[Senate Hearing 110-645]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-645
EVALUATING U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
ON THE HORN OF AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Almquist, Hon. Katherine, Assistant Administrator for Africa,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC...... 13
Prepared statement......................................... 17
Dempsey, Colonel Thomas, USA (Ret.), Professor, Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA................................................... 61
Prepared statement......................................... 63
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin........... 1
Frazer, Hon. Jendayi, Assistant Secretary, African Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared statement......................................... 8
Fredriksson, Lynn, Advocacy Director for Africa, Amnesty
International USA, Washington, DC.............................. 43
Prepared statement......................................... 45
Shinn, Dr. David, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, The
Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington
University, Washington, DC..................................... 54
Prepared statement......................................... 56
Whelan, Theresa, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC.......................... 23
Prepared statement......................................... 26
(iii)
EVALUATING U.S. POLICY OPTIONS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA
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TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ
Feingold, presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Bill Nelson, Cardin, Lugar, and
Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. This hearing will come to order. I want
to begin by thanking Senator Biden, Chairman Biden, for making
this a full committee hearing, while allowing me to chair as
the Africa Subcommittee chairman. Today's hearing will address
U.S. policy toward arguably the most worrisome region on the
African Continent, the Horn of Africa. Since, I visited that
region just over a year ago; the situation has gone from bad to
worse.
Today's hearing is an effort to examine the United States
Government's policy toward the Horn--specifically, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Somalia--and to assess what we've done right, what
we've gotten wrong, and most importantly, what we need to do
going forward to reconcile what appears to be, by most
accounts, a failing policy in a very critical part of the
world.
This committee has sought to understand and address the
escalating deterioration of security, political, and
humanitarian conditions on the Horn that have been generated
and exacerbated by more than two decades of instability. This
is our third hearing in less than 2 years to try to inform and
encourage a comprehensive U.S. strategy to address the Horn.
Unfortunately, the problems we will hear about today are
quite similar to those discussed at previous hearings, while
the deterioration on the Horn continues to pose a serious
threat to regional and international security. We need to
address this--the insecurity and instability in Somalia,
Ethiopia, and Eritrea, as in other countries in Africa--by
working to end violence, promote democracy, defend human
rights, reduce poverty, and improve security. But too often,
these long-term goals have taken a back seat to more short-term
and short-sighted priorities.
I would like to say a word about why this hearing is so
timely and important. There may be less than 10 months left in
this administration, but we must nonetheless develop a policy
that can help reverse the declining trends in the Horn of
Africa, both at the national level as well as regionally. We
have no option but to reassess where we currently stand, given
that the political crises in Ethiopia and Eritrea are
escalating dramatically, the border situation between those two
countries remains inflamed, and the bloody fighting in Somalia
shows little sign of abating, despite the recent appointment of
a Prime Minister who appears to be saying many of the right
things.
The challenges we face on the Horn are not new, but in the
post-9/11 world, how we deal with them presents new challenges
that have, in my opinion, yet to be met. We have repeatedly
discussed the need for a long-term comprehensive and
coordinated U.S. Government policy that considers our strategic
concerns, political dynamics, humanitarian concerns and,
perhaps most critical, our national security interests, and
applies our significant diplomatic, military, intelligence, and
foreign assistance resources toward building a secure and
stable Horn of Africa.
Unfortunately, such a policy remains elusive. As we are
likely to hear today, the problems in Somalia have a ripple
effect across the Horn; they reflect longstanding clashes
between Ethiopia and Eritrea that, in turn, benefit from the
turmoil of a country with no functioning central government.
In other parts of the world, we've seen what happens when
decisions are made and executed without the benefit of a long-
term, comprehensive strategy. We've seen what happens when the
administration's counterterrorism agenda dominates its
bilateral relationships, and poor governance and human rights
abuses therefore get a pass. Such actions undermine our
country's own credibility and actually end up contributing to
instability.
This hearing is intended to not only inform the legislative
process here in the Senate, but also to continue to emphasize
the need for a more interconnected and balanced approach to the
Horn of Africa that addresses each country specifically while
still recognizing the transactional challenges and national
security implications. This part of the world is far too
important for us to rely on narrow, feeble policies or half-
hearted ad-hoc measures.
And so with that said, let me introduce our two
distinguished panels so we can begin today's discussion. On our
first panel we have three witnesses from the administration who
represent the top Africa Policy Directors in their respective
agencies. We have Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer; the Assistant Administrator for
Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development, Ms.
Katherine Almquist; and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa
at the Defense Department, Ms. Theresa Whelan.
All three of these witnesses have testified before the
Africa Subcommittee, so it's my pleasure to welcome you back to
full committee. I appreciate your willingness to testify and
look forward to, what I hope, will be a frank and productive
discussion.
Our second panel features a range of individuals who are
well-qualified to speak on the unique challenges related to
this complex region and the impact that U.S. policy is having
throughout the volatile Horn of Africa, as well as on the U.S.
national security priorities and policies, more generally.
First, we'll hear from Ms. Lynn Fredriksson, the Africa
Advocacy Director for Amnesty International U.S.A. We will look
to you, Ms. Fredriksson, for a detailed picture of dynamics on
the ground, and how they have been affected by recent
developments.
We are also privileged to welcome back Dr. David Shinn.
Ambassador Shinn was the U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia between
1996 and 1999, and currently serves as an Adjunct Professor of
International Affairs at George Washington University. Mr.
Ambassador, we hope that you will offer analysis of the
regional and international dynamics relating to developments on
the Horn, as well as your opinion of how the United States and
the international community can most effectively address the
challenges we face there.
Last, we welcome Retired Colonel Thomas Dempsey, currently
the Professor of Security Reform, at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute. Mr. Dempsey has served as a
Strategic Intelligence Analyst for Africa at the John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center, and as Chief of Africa Branch
for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
I'd like to extend a special welcome, also, to all those in
the audience today who have personal ties and commitments to
these countries and issues. I know many of you have traveled a
long way to attend this hearing, and I'm pleased that you could
be with us. We are seeking to obtain balance and insightful
recommendations that will have lasting implications for the
Horn of Africa and for United States and international
security.
I am looking forward to hearing from each of our witnesses
about the nature and consequences of our actions and our
inaction on the Horn, as well as what our long-term objectives
and strategies should be.
Now, I am pleased to turn to the ranking member of the
full committee and the former chairman of the committee, and
really find it impossible not to mention his consistent
commitment--not only his famous work on African issues, but he
is almost always at this subcommittee's hearings, showing his
continued devotion to working on issues related to African
countries.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me just mention again the commendation you've given to our
witnesses, and likewise to the distinguished audience that has
joined us today, as you pointed out, many from long distances,
but all with very compassionate and constructive interests in
Africa.
And I appreciate so much your leadership, your willingness
to have extensive hearings discussing all parts of the
continent and the various dimensions of what we can do. So I
will forgo any opening statement. I will be in and out of the
hearing, as will be the case of many Senators, I suspect today,
trying to cover several bases, but I really look forward to the
hearing and the witnesses.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. I thank you, Senator Lugar. And, with
that, we'll start with our first panel.
Secretary Frazer, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Frazer. Good morning. And thank you, Chairman Feingold,
Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, for calling the
hearing on this important subject.
I am especially pleased to have this opportunity to meet
with you shortly after the President's overwhelmingly
successful visit to Africa and the critical peace agreement in
Kenya. The President's trip saw an extraordinary outpouring of
support for the United States and the American people, and
appreciation of the President's initiatives funded by the U.S.
Congress.
At points in their history, the five countries the
President visited--Benin, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, and
Liberia--experienced some of the turmoil now facing countries
in the Horn of Africa, that is, societies torn apart by war,
and conflict with neighbors, and experiencing political strife.
Yet today, these countries stand as transformative models, and
we foresee the same in the Horn of Africa. Today, the Horn of
Africa is a crucible in which many of our most important
priorities for Africa are being addressed in their most raw
forms. We will continue to work for U.S. interests in the Horn,
as elsewhere in Africa, to promote regional stability,
facilitate economic growth, eliminate any platforms for al-
Qaeda or other terrorist operations, provide humanitarian
assistance to the people in need, and work with governments in
the region to transform the countries to invest in the people
and good governance. Our strategy focuses on a regional
approach working in partnership with African countries.
The situation in Somalia remains the key challenge to
regional stability and security in the Horn of Africa. Somalia
has been characterized as a complex emergency, both in
humanitarian and political terms, since the collapse of the
Siad Barre regime in January 1991. For the last 17 years,
Somalis have struggled to establish credible governance and
stability in their country.
During 14 reconciliation conferences, and numerous civil
conflicts during the intervening years, U.S. strategy for
Somalia aims to advance four key policy objectives.
First, encourage inclusive political dialog to further the
transitional political process outlined by the Transitional
Federal Charter and leading to national elections in 2009.
Second, provide humanitarian and development assistance for
the Somali people, and help build the capacity of the
Transitional Federal Government to better govern and deliver
services.
Third, facilitate the full deployment of the African Union
Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, to stabilize the country and create
the conditions for Ethiopia's withdrawal.
And fourth, deny terrorists the opportunity to find save
haven in Somali territory.
Over the past year, we pursued our objectives coordinating
closely with the Transitional Federal Government, or TFG, and
regional countries, and working multilaterally, especially
through the International Contact Group on Somalia.
Mr. Chairman, the committee requested an update on our core
objectives. Since we submitted the comprehensive regional
strategy on Somalia to Congress in February 2007, we have made
important progress. But we still have a ways to go, as
expected, and working to transform Africa's one, true failed
state.
First, we have worked closely with the Transitional Federal
Government leadership and the U.N. Special Representative to
the Secretary General, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, to continue the
political dialog process and encourage additional outreach to
key Somalia stakeholders. The TFG successfully held a National
Reconciliation Congress in Mogadishu in July through August
2007 that was attended by 2,600 delegates, and funded by the
United States and other donors, and backed by the African
Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations.
The conference recommendations were also blessed by Saudi
Arabia, recognizing the inclusive participation of Somali clan
leaders, business, civil society, women's groups, and the
religious leaders, among others. Only the truly extremists
refused to take part, as noted in the GAO Report on Somalia.
In more recent months, we have seen the emergence of a very
positive momentum with President Yusuf's appointment of a new
Prime Minister in November 2007, and that Prime Minister's
selection of a more representative Transitional Federal
Government Cabinet. Prime Minister Nur ``Adde'' Hassan Hussein
has promoted reconciliation by engaging in extensive outreach
to elements of the Somali opposition, working closely with
humanitarian agencies, and preparing the ground for the key
tasks that remain to be completely before elections in 2009.
However, time is short for this 2009 transition, and
significant tasks remain ahead. Needed among them are effective
and inclusive security and justice mechanisms that will allow
Somalis to live in peace and security. Given financial support,
the neighboring countries are prepared to provide training to
assist the TFG to create viable and responsive security forces,
to establish a more secure environment in which the political
process can move forward.
Second, as correctly noted in a GAO Report, Somalia's
chronic humanitarian emergencies continue today, following
almost two decades of civil conflict. Localized droughts and
flooding have exacerbated the deteriorating humanitarian
conditions. We will continue to pressure all parties to allow
unfettered delivery of humanitarian aid to effective
populations. We have to develop greater leverage over
extremists, especially groups like al-Shabaab that attack
humanitarian relief staff and facilities.
We will continue urging the Transitional Federal Government
and Ethiopians to do all that they can to protect fluencies and
prevent further deaths and displacement of innocent people. In
2007, the United States was the leading donor of humanitarian
assistance, providing more than $140 million to assist the
Somali people.
Third, at the time of the Somali Strategy Report to
Congress, AMISOM was but a concept on paper. One month later,
in March 2007, Uganda deployed two battalions, and today,
Uganda and Burundi have deployed more than 2,500 soldiers as
part of AMISOM.
Burundi deployed its first battalion of approximately 850
soldiers in January 2008, and has an additional battalion that
awaits only funding to deploy. Uganda also plans to deploy an
additional two battalions of 1,600 troops, if the necessary
financial support is provided.
Nigeria has pledged a battalion as well. Once deployed,
this would bring the total number of troops in AMISOM to almost
6,000, closer to the authorized strength of 8,000. To date, the
United States has allocated $59.1 million to support this
critical mission. We continue to work with the United Nations
on contingency plans to support AMISOM, and a possible
rehatting as a U.N. force, as conditions permit.
Fourth, while the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab is more
isolated than ever, we remain deeply troubled that al-Qaeda
operatives are treating Somalia as a safe haven. The United
States remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-
Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and others in the Horn
of Africa.
We have been clear that we will therefore take strong
measures to deny terrorists safe haven, as well as the ability
to plan and operate from Somalia. Fighting terrorism in Somali
is not our sole priority, but rather is part of a comprehensive
regional strategy to improve governance and the rule of law,
stabilize the country and the region, and create the conditions
for economic growth and development.
Finally, since the report to Congress, Secretary Rice has
appointed a special envoy for Somalia based in Nairobi and has
increased the staff of our Nairobi office, working exclusively
on Somalia.
Our effectiveness will be further enhanced with the ability
to regularly travel to Somalia and establish offices in the
country. I have traveled to Baidoa in Somalia, and Hargeisa in
Somaliland, to pave the way for regular, in-country, diplomatic
engagement. This is a difficult and long-term effort in
Somalia. As we encourage political dialogue, we will continue
to seek to isolate those who out of extremism refuse that
dialog and insist on violence.
This dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea regarding
demarcation of their common border poses an additional threat
to regional stability. However, the current standoff is not
comparable to the 1998 to 2000 war that claimed the lives of
120,000 combatants. Our diplomatic goals are for Eritrea and
Ethiopia to work together in good faith to implement the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's Delimitation Decision,
and for both parties to engage in talks to normalize relations.
Unfortunately, recent efforts to resolve the boundary
impasse remain stalled. Ethiopia refuses to demarcate the
border without broader normalization talks, and Eritrea's
longstanding restrictions on the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea, UNMEE operations, and the more recent refusal to allow
UNMEE to obtain fuel have caused the U.N. to begin withdrawing
UNMEE personnel.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's virtual
demarcation decision by map coordinates has not brought the
parties closer to resolution. The result has been a hardening
of positions on both sides, and increased tension between them.
We will continue to seek opportunities for progress, especially
supporting U.N. efforts, but we do not expect this impasse to
be resolved in the near future.
With Eritrea, while publicly claiming to seek peace and
stability for the region, the Government of the state of
Eritrea has privately undermined nearly all efforts for broad-
based inclusive dialog and reconciliation in the region, most
notably in Somalia and Sudan.
Its activities include supporting and hosting Hassan Dahir
Aweys, a United States and United Nations designated terrorist;
supporting Somalia extremists elements associated with the now-
defunct Council of Islamic Courts; and supporting the Ogaden
National Liberation Front, ONLF, in Ethiopia-Somalia region.
In addition to its destabilizing activities in the region,
the Government of Eritrea has stamped out political freedom at
home. Fifteen years after independence, national elections have
yet to be held, and the constitution was never implemented. The
Eritrean people deserve better. The United States has
repeatedly pressed the Eritrean Government on these issues, but
the Eritrean people continue to suffer.
Ethiopia is the oldest independent country in Africa, one
of the poorest countries in the world, and one of America's
staunchest partners, especially in countering terrorism in the
Horn of Africa. In Ethiopia, the Somali region commonly called
the Ogaden, is both a humanitarian and an emergency problem,
complicated by Eritrea's support for the ONLF and the periodic
infiltration of al-Qaeda-trained terrorists, like Aden Ayro.
Our objectives in Ogaden are to assist the Government of
Ethiopia to prevent famine in the short term by reopening
commercial trade routes and ensuring food deliveries, to push
for improvement in the human rights conditions, and over time
support efforts to integrate the Ogaden into national strategy
for better health, education, agriculture, and economic
development.
The United States is deeply involved in the persistent
diplomacy to ensure that humanitarian conditions in Ogaden do
not deteriorate into famine. Our Ambassador in Addis Ababa
coordinates the humanitarian response from the international
community. I visited the Ogaden in September to push for
increased commercial food deliveries, greater access, and
respect for human rights.
USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore and my colleague, Kate
Almquist, also traveled to the region in November. It is not
easy to ensure access for humanitarian workers for parts of the
Ogaden, at the time, remained mired in conflict to ONLF attacks
and counterinsurgency measures by the Ethiopian National
Defense Forces.
We acknowledge the government's right to defend its
territory, including against insurgents, but equally, I've made
clear to the Government of Ethiopia its responsibilities toward
noncombatants during its operations, and have expressed our
concerns about the impact of the insurgency and
counterinsurgency on the civilian population.
In promoting improved governance, we were encouraged by
the Government of Ethiopia's release of political detainees in
July and August of 2007. Again, this achievement was the result
of persistent diplomacy. Although Ethiopia has a long and proud
history, its democratic governance institutions are still
young. We have conveyed directly our expectations for
improvement on human rights and democracy issues, but also
recognize the progress made over the past 15 years.
We are confident that Ethiopia will work through its
challenges, and will work with the government and opposition to
find them--to help them find common ground as they work toward
the elections in 2010.
Djibouti is in a region fraught with instability, yet
Djibouti is a peaceful, tolerant, democratic country serving as
a valuable partner for both its neighbors and the United
States. Though challenged by poverty and chronic food
insecurity, Djibouti is rapidly becoming a vital hub for
regional economic growth.
President Guelleh recognizes that Djibouti knows that its
future success depends on regional stability and economic
integration, and with successful elections, it will continue to
serve as a model for several of its neighbors.
Somaliland: In early February, I also had an opportunity to
visit the city of Hargeisa in the self-declared Republic of
Somaliland. Somaliland has achieved a commendable level of
stability, largely without external support or assistance.
However, Somaliland's democracy remains fragile, and it is
important to maintain the success of the past.
We will continue to urge Somaliland's political parties to
demonstrate the level of political will that ensured the
previous Presidential elections in 2003 were credible and
transparent, and to work together to ensure a peaceful result,
regardless of who wins the elections.
Although not a focus of this hearing, Kenya is an integral
part of our policy in the greater Horn of Africa, and has long
been a productive force of peace and stability in this region.
We are encouraged by the February 28 political agreement
reached by President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader, Raila
Odinga. And we believe that that agreement will allow Kenya to
play its traditional leadership role in the region.
In conclusion, despite continued instability in Somalia,
and persistent tensions along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the
Horn of Africa as a whole is making some progress. Our policy
objectives remain consistent with our international and
regional partners, but as always, we are constrained by limited
resources, and to date, an inability to regularly travel to and
set up offices in Somalia and Somaliland.
Despite these constraints, we will continue to work with
our partners to bring lasting stability to areas of conflict in
the Horn of Africa, and to maintain stability and good
governance where these goals have been achieved.
Thank you. And I would be happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold and members of the
committee, for calling a hearing on this timely and important issue. I
am especially pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you shortly
after the President's tremendously successful visit to Africa, and in
the wake of the critical peace agreement in Kenya.
The President's trip saw an extraordinary outpouring of support for
the United States and the American people. We are working closely with
our African partners in a way that brings credit to our country. Our
objectives in the countries the President visited--Benin, Tanzania,
Rwanda, Ghana, and Liberia--are similar to those currently dominating
our agenda in the Horn: Helping Africans resolve conflict and rebuild
societies torn asunder by war; promoting ethnic tolerance and
reconciliation; encouraging economic growth and job creation; improving
health conditions; and ensuring democratic institutions and values
prosper, including in nations with significant Muslim populations, for
Islam is clearly compatible with democracy.
The Horn of Africa today is the crucible in which many of our most
important priorities for Africa are being addressed in their rawest
forms. The issues are not conceptually different in the Horn than in
the countries the President visited, but in some cases they present
starker challenges in societies confronting ongoing conflict, where
delivering state services and entrenching democratic values and
institutions remain major challenges.
Somalia's challenges have frustrated its citizens, neighbors, and
friends for decades. Following the appointment of Prime Minister Nur
``Adde'' Hassan Hussein, we are now seeing greater and more effective
outreach to elements of the Somali political opposition, isolation of
terrorist and extremist elements, efforts to repair and strengthen
relationships with the humanitarian organizations, and concrete plans
and timetables to accomplish the required transitional tasks under the
Transitional Federal Charter. In Somaliland, we are witnessing the
patient, methodical emergence of representative institutions.
While Ethiopia and Eritrea have been as yet unable to resolve their
many differences, the parties have controlled their militaries and
largely refrained from reckless behavior on the border. Ethiopia has a
unique history and is making the transition from two millennia of
autocracy to a modern state. Djibouti is stable and preparing to be an
important regional hub centered on its strategically located port.
Eritrea remains the tragic exception to this picture. We have strong
relations and mutual interests with the countries of the Horn of
Africa, except Eritrea. President Isaias sponsors instability in
Ethiopia, Darfur, and Somalia and is undermining the integrity of
United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. His contempt for his
neighbors and the U.N. is not new but it is particularly egregious at
this sensitive time and sets a dangerous precedent.
We will continue to work in the Horn, as elsewhere in Africa, to
promote regional stability and representative government; facilitate
economic growth, increased prosperity and jobs; eliminate any platform
for al-Qaeda or other terrorist operations; provide humanitarian
assistance in the wake of drought, flooding, and 17 years of near-
constant conflict in southern and central Somalia; and work with
governments in the region to transform the countries through investing
in people and good governance.
SOMALIA
The situation in Somalia remains a key challenge to regional
stability and security in the Horn of Africa. Somalia has been
characterized as a complex emergency, both in humanitarian and
political terms, since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in January
1991. For the last 17 years, Somalis have struggled to return lasting
governance and stability to their country, enduring 14 reconciliation
conferences and numerous civil conflicts during the intervening years.
U.S. strategy for Somalia remains centered around four key policy
priorities. First, encourage inclusive political dialog with the goal
of resuming the transitional political process outlined by the
Transitional Federal Charter and leading to national elections in 2009.
Isolating terrorist and extremist elements is a key component of this
priority. Second, provide development and humanitarian assistance for
the Somali people and help build the governance capacity of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Third, facilitate the full and
timely deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to
stabilize the country and create the conditions for Ethiopia's
withdrawal. And four, deny terrorists the opportunity to find a safe
haven in Somali territory.
Over the past year, and particularly since President Yusuf
appointed Prime Minister Hussein in November 2007 and Hussein's
subsequent appointment of a new TFG Cabinet in January 2008, we have
worked closely with the TFG leadership and the Special Representative
of the United Nations Secretary General (SRSG) to continue this dialog
process and encourage additional outreach to key Somali stakeholders,
including clan leaders, business and civil society, women's groups, and
religious leaders, among others. It is also important to continue the
efforts begun during the National Reconciliation Congress in Mogadishu
held in July-August 2007 in moving toward national elections in 2009.
As a result of the efforts of the President, Prime Minister, and
SRSG, we have seen the emergence of a new, positive, yet fragile,
momentum in recent months. The Prime Minister has promoted
reconciliation by engaging in extensive outreach to elements of the
Somali opposition, working closely with humanitarian agencies, and
preparing the ground for the key tasks that remain to be completed
before elections in 2009. Similarly, and as a consequence of its own
extremist tendencies, the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab is more
isolated than ever. However, time is short for the 2009 transition and
significant tasks remain ahead, among them building effective and
inclusive security and justice mechanisms that will allow Somalis to
live in peace and security.
The United States remains the leading donor of humanitarian
assistance in Somalia, with approximately $140 million provided to date
over FY 2007-FY 2008. Working with our international and regional
partners in the International Contact Group on Somalia, we continue to
call on all parties, including the TFG, to ensure unfettered delivery
of humanitarian aid to affected populations, and encourage all Somalis
to protect civilians and prevent further deaths and displacement of
innocent people. We continue to work closely with our international
partners and the donor community to improve humanitarian access and
respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.
Similarly, additional deployments under AMISOM will help create a
more secure environment in which this political process can move
forward and the TFG can create viable and responsive security forces.
Since I last appeared before this subcommittee to discuss Somalia,
Uganda has deployed more than 1,800 soldiers as part of AMISOM, and was
joined by a battalion, or approximately 850 soldiers, from Burundi in
January 2008. Uganda plans to deploy an additional 1,600 and Burundi an
additional battalion. Nigeria has pledged a battalion as well. Once
deployed this would bring the total number of troops in AMISOM to
almost 6,000, closer to the authorized strength of 8,000.
