[Senate Hearing 110-649]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-649
CHINA IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 4, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Christensen, Thomas J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement......................................... 8
Economy, Elizabeth C., Director of Asia Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations, New York, NY................................ 25
Prepared statement......................................... 27
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin........... 1
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator From Georgia.................. 3
Morrison, J. Stephen, Executive Director, Africa Program, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC........ 30
Prepared statement......................................... 32
Swan, James, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 6
Prepared statement......................................... 8
Appendix--Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responding to China in Africa, by David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman 49
(iii)
CHINA IN AFRICA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ
Feingold, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Nelson, Casey, Webb, Lugar, and
Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. We'll call the committee to order. Thank
you all for being here. The hearing will come to order.
I have had the privilege of traveling to Africa many times
over the 16 years that I've served in this subcommittee, and
I've often noted the tangible, prominent signs of China's
activities on the continent--new roads, sometimes ornate
government buildings, crowd-pleasing soccer stadiums, and the
growing numbers of Chinese-run factories and retailers.
Through its no-strings-attached approach and ability to
deploy state-owned assets, China has rapidly increased its
trade, investment, and influence in many sub-Saharan African
countries in recent years. I'm pleased to hold this hearing to
further examine this issue as China makes its interest in
Africa abundantly clear and as other emerging economies follow
its lead.
Two years ago, China held the Beijing Summit of the Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation, which served as a clear indication
of China's commitment to this part of the world. With leaders
of 48 African countries--including Sudan's Omar al-Bashir and
Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe--in attendance, Chinese President Hu
Jintao noted that China wants to be Africa's partner and
pledged to double his country's assistance to the continent by
2009 through a raft of new loans, development projects in
health, education, and agriculture, and debt cancellations.
The 2006 Sino-African Summit sparked concern in some
Western countries, where donors feared their efforts to improve
economic and political governance would be undermined by
China's unconditioned support.
Now, in theory, there should be no problem with this type
of increased cooperation and engagement. It is no secret that
many African nations are in great need of assistance when it
comes to building infrastructure and strengthening their
economies. However, this engagement does become more
problematic when it appears, and often is, devoid of the
critical underpinnings that help build robust, open societies.
To this end, it has not gone unnoticed that as the Chinese
identify and seize development and investment opportunities
across Africa, they are doing so to help secure their own
economic objectives, but often without concern for national
political dynamics and the consequences their engagement may
have on local populations.
Nonetheless, the United States must not fall into the trap
of believing that, simply because China is willing to provide a
package of assistance, enter into some partnership, or make
some investment, we need to try to beat the Chinese to the
punch. In some cases, it may not be economically feasible or
prudent for American companies to compete with Chinese state-
subsidized firms. In many other instances, loosening or
abandoning historic U.S. standards for democracy, governance,
and human rights to seize an opportunity would weaken our most
potent and unique leverage: Our fundamental values.
Compromising these principles will leave us with less
influence, over the long term, and limit our ability to build
lasting, productive partnerships for the pursuit of shared
objectives on the continent.
Where the Chinese are providing critical infrastructure
development, we should not attempt to compete with or obstruct
these efforts, but rather, we should seek to empower African
governments and communities to demand internationally
recognized standards with respect to the environment, human
rights, and product quality.
There are times, however, when China's actions need to be
condemned--for example, when they sell weapons to Sudan that
could be used to prolong the conflict in Darfur, or build new
power plants that support Robert Mugabe's repressive regime in
Zimbabwe. We, as an international community, should not
tolerate such reckless behavior, as it undermines global
efforts to bring peace and security to these countries. We
should be clear about the need to uphold international norms
and responsibilities and not provide soft loans as a
substitute.
So, in sum, I believe that the appropriate response to
China's rising role in Africa is more United States engagement
with both Africans and Chinese to show that we acknowledge the
growing strategic importance of this continent and are
committed, over the long term, to its stability, development,
and prosperity.
This morning's hearing will explore these issues in great
depth--what China is doing in African countries, why, and how,
as well as what implications this has for African and Western
countries, particularly the United States.
On our first panel, we will hear from the Deputy Assistant
Secretaries of State responsible for East Asia and Africa,
respectively. Tom Christensen will offer historical context for
China's economic, commercial, and political engagement on the
African Continent and insights from ongoing United States-China
senior dialogue. James Swan will follow with an Africa-focused
analysis of how Chinese activities on the continent affect
countries and United States interests there.
Our second panel will offer expert analysis, again from
both the Chinese and African viewpoints. Dr. Elizabeth Economy,
the senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council
on Foreign Relations, has written widely on Chinese domestic
and foreign policy and United States-China relations. She will
offer insights on the motivations behind China's growing
involvement in Africa and the challenges this presents for
China, African countries, and the United States. Next, Steve
Morrison, the executive director of the Africa Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, who has
recently returned from one of many trips to China to discuss
that country's Africa policy, will assess where Chinese and
United States interests converge in Africa, where they clash,
and what this means for United States foreign policy.
Thank you all for being here today. I am looking forward to
your testimony and engaging with you in a discussion of this
timely and complex issue.
At this time, I will invite my esteemed colleague and the
ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator Isakson, to make
his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold. And at
the risk--so I won't be redundant, I would just like to echo,
verbatim, the comments that you made with regard to Africa and
China and the very importance of the United States
relationship.
I just returned, in January, from a trip to Africa, and saw
firsthand both increased Chinese investment in its embassies
and engagement in Africa, as well as great efforts on behalf of
the United States of America in many countries in Africa, as
well. Africa is of critical interest to the United States, not
just strategically, not just because of its assets, because of
its great future. The promise of Africa is obviously ahead of
it. The American people have made a tremendous investment in
the AIDS initiative, the Millennium Challenge account and other
investments in Africa to improve the quality of life.
And I echo again what Chairman Feingold said with regard to
my disappointment with some of the engagements of the Chinese
in places like the Sudan and Darfur, where they've had some
engagement, without any strings attached. That's not in the
best interest either of those countries or of humanity.
So, I welcome our esteemed guests for being here today. I
look forward to the information we learn from them, and I thank
the chairman for calling this hearing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
We'll begin with the first panel.
Mr. Christensen. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Christensen. Thank you. The Department welcomes the
opportunity to address the implications of China's engagement
in Africa and the implications of that engagement for U.S.
foreign policy.
My colleague, Jim Swan and I, have submitted lengthy
written testimony, and we'll make some brief comments this
morning.
We believe China has multiple goals in its Africa policy,
much like many nations who trade and invest in Africa, but we
believe that three major objectives stand out over the last
several years in China's policy toward Africa. First, to secure
supplies of natural resources and markets for Chinese exports
in Africa. Second, to increase China's power and prestige on
the international stage as a leader of the developing world.
And third, to compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition by
African states.
I'd say, at the outset, that China's role has been, for the
most part, in our perspective, a positive one. On an abstract
level, China's own domestic economic reforms and opening up to
the outside world provide a good example for some of the more
insulated economies on the continent. And on a more concrete
level, we believe that China's investment in infrastructure and
in building businesses in Africa provide positive results for
the African people.
We neither perceive nor seek a zero-sum competition with
the Chinese in Africa. In fact, as elsewhere in the world,
we're encouraging China to do more in Africa, albeit in
coordination with the United States, major donors, and
international institutions, like the IMF and World Bank.
To date, we believe that Chinese aid and investment
policies are not transparent, and generally lack the
conditionality that's been attached by leading donors and
international institutions. Conditionality is designed to
encourage good governance, and we believe that good governance
in Africa is the foundation of sustained economic development.
We believe we share the views of most economic development
experts in pushing that approach.
We engage the Chinese on their Africa policy in all our
major dialogues, including the Strategic Economic Dialogue led
by Secretary Paulson, at Treasury, and the Senior Dialogue on
security and political affairs, led by Deputy Secretary of
State John Negroponte. At the State Department, we also have a
regional subdialogue on African affairs, led by Assistant
Secretary Jendayi Frazer and her Chinese counterpart, Assistant
Foreign Minister Zhai Jun. We also have dialogues on Sudan with
our special envoy, Ambassador Williamson, and his Chinese
counterpart, Ambassador Liu Guijin.
We plan to start a very important dialogue, this fall, on
assistance policy in general, of which Africa policy will be an
important part. And that will be led by Director of U.S.
Foreign Assistance Henrietta Fore and her counterparts in the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce.
I would like to say something about China's own efforts in
Africa to date, where they have pushed their agenda through
various channels. Senator Feingold mentioned the most prominent
one, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, a large summit held
every 3 years, most recently in November 2006.
China's engagement in Africa has grown very quickly, and
there's no doubt that this is an impressive rate of increase,
but we should keep things in perspective. First of all, China's
aid to Africa is somewhere between $1-$2 billion a year. It's
not very transparent, but that's the best estimate we can come
up with. This is significantly lower than figures for United
States aid of $5 to $6 billion a year, and European aid, which
is upwards of $18 billion a year.
In terms of investment, China's total investment stock to
date in Africa amounts to about 1 percent of the total stock,
according to our latest figures, which come from 2006. This is
several times less than the U.S. stock.
And to put things in perspective in the energy sector,
which has drawn a lot of attention in the scholarly community
and among pundits, we believe that China's overall production
in Africa is about one-third of the total production of one
U.S. firm--ExxonMobil. So, I think we need to keep those
figures in perspective, even as we appreciate the growth rates
in China's activities.
So, what's our task, moving forward, from a U.S. Government
policy perspective? We're trying to encourage better aid and
investment practices that will not only better assist African
development, but will actually help China's own reputation on
the continent. So, we don't believe we're asking China to do
anything for our benefit; we believe we're asking China to do
something that will actually assist China, as well, over the
long term if they put the proper conditionality on their
assistance programs and on their investments, if they're more
transparent, and if they encourage good governance.
We first need to better understand China's own policies.
There's a tendency in the United States to ascribe to China a
great deal of grand strategizing and integration within the
Chinese Government on Africa policy, yet we are under the
impression that this view is not accurate. We believe that
there are multiple Chinese Government agencies involved in aid
and investment to Africa; and that these agencies are not
particularly well coordinated at this time. Relevant agencies
include the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the
National Development and Reform Commission, as well as state-
owned enterprises involved in investment and assistance
programs. And we would like to get a better handle on exactly
what China is doing there, so that we can try to assist the
Chinese Government in making better choices and in coordinating
its own policies toward Africa in a positive direction.
So, we hope to learn more in our dialogues about the nature
of China's activity, and to steer them, again, in a direction
that makes China's policies more compatible with the leading
donors, with the United States, and with international
institutions.
While many are concerned about competition between the
United States and China in Africa, I'd like to point out that
our own economic activity and aid programs to Africa have grown
very quickly this decade, just as China's have. I think this
underscores the point that there is no zero-sum competition
between the United States and China in Africa. We will continue
to work with the Chinese to try and help make their policies,
investments, and assistance programs in Africa more effective
for the long-term. The best way to do that is to have the
Chinese and others encourage African governments to adopt good-
governance practices and create the foundations for long-term
stability.
The ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy in Africa is to
create a better environment and better prospects for the future
for Africans, not to compete with the Chinese for influence.
Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Christensen.
Mr. Swan.
STATEMENT OF JAMES SWAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Swan. Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, thank you very
much for the opportunity to testify this morning.
My colleague obviously has presented much of the background
with respect to China's motivations in Africa and the nature of
the United States dialogue with the Chinese on African issues.
I want to stress that China's engagement with Africa is not
new. Beijing initiated bilateral assistance to Africa in 1956,
and, as you mentioned in your opening remarks, Senator, on the
continent there is no place where there is not a gleaming
showplace that has been built by the Chinese.
Estimates of Chinese development assistance this decade,
again, are in the range of $1 to $2 billion a year, which is
significantly overshadowed by the over $30 billion in
assistance from the European Union, the United States, and
multilateral institutions.
But, there's no question that China's economic and
commercial engagement in Africa has increased dramatically and
been diversified in the last several years. Bilateral trade
rose from about $10 billion in 2000 to some $70 billion in
2007, and China is now Africa's second largest trading partner,
after the United States.
As my colleague mentioned, China's direct investment stock,
albeit starting from quite a low base of less than half a
billion dollars, has ballooned to some $2.5 billion over the
last 3 years, and it continues to grow. And Africa is becoming
a more important export market for Chinese consumer goods.
China's increased economic and commercial activity in
Africa raises a variety of issues that Chinese and American and
outside experts, but also Africans themselves, are examining.
Among the primary concerns--and some of these have already been
touched upon, Mr. Chairman--are that the influx of low-cost
goods from China will undercut local industries as they develop
in Africa; that Chinese infrastructure projects and other
investments underutilize indigenous labor, finance, and
resources, and oftentimes ignore labor and environmental
standards; and, finally and perhaps most importantly, that
China's assistance efforts in Africa, which emphasize no
strings and eschew conditionality that is typical of Western
donor programs, is going to endanger progress that has been
achieved in promoting good governance and market reform in
Africa.
In our view, Africans themselves ultimately will largely
shape the terms of their relations with China, and it is
apparent that, while welcoming increased Chinese engagement,
Africans are also increasingly signaling the importance to them
of business practices and investments that reinforce African
Union and New Partnership for African Development principles on
good governance and transparency.
My colleague spoke about the methods that we have for
senior-level dialogue with the Chinese, both on global issues
and on African issues, and I have spoken about some of the
concerns that we have with respect to China's engagement in
Africa, but I also want to speak briefly about a number of
areas that we believe could benefit from additional cooperation
and burden-sharing between us and the Chinese.
For example, with some 1,500 Chinese peacekeepers and
military and police and other observers serving on peacekeeping
missions throughout the continent, we think that China could
play a growing role in partnering on post-conflict security-
sector reform on the continent. And we've seen some initial
efforts at collaboration with the Chinese. One example is
Liberia, where we've collaborated in trying to improve bases
for the newly created Liberian military. And this is an
example, frankly, where very close collaboration between our
embassies in the field has been critical to moving forward on
this project.
Let me, in my brief time remaining, say a word about our
engagement with China on Sudan. It's been mentioned by the
chairman and others.
Our dialogue with the Chinese on Darfur continues and is
producing results. After years of acting primarily to protect
Khartoum from international pressure, since late 2006 China is
showing an increased willingness to engage with the
international community on Darfur and to apply diplomatic
pressure on the Government of Sudan to change its behavior.
China voted for the Security Council resolution that created
the hybrid United Nations-African Union mission in Darfur. It
has contributed engineering corps to this mission,
interestingly, making China the first non-African troop-
contributing country to deploy in Darfur. And China has become
somewhat more involved in responding to the humanitarian crisis
in Darfur.
We've welcomed these positive trends in Chinese policy on
Sudan, but we've also told the Chinese, frankly, that we think
they could do a lot more. The Sudanese Government continues to
use violence against civilians and rebels in Darfur, and to
renege on key elements of the UNAMID deployment.
China, as we've discussed, has significant influence with
the Government of Sudan, and we've asked China to exercise that
leverage to pressure Khartoum to work toward a negotiated
settlement in Darfur.
Elsewhere on the continent, we've pushed the Chinese
Government to reconsider its close military relations with
repressive regimes. Perceptions of Chinese support for African
leaders, such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, harm China's public
profile and detract from its ability to play the role of a
responsible stakeholder in Africa.
The recent case of an allegedly routine arms shipment set
to arrive 2 weeks after the March elections in Zimbabwe was
recalled due to international and, importantly, regional
pressure on the Chinese.
Finally, as we look for opportunities in our relationship
with China in Africa, we note that there may be some
possibilities in nonsecurity sectors such as health and
agriculture. For example, China and the United States are
pursuing potentially complementary programs to eradicate
malaria, polio, and other endemic diseases, and we have
encouraged our embassy teams across the continent to identify
potential areas of cooperation with the Chinese and to engage
with them to try to promote the benefit of the African
population.
We'll continue to pursue these opportunities with the
Chinese while also seeking to influence their actions on
African issues to encourage good governance, democracy, human
rights, and transparency, issues that we would like to see play
a yet more prominent role in Chinese policy toward Africa.
Thank you, Senator.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Christensen and Mr.
Swan follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement of James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of African Affairs and Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to address the subject of China's growing
engagement with Africa and its ramifications for U.S. foreign policy.
