We'll continue to work
very closely with our Six-Party partners as we work forward in
the tough tasks that lie ahead.
I want to thank you once again for allowing me to appear
here and I stand ready to answer any and all of your questions.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Ambassador, thank you very much. Thank you
for your long commitment and your professionalism and your
steadfastness.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Christopher R. Hill
INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished
members for inviting me to update you on the status of our efforts to
achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through
the Six-Party process. I also want to talk today about our broader
vision--as outlined in the September 2005 Joint Statement--of a region
where the benefits of human rights protections and economic development
go along with progress on denuclearization. I am pleased to be joined
today by my colleague Will Tobey from the Department of Energy (DOE), a
key partner in the implementation of our Six-Party agreements.
We have made important progress recently in the Six-Party Talks,
but much work remains for the full implementation of the September 2005
Six-Party Joint Statement and the verifiable denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. Before turning to the specific status of
implementation of Six-Party agreements, I want to reflect on the
importance of the Six-Party framework that we have built.
THE SIX-PARTY FRAMEWORK
In October 2002, President Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin
discussed creating a Six-Party framework to deal with the North Korean
nuclear issue. Over the past 6 years, we have seen the strategic
importance of this framework not only for dealing with the important
North Korean nuclear issue, but for Northeast Asia more generally.
Multilateral diplomacy takes time and effort, and merging the interests
of six countries is not an easy feat. Yet, it is because of our common
interests in the region and our concerted efforts that we have achieved
important accomplishments to date.
Throughout this process, the Chinese Government, which chairs the
Six-Party Talks, has played a key role. Our close cooperation with
China in the Six-Party Talks has implications beyond the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and has an important, salutary impact on
China's emergence as a responsible stakeholder in the region.
The Six-Party framework works because each nation represented at
the table has a shared interest in a peaceful, stable and denuclearized
Korean Peninsula, and because North Korea is accountable to all of its
neighbors for its actions. Each of these nations complements one
another in our efforts to hold North Korea to its commitments.
The Six-Party process is based on the principle of ``action-for-
action,'' which was embodied in the September 2005 Six-Party Joint
Statement. The Joint Statement lays out the goals of the Six-Party
Talks, most importantly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs, and return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
The Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of
energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally, and
the other Parties described their willingness to provide energy
assistance to the DPRK. The joint statement outlines a vision for
transforming relations in Northeast Asia, including through
normalization of bilateral relations with the DPRK, exploration of ways
and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia, and
negotiation among directly related parties of a Peace Regime on the
Korean Peninsula.
This is a broad vision. Full implementation of the September 2005
Joint Statement would not only offer the North Korean people a better
future, but also provide a foundation for regional peace and stability,
based on recognized norms of international relations, including human
rights. Of course, this ambitious agenda cannot be realized all at
once. Rather, the Parties agreed to take a phased approach to reaching
these goals. Each of these phases has been challenging, but we have
made important progress throughout each phase. With each step forward,
we have reduced the number of tasks before us.
The action-for-action approach has allowed us to build trust, as
each side knows that the process will only move forward when each party
fulfills its commitments. Under this framework, the DPRK receives
something from the other Parties only as it moves forward on its
commitments. This process of building trust is of great importance, for
the tasks will only become more difficult as we progress.
CURRENT STATUS OF SIX-PARTY ACTIONS
So what is the status of the implementation of these agreements?
The Initial Phase was concluded in July 2007. We are currently
completing Second Phase actions and moving into the Third Phase of
implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement. In the first two
phases, we have made important progress. Under the February 13, 2007
agreement on ``Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint
Statement,'' the DPRK shut down and sealed core nuclear facilities and
invited back the IAEA to conduct monitoring and verification
activities. IAEA personnel have remained in place, monitoring the shut-
down and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, since July 2007.
Under the October 3, 2007 agreement on ``Second Phase Actions for the
Implementation of the Joint Statement,'' the DPRK has taken significant
steps to disable three core Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and on June
26, it provided a declaration of its nuclear programs to the Chinese
chair. On June 27, in an important symbol of its commitment to the
disablement process, North Korea collapsed the cooling tower at
Yongbyon before the international media.
Since November 2007, a rotating team of U.S. experts has been on
the ground overseeing disablement of the three core nuclear facilities
at Yongbyon, and North Korea is no longer able to produce weapons-grade
plutonium at Yongbyon. As of today, the DPRK has completed 8 out of 11
agreed disablement tasks, and has discharged more than half of the
8,000 spent fuel rods from the 5-MW(e) reactor. Upon completion of all
11 steps, the DPRK would have to expend significant effort, and time--
upwards of 12 months--to reconstitute all of the disabled facilities.
Our experts continue to report good cooperation with DPRK experts at
the site.
The declaration package that the DPRK provided to the Chinese on
June 26 addresses its plutonium program, and acknowledged our concerns
about the DPRK's uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation
activities, specifically with regard to Syria. The DPRK's declaration
is not an end point in our efforts to understand North Korea's nuclear
programs, but rather is the basis for a rigorous process of verifying
all of the DPRK's nuclear programs. Review of the copies of 19,000
pages of documents, consisting of copies of operating records from its
5-MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon and the reprocessing facility, that the
DPRK provided to the United States in May, is already producing
results. The Six Parties have agreed to general principles for
verification that are guiding ongoing discussions of a verification
mechanism. These principles include access to facilities, documents,
and interviews with personnel, and other measures as agreed by the Six
Parties. The verification process would include participation by
experts from the Six Parties and the IAEA.
In response to the DPRK's actions to fulfill its Second Phase
commitments, the United States has also moved forward on fulfilling our
Second Phase commitments. On June 26, President Bush announced that he
was terminating the exercise of authorities under the Trading with the
Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, and notified Congress of his intent
to rescind designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism
following the 45-day congressional notification period. The President
made clear that we would use this 45-day period to assess the DPRK's
cooperation, including on reaching agreement on a verification
protocol, and respond accordingly.
North Korea is also receiving energy assistance in return for its
denuclearization actions in the First and Second Phases--equivalent to
1 million tons of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO). To date, the DPRK has received
approximately 420,000 tons of HFO and equivalent assistance, including
134,000 tons of HFO provided by the United States. HFO-equivalent
materials and equipment provided have been consistent with U.S. laws
controlling exports to the DPRK. On July 12, the Six Parties announced
agreement to work in parallel to complete all remaining disablement
work at Yongbyon and to contract for or deliver remaining energy
assistance by the end of October.
Even as we have seen progress on these fronts, the United States
remains concerned about outstanding questions relating to North Korea's
uranium enrichment efforts and proliferation. We will continue to
engage the DPRK in detailed and candid discussions on these issues
until North Korea resolves these concerns in a verifiable manner. The
Six Parties have agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism to track
all Parties obligations--including nonproliferation and provision of
energy assistance. We will use this mechanism to hold the DPRK to its
commitment ``not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-
how.'' The North Koreans are also cognizant of the fact that United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 remains in effect.
At the same time, the United States will continue to press the DPRK
to address questions about the Japanese abductees. We will continue to
urge the DPRK at every opportunity to address Japan's concerns. Japan
is an important friend and ally of the United States, and we will
continue to consult closely with the Japanese government as we move
forward.
OFFERING THE DPRK A BETTER FUTURE
Even as we make progress toward finalizing Second Phase actions and
begin moving into the Third, and final, denuclearization Phase,
significant work remains, including abandonment of North Korea's
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, dismantlement of all
North Korea's nuclear facilities, removal of all fissile material, and
verification of North Korea's denuclearization.
In exchange, the United States is prepared to transform our
relations with the DPRK into a more normal relationship. The United
States and DPRK have committed to improving bilateral relations and
working toward full diplomatic relations. One way we will seek to do
this is by increasing bilateral exchanges between the United States and
DPRK aimed at enhancing mutual trust.
The issue of human rights will be a key element of the
normalization process. We will continue to press the DPRK for the kind
of meaningful progress that will be necessary for the DPRK to join the
international community. The DPRK's human rights record is abysmal, and
every day that the people of North Korea continue to suffer represents
an unacceptable continuation of oppression. I have seen satellite
images of the DPRK's extensive prison camp system--a scar on the Korean
Peninsula--in which it is reported that North Koreans suffer torture,
forced abortions, and in some cases execution. The dangers faced by
North Korean refugees, who flee their country in search of a better
life, often only to face suffering or repatriation, are similarly
unacceptable. The United States' dedication to improving the lives of
the North Korean people will never wane, and we continue to seek all
available opportunities to improve this heartbreaking situation. We
have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that human rights is a U.S.
priority. We have emphasized how much we value the advancement of human
rights in all societies, and our need to have this and other
outstanding issues of concern discussed in the normalization process.
We note that the ROK's National Assembly is considering legislation
addressing North Korean human rights. Our Special Envoy on Human Rights
in North Korea, Jay Lefkowitz, plans to travel to Seoul soon. We will
look for every opportunity to work with our partners in the region on
our shared goal of a better future for the people of North Korea. Our
goal through this process has been and will remain improving the lives
of the people of North Korea.
On a separate track, to respond to severe food shortages in the
DPRK, the United States began providing food assistance to the DPRK in
June after establishing a strong framework to ensure that the food will
reach those most in need. The United States also assisted U.S.
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in providing aid to fight the
outbreak of infectious diseases following floods in North Korea last
summer, and is working with U.S. NGOs to carry out a plan to improve
the supply of electricity at provincial hospitals in North Korea.
The administration shares the desire of families and veterans to
resume remains recovery operations in North Korea, and we are prepared
to do so at the appropriate time. The Department of Defense temporarily
suspended remains recovery operations in May 2005 due to concern for
our personnel during a period of heightened tensions between the U.S.
and North Korea. As soon as we believe it is appropriate to reengage
with North Korea on these recovery efforts, we will ensure that
Congress is informed.
