[Senate Hearing 110-612]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-612
THE STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND RECENT REPORTS BY THE AFGHANISTAN STUDY
GROUP AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 14, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
45-501 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Strategy in Afghanistan and Recent Reports by the Afghanistan Study
Group and the Atlantic Council of the United States
february 14, 2008 (a.m. session)
Page
Shinn, Hon. James J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Policy............................................. 9
Boucher, Hon. Richard A., Assistant Secretary of State for South
and Central Asian Affairs...................................... 13
Continuation of the Strategy in Afghanistan and Recent Reports by the
Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council of the United States
february 14, 2008 (p.m. session)
Jones, Gen. James L., USMC (Ret.), President and CEO of the
Institute for 21st Century Energy, United States Chamber of
Commerce, and Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Atlantic
Council of the United States................................... 62
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl F., John O. Rankin Professor of the
Practice of International Affairs, The George Washington
University..................................................... 65
ANNEX A.......................................................... 100
ANNEX B.......................................................... 104
ANNEX C.......................................................... 141
ANNEX D.......................................................... 155
ANNEX E.......................................................... 166
ANNEX F.......................................................... 169
ANNEX G.......................................................... 178
(iii)
THE STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND RECENT REPORTS BY THE AFGHANISTAN STUDY
GROUP AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley,
professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Ali Z. Pasha,
and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Tim Becker, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J.
Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant
to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator
Collins; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W.
Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III,
assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
First, let me welcome our witnesses. We very much
appreciate their being with us today. They're adjusting their
schedules to accommodate ours. There is a memorial service
going on for Congressman Tom Lantos, which is the reason that
I, at least, had to delay this until now. We very much
appreciate, as always, the cooperation and advice of Senator
Warner as to how to approach these delays in the scheduling
today.
Senator Warner. But, this was very, very well-deserved.
Congressman Lantos was an extraordinary member; and you and I,
throughout our long careers, have intertwined our official
duties with him many times in many places of the world.
Chairman Levin. Indeed, we've traveled with Tom Lantos, and
know him and Annette well. The eloquent testimony that's now
being delivered about his life goes on as we speak here, and we
shall all miss him, his committee, and his love of this Nation.
The committee, today, receives testimony on the situation
in Afghanistan, including the assessments contained in two
recently released reports from the Afghanistan Study Group and
The Atlantic Council of the United States.
Our witnesses on this morning's panel are Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,
James Shinn; Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central
Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher; and Lieutenant General John
Sattler, the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, of
the Joint Staff.
This afternoon at 2:30, this committee will hear from two
experts who participated in preparing the independent reports
on Afghanistan, Retired General Jim Jones, chairman of the
board of directors of The Atlantic Council, and Ambassador Rick
Inderfurth, professor of the Practice of International Affairs
at George Washington University. Both General Jones and
Ambassador Inderfurth participated in the Afghanistan Study
Group, which is established under the auspices of the Center
for the Study of the Presidency.
The American people understand the stakes in Afghanistan.
Unlike the war in Iraq, the connection between Afghanistan and
the terrorist threat that manifested itself on September 11 has
always been clear. American support for the mission in
Afghanistan remains strong.
Last week, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
Admiral McConnell, reiterated the significance of the threat
emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. He told
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that al Qaeda's
central leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is al
Qaeda's, ``most dangerous component.'' He added that the safe
havens that extremists enjoy in the tribal areas along the
Pakistan border serve, ``as a staging area for al Qaeda's
attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as a
location for training new terrorist operatives for attacks in
Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United
States.''
For too long, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have
taken a backseat to the war in Iraq, leaving our forces in
Afghanistan short of what they need. Admiral Mullen
acknowledged as much in December, calling the Afghanistan
mission an, ``economy-of-force operation.'' He added, ``it is
simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we
do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must.''
Last year, Congress took action to strengthen the focus on
Afghanistan. The National Defense Authorization Act included
several measures to increase transparency and expand
congressional oversight, including establishing a special
inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, requiring the
President to submit a comprehensive strategy for security and
stability in Afghanistan, and provide regular updates on the
progress of that strategy, and requiring a report on plans for
the long-term sustainment of the Afghanistan National Security
Forces. The President continues to paint a rosy picture of the
situation in Afghanistan. Last Friday, he said that, in
Afghanistan, ``the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies are on
the run.'' But, the reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and
The Atlantic Council provide more sobering assessments of the
situation on the ground. Among the findings of those reports
are the following:
Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are, quote, ``faltering,''
according to the Afghanistan Study Group report. That report
finds that, since 2002, ``violence, insecurity, and opium
production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in
their government and its international partners falls.''
The Atlantic Council report states that, ``Make no mistake,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in
Afghanistan.'' Instead, the security situation, according to
The Atlantic Council report, is ``a strategic stalemate, with
NATO and Afghan forces able to win any head-to-head
confrontation with the Taliban, but not being able to eliminate
the insurgency, so long as the Taliban enjoys safe haven across
the border with Pakistan.''
The antigovernment insurgency threatening Afghanistan ``has
grown considerably over the last 2 years,'' according to the
Afghanistan Study Group. Last year was the deadliest since 2001
for U.S. and international forces. The Taliban are relying
increasingly on terrorism and ambushes, including over 140
suicide bombings in 2007. The Afghanistan Study Group report
also finds that ``the Taliban have been able to infiltrate many
areas throughout the country,'' intimidating and coercing the
local Afghan people.
The reports find that more U.S. and international forces
are needed for Afghanistan. The NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) currently consisting of more than
43,000 soldiers from 40 countries, remains short of the troops
and equipment that it needs to meet mission requirements. These
shortfalls include maneuver battalions, helicopters, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
The United States has announced its intention to deploy an
additional 3,200 marines, and other NATO members have upped
their contributions, including Britain and Poland. Yet, as the
Afghanistan Study Group points out, more NATO countries need to
share the burden and remove national caveats that limit the
ability of their troops to participate in ISAF operations.
Opium production continues to be at record levels. The
Atlantic Council calls drug production ``the most striking sign
of the international community's failure.'' That report cites
World Bank estimates that around 90 percent of the world's
illegal opium comes from Afghanistan. A report this month from
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime finds that
cultivation levels this year are likely to be similar to last
year's ``shockingly high level.''
The Afghanistan Study Group finds that the need for greater
international coordination is ``acute,'' in their word.
Contributors to Afghanistan reconstruction include over 40
countries, the United Nations, the World Bank, the European
Union, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Unfortunately,
the recent withdrawal of the widely respected Paddy Ashdown
from consideration for the position of United Nations
International Coordinator for Afghanistan, reportedly at the
request of the Karzai Government, is a real setback. The
Atlantic Council report concludes, ``In summary, despite
efforts of the Afghan Government and the international
community, Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become
a failed state.''
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning
concerning recommendations for getting Afghanistan on the right
track. I hope they'll address the assessments and
recommendations of the reports of the Afghanistan Study Group
and The Atlantic Council. These reports highlight the urgent
need for the administration to reassess its approach, to ensure
that Afghanistan moves towards a stable and progressive state,
and never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists intent on
exporting violence and extremism.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
Good morning and welcome to our witnesses.
Today, the committee receives testimony on the situation in
Afghanistan, including the assessments contained in two recently-
released reports from the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic
Council of the United States.
Our witnesses on this morning's panel are: Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, James Shinn; Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard
Boucher; and Lieutenant General John Sattler, Director for Strategic
Plans and Policy, J5, the Joint Staff.
This afternoon at 2:30 the committee will hear from two experts who
participated in preparing the independent reports on Afghanistan:
retired General Jim Jones, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Atlantic Council; and Ambassador Rick Inderfurth, Professor of the
Practice of International Affairs, at the George Washington University.
Both General Jones and Ambassador Inderfurth participated in the
Afghanistan Study Group, which is established under the auspices of the
Center for the Study of the Presidency.
The American people understand the stakes in Afghanistan. Unlike
with the war in Iraq, the connection between Afghanistan and the
terrorist threat that manifested itself on September 11 has always been
clear. American support for the mission in Afghanistan remains strong.
Last week, Director of National Intelligence Admiral McConnell
reiterated the significance of the threat emanating from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. He told the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence that al Qaeda's central leadership, based in the border
area of Pakistan, is al Qaeda's ``most dangerous component.'' He added
that the safe havens that extremists enjoy in the tribal areas along
the Pakistan border serve ``as a staging area for al Qaeda's attacks in
support of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as a location for
training new terrorist operatives, for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle
East, Africa, Europe, and the United States.''
For too long, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have taken a
back seat to the war in Iraq, leaving our forces in Afghanistan short
of what they need.
Admiral Mullen acknowledged as much in December, calling the
Afghanistan mission an ``economy of force operation.'' He said, ``It is
simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what
we can. In Iraq, we do what we must.''
Last year, Congress took action to strengthen the focus on
Afghanistan. The National Defense Authorization Act included several
measures to increase transparency and expand congressional oversight,
including: establishing a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction; requiring the President to submit a comprehensive
strategy for security and stability in Afghanistan and provide regular
updates on the progress of that strategy; and requiring a report on
plans for the long-term sustainment of the Afghanistan National
Security Forces.
The President continues to paint a rosy picture of the situation in
Afghanistan. Last Friday, he said that in Afghanistan ``The Taliban, al
Qaeda, and their allies are on the run.''
But the reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic
Council provide more sobering assessments of the situation on the
ground.
Among the findings of the reports are the following:
Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are ``faltering,''
according to the Afghanistan Study Group report. That report
finds that since 2002 ``violence, insecurity, and opium
production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in
their government and its international partners falls.''
The Atlantic Council report states, ``Make no mistake,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in
Afghanistan.'' Instead, the security situation is ``a strategic
stalemate,'' with NATO and Afghan forces able to win any head-
to-head confrontation with the Taliban, but not being able to
eliminate the insurgency so long as the Taliban enjoys safe
haven across the border with Pakistan.
The anti-government insurgency threatening Afghanistan
``has grown considerably over the last 2 years,'' according to
the Afghanistan Study Group. Last year was the deadliest since
2001 for U.S. and international forces. The Taliban are relying
increasingly on terrorism and ambushes, including over 140
suicide bombings in 2007. The Afghanistan Study Group report
also finds that ``the Taliban have been able to infiltrate many
areas throughout the country,'' intimidating and coercing the
local Afghan people.
The reports find that more U.S. and international
forces are needed for Afghanistan. The NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) currently consisting of more
than 43,000 soldiers from 40 countries, remains short of the
troops and equipment it needs to meet mission requirements.
These shortfalls include maneuver battalions; helicopters; and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The
United States has announced its intention to deploy an
additional 3,200 marines and other NATO members have upped
their contributions, including Britain and Poland. Yet, as the
Afghanistan Study Group points out, more NATO countries need to
share the burden, and remove national caveats that limit the
ability of their troops to participate in ISAF operations.
Opium production continues to be at record levels. The
Atlantic Council calls drug production ``the most striking sign
of the international community's failure.'' That report cites
World Bank estimates that around 90 percent of the world's
illegal opium comes from Afghanistan. A report this month from
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime finds that
cultivation levels this year are likely to be similar to last
year's ``shockingly high'' level.
The Afghanistan Study Group finds that the need for
greater international coordination is ``acute.'' Contributors
to Afghanistan reconstruction include over 40 countries, the
United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, and
nongovernmental organizations. Unfortunately, the recent
withdrawal of the widely-respected Paddy Ashdown from
consideration for the position of United Nations International
Coordinator for Afghanistan, reportedly at the request of the
Karzai Government, is a set back.
The Atlantic Council report concludes, ``In summary,
despite efforts of the Afghan Government and the international
community, Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become
a failed state.''
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning
concerning recommendations for getting Afghanistan on the right track.
I hope they will address the assessments and recommendations of the
reports of the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council. These
reports highlight the urgent need for the administration to reassess
its approach to ensure that Afghanistan moves toward a stable and
progressive state and never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists
intent on exporting violence and extremism.
Chairman Levin. I will now submit Senator Byrd's statement
for the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Byrd follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Thank you, Secretary Shinn, Secretary Boucher, and General Sattler,
for updating us on progress being made in Afghanistan. I am
particularly concerned by the continuing reports of a lack of
coordination among the international coalition on a plan of action for
Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports that progress among civilian
reconstruction efforts and local police security efforts lag so far
behind progress in fielding an Afghan National Army.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to ask unanimous consent that my entire statement
be placed in the record this morning.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Senator Warner. Given that we started at a late hour, I'm
going to abbreviate my comments here.
But, I'd like, first, to begin by commending Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates. By the way, we all wish him well with his
current problem with his arm. But, I want to commend him for
his efforts over the past few weeks to impress upon our NATO
allies the importance of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. He
also emphasized that militant extremists, either in Afghanistan
or elsewhere, still pose a significant threat. The threat posed
by these extremists may be greater in Europe than some in
Europe may now believe.
The debate on the importance of the mission in Afghanistan
may be among the most complicated that the NATO allies have
faced since the alliance was formed to counter the Soviet Union
threats.
Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to place the
entire statement of Secretary Gates, on February 10, when he
addressed the Munich Conference on Security Policy, into the
record (see Annex A).
Chairman Levin. That will be made part of the record.
Senator Warner. In addition to expressing my strong support
for Secretary Gates's remarks, I'd like to highlight a few
matters concerning Afghanistan.
First, I concur with those who assert that the credibility
of NATO, the most successful political and military alliance in
contemporary military history--that credibility is at stake as
they continue to perform their missions in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan today, there's been no doubt that progress
has been made since 2001, that the Taliban's recent resurgence
in Afghanistan, the escalating opium economy, and the presence
of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan threatens to challenge
positive momentum and potentially lead Afghanistan to slip back
into the pre-September 11 role as a safe haven for terrorists.
You mentioned General Jones; I'll overlook that part.
I also want to point out that we should never forget that
the failure of Afghanistan would be a significant boost to
militant extremists. Secretary Gates said that the Islamic
extremist movement, so far, was built on the illusion of
success, that all the extremists have accomplished recently is
the death of thousands of innocent Muslims. Secretary Gates
went on to say, ``Many Europeans question the relevance of our
actions and doubt whether the mission is worth the lives of
their sons and daughters.'' Well, the bombings in Madrid and
London, and the disruption of cells and plots throughout
Europe, should remind all of us that the threat posed by the
extremism in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Europe, and
globally, remains, as Secretary Gates said, ``a steep
challenge.''
I'll put the balance of my statement in the record, so we
may get started.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Mr Chairman, thank you.
I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today and I thank you
for scheduling the two panels for this very important hearing.
I would like to begin by commending our Secretary of Defense,
Robert M. Gates, for his efforts over the last few weeks to impress
upon our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies the
importance of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. He also emphasized that
militant extremists, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere, still pose a
significant threat and that the threat posed by these extremists may be
greater in Europe than some in Europe may believe.
The debate on the importance of the mission in Afghanistan may be
among the most complicated that the NATO allies have faced since the
alliance was formed to counter the Soviet threat.
Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to place the entirety of
Secretary Gates' February 10 address to the Munich Conference on
Security Policy into the record (see Annex A).
In addition to expressing my strong support for Secretary Gate's
remarks, I would like to highlight a few matters concerning
Afghanistan.
First, I concur with those who assert that the credibility of the
NATO--the most successful political organization and military alliance
in recent history--is at stake in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan today, there has no doubt been progress since 2001:
but the Taliban's recent resurgence in Afghanistan; the escalating
opium economy; and the presence of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan
threatens to challenge positive momentum and potentially lead
Afghanistan to slip back to its pre-September 11 role as a safe haven
for terrorists.
General Jim Jones, the former NATO supreme allied commander, and
co-chair--with Ambassador Thomas Pickering--of the Afghanistan Study
Group Report which was sponsored by the Center for the Study of the
Presidency, has said: ``Make no mistake; NATO is not winning in
Afghanistan.''
In his recent remarks in Munich, Secretary Gates reiterated a
warning he made last Wednesday in testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee. In that testimony, Secretary Gates expressed
concern about ``the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in
which some are willing to fight and die to protect people's security,
and some are not.''
Over the past 6 years NATO forces have grown from 16,000 to 43,000.
The ground commander is now calling for another 7,500 troops. This is a
troop requirement NATO should work vigorously to meet.
All of the nations of NATO should reexamine their contributions to
military operations in southern Afghanistan and lift the incapacitating
restrictions, known as national caveats, on where, when, and how their
forces can fight.
Second, we should never forget that failure in Afghanistan would be
a significant boost to militant extremists.
Secretary Gates said that the Islamic extremist movement so far was
``built on the illusion of success'' and that all the extremists have
accomplished recently is ``the death of thousands of innocent
Muslims.'' Secretary Gates went on to say: ``Many Europeans question
the relevance of our actions and doubt whether the mission is worth the
lives of their sons and daughters.''
The bombings in Madrid and London and the disruption of cells and
plots throughout Europe should remind all of us that the threat posed
by global extremism in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Europe, and
globally remains, as Secretary Gates said, ``a steep challenge.''
In his Munich speech, Secretary Gates said extremist success in
Afghanistan would ``beget success on many other fronts as the cancer
metastasized further and more rapidly than it already has.'' I fully
agree with this assessment by Secretary Gates.
Third, and concomitantly, we should not forget that Afghanistan and
Iraq are very distinct missions. Failure in either would be disastrous
for the other, the region as a whole, the U.S. and Europe. However, the
more we tie the two fronts together we may unintentionally be creating
false and misleading impressions.
In very frank comments on Saturday, Secretary Gates said, and I
believe correctly, that many Europeans ``have a problem with our
involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan, and do not
understand the very different kind of threat.''
Afghanistan has its own strategic importance which should not be
confused with Iraq's strategic importance. It is therefore important
that we find ways to decouple our strategies, policies, and funding for
Afghanistan from those for Iraq.
Next, we must wholly engage Afghanistan's neighbors and fully
enjoin them in the plans for the future security and stability of
Afghanistan. This specifically includes the development of an effective
strategy to dislodge al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan's
tribal areas along the Afghanistan border.
Finally, there is little doubt about the strong link between
instability in Afghanistan, poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. I
do not believe there can be lasting stability in Afghanistan until
these links are disrupted.
Afghanistan supplies about 93 percent of the world's opium supply.
While poppy cultivation has decreased in the north-central Afghanistan,
it has dramatically increased in the southwest. In 2006, the drug trade
was estimated to total more than $3 billion--money that continues to
fund Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents.
Breaking the nexus between the insurgency and opium production
requires a coordinated counternarcotics strategy that must be
integrated with our counterinsurgency strategy and linked to the
economic revitalization of Afghanistan's rural economy that includes
alternative livelihood programs.
In closing, the United States, our NATO allies, Afghanistan's
neighbors, and international organizations all have roles to play.
Each, and all, should recommit to the development of a comprehensive,
urgent, and long-term strategy for Afghanistan. This long-term strategy
should be one that integrates political and developmental features that
complement the military counterinsurgency strategy.
This recommitment should, as I have already discussed, include
increasing NATO forces in southern Afghanistan and suspending national
caveats. We should also expand the training and equipping of the Afghan
National Army and the police through a long-term partnership with NATO
to make it professional and multi-ethnic, and deploying significantly
more foreign trainers.
This recommitment must also address deficiencies in judicial
reform, reconstruction, governance, and anticorruption efforts, and
here the other elements of so-called `soft power' should be marshaled
effectively. The international assistance effort should be reenergized
and managed efficiently. The efforts to appoint a United Nations High
Commissioner should be revived immediately.
After 6 years of international involvement, Afghanistan may be
nearing a defining moment. Regretfully, I add, so too may NATO.
Secretary Gates' comments this weekend brought these issues to the
fore. I vigorously laud his efforts to speak openly to our allies and
to make an effort to ensure that the troop burden in Afghanistan does
not divide the NATO allies.
The witnesses on this first panel should be prepared to discuss,
among other issues: the current situation in Afghanistan; our current
strategies and policies there; the contributions of our partners and
allies; the role played by Afghanistan's neighbors to foster stability
and security in Afghanistan; and how the drug trade has undermined the
Government of Afghanistan's drive to build political stability,
economic growth, and rule of law.
This panel of witnesses should also be prepared to respond to
questions about three reports released last month. These reports
conclude that a new effort is required to succeed in Afghanistan. The
reports were the Afghanistan Study Group report sponsored by the Center
for the Study of the Presidency (see Annex B); the Atlantic Council
report on Afghanistan (see Annex C); and a paper by Dr. Harlan Ullman
and others titled, ``Winning the Invisible War: An Agricultural Pilot
Plan for Afghanistan (see Annex D).''
I request unanimous consent that each of these reports be entered
into the record. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to the
testimony from our witnesses today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
By the way, I do concur with your remarks supporting the
comments of Secretary Gates. I think they're very significant
and accurate.
Secretary Shinn, I think you are going to go first,
followed by Secretary Boucher. General Sattler, do you have an
opening statement?
General Sattler. I'll just introduce myself, sir; that's
it.
Chairman Levin. Okay. We already know you and appreciate
your work, but we'll get to you, then, in that order.
Secretary Shinn?
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES J. SHINN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Shinn. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
members of the committee. We appreciate the opportunity to
discuss Afghanistan with you today.
If I may just submit some written remarks for the record,
and use the time efficiently to respond and build on comments
made by both you and Senator Warner, so we can leave time for
questions.
Chairman Levin. We would appreciate that, and all your
comments and statements will be made part of the record.
Dr. Shinn. Great.
If I may, with regard to the Afghan Study Group study, as
well as The Atlantic Council report that you made reference to,
we concur with many of the conclusions of those reports. To the
degree that the reports suggest that our strategy in
Afghanistan needs to be fundamentally changed, I believe that
we would submit to the committee that U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan is sound. The real challenge is execution of that
strategy--resourced and done systematically, sustained over
time.
Two weeks ago, Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak,
who's known to some of you, gave a speech to the NATO
ministers, and he described the strategy in Afghanistan in
terms of clearing, holding, and building. I'd like to very
briefly touch on those three aspects of the strategy.
With regard to the clearing part of the strategy, we would
submit to you that we believe we are winning, slowly and
painfully. As the chairman mentioned, and quoting the report, I
believe where the Afghan forces together meet the Taliban who
stand and fight, we always prevail. Much of this is due to the
Afghan National Army (ANA)--and General Sattler can speak more
to how that was trained into a disciplined and effective
organization--but also by U.S. and alliance troops. Currently,
we have 27,500 troops in Afghanistan, and another 3,200 marines
on the way.
We would point out that the success in the clear part of
the strategy has been purchased at a horrible price: 415
Americans have been killed in and around Afghanistan, another
1,863 wounded, some of them very seriously.
Our analysts have concluded that the Taliban usage of
assassinations, of terrorism against soft civilian targets, and
even, to some degree, the use of suicide bombs is really, in
part, a reaction to the success of the clearing strategy.
But that brings us to the hold and then to the build part
of the puzzle. We would submit to you that both of those pieces
of the strategy are both harder and slower to make progress in.
It's inherently more ambiguous and hard to measure when you're
making progress.
One example, probably known to most of you, of course, is
that much of the hold part of the puzzle devolves around the
Afghan National Police (ANP). As an institution, the ANP has a
much spottier record than the ANA, less credibility with the
Afghan citizens, some reputation for corruption in some
districts. Again, General Sattler can speak to some of the
reforms underway. We are encouraged by efforts by the Ministry
of the Interior in Kabul, with our assistance, to pay and rank
reform of the ANP, to train and equip them better, and, in
particular, a program called the Focused District Development
Program, where they go to a district, they take out the
existing police corps, they put in a trained and vetted
temporary police force, and they take out the existing police
corps, and vet them for corruption or involvement in
trafficking; they train them, equip them, and put them back in,
with mentors. We're in phase 1 of this program, and we look
forward to the results.
Moving to the build part of the puzzle, this starts from a
very tough base. I know many of the Senators on the committee,
and staff, have been to Afghanistan. When you see it with your
own eyes, you realize how much of the physical and human
capital has been destroyed by the three decades of war and
civil war. It's really pretty striking.
The good news is that the GDP is growing now. It's between
$8 and $9 billion a year now. But, if you divide that by the
Afghan population of about 32 million, that gives the average
Afghan an annual income of about $300, less than a dollar a
day, which is crushing poverty. If, into that mix, you then add
the trafficking problem, the narcotics problem, you have a
seriously corrosive effect on already weak state institutions.
We have a five-part counternarcotics substrategy to deal
with that. Secretary Boucher can speak to that, because that's
principally in the State Department lane. It involves both
public education, alternative livelihood, eradication,
interdiction, and law enforcement, on the back end of that.
This is going to take time, patience, and a sustained effort.
I conclude by just pointing out, again, that this part of
the execution puzzle, as well as the other two pieces, is not
solely, nor, in many cases, is it even primarily, the
responsibility of the United States, that execution on these
three pieces involves us, our NATO allies, the Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) partners, certainly the United Nations
(U.N.), the international community writ large, and, of course,
most importantly, the Government of Afghanistan and its
citizens.
Maybe I could close with another quote from Minister
Wardak, who said, ``In my opinion, the war in Afghanistan is
eminently winnable, but only if the Afghans are enabled to
defend their own homeland. The enduring solution to this war
must be, in the end, an Afghan solution.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shinn follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. James Shinn
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: Thank
you for the opportunity to discuss Afghanistan.
You have had heard from a number of witnesses recently who have
challenged our strategy in Afghanistan. I would submit to you that the
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is largely sound. The challenge lies in
properly executing elements of the strategy. Execution requires the
right amount of resources--both military and non-military--and then
using these resources in a disciplined, coordinated fashion, over a
sustained period of time.
Our basic strategy is to use U.S. and international forces,
partnered with Afghan units, to counter the insurgency, while building
up the capacity of the Afghan Government to govern. As Afghan Minister
of Defense Wardak told North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Ministers last week, ``The simple counterinsurgency prescription is to
Clear, Hold, and Build.'' I emphasize the ``build'' part here.
International Crisis Group put it succinctly in their November 2006
report, Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, when they
observed that: ``Fighting the insurgency and nation-building are
mutually reinforcing.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ICG, Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, page
ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would emphasize that this isn't only, or even primarily, a U.S.
task. This is a task for the international community, our NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, the United
Nations, and above all the government and people of Afghanistan.
Because there are multiple actors, there are some differences with
regard to the basic strategy; the U.S. and some of our key partners put
a higher priority on implementing a traditional counterinsurgency
approach. Other partners, however, place a greater emphasis on the
``nation-building'' aspect of the mission. These differences are an
inevitable part of coalition warfare, but there are steps we can take
to enhance unity of effort. For instance, Secretary Gates is working
with his counterparts on an ISAF ``vision statement'' that lays out
what we want to achieve collectively in Afghanistan, and how we intend
to get there.
Developing the Afghan National Security Forces is a critical
element in this strategy. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is
increasingly assuming a leading role in the planning and execution of
operations. 49,400 personnel are currently assigned to the ANA, with a
projected increase of between 10,000 and 15,000 personnel per year. To
date, the U.S. has invested about $8 billion on the Army's development.
Secretary Gates has agreed to support an Afghan-proposed expansion
of the Army by 10,000 personnel, above the previously authorized 70,000
force structure. This increase was recently approved by the Afghanistan
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board that met in Tokyo on 4-5
February.
Further consideration is being given to the Army's longer-term end
strength. I expect it will eventually grow beyond 80,000 as the Afghans
assume greater responsibility for the security situation in their own
country and both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF troops
withdraw over time, though I know of no timetable for withdrawal. I
don't know what the likely ``end state'' number for the ANA will be,
nor how it would be funded, other than the fact that these security
forces are likely to exceed the ability of the Afghan Government to pay
for itself, thus requiring some kind of sustained international
financial assistance.
In contrast, the Police lag behind the Army in both capability and
effectiveness. The Police have not been able to hold areas cleared of
insurgents by ISAF and the ANA--the Hold part of Minister Wardak's
``clear, hold, build.'' Furthermore, the Police have a history of
corruption that has undermined their credibility.
The Afghans, with considerable support from the U.S., are taking
steps to fix these problems. These steps include: better weapons and
equipment for the Police, leadership changes within the Ministry of
Interior, pay and rank reform (including pay parity with the Army),
integrating Police Mentoring Teams with ANP units, and executing the
Focused District Development (FDD) plan. The FDD is an initiative to
temporarily insert teams of highly proficient Afghan National Civil
Order Police into selected districts while the regular ANP are immersed
in 8 weeks of intensive refresher training before resuming their
positions.
So far, the U.S. has invested $5 billion in Police development.
There are some 75,000 personnel assigned to the ANP, of a projected
82,000 end strength. I'd like to note the sacrifices that the Police
have made. Over a 4-week period between December and January, for
example, the ANP suffered 54 killed in action, compared to 13 ANA
soldiers killed in action over the same time.
ISAF is fighting alongside the ANA and ANP. NATO's ISAF mission
currently includes 44,000 troops from nearly 40 countries, in NATO's
first deployment outside the European theater. Some 16,000 U.S. troops
are under the ISAF command structure, led by General Dan McNeill. An
additional 3,200 U.S. marines will soon deploy to Afghanistan, of which
about 2,200 will join the fight in the south, while the other 1,000
will be partnered with Afghan units, primarily the ANP.
Among the Alliance members, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Romania are engaged in intense combat
operations in the south, and Poland fights as an integrated member of
the CJTF-82 team in RC East. But some others have not been willing to
deploy their soldiers to Afghanistan's hot spots. Secretary Gates
recently expressed his concern about ``the Alliance evolving into a
two-tiered Alliance, in which you have some Allies willing to fight and
die to protect people's security, and others who are not,'' a concern
he has raised with his NATO counterparts during the recent NATO
ministerial meeting in Vilnius.
The U.S. currently has about 27,500 troops deployed in Afghanistan.
To date, 1,863 U.S. soldiers have been wounded in action, and 415 of
our soldiers have been killed. Some 280 of our ISAF and coalition
partners have been killed.
Despite these sacrifices, the Alliance has fallen short of meeting
its stated commitments in several areas. Afghanistan needs more
maneuver forces, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), aviation
assets, and mentors for the Afghan National Security Forces. Some
Allies also need to remove restrictive ``caveats'' on their forces,
which all too often preclude their troops from taking on certain
missions or deploying to particular regions.
Some recent reports, like the Afghanistan Study Group, focus on the
command and control arrangements of the military and the civilian
structures of international forces. The reporting structures of ISAF
and OEF are complex, and there is no clear point where authority for
both the military and international reconstruction efforts comes
together in country. Some military commanders have told me the current
arrangement is awkward but it works. It's my view that having an
integrated campaign plan is more important than devising alternative
command and control arrangements. Getting Allies to agree to an ISAF
vision statement will be the first step in enabling us to develop this
type of integrated plan--a plan that integrates the ``clear, hold, and
build'' parts of the strategy.
As I noted earlier, military means alone will not prevail in this
contest. In fact, the overall trend we've seen in the preceding years
is a transition by the enemy from conventional engagements to greater
reliance on asymmetric tactics--for example, suicide bombers and
improvised explosive devices. They recognize there's no possibility to
defeat ISAF and the ANA on the battlefield, so they resort to terror to
intimidate the population and create the impression that the Afghan
Government can't provide security.
In order to defeat the insurgents, the population has to believe
that the Afghan Government offers the best hope of a brighter future,
or at least a better shot at basic security for them and their
families. That means they need to see improved governance and rule of
law, accelerated development, a stronger economy, and positive steps to
tackle corruption and narcotics trafficking. Where we've undertaken a
concerted effort to tackle these issues, such as in Regional Command
East, and with the support of strong local leadership, this approach
clearly works.
The Department of Defense and a number of our partners in ISAF play
a role in the reconstruction activities that have led to kinds of
successes we've seen in Regional Command East--for instance, the
Department of Defense (DOD) is significantly involved in PRTs. However,
civilian expertise has to be integrated with the military's
capabilities. State, United States Agency for International
Development, and Department of Agriculture personnel are partnered with
U.S. military officers in most of our PRTs. I believe the civilian
elements of the interagency need to be able to deploy more of these
experts into conflict zones like Afghanistan.
Appointing a senior international civilian coordinator would also
help us improve the effectiveness of our overall effort--and, perhaps
even more importantly, help make the case for sustained investments by
the international community of both military and economic assistance to
Afghanistan. There is some lack of coherence among the various nations
and official organizations involved in Afghanistan, which a senior
coordinator could help fix.