China's growing presence in Africa has generated significant
discussion during the last several years. This attention reflects the
reality that China has important and growing interests in Africa,
including access to resources and markets, development of diplomatic
ties, and Chinese claims of leadership in developing world. These
objectives are not inherently incompatible with U.S. priorities and, in
fact, may offer important opportunities for the continent. In general,
we see China's growing activity on the continent as a potentially
positive force for economic development there, which is a goal we share
with China and many others. As President Bush has said, we do not see a
``zero-sum'' competition with China for influence in Africa. Nor do we
see evidence that China's commercial or diplomatic activities in Africa
are aimed at diminishing U.S. influence on the continent.
As Deputy Secretary Negroponte recently noted in testimony before
the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, policy differences in some
areas should come as no surprise given the two countries' very
different demographic and economic conditions, histories, and political
systems. Our goal, as with other areas of the world, is to engage
Chinese officials to try to define and expand a common agenda for
Africa that ultimately will serve both our national interests and
maximize the benefit Africa derives from U.S. and Chinese economic
investment in the continent. We are actively looking for areas of
complementarity and cooperation with the Chinese, while engaging at
multiple levels on differences in approach to specific issues.
Our regular high-level dialogues with China include the ``Senior
Dialogue'' led by Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, which focuses
on political and security issues and the Treasury-led ``Strategic
Economic Dialogue,'' which addresses bilateral and global economic
issues. We also plan to begin this autumn a bilateral dialogue on
development assistance led by the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Henrietta Fore and her counterpart in China's Ministry of Commerce.
The State Department holds a regional subdialogue on Africa as part
of the United States-China Senior Dialogue on security and political
affairs. The subdialogue is led on our side by Assistant Secretary
Jendayi Frazer. In addition to these formal dialogues, Assistant
Secretary Frazer talks with her Chinese counterparts on an ongoing
basis on a variety of issues, most recently hosting China's Special
Representative Liu Guijin in May. Special Envoy to Sudan Richard
Williamson also regularly communicates with Ambassador Liu on Sudan. In
September 2007, Ambassador Ruth Davis, Chief of Staff of the Bureau of
African Affairs, traveled to China for a series of high-level meetings
and public appearances aimed at explaining United States-Africa
relations. And, of course, our diplomats in Africa are in regular
contact with their Chinese counterparts on the full range of issues on
the continent.
CHINA IN AFRICA
China's engagement with Africa is not new. Beijing initiated
bilateral assistance to Africa in 1956 and, by its own account, has
funded over 800 projects between 1957 and 2008. There are few capitals
in Africa where China has not built a showpiece building, from a
national sports stadium to a gleaming new ministry headquarters.
Estimates of Chinese development assistance to Africa in this decade
vary, but tend to fall around $1-$2 billion per year. This amount is
still relatively modest in comparison to the annual contributions of
$18 billion (including debt relief) provided by the European Union (EU)
and member countries, $9 billion from multilateral institutions, and
about $5 billion from the United States Government.
China's economic and commercial engagement in Africa has
dramatically increased and diversified during the last several years.
Bilateral trade rose from $10 billion in 2000 to $70 billion in 2007,
and China is now Africa's second largest trading partner after the
United States. Africa ran an overall trade surplus with China between
2004 and 2006, as it did with the United States, and it is clear that
China, like the United States, has become an important source of both
export revenue and investment for the continent. China's direct
investment in Africa increased from $491 million in 2003 to over $2.5
billion 3 years later and continues to grow. Africa is also becoming an
important export market for Chinese consumer goods. Small, private
Chinese investors have invested millions of dollars into opening
enterprises in Africa that operate in textiles, light manufacturing,
construction and agriculture. Recent media attention has focused on
high-profile Chinese investments in Africa, such as the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China's October 2007 purchase of a 20-percent stake
in South Africa's Standard Bank, or a $9 billion loan and investment
package for Congo that will be repaid in cobalt and copper from
Congolese mines.
China's economic and commercial engagement in Africa should be
understood in a broad context. Its activity has increased dramatically
in recent years, but started from a relatively low base. As of 2006,
the value of China's trade with Africa was lower than with the Middle
East or Latin America and was a minute percentage of its trade with the
rest of Asia. On the investment side, China's investment flow into
Africa constituted only 2.9 percent of its global outward direct
investment. China's total direct investment stock in Africa accounted
for only 1 percent of global foreign direct investment in Africa.
The composition of China's involvement in Africa has changed
greatly over the past decade. Whereas the foundation for China's early
interaction with Africa was the promotion of a shared leftist,
anticolonial ideology, the common ground now is mostly a convergence of
economic interests in a global trading system. In many ways, China's
successful embrace of market-based economics and openness to most
aspects of globalization can be a positive example for African nations.
There also have been significant increases in two-way tourism, academic
and nongovernmental exchanges, and diplomatic initiatives. China has
even modeled many of its engagement programs after very successful U.S.
exchanges on the continent. For example, historically, the United
States has identified young emerging political and economic African
leaders for exchange programs in the United States under something
known as the ``international visitors program.'' China is now doing the
same thing--identifying Members of Parliament, local entrepreneurs, and
well-placed government officials in such key ministries as Foreign
Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Trade and Commerce for training and
exchange programs in Beijing. China also funds trips by local traders
and businesspeople to Africa to source Chinese consumer products. It
funds sports teams and provides equipment for aspiring African
Olympians. Since the year 2000, China's primary public relations
vehicle for promoting its African presence is the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), which is held every 3 years.
China's increased economic and commercial activity in Africa raises
a variety of issues that African, Chinese, and other international
experts are examining. Some Africans worry that the influx of low-cost
goods from China undercuts local industry. We also hear concerns that
Chinese infrastructure projects underutilize indigenous labor, finance,
and resources. Chinese projects often employ imported Chinese workers
and utilize imported raw materials. Observers have warned that China's
assistance efforts in Africa, which emphasize ``no strings'' and are
not predicated on the same kinds of conditionality as other countries'
aid programs, could endanger progress in promoting good governance and
market reform in Africa. As Chinese companies' presence on the
continent expands, they will increasingly be expected to bolster
indigenous capacity and contribute to long-term development. The U.S.
Government would like to engage the Chinese on how their economic
policies in Africa can help produce better results for sustainable
economic development if they conform to the international community's
broader initiatives for Africa. We remain steadfast in our belief that
strong democratic institutions and protection of fundamental human
rights are the foundations for sustainable economic growth.
We remain concerned with a general lack of transparency regarding
China's foreign assistance practices in Africa, and are encouraging
Beijing to more fully engage with other major bilateral and
multilateral actors to ensure that aid supports the efforts of
responsible African governments to be responsive to their people's
needs. As the U.S. and other creditor countries implement the enhanced
Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and provide debt
relief to qualifying countries, transparency is key to understanding
how creditors' assistance packages fit with a borrowing country's debt
sustainability framework developed with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank. By its reluctance to coordinate with groups like
the IMF and World Bank, we believe China misses an opportunity to make
the most of its aid, loans, and investment in Africa. On occasion, it
appears that China's policies serve to undercut the efforts of others
to use investment and development assistance to produce improved
governance, which almost all credible research about development point
to as essential to long-term, stable economic growth.
The international community has expressed similar concerns about
the Chinese use of foreign assistance as a trade tool, as when African
governments grant favorable treatment to Chinese project bids because
such bids are tied directly to Chinese Government development
assistance packages. It is in China's interest to demonstrate to the
international community that its policies in Africa are not driven
solely by the desire to secure natural resources and access to markets
and access to major infrastructure projects, and that the Chinese
Government is committed to improving the long-term welfare of people
across the continent.
When discussing China's presence in Africa, it is important to
highlight that China's economy has become increasingly diversified and
has numerous public and private economic actors that influence the
African market. Chinese companies are active in financial markets,
telecommunications, manufacturing, textiles, agro-business, and a
variety of extractive industries. For example, we must distinguish
between Chinese energy companies' pursuit of exploration agreements and
the Chinese Government's Africa policy. Certainly the Chinese
Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs promote access to natural
resources and export markets for Chinese firms as part of their
policies. But observers sometimes ascribe too much coordination and
grand strategizing to the Chinese leadership's policies toward the
developing world. There are often exaggerated charges that Chinese
firms' activities or investment decisions are coordinated by the
Chinese Government as some sort of strategic gambit in the high-stakes
game of global energy security. In reality, Chinese firms compete for
profitable projects not only with more technologically and politically
savvy international firms, but also with each other.
Contrary to what many assume, China's large oil companies are not
dominant players in Africa's energy industry. With the important
exception of Sudan, where the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC)
is the major operator, Chinese oil companies are relatively minor
players in Africa. In 2006, total output by all Chinese producers was
approximately one-third of a single U.S. firm's (ExxonMobil) African
production. Some energy assets now held by Chinese companies were in
the past run by international oil companies that found more profitable
opportunities elsewhere in Africa.
Africans themselves will, of course, largely shape the terms of
their relations with China. While welcoming increased Chinese
engagement, Africans have also signaled the importance of business
practices that reinforce African Union and New Partnership for African
Development principles on good governance. Chinese labor, environmental
and quality-control standards have drawn extra scrutiny from many
Africans. In Zambia, for example, anti-Chinese sentiment became an
important election issue in 2005 when the opposition mobilized voters
from the country's copper belt following a deadly explosion at a
Chinese-owned copper mine.
UNITED STATES-CHINA ENGAGEMENT
Within the context of our senior- and policy-level discussions with
the Chinese, we have identified a number of areas that would benefit
from additional cooperation and burden-sharing. For example, with 1,452
Chinese military, police, and observers serving on peacekeeping
missions throughout Africa, China could play a greater role in
coordinating with us on post-conflict security sector reform activities
and in equipping and supporting African peacekeepers. In Liberia, for
example, China has contributed to the U.S.-led rebuilding of that
nation's army. The U.S. Government trained staff and refurbished the
Ministry of Defense headquarters while China provided vehicles and
computer equipment. The United States is in the process of recruiting,
vetting, training, and equipping a 2,000-man army and has rebuilt three
military bases around Monrovia. China is providing some specialty
training and is rebuilding at least one base up-country. Good
communication between the U.S. and Chinese Embassies on the ground has
helped each party identify areas for inputs. We want to build on that
success elsewhere in Africa.
Our dialogue on Darfur is ongoing and is producing important
results. After years of acting primarily to protect Khartoum from
international pressure, since late 2006 China has shown an increased
willingness to engage with the international community on Darfur, and
has applied diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan to change
its behavior, as well as to engage in a political process for a
peaceful negotiation to the Darfur conflict. China voted for UNSC
Resolution 1769 that created the hybrid United Nations African Mission
in Darfur, but has at times acquiesced in the Government of Sudan's
opposition to its full implementation. China has pledged up to 300
military engineers, of whom 140 have been dispatched, making China the
first non-African Troop Contributing Country to deploy in Darfur. China
has also become more involved in responding to the humanitarian crisis,
providing some direct assistance and donating $1.8 million U.S. dollars
to the Darfur region and the African Union Special Mission.
We have welcomed this positive change in Chinese policy, but have
also told China frankly that it could do a lot more. The Sudanese
Government continues to use violence against civilians and rebels in
Darfur, and renege on key elements of the UNAMID deployment. China
enjoys significant influence with the Government of Sudan due to its
investments in the country's energy sector, and we have asked China to
exercise its leverage to pressure Khartoum to work toward a negotiated
solution in Darfur.
We have also asked the Chinese Government to halt its companies'
substantial arms trade with Sudan because of the likelihood that some
Chinese-origin armaments are being used by the Sudanese Government in
Darfur, in contravention of UNSCR 1591. The proliferation of lethal
conventional weapons in Africa contributes to instability and endangers
China's long-term interests on the continent. In the same spirit we
have pushed the Chinese Government to reconsider the wisdom of
retaining close military relations with repressive regimes on the
continent. Perceptions of Chinese support of African leaders such as
Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, who rule through guns and intimidation, harms
China's image and undermines it ability to play the role of responsible
stakeholder in Africa's affairs.
In nonsecurity areas such as health, China and the United States
are pursuing potentially complementary programs to eradicate malaria,
polio, and other endemic diseases. In agriculture, the U.S. and Chinese
Ambassadors in Ethiopia arranged exchanges to observe demonstration
farms each country had built to increase agricultural capacity. The
U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Angola have also agreed to identify a
joint development project in the agriculture sector. We have encouraged
our Embassy country teams all over Africa to identify potential areas
of cooperation in the multiple sectors and engage with Chinese
counterparts to the benefit of African populations.
The State Department has also attempted to bring Chinese, United
States, and African civil society together by supporting conferences
and symposiums. For example, the NGO Vital Voices held a summit for
African Women in Cape Town, South Africa, in January 2007, in which a
small contingent of Chinese women participated. A followup symposium
for Chinese and African women entrepreneurs in Shanghai was held in
September 2007 to further cooperation.
CONCLUSION
International concerns about China's increasing commercial and
diplomatic presence in Africa must be considered within the wider
context of questions about the ramifications of China's rise as a
global economic and political actor. These questions are particularly
acute because of our bilateral trade deficit with China and the
perception that China's growing demand for natural resources is
contributing upward pressure on global commodity prices during a
potential global economic slowdown.
But the big questions for the United States in discussions of
China-in-Africa are not based in concerns about the United States-China
bilateral economic relationship but rather in our foreign policy
priorities for Africa, which are promoting democracy, human rights,
political stability, good governance, and sustainable economic
development to improve the health, education, and living standards of
the continent's population. China already is making a substantial
contribution to the continent's economic development, and we believe
that it can play an even more important role in the future. In that
spirit, we engage at multiple levels to influence Chinese actions on
issues such as good governance, human rights, and transparency--issues
that we believe should play as prominent a role in Chinese Africa
policy as in ours.
Senator Feingold. Thanks, Mr. Swan, and to the panel.
We've been joined by the ranking member of the committee,
Senator Lugar, who, of course, has a very long career and is
very devoted to all the issues that come up with regard to
Africa, and Senator Bob Casey, Pennsylvania, who, of course, is
a new colleague, but this time last week Senator Casey and I
were in India, holding meetings with top Indian officials. And
I would just note that India has significant involvement in
Africa, as well, and that is the subject of some interest, as
well, even though the focus today is on China and Africa.
Let me begin with 7-minute rounds.
Thank you for your remarks. I'm glad to hear that the State
Department appreciates both the potential for cooperation with
the Chinese in some areas, as well as the need for more
concerted efforts to change current Chinese policy in others.
I agree that China's commercial and diplomatic activities
in Africa are not aimed at diminishing U.S. influence on the
continent, but, of course, as you've both suggested, if
repressive rulers or abusive militaries know they can rely on
Chinese support, that will undermine efforts of the
international community to bring about reform through isolation
or conditional assistance.
Now, Mr. Swan, as you pointed out, China's arms sales to
Sudan are an excellent example of the Chinese Government
directly defying the will of the international community, as
expressed in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1591. I
appreciate that you have asked the Chinese to halt such sales.
What more can the United States do to hold China accountable
for its violation of international law and norms?
Mr. Swan. Thank you, Senator.
The Security Council resolution prohibits arms shipments
into Darfur, and the concern that we have raised with the
Chinese is that their sales to Sudan, in general, pose the risk
that those armaments could be transferred to Darfur and add to
the instability in that region. This is an issue that obviously
we continue to raise with the Chinese. We have a very active
dialogue with them on Sudan issues. The special envoy for
Sudan, Richard Williamson, is in frequent contact with his
counterpart. His predecessor as special envoy also met
frequently with his Chinese counterpart, and, indeed, traveled
to Beijing on, I believe, twice for consultations on these
issues. So, on the whole range of subjects related to how to
influence Sudanese behavior with respect to Darfur, we are
working very closely with the Chinese.
Obviously, there are other vehicles for us to continue to
engage the Chinese on this subject. We are in frequent contact
with them through the Security Council, which, of course, is
active not only on Sudan issues, but on other peace and
security issues throughout the continent. So, this issue is
going to remain very much at the top of our agenda with the
Chinese.
