[Senate Hearing 110-609]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-609
AFGHANISTAN: A PLAN TO TURN THE TIDE?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 31, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 1
Boucher, Hon. Richard, Assistant Secretary, South and Central
Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC............. 5
Prepared statement......................................... 8
Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Former U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, New York, NY............................... 49
Johnson, Hon. David T., Assistant Secretary, International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 12
Prepared statement......................................... 14
Jones, General James L., USMC (Ret.), Former Commander, European
Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Mclean, VA....... 41
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................ 3
Pickering, Hon. Thomas, Former Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 43
Prepared statement......................................... 45
Appendix
Responses to additional questions submitted for the record by
members of the committee....................................... 67
(iii)
AFGHANISTAN: A PLAN TO TURN THE TIDE?
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Bill Nelson,
Cardin, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, and Sununu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, please.
Let me, in advance, apologize to my colleagues and the
witnesses for my cold and my occasional coughing. I am--it's
irritating to me, it's probably going to be more irritating to
you, but I thank you very much for being here. We have a very--
two distinguished panels here today, and we're anxious to get
going.
As I see it, here's the situation in Afghanistan. Security
is probably at its lowest ebb since 2001, much of the country
is only nominally under the control of Kabul. The United States
and coalition forces win every pitched battle, but the Taliban
still grows stronger, day by day. Drug trafficking dominates
the national economy, and narco-barons operate with impunity.
Reconstruction efforts have failed to bring substantial
improvement to the lives of most Afghan citizens, and the slow
pace is causing widespread resentment of both the Karzai
government and the West. And bin Ladin and top al-Qaeda leaders
enjoy safe haven somewhere along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
In fact, this summer, the NIE--the National Intelligence
Estimates--on the terror threat, found that al-Qaeda has
``protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack
capability.'' The administration firmly believes that we're
about to turn the corner, and that we just need to give our
policy a chance to work. I am curious as to what that policy
is, because, quite frankly, I tell you, I'm somewhat--I'm--it's
not clear to me.
But, that's exactly, as well, what we've been hearing for
the past 5 years, ``the tide is about to turn.'' I sure hope
so, I say to my witnesses--the witness from the administration,
but I'm not prepared to bet on that, under the present
strategy.
If we're not going to hold another hearing in Afghanistan
next year, and have another retelling of the same story, it
seems to me we need a significant change in policy now.
Last month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Michael Mullen, testified to another congressional
committee that the Taliban support has tripled over the past 2
years. In Iraq, he said, ``The United States does what it must,
while in Afghanistan the United States does what it can.'' I
appreciate the admiral's honesty. His statement, it seems to
me, makes abundantly clear why our efforts in Afghanistan seem
to be too little too late.
We're not succeeding in Afghanistan, quite simply, because
we haven't made the kind of priority, I think, that need be
made; we've not made success there our priority.
What would it take to achieve success in Afghanistan? At a
minimum, it seems to me, from reading testimony, talking to
other people, having briefings from the intelligence community,
as well as discussions with my colleagues--at a minimum, it's
going to take a significantly greater investment, including
troops, and the type of troops, and including investment in
rebuilding that country. But, it will still be a small fraction
of what we have devoted to Iraq, thus far. We've spent about as
much on development aid in Afghanistan over the past 6 years as
we've spent on the war in Iraq--as we spend in the war in Iraq
every 3 weeks.
What could more development aid do? Can it do much without
a reorganization of the way in which the aid is distributed and
dealing with corruption?
As every military expert to testify before our committee
has noted, the battle against the Taliban is not going to be
won with bullets and bombs alone. It's going to be won with
roads, clinics, and schools.
General Karl Eikenberry used to say, when he was in command
of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, ``Where the road ends, the
Taliban begins.''
We could have done--what could we have done with a fraction
of the military resources we've spent in Iraq? Earlier this
month, Secretary Gates announced the deployment of 3,200
additional marines to Afghanistan. This is welcome news, at
least in my view. But, does anyone truly believe that it's
enough to turn the tide? What do we need to do to achieve
success in Afghanistan? In brief, the same thing we should have
been doing all along: First, establish security. If we should
securing--if we should be surging forces anywhere, it's in
Afghanistan, not Iraq. NATO troops and a new Marine deployment
are necessary, but not sufficient. We have to focus not just on
sending more forces, but the kinds of forces and equipment we
need to have sent. We need more helicopters, more airlift, more
surveillance drones.
And we've got to do a better job of training the Afghan
and--police and army. You know, that old, bad expression,
``deja vu all over again''? As I read the reports that have
been filed with regard to the police agencies, it is
frighteningly reminiscent of the early reports about the police
agencies in Afghanistan--excuse me, in Iraq. They're corrupt,
ineffectual, and, most places, based on what I'm told--and the
administration may have a different view--they're viewed more
as the problem than the solution, by the population.
We need far more funds. We need to use them far better. The
Afghans are patient, but they're not seeing reconstruction
worthy of a superpower or worthy of the commitment that we
made--the President made--for a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.
After more than 6 years and more than $6 billion, the most we
can claim is that life of ordinary Afghans isn't as bad as it
was under the Taliban. We've got to aim much higher, I think,
and we have to deliver much more.
Third thing we have to do is deal with the
counternarcotics--excuse me--we have to counter the narcotics
explosion. We should target multimillion-dollar drug kingpins,
not dollar-a-day opium farmers.
Someday, aerial eradication may have its place, but, in my
view, not until we've got an alternative livelihood set up and
a judicial system capable of taking down the drug barons. Until
then, we should focus on the top of the food chain, not the
bottom.
We have five witnesses, today, who can explain these issues
in detail, with authority and expertise. First are Assistant
Secretaries Richard Boucher and David Johnson, from the State
Department; then, three outside experts, well known to this
committee and widely respected, will be here: General James
Jones, Admiral Thomas Pickering--excuse me--Ambassador Thomas
Pickering, and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke.
I believe the war in Afghanistan is winnable, but I don't
believe we're winning. I believe we need a new strategy for
success, and I hope this hearing can--and this committee--can
help the administration produce one.
Before I recognize Senator Lugar, I'd like to welcome our
guest, Michael Wilson, the Ambassador of Canada.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for being here, and thank
you for the really herculean effort your country is making and
the sacrifices you're enduring to deal with the situation in
Afghanistan. You're one of our closest friends, and your nation
is shouldering a heavy load for the common good in Afghanistan,
and we thank you very much.
To date, at least 78 Canadian troops have given their lives
in this struggle. And, of the dozens of nations participating
in this struggle, only the United States and Britain have lost
more troops. These represent the first combat deaths Canada has
suffered since the Korean war, and I'm sure it has political
repercussions at home.
It's not always appreciated. We're not a--we don't always
tell you, but our gratitude for your country is immense, and we
thank you for being here.
Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our very distinguished panels. All of the witnesses
are good friends of the committee who have appeared before us
many times. We're especially grateful that they have come today
to share their conclusions and insights on a subject of
critical importance to United States national security.
The ongoing international effort to stabilize and rebuild
Afghanistan must succeed. There should be no doubt that
Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO. The September 11
attacks were planned in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda still operates
there, and the fate of the country remains both strategic and
symbolic.
Afghanistan has experienced a 22-percent decrease in infant
mortality since the Taliban were in power. In 2001, only 8
percent of Afghans had ready access to health services. Today,
almost two-thirds of Afghans enjoy this benefit.
Since the fall of the Taliban, nearly 1,000 miles of main
and secondary roads have been rehabilitated. This has
contributed to a growing economy, which realized a 13-percent
increase in GDP in 2007. School attendance has increased
fivefold since 2002, with 5 million Afghan children attending
schools and 60 million textbooks delivered.
Thus far, the United States has invested nearly $5 billion
in the reconstruction effort. The rest of the international
community has invested even more. Yet, while these investments
have yielded demonstrable gains, the overall situation in
Afghanistan remains grave. Democratic institutions are fragile,
and the government does not control significant regions of the
country. A massive drug trade funds the Taliban, which, despite
setbacks, seems to be able to regenerate its ranks.
Now, these circumstances demand a resolute commitment by
NATO countries and other coalition partners to help establish
security and advance the causes of reconstruction, democracy,
and the rule of law in Afghanistan.
For its part, Afghanistan must be committed to building a
sufficient army, raising an adequate budget, maintaining
control of its own territory. NATO can only be a transitional
force.
At the end of the cold war, a debate ensued over the
durability and purposes of the NATO Alliance. And, after much
debate, the stability of Europe was greatly enhanced by the
addition of new NATO members. This discussion flared again in
the shadow of the Balkan conflicts. Each situation appears to
have reinforced the value of the NATO Alliance. If the debate
over the efficacy of the Alliance continues, as the NATO-led
ISAF has encountered the limits of coordinated action among its
members, there is a troubling shortfall of political commitment
that is hampering the ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The
time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense of
continental Europe is far in the past. With the end of the cold
war, the gravest threats to Europe and North America originate
from other regions of the world, and this requires Europeans
and North Americans to be bolder in remaking our alliances,
forging new structures, and changing our thinking. To be fully
relevant to the security and well-being of the people of its
member nations, NATO must think and act globally. And I am
pleased to hear that the Bush administration is reviewing its
current approach in Afghanistan. I look forward to hearing more
about that today.
The decision to send 3,000 additional marines in
Afghanistan should indicate to partners that the United States
is committed and willing to dedicate the necessary forces to
combat the insurgency. We also stand with the Canadians, the
British, and the Dutch forces, who are calling for more support
from partners.
I believe strongly that NATO is capable of meeting the
challenge in Afghanistan. NATO commanders have demonstrated
that they understand the complexity of the mission. They know
that success in Afghanistan depends on the attitudes of the
people, the progress of reconstruction, and the development of
the economy, as much as it depends on battlefield successes.
But, NATO commanders must have the resources to provide
security, and they must have the flexibility to use troops to
meet Afghanistan's most critical security needs.
I thank the chairman for holding this timely hearing, and
look forward to excellent discussion with our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SOUTH
AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Boucher. Thank you, Senators.
Mr. Chairman, I'm very pleased to be here today. I think
it's very timely that we have this discussion of the situation
in Afghanistan, and strategy on the way forward. And having
received your letter about what you wanted to hear from us, I
will try to be brief, but I would like to discuss the
situation, talk about the strategy, and talk about how we're
implementing it and what the next steps are, as far as we see
it.
As Senator Lugar described, progress is being made. I have
many of the same numbers that he does, but, I think, if you add
together the achievements in roads, achievements in education,
achievements in health care, we see a profoundly changed
situation in Afghanistan. The economic growth is one sign of
that. The extension of the government, having gone through the
Bonn process and help build up a national government, I think
last year we saw a lot of progress at the provincial level. And
if I could say anything about this year, it's probably that
progress needs to be made at the district level, and that's
where a lot of the focus is.
The Taliban are losing on the battlefield, repeatedly, but
they do remain a threat. But, over the last year they've been
driven out of their strongholds in places like Panjshir, near
Kandahar, Sanguin Valley in northern Helmand, and, most
recently, Musa Qala, in Helmand. Unfortunately, as they've lost
on the battlefield they've resorted, more and more, to tactics
of pure terror, tactics of bombings, of IEDs, of kidnappings.
So, we've had many successes, but we have not yet enjoyed
success, and that's what we have to focus on.
In the end, we've found that, if we provide good governance
in places, we see development, we see security, we see, as my
colleague will say, a decline in the poppy production. Good
governance and the benefits of governance are what really make
the difference in Afghanistan. Those are the things that will
win the war. It requires military force, it requires good
leadership, both in the international and the Afghan side, and
it requires continuing flow of sufficient resources from the
international community to help the Afghan Government.
So, the first conclusion about what we've seen in the last
year and the years before is, we know what works in
Afghanistan. We just have to make sure we're doing it, and that
we do it more and better.
The first element that we have to do is provide people with
security. We're using the necessary force to fight the enemy.
U.S. troops are at an all-time high; NATO, as well. Afghan
forces are increasing in number, and are increasingly out in
front. I think, some of the provinces I've visited, most of the
security is provided by Afghan forces now; and NATO forces,
U.S. forces, are there to support them and work with them.
The extra marines will provide extra capability for us in a
very key area, and allow us to do some things, particularly
with training and with putting more people out in the field
with the Afghan forces and the Afghan police than we have
before, since that's one of the keys to winning on the
battlefield.
We have been accelerating police training, quite a rapid
pace over the last year. The effort right now is focusing on
what we call focus-development districts. General Cone, at the
Combined Command Alpha, has a program that we call the Focus
Development Districts, where they take the police out, put in
some good national policemen, more capable, and take the police
from a district and go retrain them, re-form them, reconstruct
them, basically, and then put them back with mentors and
supporters so that they can do a better job of holding
territory and providing the basic service that people want from
their government, which is safety and security.
The narcotics problem is--my colleague Ambassador Johnson
will talk about--but, I think it's fundamentally a matter of
watching the map, at this point, that the--we're going from
six--we went, last year, from six provinces that were poppy, to
three to thirteen. We see the narcotics problem, while
exploding, but exploding in particular areas. And the
insurgency and the narcotics trafficking are increasingly
feeding off each other. And so, as we address the narcotics
problem, we have to look at it in that context. And, as I said,
that's what we're doing.
In terms of providing people with the services that they
expect, they want safety, they want justice, they want economic
opportunity, and they want health care and education from their
government. Major push this year is in expanding the
governance, the ability of government to provide services and
safety to people at the local level. We've got about--if you
add up the base request plus the supplemental that's still on
request, we've got over $500 million devoted to governance this
year. We've got more money going through our Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, which are spent locally to support the
extension of the Afghan Government and give people new
opportunities.
The Afghans are doing their part. They've provided a new
Office of Local Governance, working out of President Karzai's
office, that's started to appoint governors and district chiefs
who are vetted, who are there for their quality, and not just
for their connections. And these people have already shown, I
think, great promise, in terms of how they deliver governance
at a local level.
Expanding justice at provincial levels is also a big part
of the new budget. There's about $70--about $91 million, either
appropriated or on request this year, that will go into
expanding justice at the provincial level.
The third big item is the one you referred to by quoting
General Eikenberry, the--``Where the road ends, the insurgency
begins.'' And that's the opportunity that's provided by
infrastructure, by roads and electricity, in particular. We're
now moving from the Ring Road, which is, but for one section,
almost all completed, into--last year, a lot of money went into
key provincial connections; that's still being done--and more
and more small roads, built by Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
that go up the valleys and the villages. Roads are probably our
largest funding item, if you look, overall, in Afghanistan, and
it's something that works. I was up in Konar Province, which
has been one of the most violent provinces in Afghanistan. I
was there about a week ago, and our Provincial Reconstruction
Team folks and the governor there are all talking--they're not
talking about how many insurgents there are in the Konar
Valley, but they're talking about how many gas stations and
Internet cafes there are along the road that we built down
through the Konar Valley that connects them to Jalalabad and
markets for their produce.
We're also pushing very hard to expand the availability of
electricity in Afghanistan. It's been a country with a very low
supply of electricity; I think about 6 percent of the
population gets their electricity from the grid. We're trying
to expand that very dramatically this year. There are major
projects that will bring more electricity to Kabul by the end
of the year. The Kajaki Dam, down in Helmand, is being--
generators there are being refurbished. That's already
increased the electricity quite a bit in that area. And we're
bringing electricity down from north--from countries in the
north, working with the neighbors to the north, to get
electricity for Afghanistan that they can buy. So, there's
about $200 million in this year's budgets that's devoted to
bringing up electricity. Electricity, of course, provides not
only lights for kids to do their homework, but the ability to
do things like cold storage projects, so that farmers can grow
something other than poppy and be able to market it at better
prices, year round.
Finally, I'd point out, agriculture and education--
agriculture and irrigation are major components of our work,
because much of the population is agricultural, and a lot of
the aid projects, as well as the alternate livelihoods
projects, focus on repairing irrigation systems, building
irrigation systems, and giving people other forms of
agriculture and agricultural rural economics to go to when they
abandon the poppy production.
One of the things that everybody's very focused on in
Afghanistan--I found that in all my conversations last week--
was that--the need to concentrate all these efforts on key
areas. General McNeill points out that 40 percent--40 districts
produce 70 percent of the violence. And so, there's a real
effort now to concentrate the military effects, the police
training, local governance programs, some of the things the
Afghans are doing under their national solidarity program--they
do 35,000 small projects in 25,000 villages now--as well as our
aid efforts and the U.N. efforts, so that we can concentrate in
particular districts and get the--not just the immediate
military effect, but get the rebuilding and get the stability
that we know that security and governance can provide if
they're done well together.
Musa Qala is the latest example, where, after the troops
went in and flushed out the Taliban, people are going in now
with better governance, they're going in with electric
generators, they're going in with projects, in consultations
with the local population about what they need to stabilize and
develop there. So, one area where I think you'll see a lot more
of this here is the concentration of these effects,
concentration of these resources, at the district level.
The second is, there'll be a big push this year to expand
funding and nail down funding for the longer term. Not only has
the United States done that for the last 2 years, some of our
allies have, too, and we'll probably have a major donors
conference this year, once the Afghan national plan is
finished. They look continuously to bring in other donors. I
say many countries have been responses--responsive, and I think
the goal this year is to keep that up and to bring in some
others.
Effort focused on better coordination of international
assistance. The Afghans have complained that they have to--you
know, 62 different kinds of forms to get projects, and things
like that. And we're trying to put ourselves all under a better
yoke, in terms of working together to support the Afghan
Government.
And, finally, I'd note several of the reports that we've
seen recently talk about Pakistan and the situation in
Pakistan. That is very important to us. We understand the
militants have been able to hole up in the tribal areas and
push out from there, push into Afghanistan, push into Pakistan.
There's a lot more coordination going on. For several years
now, we've had tripartite military efforts, U.S. commanders,
NATO commanders, and the Pakistanis and the Afghans getting
together, that we feel that's been a very productive process,
but we've also seen, I think, with President Karzai's recent
visit to Islamabad, a very positive set of changes in the
Pakistan-Afghan relationship, recognition on both their parts
that they faced a common threat and an opportunity to do more
and go forward, both on the popular level, with things like the
jirgas that were held last August, but also the government-to-
government and the military level. So, we'll be pushing
forward, in terms of cooperation against the insurgents along
that border.
So, that's a basic overview of what we're doing, why we're
doing it, and what we intend to do this year. So, I'd be glad
to take any questions you have, after my colleague speaks about
narcotics.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Boucher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address you and the
committee today regarding progress in carrying out U.S. policy toward
Afghanistan.
Let me begin by sharing a few strategic thoughts about our
involvement in Afghanistan to help shape our discussion today: Wh y are
we there and what strategy are we pursuing to achieve these goals?
After 9/11 the United States, joined by many international
partners, toppled the Taliban regime to never let Afghanistan become a
sanctuary for terrorists again. Our goal is to defeat the insurgency
and return Afghanistan to long-term stability based on Afghan rational
sovereignty, democratic principles, and respect for human rights. We
have achieved many successes in our fight against the Taliban and al-
Qaida, but we have not won yet. Our goal requires a large commitment
from us and our allies; and will continue to for a considerable time.
This commitment is an investment, because Afghanistan is more than
just a theater to fight enemies. It is a place of strategic
opportunity. Afghanistan offers a rare opportunity to win a close,
loyal, democratic ally in the heart of a continent with unmatched
political and economic capital and potential. Afghanistan is located at
the crossroads of countries that are the focus of our foreign policy
efforts and has the potential of becoming the linchpin for regional
integration in south and central Asia. The transformation from an
essentially ungoverned territory into a land bridge between the
hitherto virtually disconnected south and central Asian regions
provides new opportunities for growth in trade and security. We have
the opportunity to help the Afghans in what is also their fight for
long-term stability respectful of democratic principles and respect for
human rights.
Concurrent with security efforts to fight insurgent groups and
train the Afghan National Security Forces are the equally crucial
efforts to improve governance and prosperity. We're seeing support for
insurgency decline and support for the Afghan Government increase in
areas where Afghans are provided access to fair government institutions
and economic livelihoods.
It is against this strategic background that I want to discuss the
individual areas of our Afghanistan engagement. We have made progress
on a broad range of fronts. Particular achievements include economic
growth, strengthened local and national institutions, and successes on
the battlefield. But our job is not finished, and important challenges
remain, most prominently in the fields of terrorism, narcotics, human
rights, and corruption.
security
I am pleased to report that our counterinsurgency effort has shown
the way to success. We have made considerable progress against the
Taliban insurgents. U.S.-led NATO forces in the east, have successfully
married security with governance and reconstruction in a full-spectrum
counterinsurgency effort. We are seeing Afghan army and police,
governors and citizens resist the Taliban. In the south, Afghan and
allied forces have taken the fight to the Taliban, recently recapturing
the restive district of Musa Qala and helping establish Government of
Afghanistan presence. We and our NATO and Afghan partners continue to
work together to consolidate and extend those gains by bringing in
governance and development.
Due to th eir inability to win on the battlefield, the Taliban have
resorted to malicious tactics such as improvised explosive devices,
suicide bombers, and directly targeting foreign civilians. The attack
on the Serena Hotel in Kabul on January 14 is but the most recent
example. We are also battling a Taliban communications strategy that
reflects neither the truth nor any respect for the local population.
The United States and our allies in Afghanistan share the desire to
see the Afghan Government assume greater responsibility for its own
security. We have had success in building Afghanistan's security
forces. At this point, we have already trained and equipped more than
49,000 Afghan National Army personnel. The Afghan National Army is a
respected institution in Afghanistan and the Afghans show an increasing
capacity to plan and lead independent military operations.
The transition from a system of militias loyal to local commanders
and warlords, to a professionally led force that respects and enforces
rule of law and human rights will take time. We have a sound program in
place for developing the Afghan police and to increase policing
capacity at the district level. Through better training and leadership,
improved pay and electronic distribution of salaries, and provision of
better equipment, we are working to ensure that the police are ready
and motivated to do their jobs.
We are increasing American support to the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force with more troops and resources because we are
committed to NATO's mission. The United States will deploy an
additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan this spring; 2,200 marines will
be deployed to Regional Command South under command of the
International Security Assistance Force. The remaining 1,000 marines
will train Afghan National Security Forces.
Success is possible, but not assured. Therefore, the international
community needs to continue and expand its efforts. The greatest threat
to Afghanistan's future is abandonment by the international community.
As Secretary Gates has made clear in testimony here and in other public
comments, meeting the requirements identified by NATO commanders
remains a challenge. The mission in Afghanistan needs more troops,
equipment (such as helicopters), and trainers for the Afghan army and
police. We expect more from our NATO allies; we have promised the
Afghan people to assist in stabilizing their country, and we must give
NATO personnel the tools they need to make good on that promise. Too
few of our allies have combat troops fighting the insurgents,
especially in the south. As we look to the upcoming NATO summit in
Bucharest in April, we will continue to work with our 25 NATO allies
and l3 additional partners in Afghanistan to meet the requirement to
complete the NATO mission.
governance
Lasting stability will only come when the Afghan Government can
step in to fill the void that is left when an area is cleared from
insurgents. We must, therefore, focus on the less tangible, but equally
as critical, goal of extending the government's influence nationwide.
In order to persuade them to side with the government against the
insurgents, Afghans must be given more visible evidence that their own
government has the ability to deliver basic services, provide rule of
law, uphold human rights, and extend economic opportunities
effectively, transparently, and responsibly in all corners of the
country. Our foreign assistance programs foster programs big and small
to help achieve the objective of visible and viable governance at the
local level. We are funding local projects developed by community and
provincial councils that play an increasing role responding to the
people's needs. We are also helping the Ministry of Education create a
network of public service academies and the Ministry of Justice to
promote rule of law at the local level.