To date, the United States has allocated $49.1 million over FY
2007-FY 2008 in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds to support this
critical mission. We have also contributed $10 million in deployment
equipment and transportation as part of the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI) to help Burundi and Uganda deploy to AMISOM. We
continue to work closely with the African Union (AU) and troop
contributing countries to encourage additional troop deployments under
AMISOM.
At the same time, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists
associated with al-Qaeda have received safe haven in Somalia. The
United States remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-
Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and others in the Horn of
Africa. We have been clear that we will therefore take strong measures
to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia, as well as the ability to
plan and operate from Somalia.
Fighting terrorism in Somalia is not our sole priority, but rather
is part of a comprehensive strategy to reverse radicalization, improve
governance, rule of law, democracy and human rights, and improve
economic growth and job creation. This is a difficult and long-term
effort in Somalia. As we encourage political dialog, we will continue
to seek to isolate those who, out of extremism, refuse that dialog and
insist on violence. Unchecked, terrorists will continue to undermine
and threaten stability and the lives of civilians inside Somalia and
throughout the region. Therefore, we will remain engaged in working
with our regional partners, Somali stakeholders, to ensure a successful
political process leading to the return of effective governance and
lasting peace and stability.
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA
The dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea regarding demarcation of
their common border poses an additional threat to regional stability.
Unfortunately, recent efforts to resolve the boundary impasse are
stalled and the situation has deteriorated. Eritrea's refusal to allow
the U.N. mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to obtain fuel and
continued restrictions on UNMEE operations have caused the U.N. to
begin to withdraw UNMEE personnel.
Eritrea's restrictions on UNMEE have been nearly universally
perceived as an assault on the integrity of the U.N. with dangerous
consequences for other U.N. missions and activities. The U.N. Security
Council and other interested governments have strongly condemned
Eritrea's actions. We are now supporting the U.N. to ensure the safe
withdrawal of UNMEE and avoid a further escalation in tensions.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) demarcation
decision by map coordinates has not brought the parties closer to
resolution of the impasse. Eritrea accepts the decision, while Ethiopia
rejects it as inconsistent with international law. The result has been
a hardening of positions on both sides and increased tension between
them. Eritrea and Ethiopia will have to work together in good faith to
implement the delimitation decision of the EEBC, a decision that both
parties have accepted.
It is essential for both parties to engage in talks on issues that
prevent normalized relations. We strongly support the U.N.'s efforts to
achieve such talks and expect that these efforts will resume after the
situation involving UNMEE has been resolved. At the same time, we
continue to press both parties to respect the Algiers Agreement and
implement concrete steps on the border to reduce tension and avoid
renewed conflict. We will continue to seek opportunities for progress,
but do not expect this impasse to be resolved in the near future.
ERITREA
While publicly claiming to seek peace and stability for the region,
the Government of the State of Eritrea has pursued a widespread
strategy of fomenting instability throughout the Horn of Africa and
privately undermined nearly all efforts for broad-based, inclusive
dialog and reconciliation in the region--most notably in Somalia and
Sudan. Its activities include supporting and hosting Hassan Dahir
Aweys, a U.S.- and U.N.-designated terrorist; supporting Somali
extremist elements associated with the now-defunct Council of Islamic
Courts; and supporting and training the Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia. Last year, Eritrea also suspended its
membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and
did not support the region's strategy for achieving a long-term
solution in Somalia.
In addition to the Government of Eritrea's increasingly
destabilizing activities in the region, its domestic human rights
record remains deplorable and is steadily declining. Last year and this
year it was listed in the Human Rights Report among the ``world's most
systematic human rights violators.'' This is no surprise as several
thousand prisoners of conscience are detained indefinitely without
charge and without the ability to communicate with friends and
relatives. There is no freedom of press, religion, speech, or assembly.
Tight government controls on the financial system and private sector
have destroyed the economy.
The United States has repeatedly pressed the Eritrean Government on
these issues, but Eritrea remains unresponsive and the Eritrean people
continue to suffer. Fifteen years after independence, national
elections have yet to be held, and the constitution has never been
implemented. The Eritrean people deserve better.
ETHIOPIA
In Ethiopia, the United States was deeply involved in the
persistent diplomacy that ensured humanitarian conditions in the Ogaden
did not deteriorate into famine. I visited the region personally, as
did USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore, and our Ambassador in Addis
Ababa coordinated the humanitarian response from the international
community. It was not easy to ensure access for humanitarian workers,
for parts of the Ogaden at the time remained mired in conflict, with
Ogaden National Liberation Front attacks and counterinsurgency measures
by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). We have made clear to
the Government of Ethiopia its responsibilities toward noncombatants
during its operations and have expressed our concerns about the impact
of the insurgency and counterinsurgency on the civilian population.
While the humanitarian situation in the Ogaden is not
deteriorating, access remains a key challenge. Commercial trade in and
out of the region has improved in the past several months, although
poor rains, drought, and security restrictions provide a continued risk
of famine. Our Embassy in Addis Ababa is leading the international
effort to work with the government to get food distributed throughout
the region by March and April before the rainy season in an effort to
prevent a famine from emerging.
The United States has committed approximately $53 million in
emergency assistance to the Ogaden since August 2007, accounting for 98
percent of all international emergency assistance. Since January 2008,
a USAID-sponsored Humanitarian Assistance Team has been in place in
Ethiopia, traveling through much of the Ogaden, assessing needs and
working closely with Ethiopian and international organizations to
coordinate relief efforts.
In promoting improved governance, we were encouraged by the
Government of Ethiopia's release of political detainees in July and
August 2007. Again, this achievement was a result of persistent
diplomacy, unheralded in public at the time but without which the
detainees might not have been released. Although Ethiopia has a long
and proud history, its democratic governance institutions are still
young. It is frequently forgotten that Ethiopia is a country emerging
from almost two millennia of autocracy. We have conveyed directly our
expectations for improvement on human rights and democracy issues, but
also recognize significant progress made over the past 15 years.
Ethiopia is still working through the aftermath of the 2005
elections, which saw a vibrant political culture emerge. This is a
talented people, destined by dint of population, location, and energy
to play a prominent leadership role on the continent for a long time to
come. We are confident Ethiopia will work through its challenges and we
will work with the government and opposition to help them find common
ground as they move toward elections in 2010.
DJIBOUTI
In a region fraught with instability, Djibouti is a peaceful,
tolerant, democratic, Muslim country, serving as a valuable partner for
both its neighbors and the United States. Djibouti plays a key role in
supporting regional efforts to reach a lasting solution in Somalia. I
visited Djibouti in early February, just prior to its parliamentary
elections. Despite a boycott call from a rival coalition, the elections
were peaceful and voter turnout was over 72 percent.
Though Djibouti is challenged by poverty and chronic food
insecurity, it is rapidly becoming a vital hub for economic growth in
the region. Current significant foreign investment into Djibouti's port
and infrastructure will likely allow Djibouti to serve as a regional
transshipment hub. Djibouti's expanding port capacity speeds regional
trade, and its livestock quarantine and export facility (launched by
USAID) permits legitimate exports from the Horn to key Middle East
markets for the first time in decades.
President Ismail Omar Guelleh is committed not only to expanding
Djibouti's role in the global economy and increasing foreign and
private investment, but has also emphasized education and health care,
so the Djiboutian people can realize the benefits of the country's
economic growth. Djibouti knows that its future success depends on
regional stability and economic integration, and it serves as a model
for several of its neighbors.
SOMALILAND
In early February, I also had an opportunity to visit the city of
Hargeisa in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland has
achieved a commendable level of stability, largely without external
support or assistance, which the international community must help to
sustain regardless of the question of formal recognition. My visit in
February provided a chance to witness Somaliland's progress regarding
economic development, but also to hear about the challenges that
Somaliland faces in its democratic process.
During my visit, I met with members of the Somaliland
administration, as well as representatives from Somaliland's three
political parties to discuss the municipal and Presidential elections
expected to take place in July and August of this year. The United
States has provided $1 million through the International Republican
Institute (IRI) to support training for members of Parliament elected
in Somaliland's September 2005 parliamentary elections, as well as
capacity-building programs for Somaliland's three political parties. We
also plan to contribute an additional $1 million in support of the
upcoming municipal and Presidential elections.
Despite some recent delays in beginning a voter registration
process, we are hopeful that the recent decision by President Dahir
Rayale Kahin to authorize the voter registration process proposed by
the National Electoral Commission will enable the elections to take
place on schedule. At the same time, Somaliland's democracy remains
fragile and it is important to maintain the success of the past. We
will continue to urge Somaliland's political parties to demonstrate the
same level of political will that ensured the previous Presidential
elections in 2003 were credible and transparent, and to work together
to ensure a peaceful result regardless of which candidate wins the
election.
KENYA
Although not a focus of this hearing, Kenya is an integral part of
our policy in the greater Horn of Africa and has long been a productive
force for peace and stability in this troubled region and I just want
briefly to address it. As chair of the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), Kenya has had a leadership role in supporting the
peace processes in southern Sudan, Somalia, and northern Uganda.
Kenya is the economic anchor of the region, with food aid, fuel,
and commercial goods for Horn countries passing through Kenya. The
Kenyan Government continues to support and pursue our joint efforts to
counter the threat of terrorism in Kenya and elsewhere in East Africa.
Kenya's recent political crisis has somewhat diverted Kenya's focus on
this effort, but we expect this will quickly be resolved.
Kenya's recent political crisis following the December 27 elections
harmed its economy (and thus, the economies of the Horn countries) and
impeded Kenya's ability to play its traditional leadership role in the
region. We are encouraged by the February 28 political agreement
reached by President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga,
and we will continue to monitor implementation of the agreement
closely. We believe one of the most important reasons the parties
decided to sign this agreement was the skilled mediation of Kofi Annan
and strong private messages to both parties from the United States.
To support implementation of the agreement and economic recovery,
Secretary Rice has committed an initial assistance package of $25
million that will focus on three key areas: Peace and reconciliation,
institutional reform, and restoring livelihoods and communities. With
the continued support and assistance of the United States and the
international community, we are confident that Kenya will soon be back
on the path of democracy, prosperity, and stability, and will be once
again in the position to support and advocate for peace initiatives in
the Horn of Africa. Implementation is critical, and we will remain
closely engaged with the government, opposition, and civil society.
CONCLUSION
Despite continued instability in Somalia and persistent tensions
along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the Horn of Africa as a whole is
making progress toward improved regional stability and governance. Our
policy objectives remain consistent with our international and regional
partners, but as always we are constrained by a lack of resources.
Despite these constraints, we will continue to work with our partners
to bring lasting stability to areas of conflict in the Horn of Africa,
and to maintain stability and good governance where these goals have
been achieved.
Senator Feingold. I thank the Assistant Secretary. It is
clear from the range of issues you raised, how important it is
to try to look at this region as a whole, as well as the
individual difficulties, because the challenges are so
interrelated. And I certainly take your point about Kenya as
being very relevant to the region, as well.
So we thank you. And now, we turn to Ms. Almquist.
STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Almquist. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, and members of
the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss USAID's programs in the Horn of Africa.
Like elsewhere in the world, USAID's efforts to promote
economic development, strengthen democracies, and provide
lifesaving humanitarian assistance in the countries of the Horn
will ultimately contribute to greater stability in the region.
I have prepared a longer statement about our programs, which I
would request be entered today for the record.
The Horn of Africa continues to face numerous humanitarian
challenges which constrain our development opportunities. Thus
far in fiscal year 2008, USAID has spent over $265 million in
food and nonfood to humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia and
Somalia alone.
In addition to drought, which has contributed to near-
famine conditions in the Horn during 6 of the past 10 years,
ongoing tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea, prolonged civil
and clan conflict in Somalia, and the multifaceted conflict in
Ethiopia's Ogaden region continue to drain the human and
financial resources of these countries, undermining national
and international development efforts and the stability of the
region as a whole.
Providing effective humanitarian assistance in these
environments is enormously difficult, and attacks targeting
humanitarian personnel in both Somalia and the Ogaden highlight
the risks our partners face on a daily basis. The unexpected
crisis in Kenya, the stable anchor country in the Horn and East
Africa region, has also added further challenging dimensions.
As Somalia enters a projected transition to a
democratically elected government in 2009, United States
foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to eliminate the
terrorist threat, promote political stability by supporting the
establishment of a functioning central government, and address
the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. U.S. assistance is
helping to build the capacity of the Transitional Federal
Government, the components of which are known as the
Transitional Federal Institutions, to provide social services
and support the transitional process leading to national
elections and the establishment of permanent, representative
government institutions.
Despite the difficult environments and the limited
timeframe, the outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress,
and the appointment of the new Prime Minister and Cabinet in
the late fall, provide an opportunity for reviving the
constitutional process.
USAID is also encouraging the continued democratization and
development in the regional administrations in Somaliland and
Puntland.
The continued insecurity, localized drought conditions, and
increasing numbers of internally displaced persons have
generated deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Somalia,
even while this transition takes place. Multiple attacks on
humanitarian relief staff and facilities in January and early
February have led to the withdrawal of some international staff
and temporary travel restrictions, further complicating efforts
to provide critical assistance.
According to the United Nations, the number of people
requiring humanitarian assistance and livelihood support has
increased from 1.5 million as of mid-2007 to nearly 2 million
people in early 2008, which includes both new and long-term
internally displaced populations in rural areas of southern and
central Somalia.
These figures do not represent the sizeable but unknown
number of vulnerable households in urban settings, which also
are affected by record high prices for staple foods,
disruptions in market and commercial activities, and the
ongoing conflict. In response to growing concern over food
insecurity among displaced and affected households, relief
agencies are reviewing current response plans and food stocks.
The United States and other donors are working with the
Prime Minister and his Cabinet to help address bureaucratic and
security impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance and
help improve access for humanitarian relief. We are heartened
by the Transitional Federal Government's recent commitment to
work with donor partners and NGOs to improve access, but urge
the Transitional Federal Government to further implement the
necessary steps as soon as possible to ensure that aid reaches
those in need.
Ethiopia is one of the world's poorest countries, with
severe malnutrition and health problems affecting up to one-
tenth of the population of over 77 million. The country
nevertheless has experienced robust economic and export growth
in recent years, around 8 percent annually, but subsistence
agriculture is prevalent and vulnerable to seasonal flooding
and cyclical droughts.
While the country is experiencing growing pains, sometimes
severe, in its march toward democracy and a market economy,
with U.S. support, Ethiopia continues to undertake ambitious
programs to reduce poverty, advance political reform, boost
sustainable economic growth, and increase the quality and
coverage of health, education, and other service delivery.
U.S.-supported governance, judicial and conflict mitigation
programs help improve political dialog, strengthen civil
society, and lessen ethnic conflict. U.S. assistance will
continue to help the government tackle the underlying causes of
food insecurity through employment generation and enterprise
growth. And we have a robust development program working with
the Government of Ethiopia and our donor colleagues on all of
these areas.
In terms of the humanitarian situation, overall food
security in Ethiopia has improved over the past several years.
And the main agriculture season between October and December
which represents 90 to 95 percent of total crop production
countrywide, was above the recent 5-year average.
However, an estimated 8 million chronically food insecure
people across Ethiopia receiving food assistance and cash
transfers while building productive assets through the
Productive Safety Net Program, continue to confront a food
security crisis. In addition, approximately 1.3 million people
require emergency food assistance, including nearly 1 million
people in the Somali region.
Although slowly improving, recent restrictions on trade and
movement in the Somali region have disrupted livelihoods and
increased food insecurity among pastoralists and
agropastoralists in the five zones under military operations.
And 1.5 million people living in these restricted areas are
estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance between now
and June of this year.
The inability to access markets, combined with high food
commodity prices, has decreased food availability and dietary
diversity, contributing to increased levels of malnutrition in
affected areas for local populations' dependant on the sale and
exchange of livestock for income.
Delays and logistical constraints have limited actual food
distributions, and the full resumption of commercial activities
remains critical to improving food security in the region.
In late November, the USAID Administrator and Director for
U.S. Foreign Assistance, Henrietta Fore, and I traveled to
Ethiopia, including the Somali region. As a result of
Administrator Fore's meeting with Prime Minister Meles, in
December USAID deployed a Humanitarian Assistance Team to the
conflict-affected zones of the Somali region to assess
nutritional and humanitarian conditions there and determine
what steps could be taken to further facilitate delivery of
aid.
The Humanitarian Assistance Team concluded an initial
assessment phase on January 31. While it did not observe
indicators of an immediate crisis within the areas it was able
to visit, it cautions that humanitarian conditions and the food
security situation could still significantly deteriorate in the
next couple of months due to poor seasonal rains, continued
restriction on commercial trade and disruptions to livestock
movement, poor delivery mechanisms for food aid being employed
by the Government of Ethiopia's Disaster Prevention and
Preparedness Agency, limited access to and delivery of
essential health services, and ongoing insecurity and overall
reduced humanitarian access.
In order to address obstacles to effective food and
humanitarian aid distribution, USAID is urging the Government
of Ethiopia to improve access to affected populations for
further needs assessments and response activities.
We look forward to working with the Government of Ethiopia,
beyond this humanitarian situation in the Ogaden, on a recovery
and a development strategy for this region, which is critical
to addressing some of the underlying causes behind this
conflict.
In Eritrea, chronic drought conditions continue to
negatively impact food security, health, and nutrition
indicators, as well as water availability. Economic and
political challenges, including a lack of human resources due
to high levels of military conscription and shortages of
agricultural inputs, have also contributed to the disruption of
agricultural production and economic development, exacerbating
existing poverty and deteriorating humanitarian conditions. In
addition, political constraints prevent comprehensive
assessments and monitoring, and have led to a significant
reduction in the number of humanitarian agencies operating in
Eritrea.
Indeed, USAID is not currently providing any development or
humanitarian assistance, as we closed our mission at the end of
2005 at the request of the Government of Eritrea.
In Djibouti, United States assistance programs support
health, education, governance, food security, and economic
development. United States-funded programs serve as catalytic
agents, helping Djibouti ensure that it stays safe from
security threats; its health care and education programs reach
rural and large urban areas; it is prepared to respond to the
food emergencies and other food insecurity, and help its people
obtain the tools they need to secure jobs in a rapidly changing
economy. U.S. investments also contribute substantially to
achieving our own security and development objectives in the
region.
And finally, I would just like to note how critical
stability in Kenya is to avoiding massive instability in the
entire Horn of Africa region. The crisis in Kenya has already
affected its neighboring countries in the region through the
sharp increases in fuel prices and transportation blockades. We
are extremely encouraged by the breakthrough in negotiations
and the agreement reached on February 28, but are very mindful
that our attention will need to stay focused on Kenya, as this
will be a long-term process of national healing and reform.
The political and security challenges in the Horn of Africa
are significant, as are the development and humanitarian needs.
USAID is deeply engaged with our partners to help to address
these challenges and support emerging opportunities.
Thank you for the opportunity this morning, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Katherine J. Almquist, Assistant
Administrator for Africa, USAID, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss USAID's programs in
the Horn of Africa. U.S. Government objectives for the Horn of Africa
are to promote stability, combat terrorism, and advance democracy and
economic development while addressing the humanitarian needs of the
region's people. Like elsewhere in the world, USAID's efforts to
promote economic development, strengthen democracies, and help people
fulfill their human aspirations in the countries of the Horn of Africa
will ultimately contribute to greater stability in the region.
The Horn of Africa continues to face numerous humanitarian
challenges. Thus far in FY 2008, USAID has spent over $265 million in
food and nonfood humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia and Somalia alone.
In addition to drought, which has contributed to near-famine conditions
in the Horn during 6 of the past 10 years, ongoing tension between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, prolonged civil and clan conflict in Somalia, and
the multifaceted conflict in Ethiopia's Ogaden region continue to drain
the human and financial resources of these countries, undermining
national and international development efforts and the stability of the
region as a whole. Providing effective humanitarian assistance in these
environments is enormously difficult, and attacks targeting
humanitarian personnel in both Somalia and the Ogaden highlight the
risks our partners face on a daily basis. The unexpected crisis in
Kenya--the stable ``anchor'' country in the Horn and East Africa
region--has also added further challenging dimensions.
SOMALIA
Somalia has struggled to reestablish effective central governance
following nearly two decades of civil conflict. As Somalia enters a
projected transition to a democratically elected government in 2009,
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to eliminate the
terrorist threat, promote political stability by supporting the
establishment of a functioning central government, and address the
humanitarian needs of the Somali people. U.S. assistance is helping to
build the capacity of the Transitional Federal Government, the
components of which are known as the Transitional Federal Institutions,
to provide social services and support the transitional process leading
to national elections and the establishment of permanent,
representative government institutions. The United States also works
closely with other donor partners and international organizations to
support the development of an effective and representative security
sector, including the military, police, and judiciary, while supporting
ongoing peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. The deteriorating humanitarian
situation continues to be a significant concern to which the United
States is providing substantial assistance.
Peace and Security
USAID will continue to provide training and support in conflict
mitigation and reconciliation to political, clan, and civil society
leaders in order to promote stability conducive to social and economic
development. In FY 2007, the United States supported the successful
convening of the National Reconciliation Congress, which brought
together more than 2,600 delegates to Mogadishu. The National
Reconciliation Congress succeeded in producing concrete recommendations
on the transitional tasks ahead, including the drafting of a
constitution and preparations for elections, as well as calling for the
Transitional Federal Parliament to ratify an amendment to the
Transitional Federal Charter that allowed for ministerial positions to
be held by nonmembers of Parliament, paving the way for enhanced
representation in the Transitional Federal Government. USAID, in
concert with the State Department, is working closely with other donor
partners to support the efforts of Prime Minister Nur ``Adde'' Hassan
Hussein, under the leadership of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, in
promoting reconciliation at all levels across Somali society.
USAID is also supporting quick impact community-based projects to
provide tangible, practical benefits; in FY 2007, 65 quick impact
projects were supported benefiting over 6,000 households. Complementary
support is being provided to civil society and media programs to enable
government-civil society collaboration and promote transparency and
accountability.
Governing Justly and Democratically
USAID assistance both supports the transitional political process,
as well as programs to build the capacity of government ministries and
train public sector executives in the transparent and accountable
management. USAID recently contributed to a multidonor package of
minimum needs that will allow the new Transitional Federal Government
Cabinet to establish itself in Mogadishu over the next 6 months.
Programs are providing assistance for the Transitional Federal
Institutions to help reestablish appropriate executive functions,
including ongoing training of 30 directors general from selected
ministries, provision of basic equipment, and deployment of technical
advisors in the office of the President and other key ministries.
Support also includes the launching of a Public Administration and
Capacity Building Institute in Mogadishu and programs to strengthen the
capacity of the Transitional Federal Parliament. Despite the difficult
environment and the limited timeframe available for constitutionmaking,
the outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress and the recent
appointments of a new Prime Minister and Cabinet provide an opportunity
for reviving the constitutional process. U.S. assistance is also
encouraging continued democratization and development in the regional
administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. USAID will continue to
support existing and emerging civil society institutions, including
independent media outlets, which are key stakeholders in Somalia.
Investing in People
USAID is also working with the Transitional Federal Government to
support the delivery of critical social services, including basic
education and essential health interventions. The integrated USAID
program provides support for essential social services directly at the
community level. The program is expanding assistance designed to
increase student attendance and retention by rehabilitating community
primary schools; training additional teachers, especially women; and
increasing access to education. Health programs are focusing resources
on delivering basic maternal and child health interventions at the
health facility and community levels in collaboration with relevant
line ministries and local government counterparts. U.S. assistance will
also provide funds to develop safe water points and latrines in
community schools and health posts.
Humanitarian Assistance
Continued insecurity, localized drought conditions, and increasing
numbers of internally displaced persons have generated deteriorating
humanitarian conditions in Somalia, particularly affecting Mogadishu
and Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Hiran, and Central regions.