I would like to point out that, at the last Assistant
Secretary level meeting with her counterpart in the PRC
Government last March, Sudan was very much on the agenda, and,
indeed, as part of those discussions, our Assistant Secretary
emphasized the importance of a Chinese contribution to
proceeding with the heavy support package as a bridge to
deployment of UNAMID. And partly as a result of those
conversations, we did see the Chinese commit to a deployment of
400 engineers to Darfur, of which I believe about 140 are
currently in place in Darfur. We also pressed, during those
conversations, for the Chinese to take a greater interest in
the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and, as a consequence
partly of those conversations, Assistant Secretary Frazer's
counterpart, Zhai Jun, personally traveled to Darfur as part of
a multilateral humanitarian mission, and we've subsequently
seen some modest contributions from the Chinese in the
humanitarian sector in Darfur. So, our engagement is showing
results, in terms of influencing Chinese behavior, and, on the
full range of issues related to Sudan, we will continue to try
to exercise that pressure.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Let me get Mr. Christensen's view. Why aren't we doing more
to hold the Chinese Government accountable for its
irresponsible policies in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere, where
its economic ties seem to trump wider governance and security
objectives? And what, in your view, are our points of leverage
here?
Mr. Christensen. Thank you very much.
I think it's an excellent question, and, as Jim Swan just
pointed out, we have been engaging the Chinese on these issues
for some time. I started this job in July 2006, and at that
time China's policy on Sudan, in particular, was about as bad
as one could imagine, where they were basically telling the
international community, ``If you want to put pressure on
Sudan, you have to come through China; China will stand in the
way and protect Khartoum.'' And it really has evolved quite a
bit in that period, from July 2006 to the present, to include
deployment of engineering troops, et cetera. And we believe
that our dialogue system and basically holding China to account
for its reputation around the world for its policies has been
effective in getting China to move in a positive direction.
On the issue of arms sales, we're not at all satisfied,
obviously, with the policy. And one of the things we're trying
to drive home to the Chinese is that there's more to being a
responsible stakeholder in the world than following the letter
of the law in U.N. Security Council resolutions. So, if you
look at 1591, China can come back and say, ``Well, we're
selling weapons to Khartoum, we're not selling weapons to the
Darfur region.'' But, China needs to recognize that selling
weapons to Khartoum at this time, while Khartoum is involved in
the activities in the Darfur region that it's involved in, is a
negative outcome for the international community, for
humanitarianism, and also for China's own reputation on the
international stage.
In the case of Zimbabwe, you saw China get a lot of
pushback, again, not just from the United States and the EU,
but also from regional actors, about its arms sales to
Zimbabwe, particularly just after just after the election
debacle there. I think that sends a message to China, that they
need to learn, over time and through these types of dialogues,
that it's really their own interests that are on the line when
they adopt these policies because their reputation is harmed.
And they do seem to care quite a bit about their reputation.
Senator Feingold. As you both know, today is the 19th
anniversary of the infamous Tiananmen Square massacre. On that
note, one issue that was glaringly absent from your testimonies
is China's poor human rights record, which we see reflected in
its activities in Africa.
Mr. Christensen, I understand that after being stalled for
a number of years, the United States-China Human Rights
Dialogue was restarted last week in Beijing, and that you were
a participant in these discussions. I'm curious why this
dialogue was reopened now, despite no observable progress with
respect to human rights. In fact, China has recently violated
its own promises to improve its record in advance of the
summer's Beijing Olympics. So, what was the impetus for this
meeting? And what were the intended deliverables from the
meeting?
Mr. Christensen. The meeting was agreed upon this February
by Secretary Rice and Chinese Foreign Minister Jang Jiechi.
They talked at great length about the importance of human
rights and why restarting the dialogue was a good way to try to
push the ball forward on this issue.
In terms of the types of topics that we dealt with in the
dialogue, it was precisely the types of topics that you raised,
Senator: freedom-of-the-press issues that are supposed to be
linked to the Olympics--China's implementation of its own
commitments in January 2007 to open up China to the foreign
press corps. We're urging China to abide by those commitments,
to implement them around the country, and also to apply those
commitments, after the Olympics, to foreign and Chinese
journalists.
Senator Feingold. Just a quick followup. Were any of these
deliverables achieved?
Mr. Christensen. We'll have to see whether they're
achieved. The nature of these dialogues is that we present our
concerns and our analysis of trends in China, and then we wait
to see how the Chinese Government responds. We deal with
programmatic issues, like freedom of the press, rule of law,
the court system, and various laws that have been passed. We
also deal with specific lists of dissidents and prisoners, and
issues like the Tiananmen prisoners. Then we have to wait and
see.
The way we present this to the Chinese, to get at the
question of what might move the Chinese, is, to say that we are
committed to the idea that China should have a successful
Olympics. That's something the United States would like to see.
The President has committed to go to the Olympics. For the
Olympics to be successful, however, China has to show progress,
not just on the economic front, but on the social and human
rights fronts as well. That's the approach that we've taken. I
think it's an approach that leads the Chinese to listen to our
concerns in a more attentive fashion because they know that
when we raise these human rights concerns that we wish China
well. We want China to adopt these reforms, because we think
it'll make China stronger and more stable.
I think that's the spirit of the dialogue. We hope that the
dialogue will produce results. We think this type of dialogue
is the way to go. And we're glad that it's been restarted after
a 6-year hiatus.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have not traveled to Africa nearly as extensively as the
chairman has, but I've traveled there a little bit, and I know
the issue of the no-strings-attached approach of China, versus
the United States approach; we focus on human rights, we focus
on democracy, we focus on infrastructure.
I was in Equatorial Guinea in January. They have a newfound
wealth, in terms of natural gas in abundance. And I noted with
interest that they were building hospitals. They brought the
Israeli Government in to build and staff hospitals. They were
building facilities. They were really investing not only in
their infrastructure, but their people, which is, of course,
what we would like to see every countrydo. Is there a move--as
Africa is beginning to prosper in certain areas, is there a
movement--a positive movement toward what we seek, which is
helping the people, reinvesting in the people in the country,
and human rights? Do you see a trend going that way and away
from the old Africa?
Mr. Swan. Thanks very much for the question, Senator.
Yes; overall, I think our Government is Afro-optimistic. I
think that we believe that there is a very strong and positive
future for the continent, and that we've seen tremendous
progress in Africa in recent years, with some unfortunate
exceptions----
Senator Isakson. Right.
Mr. Swan Overall, certainly we've seen high levels of
economic growth, averaging more than 5 percent for the
continent in recent years. We have seen a wave of democratic
reform on the continent, from fewer than five countries that
were classified by Freedom House as free in the late 1980s, to
a majority, at this point. So, we're seeing steady progress on
the continent in a whole variety of areas.
Equatorial Guinea is a unique example, in many ways,
because of the very rapid increase in its wealth as a
consequence of the oil discoveries, oil discoveries that were
primarily undertaken by U.S. private-sector firms when a number
of other governments, parastatals, and private foreign
companies were not interested in Equatorial Guinea. So, I think
this is an example of a strong and successful private-sector-
led investment in Africa.
And as I hope you noted, Senator, while you were there,
although we are starting from quite a small base, in terms of
our own presence, our post in Malabo was closed for a number of
years, but we have a very dynamic Ambassador there now who is
building up a staff. We have identified a new property, and
look forward to construction of a new embassy in the coming
years, and are very actively engaged with the Equatoguineans.
There is also an innovative program there, the Social
Development Fund, in which the United States is actually
helping the Equatoguineans and the Equatoguinean government in
determining how best to manage its own social investment
programs within Equatorial Guinea to ensure maximum benefit to
its people.
Senator Isakson. Well, on that subject, Ambassador Johnson
is doing a great job. And I had enjoyed meeting with him. The
Chinese are building a huge embassy compound there. And the
Equatoguineans gave the United States a good site. I want to
commend you--if you had anything to do with it--moving forward,
by a year, the funding for both the residence, as well as the
embassy, which I think is going to be critically important.
This is not to compete with China or anybody else, but because
a lot of the European countries are doing the same thing, as
well, and we have a tremendous American investment--private
investment in Equatorial Guinea.
One comment you made, I was interested in. You said, ``Some
Africans worry that the influx of low-cost goods from China
undercuts local industry.'' Did you say that, Mr. Swan?
Mr. Swan. I did.
Senator Isakson. OK. What took me was that I would have
thought that, as China being at the level of development they
are, and Africa the level they are, that the reverse would be
true. But, are the Chinese able to produce and sell in Africa,
products cheaper than Africans could do it themselves?
Mr. Swan. In some sectors and for some commodities, yes. I
mean, one sees throughout Africa small, inexpensive mass-
produced Chinese plastic goods. And because of the scale of
production in China--I'd defer to others who know more about
the Chinese economy, certainly than I do--but, because the
Chinese scale of production is so massive, their ability to tap
into worldwide distribution chains so good, while many African
countries are still at a nascent stage, in terms of
industrialization and manufacturing production, this has been
an issue.
In South Africa, for example, which does have an active
manufacturing sector, the threat from very inexpensive Chinese
imports has been an issue in the labor sector there.
Senator Isakson. Well, I guess one great target for
investment would be in business and manufacturing expertise.
The United States has to get them competitive, in and of
themselves, in Africa.
Last question. Mr. Christensen, you made an interesting
comment also. You said they had three goals--China had three
main goals in Africa. One was the natural resources, which the
majority of their imports from Africa are natural resources;
enhanced power and prestige; and then you said ``to compete
with the image of Taiwan and China.'' Did you say that?
Mr. Christensen. To compete for diplomatic recognition from
Africa----
Senator Isakson. What is Taiwan's presence in Africa?
Mr. Christensen. Currently, four African nations that
recognize the Republic of China--Taiwan's official name--
instead of the PRC.
Senator Isakson. OK. That was very interesting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I
appreciate you calling this hearing, and enjoyed our time in
India the last couple of days, and it's good to be home. Thank
you so much.
I wanted to return to the discussion about Darfur--and also
want to say, to Mr. Swan and Mr. Christensen, thank you for
your testimony today, and your public service--I wanted to
return to some of the questions that Senator Feingold raised
with regard to Darfur. In particular, let me also just quickly
review what was in the testimony, as it pertains to Darfur and
China.
All is good news. I don't mean to downplay or undercount
what we reviewed here. But, five or six things were mentioned.
Engage with the international community--that's good news.
Diplomatic pressure--good news. Resolution 1716--that's good.
Three hundred military engineers--good news; 1.8 million
bucks--not a lot of money, frankly, but some good news.
But also, I think it's important to make sure we're on the
same page, in terms of what the reality is. Let me ask--Mr.
Swan might be the one to answer this. Does China continue to
sell aircraft, weapons, and police equipment to the Khartoum
regime?
Mr. Swan. I don't know when the last sale would have taken
place, but my understanding is there has been no commitment by
the Chinese not to continue arms sales to Sudan. But, I don't
know exactly when the last sale might have taken place.
Senator Casey. But, you have no evidence that there's been
any diminution in that, or the cessation of that kind of
commercial activity, we'll call it.
Mr. Swan. No; I don't think we have any indication of a
cessation of that activity, that's correct.
Senator Casey. And that's obviously very troubling. And,
Mr. Christensen, you raised this issue, and it's an important
one to remember, that despite all of the progress--and I know
that progress doesn't come by accident--it didn't happen
because they woke up one morning and decided to do it; I
realize our Government and people like you have been working on
this. So, we appreciate that. And I think that has to continue.
And I think people are going to be watching carefully--or
watching closely, I should say, the progress of that effort to
ask the Chinese Government to do what it can do, because of the
influence that they have on the Sudanese Government.
Let me also--in terms of what they're not doing--let me go
back to a discussion about their noninterference policy. It
seems that their noninterference policy is in place, but
there's a--there's a big neon sign--asterisk when it comes to
Taiwan. It's, ``Noninterference, except you've got to do this,
that, and the other thing with regard to Taiwan.'' And just in
terms of their credibility in the international community, do
you think that exception, or that asterisk on the policy, don't
you think that compromises their ability to--or compromises
their credibility, I should say, in the international
community?
Mr. Christensen. I think I can answer that. People say that
there are no strings attached to Chinese aid and Chinese
investment. Actually, there is clearly one string attached,
which is whether the country in question recognizes the
Mainland or recognizes Taiwan. That does affect their policies.
I think that, in general, there are optimistic trends in
cross-Strait relations that may, we hope, lead to a more
expansive and open policy on the Mainland toward Taiwan and
cross-Strait relations, and also toward Taiwan and the
international community, to provide Taiwan more international
space. We have pushed for that consistently as part of our
policy. In cases where statehood is a requirement, the United
States doesn't seek Taiwan's membership in international
organizations, but we do support observer status and meaningful
participation. In other cases, where statehood is not a
requirement, we support Taiwan's full membership and active
membership.
We're hopeful that the warming trends in cross-Strait
relations will lead the government in Beijing to realize that
it's in the long-term interest of stability across the Strait
and in the long-term interests of the international community
for Taiwan to play the full role that it can play on the
international stage.
Senator Casey. Mr. Christensen, before, in response to--I'm
not sure what question it was--you mentioned the awareness or
the sensitivity that the Chinese have to their reputation, or
how they're viewed. Tell us more about that. In terms of--in a
general sense, but specifically in terms of, for example, the
Darfur policy. I'm thinking about psychology here as much as
anything, but tell us more about that, in terms of how we can
foster that.
Mr. Christensen. Yes, I think psychology is important here.
China clearly, as part of its overall policy toward the
international community, wants to improve it's prestige and
reputation abroad. That's been a consistent goal for decades.
What we need to do is to convince the PRC that the best way to
improve that reputation and to improve its prestige is to
coordinate its activities with the international community.
That's the whole foundation of our approach of saying, ``China,
we want you to do more on the international stage, we want you
to have a higher profile, we want you to have more influence,
but we want you to do that by becoming a responsible
stakeholder.''
We think that this approach has produced results, not just
in Sudan, but in other countries, as well, and it's a process
of debate within China. There's not a monolithic view within
the Chinese Government on how China should pursue its foreign
policy. We want the right people to win those debates.
One of the things we try to do is point out when China
takes actions that we think are irresponsible, such as the arms
sales to Sudan, but we also try to point out, in a positive and
very public way, when China does the right thing, like
committing to send 300 engineering troops to the UNAMID
peacekeeping force, 140 of whom are deployed. And they're under
threat, to be frank. There are groups in Sudan that don't want
those Chinese forces there. And they've kept them in place, and
they are building infrastructure.
Ultimately, we won't be satisfied in Darfur until that
large peacekeeping force is in there and the people are safe,
so we urge China to do more than it has in the past. But, when
it does the right thing, we're very quick and very public in
our congratulations of China for doing the right thing.
We think that's the way to go, in general, with China. A
lot of people in China think that we're trying to contain China
and keep it down, but, in fact in many ways, we're doing the
opposite by encouraging China to do more on the international
stage, albeit in coordination with the international community,
the United States, and the European Union, in order to achieve
stability and long-term economic development.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join
Senator Casey in congratulating you and Senator Isakson for
this timely meeting, and, likewise, the energy you give to
issues of Africa.
A group in Washington, called the Africa Society, held its
fourth annual meeting honoring a specific ambassador from an
African country this year. The ambassador nominated and heard
was the distinguished Ambassador from Angola. And I mention her
because, during her remarks to a large group of Americans and
Africans, she mentioned Angola is now the seventh largest
supplier of oil to the United States. This came as a revelation
to many, that, first of all, there was that much oil being
produced in Angola, and that we were as dependent upon Angola
as we are, as a matter of fact. It also brought to the fore
that a civil war occurred in Angola for well over two decades,
terminating somewhere around 2002-2003, and, in some respects,
the United States was perceived on the wrong side of how that
turned out.
Now, this is not all bad, from our idealism; we were on the
side, we felt, of human rights and of trying to diminish what
we felt were Communist influences from other countries. But, at
the same time, the Angolans are pointing out, this has required
very special emphasis on our part, not as a rectifying our
position, but of more engaged diplomacy with Angola to bridge
gaps that are important, with an important country.
Now, I mention all of this because two of our staff members
from the committee, Michael Phelan and Neil Brown, went to five
African countries during the recent recess, and their
observations jibe with what I learned during this Africa
Society dinner, which also included about 20 other ambassadors
from African countries. I had a very rich dialogue both before
and after the speech by the Angolan.
And, essentially, what they are pointing out is, as you
have, that the Chinese presence has been highly visible for a
long time, for decades now, a very high visibility, and not by
chance. The Chinese have attempted to enhance that visibility.