We support honest and competent governors that respond to the needs
of the people and respect human rights. In this context, we welcome the
establishment of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance which
has already achieved encouraging results. We hope that this institution
will continue to be instrumental in fostering people's confidence in
the state.
reconstruction
Reconstruction and development work remains on track in most of the
country and the Afghan economy continues to grow at impressive rates,
with licit Gross Domestic Product more than doubling since 2002. Thanks
in large part to our colleagues in the U.S. Government, the lives of
millions of Afghans have improved considerably. In 2001, just 8 percent
of Afghans had access to some form of health care; now, more than 80
percent of the population has access to medical care. Almost 11,000
medial professionals have been trained. More than 680 hospitals and
clinics have been built and outfitted. For the first time in 10 years,
the grain harvest was sufficient to meet consumption needs inside
Afghanistan. In 2001, 900,000 children--mostly boys--were enrolled in
school; now, there are more than 5 million and more than 1.5 million of
these (34%) are girls and young women. Since 2001, there has been a 22-
percent decline in mortality rates for infants and children under 5
years of age--we are saving 85,000 more young lives every year. Two
years ago only 35 percent of children were being inoculated against the
polio virus. Now more than 70 percent of the population--including 7
million children--are inoculated. In 2001, there was a dysfunctional
banking system. Now, Afghanistan has a functioning Central Bank with
more than 30 regional branches and an internationally traded currency.
There are now 3 mobile telephone companies serving over 3.5 million
subscribers--this is almost 11 percent of the population. In 2001,
there were 50 kilometers of paved roadway in the country, now there are
more than 4,000 kilometers of paved roads.
We plan to allocate close to $600 million of our fiscal year 2008
base foreign assistance budget to reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan, which will support programs ranging from education,
health, agriculture, infrastructure, and Provincial Reconstruction
Teams. In the fiscal year 2008 supplemental, we have also requested
about $500 million to build roads and power infrastructure and another
$50 million to expand our successful health and education programs.
Working hand in hand with the Government of Afghanistan, these
initiatives are critical tools to connecting the Afghan people to their
government and transforming the environment to one in which they have
the basic services necessary to prosper.
democracy and human rights
Our support for democratic stability and human rights in
Afghanistan is also paying off. The Afghan Parliament is assuming its
appropriate role as a deliberative body. We attach great importance to
the upcoming Presidential and parliamentary elections because having
free, fair, and transparent elections is an essential part of
Afghanistan's transition to a full democracy. Given that voter
registration will take about a year to complete, it needs to begin
soon. The Afghans will have to make key decisions on election dates and
the electoral system. In the fiscal year 2008 supplemental, the
President requested $255 million for critically needed democracy and
election-support programs.
There is now a renewed focus on rule of law and the justice sector.
We have established a public-private partnership with American law
firms and schools to help advance rule of law and establish a strong
core of legal professionals. We believe a transparent and fair justice
system is critical to ensuring that the people of Afghanistan respect
the authority of the central government and to ensuring that the rights
of Afghan citizens are protected.
The development of an independent, active Afghan media has been
remarkable. However, there is still room for improvement. We are
concerned with the increase in detention of journalists and government
interference in media coverage over the past year. Also troubling were
the deaths of two female journalists last summer and the recent death
sentence of a young Afghan journalist. We are working with the Afghan
Government and the Afghan Parliament to emphasize the importance of the
new media law currently in the legislative process meeting
international standards regarding, in particular, the legal protection
of journalists and removing vague content restrictions, establishing a
fair, independent licensing system and an independent body to govern
Radio Television Afghanistan.
A peaceful and stable Afghanistan cannot be secured without the
active political and economic involvement of women. While women's
political participation has gained a degree of acceptance, women who
are active in public life continue to face disproportionate threats and
violence. Furthermore, women and girls continue to face severe
discrimination and both formal and customary justice mechanisms that
fail to protect their rights. The U.S. is firmly committed to support
for Afghan women and integrates women's issues into virtually all of
its programs, aiming to increase female political participation,
education, economic opportunities, and their role in civil society.
counternarcotics
Though the number of poppy-free provinces doubled in 2007, total
opium cultivation in Afghanistan grew significantly, The Afghan
Government and the international community are alarmed about this
development. Afghanistan's poppy production fuels corruption, narcotics
addiction, and is a significant source of financing for criminal and
insurgent groups. In order to prosper, Afghanistan must rid itself of
the opium poppy. President Karzai and his top leader recognize this.
Countering poppy growth requires a multifaceted approach. We are
pursuing precisely such an approach with our five pillar strategy
involving public information, alternative development, law en
forcement, interdiction, and eradication. We are reinforcing the
message that poppy cultivation is immoral, illegal, and un-Islamic. We
are helping farmers to gain access to other means to feed and clothe
their families--access to alternative crops and other means of
livelihood, to roads that will allow them to move their crops to
market, to advice concerning markets for their new crops and to
legitimate sources of credit. We are also helping the Afghan Government
to increasingly provide cre dible law enforcement, interdiction, and
eradication. The disincentives for poppy cultivation must be bigger
than the potential profit. The credibility of our counternarcotics
efforts must include making the risks of growing poppy unacceptable.
Local governance structures and counternarcotics are closely
interconnected. Where government has control and has placed good
administrators, poppy production is down. Where the insurgency rages,
poppy production is up.
relations with pakistan
The Afghanistan and Pakistan bilateral relationship and improved
coordination of border surveillance activities along the Durand Line is
crucial for stemming the cross-border flow of insurgents and
eliminating their safe havens in Pakistan's Federally Administered
Tribal Areas. Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan moved forward in
2007 with several summits, the productive August bilateral peace jirga
in Kabul, and President Karzai's successful visit to Islamabad in late
December. Both sides ageed at the August peace jirga to hold routine
minijirgas. Pakistan has offered 1,000 scholarships to Afghans in a
good step to increasing positive connections. Current political events
in Pakistan may divert the attention of the Pakistan army from
combating extremism in the FATA, however, close military cooperation
with Pakistan is still key to the success of U S. strategic goals in
the region.
We continue to encourage the Government of Pakistan to take
sustained and aggressive actions against violent extremists. At the
same time we recognize that a purely military solution is unlikely to
succeed. We therefore strongly support the Government of Pakistan's
efforts to implement a comprehensive and long-term strategy to
combating terrorism and eliminating violent extremism in the border
regions, which include the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, parts
of the Northwest Frontier Province, and Baluchistan. We are committed
to supporting this initiative to bring economic and social development
and effective governance, thereby rendering these remote areas
inhospitable to violent extremists, We are also looking forward to
working with Pakistan's new civilian government on this important
initiative after the February 18 parliamentary elections.
Along the Afghan side of the border as well, we're seeing signs
that local support for terrorism is declining as a direct result of our
comprehensive efforts on security and reconstruction. Improvements in
roads leading to Pakistan reap economic, social, and security benefits.
But they also make it easier to identify insurgents crossing the
border. While some of the fighters along the Pakistani side of the
border intend to cross over into Afghanistan to attack U.S. and NATO
military forces, their main goal now seems to be the expulsion of the
Pakistani military from the Tribal Areas and the imposition of sharia
law in the areas they control.
concluding remarks
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to t hank you for this
opportunity to appear before this committee. We at the State Department
appreciate the committee members' interest and support of this most
important endeavor. We and our allies must recognize that success in
Afghanistan is our only option. I am convinced that we are a ll moving
in the right direction and that with sustained international support
Afghanistan can look forward to a stable, democratic, and more
prosperous future so that this country will never again fall prey to
extremists and terrorists.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and distinguished
members of the committee, like Ambassador Boucher, I appreciate
the opportunity you're providing us to discuss our efforts to
assist Afghanistan, and, in my case, to curb the production and
trafficking of illegal narcotics. I'm going to focus my remarks
on how we've adjusted our strategy, in light of the current
situation, as we enter the 2008 poppy growing season.
I've submitted a written statement, for the record, that
I'll summarize.
Mr. Chairman, the scope of Afghanistan's drug problem is
hard to overstate. In 2007, Afghanistan produced 93 percent of
the world's opium poppy, a record high in the second year
standing. Cultivation was particularly pronounced in the south,
where the insurgency is strong and government authority weaker.
Afghanistan's narcotics industry fuels insecurity,
undercuts reconstruction efforts, and hinders the development
of the legitimate economy. Notwithstanding these challenges, we
did observe significant poppy reductions in the north of the
country, including in the traditional poppy-growing provinces
of Balkh and Badakhshan. As Ambassador Boucher mentioned,
during 2007 the number of poppy-free provinces more than
doubled, from 6 to 13. To us, these trends demonstrate that
counternarcotics success can be achieved where there is
security, political will, and the ability to provide
alternatives.
Early indications for the 2008 poppy-growing season show a
deepening of last year's trends. In the province-by-province
map to my left, the provinces in the shade of red indicate
where we expect substantial or moderate cultivation. Those in
blue are where we expect to have little cultivation or where we
expect to see significant decreases in poppy cultivation, such
as in Nangarhar. As this demonstrates, the phenomenon of drug
cultivation is not uniform across Afghanistan. In large
sections in the north and east, including some areas bordering
Pakistan, Afghanistan's made significant progress in reducing
poppy cultivation. The problems become much more localized and
concentrated in the south, in provinces such as Helmand and
Kandahar, where insecurity persists.
Our revised counternarcotics strategy, released in August,
seeks to consolidate and expand upon gains throughout the
north, while addressing expanding cultivation in a very
challenging security environment in the south.
Our revised strategy aims, dramatically, to enhance
incentives through the provision of additional development
assistance, while simultaneously strengthening the
disincentives through efforts such as interdiction,
eradication, and law enforcement. We have, for instance,
strengthened the good-performers initiative that aims to
deliver rapid, high-impact development assistance directly to
those communities that have been successful in reducing or
eliminating opium poppy. The enhancements further support the
U.S. Agency for International Development's well-established
Alternative Development Program. Incentives such as these must
be balanced with strong disincentives, such as interdiction,
eradication, and, most of all, an effective criminal justice
system.
Assisting the Government of Afghanistan in improving
interdiction capabilities is among our highest priorities. The
Drug Enforcement Administration provides training, mentoring,
and investigative assistance to the counternarcotics police of
Afghanistan, and it supports three specially vetted units that
investigate and pursue key high-value targets.
According to the Afghan Government statistics, in 2007 the
counternarcotics police of Afghanistan seized 39 metric tons of
opium, 4 metric tons of heroin, arrested 760 individuals for
trafficking, and destroyed 50 drug labs. Eradication is another
critical component of our counternarcotics strategy. Based on
its experience in other countries, the U.N. estimates that 25
percent of Afghanistan's poppy crop must be eradicated in
order, effectively, to deter the population from growing poppy.
To promote eradication that is effective and equitable, the
U.S. Government strongly supports nonnegotiated force-protected
eradication.
The U.N. has reported that poppy cultivation is no longer
associated with poverty in Afghanistan. The poppy fields in the
south are largely owned by wealthy drug lords and, in some
instance, corrupt officials. The benefits of this policy, of
reducing financial benefit to insurgents and corrupt officials
that enable a climate of corruption, far outweigh the potential
loss of the support of a small percentage of the population.
To develop the ability of the nascent Afghan criminal
justice sector, the Departments of State and Justice are
training a specially vetted task force of Afghan judges,
prosecutors, and investigators to try mid- and high-value
narcotics traffickers before the Counternarcotics Tribunal of
Afghanistan. Since that Afghan-led task force became
operational in May 2005, it's prosecuted over 1,200 cases,
arrested over 1,600 defendants, and seized more than 38 metric
tons of opium.
Mr. Chairman, again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you and your colleagues. I welcome your feedback and
look forward to the discussion.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and other distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to come before you to discuss
our efforts to assist Afghanistan in curbing the production and
trafficking of illegal narcotics and to enhance the ability of the
Afghan National Police (ANP) to provide public security throughout
Afghanistan. These are two of our most critical missions in Afghanistan
today. My testimony will provide you with an update on counternarcotics
and police training activities facilitated by the Department of State's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), in close
collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan, the interagency
community, and our international partners, since I last appeared before
this committee in September 2007. In particular, I would like to focus
my remarks on how we have adjusted our strategy in light of new
realities and as we enter the 2008 poppy growing season.
current status and trends
The scope of Afghanistan's drug problem cannot be overstated.
According to the U.N., in 2007 Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the
world's opium poppy, which was a record high for the second year in a
row. Total poppy cultivation increased by 28,000 hectares over 2006
levels, which accounts for an increase of 17 percent in land under
cultivation. Cultivation was particularly pronounced in the south of
the country where the insurgency is strong and government authority is
weak, with the southern province of Helmand producing over 50 percent
of the country's opium on its own. It is now clear that Afghanistan's
narcotics industry feeds a troubling cycle of insecurity wherein drug
money fuels insecurity by assisting the insurgency, undercuts
international reconstruction efforts, and hinders the development of
the legitimate economy.
Despite these challenges, U.N. surveys showed significant poppy
reductions in the north of the country, including in the traditional
poppy-growing provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan. During 2007, the
number of poppy-free provinces more than doubled from 6 in 2006 to 13
of Afghanistan's 34 provinces in 2007. These trends demonstrate that
counternarcotics success can be achieved where there is security,
political will, and the ability to provide alternative development
opportunities.
Early indications for the 2008 poppy growing season show a
deepening of the previous year's trends: Sustained reductions in poppy
cultivation in the north and east of the country will likely be offset
by increases in the insecure south. We anticipate that Nangarhar
province, where cultivation of poppy more than doubled from 2006 to
2007, will demonstrate a dramatic decrease--perhaps as much as 50
percent--in poppy cultivation in 2008 due in large part to the
successful counternarcotics efforts of its Governor. If this
expectation proves true, it would demonstrate the power of political
will even in areas where drug traffickers operate and insecurity
thrives.
improvements to the u.s. counternarcotics strategy
In August 2007, the ``U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for
Afghanistan'' was unveiled, and sets forth the USG's efforts to achieve
short-term and long-term success in the fight against narcotics. The
strategy maintains the basic framework of our comprehensive five pillar
approach to counternarcotics--which includes public information,
alternative development, eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement
and justice sector reform components--but calls for several key
improvements to better address changing trends in cultivation, the
security context, the political climate, and economic development
requirements. In particular, we aim to dramatically enhance incentives
for participation in licit livelihoods through the provision of
additional development assistance, while simultaneously strengthening
the disincentives in participating in all facets and levels of the
narcotics industry through increased interdiction, eradication, and law
enforcement. The complexity of the drug problem in Afghanistan demands
a balanced counternarcotics approach that melds deterrence, prevention,
and economic development assistance.
To advance this strategic refinement, the Department of State is
actively working with the Government of Afghanistan and our allies to
provide increased development assistance to Afghans who live in areas
with high levels of poppy cultivation and who have demonstrated
progress in counternarcotics. One vital component of this strategy is
the implementation of a strengthened Good Performers Initiative (GPI)
which is a counternarcotics incentive program designed to deliver high-
impact development assistance directly to those communities leading the
fight against poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.
Established in 2006 by the Government of Afghanistan with financial
support from the United States ($35 million committed to date) and the
United Kingdom ($6.5 million committed to date), the GPI initially only
rewarded poppy-free provinces with funds for development assistance.
With sustained encouragement from the United States, President Karzai
expanded the terms of the initiative in November 2007 to provide GPI
assistance to provinces that achieve net poppy reductions of over 10
percent as well as those that have taken extraordinary counternarcotics
measures but did not meet the criteria for an award. To date, 17
provinces are eligible for or have received GPI development assistance
totaling more than $16 million. GPI projects currently underway include
irrigation projects; provision of agricultural equipment; and the
construction of greenhouses, university buildings, information
technology training centers, and girls' schools.
The enhancements made to the Good Performer's Initiative further
support the U.S. Government's well-established alternative development
program in Afghanistan, which is led by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). During FY 2007, nearly $229 million
in funding was allocated for USAID-led alternative development
initiatives, which included efforts to implement a rural finance
program to provide credit to farmers and small- and medium-sized
enterprises, to create overseas markets for Afghan agricultural
exports, to provide technical and material assistance to farmers, to
establish economically viable infrastructure to produce and move licit
goods to market, and to administer cash-for-work programs. USAID has
been particularly successful in organizing a series of agricultural
fairs, which encourage public-private partnerships to advance licit
agriculture in high-poppy cultivation areas, including Helmand,
Nangarhar, and Badakhshan.
Incentives such as these must be balanced with strong
disincentives--namely interdiction, eradication, and a viable justice
sector--to deter drug traffickers and the wider public from
participating in the narcotics industry. Although insecurity, porous
borders, and mountainous terrain make interdiction a particular
challenge in Afghanistan, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is
working with the Departments of State and Defense to help the GOA
improve its interdiction capability by strengthening the
Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). DEA provides training,
mentoring, and investigative assistance to the CNPA and supports three
specially vetted CNPA units that investigate and pursue high-value
targets. DEA, with DOD and State Department support, is planning to
further expand the Afghan Government's efforts to break major
trafficking groups that are operating in outlying and border provinces.
Eradication, while controversial and difficult, is a critical
component of our counternarcotics strategy and is essential to ensuring
sustainable progress in democracy, economic reform, and rule of law.
Based on the experiences of other countries, the U.N. estimates that 25
percent of Afghanistan's poppy crop must be eradicated in order to
effectively deter poppy farmers, and those who support them, from
planting poppy in the future. Past efforts by the Afghan central
government's Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) showed that negotiated
eradication, in which PEF leaders negotiate with local leaders over
which poppy fields to eradicate, allowed for undue political influence
and an inconsistent application of Article 26.6 of Afghanistan's
December 2005 Counter Narcotics Law, which subjects all illicit drug
cultivation--whether you are a wealthy landowner with connections to
power or a poor farmer--to the risk of destruction without
compensation. To this end, the U.S. Government strongly supports PEF
engagement in nonnegotiated eradication supported by adequate force
protection. If the Afghan Government chose to pursue this strategy, it
would instill a heightened degree of risk into the decision to
cultivate poppy and have the added effect of demonstrating the reach of
the central government in areas where it has struggled to consolidate
its power to date.
Just as the security context is closely linked to the narcotics
industry in Afghanistan, we strongly believe that the State
Department's foreign policy counternarcotics mandate, which includes an
eradication component, is closely linked to wider U.S. Government
counterinsurgency objectives. A growing body of evidence indicates the
presence of a symbiotic relationship between the narcotics trade and
the antigovernment insurgency, most commonly associated with the
Taliban. Narcotics traffickers provide revenue and arms to the
insurgency, while the insurgents provide protection to growers and
traffickers and prevent the government from interfering with their
activities. In recent years, poppy production has soared in provinces
where insurgents are most active--five relatively higher income,
agriculturally rich provinces along the Pakistan border account for 70
percent of Afghanistan's 2007 poppy production with over 50 percent in
Helmand Province alone. Our strategy faces this challenge head-on,
seeking to starve the insurgency of the drug money that fuels it.
Some have suggested that increased eradication would have the
effect of pushing ``farmers with no other source of livelihood into the
arms of the Taliban without reducing the total amount of opium being
produced.'' \1\ The facts do not support this view. The poppy fields in
the south--where poppy cultivation and the insurgency are most acute--
are largely owned by wealthy drug lords and, in some instances, corrupt
officials. Recent aerial reconnaissance missions have observed
organized and industrialized poppy farming in broad, open fields.
Helmand province is also a significant recipient of international
assistance. In fact, if Helmand were a separate country, it would be
the sixth largest recipient of bilateral USAID assistance in the world.
Pursuing nonnegotiated, force-protected eradication would primarily
impact these well-financed narcofarmers and provide a blow to the
insurgents that protect them in the process. The benefits of this
policy--of reducing financial benefit to insurgents and corrupt
officials that enable a climate of corruption--far outweigh the
potential loss of support of a small percentage of the population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Richard Holbrook, ``Still Wrong in Afghanistan,'' the
Washington Post, January 23, 2008, A19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advances in interdiction and eradication will stall without
simultaneous efforts to develop the ability of the nascent Afghan
justice sector to investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate those
guilty of narcotics violations. The Departments of State and Justice,
in collaboration with other international donors, are working to
support the Afghan Government's Criminal Justice Task Force (CNTF),
responsible for narcotics prosecutions, and the Counternarcotics
Tribunal (CNT), which has exclusive national jurisdiction over all mid-
and high-level narcotics cases. While much work remains, progress has
been made to help Afghanistan build its justice system from the ground
up. We are in the process of expanding training efforts for provincial
and district-level prosecutors to assist them in developing narcotics
cases to be transferred to Kabul and tried before the CNT. None of
these counternarcotics efforts would be possible without the presence
of a capable and independent Afghan National Police (ANP) force, which
I would now like to discuss.
afghan national police (anp)
In 2003, the United States and the international community began a
program to increase the overall capacity of the Afghan National Police
(ANP) and its ability--under the direction of the Ministry of Interior
(MOI)--to provide law enforcement throughout Afghanistan. To this end,
the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and the Department of Defense's Combined Security
Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) are working together and with
our international partners to train, equip, and mentor the Afghan
police and reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior.
Together, we have made substantial progress in developing the
rosters, the capabilities, and the reach of the ANP. Many of the 74,000
ANP currently deployed--including more than 25,000 in 2007--have
completed basic, advanced, and/or specialized training at one of seven
Regional Training Centers (RTCs) in the provinces or the Central
Training Center (CTC) in Kabul. To assist in the development of law
enforcement skills, approximately 500 U.S. civilian police advisors
work alongside Afghan police units at RTCs at the provincial and
district level and within the MOI.
In addition to the large number of ANP already trained and
mentored, the efforts of our civilian police advisors have yielded
other concrete successes in Afghanistan, including:
A greater understanding of the operational capabilities and
requirements of the ANP, which led to the creation of
specialized civil-order police units and domestic violence
(family response) police units. The civil order police now
serve as the bedrock of the Focused District Development (FDD)
plan to enhance district-level law enforcement, while the
family response units provide a unique and critical capacity
for the ANP to extend their reach to the female population;
Recognition of the importance of female police, which has
led to greater efforts to recruit female ANP and the
establishment of the Women's Police Corps (WPC) with facilities
designed specifically for training female police;
Development of a specialized border security curriculum for
the Afghan Border Police (ABP); and
Significant improvements to the ANP's investigative
techniques for tracking the perpetrators of crime.
Despite these and other successes, considerable challenges remain
in establishing a professional MOI and a fully independent and
functional ANP. Similar to the challenges facing our counternarcotics
mission, persistent insurgent activity, especially in southern
Afghanistan has routinely placed the ANP in high-threat environments
that demand skills and operations far more complex than those required
of community police. ANP are regularly targeted by insurgents and
suffer a high casualty rate. This environment, and the resulting high
mortality rate for ANP, continues to have a negative impact on the ANP
and on the MOI's ability to recruit and retain qualified personnel.
To overcome these challenges and further enhance the effectiveness
and operational independence of the ANP, the highest priority for our
police advisors in the coming months is the successful implementation
of the Focused District Development (FDD) plan, which is a new and
holistic approach to train, equip, and mentor the ANP. FDD was designed
by the Government of Afghanistan, the United States, and international
partners to be a Ministry of Interior-led, cross-sectoral approach to
training, equipping, and mentoring Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) at the
district level. In each district undergoing FDD, four primary
activities occur:
A needs and skills assessment of district AUP is conducted;
Collective training and equipping of district AUP occurs at
RTCs based on the assessment findings;
Comprehensive mentoring of district AUP follows training;
and
Concurrent development of the judicial and prosecutorial
sectors is assessed and implemented in that district.
Each full cycle of FDD is expected to take 6 to 8 months, per district.
The first FDD cycle--currently being implemented in seven districts
throughout Afghanistan--began in December 2007, and is expected to be
completed in April 2008. The MOI is working with the international
community to plan for future iterations of FDD, which will be rolled
out on a regular basis. Assessments for the second FDD cycle are
currently underway in five districts.
While comprehensive findings and outcomes of FDD will not be
available until late spring 2008 at the earliest, preliminary reports
on the program are positive. Thus far, U.S. civilian police mentors and
trainers report that training is proceeding on track and anecdotal
evidence has indicated that the improved student-mentor ratio at the
RTCs has led to a more positive learning environment for the ANP. Also,
the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) has been effective in maintaining
district security and has been well-received by local populations.