Multiple attacks on humanitarian relief staff and facilities in January
and early February have led to the withdrawal of some international
staff and temporary travel restrictions, further complicating efforts
to provide critical assistance. According to the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization's Food Security Analysis Unit, the number of
people requiring humanitarian assistance and livelihood support has
increased from 1.5 million as of mid-2007 to nearly 2 million people in
early 2008, which includes both new and long-term internally displaced
populations in rural areas of southern and central Somalia. The Food
Security Analysis Unit notes that these figures do not represent the
sizeable but unknown number of vulnerable households in urban settings,
which are also affected by record high prices for staple foods,
disruptions in market and commercial activities, and the ongoing
conflict. In response to growing concern over food insecurity among
displaced and affected households, relief agencies are reviewing
current response plans and food stocks.
The United States and other donors are working with the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet to help address bureaucratic and security
impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance and help improve
access for humanitarian relief. We are heartened by the Transitional
Federal Government's recent commitment to work with donor partners and
NGOs to improve humanitarian access, but urge the Transitional Federal
Government to implement the necessary steps as soon as possible to
ensure that aid reaches those in need.
In FY 2007 and to date in FY 2008, the U.S. Government has provided
more than $139 million for health, nutrition, agriculture and food
security, livelihoods, coordination, protection, and water, sanitation,
and hygiene programs, as well as for emergency food assistance, peace-
building activities, refugee assistance, and air operations in Somalia.
ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia is one of the world's poorest countries, with severe
malnutrition and health problems affecting up to one-tenth of the
population of over 77 million. The country nevertheless has experienced
robust economic and export growth in recent years (around 8 percent
annually) but subsistence agriculture is prevalent and vulnerable to
seasonal flooding and cyclical droughts. The country is experiencing
growing pains in its march toward democracy and a market economy. With
U.S. support, Ethiopia continues to undertake ambitious programs to
facilitate peaceful change, reduce poverty, advance political reform,
boost sustainable economic growth, and increase the quality and
coverage of health, education, and other service delivery. U.S.-
supported governance, judicial and conflict mitigation programs help
improve political dialog, strengthen civil society, and lessen ethnic
conflict. U.S. assistance will continue to help the government tackle
the underlying causes of food insecurity through employment generation
and enterprise growth. Support to the Productive Safety Net Program and
Pastoral Livelihoods Initiatives will continue to build resilience
among the most vulnerable. Three Presidential Initiatives--the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President's Malaria
Initiative, and the recent Education Initiative--will provide
assistance for integrated programs for the prevention, treatment, and
care of HIV/AIDS and malaria, and improve access to education for all
Ethiopians, particularly underserved girls. Regional foreign assistance
programs will continue to support refugee flows, including repatriation
programs, as well as projects which combat environmental degradation.
Peace and Security
Conflict mitigation and reconciliation programming is designed to
help stabilize border regions with Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia by
addressing tensions arising from competition over scarce resources and
expanding openings to resolve longstanding disputes between the
Government of Ethiopia and insurgent groups. USAID is working to build
the capacity and support the interventions of joint government-civil
society conflict management partnerships at the local, regional, state
and national levels to prevent and manage conflict in violence-prone
areas, including assisting with the development of a national conflict
management policy.
Governing Justly and Democratically
USAID programs are supporting constructive dialog among Ethiopians
who represent diverse political perspectives and ethnic groups to build
consensus on key issues. Funds are also being used to support
multilateral efforts to facilitate the ongoing restructuring of
elections and political processes and build capacity in preparation for
the May 2010 national elections. USAID is helping to strengthen the
capacity and role of civil society; improve independent human rights
monitoring, investigation and reporting; and improve the respect the
judiciary and police have for international, national, and
institutional human rights standards. U.S. assistance is also used to
ensure a U.S. role in the ongoing multidonor support program to
strengthen the federal and regional Parliaments operating in the new,
multiparty environment, and build the capacity of the National and
Regional Judicial Training Centers and selected law schools. Capacity-
building efforts are also assisting the Gambella and Somali Regional
State Governments to improve governance through better service
delivery.
Investing in People
Ethiopia's health services and education are slowly improving but
are still among the poorest quality in the world. USAID programs
continue to support and improve management and quality of health care
services including family planning services to meet the growing unmet
demand in order to reduce Ethiopia's very high population growth rate
to sustainable levels. Investments in health and education are enabling
Ethiopians to take advantage of expanded economic opportunities. USAID
is supporting activities that expand access to sustainable reproductive
health care and high-quality, voluntary family planning services and
information contributing to poverty reduction. USAID provides support
in maternal and child health to help mitigate the effects of external
shocks, foster a healthier workforce, and focus on both child and adult
education in the hinterlands. Funds are also used to help combat
tuberculosis and reduce the incidence of malaria, major sources of
morbidity and workforce absenteeism, and improve access to safe water
supplies and basic sanitation, ultimately improving rural household
health and food security. Africa Education Initiative assistance and
other USAID support will improve the quality and equity of primary
education through training teachers and administrators, strengthening
planning, management, and monitoring and evaluation systems, and
fostering community partnerships and school governance through
capacity-building of parent-teacher associations and management of
school grants. Scholarship support is assisting girls and HIV/AIDS
orphans to succeed in school. Ethiopia is receiving significant support
to scale up integrated prevention, care, and treatment programs
throughout the country and support orphans and vulnerable children,
thereby forging linkages with the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief funded programs.
New assistance in FY 2008 under the President's Malaria Initiative
will expand efforts to scale up proven preventive and treatment
interventions toward achievement of 85 percent coverage among
vulnerable groups to support the program's goal of reducing malaria-
related morbidity by 50 percent.
Economic Growth
The U.S. Mission in Ethiopia is using a range of assistance to
leverage investment, export and private sector growth. USAID programs
help to drive economic growth and promote a more enabling environment
for agriculture, the private sector, small and medium enterprises, and
trade and investment in general. Focus will continue on developing
commodity exchanges, improving access to finance, and establishing
policies to enable private-sector-led economic growth. Programs also
focus on enhancing the productivity and competitiveness of key sectors,
especially in rural areas. This includes investments in the tourism
sector, agribusiness expansion, support to African Growth and
Opportunity Act exports and World Trade Organization accession,
continued support to pastoralist areas, and support to the livestock
and agriculture sectors which employ 85 percent of the workforce and
contribute 45 percent of GDP. These programs are continuing to increase
economic prosperity through exports and job and wealth creation. The
U.S. mission will continue its focus on the most vulnerable
populations, providing impetus for new and alternative livelihood
programs, improved agricultural practices, better livestock husbandry
and meat and dairy marketing, and phyto-sanitation. Along with other
major donors, the United States supports the Government of Ethiopia's
Productive Safety Net Program to reduce food insecurity, which affects
44 percent of the population. Investments in the Safety Net Program and
related policy, regulatory, and administrative systems are serving to
protect vulnerable populations and contribute to poverty reduction and
rural economic growth. USAID funding is also helping to strengthen
small enterprise and other poverty reduction efforts related to the
Productive Safety Net Program.
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States is the major donor assisting the Government of
Ethiopia to anticipate and respond effectively to any natural or
manmade disaster. USAID will continue to work closely with the Ethiopia
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency, to increase capacity for
early warning and to provide humanitarian assistance of emergency food
and nonfood aid.
CURRENT HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
Ongoing trade and access restrictions in Somali region--though they
have eased just slightly over the last few months--coupled with
insecurity and recent drought conditions in Southern Ethiopia have
increased humanitarian needs and food security concerns. In Somali
region, insecurity, reduced humanitarian access and now poor rainfall
are leading to deteriorating humanitarian conditions and increased
malnutrition. Distributions of food aid and commercial food deliveries
in some areas are subject to inadequate delivery systems or are being
disrupted, impeding the ability to address the needs of affected
populations, according to USAID's Famine Early Warning Systems Network.
Food Security and Agriculture
Overall food security in Ethiopia has improved over the past
several years, and the main agricultural season between October and
December, which represents 90 to 95 percent of total crop production
countrywide, was above the recent 5-year average. However an estimated
8 million chronically food insecure people in Afar, Oromiya, Amhara,
Tigray, Somali, and Southern Nations regions receiving food assistance
and cash transfers while building productive assets through the
Productive Safety Net Program continue to confront a food security
crisis. In addition, approximately 1.3 million people require emergency
food assistance, including nearly 1 million people in Somali region,
84,000 people displaced by last year's flooding, and more than 260,000
people in Oromiya region affected by localized crop failures, according
to Famine Early Warning Systems Network.
Somali Region
Although slowly improving, recent restrictions on trade and
movement in Somali region have disrupted livelihoods and increased food
insecurity among pastoralists and agropastoralists in the five zones
under military operations--Warder, Korahe, Gode, Fik, and Degehabur.
The inability to access markets combined with high food commodity
prices has decreased food availability and dietary diversity,
contributing to increased levels of malnutrition in affected areas for
local populations dependent on the sale and exchange of livestock for
income.
The December 2007 deyr rains assessment mission in Somali region
identified approximately 1.5 million people living in restricted areas
of Warder, Korahe, Gode, Fik, and Degehabur zones in need of
humanitarian or livelihood assistance between January and June 2008. As
of February 19, humanitarian agencies had distributed approximately
10,000 of the estimated 52,000 metric tons of food aid required to the
region, according to the U.N. World Food Program. The Government of
Ethiopia has approved 21 nongovernmental organizations to operate in
the five Somali zones under military operations, but few organizations
have been able to initiate programs to date, according to field
reports. In addition, the Government of Ethiopia has approved 186 food
distribution points--a 38-percent decrease from the previously utilized
300 distribution points. However, delays and logistical restraints have
limited actual food distributions, and the full resumption of
commercial activities remains critical to improving food security in
the region.
From November 23 to 26, USAID Administrator and Director of Foreign
Assistance Henrietta H. Fore and I visited Ethiopia, including Somali
region, to discuss humanitarian conditions and efforts to facilitate
emergency assistance to affected populations. On December 4, we met
with Prime Minister Meles to discuss our concerns and offer USAID's
assistance in response to his expressed need for better nutritional
data for the region. Administrator Fore formally offered to Prime
Minister Meles that USAID could deploy a Humanitarian Assistance Team
to the conflict-affected zones of Somali region to assess nutritional and
humanitarian conditions there and determine what steps could be taken to
facilitate delivery of food and other humanitarian assistance. The Prime
Minister accepted and the team deployed to Ethiopia on December 20.
The Humanitarian Assistance Team concluded an initial assessment
phase on January 31 and while it did not observe indicators of an
immediate crisis within the areas of travel to date, it cautioned that
humanitarian conditions and the food security situation could
significantly deteriorate in March or April. Among the factors that
signal potential deteriorating conditions in the region are:
The poor performance of the 2007 gu and deyr rains;
Current restrictions on commercial trade and disruptions to
livestock movement;
Poor delivery mechanisms for food aid being employed by the
Government of Ethiopia's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Agency;
Limited access to and delivery of essential health services;
and
Ongoing insecurity and reduced humanitarian access.
In addition, Ethiopia's National Meteorological Agency is
predicting an 80-percent chance of average or below average rains
beginning in the March through May rainy season, with a 45-percent
chance of below average rains. The Somali Regional Government has just
appealed to donors for help due to poor rainfall and the U.N. is
pressing the Government of Ethiopia to formally acknowledge the drought
conditions and need for assistance.
Some of the key recommendations from the team's initial assessment
phase were that:
The capacity of the Government of Ethiopia's Disaster
Prevention and Preparedness Agency to target, monitor, and
deliver assistance needs to be enhanced to address obstacles to
effective food aid distribution;
USAID should support the current joint UNICEF and Government
measles vaccination campaign, given a serious outbreak in the
region;
The Government of Ethiopia should allow qualified U.N. or
nongovernmental organization partners to conduct standardized
nutritional surveys in conflict-
affected areas; and
The Government of Ethiopia should work to improve
humanitarian access to affected populations for further needs
assessments and response activities.
The Humanitarian Assistance Team remains engaged in the conflict-
affected areas of the Somali region, and has shifted focus from
assessment to advocacy, monitoring, and program management. The team
plans to undertake ongoing targeted field visits to Somali region to
enhance findings and monitor humanitarian conditions, and assist the
USAID/Ethiopia mission, partners, and host-country government
ministries to implement response programs.
OFDA has committed $5.3 million in Nutrition, Health, Water/
Sanitation, Livestock and Market interventions in Somali region to date
in FY 2008.
ERITREA
We are not currently providing any development or humanitarian
assistance to Eritrea. We closed down our mission in Asmara on December
31, 2005, in response to a request from the Government of Eritrea that
we do so.
In FY 2007, however, we did provide nearly $3 million in
humanitarian assistance for ongoing programming in the areas of health,
nutrition, humanitarian coordination and information management, and
water, sanitation, and hygiene.
Chronic drought conditions continue to negatively impact food
security, health, and nutrition indicators, as well as water
availability in Eritrea. According to the U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, only 32 percent of rural
populations have access to protected water sources. Economic and
political challenges, including a lack of human resources due to high
levels of military conscription and shortages of agricultural inputs,
have also contributed to the disruption of agricultural production and
economic development, exacerbating existing poverty and deteriorating
humanitarian conditions. In addition, political constraints prevent
comprehensive assessments and monitoring and have led to a significant
reduction in the number of humanitarian agencies operating in Eritrea.
DJIBOUTI
U.S. assistance programs supporting health, education, governance,
food security, and economic development are helping Djibouti build on
its demonstrated will to achieve its goals. U.S.-funded programs serve
as catalytic agents, helping Djibouti ensure that it stays safe from
security threats, that its health care and education programs reach
rural and marginalized urban areas, that it is prepared to respond to
food emergencies, and that its people obtain the tools they need to
secure jobs in a rapidly changing economy. U.S. investments will also
contribute substantially to achieving our own security and development
objectives in the region.
Peace and Security
Djibouti is on the mainline between the Middle East and Africa and
faces steady pressure aimed at radicalizing its people and changing its
polity. U.S. security cooperation is intended to ensure Djibouti has
the tools to resist the threat of terror and instability. Department of
State-funded programs promote stabilization operations and security
sector reform, fight transnational crime, and support counterterrorism
activities.
Governing Justly and Democratically
Assistance for improving governance, provided by USAID, is helping
promote a more transparent and efficient government at the national,
regional, and local levels, increase confidence in the electoral
process, and advance Djibouti's decentralization. It also helps to
increase political participation, guarantee civil liberties, promote
government accountability, and strengthen civil society. The democracy
and governance program addresses major obstacles to Djibouti's capacity
to sustain private sector development by promoting dialog between
government, civil society, and the private sector. Popular frustration
over the lack of jobs, inadequate public services, and obstacles to
political participation must be overcome to ensure Djibouti's long-term
success and stability. Leadership education and training will
constitute a major focus of the democracy and governance program.
Investing in People
To ensure Djibouti's continued stability in the volatile Horn of
Africa region, U.S. assistance programs promote improved quality of
life for Djiboutian citizens. USAID-funded health and education
activities combat low life expectancy, maternal and under-5 child
mortality, and the transmission of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS
and tuberculosis. In addition, USAID activities continue to assist
Djibouti in responding to food and other humanitarian emergencies. The
health program continues to focus on expanded access to quality health
care by improving maternal and child health services, and on the
prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. The education
program continues its essential focus on basic education, promoting
expanded access, particularly for girls and rural children, and an
emphasis on preparation for employment opportunities. Support for
teacher training, the provision of pedagogic materials, expanded
community participation in education, the improvement and
decentralization of education sector service delivery, and improved
sector information systems and management capacity are also priority
targets for U.S. assistance.
KENYA
It is important to note how critical stability in Kenya is to
avoiding massive instability in the entire Horn subregion. The crisis
in Kenya has already affected its neighboring countries region through
the sharp increases in fuel prices and transportation blockades.
We are extremely encouraged by the breakthrough in negotiations and
the agreement reached on February 28 but are very mindful that our
attention will need to stay focused on Kenya as this will be a very
long-term process of national healing and reform.
The political and security challenges in the Horn of Africa are
significant as are the development and humanitarian needs. USAID is
deeply engaged with our partners to help to address these challenges
and support emerging opportunities.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Ms. Almquist. And
now, Ms. Whelan.
STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Whelan. Good morning, Chairman Feingold, and
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the
invitation to speak to you today about the situation in the
Horn of Africa, and the Department of Defense's activities in
the region.
Africa, and the Horn of Africa in particular, is a region
of great strategic importance to the United States. At the
crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East, the Horn
presents a series of complex threats to U.S. national security,
including weak governance, lawlessness, territorial disputes,
and safe havens for terrorism.
If ignored or unaddressed, all of these issues will have
dire consequences for the people of the Horn, for the broader
region, for our friends and allies on the continent, and for
the United States. We believe that a coordinated U.S. foreign
and national security policy in the Horn of Africa, of which
our defense relations are a component, is of critical
importance to U.S. security interests.
The Department of Defense's activities in the Horn are a
subset of U.S. national security strategy for Africa, as
outlined by the President in the National Security Presidential
Directive 50. And we also support the Department of State's
foreign policy goals of countering terrorism and building local
capacity. Our activities with African partners focused on
issues of mutual strategic concern, including the elimination
of terrorist safe havens, prevention of arms and human
trafficking, and ensuring access to land and sea lines of
communication.
We addressed these security interests by working with
African partners to promote civilian control and defense
reform, and to build local military capacity. This is achieved
by ensuring their militaries are appropriately sized and
funded, by professionalizing militaries through training to
develop and maintain well-trained and well-led and disciplined
forces, with respect for law and human rights, and by building
capacity of African partner militaries that positively
contribute to combating terrorism, and that prevent and respond
to national and regional crises.
Theater Security Cooperation remains the cornerstone of our
strategy to enhance partner capabilities and to promote these
relationships and common interests. Within the Horn, our
engagement and activities are governed by the realities of
regional instability and our bilateral relationships.
In Ethiopia, the security situation remains challenging and
complex, with profound regional implications. One area of
significant concern is the ongoing border dispute between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea dedicate a
significant portion of the military resources and efforts to
manning the border region, and we remain concerned about the
possibility for renewed hostilities along the border. We
believe that any return to conflict between Ethiopia and
Eritrea would undermine stability throughout the entire region.
Beyond the border, Ethiopia is facing genuine security
concerns in the Ogaden region. The Ogaden National Liberation
Front continues to wage a separatist insurgency in the Ogaden
region with outside support, including from neighboring
Eritrea.
Following the April 2007 attack, that killed 9 Chinese oil
workers and more than 70 Ethiopians, the Government of Ethiopia
increased its operations in a coordinated counterinsurgency
campaign in the region. As a result, we have seen increased
military operations, coupled with restrictions on commercial
traffic and humanitarian access.
We continue to monitor the situation in the Ogaden, but
given that we in DOD no longer have the level of direct access
that we previously had to the region, we are unable to confirm
the actual facts on the ground. We are, however, acutely aware
that for a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful, the
military must respect the local civilian populace.
We continue to pursue the strategic bilateral relationship
with Ethiopia and the Ethiopian National Defense Force, a
partner in regional counterterrorism activities. We believe
that promotion of a professional ENDF, committed to human
rights and rule of law, is best achieved through engagement,
rather than isolation. And we have invested in training and
supporting the professionalization of the Ethiopian forces.
Our engagement with the Government of Ethiopia and the ENDF
emphasizes our expectations that any military partner of the
United States behave in a professional manner with respect for
the rule of law and citizens' rights. Our training engagement
is particularly important with the ENDF, a 200,000-person
military that is professionalizing and restructuring into a
more conventional force. This transformation has been
challenged and made all the more necessary by the border
conflict, the counterinsurgency campaign in the Ogaden, and
Ethiopia's military activities in Somalia.
Our relationship with the ENDF includes military education,
counterterrorism capability development, and funding for
nonlethal equipment purchases and maintenance to support the
ENDF's modernization. Our Security Assistance Office in Addis
works closely with the embassy to ensure our assistance
complies with Leahy Law requirements. Until last year, the
United States conducted military-to-military training in basic
soldiering and commando skills at small outposts in Central
Ethiopia. All of this training emphasized the rule of law.
While this training ceased in 2007 at the request of the
Ethiopian Government, we continue our activities at the
Ethiopian Command and Staff College, where we have two
uniformed instructors who have trained over 120 mid- and
senior-level Ethiopian military officers. We believe that
continued robust security cooperation, including military-to-
military training, is critical to the development of the ENDF
and to U.S. foreign and national security policy in the region.
Although we currently do not have a bilateral relationship
with the Eritrean Defense Forces, we believe that there are
areas of strategic security interest to the United States,
including maritime security in the crucial shipping lanes in
the Red Sea and the transformation of the ENDF from a guerilla
force to a smaller, professional military.
Since the closure of our Security Assistance Office in
Asmara in early 2006, based on indications from the Government
of Eritrea that it no longer wished to maintain a bilateral
military relationship, we have had little to no contact with
the Eritrean forces.
The Government of Eritrea continues to undermine security
in the Horn of Africa by supporting destabilizing elements in
the region. We are concerned about Eritrea's actions, including
the decision in November 2007 to deny the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea on the right to purchase or
import fuel, de facto forcing UNMEE's current relocation of
forces out of the TSZ and into Asmara.
We continue to monitor the situation with UNMEE, and
particularly whether UNMEE--now that it has started to withdraw
from Eritrea--will be allowed to take with it all its
equipment. If UNMEE were not allowed to take its equipment out
of the country, Eritrea in essence would receive a windfall of
military equipment left by departing U.N. troops.
Another area of concern for us is the situation in Somalia.
Although we have no bilateral military cooperation with the
Transitional Federal Government, we are watching the security
situation in Somalia and the implications of its continued
instability for the region as a whole.
Although recent efforts of the new TFG Prime Minister to
reach out to elements of the opposition appear promising, there
are serious and ongoing concerns about the security situation
throughout Somalia. There is sporadic violence between
Somaliland and Puntland forces. The lack of a representative
security force impedes the TFG's efforts to extend its
authority and control over all of Somalia, including portions
of Mogadishu and the southern border area. Terrorist and
extremist elements, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-
Shabaab militia, continue to exploit TFG weaknesses and are
attempting to undermine any efforts toward peaceful dialog
process and to seek safe haven in Somalia.
The ability of al-Qaeda operatives and their affiliates to
continue to use Somalia as a base for operations is a real and
severe threat, not only to Somalia, but to the entire region
and to the United States. We continue to work with our
partners, particularly Djibouti and Kenya and Ethiopia, to
develop regional counterterrorism capability to respond to
terrorists and extremist elements in Somalia that threaten
United States interests and the security of the region.
Security assistance, including through traditional funding
streams like foreign military financing and international
military education training, and the DOD 1206 authority, have
allowed us to support partners as they develop the capability
to respond to the terrorist threat emanating from Somalia.
Kenya's progress in developing a counterterrorism
capability, with United States assistance, has been critical to
regional security. Continued and increased assistance to these
frontline states is crucial to ensuring that the instability in
Somalia does not impact its neighbors. There may also be
opportunities to make progress in Somalia by working with those
parts of Somalia, including Somaliland, that are relatively
stable. In addition to our partner relationships, the United
States also has ongoing operations in the region that respond
to the presence of identified al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia.
We remain committed to promoting security and stability in
the Horn of Africa, and believe this is in the best interests
of the people and governments of the region, and of the United
States. The Department of Defense's relations and policies in
the region are subordinate to our foreign and national security
policies, and consequently, we continue to support and work
closely with the embassies and USAID missions in the region to
ensure our activities are consistent with and support the U.S.
foreign policy objectives in the Horn.
Thank you very much, and I would be happy to take your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Good morning, Chairman Feingold, distinguished members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about
the situation in the Horn of Africa, and the Department of Defense's
activities in the region.
Africa, and the Horn of Africa in particular, is a region of great
strategic importance to the United States. At the crossroads of sub-
Saharan Africa and the Near East, the Horn presents a series of complex
threats to U.S. national security, including weak governance,
lawlessness, territorial disputes, and safe havens for terrorism. If
ignored or unaddressed, all of these issues will have dire consequences
for the people of the Horn, for the broader region, for our friends and
allies on the continent, and for the United States. We believe that a
coordinated U.S. foreign and national security policy in the Horn of
Africa, of which our defense relations are a component, is of critical
importance to U.S. strategic and security interests.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN THE HORN
The Department of Defense's activities in the Horn are a subset of
the U.S. national strategy for Africa, as outlined by the President in
National Security Presidential Directive 50, and support the Department
of State's foreign policy goals of countering terrorism and building
local capacity. Our activities with African partners focus on issues of
mutual strategic concern, including the elimination of terrorist safe
havens, prevention of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring enduring
access to land and sea lanes of communication. We address these
security interests by working with African partners to promote civilian
control and defense reform, and to build local military capacity. This
is achieved by ensuring their militaries are appropriately sized and
funded, by professionalizing militaries through training to develop and
maintain well-trained and disciplined forces with a respect for law and
human rights, and by building capacity of African partner militaries
that positively contribute to combating terrorism, and that prevent and
respond to national and regional crises.
