    [Senate Hearing 110-627]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 110-627

                 U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN POST-ELECTION PAKISTAN

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 28, 2008

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                                   index.html

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                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
    RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
    BARBARA BOXER, California            BOB CORKER, Tennessee
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    BARACK OBAMA, Illinois               LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
    ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
    BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
    ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
                       Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
                Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
      statement......................................................     1
    Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
      statement......................................................     5
    Negroponte, Hon. John D., Deputy Secretary of State, Department
      of State, Washington, DC.......................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     8
        Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
          Russell Feingold...........................................    43

                       Material Submitted for the Record

    Barrasso, John, U.S. Senator from Wyoming, prepared statement....    32
    Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, articles
      submitted:
        Pakistani Military ``Misspent up to 70% of American Aid''--
          from The Guardian, Feb. 28, 2008...........................    45
        CRS Report for Congress, ``Pakistan's 2008 Elections: Results
          and Implications for U.S. Policy''--April 9, 2008..........    48
        Executive Summary from ``Terror-Free Tomorrow: The Center for
          Public Opinion''...........................................    69
        ``Musharraf: Pakistan Isn't Hunting Usama''--from
          FOXNews.com, Jan. 23, 2008.................................    71
    Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, prepared
      statement......................................................    42

                                     (iii)

                 U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN POST-ELECTION PAKISTAN

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
    Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
    Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Isakson, and
    Barrasso.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

        The Chairman. Hearing will come to order.
        Welcome, Secretary. Appreciate having you here.
        I'm going to make a brief opening statement, then turn it
    over to my colleague Chairman Lugar, and then we'll begin to
    move.
        And I say good morning to my colleagues.
        Ten days ago, Pakistan--in Pakistan, three members of this
    committee witnessed a truly extraordinary thing; and the world
    observed, I think, an outcome that was better than anyone
    really had anticipated, at least in my perspective. People went
    to the polls and overwhelmingly cast their votes for democracy,
    moderation, and the rule of law. It's not merely that the party
    of President Musharraf was clearly, clearly outvoted by the two
    major competing parties, but there was--well, the least noted
    outcome election was, the religious party suffered serious
    losses, which I think was a significant, significant expression
    of the will of the people of Pakistan.
        Senator Kerry, Senator Hagel, and I were privileged to
    observe this election. We met with a wide cross-section of
    Pakistanis, in and out of government. We met with the leaders
    of the three largest political parties, two of whom are
    expected to form the coalition that leads Pakistan to its first
    truly civilian government in nearly a decade.
        We met with the wife of the imprisoned leader of the
    lawyers' movement, a brave woman carrying the message of those
    judges and attorneys who were arrested for the crime of
    practicing law. We met with Pakistani journalists, human rights
    advocates, and other members of the civil--of civil society,
    many of whom had faced detention and physical intimidation in
    recent months.
        And we were the first foreign visitors to meet with
    President Musharraf the day after the election, relatively
    early that morning. He promised to honor the message delivered
    by the Pakistani people, and, quite frankly, he was--there was
    a bit of nobility in the way he addressed us. He walked into
    the room, said, ``The people have spoken,'' and he would abide
    by the judgment. And when asked about issues relating to the
    Supreme Court and other contentious issues, he said, ``That
    will be for the Parliament to decide,'' and he indicated that
    he was willing to--my phrase, not his--step back into the roles
    of the President, as opposed to the Prime Minister. And, under
    the Constitution, as all my colleagues know, the vast power
    under that Constitution is in the hands of the Prime Minister,
    not the President. It was encouraging, to say the least. And I
    take him at his word, and I hope the administration will hold
    him to his word.
        The Pakistani people have expressed a very clear vision for
    what they want their nation to look like: Moderate, democratic,
    grounded in the rule of law, with leaders who provide good
    governance and the basic necessities for all citizens of
    Pakistan.
        It's in America's vital national interest, to say the
    least, to help Pakistan make this admirable vision a reality
    and this transition smooth. Why? Well, because Pakistan, along
    with its neighbor, Afghanistan, could provide the ballast of
    moderation to stabilize the Muslim world in that part of the
    world, or it can become the generator of violent radicalism
    that would directly threaten our own security, as well as the
    security of the people in the region.
        The Afghan-Pakistan border region is where the 9/11 attacks
    were plotted, it's where most attacks in Europe since 9/11 have
    originated. It's where Osama bin Laden lives and his top
    confederates enjoy safe haven, planning new attacks. And it's
    where we must urgently, in my view, shift our focus to the real
    central front on the so-called war on terrorism, using the
    totality of American strength, not merely our military, which
    is incredible. I know all of you have traveled abroad in the
    last 3 or 4 years, seeing these kids, the stuff they're doing,
    the authority they're given--young captains, a young Navy
    commander out in a PRT; it's astounding, the authority he has
    and the judgment he's exercised. I sat down, Dick, and he laid
    out for us--I literally--I'm not being facetious--I could have
    been in a graduate class at one of the great universities--he
    explained the tribal allegiances, the history of the tribes,
    the way in which they function. I mean, these kids--these guys
    and women, they are truly, truly, truly amazing. And I'm not
    being solicitous. It really is a great, great asset we have.
    But, it is not the totality of the U.S. arsenal, and it's not--
    but it's been relied upon more than any other part of our
    arsenal. Our ideas matter, too.
        The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in my
    view, remains a freeway for fundamentalism, with the Taliban
    and
    al-Qaeda now finding sanctuary on the Pakistani side, and where
    suicide bombers they recruit and train wreak havoc upon
    Afghanistan and, I predict, increasingly, within Pakistan.
        Pakistan's cooperation in the fight against extremism is
    critical to our success in Afghanistan, but that cooperation
    has been, in my view, sporadic, at best. The reason is that,
    until recently, the terrorists we were fighting and the
    extremists the Pakistanis fear, in my view, are not one and the
    same. Islamabad's main concern is the indigenous militants in
    the Federally Administered Tribal Areas--Mr. Mehsud, in
    particular. Success of Pakistani Governments have taken turns
    fighting them, appeasing them, playing one militant group
    against the other, or using them to make trouble in Kashmir, on
    its eastern border, or in Afghanistan, on its western border.
        This different focus, the Pakistanis, versus our focus on
    al-Qaeda, in particular, and Taliban, second, I think, is a
    reason for some of the disconnect that has existed, in terms of
    how we view, ``the war on terror'' in that region. This
    different focus is why, in my view, President Musharraf decided
    to divert Pakistani resources from fighting al-Qaeda and the
    Taliban to keeping his political opponents at bay. It's why, in
    my view, when Musharraf concluded that we were not serious
    about finishing the job in Afghanistan--and that's not a knock
    on the military, that's a judgment that some of us have made, 5
    years ago, when we diverted resources badly needed in
    Afghanistan to Iraq and left, in my view, Afghanistan somewhat
    bereft of the needed resources in order to conduct this war.
    And Musharraf, in my view, observed that. And, as I said to
    General Musharraf and others--my first visit to Afghanistan,
    over 6 years ago, I remember meeting with a British two-star,
    and I asked the British two-star, I said, ``How long will your
    Parliament allow you to stay?'' And he said ``We Brits have an
    expression, Senator, as long as the big dog is in the pen, the
    small dog will stay; when the big dog leaves, the small dogs
    will, too.'' The big dog left Afghanistan. America left
    Afghanistan, in terms of what was really needed in Afghanistan,
    in my view. And I believe that generated a conclusion on the
    part of Mr. Musharraf that we weren't likely to finish the job
    in Afghanistan, and he began to cut his own deals with
    extremists in Pakistan. It's why, in my view, Pakistan could
    concentrate most of its military might on the Indian border,
    not on the Afghan border. It's why the Pakistani people have
    not supported, based on their polling data, what we call--what
    we call the ``war on terror'' in that region.
        But, now the monster that Pakistan's intelligence service
    helped create is turning on its master. Today's enemy No. 1 is
    Baitullah Mehsud--an indigenous militant--who is taking the
    fight beyond the FATA, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
    in the mountains, and is likely behind the assassination of
    Benazir Bhutto. Mehsud is independent of the Afghan Taliban and
    the al-Qaeda in Pakistan, but he is giving them sanctuary, and
    they are helping train his forces. As Islamabad awakens to this
    new reality, I think there's an opportunity to put Pakistan and
    Afghanistan and the United States on the same strategic page.
        Some argue that, imperfect as Musharraf has been, the
    civilian leaders of last week's elections return to power will
    be even worse partners in fighting terrorism and fostering real
    progress in Pakistan. I disagree, if we change our policy.
        For Pakistan, nothing is more important than giving the
    moderate majority a clear voice and a stake in the system, in
    my view, and that's what the election was about, in my view.
    Without that, dissent gets channeled underground and, over
    time, moderates make common cause with extremists. We've been
    down that road before, in my view. It's not absolutely
    analogous, but it's similar. We went down that road in Iran.
    And it leads to nowhere. Nowhere good.
        With this election, the moderate majority has regained its
    voice. The United States should seize the moment to move from a
    policy based on a personality--Mr. Musharraf--to one based on
    an entire country--Pakistan. I believe we should, first of all,
    triple nonmilitary assistance--and, to put it in perspective,
    nonmilitary assistance is roughly $500 million a year now--
    triple nonmilitary assistance, and make it clear we plan on
    sustaining that for a decade. This aid should be focused on
    schools, roads, and clinics, and expanding development in the
    tribal areas.
        Second, we should give the new government, once it's
    formed--if it is formed consistent with democratic principles
    and it is a transition that we expect--a democracy dividend of
    $1 billion in annual assistance to jump-start its progress.
        Third, we should demand transparency and accountability in
    the military aid we continue to provide. It's one of the things
    I want to talk to you about, Mr. Secretary.
        At the same time, we have to recognize that, even as
    Pakistan develops the will, it still lacks the capacity. One of
    the things we came away with--not speaking for my colleagues--
    but, one of the things I came away with was, notwithstanding,
    whether or not the Pakistani military and the political
    establishment had the will to take on extremists in the FATA
    and in the territories, it does not have the capacity--it does
    not have the capacity to do it. And so, at the same time, as I
    said, we have to recognize and help develop the will, we have
    to help them with their capacity, which is a complicated
    process, I acknowledge.
        Its military is designed to fight a conventional war with
    India, not to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the
    tribal areas. So, we should make it a priority, as our military
    is attempting to do, to help train Pakistan in--to reorganize
    its military, not in its entirety, but to reorganize its
    military to be better suited to deal with those very areas.
        Last, in my view, we should engage the Pakistanis on issues
    important to them, rather than just those important to us. For
    the last three decades that I've been here, the fact is that
    our relations with Pakistan has been basically transactional,
    and that's how the Pakistanis view it and understand it. And I
    believe they wonder--that moderate majority wonders whether or
    not we are looking for a long-term relationship based on mutual
    interests. I think we have to demonstrate to the people of
    Pakistan that ours is a partnership of mutual conviction, not
    merely of American convenience, that we care about their needs
    and progress, not just our own interests, narrowly defined.
    That happens to be, in my view, the best way to support--to
    secure the support of the Pakistani people and their
    democratic-elected leaders, for our priorities, starting with
    the fight against al-Qaeda and the fight for Afghanistan.
        Our witness today is one of the most eminent members of the
    administration. He is Deputy Secretary of State John
    Negroponte, who has taken on challenges as diverse as serving
    as Ambassador to Iraq, to the National--to Director of National
    Intelligence.
        Mr. Ambassador, welcome. It's a delight to have you here.
        And let me now yield to Chairman Lugar for his opening
    statement.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

        Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
    I congratulate you and Senator Hagel, Senator Kerry, on,
    really, an extraordinary mission of observing the election,
    but, beyond that, your advocacy, as represented in your
    statement this morning.
        I join you in welcoming our friend, John Negroponte.
        Pakistan has long been one of the most strategically
    important nations to the United States. Its efforts against
    terrorism within its borders, its stewardship of its own
    nuclear arsenal, its relations with other nations in the
    region, are truly critical to global security.
        The situation in Pakistan is more positive than many of us
    had anticipated before the recent election. Although the
    election campaign and the voting had a number of serious
    problems, I share the assessment that the outcome at least
    broadly represents the will of the Pakistani people.
        The election appears to have restored a rough balance of
    power in the country, with the party of the late Benazir
    Bhutto, the Pakistan People's Party, the party of former Prime
    Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistan Muslim League, each winning
    a large number of parliamentary seats. The parties have agreed
    to join together to form a government. And the supporters of
    President Musharraf did not fare well.
        Equally important, the voters in the North West Frontier
    Province repudiated extremism by voting out the fundamentalist
    religious parties who came to power in 2002, replacing them
    with the secular opposition. This is a return to normalcy in
    that area, and, I hope, a sign that Pakistanis will
    increasingly reject the extremism that poses as much a threat
    to their interest as it does to the United States interest in
    the region.
        These changes provide an opportunity for the United States
    to recalibrate its policy toward Pakistan. The Bush
    administration has been criticized, in Pakistan and by some in
    this country, for focusing his policies too narrowly on
    President Musharraf, who siezed power in a coup, refused to
    respect democratic institutions and the judiciary, and only
    very recently resigned his post as leader of the military. The
    administration should broaden its scope and engage with the new
    political actors on stage, and reach out to the general public
    of Pakistan.
        If Pakistan is to break its debilitating cycle of
    instability, it will need to achieve progress on fighting
    corruption, delivering government services, promoting broad-
    based economic growth. The international community and the
    United States should support reforms and contribute to the
    strengthening of Pakistani civilian institutions. And I commend
    the chairman for his specific suggestions as to how that might
    be implemented.
        Part of our recalibration should involve revisiting the
    issue of foreign assistance, in particular. We should carefully
    reconsider both the amounts we are providing and the goals we
    are hoping to achieve in Pakistan. Establishing reconstruction
    opportunity zones in frontier regions, continued investment in
    important sectors, such as education, and efforts to
    restructure our military assistance in Pakistan, are all steps
    in the right direction.
        More immediately, the United States could demonstrate its
    regard for the rule of law by encouraging the new government to
    reverse or rescind the actions against the media and judiciary
    that were taken during the state of emergency last year. The
    United States previous reluctance to press President Musharraf
    on these matters has fueled doubts within Pakistan about our
    commitment to democratic principles. The Bush administration
    should engage the two new government parties to continue our
    cooperation in the fight against terrorism, al-Qaeda, and the
    Taliban. However, U.S. interests are neither one-dimensional
    nor short term, and bilateral cooperation must also address
    economic and social challenges throughout the country.
    Otherwise, our security goals are unlikely to be reached.
        While some in the new Pakistan Government may favor new
    tactics in the battle against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or other
    extremists, the leaders of both parties appreciate the grave
    threat that these elements pose to Pakistan's internal
    security, and the United States should work with the parties to
    achieve agreement on a strategy for fighting extremism and
    advancing Pakistan's broader national interests. We should make
    it clear to the people in Pakistan that our interests lay not
    in supporting a particular leader or party, but in democracy,
    pluralism, stability, the fight against violence and extremism.
    These are values supported by a large majority of the Pakistani
    people.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make this
    comment and to welcome the witness.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours.

       STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
               STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

        Ambassador Negroponte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I have submitted a longer statement for the record, but
    would like to make some brief summary remarks.
        Thank you for inviting me here to discuss recent
    developments in Pakistan. Let me, first, underscore that the
    stakes remain very high in that country. Successful American
    engagement with a stable and democratic Pakistan is vital to
    our national security interest. Pakistan has been indispensable
    to our worldwide struggle against radical terrorist groups. As
    Afghanistan's neighbor, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in the
    coalition's war effort there. Without peace and stability on
    the Pakistani side of the border, success in Afghanistan will
    prove elusive, its future will be decisive, too, in the search
    for stability in South Asia, a region of vastly increased
    importance to the United States.
        There is a common United States and Pakistani interest in
    Pakistan's success, in the robust and multifaceted fight
    against violent extremism, focused on democracy and economic
    development, as well as on security cooperation. We intend to
    pursue that common interest vigorously with whatever government
    emerges from the election.
        Pakistan, as you noted, took another big step toward
    civilian democracy on February 18, holding successful
    parliamentary elections under challenging circumstances. I
    thank Senators Biden, Kerry, and Hagel, of this committee, and
    Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, for their interest in
    Pakistan's democratic progress. You were in Pakistan on
    election day, observing polling places and talking to political
    leaders, and I believe your presence helped underscore, for the
    Pakistani people, the importance we place on their democratic
    progress.
        The election outcome proves that moderate prodemocracy
    parties are the heart of Pakistan's political system, and that
    religious-based politics have no hold on the voters. While not
    perfect, the elections reflected the will of the voters, who
    have embraced the results. Over 70 Pakistanis lost their lives
    on election day, and we regret the violence that led to those
    deaths. I think it is fair to say, however, that the violence
    could have been worse. The Pakistani people refused to be
    intimidated by a wave of fatal terrorist attacks prior to
    election day. In fact, they voted in higher percentages on
    February 18 than during the last general elections, in 2002,
    when conditions were undeniably safer. We think that democratic
    participation in the election results will help focus
    Pakistan's resolve on countering the growing threat of violent
    extremists.
        Looking ahead, the United States must help the Pakistani
    people size the opportunities that these successful elections
    now present for their country. Our assistance and engagement in
    Pakistan is designed to help the country develop into a modern,
    moderate, democratic, and prosperous country. We should now
    renew our efforts. We will continue to support Pakistan's
    democratic progress. We will continue to help Pakistan build a
    better education system, improve governance across the country,
    and offer more economic opportunities to its citizens in
    impoverished areas. We will also help--we will also continue to
    help Pakistan to increase the capacity of its security forces
    to fight the violent extremists that threaten us both.
        Our efforts in each of these areas are ongoing. We
    supported Pakistan's elections, and now we will support the
    Pakistani people as they choose their leaders. Political
    parties are negotiating the formation of a government, and we
    look forward to working with the leaders who emerge from that
    process. We have robust education, governance, and economic
    growth programs in Pakistan. Between 2002 and 2007, for
    example, we invested $256 million in projects to reform and
    revitalize Pakistan's education system. We also continue to
    help Pakistan improve its security force capabilities. In many
    areas, in the northwest, in particular, local forces cannot
    defend their homes and towns against militants and terrorists.
        For national security reasons, much of our assistance to
    Pakistan will continue to focus on the Federally Administered
    Tribal Areas. This area, on both sides of the border, is
    critical to our national security. Al-Qaeda leaders use this
    area to plot, plan, and train for attacks in Pakistan,
    Afghanistan, and, indeed, throughout the world, including
    against the United States and United States interests abroad.
    Thanks to strong bipartisan support, we are implementing a
    multiyear program to expand, equip, and train local security
    forces in the tribal areas. The goal is to give these forces
    what they need to protect their towns and fight violent
    extremists who are trying to undermine Pakistan's
    modernization.
        We are partnering with select units of Pakistan's special
    forces, as well. Enhancing Pakistan's counterinsurgency skills
    in the tribal areas is only part of the story, however. Also,
    thanks to congressional support, the United States Agency for
    International Development is implementing programs to support
    the Pakistani Government's 9-year, $2 billion sustainable
    development plan for the tribal areas. We hope to continue
    supporting this program, with a total commitment of $750
    million over the next 5 years. Our and Pakistan's programs are
    increasing economic opportunities and improving governance in
    sections of the tribal areas with little hope and few jobs. The
    battle for hearts and minds is nowhere more evident than here,
    where towns and villages without strong economic foundations
    are vulnerable to extremist infiltration.
        We urge you to consider and pass legislation to create
    Reconstruction Opportunity Zones which can play a major role in
    the development of this part of Pakistan, as well as on the
    other side of the border, in Afghanistan. We look forward to
    legislation authorizing these zones to be introduced in
    Congress and eventually passed.
        On February 18, the Pakistani people rejected the forces of
    fear and terror, and, instead, cast their votes for freedom and
    democracy. We should help the Pakistani people seize the
    opportunities that their successful elections now present. We
    are fully prepared to work closely and intensively with all of
    Pakistan's leaders to create a strong civilian democracy to
    continue to aggressively prosecute the war on terror.
        I note with interest Chairman Biden's proposal on our
    assistance to Pakistan, which we are looking at closely. We
    look forward to talking with you about how we can strengthen
    our commitment to Pakistan's democratic progress, to continue
    economic prosperity, and to continue to--continued close
    cooperation against violent extremism. With the support of
    Congress, we will remain close allies with Pakistan in support
    of our common objectives.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of
                   State, Department of State, Washington, DC