Given the vital importance of the police to ensuring security and the
rule of law, we will continue to work closely with CSTC-A, the
Government of Afghanistan, and our international partners to look for
creative ways to improve the police program and ensure its continued
success.
conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before the committee today. Please know that I will continue to
strive to keep you fully informed of our progress and our setbacks in
these important missions, and I certainly welcome your thoughts and
advice.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Seven-minute round, is that OK?
Well, to listen to you two guys, we're doing really well,
things are going really well in Afghanistan. And I--that's
encouraging.
But, let me ask you, 38 metric tons seized, how many
produced?
Mr. Johnson. Sir, it's a fraction of the amount produced.
The Chairman. Like what? One percent?
Mr. Johnson. No; I think it's substantially more than that,
but not----
The Chairman. Well, what do you think? Give me an estimate.
Mr. Johnson. I believe, about 400. So, I'd--I would say, in
the estimate--in the range of maybe 10 percent.
The Chairman. And the criminal justice system, is it
functional?
Mr. Johnson. It is beginning to function, but it is not
functioning in the way that we would expect in a----
The Chairman. It's not even remotely functional, at this
point, is it?
Mr. Johnson. ``Remotely,'' I would not describe--it is--I
would describe it more than ``remotely functioning,'' but it
is--it is in the process of being established.
The Chairman. Yeah. It isn't functioning. That would be a
fair statement, isn't it true? I mean, there are some places
where it may be functioning, but essentially it's not a
functioning criminal justice system.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I did mention that there have been over
1,200 convictions with--for this special court, so there is a
system that is producing some results, but it is embryonic.
The Chairman. Ambassador Boucher, you indicated that we're
making progress against the Taliban. How does that square with
the fact they control a lot more of the country?
Ambassador Boucher. I don't--I don't think they actually
control a lot more of the country. They operate in a lot of the
country. But, we've seen areas where they've tried to settle
down and establish control, we've seen several of those major
areas taken away. Panjshir, near Kandahar, Canadian and Afghan
operation early this--late 2006, early this year--that was one
of their heartland places, and they're out of there now, and
there are services being brought into that area, a lot of
people--ordinary people moving back. So, I----
The Chairman. Are we better off, relative to the Taliban,
today than we were 2 years ago?
Ambassador Boucher. We're better off, in terms of our
ability to bring in the government and help them provide
services throughout the country. We're not better off--we're
better off, in terms of--they're not controlling places and not
having so many concentrations where they can operate from.
We're not better off, in terms of bombs, because they've been
losing on the battlefield, they failed to achieve any of their
objectives last year, except they've turned more and more to
terror, and they've--they're able to go blow themselves up.
The Chairman. So, we're losing more--right?--this year than
last year.
Ambassador Boucher. We've been out there, fighting a lot
more, and yes, we've had more casualties this year.
The Chairman. Yeah. The police, how would you rate their
effectiveness?
Ambassador Boucher. Very variable.
The Chairman. Anyplace--tell me where it's real good.
Ambassador Boucher. I think some districts--some places in
the north, some districts in the south, where we've started
this Focus Development, show a lot of promise. Police training
has lagged behind all the other sectors. We've made a major
push last year in budget and in effort. Now we've got a lot
more good policemen coming out, we've got a lot more trained
policemen, we've got a lot more focus on what needs to be done
with the police, we've----
The Chairman. The reports I've read----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Seen some of the reform in
Ministry of Interior that's needed, but more is--more of that
is yet to come.
The Chairman. This discussion reminds me so much of the
discussion about police in Iraq that Senator Hagel and I have
had over the years. I don't--I've not found one independent
report that suggests that they're anything other than a
problem. Can you cite one for me?
Ambassador Boucher. I'll tell you one thing. There was a--
it was the--a survey done last year that I think was reported
by the BBC in December, and one of the things that really
struck me was, people said they'd rather have bad policemen
than no policemen at all. Now, that's certainly not our goal,
but the fact----
The Chairman. Well, it's been achieved.
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. That people who have
policemen----
The Chairman. We've achieved that, though. It may not be
the goal. We've achieved it. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Boucher. That was the case beforehand, sir.
There were----
The Chairman. It's the case right now. Look--look, you
know, it's interesting, I--I thought this report by the--by the
Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit--it's called ``Cops or
Robbers''--the report ends with the following--and I'm not
citing this as the only source; we're going to hear from two
witnesses about this, as well--it says that it's time to
clarify today's blurred vision on the role of police in
Afghanistan and to achieve a consensus on a common vision, the
strategy for developing a police force will operate as cops
rather than as robbers. This is so much--I mean, such an echo
of 4 years ago, 5 years ago in Afghanistan. The emphasis has
been on numbers, not quality. The emphasis has been to rapidly
ramp up the numbers of police, and----
Well, I'm going to move on, in the minute or so I have
left.
With regard, Mr. Johnson, to the move against poppy
production, how many of the drug lords have been arrested and
tried and put out of business?
Mr. Johnson. I mentioned, in the statement that I made, the
number of arrests that have been made by--and the number of
convictions. Now, ``drug lord'' is a--an indefinite term.
The Chairman. No; it's not. No; it's not an indefinite
term. You know there's at least a dozen identifiable people you
know who are running these operations. If you don't know, we
really have a problem. We have a gigantic problem if you don't
know. You know. Have any of them been arrested?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think if you--we were going to be
using the term ``kingpin,'' which is frequently used in this
term, I don't think we have been yet successful in that--and
arrested and convicted. The exception to that being that there
have been some extraditions to the United States for trial
here. I think all of those individuals are people that we would
describe as significant players in the Afghan drug trade.
The Chairman. Yeah. One last question on this. And there's
a lot more I want to come back to. But, I--in speaking with the
intelligence community, the military, almost every segment of
our government involved with--having an input on dealing with
eradication, nobody seems to think, including our NATO allies,
that aerial spraying is a good idea. And you pointed out that
you have reduced to--you have six fewer areas in which poppy is
now being produced. How did you succeed there? Was it aerial
spraying?
Mr. Johnson. The way we made progress there was multifold,
but it was through a forced eradication program in which we
provided assistance. It was significantly----
The Chairman. When you say ``forced eradication,'' what
kind of ``forced eradication''? What was the----
Mr. Johnson. On the ground--on-the-ground mechanical.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Johnson. It was through--it was significantly, and even
largely, through local governing officials--in particular,
governors who had the political will and had the security
environment in which they could destroy poppy, themselves. And
that----
The Chairman. I think there's probably a lesson in that,
isn't there? I mean----
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think the lesson is, where you have--
that security and counternarcotics go hand in hand, that you
can't have one without the other, and you can't do them
sequentially, you have to do them together.
The Chairman. Well, I--the military tells me that, if, in
fact, aerial eradication was--is adopted as the favored method
of eradication, which is--our Ambassador wants, very much--that
that would require a heck of a lot more military resources than
we have now. You're essentially flying crop dusters. This is
something I've been involved in--with 30 years in the--on this
issue, as you have, from the Judiciary Committee. And you're
essentially flying crop dusters, what most people would think
would be that, the eradicating these defoliant--this takes out
the--and in order for that to occur successfully, you need
helicopter gunships, you need protection for those aircraft,
because they can be shot down. They can be shot down, some of
then, just with small-arms fire. So, have you calculated what
it would--what additional military resources, beyond the actual
planes that would spray the defoliant, are needed in order to
make--even if the decision is made that aerial eradication
should be the major thrust of eradication, have you--have there
been--is there a study or a calculation or a report that
you've--that you've put together, what other assets you'd need?
Mr. Johnson. Well, based on the consideration of this issue
earlier, when we were considering whether or not it would be
the right way to go, we have developed plans for this,
including--in addition to the spray aircraft, which are lightly
armored, as you mentioned. We have the helicopter already on
the ground that provide security for the ground forced-
eradication program. So, they're there, and they are capable of
providing this service, if it were needed.
We have these aircraft there, because we need them for the
helicopters for the ground program. They're also used to--for
mobility for the police training program, for assisting in the
development of judicial systems. So, those aircraft are on the
ground already.
The Chairman. Pretty well spoken for, right?
Mr. Johnson. But, not any spray aircraft. We don't have the
capability to do any spraying, and we don't plan to, because
we've consulted with the Government of Afghanistan, and they--
--
The Chairman. Oh, OK.
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Have said that they do not wish
for us to do so.
The Chairman. Good. All right. Thank you very much.
I yield to the chairman.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to explore a thought, which you mentioned, I
think, Secretary Boucher, that there will be a donors
conference after the Afghan national plan is completed, and
that sounds like a very good idea. But, it just spurs, once
again, my thinking, because I'm not sure that we have a plan
for Afghanistan. I'm not certain we really have comprehension
on this committee. And I suppose I want more reassurance that
the administration knows more.
Specifically, if were to use the model, in business, of a
business plan of what works--how much capital is required, what
kinds of activities are going to be required, what marketing
strategy and so forth--sometimes business plans work and
businesses thrive; but, in this particular case it appears to
me that, of necessity, we've reacted to 9/11 and we have been
in Afghanistan ever since. We have worked with NATO allies in
Afghanistan. A great number of good things have happened in
particular provinces. But, in--at the end of the day, despite
assurances that the government has some degree of control over
the country, most observers, going province by province, don't
find that. Central government control is very limited. There is
control by tribal leaders or those who had some leadership in
the past in various places. Certainly, control is contested in
many areas--in the south and in the east--and is not simply the
problem of the drug lords and so forth, it's Taliban or, on
occasion, even al-Qaeda supplementing their activities. So, day
by day, we combat this. We have successes, we can report a
number of things,--good things that happen. But, I'm hopeful
the administration may come forward, working with the
international community, to try to get some idea what sort of
capital resources does this country need--a poverty-stricken
place--to at least advance to a different level of potential
economic activity and education. How much money to build the
roads and the infrastructure so, in fact, the central
government might have some possibility of actually reaching
constituent populations? How much is going to be required for
the training of an adequate army and police force? In other
words, a cadre of civil servants who are involved. It's likely
to be a very, very large sum. And, in addition to the money,
how many personnel, whether they are military people of our
country and others--NGOs, volunteers--are going to be required?
Otherwise, what I suspect we're looking at a situation of
transition here in which we do not have hearings like this,
there'll be reports that there were some ups and downs last
year, and so forth. But, at some point, the patience of our
NATO allies, maybe even of the American people--our
constituents--will say, ``We've done enough. These folks are on
their own and will have to do their best.'' Now, some will
counsel, ``We've been through this before.'' Withdrawal, after
the last occasion, led to what some would say, a theater in
which the Taliban made it possible for al-Qaeda to have the
camps, and people attacked us. So, they would say, ``Here we go
again, all the way back around.'' But, nevertheless, unless
there is some plan as to why Afghanistan will ever be a
different country, what, physically, is going to bring
integrity to this situation? The model that has often been cast
of democracy, with the gains for women, for students, for
everybody--unless there is some goal out there, some overall
plan, this situation is going to be a victim, at some point, of
the politics of this country or others, and then we may lament
this, but we will indicate that we gave it our best shot, we
spent a good bit of money and troops and so forth.
Now, what kind of overall planning--a comprehensive thing--
even if, at the end of the day, people say, ``Well, this is
impossible, we just can't raise the cash, we can't get the
people there,'' and, therefore, we then have a more limited
goal, which will not be as satisfying, in terms of the
integrity of the state and so forth--but, at this point, I
don't see any parameters of this, and that's disturbing, and
this is why I want some reassurance.
Ambassador Boucher. Let me reassure you, sir. You've raised
a lot of very important and substantial questions there. And I
think the framework that you're coming from is the right one.
We have to remember, this was one of the poorest countries in
the world in the fifties, sixties, and seventies; it was on a
par with sub-Saharan Africa, and then went downhill for 25
years. When I first went there, in January 2002, the Afghan
Government was 20 people sitting around a table. The Afghan
treasury was an empty safe. There were 50 kilometers of roads.
There were a few telephones, that didn't work. It's now one of
the fastest growing cell phone markets in the world. It's got a
road system that unifies the nation. It's got a government that
works fairly well--better in some ministries than others--but
is capable of providing education and wells and projects for
people around the country. It's got an army that's credible and
out in the field and fighting. It's got a police force that is
reforming. It's not just quantity, it's quality, as well. A lot
of what's being done with the police training is to reform it
as we expand it.
So, I see all these efforts. Nobody can tell me it's not
going in a positive direction. What I see when I go to Kabul,
you know, it's a--4 or 5 years ago, people were building
housing, and they were furnishing houses. The shops that used
to be in containers are now in buildings. You see school kids
out, going to school. You see more lights at night than you
ever did before. There is progress. It's going in the right
direction.
The question that you asked, though, is: How much does it
take to finish the job all over the country, to really succeed?
Last year, at the London conference--last year? Yeah, last
year, at the London conference, the London compact and the
Afghan strategy were laid out with the goals that had to be
achieved in a timeframe between then and 2014, I think most of
them were. That is being turned, increasingly, into an
implementation plan, a development strategy that will go to the
World Bank for vetting, about March of this year, and it will
be based on that, that we expect to hold a donors conference,
probably in the summertime--or beginning or end of this
summer--to try to put money into the specific implementation
steps needed to achieve those goals that have been laid out.
On the military side, there have been targets set for
military and police, requirements set, in terms of what needs--
who needs to be trained, the kinds of forces they need, the
kind of, you know, air mobility the army needs, and really set
those things.
Now, those may not be the final numbers. There are plans to
get to certain levels, and there's already a look at whether
those are going to--in the end, going to be the right levels.
But, I think there is very specific plans about what we're
trying to accomplish with training, both in terms of quantity
and in quality.
And these plans dovetail. They dovetail, because they're
brought together in Washington by the planners who are making--
in Kabul, by the people who are making and implementing these
plans. And the strategy, the overall strategy, is to win on the
battlefield, and win the war, really, by providing this
governance at the local level, and that's being done more and
more every day. I think there are places where you can see it
definitely working. I saw it last week in Konar. I saw it last
week in Jalalabad. I've seen it in Panjshir, in the north. You
see it some places at the district levels, some place at the
provincial level. But, where we have succeeded is--in
Afghanistan--is where we've been able to provide a combination
of military force, good governance, and economic opportunity,
and we've done that successfully in many places; we have to do
it in all the places if we're going to succeed fully.
Senator Lugar. Just two quick comments. I hope that, as
these plans are developed, or if they actually are on paper,
that you will share them with us----
Ambassador Boucher. Absolutely, sir.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Ambassador Boucher. A detailed development strategy for
Afghanistan, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, is being
finalized by the Government of Afghanistan. This multi-year strategy
will lay out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving
Afghanistan's development goals with the help of international
assistance. The Government of Afghanistan will present the Afghan
National Development Strategy to the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund by the end of March 2008.
The U.S. development program for Afghan National Security Forces
will increase the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan security
forces. Our goal is to have professional, capable, respected, multi-
ethnic, and sustainable security forces loyal to the Government of
Afghanistan.
With assistance from other countries, the U.S. is training and
equipping the Afghan National Army so that it will be able to assume
the lead for counterinsurgency and internal security operations. Troop
strength for the army who recently increased to approximately 80,000
soldiers, including combat forces, support forces, Air Corps,
sustaining institutions, and ministry and general staffs.
The U.S., along with other members of the international community
is training and equipping the Afghan National Police so that they will
be able to enhance public security and uphold the rule of law. The
police will number approximately 82,000, including uniformed police,
civil order police, border police, auxiliary police, and counter-
narcotics police.
However, we continue to review force size and capabilities of the
Afghan National Security Force based on requirements.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Because this has been the
consistent focus of the committee for several years. And let
me, finally, say--this is not a precise analogy, but--if, for
example, in a political campaign, you were to report to your
supporters, ``I'm making progress.'' You know, ``I'm--I've been
to Clinton County, I've touched base, and we're doing well over
here in Kokomo,'' but the--and if the final result is that you
get 25 percent of the vote and lose, three to one, this is bad
news. And all----
The Chairman. I did that. [Laughter.]
Senator Lugar. All I'm saying is that we need to have some
overall parameters of, in fact, how this is going to be a
nation that holds together, as opposed to the fact that, as you
point, you've found some progress, and we acknowledge progress;
but, at the end of the day, Afghanistan has been a very
difficult state, historically, as you know better than many in
your scholarship, and it will be extremely difficult, again, if
we really don't get it right, and we do have this opportunity
with our NATO allies now, and the focus of the world. If this
is not the moment we get it right, I pity the Afghans, because
their situation is not going to improve after the world
withdraws.
But, I thank you very much for your testimony and your
answers.
Ambassador Boucher. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Let me explain, if I may, the absence of the
Democrats. There is a Democratic caucus going on right now
relating to the combination of what the Democrats are going to
do in the Senate relative to the stimulus package, as well as
what they're going to do relative to our debate relating to
continuation of the President's program on eavesdropping. So,
that's underway now, that's the reason why they're not here. It
was called at 10 o'clock, and I--and I'd rather be here.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, gentlemen,
thank you for your time this morning.
Mr. Boucher, how long have we been in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Boucher. Since late 2001.
Senator Hagel. So, we're in our 7th year.
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah.
Senator Hagel. How much money have we invested in
Afghanistan, total--drug eradication efforts, military
operations, economic assistance? Do you have any general
number?
Ambassador Boucher. I want to make sure I get this right.
It's about $25 billion.
Senator Hagel. Well, that sounds a little light to me, on
the numbers that I had, but we'll come back to that. And I
would appreciate it if you could provide this committee, for
the record, the best numbers that you can provide, over the
last 6 years, as we are in our 7th year, in total expenditures
in Afghanistan.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Ambassador Boucher. U.S. assistance to Afghanistan from fiscal year
2001 to fiscal year 2007 is $23 billion in total. On military
operations, we have spent $86.3 billion on Operation Enduring Freedom
since 2001. Questions on the total expenditures on the International
Security Assistance Force would need to be answered by NATO.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Boucher, I believe this was your quote,
here over the last few minutes. You said, ``No one can tell me
Afghanistan is not going in the right direction.'' Now, the
panel after you will have an opportunity to express themselves
rather directly, but some of that--of what I think we will hear
in the next panel has taken some issue with your comment. And
since you, I suspect, will not be here to respond to this
panel, who--you know the individuals who will appear after you
and Mr. Johnson, you know they are highly regarded, highly
experienced, highly respected former public officials who know
something about Afghanistan and the world. And I might draw
your attention, especially in light of your comment that no one
can tell you we're not going in the right direction, to the
Washington Post story this morning. It was based on a press
conference, yesterday, held by the former Supreme Allied
Commander of NATO, incidentally--General Jones, who will follow
you. And this was a release of two studies, according to the
Post words ``strongly worded assessments of the war in
Afghanistan.'' And General Jones said this, according to the
story, ``'Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan,'
said the report by the Atlantic Council of the United States.''
Further, the quote goes, `` 'Afghanistan remains a failing
state. It can become a failed state,' warned the report.'' And,
of course, the report--both reports produced some
recommendations, which I would like to get your response to
here in a moment.
And you and Mr. Johnson, as the chairman has noted, have
expressed yourselves in--I understand, in a way that would be
expected from you. But, there's an astounding number of
contradictions about how much progress we're making. And you
have both alluded to the fact that the Taliban is losing on the
battlefield, we're making good progress on the poppy-
production-decline front, but yet, the facts just don't bear
that out. And if we're making so much progress, then why are we
putting in 3,200 more marines? Why are we to a breaking point
in NATO over this issue? Consequently, the Canadian Ambassador,
sitting in the front row, listening to this. Why is there a
great discussion among our allies about our strategy, if we
have one, what the plan is, as Senator Lugar asked you about?
So, I'm confused by the facts.
Now, again, we're going to have an opportunity to hear from
the next panel, and they will articulate, in some substance,
why they have said what they said, according to these two
reports, which I think, fairly or unfairly, take great issue
with what the two of you are telling this committee this
morning.
So, my first question is: Have you had a chance to look at
those reports? Have you had a chance to, in particular, to look
at the recommendations included in those reports? And, Mr.
Johnson, I'll be particularly interested in your response to--
one of the things they talk about is, in their words, ``a
runaway opium economy,'' which you, I think, alluded to, what--
97 or 98 percent of the world's opium is now produced as a
result of the poppy production in Afghanistan. Now, I----
Mr. Johnson. Ninety-three, but it----
Senator Hagel. Ninety-three? Well, let the record show 93.
It's a--that's very impressive, that we made that kind of
reduction. I don't see how that is progress. And especially in
light of the fact, Mr. Johnson, as the chairman noted, we
obviously don't have a coordinated policy on an eradication
effort. When you look at our continued focus on spraying, when
President Karzai, who knows something about his own country and
his own government, is opposed to that, as do most of our NATO
allies that I'm aware of--so, if I could focus, with my
remaining time, on the administration's position on these two
reports; in particular, the recommendations that were made. Do
you think there's validity in the reports? Do you think there's
merit in the recommendations? Thank you.
Mr. Boucher.
Ambassador Boucher. Senator Hagel, like you, I have
enormous respect for the people who have done these reports,
and some of them have been mentors to me over my career, so I
hesitate to contradict them in public, but I will.
I think--I've looked at these reports. They--three big
reports that came out yesterday on Afghanistan, and they're all
serious efforts. One's on agriculture, two are on the overall
situation. They're all very serious efforts and look at a lot
of different angles. I tend to disagree with the--sort of, the
general observations. Words like ``failed state''--I mean,
Afghanistan was a failed state in the nineties, it was a failed
state when we got in there in late 2001, early 2002. But, if I
plot all the points on the graphs of what's happened since
then, I'd say the trajectory is up. And, as I----
Senator Hagel. Just a correction, here. What General Jones
said, ``remains a failed state.'' He doesn't----
Ambassador Boucher. Remains a failed state.
Senator Hagel. He does take issue with what you've just
said. He said it ``remains a failed state.''
Ambassador Boucher. Well, it--I guess, you know, one can
always say--at what point do you stop being a failed state?
But, the fact is, they have capabilities, and they have
capabilities of governing, of delivering good governance,
delivering welfare and assistance to their people, and
delivering security to their people. We support them in doing
that. But, they do that in a way that they couldn't do 7 years
ago, and they can do that, increasingly, in more and more parts
of the country. And I think that's the right trajectory. So, I
tend to disagree with some of the broad observations of these
reports.
As I've started to go through the recommendations, I see a
lot of things that we're either doing, working on, or very
interested in, and I think a lot of the analysis is very
useful. But, just flipping through, you know, there's, like,
five pages of key recommendations out of the report that
Ambassador Pickering did. I see a lot of things there about
police training, about military training, about establishing
better coordination, you know, more effective justice system, a
whole lot of things--better appointments, things like that,
that we're working on, and we'll look at the details of some of
their ideas, to see if there are pieces of--ways to do this
that we haven't, maybe, adopted yet.
So, I think it's a very important effort. I know there's a
lot of useful material here. And, as I said, I disagree,
probably, more with the--some of the observations than I do
with the actual recommendations.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
May I ask Mr. Johnson to respond?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. I've, of course, focused on the
issues related to counternarcotics in these reports, and there
are some things I agree with in there, and there are some
things that I very much disagree with. One is that the--in the
discussion about the--I think, the thing--the key thing that I
do disagree with in the discussion about how to deal with
counternarcotics, there is a suggestion, maybe even you could
call it a recommendation, that we could sequence this, that we
could work on things related to alternative development, and we
could give time for alternative development to take effect, we
could put in a judicial system and a police system, and we
could mature that over time, and that then it--and we could
arrest more people, we could engage in more interdictions, and,
at some point in the indefinite future, we could do
eradication. Our experience, not just in Afghanistan, but
globally, is that that doesn't work. You have to do all of
these things at the same time. And they move at varying rates.
But, the notion that we could just avoid eradication until some
indefinite point in the future, I think, is not going to allow
us to succeed.