I am also concerned by signs of questioning of the long-term
commitment to Afghanistan by both politicians and citizens in some
ISAF-contributing nations. Both the Afghan Government and the
insurgents follow any signs of wavering commitment with intense
interest--as do both the Pakistanis and Iranians. A senior coordinator,
especially one with U.N. credentials and credibility among NATO
Alliance members at home, could help counter this softening of will.
The narcotics trade is a huge headache with no easy solutions. We
have a counternarcotics strategy with five pillars--public information,
alternative development, eradication, interdiction, and justice reform.
These five pieces come together to form a comprehensive strategy that
presents incentives to Afghans to encourage them to participate in
legal livelihoods while providing disincentives that deter them from
participating in all aspects and levels of the narcotics industry.
Implementing this long-term strategy is challenging, particularly in
the insecure south of the country where poppy cultivation is highest.
For example, without an adequate alternative livelihood, we risk
creating insurgents out of ordinary farmers whose sole source of
feeding their families has been taken from them. I saw that Senator
Hagel zoomed in on this problem in his comments at the Foreign
Relations Committee January 31 hearings.
Another significant challenge is external--namely, the Taliban
safe-haven in Pakistan, and the willingness of the Iranians to provide
weapons and other assistance to the Taliban. Both Senators Biden and
Lugar highlighted this concern in their comments and questions at the
SFRC hearings on January 31.
Everyone agrees that we--the U.S., the international community, and
above all the Afghan Government--need to work with the Government of
Pakistan to eliminate safe-havens in the border areas. But this is
going to take a long time, and--as in Afghanistan--is not going to be
achieved by military force alone. It will require helping Pakistan to
build up its own capabilities to wage a counterinsurgency.
As for the Iranians, intercepting and capturing arms convoys to the
Taliban may be the most effective local tactic for the time being. We
need to do this aggressively, but we also need to monitor the trends
for indications that this is turning into a strategic problem. Our
international partners, along with the Afghan Government, can also play
a productive role in convincing Iran that a stable and peaceful
Afghanistan is very much in everyone's interests.
In conclusion, I would endorse another point made by Minister
Wardak in his speech to the NATO Ministers, when he said that ``the war
in Afghanistan is eminently winnable. But only if the Afghans are
enabled to defend their own homeland. The enduring solution must be an
Afghan solution.''
Thank you. I look forward to your comments, concerns, and
questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ISAF consists of both NATO Alliance members and non-NATO
contributors. The term ``Coalition'' generally refers to those forces
deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Shinn.
Secretary Boucher?
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
Ambassador Boucher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of
the committee, I thank you for having us over today.
This is a subject of vital national interest to all of us,
and, as the chairman referred to, I think we all understand the
danger of renewed terrorist attacks to the Homeland stemming
from this part of the world. I think it's also good to keep in
mind the opportunities of creating a stable, peaceful,
strategic hub in Afghanistan for Central and South Asia, for
new routes for energy, trade, ideas, and people, and also the
opportunity to see to the welfare of some 30 million people in
Afghanistan, who, as my colleague pointed out, are suffering
from great poverty. Afghanistan, in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s, was one of the poorest countries in the world, and then
they've gone downhill for 20, 25 years, and it's no wonder that
the challenges of development alone are enormous, and
development, given fighting and the circumstances now, is even
a harder task.
We're doing this task. We have, I would say, many
achievements, but not yet success, in this task. The focus is,
increasingly, on the people of Afghanistan, the people that I
said are largely rural, they learn to rely on local and
traditional structures over the last several decades. They've
seen too much fighting, and, frankly, too little benefit from
government. That's the situation we're trying to change. I
think, to fundamentally win this war, to stabilize Afghanistan
as a peaceful nation, we need to provide those people with
security, with justice, with economic opportunity, and with
good governance, just what anybody in the world expects from
their government.
So, how are we doing? My summary is that we're doing what
works, we're getting the job done, but we need to do it more
broadly, we need to do it better. I'll talk about that, as
well. As Secretary Rice said last week, our counterinsurgency
effort is having good effect, but the work is not complete.
We've seen, now, more and more police, more and more
military available to the Afghan population to provide them
with security. As you travel around Afghanistan--and I've been
there twice in the last month--you see the green police trucks
that we've provided with our supplemental funding from last
year, new policemen out on the streets, new trucks out on the
street. We know the numbers are still low, the quality is still
not what it should be, but they're getting out there, and
they're more and more visibly providing security for the
population. You see new governors and new district chiefs. The
government is extending itself, including a renewed effort on
local governance, on working with local populations in the
districts, and providing better personnel through the Office of
Local Governance that has been set up in President Karzai's
office.
You do see economic growth. Every time I've gone, for the
last 6 years, you see different products being sold, you see
Internet cafes starting up, you see oranges in the market,
better quality stores, people no longer selling from
containers, but selling from buildings. There's economic
growth. The legitimate economic growth last year was estimated
to be 13 percent, really remarkably high. You see the other
aspects of this--3.5 million cell phones. Whereas, 5, 6 years
ago there was virtually--a very small phone system that really
didn't work.
There are now 4,000 kilometers of roads, versus 50 in
2002--50 kilometers of roads, to 4,000. Those roads have a
transforming effect. I was up in the district of Kunar, on the
Pakistan border, and you see there, they're no longer talking
about the number of insurgents in the Konar valley, they're
talking about the number of gas stations, the number of
Internet cafes along the road that was built by the U.S.
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the local governor's
office.
You see education, healthcare being delivered to the
population--5 million kids in school now, versus about 900,000
in 2001. Health care now reaches 80 percent of the population.
The real effect of this is that there are 85,000 babies and
children every year who survive in Afghanistan who would not
have survived without that service.
All those things said, all those achievements listed and
seeing them around the country, you can see them have an effect
in districts, you can see them have an effect in provinces,
where they've been done in a coordinated and concentrated
fashion. But, we still have enormous challenges through the
country as a whole.
As my colleague, Mr. Shinn, referred to, we've routed the
enemy from their strongholds, but they've now turned more and
more to tactics of pure terror--to bombs, kidnaping, things
that make the population feel unsafe, and things that we need
to prevent. In some cases, we're able to prevent those, because
we get tips from local populations. I've heard that story in
districts of Afghanistan. In other places, it's harder to
prevent, because we don't really have solid government control,
police control and governance, in all the areas of the country
yet.
The narcotics problem is still enormous. We're pleased to
see the U.N. early assessment for this year that says there's
probably going to be a slight decrease, but what it also says
is that the high levels of poppy production in the south are
going to stay that way, and that the link between the
insurgency and the narcotics production is even more focused,
even tighter.
Where we establish good governance and are able to carry
out the full scope of antinarcotics programs, we can see a
decrease in the poppy cultivation; where, because of
insecurity, we're unable to do all the things that government
would like to do and all the aspects of the narcotics program,
we're still seeing a very high level of counterproduction. We
not only need to get a hold of these areas, but also to carry
out this full-scope counternarcotics effort in those areas.
Finally, weak government, and particularly, corruption,
remains endemic. The reform and training of government
ministries, of local officials, and of police forces have to be
a high priority, because what the Afghan people expect from
their government, they expect basic decent government, they
expect government to be on their side, and not to try to take
advantage of them through corruption and other means.
In 2008, therefore, we're trying to deal with all of these
problems, and attack both the enemy and the problems with all
our various tools. I'd say there are four main tasks this year.
One is to concentrate and coordinate our efforts. If you
look through the reports that you've been talking about, a lot
of the recommendations have to do with, how do you tighten the
coordination in the international community? How do you tighten
the coordination between civilian and military activity? How do
you tighten the coordination between the international effort
and the Afghan Government? Those are all tasks that we're
concentrating on.
Second is to try to focus our resources, focus police,
justice, roads, electricity, governance, the things that people
want in the most troubled area. So, we bring all those things
to bear in the district of Musa Qala in Helmand, which was a
Taliban stronghold, which they have been pushed out of in
recent weeks and the Afghan Government's going in with police
and local government, we're going in with electric generators,
with projects for the local population, to try to help
stabilize those areas by bringing all our tools to bear.
Second is that you'll probably see a dramatic expansion of
the availability of electricity in Afghanistan this year,
dramatic expansion that reaches, still, a minority percentage
of the population, but people on the grid in Afghanistan--it's
about 6 percent of the population. We have some major projects
cutting in this year in Kabul, bringing electricity down from
countries in the north, getting Kajaki Dam in the south back
on, that should let us provide a lot more electricity to people
in Afghanistan. That turns on the lights for kids to do
homework, but it also gives farmers opportunities to do things
like cold storage and marketing of their products in a way that
they haven't been able to do, and, therefore, to increase their
yields from legitimate crops instead of poppy.
Third, there's a real focus on the narcotics problem, I
think, especially in two ways. One is stepping up the
interdiction of networks and traffickers, and, second of all,
to go into these denied areas where the poppy production is
protected by large landowners or protected by the insurgency,
and to make sure that we can go into those areas and
demonstrate that we can get the poppy that's grown in those
places.
Fourth, I'd say, there are increasingly good signs of
cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we want to
work with both countries so that, instead of having the
insurgents use these territories in Pakistan to push out in two
directions, that between what's going on, on the Pakistan side
and what's going on, on the Afghan side, we are, in fact,
pushing in on them from two directions, and that they have to
deal with that situation.
I think we have, as I said, enormous challenges that
remain, but we have good programs to deal with them, we have a
focused strategy that needs to be concentrated and coordinated
better, but that we could really have an opportunity here in
Afghanistan this year to put the government in the ascendancy.
The Taliban no longer control territory, but they're able
to operate very widely throughout the country, and I think this
has to be the year where the government is able to implant
itself and bring stability to the key areas of Afghanistan. I
think we have the programs to do that, if we do them properly,
if we do them well.
That's about all I'd like to say at the beginning. I'd be
glad to take questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Boucher follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Richard A. Boucher
Chairman Levin and members of the committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to address you today on progress and strategy in carrying
out U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. I am just back from a trip to Kabul
and Kandahar and look forward to sharing my impressions.
Let me begin by posing two very fundamental thoughts about our
involvement in Afghanistan: What is our objective and what strategy are
we pursuing to get there?
After September 11, the United States helped Afghan partners topple
the Taliban regime and joined with international partners to ensure
that Afghanistan would never again become a sanctuary for terrorists.
We remain committed to the goal of building long-term stability based
on Afghan national sovereignty, democratic principles, economic
development, and respect for human rights. Afghanistan has achieved
many successes in their fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda--
establishing infrastructure, securing territory, providing education,
health care, and training, but we have not won yet. Our shared goal of
stability requires a large commitment from us and our Allies, and will
continue to require this for a considerable time.
When we speak of our commitment, we are speaking of an investment
in the future. Afghanistan is not just a battle theater to fight
enemies, but a place of strategic opportunity. Afghanistan represents
an opportunity to have a close, democratic ally in the heart of a
continent with unmatched political and economic capital and potential.
Afghanistan has the potential of becoming the linchpin for regional
integration in south and central Asia. The past 6 years have showed us
that it has the potential for transformation from a broken, failing
state that harbored terrorists into a democratic, prosperous land
bridge between the south and central Asian regions--regions that were
virtually disconnected until 2001. A free and secure Afghanistan
provides new opportunities for growth in trade and security, for the
benefit of the region and the world.
Comparing Afghanistan to what it was under the Taliban regime just
6\1/2\ years ago, we have made serious progress on a broad range of
fronts. Sustained successes on the battlefield have deprived the
Taliban of their ability to move freely about the country and spread
their extremist writ. Thanks to economic growth and strengthened local
institutions, we are seeing support for the insurgency decline and
support for the Afghan Government increase in most areas of
Afghanistan. The recent visit of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to
Kandahar, which was once the insurgent groups' home base, indicates the
progress we have made and our continued commitment to support
Afghanistan in completing its transition from tyranny to stability and
a constitutional government.
At the same time we must recognize that important challenges
remain. The recent reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and the
Atlantic Council of the United States are accurate in their assessments
that narcotics production and trade, widespread corruption, cross-
border flow of insurgents from Pakistan, and lack of international
donor coordination require our full attention. Many of the reports'
recommendations for the way ahead are already being implemented: A
resolute and comprehensive approach to counternarcotics; an economic
and social development plan for Pakistan's border regions; diplomatic
efforts to strengthen North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
involvement in Afghanistan; and support for a United Nations Special
Representative with a strong mandate.
security
As Secretary Rice said during her trip to Afghanistan last week,
our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan ``is having good effect,
but the work is not complete.'' We have made considerable progress
against the Taliban and other insurgents. U.S.-led NATO forces in the
East have successfully linked security operations with governance and
reconstruction initiatives in a full-spectrum counterinsurgency
campaign. Afghan army, police, governors, tribal leaders and citizens
are standing against the Taliban. In the south, Afghan and Allied
forces have taken the fight to the Taliban, recently recapturing the
restive district of Musa Qala in Helmand province and helping establish
Afghan Government presence. We and our NATO and Afghan partners
continue to work together to consolidate and extend those gains by
bringing in governance and development.
Due to their inability to win on the battlefield, the Taliban have
resorted to terrorist tactics such as improvised explosive devices,
suicide bombs, kidnapping, and direct targeting of foreign civilians.
The attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul on January 14 is but the most
recent example. Of course, these indirect tactics can be deadlier than
open combat for our troops. We are also battling a cynical but
effective Taliban communications strategy.
The United States, our Allies, and Afghan officials share the
desire to see the Afghan Government assume greater responsibility for
its own security. Our training and equipping programs for the Afghan
National Security Forces are showing results: We have trained and
equipped more than 49,400 Afghan National Army personnel. The Afghan
National Army is now a respected institution amongst Afghans and is
increasingly taking the lead in planning and executing operations.
We have a comprehensive program in place to develop the Afghan
police and to increase policing capacity at the district level called
the Focused District Development Plan. Through better training and
leadership, improved pay and electronic distribution of salaries, and
provision of better equipment, we are working to ensure that the police
are ready and motivated to do their jobs. But it takes time to
transform a system of militias loyal to local commanders and warlords
to a professionally led force acting on behalf of the Government of
Afghanistan that respects and enforces rule of law and human rights.
We are committed to NATO's mission and are increasing American
support to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force with
more troops and resources. The United States will deploy an additional
3,200 marines to Afghanistan this spring. 2,200 marines will be
deployed to Regional Command South. The remaining 1,000 marines will
train and develop Afghan National Security Forces.
Without doubt, success is possible but not assured. Therefore, the
international community needs to continue and expand its efforts. The
greatest threat to Afghanistan's future is abandonment by the
international community. As Secretary Gates has made clear in testimony
here and in other public comments, meeting the requirements identified
by NATO commanders remains a challenge. The mission in Afghanistan
needs more forces, equipment (such as helicopters), and trainers for
the Afghan army and police. We have promised the Afghan people to
assist in stabilizing their country and NATO needs to provide the
personnel and the tools to make good on that promise. As we look to the
upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, we will continue to work
with our 25 NATO Allies and other International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) partners in Afghanistan to meet the requirements needed to
succeed in the NATO ISAF mission.
governance
Lasting stability will only come when the Afghan Government can
step in to fill the void that is left when an area is cleared from
insurgents. We must, therefore, focus on the less tangible but equally
critical goal of extending the government's influence nationwide. In
order to persuade Afghan citizens to side with their government against
the insurgents, Afghans must see that their government has the ability
to deliver basic services, provide the rule of law, uphold human
rights, and extend economic opportunities effectively, transparently,
and responsibly throughout the country. Our foreign assistance programs
help achieve the objective of visible and viable Afghan governance at
the local level. We are funding local projects developed by community
and provincial councils that play an increasing role in responding to
the people's needs. We are also helping the Ministry of Education
create a network of public service academies and the Ministry of
Justice to promote rule of law at the local level.
We support honest and competent governors that respond to the needs
of the people and respect human rights. In this context, we welcome the
establishment of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance that
has already achieved encouraging results. We hope that this institution
will continue to be instrumental in building public confidence in the
Government of Afghanistan.
reconstruction
Reconstruction and development work remains on track in much of the
country and the Afghan economy continues to grow at impressive rates,
with licit Gross Domestic Product more than doubling since 2002. The
lives of millions of Afghans have improved considerably: Up from 8
percent of Afghans in 2001, more than 80 percent of the population now
has access to medical care. Almost 11,000 medical professionals have
been trained. More than 680 hospitals and clinics have been built and
outfitted. For the first time in 10 years, the grain harvest was
sufficient to meet consumption needs inside Afghanistan. In 2001,
900,000 children--almost exclusively boys--were enrolled in school.
Now, there are more than 5 million and more than 1.5 million of these
(34 percent) are girls and young women. Since 2001, there has been a 22
percent decline in mortality rates for infants and children under 5
years of age--we are saving 85,000 more young lives every year. More
than 70 percent of the population--including 7 million children--has
been inoculated against the Polio virus. In 2001, there was a
dysfunctional banking system. Now, Afghanistan has a functioning
Central Bank with more than 30 regional branches and an
internationally-traded currency. There are now 3 mobile telephone
companies serving more than 3.5 million subscribers--this is almost 11
percent of the population. In 2001, there were 50 kilometers of paved
roadway in the country, now there are more than 4000 kilometers of
paved roads.
We plan to allocate close to $600 million of our fiscal year 2008
base foreign assistance budget to reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan, which will support programs ranging from education,
health, agriculture, infrastructure, and the activities of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. In the fiscal year 2008 supplemental, we have
also requested about $500 million to build roads and power
infrastructure and another $50 million to expand our successful health
and education programs. These initiatives are connecting the Afghan
people to their government and are creating an environment in which
they have the basic services and infrastructure necessary to prosper.
We are not alone. Our programs are part of a broad international
assistance effort. The Government of France has indicated its
willingness to host an international conference this summer that will
provide an opportunity for significant new pledges of international
assistance for Afghanistan over the coming years. We are confident that
this conference will demonstrate once again the depth of international
support for Afghanistan.
democracy and human rights
Our support for democratic stability and constitutional government
in Afghanistan is also yielding positive results. The Afghan Parliament
is assuming its appropriate role as a deliberative body and
Presidential and Parliamentary elections are due in the next 2 years.
Given that voter registration will take about a year to complete, it
needs to begin soon. The Afghans will have to make key decisions on
election dates and the electoral system. In the fiscal year 2008
supplemental, the President requested $100 million for critically
needed election-support programs.
A transparent and fair justice system is critical to ensuring that
the people of Afghanistan respect the authority of the central
government and to ensuring that the rights of Afghan citizens are
protected. We have established a public-private partnership with
American law firms and schools to help advance rule of law and
establish a strong core of legal professionals.
The development of an independent, active Afghan media has been
remarkable. However, there is still room for improvement. We are
concerned about the deterioration of media freedom over the last year,
including an increase in detention of journalists and government
interference in media coverage over the past year. Also troubling were
the deaths of two female journalists last summer and the recent death
sentence of a young Afghan journalist. We are working with the Afghan
Government and the Afghan Parliament to emphasize the importance of the
new media law currently in the legislative process meeting
international standards regarding, in particular, the legal protection
of journalists and removing vague content restrictions, establishing a
fair, independent licensing system and an independent body to govern
Radio Television Afghanistan.
A peaceful and stable Afghanistan cannot be secured without the
active political and economic involvement of women. Although women's
political participation has gained a degree of acceptance, women who
are active in public life continue to face disproportionate threats and
violence. Furthermore, women and girls continue to face severe
discrimination and both formal and customary justice mechanisms that
fail to protect their rights. The United States is firmly committed to
support for Afghan women and integrates women's issues into virtually
all of its programs, aiming to increase female political participation,
education, economic opportunities, and their role in civil society.
counternarcotics
Although the number of poppy-free provinces more than doubled in
2007, total opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan grew significantly.
The Afghan Government, the United States, and the international
community are alarmed about this development. Afghanistan's poppy
production fuels corruption and narcotics addiction, and is a
significant source of financing for criminal and insurgent groups. In
order to prosper, Afghanistan must rid itself of the opium poppy.
President Karzai and his top leaders recognize this.
Countering poppy growth requires a multi-faceted approach. We are
pursuing precisely such an approach with our comprehensive five-pillar
strategy involving public information, alternative development, law
enforcement, interdiction, and eradication: We are reinforcing the
message that poppy cultivation is immoral, illegal, and un-Islamic. We
are helping farmers gain access to other means to feed and clothe their
families--access to alternative crops and other means of livelihood, to
roads that will allow them to move their crops to market, to advice
concerning markets for their new crops and to legitimate sources of
credit. We are also helping the Afghan Government to increasingly
provide credible law enforcement, interdiction, and eradication. The
disincentives for poppy cultivation must be bigger than the potential
profit. The credibility of our counternarcotics efforts depends upon
making the risks of growing poppy unacceptable.
Local governance structures and counternarcotics are closely
interconnected. Where government has control and has placed good
administrators, poppy production is down. Where the insurgency rages,
poppy production is up. This trend is likely to deepen in 2008. The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime projects an increase in poppy
cultivation in several southern and western provinces and sustained
decreases in the East and the North. Overall cultivation is expected to
decrease slightly. Given the record cultivation numbers last year, a
slight decrease is clearly not satisfactory. We will continue our
efforts to counter the narcotics cultivation and trade.
relations with pakistan
A strong, cooperative bilateral relationship between Afghanistan
and Pakistan is a crucial precondition if we are to see a decline in
the cross-border flow of insurgents and progress toward security on
both sides of the Durand Line. Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan
moved forward in 2007 with several summits, the productive August
bilateral peace jirga in Kabul, and President Karzai's successful visit
to Islamabad in late December. Both sides agreed at the August peace
jirga to hold routine mini-jirgas. Pakistan has offered 1000
scholarships to Afghans in a good step toward increasing positive
connections. Despite recent political events in Pakistan, its security
forces continue to combat extremism, as demonstrated by their
operations to flush out militants in the Swat Valley. Close cooperation
with Pakistan remains key to the success of U.S. strategic goals in the
region and we continue to explore ways to help the Pakistani military
and local security forces improve their counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism skills.
We are and have been encouraging the Government of Pakistan to take
sustained and aggressive actions against violent extremists. At the
same time we recognize that a purely military solution is unlikely to
succeed. We therefore strongly support the Government of Pakistan's
efforts to implement a comprehensive and long-term strategy to combat
terrorism in the border regions, which include the federally
Administered Tribal Areas, parts of the Northwest Frontier Province,
and Baluchistan. We are committed to supporting this initiative to
bring economic and social development and effective governance, making
these remote areas less hospitable to violent extremists. We are also
looking forward to working with Pakistan's new civilian government on
this important initiative after the February 18 parliamentary
elections.
concluding remarks
In conclusion, let me repeat my earlier observation that in
Afghanistan we have had a lot of successes, but we are far from
success. We should not lose sight of the progress that has been made
and that we continue to make year by year. Broad swaths of
Afghanistan--especially in the north, the west and even the east--are
hardly recognizable by comparison with where they were 7 years ago. We
do no-one a service by ignoring this progress.
Nonetheless, there remain daunting challenges--especially with
respect to security, counternarcotics, and governance. For millions of
Afghans, life remains bitterly difficult--especially during this
exceptionally cold winter.
We and our international and Afghan partners have our work cut out
for us, but we have a solid foundation of progress on which to build. I
am convinced we have no choice but to meet the remaining challenges
head on. With a sustained investment of resources and effort, we have
every prospect of securing a stable, democratic and lasting ally in
Afghanistan, and an important lynchpin for regional stability and
economic integration.
I would be pleased to respond to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Secretary Boucher.
General Sattler, would you like to add anything?
General Sattler. No, Mr. Chairman. I'm ready for questions,
sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We'll try a 7-minute round, if that's all right.
Senator Warner made reference to Secretary Gates's comments
about NATO and the need for NATO to step up and provide a
greater share in their commitments. Secretary Shinn, is NATO at
risk of failing if alliance members do not come forward with
the resources to meet the requirements of the ISAF mission?
Dr. Shinn. I believe that's something very close to what
the Secretary mentioned in his comments to the NATO ministers,
week before last. My understanding is that he was talking about
the future, and that it hadn't happened yet, but that there was
a real risk to the alliance if, as he said, it evolved into one
set of members who will fight, and others who will not put
their troops in harm's way.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree, Secretary Boucher, with
Secretary Gates, that NATO is at risk of being a two-tiered
alliance, for the reason that Secretary Shinn just gave? Is
that a real risk?
Ambassador Boucher. It is, sir. I think we have to remember
that there are difficult tasks throughout Afghanistan, and we
have to value the contribution that everybody's making. But,
one of the things our commanders keep telling us is, they need
the flexibility to use the different forces in different parts
of the country----
Chairman Levin. They don't have that----
Ambassador Boucher.--and they don't have that flexibility,
both through caveats, people who put their troops in a certain
place and want them to stay there, and just through the overall
manning levels that haven't been reached yet.
Chairman Levin. Now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Chairman Mullen, said that the coalition forces are facing a
classic growing insurgency. DNI, Admiral Michael McConnell,
testified on February 5, that ``The security situation has
deteriorated in the south, and Taliban forces have expanded
operation into previously peaceful areas of the west and around
Kabul.'' Do you agree with that? Secretary Boucher, do you
agree with that? That's the DNI saying that.
Ambassador Boucher. I'll always agree with DNI, but I think
we----
Chairman Levin. You don't have to agree with him. I'm just
asking, do you agree with him?
Ambassador Boucher. I think the answer is ``yes and no.''
What we've found is, the Taliban set out last year to take
territory. They set out to put a ring around Kandahar and see
if they could take Kandahar. They set out to strengthen their
hold on particular strongholds. What we showed last year is,
they were unable to achieve those goals. They failed in their
goals, as they stated them for last year. The spring offensive
never happened.
So, we have, last year, pushed them out of strongholds--the
Panjwayi district, near Kandahar, Musa Qala district, in
northern Helmand, the Sanguin district, in northern Helmand.
Those were strongholds. Those are heartland for Taliban.
They've been unable to hold them.
On the other hand, they have been able to change their
tactics, adjust their mode of operations, and they've adopted
tactics of bombings and kidnapings and intimidation of
villagers. They have been able to do that more broadly.
Chairman Levin. Have the Taliban forces expanded operations
into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul, as
Admiral McConnell said?
Ambassador Boucher. They've been able to carry out attacks
in those areas, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. General Sattler, do you believe the
antigovernment insurgency in Afghanistan has been contained?
General Sattler. Mr. Chairman, it goes back to your
previous question. NATO has expanded their operations, doing
more distributive operations outside major bases, which means
you obviously encounter more enemy forces in locations they may
have declared safe havens previously, but now you're there. So,
our engagement with the enemy, as was already articulated, sir,
each and every time we do encounter the enemy, mano-a-mano,
that they come out on the short end. So, I would say, contact
with the Taliban and the insurgent forces has been greater over
the course of the last year. But, once again, I cannot confirm,
sir, that either they may have been there and now we're
operating in areas which were previously perceived as safe
havens, or if, in fact, they've grown, sir.
Chairman Levin. So, you're not able to tell us that, as of
now, antigovernment insurgency in Afghanistan has been yet
contained. You cannot tell us that.
General Sattler. Mr. Chairman, in the areas where we have
forces, it is contained. Where we have been able to do the
clear and the hold, it is contained. In other areas, I cannot
comment on, sir.
Chairman Levin. You can't comment, or you can't tell us
that it has been?
General Sattler. I can't tell you that it has been
contained, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, The Atlantic Council report says that
the future of Afghanistan is going to be determined by progress
or failure in the civil sector. I think a number of our
witnesses have confirmed the importance of that. The
reconstruction effort has been criticized for the lack of
international coordination among contributors, which include
over 40 countries, the U.N., the European Union, NATO, and a
number of NGOs. Both the Afghanistan Study Group and The
Atlantic Council reports recommend the appointment of a high-
level U.N. international coordinator. Paddy Ashdown, former
high representative for Bosnia, was considered for this
position, but, apparently, the Karzai Government nixed it. Do
we know, Secretary Boucher, why that appointment was nixed?
Does that represent a setback?
Ambassador Boucher. First of all, I think it's regrettable
that the Karzai Government didn't accept Paddy Ashdown as the
international senior civilian. We very much looked forward to
having him in that role.
We've heard a lot of explanations and discussions, mostly
having to do with the domestic political environment. But,
ultimately, I think it's for them to try to explain, rather
than me.
But, at the same time, we've sat down with them,
subsequently, both in the Secretary's talks last week and in my
subsequent follow-up with the Foreign Minister. They tell us
they do agree on the need for a strong international
coordinator, they will look forward to working with an
appointment by the U.N. Secretary General, and we're now
engaged in the process of identifying the proper person.
Chairman Levin. The Atlantic Council report finds that less
than 10 cents of every dollar of aid for Afghanistan goes to
the Afghan people directly. One program that has worked, we
believe, successfully to establish community development
councils to identify local priorities and implement approved
sub-projects, that has been the National Solidarity Program.
Now, according to a press release from December, the National
Solidarity Program has provided $400 million in payments
disbursed to 16,000 community development councils in
Afghanistan. These payments have financed more than 30,000
community development sub-projects to improve access to
infrastructure, markets, and services. The program draws
resources from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which
is administered by the World Bank, by distributing funds
directly to districts at the lowest level, which are the
villages. By bypassing the central or provincial governments,
the National Solidarity Program reduces corruption and
misappropriation, and avoids unnecessary contractual layers.
I'm wondering, Secretary Boucher, whether or not you are
familiar with the National Solidarity Program, and would you
comment on it? If it is successful, can you tell us if the
Afghan Government supports the program and their use of
community development councils? Do we support the program?
Ambassador Boucher. The answer is: yes, yes, yes, and yes.
This is one of the more successful programs in Afghanistan. Ten
days ago, when I was out there, I met with the Minister for
Rural Rehabilitation and Development, who runs this program.
His updated numbers are 35,000 projects in 25,000 villages
around the country. These are mostly small projects. They're
wells, they're roads, they're retaining walls--schools,
sometimes--things that are done in consultation with local
people, with local villagers, through the community development
councils. That's a mechanism that we think works. We think the
projects are done well. It delivers what people need and what
people want from their government, which is, as I said in my
opening statement, really the nub of the matter.
So, we have put money in this program, ourselves. I think
we've put about $10 million in. But, we have another $50
million for this program in our budgets this year. I think much
of it's in the supplemental funding that hasn't been passed
yet, but we would hope to get that money and be able to expand
our contribution.
Chairman Levin. I'm glad to hear that because apparently it
does not have the problems of corruption and bureaucratic
layers that these other programs have, and I'm glad to hear
there is support for it. We will continue to look for that
money to be flowing in that direction.
Ambassador Boucher. Yes. There are a number of ministries
in Afghanistan that have gone through the reform process, that
have improved their capabilities, and that are really able to
deliver projects at a local, provincial, and district level.
This is one of them. Education's another one. Health's another
one, and one of the things we're trying to do this year is
concentrate international and Afghanistan resources, so that
all those programs can work to stabilize an area.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe has asked that
he take my spot in the rotation.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warner, thank you very much for
allowing me to do this, and I won't take all of my time, here.
When OEF begain in October 2001, all the journalists were
buzzing around, and then all of a sudden it seemed to have lost
its sex appeal and they all went to Iraq. Now they have talked
about rediscovering Afghanistan; it's the forgotten war. Having
made several trips to both Iraq and Afghanistan, I don't think
that's the case. Let me just share a few memories, here.
Early on, I was there when they turned over the training of
the ANA to the ANA. It was very meaningful to me, I say,
Senator Warner, because it was the Oklahoma 45th that was in
charge of the training. I've talked to these kids, they're very
much impressed with the type of warriors these guys are. Then I
was honored to be with General Jones on his last trip that he
took.
One of the things that I haven't heard much in the
testimony here, that was a problem in those early years, and
apparently still is, or at least it was, according to General
Dan McNeil on December 1, is that there's a unique problem of
corruption at the local level, that there's not really a
central authority that you can get in there and try to address
the corruption problem, because it's the mayors and those--is
this a problem?
Ambassador Boucher. It is endemic in Afghanistan, and when
people look to their government for fairness and decency and
services, that corruption is really one of the things that
separates people from their government, instead of pulling them
together. There are a lot of efforts made to improve the
quality of government services, the audits and the accounting,
the insulation of the government against corruption. It's an
active program that we have with the Ministry of Finance to try
to track money better, keep it from being stolen.