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for giving me
    the opportunity to address recent developments in Pakistan, where the
    stakes remain very high for the United States and for the world.
    Pakistan has been indispensable to our worldwide struggle against
    violent extremists, and successful American engagement with a stable
    and democratic Pakistan is vital to our national security interests. As
    Afghanistan's neighbor, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in the
    coalition's war effort there. Without security and stability on the
    Pakistani side of the border, success in Afghanistan will prove
    elusive. Pakistan's future will also be decisive in the search for
    stability in South Asia--a region of vastly increased importance to the
    United States. The United States and Pakistan have a common interest in
    the success of a robust and multifaceted fight against violent
    extremism, focused on democracy and economic development as well as on
    security cooperation. We intend to pursue that common interest
    vigorously with Pakistan's next government.
        Pakistan took a big step toward civilian democracy on February 18,
    holding successful elections under challenging circumstances. We thank
    Senators Biden, Kerry, and Hagel of this committee, and Representative
    Sheila Jackson-Lee, for their interest in Pakistan's democratic
    progress. You were in Pakistan on election day, observing polling
    places and talking to political leaders, and I believe your presence
    helped underscore for the Pakistani people the importance we place on
    their democratic progress.
        The election outcome demonstrates that Pakistanis are strongly
    committed to democracy, and the outcome in the North West Frontier
    Province shows that Pakistanis want good governance, including
    effective action against violent criminals and suicide terrorists.
    Although not perfect, the elections reflected the will of the voters,
    the vast majority of whom have embraced the results.
        More than 70 Pakistanis lost their lives on election day. We
    condemn the violence that led to those deaths. I think it is fair to
    say, however, that the violence could have been worse. The Pakistani
    people refused to be intimidated by a wave of murderous terrorist
    attacks prior to election day. In fact, they voted in higher
    percentages on February 18 than during the last general elections in
    2002, when conditions were undeniably safer. We think that democratic
    participation and the election results will help focus Pakistan's
    resolve on countering the growing threat of violent extremists.
        Thanks to strong congressional support, the United States was able
    to help Pakistan prepare for the elections. International observers got
    the accreditation they needed to do their jobs, and they were allowed
    to visit and monitor polling stations. We helped the Election
    Commission post voter information online, including a list of polling
    station locations, the voter rolls, and a roster and running tally of
    election complaints. We also supplied 215,000 translucent ballot boxes
    for election day.
        Our private and public engagement with senior Pakistani leaders
    helped end the state of emergency in December 2007, which we believed
    was a setback to Pakistan's democratic progress. We supported the
    international observer effort as well, deploying some 40 American
    monitors, and an additional 38 independent observers. Along with six
    other countries, we financed and helped train more than 19,000 domestic
    observers. In general, the observer groups' reports judged the
    elections successful, even while pointing out serious flaws in the
    process. The United States continues to believe that only democracy can
    build a long-term consensus among Pakistanis on a moderate, prosperous
    future for their country. Our engagement with Pakistan's leaders
    reflects those beliefs.
        Looking ahead, the United States must help the Pakistani people
    seize the opportunities that these successful elections now present. We
    supported Pakistan's elections, and now we will support the Pakistani
    people as they choose their leaders. Political parties are negotiating
    the formation of a government, and we look forward to working with the
    leaders who emerge from that process. Our assistance and engagement in
    Pakistan are designed to help the country develop into a modern,
    moderate, democratic, and prosperous country. We should now renew our
    efforts by continuing to support Pakistan's democratic progress, to
    improve its education system, to improve governance across the country,
    and to offer more economic opportunities to its citizens in
    impoverished areas. We will also continue to help Pakistan increase the
    capacity of its security forces to fight the violent extremists that
    threaten Pakistan's gains and the world's security. In many areas in
    the northwest, in particular, local forces cannot defend their homes
    and towns against militants and terrorists.
        For national security reasons, much of our assistance to Pakistan
    will continue to focus on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Al-
    Qaeda leaders exploit this area to plot, plan, and train for attacks in
    Pakistan, Afghanistan, and, indeed, throughout the world, including
    against the United States and against U.S. interests abroad. Thanks to
    strong bipartisan support, we are implementing a multiyear program to
    expand, equip, and train local security forces in the tribal areas. The
    goal is to give these forces the capabilities they need to protect
    their towns and to fight violent extremists who are trying to undermine
    Pakistan's modernization. In the short term, we continue to encourage
    Pakistan to aggressively target al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
    violent extremists who enjoy safe haven in the tribal areas.
        Militants and terrorists treat the Afghanistan/Pakistan border
    region as a unified battle space. Coordination among Afghan, Pakistani,
    International Security Assistance Force, and U.S. forces in the border
    region is therefore crucial to denying violent extremists space to plan
    and train there. In mid-March, we and our Afghan, Pakistani, and
    coalition partners will open the first of six planned Border
    Coordination Centers at Torkham, Khyber Agency. The centers will make
    it possible for Pakistani, Afghan, and International Security
    Assistance Force representatives to coordinate more effectively to stop
    the enemy from skirting both sides of the rugged border to avoid
    engagement.
        Enhancing Pakistan's counterinsurgency skills and improving
    coordination along the border is only part of the story, however. Also
    thanks to congressional support, the U.S. Agency for International
    Development is implementing programs to support the Pakistani
    Government's 9-year, $2 billion Sustainable Development Plan for the
    tribal areas. We hope to continue supporting this program with a total
    commitment of $750 million over the 5 years from FY 2007 through FY
    2011. Our and Pakistan's programs are increasing economic
    opportunities, developing capacity and improving governance in sections
    of the tribal areas with little hope and few jobs. Nowhere is the
    battle for hearts and minds more evident than here, where towns and
    villages without strong economic foundations are vulnerable to
    extremist infiltration. Just as our earthquake assistance to Pakistan
    in 2005 and 2006 had a profoundly positive impact on the people of
    Pakistan--generating good will that has lasted to this very day--so do
    we envision our support for development of the tribal areas opening
    this challenged environment to government and opportunity.
        We are accomplishing much in the tribal areas. This month we will
    help refurbish several hospitals' delivery and surgical facilities, and
    will train maternal health and other medical professionals. We will
    continue a 4-year polio eradication drive. We recently provided water
    and sanitation facilities to 108 girls' schools and 54 communities in
    the tribal areas. We are supporting a range of education programs, from
    school construction to curriculum development, that seek to expand
    opportunities at all education levels. In another area, we are talking
    to local officials about how to restore police authority to a central
    market. We are even providing blankets, stoves, utensils, and other
    relief items to individuals in North Waziristan who have been displaced
    due to fighting in South Waziristan. These are just a few examples of
    the activities we are pursuing to improve lives and enhance governance
    in the tribal areas.
        Our security and development programs in the tribal areas are
    critical to achieving our highest long-term objectives in the war on
    terror. These programs will boost sustainable economic development for
    citizens in impoverished areas at the epicenter of the war on terror
    and drugs. Just as important, these efforts are essential to
    maintaining forward momentum in strengthening our long-term, broad-
    based relationship with the Pakistani people. In this regard, we urge
    you to consider and pass legislation to create Reconstruction
    Opportunity Zones, which can play a major role in development of this
    part of Pakistan and on the other side of the border in Afghanistan.
    This legislation is vital to long-term development, to creating jobs,
    and to providing an alternative to illicit activities, including
    terrorism and narcotrafficking, in some of the most troubled regions of
    Pakistan and in Afghanistan.
        On February 18, the Pakistani people cast their votes for freedom
    and democracy. We must continue to help the Pakistani people seize the
    opportunities that these successful elections now present. We are fully
    prepared to work closely and intensively with all of Pakistan's leaders
    to create a strong civilian democracy and to continue to aggressively
    prosecute the war on terror. I note with interest Chairman Biden's far-
    reaching proposal on restructuring our assistance to Pakistan, which we
    are studying closely. We look forward to talking with the committee
    about how we can strengthen our commitment to Pakistan's democratic
    progress, to economic prosperity, and to continued close cooperation
    against violent extremism. With the support of Congress, we will remain
    close allies with Pakistan in support of our common objectives.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
        As you can see, we have a big turnout. The reason why some
    of our colleagues have left, we move in order of seniority, and
    they're in other committees, and Banking Committee has the
    Chairman of the Fed there, and a few other things, but they're
    all planning on coming back.
        So, with the permission of the chairman, I think we should
    do 7-minute rounds, so everybody has an opportunity, here,
    getting questions.
        I have many, many questions, as we all do, so I may, with
    your permission, submit some in writing for the Department.
        One of the things that I observed--I think we all--the
    three of us, had a sense of, anyway--we did not get into the
    Federally Administered Territories--Tribal Areas, but we got
    very close; we were right in the border, and we saw their
    counterparts, in effect, on the Afghan side of the border. And
    we watched these young military and aid workers, civilian
    workers, do remarkable things with a little bit of money in
    these forward operating bases and in these PRTs that we
    visited. And we went up into the area nestled up into the
    mountains, just beyond Tora Bora. As a matter of fact, we had
    an interesting landing, because--we blame it all on Senator
    Kerry for wanting to go see Tora Bora. I'm only kidding, John,
    but----
        [Laughter.]
        The Chairman [continuing]. But, literally, it was amazing
    what's happened up there.
        And here's the point. The point is that I came away more
    convinced than I was before, Dick, that economic assistance
    into these areas has a gigantic bang for the buck, and that if
    it worked in the Afghan side, I was even more convinced it
    would have even greater firepower, figuratively speaking, on
    the Pakistani side.
        And so, my first question is a generic one, and just
    could--if you'd help me with close to a yes or no--is that--Do
    you believe that our ability to bring some economic opportunity
    into the FATA, into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,
    has, along with the training of the Pakistan special forces,
    along with our efforts in coordination from the Afghan side,
    that it is one of the elements of being able to get a hold on
    the terrorists coming out of that territory?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Absolutely, Senator. And I would
    just make two points.
        I think that the Government of Pakistan itself has felt
    that in the last couple of years, and they developed this $2
    billion, multiyear plan to develop the Federally Administered
    Tribal Areas, and then, of course, we have this $150 million a
    year plan--5 years, $750 million, total--which I think can, and
    will, play a very important role in helping reduce the threat
    of extremism in that part of the country.
        The Chairman. I knew you believe that, but I think it's
    important, for the record, for a lot of our colleagues not on
    this committee to understand that the administration, as well,
    believes there's a correlation between the economic assistance
    and our ability to do this.
        I would--there is much to speak about, and I appreciate the
    invitation to talk with the administration about the proposal I
    put forward, which, quite frankly, I don't think is a lot
    different than what my friend Senator Lugar is proposing, and
    maybe he and I can work out a--an overall position, here. But,
    I hope we can make some progress on that. I don't--I think
    we're sort of on the same page, the administration and us, on
    what we want to--how we want to move forward.
        One place where I don't--at least, I haven't gotten an
    answer and--is that we have provided $10 billion now in
    economic assistance--excuse me--military assistance, explicitly
    for the purpose of dealing with the fight against al-Qaeda and
    the Taliban. And people with whom we spoke, both here and in
    the region, point out that there is not much accountability--at
    least, we're not aware of any accountability. I asked Assistant
    Secretary of State Boucher, back on December 8--I asked him
    several questions relating to reimbursements, the $6 billion,
    in particular, over the last 6 years. And what we're told is
    that every military--and it's become, sort of, the cash cow for
    speaking with our Embassy personnel, they view it as a sort of
    a cash cow for remittance and reimbursement, and it's--asked
    the question, ``Well, how do we know what we reimburse? Do we
    know whether or not the billion dollars we are paying to deal
    with the extremism in the--along the Afghan border--is that
    money being spent there, or is it being spent on the Indian
    border? Where is it being spent? How do we know?'' It's kind of
    hard to find a billion dollars worth of expenditures, as I look
    at it, along the border with Afghanistan, which I think is the
    central point.
        And so, I was told the State Department keeps meticulous
    records of the reimbursements made under the coalition support
    funds to Pakistan. I was told that if State does not--that
    there is some paper trail, and that there is a--but, there is a
    specific signoff when--and the way it works, as I understand
    it--and my time's about to run out, so maybe you can explain
    this to me--the Pakistani military submits--or the Pakistani
    Government--in this case, it was, up to now, Musharraf--submits
    a bill for reimbursement, saying, ``We help--we kept our
    commitment, we're out there fighting the terrorists, this is
    how much it cost us, reimburse us for this.'' I'm told that
    there is a specific--a specific individual or group of
    individuals at State and Defense who look at this and say,
    ``Yeah, this really was expended for the purpose of fighting
    terrorism.'' I have asked whether or not, in a classified forum
    or a nonclassified forum, those of us in this committee could
    see that, because we're the ones, along with the Armed Services
    Committee, saying, ``OK, let's spend a billion dollars of the
    taxpayers' money.'' I see very little evidence that a billion
    dollars has been spent in what we would characterize
    antiterrorist, anti-al-Qaeda, anti-Taliban expenditures per
    year.
        So, is there a reason why--did they just not get around to
    it, or is there a reason why State is unwilling to submit these
    records to us, showing what they've signed off on that--what
    constitutes legitimate reimbursement for the war on terror in
    Pakistan?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Senator, first of all, if I could,
    my understanding is that--you talked about $10 billion--I think
    that's probably----
        The Chairman. Well, I--let me amend that.
        Ambassador Negroponte [continuing]. The aggregate----
        The Chairman. Six billion, in the aggregate, since----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Correct.
        The Chairman [continuing]. 9/11.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. I believe it's $5.6 billion
    in coalition support funds that have been provided. And you're
    correct in pointing out that these are funds appropriated to
    the Department of Defense, and they are essentially a
    reimbursement to the Government of Pakistan for expenses
    incurred in their cooperation with us for logistical, military,
    and other support provided to our operations in the war on
    terror. The Embassy does have a role in this, although the
    final disbursement decision is made by the Department of
    Defense. I will have to look into the question of the receipts
    and the information, but we're certainly more than prepared to
    provide a briefing to the committee on this.
        And let me go back, on the question----
        The Chairman. Well, I----
        Ambassador Negroponte [continuing]. Of providing the
    documentation that you requested.
        The Chairman. I would----
        Ambassador Negroponte. I don't know whether this is an
    issue--as between the fact that it's DOD funds, as opposed to
    our funds--whether they have the lead responsibility for
    providing that kind of information.
        The Chairman. But, as I understand it----
        Ambassador Negroponte. I would have to inquire----
        The Chairman. I'm 57 seconds over my time--but, as I
    understand it, State has to sign off first. State actually----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right
        The Chairman [continuing]. Looks at it and checks it out.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right.
        The Chairman. And so, I would formally request that we have
    such a briefing, in whatever setting you think it has to occur.
        Ambassador Negroponte. OK.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Yield to my colleague.
        Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Negroponte, as you can gauge from at least our
    opening statements, the chairman and I are on the same page
    with regard to what we hope is your testimony, that there
    really does need to be a comprehensive plan involving the
    economy, specific focus of foreign assistance, in one form or
    another, as well as accountability for military expenditures.
    So, I'm going to ask two or three things, so that you can
    express, maybe, more essay form, rather than spot answers.
        My first question will be, How rapidly can the
    administration come forward? I realize that's not your prime--
    or your only responsibility. The Department of Defense is
    involved, National Security Council, the President's own
    decision. But, it seems to me that this is a crucial turning
    point--the election, the formation of this government now, our
    views with regard to that government--and that the need to at
    least spell out what type of moneys we're thinking about, and
    how those are to be organized, is really critical, in terms of
    our diplomatic role in approaching the new leadership, as well
    as the Pakistani people, and, for that matter, our allies
    elsewhere, who we are counting upon in Afghanistan. Certainly
    that forthcoming NATO meeting in Bucharest will clearly have
    that at the top of the agenda, quite apart from consideration,
    at least, directly with Pakistan.
        So, in terms of timeliness, we're about to take up--in the
    Senate in a couple of weeks--a budget that is not definitive
    for the whole year, but it does really bring the issue,
    hopefully, forward pretty fast. And if this is to be effective,
    why, appropriations would need to follow fairly rapidly if we
    are to seize this moment.
        So, my thought is whether we do this in private session,
    initially or publicly, that is, the need for a comprehensive
    plan and a very rapid one, in which we may have suggestions.
    The chairman has made some, in terms of actual sums of money
    involved. But, the administration's views are really important,
    at this point.
        Now, I think, on top of that, I would stress, once again,
    this idea of accountability. The thought will clearly come to
    many members, ``Sure, we would like to support some of these
    objectives, but how do we know what has happened, what have the
    results been?'' Certainly, press accounts have offered a rather
    murky view of this. But, here we have a new beginning, we have
    a new government, an election, and a new day. At least, we can
    cast it this way, and I think the Pakistani people may already
    have.
        Now, as a third function in--this is a more difficult
    proposition, I would admit, but this is a good opportunity, it
    seems to me, once again, to think about transparency with
    regards to the nuclear program of Pakistan. And whatever
    happened to A.Q. Khan--or, more importantly, his network? What
    still exists? What elements are there that are very important
    for us in nonproliferation in a lot of other areas that have
    been affected by Pakistan through this important individual, at
    one point--A.Q. Khan? For the time being, President Musharraf
    has assured us that he's done about the best that he can,
    simply with, a sort of house detention of A.Q. Khan, but with
    nothing more said. He would have testified, I think, if he were
    here, that A.Q. Khan is a national hero, perhaps of greater
    significance than even President Musharraf himself or anybody
    else. And, therefore, you don't touch national heroes. From our
    national interests, however, we need to have some thoughtful
    conversation about this. And so, as we have a new beginning
    with Pakistan, hopefully we think about this, because we are in
    heavy negotiations right now--and they're rather labored--with
    the Parliament of India, with regard to the nuclear agreement
    that we hope to fashion there. But, many in India, in that
    Parliament, quite apart from the Communists, but, say, the
    military, would say, ``Why in the world are we becoming more
    transparent with regard to the IAEA or America or anybody else,
    with the Pakistanis, right across the border, being supported,
    militarily, by the United States, but without the same
    questions asked, without the same possibilities?''
        So, this is a large bit of planning, suddenly; but then,
    this is the way the world works, and this is such a critical
    area for our national security, it would be worthwhile for our
    highest officials to take the time, right now, to formulate a
    plan.
        Do you have any overall comment about this?
        Ambassador Negroponte. A couple of comments, Senator.
        First of all, we, of course, are operating under our
    existing plans, and we had a 5-year, $3 billion assistance
    program for Pakistan under the global war on terror, so that's
    fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, $600 million a year.
    We also have the earthquake reconstruction moneys, which are
    also being expended at the moment. Plus, now, of course, as I
    mentioned, this 5-year plan, from fiscal year 2007 through
    fiscal year 2011, to support the Federally Administered Tribal
    Areas. So, those, I would submit to you, are the elements of a
    plan that are already ongoing. I think the fact that the 5-
    year, $3 billion global war on terror plan will be ending in
    fiscal year 2009 presents an opportunity to have the kind of
    dialogue that you're talking about. So, without getting into
    specific numbers and figures, I think it's something that we
    ought to discuss, going forward.
        And the other more general point I would submit, which I
    think is the tenor of the commentary that we've heard in this
    room so far today, is that the situation in Pakistan is of as
    great an interest to us--to the United States and to our
    interests--as the situation in Afghanistan, and, in some sense,
    these two countries, they're the flip side of the same coin, as
    far as the problems we're trying to address. We're never going
    to be able to succeed in one of those countries unless we
    succeed in the other. And I think that's a crucial point, and I
    would hope that those who are watching or listening would be
    receptive to that suggestion.
        On accountability, one point I would like to make about,
    ``How do we know what's happened?''--I was reading, in
    preparation for the hearing, about some of the results of our
    economic assistance programs in Pakistan in recent years, and I
    really do think that some of the progress in that country, in
    terms of infant mortality, literacy, particularly female
    literacy, has been, really, quite impressive. Enrollment in
    schools, which--in 2000, for example, female enrollment in
    schools was 47 percent; now it's 59 percent. I think there have
    been some significant improvements in the social and economic
    situation in that country. And we would hope to see a
    reinforcement of those trends in the future years.
        Last point, on whatever happened to A.Q. Khan--as you
    correctly note, he is under house arrest. I gather his health
    may be an issue. But, in any event, I don't think that that
    network is active, at the moment. I think it has been
    neutralized, if you will, and I think we're satisfied that that
    kind of activity is not continuing, at the moment. And I think
    that we've also succeeded in getting quite a bit of information
    from the Pakistani authorities about questions that were of
    concern to us in that regard. But, I think we probably have to
    talk, in classified session, about the A.Q. Khan network, if
    we're to go into it any more deeply.
        Senator Lugar. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I'd say to my colleague, one of the things
    that startled us, the day after the election, is the first
    comment by Sharif was that he wanted to see the release of A.Q.
    Khan. That was the first official statement he made, to the
    best of our knowledge. Fortunately, he did not win outright,
    but it reinforces your point about the national hero status.
        Senator Kerry.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here with us. With
    reference to that landing that Senator Biden was talking about,
    I want you to know that--that's the first time I realized I was
    responsible for it, but, apart from that, we had decided that
    if the Taliban or al-Qaeda attacked, the three Senators were
    just going to go out and talk them to death. [Laughter.]
        So, we weren't worried at all.
        Mr. Secretary, one of the things that really hit all of us
    while we were there, particularly through the competence of the
    young PRT personnel that we met with, who are doing
    extraordinary work, obviously, in nation-building, perhaps even
    more so than in their military operations--though they are
    engaged in those also--but what was really significant was the
    civic community-building taking place, and the changes
    occurring as a consequence of that. And, as Senator Biden said,
    if you spend some money, and you invest in it, you can get
    results. How you do that is pretty critical. What the
    relationships are, what your footprint is, what the perceptions
    of the people are of that footprint--all of that is part of the
    mix.
        It struck us how critical--and, indeed, you've said it in
    your testimony--the relationship is between what happens on
    that border in Pakistan to Afghanistan, and vice versa, what
    happens in Afghanistan to Pakistan, because of those tribal
    linkages, the freedom of movement, obviously, and the history
    there, culturally and otherwise.
        Here's the ``but'' in the big question. We observed that,
    in Pakistan, their leadership tends to be far more concerned,
    and expresses greater concern about, the indigenous insurgency.
    Baitullah Mehsud and company are a far greater concern to them
    than al-Qaeda. And, in fact, disturbingly, I have read, in the
    papers in the last couple of days, discussions not dissimilar
    to what Musharraf engaged in Waziristan, with the tribal
    leaders for some kind of a settlement. It didn't work then; it
    allowed freedom of movement; violence went up. And I think
    that's a recipe for disaster. And I'd like to hear your
    comments on the administration's view with respect to your
    concerns about these distinctions between different insurgents
    and the capacity of the Pakistan military and Government to
    focus on this mutual concern of transformation that has to take
    place in those areas, and the full measure of engagement that's
    got to take place, with all of its risks, in order to really
    provide real stability.
        Ambassador Negroponte. First of all, Senator, I would say,
    I don't think that--whatever might be said about talking or not
    talking with the militants, I don't think there's any
    particular sympathy in the Pakistani body politic for militant
    extremism. And I think we saw that in the outcome of the
    election results.
        Senator Kerry. But, Musharraf cut a peace deal, so to
    speak, and the peace deal was, ``If you don't bother us in X,
    Y, and Z, we're not going to bother you here,'' and that
    allowed them freedom to do what they want to do with al-Qaeda.
        Ambassador Negroponte. If you're talking about the deal in
    south Waziristan--and it didn't really work, and I think they--
    --
        Senator Kerry. That's what I'm saying.
        Ambassador Negroponte. I think they found that out. And I
    believe--and the government has got 100-plus-thousand troops up
    in that frontier area, they've got two divisions in
    Waziristan--I believe, one in south Waziristan, and one in the
    north--and they've engaged in significant combat.
        Senator Kerry. They have. But, again, in our meetings with
    the ISI, and in the discussions with folks, there seemed to be
    a conclusion that those 100,000 troops and others aren't really
    trained for counterinsurgency, they don't understand
    counterinsurgency, and that there's a lack of capacity to be
    able to achieve this. So, just having 100,000 troops up there
    engaging in these assaults, in fact, can push people further
    away toward the insurgency, rather than doing what we need to
    do to win.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. And I think that that's one
    of the plan--that's really one of the plans, going forward, is
    to help Pakistan improve it's counterinsurgency capability, in
    two different respects: One, helping the army with some of its
    special units--and we have plans with regard to that; and the
    other is to help train the frontier corps, although that'll
    take a longer period of time. But, in that $750 million plan,
    we've got some ideas of helping the frontier corps, as well.
        So, I would say that it's not a question of accommodating
    these extremist forces. I believe that the Government of
    Pakistan wants to, and I believe the political actors in
    Pakistan want to, deal with them. They do not want to give them
    free rein. They've suffered a lot of casualties. There's been
    an enormous increase in violence in the past year, and it's
    spread, as you know, not only from the FATA, but down into what
    they call the settled areas. And they want to resist this
    trend, and beat it back. But, it's going to take some time and
    some work----
        Senator Kerry. My concern is that if there isn't a more
    effective partnership with respect to the counterinsurgency
    mission, and a greater understanding on their part of how to
    implement it, I fear that they are just going to increase that
    insurgency.
        Ambassador Negroponte. And that's why, I think, we have to
    work with them harder on both the counterinsurgency--the
    military and security aspect of training them, and working with
    them on the economic aspects that we're talking about. And I
    think we're positioning ourselves better to do that than we've
    been, in previous years.
        Senator Kerry. Do you feel that there are some best
    practices that come out of the Afghan PRTs that might be
    applied to what we're doing, in terms of that?
        Ambassador Negroponte. I would have to study that, but the
    one major difference, of course, is that we're not going to be
    able to use American military forces.
        Senator Kerry. Clearly understand--we want the Pakistanis
    to do this.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right.
        Senator Kerry. We don't want American forces--but, the best
    practices fit, nevertheless, in the context of the mix of
    activities, the presence of a robust kinetic capacity, while,
    at the same time, doing the other things----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. And I think that's a good
    idea. And I think we should encourage our AID officials, who
    have, perhaps, the principal responsibility for carrying out
    these assistance programs in the FATA, and they're doing it
    mainly through Pakistanis, nongovernmental organizations,
    subcontractors, and so forth. But, I think it would be good, if
    they're not already doing so, to compare notes with those
    running the PRTs across the border.
        Senator Kerry. I was impressed that, in a sense, this is
    sort of a next-generation effort, and I saw this in Iraq also.
    A young Navy commander from Nebraska who was in a PRT was
    unbelievably impressive to all of us in his ability to brief us
    on every single tribe, the leaders, knowledge of their history,
    a sense of who the players were, and what the dynamics were
    between them. And he really understood politics. And, while
    wearing a uniform, his effort was to try to separate the enemy
    from the people without using the military. But, that presence
    does make a difference, notwithstanding. And I think we may
    have to rethink the AID model, which doesn't necessarily work