Where we have succeeded, as we've tried to illustrate on
the map here, is places where we could combine all of those
things. But, the key ingredient here, I believe, is security.
If you have security in an area, and--then you can have the
development and the eradication all taking place at the same
time.
One point I would take issue with you and your remarks,
about our being still focused on aerial spraying. We considered
aerial spraying. We think it has advantages. But, the essential
ingredient in a successful aerial spraying program is that the
local authorities accept it and believe it will work. We
consulted with the Afghan Government. President Karzai does not
believe it's appropriate. We've moved on to other things.
Senator Hagel. Well, I would tell you that 2 weeks ago I
had a very senior former member of the Karzai government in to
see me, and that's not what he told me. He told me exactly what
I just said. That's not the only reason I said what I did,
but--and I will--since I've not asked if I could use his name,
I will not use his name. But, you know who this individual is.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I apologize for
being late. I was at the caucus meeting on the stimulus, but
glad to be here now and welcome our witnesses, this panel and
the next.
I apologize, Mr. Secretary, I wasn't here to hear your
testimony, but I've gotten a quick update on it, and I want to
pick up where Senator Hagel left off.
I think your quote is that, ``Nobody can tell me that it's
not going in a positive direction,'' and you've just had a
little go-around with Senator Hagel about that. And I don't
want to get caught up completely in the definitions or
semantics with regard to it, but the facts on the ground--and
facts are pretty indisputable--seem to indicate, between 2001
and 2005, there were five suicide bombings in Afghanistan.
There were 77 in the first 6 months of this past year alone.
Those of us who have traveled to the region, and those of us
who have had the intelligence briefings, know that we are being
told about the rise of the Taliban, the increased ability of
the Taliban to strike, about the reconstitution of al-Qaeda,
and so forth. There is an increase in heroin trade. President
Karzai himself said to me at dinner in Kabul that he would
describe his economy as a narco economy. It's not yet a narco
state, but it's a narco economy.
So, how is it--you know, when you have the Oxfam
representatives there now reporting, quote, ``humanitarian
conditions rarely seen outside sub-Saharan Africa,'' and there
are tensions between Kabul and the governors in the regions,
the ability of the government, there is suspicion about the
government--I mean, all of the indicators that wise observers,
from, you know, Ambassador Holbrooke, General Jones, Ambassador
Abshire, others who--all of whom made reports public, right
here in this room yesterday, contradict what you're saying. So,
how do we get a baseline that's going to be accurate here, in
terms of your decisions and your choices?
Ambassador Boucher. I think it's important just to think
back a little bit before you think forward. Any snapshot is
going to show a terribly underdeveloped country with a weak
government, a raging insurgency, and an enormous poppy crop.
But, you can take that picture----
Senator Kerry. No; it's bigger----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Most anytime----
Senator Kerry. It's bigger than it was when we started.
Ambassador Boucher. I know that.
Senator Kerry. And the conditions are worse than they were
when we started.
Ambassador Boucher. I don't think that's----
Senator Kerry. We're in the opposite direction.
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Generally true.
Senator Kerry. Excuse me?
Ambassador Boucher. I don't think that's generally true.
Bombings----
Senator Kerry. You think 77 suicide bombings----
Ambassador Boucher. Bombings are horrible.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Is not worse than five in 4
years?
Ambassador Boucher. I think it is worse. There's more
bombings. But, that doesn't mean that the overall condition in
the country is worse. If you think back a year ago, what were
we talking about, what were you hearing in your intelligence
briefings? We were hearing the Taliban was going to try to take
Kandahar, we were hearing they were going to launch a major
spring offensive, we were hearing that they were going to try
to push into--they were going to try to take provinces and
occupy territory. They failed. They didn't take Kandahar, they
didn't launch an offensive, they didn't take new territory.
They've been pushed out of strongholds----
Senator Kerry. The point is, there is----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. And they've turned to----
Senator Kerry. What the reports----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Bombing.
Senator Kerry. What the report said yesterday--and it's
important to listen carefully to what is being said--is not
that it has failed, but that it is moving in the wrong
direction. It also said that the military will always win these
confrontations. There is no issue about the ability to prevent
them from taking over a Kandahar. That's not the measurement
here. We can fight this to that kind of--I mean, unless, you
know, we become, ultimately, like the Soviet Union, where our
presence doesn't produce enough economic results, that we begin
to lose the populace. But, yesterday these eminent persons
reported we still have the populace, we still have support, but
they all see and sense and are hearing reports and have
personally visited and found that it is moving in the wrong
direction and we are risking losing that support and ultimately
putting at risk our presence itself if we don't deliver on the
economic side. So, you know, would you not agree that many of
the reconstruction efforts--the water irrigation, for instance;
the water irrigation is worse today than it was when we went
in, worse than--excuse me--worse than pre-Soviets, because the
Soviets helped destroy that. But, we haven't made a lot of
progress in restoring those projects, and much of the
reconstruction is stalled.
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, I've been to Afghanistan many
times; I was there last week. I was in the east, where U.S.
forces have done a terrific job, not only of fighting, but of
building. I told the story in my opening statement, in Kunar
province, which was one of the most violent last year, they're
not talking about the number of insurgents in the Kunar Valley
now, they're talking about the number of Internet cafes and gas
stations and markets along the road that they built. They're
talking to villagers about the valleys that we can reach with
other roads. We have seen transformed situations in a number of
areas where we've been able to apply all these tools in a
coherent and consistent manner. That doesn't mean we've been
able to do it everywhere in the country; there's a lot of work
still left to do. But, I just think that if you see that kind
of progress, that's the test of whether we're achieving
anything.
You may say that Taliban's failure to win on the
battlefield is not the true measure. I would probably say their
ability to blow themselves up with suicide bombs is not the
true measure, either. I think this war is going to be won by
delivering good governance--meaning safety, justice,
opportunity, education, health--delivering that at the district
and provincial level in Afghanistan.
Senator Kerry. Well, I don't think any of us----
Ambassador Boucher. And that's the----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Disagree----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. That's the measure----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. That was--that's exactly the
measure that each of the reports laid out yesterday.
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah.
Senator Kerry. And none of us would disagree that that's
ultimately the measure. But, by that measurement, those reports
and many of us are asserting that we are not moving at the pace
and in the direction that we ought to be to achieve it. I mean,
let me just ask you, quickly, because time's about to run out--
on the Paddy Ashdown issue, obviously the Karzai government is
concerned about the national sovereignty issue and the
prospective powers of a high commissioner, but without one
entity in charge and, sort of, helping to coordinate, pull
things together, it's hard to see how you really put in place
the strategy that we need. Why did President Karzai oppose
that? And is it still under consideration, perhaps with a
different nominee?
Ambassador Boucher. Senator, I absolutely agree with you
that we need someone who can help pull this stuff together even
tighter in the international community and in Kabul. There's a
lot of very good coordination going on now, a lot of
committees, a lot of groups that meet. When I was up in
Jalalabad, the military and the antinarcotics folks were up
there, planning strategy, along with the governor and the
economic folks. So, there's a lot of good coordination going
on. But, having a single figure who can help bring together the
international community remains very important to us.
Senator Kerry. Is it still under consideration?
Ambassador Boucher. It's--we're going to have to look at
other candidates, unfortunately. Paddy Ashdown, we thought,
would have been superb man for this job. He----
Senator Kerry. Are you over the sovereignty issue?
Ambassador Boucher. I think we are. I think there were
particular--a particular hullabaloo raised in Kabul by people
that might have felt threatened by his person or his position,
but I do think we're over the basic issue of whether there
needs to be a strong international coordinator, and we're going
to do everything we can to make sure we get one.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I'd just note, if I--as I yield here, I'd
just note that it may not be a measure of whether we're winning
or losing, but three of us are heading there--Afghanistan, in--
shortly. And committee staff has come back and filed their
fourth report, and little major things--little minor things,
like you can't go outside the Embassy now without armed
escort--that's been beefed up; you can't walk places we walked
before; you can't go into certain areas without a significant--
significant military cover. That may not--in fairness, it may
go to the point that--you're right, that it may not say much
about what the total circumstance of the Afghan people are, but
it sure says what--how things have become a helluva lot more
dangerous for our personnel there than they were yesterday and
the day before and 10 days before and a year before and 2 years
before and 4 years before and 5 years before.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Senator Coleman is a little more senior
than I am, if you----
The Chairman. Oh, I'm sorry. I--sure, no, we--I thank you
for reminding me of that. I was just looking at the seating
arrangement. I apologize. It's been so long since I've been
here. [Laughter.]
Senator Coleman. And we're thrilled to have you back, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I was--I had a chance, yesterday, to be with
General Jones and Ambassador Pickering and others to review
some of the reports, and, kind of, got a mixed perspective on
this. If you look at General Jones, Atlantic Council, ``Make no
mistake, NATO is not winning. Urgent changes are required now
to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed--failing--failed
state. The mission is faltering. And yet,'' it says,
``support--international support is broad, but some of our
allies are beginning to believe the mission is false.'' So,
clearly we're in a situation now where the--there is deep
concern about the future. And, rather than look back and, you
know, try to evaluate ``failing,'' ``failed,'' whatever, we
have some real challenges, and the consequence of failure is
great. And I think that's where there's unanimity. I think
nobody disagrees with that.
One of the--where there seems to be consensus in all these
reports is in a couple of fronts, and I'd ask you gentlemen to
respond. One is--and I'm going to reflect, by the way, back on
Iraq, because I think we've learned some lessons--and, by the
way, I am one who stood with Senator Kerry to say that we need
to decouple Iraq from Afghanistan, but that's not to say--
they're both important. In other words, we've got to do Iraq
right, and we have to do Afghanistan right. And I'm not one who
believes, because we're focusing on one, that we're not doing
the other. We're a great nation, and we should be able to, you
know, walk and chew gum at the same time. We have to do both
right.
Among the challenges in Afghanistan are a few--and I'm just
wondering--the lessons of Iraq. One, clearly we're bringing in
some more Marine units now. There is a concern, and the reports
reflect this, that, you know, we came in--that we're in, light.
That's been one of the issues in Iraq that was raised, early
on. Senator McCain raised that, and others raised that. No
question that we're light in Afghanistan. We're making a
commitment. Is there any discussion among our allies to enhance
their commitment, just in terms of numbers on the military
side?
Ambassador Boucher. Senator, there is. There is discussion
among allies, and certainly discussion by us with allies. We
were talking earlier with Senator Lugar about, sort of, What
are the plans in this area? NATO has the staffing requirements;
it's just, NATO hasn't met the requirements for what needs to
be there. So, continuing to look at ways to fill that out. NATO
summit coming up in Bucharest in April.
What we found out last year when we added 3,500 U.S. troops
is, other countries pledged 3,500 to match. And we're
definitely going to use the deployment of Marines this year as
a lever to make sure we get other countries to step up,
especially on the follow-on to those Marines and to help
solidify some of the efforts in the south, particularly with
our Canadian friends.
Senator Coleman. I think the real core of the reports then
go on to note that whatever happens in the military side,
unless we transform the civil side, unless we do those things
to generate a system where there is respect for rule of law,
where there is a police force that has credibility, ultimately,
where there are jobs on the economic side, that you can't win
this on the military side. And, again, another lesson from
Iraq; if you go in now, and you walk through the joint security
stations, and you're there with these young marines, they're
like mayors, and they're dealing with security, but they're
also dealing with the economic side.
Let me focus, then, on that aspect, and starting with the
police. One of the things that was said, my last trip to Iraq,
was that we made the mistake, the first couple of years; we
tried to train the police on their own, and it didn't work. And
now, you walk in, we have either joint security stations, we
have American troops embedded, the police there, the Iraqi
security--the army forces are there, and our forces are there.
One of the reports makes a recommendation, talks about
embedding our folks with police. Give me the vision, the sense
of what we're doing on police training, understanding the
lessons from Iraq and how we're applying them to Afghanistan.
Ambassador Boucher. There's a lot of different levels of
police training. The vision of the police is to have a regular
police, and then more dedicated and specialized units, to do
that. We are--we've trained a lot, in terms of numbers. Some of
the training is very, very basic. I mean, basic training has
a--you know, they've got the track for the people who can read
and write, and a track for the people who can't read and write,
which is, like, 70 percent of the recruits. But, there's also
very--there's focused district development strategy, which will
bring police forces out of the districts, train them all
together, and put them back with mentors and trainers. And I
think--what they told me last week was, they've got mentors,
trainers, and support in 102 districts already, even though
we're only into the first few months of these focus----
Senator Coleman. But, does it represent a change? My point
is, on the one hand, we talk, in Washington, about decoupling
Iraq and Afghanistan and----
Ambassador Boucher. Please.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. I'd actually like to see a
coupling, at least in terms of lessons learned.
Ambassador Boucher. I think----
Senator Coleman. Are we transforming----
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah.
Senator Coleman. Are we changing the way we're doing it?
Recognizing that it has not--in 7 years, we have not made the
progress----
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. We need to make, and we have
learned some lessons to step it forward.
Ambassador Boucher. Last year, the big budgets we got was
to fundamentally transform the way we did police training, and
we've really done that--not only the training, but also the
deployment of policemen, the support we give them. When I was
out last week, I saw a lot of the new trucks that we've bought.
The police are now mobile, they can communicate. A lot of
things being done to give them real capabilities.
Senator Coleman. I would urge you to look at these reports.
Again, I--without the debate focusing on the broad
pronouncements, there are some recommendations in here that I
think we all should be agreeing on.
Ambassador Boucher. I agree. Yeah.
Senator Coleman. Educating government officials. If there's
no structure of local government, of folks who--you're dealing
with a society that hasn't done that. And so, now we've got an
opportunity.
Rule of law. If--no matter what success we make militarily,
if there isn't--you can't build an economy without a
fundamental, kind of, system and respect for rule of law.
So, my--walk through these recommendations. I think there's
a lot of merit, without getting into the debate of finger-
pointing, of what we didn't do, or what's failing, not failed.
Afghanistan right now is--it's--where it's in danger of
failing, there's no question. There is frustration about
progress, but it's in danger. And I think what you've got is, a
group of people have come forward with some recommendations I
think we all could embrace and increase the possibility of
success, which is in our interest. Failure--we cannot afford to
fail in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Boucher. I absolutely agree, sir. I think the
two areas you cited are probably good examples of what I've
seen in this report, so far, is that these are things we are
focused on.
Educating government officials--the United States has major
program. Last year, the push was to do more education of local
and provincial officials. The Indian government has taken on a
lot of the training that's being done for civil service and
others. There are academies being built in Kabul.
So, what I tend to look for in these reports is, go one
level deeper and see--yes, we agree with the focus and the
recommendation, we need to go one level deeper, see if they've
come up with ways of doing this, ideas about how to do this,
that supplement, complement, or are better than ours.
Senator Coleman. I appreciate that.
Ambassador Boucher. The same with rule of law, a big push
last year.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for testifying. The war in Afghanistan has been
called by many experts ``The Forgotten War.'' The report,
released yesterday, which will be discussed on the next panel,
notes just how close we are to failure in Afghanistan, and yet,
despite the clear threats emanating from the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border region in testifying before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Mike Mullen, recently said, ``In Afghanistan we do what we can,
in Iraq we do what we must.'' Is this the policy of the Bush
administration, that Afghanistan is of secondary importance to
the national security of the United States?
Ambassador Boucher. No; not that I've ever had it expressed
to me. I'm not--perhaps the admiral was talking about,
specifically, some of the military requirements. We've always
looked at what we have to do in Afghanistan to make--succeed,
militarily, as well as with assistance. We've come to the
Congress; Congress has been very generous in supporting that.
And we're always looking at what we need to do next and how
much it's going to take to do it.
Senator Feingold. Which of those two----
Ambassador Boucher. So----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Situations do you regard as
more important to our national security?
Ambassador Boucher. Iraq or Afghanistan? I think they both
are. I think----
Senator Feingold. No; I asked: Which one do you think is
more important? Surely they're not identical.
Ambassador Boucher. I would hope we can do both. I don't
see any way of----
Senator Feingold. I do, too. I'm asking you, though, which
one you think is more important, in terms of the threat.
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, I spend my--much of my day working
on Afghanistan, so I'm very much focused on Afghanistan. I find
it hard to weigh one against the other, because the problem is,
if you don't--if you don't stabilize both places, the--you'll
never stabilize either one. There would be----
Senator Feingold. I guess my comment is----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Support back and forth.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Of course you want to
succeed in each and every place, but, surely, in any endeavor,
including military and war endeavors, priorities matter. And,
in order to determine priorities, one has to determine where is
the greater concern. And so, I've tried, several times with
different people, to get an answer to this, and I've never
gotten one; I find it a little surprising, in light of the
global nature of the threat that we face.
Ambassador Boucher. Sir--I mean, which of your----
Senator Feingold. Go ahead.
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Kids do you like best?
Senator Feingold. I'm sorry?
Ambassador Boucher. Which of your kids do you like best?
You know, do you want----
Senator Feingold. Well, I think it's more----
Ambassador Boucher. Do you want----
Senator Feingold. I think it's really more----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Some of your children to
be educated----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Going to be----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Which ones----
Senator Feingold. I don't think it's as simple--I don't
think it's as simple as that. I think----
Ambassador Boucher. I----
Senator Feingold. I think it really--this is the----
Ambassador Boucher. I think----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Core question, of whether we
can get our priorities right in this country about this war.
Ambassador Boucher. Here's the way I've explained it.
Senator Feingold. These are not identical.
Ambassador Boucher. If you look at the history of 9/11 and
how that happened, ungoverned spaces are a threat to us around
the world; wherever they are, that's where the terrorists are
going to go, and they're going to plot, and they'll plan, and
they're going to come out of there and kill us. You can't
neglect any portion of the planet. And we----
Senator Feingold. That's absolutely----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Have, in the last----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Right. And in that----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. several years, taken away
those ungoverned spaces--sometimes diplomatically, sometimes
through our relations with governments, and sometimes with
military force. If we don't continue to do that in all the
remaining ungoverned spaces, there's always going to be a
threat to us.
Senator Feingold. Yeah, and if the question here was
``neglect,'' I would understand what you said, but the question
here is, in my view, is whether or not we've neglected Pakistan
and Afghanistan because of our overemphasis on Iraq. So, the
question here is relative emphasis.
I understand the Secretary of Defense has elected to send
an additional 3,200 U.S. Marines to Afghanistan. Is this
sufficient to address the full nature of the deterioration in
that country? What steps are we taking to ensure that we
address both military needs and nonmilitary priorities in
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Boucher. The 3,200 marines, about 2,200 will be
put in a maneuver unit in the south to provide additional
security for a lot of the operations there, about 1,000 will go
into training. If you look at the NATO requirements and the
other requirements, there are still shortfalls, both in
fighters, and in trainers especially. And we will try to use
this deployment of U.S. forces to leverage even more
contributions from allies, frankly.
Senator Feingold. A counterinsurgency campaign in the
border region, I don't think will be successful if it does not
have the support of the Pakistani people. How can we gain the
support of the people of Pakistan if we continue to be
associated with the current Pakistani regime, even as it
persists in resisting democratic reforms?
Ambassador Boucher. Our policy in Pakistan is very much
focused now on the elections and with working with the new
situation that will emerge after the elections. We're pushing
to try to have--try to make it as good an election as we can,
try to encourage the Pakistani Government, right up to the end,
to take steps to make it more transparent, more credible. The
new leadership will emerge. There'll be a number of elements to
work with there. But, I think, overall, we're trying to
encourage the develop--sort of, movement toward the center in
Pakistan as a base from which they can fight their own
terrorist problems.
Senator Feingold. The State Department's counterterrorism
chief, Lieutenant General Dell L. Dailey, whom I just saw
earlier this morning, has expressed, publicly, his concerns
that there are significant gaps in what the United States knows
about the threats in the Afghan-Pakistan border tribal areas.
He said, ``We don't have enough information about what's going
on there, not on al-Qaeda, not on foreign fighters, not on the
Taliban.'' I'd like to ask both of you how we can be proactive
in the region if we're not adequately informed as to what's
happening on the ground. How do you propose that we become
better informed?
Ambassador Boucher. I think there are a lot of steps being
taken so that we and our friends in Pakistan and Afghanistan
can be better informed about what's going on up there. It is
forbidding territory, it has a--administrative arrangements
going back to the colonial period that mean the government's
not fully there or fully in control, and it's difficult
territory for anybody to operate in and to understand. There
are a lot of things that go on up there that are difficult to
find out. On the other hand, we do have a pretty good idea of
what's going on up there, who's up there and what they're
doing. We do have more and more information about how they're
coming across and where they're coming across. I think, if you
ask U.S. commanders on the ground, you'll see that they've had
much more success in interdicting people that are trying to
come across the border.
They're now--the militants in that area are now fighting on
two sides. The Pakistanis are attacking them from one side, and
they get attacked when they come into Afghanistan, on the other
side. So, I think there are a lot of things we can do to
improve the capabilities to monitor the border. We're working
with the Pakistanis and Afghans to do that. We'll have a border
coordination center that opens in March of this year. There's
better military coordination going on now, and there's a lot of
things we're doing to support the Pakistanis as they start to
go after these areas with more force.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. The only thing I would add is that the longest
standing persistent assistance program we've had in Pakistan is
in the counternarcotics area, and it's been in this region. And
that, in and of itself, has given us greater visibility as to
what's going on there over a long period of time, when we had
no other assets. And that is a--I think, a very effective
program, and one that's given us some visibility we otherwise
wouldn't have had.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for your answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Who's next? Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Senator Sununu's quite polite, and I--Mr.
Chairman, thank you for having this hearing.
I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2 months ago, and I was
able to meet with President Karzai, General McNeill, General
Livingston, and a number of other people. And I think that--I
think the testimony today has been helpful. I will say that I
think we've missed a tremendous opportunity over the last
period of time, and I think there's absolutely no question that
the war in Iraq has definitely taken away from what we've been
doing in Afghanistan. I think that's beyond dispute. And, while
I might not have followed exactly Senator Feingold's line of
questioning, I think that's a indisputable fact, that we have
missed opportunities in Afghanistan because of what is
happening in Iraq.
One of the things that was recited over and over by people
there was the lack of training that we were giving the Afghani
police, and the fact that building up a police force there was
most needed. There's no question we've had gains, from the
standpoint of building the roadways, and there's no question
there's been economic activity. But, what's occurring is, we'll
create stability in an area, and then the warlords will come
back into communities and terrorize them. And while I'm
concerned about the NATO alliance, I'm concerned about, as
Senator Lugar mentioned, that the people here in our country
and their tolerance for this going on for a long time--the
people of Afghanistan are a gritty people. We don't have the
same issues there that we have in Iraq; we have a people there
that are willing to really step up and defend their country and
have a national pride there in a very different way than we
have in Iraq. And what I'm concerned about is, because of the
lack of investment that we've had there directly because of
Iraq, because of the lack of manpower that we've had there
because of Iraq, I'm concerned that we're beginning to lose the
Afghani people themselves, and I wonder if you might address
that.
Mr. Johnson. Well, in terms of police, I think the numbers
of we--police we've trained has been, actually, quite high, but
we've had significant problems in retaining them and keeping
them retrained. Part of the refocus that Richard was referring
to earlier that we've done with this program is to implement a
rank restructuring and a pay reform so that they're paid
directly, without the opportunities to skim off the top, and
that we've changed the way we've trained, and put a much
greater emphasis both on the Focused District Development
Program, where we take a group of policemen out of where they
are replace them with a highly trained group--retrain, re-form,
re-equip, put them back in.
The other thing we have done is moved away from a singular
focus on training in a training camp, ``and then you're on your
own,'' to one where the much greater focus is on post-training
mentoring. The number we have, about 600--excuse me--a little
over 500 American trainers in Afghanistan now, training police.
And by a ratio of about five to one, they are mentors in the
field with the police rather than classroom trainers. So, I
think we're making progress there, but it's--it is a--it is a
long road. It's a--this is a--this is going to take time.