Full implementation of the September 2005 joint statement may also
provide a way forward for the transformation of overall security
relations in Northeast Asia. We remain committed to replacing the 1953
Armistice with a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula.
The United States believes that discussions of a Korean Peninsula peace
regime could begin early in the Third Phase. We can achieve a permanent
peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula once the DPRK has verifiably
denuclearized. We also hope to move forward on the development of a
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, which could help further
solidify the cooperative relationships built through the Six-Party
process and provide a means for the parties to work together to address
issues including greater economic opportunity and greater human rights
protections for their citizens.
Our denuclearization efforts in the Third Phase will require
substantial funding, and we welcome Congress' provision of the
additional authorities necessary to undertake these important tasks.
While the State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund may
continue to shoulder some costs in the Third Phase, we are hopeful that
DOE will be able to provide funding, if the President exercises the
recently enacted authority to waive needed elements of the Glenn
Amendment sanctions imposed on the DPRK. My DOE colleague will speak to
those estimates. We look forward to working with Congress to ensure
that the administration has the necessary funding to undertake these
important tasks.
THE ROAD AHEAD
While we have made important progress toward the full
implementation of the September 2005 joint statement, much work remains
on the road to verifiable denuclearization of the DPRK and all the
goals laid out in that document. We must continue to move forward in
the Six-Party process to realize the DPRK's abandonment of all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs in accordance with the September
2005 joint statement, as well as its return to the Treaty on
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. We will
continue to work closely with our Six-Party partners as we move forward
on the tough tasks that lie ahead.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
happy to answer your questions.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Tobey?
Senator Warner. I wish to join you, Mr. Chairman, in that
observation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Tobey. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of the
committee: Thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss
achieving verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
You and Ambassador Hill have eloquently defined the important
context for our work, one that includes both conflict and the
political and economic success of the Republic of Korea, and
I'm certainly mindful of that context.
Since early November 2007, teams of NNSA nuclear monitors
have maintained a continuous on-the-ground presence at the
Yongbyon site, overseeing the implementation of agreed
disablement tasks. Ambassador Hill has detailed the progress
that has been made on those tasks and I agree with his
characterization and I won't repeat that assessment.
Of course, North Korea's pledge to abandon all existing
nuclear programs extends beyond the plutonium production plants
at Yongbyon. It also includes other nuclear facilities or
activities to be subject to verification, as agreed by the Six
Parties.
Working level cooperation between U.S. teams and their
North Korean counterparts has been generally constructive. Our
experts have been able to perform maintenance on installed
monitoring equipment, access the spent fuel pond to measure
water temperature, clarity, and pH levels, and access the
reprocessing plant and fuel fabrication plant to verify that
completed disablement tasks remain in effect. Our working level
relationship with IAEA inspectors monitoring the shutdown at
Yongbyon has also been very strong.
As Ambassador Hill noted, the Six-Party Talks are moving
toward Phase Three activities, including negotiation of a
comprehensive verification protocol and negotiation of
dismantlement and fissile material removal measures. The NNSA
will continue to provide policy and technical support to these
negotiations and we stand ready to implement agreed
verification measures and other tasks as requested by the Six
Parties.
Although the exact details of Phase Three are yet to be
negotiated, our planning assumption is that the NNSA will be
called upon to support implementation of comprehensive
verification and denuclearization measures. We anticipate that
the costs of implementing Phase Three activities will be
substantially higher than the costs of Phase Two. To date the
NNSA has spent approximately $15 million in support of Phase
Two implementation.
In addition, the State Department's Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund has provided assistance of approximately $20
million for the costs of completing disablement activities in
Phase Two. This assistance has been necessary because the
Department of Energy has been prohibited by Section 102[b] of
the Arms Export Control Act, known also as the Glenn Amendment,
from providing financial assistance to the DPRK in support of
the denuclearization process.
By legislation recently enacted which provides the
President with the authority to waive the so-called Glenn
Amendment restrictions, Congress has addressed this problem and
opened the door to more substantial NNSA participation, and I
thank the committee for its role in passing this legislation.
If the President exercises this waiver authority, the NNSA
will be able to procure, ship to North Korea, and use equipment
required to support the full range of disablement,
dismantlement, verification, and material packaging and removal
activities that phase three will likely entail. If these
activities begin soon and continue at a more rapid pace, we
estimate that the total implementation costs could amount to an
additional $34 million in 2008 and over $360 million in fiscal
year 2009. The bulk of these costs relate to packaging and
disposition of separated plutonium and spent fuel at Yongbyon.
But they also cover implementation of critical measures
necessary to verify North Korea's nuclear declaration and to
ensure our teams on the ground have adequate protective
equipment and health physics support.
The cost to the U.S. Government for this effort could well
fall on the NNSA, as the lion's share of verification work
involves the time and expertise of technical specialists from
the Department of Energy and the NNSA.
I would like to conclude by reiterating our strong
commitment to supporting U.S. efforts to achieve the verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Through the Six-Party
process, we have achieved tangible progress towards this goal
and our dedicated staff of technical experts remains ready to
provide whatever additional support may be required as the
process moves forward.
I thank you again for this opportunity and look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. William H. Tobey
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to appear today to discuss the
process of achieving verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. My remarks will focus on: (1) the role of the Department of
Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in
implementing agreed denuclearization measures in North Korea; (2)
progress to date; and (3) planning for anticipated ``Phase Three''
verification and material removal activities, including the budget
requirements for those activities.
DOE/NNSA provides two main forms of support for U.S. efforts to
eliminate the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. First, we provide
technical experts to advise Ambassador Hill and the U.S. delegation to
the Six-Party Talks, including the Denuclearization Working Group and
Economy and Energy Cooperation Working Group, on issues related to the
disablement and dismantlement of North Korea's existing nuclear
programs as well as verification. Second, we lead technical teams
responsible for on-the-ground oversight of implementation of
denuclearization measures agreed to in the Six-Party Talks context.
Under the September 2005 joint statement, North Korea committed to
abandoning all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and
returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. As a first step towards this objective, North Korea agreed
in the February 13, 2007 ``Initial Actions Agreement'' to shut down and
seal its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, for the purpose of eventual
abandonment, and also to invite back IAEA inspectors to conduct
monitoring and verification as agreed between the IAEA and the DPRK. In
July 2007, the IAEA confirmed that the Yongbyon facility had been shut
down.
Under the October 3, 2007 Agreement on Second Phase Actions, North
Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to
abandonment under the 2005 joint statement. North Korea further agreed
to disable the three core facilities at the Yongbyon site--the 5MW(e)
reactor, the reprocessing plant, and fuel fabrication plant--by the end
of 2007. A list of 11 ``Phase II'' disablement tasks was agreed based
on the findings of a Six-Party team of experts, including a technical
representative from DOE/NNSA, that visited Yongbyon in September 2007
to assess the feasibility of various disablement approaches.
Since early November 2007, teams of DOE/NNSA-led nuclear monitors
have maintained a continuous on-the-ground presence at the Yongbyon
site overseeing the implementation of agreed disablement tasks. As of
today, 8 of the 11 agreed tasks have been completed, including all
agreed tasks at the reprocessing plant and the fuel fabrication plant.
Discharge of the nearly 8,000 fuel rods from the core of the 5-MW(e)
reactor continues, with over 4,000 rods discharged, but progress has
been slower than anticipated.
Equipment developed by DOE/NNSA has been installed at the 5-MW(e)
reactor to monitor the fuel rods as they are discharged. As a result of
these disablement actions, we estimate that it would take North Korea a
significant amount of time, upwards of 1 year or more, to reconstitute
a plutonium production capability at Yongbyon. Of course, North Korea's
pledge to abandon all existing nuclear programs extends beyond the
plutonium production plants at Yongbyon. It also includes other nuclear
facilities or activities to be subject to verification as agreed by the
Six Parties.
Working-level cooperation between U.S. teams and their North Korean
counterparts has been generally constructive. Our experts have been
able to: perform maintenance on installed monitoring equipment; access
the spent fuel pond to measure water temperature, clarity, and pH
levels; and access the reprocessing plant and fuel fabrication plant to
verify that completed disablement tasks remain in effect. Our working-
level relationship with IAEA inspectors monitoring the shutdown at
Yongbyon also has been very strong.
As Ambassador Hill has noted, the Six-Party Talks are moving toward
Phase Three activities, including negotiation of a comprehensive
verification protocol and negotiation of dismantlement and fissile
material removal measures. DOE/NNSA will continue to provide policy and
technical support to these negotiations, and we stand ready to
implement agreed verification measures and other tasks as requested by
the Six Parties.
While we have been actively planning to support implementation of
Phase Three, it is difficult to predict the full scope and schedule of
Phase Three activities. The Six Parties have agreed that verification
will include access to facilities, documents and personnel, and we
anticipate that DOE/NNSA will be called on to undertake technical
measures to implement the verification process. The Six Parties
continue to work on negotiating a comprehensive verification protocol
outlining the full scope of verification activities. We hope to begin
agreed activities quickly once the protocol is in place. The North
Korean declaration and the more than 18,000 pages of operating records
provided by the DPRK provides a basis to initiate further verification
activities. We anticipate that verification will proceed in parallel
with other Phase Three activities, which we hope will include
dismantlement of facilities and removal of the DPRK's fissile and other
nuclear materials.
Although the exact details of Phase Three are yet to be negotiated,
our planning assumption is that DOE/NNSA will be called upon to support
implementation of comprehensive verification and denuclearization
measures. To plan for something less than this and then be caught
unprepared is unacceptable.