Theater security cooperation remains the cornerstone of our
strategy to enhance partner capabilities and to promote these
relationships and common interests. Within the Horn, our engagement and
activities are governed by the realities of regional instability and
our bilateral relationships.
ETHIOPIA
The security situation in Ethiopia remains challenging and complex,
with profound regional implications.
One area of significant concern is the ongoing border dispute
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea dedicate a
significant portion of military resources and efforts to manning the
border region, and we remain concerned about the possibility for
renewal of hostilities along the border. We believe that any return to
conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would undermine stability
throughout the entire region.
Beyond the border, Ethiopia is facing genuine security concerns in
the Ogaden region. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
continues to wage a separatist movement in the Ogaden region with
outside support, including from neighboring Eritrea. Following the
April 2007 attack that killed 9 Chinese oil workers and more than 70
Ethiopians, the Government of Ethiopia increased its operations in a
coordinated counterinsurgency campaign in the region. As a result, we
have seen increased military operations coupled with restrictions on
commercial traffic and humanitarian access. We continue to monitor the
situation in the Ogaden, but given that we no longer have the level of
access that we previously had to the region, we are unable to confirm
the actual facts on the ground. We are, however, acutely aware that for
a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful, the military must
respect the local civilian populace.
We continue to pursue a strategic bilateral relationship with
Ethiopia and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), a partner in
regional counterterrorism activities. We believe that promotion of a
professional ENDF, committed to human rights and rule of law, is best
achieved through engagement, rather than isolation, and we have
invested in training and supporting the professionalization of the
Ethiopian forces. Our engagement with the Government of Ethiopia and
the ENDF emphasizes our expectation that any military partner of the
United States is to behave in a professional manner with full respect
for the rule of law and citizens' rights. Our training engagement is
particularly important with the ENDF, a 200,000-person military that is
professionalizing and restructuring into a more conventional force.
This transformation has been challenged and made all the more necessary
by the border conflict, the counterinsurgency campaign in the Ogaden,
and Ethiopia's military activities in Somalia.
Our relationship with the ENDF includes military education,
counterterrorism capability development, and funding for equipment
purchases and maintenance to support the ENDF's modernization. Our
security assistance office in Addis works closely with the Embassy to
ensure our assistance complies with Leahy law requirements. Until last
year, the United States conducted military-to-military training in
basic soldiering and commando skills at small outposts in central
Ethiopia. All of this training emphasized the rule of law. While this
training ceased in 2007 at the request of the Ethiopian Government, we
continue our activities at the Ethiopian Command and Staff College,
where we have two uniformed instructors who have trained over 120 mid-
and senior-level Ethiopian military officers. We believe that continued
robust security cooperation, including military-to-military training,
is critical to the development of the ENDF and to U.S. foreign and
national security policy in the region.
ERITREA
Although we currently do not have a bilateral relationship with the
Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), we believe there are areas of strategic
security interest to the United States, including maritime security in
the crucial shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the transformation of the
EDF from a guerilla force to a smaller, professional military. Since
the closure of our Security Assistance Office in Asmara in early 2006,
based on indications from the Government of Eritrea that it no longer
wished to maintain a bilateral military relationship, we have had
little to no contact with the Eritrean forces.
The Government of Eritrea continues to undermine security in the
Horn of Africa by supporting destabilizing elements in the region. We
are concerned about Eritrea's actions, including the decision in
November 2007 to deny the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea (UNMEE) the right to purchase or import fuel, de facto forcing
UNMEE's current relocation of forces out of the TSZ and into Asmara. We
continue to monitor the situation with UNMEE, and particularly whether
UNMEE, now that it has started to withdraw from Eritrea, will be
allowed to take with it all its equipment. If UNMEE were not allowed to
take its equipment out of the country, Eritrea in essence would receive
a windfall of military equipment left by departing U.N. troops.
SOMALIA
Another area of concern for us is the situation in Somalia.
Although we have no bilateral military cooperation with the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), we are watching the security
situation in Somalia and the implications of its continued instability
for the region as a whole.
Although recent efforts of the new TFG Prime Minister to reach out
to elements of the opposition appear promising, there are serious and
ongoing concerns about the security situation throughout Somalia. There
is sporadic violence between Somaliland and Puntland forces. The lack
of a representative security force impedes the TFG's efforts to extend
its authority and control over all of Somalia, including portions of
Mogadishu and the southern border area. Terrorist and extremist
elements, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab militia,
continue to exploit TFG weaknesses and are attempting to undermine any
efforts toward a peaceful dialog process and seek a safe haven in
Somalia.
The ability of al-Qaeda operatives and their affiliates to continue
to use Somalia as a base for operations is a real and severe threat not
only to Somalia, but to the entire region and to the United States. We
continue to work with our partners, particularly Djibouti, Kenya, and
Ethiopia, to develop a regional counterterrorism capability to respond
to terrorists and extremist elements in Somalia that threaten U.S.
interests and the security of the region. Security assistance,
including through traditional funding streams like foreign military
financing (FMF) and international military education training (IMET),
and the DOD 1206 authority, have allowed us to support partners as they
develop the capability to respond to the terrorist threat emanating
from Somalia. Kenya's progress in developing a counterterrorism
capability, with U.S. assistance, has been critical to regional
security. Continued and increased assistance to these front-line states
is crucial to ensuring that the instability in Somalia does not impact
its neighbors. There also may be opportunities to make progress in
Somalia by working with those parts of Somalia, including Somaliland,
that are relatively stable. In addition to our partner relationships,
the United States also has ongoing operations in the region that
respond to the presence of identified al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia.
SUMMARY
We remain committed to promoting security and stability in the Horn
of Africa, and believe this is in the best interests of the people and
governments of the region, and of the United States. The Department of
Defense's relations and policies in the region are subordinate to our
foreign and national security policies, and consequently we continue to
support and work closely with the Embassies and USAID missions in the
region to ensure our activities are consistent with and support U.S.
foreign policy objectives in the Horn.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Whelan.
Even if there is not a Defense Department presence in the
Ogaden we can, or we could at least, hope that you're talking
to State and USAID through the interagency process to get the
facts on the ground. Perhaps your staff can confirm some of
these reports that way, instead of simply suggesting that
you're unable to get it any information because the United
States does have some presence there.
But I do thank you for your testimony. I allowed much
longer testimony than usual, because this is such a broad and
intricate subject. So I thank all of you, and I will begin 10-
minute question rounds at this point.
Dr. Frazer, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
recently released a report I requested in 2006, analyzing U.S.
policy in Somalia, which found that the administration's
strategy has been insufficient, incomplete, and ineffective.
Now this comes not really as a surprise. As you know, I had a
requirement passed into law that same year requiring the
administration to detail its Somalia strategy. The document
that Congress received, which was received long past the
deadline, was badly insufficient. The Pentagon has acknowledged
the need for a detailed interagency strategy, but the State
Department did not respond to the GAO's recommendation.
Do you agree with the GAO's assessment that a more specific
coordinated and comprehensive plan for restoring security and
stability in Somalia is necessary?
Dr. Frazer. I read the GAO Report, Senator, in great
detail, and I came away with a very different take than the one
that you just described.
I felt that the GAO, based on their interviews both in the
region and in Washington, did a really excellent job of
describing a very complex situation in Somalia that creates
many barriers to transforming that country into what we both
would share as our goals of well-governed, developed, without
humanitarian crisis. The GAO talked about the weaknesses of the
Transitional Federal Government. The GAO Report talked about
the need to have more African troops deployed. And so, I didn't
take the report the way you characterized it.
I do recognize that the GAO gave one or two
recommendations.
One, that we should have used their six characteristics of
an effective national strategy in our report of our strategy.
And so, they compared our strategy--which answered the mandate
of the legislation that you put forward--versus their six
criteria that they've used in many other cases. And then, they
broke those six criteria into another 27 component elements.
And so, I think they were comparing apples and oranges.
We, in our strategy, did what the legislation asked us to
do. If the legislation had asked us to use the six criteria
from the GAO Report, then we would have done so.
Senator Feingold. Well, do you think the current strategy--
if we can call it that--is actually working? And why do you
think the Pentagon believes interagency planning and
coordination on Somalia policy is insufficient?
Dr. Frazer. I think I outlined in my testimony that in each
of the four areas of our strategic objectives, we have seen
significant progress, over the last few years, and more
progress than we've seen over the previous 17 years.
And so, yes; I do think our strategy is working. I don't
think you can fix a country that's been broken for at least 17
years--and much longer, in fact, because it was under an
authoritarian regime--in just 2 years.
Senator Feingold. Well, why do you think the Pentagon
thinks that interagency planning and coordination in Somalia
policy is insufficient?
Dr. Frazer. I think the GAO probably interviewed a low-
level Pentagon official, because Secretary Gates was the
principle at the Principles Committee who blessed the
interagency policy and strategy on Somalia.
And so, sure, whenever you go around any government, you're
going to find some person who's going to say that they don't
feel that it accurately----Senator Feingold. Dr. Frazer, it is
my understanding that the Pentagon's response to the GAO Report
was written by Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan.
Dr. Frazer. Well, I know what----Senator Feingold. And
we're fortunate to have her with us. I'd like to ask you, Ms.
Whelan, to explain why you not only accepted and agreed with
the GAO's recommendation for a more detailed U.S. strategy on
Somalia, but actually asked that the recommendation be
strengthened.
Ms. Whelan. Since the strategy came out in--last spring--
April, almost a year ago, there have been numerous developments
in Somalia, to include: A new Prime Minister, Prime Minister
Nur Hussein, or otherwise known as Nur Adde; President Yusuf
and the TFG has confronted some health challenges that have
raised questions about his future, at least, it raised
questions in some of the Somali's minds; there have been some
tensions between the President and the Prime Minister that have
been reflected in Somali press; Ethiopia's posture in Somalia
has changed considerably over the course of the past year;
there have been splits noted in the Shabaab militia; and we
also have seen, unfortunately, only two of the nations that had
pledged to pull their troops to AMASOM follow through.
So our contention is simply that the situation has evolved
over the course of the last year. And in such circumstances, it
always is healthy to review one strategy to take into account
the evolving situation.
Senator Feingold. Let me go back, Secretary Frazer, and you
can respond to that, as well. But let me also ask you--I had
been pleased to see Somalia's new Prime Minister Nur Hussein
calling for inclusive negotiations and a renunciation of
violence by all sides, but I'm not aware of any concrete
measures he has taken since his appointment last November.
So let me ask, what is your assessment of his potential and
progress to date as a unifying and credible leader of the TFG?
And also, what steps have we taken to ensure that this rhetoric
of the Prime Minister has tangible outcomes? I'm a little
concerned that, once again, we based our policy on one man, or
one leader, one person, as opposed to seeking opportunities to
build and bolster institutions.
Dr. Frazer. Thank you Senator. I think we're trying to do
both. I think the very, very first test of the Prime Minister
was in the false start that he had in appointing his first
Cabinet, or floating names for a Cabinet.
He quickly reversed himself, and appointed a Cabinet that
by all accounts is extremely representative, and far more
credible than the previous Transitional Federal Government. And
so, I think that's a very first important step that he put in
place--people who could be more representative.
Second, he has certainly reached out to the NGO community.
He has, in fact, reversed decisions of some of the security
officials to end the arrest of certain media, certain
reporters, as well as humanitarian aid workers. And so, he's
gotten them out of jail. That's an important step.
Third, he has reached out effectively to the international
community particularly in establishing a very strong
relationship with the U.N. Special Representative to the
Secretary General. And so, he has credibility internationally.
It's going to take a much longer time to build the capacity
of his ministry. Yes; he has ministers, but to get civil
servants and others who can really work in these ministries is
going to take some more time. But I do think that his early
steps have been promising.
Senator Feingold. On another topic, Dr. Frazer, last fall
the U.N. conducted an assessment mission of the Ogaden and
released publicly its humanitarian assessment, but did not
release its human rights assessment.
Have you seen this report and would you recommend that it
be released?
Dr. Frazer. I haven't seen the report, but I would imagine
that our Ambassador in Ethiopia, who is a coordinator of the
international community in Addis Abbaba, may have seen the
report. But I have not personally seen that report.
Senator Feingold. Well, I would ask your assistance in
having this reviewed. And if there's not a reason to release
that part of it, we would like to see that happen.
Ms. Almquist, what is the U.S. Government doing to hold the
TFG and Ethiopians accountable for their promise to facilitate
humanitarian access? For example, I've heard reports of
checkpoints run by TFG-appointed officials, and then secured by
Ethiopians and TFG militia on the road leading from Mogadishu,
that are taxing humanitarian aid shipments. What is being done
to reduce these kinds of activities?
Ms. Almquist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. We
are working closely with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to
raise these issues and to seek a humanitarian focal point from
him and on behalf of the TFG. He has committed to appointing
one.
That has not happened yet, but we understand that it will
be forthcoming soon, so that we can address each of the
blockages and the taxation issues, and other hurdles that are
coming up from the TFG, or those elements that the TFG might
influence directly in Somalia.
We also have more engagement now with the Prime Minister.
He's met with the donors and the humanitarian community in
Nairobi several times. He's seeking to have more interaction in
Mogadishu itself. It's complicated for us, since we aren't
present in Somalia as American officials, but our partners are
there, and the United Nations is there, and so we're actively
working on the agenda of this issue.
Senator Feingold. Also on the issue of accountability,
earlier this month there were reports of TFG troops looting the
country's bustling Bakara Market in broad daylight. The Prime
Minister apologized for the soldiers' misconduct and promised
to take immediate action against those that had committed these
crimes.
Do you know if any action's been taken yet?
Dr. Frazer. No, Mr. Chairman; I do not have information on
that.
Senator Feingold. If you could get back to me on that, and
I thank my colleagues for their patience.
[Dr. Frazer's response to Senator Feingold follows:]
Dr. Frazer. Unfortunately, due to the rather loose chain of command
in the TFG's security forces, there was no structure within which to
investigate, identify, and hold accountable the perpetrators of the
misconduct in Bakara market. As a result, in order to address this
problem and prevent future incidents, the TFG leadership opted for a
systemic remedy.
Following the incident in Bakara market, TFG Prime Minister Nur
``Adde'' Hassan Hussein engaged in discussions with the Benaadir
Business Council, which includes the key business leaders of Bakara
market, with the goal of establishing a private security force of 200
persons who would be paid by the traders in Bakara market to guarantee
security in the area. In exchange, the business leaders agreed to deny
safe haven for extremist elements within Bakara market. Since the
establishment of this private security force, violence in Bakara market
has decreased, and there have been no further looting incidents.
To address the broader problem of a lack of an effective chain of
command within some of its security forces, the TFG is working to
create effective security institutions to prevent and address
misconduct in the future. The Prime Minister and his cabinet, under the
leadership of President Yusuf, have launched an overhaul of the
security forces, removing clan-based militia leaders from positions of
power and sending troops to participate in training that will integrate
them into a broader national force. While this will be part of a
longer-term security sector reform process, we are hopeful this
institutional action will help i prove accountability within the TFG
security forces and prevent similar incidents from occurring in the
future.
Senator Feingold. I note that Senator Isakson has joined
us. I understand that you will be the ranking member of the
subcommittee?
Senator Isakson. Pending a vote admitting, yes.
Senator Feingold. I wish you good luck on the vote. And,
obviously, I look forward and would be delighted to work with
you.
Of course, Senator Cardin, very active on the subcommittee,
as well as the whole committee, and I know Senator Nelson of
Florida has already been here, so this is a long hearing, but
we have had a fair amount of interest.
And, with that, I turn to Senator Lugar for his round.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
will welcome, along with you, Senator Isakson, as our ranking
member, pending the election which is to occur about noontime,
and which appears to, I hope, be a unanimous vote for him.
Let me just ask you, Secretary Frazer, about the election
of 2005 in Ethiopia. At least, for many of us, it was a setback
for democratic efforts, and I think you've testified to that
effect in previous hearings. But the opposition did make some
gains in the Parliament.
Can you trace what that has meant in governance in the
country, and specifically speculate what the position of the
opposition is with regard to Ethiopia's military deployment in
Somalia?
Dr. Frazer. Thank you, Senator Lugar. The opposition took
up their seats; they hold now 173 out of 547 seats in
Parliament. And it's been important to move toward what Senator
Feingold just asked for, ``greater institutionalization of good
governance.''
The rules and procedures of Parliament have been modified
to accommodate the opposition to allow opposition members to
initiate legislation. And so, we think that taking their seats
in Parliament is key to the continued development and the
strengthening of the quality of Ethiopia's democracy.
And we will continue to work with the opposition members in
Parliament. We will continue to work with the Government to
have effective electoral campaign regulations, including for
the local elections, which are going to be taking place this
year.
On the issue of what the opposition feels about Ethiopia's
deployment in Somalia, I'll have to come back to you, Senator,
with a specific answer to that.
Senator Lugar. Well, I was just hoping for some speculation
down the trail as to whether there is an active debate going on
in the country. Can you characterize that? Is this--is Somalia
discussed in the Ethiopian Parliament?
Dr. Frazer. Somalia is discussed, and certainly it was
discussed in Parliament. It's also discussed within the ruling
party itself. There are definitely differences of views about
whether Ethiopia should have deployed into Somalia.
Senator Lugar. Now, let me ask, what justification does
Ethiopia have to perceive Eritrea as a threat in the region?
You've characterized these free border disputes in Eritrea as
serious, with regard not just to Ethiopia, but certainly to
Somalia and Sudan.
Describe, will you, that relationship between Ethiopia and
Eritrea?
Dr. Frazer. Well, Ethiopia perceives Eritrea as a threat,
because Eritrea has been funding, and perhaps training and
arming insurgents within Ethiopia, including the ONLF, but not
restricted to the ONLF.
Eritrea, of course, not only doing this in Ethiopia, but is
also doing it in Sudan, so it has a long history of doing this.
Eritrea also continues to essentially almost hold hostage
Somalis who were part of the Somali Courts, and so that's part
of the concern of Ethiopia.
Also, Eritrea has moved its forces into the Temporary
Security Zone, so it's moved it closer to Ethiopia's border,
leading to some speculation about Eritrea's real intentions in
pushing to get the UNMEE forces out of that border region.
So I think that Eritrea, on several fronts, support for
insurgencies, past support for extremists, as well as the
deployment on the border has led the Ethiopians to feel
threatened.
Senator Lugar. What do we counsel with regard to that? In
other words, in dialog with leadership of Ethiopia vis-a-vis
Eritrea.
Dr. Frazer. We've been very clear, especially regarding the
border, that Ethiopia should do nothing to provoke any type of
attack by the Eritreans. We, of course, counseled them that
they have the majority of forces, and that they really should
use all restraint necessary.
We, of course, with their insurgency, continue to push as
we do around Africa for a political solution for reaching out
to these insurgent groups, to the extent that the insurgents
will also reach out. And we've pushed them also with Eritrea to
try to normalize the relations through allowing the demarcation
of the Ethiopia-Eritrea boundary delimitation decision.
Senator Lugar. Senator Frazer, we now have an Ambassador to
the African Union headquartered in Ethiopia. Would you give us
some further information about what kind of institutional
assistance we provide to the African Union, and how that
mission is progressing.
How does that particular Ambassador fit into the scheme of
all that you have commented on this morning?
Dr. Frazer. Well, our Ambassador to the African Union, our
mission to the African Union (AU) is extremely important. We
are providing assistance to try to strengthen the AU's
institutional capacity, including on the peacekeeping front. We
have planners there working with the AU planners for the
deployment of the AMISOM force, as well as for the deployment
of the UNAMID force in Sudan.
We are also working to strengthen a democracy unit, so that
they can better train observers who can go to, for instance,
hopefully to Ethiopia, also to Zimbabwe and other countries.
The mission has grown. It's growing slowly. We have a----
Senator Lugar. How many people do you have there?
Dr. Frazer. We have the Ambassador, a DCM, a Public Affairs
Officer, a Health Attache, an Office Management Specialist, and
three or four locally engaged staff.
So it's growing. And we anticipate that it will grow
further, but certainly we arehelping the African Union to be
able to deploy these peacekeepers, to plan these peacekeeping
operations, as well as to support countries in what are the
fundamental basis for peace and stability, which is democracy.
The USAU mission is certainly playing a positive role.
Senator Lugar. In your judgment, that's the proper place
for that Ambassador to be headquartered? In other words, our
relationship with Ethiopia is such that working from that point
and with regard to all these democracy efforts, that that's
the--at least, the right spot for the Ambassador?
Dr. Frazer. It is. It's much like the U.N. in New York. It
is the headquarters of the AU. All of the permanent
representatives to the AU are based in and out of Addis Ababa,
and so it's the appropriate place for our Ambassador to the AU
to be located.
Senator Lugar. Now, finally, let me just ask one further
question of you. The Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of
Africa has now been in place since May 2003, with the support
of the Maritime Task Force and Special Operations Task Force.
Now, granted the complexity that you and the other
witnesses have described today, what sort of added value has
this given to our diplomatic efforts in the Horn of Africa?
Dr. Frazer. The Combined Joint Task Force has been
absolutely critical. I can say that they have planners who are
at our USAU headquarters, again assisting the AMISOM
deployment. In addition, they have helped me personally with my
diplomatic missions, providing left and sitting right with me
in meetings with heads of state, Foreign Ministers, Defense
Ministers, as we have coordinated this regional approach to the
challenges in the Horn of Africa. So they've played a
fundamental role.
They're also working in civil affairs in areas to try to
prevent these crises. For instance, in Comoros, a place that
very few people get to--I went myself to Comoros--there are a
number of Seabees there who are building schools and painting
the schools. So they have an important presence and, I believe,
a stabilizing presence, and certainly help our diplomatic
efforts.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you
for holding this hearing. The Horn of Africa represents
significant challenge for the international community and for
the United States, and I very much appreciate this opportunity
of hearing from our key people as to the strategy related to
the countries of the Horn of Africa. And I would ask that my
full statement be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin,
U.S. Senator From Maryland
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to hear testimony
from the administration and expert analysts about the Horn of Africa.
Without a doubt, the Horn of Africa is the most volatile subregion
in all of Africa. The potential for the outbreak of war, terrorist
activity, and complex humanitarian emergencies are all serious threats
in this area.
As we witnessed recently in the aftermath of Kenya's elections,
long-seeded tensions can take a turn for the worst almost overnight
because mechanisms for resolving conflict are either inadequate or
nonexistent.
In the Horn of Africa, millions face starvation, displacement, and
political marginalization. While the world watches little is, or can
be, done from the outside.
If we take a brief survey of the region, we see that Somalia is
still a failed state without a central government. Following Ethiopia's
December 2006 invasion and removal of the Islamic Courts, Somalia is
even more dangerous than ever. Added to that, some 600,000 people had
to flee their homes in Mogadishu during fighting in 2007.
The small nation of Eritrea continues to act in an obstructionist
manner. Relations between the United States and Eritrea are not good.
Issues pertaining to religious freedom and Eritrea's alleged links to
funneling weapons into the region is worrisome.
Mr. Chairman, perhaps no other nation in the Horn of Africa is more
complex than Ethiopia. Ethiopia is an important U.S. ally in our war on
terror and peacekeeping operations in the region.
However, Ethiopia's recent activities have caused many observers to
question their commitment to democracy and human rights. The May 2005
elections in Ethiopia and the subsequent crackdown on political
opponents was a major cause of international concern for a nation which
views itself as a regional power. The level of secrecy and intimidation
worried many friends and analysts of this ancient and proud nation.
As a Senator who is concerned about human rights, I am particularly
concerned about Ethiopia's activities in the Ogaden region. It is my
understanding that international human rights groups have raised
concerns about human rights abuses, perpetrated by the Ethiopian
military in the Ogaden.