    in these unsecure situations, where you can't keep people out
    there. And that was just eye-opening. It was significant. I'm
    not saying it's the whole solution. For one, you've got to
    substitute those people as rapidly as possible with indigenous
    forces, obviously.
        And the other question that leapt out at me--and I'd just
    leave it on the table--there's a big nut for the American
    people in that PRT presence, when it's on a broader basis. And
    the question that has to be asked, Is there a cheaper way? Is
    there a more effective way to train indigenous forces and do
    this without the American people taking on in some aspects the
    responsibility of a ``52nd state? And we need to think about
    that.
        Ambassador Negroponte. If I could, just one point, Mr.
    Chairman, in reply.
        One of the issues that you're addressing, really, is how
    we're going to gear up in the future to deal with these kinds
    of stabilization situations, and, is there more that could be
    done? And, of course, the chairman and Senator Lugar have
    submitted legislation on reconstruction and stabilization.
        Senator Kerry. Right, the civilian corps.
        Ambassador Negroponte. They call this the Reconstruction
    and Stabilization Civilian Management Act. And I think that
    could very well be part of the mix in the future, and I think
    it's a very good--a very, very good initiative, and hope that
    it receives the support of the Congress.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        As you can see, Mr. Ambassador, both Senator Kerry and I
    were startled that someone from Nebraska knew so much.
    [Laughter.]
        I now recognize the Senator from Nebraska. Senator Hagel.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Hagel. Well, I----
        The Chairman. For the record, that was a joke. OK? I mean--
    --
        Senator Hagel. I'm not often introduced with such a
    flourish of flowery----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Hagel [continuing]. Positive contribution.
        And I would add my note, not only of gratitude, but of
    acknowledging how impressive all of those young men and women
    were, and the work that they're doing. And they are more than
    just soldiers; as Senator Kerry noted, they are ambassadors,
    they are mayors, they are mediators, they are warriors. And
    it's really a dramatic recognition of commitment, but also
    training, as well.
        I'd also like to acknowledge our ambassadors in that area.
    Obviously, we spend a lot of time with Ambassador Patterson, in
    Pakistan, and her colleagues, who are doing a very, very
    important job. And doing it in a way that has, I think, made a
    considerable difference in watching the Pakistanis respond to
    Ambassador Patterson and her people was some measure, I think,
    of the respect that she has earned, as well as our position
    there. And I would also add the same for Ambassador Wood and
    his colleagues, in Afghanistan.
        Ambassador Negroponte, you noted, in the opening of your
    statement, the importance, as you have said here--``Pakistan's
    future will also be decisive in the search for stability in
    South Asia,'' and you connected that to Afghanistan. I agree
    with that. I'm going to ask you a question based on that
    statement. It is my opinion that the belt that stretches from
    Iran to India--Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India--represents
    as important an area--and you've noted in your testimony--but
    also as a dangerous, combustible, complicated area of any area
    in the world. And when you add to that China, off the border of
    India, and Turkey, off the border of Iran, we find three
    nuclear powers, a nation that obviously is quite interested in
    developing nuclear capability in Iran, an indispensable ally in
    Turkey, and Afghanistan and that strip of land, the border
    between Afghanistan and Pakistan, represents, I think, the
    centerpiece of our fight--the world's fight--against extremism.
        Now, I know that you agree, at least in some measure, to
    that based on your testimony. My question is this. If, in fact,
    any of that is accurate, what I have just noted, what is our
    regional strategy? You have gotten into some of this regarding
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, as to how they are connected, how
    they are linked. One cannot be successful without the other--
    very clear, very obvious. But, I think it's broader than that
    and deeper than that. I would include that entire region, the
    nations that I just mentioned. And so, it seems to me that some
    regional strategic context is going to be required, if it's not
    already being applied, and I'd like to get your response to
    that ``regional strategy'' concept.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Of course, the countries you
    mentioned, in addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan, have other
    neighbors, as well--I mean, China, and so on, and so forth; and
    Turkey, of course, is part of the European region. I think
    you're asking a very complex question, but, I think the way I
    would try to answer it, Senator, is, first of all, we think the
    most important priority is to deal with the very sensitive
    border area that you're talking about, and deal with the
    militant extremism; all the while, working to stabilize the
    situation in Afghanistan, and help that government extend its
    writ throughout the country. I would say that's point
    No. 1.
        I think point No. 2 is that, as you know, we have, in
    recent years, improved our relationship, our outreach to India,
    and have developed more of a partnership with that country,
    while, at the same time--and I think we've played a
    constructive role in that regard--encouraging improvement in
    relationships between India and Pakistan. And then, of course,
    Iran, I would say, is a whole sort of different issue set. It
    happens to border on Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it also
    plays a significant role in the Middle East; mostly negative.
    So, I think it would be hard to slot all of this into one
    regional strategy of the kind you're talking about, but there
    certainly are elements there.
        Senator Hagel. Well, obviously, we deal with each on the
    basis of the dynamics and the realities that are in play, but,
    at the same time, it seems to me, the strategic moves that we
    make in any of these areas affect all of the other areas. And
    that's what my point is. Do we think about that? Do we
    strategize? Obviously, Afghanistan is sitting there with two
    dangerous borders, to the east and the west. The dynamic of
    Iran seeing American forces on each side of its border. Do we
    factor those in to the larger fabric of our strategic thinking,
    with our allies and our aid, working with governments?
        Ambassador Negroponte. I think we do. If I could say this
    about Iran; I think Iran plays a fairly negative role, wherever
    it happens to be engaged. We've seen--and I'm sure you
    encountered this when you were in Afghanistan--a concern about
    their providing explosive devices to the Taliban. They've not
    been helpful in Iraq. And, of course, they've played a role in
    fomenting and encouraging militant extremism in the Middle East
    region, particularly in Lebanon, and in the Israeli-Palestinian
    situation. So, I think that Iran itself calls for a strategy to
    deal with it, both in the context of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    but also the Middle East, generally.
        Senator Hagel. Do we have enough people to carry out these
    programs that you were talking about in your testimony, and
    Senators Biden and Kerry and Lugar were talking about?
        Ambassador Negroponte. We've got a total, in our mission in
    Pakistan, of--permanently assigned--of over 1,400 people; 336
    are Americans, 1,098 are local nationals. And that doesn't
    include a fairly healthy number of temporary duty personnel who
    are in Pakistan at any given time. So, I would say it's a good
    size mission.
        Senator Hagel. Well, my time is up, but that really wasn't
    my question. It's a good size mission, I recognize that, but
    you're talking about a number of new programs in your
    testimony. For example, pass legislation to create
    Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. We saw a number of those
    programs; not these specific ROZ programs, but other programs.
    My question is, Do you have the manpower in order to implement
    a rather aggressive agenda, which I think are needed, of
    programs, or are you going to require more people?
        Ambassador Negroponte. I think, with respect to
    Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, if and when we accomplish
    that, we may need some more resources, both financial and
    human, and maybe that'll be true of some other programs, but I
    do think that we have a solid basis right now, and it may
    require some adjustments--upward, going forward, but I wouldn't
    want to commit to any, or predict any, specific numbers.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
        Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
    very timely hearing.
        And thank you, Secretary Negroponte, for your testimony.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I know you and some of the other
    Senators are just back from Pakistan. I appreciate hearing the
    recent insights that you're able to give.
        The historic, relatively peaceful parliamentary elections
    in Pakistan have ushered in a new opportunity to build strong
    institutions that can bolster and build a strong democracy,
    address the increasing insecurity throughout the country in a
    balanced manner, and ensure that our assistance is consistent
    with the needs of the people of Pakistan, rather than with a
    President who now has been rejected by Pakistan's voters and
    who has increasingly repressed political space and undermined
    democracy.
        We must seize this opportunity to reverse decades of
    failed, ineffective policies with various Pakistani leaders. We
    can do this by promoting and supporting the rule of law, and by
    seeking to eliminate corruption, poor governance, endemic
    poverty, and historic marginalization. We should help ensure
    that restrictions on basic freedoms and political rights are
    permanently reversed, all while working with the Pakistani
    Government to counter the terrorist threats that fester and
    grow in Pakistan and the border region.
        And, with regard to some questions, I'm interested to hear
    from you about U.S. Government intentions to support the newly
    formed coalition government. Mr. Secretary, how does the United
    States intend to support the loosely formed coalition
    government? And can you speak to how our policy has actually
    been impacted by these elections?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Regarding our intentions, Mr.
    Chairman, as I said in my opening statement, we certainly look
    forward to working with whatever government emerges from this
    process. We don't know yet what that government will be. I
    spoke to Ambassador Patterson this morning. She predicted that
    such a government should emerge within the next couple of
    weeks, perhaps sooner. So, we're in a ``wait and see'' mode, as
    far as that is concerned. But, certainly, we look forward to
    working with that government in every way possible, and being
    supportive.
        Senator Feingold. Well, obviously, in the long run, the
    actions will speak louder than words, and I'm sure it's not
    escaped the attention of the Pakistani people that, as the
    administration has paid at least lipservice to democracy in
    Pakistan, it has continued to provide hundreds of millions of
    dollars in military equipment designed to combat a conventional
    military foe--actually, not terrorists--a military foe to the
    Musharraf regime. So, right now, are you encouraging this
    coalition to work with President Musharraf's party? Isn't there
    a danger that your unwavering support for the regime will cost
    us the support of the Pakistani people?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Well, as I said, we're going to work
    with whatever government emerges from the process. We're not in
    the business of recommending specific alignments or specific
    coalitions. I think we would, as a general proposition, urge
    that the moderate political forces work together. And, of
    course, President Musharraf is still the President of his
    country, and we look forward to continuing to work well with
    him, as well.
        Senator Feingold. But, what about the military support to
    the regime continuing unabated, without any recognition of the
    political change, here? I mean, doesn't it send a troubling
    message?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. I think it's not a question
    of supporting a particular individual, Senator. It's a question
    of providing assistance to the institution of the army and of
    the security forces in Pakistan, and try to enable them in the
    ways that we've been discussing, here--improving their
    counterinsurgency capability and so forth. And also, I don't
    think we should underestimate the high impact that some of our
    economic and social programs have had, whether it's been on
    literacy or democracy support. Actually, we did a lot, as your
    colleagues know, to support the election process that was just
    carried out, in terms of helping promote election observation,
    democracy promotion, and so forth.
        Senator Feingold. I recognize that point. I also recognize
    that, in an ideal situation, providing support to the military
    for a country certainly can be consistent with supporting
    institutions and supporting a country moving forward. But, in
    this case, there's a particular problem with the military, with
    the role of the army in Pakistan, and with President
    Musharraf's relationship with the military, and how that's
    perceived by the public. So, obviously, you're aware of that,
    and it carries more messages than simply supporting a military
    institution.
        But, let me switch to the issue of judicial reform.
    Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher told a January 29
    House subcommittee hearing, ``We have urged the political
    leaders and other leaders in Pakistan to focus on the need for
    an independent judiciary. I think it's fair to assume they
    won't really address it seriously until after the election.''
    However, immediately after the elections last week, rather than
    pressing this point, administration officials were reportedly
    pressuring the new Pakistani leadership to stop their calls for
    reinstatement of the judges dismissed by Musharraf when he
    declared martial law.
        So, what is the administration's policy regarding
    reinstatement of the judges? And is it consistent with the Bush
    administration's stated support for democratic institutions?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Just one point on the previous
    issue, Senator, which I, of course, should have mentioned, is
    that Mr. Musharraf did take off his uniform and did step down
    as Chief of Staff of the Army, and I think that was a very
    significant development.
        Senator Feingold. Very, very late in his Presidency, after
    many years of requests, and only right before the election.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Correct. But I do recall--prior to
    her tragic death, I spoke to Mrs. Bhutto, and I recall her
    saying that she thought this was one of the most important
    things he could do to advance the prospects for a fair and free
    election in her country.
        Senator Feingold. I agree with that.
        Ambassador Negroponte. And, of course, we can't lose sight
    of the fact that the Pakistani military now is a vital
    institution in this war on terrorism.
        As far as the question of the judicial reform, this is
    something that we believe the Pakistanis themselves are going
    to have to sort out. And I think that it's something that'll be
    taken up in their legislature. And we will watch that
    discussion with interest. And we're certainly not trying to
    block any changes of any particular kind, nor do we have some
    kind of prescription or formula for how they should go about
    reforming or improving their own judicial system.
        Senator Feingold. But, does the administration have a
    policy regarding the reinstatement of those judges? Are they
    asking--are we asking for that, or not?
        Ambassador Negroponte. We have not--we have been silent on
    the subject to best of my knowledge.
        Senator Feingold. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        The Chairman. Senator Corker.
        Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, whoever you are.
    Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. I'm not sure who I am, either. [Laughter.]
        Senator Corker. I want to thank you for your testimony, and
    I certainly was glad to hear of the testimony of the three
    Senators who were there during the elections. I was there, I
    guess, within a day of General Musharraf taking his uniform
    off, and met with him, and really was touched, if you will, by
    many of the comments that he made. And, I think, actually, some
    of the Senators have said the same thing. I also met with
    former Prime Minister Bhutto to encourage her to run, and not
    boycott the elections; and 27 days later, of course, she was
    assassinated. But, I think it shows tremendous progress to see
    what has happened when we had a president that was, in essence,
    shellacked, if you will, during an election, and yet, is moving
    ahead with trying to build a coalition. And I would say that
    I'm actually somewhat--while this person is not perfect--
    impressed with what is happening. It looks like we may, in
    fact, have a peaceful transition. Certainly the country is, by
    no way, perfect, and there are lots of issues that need to be
    addressed, but I hope that you will continue to work with all
    the leaders in Pakistan to ensure that this continues. And I
    want to thank the Senators for having done what they did.
        Let me just ask you this. What do you think has caused the
    fact that moderates were elected, when, in fact, we have this
    tremendous turmoil that is taking place there, which is very
    different from what has occurred in other countries, where more
    extremists have actually taken the lead--what do you think has
    caused this response by the electorate, to, in essence, cause
    moderates to come to the forefront?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Two points. One would be that I
    think there are a lot of secular political leaders in Pakistan,
    and they have a fairly long tradition of that. But, the other
    point I would make is that, whereas the problem of militant
    extremism was bottled up in the FATA area in previous years, it
    has spread into what the Pakistanis call the ``settled areas''
    now. And I'm sure it was mentioned to you that the number of
    suicide bombings and car bombs and so forth had gone up
    significantly in the past year or so, acts of violence by
    terrorists, in the settled areas. And I think that what you're
    seeing is a reaction to that fact. People don't like that, they
    don't like the disruption to their lives, they don't like the
    terrorist threat. And I think they want to see it dealt with.
        Senator Corker. I thought that Chairman Biden's comments
    about increasing aid there, the soft aid that actually
    addresses the need of Pakistanis, and not necessarily focused
    so much on our transactional relationship, if you will, was
    actually a very good comment. I don't know about the actual
    numbers that need to be invested, but I did notice the
    President's budget actually reduced funding in that regard by
    $75 million. And it does seem that this is a time for us to
    really try to move ahead the government, move ahead the
    understanding of people, move ahead economic development and
    educational opportunities. And I'm just wondering why, at the
    time when this needs to occur, and we've invested so much in
    this country, we're actually, through the President's budget,
    reducing aid in that way, at least proposed aid, in Pakistan.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Yes; I'd have to look at those
    precise numbers, Senator, because my--the picture of the budget
    that I carry with me in my mind over the previous--you know,
    the previous several years, is that it's been running something
    between $600-$700 million a year for these past several years,
    and that's sort of the projection, going forward.
        Senator Corker. OK. Well, I do hope we can follow up with
    some of the meetings that I--that Ranking Member Lugar has
    asked about. And I hope we can get into some of the
    accountability issues.
        Following up, again, on the chairman's thoughts regarding
    Musharraf's activities to sort of retrench and look at his own
    political backside, if you will, based on our lack of
    investment in Afghanistan, I will tell you, there's no question
    in my mind that our actions in Iraq have hurt us in
    Afghanistan, that we have disinvested there, that we have--we
    have, sort of, gone sideways over this last period of time
    because of that. But, I'd love for you to respond to that. I
    don't think he asked the question. I think he made the
    statement. Do you think that, in fact, did affect General
    Musharraf's focus as it relates to terrorism and retrenchment
    back to focus on his own political situation there--our lack of
    focus on Afghanistan?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Well, I guess, first of all, I would
    take some issue with the thought that we have not been focusing
    on Afghanistan, because we have a substantial effort there,
    both our own and, of course, the NATO countries, and we have
    this major NATO summit coming up, in April, where the subject
    of Afghanistan will be a focus.
        Senator Corker. But, I think the people on the ground--I
    mean, I think General McNeill and everybody there on the ground
    acknowledges that we have lacked in our effort there, because
    of resource issues, and that it has, in fact, hurt us. I mean,
    that's--these are the folks we depend upon to lead us in that
    regard----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right.
        Senator Corker [continuing]. And certainly have been
    hamstrung by some of the other efforts. And, again, I don't
    want to take issue with that, it's just an observation. I think
    you would agree with--do you not agree that we've been----
        Ambassador Negroponte. I think I would say that we're doing
    the best we can in both places, and they're both important,
    Senator.
        The second thing I'd say is that there's been a rather
    sharp increase, in the last couple of years, in the assistance
    levels to Afghanistan, whether it's road-building or other
    types of aid. And I think another development in Afghanistan
    that's been good in the last couple or 3 years has been the
    emphasis on increasing the competence and capability of the
    Afghan security forces.
        Senator Corker. On the military side, but not at the police
    level. That's where we really----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Yes. And that police is an area that
    we hope that some of our NATO allies will, maybe, come up with
    more offers of assistance. It's an area where we think they can
    be helpful.
        Senator Corker. But, back to the statement that was made,
    what do you think that did, in fact, or has, in fact, affected
    Musharraf in his efforts as it relates to terror, versus just
    trying to shore up his own political base?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Senator, I was the Ambassador to the
    United Nations in 2001, when President Musharraf came to New
    York, had his first meeting with President Bush in November of
    that year, and, I think, ever since that time, he's been
    committed in this effort against violent extremism. And he made
    his famous speech there, at the end of 2001, and I think he's
    been strongly committed ever since. So, I don't think I would
    agree that he has somehow waned or relented in his effort on
    this.
        Senator Corker. I know my time is up. I would just say
    that, in meeting with our country team there on the ground, and
    certainly talking with our CIA operatives there, I think there
    is a tremendous disconnect between the leadership of Pakistan's
    view of where we are, as it relates to fighting terror, and our
    own CIA view of that. And I think there's a huge disconnect
    there. And hopefully, as we move into new leadership there,
    with a new Prime Minister, those can come into sync more fully.
        But, again, I want to say, in general, I think we've moved
    along in a very good way, as it relates to progress there on
    the elective side. I thank the Senators for going over and
    making sure that the elections were focused on the proper way.
    And I think we have an opportunity for great progress there.
        Thank you very much.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to something
    that the Senator from Tennessee said in regard to his
    observation about force structure in Afghanistan?
        You recall, as does Senator Kerry, that, when we were there
    last week, we were told, by a very senior general, that he
    would require an additional two infantry brigades in the south,
    with a two-star billet, in addition to the 3,200 marines going
    in there. And I think it addresses part of what Senator
    Corker's comment was about resources in Afghanistan. This was
    not a Senator saying this; this was a rather senior general--
    not saying he wished we could do it, he said, straight out,
    ``We have to do it.''
        The Chairman. And that he knows he can't do it, in terms of
    getting the troops. I apologize for the----
        Senator Boxer. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Interruption.
        Senator Boxer.
        Senator Boxer. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I actually want to follow up on your opening--the points
    you made about funding. And today, there's an article--and
    welcome, Mr. Secretary--there's an article in the British press
    with the headline, ``Pakistani Military Misspent Up To 70
    Percent of American Aid.'' It goes on to say that, ``American
    officials processing the payments at the Embassy in Islamabad
    have concluded that Pakistan's expense claims have been vastly
    inflated. According to an official, `My back-of-the-envelope
    guesstimate is 30 percent of the money that they requested to
    be reimbursed was legitimate,' '' so 70 percent was not. The
    official said he didn't know what happened to the remaining
    $3.8 billion, but suspected that some of the money might have
    been spent on F-16 fighter jets or, ``a new house for an army
    general.'' The Pakistani military replied that, ``We've never
    received any formal complaint about this.'' Every month, the
    Pakistani's expense claims of about $80 million to the U.S.
    Embassy in Islamabad; no receipts are provided to support the
    claims, and the money is paid directly to the Finance Ministry.
        Now, here's the thing. The American people are getting a
    bit impatient. We've got $9 billion that's missing in aid to
    Iraq. And now we hear this. The American people are being told
    that President Bush is cutting everything that they care about,
    including, let's see, funds for after-school programs. We're
    supposed to be spending $3 billion on these programs, but we
    are actually spending less than $1 billion. Millions of kids
    can't get in. The President is not even willing to spend $1
    billion a year on these programs, but we're losing track of
    multiple billions of dollars in Iraq.
        So, I guess I need to hear from you--what are you doing to
    address this?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. And earlier, Senator--and I
    can't recall whether you were here or not, but I did offer a
    briefing to the chairman on this whole issue of coalition
    support funds, but I said we'd have to work out as to whether
    it would be us, in the State Department, or the Department of
    Defense, since it's basically their moneys.
        But, let me make a broad point, which is that we--in the
    case of these coalition support funds--have provided over the
    years, it's been to compensate Pakistan for the expenses it has
    incurred in providing military and logistical support in the
    war on terror. And, as I mentioned earlier, they have deployed
    something like 100,000 troops to their border area, which is
    not a trivial amount.
        Senator Boxer. OK. Mr. Secretary, I don't--I want us to
    have a strong, cooperative relationship.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right
        Senator Boxer. I don't question that. I'm questioning some
    fraud and abuse that could be going on, what American officials
    are saying might be happening. Here is another quote: ``The
    road could be paved with this money.'' All I'm saying is, I
    look forward to that briefing.
        I ask unanimous consent to place into the record this
    article in the British press that says 70 percent of the money
    may be being misspent, and also the chart that shows how much
    money we're talking about, because it's a lot more than this $6
    billion, when you go to the other accounts.
        The Chairman. Without objection, it'll be placed in the
    record.
        Senator Boxer. And so, I really do look forward, Mr.
    Chairman, to working on this with you as we see this
    administration slashing the budget for the American people.
        Now, I also feel very disturbed by your seeming ambivalence
    about an independent judiciary. Again, we're spending billions
    of dollars in Iraq to set up a judiciary. The Pakistani
    President--Pervez Musharraf--dismissed the judiciary. Imagine
    what would happen if President Bush went to the microphone and
    said, ``Today, I'm firing the Supreme Court, and all the judges
    can go home.''
        Now, the fact is, when we had a problem with the U.S.
    attorneys it caused an uproar. You saw what happened when we
    had a problem with U.S. attorneys being fired. We still haven't
    gotten to the bottom of that.
        I would ask unanimous consent to place into the record a
    CRS report, which says, ``Reseating the pre-November 3rd
    Supreme Court would almost lead to Musharraf's removal from
    office, as that court appeared close to finding his October
    reelection as President unconstitutional.'' I want to put that
    in, as well as another statement, here, ``By some accounts, the
    administration remains wedded to a policy that would keep the
    embattled Musharraf in power, despite his weakness and lack of
    support.''
        The Chairman. Without objection, it will be placed in the
    record.
        Senator Boxer. So, I just hope you'll rethink this, because
    we don't seem to be sincere when we're quiet on the importance
    of an independent judiciary. It just doesn't meet American
    ideals and what we stand for in our Constitution.
        So, I'd like us to rethink this. We cannot base our support
    for an independent judiciary on what they might find about
    President Musharraf. I just think it's bigger than that. And if
    you look at--and I'd ask unanimous consent to place part of a
    report from ``Terror-Free Tomorrow: the Center for Public
    Opinion,'' in the record--just their summary page, if I might.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Senator Boxer. There are some really wonderful things in
    the findings. The report basically finds that the Pakistani
    people really want to see Osama bin Laden and the terrorists
    gone. They also are very concerned that American policy is
    propping up Musharraf. This is not good for us. It is not good
    for us.
        So--I will give you an example. And I will finish with
    this--in August 2007, Secretary Rice said, ``I think that we
    and Pakistan have a very strong interest together in capturing
    or killing high-value targets.'' And she said, ``Musharraf
    himself is at risk from extremists. We all have this in common,
    to get the terrorists.'' Yet, President Musharraf recently
    said, on a tour through Europe, regarding the fact that Osama
    bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are still at large, that it ``doesn't
    mean much.'' He said, ``it doesn't mean much.'' According to
    the Associated Press, Musharraf attributed his feelings about
    the two's continued freedom--bin Laden and Zawahiri--to the
    fact that the two are less a threat to his regime than Taliban-
    linked militants. He even went on to elaborate that the 100,000
    troops that you referenced are not going around trying to
    locate Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri. He said that.
        So, it's outrageous, and it runs contrary to what Secretary
    Rice said in August 2007. The fact that these al-Qaeda leaders
    are still on the loose is distressing to all Americans,
    especially the families and loved ones of those who died on 9/
    11. So, I think your defense and your support of Musharraf, and
    talking about the 100,000 troops, when Musharraf himself has
    said that those 100,000 troops aren't being used to catch
    terrorists, is just very concerning.
        So, I have one last question. How do you reconcile
    Musharraf's statements that he's not worried about these two
    being loose, with what Secretary Rice said about our joint
    commitment to capturing high-value targets?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. Well, I can't--he'd have to
    address that, and I'd have to see the context in which he said
    all of that. It was a question-answer situation. But, what I
    would say is, we've had good cooperation with them on this
    issue of al-Qaeda. I recall, as Director of National
    Intelligence, being very impressed by the cooperation that we
    had with the Government of Pakistan, particularly with
    counterparts of my then-organization in seeking out extremist
    militants. And I think it's worth recalling that Mr. Musharraf
    himself has been the victim of some of these militant
    assassination attempts.
        Senator Boxer. That's what Secretary Rice said.
        Ambassador Negroponte. So, I think that we are essentially
    on the same page with the Pakistani authorities on this issue.
        Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to put in the
    record, because you said you didn't see it--it's from FOX News.
    The story has Musharraf saying that ``The 100,000 troops we're
    using are not going around trying to locate Osama bin Laden and
    Zawahiri, frankly,'' and that, ``it doesn't--it doesn't mean
    much,'' that they're running around loose. This is really
    outrageous.
        And our President is still saying how strongly he supports
    Musharraf. I'd put that in the record, a comment made after the
    elections.