Now, I suppose, second, they observed, at least in the
embassies that they visited, that there was little systematic
policy engagement between the United States diplomats there and
the Chinese. Now, this is differentiated from the occasional
partnership or place in which we find a cooperative element.
But, in terms of persons in the embassy and resources in the
embassy assigned to an alliance or a--more of a coming together
with the Chinese, this suffers, perhaps, as both of you know
better than most, from the lack of resources in some of these
embassies. And I compliment both of you for your advocacy
within the Department. It's not easy.
Or, to state it another way, there is also a feeling on the
part of these African ambassadors that I talked to, quite apart
from observation of our staff, that high-level visitations by
United States officials in Africa clearly are well behind those
of the Chinese, for example. Maybe other countries. But, the
Chinese frequently devote pretty high-level folks to have high-
level dialogue.
Now, we do the best we can with resourceful ambassadors in
the field, and with yourselves, as you move through there. And
I don't diminish your importance. But, at the same time, I
would just suggest that this, you might say, is a subject
that's beyond my paygrade. You know, the Secretary has to
decide who goes and who doesn't, and so forth. I just observe
that, as we're discussing, today, the role of China there,
pretty high profile for a long time, and sort of embedded in a
good number of these situations, and with some pretty stringent
objectives, as they look at it, that are useful for them, as
well as for the African countries--been mutually helpful--and,
I would say, even in the oil business. The observation of the
ambassadors, as well as our staff, is that the Chinese have not
been invidious to our interests. If anything, the Chinese
investment in the oil business has made available more oil in
the world markets than would have been the case without their
investment. So that it's a sophisticated process as to who is
doing what.
My only question--and I raise it in this way--is, How can
we elevate the interest, in our own government, in the African
nations to a point where resources are available, that the
requests come initially from the Department for these
situations? And, second, organizationally, how can the
embassies be configured in ways in which we are more likely to
have systemic cooperation with the Chinese--sort of, week in,
month out--so that--because I think that's doable--in part,
because of some breakthroughs, maybe, elsewhere in the Six-
Power Talks with North Korea, which have nothing to do with the
Chinese specifically, but, as all of you know, brought together
our diplomats at various levels with Chinese diplomats in ways
that have led to cooperation elsewhere in the world, including
Africa.
Do you have any general comments as to how the situation
can be enhanced?
Mr. Swan. Certainly. Thank you very much, Senator.
With respect to the level of engagement that we have with
the Chinese in Africa, first of all, I think we are seeing that
increase. My own observation, personally from the field, is
that in recent years we've seen a new breed of Chinese
diplomat, if I may put it that way, on the continent, often
with a lot of regional area expertise, often with very good
local language skills, and seemingly much more interested in
exchange and dialogue with us. And I know that our posts in the
field, our embassies, are acutely aware of the heightened
interest in China in Africa. We frequently ask them to take the
pulse of what's happening in those relationships.
I know that when I am out in the field personally, I try to
see my Chinese colleagues. I was in Chad not too long ago, and
made a point of seeing the Chinese Ambassador there for his
perspective on developments in Chad. And so, I think there is a
serious effort to move in that direction.
But, I take your point, absolutely, sir, that this is an
important issue, and we need to continue to look to ways to
step up our engagement on it.
If I might just say a word with respect to a more general
premise of the question, I think, it's that United States
engagement in Africa, of course, has increased and is quite
robust, at this point. As someone from the Africa Bureau, of
course, I would be enthusiastic about seeing it increased yet
further. But, obviously, there are questions of global
priorities that have to be addressed by others. But, certainly
we've seen United States assistance bilaterally increase to
$5\1/2\ billion; we've got the Millennium Challenge Corporation
program--8 of the 16 countries that have signed a Millennium
Challenge Compacts are in Africa; it's about 3 billion dollars'
worth of Millennium Challenge programs; very dynamic and
expansive PEPFAR, President's Emergency Program for AIDS
Relief, on the continent at the $30 billion commitment level; a
$1.2 billion multiyear President's Malaria Initiative and other
programs. So, I think that there is a very active engagement
there.
We also have been very involved in certain areas in which
perhaps others are less willing to be--the patient and
painstaking diplomatic work to help resolve conflicts. I think
the United States has been very actively promoting peace on the
continent, from Liberia to Democratic Republic of the Congo to
the North-South Sudan Peace Agreement. So, I think there is
very active U.S. engagement on that front as well.
In terms of high-level visits, President Bush was there in
February and was, I think, extraordinarily well received in
Tanzania, in Rwanda, in Benin, in Ghana, and in Liberia. And, I
think, as you look at African responses, African attitudes
toward the United States, remain very, very favorable. And I
think that that is a testimony to the level of engagement that
we've had.
That said, I support, absolutely, contining on a trajectory
that leads to deeper engagement.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Mr. Christensen. If I could just add a couple of things,
Senator. I think your question is an excellent one, and I would
just point out that, in the case of Angola, it is a major
energy supplier for China--in fact, it's the largest energy
supplier in sub-Saharan Africa for China, much bigger than
Sudan. China has big interests in Angola. China has invested a
lot in Angola and has given assistance to Angola.
One of the things we have tried to do through our
Ambassador in Angola is reach out to the Chinese in Angola to
see if we can do joint projects on agricultural development.
This is right along the lines of the thrust of your question.
We don't know where this is going to head. It's a new
proposal. But, we think it's the right kind of proposal.
And I'll just say, as a China specialist--so I can make my
own special advocacy for China specialists--I'm an academic;
I'm in the government temporarily--I think it's very important
for the Nation to have lots of China specialists, to have
people who speak Chinese. I think it's good for the U.S.
Government to have China specialists deployed not just in
China, but deployed increasingly in other places, so that they
can engage their Chinese counterparts in places like Southeast
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. If more resources
were put in that direction, I think it would be welcome and it
would be a good idea.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you both.
Senator Feingold. I'm pleased to see such good attendance
for this hearing.
I'd turn now to Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your public service.
I want to follow up more on the cooperation of the Chinese
with us. And, Mr. Christensen, you state in your testimony,
``We also plan to begin, this autumn, a bilateral dialogue on
development assistance, led by Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance Henrietta Fore and her counterpart in China's
Ministry of Commerce.'' And the last time that Secretary
Negroponte was here, I asked him what the United States was
doing to get China to cooperate--specifically, that question
was to the Sudan. And he said the State Department had proposed
dialogues on assistance with China. Have the Chinese agreed to
discuss their assistance programs in Africa with us?
Mr. Christensen. Yes, sir. We had a very good visit. I
traveled with the Deputy Secretary in May, and we met with the
Ministry of Commerce during that trip, and we discussed the
assistance dialogue. The Chinese were very receptive to the
idea, the only problem being that they have this small event,
the Olympics, coming up in a hurry, and they're also tied down
in relief work in Burma and their own earthquake problems,
which are quite severe, as you know. So, they decided that it
was probably best to have these meetings sometime after the
Olympics.
They were quite positive in their discussions with us about
this idea. They seemed to want to engage. And we had a very
good meeting with one of their vice ministers in the Ministry
of Commerce, and we look forward to that dialogue. It will be
about more than just Africa, but obviously Africa will feature
prominently in that dialogue.
Senator Bill Nelson. And in that dialogue will it be the
position, the policy of the United States Government that, in
the dialogue, that the Chinese position of no-strings-attached
approach is not going to be good, because it helps prop up some
of these brutal regimes?
Mr. Christensen. Yes, sir. When we approach the Chinese on
these issues, we try to drive home why these good-governance
programs, at the heart of which is this conditionality, are
important for long-term development in Africa. For either
intentional or unintentional reasons, some Chinese assistance
programs which have no strings attached pull in the opposite
direction, and a big part of our dialogue system is simply
convincing them that it's in their interest to have good
governance in Africa, to have transparency, to have
accountability in Africa. We believe, as they invest more and
more in Africa, they're going to increasingly come to this
conclusion, that they have a stake in stability and good
governance there. They've run into some real problems in Africa
with their investments. They've had kidnappings of Chinese
workers; they've had some contractual problems. I think, over
time, partially through our dialogue and partially through
their own experience, they will come to different conclusions
about the nature of no-strings-attached investment. That will
be very much at the front and center of our approach when we
address them, as it has been in the past, in the Senior
Dialogue and in the Strategic Economic Dialogue.
Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson. Have you seen any evidence that
they're changing their attitude about their no-strings-attached
policy?
Mr. Christensen. I wouldn't say that we have evidence that
they've changed, on a principled level, the no-strings-attached
policy. However, we do see some evidence that they have run
into problems in Africa that have forced them to adjust their
behavior toward certain countries, that they've pulled back
some business deals, they've had some problems recently in
Zimbabwe, like everybody else, because of the nature of the
regime there. We're hopeful that the Chinese Government will
draw the proper conclusions from those lessons that the best
way forward over the long term is to have good governance in
those countries.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, speaking of Zimbabwe, they want
to sell weapons to Zimbabwe. What's their lesson in Zimbabwe?
Mr. Christensen. Well, here's a good example. They do sell
weapons to Zimbabwe, and we have real concerns over that.
Recently, there was a shipment to Zimbabwe, just following the
election debacle there, and the international community and, I
think, even more important still, local governments and local
actors in Africa resisted that arms transfer at that time, and
it's our understanding that the shipment of arms, which was
worth over a million dollars, we believe, in arms, was sent
back to China. They had trouble unloading the shipments in
South Africa. Other countries said the shipments were
unwelcome. The international community, including the United
States, expressed concerns about the transfer of weapons at
this time, given the civil strife in Zimbabwe, and the Chinese
recalled that shipment. Whether that will become a pattern or
not, we will see, but we think that the recall of that shipment
was a good decision.
Senator Bill Nelson. This kind of approach to aid
assistance in Africa by China, is this buying them long-term
political support among the African nations?
Mr. Christensen. I think, as with many countries'
experience in the past, China's record on this is mixed. I
think that governments in Africa are obviously more comfortable
with unconditional aid than conditional aid, but I think that
China has run into some reputational problems in Africa as a
result of its economic engagement. There have been, as I said,
some attacks on Chinese projects in countries like Nigeria.
There have also been problems for China in electoral politics
in countries like Zambia. And we think that China is running
into some of the problems that former investors and outside
economic actors have run into in Africa. I think they've run
into some that are particular to China at this time, which is
that many people in Africa seem to appreciate the fact that the
international community, the United States, the major donors,
the international institutions, support good governance as part
of these assistance programs. Our own reputation in sub-Saharan
Africa, I understand--Mr. Swan can speak more authoritatively--
is quite high, and we have kept a very strict conditionality on
our assistance.
So, hopefully----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what----
Mr. Christensen. I am hopeful that China will study that
lesson, will care about its own reputation, as it does around
the world, and will draw the right conclusions from that
experience.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about debt forgiveness? Are they
going to work with other nations in the forgiveness of debt
among African countries?
Mr. Christensen. That's one of the areas where we want to
see coordination. It's very important, because we have debt-
forgiveness programs, and we don't want Chinese money to pour
in just after that and to undercut some of the efforts at,
again, producing good governance and better institutional
decisions on the parts of these governments.
But, again, I think I should turn to Mr. Swan, here. I'm
getting a little bit in over my head, in terms of the African
reality.
Mr. Swan. With your permission, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to pick up on a couple of points that my
colleague mentioned, to stress again, it's not just those
outside Africa who are concerned about the Chinese actions in
Africa. It's fundamentally and primarily Africans themselves
who have concerns about the direction of some of these no-
strings-attached policies and nontransparent-assistance
practices. And we've certainly seen concerns raised in a number
of countries over the fact that a no-strings-attached policy, a
lack of attention to good governance, is, indeed, contrary to
principles that have now been agreed by the African Union
itself as an institution, is contrary to the overall direction
of the New Partnership for African Development, which includes
governance and other criteria as a key element in economic
development in Africa.
So, I think what we're seeing is a growing level of African
concern, as well, to ensure that the Chinese behave and perform
responsibly in Africa.
Similarly, on the issue of debts and nontransparency, we've
seen an example recently in the Congo, where a significant
Chinese offer of a loan has attracted attention within the
Congolese Parliament. It's obviously attracted attention more
broadly within the Congo. And so, I think we're going to see
more of that with it not only being other donors concerned
about how China's loan practices may influence debt relief, but
the populations and the political leadership within these
countries also have those same questions and will insist on a
greater level of transparency.
Senator Feingold. I thank the first panel very much, and
we'll now turn to the second panel.
[Pause.]
Senator Feingold. Dr. Economy, would you please begin with
your testimony?
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, DIRECTOR OF ASIA STUDIES,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Economy. Thank you. Three brief points, focusing my
remarks on the China component of the equation, and then I'll
certainly welcome questions.
The first point I want to make is really just that China's
Africa strategy is part of a much broader global strategy that
we find in Southeast Asia, as well as in Latin America, to
secure resources, as Tom earlier mentioned, to limit Taiwan's
international space, and, I think, really, as a hedge against
any potential U.S. political or military challenge. This makes
the job of addressing China in Africa more difficult in some
ways, because what we're really talking about are the
fundamentals of Chinese foreign policy, not simply China's
engagement with several individual countries in Africa. But, I
also think it offers the United States a wider range of
political partners so that when we're talking about something
like illegal logging, for example, we're not simply talking
about Mozambique or Gabon, but also Indonesia and Brazil. This
offers the United States broader opportunities, in terms of the
forums for discussion and negotiation with the Chinese.
In the past few years, I've attended a couple of
conferences in South Africa that have focused all of their
attention, really, on this issue of China in Africa. The
picture that has emerged, at least in my mind, is clearly a
very mixed one, and some of what I've seen and heard has been
mentioned already. But, Chinese investment, its infrastructure
development in Africa, its educational assistance, its
technical assistance, are very much welcomed, and often, at
least in these conferences, they're discussed in the context of
filling a gap that the United States and the European Union are
not, in fact, addressing. At the same time, there is a lot of
concern voiced among many of these academics who are at these
conferences over the lack of transparency, over the
environmental and labor conditions and practices of Chinese
multinationals, over the competition from Chinese
manufacturers, the loss of potential jobs with African labor,
the export of Chinese labor to Africa, and China's reluctance
to engage in broader good governance and regional security
issues.
I think the good news is that over the past few years the
Chinese have become highly sensitive, highly attuned to these
complaints, and some officials and scholars are beginning to
rethink part of their approach to Africa, and that means that
there is an opportunity for the United States to assist.
But, I do think it's important to recognize that
cooperation with China is hard, and that, no matter the number
of dialogues, the Chinese are often very content to have
dialogues or 10-year frameworks for dialogue that don't
actually require change in behavior, so that sometimes it's
necessary to hold Chinese feet to the fire. Dialogue can only
take us so far.
But, I do think there are a few things that we can do to
maximize our chances of success in working with China.
The first is to address those issues which the Chinese
themselves have recognized as necessary to reform. For example,
corporate social responsibility. I think this is key for the
Chinese at this point. It addresses several issues of
governance on the ground, where there have been many protests
in Africa concerning Chinese behavior. You now have officials
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China, in the Ministry of
Environment, certainly you have NGOs in China--to a lesser
extent, people in the State Forestry Administration--who are
quite interested in seeing Chinese companies adopt better
environmental and labor practices.
Unfortunately, for the most part, these institutions have
less power, because corporate social responsibility is overseen
by the Ministry of Commerce, which has no experience in this
area, and not so much interest.
Nonetheless, we've seen the Chinese taking up to 200
companies to the Global Compact, to the United Nations, to talk
about corporate social responsibility. I think there's
opportunity in the strategy economic dialogue to address this
issue. So, looking forward, it's an area where the kinds of
reputational issues that Deputy Assistant Secretary Christensen
raised earlier, come to the fore for the Chinese. They're very
concerned, for example, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
about this kind of backlash on the Chinese reputation due to
the poor practices of Chinese companies.
I think, too, one of the things that perhaps was missing in
the earlier discussion is an opportunity to work with China in
a multilateral context. We have a lot of bilateral dialogues
going, but it seems to me that we have to consider China in a
broader context, because, in many respects, that's where you
get the most bang for the buck, when it comes to China.
So, first, I think that means engaging India--and this was
raised by Mr. Chairman because India is following on the heels
of China, and is going to pose many, if not all, of the same
challenges to the region. It's far behind, still, in terms of
level of its trade, et cetera, but has similar issues on
sovereignty that the Chinese have. So, we're going to have to
engage India. China's not going to trade off its short-term
economic gain if it thinks that India is somehow going to be
advantaged by this.