We have a lot of support for the attorney general and the
prosecutors, who have started going after corruption. But, it
is deeply rooted, it's longstanding, and it's something that we
need to get at.
One of the features of the current police program, I think,
is to really go into the district and, as we pull out the
current police, they're then not only retrained, but reformed
and vetted, so that when they go back, they will behave
differently than they did before.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and that's essentially what General
Eikenberry said in this report that we're looking at today.
General Sattler, I know what your answer is, but I have to
get it on the record, so, here it comes. My favorite programs,
as I've gotten from the commanders in the field, are 1206,
1207, 1208, and train and equip, and then, of course, the
Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP). We tried to get
these programs expanded during this last go-around, but the
1206, -7, and -8 will expire at the end of this year. I'd like
to know, from your perspective, how significant this is, that
we get these, not just reauthorized, but also expanded.
Then I would ask the same thing about the CERP, because
right now, while it is only good for Afghanistan and Iraq, we
were trying to make it global, and this really came from the
commanders in the field. Could you respond to that?
General Sattler. Yes, Senator Inhofe. Thanks for the
opportunity.
The 1206 is the global train and equip, which the Armed
Services Committees have given us the authority, but not
appropriations, to reprogram up to $300 million, globally, to
go ahead and take a look at problems, to home in, along with
the chief of mission--it's a combination program that is
actually executed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense. The two secretariats gives us the flexibility for
the combatant commander to get with the country team and the
ambassador and look at a problem that might exist, either a
problem that's sliding towards becoming a crisis, or to take
advantage of an opportunity. Because the budgeting cycle takes
a period of time, you can't really get in and fix, train, and
equip local forces on a normal budget cycle. So, this is that
malleable tool, that flexibility, that permits the two
Secretaries to help a troubled spot anywhere in the world.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I'd ask, since we have both State and
the Department of Defense represented on this panel. I think it
was put together in such a way so that the commander in the
field makes a recommendation, then it goes, and it's a real
fast track, just a matter of a very short period of time. Yet,
it ensures the cooperation of both State and Defense. Any
comments from either State or Defense on this?
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, if I can echo everything General
Sattler said, the 1206 in particular, is really important to us
in fighting terrorism around the world and really being able to
bring some resources to bear fairly quickly on particular
problems that confront us. So I think there's excellent
interagency cooperation in targeting and focusing those funds.
I want to just praise, as much as I can, the CERP. We
decided, last year at the beginning of the year, that we really
needed to expand the money that we spend through PRTs, to help
extend the government and help the Afghan Government do things
on the ground in key areas. CERP has come through. I've been
out to these PRTs. They're building dams, they're building
schools, they're building bridges, they're building roads,
they're changing the environment, really transforming the
situation. It's a combination of the reservists in the U.S.
Army, the people who know how to build bridges and plan cities
and conduct--plus the CERP.
Senator Inhofe. What about the idea of making it global so
it's not confined to just those areas?
Ambassador Boucher. I think the more, the better. It's
money well spent. Some of the best-spent money in Afghanistan
is CERP money.
Senator Inhofe. That's good. I appreciate that very much.
Do you agree with those comments?
Dr. Shinn. Yes, Senator, I'd agree with that and point out,
to the earlier question about the alliance, the CERP has all
the merits that you described, but it's largely limited to the
12 PRTs that the U.S. manages. We've been pressing our NATO
allies, those who run the other 13 PRTs, to come up with
something similar to that, that would have the same positive
effects without all the central bureaucracy and within the
short decision cycle that CERP does.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for convening the hearing.
I'd like to thank and welcome the witnesses today.
I think it's helpful for us to hear what you are telling us
about Afghanistan in relationship to that part of the world,
and as well as what we can expect with respect to NATO's
participation. It appears to me that the strategy, thus far,
has left us a path with insufficient military force and
inconsistent strategy to combat the Taliban and al Qaeda, and,
as a result of that, they are reconstituting themselves, both
in the area and on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
The challenge we have is, we've either been unwilling or
unable to get the expansion of the capabilities of NATO, over
the last several decades, at the level that we've needed it in
order to be able to deal with an issue like we have in
Afghanistan. I don't know whether we've kidded ourselves or
whether we've known this; but, I can tell you, I don't think
the American people have realized how inadequate NATO may have
been.
Fortunately, and thankfully, Secretary Gates has spoken out
on this. As he said, nobody's united the NATO forces more than
he has with his remarks in the last several weeks. But, thank
goodness somebody has spoken out to at least get the subject
out before us so we can begin to deal with it.
Now, my question, to begin with, is, as we look at the
strategy in Afghanistan today, do we have an inverted triangle
that we're building, the base being very unstable, a base that
continues to have an agrarian economy that is structured on
poppy, as opposed to a true agricultural base that is
sustainable in the long term? Either we're going to have to
wipe out their poppy crop or we're going to have to see them
change to a different kind of agricultural system. I've been
worried about getting a farm bill over here. Maybe we ought to
be worrying about getting a farm bill over there, to be able to
restructure their agricultural base, because if we don't do
that, all that we're doing over there is fundamentally based on
agriculture that is not sustainable, by any imagination, if
it's based on narcotics and if that is what is sustaining
Taliban and al Qaeda and other terrorist activity as the
fundamental source of the funding.
So, I guess I'm going to start with you, Secretary Shinn.
What are your thoughts, do we have a base being built over
there, or is it all on the wrong premise?
Dr. Shinn. You're certainly right, Senator, on your two
major points, that it's an agricultural economy, and----
Senator Ben Nelson. Sort of.
Dr. Shinn. It has a narrow base, and much of that base is
narcotics, it's growing poppy. There is no easy solution to
that problem, other than widening out the bottom of that
triangle with the Alternative Livelihood Program.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we have a farm bill over there?
Dr. Shinn. I'm not sure we have the equivalent of a farm
bill, but----
Senator Ben Nelson. We'll let Secretary Boucher speak to
that.
Ambassador Boucher. I guess I'd have to say I'm not
familiar enough with a farm bill to tell you exactly----
Senator Ben Nelson. A farm bill. Do we have an agricultural
plan there to change the base of the agriculture from
narcotics-driven production agriculture to something that is
sustainable into the future? Because we cannot permit them to
sustain this form of agriculture.
Ambassador Boucher. Yes. I think you've put your finger on
it. But, it's broader than just agriculture. There's probably
no single crop that's as easy to grow and as lucrative to a
farmer as growing opium poppy. But, what we've seen in the
experience of other countries--if you take Turkey, Thailand, or
Pakistan, places that had been, at one point in time, the major
suppliers of opium or heroin to the world, what you see there
is, the transformation of the rural economy has been a key
factor. So the effort of bringing in roads, electricity,
irrigation programs, and fruit trees, transforms the rural
economy, so you get a better market for the vegetables and
fruit that you grow. Your brother-in-law drives a truck, makes
some money; your sister-in-law, she has a handicraft store,
where she is able to supply things to the local area, or even
the export market. The whole rural economy changes, and that's
how people get out of poppy production.
Unfortunately, what we've seen is the concentration of
poppy in the insurgency areas in the south. This new U.N. drug
estimate report has some very interesting statistics. We're
actually doing a lot of assistance in the areas that have now
become the major producing areas for poppy: there are
alternative livelihoods available, there is assistance, there
are education programs. But, nonetheless, some of these surveys
show 70 percent of the villages that have received some kind of
assistance are still growing poppy in the south. That's
different from the whole rest of the country. You have to,
essentially, establish government control, and build a
different economy.
Senator Ben Nelson. But, if you look at the economics of
it, isn't it true that the money to be made in poppy production
is not at the agricultural level at the base for the farmer.
They're told what they're going to get. They have to do it.
But, the money is to be made by the narcotics ring, Taliban and
the others that are generating great sums of money for their
own evildoing.
So, wouldn't it be wise for us to have a broadbased
agriculture plan within the area? I heard the President, the
other evening, speaking about agriculture. Unfortunately, it
wasn't about American agriculture, it was about agriculture in
other parts of the world. Perhaps we ought to have a plan there
that we can articulate, that we can facilitate, and we can
measure, after the fact. Because, what it seems to me is, we're
fiddling, and Rome is burning internally there as we see the
enemy regenerate itself from right in the midst of what we're
watching, as we try to continue to put bandages and Band-Aids
on hemorrhaging arteries.
Ambassador Boucher. I agree with you, Senator, on what we
have to do. I think there is a broadbased agricultural and
rural development plan for the country, and including for those
areas where the poppy is most prevalent.
Senator Ben Nelson. But, how soon and how long?
Ambassador Boucher. In order to apply it, and apply it
thoroughly, you need to get security, and you need to get the
government in there. That's where this nexus between insurgency
and narcotics--it's areas of insecurity, where the government
is--where there's lack of governance, that we've not been able
to bring the poppy problem under control.
Senator Ben Nelson. Even if we don't require the NATO
countries to put up guns, can we help them get involved with
helping the Afghans with butter, in terms of supporting that
level? That's some of the soft power that I've heard Secretary
Gates talk about in dealing with the challenge we have in the
world today with asymmetrical warfare, that it has to be a much
broader base. So, maybe we don't have to ask them to send guns,
maybe we can have them come and help us with the Afghans so
they can create their own butter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time's up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I'm to, again, yield to my colleague
Senator Sessions, in that you have to go to the 12:30 meeting
with General Cartwright, as you are the ranking member on our
subcommittee on that subject.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Warner.
I want to ask some questions that concern me. I truly
believe that it would be a tragedy of monumental proportions if
we were to somehow allow Afghanistan to sink into the chaos it
was in before. It would be bad for the world and for the 30
million people there, and bad for the United States.
I want us to be successful. We've been at it quite a while.
I think, one thing that's clear, that creating an operating,
efficient government in an area of the world that's never had
one before is very, very difficult. It's just hard. We can
place blame anywhere we want to place it, but it's not easy.
Corruption is not something we can just pass a law and have it
end; it's part of the cultural history that's risen from the
oppression and so forth that they've suffered.
But, I guess I'm looking at The Atlantic Council report
that indicates on the security side, that a stalemate has taken
place, and then they say, ``However, civil sector reform is in
serious trouble. Little coordination exists among the many
disparate international organizations, agencies active in
Afghanistan. To add insult to injury, of every dollar of aid
spent on Afghanistan, less than 10 percent goes directly to
Afghans, further compounding reform and reconstruction
problems.''
Now, the three of you have talked about that, and our two
secretaries, mostly, have discussed it. Secretary Boucher, who
is in charge of this, from the United States side, on the civil
responsibilities in Iraq?
Ambassador Boucher. I guess I'd say the chief people are
myself, in Washington, and our ambassador, in the field.
Senator Sessions. What other responsibilities do you have,
in addition to Afghanistan, in your portfolio?
Ambassador Boucher. I have India to Kazakhstan, but I also
have an Afghan coordinator, working in my front office, who
spends all his time on Afghanistan.
Senator Sessions. If a decision has to be made about how to
distribute our assets or set priorities, who makes that
decision?
Ambassador Boucher. Primarily our ambassador in Kabul. They
get the funding, and they try to allocate it where it's most
needed.
Senator Sessions. But, ambassadors are, on the scheme of
things, pretty far down the line, are they not, in terms of
requesting the resources and reprogramming monies? Are they
able to effectively make the decisions, and does our ambassador
understand that he has that authority?
Ambassador Boucher. He very much understands he has that
authority. I think, if you look back at the funding requests
that we've made to Congress, and Congress has funded, most of
those originated at our Embassy in Kabul, and our ambassadors
very much understand and put their requests directly to us and
at a high level. Our job is to get the money that the people on
the ground need to do their job.
Senator Sessions. You indicated, I believe, or maybe
Secretary Shinn, that tightening coordination, focus resources
in troubled areas, increasing electricity, poppy eradication,
and better cooperation with Pakistan are priorities in
Afghanistan. Who is in charge of executing that, and what name
do they have?
Ambassador Boucher. The people I just talked about, I
guess, would be in charge of executing that: the Embassy in
Kabul, Ambassador Wood, out there, myself, and our Afghan
coordinator, Pat Moon.
Senator Sessions. It's my observation that our American
public is a little bit confused. We look to our military to
take care of Afghanistan. We are looking to our military to
take care of Iraq. But, large parts of the effort that's
necessary to success depends on the civil infrastructure. So
you acknowledge that that is the State Department's, primarily,
responsibility.
Ambassador Boucher. Yes, our primary responsibility--we
work with people from all the agencies.
I have to say, the coordination on the ground between the
U.S. military, U.S. agencies, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) programs, handled by the Ambassador and
General McNeil and the other generals out there, is very, very
good. I think the key problems of coordination involve getting
all the international community together to focus on some of
these goals and do things in a standardized and focused way.
Senator Sessions. Let me ask you, these four goals that you
mentioned, I guess that's a plan, although it is not
particularly specific. I sense that it's an objective report
that I'm getting here from you, Secretary Boucher and Secretary
Shinn, we're sitting back, and you're discussing all of this,
with wisdom and observation from afar, but I'm interested in
who is in charge of fixing it, who has direct responsibility,
who understands it's their responsibility, who understands, if
we fail, civilly, we place our soldiers at greater risk to be
killed, or our allies to be murdered. It furthers the progress
of the Taliban if we're unsuccessful. Do we clearly understand
that? I guess, again, our ambassador, you say, is the primary
point person on the ground, but how long does an ambassador
serve there, and when do you expect a change in that office?
Ambassador Boucher. Ambassadors serve at the pleasure of
the President. It has generally been 2 years in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Wood started earlier in 2007, late spring, if I
remember correctly.
I think we all understand, whatever department, whatever
agency, whatever job we have in Washington or in Afghanistan,
the stakes involved and the need for success and the way that
we have to operate in order to achieve success. Any problems
that come up in that process are the responsibility of me and
the ambassador and others involved in the chain, to make sure
they get fixed.
Senator Sessions. A little while ago you said, ``I guess,''
in referring to responsibility, and you began listing a group
of people with vague responsibilities. I would just suggest one
of the weaknesses we have is, we don't have a clear chain of
command, that there's one person that we can look to, by name,
and who's responsible for the constant adjustments and changes
and reallocation of resources necessary to be successful in a
difficult situation like this. My only other question would be,
how would the role of someone like Paddy Ashdown, the
international coordinator, be able to focus our resources more
effectively?
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, this is a complex problem, and
there are a lot of moving pieces to it, there are a lot of
people involved in trying to solve it. If anybody's going to be
held responsible in Washington, it ought to be me, and that's
why I'm here talking to you. So, I'm happy to have my name
attached to any success or failure that we achieve out there.
I'd say, we do think that having a senior international
civilian would help with that broader effort to coordinate the
international community, coordinate the civil and military
operations, and to coordinate between the internationals and
the Afghans. Ultimately, our job, his job, is to support the
Afghan Government in building and extending its capabilities.
So, that, we think, would be a boon, not only to us, but
also to the Afghans and the international community, as a
whole, and that's why we're working on getting somebody who's a
strong figure to perform that job.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Senator Levin, let
me, first, thank you for convening the hearing.
It strikes me, as I listen to our colleagues ask questions,
Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, that the situation on the
committee and in Congress with regard to Afghanistan is quite
different from with regard to Iraq. These two conflicts are
different, although, I think, part of a larger war that we're
in with Islamist extremism and terrorism. But, what I'm saying,
in brief, is that, while we have had a lot of division of
opinion on Iraq--unfortunately, too much of it on partisan
lines--there does seem to be a kind of unanimity of purpose
here with regard to Afghanistan, about how critical it is for
us to get it right, and how we all know how harmful it will be
if we fail. I do want to, in that spirit, thank you for
convening these two hearings today, and to express the hope
that, under the leadership of the two of you, this committee
can play a very proactive role with regard to Afghanistan, in
support of the work that these three gentlemen, and all the
many who work under you, both here and in Afghanistan, are
doing on our behalf.
I was in Afghanistan about a month ago. Just to state an
impression briefly, there are a lot of people worried about
where this is going in Afghanistan. My own conclusion was that
this is nowhere near as on the edge as, for instance, Iraq was
in 2006, that our forces and the coalition forces, NATO forces,
are holding our own, but we're facing an insurgency that is
revived, we're operating in an unbelievably poor country, which
has a proud history, but not so much of a governmental history,
so it gives us great challenges. I think what we want to see
happen--I know, we do and you do--is to see us begin to turn
the tide toward more success in Afghanistan, as we've begun to
see in Iraq.
So, I want to begin with a question to Secretary Shinn. In
your prepared testimony, you state, and I quote, ``that the
simple counterinsurgency prescription is clear, hold, and
build.'' It's my observation, based on a couple of visits there
and, just, what I hear and read, that in the south of
Afghanistan, in fact, coalition forces are clearing, but
they're not really holding and building. I wanted to ask you--
which is to say that they clear a district, withdraw, the
Taliban retakes it, and obviously there's no opportunity for us
to build. I wanted to ask you if my impression is correct. If
so, why is it so, and what can we do to change it?
Dr. Shinn. Senator, I think your impression is correct. It
is exactly the clear, hold, and build problem, particularly the
hold part of it, that we agree with you, is what constitutes
much of the problem in the south. Shortly, we're going to have
a test case of this in Musa Qala, where, essentially, it was,
for a period of time, under Taliban control; they were cleared
out; we have backfilled, now, with ANP, for the hold part.
Perhaps Secretary Boucher could expand on this. We're starting
to, with the Afghans, flow in the resources for the build, the
third piece of the equation, but the jury is out on how hard
it's going to be for the reformed, or, in the process of being
reformed, ANP, along with elements of the ANA, to hold Musa
Qala long enough, and at a big enough of a scale, so that the
rebuilding and the governance part can take place.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Secretary Boucher, do you want to add a quick word?
Ambassador Boucher. I think, Senator, for a variety of
reasons, the training of the police has lagged behind the
training of the military.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ambassador Boucher. I think we have it right, both in
numbers and quality. There's still the national apparatus that
we've built with the military--the payroll systems,
communication systems, command systems--that is still weak on
the side of the police; and that's an essential part to being
able to coordinate and use police well. Perhaps the job of
building police is inherently more difficult, because you have
a lot of people with some very bad habits who need to be
reformed, retrained, weeded out, et cetera. But, I do think we
have formulas, now, for really doing the job of the police
training right. We've already seen some signs of success with
this Focused Development District concept, and it's going
forward in a big way this year. So, proof of the concept will
be seen this year on the ground.
Senator Lieberman. General Sattler, let me ask you a
related question, which really goes to the clear, hold, and
build. It's my impression that the comprehensive
counterinsurgency strategy that our forces are employing so
successfully in Iraq is being employed successfully also in
Regional Command (RC) East by American forces. But--and which
is to say, they have a campaign plan, and they are executing
it, and they're executing it successfully--it's also my
impression that there's no comparable campaign plan for the
contested provinces of southern Afghanistan, where NATO forces
are in the lead. I want to ask you to talk a little bit about
whether that impression of mine is correct. What's prevented
that from happening, and what can we do to get the south
heading in the right direction--south of Afghanistan?
General Sattler. Senator Lieberman, when ISAF took over,
they have an operational plan, which has, basically, the same
three lines of operation--security, reconstruction, and
governance--as they move forward.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Sattler. When they came onboard 18 months ago, when
ISAF took control of all Afghanistan, at that point most of the
countries, when they signed up, they believed they were coming
in for security and stability operations, or stability and
reconstruction operations. Over a period of time, especially in
RC South, the RC South countries have realized that it is a
counterinsurgency in the south. They use the term
``comprehensive approach to the challenge'' in the south. The
Canadians, the Brits, the Dutch, and the Danes have all stepped
up to the plate and are doing more counterinsurgency-like
operations.
Secretary Gates just submitted a paper to the RC South
countries, which is a counterinsurgency-type strategy that
takes credit for what's being done, talks about what is going
on right now in RC South, and also looks towards the future.
That paper was submitted by the secretary to the RC South
countries at the same time that the NATO, the North Atlantic
Council (NAC), and the Secretary General have come forward with
a campaign architecture to now take all the international
instruments of national power, and the lines from security to
economic to governance, to come up with a comprehensive
approach across the country. So, right now, NATO is taking a
hard look at that comprehensive approach, sir.
So, we feel very comfortable that the RC South countries
are doing what needs to be done, but what we need to do is get
a more coherent--it was already articulated a more coherent
approach to use all the resources--U.S., NATO, partnership
countries, and international organizations--to come together.
That's being worked on right now, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Right. So, and just a final quick
question, you think we're in reach in time of seeing--having a
campaign plan by NATO in the south of Afghanistan that's
comparable to the one we're executing in the east of
Afghanistan?
General Sattler. Sir, I believe it'll be--it'll go beyond
RC South. It'll be a comprehensive plan for the country of
Afghanistan, of which RC South and East, sir, are components,
sir.
Senator Lieberman. That would be good. That's certainly
what we need. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to start with Mr. Boucher, to be followed by
Secretary Shinn. Using, as an example, the steps that are being
taken by our government in Iraq to establish written and
agreed-upon documents between the two governments--namely--you
saw that, I hope, editorial by the Secretaries of State and
Defense outlining how they're going to write two documents, one
being a status-of-force agreement (SOFA). Would you recount for
us exactly the legal authority by which NATO is now operating
in a sovereign nation of Afghanistan, and the United States is
operating as a part of NATO, as well as conducting its own
separate operations of a security and antiterrorist nature?
Dr. Shinn. To be as precise as you are requiring us to
respond, has to do with some of the technicalities of the U.N.
Security Council strategy.
Senator Warner. That's what I want to sort through.
Dr. Shinn. Right.
Senator Warner. We're engaged in active combat operations
in a sovereign nation. What is the basis on which that is being
done?
Ambassador Boucher. The basis is U.N. resolutions and, of
course, the consent, of the Afghan Government for those kind of
operations and that kind of support. But, actually, to get to a
precise legal answer, I'd probably have to go back to my
lawyers and go through it once again.
Senator Warner. I think it's important that the record, Mr.
Chairman, have that in as a part of our deliberations here
today.
So, I recognize that there are some U.N. resolutions. What
are the expiration dates on this, given that the operations in
Iraq are dependent on a resolution which is going to expire at
the end of this calendar year?
Ambassador Boucher. The U.N. mandate has generally been, I
think, a 1-year resolution, comes up for renewal about March-
April of every year, and we'll look at renewal every year,
again this year, with whatever extensions or revisions it might
need for this operation over the year to come.
Senator Warner. Are we contemplating a status-of-forces
agreement?
Ambassador Boucher. Again, that's something I'd have to
check with the lawyers on.
Senator Warner. Mr. Shinn, do you have any comments?
Dr. Shinn. Yes, sir. One of the core points you're making
is a valid one, and it's an important one, which is that we are
going to have to regularize and scale up the legal foundation
for activities in Afghanistan, similar to the way that we're
doing it in Iraq. It's our intention to use some of the same
models; for example, a SOFA. It's all the more important
because, as you implied, we have the NATO piece of the puzzle
that we also have to factor into the equation.
Senator Warner. I think it's essential that we put that
together, because our forces are fighting, taking casualties,
and, I must say, regrettably, it happens in all conflicts,
inflicting casualties on the civilian population, destruction
of civilian property, which, unfortunately, is in the path of
the combatants. I think we'd better be all signed up and--to
the dotted line on this, to protect not only the credibility of
our Nation, but also the military individuals, the civilians,
and others from our government who are, really, in a courageous
way, taking their own risks and sacrifice to make this a
successful operation in Afghanistan. I think we owe them no
less than to have complete clarity and openness on this issue.
So, you will provide that, in due course, for the record.
Dr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Ambassador Boucher. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Warner. Good.
General Sattler, I asked this question of Secretary Gates
recently, and he was very forthright in the answer, and that is
that Congress and the general public here in this country have
been informed that we're going to send in two augmented marine
battalions to become a part of the force-structure contribution
by the United States in Afghanistan. I understand part of that
force will be utilized to augment our current level of force
structure within NATO. Is that correct?
General Sattler. That's correct, Senator. Of the 3,200
soldiers in the Marine Expeditionary Unit, about 2,200 of them
will be under ISAF command and control to be part of the ground
forces, correct, sir.
Senator Warner. The balance will augment the existing force
structure that we have, that are performing various security
and antiterrorist operations. Is that correct?
General Sattler. The remaining 1,000 will work under
Admiral Fallon, under OEF. They will be tasked under the train-
and-equip mission, working for General Cone. So, for their
period of time, they will be enablers and facilitators,
coaches, mentors, and security, to take the police, which we've
already talked about, to permit them to get out into some of
the areas where it's not safe and secure now. So, the marines
will have police trainers and mentors with them. The
preponderance of their mission will be security. But, because
of their ability to handle and teach weapons, tactics, et
cetera, they will probably be dual-use, sir.
Senator Warner. Now, Secretary Gates, in consultation with
the NAC and others, recognized the need for these forces. Is
that correct?
General Sattler. That's correct, sir. This is fully
coordinated with the NAC.
Senator Warner. Right. But, the fact that the United States
has to completely fulfill this requirement by NATO, and also
our own separate command, it was because the NATO forces have
not lived up to their commitments. Isn't that the blunt truth?
General Sattler. Sir, part of the requirement for the
train-and-equip, the coaching and mentoring piece, it is a
requirement that has come forward from Admiral Fallon to the
U.S. side; but, the Marine Expeditionary Unit--even though the
3,200 went together, the Marine Expeditionary Unit was
Secretary Gates's contribution, to ensure that the proper
firepower, et cetera, would be in place in RC South or wherever
the ISAF commander wants to use it, sir. So, it was a
unilateral placement of those forces by Secretary Gates. That's
a correct statement, sir.
Senator Warner. But, again, it's because of the shortfall
of earlier commitments made by our NATO partners, am I not
correct?
General Sattler. Sir, there is a requirement on the books,
for approximately three battalions, that is unfilled. But, this
is not being placed against that requirement, no. It's going
into an area where ISAF wants to place it. So, I guess the
answer to your question, Senator, to be straight, would be not
directly correlated; but, if the other units were there, would
the Secretary have had to come forward? Sir, I would only be
speculating. So, this is not being placed against the three-
short battalions on the NATO requirements, sir.
Senator Warner. I'll go back and get exactly what he said,
but his answer was fairly crisp and to the point, ``Yes,
Senator, that is the reason we're sending those forces in, to
make up for the shortfalls.''
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, if I could make one comment. Last
year, our experience was, the U.S. increased its forces by
about 3,500, and, in turn, then other NATO allies, other
allies, Australia included, stepped up and matched that pledge,
if you want to say that, and we ended up with an increase, last
year, of about 7,000 in the overall force levels. We are now
actively engaged in the diplomacy, particularly leading up to
the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, to try to leverage this
contribution of 3,200 marines with the other allies to get them
to step up and both follow on and meet some of these other
requirements.
Senator Warner. We may be working on that, and leveraging
that, but the plain, blunt fact is, the troops were needed, and
the U.S. was the one that came forward and made that
contribution. It's as simple as that.
Do you wish to add anything, Secretary Shinn? We have an
obligation to the American people, when we make additional
force commitments, to say precisely why we're doing it.
Dr. Shinn. We do.
Senator Warner. We're doing it, because it's the judgment
of the military commanders, (a) they need forces, and (b) no
other nation was willing, in a timely way, to come forward with
that force structure, and force structure that has no national
caveat. The U.S. structure does not have a national caveat, and
they can be employed by that NATO commander to meet all the
contingencies, a full spectrum of contingencies facing NATO. Am
I correct in that?
Dr. Shinn. You are, sir.
General Sattler. Yes, sir.
Dr. Shinn. It's a clear fact that there are shortfalls in
resourcing the military side of Afghanistan. It's also, I
think, true that the Secretary committed those incremental
troops in the expectations that our NATO allies would be more
forthcoming. I would also point out that the NATO resourcing
story is not over yet. As Secretary Boucher mentioned, this is
part of the long negotiations that will, hopefully, produce
incremental results at the Bucharest summit, which is in April.
Senator Warner. Okay. Let the record note you're struggling
with a response, but I think we got it all out.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Let the record also show that the Secretary
of Defense was very direct. As Senator Warner says, when asked
whether or not the reason we had to send the 3,200 troops is
because the allies didn't come forward with their part of the
deal and what they committed to and need to supply. He was very
direct. Senator Warner is correct. I don't know why you're
dancing around something which the Secretary of Defense was
very clear on.
By the way, this is all being done, filling in the gap left
by our NATO allies, at a time when we're overstretched in Iraq,
which everyone acknowledges.
So, Senator Warner's right, we will get the record on that,
and put that right at this spot in the record (see Annex E).
It's very important that the American people know. As
Senator Lieberman says, there is support for doing this. This
is not an area where there's great division. I think there's
kind of a need to fill in where our NATO allies failed, but
there's no use mincing words on it. They have failed, and we
should put maximum pressure on them to come through with what
they need to come through with.
So, I just want to support what Senator Warner has said.
Senator Warner. I thank the Chair.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Shinn, Secretary Boucher, and General Sattler,
welcome to the committee today, and thank you for your service.
Up here, sometimes we don't always agree, but there is
certainly bipartisan agreement on one thing, and I think that
is how important it is that we win in Afghanistan. I think
there's also consensus in the international community about how
important it is that we succeed there.
One of the questions that I think has been touched on a
little bit already today, that seems to be right at the heart
of getting a private economy going in Afghanistan and helping
our efforts succeed, has to do with the whole question of
counternarcotics and the direct correlation between the
narcotics trade and financing for terrorist activity. I guess
I'd like to direct a question to Secretary Boucher, if I might,
because there is some question about whether or not there ought
to be use of military when it comes to eradication efforts, and
some contradictory-type, I guess, opinions on that issue.
From The Atlantic Council report, on page 10, it says, and
I quote, ``Some have suggested that ISAF take on an aggressive
drug eradication role. This is not a good fit for ISAF. Armed
forces should not be used as an eradication force,'' end quote.
The Afghan Study report, however, makes what seems to be a
contradicting conclusion on page 32. There again, it says,
``The concept of integrating counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency by using international military forces to
assist interdiction is welcome and overdue.''
So, I guess, I understand the need for military forces to
take extreme care during these eradication/interdiction types
of operations, and the need for integration with Afghan forces,
but, in terms of how you would respond to these two conflicting
or contradictory reports, do you think we should use our forces
for eradication purposes, or not?
Ambassador Boucher. I think there's actually a subtle
language difference between the two things you quoted, and
therein lies the answer to the question. No, I don't think we
should use NATO or U.S. forces to eradicate, but I do think
there's an appropriate role, and it's actually part of the NATO
mandate, for our forces or NATO forces to provide a secure
environment in which the Afghans can go in and eradicate, so
that the Afghans have about a 500-man Afghan eradication force.
They're prepared to go out in the field and eradicate poppy. If
they are provided with the appropriate security environment,
they can do that in denied areas, areas where the Taliban
operate or where there are local drug lords. So as we've seen
the increasing nexus between poppy-growing and insurgency, it's
become even more important that we have a secure environment
for the eradicators to go into those tough areas, and that's
where NATO can play a role, that's where the Afghan army can
play a role, but the actual eradication would be done by the
Afghan eradication force.
Senator Thune. I think this question was touched on
earlier, maybe by Senator Nelson, but I posed a question a
while back to Eric Edelman, who, at that time, was Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, about this transition of
getting the Afghan economy, particularly the agricultural
economy, transitioned from poppy production to some other types
of things that we can grow in this country. The climatic
conditions are very similar there. I guess the question is, is
enough effort being made on that level to start making that
transition so that we don't have to have as much of the hard
power, the military, even if it's the Afghan military,
involved? Is there enough effort on that front? My impression
was, the last time I asked this question, that the answer was
no, and I'm just wondering if that's changed? Are we making an
aggressive effort to try and transition their agricultural
economy to more legitimate types of production?
Ambassador Boucher. There is an aggressive effort on the
rural economy. First and foremost, you have to get in roads,
you have to get in electricity, you have to build the
irrigation systems, in addition to providing agricultural
extension crops and other industries--cold storage, things like
that--that can operate in those areas.
We're in the process now of trying to beef up our State
Department, USAID, and Department of Agriculture personnel at
the PRTs, at the provincial level, so that they can do more of
that. It also rests on being able to bring that stuff in, along
with military activity, the hold part, so that we can--you
can't always build a road or start a new economy or clear the
irrigation ditches if there is an insurgency raging in that
district, so you have to be able to do these things in a very
coordinated fashion, that's sequenced, but very, very close
together. So, the answer is yes, there is an aggressive effort,
but no, it's not being done everywhere, because it's not able
to be done everywhere, at this moment.