We anticipate that the costs of implementing Phase Three activities
will be substantially higher than the costs of Phase Two. To date, DOE/
NNSA has spent approximately $15 million in support of Phase Two
implementation. In addition, the State Department's Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund (NDF) has provided assistance of approximately $20
million for the costs of completing the disablement activities in Phase
Two. NDF assistance has been necessary because DOE has been prohibited
by Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act--also known as the
Glenn Amendment--from providing financial assistance to the DPRK in
support of the denuclearization process.
By legislation recently enacted which provides the President with
the authority to waive Glenn Amendment restrictions, Congress has
addressed this problem and opened the door to a more substantial DOE/
NNSA role. If the President exercises this waiver authority, DOE/NNSA
will be able to procure, ship to North Korea, and use equipment
required to support the full range of disablement, dismantlement,
verification, and material packaging and removal activities that Phase
Three will likely entail.
If these activities begin soon and continue at a more rapid pace,
we estimate that the total implementation costs could amount to an
additional $34 million in fiscal year 2008 and over $360 million in
fiscal year 2009. The bulk of these costs relate to packaging and
disposition of separated plutonium and spent fuel at Yongbyon, but they
also cover implementation of critical measures necessary to verify
North Korea's nuclear declaration and ensure our teams on the ground
have adequate protective equipment and health physics support. The cost
to the U.S. Government of this effort will largely fall on DOE/NNSA, as
the lion's share of verification work involves the time and expertise
of technical specialists from DOE/NNSA.
I would like to conclude by reiterating our strong commitment to
supporting U.S. efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. Through the Six-Party process, we have achieved
tangible progress towards this goal, and our dedicated staff of
technical experts remains ready to provide whatever additional support
may be required as the process moves forward.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Tobey. We're going
to do a 7-minute round and try to complete the questioning
during a first round so that we can go to S-407.
Ambassador, in the 2005 agreement in which North Korea
agreed to denuclearize, did they agree to dismantle and destroy
their nuclear weapons? Was that part of the agreement?
Ambassador Hill. Yes, they did. That is right up at the top
of the agreement, all nuclear programs, specifically nuclear
weapons.
Chairman Levin. Not be ended, but they agreed that they
would dismantle and destroy those weapons?
Ambassador Hill. It was that they would be abandoned, and
``abandoned'' means taken out of the country. We don't have
information to say how much of the kilos of plutonium that they
have produced are actually embedded in weapons. But the point
is all separated plutonium must be abandoned.
Chairman Levin. Whether it's in weapons or otherwise?
Ambassador Hill. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Now, back in 2002 Ambassador James Kelly
confronted the North Koreans with evidence of a uranium
enrichment program, and Ambassador Kelly reported that the
North Korean foreign ministry representative acknowledged that
North Korea had such a program. Of course, there's been a great
deal of interest since then in trying to get a bead on that
program, and we have received a letter apparently from North
Korea which simply acknowledges U.S. concerns about uranium
enrichment, but reportedly it does not acknowledge the
existence of a program.
Has that letter been made public?
Ambassador Hill. That letter is part of the declaration
package that they gave us. Essentially what they have said is
that they do not now and will not in the future have a highly
enriched uranium program. They acknowledge our concerns about
it and also acknowledge the information, our information about
it.
What we have tried to do is to pursue with them our
information to run down the facts that we have. I think in
closed session I can go into greater detail, but suffice to say
in this context that we have in our view pretty compelling
evidence that they made certain purchases that were very much
in line with a uranium enrichment program. Our effort is to try
to find out the disposition of those purchases, and they have
tried to address some of our concerns with some of those
purchases and have not yet addressed some of our other
concerns. So it's a work in progress.
Chairman Levin. But in that letter they deny that they ever
have had one?
Ambassador Hill. They did not deny they ever had one. They
simply deny that they have one now.
Chairman Levin. Can that letter be made public?
Ambassador Hill. Let me get back to you on that. It is part
of the declaration package and it was given as part of the
package that was given to the six parties, and let me see how
that can be disseminated.
Chairman Levin. Well, we would appreciate your informing us
as to whether or not that letter can be made public and, if
not, why not.
Ambassador Hill. All right.
Chairman Levin. In your judgment, does that letter
constitute a complete declaration?
Ambassador Hill. What it constitutes is it provides a basis
for us to continue to work on that issue such that, since it
provides that basis, we can eventually make a judgment as to
whether we have a complete and correct declaration. But we
cannot make that judgment as of now. The letter obliges North
Korea to continue to work to address our concerns.
Chairman Levin. So that as of now we don't have a complete
declaration on the uranium issue?
Ambassador Hill. I cannot say that we do. I can only say
that after we address our concerns with them, and if they are
fully addressed then I can say, yes, it was complete. But I
cannot make that statement today.
[The information referred to follows:]
As part of North Korea's declaration package, the DPRK acknowledged
U.S. concerns relating to uranium enrichment. The entire declaration
package was provided to relevant congressional committees, including
the Senate Armed Services Committee. The declaration package is
classified, and therefore, cannot be publicly released.
Chairman Levin. You made reference in your opening
statement to the question of our recovery operations for the
remains of missing Korean War veterans and we appreciate your
reference to that. It's been an important subject that we press
very hard to get a satisfactory explanation from our Defense
Department as to why we have not resumed those recovery
operations, given the fact that the talks have resumed.
Your statement is that it's not yet appropriate to reengage
North Korea on these recovery efforts. Can you be a little more
explicit as to why it's not yet appropriate?
Ambassador Hill. Senator, first of all I want to make very
clear that my colleagues in the Defense Department need to
address specific questions about this. But I can certainly
answer the question as you've posed it to me.
I think one of the concerns is that we don't want a
situation where things are restarted, only to be stopped again.
The thinking here is foremost the humanitarian concerns about
the families. So when these efforts are restarted, we want them
to be sustained and not stopped again.
I can tell you, speaking from my vantage point, that I
would like to see if we can do that, but I'm very respectful of
my colleagues in the Department of Defense.
Chairman Levin. Can they run in parallel? Could these
efforts be done in parallel, the talks and the recovery efforts
going on at the same time?
Ambassador Hill. Again, I do not want to speak for my
colleagues in the Defense Department, but from my vantage point
that could be done.
Chairman Levin. Are North Korea's ballistic missiles
included in the Six-Party Talks?
Ambassador Hill. No, sir, they are not. I share the concern
of many people that we do need to get at their ballistic
missile program. They have been exporting missiles and missile
know-how to other countries and I think this is an issue that
does need to be addressed. There are many problems in that
country, as I alluded to in my statement, and what we have
tried to focus on is what we feel is the most imminently
dangerous problem, that is their nuclear program.
But I would certainly believe that missiles need to be
addressed at an early opportunity.
Chairman Levin. As part of these talks?
Ambassador Hill. Not directly as part of these talks, but
certainly as we go forward I would say that the Six Parties
need to address missiles. I would emphasize again, for the same
reason that we mentioned, in the issue of nuclear talks, that
missiles are not just a problem for the U.S. They are a problem
to all the other parties, and that's why it is appropriate to
raise those in the Six-Party context and why I also, as I
suggest in my testimony, address human rights issues as well.
This is not just a U.S. concern. This is part of the price of
admission to the international community and they need to
address that.
Chairman Levin. We very much welcome that focus on human
rights concerns. It's a very important part of any solution to
the problems on the peninsula and it also represents something
that America should always be in the lead in insisting upon.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
share your thoughts, as I'm sure other members of this panel
do, about the issue of human rights.
Since I will be joining you for the balance of this
hearing, I'll withhold my questions at this time and ask the
permission of the chair, which has been granted to me, to let
my time be used by my distinguished colleague Senator
Brownback, who is an acknowledged person with expertise in the
area of human rights. We're proud of him in the Senate for his
voice on that, not only with regard to the Korean Peninsula,
but elsewhere in the world.
Chairman Levin. We not only welcome Senator Brownback, but
we have always welcomed his focus on human rights. It's a very
important part of the U.S. Senate.
Senator Brownback.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
KANSAS
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
really appreciate this incredible privilege you're granting me
to be here today and join this distinguished panel, and my
colleague from Virginia for allowing me to step forward.
We all share the same concern. Ambassador Hill and I have
talked several times about human rights issues and I had some
frustration about that.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Sam Brownback
Mr. Chairman, ranking member, colleagues who serve on this
committee: I want to start by thanking you for giving me the
opportunity to join you today for this extremely important hearing. I
know that my colleagues who serve on this committee have focused on the
nuclear disarmament issues, and although I have numerous concerns about
the way this process has moved forward--whether by ignoring uranium,
proliferation to Syria, or even the deficiencies in the plutonium
declaration itself--my purpose here today is to determine what specific
steps the State Department has taken--is taking--and will take in the
future--to improve the disastrous human rights situation of the North
Korean people. I do not wish to take any more time than necessary, so I
will move straight to my questions.
Ambassador Hill, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you
today. Thank you for you service.
In the interest of time, almost all of these questions can be
answered with a simple yes or no response. My goal here is not to play
``gotcha.'' Most of the questions refer to U.S. law, international
conventions, or previous agreements or public statements.
Refugees:
1. Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act nearly 4 years
ago. That Act requires U.S. consular facilities to facilitate the
submission of applications for political asylum in the United States.
Nearly 4 years later, the United States has admitted just 60 North
Korean refugees, and according to credible reports from human rights
workers, our consular facilities are turning away North Korean refugees
as their gates.
a. Ambassador Hill, has the State Department failed to
execute this law, or is there a problem in understanding
Congress's legislative intent, even though the bill passed
unanimously?
b. Would you agree that turning away North Korean refugees is
contrary to at least the spirit of the law, if not the
statutory requirement?