The EU already has a trilateral dialogue with Africa. Japan
is becoming much more engaged in Africa. It has, now, what it's
calling ``rare metals diplomacy.'' So, I think that bringing
all of these forces together to talk to China will be
important.
And then, I think one of the things that was coming through
earlier in the discussion, too, is that Africa itself, in many
respects, has the greatest leverage, both because it holds what
China wants--namely, the commodities and the reputation. To a
large extent, China feels free to disregard the United States.
They will call it containment, or they'll say we, ourselves,
are not having best practices. So, I think that it's important
to remember that Africa probably holds greater leverage on many
of these issues than the United States does.
In my last 34 seconds, I'll just say that one thing that
struck me, again, at these meetings in which I've participated
in Africa, is that, while they will complain about China, they
certainly complain as much about the United States. And, while
I don't focus on U.S. policy in Africa, I'll just note that
some of the complaints, such as an overwhelming focus by
theUnited States on antiterrorism issues, not listening to the
needs of Africa, a lack of, high-level diplomatic attention, et
cetera--are very much the same kinds of complaints that I hear
when I travel in Southeast Asia, as well. So, it seems to me
there's the possibility that, on a few issues, we might want to
be taking a page out of China's playbook in thinking about the
way that they engage more broadly strategically and deeply.
I'll stop there.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Economy follows:]
Dr. Elizabeth C. Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director, Asia
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY
THE LANDSCAPE OF CHINA IN AFRICA
China's active diplomatic, economic and military engagement in
Africa dates back more than a half century. Yet over the past decade,
the relationship between China and much of Africa has expanded so
rapidly that both sides--not to mention the rest of the world--have
been left struggling to understand the new rules of engagement.
Why Africa matters to China is no mystery. China's top priority is
acquiring access to the natural resources--copper, timber and oil,
among them--that are plentiful in Africa and critical to China's future
economic development. China currently accounts for approximately one-
fourth of world demand for zinc, iron and steel, lead, copper, and
aluminum. Africa also offers a growing market for inexpensive Chinese
consumer goods, such as textiles and electronics. Politically, African
countries often play a pivotal role in support of China's broader
interests: Supporting its case against greater international
recognition for Taiwan (although this may become less important given
the recent warming in Taiwan-PRC ties) and protecting it from censure
in various human rights fora.
On all fronts, the relationship between China and Africa is
exploding with activity. During 2001-2007, trade between China and
Africa jumped from $8.92 billion to a reported $73 billion; China
anticipates that bilateral trade will reach $100 billion by 2010. More
than 800 Chinese companies are formally registered to do business in
Africa and have officially invested $12 billion. Much of this
investment is tied into larger investment, aid and loan packages
structured by the Chinese Government, such as a recently inked $9
billion deal with Congo exchanging resource rights to copper, cobalt,
and nickel mines for extensive assistance in infrastructure
development. The Congo deal also typifies China's strategic thinking
about the region: It will develop a special economic zone in Congo that
will be the hub of an industrial distribution system linking Congo by
rail and highway to Zambia and Angola, all of which will benefit
China's export capacity.
China's economic activity is matched and supported by an
extraordinary level of diplomatic initiative. There is an endless
stream of highly polished diplomatic forays by China's top leaders to
Africa, the establishment of an Africa+China institution, the Forum on
China Africa Cooperation, and China maintains the largest number of
embassies, consulates, and diplomats in Africa of any country. China is
also expending significant energy in its cultural and educational
diplomacy, establishing 11 Confucius institutes to promote Chinese
language and culture throughout Africa and promoting a wide range of
student, medical, and technical exchanges.
In contrast to its expansive economic and political efforts, China
is only gradually expanding its military role and influence in Africa.
As of 2006, there were only 15 permanent military attaches and 26
bilateral mil-to-mil exchanges. China's only permanent military
dialogue is with South Africa.
For the United States, China's engagement in Africa poses a clear
challenge to America's stated commitment to promoting good governance
in the region and, according to some U.S. businesses, to American
competitiveness. Importantly, China's ``go out'' strategy is a global
not merely a regional one. China in Africa looks very much like China
in Southeast Asia and Latin America, suggesting that any U.S. response
to China's growing role in Africa will have broader applicability
throughout much of the developing world. Second, while China is clearly
at the forefront of redefining how outside powers engage in other
regions of the world, India, and in some cases, Russia are close
behind. Thus, a U.S. strategy designed to meet the challenges or take
advantage of the opportunities posed by China's Africa initiatives
should account for the future challenges and opportunities posed by
other rising global powers.
EMERGING CHALLENGES FOR CHINA IN AFRICA
China's initiatives in Africa have generally been heralded by
senior African officials and businesspeople for their focus on
providing Africa with what it needs--namely no-strings investment and
infrastructure. At the same time, there is a growing sense of disquiet
among some African governments and sectors of civil society concerning
how China does business, including rampant corruption, poor
environmental and labor standards, the influx of hundreds of thousands
of Chinese workers, and, perhaps most importantly in some instances, a
perceived mismatch between China's oft-stated principles of
noninterference and not mixing business with politics and African
interests in better governance and regional security.
Inequitable Trade and Investment Deals.--African officials
raise several concerns on the trade and investment front: (1)
China imports primarily raw commodities from Africa, but
exports finished textiles and electronics. Ghanaian Trade
Minister Alan Kyerematen has argued that Africa needs to be far
more aggressive in identifying market opportunities for
finished products in China. (2) China's extraction of resources
to benefit its continued industrial development will prevent
African industry from developing. (3) China is undermining
domestic industries in textiles and wood processing (e.g. while
timber-rich countries export finished wood products to Europe
and the United States, Chinese imports are 85 percent logs).
The Export of Chinese Labor to Africa.--An estimated
750,000-1,000,000 Chinese now reside in Africa; Chinese
infrastructure deals often mandate up to 70 percent Chinese
labor. As a result, Africans complain that they receive little
benefit from these large deals. In addition, within African
cities and towns, Chinese often establish their own
restaurants, small hotels/dormitories, and stores to serve the
needs of the Chinese workers, thereby limiting the value of the
new labor to the local economy.
Corruption.--Complaints about Chinese corruption arise from
both government and nongovernmental actors. Both raise the
issue of the significant role Chinese companies play in illegal
logging and mining, depriving both locals and the government of
legal revenues. As Richard Behar reported in a series of
articles in Fast Company, the Government of Congo, for example,
revealed that as much as 75 percent of the minerals such as
copper and cobalt are illegally exported via black market
miners, many of whom are indentured to Chinese middlemen and
financiers, who then smuggle the minerals to China on cargo
ships via South Africa or Tanzania. Nongovernmental actors are
also concerned about the lack of transparency in China's back-
room, large-scale aid/trade and investment projects, believing
that much of the potential economic windfall is siphoned off by
senior government leaders in their own countries.
Poor Labor and Safety Standards.--Chinese extractive
resource industries in Africa have earned a reputation for weak
labor and safety standards, as well as low levels of pay; a
situation reflected within China itself. (More than 300 people
die every day in China because of unsafe working conditions.)
Cheng Siwei, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of China's
National People's Congress, has warned that the lack of CSR by
Chinese companies operating abroad is harming China's
reputation. (In at least one case, in Zambia, the issue of
Chinese business practices became an issue in the national
election.)
Environmental Degradation.--Chinese companies' CSR deficit
extends to their environmental practices. Mining companies have
come under fire in Zambia for groundwater contamination and
failure to undertake mandated environmental impact assessments.
The Chinese oil company, Sinopec, lost its drilling rights in
Gabon for its environmentally unsound practices in a national
park. Chinese timber exporters are funding extensive illegal
logging in Mozambique and Gabon. (Between 70-90 percent of all
exports are illegal.) International and domestic environmental
nongovernmental organizations have also condemned poor
environmental practices surrounding Chinese dam construction in
Sudan and now Mozambique.
Regional Governance Concerns.--China has generally trumpeted
its principles of sovereignty, noninterference, and not mixing
business with politics as a strong selling point in its
relations with Africa. Increasingly, however, African leaders
have begun to pressure China to play a more responsible role in
regional security affairs. They have called on China to cease
arms sales to Zimbabwe, for example, arguing that they are
fueling an already highly explosive situation. The African
Union has also argued for intervention in the case of
humanitarian disasters, as well as supporting democracy, and
has called on China to be supportive of its efforts.
CHINA'S NEW THINKING
Chinese officials in Africa and scholars who work on relations
between China and Africa are highly attuned to these emerging problems.
In speeches, writings and private discussions, these diplomats and
scholars suggest that while overall they feel their Africa strategy is
quite successful and should stay the course, some aspects will require
adjustment. Some of the lines of continuity and potential change
include the following:
Continue and Expand Economic, Technical and Educational
Ties.--In 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao set forth an eight-
point proposal to support future African development, including
$5 billion to support Chinese business investment in Africa, $5
billion in preferential loans and credits to establish Sino-
African trade and economic zones, the doubling of 2006 levels
of assistance by 2009, expanding the range of tariff-free items
Beijing will import from Africa from 190-440 before the end of
2009, and the provision of technical assistance. China will
also increase the number of government scholarships for African
students from 2000 to 4000. (Some scholars argue that much of
African elites' commitment to multiparty democratic values,
etc., comes from studying in the West and that China should
similarly stress its political and economic comparative
advantages through educational opportunities.)
Overseas Development Assistance.--There has been some debate
within China over the lack of untied aid to Africa between
those who believe Beijing needs to increase its efforts in this
area while others argue that Western-style aid projects are not
effective. One scholar has suggested that Chinese aid projects
allow Africans their dignity and are more stable and equal than
those offered by the West.
Gradual Reform of Sovereignty Principles.--As the African
Union has begun to push China to do more to ensure regional
security, China is very gradually assuming a more responsible
role (largely through its support of U.N. peacekeeping
missions). China's official position remains that it is limited
in what it can and should do as an outsider, that sovereignty
must be respected and that with regard to human rights, China,
as is true of other countries, has its own human rights
problems and shouldn't criticize others. Still, there is now
discussion within Beijing about how to adjust to the AU's
belief in conditional intervention.
Develop a System of Corporate Social Responsibility.--
Raising the labor, safety, and environmental standards of
Chinese companies in Africa has become a top priority for
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who believe that these
corporations are seriously damaging China's reputation. (In
some cases, MOFA officials must establish a temporary residence
in areas where Chinese companies are based in order to help
with community relations.) This will be a challenging task:
Chinese companies have no tradition of CSR and introducing it
in Africa will come only after they address the problem
domestically; responsibility for CSR rests with the Ministry of
Commerce, which has no experience in these issues;
increasingly, the Chinese companies going to Africa are not
simply the large state-owned enterprises with financial and
political ties to Beijing but rather smaller enterprises from
the provinces or private entrepreneurs over whom Beijing has
virtually no leverage.
Rethink Security Interests.--China has only low-level and
limited military engagement with most of Africa. Several
factors are prompting a growing interest in a broader security
engagement: The safety of Chinese workers, who have been
abducted and killed in Southern Sudan, Nigeria, Zambia,
Ethiopia, and Chad; the increasing presence of India, which has
a strong and growing naval presence in maritime shipping lanes;
concern over the security of China's supply lines; and the
U.S.'s AFRICOM initiative, which some Chinese military experts
argue is directed at China's growing role in the region.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
China's successes and its emerging challenges offer the United
States the opportunity to increase its own engagement in the political
and economic development of Africa. There are several avenues the
United States could pursue in conjunction with China and/or Africa to
enhance the U.S. role:
Cooperate with China on issues of corporate social
responsibility. China's new-found desire to improve the
reputation of its businesses operating in Africa provides both
the United States and African countries the opportunity to
press Chinese state-owned enterprises to join the Extractive
Industries Resource Initiative and/or other global corporate
governance efforts such as the Global Compact. The United
States could also use its Strategic Economic and Political
Dialogues with China to advance cooperation on areas of joint
concern, such as illegal logging and mining safety.
Take advantage of growing Chinese Government concern over
the security and stability of African states and the Chinese
citizens who reside there to engage in broad security
cooperation. This might include in some instances joint support
for police and military; most certainly it should include the
advancement of international standards on transparency and good
governance.
Assist Africa in taking a page from China's own economic
development playbook. Throughout China's economic takeoff, the
country's leaders have ensured that Western assistance and
investment benefited Chinese companies and Chinese workers,
with domestic labor and sourcing requirements. In addition,
they insisted on broad corporate social responsibility, with
multinationals required to fund infrastructure such as roads,
schools and hotels, as part of the price of doing business.
Recognize that Africa's leverage with China is often greater
than that of the United States. China can often dismiss U.S.
pressure by pointing to shortcomings in America's own
governance and human rights practices or by claiming that the
United States is simply trying to contain China. Africa,
however, provides China with both resources and international
legitimacy. There are significant costs to China's reputation
when it ignores Africa's requests for good corporate governance
or support for regional security.
Ensure that America's Africa strategy is meeting Africa's
perceived needs as well as those of the United States. China
gets high marks across the developing world for listening to
the interests of its prospective partners. Moreover, its broad
and deep diplomatic and economic engagement ensures that even
as it falls short in meeting African expectations and needs, it
is constantly reassessing and adapting its policies. The United
States could likely benefit from the type of broader and deeper
political/economic and strategic integration that China's
political and business leaders have brought to their Africa
strategy.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for your testimony, Doctor.
Dr. Morrison.
STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AFRICA
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Morrison. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, for
the opportunity to be here today.
I'm going to offer a few focused remarks that look beyond
my prepared testimony.
First has to do with China's evolving approach on Africa.
There's been some discussion earlier about the scope and scale
of its assistance. I think we need to acknowledge, out front,
that this is not just another donor. China will surpass the
United States as the lead premier trading partner with Africa
no earlier--no later than 2010. When concessionary financing is
being put on the table on the order of $50 billion for Nigeria,
this is a different reality and a different order of
engagement.
There is a reassessment, an internal reassessment ongoing
within China right now with respect to its approaches to
Africa, and that is a multisectoral and long-term approach
that's going on. We don't understand it very well. They're
reexamining their approaches on health, the way that they deal
with human rights advocates and media within Africa. Corporate
social responsibility is a source of active internal debate. We
need to know more about that.
I think that you can look at the Darfur instance and make
the case that China's foreign policy engagement did respond, in
terms of appointing an envoy, dispatching the envoy into Darfur
repeatedly, and engaging a much broader spectrum of players
than would have been the habit before that. That's positive.
There are very serious interagency difficulties within the
Chinese approach, and embarrassing episodes like the arms sale
to Zimbabwe. The Foreign Affairs Ministry struggles, I believe,
to get its arms, in the case of Sudan, around the policy with
respect to Sudan, as against the interests of oil and the
security alliance with Sudan.
The Olympics are a huge factor right now, heightened
sensitivities on Darfur, quite a bit of outrage internally
within the government over some of the actions; for instance,
the decision by Steven Spielberg to step down as the director.
These are issues that became very emotional and incendiary
issues, and there's a--the debate, I sense, with respect to
Darfur, has crept into an area of, sort of, backlash of Chinese
nationalism that we saw also around Tibet and we've seen in
some other issues, and in which a sort of sovereign interest
and sovereign pride has crept into the discussions, that
earlier, around Darfur, could be much more confined. I think
we're going to have to wait until the other side of the
Olympics to be able to really begin to seriously reengage
around some of these, although many of these pressing matters
on Darfur require immediate attention, obviously.
The Africa policy that the Chinese pursue, I believe, will
enter a period of accelerated reassessment, this fall, in the
lead-up to the next FOCAC Summit, in Cairo, which will be at
the end of 2009. That's not that far off. So, you can expect, I
believe, to see some interesting developments that will be
rolled out in that November--October-November-December
timeframe, whenever they actually hold that Cairo meeting.
On United States-Chinese collaboration, I think there is a
general consensus around no-zero-sum competition, points of
tension that need to be managed, shared interests. However--and
the subdialogue that was created, I think you could be very
helpful in trying to ensure that that subdialogue is carried
forward into the next administration.
Very little has been achieved, in concrete terms, but a
consensus is being formed that this is valuable. We should
preserve that and move that forward.