These allegations include public executions, disappearances,
arbitrary arrests, rape, torture and other inhumane treatment.
Additionally, there are allegations of burning villages and denying
food and water to the civilian population.
For some time the International Committee of the Red Cross was
denied access to the area. I understand now this situation has been
corrected, but I am under the opinion that humanitarian corridors must
be maintained to assist the most vulnerable populations during
humanitarian crises.
To conclude, I am very interested in learning from the Assistant
Secretary of State what the U.S. position is regarding Ethiopia's
Ogaden region. Additionally, I wish to learn from the USAID what
findings the DART (Disaster Assistance Response Team) team concluded
from its recent assessment mission to the region.
In the end, a workable solution to the situation in the Ogaden must
be found and I believe the United States can help Ethiopia reach a
solution that is in the best interest of all parties.
Senator Cardin. I want to deal with the Ogaden region of
Ethiopia, and talk a little bit more about what our strategy is
there. It seems to me that the communities are at risk. The
underlining problems do not appear to be addressed. There are
fundamental issues that need to be dealt with for the safety of
the people of that region.
And I would just like to get a better assessment from the
panel as to what the U.S. policy is in regards to the rights of
the people in that region, our involvement, how we're
protecting the safety, or how we're participating in protecting
the safety of the people of the region, and providing the
appropriate type of international attention.
Whomever would like to take that question. I see that
everybody's volunteering all at once.
Ms. Almquist. Senator Cardin, maybe I have in some ways the
easiest job to answer what we're doing on the humanitarian
assistance side. And from our foreign assistance perspective,
we have certainly, all of us, in fact--Assistant Secretary
Frazer, and other senior officials, as well as USAID
Administrator Fore, and myself--been raising concern over the
humanitarian situation in the Ogaden, and trying to follow it
as closely as possible. Access to the area is difficult, and
we've seen some improvement in that as a result, I think, of
our engagement with the Government of Ethiopia in terms of the
ability to even monitor what's happening on the ground for the
condition of the civilian population.
Additional access is still needed in order for us to truly
respond to the humanitarian situation. There are nearly 1
million people in the Ogaden that are in need of food
assistance, and 1.5 million people in the Ogaden region are in
need of some sort of humanitarian assistance, including the
food assistance, and more broadly in the Somalia region, 4.5
million people are--the region as a whole is 4.5 million
people.
So this is a significant proportion of the population that
we would like to be able to address more directly.
We have seen some increase in the delivery of foods to the
region; 12,000 metric tons out of about 36,000 metric tons that
have been allocated by WFP for the Ogaden have been
distributed. There are 186 distribution points. Unfortunately,
the World Food Program cannot reach all of those distribution
points to monitor delivery of food assistance, and this is
something that we would still, and are selectively, pursuing
with the Government of Ethiopia so that we can get monitors
out, and ensure that food is reaching the intended
beneficiaries.
The Ambassador has been very engaged on behalf of the
humanitarian community in Addis Abbaba. And when briefing these
issues with the Government of Ethiopia, a number of us have
visited the region ourselves to draw more attention to the
situation there and try and understand it better. We think that
the coming--in fact, this month and next month are crucial,
because of the projections for poor rainfall, which is critical
right now given the vulnerability of the population in that
area. And we hope that increased access will enable us to
provide a better immediate response to the situation.
In the longer term, we look very much forward to working
with the Government of Ethiopia on a recovery and a development
strategy for the Ogaden, and addressing the needs of the
pastoralist population there. And we have some experience with
this already in the Somalia and Afar regions in Ethiopia, and
we think there are a number of interventions that would be very
beneficial in recovering the assets of the livelihoods of the
population that have been affected by conflict and security, as
well as the cyclical droughts and other conditions aggravating
the situation that they have right now.
Senator Cardin. Is this as a result of findings of the DART
assessment? What were the key findings within the DART
assessment?
Ms. Almquist. Yes. We feel that the Humanitarian Assessment
Team, more or less the same thing as the DART, although we
chose a different title for bureaucratic reasons.
Senator Cardin. We can't keep up with all your titles.
Ms. Almquist. I know, I'm sorry. We try and limit the
number of acronyms these days.
So far, the Humanitarian Assessment Team did not find
famine conditions in the region. They were able to visit a
number of areas, but insecurity and time prevented them from
visiting all of the areas that we think are affected by this
situation. They found that there are some improvements in
humanitarian and commercial access, but overall, the situation
is still quite concerning, in terms of the distribution process
for humanitarian food assistance.
They looked at what the Ethiopia Government, DPPA, Disaster
Prevention and Preparedness Agency, is able to do with WFP.
They looked at what international NGOs are able to do, in terms
of delivery of health services and other nonfood assistance.
And they tried to assess the level of commercial trade, and the
prices of foods in the markets, and that sort of thing, and
livestock movements, in order to understand the livelihoods of
the people in the region.
They came away with an impression that there is a serious
humanitarian situation that could deteriorate significantly if
there is another shock, such as poor rains forthcoming, or even
worse, further reduced humanitarian access, so that food aid
cannot get out.
There are a number of things that could be done to improve
that, in terms of movement of humanitarian organizations,
working to increase the capacity of the local government agency
responsible for working with World Food Program on distribution
of aid, as well as trying to ease the restrictions on
commercial trade. And those would all benefit the people of the
region.
Senator Cardin. I take it when you mean access to
humanitarian assistance that you're talking about the safety of
operating within that area, and the operations of either
government officials or those that are for independence in that
region. Is that right?
Ms. Almquist. Right now, the humanitarian organizations, to
operate in the region, they must be registered with the
government, and then they have to have essentially travel
clearances from the government to move about the area. The
Somali regional government, as well as the military, given its
operations, are relevant actors in that regard.
And so, there are efforts to coordinate movements of
humanitarian aid with both of those parties. Now, obviously, if
there's an ongoing military or security situation, it's not
appropriate or it's much more difficult for humanitarian actors
who are unarmed to move freely in those areas. Now, we would
encourage in our working with the United Nations to see if,
through their Department of Security, they can put more staff
on the ground in the Ogaden to work with the Ethiopian
authorities in assessing the security conditions, so that in
the maximum number of cases we can get out and deliver
humanitarian aid.
Now, that's the stuff that is under discussion right now,
both with the United Nations and with the Government of
Ethiopia, and we only hope very much that we can move forward.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me just turn to the political
situation and the future of that region, as far as stability
and respect for the communities. Is there a game plan? Is there
an end game here that appears to be moving forward?
Dr. Frazer. Senator, in terms of the Somali region, it is
very difficult. What we've been pushing for, of course, is on
the humanitarian side, primarily. But in addition to the
humanitarian side, we've sent signals to the ONLF to renounce
violence, and we've also pushed the Government of Ethiopia to
positively respond to the ONLF should the ONLF actually
renounce violence. So that's on the internal dynamics.
We've also pushed for the Government of Ethiopia to treat
the Ogaden in a more integrated fashion. As all of us have
said, it's important to win over the civilian population. And
so, the only way to do that is to bring development to that
region. And so, there needs to be a real focused effort, and an
increased effort on the part of the Government of Ethiopia.
Senator Cardin. Do you see that happening?
Dr. Frazer. We're pushing for it. I think that the focus is
on counterinsurgency, and also to allow for more humanitarian
aid to come in. But we need more development, as well.
And then, the third part of that strategy is, of course,
one that is far more difficult, which is that you have to get
the normalization between Ethiopia and Eritrea, because Eritrea
is continuing to arm and finance and train the insurgents.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, I look forward to working with you on the subcommittee,
and I appreciate the opportunity to be here. And I apologize to
our panelists for having missed your testimony. This is an
unusually bad day for me with commitments. I'm overcommitted
and underprepared. But I'm glad to be here. And I want to make
a couple of comments, if I can.
First of all, to Dr. Frazer, I just returned from Djibouti.
I was there visiting Ambassador Symington, and the military
installation that we have there, and the deployments that we
have there assisting people in Africa. And I would like to note
that last month when the President made his trip to Africa,
there were a couple of African leaders that made outspoken
statements not wishing any American military personnel in their
country.
But the people of Djibouti, and the Governor of Djibouti,
seemed not only to be very hospitable, but very welcoming to
our investment there. Was I correct in that judgment?
Dr. Frazer. Yes, sir. Without a doubt.
Senator Isakson. The folks I talked to, the ones who were
going out and drilling wells and providing infrastructure
assistance, said they were being received very well in the
outlands of the countries they were going visiting. Is that
correct?
Dr. Frazer. That's correct. And I think it's true of our
military forces throughout Africa, where they're doing civil
affairs projects, bringing assistance and development to many
regions that are typically not reached. So, yes; that is
correct.
Senator Isakson. Well, the reason I raised the point with
you is I read Ms. Whelan's testimony, ``We believe that a
coordinated U.S. foreign and national security policy in the
Horn of Africa is of critical importance to the United States'
both strategically and regarding our security interests.''
Having now been there and seeing firsthand, I
wholeheartedly echo that statement. And I think what's going on
in Djibouti is a perfect combination of both the national
security aspect, as well as America helping those people to
have a better life. And it was very impressive.
Ms. Almquist, I also had the privilege to spend a week in
Ethiopia a few years ago with the Basic Education Coalition,
Save the Children, and CARE, organizations all of which I know
USAID works with.
I was impressed with the progress that was being made in
educational assistance in Ethiopia. That was 2002, so that's
been--well, 5\1/2\ years ago now. Is that still progressing
through USAID?
Ms. Almquist. Yes, sir. We still have a Basic Education
Program there. And, in fact, Ethiopia is part of the
President's most recently announced International Education
Initiative, which he announced last year. And so, we'll be
further adding to our basic education funding for Ethiopia in
support of that initiative.
[Additional information submitted by Ms. Almquist follows:]
what kind of basic education programs is usaid supporting in ethiopia?
Assistance from the Africa Education Initiative and other USAID
support has helped to improve the quality and equity of primary
education. Programs with the Ministry of Education improve the quality
of primary and secondary education by improving teaching methods and
curriculum, strengthening school-community empowerment, and fostering
civic education.
These programs support the training of teachers and administrators;
the provision of textbooks and other learning materials; strengthening
of planning, management, monitoring, and evaluation systems; and the
fostering of community partnerships and improved school governance
through capacity-building of parent-teacher associations and management
of school grants. USAID is working closely with the Ministry of
Education to produce Ethiopia's first primary grade English as a Second
language textbook with integrated HIV/AIDS messaging.
Scholarship support will assist girls and HIV/AIDS orphans to
succeed in school through integrated coordination and implementation
between the USAID basic education program and PEPFAR. There is a
special focus on increasing access to education for girls and on
schools in Muslim areas. Ethiopia received $7 million for basic
education in FY 2007; the FY 2009 request level is $18 million. FY 2008
levels are not yet final but are expected to be on par with or higher
than the FY 2009 request level.
Senator Isakson. And CDC out of my hometown of Atlanta, GA,
is operating in Addis Abbaba, and in Africa, on the American
AIDS Initiative, if I'm not mistaken.
Ms. Almquist. Yes, sir. The President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief, PEPFAR, is also present in Ethiopia. And USAID is
implementing a substantial portion of that program, as well as
the President's Malaria Initiative.
Senator Isakson. Has there been a decline in the AIDS
infection rate in Ethiopia over the last few years? They were
one of the worst at one time, I know.
Ms. Almquist. Yes, sir. I unfortunately don't have those
statistics off the top of my head, but I would be happy to get
back to you on that.
[Ms. Almquist's response to Senator Isakson's question
follows:]
Ms. Almquist. The most recent HIV prevalence rates for Ethiopia are
indeed lower than those published in previous years. However, this
reflects a change in the way that prevalence is being measured rather
than a true decrease in HIV infection rates.
The new estimate is a calibration of both antenatal clinic (ANC)
sentinel surveillance and the 2005 population-based Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS). The 2005 ANC estimate was about 3.5 percent; the
2005 DHS prevalence was 1.4 percent (with an urban prevalence of 5.5
percent and a rural prevalence of 0.7 percent). The Government of
Ethiopia conducted a data synthesis exercise in conjunction with the
World Bank in 2006, and the official prevalence rate of the Government
of Ethiopia was derived from that exercise. The Government of Ethiopia
states that the national prevalence is 2.1 percent. The range published
by UNAIDS, which shows the range of 0.9-2.5 percent, rather than a
single number, is a ``confidence interval'' that reflects the
statistical precision of the estimate.
Through linkages with the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR), Ethiopia will receive significant support to scale up
integrated prevention, care and treatment programs throughout the
country and support orphans and vulnerable children. These programs
leverage and complement resources of other international partners,
Ethiopia's public and private sectors, and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
USAID PEPFAR programs support HIV/AIDS prevention, care and
support, and treatment at primary care facilities and include
prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV, activities that
strengthen the health system and develop its human resources, HIV
education activities, community care for people living with HIV and
AIDS, and provision of food, safe water, education, protection, and
health care services for orphans and vulnerable children. PEPFAR
provided close to $230.2 million for Ethiopia in FY 2007; the FY 2009
request is $337 million. FY 2008 levels are not yet final but are
expected to approximate the FY 2009 level.
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
look forward to serving with you. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. I share that, Senator. Thank you for your
participation. We do need to get to another panel, so I'll only
use a portion of my second round time.
Ms. Whelan, I noted in your testimony that you referred to
al-Shabaab as al-Qaeda-affiliated. What are the implications of
this designation, in terms of DOD's activities?
And then, I'd like Dr. Frazer to indicate if she agrees
with this assessment. And what are the implications of such a
designation on U.S. counterterrorism policy, Ms. Whelan?
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Senator. The al-Shabaab, we believe,
is affiliated with al-Qaeda in that certain elements of the al-
Shabaab militia have sought to gain financial support from the
al-Qaeda organization.
In the context of our counterterrorism policy, we continue
to see our counterterrorism approach in the Horn, and
particularly in Somalia, in a holistic fashion, in that we need
to work with our partners in the Horn to develop their
capacities to deal with the terrorist issues inside their
borders, particularly with the Kenyans, and we have had great
success there.
We also need to work directly where we can to go after al-
Qaeda terrorists, particularly those who were engaged in the
bombings in Mombasa, and the bombings in Nairobi, and Dar-us-
Salam. So the fact that al-Shabaab is courting--or at least
elements of al-Shabaab are courting al-Qaeda for greater
support, somewhat along the lines of the al-Qaeda in the lands
of Islamic Maghreb in Northern Africa, that relationship, this
to us is a very disturbing development.
And it could lead to further entrenchment, potentially, of
al-Qaeda elements in the Horn. So we are continuing to monitor
this, and we will continue to work with our partners in the
region to attempt to address it, if it develops along those
lines.
Senator Feingold. Dr. Frazer, your comments on this?
Dr. Frazer. Yes. The al-Shabaab is very much linked to al-
Qaeda. Leaders, like Aden Hashi Ayro, trained with al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan prior to 2001. He's issued statements praising al-
Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and inviting foreign fighters to
come to Somalia to participate in holy war against Ethiopians
and Ugandan forces.
He's also responsible for the assassination of Somali peace
activists in July 2005, and multiple targeted assassinations,
and harassment of civil society figures, government officials,
and journalists. He is also implicated in the murder of an
Italian nun in Mogadishu in September 2006.
Mukhtar Robow is another senior military commander, a
spokesman of al-Shabaab who has provided logistical support for
al-Qaeda operatives inside Somalia. And I can go on with others
who were in the leadership of al-Shabaab, with ties and
membership in al-Qaeda.
I believe that their role in attacking civilians and their
connections with al-Qaeda terrorists will further isolate them
from the Somali people, who are very pragmatic and who are not
linked and tied to terrorists and to extremists. And so, I
think that clearly going after al-Shabaab and designating them
is an important part of our strategy to isolate them further,
and to be able to take direct action against them.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Back to Ms. Whelan. Are we at
war in Somalia? And, if so, who is the enemy?
Ms. Whelan. The United States is not at war in Somalia. And
I think that our enemy in that region, Senator, are the al-
Qaeda operatives who are utilizing that region to plan and
execute terrorist operations that kill civilians, innocent
civilians.
Also, any individuals associated with those al-Qaeda
operatives, who facilitate their operations, are those that we
have an argument with, but we are not at war in the region.
Senator Feingold. Well, the Department acknowledged a
strike last week against a terrorist target in Somalia. And I
appreciate, of course, that there are some very bad actors in
the region, whom we should be pursuing, and I support those
efforts.
But from the point of view of military strategy, are our
operations in Somalia simply part of a global manhunt, or do we
have broader goals?
Ms. Whelan. I think we have broader goals, but there are
elements--there are individual elements and objectives that try
to achieve our broader goals. Our operations in Somalia have
been quite limited in the scheme of things. In the last year,
5--about half of our top 10 individuals have been either
captured or are dead.
Most of that has been through the support of our partners
in the region. And so, our efforts in the region are really not
necessarily focused on U.S. military action, per se, although
there are some very limited circumstances in which we have
found it necessary to take action ourselves.
But, for the most part, our efforts in the region have been
coordinated with and supported by and, in some cases, the
counterterrorism campaign has been directly executed by our
partners in the region who share our goals to eliminate global
extremism.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Whelan, only about one dozen sub-
Saharan African countries receive foreign military financing.
And the total amount requested for bilateral military
assistance to these countries has fallen significantly in
recent years.
However, the administration's fiscal year 2009 request
includes the seven-fold increase in EMF money for Ethiopia. Why
are you asking for such a large increase? I am very concerned
by the fact that we've received reports from a range of sources
citing serious human rights abuses committed by Ethiopian
security forces, particularly in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia,
even though the Ethiopian Government certainly has legitimate
security concerns in that part of the country.
What steps has the administration taken to investigate
these reports, and convey to the Ethiopian military and
political leadership that such misconduct is not acceptable?
And what steps have the Ethiopians themselves taken to
investigate these reports?
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Senator. With regard to overall FMF
numbers for Africa, certainly we hope that in the future that
FMF numbers will increase, in that FMF is critical to capacity-
building, long-term capacity-building. It is through such long-
term capacity-building that we see positive change in not only
the capability of African militaries, but also their
professionalism and their behavior in difficult and challenging
combat situations.
We have seen, for example, our capacity-building training
with Nigeria, some years ago, in preparation for their
deployment to Sierra Leone to support the U.N. And Sierra Leone
resulted in the Nigerian battalions that deployed to Sierra
Leone performing in a much better way than previously untrained
battalions. So capacity building is critical to ensuring
professional militaries on the continent.
With regard to the Ethiopian request, the Ethiopian
Government has been a strong supporter of the United States. We
have strong military relations with the United States. And, as
I mentioned in my statement, the Ethiopian military is a
200,000-man military. It is a military that the intention of
the Ethiopians has been to transform that military into a much
more professional force.
This is the force that Ethiopia's inherited, essentially,
from its years of conflict against the Dergue. And, subsequent
to that, instead of having the opportunity to restructure and
reform the military, the Ethiopians found themselves in a
border conflict with Eritrea. And, since then, of course, there
have been numerous other issues in the Horn.
So the Ethiopians have not necessarily had the time to
focus on the reforming and professionalization.
Senator Feingold. Well, what are we doing to investigate
these reports of human rights abuses by the Ethiopian forces?
Ms. Whelan. I have met with both Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International, and we have encouraged them to provide
us in the Defense Department with as much specificity as
possible with regard to allegations of Ethiopian forces
committing human rights violations in their operations in the
Ogaden.
I think--and we are waiting for both of those organizations
to get back to us with that specificity. General accusations
are not helpful. Specific accusations can be helpful. We
believe that the Ethiopian military understands just as much as
we do that a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires
taking into account the local populous, and not turning the
local populous into your enemy.
Senator Feingold. Well, I would urge you, and the
Department, and the administration, and Ethiopia, with all
respect, to make this a high priority. It's very important on
the merits, and also for credibility.
Well, this has been a very long panel, and I appreciate
your patience. Thanks so much. I'd ask the next panel to come
forward.
All right, we will begin the second panel. Ms. Fredriksson,
please proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF LYNN FREDRIKSSON, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Fredriksson. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and distinguished members of the committee, for this important
opportunity for Amnesty International to share our concerns
about violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and the need for a
consistent recentering of human rights in U.S. foreign policy
on the Horn of Africa.
Amnesty International is deeply concerned by widespread
egregious human rights violations being perpetrated against
civilians throughout the Horn. Ending current violations and
preventing future violations in these three countries is
perhaps one of the greatest challenges of our time, requiring
immediate action and long-term planning, attention to domestic
conditions within the context of a regional perspective.
Each set of country concerns must be considered
independently, as with Ethiopian Government repression of its
domestic opposition, journalists and human rights defenders,
and the humanitarian crisis in the Somali region.
In Eritrea, an authoritarian government maintains a
stranglehold on freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and
press freedom, while detaining thousands of dissidents, many in
the harshest conditions.
In Somalia, a transitional government without popular
mandate has not only failed to protect over 1 million displaced
civilians, but has failed to hold its own troops accountable
for violations against them. Compounding these challenges is
the intervention of Ethiopian forces in Somalia, and recent
threats of renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea along
their disputed border. Further compounding these challenges is
what I consider a flawed--what Amnesty considers a flawed U.S.
foreign policy, which has placed counterterror concerns at the
forefront of U.S. involvement in the region, often at the
expense of human rights and humanitarian concerns.
In large part, because of the capable and resilient civil
society throughout the region, despite these conditions, the
situation is far from hopeless. But the United States, the
International Contact Group, regional donors, and the U.N.
Security Council, and the U.N. Human Rights Council, as well as
other international organizations cannot simply maintain their
current priorities and refuse to shift course.
Crucial to this course shift is a recentering of
humanitarian and human rights in U.S. foreign policy. On
Ethiopia, that means more consistent and more public
denunciations of ongoing restrictions on civil society and the
private media, demands for the release of remaining prisoners
of conscience, and the requirement of a demonstrated opening of
commercial and humanitarian access to the Somali region.
Eritrea represents a different type of situation. The U.S.
administration should seriously reconsider any plans it might
have to add Eritrean opposition groups to the United States
list of foreign terrorist organizations, or to add an already
isolated regime to the United States list of state sponsors of
terrorism, but should consider opportunities to provide
essential humanitarian assistance.
The international community must also decide where it
stands on the Border Commission ruling, thereby denying
Ethiopia the ability to continue to flout its findings, and
Eritrea the excuse to interfere with UNMEE. On Somalia, if the
United States intends to alleviate, not worsen, the anti-
American sentiment on the Horn, it must first and foremost
cease all land and air assaults intended to ``take out''
presumed al-Qaeda or other terrorist operatives.
Since early 2007, four such assaults have been launched in
Somalia, leading to civilian casualties, destruction of
civilian property and livelihood, and the widespread belief
that the United States protects the TFG and backs the Ethiopian
forces, without genuine concern for civilians.
In addition, the United States Government must exert
significantly more pressure on the governments of Ethiopia and
Somalia to prevent human rights abuses and ensure
accountability for the conduct of their armed forces.
Additional specific recommendations from Amnesty are
included in an extensive written testimony, which I ask to be
included in the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Ms. Fredriksson. I will use my remaining time to just
briefly outline a few of the most disturbing aspects----Senator
Feingold. I would ask you to conclude within a minute or two.
Ms. Fredriksson. OK, I will do that. I want to mention
simply a few of the most egregious violations in Somalia,
Eritrea, and Ethiopia.
In Somalia, witnesses describe disproportionate military
responses by Ethiopian forces after opposition groups launch
attacks against them, most often using small improvised
explosive devices. These forms of human rights abuses include
rape and unlawful killing referred to by Somalis locally as
``slaughtering like goats.'' And we have collected scores of
testimonies regarding men whose throats were slit and left in
the street. Displaced civilians are also facing abuses on the
road, and they are facing abuses within the IDP settlements and
camps.
I just also want to mention that the contrast between
Somaliland, Hargeisa, and Mogadishu is striking. I don't want
to admit that from the testimony, but the longer testimony
includes further information.
On Ethiopia, I want to skip from our concerns regarding
ongoing incarceration of prisoners of conscience to the Ogaden
region, where the Government of Ethiopia, initially in response
to attacks by the ONLF, has maintained a blockade of commercial
aid and trade, and that has had a devastating impact on
conflict-affected areas in the region. And, in addition to
that, we have not seen the type of human rights access that is
necessary to actually understand whether or not progress has
been made, as the first panel indicated it might have been.