Ambassador Boucher. If I can just add to that. The people
that train the police out there say it's actually more
difficult to train the policemen than the--than soldiers,
because the policemen have been used to a bad system, and
there's a lot of, sort of, reeducation and retraining, and re-
forming involved in that. But, I think, certainly from last
year, with the large appropriation we got from Congress, we
were able to go about this in a new and a different and very
much more intense way. And so, we've been doing that, I think,
rather successfully. It's a question of: Keep doing it, get the
numbers, get the focus.
Overall, the reports that we see, the polls that come out
in public, they indicate still very high levels of support for
government, for the new government. They want things from their
government. If anything, the government's failure is failure to
meet expectations. People want to know where the money goes,
they want to know where the government is, they want to know
why they haven't gotten a new set of policemen to protect them.
And--but, overwhelmingly, if you--the indications are, people
want the government, they want the government to provide them
with safety, with justice, with economic opportunity, with
health care and education. And when the government provides
that, the situation stabilizes, the poppy goes down, the
Taliban get kicked out. It's the areas where the government
can't provide that yet because they're weak, or provides it
badly because of corruption or other things, that are the
problem areas. And so, we've shown that there are places that
we have brought that kind of stuff to bear successfully, and
that's what we're trying to do much more thoroughly, in a more
concentrated fashion.
Senator Corker. I think it's more of a manpower issue, by
the way, of the police and, necessarily, financial resources.
And I know that both Livingston and McNeill were asking for at
least 3,200 troops, not to do, necessarily, what's being done
today, but to actually train policemen.
I think the issue of the tsar certainly is something that
needs to be resolved, as far as coordinating NATO resources,
and I realize that President Karzai feels, if you will,
challenged by somebody else coming in and administering those
goods and services, and maybe the loyalty issue is a problem
for him.
But, let me just ask one last thing. I know my time is
getting ready to run out. When I came here, I was somewhat
stunned by the lack of coordination and focus in Iraq. That was
a year ago. And certainly, things have changed. General
Petraeus has provided great leadership, and other things have
occurred. We are making progress in some areas in Afghanistan,
but, I have to tell you, I am stunned, again, at us not having
an overall plan, as has been alluded to in the past, and I'm
wondering if you have any sense whatsoever of a major
resurgence on our part to actually bring resources together in
a way, to bring this to an end at an appropriate time, and
transition over. I just sense we're just, sort of, moving along
at a pace, but we really just don't have a coordinated effort,
on behalf of our government and others, to really go someplace,
to call this a victory and move on.
Ambassador Boucher. We went through a major review--
strategic review--in late 2006, and that resulted in the big
effort that was made last year to increase the forces, step up
and change the nature of police training, push the government
out at the provincial and local level, build more roads; a lot
of things that we have done last year, we continue to do this
year. We're always looking at the program, we're always looking
at what we're doing and what we're achieving. Money spent
through our PRTs is particularly useful, and so, we tend to put
money--more money in there. Those kinds of things, adjustments
along the way.
But, I think there is a--you know, there are overall plans
on the economy, there are overall plans on the military side,
there are overall plans for the police, and they all come
together in this very fundamental strategy of, you know,
beating the Taliban on the battlefield and winning the war by
extending governance.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, how much was obligated last year through USAID
for all of the important programs we've been talking about?
Ambassador Boucher. We're in the range of $2 billion for
the civilian side of the effort.
Senator Sununu. On the civilian side----
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. You think you are close to $2
billion. And----
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. What are the proposed outlays
for fiscal year 2008?
Ambassador Boucher. 2008, it's--same range. I think last
year was 1.8, and this year is about 2. I now look at my
numbers--and we didn't do the totals--but, if I add up the
regular spending and supplemental, it's about $2 billion.
Senator Sununu. But, you believe it'll be close, or
slightly above, to what we did last year?
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah; slightly above, probably.
Senator Sununu. And as I look down a list I have of the
different areas--agriculture, road, power, water--you know,
there are obligations in all of these important areas, but it
begs the question, Which of these areas is the most resource-
constrained? If you had an incremental $100 million or $500
million in addition to your proposed outlays, where would you
put it?
Ambassador Boucher. I'd probably put it into electricity
and governance. I mean, if you--if you do the totals for this
year, I've got--governance is the biggest one, $493, between
the base and supplemental--$493 million. That includes $100
million to start going on the election, which will be held next
year. So, we know we need more money as we move to the
elections next year.
Senator Sununu. Is the bulk of that money, $500 million,
being used to prepare for the elections, or is----
Ambassador Boucher. No. About $100 million is for
elections, then you have the provincial justice amounts, you
have a lot of the training that was talked about, especially
officials that are going to go out at local levels, money to
support the outreach efforts of the government, the
reconciliation efforts, a lot of things like that. The overall
governance category is----
Senator Sununu. But, you would place governance and
electricity ahead of, say, police training?
Ambassador Boucher. We got--the police training is not
included in this amount. There was a big chunk of money, about
$8 billion, I think, for police and military training that came
out----
Senator Sununu. But, that's not funded through----
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Came out of last year's
budget. There's more this year, on a continuing basis, but
it's--there's money there to do what we need to do right now.
Senator Sununu. The issue with the police has been covered
in some detail. It's clear that there are very significant
problems. You seem to feel that you've changed some of the
approaches that are being taken. But, I want to try to better
understand what went wrong, because in the--after, you know,
2002 and the 2003 timeframe, as we were trying to work with the
government to deal with all of these terrible issues,
everything from governance to infrastructure and the economy
and security, I think everyone probably recognized that local
security, police force, would be an important issue. You
indicated there are 500 U.S. trainers now focused on the
police.
Ambassador Boucher. No; there's----
Senator Sununu. You----
Ambassador Boucher. It's more than that now.
Senator Sununu. You said there--well, you just--someone
just used the number of----
Ambassador Boucher. Oh.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Five hundred.
Ambassador Boucher. There's the military guys, too.
There's--I think it's 500 in your programs.
Mr. Johnson. Plus--yes.
Ambassador Boucher. And then, General Cone's found, I
think, another 800 or something----
Senator Sununu. Understood. So, we have--those are U.S.
trainers in place, obviously----
Ambassador Boucher. Yeah.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Working on the issue. It
sounds as if the United States is in a lead position, at this
point. Who was leading the effort in 2003, in 2004? And what
did they do wrong that has required us to go back and rethink
our approach to training police?
Mr. Johnson. In 2002, when we began this effort, we divided
up responsibilities among countries who would step up and do
some things. The Germans had a longstanding program which dated
back to pre-Soviet days, engagement with security in
Afghanistan. And this is a program that they began, themselves.
As they got underway, it became clear to us that it was focused
almost exclusively on training a senior officer corps, if you
will. And there was a very high demand, at that time, by the
Afghan Government, by our military, I think by any observer,
that we needed to move as rapidly as we possibly could to
provide some form of police on the streets. And, as a result of
that, rapid training programs were developed. Rapid training
programs answered the question of putting people on the street,
but things----
Senator Sununu. When was that realization?
Mr. Johnson. I'm sorry?
Senator Sununu. You said ``we realized these''----
Mr. Johnson. I think the realization became apparent during
the course of 2002----
Senator Sununu. OK.
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. As the program started.
Senator Sununu. It still begs the question, then: What was
being--if you realized that shortcoming in 2002, what were we
doing wrong in 2003 and 2004?
Mr. Johnson. I think what we were doing wrong in the long
term, but right in the short term, was giving short-term
training to people, to get them out as quickly as we possibly
could. That led, in and of itself, to retention issues, to not
having people as well trained as they should have been, but it
did answer the demand of getting people out as rapidly as we
possibly could. We're--if you--and, in a sense, recovering from
having tried to push out, possibly too fast.
Senator Sununu. On the issue of drug interdiction, I think
it's understandable that there's a--there's a potential
conflict in aerial spraying or any basic eradication, because
that's having an effect on the Afghan population on a mass
scale, at the grassroots scale, with farmers and people who are
doing the cultivating. And so, you have--run the potential of
turning those individuals against the government and against
our efforts, and it makes the--could make the security
situation worse.
But, in the documentation we have, it suggests that
targeting drug labs is still under review. Now, it would seem
to me that the lab itself is obviously a bottleneck for the
production of drugs. It's a--even a larger source of income for
Taliban or other drug lords that are benefiting from the
cultivation. There are few of them, and it would seem to make
sense that they should be a target already, in some way, shape,
or form. Why is this described as still being under review? And
if it's not under review, if it's part of your policy, how many
have you targeted over the last 12 months, how many have been
destroyed?
Mr. Johnson. Let me get you the statistics on the last
question you asked.
But, this is something that we're attempting to do. But,
you've got to bear in mind that these labs can be quite small,
so it's not a question of having, you know, a handful that
really are the bottleneck that we wish that they were. But,
the--as we discussed earlier, this is part and parcel of our
effort here, but it--we don't believe that it can--we can have
a successful program if it is exclusive of any of these
elements. And so, there has to be an element of risk to someone
planting poppy. The U.N. estimates you have to have about a 25-
percent chance before there's a real deterrent. So, we're
working, as best we can, on all of elements of this program,
not just on one.
Senator Sununu. How much money was spent on programs to
provide alternative sources of income, alternative crops, crop
substitution, to deal with--or try to reduce the preponderance
of poppy-growing?
Mr. Johnson. Directly related to poppy and exclusive of
other development programs, $200 million.
Senator Sununu. So, $200 million, compared to how much
spent on the interdiction and eradication effort?
Mr. Johnson. On interdiction, which includes funding to
support the Drug Enforcement Administration, $350 million; on
eradication, $166 million.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony.
Our next panel is a very distinguished panel: General James
Jones, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), former Commander, European
Command, and Supreme Allied Commander of Europe; The Honorable
Thomas Pickering, former Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
the Department of State; The Honorable Richard Holbrooke,
former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for being here.
I know you have extremely busy schedules, but your continued
service to this committee and to the country is very much
appreciated.
Why don't we begin in the order in which you were called:
General Jones, Ambassador Pickering, and Ambassador Holbrooke.
General, it's all yours.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.), FORMER
COMMANDER, EUROPEAN COMMAND, AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
EUROPE, McLEAN, VA
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, it's a great pleasure to be
here today in front of this committee. I last had the honor of
appearing here in March of 2007 on the same subject, and so,
it's a great pleasure to be able to spend some time with you
this morning, and with my colleagues at this table.
I had the privilege of participating in two--the formation
of two reports that, by coincidence, were released
simultaneously yesterday. I won't go over the details; you have
the reports in front of you. So, I will just--with your
permission, just make a few short opening remarks.
It's been my experience and my observation that what is
happening in Afghanistan is a loss of momentum, in terms of the
kind of progress that, not only the Afghan people expected to
see and witness and to feel, but also as a result of an
inability of the tremendous international effort to coordinate
itself in a way to do what I believe is the top two, three, or
four things that absolutely have to be done.
This is not a new position on my part. I said it when I
left NATO in 2006. I said it in testimony in 2007. I continue
to believe it to be true in 2008. And I think that if there is
good news, the good news is that we can be successful in
Afghanistan, but the loss of international momentum, in terms
of addressing the issues of narcotics, which permeates the
society, corrupts a generation of Afghans, prevents the
legitimate growth of economic reform, and, perhaps more
insidiously, funds the insurgency by virtue of the tremendous
revenues that they're able to generate. And it certainly
prevents the influence of the government from expanding.
Second belief of mine is that judicial reform is--if it's
made any progress, it's barely discernible, and I don't
understand how you can not more--have achieved comprehensive
judicial reform, given the challenge of narcotics and the
challenge of a corrupt society and criminal activity.
The third is police reform, which is neither adequate in
quality or quantity.
And the three--these three things are completely
interrelated, because you need all three if you're going to
attack the narcotics problem. If you don't have a police that's
able to secure the countryside and prevent the insurgents from
threatening families and killing--killings in the middle of the
night to intimidate the farmers to grow the crop, if you don't
have a judicial system that can prosecute effectively, then you
don't have--you just don't have the incentives for a
comprehensive attack on narcotics.
I would say that a fourth concern of mine has to do with
having the international community hold the government to some
metrics, in terms of performance. And I think judicial reform
is probably one that I would highlight as imminently possible
for an elected government to begin to try to achieve and to
make it a priority. When I left, in December 2006, it was still
high on my list of one of the things that we ought to
encourage, and I think it's still pretty much that way in 2008.
And last, of course, the deteriorating situation in
Pakistan, a neighboring state, leads me to conclude that this
is now a regional problem. You can't simply just talk about
Afghanistan in isolation of the regional nature. So, regional
problems demand regional solutions and a strategic sense of
where we're going.
I'm extremely proud of the fact that NATO accepted to be
engaged. I think there has been progress on the ground in
Afghanistan, but I worry about a loss of momentum, I worry
about the fact that the safe havens for the insurgents are more
numerous now than they were 1 or 2 or 3 years ago, and that the
resurgence of the Taliban is a result of our inability to
address three or four problems in a way that focuses the
tremendous amount of resources, and manpower towards those
things that we absolutely have to be done--that absolutely have
to be done, and done well, if we are to succeed in the long
term.
I said yesterday at the rollout of our studies, that I was
very disappointed--and I think many others are as well, that
the government refused to permit Lord Ashdown to be the
international representative. I know Lord Ashdown, personally.
I worked with him in Bosnia. He did a masterful job. He is the
kind of leader that could coalesce and focus the international
effort and better account for the monies that are expended, and
hold the government, that he--that we all want to see succeed,
to some metrics and standards that would allow them to make
some discernible progress, instead of just gradually losing
momentum and running the risk of backsliding, which is where I
think we are now in terms of those three or four things that I
mentioned.
Our two reports agree on several lines of action. One is
the need for swift completion of the Afghan assessments. We
continue to believe the appointment of a high commissioner to
work with the Karzai government to coordinate and integrate
assistance is critically important. We need a comprehensive
counternarcotics effort, improved training for the Afghan
national police force, emphasis on effective governance, the
creation of a credible Afghan judicial system, and improved
development and more focused development assistance.
Mr. Chairman, I'll stop with those brief remarks, and we
stand ready to answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Secretary Pickering.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS PICKERING, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar. It's an honor to be here, and thank you for the
opportunity to be with you.
There is no mistaking it, I think that we are, perhaps, in
a timely period, or maybe even, Senator, to coin a phrase, a
post-timely period, to be considering Afghanistan at these
hearings this morning, in light of the reports. There's no
question, too, that this situation, certainly in my humble
view, rivals the situation we faced as the Iraq Study Group got
its materials together and put those out. I hope that
reactions, in terms of doing something about this, can and will
come out of this effort that you're holding.
I briefly want to summarize my testimony, which attempts to
point up both the critical nature of our assessment of the
situation in Afghanistan, a little bit unlike what we have just
heard, and, at the same time, I want to highlight a few of the
key recommendations from the Afghan Study Group report.
We say Afghan is--Afghanistan is at a critical crossroads.
That may be an understatement. Six years of progress is under
serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international
resolve, mounting regional challenges, and a growing lack of
confidence on the part of the people in the country. The United
States and the international community have tried to win the
struggle with, in our view, too few military, insufficient
economic aid, and without a clear and consistent strategy. We
now have to deal with a reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda,
both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a runaway opium economy
and severe poverty faced by most Afghans.
General Jones has just pointed out why this is so
critically important for us. It's a national security issue.
Collapse in Afghanistan would certainly move what is already a
rampant drug culture into higher gear. We certainly would have
a serious blow to our alliance in NATO, which would be
difficult to recover from. As you know, this has been the
deadliest year for U.S. and coalition troops since 2001. We've
just heard that training is lagging, that counternarcotics
efforts, judicial and penal reform are not--if taking place,
taking place only at a very slow pace.
There are many detailed questions that I don't want to go
into, but I do want to focus just a few statements on the issue
of what to do and how we are dealing with narcotics.
2006--that's a year ago--showed a spread of cultivation by
at least 30 percent in the acreage involved. And you,
yourselves, have understood the output tonnage and how little
we have been able to deal with that. The figure of 93 percent
of world-available heroin is, I think, a clear statement of the
tremendous difficulties.
We believe that attacking this problem has to be a closely
linked effort, but you cannot do it by eradication alone. You
have to establish a predicate for popular support. And, indeed,
I would say, in Afghanistan, we have to continue to do
everything we can to encourage Afghan leads in dealing with
these particularly difficult and taxing problems.
I think that, as General Jones has just pointed--and I
think we all agree--Afghanistan can no longer be considered as
a kind of island state in the middle of nowhere. It is, in
fact, deeply linked with what goes on around it, and
particularly with what is happening in Pakistan. And, as we
have seen, that porous and ungoverned border region is a source
of continued difficulty, that there is no question at all that
Pakistan itself has serious problems in coming to grips with
governing that piece of its own territory, and it has been a
historical legacy that has not been--in my view, certainly--
dealt with in the way it needs to be done.
We believe, overall, that the effort to come together on an
assessment and a strategy for Afghanistan is way overdue. We
have proposed that, if this is not accomplished rapidly by the
United States and its friends, that perhaps NATO could take the
lead in appointing an eminent-persons groups that can bring
together Afghans, our partners, and ourselves around a
strategy. And you, yourselves, have felt the need, in your own
questioning, for having a clear strategic view ahead.
Second, we felt, as an overarching proposition, we needed
to find a way to decouple in the work of the legislative
branch, in executive branch consideration, particularly in
budgets, and maybe in the minds of the American people, Iraq,
and Afghanistan. There are similar problems, but there are
different solutions.
There are clearly both urgent and emergent priorities that
have to be dealt with. And we've seen some resonance in
members' questionings already of this particular issue. I think
it is important. It needs careful consideration, but it is
significant.
And then, finally, within our own Government, we have felt,
for some time, we need a key person to move it ahead. We need
an American Paddy Ashdown, if I could put it that way, someone
who can help pull all of these pieces together. If there is
anything that has impressed me in Afghanistan, it is the number
of programs that are moving in different channels at different
paces in, seemingly, an uncoordinated way. When you asked a
question, a minute ago, we had to go and compare General X's
police trainers with Department Y's police trainers to come up
with the total figure. Well, you know, it doesn't work that way
in the need to have a unified effort.
I spent a lot of my life dealing with last decade's
problems in El Salvador and Colombia. Still not dealt with.
But, they indicated to me that we needed, to the extent that we
possibly could get it, a unified effort.
Our report, and its accompanying reports, are all four-
square on the same ideas. We have 40 or 50 integrated,
collected recommendations. They're part of a synergy. I'm not
going into them in detail. We commend them to your reading. We
think they provide a strong basis for going ahead, and we thank
you, again, for the opportunity to put this material before
you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas R. Pickering, Former Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear
before you today to address one of the most pressing and emergent
issues we face as a nation--one which for too long has been hidden by
our focus and concentration on other issues in the region and beyond.
In recognition of the growing crisis in Afghanistan, three major
American organizations each carried out independent studies of what was
happening and what needs to be done to deal with the problems. It is no
accident that the issue is so exigent, that when the three
organizations gathered to discuss their reports, they immediately
agreed to issue their reports together and to join forces in their
presentations. That was done yesterday afternoon.
Today's hearing gives me a chance to highlight aspects of the
report I had the welcome pleasure of cochairing with General James
Jones, former NATO SACEUR and U.S. Combatant Commander in Europe. He
joins me on the panel today and will present his own views on the
report and its salient features.
My task is a simple one. In order to highlight the urgency and the
importance of the issue I want to present to you a summary of the
report's key conclusions on what is happening now, as we meet, in
Afghanistan. Second, I want to provide you with the most important
recommendations of a distinguished group of panel members each one of
whom has had extensive experience in Afghanistan and the region. I
don't claim special knowledge or experience in Afghanistan and have
relied heavily on the team's expertise to make and justify our
conclusions and recommendations. I have drawn heavily on the language
of the report to assure that their conclusions are concisely and
crisply conveyed to you.
assessment
Afghanistan is at a critical crossroads. Six years of progress is
under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international
resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence
on the part of the Afghan people.
The United States and the international community have tried to win
the struggle with too few military, insufficient economic aid, and
without a clear and consistent strategy. We must now deal with
reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
a runaway opium economy and the severe poverty faced by most Afghans.
Why is this so important to us?
In the words of our report, success in Afghanistan is a critical
national security imperative. Failure means new threats from the
Taliban and al-Qaeda from a renewed sanctuary for them in Afghanistan
to the detriment of our interests in the region and at home.
Internationally, we are seeing a weakening of resolve among our
friends and partners. Polls show public attitudes are divided on
bringing troops from their countries home immediately or remaining
until the country is stabilized. In all but the U.S. and the U.K.
majorities called for withdrawal as soon as possible.
It is clear that there is a lack of an overall, overarching
strategic vision to reinvigorate the effort to attain unified,
reachable goals.
This year has been the deadliest for U.S. and coalition troops
since the invasion of 2001.
The most immediate threat is from the antigovernment insurgency
that has grown significantly in the last 2 years. Attacks against
Afghan military and police forces have also surged. Some success has
been achieved in targeting Taliban leadership, but significant areas of
Afghanistan, particularly in the south have been lost to friendly
control.
Some of our allies believe the mission is failing and several NATO
members are wavering in their troop commitments, offsetting the strong
involvement of Britain, Denmark, Poland, Canada, Australia, and the
Netherlands among others.
A failure of NATO in Afghanistan would damage the future of the
organization itself.
Realizing an Afghanistan that is stable and secure and free of
influence from radical, Islamic forces is a core objective. Taliban and
al-Qaeda maintain close links.
There is an acute need for international coordination on both the
military and civilian side. Separate military commands with some
overlapping missions complicate the process as does the lack of a
senior civilian leader. The recent inability to appoint Lord Paddy
Ashdown of the United Kingdom (U.K.) as a result of objections from the
Karzai government means we are back to square one in trying to find a
solution to that critical issue.
Military and especially police training are lagging as are
counternarcotics efforts and judicial and penal reform.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) fielded by many governments
have separate reporting channels back to their capitals and there is no
unified field theory on how they should operate, be coordinated, or
accomplish their missions.
A recent report in the Washington Post concluded that: ``While the
(U.S.) military finds success in a virtually unbroken line of tactical
achievements, (U.S.) intelligence officials worry about a looming
strategic failure.''
Six years after the fall of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan
the country is still facing a fundamental crisis of governance. Without
an honest, sustainable government there can be little effective
development and even less political legitimacy. The country has ``a
stunning dearth of human capital'' and a number of leaders, often in
the provinces, are considered to be serial human rights abusers by much
of the population. This shakes confidence in the rule of law and
democracy and overall governance in critical ways. Underpaid civil
servants are asked to undertake dangerous counternarcotics missions and
easily fall prey to bribery and corruption in return.
The public looks to the government not only for housing and health
care, roads and schools, but just as much, if not more, for security
and justice. At present the government cannot do this and this leads
neighbors, aid donors, and troop contributors to hedge their bets.
Former U.S. Commander, LTG Karl Eikenberry, has said the greatest
long-term threat is not the resurgence of the Taliban but ``the
potential irretrievable loss of the Government of Afghanistan.''
Equally, if not more disturbing are important findings from 2006
showing the spread of narcotics cultivation from 165,000 hectares to
193,000; more land than is under coca cultivation than in Latin
America. And while some key provinces in the north and center are being
reported as opium free, those provinces continue to profit handsomely
from drug trafficking.
Extensive receipts from this activity, ``drug money'' weakens key
institutions and fuels and strengthens the Taliban, while at the same
time corrupting the country's governmental leadership.
There are serious disputes about how best to deal with the drug
economy. Some want large, scale aerial eradication with the potential
for serious, disruptive impacts on rural Afghans and their livelihood.
Others are counseling more gradual but more complete approaches seeking
to find crop substitutes and other supports for the 90 percent of
Afghans who have said they are willing to abandon poppy cultivation if
they can count on earning half as much from legal activities.