I also think that the consensus that exists, and what we--
and the cooperation that we've seen on Darfur recently between
the United States and China, in getting to the U.N. Security
Council resolution, this is very fragile, and could be easily
reversed, and I'll explain in a moment what I mean by that.
The Chinese changed, in 2006 and 2007, with respect to
Darfur, partly because they wanted--they were concerned about
their--how their behavior within the Security Council itself
was being seen; and Kofi Annan's argument that, ``If you're
going to be a member of this group and be influential, you
have--you cannot be isolated, you need to move forward,'' was a
convincing one. I think there were lots of reputational damages
being inflicted internally within their own elite, within every
Western embassy, protests of all sorts, of all forms, and
within the African political community. I think we've seen a
slowdown lately in that cooperation. I see a hardening of
position with respect to Darfur, less interest in helping move
forward a deployment of non-African troops into Darfur, less
interest in helping overcome some of the slowing tactics that
we see Khartoum enacting. There seems to be a position that
there needs to be some--on the Chinese part--a need for some
kind of longer term new thinking on this. I'm not sure where
that goes.
There hasn't been any discussion around the JEM attack upon
Khartoum and Omdurman. This, in my mind, was a dramatic moment.
It revealed the degree to which the conflict in Darfur has
become regionalized between N'Djamena and Khartoum. It shook
this regime. There has been debate within the Security Council
about the possibility of a Security Council-led initiative to
try to broker an end to proxy border warfare between Khartoum
and N'Djamena. It hasn't gone very far. However, that's another
opening where you could see greater cooperation.
Within the CPA, the North-South Peace Accord, there is
dramatic tension today, and, I think, as we look forward, in
the next 2 years, towards the election in 2009 and the
possibility of the referendum that's called for in 2011, we can
expect continued tension and conflict between the North and the
South. We have a terrible problem in Abia today that's
unresolved. And, I think, when you look at the Chinese and the
United States position, we're allied on opposite sides of the
table on that. When you look at the interests that the Chinese
have with respect to oil, arms, political alliance with
Khartoum, opposition to a cessation within the South; you look
at the United States position, which is sanctions, which
alignment with the South, which is coding Khartoum as a
genocide regime, on the list of State Sponsors of Terror--the
potential for a polarization and divergence of approaches as
the CPA moves forward in the next 2 years is very, very high,
and we need to keep that in our minds and be thinking about
that.
There are some other cases in which there could be greater
collaboration or thinking. Nigeria being one, Angola being
another.
On AFRICOM--just one closing comment on AFRICOM--the
Chinese seem to be taking a quiet wait-and-see approach on
AFRICOM. They are resistant to cooperating directly with us on
peacekeeping. This issue was raised by Jim Swan. I support that
idea. They do not see AFRICOM, I do not believe, as a threat to
their interests or as motivated by Chinese entry and--they see
this as a--an important United States initiative that's been
beset by some difficulties around mandate, partnerships, and
building legitimacy, and winning support within Africa.
However, I would argue that there are openings in which the
Chinese and the Americans could begin dialogue and exchanges on
creating peacekeeping support within Africa.
Senator Feingold. Thank you----
Dr. Morrison. Thank----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Doctor.
Dr. Morrison. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Director, Africa
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Senators Feingold and Isakson, I am very grateful for the
opportunity to speak today at this timely hearing.
In late 2006, CSIS and the China Institute for International
Studies (CIIS) hosted a conference in Beijing that examined the scope,
characteristics, and drivers of China's engagement in Africa. The
results were detailed in the CSIS conference report, ``China's
Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States.'' In your
invitation letter, Senator Feingold, you cited the conclusions of that
report and asked that I comment on new, emerging evidence and thinking
on China's role in Africa, based on CSIS's ongoing work, and the
implications these developments may have for U.S. policy.
To answer Senator Feingold's question, I will base my remarks
largely on a subsequent major CSIS conference, held in Washington,
December 5-6, 2007, in collaboration with the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and CIIS. It featured senior leaders
and expert analysts from China, the United States, Kenya, Nigeria,
Angola, Swaziland, and Uganda. It solicited a range of African views on
the impacts of Chinese engagement in Africa, and sought to identify
concrete areas for future United States-Chinese-African collaboration.
The full conference report will be available on the CSIS Web site at
the end of this week.
CHINA'S EXPANSIVE ENGAGEMENT IN KENYA, ANGOLA, AND NIGERIA
At the December 2007 conference, commissioned papers were tabled
that examined in depth China's engagement in Kenya, Angola, and
Nigeria. The authors, experts from the three focal countries, each drew
on extensive in-country interviews. It was our view that this type of
informed, ground-level analysis has been largely absent from most
discussions of China's expanding role in Africa. Interestingly, while
the authors varied considerably in their approach and focus, all three
described a largely positive and pragmatic relationship with China, and
emphasized that engagement is maturing as country capacities and
priorities evolve. The three country studies are contained in the full
conference report.
Michael Chege, UNDP advisor to Kenya's Ministry of Planning and
National Development, argues that China's resounding economic entry
into Africa has been poorly served by most literature on the subject,
which often depicts African economies under threat of malevolent
Chinese investment strategies and a flood of cheap manufactured goods.
In the Kenyan instance, the Chinese-Kenyan relationship has by-and-
large been mutually beneficial.
Chege challenges the assertions that increased imports from China
have harmed the Kenyan economy, arguing that Kenya's manufacturing
output has risen and become more diversified while imports from China
have been rising to record levels. Chinese construction firms are not
inherently detrimental to Kenyan interests; they are a leading source
of employment, and create infrastructure at lower costs, making Kenya's
economy more competitive overall. The study finds that most Kenyans are
pleased with the transportation networks Chinese firms have provided,
despite widespread criticism of inferior Chinese construction.
China's share of Kenya's external development assistance has
increased dramatically, from .08 percent of total assistance in 2002 to
13 percent in 2005. In Kenya, there is no single predominant oil or
other natural resource base. Accordingly, China's investments are
spread across multiple other sectors.
Kenya will need to carefully manage its bilateral relationship if
it is to be successful in the long term. Kenya continues to struggle to
boost the volume of its exports to China in the face of a large surplus
in China's favor, and it will continue to be tested when Chinese
businesses engage in poor environmental practices or illegal activity.
Protectionism or limiting its cooperation with China will only harm
Kenya in the long run. Chege argues that Kenya's competent technocratic
cadre and business sector have thus far been able to manage the
relationship to Kenya's benefit. The larger enduring challenge, in his
view, is for Kenya to come to terms with evolving global competition.
Indira Campos and Alex Vines, research assistant and head of the
Africa Program at Chatham House, respectively, describe in their
analysis a largely pragmatic relationship between Angola and China,
which the Angolan Government has leveraged to meet the country's urgent
reconstruction priorities. Angola has benefited from large quantities
of Chinese financing when concessional funding from international
institutions, like the IMF, was not available. Chinese financial and
technical assistance has kick-started over 100 projects in the areas of
energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, and
public works enabling Angola to become one of the most fast-growing
economies in sub-Saharan Africa in a span of 5 years. The China-Angola
relationship is unique in the China-Africa context in that Angola
inconsistently runs a large trade surplus with China, owing to the
rapid rise of Chinese oil importation.
In Angola there is a clear quid pro quo: China's desire for natural
resources as against Angola's stark development needs. Crude oil
represents over 95 percent of all Angolan exports, and it is also
China's main Angolan import. Over the last 6 years, China has been the
second-largest importer of oil from Angola behind the United States,
consuming roughly 9.3 to 30 percent of Angola's total oil exports.
Despite the U.S. lead in the imports of Angolan oil, since 2002 Angola
oil exports to China have increased seven-fold, compared to only 3.5
times to the United States. However, Angolan oil production is still
dominated by Western companies such as ChevronTexaco, Total, BP, and
ExxonMobil.
Despite rising Chinese investment, Angolan officials insist that
China is only one of several major external partners, and they remain
wary of becoming beholden to any single external partner or resource.
This pattern is visible when looking at the origins of Angola's imports
over the years: China's share has increased significantly, but so have
the shares of India, South Africa, and Brazil. Similarly, Angola
exports over the years have significantly diversified.
Angola is acutely aware of many of the challenges it faces in its
relationship with China. It acknowledges that it is often unable to
utilize local capacity to fill the mandated 30-percent Angolan
workforce quota for infrastructure projects under Chinese credit lines.
It has established a mechanism whereby it reinvests 5 percent of its
oil proceeds into the nonoil sector. It seeks to improve its relations
with Western institutions by agreeing to pay, on an accelerated basis,
the bulk of its debt of $2.5 billion owed to Paris Club creditors and
seeks greater foreign direct investment by claiming to have eased its
investment laws. It has also responded to Western criticisms of
opaqueness in its Chinese credit lines by issuing a statement in Luanda
in October 2007 clarifying the Angolan terms for use of those funds.
Although this is a welcome development, Vines and Campos argue that
more disclosure on the part of the Angolans is needed.
As Angola continues developing its relationship with China,
controversial issues such as local content and employment may intensify
over time, and tensions may rise over the slow pace of implementation
and relative decision-power in the relationship. However, Angolan
officials appear confident that their efforts to diversify donors and
diversify investment into nonoil sectors will succeed in the long term.
Professor Pat Utomi, a political economist and senior faculty
member at the Lagos Business School-Pan African University, details in
his analysis an increasingly complex, rapidly evolving relationship
between Nigeria and China. He makes the case that Nigerian perspectives
on that engagement, even within the government itself, are far from
uniform. Utomi's study explains that many career foreign affairs
officers and politicians feel that a China-Nigeria partnership could
offer greater benefits than collaboration with the West, but that there
were many areas of the relationship that needed increased attention and
improvement: The risk of heightened dependence on China and often weak
official Nigerian leverage in the relationship; quality of project
implementation, and uncertainty over technology transfer. Nigeria's
private business community also exhibited mixed feelings about Chinese
business incursions into Nigeria. Businessmen welcomed trading with a
lower cost economy, securing financing from Chinese partners, and
learning from Chinese manufacturers and business models, but worried
that Chinese firms might be benefiting in greater proportions than
Nigerian businessmen.
In order to combat some of these challenges, Utomi calls for
expanded debate within the Nigerian Government and across the business,
academic, and civil society communities on how best to optimize Western
and Chinese engagement. He argues that Nigerian policymakers, including
national and local officials, are not setting policies that will have
the strongest possible impact on Nigeria's long-term economic growth
for the widest array of its citizens. To overcome this challenge,
strong pressure must be placed on Nigerian leaders to effectively
balance U.S. and Chinese engagement to maximize African growth and
opportunity.
EMERGING THEMES
Several important cross-cutting themes emerged from the discussions
held at CSIS on December 5-6, 2007.
Correct for exaggerations: First, there was a widely held view that
much of the rhetoric surrounding China's engagement in Africa has been
overblown, particularly the emphasis on negative impacts in terms of
internal governance, business and donor practices, and environment, and
the potential for a major clash with U.S. strategic interests. This is
fueled by generalized uncertainty as China's engagement rapidly
expands, and in part by concern about African capacities to manage and
shape this engagement to their countries' ultimate benefit. While
serious tensions and challenges were acknowledged, on balance there was
a shared sentiment that there are several areas in which United States,
African, and Chinese interests intersect and where greater
collaborative efforts can yield positive results.
Need for African leadership: Second, there was a strong consensus
that both African state and nongovernmental interests need to play a
more proactive role in shaping and directing United States-Chinese
cooperation. African states are too often discussed as the scene in
which United States-Chinese strategic competition playouts, and African
interests are frequently cast also as passive recipients of potential
cooperative development or security assistance. If African governments
assert themselves strategically, they will leverage competition to
their countries' long-term benefit and set priorities for cooperative
efforts.
African diversity: Third, there is no single ``African''
perspective on China's engagement in Africa. Africa features a wide
diversity of actors and interests, across countries, across sectors,
between governmental and nongovernmental actors, and within African
governments themselves. In many countries that have enlarged the
political space for civil society, these various interests and
perspectives have become increasingly influential, and the demands on
African governments for competent and accountable management will
likely continue to increase. A priority for the international community
should be to build the capacity of nongovernmental entities--the
business sector, civil society, and the media--to engage their
governments on a strategy to manage increasing external competition and
opportunities for cooperation.
Multiplicity of Chinese interests: Fourth, China itself is not a
monolithic entity, and Chinese engagement, contrary to popular
rhetoric, is often not directed from Beijing. The number and types of
Chinese actors engaged in Africa are rapidly diversifying, including
diplomatic representatives, state-owned enterprises, private
enterprises and individual families, each driven by different
interests, and different modus operandi. There are instances where
Chinese national interests and those of state-owned enterprises appear
increasingly independent of one another. To maximize opportunities for
cooperation at multiple levels, both U.S. and African actors will need
a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of these realities.
Early United States-China dialogue: Fifth, there have been
tentative steps toward United States-Chinese dialogue and cooperation
in Africa, conducted at the Assistant Secretary level; in the case of
Sudan, between special envoys and in actions taken in the U.N. Security
Council; and in the case of Liberia, generated through innovative
cooperation on the ground. These have yielded concrete gains on Darfur
and Liberia security sector reform. Especially important has been
Chinese diplomatic leadership in the U.N. Security Council and its
pressures upon Khartoum. These were essential to the U.N. Security
Council authorization in July 2007 of the deployment of the 26,000-
person joint UN/AU peace operation to Darfur. Much more effort, backed
by high-level commitments on both sides, will however be needed to
sustain the peace efforts in Darfur and address the worsening crisis
within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the North-South war
in Sudan in January 2005.
There is opportunity for United States-Chinese project cooperation
in less politically sensitive areas like agriculture and health. There
is a case for active United States-Chinese cooperation on peacekeeping
in Africa, but resistance from both sides remains strong, and U.S.
statutory limits (for instance, a provision contained in the National
Defense Authorization Act of FY 2000 barring cooperation with the
People's Liberation Army except for humanitarian purposes).
There is need for continued dialogue on areas of disagreement and
tension: Most importantly, human rights, governance, donor lending and
debt terms, business practices, and environmental standards, for
example. In each of these areas, African regional organizations and
nongovernmental players could facilitate debate and create a greater
African voice. Across the board, stronger leadership from African
interests is needed to drive these efforts forward on a sustained
basis.
Transnational expert networks: The final cross-cutting conclusion
is that much analysis concentrates too narrowly on government-to-
government engagement in discussion of United States-China-Africa
relations. Greater priority is needed to strengthen nongovernmental,
policy-focused, transnational networks. Universities, research
institutes, and advocacy groups, environmental and health policy
organizations, could play a powerful role in promoting corporate social
responsibility, environmental stewardship, and community development.
ENERGY SECURITY
China is sensitive to being lectured on ``gobbling up'' Africa's
oil supplies. There is often exaggeration of the scope of Chinese
energy engagement in Africa, frequently portrayed as a zero-sum
``scramble'' for African energy resources. China's demand for oil
resources is indeed rising steeply, but in absolute terms China remains
a relatively small player in African oil exploration. Today Africa
accounts for 30 percent of China's overall oil imports (oil imports
constitute 30 percent of China's total energy consumption) and Africa's
share of oil imports is certainly set to rise. Given projected Chinese
energy demands, China, like the United States and the rest of the
world, has a long-term interest in both oil conservation and the
development of alternative energy sources. At present however, total
Chinese oil consumption is one third that of the United States.
Further, China's share of total African oil production is approximately
9 percent, versus Europe's share of 33 percent or the U.S. share of 32
percent.
The Chinese argue that China's investment in upstream oil
exploration and production should not be considered threatening, but in
fact be welcomed since it expands global supplies. It is important to
recognize that China frequently chooses not to ship African equity oil
back to China. Logistically, it is easier to ship West African oil to
markets in Europe and North America, and, commercially, the incentive
is to choose those markets which fetch the best price. Although
approximately half of China's equity oil production worldwide come from
Africa (approximately 300,000 of 600,000 barrels per day, of which
225,000 barrels derive from Sudan), the majority of that equity
production is not shipped to China but sold in the global market.
China, like the United States, will continue to rely overwhelmingly on
the open market for years to come.