Dr. Shinn. Senator Thune, could I just amplify a little
bit? It depends where you are. If you're in Nangahar, for
example, in the eastern side of the map, where the security
situation is stable enough so that we could succeed in putting
in the roads and the infrastructure, so you could begin the
conversion from poppy to real agriculture, you'll see that the
poppy production, when the data comes out, has gone way down.
But, conversely, we'll see the poppy production in Helmand, in
particular--in Helmand, and in Kandahar, to some degree, going
up, for just this reason. Yes, you can't get in there, because
of the security situation, to begin that conversion. So, no
matter how many resources you throw at roads and cold storage,
if you can't actually deliver them to the population, it won't
have the desired effect.
Senator Thune. Have you seen the connection between this
narcotics--the poppy production and insurgent funding and all
that sort of thing going up? I know there's always been a
fairly established connection there, but what's the trend line
with regard to the illegitimate activity, in terms of that
industry, and a lot of the other issues that we're fighting
with regard to the insurgents?
Dr. Shinn. It's a pretty murky picture. There's not enough
evidence--first of all, we don't know very much about how they
actually fund the Taliban insurgency, either as an aggregate or
in the groups. It's not clear whether the trend is up or down,
in terms of cash flow. My personal inference is that that nexus
is growing; then, it's probably becoming increasingly important
to them to fund the insurgency. But, I don't have a lot of
intelligence information to support that.
Senator Thune. That's my impression, too, just from
observation of media reports and that there seems to be a
growing connection, or relationship, between that narcotics
trade and the insurgency.
Dr. Shinn. Yes.
Ambassador Boucher. I think it may actually be the other
way around, that we've always known that the narcotics trade
and the insurgency would feed off each other. That's been
especially true in the south. What we've seen is, where we've
been able to establish good governance and establish policemen
and establish an overall climate of development, the poppy has
gone way down. So, if you start looking at it on a map, you
have more and more poppy-free provinces and poppy reductions in
the east and the north of the country; and, in the south, where
the insurgency is, you're left with the poppy and the
insurgency feeding off each other. So, whether that's actually
grown or that's been the case, it's just we've been able to
eliminate it on these areas, and we haven't eliminated here
yet, I think, is probably hard to say. But, yes, the connection
between the two is increasingly clear.
Senator Thune. Do you think that there is sufficient
support from the government there? I was there a while back,
and again, my impression was that they know this is a problem,
and they're at least verbally committed to fixing it. But, do
the actions follow that? Are they taking the steps that are
necessary to help deal with that?
Ambassador Boucher. In a general sense, yes. I think it's
especially true in the provinces, where we've seen big
reductions and that have gone poppy-free last year. One of the
biggest factors have been the governors and the people on the
ground. There is even, now, a good-performers fund, so the
governors that achieve a decrease can get some money to spend
on local projects.
So I think that remains one of the key factors, including
the lack of good governance, in addition to the lack of
security in the provinces where poppy is still a big problem.
So, it's something we're still working on.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired. Thank you.
Thank you, all.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Let's try a 4-minute second round.
As I mentioned, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Mullen, before the House Armed Services Committee a few
months ago, described the war in Afghanistan as ``an economy-
of-force operation,'' and said that, ``It's simply a matter of
resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in
Iraq, we do what we must.''
General Sattler, can you tell us what Admiral Mullen meant
when he said the war in Afghanistan is an ``economy-of-force
operation''? What does that mean in military terms?
General Sattler. Sir, an ``economy-of-force'' would mean
that you would have two challenges, and you would put a
priority of effort on one of the two. In this particular case,
as Admiral Mullen alluded, that the priority now for resources
is going towards Iraq, at this time. But, sir, I would also
like to stress that the resources that are in Afghanistan, that
there is no man or woman, no warrior, who goes forward on an
operation where they are not fully resourced to accomplish the
mission at hand. But, that being said, sir, as you're alluding,
there are some things we could do, and, as Admiral Mullen said,
we would like to do that we can't take those on now, until the
resource balance shifts, sir.
Chairman Levin. The Afghanistan Study Group recommends a
number of diplomatic steps to be taken to strengthen a stable
and a peaceful Afghanistan, including the following. This is
for you, Secretary Boucher. This is what they recommend:
reducing antagonism between Pakistan and Afghanistan, including
by having Afghanistan accept the internationally recognized
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the so-called Durand
Line, as the official border; next, getting Pakistan to remove
restrictions that burden the transportation of goods through
Pakistan to and from Afghanistan, including from India; and,
third, having the United States and its allies develop a
strategy to convince Iran to play a constructive role with
respect to Afghanistan, including the possibility of resuming
direct discussions with Iran on the stabilization of
Afghanistan.
I'm wondering, Secretary Boucher, whether you would support
those, or whether the administration would support the
diplomatic initiatives outlined in the Afghanistan Study Group
report that I've just quoted.
Ambassador Boucher. Generally, yes, but not exactly the way
that they recommended, I have to say. We've put a lot of effort
into reducing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We all
remember last year, March and April, when things really flared
up, and not only was there shooting across the border, but one
of our U.S. officers got killed at a flag meeting that was held
to try to reduce that shooting. It has been a very dangerous
situation. I'm happy to report that the situation seems to have
turned around quite a bit. Last fall, there was a jirga of the
tribes from both sides of the border, where peaceful people on
both sides stood up together and said, ``We don't want the
insurgency, we don't want the extremists in our midst, and
we're going to work to accomplish that.'' That's a process that
we're confident will continue to go forward between the two
countries. President Karzai and President Musharraf met at the
end of December, the day after Christmas, had a very good
meeting, and there have been subsequent followup meetings and
cooperation between the two sides.
We've also promoted border cooperation, economic
cooperation, and other areas, so we see things going, I'd say,
a lot better between the two countries, both starting to
realize, and starting to act upon the realization, that these
people are enemies of both nations, and these people need to be
dealt with from both sides, by both countries.
Frankly, we haven't taken on the issue of the Durand Line.
It's a problem that goes back to 1893, to the colonial period.
I think both sides do operate with that as the border. They
shoot across it to protect it. They operate border posts on it.
Our goal has been: try to reduce those tensions and get them to
work in a cooperative manner across that line.
Pakistan's restrictions on transit trade from India, truck
transit from India, is an issue that we have taken up, and we
continue to take it up, because, frankly, we think it's in
Pakistan's overall economic interest to capture that transit
trade and to have it go through Pakistan and not have it go
through Iran. It was something we continue to raise. Pakistani
government keeps telling us it's really a matter that's
determined by their bilateral relationship with India, and not
even by the broader global interest, but it's something we do
continue to push, because we think it would be not only helpful
to us and allies and others who operate in Pakistan, but it
would be helpful to Pakistan itself.
The strategy for Iran, we certainly keep in very close
touch with the Afghans on their relationship with Iran. We see
Iran doing a lot of different, and sometimes contradictory,
things. They do participate in support for the Afghan
Government. They participate in the Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board of donor countries that are trying to support
Afghanistan. But, they're also undermining the politics, and,
in some cases, even supplying arms to the Taliban. So, we've
had, I think, a comprehensive response to that.
At this point, I think, the issue of whether we sit down
and talk to Iran about it is more one that needs to be looked
at in the broader context of our relations with Iran. We have
had such discussions in the past. But, really, Iran needs to
cooperate with the international community and with the Afghan
Government, not just with the United States, and that's where
we think the pressure ought to be on Iran.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. General Sattler, I've had the privilege of
visiting with you in your own office in the Pentagon of recent,
and we had some lengthy discussions about my grave concern
about the drug problem, and the fact that the continuously
rising revenues from this drug problem are, in part, filtering
their way back into the hands of the Taliban, enabling them to
have greater purchasing power for weapons and other pieces of
equipment to engage, not only the NATO forces, but our forces
within NATO and our forces that are not a part of NATO, and
that, therefore, it's incumbent upon the United States to
really sit down with our NATO partners, in particular, and work
out some sort of an arrangement to begin to curtail this flow
of funds from the poppy trade.
We keep going around in a circle on this issue. Originally,
it was going to be Great Britain, ``This is your problem.'' I
think they still have some portfolio investment in trying to
solve it, but I'm not here to point fingers, they've just not
been successful.
What are we going to do? Because we're putting at risk the
loss of life and limb of our own American GIs as a consequence
of the funds flowing from the poppy trade.
General Sattler. You're absolutely correct, Senator Warner.
The United States has come up with a five-pillar comprehensive
strategy to go in and take on the counternarcotics challenge
inside of Afghanistan. It goes back to Senator Lieberman's
point--we can have a strategy, but it needs to be executed by
all elements that are on the ground inside of Afghanistan. The
sovereign country of Afghanistan obviously has to buy into it,
sir. Then our NATO partner countries, too, who are on the
ground beside us. It has an eradication piece to it. It has an
interdiction piece to it. It has a rule-of-law and justice
piece to it. It has a public information piece, to illuminate
the Afghan public as to why this must be undertaken. The last
thing it has, which has already been discussed here, an
alternate-livelihood piece--What other crop do I grow? How do I
get it to a market?
Senator Warner. Those are the pieces, but your operative
phrase is that the Afghan Government has to ``buy in'' into
this program. So, I would turn, now, to Secretary Boucher.
Where are we, in terms of their ``buying in'' to begin to
lessen this risk to our forces?
Ambassador Boucher. I think the Afghan Government has
basically bought into the strategy. The strategy evolved from
their program, which they say has eight pillars. We talk about
five pillars. But, essentially, it's a common strategy between
us and the Afghans to get at the narcotics problem, both
through all the tools mentioned, but also just the basic
security and government--governance activity. As I said, it is
Afghans who go out and destroy the poppy in the fields. We're a
long way from reducing it, but it at least seems to have peaked
out this year. But there is also an effort, a diplomatic
effort, underway with other governments to go after the funding
and to get at the money that the traffickers use, move around,
and sometimes supply to the Taliban.
Senator Warner. I'm not trying to put you on report. You're
a fine public servant, doing the best you can. But we don't see
any results. What's the increase this year over last year?
About 20 percent, isn't it?
Ambassador Boucher. Last year's increase was 34 percent.
Half of that was yield, and half of that was hectarage. The
early estimates for this year are that it'll be a slight
decrease overall, including stabilization in Helmand, in the
south. But, obviously it's still at a very high level that
needs to be, not just capped, but reduced.
Senator Warner. So, we'll have some, although,
unfortunately, not as large, an increase as the year before,
but, at some point we have to see a reversal and a beginning of
a decrease.
Now, can you add anything, Secretary Shinn? Because it is
your Department that's taken the casualties.
Dr. Shinn. It is, and I don't have very optimistic things
to say about this.
Senator Warner. What can Congress do? What can anybody do?
We can't just throw up our hands.
Dr. Shinn. This is a tough one. Part of it is just the
basic math. The Afghan central government budget is about $600
to $700 million a year from their domestic revenue, most of it
from customs. The street value of 1 year's production of opium
is between $3 and $3.5 billion a year. So, the out-of-scale
between the amount of money that can flow in to corruption and
undermine the public institutions in Afghanistan is so big,
compared to the fragile base of the government itself, that we
are really walking up a steep hill.
Senator Warner. We may be walking up a steep hill, but when
General Sattler puts into effect the orders for these 3,000
marines, it's incumbent upon the Congress of the United States
to assure their families and the marines that we're doing
everything we can to limit the risk that they're going to face
over there. Among those risks are weapons that are being
purchased by this drug money. So, I'm going to unrelentlessly
continue to press on this issue, because I feel a strong
obligation to those marines.
General Sattler. Sir, I absolutely agree with you on that.
I do think this is an issue that deserves unrelenting pressure.
We know what works in Afghanistan. We've seen provinces go
poppy-free, we've seen provinces with significant reductions,
including places like Nangahar, which was way up, came down,
went back, and has now gone down again. It's a combination of
military force, police, good governance, and economic
opportunity, in addition to the counterdrug programs. The most
important thing is that we pursue the overall stability in
provinces, we get better government down there, and we pursue
these narcotics programs with unrelenting vigor.
Senator Warner. Thank you, gentlemen.
I thank the Chair. It's been a very good hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I was thinking that before I ask a few questions, I just
want to say a word about the American forces over there and say
what I heard from the Afghanis when I was there a month ago.
It's quite remarkable. They have the greatest appreciation and
admiration for the American troops that are there--their
courage, what they bring to the fight, and their involvement in
the fight. But, beyond that, it's encapsulated in this sentence
that one of the Afghanis said, ``We appreciate all soldiers and
troops from outside Afghanistan that are here. The American
soldiers are the only ones that share their canteens with us.''
Now, that is a simple statement that says a lot, which is that,
``The American soldiers treat us like equals, they treat us, in
fact, like fellow soldiers, they treat us like brothers in this
conflict.'' I was so moved by that, that I wanted to put it on
the record here, because these troops of ours are the best.
They're the best of America. What that said to me is that they
are bringing American values to this battlefield, which is far
from the United States, but has so much to do with our own
future security. That pride, of course, doesn't mean that we
don't need, as my colleagues have said, to get more NATO forces
in there. They, frankly, have to be more involved, as our
troops have been.
I want to come to the other part of what I think we need,
militarily, which is, just as in Iraq, we need to train more of
the Afghans to be an effective ANA.
I want to ask two questions about that. Among the most
perplexing things that I heard was that, when I was there,
General Cone is actually about 3,000 people short of what he
needs to carry out the mission we've given--that is, American
short or coalition forces short--to train the Afghan army. Did
I get that right? If so, General or Secretary, what are we
going to do to--that's the long-term hope here: they get
skilled enough, trained enough, to protect themselves from the
Taliban.
General, do you want to start that?
General Sattler. Yes, Senator Lieberman. You are correct,
sir. General Cone has, through Admiral Fallon, put a request in
for approximately 3,400 additional U.S. men and women to go and
assist in the train-and-equip mission for the Afghan National
Security Forces, both the army and the police. We have not been
able to resource that requirement, sir--what General Cone has
been able to do is to stretch the forces he has; and, through
some very creative management of the assets he had, he's been
able to cover the gap, up to approximately this point. But, we
are at a point now--which is why the Secretary is sending 1,000
marines in--to go work for, eventually, General Cone in the
train-and-equip mission. So, that time on the ground, they will
be able to fill his shortfall. But, as has already been clearly
stated, that is for a finite period of time.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Sattler. That is for 7 months. We will then need to
find the resources to come in behind, to continue that coaching
and mentoring and providing security for Afghan National
Security Forces. So, you're correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate the answer, and I hope we,
in Congress, can help, in any way we can, to provide those
additional personnel, because that seems to be fundamental to
the success of our mission.
Second point is, I was also struck by the fact that we are
training the ANA up to a number that is remarkably below what
we're training the Iraqi Army up to, notwithstanding the fact--
and this would probably surprise most Americans, based on our
focus--that Afghanistan is larger, both in terms of land area
and population, than Iraq is. So, I wonder whether there's any
thinking, within the Pentagon and within NATO, that we ought to
increase the goal for training the ANA.
General Sattler. Sir, I'll go and take that first, Senator.
As the base forces, what we describe the end state, this is the
objective force that the Afghan Government has described what
they need for military. It was originally 70,000, sir. They
have just come in with a proposition to take that up to
80,000----
Senator Lieberman. 80,000, right?
General Sattler.--80,000--from 70,000 to 80,000.
Senator Lieberman. Compare it to Iraq, just for a moment,
in terms of the army, as opposed to the local security forces
in Iraq. Aren't we going for over 300,000 there?
General Sattler. I don't think it's quite 300,000, Senator.
The overall force in Iraq--police, border guards, and the
army--will be somewhere close to about 600,000, total.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
General Sattler. In this particular case, the objective
force for the police is 80,000. So, even if they went to 80,000
for the army, they'd have approximately 160,000. So, it is a
much smaller force. But, once again, we are in conversation
with the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to go
ahead and come up with what they feel, based on the enemy
threat, their objective force should be, sir.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Secretary Boucher, did you want to add something?
Ambassador Boucher. Yes, if I can just say one thing. That
new target, of 82,000--or 80,000 for the army--was approved,
about a week ago in Tokyo by the international community doing
the coordination monitoring.
Senator Lieberman. Good.
Ambassador Boucher. There is serious look now at what's the
overall force total that they need? We came through last year
with $8 billion to step up the training, both in the pace, the
quantity, the quality. As we look, now, to being able to
achieve those initial targets, we have to look where the
ultimate end goal is, and that's a serious study that's going
on right now.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
My time is up. I just want to put a thought on the table,
Mr. Chairman, and that is, one of the things that the future of
Afghanistan depends on is an understanding that we are
committed to a long-term relationship with them. I'm not
talking about permanent bases or any of that, and I just hope
that as we announce that we're going to begin to negotiate some
kind of bilateral agreement, strategic partnership with the
Government of Iraq, that we ought to be thinking about doing
the same, for some period of time, with the government in
Afghanistan, because I think that that will give them the
confidence, including in the army, the Afghan army, to go
forward. So I hope that we're thinking about that.
General Sattler. Senator Lieberman, I know you're out of
time, sir, so I----
Senator Lieberman. But, you're not out of time, so you can
talk as long as you want. [Laughter.]
General Sattler. Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir.
If I could just baseline how we've gone from when we
started--you mentioned you've been involved in this all the way
along, as everyone in this room has, sir. But if you went back
to 2003, when then-Lieutenant General McNeil--three-star
General McNeil commanded the forces in Afghanistan, at that
point in time, sir, he had about 10,000 U.S. warriors under his
command and about 2,000 coalition warriors.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Sattler. We had one prototype PRT we were just
experimenting with. The Afghan National Security Forces, based
on the brutality of the Taliban rule, did not exist. There were
no Afghan units that--there were warriors, they had the warrior
culture, but no units, sir. So that's 2003.
If you move forward to today now, where General McNeil
commands all ISAF, now what he has under his command, sir--he
has approximately 27,000 U.S. forces on the ground in
Afghanistan, he has 31,000 coalition and NATO forces on the
ground. The PRTs now have grown to 25 PRTs, of which 12 are
U.S. and 13 are international PRTs. The Afghan National
Security Forces, which are growing in capacity and capability,
today there's approximately 75,000 police at some stage of
training and effectiveness and efficiency, sir, and 49,000 ANA,
for a total of approximately 124-125,000.
So, I know we use terms, and I read them in the paper,
``the forgotten war,'' sir, ``the unresourced war,'' and as
someone who's been involved with it, myself, for the past 7
years--I apologize if I'm a little emotional on it, but I just
wanted to make sure that we did show that there has been
tremendous growth in capacity and capability, and the hold
piece, as Secretary Shinn alluded to, we need to get that
Afghan National Security Force to have the ability to fill in
and do that hold, where they're respected and they're
appreciated by the Afghan national people, sir.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your emotion and the truth
of what you've said, which is that we've come a long way. Of
course, I think we all agree, we have a ways to go yet until we
get to where we want to be.
General Sattler. I certainly agree with ``we have a ways to
go,'' sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. It's Senator
Akaka's turn, but just on this particular subject, if Senator
Akaka would not mind just for a moment.
Your figures were 49,000, currently, ANA, and 74,000 ANP
personnel. That's the figures we have. But we have something
added to that, which is, there's a training completion date,
for those two groups, of March 2011. Is that right? Are my
notes right on that?
General Sattler. Senator, I'll have to check, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Information regarding the current status of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), compiled monthly by the Joint Staff, includes a
``completion date'' on one slide. This date depicts a month/year in
which a specific category in the ANSF is projected to reach Capability
Milestone 1 (CM1) for manning, training, and equipment.
In its broadest sense, CM1 is attained when a unit, agency, staff
function, or installation is capable of conducting its primary
operational mission (or missions) and has reached full operational
capability (FOC). In terms of manning and equipment, CM1 is attained
when at least 85 percent of its authorized strength is fielded. In
terms of training, basic military training for soldiers,
noncommissioned officers, and officers is provided at the military
training centers. Manned and equipped units are then fielded with
embedded trainers and mentors that assist, mentor, and assess the unit
in training and combat operations as it progresses toward FOC.
General Sattler. There's 8,000 army in training right now,
and we're at approximately 49,000. So when they graduate,
you're looking to actually hit the goal of the current
objective force of 70,000. Sir, I wouldn't want to take a guess
at that, Senator, I'll----
Chairman Levin. How long does it take to train an Afghan
police unit, approximately? Do you know offhand?
General Sattler. Sir----
Chairman Levin. Okay. It's all right.
General Sattler.--I'll get back to you, rather than guess,
Senator, about----
Chairman Levin. The same with the----
Ambassador Boucher. Senator, the----
Chairman Levin.--how long it takes to train the army unit.
I don't quite understand that figure, in my own notes. We'd
appreciate for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Basic training for Afghan National Police (ANP) is approximately 8
weeks; advanced training for specialty police such as border or
counternarcotics averages 2 to 3 weeks more. For the Afghan National
Civil Order Police (ANCOP), training consists of a 16-week program
followed by a dedicated mentoring program.
Our primary program for development of the ANP is the Focused
District Development (FDD) plan. Targeted for district uniform police,
and eventually incorporating the border police, this program includes
the wholesale removal of police units (temporarily backfilled by ANCOP)
and provides an intensive 8-week training period at regional training
centers that include instruction on individual and unit-level
requirements. After this training period, units are then redeployed to
their home districts where they undergo a focused mentoring and
validation period followed by period of oversight and sustainment.
Depending on the size, location, and ability of the FDD-trained units,
the post-training mentoring and oversight periods are projected to last
approximately 5 to 7 months.
The basic building block of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is the
infantry battalion or kandak. The standard training model for
developing a kandak with a fully manned training and mentoring team is
approximately 15 months. This model includes a series of condition-
based phases that covers unit progression from initial formation to
full operational capability or CM1. The validation period from fielding
to CM1 can vary depending on the availability of mentoring teams and
the unit's participation and performance in combat operations. Other
noncombat units in the ANA, such as combat support, medical, and
intelligence, will have different training and validation timelines
associated with the specific skill sets required to reach CM1.
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, the Focused District Development
Plan that pulls the police out, puts in temporary police, and
then moves them back, it's an 8-week training program that they
go out on, and then they go back. But, they go back with
mentors, and the mentoring is actually probably the key part to
how they operate when they get back here.
Chairman Levin. We'll get into the mentoring later.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my welcome to Secretary Shinn and Secretary
Boucher and General Sattler for being here and to continue to
inform us about what's happening there.
Six and a half years ago, our country went to war in
Afghanistan to drive out al Qaeda and Taliban. Now, because we
did not finish the job as we should have, we are still fighting
the Taliban. Recent developments in neighboring Pakistan have
also added to the concern that we must increase our efforts to
ensure stability in this region of the world. So I'd look
forward to hearing your responses on the recommendations of the
Afghanistan Study Group and Atlantic Council and how we can
best proceed on this important mission.
Secretary Boucher, it has been reported by the Afghanistan
Study Group that the United States and its allies lack a
strategy to--and I'm quoting--``fill the power vacuum outside
Kabul and to counter the combined challenges of reconstituted
Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a
runaway opium economy, and the poverty faced by most Afghans.''
In your opinion, Secretary, is there a clear political end
state for Afghanistan that is agreed upon by both the NATO
alliance and within U.S. Government agencies?
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, I think there is. If you listen to
what military colleagues, Defense Department colleagues, other
colleagues in the government, and even other governments, talk
about, you'll find that we're all focused on the same issues:
beating the Taliban on the battlefield, providing the safety
and security that Afghan people need, and providing them with
economic opportunity and good governance throughout the
country. The goals are there, the strategy to do that in a
comprehensive approach is there. Frankly, we need to make sure
that the execution matches the strategy, and that's where a lot
of the focus is to improve the concentration and the
coordination of all those elements. What you might call the
``campaign plan'' for any given period is where we're very much
focused right now.
Senator Akaka. Do you think that there needs to be a change
in our strategy in order to achieve that end state?
Ambassador Boucher. We are, indeed, looking at the overall
strategy, preparing, with our NATO allies, strategy documents
for the Bucharest summit in April, for example, as well as more
detailed discussions of the countries of the south, on how we
actually implement that strategy in the south this year.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Shinn, some of the lessons learned
in Iraq include the importance of using existing social and
political structures within the country in order to more
effectively establish a government perceived as legitimate by
the people. The extent of de-Ba'athification that was imposed
after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime increased many
problems in that country that we are still trying to overcome.
Given the tribal and decentralized nature of Afghanistan, what
do you believe are the best steps forward to establish a more
centralized government, particularly given the country's long
history of tribal-centric leadership and politics?
Dr. Shinn. That's a good and important question, Senator
Akaka. I think, probably the most important two areas that we
can work with the Afghan Government to strengthen the hand of
the central authorities are, first of all, the general
capacity-building of their ministries or their institutions,
things that Secretary Boucher referred to, some, earlier in
this meeting--in particular, building national institutions,
like the ANA, which is distributed in four corps around the
country, but is essentially managed by the Ministry of Defense
out of Kabul.
The other piece of this puzzle to which there's not a clear
answer is what advice we would provide to the authorities in
Kabul, and particularly to President Karzai, who is attempting
to simultaneously manage the tribal network out in the
provinces and out on the ground, some of which are in areas
that are actually contested by the Taliban, at the same time as
he tries to grow these national institutions out of Kabul. That
second question is a much more difficult row to hoe. We are
being very cautious about the degree to which lessons from
Iraq--for example, the concerned citizens organizations that
have worked in Anbar--whether or not they are applicable to
Afghanistan.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Shinn, in a recent combined ABC/
BBC poll, 67 percent of Afghanis said they supported the NATO
presence, while 13 percent support the Taliban. To what extent
do you believe that this poll represents an accurate portrayal
of NATO's effectiveness in winning the popular support of the
Afghani people?
Dr. Shinn. I might defer that to Secretary Boucher, who
knows more about some of the polling data in Afghanistan than I
do, while I try to think it through.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Boucher?
Ambassador Boucher. I don't like it when people say
``That's a tough one, let him answer it.'' Let me give a try at
it. [Laughter]
Chairman Levin. Unless you do that, right, Secretary?
Ambassador Boucher. I'm allowed to do that occasionally,
sir, I think.
Chairman Levin. Yes, right. We all do that, at times.
Ambassador Boucher. If anything, it might reflect even a
lower level of support for the NATO forces than actually
exists. We find story after story, place after place, the
strong support for the United States forces, in particular, but
NATO forces, in general. They have, unfortunately, experienced
the Taliban. They don't want to be whipped in the marketplace,
they want their girls to go to school, they don't really want
to grow opium poppy, even if they still do, for economic or
other reasons. So I think there's a very open attitude towards
accepting NATO, U.S., Afghan Government security, Afghan
Government structures, if those structures perform, if they
deliver what people want, which is safety, justice, economic
opportunity, and governance. That's where the concentration is:
making a government strong enough to deliver those things
throughout the country.
One of our former commanders used to say, ``It's not that
the Taliban is strong, it's that the government is weak.''
Strengthening government remains, I think, the strongest
effort, because that's what people want. They have expectations
that need to be met.
Senator Akaka. I'm just interested in this. Do you believe
that this informational success is an aspect of the war that
NATO is winning and that it is mainly lack of force coverage
and presence of insurgent sanctuaries that has enabled and
encouraged the recent increase in Taliban activity?
Ambassador Boucher. I think it's not so much the
sanctuaries, because we've managed to take away, at least in
Afghanistan, much of the strongholds, and we've been able to
interdict or otherwise decrease the level of cross-border
activity in many places. I think it's the fact that they're
adjusting their tactics, they're picking up new tactics,
they're picking up on bombs and kidnaping and things like that.
We have to adjust, as well.
General Sattler. Senator, if I might just add to that, I
believe that some may perceive that they are in these safe
havens, but, due to, now, getting out and about more, better
intelligence collection, sharing information with the
population, and all the things that are critical in a
counterinsurgency operation, that, as Secretary Boucher just
indicated, we are able to precisionally take away those safe
havens. But, ``Are we getting them all?'' is the question that
we were asked earlier, and at that point, we answered that we
don't believe we're getting them all, sir, but, when we do find
them, we do have the resources and capacity to take those out.
Senator Akaka. My final question, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Shinn, it has recently been advocated by both
General Petraeus and Secretary Gates that further troop
withdrawals from Iraq this summer should be put on hold for an
indeterminate period for a security evaluation at the reduced
levels. Admiral Mullen has also recently testified as to the
development strain facing U.S. forces that must be alleviated
sooner rather than later. Given the findings of the Afghanistan
Study Group that indicate too few troops have been used to
fight the war in that country, what do you make of the ability
of the U.S. forces to endure what essentially will amount to a
shift from Iraq to Afghanistan rather than a reduction that
will ease the operations tempo?
Dr. Shinn. It strikes me that one of the most important
responses to that question is an observation, made a little bit
earlier here by General Sattler, which is, for the forces that
we have in Afghanistan, under no circumstances have they
engaged in missions for which they were under-resourced--is the
first point. The second point is the broader one, which is, on
the military clear side of the strategy in Afghanistan, we
believe that we're winning--slowly, surely, but winning.
So, the sourcing level is not, to me, the principal concern
about Afghanistan. It has to do more with the execution on the
hold and the build side of the strategy.
I'd defer to General Sattler to comment on the Iraq side of
that.
General Sattler. I would just say that the Secretary of
Defense has that tough call. We talked earlier, Mr. Chairman,
about resources and where the resources go. He has the
challenges of Iraq, he has to balance against Afghanistan,
against, as you just articulated, the health of the force, the
opportunity to be home and reset and retrain the force, and
then the global challenges of the long war. As you mentioned,
we will come down by the end of July. We'll have reduced
approximately five brigades of combat power out of Iraq. Then,
the Secretary has clearly stated that he wants to take a pause
at that point, in conjunction with Admiral Fallon and General
Petraeus and Admiral Mullen, and take a look at what that has
done. Then, the Secretary, when the time is correct, based on
input from his commanders and advice from the Chairman, sir, I
believe he will make a decision, at that point, what the next
move is.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
You've talked a little bit about the use of the military,
in terms of drug interdiction. I may have missed this
testimony, in which case I am apologetic for that, but when, I
think, you were asked, I believe, Secretary Shinn, but I'm not
sure, it may have been Secretary Boucher, about the use of the
military, in terms of eradication, were you also saying that we
should not be using the military, in terms of interdiction? Who
addressed that issue?
Dr. Shinn. Actually, it was him, but I could answer for
him.
Chairman Levin. Either one. Point the finger at yourself on
this. Go on, Secretary Shinn.
Dr. Shinn. Yes, I think the response was that our military
is not directly involved in either eradication or interdiction,
that we believe it should have an Afghan face to it, but we do
provide indirect support, in terms of training and equipping,
for some parts of the counternarcotics strategy, sir.
Chairman Levin. Right, why can't we join with the Afghan
forces in the interdiction side, and leave the farmers alone,
don't get involved in the eradication, but, when it comes to
dealing with heroin laboratories and smuggling convoys and
going after the precursor chemicals, why not use our military
jointly with the Afghans--not on the fields, not on the
eradication, but on the big guys?
Dr. Shinn. Sometimes, we do, actually. There is some
crossover between the Taliban and nacrotraffickers.
Chairman Levin. Even when there's not a crossover----
Dr. Shinn. When that occurs, we go after them.
Chairman Levin.--even when there's not a crossover, why not
go after the big guys militarily?
Ambassador Boucher. Part of it's theology, but, I think,
it's more effectiveness.
Chairman Levin. Part of it's what?
Ambassador Boucher. Theology. Sort of the--these things get
discussed in the NATO mandate----
Chairman Levin. I think there's enough theology, as it is,
in Afghanistan. Could you use a different word, perhaps?
Ambassador Boucher. Part of it's a theoretical decision
that was made by NATO on how the NATO forces should be used.
Part of it's the practical aspect of--you want to take down
drug lords in a way that can be done through law enforcement
means, so that they can be prosecuted and punished. Therefore,
if it's going to be done in the Afghan justice system, it's
better for the Afghans to do it. We have extensive Drug
Enforcement Administration presence that we're in the process
of beefing up to work with the Afghans, but they need to be
able to do these operations, by and large, in a manner that
allows them to continue, not just to take down the guy, but to
go into prosecution and law enforcement.
That said, NATO is quite aware, because of the nexus, that
there are drug lords aligned with the Taliban. I think, both in
counterinsurgency terms and counternarcotics terms, they're
prepared to go after some of these guys.