2. Have you heard the estimates that up to 300,000 North Korean
refugees are living as fugitives in China, under the constant threat of
being trafficked or repatriation to face torture or death?
a. Can you understand why some Members of this Congress would
be dissatisfied at the admission of just 60 refugees?
3. I understand that it is the State Department's position that it
needs China's concurrence to let a North Korean into one of our
consular facilities in China to apply for asylum.
a. Does State believe that China is complying with its
obligations under the Refugee Convention it signed?
b. When, if ever, will State clarify its instructions on
North Korean asylum seekers for our consulates to better comply
with the law?
Famine:
1. Are you aware of the estimate by Andrew Natsios that 2.5 million
North Koreans may have died in the famine of the 1990s?
2. Have you read the research by Natsios, or by the experts Marcus
Noland and Stephan Haggard suggesting that those deaths could have been
prevented, but for the regime's misallocation of food and other
resources?
3. Are you aware of the call by Elie Wiesel and Vaclav Havel to ask
the U.N. for Chapter VI sanctions against North Korea for failure to
protect its population from famine?
4. Have you seen the reports this year, including reports by the
U.N. this very week, that North Korea has slipped back into famine?
5. Are you aware that despite the reports of famine, North Korea
has resumed construction on a 105-story, 4 million square foot hotel
for tourists in the middle of Pyongyang--a hotel that sat unfinished
for two decades until this year?
6. In your discussion of the normalization of relations--or in any
other context--have you raised any of these issues about North Korea's
failure to protect its population?
a. If so, when was this raised? What specific steps have been
taken to link this issue to normalization?
Gulags/Concentration Camps:
1. Have you ever asked the North Korean regime about the 200,000
men, women, and children believed to be in their concentration camps?
2. Have you ever asked them about estimates that some of those
camps have a 20 percent annual mortality rate, or the reports of
widespread torture, starvation, and arbitrary executions there? If so.
when, and how many times have you brought this up?
3. Have you ever asked them about allegations that they test
chemical and biological weapons on political prisoners in those camps?
4. You were interviewed by the L.A. Times for a report that was
published on March 4, 2008. The interviewer asked you about the
relationship between the establishment of diplomatic relations and
human rights. You said, ``Obviously we have continued differences with
them, but we can do that in the context of two states that have
diplomatic relations.'' Do you recall that response?
5. Will you state on the record here today, and follow up in
writing, that any prospect for normalization with North Korea is
contingent upon the regime shutting down the political gulags and
concentration camps?
Normalization/Diplomatic Relations:
1. Have you ever told the North Koreans when you expect the U.S. to
begin the process of establishing diplomatic relations with NK?
2. Have the North Koreans ever told you when they will let the Red
Cross visit any of those concentration camps?
3. Have you ever asked--or have they ever told you--when North
Koreans will be able to speak, think, or worship freely?
4. Have the North Koreans told you when they will allow the World
Food Program and USAID full and free access to their starving people?
5. Have they given you any promises, benchmarks, or deadlines about
casing the oppression of their people?
6. Has the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea ever been
invited to take a place at the negotiating table in our normalization
working group?
a. Will you state for the record that the Special Envoy will
be invited to all future negotiating sessions with the North
Koreans as a way of carrying out the NIC Human Rights Act and a
way of firmly linking human rights?
Lifting of Sanctions/Trade:
1. Do you agree that lifting sanctions will make North Korea
eligible to export certain goods to the United States? (If no, do you
foresee that NK will be able to export goods to the U.S. in the next 3-
5 years?)
2. Are you aware of the prohibition in the Tariff Act, at 19 U.S.C.
Sec. 1307, against landing any goods made with forced labor in U.S.
ports?
3. You're aware that North Korea is a Tier III country for human
trafficking?
4. Which means that North Korea does not fully comply with minimum
standards for the elimination of human trafficking--which includes
slave labor--and is not making significant efforts to do so.
5. If the North Korean regime were to attempt to land merchandise
in our ports, what plans are in place to verify that the goods were not
made in one of those concentration camps?
6. Have you made North Korea aware of the Tariff Act's
prohibitions?
Abduction of U.S. Resident Reverend Kim Dong-shik:
I'd like to ask you about the case of Rev. Kim Dong-shik. who was
abducted in 2000 from northeastern China and taken to North Korea for
interrogation and imprisonment, [hold up picture] As I hope you now
recall, he had raised the ire of the North Korean government by helping
its citizens flee torture and repression and by attempting to convert
North Korean athletes who attended the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta.
When you came to my office in November of last year, I personally
handed you the letter from Mrs. Kim, Rev. Kim's wife. Back in January
28, 2005, the entire Illinois delegation, including Senators Durbin and
Obama wrote to the North Korean ambassador that ``We view Rev. Kim Dong
Shik as also being a hero who assisted with the escape of the powerless
and forgotten . . . we will NOT [capitalized in the letter] support the
removal of your government from the State Department list of State
Sponsors of Terrorism until such time, among other reasons, as a full
accounting is provided to the Kim family regarding the fate of the Rev,
Kim Dong-Shik following his abduction into North Korea 5 years ago.''
[hold up letter]
1. Have you raised Rev. Kim's matter with the North Koreans
in any of the many meetings you have had with the North
Koreans?
2. What do you say to his wife, a US legal permanent
resident, and to his children who are U.S. citizens, who in
testifying before this Congress last month begged for an
explanation as to how North Korea could be removed as a state
sponsor of terror without her either being told exactly what
had happened to her husband, let alone her receiving his
remains for her to bury so she could have some closure and so
he could rest in peace?
3. How long does the State Department believe she should have
to wait?
Helsinki Process:
Please state for the record if and when there will be a Human
Rights Framework established with respect to North Korea, that is
modeled on the Helsinki Process, which explicitly links human rights
with security concerns.
Senator Brownback. Ambassador Hill, I appreciate your
specific statement--I've read it in the record; I'm sorry I had
to step out briefly while you were in the middle of that--on
human rights. I would like for you to drill down on the
specifics on this, though, for me, and I just want to ask you
when and in what setting will specific issues of human rights
be negotiated between the United States and North Korea, either
in the Six-Party Talks or in some side setting?
Ambassador Hill. First of all, we have raised the issue
many times with our interlocutors. The issue that you're
addressing, though, is the crucial issue, how do we negotiate
things and, frankly, what are we going to be negotiating. So
what we want to do as we go forward into this next phase is we
would like to set up our working group where we address the
DPRK-U.S. relationship. In specific terms address human rights
issues.
Now, this would involve a human rights dialogue of the kind
we've had with other countries. It doesn't mean that a human
rights dialogue is going to solve this problem, but it is a
start to set up a dialogue and to begin to address the issue of
prisoners of conscience, people who have been summarily put
into prison, to try to address that, and also begin to address
the issues of how their judiciary functions.
We are prepared to do that on a systematic basis as part of
our overall effort at normalization, with the understanding
that we do not normalize with North Korea absent a nuclear
deal.
Senator Brownback. In the next set of dialogues this will
be a formal part of the negotiations?
Ambassador Hill. The plan is to make this a formal part of
our series of meetings with the North Koreans, in our so-called
bilateral working group, human rights would be riveted into
that bilateral working group.
Senator, I want to again emphasize, human rights is not
just for the United States. Other countries also have a human
rights issue. I know that Japan will also raise this in their
bilateral working group. Ideally, Senator, I would like to see
it raised in a plenary. I can't get all of the parties to agree
to that. But we will raise this systematically in our bilateral
working group.
Senator Brownback. Ambassador Hill, there's a Special Envoy
for Human Rights in North Korea, which I don't believe has been
invited to any of the negotiations to date between the United
States and the Six-Party Talks.
Ambassador Hill. Well, first of all, he would be most
welcome if he wishes to attend.
Senator Brownback. I want to, because my time will be
narrow here: will you state that the Special Envoy will be
invited to all future negotiating sessions with North Korea?
Ambassador Hill. I would be happy to invite him to all
future negotiating sessions with North Korea.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, you noted this earlier, that there are
political gulags and concentration camps in North Korea. Will
you state that any prospect of normalization with North Korea
is contingent upon the regime shutting down the political
gulags and concentration camps?
Ambassador Hill. I can say to you, Senator, that we will
definitely raise these issues as an element of the
normalization process. I'm not in a position at my level to
state to you today what the specific conditions of
normalization were, but they will be raised as part of that and
clearly, we will be looking for more satisfactory answers on
this.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Ambassador, the Illinois delegation
in total in a letter dated in 2005--noted the abduction of
Reverend Kim Dong Shik, who's a U.S. citizen, and his wife is
an Illinois resident, children U.S. citizens. I'm going to
enter this letter in the record. It's from the Illinois
delegation. They have said they would not support any
normalization with North Korea until his abduction is dealt
with.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Brownback. Are you familiar with this particular
case?
Ambassador Hill. Yes, I am. I received a letter from his
wife and I've answered it and offered to meet with them
directly.
Senator Brownback. Will you raise that with the North
Koreans?
Ambassador Hill. Yes, I'm happy to do so, as I have done
for the Japanese.
Senator Brownback. It seems like this case is very similar
to the Japanese that were abducted. Now, he has been a human
rights advocate and really an underground railroad hero helping
people out of North Korea. I think in the history of the Korean
Peninsula his name will go down famously. It's just my hope and
prayer that he's still alive and that he's somebody that we can
get out.
Ambassador Hill. Senator Brownback, these are truly
horrific stories and they are ones that I think require us to
pursue them. I'm just pulling out of my wallet the list of the
Japanese abductees that I carry. These are their pictures. I've
raised these on individual terms with the North Koreans, and
I'm most happy to raise his case specifically to see if we can
find out what has happened to him.