In terms of Eritrea, the situation is simply that one would
be hard-pressed to find a country in sub-Saharan Africa in
which United States foreign policy has had less impact. The
government maintains a stranglehold on basic human rights and
perceived protection against threats to the President's rule.
Eritrea's human rights record remains abysmal, including
persecution for religious beliefs, arbitrary detention, and
cruel and unusual punishment.
I'd like to just conclude by saying that the dearth of
consideration of serious human rights and humanitarian concerns
throughout the Horn of Africa by United States policymakers has
dire consequences. As described, these violations in all three
countries are not improving, as indicated by some on the first
panel. It is time for a shift in policy that puts civilians,
and particularly vulnerable civilians, at the center of our
foreign policy.
We have welcomed the opportunity to present longer
recommendations in our written testimony. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fredriksson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lynn Fredriksson, Advocacy Director for Africa,
Amnesty International USA, Washington, DC
I would like to thank Chairman Feingold and distinguished members
of the subcommittee for this important opportunity for Amnesty
International to share our concerns about violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea,
and the need for a consistent recentering of human rights in U.S.
foreign policy on the Horn of Africa.
INTRODUCTION
Amnesty International is deeply concerned by widespread egregious
human rights violations being perpetrated against civilians throughout
the Horn of Africa. Ending current violations and preventing future
violations in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea is perhaps one of the
greatest challenges of our time, requiring immediate action and long-
term planning, attention to domestic conditions within the context of a
regional perspective. Each set of country concerns must be considered
independently--as with Ethiopian Government repression of its domestic
opposition, journalists and human rights defenders, and the
humanitarian crisis in the Somali region (known as the Ogaden). In
Eritrea an authoritarian government maintains a stranglehold on freedom
of expression, freedom of religion, and press freedom, while detaining
thousands of dissidents, many in the harshest conditions. In Somalia a
transitional government without popular mandate has not only failed to
protect over 1 million displaced civilians, but has failed to hold its
own troops accountable for violations against them. Compounding these
challenges is the intervention of Ethiopian forces in Somalia, and
recent threats of renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea along
their disputed border. Further compounding these challenges is a flawed
U.S. foreign policy which has placed short-sighted counterterror
concerns at the forefront of U.S. involvement in the region, while
human rights and humanitarian concerns are routinely pushed aside.
In large part because of capable and resilient civil society
throughout the region, despite these conditions, the situation is far
from hopeless. But the United States and the International Contact
Group, regional donors, and the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Human
Rights Council, and other international organizations cannot simply
maintain their current priorities and refuse to shift course. Crucial
to this course shift is the recentering of humanitarian and human
rights in U.S. foreign policy. On Ethiopia, that means more consistent
and more public denunciations of ongoing restrictions on civil society
and the private media, demands for the release of remaining prisoners
of conscience, and the requirement of a demonstrated opening of
commercial and humanitarian access to the Somali region. Eritrea
represents a different type of situation which requires a reversal in
current policy. The U.S. administration should seriously consider any
plans it might have to add Eritrean opposition groups to the U.S. list
of foreign terrorist organizations or to add an already isolated regime
to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, but should consider
opportunities to provide essential humanitarian aid. The international
community must also decide where it stands on the Boundary Commission
Ruling, denying Ethiopia the ability to continue to flout its findings,
and Eritrea an excuse to interfere with UNMEE. On Somalia, if the
United States intends to alleviate, not worsen, anti-American sentiment
on the Horn, it must first and foremost cease all land and air assaults
intended to ``take out'' presumed al-Qaeda or other terrorist
operatives. Since early 2007 four such assaults have been launched in
Somalia, leading to civilian casualties, destruction of civilian
property and livelihood, and the widespread belief that the U.S.
protects the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and backs up
Ethiopian forces, without genuine concern for civilians. In addition,
the U.S. Government must exert significantly more pressure on the
governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to prevent human rights abuses and
ensure accountability for the conduct of their armed forces.
I will note additional specific recommendations from Amnesty
International after outlining a few of the most disturbing aspects of
recent findings. This information was obtained on a November/December
2007 mission to Nairobi, Kenya, and Hargeisa, Somaliland to meet with
international actors and interview refugees from southern and central
Somalia, as well as recent reporting on the state of human rights in
Ethiopia and Eritrea. A short report on the targeting of journalists in
Somalia, entitled ``Journalists under Attack,'' is already available,
and a full report on our findings on Somalia, entitled ``Who Will
Protect Human Rights in Somalia,'' will be made available in the coming
weeks.
RECENT FINDINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SOMALIA:
ABUSES BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
Amnesty International has documented ongoing human rights abuses
and violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the
conflict in Somalia, including unlawful killings, rape, arbitrary
detention, and attacks on civilians and civilian property. Some 6,000
civilians are estimated to have been killed in Mogadishu and across
southern and central Somalia in 2007. Over 600,000 are reported to have
been displaced in 2007, and a further 50,000 so far this year, joining
some 400,000 already displaced from previous periods, for a total of
over 1 million internally displaced persons in southern and central
Somalia today. In addition, an estimated 335,000 refugees fled Somalia
in 2007, seeking safety in other countries. On February 14, 2008,
UNICEF announced that some 90,000 children could die in the next few
months if the international community doesn't increase funding for
nutrition, water and sanitation programs in Somalia.
Our findings from November and December included testimony and
other information reporting frequent incidents of rape and pillaging by
the TFG, a recent surge in violent abuses by Ethiopian Armed Forces in
Somalia, and the targeting of Somali journalists and human rights
defenders by all parties to the conflict. House-to-house searches and
raids in neighborhoods around Mogadishu were carried out by both TFG
and Ethiopian forces, as were violent abuses against individuals and
groups on the streets.
``Armed groups'' in Somalia constitute a range of nonstate
combatants fighting the TFG, including remnants of the Islamic Courts
Union, supporters of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, and
Shabab youth militia. Subclan and other local political leaders have
also acted outside of the law, as have bandits and clan militia
conducting raids, robberies, and violent attacks on civilians. While
the command structures within these entities are opaque, and nonstate
armed groups and criminal elements are more difficult to identify by
dress, vehicle, or appearance, some leaders have made themselves known
and should be held responsible for the conduct of their forces.
Those fleeing armed violence in Mogadishu have faced violence on
the roads north toward Puntland and west toward Afgooye and Baidoa,
including theft, rape, and shootings. Once they arrive at displacement
settlements and camps, IDPs and refugees have faced further violence,
and a lack of access to essential services, including clean water,
medical care, and adequate food supplies. Humanitarian operations
attempting to deliver these services have frequently been impeded by
the TFG and other parties to the conflict and armed criminal groups, as
well as overall high levels of insecurity throughout Somalia.
Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law by TFG
and Ethiopian Forces
From testimonies we have collected, Amnesty International has
concluded that until mid to late 2007 TFG forces are believed to be
responsible for the majority of incidents of theft, looting, beatings
and rape in and around Mogadishu. For example, one eyewitness reported
seeing TFG soldiers seizing mobile phones from Somalis outside of a
mosque as men were leaving Friday prayers. Somali civilians reported
that they were more afraid of TFG forces than Ethiopians. This
situation shifted in late 2007 with growing reports of increased
incidents of theft, looting, beatings and rape, as well as unlawful
killings, by Ethiopian forces.
This shift followed fighting in early November 2007 when several
Ethiopian soldiers' bodies were dragged through the streets, recalling
images of Somali gunmen dragging the bodies of American marines through
the streets of Mogadishu after clan militia downed two Black Hawk
helicopters in 1993. The shift also followed reported deployments of
new Ethiopian troops to Somalia as more seasoned veterans were reported
to have been transferred to Ethiopia's border with Eritrea when threats
of renewed conflict along the border intensified in November.
In some instances involving rape and killing, the Somali Government
and Ethiopian forces have targeted individuals and small groups of
civilians. In other cases they have targeted entire neighborhoods in
disproportionate response to smaller scale attacks by armed opponents,
sometimes decimating or emptying entire areas, and often resulting in
injuries and unlawful killings of civilians.
Somali refugees in Nairobi and Hargeisa described incidents of
attacks on their homes and in the streets. In some cases TFG and
Ethiopians forces were searching for named individuals believed to have
collaborated with armed groups, and in several such cases, they beat,
arrested, or killed someone other than the person they were looking
for. TFG and Ethiopian forces would also ``sweep'' entire streets,
moving door to door in areas believed to be insurgent strongholds.
Witnesses described military responses by Ethiopian forces after
opposition armed groups launched attacks against them, most often using
small improvised explosive devices. Among the most commonly reported
abuses were gang rape, mass rape, and a form of unlawful killing
referred to by Somalis we interviewed as ``slaughtering like goats,''
which refers to the slitting of throats. AI collected scores of
testimonies regarding incidents where bodies of men whose throats had
been slit were left lying in pools of blood on the street until
combatants, including snipers, had cleared the area.
Somali refugees noted specific characteristics, including uniforms,
by which they identified their attackers as Ethiopian. They often
referred to Ethiopian soldiers by language as ``Amharic,'' describing
situations in which they said they pleaded for their families and their
own lives but could not make themselves understood.
Violations by Antigovernment Armed Groups
Many survivors of violence in Mogadishu reported that ``militias''
are not visible, but known to launch small scale attacks to which the
TFG and Ethiopian military respond with heavy artillery fire. There was
a clear reluctance among many displaced Somalis to provide information
about abuses by armed groups, presumably out of fear of retribution.
Many were aware of rocket fire, shelling, or gunfire they assumed came
from armed groups, but said they never saw the attackers. Others
received threats from armed groups by telephone, text message, or
letter delivered by a third party.
Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders
Journalists and human rights defenders have been specifically
targeted for their professional activities in exposing human rights
violations by multiple parties to the conflict. Amnesty International
spoke with scores of journalists among many who fled Somalia in the
last few months of 2007 when attacks against them increased. While
international journalists and human rights organizations have been able
to document some violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law, we can assume that the majority of violations are not
being documented, given restrictions on, and closures of, independent
media by the TFG, and the general silencing of journalists and human
rights defenders reporting on military operations by TFG and Ethiopian
forces and antigovernment armed groups.
Some reporters and other media workers reported staying for days,
sometimes weeks, in their offices because of general insecurity,
specific threats, and fear of TFG forces. At other times they were
unable to reach their offices for fear of violence by all parties to
the conflict. Journalists reported arbitrary detentions by TFG and
Ethiopian forces, lasting from a couple of hours to 11 days.
Since the intensive fighting in March-April 2007, local human
rights organizations active in Mogadishu have also been largely
silenced. One local women's organization was raided by TFG soldiers who
asked, ``Are you the ones giving us a bad name?''
Attacks on Civilian-Populated Neighborhoods
Shelling and mortar fire have destroyed buildings and other
civilian infrastructure, resulted in deaths and injuries of civilians,
and often emptied entire neighborhoods, as residents fled for safety.
In early December 2007, five Mogadishu districts were reported
``completely empty'' by humanitarian organizations providing emergency
assistance in IDP settlements in Somalia.
All parties to the conflict are reported to have carried out
attacks on civilian-populated areas, but TFG and Ethiopian artillery is
generally capable of causing much heavier damage, while armed groups
with less military support resort to small mortar fire and improvised
explosive devises. At times TFG and Ethiopian strikes were reported to
have targeted civilian-populated areas after armed group attacks had
been launched from specific locations within those areas. A number of
refugees told Amnesty International that they had left their homes (to
collect water, food, or other necessities) and when they returned their
houses were simply gone, destroyed by rocket-propelled grenades or
mortar fire.
Under international humanitarian law, civilians are unlawful
targets for attack, unless they take a direct part in the hostilities.
Amnesty International is not in a position to determine whether each of
the intended targets in the incidents reported meet these criteria, but
care was clearly not taken to avoid civilian casualties in most if not
all of these cases.
Attacks on Civilians on the Road
Displaced civilians from southern and central Somalia frequently
reported being attacked on the road from Mogadishu to several
destinations to the north and the southwest as they sought safety.
Unidentified robbers stole money, food, and other possessions. IDPs
were attacked or forced to pay fees at multiple check points and road
blocks. One of the most dangerous areas reported was between Jowhar and
Beletweyne on the route to Somaliland.
The number of reported attacks on displaced Somalis on the road
fleeing Mogadishu rose in late 2007, as did the level of brutality
exhibited by perpetrators, most notably in cases of rape and other
forms of sexual violence, as well as shootings, beatings, and
``disappearance.'' AL received reports of violations against IDPs on
the road in Somalia committed by Ethiopian and TFG troops,
antigovernment armed groups, clan gangs, and common bandits. At times
perpetrators would cover their faces to mask their identity, but often
survivors believed they could still identify them by language or
appearance. While in September 2007, some drivers were able to travel
though certain areas by virtue of their clan affiliation, this changed
in late 2007 when clan affiliation no longer offered any assurance of
favoritism in an attack. IDPs were increasingly targeted even in cases
where they shared clan affiliations with their attackers.
Conditions for Somali Refugees
Despite the Government of Kenya's closure of its border with
Somalia since January 2007, a significant number of Somali refugees
have managed to find refuge in Kenya. Kenya's border closure has served
particularly to keep the most vulnerable from reaching safety.
Individual Somali men can now reach Kenya much more easily than women
and children, so families are being separated, with women and children
stranded in overcrowded IDP settlements in southern and central
Somalia. While some Somali refugees in Nairobi have been receiving
basic assistance from local NGOs, others are completely dependent on
the good will of clans and neighbors for food and shelter.
In Hargeisa, there are approximately six major displacement
settlements. While the Government of Somaliland does not officially
accept displaced persons from southern Somalia, it has allowed
thousands or more to find refuge on its territory, particularly in
Hargeisa.
The U.N. reports there are now over 1 million IDPs in southern and
central Somalia. Yet, as one source told us, ``Everyone is in denial--
denial of the scope of the problem. We say there are 600,000 newly
displaced from Mogadishu and we're accused of distorting reality. The
mention of [numbers] starts everyone shouting.''
Risks were grave for humanitarian organizations in Somalia in 2007.
Every day humanitarian workers face checkpoints, extortion, car
jacking, a lack of acceptance of the impartial nature of assistance,
and lack of authority and command structure among local security
officials. The provision of humanitarian assistance is made difficult
by unacceptable bureaucratic impediments, restricted access, restricted
movement and overall insecurity, but also by the contempt for
humanitarian operations indicated in recent speeches by TFG
authorities. In October TFG security arbitrarily detained the director
of the World Food Program for nearly a week. Staff from CARE (in May),
Medecins Sans Frontieres (in December) and a French reporter (in
December) were abducted, and later released, in Puntland. MSF staff
were also abducted in Puntland, and several were killed in Kismayo
early this year.
The situation has been so dire that humanitarian organizations made
a rare public statement in October 2007, calling for urgent support for
increased humanitarian space. Forty international aid organizations
wrote: ``There is an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in South
Central Somalia . . . International and national NGOs cannot respond
effectively to the crisis because access and security are deteriorating
dramatically at a time when needs are increasing. The international
community and all parties to the present conflict have a responsibility
to protect civilians, to allow the delivery of aid and to respect
humanitarian space and the safety of humanitarian workers.''
SOMALILAND: A STRIKING CONTRAST WITH THE SOUTH
It's important not to omit formal mention of self-declared
independent Somaliland. While overall human rights and humanitarian
conditions continue to worsen in southern and central Somalia, and more
recently Puntland, a stable Somaliland has devoted attention to
democratization, institutional capacity and development in its decade
and a half long pursuit of international recognition for independence.
The contrast between Hargeisa and Mogadishu is striking, and the
international community should consider what the Government of
Somaliland needs to maintain peace and stability, including bilateral
assistance to ensure it has the capacity to institutionalize human
rights protections. Somaliland is not without its own set of human
rights concerns. Its border with Puntland is contested, with
unfortunate outbreaks of fighting in late 2007, and it has not
established a monopoly on power in its boundary regions of Sool and
Sanaag. In 2007 it held a journalist and unrecognized fourth party
opposition leaders in prison for several months after unfair trials.
And the Government of Somaliland issued an expulsion order for 24 young
southern Somali journalists seeking refuge in Hargeisa in late 2007. To
its credit that order was never carried out, and the Government of
Somaliland has also allowed itself to become the de facto refuge for
thousands or more southern Somali displaced persons fleeing armed
conflict in Mogadishu, despite a near-total lack of international
assistance to meet their basic needs.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA: POLITICAL RIGHTS, THE SOMALI REGION,
AND THE ERITREAN BORDER
In early 2005, leading up to the May 15 elections, Ethiopia
appeared to be turning a corner with respect to international human
rights. The Government of Ethiopia was allowing some--albeit limited--
international press access and space for political opposition rallies
in Addis Ababa. Yet since the disputed 2005 elections, plagued by
accusations of electoral fraud and mass protest demonstrations,
political repression greatly increased. As reported by Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. Department of State,
these violations have included mass arbitrary arrests and detentions,
torture, extrajudicial killings, repression of ethnic minorities,
intimidation of students and teachers, suppression of press freedom,
and the less reported practice of targeting peaceful political
opposition in the countryside. In several days of demonstrations in
June and November 2005, government security forces shot and killed 187
people and wounded 765, including 99 women and several children. Six
police officers were also killed in clashes with demonstrators.
In its most recent Country Report for Ethiopia, the U.S. Department
of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and labor reported human
rights abuses including: Uunlawful killings, and beating, abuse, and
mistreatment of detainees and opposition supporters by security forces;
poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; restrictions on
freedom of the press; restrictions on freedom of assembly and
association; and discrimination against religious and ethnic
minorities.
Prisoners of Conscience and Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)
Trials
While allowed very limited access to observe the trials in Addis
Ababa, Amnesty International has nevertheless closely monitored their
progress as a means to gauge overall human rights conditions for
journalists, Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) opposition
leaders, and human rights defenders in Ethiopia.
Defendants have been held in different sections of Kaliti prison on
the outskirts of Addis Ababa. Conditions in the worst sections have
been harsh, with severe overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and poor
hygiene. Correspondence has often been prohibited, and private
consultation with lawyers not allowed.
Amnesty International has consistently called for the immediate and
unconditional release of those defendants whom it classified as
prisoners of conscience, because they did not use or advocate violence
but were peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression,
association and assembly, as guaranteed by the Ethiopian Constitution
and international human rights treaties which Ethiopia has ratified.
Several trials of CUD leaders, journalists, and human rights defenders
began in spring 2006, with the prosecution resting its case in April
2007. More than 30 defendants were acquitted. In June 38 others,
including human rights leader Mesfin Woldemariam and parliamentarian
Kifle Tigneh, were convicted and sentenced to life, but they were
pardoned and released in July, after a Presidential pardon was
negotiated by Ethiopian elders and other parties.
Two civil society activists and human rights lawyers, Daniel
Bekele, policy manager of the Ethiopian office of ActionAid, and
Netsanet Demissie, founder and director of the Organization for Social
Justice, who refused to sign documents requesting pardon, were
convicted in a trial which failed to meet international standards of
justice, and sentenced to 2 years and 8 months. Their convictions were
based on evidence that did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed a crime under Ethiopian law. While their release, after time
served, was expected in early January they are still in prison.
Yalemzawde Bekele, a human rights lawyer working for the European
Commission, was charged in July 2007 with conspiring to commit outrage
against the constitution, but granted bail pending trial in late March
2008.
Over 17,000 prisoners, mostly convicted criminals, were released in
September 2007, by Presidential amnesty upon the occasion of the
Ethiopian millennium new year, while hundreds more CUD members detained
in 2005 are still being held without trial.
Separate from the CUD trials, a parliamentary inquiry was
established in December 2005 to investigate the demonstration killings.
This body initially concluded that Ethiopian security forces had used
excessive force. However, the Chair and other members of the inquiry
commission were later forced to flee the country, after receiving
threats that they must alter their findings. The remaining members of
the commission subsequently endorsed a report accepted by the
Parliament in October 2006 that the actions of the security forces had
been ``legal and necessary.'' No member of the security forces has
since been arrested or charged with any offense in connection with the
demonstration violence.
Ethiopia's Border Dispute With Eritrea
Despite the Government of Ethiopia's stated acceptance, the
international boundary commission ruling in 2002, following the 1998-
2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it has resisted the
implementation of this ruling and called for further negotiations. Not
surprising, Eritrea has refused to allow the commission's ruling to be
reexamined and demanded international enforcement instead. The ICB was
dissolved in November without any further progress toward formal
demarcation. The potential for mass abuses of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the event of renewed combat along the
border is grave, with new deployments by both sides in late 2007.
Instability and threats of violence have already had dire effects on
the livelihood, health, and right to movement of local populations.
Though the mandate for the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
was renewed in December 2007, Eritrea has created such severe obstacles
to its function that U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon is temporarily
disbanding UNMEE pending further UNSC consideration.
Ethiopian Blockade in the Somali Region (the Ogaden)
The Government of Ethiopia, initially in response to attacks by the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) on an oil installation in Obole
in April 2007, which reportedly killed 65 Ethiopian and six Chinese oil
workers, stepped up counterinsurgency operations in the Somali region,
including a blockade of aid and commercial trade that has had
devastating impact on conflict-affected districts of the region,
including food shortages. It has also further injured Ethiopia's
overall relationship with the people of Somalia.
Amnesty International has received reports of mass arrests, lengthy
detentions without trial, beatings, rape and other forms of torture,
forcible conscription and extrajudicial executions of alleged ONLF
supporters by Ethiopian forces. And the ONLF has reportedly
assassinated some civilian officials.
A U.N. fact-finding mission in August 2007 reported on the
humanitarian crisis, but a subsequent mission to assess human rights
conditions in the Somali region has not yet materialized. In addition,
Sultan Fowsi Mohamed Ali, a clan elder and mediator, was detained in
August, reportedly to prevent him from speaking with members of the
U.N. fact-finding mission, and he is still being detained without
trial. Amnesty International considers him to be a prisoner of
conscience.
While some reports indicate a partial lessening of abuses in the
region, most particularly a partial lifting of Ethiopia's blockade,
there is no way to assess this information without full access for
human rights monitors throughout the Somali region.
Armed Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia
Please see related human rights concerns about Ethiopian violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law addressed under
Somalia above.
Renditions and Forcible Returns
In January and February 2007 Ethiopian forces in Somalia rendered
at least 85 political prisoners to Ethiopia. Most had been arrested in
Kenya when Kenya closed its border to people fleeing Somalia. Foreign
nationals from some 14 countries were released after some months and
sent back to their countries of origin. In May the Ethiopian
authorities acknowledged holding 41 detainees in military custody, but
authorities have still not released their charges or their whereabouts.
These detainees included Somalis who are Kenyan citizens, two
conscripted Eritrean journalists, and alleged members of armed
Ethiopian opposition groups. Detainees from Kenya and Somalia were
reported to have been tortured or ill-treated in secret military places
of detention in Addis Ababa.
Fifteen refugees forcibly returned to Ethiopia by Sudan in August
2007 were detained in Ethiopia, and five people from the Somali region
were forcibly returned to Ethiopia by Somaliland in October 2007 and
their whereabouts are unknown.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ERITREA: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, POLITICAL
PRISONERS, AND MILITARY CONSCRIPTION
One would be hard pressed to find a country in sub-Saharan Africa
in which U.S. foreign policy currently has less impact than Eritrea,
where the regime of President Issayas Afewerki maintains a stranglehold
on basic human rights in perceived protection against multiple threats,
domestic and regional, to his rule. International relations for Eritrea
have not been improving--from the Government of Eritrea's conduct
toward UNMEE to its support for Ethiopian and Somali opposition groups.
And its human rights record remains abysmal, including persecution of
Eritreans for their religious beliefs, arbitrary detention, cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees, and forced conscription.
The government, supported by remittances from the Eritrean diaspora,
maintains its bellicosity on the Horn and its international isolation,
with the ready excuse of the unenforced border commission ruling, and
in retaliation for years of neglect by an international community
biased against independence claims. No independent or private news
outlets have been allowed since 2001, and university education is no
longer available in Eritrea.