    [Editor's note.--The above mentioned comment was not available
    at the time of printing.]

        Senator Boxer. You know, so it's just concerning to me, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Isakson.
        Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I am very supportive of what
    Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Lugar said with regard to the
    coordinated financial assistance to Pakistan. And I'm very
    supportive of the $150 million assistance provided to the
    Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. But, I do have
    a question with regard to that.
        In Iraq, last month, I traveled with a PRT team into
    Ghazaliya, along with a combination of State and military
    officials and watched the application for, and the distribution
    of, microgrants, which is part of the PRT's goal to bring
    economic activity to Iraq, and was just amazed with the level
    of accountability and the results those microgrants made in
    that program.
        Here is my question. I know we're not going to have
    military personnel of the United States in Pakistan, so we
    don't have that program for distribution and accountability of
    economic assistance. What type of NGO and what type of
    accountability are we going to have on the distribution of
    those funds in the tribal areas in Pakistan?
        Ambassador Negroponte. I'd like to submit a longer reply--
    --
        Senator Isakson. Sure.
        Ambassador Negroponte [continuing]. To your question, for
    the record, Senator.
        [The written response of the State Department follows:]

        The State Department or U.S. Agency for International Development
    monitors assistance in the tribal areas by following standard Federal
    procurement and financial management regulations, conducting third
    party as well as inspector general performance and financial audits of
    contractors and grantees, and meeting all provisions of the Foreign
    Assistance Act, including preobligation requirements.
        The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Pakistan
    Government have been working together to develop joint evaluation plans
    for programs in the tribal areas as well. That includes collecting
    baseline data and regular monitoring and evaluation plans. Several
    large programs, including the Capacity Building and Livehoods
    contracts, have been recently signed. One of the first things the
    contractors will do is collect baseline data to monitor and evaluate
    the success of the programs.

        Ambassador Negroponte. But, in brief, I would say, first of
    all, the--our aid programs are administered under the
    applicable Federal rules of accountability.
        The second is that we do have AID personnel stationed up in
    Peshawar, adjacent to the FATA area. And, third, Ambassador
    Patterson has also designated a position, in her Embassy, of a
    coordinator for our assistance programs to the FATA area, who
    will also have that kind of oversight responsibility. So, we
    will certainly be mindful of the need for accountability--
    oversight and accountability.
        Senator Isakson. Is the--on that--in addition to that, is
    the type of assistance contemplated similar to the micro-grants
    and -loans that are being made in Iraq for business
    development--small business?
        Ambassador Negroponte. I don't know that for a specific
    fact, but my understanding is, it's going to be for the range
    of civic development, community development type programs.
        Senator Isakson. It's my understanding, one of their goals
    is to try and bring some employment, economic benefit, and
    economic sustainability to the tribal areas.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Absolutely. And, of course, that's
    why these Reconstruction Opportunity Zones would be so helpful,
    as well.
        Senator Isakson. The second thing I want to mention, you
    may not want to comment on but you can if you want to, is in
    regard to terrorism and extremism in Pakistan. In Atlanta,
    Georgia, we had an incident last year, where two Islamic
    students at Georgia Tech were arrested, and a cell was broken
    up--thanks to our intelligence under FISA and the Patriot Act,
    in communications between Islamabad, Atlanta, and Toronto--
    successfully before its activation. Those communications were
    coming out of Pakistan, out of Islamabad. I want to just make
    the point that we leave ourselves, I think, at some risk, with
    the FISA law now being not extended. And one of the reasons
    that I was so supportive of reauthorizing this measure on the
    floor of the Senate was because of that singular experience we
    had in our city, to bring up a close and personal experience
    and how important it is to have that type of intelligence.
        And there is al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and it is operating, and
    it is central in the war on terror. And I'm appreciative for
    the cooperation that we have had, and I think it's critical
    that the State Department engage and maintain our relationship
    with this new and emerging Government in Pakistan, because I
    think it's probably the key area in the world in the war on
    terror.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That's all I have.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Cardin, thank you for your patience.
        Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
    it.
        Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your long record of service
    to our country in so many different roles.
        There's a lot we need to understand from this election, and
    if I had to point to one area that offers great promise--the
    rejection of extremism--particularly in the northwest area. And
    it seems to me that we should be looking at modifying U.S.
    policy and expectations as to what we expect the new leaders of
    Pakistan to do in identifying ways to root out the terrorist
    networks, particularly in the tribal areas.
        I'm frustrated and I think Americans are frustrated, that
    we haven't been able to make more progress in rooting out the
    areas that seem to be without control, where al-Qaeda and
    others can operate without real accountability.
        There's going to be a new Prime Minister in Pakistan.
    Clearly, the power of the President has been changed. There'll
    be a new Parliament. What should be our expectations of what
    these leaders can do in order to gain greater control of the
    territories and root out these training cells and operational
    support for terrorist organizations?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Well, I guess the first point I want
    to make, Senator, is Pakistan is a sovereign country, and, in
    the last analysis, whatever they do to deal with these issues
    has got to be based on their government's perception and their
    people's perception of their own best self-interest.
        Senator Cardin. And I agree with that. My point is that
    U.S. policy can affect that. And, of course, we have the
    involvement, not only in the United States, but the
    international community, in trying to support efforts within
    Pakistan. The chairman has mentioned that; I fully agree that
    it needs to be reevaluated.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right.
        Senator Cardin. So, using all of our tools, it seems to me
    we can have an impact. My question is, What can we expect?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Here would be my answer to that.
    First of all, I think that whatever we do should be done on a
    cooperative basis. I think that it is harmful when people--very
    often, unidentified sources--talk about us somehow taking this
    matter into our own hands and acting unilaterally. I think all
    that does is get people's backs up on the scene. But, I think
    what we can expect is that--we would like to work with the
    Government of Pakistan to help them in our social and economic
    programs in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in
    other parts of Pakistan, to help deal with the root causes, if
    you will, of this militant extremism. We would also like to
    work with them on the security front, whether it's intelligence
    or the military, to help improve their counterterrorism and
    their counterinsurgency efforts. And so, the expectations would
    be, really, to strengthen our collaborative efforts together
    and for them to be open to that kind of cooperation with the
    United States.
        Senator Cardin. I would just make the observation. Those
    who participated in the elections, their votes were more
    encouraging than the current leadership in Pakistan, as to
    taking on the extremist groups. It's clearly the right thing,
    but it's also, perhaps, the popular thing within Pakistan. And
    that may not have been the reading of the leaders, prior to the
    election.
        I want to comment on Senator Corker's point, because it's
    clear to me that our efforts in Iraq has an impact on what's
    happening in Afghanistan, it's having an impact on what's
    happening in Pakistan. And many of us think that we're not
    focusing on--as we should--on terrorists, because of the way
    that Iraq is being handled.
        The Iraq coalition is a small coalition compared to the
    international support we have in Afghanistan and as it relates
    to Pakistan. So, it seems to me, and most Americans, that
    what's happening in Iraq is affecting our effectiveness in
    dealing with Afghanistan and the cooperation we're receiving in
    Pakistan. And I just welcome your thoughts on that,
    understanding your position in the administration. We want to
    have an effective policy in Pakistan. The purpose of this
    hearing is, given these new opportunities brought about by
    these elections, how we can have programs to deal with
    terrorists operating in this region and engage the
    international community as effectively as we can?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Of course, in addition to my
    position in the administration, I'm a former United States
    Ambassador to Iraq, so I have a particular personal experience
    in that regard.
        Senator Cardin. And I met you there. I thank you for your
    hospitality when I was in Baghdad----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right.
        Senator Cardin [continuing]. When you were Ambassador.
        Ambassador Negroponte. So no matter what anybody thinks
    about the merits or demerits of us having gone in there in the
    first place, I think we all recognize the importance of now
    getting it stabilized and getting it on the right footing. And
    Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus will be coming back
    shortly to brief the Congress and the American people on the
    situation there, and I think they're going to be presenting a
    fairly hopeful and encouraging report.
        But, as far as Pakistan is concerned, I think the important
    point of departure, Senator, is the recognition of its
    importance in this global situation, and the importance of
    Pakistan, not only for itself, but for, also, the situation in
    Afghanistan. And it sounds to me, from the discussion we've had
    this morning, that we're sort of on the same page in that
    regard, so what we've got to do is look at ways, going forward,
    to be as supportive as we possibly can. I don't know what else
    to say, at this stage.
        Senator Cardin. Well, I thank you. I just think there is a
    new opportunity here, because of the elections. I hope we have
    a way to energize the international community and working with
    the sovereign country of Pakistan, to have higher expectations
    of what can be achieved in the tribal and the border areas as
    far as eliminating the safe havens that currently exist.
        Ambassador Negroponte. That does remind me of one other
    point that I think is worth mentioning--and you've suggested
    it, yourself--and that is, we also need, in our dialogue--and
    I've been doing this--trying to do this more and more--in our
    discussions with friends and allies around the world, we need
    to draw their attention to the importance of Pakistan, in
    addition to whatever support they might be providing to some of
    these other critical countries. But, in Iraq, Afghanistan,
    Pakistan--our help to these countries is vital, each of them,
    to the United States national interests.
        Senator Cardin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Barrasso, thank you for your
    patience.
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
    thank you for making me feel so welcome, as the newest member
    of this committee.
        The Chairman. I was just, actually, saying very nice things
    about you to the Senator--Senator Lugar. I am impressed. And
    I--presumptuous of me to say that, but I am, and I----
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
        The Chairman. And the floor is yours, sir.
        Senator Barrasso. And thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
    I know many of the questions have already been asked. Just two.
    First, regarding the elections and the multiple parties trying
    to get together with the coalition. I know you want to continue
    to focus on working with the new Parliament to ensure
    Pakistan's cooperation with us in fighting terrorist groups.
    You may have addressed some of it already. Do you believe that
    there are allies that we have, within the new government that
    is forming, who will continue to work with us?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Well, we certainly look forward to
    working with whatever government emerges. I can't tell you the
    precise coloration, if you will, or the specific individuals,
    because we don't know the answer to that question yet. But, I
    think, given the rejection of the Islamist parties, I think the
    general tendency in the country toward moderation and secular
    government--I would hope and expect that we would be able to
    work as well, if not better, with the forthcoming government
    than we have in the past. Certainly hopeful.
        Senator Barrasso. Yes. And then looking at the history of
    Pakistan, and the role of the military involvement over the
    years. We have a new military leader in November 2007, who was
    appointed the general by Musharraf. Do you see the military
    playing an additional part in Pakistan's future as we've seen
    in the past? And how do we go about with that?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. And I think the point here is
    that the military is a very important institution in Pakistan,
    particularly with regard to maintaining security in that
    country. I think it was a significant development that
    President Musharraf stepped down from the military, took off
    his uniform. And my sense is that the current leadership of the
    Pakistani military is very focused on their military tasks and
    on increasing their professionalization. And we want to be
    supportive of that. There's work to be done together in helping
    them increase their professionalization, their training, and
    their counterinsurgency capabilities.
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Barrasso follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. John Barrasso, U.S. Senator From Wyoming

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I am
    honored to be here today. Through this committee's distinguished
    history, members have played an important role in shaping relations
    with world leaders and promoting our foreign policy objectives. We live
    in an ever-changing world and this committee has a responsibility to be
    diligent in supporting and directing the United States role as a world
    leader.
        Building sound relationships with our allies and others in the
    international community effectively aids the United States as we seek
    to resolve conflicts and address humanitarian crises. As issues arise,
    it is important that this committee provide appropriate oversight and
    leadership to ensure that American values of liberty and justice are
    evident in our policy decisions.
        While Americans are generous in aiding those suffering from
    disease, political unrest, war, and natural disasters, it is important
    that the committee support policies that ensure taxpayer dollars are
    used wisely. As conflicts of all kinds continue to wreak havoc in the
    lives of so many people around the world, the United States will work
    with our allies to address regional and global conflicts, particularly
    those that have a direct impact on our Nation's interests.
        I am pleased to hear the Honorable John Negroponte's testimony
    regarding the current situation in Pakistan. Pakistan has proven to be
    an ally in the war on terrorism and plays an important role in the
    stability of South Asia. The elections held this month in Pakistan
    produced a new government and Pakistan's leaders are negotiating the
    direction their country should take.
        It is vital that the U.S. build upon our relationship with Pakistan
    and support the Pakistanis' efforts to have a voice in their own
    government. Determining our Nation's level of involvement in any
    country is difficult, but also a vital aspect of our Nation's interest
    in maintaining our security and promoting freedom. Due diligence must
    be given in all aspects of our continuing relationship with Pakistan.
        I look forward to discussing this issue further.
        Again, I am honored to serve on this committee and I value this
    opportunity to serve Wyoming in this capacity.