The number taken from Japan is something between 12 and 20.
The government is looking at those cases. Nongovernmental
Organizations (NGOs) feel it's more. If you look at some of the
numbers in South Korea, it's a lot more. There are a lot of
South Korean fishermen, for example, who were caught and never
returned, and it was never explained what happened to them.
These all need to be pursued.
I think the best way to do this is to set up a process
where we are talking about normalization. We will address these
issues in the context of normalization, because I think the
North Koreans need to understand. We need to establish a level
of effort. We need to show the North Koreans this stuff is
important to us. When they understand it's important to us and
they understand that it's things they have to do in order to
get what they want, I think it's a better way to proceed.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and my
colleagues for this deferential treatment in allowing me to be
here, and I want to thank you, Mr. Hill, for your direct
answers to me.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Senator Brownback. I associate
myself with the concern you have on these issues. Thank you
very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Brownback, for
your focus on these issues. It's really critically important
and I know you speak for so many of us when you speak about
them.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Hill, Mr. Tobey, thanks so much for your
service. An expression of parochial pride in Mr. Tobey since
he's a resident of Connecticut, where I know he looks forward
to returning, and we will welcome him.
We talked earlier about the fact that in some ways we will
know some years from now about how significant the breakthrough
is that you've achieved with the North Koreans through the Six-
Party Talks. But essentially, they have an opportunity that
they've been given to become part of the community of civilized
nations.
I want to ask you about one part of the agreement with the
North Koreans and that is the removal of North Korea from the
list, our list of state sponsors of terrorism. Frankly, I'm
concerned that was premature. I understand that this was a
first step. There had to be a quid pro quo. I think the removal
of North Korea from the U.S. sanctions as part of the Trading
With the Enemy Act was appropriate, the giving of more food was
appropriate.
But here's the basis of my concern. The North Korean
Government, as part of this recent agreement on June 10, issued
a statement that they do not support international terrorism
now and will not support international terrorism in the future.
But my question is whether there's any real basis for believing
that statement is true by the North Koreans.
I want to tell you what I'm concerned about, and I'm going
to cite a few reports that are public. The Congressional
Research Service, in a report earlier this year said: ``North
Korea's relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
of Iran (IRGC) appears to be in two areas, coordination in
support for Hezbollah and cooperation in ballistic missile
development.''
Still quoting: ``Reports also suggest that North Korea
cooperates with the IRGC and other Iranian entities in the
development of nuclear capabilities or nuclear weapons.''
A detailed report in the Los Angeles Times--it goes back, I
will say, about 5 years--nonetheless stated that ``Many North
Koreans are working on nuclear missile projects in Iran. There
is some evidence that the North Koreans have been supporting in
one way or another the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.''
There was a recent study completed and issued by the U.S.
Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth on the 2006
Lebanon War, that found evidence that North Korea had provided
various forms of support to the Lebanese Hezbollah, including
weapons and technical support.
So my question is whether the North Koreans' statement that
they're not involved in terrorism and won't be is actually
true, and therefore whether they've really earned removal from
the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Ambassador Hill. Senator, I think the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Dell Daley, should address some of these
issues. But I want to say to you that I am aware that all of
these allegations have been carefully looked at and it was the
judgment of this interagency process that North Korea qualifies
from the statute to be removed from the list.
All of these issues and these questions were very carefully
looked at. You are quite correct that there have been these
reports, but I know that they have taken each and every one of
these reports.
The last known incident of North Korean terrorism was the
explosion of a South Korean airliner in 1987. Prior to that it
was the bombing of the South Korean cabinet in Rangoon back in
1983. My understanding from our counterterrorism people is that
they do not have other examples since that time. Moreover,
North Korea has since signed on to U.N. declarations,
antiterrorism declarations.
My understanding, again from the experts, is that they
qualify on this matter. Now, with respect to the negotiation
issue of why did we agree to do this as part of the
negotiation, first of all, they wanted us to take away economic
sanctions against them and this would have resulted in the
inflow of things of monetary value to North Korea, and we
refused that. So what we've done is we're in the process of
negotiating an agreed on the removal from the list, state
sponsors of terrorism, provided of course that we get the
verification package that needs to be accompanied with their
declaration. That's where we are right now.
Senator Lieberman. You cited two instances which were both
direct North Korean acts of terrorism, as opposed to
sponsorship of other terrorist groups. I remain concerned about
it. I'm going to ask this question again in the closed session
we're going to have later this morning and perhaps would ask
that Mr. Daley come before the committee or meet with me to
pursue this, because it's easy enough to say it, but I want to
feel that we really have a verifiable understanding and will
monitor, because of the North Koreans' bad record here, that
they really have stopped supporting some of the groups, such as
the IRGC, that according to evidence presented by the U.S. Army
are responsible for training and equipping Iraqi extremists,
who in turn are responsible for murdering hundreds of American
soldiers.
I know that the law that creates the sponsor of terrorism
list is a vague law. But what North Korea has done in support
of terrorism is not vague, and I think we have a right to
expect, before we essentially say they're clean, that they
really are clean, not just that they're saying they're clean. I
look forward to discussing this in the closed session.
I do want to ask you one other question if the time allows.
I appreciate that you took out the pictures of the Japanese
abductees, and I'm concerned. I know, as you know very well,
that Japan is very concerned that we gave the North Koreans too
much too soon. ``Abductee'' is a word. I don't have to tell you
the stories, but these stories are unbelievable.
I mean, a Japanese school girl leaves her family in the
morning, goes to school, and the North Koreans simply grab her
off the street and take her to North Korea, and her family
doesn't see her again. I mean, imagine if some foreign power
did this to American kids and others.
Japan is our most consistent, closest ally in the Asia
Pacific region, and they've now pulled back, as I understand
it, from the Six-Party Talks, only in the sense that they're
not, I gather, being part of the economic and energy assistance
to North Korea as part of this. I just want to invite you to
talk a little bit about that, because I worry that in going
forward with the agreement as we have with North Korea we're
jeopardizing the real rock of our relations in Asia, which is
Japan.
Ambassador Hill. Well, first of all, Senator, I want to
assure you that we cooperate very closely with the Japanese. We
work with them extremely closely, and especially on this
abduction issue. I have raised this issue. Virtually every time
I see the North Koreans, I raise the Japanese abduction issue,
and I've done it in very specific terms with them.
Second, with respect to the issue of the de-listing on the
terrorism list, before we did that we worked very closely with
the Japanese on what would constitute, from their vantage
point, progress so that we would make sure that as we move
forward in the overall denuclearization process they are also
moving forward. We reached, with the Japanese, an understanding
of what progress would be, and I raised this with the North
Koreans in very specific terms: what we would need them to do
vis-a-vis Japan.
This was part of the package. Senator, I completely agree
with you, these are horrific, horrific human tragedies. It is
frankly appalling what went on at this time. This was clearly
an organized abduction program. It lasted several years from
the late 1970s, early 1980s. There is no excuse for this sort
of thing, I completely agree with you.
What we are trying to do is make progress on that. But at
the same time, we are really trying to get this plutonium
program shut down, because we had a problem where they were
producing plutonium. We did not want to just have a situation,
as we did in the past, where we got them to shut it off, and
that's what we did a year ago, we got them to shut it off. We
wanted to make sure it's disabled so that even if they wanted
to bring it back up, it would be very difficult.
That's what we're trying to do. Of course these things
involve painful choices, Senator. I have met with many of these
abductee families. I have met with the same in South Korea.
This is an area of the world that just has had tragedy of the
type that I think for many Americans is hard to understand. So
it is not an easy process.
But what I can assure you--and I have said this on many
occasions to the North Koreans directly--we are not going to
see ourselves in a situation where we are going forward with
you while causing problems with our very good ally Japan.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that assurance. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First let me once again commend Ambassador Hill. Senator
Lieberman takes parochial pride in Mr. Tobey. Let me assert the
same prerogative for Ambassador Hill, who is a native of Rhode
Island, who was educated in Rhode Island, and who was recently
honored with an honorary degree from the University of Rhode
Island.
But Ambassador Hill, you've done a remarkable job and only
history will tell whether the negotiations within the
administration were as difficult as the negotiations with the
North Koreans. But we'll let history, a few years from now,
make that judgment.
I think Senator Lieberman raised some very interesting
questions along the lines of the terrorism list. But I would
point out that while the Agreed Framework was in place the
North Koreans were on the terrorism list, and unfortunately one
of the prices of getting back to where we were several years
ago is this new decision by the administration to remove them
from that list.
The other issue, which I think we'll go into in more
detail, is that the premise for taking apart the Agreed
Framework was the issue of highly enriched uranium, which still
proves elusive in terms of determining what they were doing and
what they might be doing right now. So that is sort of a
prologue.
But let me just ask a question and clarify what you said, I
think, previously. If this process is successful, there will be
a full accountability of their plutonium and removal of the
plutonium, including those bits of plutonium which have been
weaponized, is that correct?
Ambassador Hill. That's absolutely correct.
Senator Reed. I know this is very difficult, but do you
have a sense of how long this might take in terms of the
process going forward?
Ambassador Hill. That is very difficult to assess. One of
the reasons we're working on a step by step basis is the North
Koreans, first of all, aren't very good at taking large leaps.
They prefer small steps. So a lot of people felt they would not
have shut down and disabled the Yongbyon facility. Yet they did
it. But they only did it because we moved them along, first
through just shutting it down.