Chairman Levin. Is the Afghan police and Afghan army
effective against the drug lords and the heroin labs?
Ambassador Boucher. The Afghan police and army tend to
provide the--as I had said, the overall security of the
perimeter for the Afghan eradication force, but the----
Chairman Levin. No, not eradication. I'm talking about
the----
Ambassador Boucher. The Afghan drug police and the Afghan
eradication force----
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Ambassador Boucher.--who are more directly charged with
that mission.
Chairman Levin. Are they effective in interdicting heroin
in the poppy?
Ambassador Boucher. They've had some success with small and
medium traffickers, but not a lot of success at the bigger
levels.
Chairman Levin. Do they want to succeed at the higher
level?
Ambassador Boucher. I think they do. The people that we've
worked with and----
Chairman Levin. No, I'm talking about the police,
themselves, or is it just so much corruption in the police or
the army that you can't rely on them to go after the big guys?
Ambassador Boucher. The counterdrug police seem to have the
determination to do so. We're trying to build up their
capability.
Chairman Levin. You mentioned a shortfall in the number of
trainers, I guess a significant shortfall. General, you've
talked about commanders being about 2,500 trainers short--900
short in the army, and about 1,500 short in the police. I think
those were your numbers. A thousand of the marines that are
going to be deployed to Afghanistan in the next few months are
going to support that training mission, but we're way, way
short. Our allies have not carried through on the commitments
that they've made for training teams. I guess the operation is
called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs);
shorthand being ``omelets,'' I gather. What's the resistance in
our NATO allies to doing that? It's not a direct combat role,
it's a training mission. Why have they fallen short on the
training mission?
General Sattler. Mr. Chairman, it really becomes a combat
mission. When you become an OMLT, you're paired with an Afghani
battalion or brigade. When you go to that brigade, as do our
embedded trainers, you eat with, sleep with, you mentor by your
mere presence, and you teach and train as you move along.
Chairman Levin. These are embeds.
General Sattler. These are embeds, and OMLTs do the same,
sir. When the OMLTs go with that unit, when that unit--if that
unit moves into combat, or when that unit moves into combat,
the OMLT goes with. The OMLT provides--they call for fire, they
provide medevac, they control artillery, so they become a
critical enabler to that unit.
Right now, sir, there's 34 international OMLTs that are in
the field inside Afghanistan. Of that 34, 24 have been
certified. There is a certification process, because of the
responsibility that the OMLT, with the enablers, that they
bring to the fight, sir--so, obviously, they're certified by
ISAF in conjunction with General Cone and Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan. There's six more OMLTs that are
in the pipeline that should be fielded later this year. So
that'll be approximately a total of 40 international OMLTs on
the ground.
Chairman Levin. Of the 72 that are needed? Is that----
General Sattler. Sir, I'll have to get the exact end--the
objective number.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of 5 March (latest information available to the Joint Staff), 34
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are fielded in
Afghanistan, 31 have been certified as operational. The current
requirement for OMLTs, as outlined in the NATO Combined Joint Statement
of Requirements is 81. This requirement grows to 103 by January 2009.
General Sattler. But, they are substantially short of the
ultimate goal. Correct, sir
Chairman Levin. Which gets back to the question of our NATO
allies not being willing--too many of them--because a number of
them are, and I don't think we ought to generalize about NATO
allies----
General Sattler. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin.--because we have NATO allies that have had,
I think, greater proportion of losses, even, than we've had in
Afghanistan, including the Canadians. So, we shouldn't be
generalizing about this. But, too many of our NATO allies have
not come through. One of the reasons, apparently, is because of
the public opposition in their countries to the Afghanistan
mission. Is one of the reasons for that, Secretary Boucher,
that, in the minds of many Europeans, the Iraq mission and the
Afghan mission are linked? We have a report, the Afghanistan
Study Group recommended that there be decoupling of the
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq as a way of improving our
overall approach to the war on terrorism, that if we delink
them, it may be helpful, in terms of attracting greater support
for the one, and that wouldn't be colored or diminished by
opposition to the other. Is there some truth to that?
Ambassador Boucher. I guess there's some truth to that. I
don't find it, extensively. As I've gone to Europe and I've
talked to parliamentarians and party leaders and people like
that about the Afghan mission, Iraq is not usually thrown up at
us.
Chairman Levin. How about their publics?
Ambassador Boucher. To some extent, you see it in the
public commentary. But, a lot of the restrictions on forces are
either parliamentary restrictions or promises that they've made
to parliament that, ``We're going in for peacekeeping and
stabilization, and, therefore, we will do these things and not
those things.'' That's where a lot of the caveats come from.
It, basically, I think, has to do with the image that they have
of their forces, the kinds of things they think they should be
doing, and they're there to be nice to people and give them a
happier life. When it comes to fighting, not everybody else is
as committed as we are, but many are, as you mentioned--the
Canadians and the Brits and the Dutch and some of the others
that are with us in the south. So, I think part of it's lack of
understanding of the full breadth of the mission that you have
to do. In order to give people a hospital, you have to be able
to give them police, and you have to be able to give them a
secure environment, as well. Our forces, and several others,
are fully committed to the whole breadth of that; whereas,
others have gone under the assumption that they would only be
doing part of that.
Chairman Levin. To the extent that the public linkage in
some of the countries that have put restrictions on their
troops is a cause for those parliamentary restrictions or
government restrictions, to that extent, would it be useful to
decouple these two missions?
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, we've been looking at that
recommendation. I guess the answer is yes, in general, but what
it means in practical terms is not quite clear to me, frankly.
Chairman Levin. Let me give you an example. The Afghan
mission could be put in our regular budget, keeping the Iraqi
mission in a supplemental budget.
Ambassador Boucher. The only place that these two seem to
go together is in the supplemental budgets. A lot of our
funding goes into the regular budget, but there are
supplemental needs, and the vehicle for getting that is a
combined supplemental. But, at least when we talk about it,
when we go out and lobby for it, we're talking about the
situation in Afghanistan and what we all need to do to
accomplish our goals there.
Chairman Levin. Yes, but I think those two missions are
linked both in the rhetoric in Washington and in the budgets.
It's the global war, and we talk about Iraq and Afghanistan. I
think you ought to give a lot more thought to this question. To
the extent that the European publics, in those countries that
have not come through with what they've committed, link these
two efforts, it seems to me that is a diminution of the support
that you're likely to get from their representatives in their
parliaments. Here, many of us have delinked them. Many of us
who have opposed the effort in Iraq, including me--been a
critic of it and opposed going in--nonetheless, very much
supported going into Afghanistan, which, by the way, I think
was a unanimous vote in the Senate, to go into Afghanistan, go
after the folks who attacked us, and who are still there, at
least on the border, and Taliban, who supported those folks. So
I think many of us have delinked it, and I guess you, in your
positions, have delinked them.
But, I'm just urging that if there is truth to the
perception and to the point that, in those countries, there's
been a linkage in the public minds, and if that is one of the
reasons why there's been a shortfall on the part of many NATO
countries in stepping up to what's needed in Afghanistan, it
may be wiser that the administration, in its rhetoric, talk--
and in its budget request--separate these two missions. They
can argue they're both valid, and you can talk about where
there ought to be more troops than the other. You have to do
that, obviously. But, in the rhetoric and in the budget, I
think it would be useful. It would reflect the public mood
here, where the public, I think, sees very differently the
challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan--and has, consistently--and
it may be true in the NATO--some of the NATO countries, as
well.
Thank you, gentlemen, and your staffs, for rearranging your
schedules today to accommodate ours.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
north atlantic treaty organization support for afghanistan mission
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Shinn and Secretary Boucher, in early
February Secretary Gates told the committee that he is worried that the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is evolving into a ``two-
tiered alliance'' composed of ``some allies willing to fight and die to
protect people's security, and others who are not.'' Secretary Gates
has also said that some European publics are confused over the
difference between the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this has
resulted in a loss of support for the Afghanistan mission, according to
news reports. The Afghanistan Study Group (ASG) recommended that the
administration decouple the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq as a way
of improving the overall U.S. approach to the global war on terrorism.
Do you agree with Secretary Gates that NATO is at risk of becoming a
``two-tiered alliance'' with some willing to fight and die and others
not?
Dr. Shinn. I share Secretary Gates' concern about NATO becoming a
two-tiered alliance. A number of allies, particularly those engaging in
combat operations in the volatile south and east, shoulder the majority
of the burden of kinetic military action against the insurgency.
Others, especially those deployed in the more permissive north and
west, focus more on reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. While the
latter are crucial to Afghanistan's long-term development, all allies
must be willing to contribute to all lines of operation, both kinetic
and nonkinetic. Simultaneously, however, we must remain mindful of the
political realities many of our allies face--in some instances they are
severely constrained by prevailing public opinion and the structure of
their governments. Recognizing this reality, Secretary Gates has worked
closely with his ministerial counterparts to develop a strategic vision
for the NATO mission in Afghanistan, which explains what the alliance
has achieved, what remains to done, and how we intend to get there.
Ambassador Boucher. NATO is united in a common commitment to
support the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment of a safe
and secure environment in order to extend reconstruction and good
governance. All 26 allies--and 13 non-NATO partners--have forces in
Afghanistan. Their deployments all fulfill NATO requirements
established by the NATO Supreme Allied Commander and the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander.
We realize, however, that there is a concern about NATO becoming a
two-tiered alliance. Allies in the south and east feel that they are
shouldering a disproportionate share of the combat burden, while others
in the west and north are mostly engaged in reconstruction and
humanitarian assistance efforts. Nonetheless, all of these efforts are
critical to the overall mission, and allies recognize that we are
fighting the same fight. We will continue to engage allies to emphasize
the need to meet force requirements, share the burden more equitably,
and provide commanders in the field with the flexibility to succeed in
their mission. We will also continue to help allies explain the nature
and importance of the entire NATO mission in Afghanistan to their
publics. To that end, allies and partners are endorsing an ISAF
Strategic Vision statement for the NATO Summit in Bucharest.
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Shinn and Secretary Boucher, do you
agree with the ASG's recommendation that the administration and
Congress decouple Iraq and Afghanistan?
Dr. Shinn. In the late 2007/early 2008 reorganization of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Afghanistan and Iraq were
decoupled--both portfolios had previously rested under the management
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. A key component of the policy reorganization shifted
responsibility for the Afghanistan regional portfolio to a new
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
Thus, from a management perspective, the two countries have been
largely decoupled within the Department.
I do not believe that Afghanistan would stand to gain by decoupling
it from Iraq in the defense budget process. Requirements for funding
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan are developed and approved
independent of those funding requirements for Operation Iraqi Freedom,
and the Department has consistently received the levels of funding it
has requested for the mission in Afghanistan.
In so far as decoupling Afghanistan and Iraq in the interest of
public opinion, I believe that the Vision Statement, currently being
drafted by NATO in preparation for the April 2008 Bucharest Summit,
will play a key role in reminding publics about the importance of the
Afghanistan mission. The goal of this document is to articulate what we
have achieved in Afghanistan, what remains to be done, and how we
intend to get there.
Ambassador Boucher. The Study Group's second overarching
recommendation is to decouple Iraq and Afghanistan. We would note that
with the exception of our supplemental funding requests, the two
conflicts have been effectively decoupled all along, with U.S. strategy
in each country moving on markedly different paths that reflect
differing local realities. We are not confident that decoupling
supplemental funding requests would in fact result in increased
resources for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan funding record before and
after the start of the Iraq war suggests otherwise.
national solidarity program
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Shinn and Secretary Boucher, the
Atlantic Council report states that ``the future of Afghanistan will be
determined by progress or failure in the civil sector.'' The report
also finds that less than 10 cents of every dollar of aid for
Afghanistan goes directly to the Afghan people. One program that
appears to be succeeding in directing funds to the local level is the
National Solidarity Program (NSP). According to the Afghanistan
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, which established the
NSP, the NSP has worked with over 19,000 Community Development Councils
to finance more than 32,000 subprojects for development and
reconstruction. What is being done to eliminate the inefficiencies and
waste in the delivery of reconstruction assistance for the Afghan
people?
Dr. Shinn. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) are best suited to respond to
questions related to the financing of development and reconstruction
projects. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 requires the
administration to identify a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR), ``to provide for the independent and objective
conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise
made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.'' I believe that,
once in place, the SIGAR will play a crucial role in ensuring that U.S.
resources are not misused.
Ambassador Boucher. Through our capacity building programs with
Afghan ministries and provincial governments, the United States is
working to eliminate inefficiencies and corruption in the delivery of
assistance to the Afghan people. U.S. foreign assistance programs work
with ministries--focusing on the most important service providers, like
the ministries of health, education, finance, and agriculture--to put
more responsibility for service delivery at the local levels. We do
this to ensure funds reach the provinces. This will also allow ministry
representatives working at the provincial levels to do planning,
decisionmaking, delivery, and monitoring activities, ensuring
assistance reaches the Afghan people. Advisors will mentor and support
capacity building for Afghan Government employees in areas such as
financial management, budgeting, procurement, human resources
management, strategic planning, project planning, project
implementation, and information and communications systems.
In addition, the U.S. Government has made a great deal of progress
over the past 7 years streamlining our disbursement of funds to program
implementers. The U.S. Government has disbursed 69 percent of the $26.3
billion in U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan from fiscal year 2001 to
fiscal year 2008 (this is not including the fiscal year 2008
supplemental), which is higher than the Ministry of Finance's reported
international average of 62 percent, and almost 20 percent higher than
where the U.S. Government was 2 years ago. Our efforts to put more
control of funding decisions in the hands of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams has improved our ability to quickly follow security gains with
development efforts that address locally-identified priorities.
As U.S. Agency for International Development Acting Deputy
Administrator Jim Kunder noted in his testimony on oversight on January
24, the Office of the Inspector General in Afghanistan has spent $2.7
million on oversight. As of December 2007, they had completed 18
performance and 23 financial audits. Not a single one of these audits
revealed significant findings of waste, fraud, and abuse.
4. Senator Levin. Secretary Shinn and Secretary Boucher, do you
support the NSP as a way of promoting development and reconstruction at
the local level, reducing corruption and waste, and promoting support
for the Afghan Government?
Dr. Shinn. I believe the NSP is a positive example of how the
Afghan Government, with the assistance of international and
nongovernmental organizations, can work to deliver development
resources to Afghan communities. The NSP was created by the Afghan
Government to develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify,
plan, manage, and monitor their own development projects. NSP builds
the capacity of local communities to manage projects, develop and
execute budgets, and perform program oversight. I would defer to the
State Department and USAID to the address details related to this
program.
Ambassador Boucher. The NSP is one of the most effective programs
in Afghanistan in that it empowers the Afghan Government to fulfill
basic needs identified by Afghan communities. It is also a tool by
which we can make progress on all three elements of our counter
insurgency strategy. By empowering communities through their
participation in Community Development Councils, it builds ties between
the people and the government and reduces the influence of insurgents,
warlords, and drug barons. The NSP also transforms the environment by
providing block grants for infrastructure projects chosen by the
communities themselves. The program has funded over 20,000 projects for
water, sanitation, roads and bridges, irrigation, power, and education.
The projects also have been proven to be at far less risk of being
attacked or destroyed than non-NSP projects. Putting the recipients in
the driver seat with a role in identifying and planning the project
also helps reduce corruption. With the World Bank working directly with
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and development to manage the
funds, there is clear oversight of the program's funds. The United
States has funded the NSP generously and we have urged other donors to
do the same.
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Shinn and Secretary Boucher, would you
support an expansion of and increased funding for the NSP in
Afghanistan?
Dr. Shinn. The NSP is a positive example of how the Afghan
Government and international and nongovernmental organizations can work
together to deliver development resources to Afghan communities. I
defer to the State Department and USAID to address issues related to
expansion of the program's size and funding.
Ambassador Boucher. Yes, the NSP is one of the most effective
programs in Afghanistan, as well as one of the most popular among
Afghans. The United States has provided $50 million of the $349 million
that the international community has contributed to the NSP through
fiscal year 2007. The U.S. Agency for International Development plans
to allocate $10 million to the NSP from the fiscal year 2008 base, and
we are asking for another $40 million in the fiscal year 2008
supplemental to fund the program. This would be our largest
contribution in a single fiscal year to the NSP. The requested funds
will support the crucial third phase of the program, which provides
$300 million in follow-on grants to solidify the impressive
accomplishments NSP has made over the past few years in empowering
communities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
international security assistance force in afghanistan
6. Senator Byrd. Secretary Shinn, I am disappointed to learn that
Secretary Gates is only now working on an ISAF in Afghanistan ``vision
statement'' to lay out with our coalition partners what we want to
achieve collectively in Afghanistan and how we intend to get there. We
have been in Afghanistan since 2001. Would you not agree that 6 years
is too long to wait before attempting to come up with a plan for what
we want to achieve there?
Dr. Shinn. The ``vision statement'' is not a plan. It is a document
that articulates what the alliance has achieved, what more remains to
be done, and how we intend to get there. It was written in terms that
are easily understood by allied publics. The situation in Afghanistan
has changed markedly since 2001. While the international community and
the Afghan Government have made notable strides in the past 6 years, we
continue to face a number of challenges: a resilient insurgency,
corruption, weak governance, and narcotics. At the same time, many of
our allies are undergoing intensive debates about the future of their
contribution to the mission. It is highly appropriate, therefore, that
allies agree on a ``vision statement'' now, so that this document can
inform the public, and bolster more widespread support for a sustained
commitment to the alliance's undertaking in Afghanistan.
afghanistan police force
7. Senator Byrd. Secretary Shinn, your testimony notes that we have
invested $5 billion in developing the Afghan police force, but it
remains ineffective and its history of corruption undermines its
credibility. Although you point out additional steps being taken to
provide more training and more pay, on what timeline do you anticipate
the police force to be able to operate effectively and independently?
Dr. Shinn. As I noted in my written statement, the Combined
Security Transition Command Afghanistan has begun implementing, in
close coordination with the Afghan Government, a Focused District
Development Plan (FDD). The goal of FDD is to concentrate training,
equipment, mentoring, and Afghan leadership in priority districts in an
effort to rapidly improve the Afghan National Police (ANP). FDD is
divided into four phases, which include assessing the status of the
police, withdrawing all the police from specific districts for training
and equipping, replacing incompetent and corrupt leaders, and then
returning the police to the district with intense monitoring and
mentoring. As we assess the effectiveness of FDD, we will be able to
better estimate when the ANP will be able to achieve higher degrees of
effectiveness and independence.
[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
CONTINUATION OF THE STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND RECENT REPORTS BY THE
AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Reed,
Bill Nelson, Pryor, McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Dole,
and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Ali Z. Pasha,
and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Bethany Bassett and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator
Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen
C. Hedger and Jason D. Rauch, assistants to Senator McCaskill;
Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood
Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Lindsey Neas, assistant
to Senator Dole; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W.
Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. This afternoon's
session is the second panel of the committee's hearing on the
strategy in Afghanistan and on the independent reports of the
Afghanistan Study Group (ASG) and The Atlantic Council of the
United States.
This morning, we heard from administration witnesses from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and
the Department of State. This afternoon, we will hear from two
experts who participated in the preparation of the independent
reports: Retired General Jim Jones, chairman of the board of
directors of The Atlantic Council, and Ambassador Rick
Inderfurth, professor of the practice of international affairs
at George Washington University.
Both General Jones and Ambassador Inderfurth were principal
members of the ASG, and that group was established under the
auspices of the Center for the Study of the Presidency.
We greatly appreciate the work of your groups that you are
representing. It is a subject which is of extraordinary
importance to the future of this planet and this country's
well-being, and we heard a lot this morning which--I don't know
if you were present or whether you had any representatives
present, but, in any event, we expect, this afternoon, we'll
get, at least from the reports that we've read, something of a
different slant than we got this morning, because the
independent reports provide a very sobering assessment of the
situation on the ground in Afghanistan. I quoted from your
reports this morning, at least some of the outstanding comments
that stick out, including, according to the ASG report, efforts
to stabilize Afghanistan are ``faltering,'' and that report
finds that, since 2002, that violence and insecurity have risen
dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its
international partners falls. The Atlantic Council report that
I quoted this morning said that, ``Make no mistake, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in
Afghanistan.'' There's a ``strategic stalemate'' in the
security situation. There's no ability to eliminate the
insurgency, so long as Taliban enjoys safe haven across the
border with Pakistan.
A comment that I quoted this morning, the antigovernment
insurgency threatening Afghanistan ``has grown considerably in
the last 2 years.'' The Study Group also finds that ``the
Taliban has been able to infiltrate many areas throughout the
country,'' which gives them the power to intimidate and coerce
the local Afghan people.
The reports find that more U.S. and international forces
are needed for Afghanistan. At the same time, the ASG points
out that more NATO countries need to share the burden and
remove national caveats that limit the ability of their troops
to participate in the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) operations. There was a great deal of agreement on that
point this morning.
The Atlantic Council report concludes that, ``despite
efforts of the Afghan Government and the international
community, Afghanistan remains a failing state'' and ``could
become a failed state.''
As The Atlantic Council report says, we cannot afford for
Afghanistan to continue to be ``the neglected war.''
As the ASG says, ``Afghanistan stands today at a
crossroads.'' The United States and the international community
must ensure that efforts to move Afghanistan towards a stable,
secure, and progressive state succeed. That's everybody's goal
here.
We made a number of points this morning about the
difference, in terms of attention being paid to the situation
in Afghanistan, compared to the situation in Iraq, and a number
of other points, which I'm sure will come out this afternoon.
Before I turn this over to Senator Warner, let me again
thank you, our witnesses, and your groups and the efforts of
your groups, the studies that you've produced. You have
volunteered, and, as volunteers, you have contributed to some
very, very important reports, and we all look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
Welcome.
This afternoon's session is the second panel of the committee's
hearing on the strategy in Afghanistan and the independent reports of
the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council of the United
States. This morning we heard from administration witnesses from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Department
of State. We will now hear from two experts who participated in the
preparation of the independent reports: retired General Jim Jones,
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council; and
Ambassador Rick Inderfurth, Professor of the Practice of International
Affairs, at the George Washington University. Both General Jones and
Ambassador Inderfurth were principal members in the Afghanistan Study
Group. The Afghanistan Study Group was established under the auspices
of the Center for the Study of the Presidency.
The independent reports provide a sobering assessment of the
situation on the ground in Afghanistan:
Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are ``faltering,''
according to the Afghanistan Study Group report. That report
finds that since 2002 ``violence, insecurity, and opium
production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in
their government and its international partners falls.''
The Atlantic Council report states, ``Make no mistake,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in
Afghanistan.'' Instead, the security situation is ``a strategic
stalemate,'' with NATO and Afghan forces able to win any head-
to-head confrontation with the Taliban, but not being able to
eliminate the insurgency so long as the Taliban enjoys safe
haven across the border with Pakistan.
The anti-government insurgency threatening Afghanistan
``has grown considerably over the last 2 years,'' according to
the Afghanistan Study Group. The Afghanistan Study Group report
also finds that ``the Taliban have been able to infiltrate many
areas throughout the country,'' intimidating and coercing the
local Afghan people.
The reports find that more U.S. and international
forces are needed for Afghanistan. At the same time, the
Afghanistan Study Group points out that more NATO countries
need to share the burden, and remove national caveats that
limit the ability of their troops to participate in
International Security Assistance Force operations.
The Atlantic Council report concludes, ``In summary,
despite efforts of the Afghan Government and the international
community, Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become
a failed state.''
We cannot afford for Afghanistan to continue to be ``the Neglected
War'' as the Atlantic Council report calls it. As the Afghanistan Study
Group says ``Afghanistan stands today at a crossroads.'' The United
States and the international community need to ensure that their
efforts move Afghanistan toward being a stable, secure, and progressive
state.
I want to thank our witnesses for volunteering to contribute to
these important reports, and look forward to their testimony.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'll just put a brief opening statement into the record and
commend each of these witnesses.
I was so interested in these reports that I actually
attended the unveiling of the reports in the spaces occupied by
the Foreign Relations Committee, and it was a very well-
attended session. I look forward to hearing it again.
I want to thank you again, General Jones, for all the
various activities that you're undertaking. They're quasi, or
not totally, pro bono publico. You certainly deserve to take on
the career you wish, but you certainly evaded a lot of
invitations to take on this type of responsibility, and you
bring to it a remarkable background of experience and
knowledge.
To you, Mr. Inderfurth, I remember you well when you were
with ABC. We're glad to have you back in a very friendly spirit
before the committee.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Mr Chairman, thank you.
I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today and I thank you
for scheduling the two panels for this very important hearing.
I would like to begin by commending our Secretary of Defense,
Robert M. Gates, for his efforts over the last few weeks to impress
upon our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies the
importance of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. He also emphasized that
militant extremists, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere, still pose a
significant threat and that the threat posed by these extremists may be
greater in Europe than some in Europe may believe.
The debate on the importance of the mission in Afghanistan may be
among the most complicated that the NATO allies have faced since the
alliance was formed to counter the Soviet threat.
Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to place the entirety of
Secretary Gates' February 10 address to the Munich Conference on
Security Policy into the record (see Annex A).
In addition to expressing my strong support for Secretary Gate's
remarks, I would like to highlight a few matters concerning
Afghanistan.
First, I concur with those who assert that the credibility of
NATO--the most successful political organization and military alliance
in recent history--is at stake in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan today, there has no doubt been progress since 2001:
but the Taliban's recent resurgence in Afghanistan; the escalating
opium economy; and the presence of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan
threaten to challenge positive momentum and potentially lead
Afghanistan to slip back to its pre-September 11 role as a safe haven
for terrorists.
General Jim Jones, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, and
co-chair--with Ambassador Thomas Pickering--of the Afghanistan Study
Group Report which was sponsored by the Center for the Study of the
Presidency, has said: ``Make no mistake; NATO is not winning in
Afghanistan.''
In his recent remarks in Munich, Secretary Gates reiterated a
warning he made last Wednesday in testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee. In that testimony, Secretary Gates expressed
concern about ``the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in
which some are willing to fight and die to protect people's security,
and some are not.''
Over the past 6 years, NATO forces have grown from 16,000 to
43,000. The ground commander is now calling for another 7,500 troops.
This is a troop requirement NATO should work vigorously to meet.
All of the nations of NATO should reexamine their contributions to
military operations in southern Afghanistan and lift the incapacitating
restrictions, known as national caveats, on where, when, and how their
forces can fight.
Second, we should never forget that failure in Afghanistan would be
a significant boost to militant extremists.
Secretary Gates said that the Islamic extremist movement so far was
``built on the illusion of success'' and that all the extremists have
accomplished recently is ``the death of thousands of innocent
Muslims.'' Secretary Gates went on to say: ``Many Europeans question
the relevance of our actions and doubt whether the mission is worth the
lives of their sons and daughters.''
The bombings in Madrid and London and the disruption of cells and
plots throughout Europe should remind all of us that the threat posed
by global extremism in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Europe, and
globally remains, as Secretary Gates said: ``a steep challenge.''
In his Munich speech, Secretary Gates said extremist success in
Afghanistan would ``beget success on many other fronts as the cancer
metastasized further and more rapidly than it already has.'' I fully
agree with this assessment by Secretary Gates.
Third, and concomitantly, we should not forget that Afghanistan and
Iraq are very distinct missions. Failure in either would be disastrous
for the other, the region as a whole, the United States, and Europe.
However, the more we tie the two fronts together we may unintentionally
be creating false and misleading impressions.
In very frank comments on Saturday, Secretary Gates said, and I
believe correctly, that many Europeans ``have a problem with our
involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan, and do not
understand the very different kind of threat.''
Afghanistan has its own strategic importance which should not be
confused with Iraq's strategic importance. It is therefore important
that we find ways to decouple our strategies, policies, and funding for
Afghanistan from those for Iraq.
Next, we must wholly engage Afghanistan's neighbors and fully
enjoin them in the plans for the future security and stability of
Afghanistan. This specifically includes the development of an effective
strategy to dislodge al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan's
tribal areas along the Afghanistan border.
Finally, there is little doubt about the strong link between
instability in Afghanistan, poppy cultivation, and drug trafficking. I
do not believe there can be lasting stability in Afghanistan until
these links are disrupted.
Afghanistan supplies about 93 percent of the world's opium supply.
While poppy cultivation has decreased in north-central Afghanistan, it
has dramatically increased in the southwest. In 2006, the drug trade
was estimated to total more than $3 billion--money that continues to
fund Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents.
Breaking the nexus between the insurgency and opium production
requires a coordinated counternarcotics strategy that must be
integrated with our counterinsurgency strategy and linked to the
economic revitalization of Afghanistan's rural economy that includes
alternative livelihood programs.
In closing, the United States, our NATO allies, Afghanistan's
neighbors, and international organizations all have roles to play.
Each, and all, should recommit to the development of a comprehensive,
urgent, and long-term strategy for Afghanistan. This long-term strategy
should be one that integrates political and developmental features that
complement the military counterinsurgency strategy.
This recommitment should, as I have already discussed, include
increasing NATO forces in southern Afghanistan and suspending national
caveats. We should also expand the training and equipping of the Afghan
National Army and the police through a long-term partnership with NATO
to make it professional and multi-ethnic, and deploying significantly
more foreign trainers.
This recommitment must also address deficiencies in judicial
reform, reconstruction, governance, and anticorruption efforts, and
here the other elements of so-called `soft power' should be marshaled
effectively. The international assistance effort should be reenergized
and managed efficiently. The efforts to appoint a United Nations High
Commissioner should be revived immediately.
After 6 years of international involvement, Afghanistan may be
nearing a defining moment. Regretfully, I add, so too may NATO.
Secretary Gates' comments this weekend brought these issues to the
fore. I vigorously laud his efforts to speak openly to our allies and
to make an effort to ensure that the troop burden in Afghanistan does
not divide the NATO allies.
The witnesses on this first panel should be prepared to discuss,
among other issues: the current situation in Afghanistan; our current
strategies and policies there; the contributions of our partners and
allies; the role played by Afghanistan's neighbors to foster stability
and security in Afghanistan; and how the drug trade has undermined the
Government of Afghanistan's drive to build political stability,
economic growth, and rule of law.
This panel of witnesses should also be prepared to respond to
questions about three reports released last month. These reports
conclude that a new effort is required to succeed in Afghanistan. The
reports were the Afghanistan Study Group report sponsored by the Center
for the Study of the Presidency (see Annex B); the Atlantic Council
report on Afghanistan (see Annex C); and a paper by Dr. Harlan Ullman
and others titled, ``Winning the Invisible War: An Agricultural Pilot
Plan for Afghanistan'' (see Annex D).
I request unanimous consent that each of these reports be entered
into the record. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to the
testimony from our witnesses today.
Chairman Levin. General Jones?
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.), PRESIDENT AND
CEO OF THE INSTITUTE FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY, UNITED STATES
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished
members of the committee, it is, as always, a very special
honor to be able to appear before you on any matter, but
particularly on the matter at hand which relates to
Afghanistan.
Just by way of summary, my experience in Afghanistan stems
from my assignment as Supreme Allied Commander of Operational
Forces of NATO. My initial attention to Afghanistan was drawn
by ambassadors of the alliance in 2003, when they asked the
military component of NATO to start developing plans that would
eventually result in NATO going to Afghanistan. We did that,
and, as you recall, those plans were approved in February 2004,
and we began a rather slow, but methodical, foray into
Afghanistan, starting with Kabul itself, then to the north,
then to the west, to the south, and finally, in 2006, we
assimilated the entire responsibility for security and
stability under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S.-led
coalition, and ISAF, which is the NATO equivalent.
I think we can be very proud of the difference that NATO
has made, despite the fact that there is consistent stories
about national caveats and inadequate resourcing of the
combined joint statement of requirements, which commanders have
repeatedly and without any change, have always been up front, I
think, in asking for what they felt they needed.
I spent a portion of every month for about 3\1/2\ years in
Afghanistan, and I watched the evolution, not only of the
military buildup, but also the international network that grew
up alongside it, and it's quite impressive.
Afghanistan has all of the international legitimacy that
one could want, beginning with United Nations Security Council
resolutions. It has, on the ground, not only the U.N. as the
overarching agency that's responsible for coordination of the
international effort, it has NATO, the European Union, the G8,
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), all operating within the
countryside of Afghanistan.