Closely linked, but also independently important for Afghanistan's
future, are questions of development and reconstruction. It is the
second lowest country on the U.N.'s human development index for 2007-
08. Life expectancy is short, infant mortality high, and access to
clean water and health services severely limited. Nevertheless there
are some positive economic indicators--8.7 percent growth (against a
small base), low inflation, a stable currency against the dollar and
significant foreign exchange reserves. Refugees are returning,
agricultural output is up, and roads are being repaired and rebuilt to
the rural areas.
The lack of security has disrupted trade, communications, transport
and the energy infrastructure.
Even after 6 years, foreign assistance amounts are hard to tabulate
and coordination is weak. School populations have boomed particularly
among girls and efforts are being made to fund primary health care.
While some experts say it is an exaggeration, claims that only 10
percent of assistance gets to Afghans are worthy of attention and a
correction of these faults is badly needed.
Finally, Afghanistan can no longer be considered as an isolated
state to be dealt with on its own. It is vulnerable as never before to
external pressure and what goes on, especially in the Pakistan border
region, is critical to success or failure. Kabul needs better relations
with its neighbors, especially coordination with Pakistan and a
commitment on the part of Pakistan to deal with its own tribal areas
FATA, something that is particularly challenging and elusive and has
been over the history of modern Pakistan.
With all of these difficulties there is clear reason why we call
attention to the need to improve and make more strategic and effective
our support for Afghanistan. It is a state poised for a slide. Our
ability to provide the help and support needed to make a difference
remains a key factor. And for that purpose, I want to provide from our
report a key list of major recommendations. The report itself should be
consulted for the full list which is put together with the objective of
forming a coherent and collective whole.
The recommendations are divided, into three overarching
recommendations and six groups--international coordination, security,
governance and the rule of law, counternarcotics, economic development
and reconstruction, and Afghanistan and its neighbors.
i--overarching recommendations
--Create an Eminent Person Group from among our allies and partners to
put together a long-term coherent strategy.
--Decouple legislative and executive branch consideration of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
--Develop a unified management structure led by a Special Envoy to
Afghanistan to coordinate and lead all aspects of U.S. policy and
implementation.
ii--key issue recommendations
1. International coordination
--Work to consolidate the command structure, missions and rules of
engagement to simplify and clarify lines of authority and strategic
objectives.
--NATO needs to review its command and control arrangements to simplify
and streamline them.
--Appoint a high-level civilian coordinator under U.N. mandate to work
closely with the Afghan Government and to oversee the full range of
activities including contacts with regional governments.
--Develop an agreed concept of operations, goals, and objectives.
2. Security
--Increase the number of NATO troops and match quantity with quality.
--Focus more efforts on the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA)
and provide training, adequate pay, and equipment to the Afghan
National Police (ANP) so they can maintain security once coalition
forces depart.
--Increase the U.S. role in rebuilding the ANP.
--Work to reduce civilian casualties with a goal of ``zero civilian
casualties.''
--Better integrate Afghan forces in U.S. and NATO planning and
operations.
--Develop with the international community a coordinated strategy in
support of President Karzai's political reconciliation efforts.
--Create a regional plan to target risks coming out of the border with
Pakistan involving both the Afghan and Pakistan Governments and
work with Pakistan to get it more closely to incorporate FATA into
Pakistan.
3. Governance and rule of law
--A coherent and resourced strategy to increase the reach, capacity,
and legitimacy of the Afghan Government should be a top priority.
--Refocus efforts to develop an integrated and effective judicial
system.
--Develop governmental pockets of competence in the country, bringing
together the judiciary, justice and prosecutorial, and police
functions.
4. Counternarcotics
--Build and sequence the introduction and use of the core tools of
counternarcotics--crop eradication, interdiction (arrests and
prosecutions), and economic development.
--Increase investment in development--infrastructure and industry.
--Enhance interdiction efforts.
--In lieu of massive eradication adopt an ``Afghan centric'' approach,
including public information campaigns, voluntary restraint, full
delivery of announced programs for alternative livelihood, and
provision of all the services for alternative crops now provided by
drug traffickers--(agricultural extension, futures contracts,
guaranteed marketing, financing and micro finance).
--Beware of negative effect of large scale eradication without careful
support mechanisms and programs on support for the government and
its programs.
5. Economic development and reconstruction
--The Afghan Government should get more credit for development and it
needs help to improve its accounting and anti-corruption defenses.
--Get Afghans to appoint an Afghan development czar.
--Spread development more evenly around the country.
--Follow up quickly clearance of Taliban forces from provinces with
development assistance.
--Enhance infrastructure development.
6. Afghanistan and its neighbors
--Embark on a sustained and long-term effort to reduce antagonisms
between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the goals of rooting out
support for the Taliban and its ideology, closing down extremist
madrassehs and training camps and encouraging a relaxation of
Pakistani restrictions on the transport of goods to Afghanistan.
The Afghans should continue to be urged to accept the Durand Line
as its border with Pakistan.
--Pakistan needs to be encouraged to regain physical control in the
FATA.
--An effort needs to be made to resume conversations with Iran to coax
out greater cooperation in helping to stabilize Afghanistan.
--A regional peace process should be developed, beginning with
confidence-building measures, with the eventual goal for
Afghanistan becoming a neutral state protected by commitments
against interference in its internal affairs, clandestine weapons
supply and a comprehensive regime to support the flow of trade.
conclusion
This is a critically important tissue for this administration in
the United States and for the next. There are many problems. Among the
most important are governance and the building of Afghan capacity in
all areas, drug cultivation, security in the border areas, and
cooperation among our allies.
The urgency is real. The problems can be dealt with. It will
require new and enlarged efforts by this committee and the legislative
and executive branches working together.
______
``Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies''--Afghanistan
Study Group Report by the Center for the Study of the Presidency
This bipartisan group, established in spring 2007, and cochaired by
General James L. Jones (ret.) and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering,
consisted of policy experts and former government officials.
The report asserts that the United States and the international
community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few
military forces, insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and
consistent comprehensive strategy to fill the power vacuum outside
Kabul and counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and
al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy,
and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans.
Achieving success in Afghanistan will require a sustained,
multiyear commitment to make the war in Afghanistan--and its
reconstruction--a higher U.S. foreign policy priority. Although
substantial obstacles remain, the strategic consequences of failure in
Afghanistan would be severe for long-term U.S. interests in the region
and for security at home. Therefore, the ``light footprint'' in
Afghanistan needs to be replaced with the ``right footprint'' by the
U.S. and its allies. It is time to revitalize our efforts and rethink
our strategies to stabilize Afghanistan to ensure our commitment level
is commensurate with the threat posed by possible failure in
Afghanistan.
The Report Calls For:
Decoupling Iraq and Afghanistan in the U.S. legislative
process and in the management of these conflicts in the
executive branch.
Appointing a U.S. government Special Envoy to Afghanistan.
Establishing an Eminent Persons Group that would develop a
long-term, coherent, international strategy for Afghanistan in
coordination with the Afghan Government.
Some of the Afghanistan Study Group's other recommendations include:
Appoint a high level international coordinator under a U.N.
mandate.
Set up a NATO compensation fund for civilian deaths,
injuries or property damage resulting from its military
operations.
Develop a coordinated strategy in support of President
Karzai's national reconciliation efforts.
Create a regional plan to effectively target the risks
coming out of the border area with Pakistan.
Sequence the core tools of counternarcotics policy and
integrate counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations
where appropriate.
Increase and accelerate investment in development--
especially infrastructure and industry development--in all
provinces. Encourage the Afghan Government to appoint an Afghan
development ``czar.''
Initiate a regional process to engage Afghanistan's
neighbors (including Iran) and other potential regional
partners in the future sustainable development of Afghanistan.
[Highlights from the Jan. 30, 2008, report is available at
www.thePresidency.org.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Holbrooke.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's such a
great pleasure to appear before you and your colleagues again,
and especially on this issue.
In order to be brief, let me just say, for the record, I
agree with everything that General Jones and Tom Pickering have
said, and I want to just add a few points, in highlight, and
make a couple of suggestions.
The importance of the issue is undeniable, and this
committee deserves great credit for keeping it in the
forefront, but I would suggest, even further, Mr. Chairman, we
are going to be in Afghanistan long after Iraq is over. This is
a long-term commitment. It may even turn out--it may even turn
out that, in the long-term, Afghanistan is more important than
Afghanistan. Tom Pickering already alluded to the fact that
Afghanistan and Pakistan are essentially one strategic unit,
and I strongly endorse that view. And, for that reason, and
because it is the area from which 9/11 was planned and from
which future attacks against the United States are undoubtedly
being planned today, it deserves the longest possible
examination. And I hope that any legislation you put forward in
the future will impose on the previous witnesses, and the
administration that they represent, the kind of metrics that
General Jones talked about, because that was a very
nonresponsive set of testimony that we heard today to your very
deep questions.
Now, on the--I would just make one other point on this. If
you see ``Charlie Wilson's War''--and I know many of you know
Charlie Wilson personally, as we all do--it's an entertaining
film, and I'm not going to judge the details of it here, but
the core point of the film, unstated, is what happened when the
film ends, which is that, after the Soviets left Afghanistan,
the United States turned its back on it, in the spring of 1989,
leading to the Taliban.
We can't walk out. We are going to be in Afghanistan as
long as those people in this room in front of us, and we, are
involved in public service. And the American public should
recognize that. This is not a partisan issue. It is not part of
the Presidential campaign, as Iran and Iraq are.
And I was very disappointed in the previous witnesses,
because they challenged your assertions and did not recognize
the merit of this extraordinarily important report that General
Jones and Ambassador Pickering and others issued yesterday in
conjunction with this hearing. That report deserves attention,
and, for the State Department officials to refute the assertion
that things are not going well in Afghanistan, which they did,
explicitly, today, was, to my mind, incomprehensible.
To be sure, the situation in Afghanistan is better today
than it was in 2001, when Afghanistan was living through what
its people called ``The Black Years,'' but it is not better
than it was 2 or 3 years ago, and the administration's spin
this morning reminded me, not only of Iraq, which you, Senator
Biden, referred to, but of a more distant war in the last
century, in southeast Asia, where witnesses sat before this
committee and tried to present evidence that Vietnam was going
well, when, quite honestly--and you have two veterans of that
war before you today--it was not going as well as they said.
Now, I want to stress that we can succeed in Afghanistan,
we must succeed in Afghanistan, but success will not be defined
by getting out and leaving it a viable country in the
foreseeable future. That's just not an--that's not a likely
outcome. And the American public must be ready to recognize
that, as I know all of you before us today have.
We can succeed. The vast majority of Afghans that I have
talked to do not wish to see a return to what they call ``The
Black Years,'' and that's especially true of the women of
Afghanistan, who live in mortal terror of the return of the
Taliban, for reasons that we all understand.
I first visited the country in 1971, and drove throughout
the country when it was a different place; and to see what
it's--what it looks like today on my recent trip is
heartbreaking.
Now, there are three key problems, to me. I would identify
the top three problems, out of dozens, Mr. Chairman.
No. 1, the border. I would submit to you that it is not
possible for us to achieve success while Waziristan and the
northwest frontier tribal areas are safe rest/recuperation/
training areas for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And we need to
address that problem. It--you all know this, but the
administration has never put enough attention to this problem.
President Bush did have one well-publicized dinner between
Presidents Karzai and Musharraf, but there was no followup.
The second problem is drugs, and the third is police. With
your permission, I would like to focus on the drug problem
briefly.
With all respect to David Johnson, who I've worked with
closely in previous administrations, and who I think is an
excellent career diplomat, I must submit to you my own view
that we, or you, are authorizing, and then the administration
is spending, American taxpayer dollars to strengthen America's
enemies. I see no other way to interpret what's happened. Each
year we spend, in a difficult-to-determine amount of money,
which is probably around a billion dollars, on our drug
program. And, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, each year the
amount of opium that's produced increases. Furthermore, as you
pointed out, the drug lords are known. And if you walk around
the streets of Kabul--although you pointed out, correctly, that
walking around now is much more difficult than it used to be--
if you walk through the streets of Kabul, you will see very
large houses, and you ask--new modern houses--you say, ``Who's
that?'' they say, ``That's the drug lord's house.'' Everybody
knows who they are. And the testimony you heard, previously,
denied the fact that--and it troubled me, because--How can we
fix a problem if the people in charge of fixing it don't seem
to admit it exists? We are strengthening America's enemies by
destroying crops in the insecure areas.
Now, the previous witnesses referred to Jalalabad and that
area in the north, where there has been an improvement in
security, and there has been a reduction of drug production;
although, let us be precise, they're also switching from
heroin--from opium to marijuana, because the crop blends in
with the scenery better. It is Helmand, in the south, around
Kandahar, which is the issue. And in that area, bordering the--
bordering Pakistan, heavily insecure, that we find an insoluble
problem with the present methodology. I do not believe that
destroying crops in insecure areas can possibly work as the
priority.
The report that General Jones and Ambassador Pickering have
produced talks about sequencing. The previous witnesses
attacked and questioned that. I think they should explain what
they meant, because their version of sequencing is precisely
the correct approach. We can't destroy crops when there's no
alternative-livelihood program, when there are no roads, and
when we are driving farmers into the hands of the Taliban while
enriching the drug lords. John Lee Anderson's article in The
New Yorker portrayed vividly what happened when he went out on
a drug eradication--on a poppy eradication program, and they
only destroyed the crop on the left side of the road, because
the right side was a landlord and a tribe that they wanted to
protect.
So, I would urge you, Mr. Chairman, to continue these
hearings and keep pushing. And I--with all respect, I hope you
will not accept what you heard in the previous testimony,
because it is--it is a formula for another hearing like this in
6 or 12 months, when the situation will be still worse.
I will stop there, Mr. Chairman, but I appreciate the
opportunity to join you today.
The Chairman. Thank all of you for being here.
A couple of us went into Afghanistan, the January after the
Taliban fell, and--with Secretary Rumsfeld trying to keep us
out. It's amazing how he didn't know there are three branches
of government, and he got confused. And, anyway, we spent some
time in there--4 days--and I had a--this is directed to you,
General--and we met with--I think it was a British two-star,
wasn't it? I can't recall. I think it was a British two-star
who was in western Kabul and went over, had--I think we had a
meeting with him. We spent some time with him. And I asked a
question of him at that time--this is 2002. I said, ``General,
how long is your Parliament going to let you stay here in
Afghanistan?'' And he said, ``Senator, we Brits have an
expression.'' He said, ``As long as the big dog's in the pen,
the small dogs will stay. When the big dog leaves, the small
dogs will leave.''
Well, it seems to me part of the problem is, the big dog
left and put all its focus on Iraq. I don't want to get into an
argument about whether Iraq's right, wrong, or indifferent, but
the bottom line was, when we came back, I issued--well, not a
report, but a--well, I guess it was a report, actually--that
then-Secretary of State Powell agreed with, and he led the
fight within the administration, as you may recall, to increase
resources and military assets in Afghanistan at that time, and
he lost that bureaucratic battle with, I assume, Rumsfeld and
Cheney. I don't know, but I--that's the obvious assumption. And
it seems to me everything's, kind of, gone downhill from there.
And I've noticed a phrase all three of you used, or some
version of the phrase, that, you know, international resolve is
waning.
Which leads me--there's a point to this--which leads me to
Pakistan. I would argue that, in 2002, we had a real
opportunity to--with Musharraf--to actually get a little more
robust cooperation in dealing with Waziristan. And I think he
saw the big dog leaving, as well, and I think he made his deal,
essentially; I don't want to overstate it. But, he made his
deal, which was, basically, let--``You leave me alone in
Islamabad, and I'll leave you alone in the provinces.''
Which leads me to this point. Most Americans think we're in
Afghanistan, fighting al-Qaeda. They could give a damn about
the Taliban, if you really got down to it. We all know that you
should be very concerned about the Taliban. But, they could
give a damn about the Taliban, because they don't think the
Taliban got in planes and came over and attacked the United
States, they think the Taliban did what they did, they gave
refuge and comfort and support to al-Qaeda.
Now, I ask the question, which I can't respond to today,
by--I can't tell you the answer in public, but you will know
it--of the intelligence community, about the relative role of
the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and how that mix works.
Which leads me to my question. If Ambassador Holbrooke is
correct that ultimate success--``success,'' meaning a stable
Afghanistan over a long period of time emerging, not unlike our
commitment we made to Korea, not unlike commitments we--long-
term commitments we've made in the past that worked--how much
of the ability to deal with the border relates to the ability
to deal with Pakistan and the ISI, and how much of that relates
to al-Qaeda? Make--if you can talk to me about, if there's a
distinction--I think there is--but where the focus, you know,
should be, in terms of that border.
And I would conclude by saying, I would suggest that if we
took out the entire--all of al-Qaeda--if the Lord came down and
said, ``There's not a single member of al-Qaeda left alive and
breathing on the Earth,'' we still have a real big problem with
the Taliban. And, conversely, if the Taliban were gone, you
still have a problem with al-Qaeda. Talk to me about the nexus
between al-Qaeda, Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, if you
would. Anyone.
General Jones. What I can talk about is the fact that, as
NATO commander, my relationship with Pakistan really occurred
in the last 6 months of my tour, just as I was leaving NATO.
So, I only had the opportunity to visit Islamabad twice and
host the Pakistani military at NATO one time. This was right at
the time when we were beginning to witness the failure of the
deal that was struck with the tribal regions to live and let
live, on the false notion that they would honor their side of
the deal, which is to say, respect the borders and cease and
desist, which they didn't do.
In my last meeting with a senior Pakistani official, I told
him that the next few months would probably show that this is
not going to work, and the problem is going to get worse and
not better. And it's exactly what happened.
I think that there are a couple of things that were going
on in 2004 and 2005. It was called a Tripartite Commission,
where the United States, Afghan, and Pakistan militaries
regularly met to discuss the situation. When NATO came in and
took over the responsibility for security and stability in
Afghanistan, NATO became a member of the Tripartite Commission,
as well. So, there is an ongoing relationship.
I think, whatever the future holds, that part of the region
is going to be a central point if we're going to achieve any
success, and we simply have to make sure that we do it well.
One last point. My observation during my 4 years there was
that the Taliban was certainly potentially more numerous; al-
Qaeda, for a while, was an afterthought in 2002-2003. Both have
shown a propensity to recover from the defeats that were--that
they experienced, and simply because we haven't addressed the
issue of safe havens and border transit.
The Chairman. Anyone else?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, I think that the
problem with that border area is one of the toughest on Earth,
so there's no easy solution. In General Jones's and Ambassador
Pickering's report, they have a very good suggestion, which
relates directly to your question, and which, as far as I know,
has received no attention in the administration. First, an all-
out effort to get the Afghan Government and the Pakistani
Government to agree on the international border. As you well
know, the Durand Line, in the 19th-century British legacy, has
never been fully accepted. Second----
The Chairman. The recommendation is for the Afghanis to
accept the Durand Line.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yeah, the--they specifically
recommend the Afghans accept the Durand Line, but in the real
world anything the two countries agree on ought to be fine to
the United States. The Durand Line is a--is, I feel, a starting
point for negotiation. I don't know every detail of it; no one
does, anymore. There is--they also suggest an--a major
international conference--they use the precedent of the
Congress of Vienna, in 1815, which fixed Swiss neutrality, and
it's held for 200 years--to agree on neutrality for
Afghanistan. They also point out that Iran must be part of the
solution of Afghanistan.
Now, I was in Herat, a year ago. The Iranian influence in
Herat is crystal clear, and Herat is relatively stable, because
the Iranians don't want problems there. They have other
problems--drugs are crossing the border, and the Iranians want
to gain economic hegemony. But, like with Iraq, a point you
have made many times, you can't fix the problems of Iran--I
mean, excuse me, Iraq and Afghanistan without a buy-in from the
neighbors, no matter how they are.
Having said all that, the actual problem of what to do with
these training camps is an awesome--a daunting one. Some people
have proposed Americans crossing the border in hot pursuit. The
risk of that is very--there's a very high risk here--and I
would defer to General Jones--that we would get into areas
where our military effectiveness would be limited, but the
political and strategic negatives would be enormous. So, I
think we have to proceed very carefully.
Finally--two last points--there is now a new element in the
equation which none of us would have expected 5 years ago:
Pakistani Taliban whose focus is eastward toward the populated,
nonfundamentalist areas of Pakistan. They pose a real threat,
and the lack of democracy in Pakistan seems to be feeding that
opportunity. It would be the biggest strategic catastrophe in
memory if Pakistan went the way that Iran went in the 1970s.
And yet, the narrowing base of the government raises that risk
in the deepest way. I know you have spoken eloquently on this
in public, repeatedly over the last year, and I can only echo
and share the things you have said, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ambassador.
Ambassador Pickering. Just three very brief points, Mr.
Chairman, to amplify what my colleagues have said, with which I
totally agree.
Al-Qaeda is an Arab organization. Taliban is predominantly
Pushtun. They clearly had tensions, even when we were
supporting them both to fight the Soviets. In adversity, those
tensions go away.
We neglected to understand that, after, in fact, we were
quickly victorious in Afghanistan, we had a huge mountain of
work to do, to follow up to make sure that it didn't roll out
under our feet. We have a constant capability of doing that, if
you look back over the years. We--pretty good at wars, and very
bad at what to do after them.
The second piece, I think, is equally important, that Iran
and the United States share a common interest in Afghanistan.
We, after all, took the two greatest burdens off the Iran
plate: The Taliban in Afghanistan and the leader of Iraq.
There is, in my view, a serious opportunity here. And the
report is not, in my view, at all wrong in suggesting that this
happened. My belief is that we need a broader conversation with
Iran anyway. But, if Iraq is a legitimate subject, why isn't
Afghanistan a legitimate subject to talk to Iran about,
regardless of all the other difficulties we've got?
Look, we couldn't have the Karzai government, as Dick
reminds me, if we hadn't got together with the Iranians in Bonn
and put it together. And Jim Dobbins, who led that effort, is
almost lavish in his praise of Iranian cooperation in those
days, as strange as that may seem in today's environment and
atmosphere.
I think the third piece is that Dick is right about the
Pakistan Taliban, but it's not totally new on the scene. We've
had movements in Pakistan in the madrassas, training radical
Islamic people, many of whom went to Afghanistan in the pre-
Taliban-ruling days and became, in fact, the nexus of a lot of
the Taliban effort. I think that a totally looney idea is to
put U.S. forces into the frontier areas of Pakistan. If the
Pakistanis themselves cannot do it with their knowledge, with
their colorable capability to operate in those areas, at least
now, how are Americans going to get over this particular
difficult problem? I have no objections to the United States
helping Pakistan, but this is a Pakistani problem, in almost an
exclusive sense, and we have to find a way, which we haven't
been successful yet in motivating the Pakistanis to do so.
I think their deal came after, at least according to
reports I had, they tried putting a division into the frontier
tribal areas, and got very badly beat up. So, it is not a
simple problem, either for Musharraf or for the Pakistanis to
deal with. But, I see that as the only road, and I totally
agree with Dick on the looming dangers.
The Chairman. Well, I know you have to go at 12:30,
General. My time is up. I'll conclude by saying that, you know,
some Americans would wonder why--with us being, essentially,
the primary guarantor of Karzai's government, why--when Paddy
Ashdown was told that he was not acceptable, why we would
accept that. I understand it's an independent government, but
many Americans would wonder why we would be in a position to
not make it clear that that was not acceptable, in terms of the
help they expect from us. But, at any rate----
Ambassador Holbrooke. May I comment on the Paddy Ashdown
fiasco? Paddy--I share General Jones's view of Paddy. I worked
with him very closely in Bosnia, and I was in close touch with
him over the last 4 months. He was ready to take great risks to
his life and give up a very enjoyable retirement to do this.
The reason he--and he and Karzai had met, and they had agreed
on it. And then, there was a political backlash, and the press
in Kabul began to charge him with being a relative of the
British lord who had led the expedition that ended in such
disaster in the 19th century. They wrote that he was coming
back for a ``blood revenge.'' They warned him that his life
would be in danger, and still he was ready to go forward, with
the support of the U.S. Government.