We are committed, however, to completing this job, and we
would like to be able to rule out any ongoing uranium
enrichment program. They claim they do not have an ongoing
uranium enrichment program--if we are able to continue on this
disabling of Yongbyon, and we believe we are continuing on this
disabling of Yongbyon, they will have a certain amount of
plutonium, which we can talk about in closed session. They have
to assess whether that pile of plutonium, whether it's in
weapons or just in someone's pockets, whether that's worth not
having recognition from the United States, whether that's worth
not having any access to international financial institutions,
whether that's worth not having a peace treaty on the Korean
Peninsula to try to replace the armistice, whether that's worth
not having the eventual Northeast Asia peace and security
mechanism.
They have to gauge whether this pile of plutonium they have
is, frankly, worth holding onto. My hope is that as they get
down to just this pile of plutonium, with a completely disabled
Yongbyon facility, they will understand what this is really
costing them.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Ambassador, the International Atomic Energy Agency is
participating with you. Is it the hope that in the long term,
North Korea will be a non-weapons state party to the
nonproliferation regime and that the IAEA will be actively
engaged with us?
Ambassador Hill. It's not only our hope; it's expected. In
the September 2005 statement they have committed to return to
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with IAEA safeguards. So in
order to do that, they have to cooperate with the IAEA. The
North Koreans are very skeptical of the IAEA. We've made it
very clear that they have to have a role in this process and we
have an ongoing negotiation with them as we speak to try to
address that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. That, by the way, I
think would be maybe even a new lease on life on the
nonproliferation regime, if you could bring them back from the
dark side.
Mr. Tobey, the administration has failed to ask for any
money to implement the Six-Party Talks in either fiscal year
2008 or fiscal year 2009. We have included in the National
Defense Authorization Bill $50 million for NNSA. Does the
administration plan to include a request in any supplemental?
Otherwise, this is all very good rhetoric, but without the
resources you're not going to be able to do your job.
Mr. Tobey. Yes, Senator. As I outlined, the costs going
forward could be substantially more than what we've incurred to
date. There has been a high degree of uncertainty as to exactly
when we would incur those costs. As Ambassador Hill has
outlined, we've had a series of joint statements which have
been helpful in moving progress forward, but it has been
somewhat slower than we had at one point hoped for.
For example, there was, I believe, a commitment by the
north to submit a declaration by the end of 2007, and of course
it was much later that we actually got the declaration.
It's very difficult to ask others within our Department to
budget within the regular budget process substantial amounts of
money that we are highly uncertain as to whether or not we
could actually spend. In my discussions with other members of
the administration and with the Office of Management and
Budget, I have made the point--and as far as I can tell there
has been general agreement--that extraordinary expenditures
which can't be reliably predicted, but are clearly in the
national interest, are just the sort of thing for which a
supplemental request might be useful.
I would anticipate that if in fact we do go forward and can
move forward at a very rapid pace, allowing us to spend these
large amounts of money, something like that would be
anticipated.
Senator Reed. Just in terms of timing, the issue of a
supplemental here is very much up in the air. This I think is
something that the administration has to lead on, and the
timing is very uncertain.
Let me ask, Ambassador Hill, just a concern that you might
have, that there is some movement by the North Koreans, that we
can't rapidly support because the funds are unavailable. Not
only will we look a little silly, but that will give them an
excuse to begin to walk away from something difficult that
they've chosen to do.
Ambassador Hill. I think we have to be prepared for a lot
of eventualities, even the one where North Korea moves faster
than we expect. That has not tended to be our problem, but I
think you're absolutely right, we have to be prepared for that.
I think we are tracking this very carefully, and I think we
would be in a position to respond. So I think we do share your
concerns about that.
It was, for us, very important when they began the
disabling action. Often this isn't talked about, but they're
not even doing maintenance in that facility. That facility is
falling apart and that's exactly what we want it to do. So we
certainly want to be prepared as we move to the dismantlement
and get critical components out of there.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome to you, Mr. Tobey and Ambassador
Hill, to the Senate committee here. I'd like to talk about
something a little different and that's about money and about
costs. Mr. Tobey, you have projected the costs of Phase Three
of the denuclearization process, to be an additional $34
million for fiscal year 2008, and more than $360 million in
fiscal year 2009. This is in addition to the $35 million
already spent during Phase Two.
While few doubt the importance of allocating resources to
ensure a nuclear-free North Korea, it seems we are bearing a
large share of the costs. So my question to you, Mr. Tobey, is
what financial commitments have the other countries involved in
the Six-Party Talks made thus far, and are they willing to
contribute comparable amounts as compared to their respective
gross domestic products over the coming 2 years?
Mr. Tobey. Senator, I think you raise a very good point. I
tried to be careful in my statement to talk about the costs
that could be incurred, but not necessarily to talk about the
funding sources for those costs. I would defer to Ambassador
Hill in a moment to discuss what might have been talked about
with other members of the Six-Party Talks. But I would note
that, because of the actions of Congress, our nonproliferation
programs are generally able to accept contributions from other
countries; that we have received substantial contributions,
which we have put to use elsewhere in the world to detect,
secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear material.
I think it would be entirely possible and appropriate for
other countries to bear some portion of these costs. But the
actual negotiation of that process I think would be more in
Ambassador Hill's domain than in mine.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Hill, would you comment further
on that?
Ambassador Hill. Well, again, as I said to Senator Reed, we
have really tried to project out what this third phase might
look like. Now, I must say as someone who's been negotiating
the second phase, which went on far longer than we wanted, if
we can get to that third phase and we can get agreement on some
of the elements that we need. Those are problems I would love
to have, because we have really had real troubles getting
through this disablement and the third phase would envision
dismantlement and abandonment of these weapons.
But I don't want to speak for my colleagues, Acting Under
Secretary John Rood or Acting Assistant Secretary Patty
McNereny, but my understanding is that they have had a very
careful look at how we're going to be able to manage this.
Senator Akaka. Continuing on verification, Ambassador Hill,
many of the critics of the Six-Party Talks have pointed to a
North Korean regime that is untrustworthy. In response to these
criticisms, you have been reported as saying: ``This has
nothing to do with trust; this has everything to do with
verification.''
Do you still agree with this view and if so has North
Korean transparency, concerning its nuclear program, developed
to the point where verification of their declarations would
indeed be possible?
Ambassador Hill. You might make an agreement at the table
that we'll do something and they'll do something, but the real
issue is can we verify their declaration package on nuclear
materials. So we cannot place any trust in that. We have to be
able to verify.
It's our belief that, assuming we get a protocol of
international standard that involves what we need in terms of
site visits, in terms of access to documents, in terms of
access to their personnel, and to make sure that our people are
allowed to do what they would do in any other protocol in any
other part of the world--and that's what we're negotiating with
the North Koreans, and those are pretty firm positions on our
part--we should be able to take samples, for example, and we
should be able to determine that the number they gave us in
plutonium is correct.
It's very important that we be able to do that, because we
cannot come back to this committee, to Congress, and say that
they've given us something that makes sense. We have to be able
to verify it. Fortunately, thanks to a lot of modern
technologies, we should be able to verify the statements that
they've made to us.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Hill, during a recent talk at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies you mentioned an
idea of establishing a new regional framework for Northeast
Asia that could expand upon the Six-Party process. In
particular, you mentioned membership considerations for a more
permanent mechanism, that the Six-Party Talks could be the
precursor of, and that both China and Russia had discussed this
idea with Secretary Rice as well.
My question to you is, is this something that has been
discussed with the remaining states involved in the Six-Party
Talks and do you see this involving all the major states in the
region?
Ambassador Hill. Absolutely. We believe we've made some
progress on the Six-Party process and framework, with the
understanding that we need to make more progress. But we would
like to keep that framework together and maybe have it exist at
first as a forum to discuss regional security issues, and
eventually to broaden it and to bring in some other countries
that are also interested in being part of sort of a
neighborhood in Northeast Asia.
Now, in fact, in the Six-Party process we set up a working
group to address this issue--we don't want a situation where
anyone is concerned that somehow the creation of this very new
concept, and at this point not very well defined concept, we
don't want this in any way to be seen as replacing the
bilateral alliances that we have in the region. That is the
bedrock, that is the basis for us being there, are these
bilateral relationships.
We would see this as complementing them, but by no means
replacing them. So we have talked to all of our partners in the
Six-Party Talks. The enthusiasm for pursuing this Six-Party--
this peace and security mechanism, varies. Some partners have
felt it's a little premature to be discussing the principles of
it yet; we still have denuclearization to deal with. Others
have felt it's time to get on with this. Asians often look at
other parts of the world and they say: Wait, are we doing
enough to foster a sense of community with multilateral
structures.
I think opinions are mixed, but I think it was unanimous at
the last Six-Party meeting that we should begin a discussion of
principles, with the understanding that, with respect to North
Korea, we cannot conclude anything until we denuclearize North
Korea.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Ambassador Hill, I know this is a tough, tough job, and we
thank you for your steadfastness in undertaking it. I think
you're wise to talk about verification. Some have tried to
point out that, I think, and today some are taking inconsistent
positions about verification. Isn't it true that during
President Clinton's attempt to work with and develop a more
peaceful relationship with the North Koreans, which I didn't
oppose, we discovered they were conducting activities seriously
in conflict with what they were publicly saying?
Ambassador Hill. That is correct, Senator. They appeared to
be pursuing a uranium enrichment program, and this was
something noted by our experts, and at the time when we had a
so-called Agreed Framework which acted to freeze their
plutonium production. So indeed this speaks to the issue of
trust and speaks even more clearly to the issue of
verification.
Senator Sessions. Well, it was a big deal. So while we were
trying to negotiate a plutonium issue they were setting about
secretly in direct violation of what they were saying publicly
and to us.
Ambassador Hill. I think that's a fair statement.