        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator, do you have any further questions?
        Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, if I----
        The Chairman. Sure. Yes, please.
        Senator Lugar. Mr. Secretary, as you say, we've got to see
    how the government will form. There are press reports today of
    a demand by the leader--the two major leaders of parties, that
    there be a meeting of the assembly right away. One news account
    says that the election results are not official in all of the
    constituencies, thus far, although a vast majority apparently
    have been decided, and it would appear that, clearly, the two
    major--well, three parties have approximately a two-thirds
    majority, or maybe more. And the reason that this is being
    stressed is that they're saying, under the Constitution, this
    would give this assembly the power to change the judiciary; for
    that matter, to impeach President Musharraf. Now, whether
    that's the will of the group when they meet is another
    question.
        But, we've been, you know, advising you, and you've been
    advising us, that we are already doing a good number of things,
    in terms of taxpayer dollars, with regard to the military, or
    economic support, and we have encouraged, perhaps, further
    briefing by you about accountability of funds, as well as other
    issues that we've raised, so that we're all on the same page,
    in terms of a very timely response.
        But, I'd just ask you, What do you foresee as the timing of
    events in Pakistan, or do you have any prediction of this? In
    other words, how soon is it likely that this assembly will come
    together, that there will be fundamental decisions made about
    the leadership and the institutions of the country? And are
    these likely to be so disruptive that whatever new policies or
    augmentation of what we're now doing could be, sort of, lost in
    the process of Pakistani politics for a period of time?
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. I believe, Senator, the first
    step is that the election results need to be certified. And
    it's conceivable--I'm not sure whether that has to be done
    before the legislature, or not. Perhaps it does. So, maybe
    that's what that is about.
        But, my understanding, from talking to Ambassador Patterson
    this morning, was that she expected that--although she wasn't
    certain--that a government would likely be formed within the
    next 2 weeks.
        Senator Lugar. Two weeks.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Perhaps sooner. Obviously, we would
    hope that, however this process unfolds, that it happen in a
    way that reflects that same moderation that permitted a
    relatively peaceful conduct of these elections, and permits
    Pakistan to go forward in a way that cannot be exploited by the
    enemies of democracy, including the terrorists.
        Senator Lugar. That leads to my comment, and that is, To
    what extent, while this process of 2 weeks, maybe more, is
    going on--as Ambassador Patterson has noted, and we are hopeful
    the same spirit of moderation might prevail. But, is that
    spirit more likely to prevail if there are at least some
    announcements coming from the United States about the emphasis
    of what we wish to do? In other words, our public recognition
    of the possibilities of moving to assist the economy.
        Now, you've pointed out we have some multiyear
    responsibilities and commitments, but these are, I think, not
    well known to the American public, quite apart from the
    Pakistani public. Maybe even the testimony you have today, it
    would reiterate that we have these commitments already, and
    that you are working with the Congress to think through what
    more we can do. It might be reassuring, might help the
    stability or encourage moderation that you're discussing, as
    opposed to our taking a standoffish view, seeing how it all
    works out, but then being dismayed that, unfortunately, there
    were currents in Pakistani politics, that are not involved in
    the election, that are disturbingly surprised.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Well, first, I think--I would hope
    this hearing could be construed in the way that you suggest, as
    a----
        Senator Lugar. Yes.
        Ambassador Negroponte [continuing]. A relatively--as a
    positive statement about our interest, and a constructive
    statement about our interest in Pakistan.
        The other specific point I would mention is that I gather
    that introduction of this Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
    legislation may be fairly imminent, and I think that would
    certainly be well received in Pakistan, and demonstrate the
    fact that we're interested in being supportive of both
    Afghanistan and Pakistan's economic development.
        Senator Lugar. Well, I think you're very correct. And,
    without being self-serving about this, I would say that the
    bill that Senator Biden and I have introduced and has come from
    this committee has had a hold on the Senate floor for a while.
    That's the reason why a large majority of Senators who would
    like to express exactly what you are saying today have not had
    that opportunity. So, I'm hopeful that we can work with the
    House legislation, with the leadership of the Senate. I count
    upon my chairman to be persuasive with regard to that, because
    clearly this is timely, I believe, to reinforce all that we're
    saying today, in the event we appropriate the money, the means
    of spending it, and doing so properly, using both Defense
    Department people and State Department people, and others, for
    that matter, in a team effort, is really important.
        Ambassador Negroponte. And that--if you're referring to
    your civilian stabilization initiative, I think that's a
    groundbreaking idea. I really do, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Lugar. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        If I could follow up, just very briefly. And this falls in
    the category of above my paygrade. But--and mildly presumptuous
    to suggest to you, Mr. Ambassador, because I know you know how,
    sort of, voracious the foreign press is in some of these
    countries.
        One observation, which I'm sure is not instructive, but
    it--just a reminder--it astounded me, and, I think, my two
    colleagues, how uniform the press in Pakistan was when we held
    a departing press conference where there were--hundreds?--I
    mean, as large a press conference as I've ever attended, other
    than the Bork hearing--and there was almost an anger--there was
    an anger expressed, in the tone of the questions coming from
    the press, on the failure of the three of us to immediately
    call for the immediate resignation of Musharraf. And almost
    every question asked--and, unfortunately--well, not
    ``unfortunately''--we literally had to catch a plane, so we
    couldn't stay--was in the context of the promoted notion by the
    press that the administration was standing foursquare,
    notwithstanding the elections, behind Musharraf exercising a
    similar kind of power he's exercised in the past. I know that's
    not true. I know that's not the administration's position. But,
    in a sense--the point that Senator Lugar made--I strongly urge
    you to consider, to the extent that you can affect the White
    House's perception, as well, that--I truly believe, if you
    were--if the administration were to put forward a statement,
    essentially acknowledging Musharraf's comments that he made in
    the editorial in the--I guess, the Washington Post, or the New
    York Times, I can't remember what editorial he wrote--and the
    expectation that you believe he will, in fact, recede to the
    position of President and not Prime Minister, which is where
    the power is. If you were to state that you were working with
    the Congress to increase economic assistance, if you were to
    state that you were prepared and anxious to work with the new
    coalition government--people don't know that in the press in
    Pakistan. It's surprising.
        Now, I know we have a very fine Ambassador. I am truly
    impressed with her. All of us are. I think she's one of the
    finest we have. Obviously, she'd know better than either
    Senator--myself or any of us here, whether the characterization
    I have just made about what I think average Pakistanis reading
    the Pakistani press believe about our position, including our
    position on the court. And I really think it's an opportunity
    to begin to change perceptions on the ground.
        But, that's my perception. I would urge you--I know you
    would--I would urge you to speak with our Ambassador to see
    whether or not what I've said is accurate. And you would know
    as well as anyone.
        Second point I'd like to make, in closing--the reason we
    were waiting, I thought Senator Menendez, who's in another
    committee, was going to come back; he's not able to, but I'm
    sure he may have a few questions to submit for the record.
        Two closing observations. You referenced that we're doing
    more in Afghanistan. And we are doing more in Afghanistan. One
    of the most interesting things I've found, I say to my friend
    Dick Lugar, is that everyone we spoke to in Afghanistan, on the
    American side, from young soldiers we referenced, to our
    Ambassador, to the military, all started with an interesting
    opening comment, some version of what I'm about to say. We
    acknowledge we haven't done much from 2001 to 2006; we dropped
    the ball. Some version of that. But, from mid 2006 to now, we
    have begun to get this together. I found that refreshing, and I
    found that--not in an ``I told you so'' way, but I found it
    refreshing that there was a recognition that a lot more had to
    be done.
        But, I just put this one little statistic in your head--
    which I think is, at least from my perspective, a way of
    looking at the effort. From 2001 to today, we have spent the
    same amount of money and resources for reconstruction in
    Afghanistan that we spent in 3 weeks--3 weeks--on just military
    operations in Iraq. This is not to suggest--which I think we
    should, but I'm not making the case we should do less in Iraq,
    but I am just making the case that if the consensus you, kind
    of, heard from members here, on both sides of the aisle, that
    we think the fault line in the war on terror is on that border
    between Afghanistan and Pakistan, we think a great deal more
    has to be done in Afghanistan, both militarily and
    economically. And, again, I'm not suggesting you agree or
    disagree, I just want to make that observation.
        No matter how much more we've done, when you think of it in
    terms of 3 weeks is--as much is spent on military operations in
    Iraq as we've spent in 6 years on reconstruction in
    Afghanistan, it's kind of--it's a bit of a--it's a bit of a--
    it's not--it exaggerates, in some ways, but it really
    illustrates how much has to be done.
        But, I apologize, I see my friend Senator Nelson is here. I
    recognize the Senator. The Senator said he likes us very much,
    Senator, but this seniority system of asking questions, he's
    not as crazy about. I felt that exact way 'til I became
    chairman. [Laughter.]
        Senator Bill Nelson. I understand.
        Well, I have been--let me just be very complimentary of
    you. I came here so that I could hear you and hear the
    Secretary. And I came early, and not only did I listen to you,
    I asked for a copy of your remarks, which I have read. And----
        The Chairman. I'm about to reconsider this seniority thing.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I would just be curious if the
    Secretary would reflect specifically upon your remarks, Mr.
    Chairman. And I'm going to reread your remarks from your
    opening statement. And Senator Biden said, ``I believe we
    should, first, triple nonmilitary assistance, and sustain it
    for a decade, from about $500 million to about $1\1/2\ billion.
    This aid should be focused on schools, roads, and clinics, and
    on expanding the development of the tribal border areas.
    Second, give the new government, if it's formed consistent with
    the democratic principles, a democracy dividend of $1 billion
    above this annual assistance to jump-start progress. And,
    third, demand transparency and accountability in the military
    aid that we continue to provide.''
        Now, I think we can stipulate that we all agree to No. 3.
    I'd like to know your comments, Mr. Secretary, to the
    chairman's recommendations on one and two--triple nonmilitary
    assistance, especially to get it to schools, roads, and
    clinics; and, second, to give the new government a democracy
    dividend of a billion dollars above this annual assistance to
    jump-start progress.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right. Senator, as I said--it may
    have been when you weren't in the room--I said that this was a
    proposal we were looking at. At the same time, of course, we
    have our own budget proposal, at the moment, before the
    Congress, so I'm not in a position to say that, yes, we should
    modify that. But, what I did point out was, two things. First
    of all, that our 5-year, $3 billion assistance program to
    Pakistan from fiscal 2005 through fiscal 2009 will be expiring
    in 2009, so I think we have to start thinking about what we're
    going to be doing in the future years. And this election may,
    indeed, be a point of departure. And the chairman's suggestion
    may also be a point of departure for taking a hard look at
    that.
        And the other was to say that I think that the chairman's
    suggestion reminds us--and I think it highlights--the
    tremendous importance of this country--Pakistan, that is--to
    this global war on terror, and to the intrinsic importance of
    Pakistan itself. But, I wasn't in a position to explicitly
    agree or disagree with the idea of tripling nonmilitary
    assistance or paying a democracy dividend.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'll never forget--and I'll just
    stop with this, Mr. Chairman--early on in this decade, I was
    visiting Pakistan, and I so well remember our Ambassador, a
    career Foreign Service officer, expressing to me, in that
    visit, her frustration that our aid was not getting out to
    build those schools and to get those curriculum materials into
    the schools, that it was getting siphoned off into other
    things. And so, when you say ``schools, roads, and clinics,'' I
    certainly agree.
        And it's not only Pakistan. You know, it'll be most of the
    Third World that the assistance that we need to do is to get it
    there. And this is not the first time that somebody has raised
    this issue; it's a continuing problem.
        The Chairman. Well, if I can say to the Senator, before I
    yield to--you still have time, but before I yield to Senator
    Menendez--I do recall you coming back and making that assertion
    before the committee.
        What I would say to the Ambassador, Senator Lugar and I,
    before he left, we've agreed, with our staffs, to work on a
    joint bill that we would introduce along those lines.
        And I'd invite the Senator to join us and give his input on
    what that should look like. But, hopefully, we can, in light of
    the changed circumstances--the budget was offered prior to the
    election, and this may be a possibility. We can work out a 2009
    budget, here, and maybe, immediate, in the supplement, some
    additional help. But, I very much look to the Senator for his
    leadership on that, because I do recall you coming back, making
    the statement. I remember you saying to me that the Saudis had
    built 7,000 madrassas in that region, and why weren't we
    building schools in that region? So, I look forward to his
    participation.
        Senator Menendez, thanks for coming back.
        Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
    for holding this hearing. It's----
        The Chairman. Thanks.
        Senator Menendez [continuing]. Incredibly important. And I
    want to echo some of your remarks that our policy should be to
    Pakistan, as an entity, not to a person. And I think it's been
    one of our mistakes.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for being before the committee.
    And, unfortunately, I had another hearing at the same time,
    with Chairman Bernanke; and the economy is important, but so is
    our policy toward Pakistan, so I'm glad to be able to make it
    back.
        You know, in December we had a hearing, under the auspices
    of the full committee's--with the chairman's authority to have
    us have a hearing of the subcommittee on our aid issues. And,
    you know, when I look at the amount of money that we have spent
    in Pakistan to date, and now, looking at the results of the
    election, and looking at where we go from here, I am concerned,
    as the administration presents its latest requests to the
    Congress, whether we are headed in the right direction. I sent
    a letter to Secretary Rice on the 21st in which, you know, I
    outlined some of my concerns. Certainly, when I look at anti-
    Americanism, when I look at what has happened, in terms of the
    Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the FATA region, I really
    wonder--and so, now I'd like to get a sense of you, do we know
    how much money has actually been spent in the FATA region--of
    U.S. taxpayer dollars----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Well, in this----
        Senator Menendez [continuing]. Toward our----
        Ambassador Negroponte [continuing]. Fiscal year, the plan
    is for $150 million.
        Senator Menendez. Yes. No, that's----
        Ambassador Negroponte. You're asking----
        Senator Menendez [continuing]. This fiscal year. I'm asking
    what we've done----
        Ambassador Negroponte [continuing]. What's actually been
    disbursed?
        Senator Menendez. Yes.
        Ambassador Negroponte. I would have to submit that for the
    record.
        Senator Menendez. Well, if you would.
        Ambassador Negroponte. I certainly know that we've begun,
    you know, programs there. They're underway.
        Senator Menendez. Well, I'd like to know what we've
    actually----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Sure.
        Senator Menendez [continuing]. Spent. And how much do you
    think will be spent on development programs in that region?
        Ambassador Negroponte. In Pakistan?
        Senator Menendez. Well, particularly in the FATA region.
        Ambassador Negroponte. You mean, beyond the $150 million?
        Senator Menendez. Do you have a sense of what we have
    spent, to date? It's the same--you--you'd have to get that for
    the record, as well?
        Ambassador Negroponte. I think so, yes.
        [The written response from the State Department to the
    above questions follows:]

        The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement has
    spent $160 million since 2002 in the border areas. This money funds our
    Border Security Program, which includes road and other infrastructure
    construction, provision of an air wing, training of law enforcement
    agencies, and commodity support, as well as our Counternarcotics
    Program, which includes crop control and demand reduction efforts.
        The United States Agency for International Development has spent
    $12.4 million in the tribal areas since 2002 (when USAID returned to
    Pakistan). We started slowly because the Government of Pakistan was
    still working on a comprehensive plan for development of the tribal
    areas, which it completed in late 2006. The initial money was spent on
    vaccinating children in the region for tuberculosis and polio and
    prividing health services to children. USAID also rebuilt 38 schools
    and provided water and sanitation facilities in several girls' schools.
    Significantly, USAID used a private sector construction company from
    the North West Frontier Province to work on the schools, to demonstrate
    that private sector companies from the settled areas of Pakistan can
    operate inside the tribal areas, with appropriate safeguards, and earn
    a profit. Finally, we also have supported Kushhali Bank, a microfinance
    institution, to open branches in all seven tribal area agencies.