But, in the end, he had to withdraw, because he couldn't
have possibly fulfilled that mandate he had without the
government's support. I did not hear a clear answer to your
question to the previous witnesses, which is a very important
one, about whether they are going to try to get someone else in
there, or whether the whole issue is now behind us. But, I hope
that this--your committee will continue to keep this issue
foremost, because everyone agrees that something along these
lines is necessary.
The Chairman. Something is necessary.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my questions for the previous panel, I was asking, as
many members have, for an overall plan for Afghanistan. And
I'll not go back through that, but each of you have illustrated
elements that have to be in that plan. And there was an
assertion that there are plans, that they are coordinated, they
mesh together in some way that we have not perceived very well.
So, I was really asking for clarification of, really, how
Afghanistan might succeed, under the best of circumstances,
with the proper insertions of capital, personnel, leadership
from abroad, all the elements that might be helpful, as well as
the reforms that the moneys and the training hope to bring
about.
What, seems to me this panel--each of you have,
individually, demonstrated that even if we had a good business
plan for Afghanistan, and prospects of gaining all the inputs
that are required, we would have to think very carefully about
Pakistan and Iran, because Afghanistan is unlikely to succeed,
isolated, even if the business plan is very good. Now, this is
even more daunting, because, to begin with, we don't know the
elements of all the investments we need.
And then, on top of that, to say, even we did this, given
this border, given Waziristan and safe havens, or, worse still,
as you've all talked about, we don't know the future of
Pakistan, its politics and its governance, quite apart from
what happens in Waziristan, and with Iran--and this is totally
outside the scope of this hearing, but I was disturbed that
Ambassador Khalilzad was being criticized for having appeared
on the same platform with the World Forum, with two Iranians.
They're a long way, to say the least, from dialogue, although I
agree that the Iranian aspect of this, historically, as well as
currently, is extremely important. And I think you, Mr.
Holbrooke, pointed out that we have encouraged, many of us,
really, almost a roundtable discussion, if not in Baghdad,
somewhere else, of all the neighbors of Iraq. That really has
not come off, despite a couple of conferences on the side. But,
it needs to, at some point, if there is to be the integrity of
that state, and so that everybody understands what everybody
else is doing in the process.
So, it seems to me, the importance of your testimony is
this additional dimension. In addition to sufficient planning
for how we might have success in Afghanistan, a more
comprehensive plan for how we work with Afghanistan and the
region--and that's even more complex--doesn't mean it shouldn't
be done; and probably we're not going to have great success in
that area without that occurring.
Now, what I am curious just to ask--I mean, in terms of
specifics, because the reports that you've cited get into
this--we've had some testimony with regard to the police
training, that it was rapid, in many cases. I think previous
witnesses pointed out one deficiency may be the training of 10
days or whatever--it was too rapid. People sent out in the
field, and were not well equipped to handle the job. But, the
more common comment is the pervasive corruption of those who
finally get into the field. In other words, there still is not
a central government culture of noncorruption. There are
provincial nodes and cultures that the police seem to fit into.
And that's going to be a difficult problem for some time, I
suspect, in the same way that we've made headway with the
rights of women or students or all the health care, whatever.
The fact is that there are cultural differences throughout the
country that are very substantial, and the police training,
even if it was more adequate, has to include, really, integrity
and sufficient pay, I suppose, as other countries have found,
to fight corruption.
The other point that some of us have heard in other
testimony is that, in the case of army recruitment, this is
difficult; and, furthermore, the number of soldiers going AWOL
is substantial. I think someone else said retainment is
difficult. But, in fact, a very large percentage of people seem
to have simply disappeared from the ranks. Now, that's
disturbing, regardless of what you're planning for Afghanistan
or generally, to have, in both of those elements, that kind of
deficiency.
Finally, let me just throw, before I ask each of you for
comment--in the case of the drug situation, maybe eradication
on one side of the road or the other is not a good idea, or
maybe eradicating it at all, given the hostilities and so
forth--but, what would happen if we adopted a policy, either
generally or specifically, that our country buys the drugs? We
simply reimburse the farmer for his problems. We take the drugs
out of circulation, put some money into circulation in the
rural areas, or in those places that are in very deep straits.
Now, when I've made that suggestion before, some people have
said, ``Well, you would have to arm-wrestle the drug lords.''
In other words, they want to get their hands on it. This is a
market--this is a system of brokerage and movement in which the
United States would be competing with the drug lords for the
product, but perhaps to the benefit of the farmer.
Now, most people would say, ``Well, this is just too
clever, by a half, that you--to get our country into an
ambivalent moral position of buying poppies or opium, whatever,
from these people.'' But, I'm simply wondering, in the sort--in
your studies, as a commission, or in your own thinking, whether
this idea of purchase as a way of moving through this thing
more adroitly has ever come up.
I rest my questions, and I've lost my time, but, in any
event, if any of you have responses, I would appreciate it.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Just a brief comment about the narcotics situation. I think
the solution is one that is comprehensive. It may have an
element of purchase to it, but it also will have an element of
eradication, it'll also have an element of crop substitution,
an element of subsidies. It also has to have a penal element
that is enforceable, and a security element. And there's the
overarching question of who's going to do that. I personally
think that, ideally, you'd want the Afghans to take more
responsibility for that kind of interaction with their own
people, but that hasn't happened.
But, if we just simply bought the crop, my feeling is that
next year you'd be buying twice the crop, because they will--
they'll just produce more if that's going to be the solution. I
don't know where that ends.
But, one of the things that I've observed was that, a few
years ago the G-8 really came up with a pretty good plan of how
to address the five pillars that everyone agreed to had to be
addressed. Two of those pillars have actually gone pretty well.
The Japanese-led disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
pillar was actually reasonably well done, and we could put that
in a plus box. The American-led pillar of revitalizing and
training the Afghan army, generally, is--has been a good one,
as well. We'd like to see more progress, but certainly, in the
short period of time, we can give that a good mark, as well.
The other three are all linked, and it's narcotics,
judicial reform, and police reform. And here, all three of
those pillars also have a lead nation: Narcotics, United
Kingdom; police, Germany; and judicial reform, Italy. And I
think what's happened, at least in my observations, while I--in
my monthly trips to Kabul, was that the international community
basically let those three nations, kind of, try to solve the
problem on their own, without getting behind them to support
them, as the international community simply has to do for
problems of that size. And so, as a result, those three pillars
have been languishing, and have really not made any substantial
progress. In the 3\1/2\ years that I visited regularly, I
always asked for updates on the G-8 pillars, and was just
saddened to see that there was none. I mean, it was simply the
same meeting, the same group, the same plans dusted off, but
without a whole lot of progress. So, that's just a couple of
observations.
But, this is why the Ashdown development is so serious,
because what is clearly lacking in the capital, where you have
the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the World Bank,
all kinds of NGOs and other global organizations that are all
trying to do their different things, but that central piece of
coordination that would direct the international effort to
those things that must be done if Afghanistan is going to
progress, seem to be still lacking, unfortunately.
Ambassador Holbrooke. May I quickly address your second
point, Senator Lugar? On crop buyback, there's a long history
of this. I first encountered it in the 1960s and 1970s, in the
Golden Triangle--Thailand, Burma, Laos. The problem is always
the same. The--General Jones has already alluded to the fact
that you just create a larger crop to buy back. It just seems
to me that the flaw in the program is that we are attacking the
victim, the people who are growing this to survive, without
giving them anything in return. On paper, there's alternate
livelihoods, and, in some parts of the north, around Musar, and
even at Jalalabad, maybe in Herat, some of it's happening. But
in insecure areas, that can't happen. So, the administration's
long obsession with aerial eradication, which they finally
abandoned, because Karzai said he would fight it publicly, and
the British and the U.N. opposed it, really was a great
diversion.
So, what's to be done? There is no sustained effort against
the drug lords or the traffickers or precursor drugs. And it
was clear from the answers to the questions you and the
chairman asked to the previous witnesses, their evasiveness,
their failure to cite any high-level drug lord. There's no
effort on precursor drugs--chemicals.
Now, there--this obviously needs creative thinking, and I
don't--I'm not an expert on this, and I don't know what the
answer is. I have read a recent proposal that we just do a
massive agricultural subsidy to the area. But, I do think that
we should not eradicate crops in the insecure areas in Helmand
right now. I think it's not just a waste of money. You--we've
had plenty of wasted programs over the last 60 years. It is
actively creating our enemy.
And, again, I wish to state, Mr. Chairman, this is the
only--this is the worst program I have ever seen--in the 45
years since I entered the State Department, the most waste of
American taxpayer money--and it is creating enemies. We're
funding the Taliban's recruitment drive, we're funding drug
lords. The crop, as you pointed out, keeps going up. And yet,
we just heard witnesses defend it as though it was making
progress. It's--this emperor really has no clothes, and we have
got to face up to that and do a groundup review of what's to be
done, with experts. And I would urge your committee to take the
leadership, because we just saw, this morning, Mr. Chairman,
that it is not going to come from the administration.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, General Jones has to leave at 12:30, so I would
suggest that, if you have any particular question for General
Jones, maybe we could--you know, it's obviously your time,
Senator Feingold, and I'll--you'll have the full time, but
maybe, if there are any questions for General Jones in the next
15 minutes----
Senator Feingold. All right.
The Chairman [continuing]. That you might be able to focus
them.
Senator Feingold. I understand, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
And I want to welcome this public panel today. It's an
exceptional group of experts. In particular, it's good to see
my friend Richard Holbrooke.
I'm very pleased to know that both the United States and
the NATO Alliance are currently undertaking reviews of their
Afghanistan policy. It's long overdue.
I would also note that, while an additional 3,200 U.S.
marines in Afghanistan is a step forward, I'm not convinced
that it's enough to fix the deterioration, as of late. So, I'd
like to ask all of you to comment--starting with the General--
on the critical balance that needs to be struck between
increased security operations and more robust reconstruction
programs, including addressing the rampant corruption and
impunity that have, unfortunately, seized the Afghan
government. We need progress on both civilian initiatives and
military operations, and I'm wondering how we can balance this.
General.
General Jones. Senator, I think I can be very brief on this
answer. I support the commander's call for the level of troops
that he feels he needs. Having been in that situation from the
outset of the first NATO expansion, I know the difficulties
associated with calls for more troops and equipment. But, it
doesn't sound to me that the number that they're requesting--
and, indeed, the welcome number that the Secretary of Defense
has proposed--is really excessive; and which goes to reinforce
my central point, is that you can certainly put a lot more
troops in a big country like Afghanistan, but, I think, unless
we address the other issues more comprehensively--that is to
say, reconstruction and the other points of our collective
testimony here--then I think you run the risk of losing
momentum, which I think may have already happened, but--and
then, even worse, backsliding. It's the failed expectations
that were raised by the--sort of, the people of Afghanistan,
when they voted so massively--and, in many cases, heroically--
to seat a President and seat a Parliament, that those
expectations have, by and large, not been met. And that is, I
think, one of the reasons why we see a resurgence of Taliban
and other insurgent activities--and, obviously, the failure to
address the narcotics problem, police, judicial reform, and
corrupt officials being prosecuted.
It's been my experience that, in those areas where we have
a good governor, a good police chief, and the presence of
viable units in the Afghan army, that people respond well to
that kind of authority. Unfortunately, those areas are few and
far between. But, when you see them, they stand out like
beacons, because it is possible to succeed.
And the lament that I have is that I would--I wish that we
could--and the reason I'm so disappointed in the Ashdown
denouement is that this is really what is needed--to get the
momentum and to regain the advantage. I think the troop
strength--I defer to the commanders. It doesn't sound to me
like what they're asking for is unreasonable, nor a lot. The
United States has already offered to kick in some. And I know
the Alliance has the capacity to do at least as much, if not
more, if it wishes to do so.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
Mr. Holbrooke.
Ambassador Pickering. Can I say a few words----
Senator Feingold. Well, Mr. Pickering----
Ambassador Pickering [continuing]. Senator, very briefly--
--
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Is next; yes.
Ambassador Pickering [continuing]. In contrast to your
question on priorities in Afghanistan and Iraq?
My sense is, from the experts and against the backdrop of
military funding in the neighborhood of $8 billion, and
civilian funding, a great deal less, I think our conclusion was
that if you had to make that tough choice on the marginal
dollar, it probably ought to go to the civilian side.
Senator Feingold. Very good.
Ambassador Pickering. But, you understand the predicates.
Senator Feingold. Absolutely.
Mr. Holbrooke.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I agree with what's just been said.
But, I want to underscore, Senator Feingold, the enormous
importance of the police program. A lot of this--these issues
are low-grade security, better adjusted for police. The police
are underfunded, underpaid, undertrained, under-equipped, and
easily corruptible. And the people of Afghanistan--I can't
stress this too highly--desperately don't want the Taliban to
come back. So, we need to invest an enormous amount more. This
is--the truth is, this is going to take a lot more taxpayer
dollars, which is why I'm so upset that our biggest civilian
program over there is the one that's actually helping the
enemy. And that's why we need a--that's why you've heard the--
this excellent report that General Jones and Ambassador
Pickering put forward, urged a special envoy--Tom referred to
it as an American Paddy Ashdown--but, obviously there is no
focal point in the U.S. Government. The previous witnesses each
have part of the problem, and neither of them is full-time in
Afghanistan. One is Assistant Secretary for a region that
includes a third of the world's population, including the
subcontinent and the central--and the other one has narcotics
worldwide. There is no one full-time on Afghanistan at the
highest levels, as there must be.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I'm going to cede the rest of
my time, so my colleagues can have a chance to ask General
Jones questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. My irreverent comment to our staff
here in response to your question was: Where is Charlie Wilson?
General, before you have to leave, there was a rumor out
that we were going to trade out the Marines out of Iraq and put
the Marines in Afghanistan. Now, of course, the Marines can
take care of business. Is there any truth to that? There's this
3,000 augmentation coming up, of Marines going into
Afghanistan, and how does that tie in a potential spring
offensive?
General Jones. I think the Secretary of Defense has made
the decision, at least for the time being, on that idea. I
think the 3,000 marines will certainly equip themselves very,
very well, as they normally do. It is a demonstration of our
national resolve, and hopefully it'll be met by some equal
offerings by some of our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
I think that it's important to support the commander's
request. It doesn't seem to me that what they're asking for is
unreasonable.
But, if we are correct, and there's a spiraling situation
in an unfavorable direction--while I've always said, at least
in my 3\1/2\ years there, that the ultimate solution is not a
military problem, but it could become one, and I don't--I
really don't want to see that happen. And I think Ambassador
Pickering's recent answer to Senator Feingold was absolutely
the perfect answer.
Senator Bill Nelson. And that has come through, loud and
clear, in all----
General Jones. Yeah.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. All of your testimony.
Let me ask Ambassador Holbrooke--when you were talking
about the lack of success in the poppy eradication, and the
huge amount of expenditures that we're making there--so, we're
not getting the bang for the buck, we're doing it the wrong
way--it occurred to me, we've gone through a lot of this drill
before in Colombia. What have we learned in Colombia that could
be applied to the situation in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, to my right is ``Mr.
Colombia,'' so may I defer to Tom?
Senator Bill Nelson. Please.
Ambassador Pickering. I'm totally out of date, but I had a
lot to do with helping to try to put Plan Colombia together.
The lessons we learned in Colombia, at our peril, were that
you could not ``not deal'' with all of the aspects, that the
civilian aspects, despite the huge costs of helicopters for the
military, which were essential, also had to be dealt with. And
it was everything from judicial reform and effective
prosecutions and rule of law, the whole thing.
Now, I'll tell you, one interesting thing we learned was
that we could reduce, radically, the amount of hectarage in
coca by aerial spraying, but the next year, it went up, and it
went deeper into the jungle, and it went to small plots. And
so, in effect, it looked like a fairly good device, but what it
did was what we're concerned about is going to happen, and Dick
has explained so clearly: recruit people for the other side,
fail to provide the alternative method of livelihood, disperse
the crop, make it harder to get at, and generally increase,
because the value is going up for that 1-year loss, the amount
of money that comes back into the system. I suspect that the
farmers don't get much, but they get a lot.
The other interesting thing, in terms of the other side of
the issue: Can you provide an alternative way? Can you provide
good agricultural crops, security, roads, market, financing?
The drug lords provide all of that. Can you do that in a
comprehensive way? You may have to start with the development
piece first, before you get totally into the eradication piece.
That seems, in my view, to be a better way to go ahead. Where
we have done that in Colombia, we've been able to hold the line
a little better than the other way around, and this has been
particularly true with the opium crop in Colombia at the higher
altitudes.
So, those are a few things, Senator Nelson, that I would
put on the table, that I think we have tried to take into
account in our report here, although we all know Afghanistan is
not Burma, is not Colombia.
The Chairman. If the Senator would yield for just a second,
I'd point out that--because I was chairman of Judiciary during
those periods, as you'll remember, and--cops--we vetted their
entire police force. We went back and retrained them. And I
don't know how Plan Colombia, the portion that worked, could
have worked without that. Medellin, you can walk the streets--
--
Ambassador Pickering. We didn't train military without
vetting them.
The Chairman. That's right. And they're not--that's not
happening now.
Ambassador Holbrooke. To add to the answer and Senator
Biden's comments, Senator Nelson, roads and markets before drug
eradication, some way of compensation to people when their only
source of livelihood has been destroyed, or else joining the
Taliban's even easier. Hold eradication off in insecure areas
for a while, and go after the traffickers and the drug lords
and the precursor chemicals.
I think the previous testimony strongly suggested to me, by
the way the witnesses avoided the questions posed by the
chairman and his colleagues, that they are not going over the
drug lord--going after drug lords at a high level. I don't
know, Mr. Chairman, if that was your impression, but I listened
carefully to the colloquy, and I was not encouraged.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank all three of our witnesses.
I want to touch upon the importance of border security in
dealing with the problems in Afghanistan. There were, I think,
some high hopes when OSCE agreed to provide some border
security with central Asia. There are very challenging issues
as it relates to Iran, and Iran's support for extremist groups
within Afghanistan. And, of course, it was well reported that
al-Qaeda has the ability to travel between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. So, I just really would like to get an assessment
from you as two points. First, how important is border security
in attaining our goals in Afghanistan? And how effective have
we been on border security issues?
General Jones. I think border security is extremely
important, but in a 360-degree sense around Afghanistan. And I
think that this is why, in our report, we stress the fact that
what's happening in the region is now making Afghanistan part
of a regional problem.
If you talk to the individual countries bordering
Afghanistan, about drugs--China, for example, and Russia--are
very concerned about the infringement of their borders and the
traffic. Iran has running gun battles with these drug convoys,
losing, I'm told, hundreds of people a year, trying to restrict
the flow of drugs through their territories. By the way, on
their way to European markets at the rate of about 90 percent
of the drug product, and also to the east.
So, I think one of the aspects of this being a regional
problem is to get regional actors together and say, ``What are
we going to do about the border situation? How can more
countries do more, particularly against drugs, but also against
the flow of insurgents?'' Because, obviously, the one that
people focus on the most is the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
dispute. And for several years we listened to the finger-
pointing between President Musharraf and President Karzai,
which didn't really contribute to any forward progress. Now
that it is a regional problem, we should all hope that the
leaders of these countries will get together and do what's
right.
Senator Cardin. Let me ask one additional question,
General, and that is: What should our expectations be? At the
end of the day, what are we hoping, realistically, to achieve
in Afghanistan? It's a country that has a history of tribal
leaders. It's never had a strong central government. What can
we expect? And what is the timeline? And I know that's very
difficult to predict, but I'd be interested in your assessment
as to, what can we achieve, as far as stability in that
country, its extremist groups being eradicated, and an economy
that's not based on narcotics?
General Jones. My feeling, from having traveled all over
the country, particularly in the aftermath of the elections
that were held, was that the Afghan people, themselves, really
want to stop fighting. There are--there is a historical
behavioral science, I think, that can--you can track problems
within a country, or within a region, where people go through a
fighting and a killing spell, and eventually they get tired of
it or something happens, they stop, and they go, and they yearn
for peace. And hopefully that's what happened in Bosnia. And
we're all hoping that the--in Afghanistan we're seeing the same
thing.
I think that the outpouring of public support for the
election, the promise of a better life, the promise of economic
stability, the promise of a judicial system, the potential of
not being pulled in two different directions, terrorized at
night, and being able to only go out during the days--those
promises came through loud and clear to the Afghan people, and
they voted, overwhelmingly, for that.
What's going on, I think, in the aftermath of these
elections is their frustration over not seeing a progress
towards that goal. It wasn't going to happen overnight. We all
recognize that. My feeling is that, for all of the enthusiasm
that happened after the elections, the decrease in violence,
the fact that the violence had really been located to a very
small place, the PRTs were launched, NATO came in more
forcefully, there was a lot of momentum that we had plans for
judicial reform, police reform, narcotics reform,
demobilization, reintegration, the--standing down the
warlords--a lot of good things, a lot of momentum.
And what I think has happened now is, the momentum has been
lost. It's been lost, because a lot of these programs have not
been fully implemented. It's been lost, because there is just
no sense that we can tackle, effectively, the three or four
most important things that are going on inside the country,
complicated now by the fact that, I think it's fair to say,
this is a regional problem; whereas, before we were able to
focus on Afghanistan, quite apart from the nations around it.
So, I still think that there is a way ahead. I think it's--
I think the international community needs to come together,
make their assessments, and us make our assessments. I do
believe that a Paddy Ashdown-like figure, or figures, is
absolutely critical to focusing the tremendous amount of money
and resources in both people and assistance that is going on,
and which is to be commended, but it's going on in a almost
uncoordinated way. And on certain issues, we need a lot more
coordination, and a lot more effect.
Ambassador Holbrooke. And, Senator, the Paddy Ashdown
affair is not about Paddy Ashdown, it's a seminal moment in the
relationship between the Karzai government and the
international community. It had not happened before, anything
like this. And, for reasons involving internal politics in
Afghanistan, the forthcoming elections, Karzai's need to be
more nationalistic and no longer so subservient to outside
world, he broke an agreement in public. It may or may not have
helped him, domestically. I have no idea. But, if it is allowed
to stand, all the things that my colleagues have recommended in
this terrific report, I don't think will happen.
Senator Cardin. Well, it appears like we have our
challenges ahead of us, and it's not going to be a quick path.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, your testimony was greatly appreciated. I mean
that sincerely. And you can rest assured, unfortunately for you
all, we're going to call on you again.
Three of us on this committee are heading over to Pakistan
and Afghanistan shortly, and we'll follow up when we come back.
But, I don't know how--to use your phrase, General, I don't
know--and also--all three of you--I don't know we get a handle
on this without much greater coordination in the--and
involvement--of the international community. I just don't--I
don't think there's any possibility.
At any rate, thank you very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record by Members
of the Committee
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Assistant
Secretary Richard Boucher by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. After your appearance at our subcommittee hearing on
December 8, I submitted several questions for the record to you. Two of
them-the most important two- remained unanswered until just this week.
The responses provided to these questions-which go directly to the role
played by Pakistani security services in providing sanctuary to the
Taliban- were, at very best, far from complete.
The first question was a request for a detailed list of the
reimbursements to the Pakistani military made under Coalition Support
Funds: some $6 billion over the past six years. You testified on
December 8 that every item had to be verified by the State Department,
and in your response you reaffirm that ``Claims are submitted through
the U.S. Embassy where they are reviewed for completeness and accuracy
and then endorsed,'' and that ``The State and Defense Departments work
closely together on the consideration of reimbursement claims and each
claim is examined closely by both departments.'' Yet your response then
states, ``As the Defense Department is responsible for oversight of
Coalition Support Funds, reimbursements, it maintains the records
necessary to provide the details requested here. Consequently, for
further details on Coalition Support Funds and a list of claims, we
would refer you to the Department of Defense.''
a) Does State keep records of the claims ``submitted through
the U.S. Embassy where they are reviewed for completeness and
accuracy and then endorsed''?
b) If State does not keep records of these claims, what are
the official guidelines regarding the destruction of this
paperwork?