Senator Sessions. Well, as a result of that President Bush
pulled back, and he was roundly criticized by the people who
today are criticizing you, some of them at least, for not being
able to verify everything that goes on. But he moved forward in
2002 with Jiang Zemin and the Chinese and the Six-Party Talks,
and frankly it looks like you're beginning to make some
progress. I think we all ought to be cautious, but we all ought
to be thankful that we have a President who's been firm in
trying to make sure we're verifying what we are doing and not
allow us to be too much manipulated by the North Koreans.
It's just a tragic thing that they seem to be so obsessed
with negotiation and gameplaying and manipulation when their
people are in such horrible shape, that starvation is again
arising as a specter. It's just an international tragedy. It's
just unbelievable to me that this nation, with such great
potential, is in this state.
I think you were wise to acknowledge Senator Warner. 55
years ago he served as a marine as part of the Korean War. I
was honored to be invited by former Secretary William Cohen to
the Defense Department to have a dinner with Senior Minister
Lee from Singapore, and he told the story that some of us may
have thought we did not succeed in Vietnam, but he ticked off
Singapore and Taiwan and Hong Kong and the Philippines and
Malaysia and South Korea as free, independent, progressive
states, and that that was part of the result of what we've
done.
Just a few years ago, I just have to note, Senator Warner,
the South Koreans invested $1 billion in my home State of
Alabama to build an automobile plant that has 4,000 direct
employees and more indirect employees that that, paying our
citizens high wages to produce a high quality, energy efficient
automobile. So this is a remarkable thing that history has
taught us, that sometimes it takes years for our actions to pay
off.
Sometimes do you think we think in too short terms,
Ambassador Hill?
Ambassador Hill. Oh, now and again, but I waited 86 years
for my baseball team to win. [Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. Let me just briefly ask you to tell us
what you could tell us in open session about the North Koreans
and their actions involving the Syrian nuclear reactor that was
attacked by Israel recently. What can you say to give any
assurances that this kind of activity won't happen again?
Ambassador Hill. Obviously, this is an issue of very great
concern, given the amount of evidence to support our conviction
that we had a serious problem of proliferation of technology.
So in addressing this with the North Koreans, they have
acknowledged our information and very much our concerns on
this. They have declared to us that they do not now have any
programs involving nuclear proliferation. They have also said
they will not in the future.
These are declarations. So what we have done is, first of
all, these declarations are contained in a Six-Party
instrument, meaning that they have made them to us, but they've
also made them to all of their neighbors, as of October 2007.
To the best of our information, this declaration is accurate.
As of October 2007, it is accurate. It would not have been
accurate to describe the past.
What we did, and as recently as 2 weeks ago, in China when
the heads of delegations met in the Six-Party process, we
agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism at the level of head
of delegation, a monitoring mechanism whereby we will continue
to monitor and we put in specific terms the commitment to
nonproliferation.
What does that mean by monitoring? It will essentially be
an information-sharing ability, and any time we see examples of
this we will bring it to the Six Parties as an example of
noncompliance with commitments made.
At this point, I don't want to get into the hypothetical of
``what if we find something,'' but I can tell you we will
definitely raise it, and it will obviously be a very serious
matter, not just for us but for all the other countries that
were part of that agreement.
Senator Sessions. I would hope that we would take decisive
action if they do anything like that again.
Could you tell us, based on the time you've been there and
been a part of this effort, is there any realistic prospect
that North Korea could see what's happened to their brothers to
the south and the progress that other nations are making and
that this leadership could somehow alter its course that's been
so devastating to the people of Korea and so dangerous for the
world and actually begin to participate with the decent nations
of the world?
Ambassador Hill. Senator, I think this is really the
fundamental question. I think North Korea needs to understand
that their security and their well-being will depend on their
willingness to open up. By that I mean not just economically,
which is important, but also they need to open up to allow
their people the freedoms that other people have. I think human
rights really do need to be seen as part of this overall issue,
where as long as they deny human rights and as long as they
deny really the rights that I think other people all over the
world expect, this is going to be a serious drag on their
ability to create a more successful economy.
I think from the point of view of their leadership, they're
trying to walk a very narrow path. They're very concerned about
opening up in the ways that we think they have to do, because
they feel that somehow to do that would be to destabilize the
place. At the same time, they can't stay closed because in this
information world we live in, they simply cannot survive as a
completely closed society. They're afraid of their survival as
an open society and they understand they can't survive as a
closed society. So they're walking a very narrow path.
I think it's in our interest to try to point this out to
them and explain to them that, with the understanding that if
they denuclearize, we're prepared to help them on this path,
we're prepared to help widen this path for them, and they
shouldn't fear change, they shouldn't fear that we will somehow
look to destabilize them. We will be prepared to work with
them, but we cannot work with them as long as they continue to
have nuclear weapons. It is simply unacceptable in so many
different ways and we have to get at that problem.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you both for the work you've been doing,
that's so important to the United States and to the world.
Ambassador Hill, I want to focus on the relationship
between North and South Korea and the framework of the Six-
Party Talks. First of all, I recall at the beginning of the
Six-Party Talks that many criticized the lack of direct
engagement between the United States and North Korea. I believe
that the wisdom of the Six-Party Talks has been proven by the
participation of China in such a vital way, as well as the
engagement of neighbors that needed to be at the table, like
Japan and South Korea particularly.
But I wonder if you would comment on the North-South
relationship in the framework of the Six-Party Talks?
Ambassador Hill. If you think of the Six-Party Talks as not
only a forum, but essentially a platform on which you can have
a number of different configurations--you can have bilateral
talks within the Six-Party process and we've been doing a lot
of that with North Korea, especially as we're addressing issues
like the terrorism list, which is very much a bilateral issue--
we have found that countries that have had great difficulty
talking to each other directly are able to do so within the
Six-Party process. For example, North Korea and Japan were not
talking for a long time, but did so within the Six-Party
process. So it's clearly been a mechanism that has helped
soften some of the very difficult bilateral problems.
Now, with respect to North and South Korea, of course they
had a parallel structure known as a North-South Process, and
this process has not gone well lately. If you ask the North
Koreans, they criticize the South Korean government for, in the
North Korean view, taking a harder line with them. But I think
if you talk to the South Koreans, our allies in this, what they
have really tried to do is to ensure that as they do things for
North Korea in this North-South Process, they expect some
things to be done by the North Koreans. They want this to be a
two-way street.
They have raised some issues that haven't been raised
before and the North Koreans have not taken this well. So the
South Koreans have had, I think, to some extent a difficulty in
this North-South Process.
But I think from the point of view of South Korea, they
would like to reduce tensions on their peninsula. They would
like to see a North-South Process continue. If you looked at
the speech their President Lee Myung-Bak gave a couple of weeks
ago, it really was a clear statement that they want this
process of dialogue to continue.
I think they have continued to be able to talk to the North
Koreans in the Six-Parties even as this North-South Process has
become more difficult. From our vantage point, it's very
important that North and South continue to talk and continue to
address the instabilities on the peninsula. In particular,
there was a very ugly incident just a couple of weeks ago,
where you had a South Korean tourist in North Korea who,
according to the North Korean authorities, strayed from the
tourist enclave that was up in this Kumgang Mountain and, as a
result of allegedly straying from this tourist enclave, she was
shot several times by automatic rifle fire. Clearly this is
something that any government has to be extremely concerned
about, and the South Korean Government has been extremely
concerned about this.
Senator Martinez. That sounds like a very dramatic sort of
incident, the kind of thing that occurs in totalitarian, closed
societies like North Korea and others around the world.
One of the things I noted is that we're now providing food
aid to North Korea as part of this process. You mentioned in
your testimony about a strong framework to ensure the food will
reach those most in need. What is that framework, what are we
doing, and is the food reaching those in need?
Ambassador Hill. Well, first of all, it is not part of the
Six-Party process. It is based on our response to the World
Food Program's assessment that there is a very serious food
problem in North Korea today. It's caused by harvest failures,
which in turn were caused by flooding and other factors.
The U.S. agreed to provide 500,000 tons of food aid in the
framework of the World Food Program and also provided by
several American NGOs. We, the United States Government, put
together a protocol that they agreed to with the North Koreans,
which goes into great detail about certain aspects of how this
is going to be administered.
I think the key factor here, and it was very much of an
unprecedented factor, is the degree of monitoring of this
assistance. That is, we have an unprecedented number of
monitors who will ensure that the food gets to those in need.
Indeed, the first shipment was actually held up briefly because
of some disagreements on how it would be handled. We continue
to incur some of those problems. But we have made very, very
clear to the North Koreans that we cannot move without the
proper monitoring and, thanks to this protocol, which was
assiduously negotiated between our food experts and North
Korea, we can point to provisions throughout the document that
I think will allow us to go forward with this.
We really want to see this food aid delivered. There are
people starving. There are children who don't have enough food
in that country. If you look at the average height and weight
of North Korean children, it is a great tragedy. We want to be
part of the process of helping that.
Senator Martinez. What is the population of North Korea?
Ambassador Hill. The overall population of North Korea is
estimated at about 22 million people. One of the issues in the
food aid was to try to get to certain provinces where it was
the judgment of our experts that the harvest conditions had
been worse.
Senator Martinez. I know the human rights situation was
covered earlier. I was unfortunately not here, so I'm not going
to ask you to repeat. But perhaps just as a treetop kind of a
thing, do you believe that there is any progress on the human
rights front as it relates to North Korea?
Ambassador Hill. As I said in my statement, I think North
Korea's human rights record is abysmal and it needs to be
addressed. It needs to be addressed in some fundamental ways.
We have raised these issues with the North Koreans and we have
made clear that as we move toward some sort of--assuming
they're moving on denuclearization--I must be very clear with
you; denuclearization is of fundamental importance to us. As we
move forward, we would look to normalize our relationship with
North Korea, with the understanding that we do not normalize
unless they denuclearize.