The contributions that allies have made have, in many
cases, made a difference in many parts of that country. I will
call your attention to Operation Medusa, in the late summer
2006, when between 8,000 and 9,000 NATO troops accepted the
responsibility of taking over the southern region in
Afghanistan. This was a region that had never had many troops
permanently present. Half a dozen countries or more accepted
the responsibility of that region, went into that region, and
very quickly got into almost conventional warfighting, and
together with our forces and OEF, dealt a very severe military
blow to the Taliban as a result of about a month and a half of
very intense fighting, the result of which was a crippling
blow, at least to the military capability of the Taliban, so
much so that the spring offensive of 2007, that was always
heralded after the winter, was really a whimper compared to
other years.
So, I mention this story because I want to state, up front,
that the NATO nations have provided serious combat
capabilities, in some respects, and many, many humanitarian
reconstruction missions, the administrations of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). So I think we should start on a
positive note in saying that where we were in 2003, and where
we are now, there certainly have been some positive things on
the ground. NATO should be evaluated in terms of its own
mandate. It is not responsible for the entire trend of things
in Afghanistan, either favorable or unfavorable, because there
are just too many other organizations that are participating in
various efforts.
At the end of my watch, in December 2006, I left there with
certain conclusions, and I will summarize them very briefly. I
think they're, unfortunately, still valid. My findings and my
opinions are reflected in both studies, and I'll just summarize
them very briefly.
What I fear is going on in Afghanistan could be best
characterized as a loss of momentum, primarily by the inability
of the international communities to come together and to tackle
the top four or five things that absolutely have to be done, in
my opinion, if Afghanistan is going to continue on the path of
progress.
A couple of years ago, you didn't hear the word al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. It was almost a footnote. The Taliban was
considered to be pretty much on the ropes. We didn't have car
bombs and suicide bombers in the capital. The border was
worrisome, but certainly was not headed, at least in those
days, to where it is today. But, what was consistent in all of
my visits to Afghanistan was the fact that the narcotics
problem was getting worse and worse each year. Narcotics are
responsible for 50 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP)
of Afghanistan today. I guess at 50 percent you can say it is a
narco-economy. But, when 50 percent of a country's GDP is tied
up in narcotics, you have a problem.
Second, it corrupts the entire society. It's corrupting the
next generation of young Afghans. It is an irresistible source
of income. The income that is derived from the sales of those
drugs, 90 percent of which are sold in the capitals in Europe,
is funding the insurgency, and therefore, the renewed capacity
of the opposition.
I think this must be addressed comprehensively. One hears
about single solutions--eradication, buy the crop, do certain
other things. The truth is, it has to be a holistic,
comprehensive campaign plan that's agreed to by the
international community. As a matter of fact, some years ago
the G8 did assign the responsibility for the strategic lead in
the war on drugs to the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the rest
of the international community left the United Kingdom to try
to sort that out by itself, and it's beyond the capacity of any
one country to do that.
Similarly, the second thing that I think absolutely has to
be resolved is judicial reform in the country. If you can't
have a judicial system that is working, you cannot win the war
on drugs. If a drug conviction is obtained in a court, and 6
months later, that same person is back out in the field, again
involved in the drug business, that's not a system that is
going to inspire confidence. Corruption is one of the big
problems in Afghanistan, and it's one of the things that the
man on the street consistently talks about in any part of the
country that one visits. So, reform of the judicial system is
absolutely essential if you're going to fight narcotics.
Even more basic is the absence of adequately trained,
adequately equipped, and adequately educated police force. Much
of the countryside is left to decide whether they're going to
side with the government by day and with the Taliban by night,
because the security structure is simply not adequate.
Again, under the G8 agreements, Italy accepted the
strategic lead for judicial reform, and Germany accepted the
strategic lead for police reform. Neither of those three
pillars--the narcotics, judicial, or police reform--has met the
standard of making the impact that needs to be made in order to
turn the country into a better direction.
Fourth, I think that what's clear on the border between
Pakistan--is that now Afghanistan has become a regional problem
that is inseparable from discussing Pakistan. Regional problems
require regional solutions, and perhaps it's time to engage
more countries in the region to have serious dialogue about
mutual concerns with regard to the very worrisome trends in
Pakistan, in Afghanistan, and along the seam where the tribes
don't recognize borders, but where the ideology of taking over
or replacing the systems of government that are veering towards
democracy, and having them try to challenge that successfully.
Lastly, I was very disappointed--and I'll just speak for
myself--that a true international servant, Lord Paddy Ashdown,
in the midst of a recognized need for an international
coordinator to begin to channel the resources of the
international community toward a cohesive and organized end
state was turned down by the Government of Afghanistan. I think
that the requirement is obviously critical, that Lord Ashdown
be replaced with somebody close to his capacities. There was an
article, written by him in the Financial Times, which appeared
yesterday, in which he gave his solution set of what he would
do, had he been approved for that job. If you read that, you
will find that the similarity between the three reports that we
rolled out and his short thesis in the Financial Times are
virtually a mirror image of one another.
So, there is great consensus, I think, about what needs to
be done. The question is, how do you do it? From my standpoint,
it's a failure of the international community, under the
current organizational structures, to bring focus to the four
or five things that absolutely have to be done. I think that
the Government of Afghanistan, under President Karzai, should
be held to some stronger metrics than previously have been
asked of them. I see no reason whatsoever that about 4 or 5
years later the government can't make any significant headroads
in combating corruption, for example, or failing to reform the
judicial system. The help is there, the international community
is there in abundance, and I think that the future progress of
Afghanistan hinges on a better cohesion of that international
effort.
Afghanistan is not a military problem. I think the
commanders should be supported. I believe the troop strengths
that they're asking for is modest by comparison to the
capabilities existing within the 40-some nations that are on
the ground there. But, if we don't improve the coordination of
the international effort, then I'm afraid that we could
backslide into a situation where the military will become more
and more important. Then that will really signal a return to
the ``bad old days,'' which all of us want to avoid.
I'll close simply by saying that I'm optimistic, because of
the capacity that is there. I would be thrilled if that
capacity was more focused and better coordinated and better led
in the international-community level. I'm very disappointed
that Lord Ashdown was not the man that is going to do this
very, very difficult job, because, at the final analysis, I
think it must be done.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for these opening
remarks.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
Ambassador Inderfurth?
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL F. INDERFURTH, JOHN O. RANKIN PROFESSOR
OF THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
Ambassador Inderfurth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Warner, members of the committee. It's an honor to be here
today. It's an honor to be here with General Jones. I feel
great comfort that he is going to be a part of this panel,
given his vast experience dealing with Afghanistan.
My experience dealing with that country was largely when I
was Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, from
1997 through 2001. I had many dealings with the then-Taliban
that was in control--met with them on many occasions, met with
others, including Hamid Karzai, who was then an expatriate. He
would come to Washington, and we would talk about life after
the Taliban; I also got involved with the U.N. ``Six Plus Two''
process. So, I had a great deal of experience during those 4
years dealing with this country.
But, I do want to relate--Senator Warner mentioned our
previous occasions of being together when I was an ABC news
correspondent--I want to mention one Afghan-related experience,
because it's highly relevant for this discussion.
In 1989, I was a Moscow correspondent for ABC News, and
they sent me to the border with Afghanistan in February 1989,
when the Soviet troop withdrawal took place, the final military
withdrawal across the Amu Darya River and across the Friendship
Bridge. The international press corps was on the Uzbek side,
and coming across the bridge was the final Soviet military
contingent, led by General Gromov. The armored personnel
carriers came across. That marked the end of a 10-year war of
occupation, a savage war that took place in that country. I
remember reporting on that great moment of hope for
Afghanistan, because this was the end of all of that bloodshed
and destruction.
It wasn't, because, soon after that, the United States and
the international community departed Afghanistan, decided that
we had done our job, done it well. If you see ``Charlie
Wilson's War,'' you'll see that story--it tells that story at
the end. But then, attention turned away. A lot of other things
were taking place in the world at that time, but attention
turned away, and that left Afghanistan to pick up the pieces--
and the seven mujaheddin factions that were then involved in
the civil war went at each other--also, by the way, it also
left Pakistan to pick up the pieces. You cannot think about a
solution for Afghanistan today without also thinking about a
solution for Pakistan. These two are joined at the hip.
So we left, and you can do a connecting of the dots between
our departure and what took place on September 11. It is not
hard to figure out that leaving that country to fend for
itself, leaving that country to fall into the chaos that it
did, gave rise to the Taliban, which imposed draconian law and
order, gave rise to the return of Osama bin Laden in 1996, gave
rise to the creation of terrorist networks in that country, and
eventually led, after the assassination of Commander Ahmad Shah
Massoud, who I also met in Tashkent at one point, that gave
rise to September 11.
So, we have a second chance to get Afghanistan right. A
second chance. You don't get many second chances in life. We
have one with Afghanistan.
This discussion now about the direction that Afghanistan is
going today, which we're all concerned about--and these reports
all have a common theme: the situation is getting worse, it is
dire, but still doable, in Afghanistan. So, I just implore the
committee to give Afghanistan its full attention. Those of us
outside of government will make whatever contribution we can in
that direction.
Let me say a few words, if I can, about the report, which I
was asked to present briefly.
Many of you know Ambassador David Abshire, NATO ambassador
under President Reagan, founder of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He was involved with the Iraq Study
Group. His new organization, the Center for the Study of the
Presidency, was involved in that. So he was involved in the
Iraq Study Group in 2006. During that time of listening to the
witnesses and the participants, that group became concerned
about Afghanistan becoming ``the forgotten war.'' There was
great concern that the war in Iraq had drained away military
resources, intelligence resources, time and attention of senior
officials, economic assistance, and that that had diverted
attention away from Afghanistan.
So, Ambassador Abshire decided last year to establish a
small-scale version, if you will, of the Iraq Study Group: the
ASG. We have General Jones and somebody else that you're well
familiar with--Ambassador Tom Pickering, with the co-chairs,
and a number of us that have either served in government or
have expertise in Afghanistan joined that study group.
So, the product that you have before you today--and I've
put excerpts in my written testimony, which I have submitted,
and we have the full report for you--is a reflection of the
work of all of us in looking at where Afghanistan is today and
what can be done about it, the challenge it's facing.
Let me just give you the briefest of summaries of what our
evaluation of Afghanistan is today. The country is standing at
a crossroads. The progress achieved after 6 years of
international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent
violence, some of which has migrated from Iraq, weakening
international resolve, which is shown, by the way, in polls
that show only two countries in the world today favor keeping
military forces in Afghanistan--the U.S. and the U.K. This was
a Pew poll during the summer. Two countries. The others, the
majority, say, ``Bring them out now.'' Mounting regional
challenges--Pakistan and Iran are two cases in point. A growing
lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the
future direction of their country; they were euphoric at the
beginning of this process. They are more concerned today that
things are heading in the right direction. They are, by the
way, still with us. They do not want us to be the next foreign
occupier, like the British or the Soviets. They still want us
there, but they are concerned. Things like civilian casualties
are undermining that support.
The United States and the international community have
tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military
forces, and insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and
consistent, comprehensive strategy to fill the power vacuum
outside Kabul, and to counter the combined challenges of a
reconstituted Taliban. You all know the reconstitution of the
al Qaeda and Taliban that was mentioned in the July National
Intelligence Estimate, which said that the al Qaeda has
reconstituted its attack capability against the homeland--and
to counter the combined challenges that were presented by a
runaway opium economy, which General Jones has referred to, and
the stark poverty faced by Afghanistan. It is the second
poorest country in the world. It is in desperate need.
Success in Afghanistan remains a critical national security
imperative for the U.S. and the international community.
Achieving that success will require a sustained multiyear
commitment from the United States and the willingness to make
the war in Afghanistan and the rebuilding of that country a
higher U.S. foreign policy priority.
Allowing the Taliban to reestablish its influence in
Afghanistan, as well as failure to prevent Afghanistan from
becoming a failed state, would not only undermine the
development of the country, it would constitute a major
victory--a major victory--for al Qaeda in its global efforts to
spread violence and extremism.
Many of us feel that Afghanistan and Pakistan are truly the
central front in the war on terrorism and there is no doubt in
my mind that Osama bin Laden, who sees this as one great
achievement, the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
which we were working toward that end, as well, but he wants to
see the defeat of the United States, the other great
superpower, and he wants to see it done in Afghanistan. So, I
think that this is high on our national security priority list.
We conclude by saying, the light footprint of the United
States and its allies in Afghanistan needs to be replaced with
the right footprint, and that it obviously leads into our
recommendations.
We have 34 recommendations. I will not go through all of
them with you right now. But, we do talk about establishing an
eminent persons group that would develop a long-term coherent
international strategy for Afghanistan and a strategic
communications plan to garner strong public support. Right now,
we're losing the public relations battle there. The European
countries, their citizens are saying, ``Bring out the troops.''
Something's not working, in terms of convincing them of the
need for them to be directly involved and that they have stakes
here. So, an eminent persons group be established.
We also believe that Iraq and Afghanistan should be
decoupled. We have joined the two in our funding requests.
We've joined the two in making the case for the war on
terrorism. The fact that the two are coupled together in the
minds of Europeans, an unpopular war in Iraq is dragging down
what may be support for Afghanistan. So, we think that these
ought to be decoupled. Both dealt with on their own merits--we
did not make any recommendations about Iraq in this report, but
start dealing with both on their own merits.
We also believe that the U.S. Government needs to have a
special envoy for Afghanistan, and have a higher level of
authority. General Douglas E. Lute was appointed to work at the
National Security Council (NSC) on Iraq and Afghanistan. I
think that was a major task that probably was impossible to
achieve without more authority and more visibility. So, we
believe a special envoy is needed, including on the
reconstruction and assistance side.
So, those were the three overarching recommendations. We
then had various recommendations, including an international
coordinator. I, too, am very disappointed that Lord Paddy
Ashdown did not take that. We have to get our act together in
Afghanistan on the civilian side. We have over 40 countries,
major organizations, U.N., European Union, NATO, scores of
NGOs, all doing good work, but nobody coordinating anything. We
owe it to President Karzai to get our act together to work with
him to achieve these things.
We also talk about security--we'll go into that, I'm sure--
including on the Afghan Security Forces. Governance and the
rule of law. Corruption--Transparency International just issued
their latest report. Afghanistan has gone down on their list.
It is now one of the eighth most corrupt countries in the
world. That's worse than it was last year.
General Karl Eikenberry, who I'm sure you have heard from
with this committee, said that the greatest long-term threat to
success in Afghanistan is not the resurgence of the Taliban,
but the irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the Government of
Afghanistan, and he cited corruption, justice, and law
enforcement.
Counternarcotics. General Jones has already discussed that.
Economic development and reconstruction. So much more is
needed to be done there, including on infrastructure, roads,
electricity, power, water systems. There ought to be a
construction surge in Afghanistan, and a surge that would
provide jobs, because over a third of the Afghans are out of
work. If we don't address that, the Karzai government will fall
further, in terms of public support.
Let me just finish on Afghanistan and its neighbors.
Pakistan. As I said, these two countries are joined at the
hip. There will be no successful outcome for Afghanistan if
Pakistan is not part of the solution. The future stability of
both countries depends on the development of an effective
strategy to counter and uproot the Taliban and al Qaeda
sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal border areas. Easier said than
done. These areas have never been under the control of any
government, including of Pakistan. It certainly is not going to
be done by sending U.S. military forces, en masse, into those
tribal areas. That would be a disaster for Pakistan, it would
be a sinkhole for us. But, there are ways that we can work with
the Pakistani government, there are ways and channels through
which that can be done.
We do see successes at times, including recently a missile
strike that took out an al Qaeda leader, al-Libi. We can work
with the Pakistani government on that. Admiral Mullen was
recently meeting with the Pakistani chief of staff, General
Kayani. There are channels to do this thing. But, it is not a
military solution, by itself. Those areas need to be brought
into the political mainstream in Pakistan.
As the Pakistani Ambassador, Mahmud Durrani, said recently,
what is needed in the tribal areas is a multipronged strategy
that is military force, development, and empowerment. Using
force alone, he said, is not the answer. I agree with that.
So, Pakistan is key, and also is Iran. Now, I know the
committee has heard testimony about covert interference by Iran
in Afghanistan. That may well be taking place. But, I will tell
you that my experience working in the so-called ``Six Plus
Two'' process was that Iran was a helpful partner in that ``Six
Plus Two''--six neighbors and the United States and Russia,
that's the ``Six Plus Two,'' led by Ambassador Brahimi. We were
on the same page with them about our opposition to the Taliban,
and strongly on the same page on narcotics and what that was
doing. The Iranians were fighting the drug traders coming
across their border.
During the Bonn process, Ambassador Jim Dobbins has
reported that they were very helpful in bringing about the
removal of the Taliban and the installation of a new transition
government under President Karzai. The Bonn process ended, and,
a few weeks later, President Bush called it part of the ``Axis
of Evil.'' They couldn't understand why they didn't get at
least a pat on the back for being cooperative with us to
stabilize Afghanistan. I think that that opportunity still
exists. It's gotten more difficult. But, I think that, and the
report calls for, us to develop a strategy to engage Iran.
Right now, we're not talking to them in Afghanistan. I think
that is not only losing an opportunity, but probably making
things more difficult for us in achieving our goals in that
country.
So, I actually have in my written statement a few upbeat
final notes, but I think I'll just wait to throw those in at
the appropriate time, because, as I said, I do see the
situation in Afghanistan as dire, but it is still doable, if we
can get, as I said, our act together. We need to do it sooner
rather than later.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Inderfurth follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee: Thank you very much for your invitation to discuss the
security, political and economic challenges facing Afghanistan today
and the recommendations contained in the recently released report of
the Afghanistan Study Group (ASG) addressing those challenges.
afghanistan study group
First, by way of introduction, a word about the ASG.
The Center for the Study of the Presidency, led by former U.S.
Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) David
Abshire, was closely engaged in the work of the 2006 Iraq Study Group.
During the deliberations of that group, it became more and more evident
that Afghanistan was at great risk of becoming ``the forgotten war.''
It was also evident that one of the principal reasons for this was the
war in Iraq. According to the study group (in its final report): ``The
huge focus of U.S. political, military and economic support on Iraq has
necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan.''
I should add that Afghanistan is still being overshadowed by the
Iraq war. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael
Mullen, told the House Armed Services Committee in December: ``It is
simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what
we can. In Iraq, we do what we must.''
Participants and witnesses before the Iraq Study Group also pointed
to the danger of losing the war in Afghanistan unless a reassessment
took place of the effort being undertaken by the United States, NATO,
and the international community. In its final report, the study group
reached this conclusion: ``It is critical for the United States to
provide additional political, economic, and military support for
Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat
forces are moved from Iraq.''
In the spring of 2007, concerned about the deepening crisis in
Afghanistan, Ambassador Abshire decided to establish a smaller scale
study group. Co-chaired by Ambassador Thomas Pickering and General
James Jones (ret.), it included 19 former government officials and
experts on Afghanistan and the region, including former Senator Charles
Robb, Ambassador James Dobbins, and Dr. Barnett Rubin among others,
including myself. The goal of the ASG was to provide policymakers with
key recommendations that will contribute to revitalizing our efforts
and rethinking our strategies for a successful long-term outcome in
Afghanistan.
overall evaluation
Before highlighting the recommendations contained in the study
group's report, let me share with you this overall evaluation of the
situation in Afghanistan, as provided by our co-chairs:
Afghanistan stands today at a crossroads. The progress
achieved after 6 years of international engagement is under
serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international
resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of
confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future
direction of their country. The United States and the
international community have tried to win the struggle in
Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient
economic aid, and without a clear and consistent comprehensive
strategy to fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and to counter
the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and al Qaeda
forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy,
and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans.
Success in Afghanistan remains a critical national security
imperative for the United States and the international
community. Achieving that success will require a sustained,
multi-year commitment from the U.S. and a willingness to make
the war in Afghanistan--and the rebuilding of that country--a
higher U.S. foreign policy priority. Although the obstacles
there remain substantial, the strategic consequences of failure
in Afghanistan would be severe for long-term U.S. interests in
the region and for security at home. Allowing the Taliban to
re-establish its influence in Afghanistan, as well as failure
to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed state, would not
only undermine the development of the country, it would
constitute a major victory for al Qaeda and its global efforts
to spread violence and extremism.
The `light footprint' of the U.S. and its allies in
Afghanistan needs to be replaced with the `right footprint.' It
is time to re-double our efforts toward stabilizing Afghanistan
and re-think our economic and military strategies to ensure
that the level of our commitment is commensurate with the
threat posed by possible failure in Afghanistan.
key recommendations
Attached to this written statement is a summary of the 34
recommendations contained in the report of the ASG (see Annex F). For
more focused work, the group decided to center its analysis on several
issues that its members identified as both urgent and crucial for
future success, beginning with three overarching recommendations.
First, the study group proposes to establish an Eminent Persons
Group to develop a long-term, coherent international strategy for
Afghanistan and a strategic communications plan to garner strong public
support for that strategy.
Second, the study group calls for decoupling Iraq and Afghanistan,
including in the funding and budget process. Doing so would enable more
coherence and focus on the increasingly important Afghanistan (and I
would add Pakistan) issues, both for Congress and the executive branch
as well as in dealing with other governments and international
organizations.
Third, the study group recommends that a Special Envoy for
Afghanistan position be established within the U.S. Government, charged
with coordinating and orchestrating all aspects of U.S. policies
towards Afghanistan, including the direction of U.S assistance programs
and relations with European and Asian counterparts and Afghan
Government officials.
The remainder of the study group's recommendations fell into the
following six specific subject areas:
On International Coordination:
appoint a high-level coordinator with a U.N.-mandate to
advise all parties to the mission in Afghanistan (over 40
countries, 3 major international organizations, and scores of
other agencies and nongovernmental organizations) on needed
changes to their policies, funding, and actions and also to
ensure that all international assistance programs (now
fragmented among 62 donors) have a coordinated strategy that
aims to bolster the central government's authority throughout
the country and is closely coordinated with the Afghan
Government. As Secretary Rice has noted: ``There are alot of
cooks in the kitchen. We owe it to President Karzai to have an
effective international coordinator.'' In short, the
international community must get its act together in
Afghanistan.
General Jones will address the need for greater international
coordination on the military side.
On Security:
increase the number of NATO troops and military equipment in
Afghanistan to the levels requested by the commanders and
ensure that the increase in quantity of forces is matched with
the quality of the forces that are needed for the mission they
are sent to perform. Also, the study group welcomes the
significant increases in congressional funding for the Afghan
National Army and Afghan National Police as well as Defense
Secretary Gates' recent announcement that the U.S. will support
the expansion of the army to 80,000, beyond its current goal of
70,000 by next year. A further expansion may be required, but
any such consideration must take into account affordability,
sustainability and the proper balance between police and
military forces.
On Governance and the Rule of Law:
a coherent and resourced strategy to increase the reach,
capacity, and the legitimacy of the Afghan Government must be a
top priority. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the former U.S.
military commander in Afghanistan, has said the greatest long-
term threat to success in Afghanistan is not the resurgence of
the Taliban, but ``the irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the
Government of Afghanistan,'' citing specifically corruption,
justice, and law enforcement. Afghanistan has slipped sharply
in Transparency International's annual corruption index and now
ranks among the worst eight countries in the world.
On Counternarcotics:
the study group cautions that proposals to increase
eradication immediately--especially the use of herbicides
whether sprayed from the air or the ground--could prove
extremely dangerous for Afghanistan, further undermining
support for the government of President Karzai and providing
new recruits for the Taliban. Instead, the study group proposes
much larger alternative livelihood programs and greater
interdiction efforts, including the use of international
military forces to assist the Afghan police to destroy heroin
labs and the removal of high officials benefiting from the drug
trade.
On Economic Development and Reconstruction:
rebuilding and development assistance must flow into a region
immediately after it is cleared of Taliban presence.
Infrastructure development--especially outlays on roads, power
and water systems--should be accelerated. These efforts should
utilize the Afghan labor force and contractors as much as
possible. In short, a construction ``surge'' is needed in
Afghanistan, as are jobs. Very high unemployment in Afghanistan
is a major factor in undermining the legitimacy of the Karzai
government and adding to instability.
On Afghanistan and its Neighbors:
the study group makes several recommendations, especially
about Pakistan.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked. It is clear there
can be no successful outcome for Afghanistan if Pakistan is not a part
of the solution. The future stability of both depends on the
development of an effective strategy to counter and uproot the Taliban/
al Qaeda sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal border areas. Indeed Director
of National Intelligence Mike McConnell told the Senate Intelligence
Committee last week that radical elements in these areas are now a
threat to the survival of the Pakistan state.
The study group recommends that the U.S. and its allies develop a
regional plan to effectively target the risks coming out of the border
region area with Pakistan, involving the governments of Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and other regional powers and including better combined
intelligence, operations and non-military efforts.
Countering cross border infiltration is critical. The Trilateral
Afghanistan-Pakistan-NATO Military Commission is an important mechanism
in this regard. So is the strengthening of the U.S. military presence
along the Afghan side of the border, which the latest U.S. marine
contingent arriving in April will assist. Washington also needs to work
more closely with Pakistan in joint counterterrorism operations that
can bring U.S. resources (including intelligence) and military assets
to bear in the borders areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. That
possibility exists, if pursued in appropriate channels. JSC Chairman
Mullen's recent visit to Islamabad to meet with his counterpart, Army
chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, was the right step in this regard. The
January 31 missile strike in North Waziristan that killed senior al
Qaeda operative Abu Laith al-Libi is an example of the right kind of
counterterrorism operation.
But the study group cautions that a large-scale U.S. military
intervention in Pakistan's tribal areas would be disastrous for the
Pakistani state and for U.S. interests and would not provide a lasting
solution to the problem. Rather than trying to insert U.S. influence
directly into the region, Washington should strongly encourage systemic
political and economic effort that incorporates the Federally-
Administered Tribal Areas into the administrative, legal and political
systems of Pakistan. This involves improving overall governance and law
and order in the region as well as facilitating economic development.
As Pakistan's Ambassador, Mahmud Duranni, says, what is needed in the
tribal areas is a ``multi pronged strategy. That is, military force,
development and empowerment of the people. Using force alone is not the
answer.''
In addition to pursuing these steps with Pakistan, the study group
recommends that the U.S. develop a strategy toward Iran--Afghanistan's
other key neighbor--that includes the possibility of resuming
discussions with Iran to engender greater cooperation to help stabilize
Afghanistan, beginning with the issue of counter-narcotics where common
ground already exists.
The present U.S stance of not speaking with Teheran about
Afghanistan risks increasing the likelihood that Iran will step up its
covert interference as a way of undermining U.S. interests and the
international effort in Afghanistan.
closing remarks
In closing, let me end on a more upbeat note. As I mentioned at the
beginning of my testimony, the genesis for the ASG was the growing
concern that Afghanistan was becoming ``the forgotten war'' and that it
had been pushed to the side by the requirements of the war in Iraq. In
recent months, however, there are some encouraging signs that the U.S.
and its international partners in Afghanistan have recognized the hard
truth that defeat in Afghanistan is a possibility--and are beginning to
rethink and adjust strategy and resources accordingly.
Several world leaders have recently traveled to Kabul to meet with
President Karzai and their national contingents in the country,
including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown (who said U.K. troops
will have to remain in Afghanistan for more than a decade), French
President Nicolas Sarkozy (the first French head of state to travel to
Afghanistan), newly elected Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (who
announced his country will stay for the ``long haul''), and Italy's
Prime Minister Romano Prodi (his first visit to Afghanistan). There was
also a high level international donors conference on Afghan
reconstruction in Tokyo.
Just last week Secretary Rice and British Foreign Secretary
Miliband traveled to Kandahar. Secretary Gates was in Vilnius to meet
with his NATO counterparts and gave a major address on Afghanistan in
Munich. All of these visits and meetings are pointing toward the
critical NATO summit that will be held in early April in Bucharest,
where the alliance will have the opportunity to demonstrate the
strength of its resolve and its long-term commitment to a stable and
secure Afghanistan. Hopefully the reports you have before you today by
the ASG (``Revitalizing Our Efforts--Rethinking Our Strategies'') and
the Atlantic Council (``Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for
Urgent Action'') will contribute to U.S. and NATO deliberations.
So, working closely with the Afghan Government and its people, I am
optimistic we can succeed in Afghanistan. In many respects the
situation there is dire, but still doable, and terribly important. As
the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, correctly points out:
``If we can get it right in the Hindu Kush, we will also be stronger
the next time we are called to defend our security and values so far
from home.''
Chairman Levin. Ambassador, thank you.
Here's the situation now. We have about 5 minutes left, I
believe, plus the extra 5 in the first vote, then there's
apparently a second vote immediately thereafter. I think
everybody--hopefully we can continue this without interruption,
but I'm not sure we can. It's going to depend on everybody's
speed and how quickly people can move and their own schedules
and everything else.
Let's start with a 5-minute round. I'll go 5 minutes, and
then, if anyone's here, I will turn it over immediately to
them.
Let me start with a question to both of you. Your reports
are pretty sobering. The Study Group says that the efforts to
stabilize Afghanistan were faltering. Atlantic Council says
NATO is not winning. The ASG says that the antigovernment
insurgency has grown considerably over the last 2 years. Is it
safe to say that neither one of you believes that the Taliban
and al Qaeda and their allies are on the run in Afghanistan? Is
that fair? Ambassador, do you believe that the Taliban, al
Qaeda, and their allies are on the run in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Inderfurth. Today, no, they're not on the run.
They were on the run. There was a moment, soon after the U.S.
military action after September 11, and into the Tora Bora
area. But, around 2003, you can start to see a shift, in terms
of reconstituting the Taliban, including in these tribal areas
of Pakistan. They basically dispersed. They were not going to
take on the U.S. military. They dispersed, and they basically
said--their leaders said, ``We'll be in touch. Stay around.
We'll be in touch.'' They went to various places, some in
Afghanistan, some in Pakistan--and they have reconstituted.
They have reconstituted, in part, because they have seen the
difficulties of the Karzai government; in part, because they
have gotten foreign assistance, and there has been a migration
of things from Iraq into Afghanistan that we never saw before.
Even during the Soviet times, you didn't see improvised
explosive devices, you didn't see assassinations, you didn't
see suicide bombers. All this is new to Afghanistan, as it is
becoming new to Pakistan.
So, I do not believe they are on the run.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Jones. Sir, I would agree with that. I think there
are some contributing factors. One is that there are safe
havens that they can withdraw to. Two is, as I mentioned, the
economic viability of the narcotics trade, I think, fuels at
least part of the insurgency. So, they're well paid. I think
they have the ability to pay their forces, perhaps, competitive
wages with the government's wages. Three is the fact that the
Government of Afghanistan has not been able to materially
increase its span of control over what it was a couple of years
ago. So, it's possible to win every single skirmish, as we have
been doing, and still lose the war, as we've learned in the
past.
Chairman Levin. I thought the President's statement the
other day, that the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies are on
the run in Afghanistan, was just rose-colored glasses to an
extreme.
Let me ask you a question about the need to do a lot of the
work in the villages. There's a national solidarity program in
Afghanistan, and one of the efforts there was their provision
of $400 million in payments that were disbursed to 16,000
community development councils in Afghanistan. These payments,
these funds, have financed over 30,000 community development
subprojects, which have improved access to markets and
infrastructure and services. The program has drawn resources
from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is
administered by the World Bank. By distributing funds directly
to districts at the lowest level, by bypassing, in other words,
the central and provincial governments, the solidarity program
has, according to the information we have, significantly
reduced corruption and misappropriation, and it avoids that
layering of bureaucracies, as well.
This morning, we asked about this. This morning, it was, I
believe, Secretary Boucher who gave a very strong statement of
support for that program. Are either of you familiar with that
program, and can you comment on it?
Ambassador Inderfurth. I'm not familiar, directly, with
that program. I've read testimony, which that has been called
attention to. I have no doubt at all we have some programs that
are working in Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. You're not familiar, though, with that
specifically?
Ambassador Inderfurth. No, I'm not familiar with that, and
it could be taking place in these areas. The south is where the
security problems are.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Ambassador Inderfurth. That's where it's difficult to do
programs. But, we're doing a lot of useful programs in other
parts of the country.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Jones. I'm not familiar with the specifics of that
program, but I do believe that there is something that I
observed, in the few years that I was there, that, where you
have a governor of a province that is not corrupt, where you
have a police chief who is not corrupt, and you have the
presence of the Afghan army and PRTs, and you have direct flow
of assistance funds, things turn around very quickly. I agree
with the Ambassador, that the overwhelming mentality of the
people is to want to live in a democracy and live in freedom.