Chinese state-owned companies operate with increasing independence
from the Chinese state. It is largely a myth that the Chinese Central
Government directs state-owned firms where to invest, or that these
companies rely overwhelmingly on financial support from Beijing. State-
owned companies act largely according to commercial versus geopolitical
interests. Particularly in places like Sudan, where the reputational
costs of Chinese investment have been considerable, there is increasing
divergence between the interests of companies and the interests of the
state, and uncertainty as to how energy security is achieved for China
through support for state-owned companies. China's actual imports from
Sudan are less than 100,000 barrels per day. The lead Chinese company,
the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), has been doing well
financially in its Sudan operations, but the Chinese Government has
been the target of massive international criticism, for what, in a
global context of 85 million barrels of production per day, is a paltry
volume of oil imports from Sudan.
Many African partners look to China for models of energy investment
different from those of traditional Western companies. The latter have
tended to operate in enclave-type settings, engaging a narrow elite,
with weak connection to the rest of society or to other economic
sectors. There is need in Nigeria, for example, to diversify away from
the energy sector, and China through its multisectoral package deals
appears engaged in a broader range of sectors, including critical
infrastructure, that Western companies and donors shun. The Chinese
development model is in its early stages in Africa, and positive long-
term impacts on development and equity are not guaranteed. However,
persistent disillusionment among Africans with Western commercial
approaches has played to China's advantage.
There are several energy-related areas where United States,
Chinese, and African interests intersect.
Working together on addressing climate change and developing clean
and sustainable energy sources will be at least as important as
managing upstream investment. While this will be a long-term challenge,
cooperative efforts should be given greater priority now.
Ensuring the security of energy personnel, infrastructure, and
transportation is a shared interest. Chinese workers are proving
equally vulnerable to local conflict and violence as Western and often
African interests, as demonstrated in attacks against oil workers in
the Ogaden and Sudan and in hostage-taking in the Niger Delta.
China's principle of noninterference will be increasingly tested in
unstable, conflicted settings, opening new opportunities for
cooperation on conflict resolution and collective international
pressure on governments in energy-producing states to invest in long-
term stability and good governance. Should the Government of Nigeria
become seriously engaged in addressing long-standing grievances in the
Niger Delta, both the United States and China would have a shared
interest in supporting an effective solution and each would bring
special strengths to a potential resolution and reconstruction
strategy. The protection of physical infrastructure and sealanes in
West Africa's Gulf of Guinea is also of increasing common interest, and
the United States may look to China to play a more active and
cooperative role in ensuring maritime security, building African coast
guards and establishing control over rich coastal fisheries that are
now often plundered through illicit industrial harvesting.
Finally, transparency and reliable rules of engagement are
ultimately in the interests of oil investors and energy-producing
countries. Neither China nor the United States wish to be at the mercy
of oil states or see market investment opportunities subordinated to
narrow political calculations and unstable, poorly governed states.
AFRICA'S PUBLIC HEALTH
China and the United States have both rapidly expanded their public
health initiatives in Africa, at a time when international attention
more broadly in global public health is also expanding. HIV/AIDS,
malaria, avian flu, and SARS have generated greater appreciation for
the internationalization of health and the need for international
health diplomacy and cooperation. Major government initiatives, along
with the expansion of efforts by nongovernmental organizations,
multilateral institutions, foundations, and faith-based organizations,
offer new opportunities for collaboration to address African public
health challenges.
African challenges are many and there are ample areas for
coordinated work. At least 300 million cases of acute malaria are
diagnosed annually. Malaria kills over 1 million people each year in
Africa and is among the leading causes of death for children under
five. More than 8 million new cases of tuberculosis are detected
annually, and despite the availability effective treatment, those
numbers continue to rise. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 85 percent of
the world's HIV/AIDS cases, and the disease compounds other diseases
and other developmental problems. New epidemics such as avian influenza
could be devastating. And as Africa's urban populations expand,
alcohol, drug abuse, and chronic diseases like hypertension, heart
disease, and diabetes are increasing as well.
Structural challenges persist: The lack of trained health personnel
and health infrastructure; weak interest internationally in tropical
disease research; lack of African capacity, for example, in minimizing
the influx and proliferation of counterfeit drugs.
U.S. contributions to Africa's health challenges have risen
dramatically in recent years, enjoying strong bipartisan support that
is likely to endure. By the end of the first 5-year phase of the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in late 2008, the
United States will have expended over $19 billion on global AIDS
control, roughly 60 percent in Africa. To date, these efforts have been
focused primarily on tackling specific infectious diseases--first and
foremost HIV/AIDS--and targeting select focal countries. In fighting
HIV, there is increasing recognition that long-term management will
require greater support to building health systems, and PEPFAR's next
5-year phase will almost certainly devote greater resources to the
training of skilled personnel. President Bush has also launched a major
$1.2 billion, 5-year initiative on malaria: In 2007 the United States
spent $338 million on malaria efforts in Africa versus $1 million spent
in 1997. Compared to HIV, control of malaria is more straightforward
and affordable, with respect to the science of the disease as well as
prevention and treatment. The challenge is to remain focused over time
and to collaborate with partners to ensure maximum coverage.
Chinese contributions to Africa are gradually increasing, and are
an important component of China's Africa policy overall. China will
continue to send medical teams to Africa, increase cooperation with
Africa on prevention and treatment and on research and application of
traditional medicines. There are approximately 1,000 Chinese medical
workers in 38 countries in Africa; more than half of the doctors are
senior physicians and surgeons. Together they have treated an estimated
170 million patients suffering from various diseases. China has helped
build numerous hospitals in Africa and has plans in the next 3 years to
build 10 hospitals and 30 malaria clinics in Africa. On training, the
Chinese Ministry of Health provides 15 courses each year to African
participants, in the areas of HIV/AIDS, malaria, hospital management,
and health reform. Malaria will remain a prominent focus of China's
health engagement. China's expanding health engagement and efforts to
link it to an international strategy are somewhat fresh issues. Through
one promising initiative, the Ministry of Health has turned to global
health experts at Peking University to help review existing Chinese
programs, develop a long-term Chinese health strategy for Africa that
updates the Chinese approach and ties it more effectively to African
health outcomes, and identify opportunities for collaboration with the
international community. These experts have recently concluded a
summary review of all donor activities in the area of health in Africa.
It is expected that reform of health approaches will take several years
to formulate and execute.
There are promising areas for public health cooperation between
China, the United States and African countries, although currently
there are bureaucratic obstacles to greater dialogue and joint
projects. At a minimum, there is need for greater communication to
avoid duplication of efforts and identify gaps.
African countries should engage China and the United States on
bilateral projects but also on multilateral efforts. Moreover, China
could play a more active role in multilateral initiatives, building on
its present substantial contributions to the board of the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, and its leadership of the World Health
Organization. China and the United States bring complementary strengths
to the table: China places an emphasis on infrastructure and health
systems, and the United States on treatment of specific diseases.
African Government, with robust public health strategies in place, can
push for cooperation in what they identify as priority areas.
Collaboration on malaria is a particularly promising area in which
to build cooperation, given the priority African governments attach to
this disease and rising commitments by both the United States and
China. It is also an area that could deliver significant, rapid returns
and perhaps help encourage future cooperation in more complex health
efforts. Despite China's interest in malaria, the Chinese and other
Asian governments were absent at the 2007 Roll Back Malaria Partnership
Board meeting in Addis Ababa. China should be welcomed and encouraged
to participate more fully in these and other multilateral global health
fora.
Cooperation on health will require greater political will--by the
United States, China, and African governments--than currently exists.
This will require senior leadership that supports innovation and
flexibility in the field, and minimizes political obstacles to
communication and favors joint initiatives. A future priority should be
strengthening African capacities to address chronic diseases as well.
Cooperation should not be limited to government-to-government
engagement. Linking nongovernmental organizations, research institutes,
faith-based organizations, and corporate interests in active
partnerships should also be a priority.
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
While Chinese and United States firms have responded to growing
pressures to pursue corporate social responsibility initiatives, these
efforts often have had little meaningful impact on the ground and are
often seen as exercises in public relations. Much more effort is needed
to transfer adequate skills or resources to local African communities
and provide for worker and community safety and environmental
stewardship.
It is in the area of environmental stewardship that Chinese
engagement has been most problematic. The Chinese Government's response
to concerns over illegal logging has been quite limited. While China
has signed resource-use agreements, it has not shown strong interest in
upholding them. As an increasing number of non-state-owned companies
are engaging in Africa, environmental enforcement will become an even
more complex and conspicuous challenge.
Ultimately, the responsibility to set terms for enforcing effective
CSR falls to African host governments. Collusion between host
governments and corporations often tilt CSR projects to benefit state,
not community, interests. Communities often expect corporations to
deliver services and resources that are more appropriately the
responsibility of the government. Weak environmental laws and labor
standards, high levels of corruption, and weak governance structures
hamper effective CSR. Few African governments have mandated strict
operational guidelines for foreign companies within their borders.
Those that have, like Angola, which mandated that at least 30 percent
of an international company's workforce be Angolan nationals, have
found these guidelines difficult to sustain. Violations of
environmental laws or regulations are rarely pursued.
There have been positive examples of corporate social
responsibility in the health field, as the threat of HIV/AIDS has
generated a number of successful public-private and community
partnerships. There may be lessons upon which both Chinese and U.S.
companies can build.
On environmental issues, there has been positive, albeit very slow,
acknowledgement of the long-term economic, developmental, and security
costs of illegal logging and other harmful environmental practices.
Until very recently, the United States and China appeared alike in
regarding environmental issues as a second-tier priority, and solely
the responsibility and problem of producing countries. This has begun
to change, and nongovernmental groups and governments themselves have
made more information available on the nexus among environmental
degradation and conflict, food security, and long-term economic costs.
When pressed, Chinese manufacturers have shown an ability to adjust
quickly. In recent years, Chinese manufacturers eliminated the use of
ramin wood very rapidly, following an international agreement to
control its trade and a precipitous drop in U.S. demand. Similar
progress was seen in the reduction of illegal trade in rhino horn. The
United States and China are negotiating bilateral agreements to address
illegal timber trade.
Perhaps the most important challenge is for African governments to
set up effective monitoring and enforcement structures, to establish
regulations to protect African resources, and to develop African
capacity for environmental governance. Here, pressure, information, and
policy advice from nongovernmental actors can play a critical role.
Strengthening transnational networks of African, Chinese, United
States, and international advocacy, policy, and research institutes
should be a priority.
BUILDING PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY
The idea of United States-China cooperation on security engagement
in Africa is new, and just a few years ago such a discussion--even on
the less politically sensitive issue of building peacekeeping
capacity--would have been unlikely. However, both China and the United
States are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of building
African security capacity. U.S. and Chinese commitments in this area
coincide with increased commitments by African states, regional and
subregional organizations, and by international organizations.
In recent years, there has been an unprecedented rise in global
peacekeeping operations: Today, there are 15 U.N. peace operations,
totaling 90,000 troops and another 26,000 police and other civilian
personnel. Seventy percent of the U.N.'s operations, which run at $7.5
billion annually, are in Africa. An increasing number of deployments
are peace enforcement operations in complex environments. Force
generation and logistics are an enduring challenge. The United Nations
has relied extensively on partnerships with African regional
organizations, in integrated missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and
now a hybrid operation with the African Union in Darfur. The African
Union has set as a priority the standup of the African Stand-by Force--
five regional brigades with rapid deployment capacity--and sought
international support.
Both China and the United States have an interest in protecting
their citizens and their investments in Africa and in strengthening
African capacities to manage conflict, including filling key gaps:
Airlift capacity; communications; command and control capacities and
surveillance.
In the United States, higher commitments are seen in the
establishment of the U.S. Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative
(GPOI), launched in 2004, and in 2007 the establishment of the U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM). Having U.S. military engagement in Africa
coordinated within a single command may make cooperation with other
donor states (and with African regional bodies) less difficult.
China has an equal stake in African security and stability. Chinese
entrepreneurs have been more willing than Western companies to go to
dangerous and conflicted places, and have suffered economic and human
losses at the hands of nonstate actors and reputational costs in
international public opinion. Compared to U.S. and EU engagement,
Chinese military involvement on the continent is limited, but growing.
China has only 14 military attaches in Africa, out of the 107 it has
globally. But China is increasing its U.N. peacekeeping commitments,
contributing more forces to U.N. operations in Africa than any other
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and often in interesting
ways. In Liberia, for example, China has deployed 570 military
engineers as part of UNAMIL, and these engineers are now working to
rehabilitate the country's roads in a joint effort with the World Bank
and the Liberian Government. Engineers have been deployed as part of
U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in
Southern Sudan, and in Darfur.
China's growing involvement in peacekeeping is an important turning
point to encourage enlargement of the base of external actors
participating in building security capacity in Africa. Direct United
States-Chinese cooperation in this arena may be some ways off but there
may be promising opportunities in nontraditional security areas such as
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.
In some instances, informal cooperation and complementary
approaches of the United States and China are already yielding results.
In Liberia, the United States-China relationship has been positive and
mutually reinforcing. The United States has taken the lead in the
recruitment and training of the Liberian Armed Forces, which was
entirely disbanded after the Liberian conflict, and in strengthening
the management capacity of the Liberian Ministry of Defense's civilian
staff. China has been helpful in complementary ways: Assisting with
hardware; refurbishing buildings; providing office equipment for the
Ministry; and constructing facilities in the northern areas of the
country.
At present, improved United States-China communication and
coordination of efforts--if direct cooperation for now is premature--is
an important first step to strengthen efforts by the AU, sub-regional
organizations, state forces, and the international community. But given
the complexity of conflicts and the many challenges and costs ahead in
building African security capacity, direct United States-China
cooperation and higher levels of commitment will be needed in the
future.
CONCLUSIONS
I thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and look
forward to our discussion of these topics.
Senator Feingold. Thank the panel.
I'd ask unanimous consent that the statement of the
chairman of the full committee, Senator Biden, be placed in the
record. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Today the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee examines China's growing engagement with sub-
Saharan Africa and its implications for U.S. policy. This hearing is a
part of a series that the Foreign Relations Committee is holding to
examine China's emergence as a major power not only in Asia, but also
in Africa and Latin America. Future hearings will examine the United
States-China bilateral economic relationship, China's internal
political development, and other issues related to China's growing soft
and hard power.
CHINA INVESTS IN AFRICA
China's rapid economic growth has spurred a global search for
markets for Chinese exports and for the raw materials to sustain
China's economic development. Chinese firms have been especially
aggressive seeking energy resources to meet the nation's mounting
demand for oil. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa.
According to a recent Congressional Research Service study on
China's ``soft power'' requested by the Foreign Relations Committee,
China's imports from Africa are concentrated both in form and
geographically. China mostly imports raw commodities--oil, iron ore,
raw timber, cotton, and diamonds. Moreover, China conducts the vast
majority of its Africa trade (almost 90 percent) with just seven
countries (most of them rich in oil, ore, and diamonds)--Angola, South
Africa, Sudan, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and
Nigeria.
As China has scoured Africa for markets and resources, it has used
soft credit, foreign assistance, investment, and security assistance
(including both peacekeeping missions and arms sales) as tools to win
influence. Although precise figures are hard to get, because China does
not have a transparent foreign aid and security assistance structure,
Chinese foreign aid to African nations runs somewhere in the
neighborhood of $500 million/year. But this figure does not include
various forms of assistance, including soft loans and state-funded
development projects. The total aid package more likely is in the range
of $1.5 billion per year, and Chinese President Hu Jin-tao has promised
to double the 2006 foreign aid level for African nations by 2009.
KEEPING CHINA'S STAKE IN PERSPECTIVE
Still, it is important to put China's overall economic position in
Africa, including its foreign assistance posture, in perspective. In
2006, China imported $26 billion in goods and services from sub-Saharan
Africa, while the United States imported $59 billion. The United States
imported 45 billion dollars' worth of oil from African states in 2006,
compared with $19 billion for China. As for exports, in 2006 China
exported $19 billion in goods and services to sub-Saharan Africa,
compared with $12 billion in U.S. exports to the region.
With respect to development assistance, in 2006, the United States
provided roughly $5 billion in aid to sub-Saharan African states. The
United Kingdom and the European Union provided $4.7 and $3.5 billion,
respectively. Japan provided more than $2.5 billion. In sum, the major
OECD donors provided more than $20 billion in aid to Africa, compared
with less than $2 billion from China.
All of this suggests to me that when considering the impact of
China's growing economic and political ties to Africa, we should not
overlook our own considerable stake in the continent, and that of our
close friends and allies.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
China's growing engagement in Africa presents both opportunities
and challenges for the United States.