As part of that normalization effort, we will have an
ongoing human rights process to address human rights concerns.
I must be very frank with you; the North Koreans don't like to
hear the term ``human rights.'' But that should not mean that
we shouldn't raise it.
I think from North Korea's point of view, they need to
understand this is not just an American issue; this is an
international issue. Every country has challenges in human
rights and I think the North Koreans need to understand that,
while their challenges are more than other countries, they need
to begin to address them. They cannot expect to be a member in
good standing in the international community sporting the human
rights record that they have today.
Senator Martinez. My time has expired, but just very
briefly, do you get any assistance from the other five members
of the Six-Party Talks on this issue?
Ambassador Hill. I do, actually. I think it's important to
have the North Koreans hearing this from someone besides me. I
have certainly talked to other participants. Some help is
greater than others.
Senator Martinez. Understood.
Ambassador Hill. But I think everyone understands it's
important to us and, frankly speaking, it's important to North
Korea to just understand that, like it or not, this is part of
the price of admission to the international community.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Hill.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. First I would express my appreciation to
the remarks of my colleague who just talked about the
historical importance of the American participation during the
Korean Conflict period, when we lost 37,000 killed and tens and
tens of thousands more than that wounded.
But it also raised in my memory the acknowledgment that we
owe to President Harry Truman, who had the foresight as
Commander in Chief of those forces that went in and made the
tough decision to see that freedom could well have been lost,
not only in the Korean Peninsula, but in many, as Senator
Sessions said, other smaller nations in that area. He was a
Democrat President and I was proud to, in a very modest way, be
just a youngster under his leadership as Commander in Chief.
But a Democrat President, and now a Republican President is
building on that foundation. I just think this is one of the
better hearings that we've had in some time, and I commend both
of you again for your service.
Why don't you take a little rest here for a minute,
Ambassador Hill. I want to talk a little with Mr. Tobey.
I'm particularly interested in the participation of the
IAEA in the Six-Party process.
Mr. Tobey. Well, Senator, as I outlined, there are IAEA
personnel at Yongbyon right now, and our people work closely
with them.
Senator Warner. That we know. But are they likely to stay
there for a period?
Mr. Tobey. That's my understanding, yes.
Senator Warner. What sort of attitude does North Korea have
towards the IAEA?
Mr. Tobey. My impression is that North Korea is not
favorably disposed toward the IAEA, although, as I've just
noted, they have allowed IAEA personnel present, to be present.
I think Ambassador Hill may wish to comment on this as well,
but at least for a time the North Koreans would often attempt
to turn this issue into a bilateral issue between the United
States and North Korea, and in particular that applied to
verification issues.
We in turn have equally tried to make sure that they
understood that this was really a multilateral issue and that
it necessarily would involve the IAEA as well, particularly
with respect to their return to the NPT, which they agreed to
in the September 19, 2005, joint statement.
Senator Warner. Did you wish to add anything to his
observations?
Ambassador Hill. No, I think that is correct. I think the
North Koreans have tried to bilateralize as much as possible.
We're prepared to do some things bilaterally, especially as we
have the strong Six-Party platform to do it. I think from the
point of view of the verification, we definitely want the IAEA
there and we want them to have a role, because ultimately the
objective here is to get them back in, back into the NPT. So
it's very appropriate that they be there.
But I also want to say that as we've gone forward with this
disablement of the facilities, I feel very good that every day
we have Americans working on behalf of our Government and our
Six Parties. As we sit here today, we have four Americans who
probably about now are tucking themselves into their guest
house in Yongbyon. So the fact that we have had the presence of
some four Americans, often colleagues of Will's from the
Department of Energy--they're courageous people, frankly.
They've been out there supervising this disablement and I'm
very pleased they're there.
As we go forward, I would like to see that the U.S.
continues to play this very important role, because as we worry
about verification I worry a lot less when I see Americans out
there.
Senator Warner. I might note, it's pretty cold up there
this time of year.
Ambassador Hill. It will be.
Senator Warner. It can get very cold over there.
Would you, Mr. Tobey, talk about the significance of
Congress taking action this spring in the context of the
budget, that is appropriations, waiving the Glenn Amendment so
that you have broader authority now?
Mr. Tobey. That was very significant, Senator Warner, and
we are quite appreciative of that action.
Senator Warner. Detail what that will enable you to do over
and above?
Mr. Tobey. Up until now, the activities have been funded
through the State Department and those funds are relatively
limited in their amounts. They've amounted to $15 or $20
million. The costs for packaging and removing the spent fuel
and plutonium and uranium would be substantially higher and
those were the costs that I spoke of earlier.
Because that amount of money would be spent by the NNSA, it
would make sense that in fact we not rely on those relatively
limited State Department funds. So allowing the Glenn Amendment
to be waived was an important step as we move forward.
Senator Warner. Ambassador Hill, going back to the 1953
armistice, people should recognize we never concluded that
conflict in a formal manner other than the armistice agreement.
That arrangement hopefully will be replaced by another
framework. Do you have any more information you can provide the
committee on that?
Ambassador Hill. That's exactly what we would like to do,
replace the armistice with a peace process. At this point I
want to reserve on the issue of whether we call it a treaty.
Senator Warner. Sure, I would, too.
Ambassador Hill. But we need a more durable peace process.
Of course, one of the key elements today is that ROK needs to
be, the Republic of Korea, needs to be in the forefront of that
peace process. They were not, of course, during the armistice
days in 1953, so that will be a change from how the armistice
was handled.
We have worked very closely with the South Koreans on how
that would work. I would say that if you look at the Six-Party
documentation on it, we use the term ``directly related
parties.'' It's a term of art, but it basically refers to four
countries: U.S., China, and North and South Korea. But we want
to make sure that Japan and Russia are also well informed. They
have interests there. But the actual peace process would be
conducted by these four countries.
Senator Warner. Wouldn't the U.N. have a role, given the
historical context?
Ambassador Hill. I think we've had a number of lawyers look
at this issue and I think our sense is that they would not play
a direct role, but at some point there would be a U.N.
imprimatur on it because of their direct role in 1953.
Senator Warner. I think that would be wise. I think it
would be very wise.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions until we go into
the executive session. I thank you again, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both. When you talk, Ambassador
Hill, about how good it is when you see Americans there at
Yongbyon, you throw me back to my memory, because in 1997 or
1998 I went to Yongbyon. They let me in and I walked in, and
there was an American from Texas who was I guess supervising
the canning of those rods at that time under the Agreed
Framework. That was a terrific sight. I actually saw those cans
in those pools.
Then when we pulled out of the Agreed Framework because of
the suspicions about their uranium program, and we pulled out I
guess in 2002 or 2003, whenever we pulled out, it was a real
step backward, I'm afraid. But that's part of the history.
You're working hard now to get us back on track. You have the
Yongbyon facility apparently, if not out of commission, just
about out of commission, and that is a good sight.
We again thank you both for all the work you've put in on
this. We will now adjourn to S-407, where we will begin in 10
minutes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
NORTH KOREAN DECLARATION
1. Senator Thune. Ambassador Hill, Ambassador John Bolton wrote in
a June 30, 2008 op-ed for the Wall Street Journal that the
administration has accepted a North Korean declaration that is
``narrowly limited, incomplete, and almost certainly dishonest in
material respects.'' How would you describe the North Korean
declaration?
Ambassador Hill. North Korea submitted a declaration to the
Chinese, as the chair of the Six-Party process, on June 26. In
conjunction with the declaration submission, China issued a statement,
which read, ``The Parties agreed that the declaration will be subject
to verification, and there is agreement within the Parties on a set of
principles to guide the establishment of a verification regime.''
This declaration package includes information about North Korea's
plutonium program, which has produced fissile material for its nuclear
weapons. As part of this package, the North Koreans acknowledged U.S.
concerns about uranium enrichment and proliferation activities. By
submitting this declaration, North Korea has begun to fulfill its
declaration commitment, but much more remains to be done.
After intensive talks on verification measures October 1-3, United
States and North Korean negotiators agreed on a series of verification
measures to be used for evaluating North Korea's declaration. We
understand that these measures will serve as the basis for a
Verification Protocol to be finalized and adopted by the Six Parties in
the near future and would allow Six-Party experts to assess the DPRK's
June 2008 nuclear declaration. The package agreed on by the United
States and North Korea provide that: experts from all Six Parties,
including experts from non-nuclear states, may participate in
verification activities; the IAEA will have an important consultative
and support role in verification; experts will have access to all
declared facilities, and based on mutual consent, to undeclared sites;
experts will be allowed to review documents, interview personnel
involved with the nuclear program, and use scientific procedures,
including sampling and forensic activities; and all measures contained
in the verification protocol will apply to the plutonium-based program
and any uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation activities.
2. Senator Thune. Ambassador Hill, is Ambassador Bolton's
description of the North Korean declaration as ``incomplete'' and
``almost certainly dishonest in material respects'' accurate?
Ambassador Hill. North Korea's provision of a declaration was an
important step toward fulfilling its declaration commitment.
Verification of the declaration has already begun with review of the
copies of over 18,000 pages of operating records from Yongbyon that
North Korea provided on May 8. Review of these operating records, which
date back to 1986, has already yielded useful data and will contribute
to the verification of North Korea's declaration. As we proceed with
verification, discrepancies that may arise in the declaration will have
to be satisfactorily explained and additional information provided as
necessary, in order for the declaration ultimately to be deemed
complete and correct.
At October 1-3 verification discussions in Pyongyang, the DPRK
agreed to a series of verification measures. The President has
determined that this agreement by the DPRK represents significant
cooperation concerning the verification of North Korea's
denuclearization actions.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the committee adjourned.]