Answer. The Department of Defense is responsible for oversight of
Coalition Support Funds reimbursements. The Office of the Defense
Representative--located at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and staffed by
Department of Defense personnel--oversees the Coalition Support Funds
program. It is the responsibility of the Office of the Defense
Representative to keep the records of claims submitted through this
program. For details on the official guidelines regarding the retention
or destruction of these records, the Department of Defense is best
placed to respond.
I would also like to comment on your description about the role of
Pakistani security services. The Pakistani security services do not
play a role in providing ``sanctuary'' to the Taliban. On the contrary,
the Pakistani military is engaged in robust efforts against terrorism
throughout Pakistan. Approximately 100,000 Pakistani soldiers are
posted along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. More than a thousand
Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops have lost their lives since
2001 in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistani
territory, over 300 security force members since last July. A major
factor contributing to the continued exploitation of the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas is the lack of counterinsurgency skills
within Pakistan's security forces, not a lack of will on their part.
Question. The second question requested ``a list of all weapons
systems primarily designed for purposes of external security currently
scheduled for sale or transfer to Pakistan, with dates of scheduled
transfer and dollar value of the transaction.'' Less than three weeks
later (on December 31), the Pentagon announced that Lockheed Martin had
been awarded a $498.2 million contract to supply twelve F-16C and six
F-16D jets to Pakistan. The decision was announced four days after the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto, at a time when Pakistani President was
publicly deliberating whether or not to postpone national elections
a) On which date was State made aware of the decision to
proceed with the award of the F-16 contract to Lockheed Martin?
b) Given the political sensitivity, was any State Department
official consulted as to the timing of this announcement?
c) It seems unlikely that a transaction worth nearly half a
billion dollars could be finalized and publicly announced
without any senior official at State or the Department of
Defense providing specific authorization. Who was the highest-
ranking official at State to give approval for this
transaction, and on what date?
Answer. On June 28, 2006, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
in coordination with the Department of State, notified Congress for the
sale of 12 F-16C and 6 F-16D aircraft to Pakistan, in addition to
various associated munitions and Mid-Life Update kits for the
Government of Pakistan's existing F-16 fleet. The State Department
discussed the sale at length with the Congress, and the Letters of
Offer and Acceptance were finally signed on September 30, 2006.
The Department of Defense's December 31, 2007 announcement was the
culmination of a year and a half process since the signing of the
Letters of Offer and Acceptance and was standard practice in meeting
Foreign Military Sale milestones. Since September 2006, the Department
of State has been aware that Lockheed Martin would be the responsible
contractor, but the final ``price'' that the U.S. government would
award Lockheed was still being negotiated by the Department of Defense.
As the sale was already approved by the Congress, and the United States
Air Force was implementing the case, the State Department was not made
aware of this routine milestone announcement. The Department of Defense
can provide further details on this matter if needed.
Question. Your response to the second question stated that of the
P-3 Orions slated for delivery, five aircraft (P-3C) have a ``delivery
date unknown.''
a) Has the Department of State requested that the Department
of Defense provide prior notification of any delivery of a
weapons system of this type? If so, how much prior notice was
requested?
b) If the Department of State receives notice of such a
scheduled delivery, will you commit to informing this Committee
of it in a timely manner? If so, how much prior notice should
the Committee expect?
Answer. The delivery dates for the remaining P-3Cs are:
P-3C 3: April 2009
P-3C 4: May 2009
P-3C 5: February 2010
P-3C 6: March 2010
P-3C 7: December 2010
As a matter of practice, the Department of State does not require
notice from the Department of Defense for the delivery of any aircraft
or defense articles. However, given the strategic relationship the
United States has with Pakistan, the Departments of Defense and State
work in close coordination and the Department of State is aware of the
operations of Foreign Military Sales programs, to include the delivery
of equipment.
From the last Question for the Record requesting a ``list of all
weapons systems . currently scheduled for sale or transfer to Pakistan,
with dates of scheduled transfer and dollar value,'' Congress has the
latest information on the scheduled delivery of some of Pakistan's
larger defense procurements. The Department will keep that list up-to-
date as new defense articles are approved for sale and will be
responsive to the Committee's requests.
Question. In the hearing, you cited a December BBC poll on Afghan
public opinion, noting ``one of the things that really struck me was
people said they'd rather have bad policemen than no policemen at
all.'' Please provide the citation for this assertion, as there does
not appear to be any such question asked or response received in the
report published by ABC and the BBC on the polling.
Answer. Although polls consistently show widespread perception of
corruption, they also reflect that Afghans strongly appreciate police
presence. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find the citation.
Perhaps I was mistaken about it.
Question. In the hearing, you made the following assertion about
Afghanistan:
It's got a government that works fairly well, better in some
ministries than others, but it's capable of providing education
and wells and projects for people around the country. It's got
an army that's credible and out in the field and fighting. It's
got a police force that is reforming--and it's not just
quantity, it's quality as well. A lot of what's being done with
the police training is to reform it as we stand it. So I see
all these efforts. Nobody can tell me it's not going in a
positive direction.
a) In the study that you cited above (ABC/BBC survey
of December 2007), positive ratings for the U.S.-led
efforts have dropped from 68% in 2005 to 57% last year
and 42% in 2007. Two-thirds said they could not afford
adequate fuel, and over half said they couldn't afford
sufficient food. Fewer respondents said their country
was on the right course than in any prior year.
Satisfaction in living conditions was lower than in
each of the three prior years polled. Moreover, 42% of
respondents view the Taliban as having gotten stronger
over the past year, while only 24% saw it as having
gotten weaker. Would you regard the survey
participants--1,377 Afghan citizens--as telling you
that things were going in a positive direction?
b) Two members of the private panel which followed
your panel (Gen. James Jones and Amb. Thomas Pickering)
served as co-chairs of a study group composed of some
of the most respected experts on Afghanistan, the
region, and the mechanics of nation-building inside or
outside of government circles. The report they released
on Jan. 30 states that ``the progress achieved after
six years of international engagement is under
threat,'' citing ``the growing lack of confidence on
the part of the Afghan people about the future
direction of their country.''
Would you regard the study group participants as telling you that
things were going in a positive direction?
Answer. When assessing progress in Afghanistan from a broad
perspective, we have to consider Afghanistan's past. Afghanistan was
one of the poorest countries in the world even before its 25 years of
constant conflict and chaos.
Against this background, it is only natural that daunting
challenges remain until the present day--especially with respect to
security, counternarcotics, and governance. And for millions of
Afghans, life remains bitterly difficult.
But we should not lose sight of the progress that has been made and
that we continue to make year by year. Broad swaths of Afghanistan--
especially in the North, the West and even the East--are hardly
recognizable by comparison with where they were seven years ago. And we
do no one a service if we ignore this progress. According to the ABC/
BBC survey of December 2007, 70 percent of Afghans rate their overall
living conditions positively, and two thirds rate their own security
positively. The democratically elected President and his Government are
rated as good or excellent by a majority of Afghans. And most
importantly, more than half of Afghans see their country moving in a
positive direction.
Question. In response to a question from Sen. Hagel, you stated
that the total amount of money spent by the U.S. in Afghanistan,
including military operations, has been about $25 billion. How much of
that, in total, has been spent for reconstruction and development
assistance?
Answer. From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007, U.S. Government
assistance to Afghanistan totaled over $23 billion. This total includes
security sector, reconstruction, governance, and humanitarian
assistance, as well as operational costs, but excludes the cost of U.S.
military operations. Of the total, $7.6 billion supported
reconstruction and development activities.
Question. Please provide the names of all high-level druglords who
have been convicted of crimes in Afghanistan and are serving jail time
in that country.
Answer. There were approximately 760 arrests and 306 convictions of
narcotics traffickers by Afghan authorities from September, 2006, to
September, 2007. However, the U.S. Embassy cannot state with certainty
how many are currently serving jail time. Once a defendant's conviction
is upheld by the Supreme Court, he/she is transferred to his/her
province for the duration of his/her term of imprisonment.
The following high-level narcotics criminals are awaiting trial or
have been convicted:
Misri Khan--convicted of heroin possession, sales and attempted
exportation
Bahram Kahn--convicted of heroin possession, sales and attempted
exportation
Noor Ullah--convicted of heroin possession, sales and attempted
exportation
Abdul Malik--convicted of kidnapping and murdering of two Afghan
National Interdiction Unit (NIU) officers in August, 2005
Babah Khan--arrested in June, 2007. Opium and heroin trafficker;
awaiting trial
Salam Khan--arrested in June, 2007. Opium and heroin trafficker;
awaiting trial
Haji Salam--arrested on October, 2007, for sale of drugs. Believed
to be a Heroin lab operator and money launderer
The following high-level narcotics criminals have been extradited
to the United States:
Haji Bashir Noorzai--convicted for smuggling heroin into the U.S.
Haji Baz Mohammad--pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import heroin
into the U.S.
Mohammad Essa--charged with conspiring to import approximately $25
million of heroin into the U.S.
Khan Mohammad--charged with narco-terrorism
Question. According to the State Department's 2006 Human Rights
Report for Afghanistan, women continue to face serious barriers to the
improvement of their rights and opportunities: ``Societal violence
against women persisted, including beatings, rapes, forced marriages,
kidnappings, and honor killings.'' Citing non-governmental organization
reports, the State Department indicates that ``hundreds of thousands of
women continued to suffer abuse at the hands of their husbands,
fathers, brothers, armed individuals, parallel legal systems, and
institutions of state such as the police and justice system. Violence
against women was widely tolerated by the community and is widely
practiced. Abusers were rarely prosecuted and investigations were
rarely carried out for complaints of violent attacks, rape, murders, or
suicides of women. If the case did come to court, the accused were
often exonerated or punished lightly.''
What efforts has the U.S. Government undertaken to help the Afghan
government specifically address the serious problem of violence against
women? How, if at all, does the widespread prevalence of violence
against women hinder women's participation in and/or support for U.S.-
led initiatives to enhance democracy and stability in Afghanistan?
Which regions might you anticipate a need for funding that is not
in the current budget request?
Answer. We are committed to addressing the widespread problem of
violence against women in Afghanistan. In 2005, the State Department's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
supported the Afghan Ministry of Interior in establishing the first
Family Response Unit in Kabul to help address domestic violence against
women. Today, there are 24 Family Response Units attached to police
stations in seven Afghan provinces that are staffed primarily by women
police. The Family Response Units offer women a place of refuge from
kidnappings, spousal abuse, rape/sexual abuse, forced marriage, and
other gender crimes and rights violations. They provide women,
children, and families a safe place to file a police report and also
offer mediation and resources to families to prevent future violence.
Since the creation of the Family Response Units, the number of domestic
violence investigations opened by the police has steadily increased due
to enhanced police capacity and heightened public awareness about
domestic violence. Furthermore, the presence of a female staff member
serves to showcase the opportunities for women in the Afghan National
Police and promotes the need for their participation in Afghanistan's
security forces. The Afghan Government plans to establish additional
Family Response Units at all provincial headquarters and in larger
districts and will continue to staff them primarily with women police.
Since their establishment, we have provided material and mentoring
support to the Family Response Units. Each week, American police
mentors meet with the Family Response Unit's female officers, identify
individual and unit needs, and provide skills training and guidance on
case resolution. Police mentors are actively working to link Family
Response Units increasingly with shelters, social services, and
prosecutors who can try gender-based violence cases.
After consultations with an Afghan women's shelter director, the
U.S. has funded a transit shelter for women and girls in Kabul in
September 2007. This shelter provides domestic violence victims,
including those requiring drug treatment services, with temporary safe
haven, health care, psychological support, and legal aid while a long-
term care strategy is being crafted. Victims needing longer-term
shelter are referred to those facilities.
A key component of preventing and responding to violence against
women in Afghanistan is ensuring that women and girls know and
understand their rights under the law. To this end, since 2004 we have
has supported the efforts of a non-governmental organization that has
partnered with Afghan women judges to conduct legal awareness training
for more than 1,400 high schools girls and their teachers about their
constitutional rights under the new Afghan Constitution. Additionally,
in late 2007 we collaborated with and provided funding to the Afghan
Ministry of Women's Affairs to run a print and radio information
campaign to raise public awareness of family violence and the rule of
law according to the Afghan Constitution, the Penal Code, and Sharia.
USAID programming has also worked to enhance Afghan women's
understanding of their rights under the law through roundtables, public
discussions, and television and radio dramas on topics such as women's
rights in Islam, forced marriage, and the right to education.
The State Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor (DRL) programming uses radio as a means of communicating with the
Afghan people about human rights, women's rights, and democracy issues
within the context of Islam. The project combines interviews and
discussions with Afghan religious scholars about human rights within
Islam and the role of women in Islam with examples from the Koran. DRL
programs also include convening women's and human rights non-
governmental organizations in order to develop grassroots leadership
training specifically for women from regions severely impacted by human
rights abuses.
Violence against women is a human rights violation and a serious
obstacle to enhancing democracy and stability in Afghanistan. Such
violence discourages half the population from participating fully in
society. Nonetheless, Afghan women have proven that they are
increasingly ready to assume their rightful role in rebuilding their
country. For example, record numbers of women registered to vote
(accounting for 43 percent of all registered voters) in the September
2005 parliamentary elections, and over 600 women ran for parliamentary
office. Girls are attending school at historical levels and women,
particularly in urban areas, are pursuing professions denied them under
Taliban rule. Education will be critical in transforming society in
Afghanistan. USAID has made Afghan women and girls a major target of
its literacy and other educational projects (e.g., ``Learning for
Life'' and the Women's Teacher Training Institute in Kabul).
To underscore U.S. government support for women's rights, for the
second year in a row, Secretary Rice will present a prestigious
``International Women of Courage'' Award to an Afghan woman who
operates a domestic violence shelter.
Question. In 2004 the Afghan government established the first unit
of female police officers to assist women and children who are victims
of crimes.
Has the U.S. Government provided or offered to provide any training
of police or prosecutors regarding domestic violence and sexual
assault? If so, please describe that training. If not, are there plans
in place to explore opportunities where our law enforcement and
prosecutorial expertise on domestic and sexual violence may be helpful
to Afghan authorities?
Answer. In 2005, the State Department's Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs opened the first Family Response
Unit in Kabul to help address domestic violence and gender crimes
against both women and men and other family issues. Today, there are 24
Family Response Units attached to police stations in seven provinces.
U.S. civilian police mentors provide training and mentoring to female
officers from each Family Response Unit, including specialized
assistance in addressing domestic violence cases. Since their
establishment, the Family Response Units have handled an increasing
number of domestic violence cases. For example, in 2007 female officers
in the Family Response Units collectively addressed 348 cases of
domestic violence nationwide, up from a total of 199 cases in 2006.
In September 2007, the State Department provided funding to a
women's issues non-governmental organization to establish a transit
shelter for female victims of gender violence. As part of this grant,
the shelter designed a domestic violence training curriculum for police
officers that introduces types of gender violence, women's rights under
the law, procedures for dealing with victims of domestic violence with
sensitivity and respect, and available government and non-governmental
resources for women in need, including how to use the shelter's
referral system. The shelter will hold five of these workshops, the
first of which will occur in late February 2008, for male and female
police in Kabul during the course of the initial one-year grant. Based
on the outcome of this pilot training program, we will consider how
best to alter or expand this program to police outside of Kabul.
In addition to the on-the-job training the police of Afghanistan
receive to enhance their response to cases of gender violence, we have
integrated domestic violence and human rights components into our
police training program. To date, over 50,000 Afghan National Police
officers have gone through the Department funded basic eight-week
police training curriculum, which covers human rights and domestic
violence issues. The two-week Transitional Integration Program training
course on policing in a democratic society, which nearly 25,000
intermediate Afghan National Police have completed to date, includes
additional coursework on domestic violence and human rights in the
Afghan context. Domestic violence modules inform police trainees about
the causes of domestic violence and the role of law enforcement
authorities in responding to it. We are currently exploring additional
ways to integrate gender issues and domestic violence responses into
training opportunities for police at all levels.
To complement its efforts to train police about domestic violence,
the Department is actively engaged in the broader effort to reform and
build Afghan justice sector institutions' capacity to respond to
violations of the law, including gender crimes. To date, hawse have
spearheaded several efforts specifically geared toward building the
justice sector's capacity to respond to cases of gender crimes and
domestic violence, including:
Enhancing police-prosecutor coordination on domestic violence
issues in Balkh province in early 2008. The Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' police-
prosecutor coordination training in Balkh directly led to the
province's decision to create the position of provincial family
violence prosecutor. The new family violence prosecutor, who
was a student in the training, has convened several meetings to
date with the female police officers that staff Balkh's Family
Response Units in order to gain evidence to support the
prosecution of domestic violence cases.
Supported the creation and distribution of 46,000 booklets on
treatment of gender crimes under Afghan and Sharia law for use
by police and prosecutors in late 2007. The booklet for
prosecutors cites specific sections from the Constitution,
Penal Code, and the Hadith and Sharia while the one for the
police uses basic language and contains pictures due to low
levels of literacy among police.
Mentoring female defense attorneys throughout Afghanistan.
Approximately 10 female defense lawyers who represent indigent
female defendants throughout Afghanistan were provided weekly
training sessions during summer 2006.
A gender justice training program for 45 justice sector
professionals and community members--including 35 women and 10
men--at the Ministry of Women's Affairs in Wardak province. The
training included lectures and small-group discussions on
domestic violence, forced marriage, and women's legal rights
and legal remedies available to women under Islam, Sharia, and
Afghan statutory law.
The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs is currently examining the feasibility of
developing additional training and assistance programs for prosecutors
working on domestic violence cases and remains committed to further
enhancing the capacity of the broader justice sector to respond to
gender crimes and domestic violence.
Question. Women's progress in Afghanistan is particularly dependent
on the security situation in the country. In the words of former acting
minister of women's affairs, Masuda Jalal, ``Women's future depends so
much on security. As much as security deteriorates, women's situation
deteriorates. At the first sign of insecurity, the head of the family
protects his women and children, and the first measure they take is to
keep them inside the house.'' In recent months we have seen press
reports of teachers being targeted and of girls being murdered outside
their schools. A recent news article reports that 130 schools have been
burned down, 105 students and teachers killed and more than 300 schools
closed down--many of those schools were for girls.
How are considerations about the security of women and girls
incorporated into U.S. efforts to ensure the overall security of the
population? And specifically, what steps, if any, has the U.S.
government taken to improve the safety of women and girls in
Afghanistan, particularly in areas where the Taliban is regaining
ground?
Answer. The United States places great priority on enhancing
security for Afghans, including women and girls. Security is an
indispensable prerequisite for improving everyday life of women and
girls, most notably school attendance and access to medical care. U.S.
troops, our NATO Allies and partners, and the Afghan Security Forces
have achieved sustained successes against the Taliban on the
battlefield helping expand Afghan Government presence so the population
can recover from decades of war and conflict. The U.S. and our Allies
will continue to train the army and police so they can respond
effectively and professionally to security and criminal threats to the
population. Human rights education, including the rights of women and
girls, are included in army and police training. Properly trained
police and army soldiers will expand the reach of security services to
areas that are currently underserved, particularly in southern
Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. and other NATO-led Provincial
Reconstruction Teams have built or rebuilt schools throughout
Afghanistan, including girls' schools, and supported other development
activities. Although the needs are still great, these efforts represent
increased opportunities for improvement in the lives of Afghan women
and girls.
Question. There are several obstacles for women in accessing the
justice system in Afghanistan. Women often face hardship in the
enforcement of family law and criminal law, and there often is a lack
of sensitivity in cases involving women, especially in crimes of sexual
nature, like adultery. Furthermore, informal justice sectors like local
councils often discriminate against women. For example, I am aware of a
recent reported case in the Province of Badakhshan in which a woman was
stoned to death for adultery, while the man was only whipped. What
steps, if any, is the U.S. government taking to help women access the
justice sector without discrimination?
Answer. Enhancing women's access to the justice sector is a high
priority goal for the United States. Strengthening the capabilities of
the justice sector and increasing the number of women legal
professionals in it will have a positive impact on women's access to
justice. The Department of State runs a justice sector reform program
that has provided training in accounting and management to ten female
defense attorneys with a local Legal Aid Organization, and is providing
ongoing mentoring. The Department conducts provincial training seminars
on human rights topics, such as gender justice and victim's rights. A
gender curriculum is being integrated into the Attorney General's
Office continuing legal education course, and specifically includes
training on sexual assault prosecution. Ten female prosecutors have
gone through this continuing legal education course. Another 15 female
prosecutors, to date, have participated in a Department-sponsored
police-prosecutor training in Balkh, Herat, and Nangarhar. The Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is also
developing a Victim-Witness Support and Prosecution initiative to more
effectively prosecute sexually related crimes.
In addition, since 2005, Afghan women judges have visited the
United States for judicial training, including on family law. Back
home, these women judges receive professional development training and
34 female judicial candidates have also received judge candidate
training under USAID programming.
Working to increase knowledge of their rights is also essential to
efforts to help women secure their legal rights. In addition to
publishing 46,000 booklets on laws against gender-based violence for
use by police and prosecutors, we are funding radio spots and 6,000
street posters on gender crimes that target the general population. We
have also supported legal rights courses, including accessing the legal
system, for over 1,400 high school girls and their teachers in Kabul.
In an example of provincial outreach, 35 female members of the
community (teachers, members of the provincial council, women
corrections officers, etc.) attended a legal aid training session
focused on women's rights in Wardak province.
USAID is also active in efforts to promote women's legal rights. It
is sponsoring a ``women's-rights-under-Islam'' program that works with
religious leaders and human rights activists to develop and disseminate
progressive messages about the rights of women under Islam. For
example, the program supported the formation of a 45-member
consultative group of local scholars and experts to assist with message
development. That group has assisted in the production of 19 radio and
television roundtables, and dramas, and three televised public service
announcements on women's rights in Islam that were broadcast
nationwide. The program is actively producing and distributing printed
women's rights materials in the provinces via its 32 community cultural
centers and other means. The program has taken Islamic scholars on
study tours to more moderate predominately Muslim countries and is
performing an assessment of access of women to justice and prospects
for women in the legal profession to help target future programming.
This program is undertaken within USAID's larger program to support the
Supreme Court's efforts to strengthen the capacity of the formal court
system, engage the informal justice system, educate Afghans on their
legal and human rights and help the Ministry of Justice collect, index
and disseminate Afghan law.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Assistant
Secretary Richard Boucher by Senator Christopher Dodd
Question. Secretary Boucher, according to the Government
Accountability Office, the Department of Defense mismanaged the
procurement and transfer of approximately 200,000 assault rifles and
90,000 handguns to the Iraqi Security Forces. These weapons were not
tracked and it is unknown in whose hands they have wound up. Moreover,
section 1228 of Public Law 110-181 mandates an accounting for these
misplaced arms as well as future such transfers.
1. Can you provide specific assurances to this committee that
all weapons being provided to the Afghan National Army and the
Afghan National Police are being properly catalogued and
tracked?
2. Is the training and equipping program for these forces
being carried out under the auspices of the State Department?
3. What role is the Department of Defense playing in these
efforts?
Answer. Since 2005, the Department of State has engaged in a
partnership with the Department of Defense and the Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan, which has responsibility for the Afghan
National Security Forces development program. The Department of State
coordinates closely with the transition command to implement the U.S.-
funded program to train the Afghan National Police at the eight
Department of State training facilities across Afghanistan. The
Department of Defense executes the equipping of the Afghan National
Police through the transition command. The resource and logistics
division of the command and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior provide
a dual-chain process to monitor police equipment accountability. A
combined inventory is recorded on both Afghan and U.S. accountability
forms. The U.S. has recently embedded over 800 U.S. military personnel
with the police to further improve end-use monitoring.
The Department of Defense directs and executes the training and
equipping of the Afghan National Army. Questions concerning the
training and equipping of the army can be best answered by the
Department of Defense.