On the plus side, China's investments and burgeoning trade are
helping to fuel strong growth in several African states, bringing
improvements in infrastructure and quality of life to millions and
bringing more energy resources into the international marketplace.
China is pursuing a comprehensive engagement strategy under the
umbrella of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, inaugurated in
October 2000 in Beijing during a summit gathering of 45 African
leaders. With the urging of African leaders, China is making
significant investments in health care, human resource development, and
agriculture. Chinese peacekeepers serve in almost every U.N. mission in
Africa, including in Darfur, Sudan, where China is the only non-African
nation to contribute forces.
On the negative side, China's ``no strings attached'' attitude
about foreign assistance has sometimes undermined efforts by the United
States and other members of the international community to tie
assistance to improvements in governance, protection of human rights,
anticorruption initiatives, and the adoption of more sustainable
environmental policies. This is particularly true in nations such as
Angola, now China's second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia.
Worse, China's business ties and sales of military equipment to the
Governments of Sudan and Zimbabwe directly contribute to the ability of
these states to perpetrate atrocities against their own people. China's
reluctance to criticize these governments for their human rights abuses
puts China out of step with much of the international community and at
odds with U.S. and European Union sanctions.
Which brings me to one of the core questions that I hope our
witnesses can address during today's hearing: How can the United States
convince China to become a more responsible ``stakeholder'' in Africa,
supporting, rather than undermining, international efforts to advance
good governance and respect for human rights? Must China learn the hard
way, as the United States did in Iran with the overthrow of the Shah,
that there is often a heavy cost to be paid down the road if one
ignores questions of human rights and good governance in the pursuit of
oil? Or might we be able to bring China around by sharing our own
experiences and urging China to join in our efforts?
I look forward to reviewing the testimony of our witnesses.
Senator Feingold. And I'll start with a 7-minute round.
Dr. Morrison, I understand that you recently returned from
a meeting in Beijing with the Director of China's Sudan Policy.
Do you agree with the State Department's claim that their
dialogue with the Chinese on this issue, ``is producing
important results''? And what concrete changes in policy have
been achieved, and what concerns remain?
Dr. Morrison. Senator, your question is what--the United
States-Chinese dialogue and what has been achieved with respect
to----
Senator Feingold. State Department----
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. Darfur?
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Claims that, in their
dialogue with the Chinese, is, ``producing important results.''
What concrete changes in policy have been achieved, and what
concerns remain?
Dr. Morrison. I think the most important changes occurred
in the latter part of 2006, up through 2007, and the greatest
evidence was the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1731, from
last July, that authorized the deployment of the 26,000-person
force. That would not have happened if the Chinese had not
intervened with Bashir and pushed for acceptance of that.
Right now, the dialogue is centered around getting the
Chinese to cooperate with respect to non--accelerated
deployment of non-African contingents, the Nepalese and the
Thais and others, into Darfur, so that you can get those
numbers up close to the 20,000 troops needed. There's only
9,200 on the ground today. And also appealing to them to
pressure Khartoum on the go-slow bureaucratic delaying tactics
that have been put forward.
But, the Chinese, as I understand it, have been less
responsive in this last phase, dating back to the, sort of,
February-March period here. And we've had--that's what I meant,
was--we've had this period of close alignment, convergence, and
cooperation in the late 2006-through-2007, but I see a--the
tightening up and a less cooperative relationship, of late.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Economy, in general, what forms of influence have
proven most effective in persuading the Chinese Government to
change a particular policy or position? And what kind of
leverage can the U.S. employ in this regard?
Dr. Economy. I think, overall, the greatest leverage that
we have really, as I mentioned, stems through Africa itself,
because China has declared itself the brother, the friend, the
partner of Africa. It sees itself as a leader of the developing
world. And, to the extent that the claims are made, or that
requests are made to China to reform its policy--whether we're
talking about Sudan or Zimbabwe or Chad, or whether we're
talking about corporate social responsibility-- when it comes
from Africa, it is more meaningful than when it comes from the
United States.
U.S. leverage, I think, is greatest when it's in concert
with other powers, as Dr. Morrison mentioned, within the U.N.
Security Council, when you have the full force coming down upon
China, when China is outed as not being a responsible player.
I think there is an element where quiet diplomacy can work,
it's a long process. And so, the kinds of dialogues that the
State Department uses are very important. It's a type of
capacity-building, building understanding through dialogue.
But, if you look at the trend, for example, in human rights
dialogue with China, notwithstanding the 6-year hiatus, the
results of that, in the larger scope of things, have been quite
limited.
So, again, I think that there has to be an element of
calling to China to account publicly, in conjunction with this
dialogue and capacity-building, and it's most effective if it
comes from those countries who matter most to China in the
context, which, in this case, is Africa itself.
Senator Feingold. I'd appreciate if both of you would say a
word about whether you believe that the current United States-
China bilateral engagement, as described by our first panel, is
sufficient and effective.
Dr. Economy.
Dr. Economy. I think it's an excellent start. In some
respects, it's very difficult to assess whether the U.S.
engagement is sufficient and effective. What we're talking
about, when we're talking about almost all of these issues with
regard to United States engagement with China in Africa, are
really fundamental problems within China itself. So, we're
talking about China's export of its worst practices. Whether
you're talking about transparency, corporate social
responsibility, corruption, issues of sovereignty, these are
all things that are a challenge within China as well. It's not
simply China's foreign policy, but it's also China's domestic
policy that we're talking about. What we're trying to do, in
essence, is have China reform the way it governs itself.
Again, I think that there is a long-term aspect to this. I
think, for the U.S. Government, it probably is the most
constructive way of engaging China, but I think there's an
important role to be played by Congress, by outside experts, by
nongovernmental organizations, in ratcheting up the pressure.
If you want to get China to change it's renminbi strategy, it's
not all about Hank Paulson and the strategic economic dialogue.
It might also be about the sets of resolutions emanating from
Congress that place China under pressure and give it the sense
that there will be consequences if China doesn't take action.
Senator Feingold. Dr. Morrison.
Dr. Morrison. I have a sort of mixed response to that
question. On the one hand, I think having multiple dialogues
going, as they were articulated by Tom and by Jim, is very
favorable, because you've got dialogues going on, on a variety
of different issues at a variety of different political levels.
That's good. We've seen the Chinese are receptive to these
dialogues, they've been responsive to them, they've engaged,
they've broadened and deepened their engagement in this. That's
good. We've come around to understand that this is a long-term
kind of dialogue. So, those are very positive.
What I do think we've underestimated in looking at the
opening of these dialogues is the way--is the resistance that
we see on both sides. And the source--to some degree, the
resistance have common sources. Both the United States and
China are very preoccupied with their--with moving forward
their expansive engagement in Africa, which is historic for
both of them. So, they're preoccupied. They also are very
concerned about branding and sovereign identity, and they don't
want to dilute that. The Chinese are getting into Africa with
an argument they are different from the West. They're not a--
you know, their motivations are not to dilute that line through
too close an alignment of--or integration of their efforts with
ours. We have to get smarter about how we frame this so that we
can make this--the case that neither of us are going to dilute
what we're really trying to do here, in terms of promotion of
comparative national interests.
The United States has a certainly sensitivity also about
this being--seeming a bit neocolonial. And I think that
interest can be ameliorated to the degree that more and more
African participants are integrating into these discussions.
To the degree that these are China and Africa's
policymakers talking--I mean, China and the United States
policymakers talking about Africa, it does have this odd
outdated appearance to it, even while there may be important
business to discuss.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Dr. Economy, you noted that the Chinese get high marks
throughout the developing world for addressing the fundamental
economic investment and infrastructure needs of its prospective
partner governments, something that the United States is not
particularly known for. But, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa,
would you say that meeting the needs of a government translates
into meeting the needs of the people? What does China--to what
extent does China really achieve that?
Dr. Economy. Well, I think that it's probably a mixed bag.
Earlier it was pointed out that we're seeing a lot of
Presidential palaces, maybe a cricket stadium, a new foreign
affairs building in some countries. I think the people of
Africa don't necessarily recognize those things as contributing
directly to benefit them, and there have been complaints, for
example, in Namibia, about the fact that you can't trace
Chinese development assistance through the budget; you can find
out how money is spent from every other country, except for
China. So, I think that lack of transparency is of concern to
many within civil society in Africa.
I think, too, the issues of the labor, the export of
Chinese labor, are raising concern within many countries. This
was brought up to me, in fact, in South Africa by somebody from
Sudan. He was, at one point, nominated to be the head of the
Chinese-Sudanese People's Friendship Association, back in the
1960s, and he remembered that the Chinese were very good about
providing real technical assistance, and that they engaged with
the Sudanese people. Now he doesn't see that kind of transfer,
real transfer of technical assistance, although it's talked
about, and that the Chinese tend to live in colonies, almost,
where they have restaurants and hotels--little hotels and
dormitories where the people stay, so that there doesn't seem
to be this kind of----
Senator Feingold. Yeah, I've heard that----
Dr. Economy [continuing]. Benefit to the local economy.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Same description many times
in Africa.
Dr. Economy. Right. So, I think that there's a mixed sense
for what the infrastructure development brings.
On the other hand, they're building hospitals, contributing
to universities, they're training Africans in China, providing
educational assistance. They have Confucius Centers. So, there
are things that they are doing that the people perceive to be
directly beneficial to them.
Senator Feingold. Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Morrison, at--toward the end of your printed testimony,
in a paragraph that cites the establishment of the Global
Peacekeeping Operation Initiative in 2004 and AFRICOM in 2007,
you have a statement--you said, ``Having U.S. military
engagement in Africa coordinated within a single command may
make cooperation with other donor states and with Africa
regional bodies less difficult.'' And then, in your verbal
testimony, I heard a reference, ``prospectively to future
peacekeeping initiatives,'' vis-a-vis the United States and
China. Would you--I heard you say they were taking a wait-see
attitude with AFRICOM, and, on the other hand, I almost read
this to be ``they see that as somewhat positive.''
Dr. Morrison. Well, my point--my initial point there was
having a more unified approach, institutionally within our own
government, will make it potentially much easier for external
partners to understand and relate to the United States, if it's
not divided among three different commands.
So, I hope that clarifies the----
Senator Isakson. It does.
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. The point.
I do think there are barriers to United States-China
military cooperation in very benign ways in Africa, that would
help support creating African peacekeeping capacity. We don't
invite Chinese to come to the Africa Center for Strategic
Studies and the leadership seminars. We don't invite them to
the ACOTA peacekeeping training exercises. We don't have a
dialogue at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping with
other Perm-5 members, around relative security strategies for
supporting. One of the factors is that, in the FY 2000 National
Defense Authorization Act, there's a bar on China-United States
military cooperation, with an exception for humanitarian
operations. And this is a very sensitive issue. We could
enlarge that--the opportunities and the incentives for
cooperation if that were--if there were leadership and if there
were some change, in that way. Chinese have over 2,000 of their
troops deployed into U.N. peace operations globally; around
1,500 of those are in Chinese--I mean, in African peace
operations. We have a very strong shared interest in building
up African peacekeeping capacities.
Senator Isakson. Dr. Economy, on the AFRICOM question,
when--at the outset of your testimony, you said, ``their global
strategy''--``theirs'' being China's--vis-a-vis Africa, was
``natural resources, Taiwan, and, third, America's strategic
interests.'' And you directly refer to AFRICOM. How do you see
the Chinese viewing AFRICOM?
Dr. Economy. I think--you know, Dr. Morrison mentioned that
there's not concern. My sense is--and this is really just from
readings of Chinese literature, not from direct interviews with
Chinese on this particular topic--is that, certainly within the
military academies in China, there is exactly that concern, and
it's stated quite explicitly, that AFRICOM is, in fact, at
least in part, directed or designed to assert United States
influence in the face of rising Chinese engagement and
development in Africa. So, I think that there is, certainly in
the military in China, a sense that AFRICOM has a China
component to it. But, it's also true that the Chinese see that
everywhere, so that no matter where you are, however the United
States engages, they tend to see it as, in some way, directed
at China.
Senator Isakson. So, sort of a paranoia?
Dr. Economy. A little bit. But, some of it might, in fact,
be justified. [Laughter.]
Senator Isakson. How do you personally view AFRICOM?
Dr. Economy. You know, I don't really have an opinion of
AFRICOM, except to the extent that, again, it seems to me, from
listening to people in Africa, that they would prefer a broader
engagement by the United States, and that this, in some way,
reinforces the sense that there's a strong military component
to it. But, some of what the Chinese do do on infrastructure
and other things would also be welcome.
Senator Isakson. Well, the reason I mentioned that point
is, I think that, perception wise, you're right; but in
reality, in my visit to Djibouti and just what I have seen, the
U.S. military initiatives have been primarily in
infrastructure, well-drilling, bridge-building, roads, and
infrastructure, and not in military operations, but in
engineering expertise, which I think Africa needs desperately.
So, I think it has the potential to be a real positive for the
country, but I do understand the paranoia and the fear.
Dr. Morrison, you made reference--you said, ``China is not
just another donor country, and, by 2010, their investment will
surpass the United States.''
Dr. Morrison. Their level of trade----
Senator Isakson. Their level of trade.
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. With Africa. Their two-way trade
with Africa will exceed that of the United States. The United
States is the largest trade partner with Africa today, and
China is rapidly approaching the point where it will overtake
us.
Senator Isakson. And most of what China buys is petroleum,
energy, natural resources, is that not correct?
Dr. Morrison. Well, it's a mixture of energy, timber,
precious minerals and metals that are--that come from Africa,
coal, other hard-rock minerals. And there's an--there's a
sensitivity around the need to diversify that base of imports,
because of what we heard earlier about the opposition from
African manufacturing interests, just seeing a flooding of
markets and the sensitivities around that. And places like
South Africa, where your manufacturers are quite well
organized, they're quite vocal, and their unions are quite well
organized.
Senator Isakson. I have one last question, if I could find
where I wrote my note. You talked about interagency, lack of
coordination within China, and referred definitely to the arms
shipment. I have always had the impression China was very
coordinated in their effort, but you seemed to imply, in that,
that maybe there was some interagency--between military and
other functions in the Chinese Government, some lack of
coordination. Did I mishear that, or----
Dr. Morrison. No; that's my strong impression. This--it's a
fairly opaque system, so--making categorical statements is a
little dangerous, but in talking to different parts of the
government about different sensitive policies, you don't
necessarily get the same answer. So, it's not quite as much a
command--a sort of centrist command system as you might expect.
And I think that one of the dramas--one of the subdramas
running through the Darfur question has been a reaction
internally among foreign policy elites and opinion leaders
within China, saying, ``What are you doing, allowing our
reputation to be dragged down so badly and damaged so badly in
a country like Sudan, where, in the big picture, we really
don't have that much at stake, in terms of national interests,
but we're taking a hammering, globally, in terms of our
image?'' And it's going to take--and it's undermining all of
the other progress that's being made in trying to build the
reputation that this is an ethical, rising superpower, which is
the core of their agenda. And so, you had a debate going on.
And we heard this--we heard this very loud and clear in 2006
and 2007, in engaging with the Chinese. And that suggested to
me that there's an internal debate.
It shouldn't surprise us that there's deep internal debates
around many of these issues, and that, in the case of Sudan, it
was the oil interests and the arms interests that got in--were
the front edge of getting involved, and the policy oversight
came much later and had to battle against that, I believe.
That's just one instance.
In the health sphere, we could talk a bit about the way
that the health system is trying to coordinate and update its
approaches, too. It's not always all that centrally directed.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
On the AFRICOM point--you know, I've been a supporter of
the concept of AFRICOM, and Senator Isakson is right, much of
what our military does, to the extent it does things in Africa,
has to do with helping developing communities. The problem is,
when it's done by the military, and that's the only thing
people see, then we come to Africa with a military face, and
only a military face. Without broader engagement, as Dr.
Economy was suggesting, without broader commitment in many
other areas, including public diplomacy, and more diplomacy per
se, that allows others--Chinese or others--to characterize our
intentions in a way that is not accurate. And that's why it's
so important to get this right.
But, I do thank the panels. Thank Senator Isakson for his
commitment throughout the entire hearing and on this
subcommittee.
And I have to go to the Judiciary Committee, so that
concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Additional Material Submitted for the Record
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Responding to China in Africa
by David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman
June 2008
The American Foreign Policy Council