Political Prisoners
There is no tolerance for dissent in Eritrea, evidenced by frequent
arrests of suspected government critics, the absence of any authorized
forums for assembly and association, and government violations of
telephone and Internet privacy. Since authorities have taken reprisals
against detainees' families if they made inquiries or communicated with
international human rights organizations, it is very difficult to
obtain information on their cases.
In addition to religious detainees (mostly evangelical Christians),
11 former government ministers, and Eritrean liberation veterans, who
called for democratic reform and were charged with treason, remain in
secret detention since 2001. They have not been seen by their families
since their arrest in 2001. Ten journalists, determined to be prisoners
of conscience, have been held in incommunicado detention since 2001 for
supporting the detained government ministers. Journalist and educator
Fessahaye ``Joshua'' Yohannes is reported to have died in detention, as
have certain of the former government leaders. Aster Yohannes, arrested
in 2003 when she returned from the United States to see her children,
also remains in incommunicado detention, as does her husband, who was
detained in 2001. Thousands of other political detainees have been held
incommunicado for years.
Prison conditions are extremely harsh and constitute cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment. Many prisoners are held in
overcrowded shipping containers, with no protection against extremes of
heat and cold. Torture by means of painful tying, known as
``helicopter,'' is routinely employed as punishment and a method of
interrogation for religious and political prisoners. Evangelicals have
been tortured to make them abandon their faith.
Freedom of Religion
Some 2,000 members of minority religions arrested since their
faiths were banned in 2002, including women and children, have been
held in incommunicado detention without charge or trial. Some members
of authorized religions (including the Eritrean Orthodox Church, the
Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church and Islam) were also
detained. Government officials closed churches and seized church
property. In one notable example, Patriarch Antonios, head of the
Eritrean Orthodox Church, aged 79 and in poor health due to diabetes,
was placed in secret detention and deposed in May 2007 after having
been under house arrest since January 2006, for protesting the
detention of three priests and the government's intervention in church
affairs.
Conscription
National military service has been compulsory for all citizens aged
18-40, with women over 27 informally exempted. Relatives of young
people who eluded conscription, by hiding in Eritrea or leaving the
country, are detained and forced to pay heavy fines. They remain in
indefinite detention if they can't pay the fine. Legal challenges to
this system are not allowed. Thousands of young people facing
conscription and conscripts have fled the country seeking asylum.
Conscientious objection is not recognized, and three Jehovah's
Witnesses have been detained by the military since 1994.
Forced Returns
Despite guidelines from the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, that rejected Eritrean asylum seekers should not be
returned to Eritrea on account of its serious human rights situation,
several recognized refugees were returned by Sudan and detained by
Eritrea in late 2007. One asylum seeker from the United Kingdom was
also forcibly returned and detained. Hundreds of detained Eritrean
asylum seekers in Libya remain at risk of forced return. Asylum seekers
forcibly returned from Malta in 2002 and from Libya in 2003 remain in
incommunicado detention. Recent threats to add Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) groups to the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations
will only serve to harm refugees seeking asylum based on serious human
rights concerns, where previously affiliations with these groups
constituted reason for consideration of asylum.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A HUMAN-RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH TO U.S. POLICY ON THE HORN
There has been a dearth of consideration for serious human rights
and humanitarian concerns throughout the Horn of Africa by U.S.
policymakers, with dire consequences. As described in this testimony,
trends indicate that violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are worsening, not
improving. It is now time for a shift in approach--to make the
immediate protection of vulnerable civilians central to an effective
U.S. foreign policy on the Horn. This means holding individual
governments accountable for protecting the rights of civilians and
controlling the conduct of their armed forces. It also means taking a
step back to gain a regional perspective on interlocking crises on the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in southern and central Somalia, and in the
Somali region of Ethiopia. Toward these ends, Amnesty International is
grateful for the opportunity to offer the following recommendations on
how to recenter human rights in U.S. foreign policy on the Horn of
Africa.
Foreign Policy Recommendations on Ethiopia
The U.S. Government must make human rights central to U.S.
relations with the Government of Ethiopia and Ethiopian civil
society.
The U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and other U.S. officials
should press the Government of Ethiopia to release all
prisoners of conscience immediately and unconditionally.
The U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and other U.S. officials
should actively monitor all political trials and visit
political detainees in Addis Ababa and other places in
Ethiopia, insist that trials and prison conditions adhere to
international standards, and actively monitor the treatment of
all prisoners of conscience and political detainees.
U.S. Government officials, including the U.S. Ambassador to
Ethiopia, must ensure that steps are taken by the Government of
Ethiopia to fully remove all remaining obstacles to unhindered
humanitarian assistance and commercial trade in the Somali
region of Ethiopia.
U.S. Government officials must press the Government of
Ethiopia to do everything in its power to avoid armed conflict
with Eritrea.
The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives should provide humanitarian assistance at
appropriate levels to meet the basic needs of the people of
Ethiopia.
The U.S. Congress should actively fund and support judicial
and security sector reform in Ethiopia.
In the spirit of current notification requirements for IMET
and FMF funding to Ethiopia, the Appropriations Committees of
the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives should consider
withholding a portion of both programs' assistance until the
Secretary of State certifies that assistance under these
programs is not being used by Ethiopian security forces against
Ethiopian civilians, including students and political
opposition groups, with special attention to the Somali,
Oromia, and Gambella regions of Ethiopia.
The United States Government should establish investigations
to determine which units of the TFG and the Ethiopian Armed
Forces are responsible for mass human rights violations, and
military assistance should be conditioned for those units.
The U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. should call
for the establishment of a long-overdue U.N. fact-finding
mission on human rights conditions in the Somali region.
Foreign Policy Recommendations on Eritrea
The U.S. Government should make human rights central to U.S.
relations with the Government of Eritrea and Eritrean civil
society.
The U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea and other U.S. officials
should press the Government of Eritrea, directly and through
mutual bilateral partners, to release all prisoners of
conscience immediately and unconditionally.
The U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea and other U.S. officials
should actively monitor all political trials and visit
political detainees in Asmara and other places in Eritrea,
insist that trials and prison conditions adhere to
international standards, and actively monitor the treatment of
all prisoners of conscience and political detainees.
The U.S. Government must press the Government of Eritrea,
directly and through mutual bilateral partners, to do
everything in its power to avoid armed conflict with Ethiopia.
The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives should provide humanitarian assistance at
appropriate levels to meet the basic needs of the people of
Eritrea, with special emphasis on the needs of displaced
persons along its borders.
The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives should consider initial ESF funding to
support Eritrean diaspora projects in the United States, to
provide disenfranchised expatriate Eritreans with an effective
means to promote human rights and democracy in their home
country.
Foreign Policy Recommendations on Somalia
U.S. Government officials should strongly condemn human
rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law
in all documents and statements pertaining to Somalia.
The United States and other countries to which Somali
refugees have fled persecution must ensure that they are
afforded protection, as required under international human
rights standards and international standards governing the
treatment of refugees.
U.N. agencies and bilateral partners, including the U.S.
Government, should fund and implement programs to provide
vulnerable groups, including women, young people, and
minorities, with education, employment, and training
opportunities, in addition to fully funding and staffing
emergency assistance programs throughout Somalia.
The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
should work within the U.N. Security Council to give the human
rights and humanitarian crisis
in Somalia a higher profile, beyond the question of a
peacekeeping force, strengthen human rights components of
UNPOS, and ensure authorization of resources necessary to
support human rights assistance for Somalia through the Office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.
The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
should work within the UNSC to strengthen and enforce the U.N.
arms embargo.
Any U.S. military or police assistance to the TFG should
require a vetting process to ensure that violators of human
rights are not placed in positions of authority in Somalia.
The U.S. Congress should consider conditioning plans for
further security sector assistance to the TFG on the inclusion
of mechanisms to monitor the human rights performance of its
security forces and hold individual leaders, soldiers and units
responsible for violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law accountable for their actions, according to
international standards of justice.
The United States should establish investigations to
determine which forces of the TFG are responsible for
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
The U.S. Government and the international community are
strongly encouraged to fulfill all commitments made in UNSC
Resolution 1745 to fund and support full deployment of AMISOM,
as part of the process required to facilitate the withdrawal of
Ethiopian troops from Somalia, while acting to encourage AMISOM
to extend its operational mandate to include civilian
protection.
As national reconciliation efforts continue, diplomatic
initiatives must ensure that human rights and humanitarian
assistance are made central to the dialog among all political
actors and parties to the conflict in Somalia.
Foreign Policy Recommendations on Somaliland
The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives should consider initial ESF and Development
Assistance to support democratization, elections,
institutionalization of human rights protections, police and
security sector reform and judicial capacity-building in self-
declared independent Somaliland. Such assistance need not
address the question of international recognition, but would
ensure the support of the Government of Somaliland requires to
continue to build democratic institutions and a secure
environment for its citizens.
Senator Feingold. Of course, we will put that in the
record. And I thank you for your important testimony.
Dr. Shinn.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE ELLIOT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Shinn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also have
a longer statement that I would like to include in the record.
I think there are essentially four issues that are of great
concern today, potentially and actual, in the Horn of Africa.
The first, by far, is the situation in Somalia and the
continuing violence there. Another is the potential breakdown
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan. A third is
the situation in Darfur, although the implications for the Horn
are not that great. And lastly, is a possible conflict between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, although I don't believe that will
happen.
The situation in Somalia is particularly worrisome. The
humanitarian situation is worsening. It impacts directly all of
its neighbors, but also has brought Eritrea very much into the
picture. The United States is treating Somalia primarily as a
counterterrorist threat, and I think this raises some serious
questions about the best way to approach the problem. The
possible resumption of civil war between northern and southern
Sudan would, in fact, have far greater consequences for the
Horn of Africa than does, for example, the situation in Darfur.
And the absence of normal relations between Ethiopia and
Eritrea contributes significantly to instability in the region.
As I say, I don't subscribe to the school of thought that
suggests there will be a return to war between Ethiopia and
Eritrea.
Efforts by governments in the region to solve the problem
in Somalia, to keep the CPA on track, and to encourage the
normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are
sometimes at counter purposes with American objectives. The
United States seeks stability in the region, and wants to
mitigate or even eliminate the terrorist threat. Regional
governments do not necessarily share these priorities.
For its part, the U.S. obsession with counterterrorism
emphasizes short-term objectives aimed at tracking down
terrorists. It gives insufficient attention to working with
regional governments on ameliorating the long-term causes that
lead to support for people who use terrorist tactics.
The United States, I think, has the most leverage with the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of all of the actors
outside the neighborhood. Although its assistance is modest,
the TFG exists at the mercy of Ethiopia and the United States.
The United States has also expended considerable political
capital in helping to achieve the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, and as a result, has some leverage there. The rocky
relationship with Khartoum, however, limits United States
leverage to affect policy change, either in Darfur or to ensure
implementation of the CPA.
Washington has virtually no leverage with Eritrea. But even
in the case of Ethiopia, leverage is a relative concept. The
leaderships in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, since they assumed
power in their respective countries in 1991, are notably
resistant to outside pressure, even when large amounts of
assistance are at stake. Both Prime Minister Meles and
President Isaias will change positions on a policy only after
they have concluded it is in the long-term interest of their
respective governments.
Mr. Chairman, I ended with a very long list of proposed
recommendations. I certainly won't take time here to go through
them all. I will only cite a few of them.
I think, mostly importantly, United States policy should
work in a stronger way to encourage the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia to create a government of national unity
that includes moderates from the Alliance for the Reliberation
of Somalia and from some clans in the Mogadishu area that now
oppose the TFG.
On a contingency basis, I think it should request, if it
hasn't already done so, the United Nations to draw up plans for
a peacekeeping operation that would eventually replace the
small African Union presence in Somalia. It should help both
Ethiopia and Eritrea identify confidence-building measures that
may eventually lead to Ethiopian acceptance of the Boundary
Commission's decision, followed by practical adjustments along
the border that are acceptable to both. And it should encourage
both Ethiopia and Eritrea to end support for groups whose goal
is to destabilize the situation in the other's country.
Finally, I would urge that the United States put front and
center counterterrorism programs that mitigate the root causes
of terrorism and the environment in the Horn that sustains but
domestic terrorists and those coming from outside the region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor of
International Affairs, the Elliott School of International Affairs,
George Washington University, Washington, DC
I thank Chairman Feingold for inviting me to testify on U.S. policy
objectives and options on the Horn of Africa. The Horn has long been
one of the most conflicted regions of the world and, as back door to
the Middle East, is strategically important to the United States. It
merits close attention by both the administration and Congress.
The Subcommittee on African Affairs asked me to assess the current
security situation in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, and to identify
the most serious threats to regional and U.S. security, It also
solicited my analysis of efforts by governments in the Horn and by the
administration to address these threats. It then urged that I offer
recommendations on how the United States can better contribute to
security, stability, growth, and democracy in Somalia, Ethiopia, and
Eritrea. In particular, the subcommittee asked what tools and leverage
the United States possesses that would be most effective in achieving
U.S. objectives in the Horn of Africa.
CURRENT SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA, ERITREA, AND SOMALIA
The serious challenges facing Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia are
longstanding and have implications for neighboring Djibouti, Kenya, and
Sudan just as developments in those countries impact the situation for
the three countries discussed in this testimony. With approximately 75
million people and located in the center of the Horn, Ethiopia is in
many ways key to peace and security (or lack thereof) in the region.
But the cross-border linkages are so important in the Horn that any one
of the countries has the potential to destabilize or make more stable
the other countries in the region.
Turning first to Ethiopia, the country is still recovering from the
aftermath of the 2005 general election. The runup to the election and
the actual balloting were deemed to be generally free and fair. It was
a major improvement over all previous elections. Charges by some
opposition parties that the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) stole the election during the ballot counting
process resulted in violence that continued sporadically for the
subsequent 6 months. In some cases the opposition provoked a strong
reaction by government security forces. Nevertheless, the security
forces clearly used excessive force in responding to a number of
challenges.
With local elections (districts and kebeles or wards) and those for
some 40 vacancies in the national legislature scheduled for April 2008,
the internal political situation approaches another potentially
significant turning point. Unfortunately, opposition political parties
are demoralized, arguing that the government has shut down most of
their regional offices and arrested some of their supporters. Several
of the opposition parties may not even contest seats for local offices,
which in Ethiopia are actually very important. The current internal
political dynamic surrounding these elections does not auger well for
enhancing democracy in the country. Traditionally, there are no
international observers for local elections. In any event, because of
the size of the country and large number of contests, it would be
difficult to mobilize a sufficient number of international observers.
Nevertheless, the local elections are an opportunity for advancing
democracy in Ethiopia. If they fail to achieve this goal, it will be an
enormous lost opportunity.
Turning to Ethiopia's relations with neighboring countries, Addis
Ababa has close relations with Kenya and Djibouti, which now serves as
the principal port for all Ethiopian imports and exports. Relations
with Sudan have fluctuated since the EPRDF took power in 1991, but have
been good following the outbreak of conflict in 1998 between Eritrea
and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa is particularly hopeful that the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended conflict between
northern and southern Sudan not collapse. From the perspective of
Ethiopia's security, maintaining peace in southern Sudan is more
important than ending the conflict in Darfur. Nevertheless, Ethiopia
has offered both helicopters and troops to the United Nations/African
Union peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This has ingratiated Ethiopia
with the United States and presumably with Sudan. Ethiopia has also
earned praise in Washington for supporting U.S. counterterrorism
efforts in the region.
Ethiopia has established a good working relationship with
Somaliland, which declared its independence from Somalia in 1991 but
has not been recognized by any country. Ethiopia's military
intervention in Somalia in 2006 at the request of Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been opposed by virtually all
Somalis except those aligned with the TFG. If Ethiopian troops left
Somalia tomorrow, however, the TFG would almost certainly collapse. The
leaders of most Somali groups opposing the TFG are in exile in Asmara,
Eritrea, where they formed the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia
(ARS) and receive support from Eritrea.
Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia has also led to increased
conflict in its Somali-inhabited Ogaden region in the southeastern part
of the country. There is strong evidence that Eritrea is supporting the
dissident Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in the Ogaden. The
withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia and the end of Eritrean
support for the ONLF would reduce, but not eliminate, conflict in the
Ogaden between ONLF and Ethiopian Government forces.
The situation in Somalia remains extremely volatile. The TFG has
limited support of Somalis, most of whom see the Ethiopians as an
occupying force. Almost 300,000 Somalis have fled the violence in
Mogadishu since last October, raising the total number who has left the
capital to about 700,000. A UNHCR representative commented at the end
of January that Somalia ``is the most pressing humanitarian emergency
in the world today--even worse than Darfur.'' The African Union force
is unable to take control of the situation in Mogadishu as a
replacement for Ethiopian troops. The U.N. is debating whether the
security situation even permits planning to send a U.N. peacekeeping
operation to replace the African Union force. An affirmative U.N.
decision, which does not seem likely anytime soon, would be followed by
many months of delay before the U.N. could mobilize such a force. In
the meantime, Somali animosity against the Ethiopians increases.
Two spoiler groups, which may have concluded it is in their
interest for conflict to continue, are also benefiting from the current
deadlock. The al-Shabaab militia, which once served as the muscle for
the Islamic Courts, is by most accounts gaining strength. Some key al-
Shabaab leaders now operate independently of the Islamic Courts while
others reportedly still follow its lead. Mogadishu's warlords, some of
whom now support the TFG, are notorious for switching sides or
operating completely independently when that serves their purpose.
Often backed by businessmen, some of them actually benefit financially
from continuing conflict. Neither they nor al-Shabaab can be counted on
to work for peace or to serve the broader interests of the Somali
people.
The positive development in this otherwise bleak analysis of
Somalia was the appointment in 2007 of Prime Minister Nur ``Adde''
Hassan Hussein by President Abdullahi Yusuf. Nur Adde has stated that
he supports a broad-based reconciliation process that takes into
account Islamists and clan-based factions that now oppose the TFG. He
said the TFG is ``ready to talk to those who are fighting in Mogadishu.
Nobody is exempted from negotiations.'' International envoys who have
met with Nur Adde believe he is sincere in reaching out to disaffected
Somali groups. There are still concerns, however, whether President
Abdullahi Yusuf is as committed to a reconciliation process with the
enemies of the TFG. Nor is it clear that the ARS is prepared to join a
government of national unity before the departure of all Ethiopian
troops. Such a precondition would result in even more chaos in
Mogadishu than exists now. Nur Adde has for the first time raised the
possibility of real accommodation with the TFG's opponents. A sequenced
departure of Ethiopian troops agreed upon by both the TFG and ARS
should not be ruled out.
The U.S. role in Somalia is focused primarily on countering
terrorism, although it deserves credit for providing significant
amounts of emergency assistance to Somalis through international and
nongovernmental organizations. So long as the U.S. effort in Somalia
remains essentially to capture and kill bad guys, and there are some in
Somalia, the United States marginalizes its ability to impact in a
positive way any long-term solution to the Somali problem. U.S. aerial
attacks against suspected high value terrorist targets inside Somalia
can be justified if there is a very high probability they are conducted
on the basis of accurate, up-to-the-minute intelligence. Going back
many years, however, the U.S. record for accurate intelligence in this
part of the world is, unfortunately, not very good. The United States
has conducted four aerial attacks inside Somalia since January 2007.
The most recent one occurred early in March. If there was any success
against high value targets as a result of these attacks, this
information has not become public knowledge. Anecdotal evidence
suggests the aerial attacks accomplished little. In the meantime, each
American attack only increases the anger of most Somalis toward the
United States, Ethiopia, and the TFG.
Developments in Eritrea present special challenges for U.S. policy.
The internal Eritrean situation leaves much to be desired. While
Ethiopia has had a long series of controversial elections, Eritrea has
not even had a national election since it became independent in 1993.
It is subject to growing criticism in the West for a concentration of
power around the Executive, a lack of press freedom, a faltering
economy, support for the Islamic Courts and opposition groups in
Somalia, and effectively ending the ability of the U.N. Mission to
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to operate in Eritrea. It supports a
number of organizations that are trying to destabilize the Government
in Ethiopia while Ethiopia provides sanctuary to Eritrean dissidents
who wish to do the same in Eritrea. On the other hand, for a country
that is approximately half Christian and half Muslim, it has managed to
preserve cordial relations between these two major religious groups.
Eritrea has good relations with neighboring Djibouti and Sudan and even
played the principal role in brokering a peace agreement between
dissident groups in eastern Sudan and the Government in Khartoum.
A close friend of the United States until the outbreak of conflict
with Ethiopia in 1998, relations between Washington and Asmara
subsequently steadily deteriorated. Eritrea has been particularly
frustrated by the inability of the United States to convince Ethiopia
to accept the 2002 ruling of the Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission.
This disagreement largely accounted for a series of decisions by Asmara
that have worsened the United States-Eritrea relationship. At one point
recently, there was even a suggestion in Washington that Eritrea might
be added to the list of states that support terrorism. This would have
been an unwise decision. It is more important to find ways, as
difficult as it will be, to encourage Eritrea to support initiatives
that improve peace and stability in the region.
MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO REGIONAL AND U.S. SECURITY
The most serious threats to the Horn of Africa, and indirectly
United States, security are in order of priority the continuing
violence in Somalia, a breakdown of the CPA in Sudan, the conflict in
Darfur, and a possible but unlikely resumption of conflict between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Other issues of concern are instability in
Ethiopia's Ogaden region, ethnic conflict in Kenya, opposition to the
EPRDF by the Oromo Liberation Front, continuing violence by Uganda's
Lord's Resistance Army, and a possible resumption of conflict in
eastern Sudan.
The situation in Somalia is particularly worrisome because the
country has effectively not been governed since the early 1990s. It has
attracted a number of movements that do not represent mainstream Somali
thought, including some affiliated with terrorism. The humanitarian
situation is worsening. The Somali conflict either impacts directly or
has drawn in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The United States
treats Somalia primarily as a counterterrorist threat and is especially
anxious to capture or kill three persons (all non-Somalis linked to al-
Qaeda and believed to have taken refuge in Somalia) who were involved
in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Even
if counterterrorism were not, a key to the U.S. agenda, Somalia would
pose a major threat to regional stability and, hence, American
interests in the Horn.
The United States played a significant, positive role in helping to
broker the CPA in Sudan and bring an end to the civil war. This was the
most significant political achievement of the Bush administration in
Africa. The international community and, at least until recently, the
United States have allowed the conflict in Darfur to monopolize their
collective energy while paying insufficient attention to a possible
breakdown of the CPA. As serious as the situation is in Darfur and its
negative impact on neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic,
the possible resumption of civil war between northern and southern
Sudan would have far greater negative implications for the Horn of
Africa. Consequently, it is critical that all parties, including the
United States refocus attention to assure the successful implementation
of the CPA and the avoidance of a return to war both between the north
and south and among rival southern factions.
The absence of normal relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea
contributes to instability in the region. When these two countries
resolve their differences and resume their important economic
relationship, all neighboring countries will benefit. I do not
subscribe to the school of thought that war is likely between Ethiopia
and Eritrea because of the failure to implement the border agreement. I
believe both countries have concluded that it is not in their interest
to initiate conflict, although both sides support groups that have
hostile intentions against the other. Any diminution in effectiveness
of the UNMEE operation increases slightly the possibility for conflict
along the border. Therefore, it is important, even as UNMEE is forced
to leave Eritrea, that it maintain a presence, however modest, on the
Ethiopian side of the border. Independent UNMEE observers would be in a
position to identify quickly and point the finger at whichever party
might initiate a border incursion.
ANALYSIS OF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THESE THREATS
Efforts by governments in the region to solve the problem in
Somalia, keep the CPA on track, and encourage a normalization of
relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are sometimes at counter
purposes with American objectives. The United States seeks stability in
the region and wants to mitigate or even eliminate the terrorist
threat. Regional governments do not necessarily share these priorities.
Eritrea and Ethiopia support each other's opposition groups; this does
not encourage stability. The TFG has been more interested in retaining
political power than encouraging reconciliation among all Somalis. It
is not even clear how committed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) and especially the Bashir government in Sudan are to
implementing the letter and spirit of the CPA. All governments in the
Horn give lip service to countering terrorism, but with the possible
exception of Ethiopia their support for this goal is not always
convincing.