Chairman Levin. The ability of 16,000 local community
development councils in Afghanistan to directly fund these
small projects, it seems to me--and, more importantly, the
people who know, including Secretary Boucher this morning--it
really gives us an opportunity to cut through layers of
bureaucracy, as well as corruption. By the way, according to
Secretary Boucher this morning, the request of the
administration in the supplemental is for $50 million instead
of the $10 million last year. Those are numbers--if my memory
is correct--which means there would be a significant increase
in that. What I'm going to do for both of you, just to get your
reactions, even though I know your reports are filed, I'd like
to send you the information on that program to get your
reaction to it.
Now we're going to have to recess, or I'm going to miss a
vote, and there's no one else here to pick up the gavel. So,
hopefully within 10 minutes, we will resume.
Thank you for your patience. [Recess.]
Our apologies, everybody. Both of you have been around the
Hill long enough to know that these things happen too
regularly, but--this afternoon was one of them.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones and Ambassador Inderfurth, thank you, not
only for your very cogent and, I think, accurate testimony, but
for your devotion and service to the country. So, thanks very
much.
One issue I'd like to raise. I was here this morning, but I
had to leave before I asked questions, and I kept hearing all
the witnesses refer to, as sort of a metric or a benchmark for
success, the fact that that we are prevailing in all of our
tactical engagements.
General Jones, I just wonder, your comments about whether,
frankly, that's encouraging, but I don't think that tells us
much about the ultimate struggle, since it's more political
than tactical. Your comments on that?
General Jones. I think that we should be careful to
celebrate tactics over strategy. In the Financial Times
yesterday, Lord Ashdown has an article about what he would have
done, and he starts out with a fairly well-known quote by Sun
Tzu, who said that, ``Strategy without tactics is the slow road
to defeat, but tactics without strategy is the noise before
defeat.'' Certainly in one of my lessons from Vietnam was the
fact that you could win all of your tactical engagements and
still not prevail. So I'd be very careful about signing up to
that ideology as a benchmark for success.
Senator Reed. Mr. Ambassador, further comments or do you
concur?
Ambassador Inderfurth. I totally concur. Coincidentally, 2
weeks ago I was in Hanoi, my first trip to Vietnam, and it was
on the 40th anniversary of the Tet Offensive. There were a few
articles there. Of course, the Vietnamese have turned the page,
they want Americans back there to do business. They like us.
But, it did raise the question of a military defeat, but a
propaganda victory.
So, the Taliban--they can suffer losses, they can't have a
set battle with the forces there, but they can create a climate
of insecurity and fear in the country that will stop
reconstruction in the south. Recently, there was the bombing of
the Serena Hotel in Kabul. This was an oasis of western secure
life. Everybody went to the Serena, and suicide bombers got in
there.
So, the psychological dimension of this is important to
deal with and to counter.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Jones and Mr. Ambassador, your report talks about
integrating counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations
using international military forces to assist Afghan National
Police (ANP) in the interdiction, including supporting the ANP
in its effort to destroy heroin labs. We're told that there's a
reluctance by Central Command to have an explicit counterdrug
mission, which would seem to undercut this explicit recognition
that these two missions are both necessary and should be
explicitly embraced. Again, can you comment on that, sir?
General Jones. Sir, it's not just the Central Command.
There is a reluctance, in most militaries, to take on drug
operations, preferring to leave it up to equivalents of drug
enforcement administrations and officials and capabilities that
are specifically suited for that challenge.
In Afghanistan, the challenge is clearly there. The good
news about Afghanistan is, you can see the size of the problem
every year. All you have to do is go up in a helicopter at the
right time, and you can see it. There's no jungle. Everybody
knows where it is, and you can really measure it with great
accuracy.
I think that whatever the solution is, it has to have an
Afghan face to it. I think the international community has to
figure out ways to support it. NATO does not have that mandate.
I was on the receiving end of what NATO would and would not do.
We were able to have a passive role--that is to say, we could
provide security for forces that were going in to do a
counterdrug operation--but we would not actively send NATO
troops to participate in it.
So, it's fairly consistent among the militaries that that
is not part of the mission. Somebody's going to have to do it.
Senator Reed. It would seem to me, following up, that these
laboratories are owned and operated by the traffickers, the
real bad guys, and there would seem to be less political
objection to knocking those out than trying to eradicate the
poppy fields, et cetera. So, it might be--they'll quickly
compensate for that, but that might be the most logical target,
if you wanted to ramp up the pressure. Is that sensible, in
your regard?
General Jones. I think that's certainly part of it. I'd
like to underscore a point made by the Ambassador, that this is
a regional problem, and, with regard to narcotics, every
country that touches Afghanistan is concerned about the
trafficking. It would seem to me that, at least on that score,
we can come to some agreements with the neighbors in the
region, that we should do more, comprehensively, to halt the
flow of drugs across the borders. There are only so many
crossings. More specifically, since 90 percent of the crop is
destined for Europe, and we know the routes through the Black
Sea and how it gets there, it seems to me a more coordinated
international outcry in response would be warranted, as well.
Senator Reed. Let me shift to the regional aspects of,
specifically, Pakistan, and ask you a question, General Jones,
but feel free to elaborate on just your impressions about
Pakistan, and then, Mr. Ambassador, your comments, too. We are
effectively denied a physical presence in these tribal areas,
American military personnel. Mr. Ambassador, you made the point
very strongly that that might even be counterproductive. But,
with technology, particularly UAVs, Predators, platforms that
can pick up signals and that are a least not-so-overt presence,
would seem to be the way to go, but there's a real concern, I
think, given the demands in Iraq for force protection. Are
there sufficient platforms available in the region--Pakistan,
Afghanistan? Or, another way to say it is, if we surge there,
with the ISR, UAVs, et cetera, could that give us an advantage
now that we don't have?
General Jones. Senator, I'd have to defer to Admiral Fallon
at CENTCOM for that. I don't think NATO has the kind of
capacity there to go beyond or, use that kind of technology to
go beyond what it's capable of doing today, though. It has
mostly been focused on Afghanistan, itself.
Senator Reed. Mr. Ambassador, that question, and also any
other elaboration about Pakistan that you'd like to make.
Ambassador Inderfurth. Senator, I think that the question
of any U.S. presence in those tribal areas--right now, the--I
hate to keep talking about polls, but it does give you
something to get your head around--the latest poll of
favorable/unfavorable views of the United States in Pakistan is
16 percent favorable; 69 percent--call it 70 percent--
unfavorable. I guarantee you, if those polls were taken in the
tribal areas, it wouldn't even go to 16 percent.
So, if we have a military presence there, any type of U.S.
presence there, I'd suggest that they would quickly grow a
beard and dress in the native garb, and do their work quietly,
because they will only generate a reaction of these tribes that
have resisted any kind of authority, including from Islamabad,
as well. But, that doesn't mean that there aren't opportunities
to have some discreet forces involved there. Obviously, I'm not
privy to any kind of classified information, so I can't say
what we're doing there and what we're not, but I do know that
there have been missile strikes there, so we're doing
something, and I think that we need to go in that direction.
But, there are other mechanisms to deal with this. There is
a Trilateral Commission--Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO--that
has been meeting to try to get these two countries to work with
NATO in a cooperative way to try to deal with the cross-border
interdiction. They are getting better at this. Some of our
military commanders have been commending this.
It's also intelligence-sharing. Intelligence-sharing is
very important, not only on this question of the interdiction
across border, but also on the narcotics side. Even if our
forces do not want to become actively engaged in
counternarcotics operations, we can sure be sharing
intelligence to let the ANP know what we have found on a timely
basis.
So, I think that there is a lot that can be done there,
but, again, if we have a heavy hand there, I think we're only
going to make our goals, objectives that much more distant to
achieve.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Forgive us, gentlemen, for departing for the vote, but
that's a necessary part of life.
I must just ask a question and go upstairs; I'm on the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, right above here. We
have the Director of National Intelligence.
But, I want to return to this subject that I delved into
deeply this morning with our first panel, and that is to
follow-on what Senator Reed was talking about--the drug
problem. What haunts me is that we had Secretary Gates before
us here a few days ago, I asked him directly--with two marine
battalions going on, that's a consequence of the inability of
NATO to meet its requirements--and his answer was very cryptic
and to the point, ``Yes, they're going, because the other
countries won't step up to their prior commitments or the need
for additional forces.'' What do we tell the wives and the
families of these marines as they go over there, that this drug
money is buying the arms that'll be used against them?
As much as you've both expressed here the reluctance of the
military to take on the narcotics, it's almost in the realm of
force protection to take it on, to help dry up this source of
income, which is going to the Taliban and being recycled into
weaponry and brought to bear against these young men and women
going over in these two battalions, and the ones that are there
now.
I just find it difficult how we're doing our responsibility
here in Congress by sending these battalions over, at the same
time we're not doing something--and I don't know what it is
that we could do--we do not wish to appear foolish or rash; the
executive branch has really got the responsibility, not the
legislative branch--but to be doing everything we possibly can
to begin to energize some activity against this drug trade.
This morning it was explained to us, it was a 30-some-
percent increase last year; this year, the projection is
considerably less, but, nevertheless, a measure of increase in
the drug trade. So, I just say we have to do something. I've
gone through your reports. This is my second time to have the
privilege to be with you on these reports. You do address the
various point plans and so forth. But, is there a sledgehammer
out here that somebody could use? I'd be willing to take the
responsibility for it in this institution.
General Jones. Sir, I've said all along that I think it's a
question of a comprehensive strategy that nations can agree on,
but that absolutely has to have an Afghan face to it. I believe
it would be a sign of leadership on the part of President
Karzai if he launched a national campaign that would be
buttressed by judicial reform and the establishment of a police
force that can do its job, supported by the international
community. I think it is so critical to his own success as a
leader, that even if he has to use his own fledgling army to
take this on to make sure that it works, that he should do
that. But, it has to be competitive. I don't think there's one
solution to this.
The international community can help by taking measures,
such as providing alternate means of livelihood, encouraging
farmers not to grow the crop, providing economic support, where
necessary. But, the harder part of the fight, I think, in order
to avoid chaos, has to be done by the Afghans themselves, and
it's going to have to be done over time. It was a ramp-up that
took several years, and it's going to be several years to come
down. You have to be careful that you don't tilt it too much
in, because you could create conditions of a civil war, when
food stocks dry up and the little economy that they have just
disappears.
But, I think it's doable. It takes that strong
international leader to be able to convene the international
community, the drug enforcement agencies from many nations, the
Afghan statement of purpose that this is definitely with the
highest national priority, and the repair work that has to be
done and the supporting infrastructure that are essential, the
judicial system and the police. I think President Karzai would
do himself a lot of good if he did that internally in his
country and stayed on it.
Senator Warner. Ambassador Inderfurth, do you care to
comment?
Ambassador Inderfurth. I would, Senator Warner.
I think that the drug problem may be more susceptible to a
agricultural solution than a military solution. There is not a
sledgehammer. I wish there were.
We've been talking about our two reports from The Atlantic
Council and the ASG. There was a third report that was released
at the same time by the National Defense University.
Senator Warner. Yes. Mr. Ullman?
Ambassador Inderfurth. Exactly.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Ambassador Inderfurth. Harlan Ullman--which is titled
``Winning the Invisible War: An Agricultural Pilot Plan for
Afghanistan.'' I'd like to read you the one paragraph that they
say, about the issue of eradication and what to do. They say,
``The stark alternative of elimination and eradication of poppy
growth will backfire. Destruction of poppies throughout the
country, even if sustainable, would create massive economic
disruption and hardship and, no doubt, recruit many more
volunteers for the insurgency,'' meaning the Taliban. Then they
say, ``As we suggest, a pilot program for licit--licit--legal
sales of poppies, or, indeed, temporary and massive increases
in payments to farmers for cultivating nonnarcotics crops, in
addition to other counternarcotic measures, may be the only way
to prevent expanding opium production.'' We may have to buy
them out. That's not something that we like the idea of doing.
Senator Warner. I think it would be relatively inexpensive
to pay the farmer.
Ambassador Inderfurth. It would be relatively inexpensive.
Senator Warner. He gets a very small amount of this.
Ambassador Inderfurth. The farmers don't get anything. It's
the drug dealers that get the money.
Senator Warner. Sure. That's where the money is.
Ambassador Inderfurth. So, it may be that we have to think
out of the box. I know that there's been a lot of studies about
licit sales and, is that going to encourage others to go into
poppy production? But, right now the current strategy is not
working, and using the sledgehammer of aerial spraying with
herbicides, every independent report I've seen says it will
backfire.
Senator Warner. Chaos. That would bring me to my last
observation point. I remember Charlie Wilson very well. I was
on the Intelligence Committee at that time, and somewhat
involved in the stinger decisions that we made here. Matter of
fact, I was deeply involved in. Charlie Wilson urged me to go
several times. I'm not going to put it in the record why, but I
was a relatively young Senator, and I wasn't going to risk my
career on some of his operations, which were unrelated to the
main mission. So much for my good friend Charlie, and I really
like him.
But, in the context of doing that work way back then, I
undertook my own study of the history of Afghanistan, and one
of the most remarkable chapters is in the late 1800s, when the
British army were there for, I think, a period of about 15
years, and they suffered enormous losses.
I say to myself, they failed in the 1800s to bring about
stability in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union poured enormous sums
of money in, and they failed. What is it that we have as an
opportunity to fail, in the wake of those two historical
chapters of absolute failure?
General Jones. Senator, for my money, it's the ability that
we bring--not just the United States, but the international
community--potentially, if done correctly, to make people's
lives better in the villages and to offer them an alternative
to a return to the draconian days of the Taliban.
This isn't a scientific observation, but, in my 40 years in
uniform, I've been to Vietnam, I've worked in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, I've worked in northern Iraq, and I've been to
Afghanistan, and I'm always amazed at--when I go into these
missions, and I see the horrific violence that's going on, the
ethnic cleansing of the Bosnias, the horror of the brutality of
Saddam Hussein against the Kurds, and so on and so forth. But,
even in Bosnia, where I thought, in 1993-1994 when I was there,
regularly and deeply involved in what was going on, I thought
to myself, there is no way that these people are ever going to
live side by side again, given all that's going on. Yet, they
do. They do.
My lesson here is that, when you go through these periods--
we'll call them civil wars, if you want, or insurgencies.
Eventually, people tire themselves out. They just go through a
certain phase, and they get to the end of it, and they're
exhausted. They need some outside help to say, ``Okay, here's a
better way.''
My sense of the Afghan people, in my 3\1/2\ years of going
all over the country, is that they are tired of the long
history of fighting, and they want an alternative. That was
clearly demonstrated in the elections. The national elections
and the parliamentary elections--hundreds of thousands of
voters turned out, and some great stories about incredible
treks across the mountains to get to a polling station. Things
that would warm the heart of anybody who loves democracy and
freedom. They voted with the expectation that their lives are
going to be changed for the better.
For a brief while, there was that moment in time when the
momentum seemed to be rapidly going that way, and then, because
of the failure to sustain the momentum, and, I think, the
failure of the international community to find the leadership
that could harmonize and make more cohesive the effort to be
felt in the four or five main areas, including governmental
reform and the assistance that's required to help that
government succeed, and the metrics that that government should
be meeting, have just simply not been met in the critical
areas. So as a result, the momentum has stalled, and we could
be in the danger of backsliding. I think that's what the
Ambassador and I are concerned about.
The fact that these three studies really do say the same
thing, but in different ways, and most people that you talk to
behind the scenes, even at NATO, they generally agree with
that, but nobody has figured out what to do with it. That's why
I'm so concerned that the turndown of Paddy Ashdown----
Senator Warner. He's going to take on the drug portfolio.
General Jones. He would have been the senior coordinator of
the international effort--economic, judicial, social, all the
nonmilitary missions, which I would think would have included
the narcotics business.
Senator Warner. That's maybe one of the reasons they turned
him down, then.
General Jones. Whatever the reason, I think it was a big
mistake, and I hope we can find somebody of that stature to
take his place. This time I hope that the international
community will be more insistent, to make sure that the
government doesn't turn him down.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Ambassador Inderfurth. I think that he was turned down, in
part, because of that British Colonial history that you
referred to.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Ambassador Inderfurth. They still have recollections of
that. It just appeared for Karzai's own domestic reasons. To
have a British proconsul come in, as they were describing,
probably was more than he could do. I think it was a mistake
that he turned it down.
Can I just mention, in terms of your discussion----
Chairman Levin. We'll have to make it short, if you would,
because we're running way over on time.
Ambassador Inderfurth. Very quickly. The history of
Afghanistan has to be understood--the British and then the
Soviets. But, we are not the successors to those two. The
successor to the British and the Soviets is al Qaeda and
Taliban. They hijacked the country. We are seen as going in to
assist the Afghan people so that they won't return to those
days. So, that's the progression.
General Jones. That's a good point.
Ambassador Inderfurth. Therefore, we are still wanted
there. We're not seen as occupiers. But, we have to be very
careful that we do things with them, so that we don't become--I
mentioned civilian casualties--that, over time, we don't lose
their support, because if we do, then that is time to leave.
Senator Warner. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you. I have to go upstairs.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Enormously valuable
and helpful hearing.
Just to relate some of the issues that we heard earlier
today to some of the things that you've said. One, Secretary
Shinn told the committee that our policy is sound and that
implementation is the question. In terms of our ability to
clear areas of insurgents, he said we're winning, but it's
happening slowly and painfully. This is at odds, obviously,
with--the Afghan Study Group and The Atlantic Council suggest
otherwise. What is your opinion? Is there convincing evidence,
as the Secretary suggests, that we're winning, even if slowly
and painfully?
General Jones. I think it depends on how you categorize the
term ``winning.'' If clearing an area of the Taliban, which I'm
sure we can do, doesn't result in some stability and some
security and some reconstruction that accompanies that clearing
in a way that either Afghan forces or Afghan officials or
international forces can hold the area, then it's--we're just
going to keep on going around in that circumstance.
I don't think that the military alone is going to win this,
if it's not accompanied by reconstruction and a change in the
security that most Afghan families experience in the
countryside.
Senator Kennedy. On this, Secretary Boucher said that to
stabilize Afghanistan we need to provide the security, justice,
economic opportunity, good governance. He said we are doing
what works, and getting the job done. So, it appears that his
reference are to those other items: economic opportunity,
governance, and the security. The Atlantic Council points out
that the civil sector reform is in serious trouble. I'm just
trying to figure out where you all----
General Jones. I think there are a lot of individual things
that are going on well. One of the things that characterizes
the international effort--and this, Senator, is not necessarily
a U.S. problem, this is a--kind of--how the whole thing is set
up--most countries, when they arrive in Afghanistan, arrive
with a fixed contribution that they're going to make, and they
decide that, largely, on a national basis, ``We're going to''--
a country is going to do a PRT or they're going to a certain
project. I think that's all very helpful. In the aggregate,
does it make change, does it move things generally in the
direction? Yes. But, on the big issues of tackling what is
fundamentally keeping the country from moving in the right
direction--narcotics, judicial reform, adequate police and
security, and more focus in the international effort--I don't
see that happening.
So, I would agree with what the witnesses talked about, in
terms of the words they used, but I don't think they can make
the case--I don't think the case can be made that, on the four
or five big things that have to be done, that the international
community is doing enough.
Senator Kennedy. Ambassador?
Ambassador Inderfurth. Senator, Richard Boucher has the job
I once had. I know, coming up on the Hill, that you want to
present your best case. I think that a great deal of what's
being said--as I mentioned, there are other parts of
Afghanistan where there are some important things taking place,
but, because this is not a coherent strategy, because we do not
have a Paddy Ashdown, someone to pull this together, a lot of
these efforts are not going well. They need greater
coordination, they need more attention.
If you take, for instance, the Afghan National Army,
there's no question that this is a bright spot on the security
front for Afghanistan. They're working up towards a 70,000-
person limit. Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was in office, wanted
to go down from that target to 50,000. Fortunately, that got
turned around. Now, Secretary Gates has said up to 80,000.
That's a good step in the right direction. But the Afghan
Defense Minister says they may need 150,000. If they need more,
who's going to pay for them? The Afghan Government cannot pay
their Afghan army personnel, so sustainability, affordability
is going to have to be taken into account.
So, yes, we can paint a good picture of increases in the
Afghan National Army capacity, numbers, training, putting more
of an Afghan face on operations, but then you ask, ``But how
far is that going to go, and who's going to pay for it, and are
we going to have the resources to do it?'' So, you have to take
it to the next step.
Senator Kennedy. Let me just finally ask you about the
contributions of these other countries, the other NATO
countries. We went through the polls, the Pew Foundation polls
of European countries, and--how are we going to--and, Secretary
Gates talked about how these countries are getting confused, or
at least he expressed some opinion that there may be some
confusion. Part of the reason may be because some of these
countries are confused between Iraq and Afghanistan. I
mentioned it's the issue of casualties, as well. But, what's
your own assessment about--one, how do you reverse that? How do
you change that? What's your sense as a former NATO commander,
about what the trend line is going to be? What are we facing
down there, and how can it be altered and shifted and changed?
What recommendations do you have to do it?
General Jones. Sir, Secretary Gates, at the Munich Security
Conference last weekend, gave really, I think, a very sobering
and accurate speech, where he basically characterized the fact
that in the United States an attack on the World Trade Center
was a defining moment akin to Pearl Harbor; in Europe, when you
have a similar event--for instance, the attack in Madrid on the
train system--Europeans react with saying, ``I sure hope the
Spanish can solve that problem.'' It's not seen as an attack
against all. Therefore, the degree of importance that we've put
to this battle against ideologies and--sponsored by terrorism--
assumes a different metric.
In 2002, the alliance at the Prague summit decided that
they were going to expand the alliance by seven nations, going
from 19 to 26, that gentleman's agreement was that 2 percent of
the GDP would be a floor for national investment for all
nations in security. In 2008, we now have 26 members, the
average investment in national security in the alliance is
about 1.7 percent. So, we've actually lost ground.
I think the alliance is going to have to decide whether
it's going to continue to expand and add new members and
celebrate the expansion of the alliance, and the tremendous
potential the alliance has, measured against an equally
offsetting will to resource the missions that they take on.
This is a fundamental moment in time for the alliance to
develop a new strategic vision for the 21st century that takes
into account the asymmetric nature of the world, and we
understand that the conventional threats of the 20th century
have faded into the rearview mirror of history, only to be
replaced by these asymmetric threats that we're fighting.
So, I don't know how we turn that corner. I know that's a
corner that has to be turned, and I hope that the summit in
Bucharest that's coming up in April will address some of that.
I think Afghanistan will clearly be on the table. But, we
definitely have a lot of work to do--the family of nations--to
convince our publics, mostly European, that this struggle is
really very important, and it's important to them. So far, I
don't think we've made the case in an effective way.
Ambassador Inderfurth. More has to be done to make that
case, and I think that you're seeing some of the leaders of
Europe beginning to recognize that they have to do that. Gordon
Brown, the Prime Minister, has traveled to Kabul. President
Sarkozy has traveled there, the first time a French president
has been there--this is in December; the new Prime Minister of
Australia, and the Italian Prime Minister Prodi, their first
visits. There is more attention. Right now, it's fair to say
that Afghanistan is not the forgotten war. People are talking
about it, it is front and center--hearings such as these,
reports being written.
But, there's no question that something has to be done to
deal with the millstone that Iraq is on Afghanistan, in terms
of public perceptions, in terms of funding, in terms of dealing
with Afghanistan on its own merits. That's why the ASG calls
for a delinking of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a recommitment to
the importance of this for the alliance.
There was a great quote that I used in my testimony from
Victoria Nuland, our very capable ambassador to Brussels, to
NATO. She said that, ``If we can get it right in the Hindu
Kush, we will also be stronger the next time we are called to
defend our security and values so far away from home.'' Well,
we are going to be called far away from home again, so we'd
best get this one right so that we can demonstrate that we are
competent and able to defend our values in this fashion. If we
can't do it with a country that wants us and the international
community is with us and NATO is beside us, where can we do it?
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Yes. General Jones, I think the most
compelling way to convey the gravity of the situation in
Afghanistan is to speak, not only in terms of what must be
done, but what are the implications if we fail to commit
sufficient personnel or resources in a unified manner to
Afghanistan. I believe, while I was over voting, this did come
up. But, let me ask you to be explicit and to spell out, if you
would, what are the implications of failure, for the United
States, for the region, and for our European allies? If we
could spell that out and be specific.
General Jones. Senator, thank you. On page 5 of our report,
there is a paragraph called ``The Consequences of Failure,''
but I'll just sum it up very briefly.
I think that, given the enormous investment of the global
international community in the institutions that are
represented on the ground--the United Nations, NATO, European
Union, the G8, the banking institutions--everything that we
need to succeed in Afghanistan is represented in Kabul. If, in
fact, we are not successful, then I think that will be a signal
victory for the ideology that we're fighting--the radical
fundamentalism--and it will only mean that we will have to
redouble our efforts in other areas, because this will be a
signal victory, and I don't think there's--that we can--that
the international community can stand and let that happen--
aside from the regional impacts of, perhaps, even a spread
beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, I think the consequences
are fairly serious. I think they're serious for the United
States, as the most powerful nation on Earth. To absorb even a
perceived failure would have longstanding consequences, whether
it's here or in Iraq.
Senator Dole. Mr. Ambassador, anything you'd want to add to
that?
Ambassador Inderfurth. Senator, I cannot improve on that
statement. I think those are exactly the right stakes that are
involved.
Senator Dole. General Jones, let me ask you about this. We
understand that there are over 40 countries and over 300 NGOs
working in Afghanistan, as we've heard today, without any means
of effectively coordinating among their actions. This is the
most compelling argument that I've heard for structural and
institutional change within our own government in the area of
interagency reform. In your professional opinion, I'd like to
hear from both of you what you feel are the greatest obstacles,
within our own departments and agencies, to bringing about
needed reforms.
General Jones. I think the very concept of what constitutes
national security in the 21st century is undergoing dramatic
change. In the 20 century, it was fairly clear. National
security threats were handled by the Department of Defense
(DOD), NSC, and part of the State Department. In the 21st
century, I think all elements of the interagency have to be
brought together in a much more cohesive way to make the
changes required. There is in Afghanistan, for example, a
strong element that argues for judicial reform, that argues for
more policemen, that argues for a successful war on drugs.
These are not traditional military tasks.
Now, if it's the national will, we can restructure our
militaries to do whatever the country wants, but this is not
the way things are supposed to play out.
So, I think, within the interagency, we need to have much
more agility, we need to be able to take on more issues, more
rapidly, as they develop around the world, because the world in
the 21st century is cycling around at a much faster pace as a
result of globalization. We have to worry about energy
security, the security of our critical infrastructures, the
weapons proliferation. God forbid that a weapon of mass
destruction falls into the Taliban's hands or al Qaeda's hands.
These are asymmetric threats. I think even international
narcotics, which clearly is supporting insurgencies and bad
things that are happening around the world, have to be dealt
with, and the only way to do that, I think, is to get more
agility and more empowerment out to the people in the field who
are actually doing the job. Speaking as a former unified
commander, I had all the responsibility in the world that I
could have wanted, but I had very, very little authority to do
anything without always coming back and asking for permission
through the interagency. As a result--the world goes around
faster, and we're still not reacting in real time to the
circumstances that evade us. I don't want to get into a 30-
minute answer to your question, but there is lots more to be
said about things that we can do to be more efficient,
competitively, in this new world of the 21st century.
Senator Dole. Right. Yes, there is.
Ambassador Inderfurth. I would only add that Secretary
Robert Gates gave a excellent speech recently in Kansas, the
Alf Landon speech.
Senator Dole. Kansas. Yes.
Ambassador Inderfurth. The disparities between our
resourcing and funding for our military side versus our
civilian side. I urge you all to read that and to think through
what this means, in terms of our ability to engage abroad.
Clearly, we can do it with our military. We can take Baghdad.
But then what happens the day after? The ability for us to do
effective work for post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction, we're not very good at it. USAID is not
working. The components of that need more attention.
So, this is a big problem, and I was very glad that my
former colleague on the NSC, Bob Gates--when we were both much
younger--I'm glad he's addressing that issue now, because it's
fairly rare for a Defense Secretary to speak in favor of
greater funding for State. There ought to be more of that. If
you look at the budgets now, half a trillion dollars for the
military and, what, smaller number--I don't have the exact
number in front of me--for State and foreign operations.
Somehow, we have to get this in better alignment. The
disparities are making it impossible for us to address ``the
day after'' in these countries.
Senator Dole. Yes. I agree with you about that speech. In
fact, when we were talking with Secretary Gates last week, I
utilized that speech to get him to elaborate further. It's a
very important subject.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me say hello, General. It's my understanding you
were born in Kansas City, MO. Is that true?
General Jones. That's correct.
Senator McCaskill. Well, hello from the friendliest big
city in America. Thank you both for your service.
I have a bad habit of focusing on one area. I'm very
focused on accountability of the money that we've spent. I
noticed, in The Atlantic Council report, General, that even
though we have spent $21 billion on reconstruction and security
institutions in Afghanistan, that less that 10 percent of that
has directly gone to the Afghans. Where's the other 90 percent
gone?
General Jones. I think that's a good question. I think that
part of it has been consumed by--corruption is a big problem,
so I think it's been, possibly, diverted. I think that we have
not always put in the right control mechanisms to make sure
that the international money that's provided is, in fact, spent
in the ways that we would like to see happen. But, also,
internationally, we need to tighten up our auditing mechanisms
to make sure that the Government of Afghanistan spends the
money in the ways intended. Because this is not clearly
evident, there are efforts to set up alternate mechanisms by
which a more direct infusion of money, that's better
controlled, directly to the people is going on by major
organizations now, absent the reforms that are necessary within
the government itself.
Senator McCaskill. The PRTs that are working now in
Afghanistan, obviously those represent people from various
countries and under various authorities with various
accountability, or lack thereof. It doesn't appear to me that
the DOD has any kind of metric whatsoever for measuring the
effectiveness of these PRTs. Are you aware of any kind of
performance metric that's in place that we can even judge how
these various PRTs are accomplishing any of the goals that
we're giving them this money to accomplish?
General Jones. Senator, I think the PRTs that are under
U.S. auspices and control are probably very well monitored. I
visited them, and their leaders are very responsible. The
international PRTs that are under the auspices of sovereign
nations, it's hard to say, there, because that's sovereign-
nation business. But, what is true, even though to me, the PRTs
are very important, and, unfortunately, they remain very
important today, because the government has not moved out to
replace the PRTs. The idea was to establish a PRT so that it
would give people hope that, soon, help would be coming, more
massive help, and the PRTs would then be replaced.
Unfortunately, the PRTs are still very, very important. But, I
think our national PRTs are probably well-funded, and I think
the auditing is probably quite good.
Where I think we have a problem is, when we go into the
general fund for international contributions and, at that
point, when you factor in the salaries, you factor in
construction costs and contracts and things of that nature, and
I think that's where, probably, the abuses are found.
Senator McCaskill. As you both are probably aware, we
included a new Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) in the Defense Reauthorization last
year. I would like, briefly, both of you to comment on advice
you would give--succinctly, if you would--the new SIGAR as to
where they would get the most bang for our buck, in terms of
spending time in the initial phases of their work, in terms of
looking at how the money is being spend and how we are
utilizing American dollars in Afghanistan.
General Jones. Within the G8 Accords, the primary
responsibility of the United States is to train the Afghan
army. I consider--and I think that of the five pillars that the
G8 agreed to, that's probably the pillar that is--has been the
best administered. I don't know whether it'll be a national
decision that the United States is going to take over some
other international responsibilities to, for example,
dramatically increase the training for the police or take on
more focus on the drug battle or champion judicial reform. I do
know that we can't do it all; and I don't think, with the
number of wealthy nations that we have there, that we should
have to do it all.
But, I'll let Ambassador Inderfurth give his viewpoint.
Ambassador Inderfurth. Annually, we have been spending
about $1.5 billion on economic reconstruction and development
programs. I would suggest that that funding stream be looked at
very closely by the new SIGAR. I testified recently, on the
House side, before the House Armed Services Committee, endorsed
that idea. I'm very pleased that it's going to be a part of the
Senate's endorsement, because, as we saw with Afghanistan,
having somebody that is dedicated to that subject can tell us,
are we getting our money's worth? I think that that has been a
valuable addition to looking at the contributions being made on
reconstruction in Iraq. Unfortunately, a lot of that money is
not going to the intended purposes. I don't know the programs
well enough to say which ones, specifically, but, again, the
reconstruction money, I think, needs to be looked at carefully.