        Senator Menendez. OK. Let me just ask you, What are our
    expectations--as we look at the new leadership in Pakistan that
    has been elected and, what is our expectation of their
    engagement? They've been critical of President Musharraf's
    policies in supporting the United States in its effort,
    particularly in the tribal regions--what do we expect from this
    new leadership in Pakistan as it relates to this region? I
    focus on this region--of course, there's a lot of different
    issues in Pakistan that are important, but, you know, we get
    our intelligence reports as the--publicly--aspects of it--and
    they clearly say that one of the greatest single challenges to
    national security in the United States is al-Qaeda's
    reconstituted strength in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border,
    where it is also suspected that Osama bin Laden presently finds
    safe haven. We look at the money that we have spent to date. We
    now look at a new leadership elected by the people of Pakistan,
    who seem to have a different view. So, the question is, What do
    we expect of this new Pakistani leadership, as it relates to
    being engaged with us in dealing with the terrorism that
    emanates out of this safe haven?
        Ambassador Negroponte. First of all, a point I made earlier
    and several times during the hearing, we plan to work with
    whatever government emerges from this electoral process and
    from the national assembly. So, that would be my first point.
        Second, whatever one might say about Pakistan's efforts
    against militant extremism, I think it is important to point
    out that they--they, themselves, have suffered a very high
    number of casualties, both military and civilian, in this
    struggle. And I think what we would hope to do with this
    government is work in partnership with them, and be helpful
    where we can, in their efforts to curb and bring under control
    militancy, which we know that they, themselves, reject. And I
    think one--that's one of the clear results of these elections,
    is that the Pakistani people, themselves, do not want this kind
    of militant extremism in their midst.
        Senator Menendez. Well, I appreciate your answer, but
    here's my concern. Congress has a fiduciary responsibility to
    the American people, both in terms of the expenditure of its
    tax dollars, as well as in the preservation of its security.
    And the bottom line is, $10 billion later, since 9/11, we have
    not prevented al-Qaeda from operating in a safe zone along the
    Pakistan-Afghanistan border; you know, we have rising anti-
    Americanism; we have not, in my mind, pursued a policy that
    deals with the moderate center in Pakistan; and this FATA
    region is a huge challenge, notwithstanding--$10 billion later.
    So, I have--and then we have a terrible accounting process,
    where we can't seem to get a handle about what, in fact, we
    have spent, and how it has been spent, and, particularly,
    where, in fact, it has been spent, as it relates to the FATA
    region. So, before one can ask for more, one has to justify
    both the past, as well as make the case----
        Ambassador Negroponte. Right.
        Senator Menendez [continuing]. For the future. And that's
    the essence of my question.
        Ambassador Negroponte. No; I understand, Senator. The
    answer has several parts, but one part would certainly be, we
    don't know how much worse things would be if we hadn't gone
    through the efforts that we have gone through. For example,
    would we have been able to influence the Pakistani Government
    to send 100,000 troops into the FATA area? They've got two
    divisions there, as was being mentioned earlier. So, that's one
    of the results--or one of the acts for which we are providing
    these coalition support funds, the $5.6 billion that we've
    provided since 2001. They've done a lot of work against
    militant extremism. And in their own country they're revising
    their curriculum of these madrassas, for example, and of their
    school system, they're trying to secularize it. On the anti-
    Americanism issue, we've got 500 students--I think it's the
    largest Fulbright Program of any of our academic exchange
    programs here in the United States, with Pakistani students
    coming over here. So, this is work in progress.
        But, I would submit to you that the situation is--has
    improved in a number of important respects, and I certainly
    would hate to speculate as to how much worse it might be, had
    we not been engaged at all. But, I think it would have
    definitely been worse.
        Senator Menendez. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to
    belabor your--the time--and I appreciate it.
        But, you know, my--Mr. Secretary, you know, we can look at
    anything--any problem in our country, domestically or abroad,
    and say, ``Imagine if it would have been worse if we hadn't
    done this.'' The question is, spending billions to accomplish
    whatever your estimate of what has been accomplished is,
    compared to what has been accomplished, is the balance. And I
    would venture to say that many of us would say that we've far
    outspent what the accomplishments were. And if we think--
    whether it be in Iraq, or whether it be in Pakistan--that
    spending billions of the taxpayers' dollars for a relative
    small return is the rate in which we make estimations, then we
    are in deep trouble. I think that there's a--there is a lot
    larger expectation. And I'm not just going over the past, I'm
    now looking prospectively. And it just seems to me, at least
    speaking for this one member, that there has to be a far more
    robust accounting, as well as a convincing, and a--hopefully, a
    changing of the dynamics as to how we are spending our money
    for the purposes that we seek to achieve. We certainly want a
    stable, democratic Pakistan. But, at the same time, I find it
    increasingly difficult to go back to my home State of New
    Jersey or to chair the subcommittee on our foreign assistance,
    and say that, $10 billion later, we would consider the amount
    of money that we spend, for what we achieved, a success. I
    personally would not consider it a success.
        So, I think we need to do a lot better, as you look at this
    next budget. And I would really urge a--some better metrics
    than what we have today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        You've been very patient and responsive, Mr. Ambassador.
    Thank you very much.
        I was just having--and I'll conclude by saying--a brief
    conversation with the chief of staff, here--and I will follow
    up with Senator Lugar--but our hope is that we may be able to
    get together a consensus piece of--with the help of the
    chairman of the subcommittee--consensus piece of legislation
    relative to economic assistance, both in the supplemental,
    possibly, but also for FY09 budget, based on what I've heard
    here today, through the leadership of the subcommittee chair--I
    think there's a consensus here, and maybe be able to get, in
    that process, before we produce that for a markup here, have an
    opportunity to sit with you, or whomever you designate, Mr.
    Ambassador, to talk about the outlines of such a proposal.
        Again, I don't say that, at this point, about--arguing
    about whether or not what was proposed is appropriate or not
    appropriate. Things have changed. Things have changed in the
    last 2 weeks. And I hope we can agree on taking advantage of
    that change.
        Again, I thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Do you have any closing
    comments you wish to make, or--the floor is yours, if you do.
        Ambassador Negroponte. Just two points, Mr. Chairman, part
    of it answering the points that Mr. Menendez made, which--I
    understand his points. The only thing to say in reply is that
    it is a vital area, particularly the Afghanistan-Pakistan
    border. I believe Pakistan is the third-largest recipient of
    assistance from the United States, and, I think, deservedly so.
        And then, the other point I'd like to associate myself with
    is the point that both the chairman and, I think, by
    implication, Senator Nelson made, when he was asking the
    question--I do think that whatever we do with Pakistan, and for
    Pakistan, ought to be over the longer term. I think that our
    relationship with Pakistan in past years, particularly in the
    1980s and 1990s suffered from peaks and valleys and ups and
    downs. And I think that whatever we can do to put it on as a
    sustainable a basis as possible would be to the good for this
    vital country in a vital region of the world.
        The Chairman. I'm glad to hear you say that. And I would
    note, for the record--I know you--we all know this--but, that
    transactional relationship occurred with Democratic Presidents,
    as well as Republican Presidents, so it's not like--I just hope
    we do not make the mistake we, in hindsight, made with regard
    to Afghanistan, as it affects Pakistan, that, after the
    Russians were defeated, we essentially walked away. It would be
    a real disaster to do that. I think everybody is aware of that.
        And so, this is one of the areas, with your leadership, Mr.
    Ambassador, we really look forward to working with you. I think
    we can do something very positive here, and try to do it
    quickly.
        I thank you. And I thank my colleagues.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                  ----------

                       Material Submitted for the Record

      Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator From Illinois

        Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on ``U.S. Policy
    Options in Post-Election Pakistan.'' I also appreciate Deputy Secretary
    Negroponte's willingness to discuss his assessments related to this
    important topic.
        On February 18, a strong majority of the Pakistani people called
    for a new direction for their country. The two main opposition parties
    that made substantial gains in the parliamentary elections are moderate
    and have expressed a willingness to work with the United States. The
    stark choice that has been presented to us by the Bush administration--
    between President Musharraf on the one hand, and violent Islamists on
    the other--was shown to be false.
        This development presents an important opportunity for the United
    States to change its policy toward Pakistan. For years, U.S. policy has
    valued stability in Pakistan over the advancement of democracy--as a
    result, we have gotten neither. Our unconditional embrace of President
    Musharraf has stifled democratic reforms, stoked anti-American
    sentiment, and contributed to a level of instability that has hampered
    Pakistan's efforts to combat terrorism and extremism. Meanwhile, the
    Pakistani Government has failed to root out the al-Qaeda and Taliban
    sanctuary in its northwest tribal region.
        To advance American interests and American values, we need a policy
    toward Pakistan that promotes the interests of the Pakistani people,
    not just the interests of Pakistan's President. All citizens of the
    world have a fundamental right to live in freedom, and to express
    themselves through robust democratic institutions. To the extent that
    violence, censorship, and intimidation threaten to destabilize Pakistan
    and jeopardize its progress toward democracy, American national
    interests within Pakistan are more likely to suffer.
        Pakistan remains a critically important ally in the fight against
    al-Qaeda, and for this reason, I have been proud to support significant
    investments in its stability and economic development over the last
    several years. However, a more effective relationship with Pakistan can
    be established if we set sensible conditions on our foreign aid to
    Pakistan to ensure that it is advancing democracy and combating
    al-Qaeda with an effective approach.
        I believe we should continue funding for Pakistan in the areas of
    counterterrorism, public education, health, microenterprise
    development, humanitarian assistance, and democracy and rule of law
    programs. However, I believe we should temporarily suspend all other
    funding for Pakistan until we are sure that U.S. funds are not being
    used to repress democracy in Pakistan, and we should make military aid
    conditional on the Pakistani Government making substantial progress in
    closing down terrorist training camps, evicting foreign fighters, and
    preventing the Taliban from using Pakistan as a staging area for
    attacks in Afghanistan.
        If the Pakistani Government increases investments in secular
    education to counter radical madrasas, we should also increase
    America's financial commitment in this area. If the Pakistani
    Government does take action to combat al-Qaeda in its northwest tribal
    region, we must help Pakistan invest in the provinces along the Afghan
    border, so that the extremists' program of hate is met with one of
    hope.
        A Pakistan that is firmly rooted in seeking democracy and
    demonstrable progress in combating terrorism will be better for the
    people of Pakistan, and for American national security. And in the long
    term, a democratic ally will be a stronger ally in the fight against
    al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
        I will continue to press for a U.S. policy that demonstrates a
    commitment to the people of Pakistan, and a more effective approach to
    foreign assistance to promote democracy and roll back the forces of
    extremism.
                                     ______

      Responses of Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte to Questions
              Submitted for the Record by Senator Russell Feingold

        Question. During last week's hearing you noted that the final
    distribution decisions on coalition support funding is made by the
    Department of Defense, not by the United States Embassy in Pakistan,
    even though the Embassy does have a role to play. Senator Biden noted
    that the State Department has to sign off first, which you agreed with.
    In the interest of clarifying ``chief of mission'' authorities in
    circumstances such as our reimbursement to the Pakistani Government of
    such large sums of U.S. taxpayer dollars like the Coalition Support
    Funds, can you clarify what the specific process is and how decisions
    are made regarding what is and what is not reimbursed and who has final
    clearance of any reimbursement?

        Answer. The Government of Pakistan submits Coalition Support Fund
    claims through the Office of the Defense Representative at the U.S.
    Embassy in Islamabad where they are reviewed for completeness and
    accuracy, and valid claims are then endorsed. Claims are then reviewed
    by U.S. Central Command which validates that Pakistan provided support
    to war on terror objectives and U.S. operations and that costs would
    not have been incurred by Pakistan otherwise. Next, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) evaluates the claims to ensure costs
    are reasonable compared with U.S. costs for the same services and
    operations to show cost savings and are credible based on the
    documentation provided. The claims are then coordinated with the
    Department of State, which must concur on the reimbursement and confirm
    that it is in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives, is consistent
    with U.S. Government National Security Strategy, and does not
    unfavorably affect the balance of power in the region. Concurrently,
    the Office of Management and Budget must give concurrence. After
    receiving Department of State concurrence, the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (Comptroller) prepares a determination for the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense to sign a notification to Congress. Once the 15-
    day congressional notification period expires, the Comptroller releases
    funds to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for payment to
    Pakistan.
        Decisions regarding what is and what is not reimbursed are made
    throughout the auditing process, which takes place at the three
    entities noted above--the Office of the Defense Representative at the
    Embassy, U.S. Central Command, and the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller).
        Final clearance on the reimbursement is provided by the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense and is dependent upon concurrence from the
    Department of State. In addition Pakistan can only receive Coalition
    Support Funds reimbursement after a 15-day congressional notification
    period. Thus, congressional approval is also a necessary part of the
    process.
        We note that the Defense Department has provided detailed
    information on Coalition Support Funds claims processed for Pakistan
    since 2001 to Congress.
        Our understanding is that the information has been made available
    to members of this committee.

        Question. Can you expand on how the State Department here in
    Washington engages with the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan regarding both
    major and minor policy decisions? How regularly are there back and
    forth conversations, and how much input does the Embassy have into any
    policy changes that might occur? How frequently does the U.S. Embassy
    in Pakistan speak with the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan and what
    mechanisms exist to ensure they can communicate regularly?

        Answer. The Department and U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and its
    consulates in Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi work closely as a single
    team to develop and implement policies. The impressive array of formal
    reporting that the Department receives daily from these posts and the
    numerous e-mails exchanged guides the policymaking process on major and
    minor issues. The Department's Bureau for South Asia and Central
    Affairs Front Office, Office of Pakistan and Bangladesh Affairs, and
    Office of Afghanistan Affairs consult daily with posts via phone and e-
    mail to receive the latest updates on political events in Pakistan and
    discuss policy developments in Washington. A large number of Department
    offices are also involved when issues relate to their responsibilities
    and expertise. The Bureau for South Asia and Central Affairs and
    Embassy Islamabad began holding a bi-weekly video conference to discuss
    overall strategy and policy priorities, among other specific issues.
    Department policy moves forward only with Embassy guidance and input--
    initiatives, both major and minor, are determined with the guidance and
    input of the Ambassador and her staff who communicate closely with the
    Government of Pakistan and other elements of Pakistani society.
        Embassies Islamabad and Kabul work closely together. In addition to
    regular consultation between our two Ambassadors in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, Embassy personnel monitor cable traffic from both posts
    closely and report back and forth as needed. Numerous e-mails are
    exchanged daily. Border Coordinator positions in Islamabad, Kabul, and
    Washington serve to increase our ability to focus on the transborder
    region and advance our goal of drawing the Afghan and Pakistani
    Governments into cooperative projects to address that region's
    problems.

        Question. In last week's hearing you stated that the State
    Department is in a ``wait and see mode'' as far as working with
    whatever government officially emerges from the recent elections. To
    that end, could you be more specific with regards to what kinds of
    scenarios the State Department is developing to react to any changes a
    new government might make to existing institutions, including the
    Pakistani military. If President Musharraf does step down--or is forced
    to react--how will State react?

        Answer. The two largest parties in Pakistan's February 18
    parliamentary elections, the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan
    Muslim League-Nawaz, formed a coalition government in March 2008. We
    are engaging with the new government to pursue our critical national
    interests and to strengthen and build a broad-based, long-term
    relationship between our two countries. Most recently, President Bush
    met with Prime Minister Gilani in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on May 18,
    and several senior U.S. officials have met government leaders since
    March.
        We encourage all political parties to work together to continue
    Pakistan's development as a progressive, moderate, and stable country
    at a key geopolitical crossroads. Pakistan faces tough economic,
    governance, and security challenges that affect the Pakistani people on
    a daily basis. We speak regularly with Pakistan's leaders about
    developing solutions to those real and pressing problems.
        Moving forward, one of our major objectives is to help Pakistan
    develop its civilian institutions, in order to build a more stable
    relationship between its civilian and military establishments. The
    military has made several visible efforts to demonstrate its commitment
    in this regard. For example, in April, Army chief General Kayani
    formally briefed Prime Minister Gilani and the Cabinet on security
    developments in the FATA, demonstrating the military's acknowledgment
    of the civilian government's leadership role. Another positive step we
    have seen in this direction is that the Pakistani military recently
    recalled all military personnel working in civilian government
    positions to return to military jobs.
        Pakistan's democratic development is an on-going process that we
    support but do not seek to drive. It is up to the Pakistani people and
    their elected leaders to choose a path toward democracy that achieves
    peace and stability and advances freedom and prosperity. We will
    continue to work closely with Pakistans to pursue our national
    interests and to strengthen our countries' long-term partnership.

        Question. I have long supported international volunteering--both
    for the personal benefits accrued to the individual volunteers and the
    broader benefits, such as a more positive and accurate image of
    Americans and of America. The U.S. Agency for International Development
    (USAID) has established an office of Coordinator for Volunteer Service,
    strengthening the agency's management of volunteer programs sponsored
    or supported by USAID. One example of these programs is the Farmer-to-
    Farmer program, authorized by Congress and managed by USAID, which
    enables U.S. agricultural experts to assist developing country farmers
    through sharing modern practices and technologies. Can you discuss the
    nature, extent, and benefits of these types of programs in Pakistan?
    What recommendations does USAID have to increase Americans' engagement
    in areas of development need in Pakistan?

        Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development established
    the Office of Coordinator for Volunteer Service to better align three
    agency-managed volunteer programs: The Farmer-to-Farmer program; the
    Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance; and Volunteers for Prosperity.
        Like the Farmer-to-Farmer program, Volunteers for Economic Growth
    Alliance is housed within USAID's Bureau for Economic Growth,
    Agriculture and Trade. Established by USAID in 2004, Volunteers for
    Economic Growth Alliance utilizes skilled volunteers with experience in
    a variety of sectors through a consortium of 15 U.S.-based
    nongovernmental organizations to support the agency's field activities
    in economic growth. Through December 2007, Volunteers for Economic
    Growth Alliance deployed 149 American volunteers on 194 assignments.
        Volunteers for Prosperity is an interagency initiative that was
    established in September 2003 by President Bush through executive order
    to promote greater international volunteer service by skilled American
    professionals. Led by the Volunteers for Prosperity Office of USAID's
    Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, Volunteers
    for Prosperity has (as of September 30, 2007) helped to mobilize 74,000
    American professionals--doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, business
    people, and others--in support of the nation's global health and
    prosperity agenda through a network of over 250 U.S. companies and
    nonprofit organizations.
        Currently, the Farmer-to-Farmer program has no involvement in
    Pakistan. None of the agreements awarded in 2003 to eight implementing
    U.S. nongovernment organizations proposed work in Pakistan. From 2004
    to 2008, the Farmer-to-Farmer program will operate in 40 countries,
    providing over 3,000 volunteer technical assistance assignments
    averaging 3\1/2\ weeks duration.
        USAID believes that any measures for increasing Americans'
    engagement in areas of development need in Pakistan should include
    consideration of the current situation regarding the security and
    safety of Americans. The State Department has an advisory in effect for
    Americans traveling in Pakistan because they have been targeted for
    violence in various locations throughout the country.
        USAID believes that one option for increasing Americans' engagement
    in Pakistan's development could involve strengthening Volunteers for
    Prosperity. There is ample justification for a stronger Volunteers for
    Prosperity program. Already the most active of the three in Pakistan--
    and operating on a considerably smaller budget than either of its
    peers--Volunteers for Prosperity may be particularly well-suited for
    increasing Americans' engagement in the development of Pakistan because
    of its focus and experience managing obstacles facing Americans seeking
    to volunteer abroad.
        Volunteers for Prosperity is helping to engage more Americans in
    development throughout the world by addressing significant obstacles to
    their volunteer service.
        Given its focus and utility in addressing obstacles to volunteer
    service abroad, providing Volunteers for Prosperity with greater
    authority and scope as well as additional resources could prove a
    worthwhile option for increasing Americans' engagement in Pakistan's
    development as well as the development of other countries.
                                     ______

                  Articles Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer

                       [From The Guardian, Feb. 28, 2008]

           Pakistani Military ``Misspent up to 70% of American Aid''

    U.S. EMBASSY STAFF BELIEVE EXPENSES CLAIMS--INFLATED ARMED FORCES DENY
                             SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES

                         (By Declan Walsh in Islamabad)

        America's massive military aid package to Pakistan is being
    scrutinised after allegations that as much as 70% of $5.4bn in
    assistance to the country has been misspent.
        Since 2002 the U.S. has paid the operating costs of Pakistan's
    military operations in the tribal belt along the Afghan border, where
    Taliban and al-Qaida fighters are known to shelter.
        Pakistan provides more than 100,000 troops and directs the battles;
    the U.S. foots the bill for food, fuel, ammunition and maintenance. The
    cash payments--averaging $80m (=40m) a month--have been a cornerstone
    of U.S. support for Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf.
        But over the past 18 months, as militants have seized vast areas of
    the tribal belt and repelled a string of Pakistani offensives, the
    funding has come under the microscope.
        American officials processing the payments at the U.S. Embassy in
    Islamabad have concluded that the Pakistani expense claims have been
    vastly inflated, two western military officials have told the Guardian.
    ``My back of envelope guesstimate is that 30% of the money they
    requested to be reimbursed was legitimate costs they had expended,''
    said one, speaking on condition of anonymity.
        The official said that the U.S. did not know what had happened to
    the remaining 70% of the funds--amounting to approximately $3.8bn--but
    suspected that some of the money might have been spent on F-16 fighter
    jets or ``a new house for an army general.''
        Other than those possibilities, he said, at least half the money
    was thought to have disappeared. ``Who knows, the roads on Constitution
    Avenue [in Islamabad] may have been paved with part of this money,'' he
    added.
        The Pakistani military denied the claims. ``As far as the military
    is concerned, I can assure you we have full account of these things,''
    said its spokesman, Major General Athar Abbas. He admitted that there
    had been some American complaints but denied serious irregularities.
    ``Yes there are minor issues they keep raising, but at no stage have we
    received any formal complaint from any official channel.''
        The controversy highlights not only strains in the relationship
    between Washington and Islamabad but also the limits of George Bush's
    ``war on terror.'' Pakistani officials say they have lost more than
    1,000 soldiers in the tribal areas since 2002--twice as many as the
    U.S. has lost in Afghanistan--and caught or killed more than 1,000
    ``terrorists.''
        U.S. officials, who have propped up Musharraf as militants have
    rampaged across the tribal belt and beyond, feel they have received bad
    value for money.
        Pakistani civilians are angry with both sides. Anti-American
    sentiment has hit a new high, while anger towards Musharraf contributed
    to the thrashing his party received in last week's election.
        The scale of U.S. military assistance was shrouded in secrecy for
    years. When it became public, so did its extraordinarily lax accounting
    procedures.
        Every month the Pakistani military submits expense claims averaging
    $80m to the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. No receipts are provided to
    support the claims, and the money is paid directly into the finance
    ministry.
        Poorly accounted-for claims for payment caused the U.S. to suspend
    payouts several months last spring, a second western official said. The
    Washington Post reported last week that a claim for ``roads and
    tracks'' from the Pakistani navy had been rejected. Abbas claimed that
    the navy was ``also involved in the war on terror'' in having to
    ``guard against infiltration of arms and explosive from abroad.''
        The scale of the problem has led U.S. officials to share their
    worries with other allies in Pakistan. American politicians have used
    the payments to exert pressure on Musharraf. On the eve of last week's
    vote, Democrat Senator, Joe Biden, head of the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee, warned that funding could be slashed if there was widespread
    rigging. But analysts and officials say the U.S. is unlikely to turn
    off the cash tap any time soon given Pakistan's importance in the hunt
    for Osama bin Laden and other foreign fugitives.

                                     ______

     Executive Summary From ``Terror-Free Tomorrow: The Center for Public
                                   Opinion''

        In a resounding setback for American policy, Pakistanis strongly
    favor their own government not fighting against al-Qaeda and the
    Taliban, but negotiating with them instead. Public support for al-Qaeda
    is also gaining ground since earlier this year.
        Important Parliamentary by-elections are scheduled in Pakistan for
    June 26. In the first poll before the elections, our survey shows that
    Nawaz Sharif is now the most popular political leader in Pakistan. Mr.
    Sharif's party, the PML-N, would emerge as the clear winner in any
    national contest, far eclipsing the current largest party in
    Parliament, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).
        These are among the many findings of a new and extensive nationwide
    public opinion survey from May 25 to June 1, 2008, across Pakistan,
    covering both urban and rural areas and all provinces. The survey, with
    face-to-face interviews of 1,306 Pakistanis age 18 or older and a
    margin of error of 3 percent, was conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow:
    The Center for Public Opinion, in collaboration with the New America
    Foundation, and field work inside Pakistan by the Pakistan Institute
    for Public Opinion, an affiliate of Gallup Pakistan. The survey is the
    third nationwide poll over the past 9 months conducted by Terror Free
    Tomorrow and Gallup Pakistan.

       PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AL-QAEDA, THE TALIBAN AND BIN LADEN INCREASES;

         pakistanis decisively favor negotiations over military action
        Half of all Pakistanis want their government to negotiate and not
    fight al-Qaeda, with less than a third saying military action by the
    Pakistani Government against al-Qaeda is called for. (For Pakistani
    Taliban, 58 percent favor negotiating to 19 percent for military
    action.)
        Pakistan is considered by most national security experts to be the
    home base of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and many Taliban fighters. From
    a safe haven in the border areas of Pakistan, they are free to train,
    plan and launch attacks inside Afghanistan and elsewhere. Indeed, last
    week, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
    that the planning to hit America itself with another terrorist attack
    is now taking place--and that it would come from Pakistan.
        The new Pakistani civilian government has begun a controversial
    policy of negotiating with certain Pakistani Taliban fighters--though
    not with al-Qaeda.
        In stark opposition to American policy, the Pakistani people
    themselves would go even further than their own government and not only
    negotiate with Pakistani Taliban fighters, but with both Arab al-Qaeda
    and Afghan Taliban fighters as well, decisively opposing any military
    action.
        Even before the latest American military incursion (which occurred
    after our poll was complete), a mere 12 percent of Pakistanis supported
    any unilateral American military action against al-Qaeda fighters
    inside Pakistan. Strong opposition to the U.S. military has also
    intensified since earlier this year.
        Favorable opinion toward al-Qaeda is mounting inside Pakistan. A
    third of Pakistanis now voice a positive view, nearly double the
    percentage from earlier this year. Similarly, for bin Laden, 34 percent
    currently have a favorable opinion, up from 24 percent in January (but
    still below the 46 percent who thought so in August 2007). Trust for
    American motives has sunk to new lows: Three quarters of Pakistanis say
    that the real purpose of the U.S.-led war on terror is to weaken the
    Muslim world and dominate Pakistan.
        Significantly, when asked who was most responsible for the violence
    that is occurring in Pakistan today, more than half (52 percent) blame
    the United States--only 8 percent al-Qaeda fighters.
        Despite the spate of suicide bombings that have shaken Pakistan at
    the apparent hands of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistanis see the
    United States as posing the greatest threat to their own personal
    safety. Forty-four percent of Pakistanis think the United States poses
    the greatest threat to their personal safety (traditional enemy India
    is next at 14 percent). By contrast, a mere 6 percent feel al-Qaeda is
    a threat, with 4 percent the Afghan Taliban and 8 percent the Pakistani
    Taliban.
             pakistanis agree with al-qaeda goals, but not tactics
        Al-Qaeda's considerable goodwill inside Pakistan is generated by
    their perceived goals, which Pakistanis say they largely share. More
    than any other goal, Pakistanis think that standing up to America is
    the goal of bin Laden and al-Qaeda--and 57 percent agree with that al-
    Qaeda goal. Likewise, the most important reason for backing al-Qaeda/
    bin Laden for almost two-thirds of their supporters was the perception
    that they stand up to America and lead a defensive jihad against it.
        Pakistanis, however, continue to oppose suicide attacks, with 14
    percent thinking these attacks can often or sometimes be justified.
    Pakistani opposition to suicide attacks extends to whoever is the
    intended target, with opposition equally highest to both Pakistani and
    American civilians and dropping slightly for Pakistani and American
    military personnel.

     BEFORE UPCOMING BY-ELECTIONS, NAWAZ SHARIF AND THE PML-N OVERTAKE THE
                   PPP AS THE MOST POPULAR PARTY IN PAKISTAN

        In another dramatic reversal of Pakistani public opinion, Nawaz
    Sharif has emerged, by far, as the most popular political leader in
    Pakistan today. In advance of the June 26 Parliamentary by-elections in
    Pakistan, a striking 86 percent of Pakistanis have a favorable opinion
    of Mr. Sharif, a former Pakistani Prime Minister with conservative
    Islamist ties that have made some American policymakers indicate
    concern.
        Mr. Sharif has also seen a steady rise in his popularity, from 57
    percent favorable in our August 2007 poll, to 74 percent in January
    2008 and 86 percent today. As significantly, those with a very
    favorable opinion have almost doubled since January 2008 to 43 percent
    now--a level no other political figure in Pakistan comes even close to.
    (By comparison, Mr. Zardari, leader of the PPP, just has a 13 percent
    very favorable rating.)
        If national elections were held today, Mr. Sharif's party, the PML-
    N, would emerge as the clear winner, garnering 42 percent of the vote
    to the PPP's 32 percent. The PML-N has witnessed a significant surge in
    popularity. From only 15 percent saying they would vote for them in our
    August 2007 poll, to 25 percent in our preelection January poll (which
    mirrored the actual election results), the party today stands at 42
    percent, the most popular party in Pakistan.
    pakistanis hold their government responsible for the high food and fuel

      PRICES; WANT INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND BLAME PPP AND MUSHARRAF FOR
                         IMPASSE OVER RESTORING JUDGES

        The reasons for the rise of Mr. Sharif and the declining fortunes
    of others inside Pakistan can be found in widespread Pakistani
    discontent with the status quo.
        The high cost of food and fuel is hitting ordinary Pakistanis hard.
    An overwhelming 86 percent of Pakistanis have faced increasing
    difficulty in obtaining flour for their daily food consumption--
    primarily because of high prices. And Pakistanis consider their own
    government most responsible.
        Similarly, 81 percent have been affected by the high price of fuel,
    with again, in their view, the Pakistani Government most responsible,
    only for fuel closely followed by American and Western oil companies.
        Overall, just 20 percent of Pakistanis think their country is
    heading in the right direction. With the highest priority Pakistanis
    have for their government (even slightly higher than the economy) an
    independent judiciary, most Pakistanis now blame the PPP and President
    Musharraf for failing to restore the judges sacked by Mr. Musharraf
    last fall. Almost three-quarters of Pakistanis want Mr. Musharraf to
    resign and if he doesn't, to be removed by Parliament as President.
        Dissatisfaction with the current civilian government does not mean,
    however, that the public wants the Pakistani military to return to
    political affairs. In our survey last August, 45 percent approved of
    the military playing a role in the political and economic affairs of
    the country. That number has now dropped to 28 percent, while those who
    disapprove have steadily risen from 46 percent last August to 64
    percent now, with those strongly disapproving doubling to over half.

             OPINION OF THE U.S. STILL NEGATIVE, BUT OPEN TO CHANGE

        While attitudes towards the United States and particularly the
    American war on terror remain strongly negative, Pakistanis say that a
    change in American policy toward Pakistan would bring about a stunning
    change in Pakistani public opinion toward the United States.
        Two-thirds of Pakistanis said that policies ranging from increased
    American business investment, free trade, educational aid, disaster
    assistance, medical care/training and increased U.S. visas for
    Pakistanis would significantly improve their opinion of the United
    States.
        More than two-thirds of Pakistanis who now have favorable views of
    al-Qaeda and bin Laden said they would also significantly change their
    opinion of the U.S. with these new American policies.
        Indeed, the number of Pakistanis who are now willing to view the
    United States more positively with new American actions is higher than
    at any other time that we have measured in our surveys.
                                     ______

                       [From FOXNews.com, Jan. 23, 2008]

                    Musharraf: Pakistan Isn't Hunting Usama

        Pervez Musharraf says he still gets the question a lot: When will
    Usama bin Laden and his top deputy be caught? The Pakistani president
    insists it's more important for his 100,000 troops on the Afghan border
    to root out the Taliban than search for Al Qaeda leaders.
        That bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are still at large ``doesn't
    mean much,'' the former general said Tuesday on the second day of a
    swing through Europe. He suggested they are far less a threat to his
    regime than Taliban-linked militants entrenched in Pakistan's west.
        Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are believed to be hiding somewhere in
    the lawless tribal areas along Afghanistan's frontier with Pakistan.
        ``The 100,000 troops that we are using . . . are not going around
    trying to locate Usama bin Laden and Zawahiri, frankly,'' Musharraf
    told a conference at the French Institute for International Relations.
    ``They are operating against terrorists, and in the process, if we get
    them, we will deal with them certainly.''
        A U.S. ally in its war on extremist groups, Musharraf has come
    under increasing pressure following the assassination of opposition
    leader Benazir Bhutto last month and for his brief declaration of
    emergency rule in early November.
        Musharraf, who as commander of Pakistan's military seized power in
    a bloodless coup in 1999, said the remnants of Afghanistan's former
    Taliban regime and its Pakistani sympathizers are the ``more serious
    issue'' for both countries.
        But he said there was ``zero percent chance'' that Al Qaeda, the
    Taliban and their Pakistani allies could defeat his 500,000-strong army
    or that Islamic militants could win control of the government in Feb.
    18 parliamentary elections.
        As part of the ``multi-pronged strategy'' against terrorists,
    Pakistan has erected fences ``selectively'' and set up 1,000
    checkpoints along the Afghan border in an effort to stop militants from
    using the areas to launch attacks inside the neighboring nation, he
    said.
        Musharraf credited cooperation between Pakistani intelligence
    services and the CIA, both of whom believe that Pakistani militant
    leader Baitullah Mehsud was the mastermind of the Dec. 27 gun and
    suicide bomb attack that killed Bhutto.
        But in Washington, the State Department's counterterrorism chief,
    Dell Dailey, said the Bush administration was displeased with ``gaps in
    intelligence'' received from Pakistan about the activities of extremist
    groups in the tribal regions.
        ``We don't have enough information about what's going on there. Not
    on Al Qaeda. Not on foreign fighters. Not on the Taliban,'' he said.
        Dailey, a retired Army lieutenant general with extensive background
    in special operations, said Pakistan needs to fix the problem. He said
    the U.S. wasn't likely to conduct military strikes inside Pakistan on
    its own, saying that would anger many Pakistanis.
        Musharraf played down the impact of recent attacks by extremists in
    the border region of South Waziristan, calling them ``pinpricks'' that
    his government must manage--not a sign of a resurgent Taliban.
        Attacks on forts in that district over the last month--including a
    battle Tuesday--have fanned concerns that militants with links to Al
    Qaeda and the Taliban may be gaining control in the region.
        Pakistan's army said fighting at the fort and another clash killed
    at least seven paramilitary border guards and 37 militants Tuesday.
        The border region emerged as a front line in the war on extremist
    groups after Musharraf allied Pakistan with the U.S. following the
    Sept. 11 terror attacks. Washington has given Pakistan billions of
    dollars in aid to help government forces battle militants.
        Rising violence in the border region and a series of suicide
    attacks across Pakistan that killed hundreds in recent months have
    added to uncertainty before next month's elections, which many people
    predict will further weaken Musharrafs grip on power.
        Despite turmoil at home, Musharraf defended his visit to four
    European countries, saying he wasn't concerned about the stability of
    his regime while he was away.
        ``I can assure you that nothing will happen in Pakistan,'' he said.
    ``We are not a banana republic.''
        French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who met privately with Musharraf
    on Tuesday, expressed support for Pakistan's fight with extremists and
    promised to press for increased European Union aid when France takes
    over the bloc's rotating presidency in July, Sarkozy's office said.