For its part, the U.S. obsession with counterterrorism emphasizes
short-term objectives aimed at tracking down terrorists. It gives
insufficient attention to working with regional governments on
ameliorating the long-term root causes that lead to support for groups
that use terrorist tactics. Nor has there been a meeting of the minds
on what constitutes terrorism in the region. The United States is
primarily interested in international terrorism instigated by al-Qaeda
and groups affiliated with it like the now moribund al-Ittihad al-
Islami in Somalia. It is much less interested in terrorist tactics used
by local groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army, which is not
affiliated with al-Qaeda. Ethiopia, for example, ascribes terrorist
acts to groups such as the ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Front that are
not on the U.S. terrorist list. It should come as no surprise that
regional governments are more concerned with these groups that have a
domestic objective than they are with al-Qaeda.
All international and regional efforts since the early 1990s to
solve the Somali dilemma have failed, although not for lack of trying.
The United States essentially abandoned Somalia following the departure
of American troops in 1994 and the end of the U.N. peacekeeping
operation in 1995. It reengaged sporadically only after
9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan for fear that the Taliban might
move to Somalia. It became much more involved about 2 years ago as the
Islamic Courts began to assert authority in Mogadishu, but again with
an overwhelming focus on counterterrorism. The United States ill-
advisedly supported an alliance of warlords in Mogadishu that led
directly to a military victory by the Islamic Courts. Ethiopian
military intervention, at some point encouraged by the United States,
resulted in the defeat of the Islamic Courts, but did not contribute to
a solution that allowed Somalia to establish a government that has the
support of most Somalis. From the standpoint of regional stability, the
situation in Somalia today is no better, and arguably worse, than
during the period of control by the Islamic Courts.
Sudan's CPA nearly collapsed in 2007 when the SPLM withdrew its
representatives from the government of national unity. This occurred at
a time when the international community was far more engaged in the
situation in Darfur. Fortunately, the SPLM and the Bashir government
resolved their differences. The CPA is back on track but remains in a
highly fragile state. In recent months, the United States appears
appropriately to be giving this issue greater high-level attention.
Ethiopia is also taking steps that encourage peace and stability
between northern and southern Sudan.
Since the outbreak of conflict in 1998 between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, the United States worked hard to end the war and made
considerable effort to convince both countries to normalize their
relations. The major stumbling block has been the unwillingness of
Ethiopia to implement the decision of the Boundary Commission. Eritrea
has not helped its case by taking a series of steps aimed at
destabilizing Ethiopia. The international community, including the
United States, seems to have concluded in the past year that there is
little it can do to resolve the impasse.
U.S. LEVERAGE AND RESOURCES
Of the major challenges facing the United States in the Horn, it
probably has the most leverage with Somalia's TFG. Although total
American assistance to Somalia is modest and not likely to influence
the TFG, its political leverage should be enormous. The TFG is heavily
dependent on Ethiopia and the United States for its very survival. If
the TFG chooses to ignore advice from Ethiopia and the United States,
it does so at its peril. The United States has also worked hard to
stand up the African Union force to replace the Ethiopians in Somalia.
The United States has brought substantial financial resources to
bear in Sudan for both implementing the CPA and alleviating suffering
in Darfur. It expended considerable political capital in helping to
achieve the CPA, but has been much less successful in resolving the
conflict in Darfur. The United States has far better relations with the
SPLM than it has with the Bashir government, with whom relations are
strained. The rocky relationship with Khartoum limits U.S. leverage to
effect policy change in Darfur or to ensure implementation of the CPA.
The United States provides Ethiopia substantial assistance,
although most of it in recent years has been emergency aid and support
to counter HIV/AIDS. Washington also has a close working relationship
with Addis Ababa. In theory, therefore, the United States has
considerable leverage with the Meles government. At the same time, the
close relations with Ethiopia have contributed directly to a worsening
of relations with Eritrea. The Isaias government accuses Washington of
favoring Ethiopia on the border question. As a consequence, it asked
the USAID mission to leave Eritrea. Washington has virtually no
leverage with Eritrea. But even in the case of Ethiopia, leverage is a
relative concept. The leaderships in both Ethiopia and Eritrea since
they assumed power in their respective countries in 1991 are notably
resistant to outside pressure even when large amounts of assistance are
at stake. Both Meles and Isaias will change positions on a policy only
after they have concluded it is in the long-term interest of their
respective governments.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Taking the above analysis into account and as requested in the
invitation to testify, I suggest the following recommendations for ways
the United States can contribute to security, stability, growth, and
democracy in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. I have purposely omitted
many desirable recommendations that are hopelessly unrealistic or
beyond the ability of the United States to implement because of its
limited leverage in one or more of the three countries.
Work closely with Ethiopia to encourage the TFG to create a
government of national unity that includes moderates from the
ARS and from subclans in Mogadishu who currently oppose the
TFG.
Consult closely with the Somalia ``Contact Group'' and ask
its members to follow the same approach with the TFG.
Ask the Arab League and its member governments to encourage
the ARS to engage without preconditions in power-sharing talks
with the TFG.
Encourage governments that have good relations with Eritrea
to follow the same approach with Eritrea vis-a-vis the ARS.
If a government of national unity that is widely accepted by
the Somali people actually materializes, be prepared quickly to
mobilize a significant amount of development assistance for
Somalia.
Likewise, push the wealthier Arab countries to make major
contributions to Somalia's development.
As security improves in Somalia, work with Ethiopia and the
TFG to design a quick, sequenced departure of Ethiopian forces
from Somalia so as to encourage broader Somali support for a
new government of national unity.
On a contingency basis, request the U.N. to draw up plans
for a peacekeeping operation that would replace the small
African Union presence and would actually keep the peace rather
than try to separate warring factions.
Be prepared to offer substantial logistical support for
standing up a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
Make a concerted effort to reach out to the Somali diaspora
in the United States to solicit ways it can help to bring peace
and stability to Somalia.
Help Ethiopia and Eritrea identify confidence-building
measures that may eventually lead to Ethiopian acceptance of
the Boundary Commission's decision followed by practical
adjustments along the border that are acceptable to both
countries.
Encourage both Ethiopia and Eritrea to end support for
groups whose goal is to destabilize the situation in the
other's country.
Following the departure of UNMEE from Eritrea, insist that
it maintain observers inside Ethiopia along the border so that
it can assign blame for any military incursion across the
Ethiopian-Eritrean frontier.
If requested by the U.N., assign a significant number of
U.S. personnel to this effort, certainly more than the tiny
number that has participated in UNMEE.
Continue and even increase the high-level attention devoted
to ensuring implementation of the CPA in Sudan.
Initiate a working group of government and nongovernment
experts from the Horn, a few European and Arab countries, and
China to identify and suggest solutions for the root causes of
both domestic and international terrorism in the region.
Put front and center counterterrorism programs that mitigate
the root causes of terrorism and the environment in the Horn
that sustains both domestic terrorists and those coming from
outside the region.
Engage governments in the region on their responsibility to
reduce social and economic inequality and political
marginalization as important ways to reduce both conflict and
support for terrorist groups.
Engage governments and groups inside and outside the region
to end their support for religious ideology of whatever
persuasion that expressly encourages intolerance.
Increase support for democracy, good governance, and
anticorruption programs in Ethiopia and be prepared to initiate
funding for such programs in Somalia and Eritrea when the
situation permits.
Provide additional funding for basic education programs,
especially in the Somali language, conducted over the radio and
which also contain useful civic lessons that include
encouragement of religious and ethnic tolerance.
Identify and, where desired by host governments, fund
programs, even on a pilot basis that help reduce youth
unemployment.
Senator Feingold. Well, thank you so much, Doctor, for that
information and testimony.
Colonel Dempsey.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL THOMAS DEMPSEY, USA (RET.), PROFESSOR,
PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMY WAR
COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA
Colonel Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me
to participate in the hearing. The views I'm about to offer are
my own.
I suggested almost 2 years ago that the U.S. response to
terrorist hubs operating in African failed states, like
Somalia, had been less than adequate. I noted that military
strikes, which target terrorists directly, have enjoyed few
successes in failed states, and that they tended to legitimate
terrorist groups by providing them combatant status under the
Geneva Convention.
I also noted that law enforcement efforts have likewise
enjoyed few successes in places like Somalia, largely because
law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to access and
operate in those very violent and austere environments.
Integrating U.S. military capabilities and U.S. law
enforcement, I suggested, offered a more effective strategy for
countering terrorist in the kind of volatile environments that
confront us in the Horn.
The military forces can establish access to failed states
and ungoverned spaces for law enforcement agencies, carve out a
secure environment for those agencies to carry out their core
function of identifying and apprehending terrorist suspects. I
also suggested that once those suspects were apprehended, they
ought to be delivered to an appropriate criminal justice
system, discrediting their activities through public trials
that shine the light of international scrutiny on their
terrorist acts and the consequences of those acts.
In the 2 years since that study was published, I think
events have borne out several of my original conclusions. As we
have heard here today, failed states like Somalia continue to
provide venues for terrorism. Our continued dependence upon
military strikes has yielded a few tactical successes, but I
would argue that the strikes have generated significant levels
of controversy, skepticism, and outright mistrust among many of
our key partners, especially within the AFRICOM AOR.
The collateral damage, including the loss of innocent
civilian lives, which are an unavoidable consequence of
military strikes, no matter how carefully planned or carried
out, threatens to undermine the moral authority of our
counterterrorism campaigns, and arguably contributes to the
ongoing recruitment by the terrorists themselves.
On the positive side, however, the past 2 years have seen
some significant progress in fostering cooperation and synergy
between military and law enforcement agencies in the Africa
region. Developments on the American side, like the
promulgation of NSPD-44, the establishment of SCRS, the
issuance of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, and the
emergence of whole-of-government approaches to stabilization
and reconstruction that those initiatives represent--promoting
rule of law and good governance, strengthening accountability
mechanisms, supporting democratic processes--I would suggest to
offer an opportunity to both implement an alternative strategy,
combining military and law enforcement capabilities, and also
offer an opportunity to improve our strategies across a broad
range of agendas and objectives in the region.
I'd note that especially in--and I'd add, this is not a
pipe dream. This process is already underway in West Africa,
and you can see significant progress in helping the northern
tier of ECOWAS states deal with exactly these kinds of
problems, and in the comprehensive security sector reform and
governance programs that we can see being implemented today in
Sierra Leone and Liberia.
And especially encouraging development in this respect is
the emergence of U.N. Integrated Missions as a key player in
stabilization and reconstruction efforts. These U.N. Integrated
Missions offer a vehicle for undertaking the transformative
reconstruction of the security sector. It's really necessary
for the recovery of states that have failed completely, as is
the case in Somalia, and can provide a means of pursuing an
effective set of counterterrorism strategies.
In that context, I would suggest that in Somalia, a quick
transition from African Union Forces to a full-fledged
integrated U.N. Mission could provide a key to jumpstarting a
recovery process that will ultimately support counterterrorism
initiatives, as well as broader governance and security agendas
that Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan and Assistant Secretary
Frazer discussed earlier today.
Thank you for the opportunity. I would ask that the full
text of my statement be entered into the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Dempsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colonel Thomas A. Dempsey, U.S. Army (Ret.),
Professor, Security Sector Reform, Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
I thank the subcommittee and Chairman Feingold for inviting me to
participate in this hearing. I have been asked to discuss recent
developments in the Horn of Africa and their implications for U.S.
military and counterterrorism policy toward this region over the past 2
years. I will also offer some comments regarding our efforts to improve
regional security capacity more generally in this volatile area of the
world. The views that I offer are my own, as an academic and former
practitioner in African security affairs, and are not intended to be a
statement on behalf of the United States Army, the Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute, or the current administration.
COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
I suggested almost 2 years ago that the U.S. response to terrorist
hubs operating in African failed states, like Somalia, had been less
than adequate. I noted that military strikes which target terrorists
directly have enjoyed few successes in failed states, and have tended
to legitimate terrorist groups by providing them combatant status under
the Geneva Convention. Law enforcement efforts have likewise enjoyed
few successes in failed states, as civilian law enforcement agencies
lack the capacity to penetrate or operate effectively in the violent
environments presented by countries like Somalia. Security assistance
programs, while enjoying some remarkable successes elsewhere on the
African Continent, require partnering with host nation security
institutions that are simply not present in those areas of the Horn at
greatest risk. While attempts to address the root causes of terrorism
may offer an effective counterterrorism strategy, such efforts require
extended periods of time in order to show results--time which appears
to be running short in the case of the Horn.
I argued in my original study of this topic that better integrating
the efforts of the U.S. foreign intelligence community with U.S.
military capabilities and U.S. law enforcement offers a more effective
strategy for countering terrorist hubs operating in failed states and
ungoverned spaces like those that confront us in the Horn of Africa.
The foreign intelligence community is best equipped to identify
terrorist hubs operating in these areas which may be developing global
reach and directly threatening U.S. national interests. Once those
threats have been identified, a synthesis of expeditionary military
forces and civilian law enforcement agencies will be far more effective
in dealing with the terrorist hubs than either element can be while
operating independently. The military forces establish access to failed
states and ungoverned spaces for law enforcement officers, and carve
out a secure environment for those officers to perform their core
function of indentifying, locating, and apprehending criminal, in this
case terrorist, suspects.
Dealing effectively with terrorist groups and activities requires
more than just taking them into custody, however. Once terrorists have
been located, identified, and apprehended, they must be screened to
assure that they are, indeed, the terrorist suspects that the
apprehending officers believe them to be, a task that I suggested was
appropriate to a properly constituted and administered military
tribunal, which could be provided by the supporting military force.
Individuals whose status as a terrorist suspect is confirmed would then
be delivered to an appropriate criminal justice system, whether
national or international, for arraignment and trial. This strategy
would avoid the legitimizing effect of treating terrorists as military
targets, while discrediting their activities through public trials that
shine the light of international scrutiny on their terrorist acts.
In the 2 years since that study was published, I believe that
events have borne out several of my original conclusions. Failed states
and ungoverned spaces have continued to provide platforms for terrorist
recruiting and operational planning, as events in Somalia have
demonstrated. Our continued dependence upon military strikes as our
primary approach to counterterrorism has yielded a few tactical
successes, but has yet to demonstrate any long-term impact at the
operational or strategic levels. Those strikes have, however, generated
significant levels of controversy, skepticism, and outright mistrust
among many of our key partners, especially within the AFRICOM AOR. The
collateral damage, including loss of innocent civilian lives, which is
an unavoidable consequence of military strikes, no matter how carefully
or surgically delivered, threatens to undermine the moral authority of
our counterterrorism efforts and arguably contributes to the ongoing
recruitment efforts of the terrorist groups themselves. This is
particularly problematic in a country like Somalia, where clan politics
and the complex web of alliances and obligations among dia-paying
groups lend unexpected consequences to the exercise of lethal force.
On the positive side, however, the past 2 years have seen some
significant progress in fostering cooperation and synergy between
military and law enforcement communities in the Africa region,
including the Horn. Several developments on the American side have
contributed to this progress, most notably the promulgation of NSPD-44,
the establishment of the Office of the Department of State Coordinator
for Stabilization and Reconstruction, and issuance of Department of
Defense Directive 3000.05, which established stability operations as a
core mission of U.S. military forces. The emergence of whole-of-
government approaches to stabilization and reconstruction, both within
the U.S. Government and among its international partners, is
transforming strategies for dealing with transnational problems like
terrorism and drug trafficking in failed states and ungoverned spaces.
This transformation opens the door to pursuing an alternative
counterterrorism strategy that leverages both military and law
enforcement core competencies to identify, apprehend, and convict the
planners and perpetrators of terrorist acts. The emergence of security
sector reform as an effective tool of state, subregional, regional and
international capacity-building can facilitate and support the pursuit
of such alternative strategies.
IMPROVING SECURITY CAPACITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
The same developments that offer opportunities to enhance regional
counterterrorism strategies promise to enhance the building of security
capacity in the subregion more generally. Integrated strategies that
address capacity-building in a comprehensive way have the potential to
fundamentally recast the security environment in the Horn. Promoting
rule of law and good governance, to include strengthening
accountability mechanisms and supporting democratic processes, can lay
the foundation for a broader and more durable concept of subregional
security. This is not a pipe dream: The process is already underway in
West Africa, embodied in the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Management
and its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and clearly evident
in the comprehensive governance and security sector reform programs
underway in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
An especially encouraging development in this respect is the
emergence of the U.N. Integrated Mission as a key player in
stabilization and reconstruction efforts. U.N. Integrated Missions, the
best examples of which are currently in Liberia and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, provide a comprehensive framework within which
partners, to include the U.S., can develop and implement a complete
restructuring of the security environment in collaboration with the
host nation. An Integrated Mission can provide levels of resourcing and
oversight that are not available from any other source, and can offer a
vehicle for undertaking the massive, transformative reconstruction of
the security sector that is necessary to the recovery of states that
have failed as completely, as was the case in Liberia, and continues to
be the case in Somalia.
The rapid recovery currently underway in Liberia demonstrates
clearly the potential of even the most devastated area to restore
legitimate, functional governance, once a genuinely secure environment
is created for the host nation and its partners to undertake
reconstruction activities. In the context of Somalia, a quick
transition from African Union forces to a full-fledged, Integrated U.N.
Mission is the key to jump-starting a recovery process that will
ultimately support counterterrorism initiatives as well as broader
governance and security agendas. U.S. support to such a mission in a
whole-of-government approach orchestrated through the mechanisms
currently being developed by the U.S. interagency, under the leadership
of S/CRS, can provide critical mass to this effort. Active involvement
of AFRICOM, the new Unified Command for Africa, can also contribute
significantly to helping U.S. agencies focus effectively on a broader
security agenda in the Horn. Such an agenda, while it cannot neglect
the other major issues confronting the subregion, must center, first
and foremost, on addressing the ongoing challenges posed by the
situation in Somalia.
Senator Feingold. Colonel, thank you for your candid and
thoughtful testimony. In fact, thanks to all three of you for
being able to do that in a rather brief period of time. I know
it was a little rushed, so thank you. And now I will just ask a
few questions.
Ms. Fredriksson, you suggest that the United States should
help alleviate Eritrea's dire humanitarian situation. What kind
of assistance do you think would be most effective? And given
that the Eritrean Government has banished USAID from the
country, how could this assistance best be provided and
monitored?
Ms. Fredriksson. Well, I think there are three different
ways to approach this. One would be through our international
agency partners, through bilateral partnerships, and others who
have an ongoing relationship with the Government of Eritrea to
encourage further assistance through those bodies.
Another would be to consider options as to what we could
provide without a presence physically on the ground.
And, in addition to that, I think the specific type of
assistance most desperately needed at this time is assistance
to IDPs and refugees along the border.
And I hope that that actually--consideration, serious
consideration, by the administration of that need would improve
to some degree the dialog that is at the moment pretty minimal.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Fredriksson, the U.N. Arms Embargo in
Somalia is clearly failing. Can you provide the committee with
some analysis of why this embargo is failing? And what can be
done to strengthen and enforce it?
Ms. Fredriksson. Thank you, Senator. I am very glad to
provide some thoughts on that.
Currently, there is no enforcement mechanism for the U.N.
Arms Embargo. There is a free flow of arms into Somalia from
several different directions and several different funding
sources. Some of those funding sources, according to our local
partners, come through the UAE, through Saudi Arabia, through
Kuwait, and other places.
As you know, Eritrea has been accused of being one of the
direct sources of arms transfers, as have Somalis based in
Eritrea. And beyond that, the conditions on the ground are such
that we're seeing an increase in the market flow through
Bakara, which is now split into three or four or five different
markets, and this is ammunitions, this is small arms, and this
is heavy arms.
So the answer that I would like to suggest is that we
consider, first of all, that no specific exemptions have
actually been requested to the Arms Embargo and to make that
process a stronger one.
And, in addition to that, to look at means by which we
could consider bans which have worked in other countries in
Africa at different times on individuals, companies, or
countries which are believed to have been providers.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Ambassador Shinn, looking
ahead to next month's bielections and local polls throughout
Ethiopia, what do you see as the best- and worst-case
scenarios? And what can the United States and the broader
international community do to encourage a positive outcome? And
what measures should be taken in the event of a worst-case
scenario?
Ambassador Shinn. The elections are scheduled for April, so
they're coming very quickly. Unfortunately, at this late date,
there's relatively little that can be done to make them more
successful. They've already been postponed a number of times.
They were to have taken place about 2 years ago.
The likely outcome is a rather a tepid outcome that will
simply not allow a great deal of contestation by opposition
groups. And that, in my view, will be unfortunate; essentially,
a missed opportunity. There probably are a lot of players to
blame for that, including some of the opposition themselves,
for not having either the ability or the capacity to mount a
real serious threat to the EPRDF in terms of going to the
ballot box.
But part of it also certainly lies with the government,
where it's made life very difficult for the opposition to
function in Ethiopia. And it's just a shame, because the local
elections are actually very important in the Ethiopian context.
And it should be an opportunity for progress on
democratization.
My fear is that it's not really going to change anything
one way or the other; it will be a continuation of the same.
Senator Feingold. Colonel, the threats emanating from the
Horn of Africa are real and need to be addressed properly, as
you indicated. You mentioned in your testimony the importance
of integrating foreign intelligence with military capabilities,
but what about other elements of national power, like foreign
and development assistance, or diplomatic engagement? How do
these elements fit into the framework that you've delineated?
Colonel Dempsey. Thank you for the question, sir. They fit
very clearly into that format. The challenge of addressing
counterterrorism is one of trying to address it in an
environment where the accompanying government structures to
support it aren't present.
And one of the keys to establishing those frameworks is a
robust approach involving all agencies--not just of the U.S.
Government, but of our inner-governmental partners, of our
bilateral partners--so that we have a comprehensive approach,
rather than trying to solve this a piece at a time.
As I suggested in my testimony, the best vehicle that I can
see for doing that is a U.N. Integrated Mission. It has the
robustness, it offers a comprehensive framework in which all of
the agencies of the U.S. Government that have a piece of this,
can engage, engage effectively, and engage with a very high
level of legitimacy.
But going back to my original thesis, I would say the key
here is addressing counterterrorism in a law enforcement
context. Military capabilities can facilitate and support them.
Senator Feingold. Finally, Colonel, what role do you see
for the new U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, furthering the
United States security agenda in the Horn of Africa? What do
you think this new Command should and should not be responsible
for? And how should it collaborate with the existing programs
like CJTF-HOA?
Colonel Dempsey. I would suggest, sir, that there are two
areas in which AFRICOM can be especially supportive of our
agenda in places like the Horn of Africa.
First, AFRICOM will bring to the table a focus on African
issues in advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
advising members of Congress. That is not distracted by
responsibilities for other areas of the world. The AFRICOM
Commander will not have to balance in his own mind how
important his African concerns are with his European concerns
or with his Middle Eastern concerns. That's the significant--
that's significant progress that I think very important.
Second, as AFRICOM has been presented by the Department of
Defense, it seeks, I think sincerely, a much more collaborative
role with nonmilitary and non-OSD players in this arena. And my
hope is that AFRICOM, as it emerges, will include a robust
component from agencies like the Department of State, like
USAID, like Department of Justice, that will be able to
coordinate one of the second major shortfalls that I see, and
that is a lack of resolution on exactly how the U.S. military
can best support these other agencies in carrying out those
duties.
And we listened to that earlier today when we heard the
difficulties the Department of State and USAID are having in
accessing the Ogaden and finding out exactly what's going on
there.
The U.S. military can do for those other agencies exactly
what I suggest it can do for law enforcement. It can provide
access, it can carve out a secure space, it can provide support
for those agencies to fulfill their functions in very, very
difficult, violent, and austere conditions.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Well, you've articulated both
the reasons why I've supported the general idea of AFRICOM, and
the need to have concentrated focus on Africa, but also you've
alluded to some of the real concerns I have about the new
command.
I have a chance in the last couple of weeks to speak
directly to both the President of the United States and the
Secretary of State about this issue. And I know that the
President heard concerns when he was in Africa about this. This
is an opportunity to get something right, but it is very
complicated and requires a long-term view.
I want to thank again this panel and I also want to thank
everyone in the audience and everyone who would be reviewing
the record of this. I hope that this hearing demonstrates,
again, how seriously this committee takes this part of the
world and how seriously we intend to follow the events there
and give it the attention it deserves.
I thank you and this adjourns the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]