There is a Catch-22 here, as well. A lot of the money
bypasses the Government of Afghanistan because of corruption,
but, by bypassing the central government, the Karzai Government
does not get credit for the decisions made about where that
money will be spent. So, the undermining of the central
government support is partly a product of the fact that so much
money is coming in the country, and they have no clue where
it's going, and have no say about where it's going. So, there
is a Catch-22 here. That also has to be worked out.
Again, we don't want to make the Super Envoy into Superman
here, but that person needs to look at the kind of funding that
goes through the government and around the government, to try
to give the central authority more credit for the work being
done in the country, because, as General Eikenberry says, ``The
loss of legitimacy by the Karzai government is the gravest
threat to Afghanistan.''
Senator McCaskill. So, we can't trust them with the money,
but we have to give them the credit.
Ambassador Inderfurth. We have to find mechanisms to be
able to trust them better with the money, and then give them
credit
General Jones. I might just piggyback on that one, because
I think this is central to the point of what's going on,
largely, in the government.
I think it's incumbent upon the international community to
embed people of competence to help these struggling young
ministries understand how things work in a democracy. So, I
think it's not enough to simply say, ``You've had your
election, you've formed your government, you're on your own,
you're a sovereign nation,'' without, at the same time,
providing the expertise and the wherewithal of helping them
write an economic recovery plan, better administer the Justice
Department, and so on and so forth. But, it seems to me that if
we did have a super--or a senior coordinator, that he or she
would want to make sure that the international community is
represented, as much as possible, to help the new Government of
Afghanistan function effectively. That takes mentoring and
teaching, and it's not going to be done over the years.
But, the worst thing you can do, in my view, is just to
treat them as though they intuitively know what to do, now that
they've had an election, when the case is clear that there
isn't that depth at the ministerial levels. There are some very
good people at the senior levels in the Afghan Government,
people of high education, high quality; but, unfortunately, the
numbers are not there.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Ambassador, welcome, and thank you for being here
today.
I want to pick up on this issue of the PRTs and their
effect on that process. The Atlantic Council report noted that
the PRTs, ``come from the various nations and report back to
the nations' capitals; hence, most are not under central
command and coordination, and integration of planning has been
modest, at best.'' I can understand why the capitals would want
to hear what they are doing, and why they would still want
command, but it seems to me at least that they're very
difficult to accomplish what we're trying to accomplish there
if they can't be centrally coordinated to avoid some of the
duplication of effort. So, I guess I would be interested in
your thought on that and what, perhaps, a better solution would
be.
General Jones. Senator, when I was in NATO, we relied
heavily on the missions of the PRTs, and we worked with the
various nations to try to, to a certain point, standardize what
the Afghans could expect to find in a PRT. There is wide
discrepancy between what one PRT of one nation does versus
another.
While I was there, there was also a security aspect that
was worrisome. I was very concerned that a PRT could have been
overrun with many captives and public executions, and so on and
so forth, so we spent a lot of time assuring the security of
the PRTs.
But, my overall conclusion was that, where you had a
governor who was not corrupt and was working in the right
direction, where you had a police chief that could aid in
reforming the structure of the police department, and where you
had a good PRT that was supported with the resources necessary,
the people in that province turned, almost immediately, in a
positive direction--building roads, opening schools, bringing
water, bringing electricity where there was none. It's very
easy to make a huge difference in people's lives in some of the
areas of that country.
So, I think, unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, that
the PRTs still remain an important tool, because we haven't had
the sustained momentum of the government being able to gain
more and more control over their countryside. Until those
governmental reforms kick in, and until the metrics on that
government are demanded by the international community, I'm
afraid that the PRTs are still going to play a very important
role for the foreseeable future.
Senator Thune. But just the notion that there are all these
independent operating parts or pieces out there, and
oftentimes, probably, duplicating the activities of others,
that there--as was noted by the report--couldn't be some sort
of central command or coordination that makes sense, that the
countries, the nations that are involved with that, could
subscribe to?
General Jones. I think it would be very good if we could
achieve that. We have not been able to achieve the
international accords that are necessary, with the exception of
the security concept of how we protect the PRTs and how you
rapidly reinforce them or how you evacuate them in a moment of
stress, because nations will need help there. But, nations
guard, fairly jealously, the investment that they're making.
It's definitely focused from the capital direct to their
national effort. It's important, I think, that we work towards
greater harmonization and coordination. But, so far, nations
have been reluctant to pool their resources and to add or
subtract based on the need.
Ambassador Inderfurth. Could I just add----
Senator Thune. Yes.
Ambassador Inderfurth. I just want to give one additional
point about the PRTs. The expression ``hearts and minds'' are
at play here. It's hard to win hearts and minds in
counterterrorist operations, counterinsurgency operations, air
power being used. PRTs are one way to extend the reach, not
only of the central government, but also the international
community throughout the country. Focusing on reconstruction,
governance issues, security, they are a way to help with the
hearts-and-minds part of this. Only 5 percent of the U.S. funds
go into PRTs. It's not a big amount of money. It needs better
coordination, all of those things, but the idea of PRTs is a
helpful way. It's kind of Peace Corps on steroids. Get them out
there, let them see that we do things to help people. So
therefore, it's a viable and, I think, legitimate concept. But,
it needs, as we have pointed out with so many other programs,
more attention and coordination.
Senator Thune. According to the report, there are only 25
such teams. Are more needed? Is that sufficient?
General Jones. I think the answer to that is probably yes.
If the government is not going to be able to expand its reach,
unfortunately, it becomes more important. The whole concept was
that the government would, in fact, move and be able to assert
more control over the provinces, but, since that hasn't
happened, the PRTs continue to be very important, and I don't
want to speak for the commanders or the alliance, but I would
imagine that people would say yes, probably more PRTs would be
beneficial.
Ambassador Inderfurth. But they cannot expand until certain
parts of the country, the south and eastern part, are better
secured, so there is a wall that they're running up against, in
terms of expansion.
Senator Thune. You talked about the amount of money that
our government is putting into the PRT effort. Of the other
nations, the international community, that are involved, what
kind of investment are they making relative to what the United
States is putting into that? Is it like the military component,
where we underwrite the biggest share, proportionally?
Ambassador Inderfurth. I don't have PRT figures.
Senator Thune. Okay, that's fine. I wouldn't expect you to
have those at your fingertips.
Just one last question, General Jones. This comes back,
maybe just drawn on your past experience--but, there have been
concerns about the military command-and-control structure in
Afghanistan, and I'm wondering what your thoughts are about how
that might be better organized to ensure that there is unity of
command.
General Jones. This is always an interesting discussion,
because the metric should not be to try to compare a 26-nation
alliance with the unified command structure of a single
country; and yet, that seems to what, sometimes, we try to do.
I was one of the ones responsible, along with General
Abizaid, for creating the command structure that exists. It was
designed and proposed to 26 sovereign nations, and 26 sovereign
nations and all chiefs of defense of those nations voted to
adopt that command structure. It has a lot of challenges. It
has the challenges of merging the more kinetic operations of
OEF with the less kinetic operations of ISAF, the NATO
operation. At every level, there are instruments in the chain
of command that deconflict those two missions, that provide for
command-and-control mechanisms to ramp up operations in certain
parts of the country, as need be; that allows for special
forces to operate in certain protected zones, or earmark zones,
if need be; it provides for allies to come to the aid of one
another. It is, on paper, relatively easy to diagram and to
explain.
In actuality, what it takes is the goodwill and the
cooperation of all commanders. The more senior you get, the
more cooperation there is to make sure that this works.
The proof of the pudding, in my book, that it's a viable
structure happened in August 2006, during Operation Medusa,
when we had near conventional combat operations in the southern
part of Afghanistan shortly after the arrival of almost 9,000
NATO soldiers. The Taliban evidently had been reading European
newspapers and decided that this force wasn't going to fight,
and they made the mistake of engaging us very symmetrically.
OEF had to come in to reinforce. The Afghan Army was involved
in it--the Canadians, the Dutch, the U.K., and a number of
other countries--and really achieved a rather stunning victory.
If that command-and-control structure was not going to work,
the warts of that command-and-control structure would have been
revealed.
So, I think it's a question of not setting the expectation
too high, recognizing that 26 nations agreeing on how to
command and control the troops is a very, very delicate issue.
Trying to apply the principles that one would find in a
national command structure to an alliance is very hard to do.
I think it's workable. I think it was agreed to. Can you
make improvements on it? Sure, and do things change, and should
you change the command structure to go along with that change?
Absolutely. But, I don't think there's too much--I think the
evidence is that the command structure works, let's put it that
way, and that it takes the goodwill of people who are within it
to make it work.
Senator Thune. General, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your
service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
A second vote is on. I want to take just a couple of
minutes, though, to ask a few additional questions.
At least one of the reports suggest that there be an
increase in the size of the Afghan National Army. The question
is, where would the cost come from on that? I figured out here
what the cost would be. My math, if we double the size of it
from 80,000 to 160,000, it would be something like $400 million
a year. I think my math is correct. That's assuming, by the
way, that the soldier be paid $5,000 a year, which I assume is
way more than a soldier would be paid in the Afghan National
Army, is that true? Do you have any idea what a soldier is
paid? It wouldn't be $5,000 a year, would it?
Ambassador Inderfurth. No. No.
Chairman Levin. It might be a couple of thousand a year.
Ambassador Inderfurth. I understand the point. As our
report points out, if you're going to expand it, who's going to
pay for it?
Chairman Levin. Yes, but that's a pretty small amount of
money, compared to----
Ambassador Inderfurth. Small amount, and you know what I
would suggest? For our NATO allies who have decided that, for
their own political reasons, they can't go south to fight? Send
the Afghan army.
Train them, supply them, fund----
Chairman Levin. Pay for them.
Ambassador Inderfurth. Pay for them.
Chairman Levin. Yes. That's where I was going with this.
Ambassador Inderfurth. That seems to be a nice offset to
provide security for Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. Yes, that's where I was going. That may be
a very conservative amount--so, if they're $2,500 a year as an
average pay--I'm just taking a number, here--it would be about
$200 million a year, which is pretty tiny percentage of what we
pay in Afghanistan, but, more importantly, if our NATO allies
are not going to do what they should do, relative to putting
their own troops in harm's way, that kind of funding to train
the Afghan army surely could be expected from them.
Now, General, you had to deal with our NATO allies for many
years. What would be the likely response? We apparently have
failed to get Germany, for instance, to agree to put their
troops in combat. Would they, you think, be open to an idea
that, for a couple of hundred million dollars a year, if my
math is right, that they could double the size by at least the
pay of 79,000 or 80,000 additional Afghan army members?
General Jones. I wouldn't want to speak for any particular
country. The logic appears sound. But, if you look at what
hasn't been done already--for example, take the case of
Germany, which has the responsibility of training the police
force, yet we still lack size, capacity, resources, and
everything else.
So, I think the financial condition of many of our allies
in Europe has gotten much better over the years; their GDP has
grown, and everything else. But there is great reluctance to
not only provide manpower, but also to provide the resources.
So, all we can do is continue to try. I have no idea whether
they would agree to do that. I would hope they would.
Chairman Levin. The Study Group has recommended that the
administration decouple the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq as
a way of improving the overall U.S. approach to the global war
on terrorism. I think you mentioned that the way to do this is
both in terms of our budgeting; put the Afghanistan war in our
regular budget, keep the Iraq war in a supplemental budget, for
instance. The rhetoric, surely we ought to separate them. I
think it was your suggestion that the European populations
might be more willing to support Afghanistan if they didn't
link, in their minds, the two efforts together. Is that a fair
comment?
Ambassador Inderfurth. Secretary Gates said that, just the
other day.
Chairman Levin. He did. Is that a fair statement about your
report?
Ambassador Inderfurth. It is a fair statement and it's
supported by the administration's Defense Secretary.
Chairman Levin. We'll press him on that one when he gets up
here on that. We had this morning General Sattler; we asked him
about the reference that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
Mullen, made about troops in Iraq versus troops in Afghanistan,
and he said, ``It's simply a matter of resources, of capacity.
In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we
must.'' In other words, Iraq is our first priority, and that
means Afghanistan is a lesser priority. Would it be helpful in
that analysis if we continue to reduce our presence in Iraq, in
your judgment, so that those forces at least would be available
to go to Afghanistan? Whether they would go there or not would
be a different decision, but at least would that be helpful?
Are they related, in that sense?
Ambassador Inderfurth. The Iraq Study Group made that
recommendation, as combat forces are withdrawn from Iraq, that
some be sent to Afghanistan. The ASG endorsed that
recommendation. So, I think that that's the answer to that
question.
Chairman Levin. They are linked, in that sense, aren't
they?
Ambassador Inderfurth. They are linked. There's only finite
resources, and the Army and our military is stretched thin. So,
you can't make up out of whole cloth. But, the statement that
Admiral Mullen made, ``do what we must, do what we can,'' I
think my major point this afternoon is that we have to put
Afghanistan into the ``do what we must'' category. It should be
there, too. It's not just a ``can,'' ``want to do,'' ``like to
do,'' it's a ``must.''
Chairman Levin. On that note--I think, General, you
probably would agree with that, but I don't want to put words
in your mouth, but I have to run and catch a vote.
General Jones. No, I do agree with that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both. I'm just going to run. I
won't even have a chance to come personally to thank you. It's
been very, very helpful. This was actually a significant
turnout of Senators under a very difficult afternoon. That's
how much interest there is in Afghanistan.
Thank you. The committee stands adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Byrd
al qaeda safe haven
1. Senator Byrd. Ambassador Inderfurth, both reports (the
Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council of the United States)
suggest that if immediate action is not taken by as early as this
spring to turn around world attention and involvement in the rebuilding
of Afghanistan, it stands in danger of becoming a failed state--a safe
haven for al Qaeda, run by the Taliban, with an economy based primarily
on the cultivation of the opium poppy. This, you argue, would be
catastrophic for regional stability and U.S. and western security.
Without suggesting that this would be an acceptable outcome, how would
a failed Afghanistan differ from the Afghanistan of 2000, except that
we are now aware of and prepared to take preemptive action against a
resurgent al Qaeda?
Ambassador Inderfurth. The Afghanistan Study Group estimated that
the prospect of again losing significant parts of Afghanistan to the
forces of Islamist extremists has become possible, and that an effort
has to be in place to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed state.
In addition to the consequences in Afghanistan itself, including the
implications on poppy trafficking, al Qaeda activity, et cetera, the
regional and international implications should also be taken into
account. Failure in Afghanistan will also enhance instability and
insecurity in the neighboring Pakistan, where local Taliban and other
extremist groups would be inspired to step up their effort to stabilize
the regime, and would be able to use Afghanistan as their base for
doing so. Also, were Afghanistan to slip into a ``failed state'' status
despite the resources and commitment by the international community,
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) specifically, it
would severely discredit the ability of the United States and its
allies on the international level.
resources and funding
2. Senator Byrd. General Jones, the ambitious agenda laid out in
these two reports will require concerted international effort and
coordination, as well as substantial resources. Please describe in more
detail the military and economic resources that you believe would be
required to achieve your prescribed outcome, both from the
international community as a whole and from the United States. From
where would you reallocate these resources?
General Jones.
Military Resources
It is my understanding that NATO military commanders have asked
allies, including the United States, for several additional maneuver
battalions, as well as heavy and medium lift helicopters and airborne
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. The alliance has those
resources in its inventory. It is a lack of political will, whether due
to force overstretch, financial costs to deploy, or domestic politics,
that keeps these gaps from being filled. Given the large numbers of
U.S. forces already deployed to Afghanistan, these resources should
come from our allies.
Economic Resources
Success in Afghanistan will not come without a revamped civilian
effort to convert tactical military success into large scale strategic
gains. This means that the international community must provide more
aid to help build a functioning and competent civilian government in
Afghanistan. For instance, the European Union (EU) could provide more
police trainers in Afghanistan to help create a society based on the
rule of law. Those allies who cannot provide forces to International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) can provide civil reconstruction
assistance, whether in terms of money or people. For example, those
allies could stand up another Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).
Ideally new U.N. envoy Kai Eide will be able to marshal these resources
into a more efficient and focused effort to affect real change in the
country. Increased activity and coordination of PRTs will be necessary
to achieve lasting success in Afghanistan as well.
Specifically, more development resources should be directed to
infrastructure development, especially outlays on roads, power, and
water systems. These will be crucial in the overall improvement in
security, governance, and economic growth in Afghanistan. Afghan
workers and resources should be used whenever possible to create job
growth.
3. Senator Byrd. General Jones, your report describes corruption in
Afghanistan that has reached a level where only $1 in aid out of every
$10 goes directly to Afghans, compounding already difficult reform and
reconstruction problems. Until this situation is corrected, how can you
expect the American public to support further expenditure of already
scarce tax dollars toward Afghan reconstruction?
General Jones. The estimate that only $1 of every $10 distributed
in aid goes to the Afghan people is an indication of how inefficient
(and costly) the distribution of assistance is in Afghanistan. The
long-term hopes of Afghanistan lie in enhanced and better coordinated
civilian aid to the Afghan people. Numerous allied and international
officials have commented on the lack of human capital in Afghanistan in
the public and private sectors. The good news is that the mandate of
Kai Eide as U.N. High Representative is to ensure that international
assistance (including U.S. assistance) goes towards meeting a common
strategic vision and goal.
Still, despite the fact that poverty remains one of the major
problems in Afghanistan, there are a number of economic indicators that
should reassure the American taxpayer that progress is being made with
their aid dollars. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, economic
growth has averaged 8.7 percent annually, resulting in a doubling of
per capita gross domestic product since 2002. Inflation remains low,
the Afghan national currency is stable, and currency reserves are
stable and sit at $5 billion. Agricultural output continues to rise and
the country is presently experiencing a construction boom thanks to
foreign aid, refugee return, and a growth in trade.
4. Senator Byrd. General Jones, is it reasonable to expect that
Afghan security forces and judicial systems can be established and be
effective quickly enough to make a difference?
General Jones. Generally, success in Afghanistan will not come
quickly, particularly in the civil reconstruction side.
Afghan Security Forces
In terms of the Afghan National Army (ANA), they are beginning to
make a difference and are growing in numbers. There are nearly 57,000
personnel in the ANA today, and we are seeing signs that the Afghan
security forces are able to lead operations with just NATO advisors and
support. They are close to being able to take responsibility for
security in certain sectors, such as in Kabul.
The Focused District Development plan has been put in place now to
reduce corruption and improve competence in the police force.
Specifically, officers are taken out of the force, rescreened, and then
given remedial training before being put back into the force. This plan
is starting to take hold and officers are already graduating and being
put back into the police force.
Judicial System (including the Afghan National Police (ANP))
The Afghan judicial system has much work to do to become a
credible, respected institution with reach throughout Afghanistan.
Especially needing improvement is the ANP, but a renewed effort there
to retrain forces and improve corruption indices is making progress.
Fortunately, the Europeans offered in 2007 to provide $777 million
over the next 4 years to improve governance, with over 40 percent of
that money dedicated to judicial system reform. In particular, the
system has faced a problem with poorly trained and corrupt officials.
In 2006, President Karzai appointed a fresh team of judges and made
a series of reforms that will hopefully begin to bear fruit in the
future. As part of Karzai's reforms, the new Supreme Court justices are
given the responsibility to monitor judicial activity in the district
to which they are assigned. To prevent nepotism and corruption in the
process of selecting justices, committees were created to screen and
select potential judges based on applicants' education and background,
and each committee must include a member of the Supreme Court.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
afghan national army
5. Senator Akaka. General Jones, looking ahead, it seems that one
of the most critical challenges to long-lasting stability in
Afghanistan is a shortfall in the number of trainers capable of
mentoring the ANA so that it is eventually capable of defending its own
borders from Taliban and al Qaeda sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan.
Without NATO assistance with providing language-skilled trainers, is
the United States capable of fulfilling this shortfall in developing
effective Afghani forces?
General Jones. Training and mentoring of Afghan national forces is
one of the most important tasks facing the alliance and its partners
today in Afghanistan. While I must defer to the U.S. Government on
whether the United States is capable of fulfilling this mission without
NATO assistance, it is important to point out that NATO and the
international community is assisting in the training of Afghan forces
and is increasing their effort. We have seen a number of our allies
increase their training contributions--including the French--following
the NATO Defense ministers meeting in the Netherlands.
In addition, for nations that cannot provide combat forces to
Afghanistan, providing trainers, especially police trainers, will go
far in assisting the Afghan Government to build a nation. Providing
personnel for an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team is an excellent
way to play a major role in the training and mentoring of the Afghan
army.
Frankly speaking, the ANA is one of the real successes of a post-
Taliban Afghanistan. There was no ANA just several years ago, and
already the force is at 57,000 with the goal of reaching 70,000 by
March 2008.
Finally, as mentioned before, problems in Afghanistan are part of a
larger regional problem that will require creative thinking for the
U.S. Government, NATO, and the international community. Pakistan itself
seems unwilling or unable to secure the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas and eliminate radicalism in its frontier provinces. It is time
for the United States and NATO to develop a regional strategy for the
problems in Afghanistan, and that would include a reassessment of the
aid and assistance programs in place for Pakistani security forces as
well. After all, controlling the Pakistani-Afghan border will be most
effective if both countries are actively participating in the effort.
long-term afghanistan strategy
6. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Inderfurth, one of your overarching
recommendations was to propose an Eminent Persons Group to ``develop a
long-term, coherent international strategy for Afghanistan''. I am very
concerned that in 6\1/2\ years of combat operations and international
aid efforts, we are still hearing calls for the big-picture strategy.
What has been the major problem with developing this coherent strategy
for achieving long-term success in Afghanistan up to this point, and
how can it be overcome?
Ambassador Inderfurth. Many factors have contributed to the
inability to create a coherent strategy for achieving long-term success
in Afghanistan up to this point. In the United States, there has been a
lack of coherence driven by both the focus on Iraq (which at least
partly came on the expense of strategic resources being devoted to
Afghanistan), coupled by the more systemic difficulty to coordinate
policy effectively within the executive branch. This is why the
Afghanistan Study Group has also recommended to decouple Iraq and
Afghanistan and appoint a special envoy to Afghanistan within the
executive branch. On the international level, the United States has
been successful in rallying allies to the mission in Afghanistan, after
initially turning down NATO's offer of assistance in the aftermath of
September 11. However, this also presents a challenge when there is a
need to coordinate on a strategic level. The problem is compounded by
the multitude of private contractors and NGOs that work in Afghanistan.
The issue of international coordination has been identified as one of
the key issues that require urgent attention.
More than 6 years after the beginning of the international
intervention in Afghanistan, we believe that now is a critical moment
to rethink our strategies, and that is why we suggested a concrete
effort to develop a new strategy on an international level through an
eminent persons group.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
training
7. Senator Pryor. General Jones, one of your overarching
recommendations is to decouple Afghanistan in the legislative process
and in the management of these conflicts in the executive branch. In
your report you state that tying together Afghanistan and Iraq also
creates the false impression that they consist of the same mission.
Yet, you identify issues such as a coherent and resourced strategy to
increase the reach, capacity, and the legitimacy of the Afghan
Government, fighting terrorism from al Qaeda insurgents, a
reconstruction effort aimed at infrastructure, roads, power, and water
systems, the resurrection of an integrated and effective justice
system, and a focused effort and resources on training and standing up
the ANA and recruiting, training, and providing adequate pay and
equipment to the ANP to maintain security in an area once coalition
forces depart. Besides enhances in poppy crop eradication and
interdiction initiatives of a counternarcotics policy, can you explain
what you found to be the differences in philosophy and strategic vision
between the two conflicts that warrant such a ``decoupling'' of the
budget process for authorizations, appropriations, and supplemental
requests?
General Jones. I would argue that although these two conflicts face
a number of commonalities, the differences between them are greater
than you implied. One of the problems that we face is that lumping the
two together sometime result in creating a false image of similarity
between the conflicts.
First, the Afghan war is one in which we are engaged with all of
our 26 NATO allies and coalition partners under the alliance umbrella.
The war in Iraq has enjoyed a not insignificant level of coalition
support, but it has never been fought under the NATO umbrella with such
sustained international engagement. This implies that in dealing with
the challenges in Afghanistan the United States faces different
opportunities, but also challenges, with regard to joint efforts with
our allies.
Second, Afghanistan is a tribal country where the divisions between
groups are not based on religious affiliations. While one of the major
challenges in Iraq is to create a shared power between different
religious groups, in Afghanistan the challenges are different and are
less based on the issue of power sharing among different ethnic or
religious groups.
Third, the poppy problem is more significant than you imply. The
poppy issue affects governance, security, economic, and societal issues
in Afghanistan. It is intimately linked with the resurgence of the
insurgency in Afghanistan and is a major factor in the corruption and
poor governance in the country. The United States will be hard pressed
to succeed in achieving its political goals in Afghanistan without
creating a non-drug-based economy.
Fourth, the Afghan war is intimately linked to the political and
security struggles of Pakistan. The Iraq conflict is tied into regional
dynamics as well, with the questionable intent of neighboring countries
such as Syria and Iran affecting coalition efforts in a negative
fashion. The ability, or lack thereof, of Pakistan to secure the border
with Afghanistan is a crucial factor in the ability of the alliance to
win the battle against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It is
for this region that NATO needs to approach the Afghan mission in a
regional context to achieve success. If the border remains porous and
Afghanistan cannot prevent the militants from gaining sanctuary, the
alliance will not defeat the Afghan insurgency.
Lastly, perhaps the most substantial difference is the opportunity
to create different coalitions for these two conflicts. Decoupling can
help both domestically and internationally in that regard. Also,
delinking the funding processes for these two conflicts can assist in
more balanced approach to funding priorities in each conflict on the
basis of its own merits.
As stated in the Afghanistan Study Group Report, decoupling the two
conflicts within the executive and legislative branch would ``enable
more coherence and focus and on the increasingly important Afghanistan
(and related Pakistan) issues [and] will likely improve the overall
U.S. approach to fighting global terrorism.''
8. Senator Pryor. General Jones, what is your recommended policy
roadmap as to how to organize, implement, and administer this
recommendation?
General Jones. I would argue that unfortunately, our allies already
see the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as inextricably linked
because the U.S. Government has been rhetorically linking the conflicts
for the last 5 years. Despite that, the United States should
immediately cease referring to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan together
as `the war on terror.' Yes, the United States is fighting terrorists
in Iraq, as in Afghanistan. However, this rhetoric is fundamentally
unhelpful in dealing with our allies and building support for enhanced
engagement in Afghanistan. In fact, according to experts in the region,
it is even undermining public support for NATO amongst countries
seeking to join the alliance in the Balkans, as they believe that by
joining NATO they will be obligated to send forces to Iraq. I would
argue as well that NATO needs a regional strategy and approach to the
Afghan conflict. The United States and a few of its allies are aware
that the Afghan conflict cannot be decoupled from what is happening in
Pakistan. The United States needs to work to create a framework or
mechanism in which NATO itself can be engaged with Pakistan to better
address the border issues that are hampering efforts to secure
Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan Study Group called for the decoupling to take place
in both the executive branch and the legislative branch. On the
legislative side, appropriations, especially defense appropriation,
need to be delinked. On the executive side, the ASG called for the
appointment of a Special Envoy to Afghanistan that would be charged
with coordinating and orchestrating all aspects of U.S. policies
towards Afghanistan, to ensure a more comprehensive, strategic approach
to managing that conflict in the interagency level. The challenge of
coordinating the missions in Afghanistan is compounded by the need to
coordinate with NATO as well as multiple different agencies and NGOs on
the ground. Without a designated official it is hard to envision a
necessarily effective strategic approach to Afghanistan that is not
over-influenced by day-to-day events in Iraq. As the ASG report stated,
``while potentially challenging and possible contentious within the
U.S. bureaucracy, higher level of coordination in Washington is
necessary to increase our chances of success in Afghanistan.''
nato cooperation
9. Senator Pryor. General Jones, your report indicates that NATO
faces a lack of a common strategic vision and has struggled to increase
the number of combat troops and military equipment in Afghanistan,
particularly in Kandahar Province. While Canada is the third largest
contributor to the military effort in Afghanistan next to the United
States and United Kingdom and has been engaged in the region since
early 2002, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has warned that
Canada may withdraw its troops from the ISAF if NATO fails to station
additional coalition troops in the southern part of Afghanistan. What
have you concluded about the cooperative fashion among those entities
representing NATO, the U.N., and the EU?
General Jones. While all three organizations are cooperating to
some degree in Afghanistan, there is clearly not the close, daily
coordination between these three major international actors. In part,
institutional blockages limit cooperation on these matters. Namely, the
Turkey-Cyprus diplomatic conflict limits the development of formal
dialogue and consultations between top NATO and EU leadership.
Furthermore, the EU defense ministers rarely--if ever--discuss the
issue of Afghanistan when they meet as a group.
Achieving long-term systemic EU-NATO cooperation in theory is a
major diplomatic task that will require sustained effort and
cooperation. However, improved practical cooperation is possible,
particularly if new U.N. High Representative Kai Eide receives the
mandate and authority needed to improve coordination in Afghanistan
among the major international actors. The U.N., NATO, and the EU need
to work with the Karzai Government to develop a comprehensive strategic
plan that they all can implement to provide assistance efficiently.
10. Senator Pryor. General Jones, how can we bring about a more
unified strategy for operations?
General Jones. There are a number of ways we can bring about a more
unified strategy for operations.
First, the alliance is presently working to create a common
strategic vision and 5 year plan for Afghanistan to be released at the
NATO Summit in Bucharest. This document will articulate to NATO member
publics the rationale for being in Afghanistan and the need to achieve
the goals outlined in this strategic vision. It will call on NATO
allies to pledge to share the burden together and to commit to
achieving long-term alliance goals.
Unfortunately, a document won't fix the problems of coordination in
Afghanistan. A more sustained diplomatic effort is required. One major
issue facing the allied effort is a lack of PRT coordination among the
nations involved. Until now, national PRTs have coordinated with their
country capitals rather than working with other PRTs in the region to
target their efforts for maximal effect. Unfortunately NATO-EU
cooperation is lacking, and not just in Afghanistan. The Atlantic
Council, of which I am Chairman, is working to propose ideas on how to
improve the NATO-EU relationship, but unfortunately, bureaucratic
blockages and diplomatic differences make improved coordination between
these two organizations exceedingly difficult. Ultimately, improving
NATO-EU cooperation will require a more sustained and long-term
diplomatic effort among the United States and its allies than a simple
NATO summit meeting.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
afghan police force
11. Senator Wicker. General Jones and Ambassador Inderfurth, in
your testimony you discuss the problems surrounding the Afghan police
force. Specifically, you detail reports of corruption throughout. As we
assist in the development of a reliable and effective Afghan police
force, what steps are being taken to weed out vulnerable police
recruits during the training process?
General Jones. The ANP force is a weak link in the effort to
provide security in Afghanistan and corruption is a particular problem
in the police. Therefore, NATO has undertaken a review of the current
police force to attempt to weed out corrupt officers, ensure that they
have proper training, and better determine where they come from. This
process is called Focused District Development, an initiative developed
by the Afghan Ministry of Interior. ISAF works with the Afghans to
identify regions particularly affected by corruption and then takes the
officers in that district offline for 8 weeks to provide them with
remedial training, make sure that they are the right people for the
job, and ensure that they are capable of providing the level of service
the job requires. It is our hope and intent that this type of training
will help instill a culture of service necessary to create a more
effective Afghan police force. The first class graduated in late
February 2008.
Ambassador Inderfurth. I concur with General Jones' response.
12. Senator Wicker. General Jones and Ambassador Inderfurth, are
police candidates screened prior to training?
General Jones. Police candidates are screened prior to training,
and over the last year and a half, efforts have been made to improve
screening of police recruits to ensure that they do not have ties to
extremism or criminal backgrounds.
However, it should be remembered that good recruits with clean
backgrounds can be pushed into corruption by circumstances. It is for
this reason that proper training, improved morale, and timely pay of
decent wages be seen as a priority for reducing corruption among the
Afghan police forces.
Ambassador Inderfurth. I concur with General Jones' response.
______
[Annexes A through G follow:]
ANNEX A
ANNEX B
ANNEX C
ANNEX D
ANNEX E
ANNEX F
ANNEX G
[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the committee adjourned.]