[Senate Hearing 110-565]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-565
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF
U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R. Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware............ 1
Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew, former National Security Advisor;
counselor and trustee, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 32
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Fried, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to additional questions submitted for the record by
Chairman Biden for Ambassador Fried........................ 15
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana................ 2
Scowcroft, Lieutenant General Brent, USAF (Ret.), former National
Security Advisor; president, the Scowcroft Group, Washington,
DC............................................................. 37
(iii)
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF
U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Cardin, Lugar, Hagel,
Corker, Voinovich, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. This morning, the committee will hear
testimony on the United States strategy for managing relations
with Russia.
Over the last 7 years, Russia has, in my view, slipped into
a mire of authoritarianism, corruption, and manufactured
belligerence. These developments, along with many serious
domestic problems, have been partly masked by an extraordinary
oil and gas windfall. But these resources are not solving
Russia's public health and demographic crisis, they aren't
being used to modernize Russia's aging oil and gas
infrastructure, and they aren't bringing peace to the North
Caucasus. Instead, we've seen a spread of rampant corruption,
Kremlin efforts to muzzle dissent and bully neighbors, and a
fixation on acquiring pipelines to deliver hydrocarbons to our
close allies.
In view of these stark realities, and the Kremlin's charged
rhetoric about the United States, the most important
conclusion.0. we can draw about our strategy for dealing with
Russia is that we need a new one. Whatever our game plan has
been--and I am not convinced we've had one--it clearly isn't
working.
Russia is very important to the United States in at least
three respects:
First, we have an interest in the country's domestic
situation, including the security of its nuclear stockpiles.
Contrary to what Russian media might say, the United States
needs a Russia that's strong and stable. Russia is the only
other State in the world with enough nuclear weapons and
delivery capacity to wipe us out. We can't afford to see its
government crippled by corruption and lack of accountability.
Beyond that, Russia's domestic problems, especially its looming
democratic implosion, could become a source of significant
instability in the world. Russia is losing the a population
equivalent to the size of the State of Delaware--almost 1
million people each year. Its population could be cut in half
by the year 2050. No country--no country--can endure that type
of loss indefinitely without serious consequences.
Second, we have an interest in Russia's neighborhood. Many
countries in Eastern Europe and along Russia's border occupy
positions of significant strategic and political importance.
They rely on Russia for energy, and trust that it won't abuse
its size and resources like a playground bully. We must respond
to Russia's actions that destabilize the country's neighbors or
undermine the region's young democracies.
Third, by virtue of its permanent seat on the United States
Security Council and the size of its territory, population, and
economy, Russia remains a significant strategic player, with
the ability to affect many of our global interests. We've seen
this recently, in Kosovo. There, as in numerous other cases,
Russia's influence has not been helpful.
For years, the Bush administration tried to paper over
problems with Russia. More recently, the State Department has
said it will work with the Kremlin when possible, and push back
when necessary. This formula sounds reasonable, but I worry
that it provides neither the strategic vision nor the practical
framework to deal with a Kremlin that has repeatedly and
successfully outmaneuvered the West in recent years.
Mr. Putin has successfully exploited the differences in the
Euroatlantic community for the past several years. But with new
leadership in several of our key European capitals, it is time
to forge a new common strategy for dealing with Russia.
When the United States and Europe come together around a
single cogent policy, we have a long and successful track
record for managing relations with Moscow. A joint United
States-European approach would not, and should not, constitute
a threat to Russia. Indeed, I believe the principal goal of
such an effort should be to refocus the Kremlin on all that
Russia stands to gain from working with the West, and all it
stands to lose by sticking to its zero-sum mentality that it
seems to be gripped by now.
The West needs to offer a clear vision of the positive role
Russia could and should play as a leader in the international
community. We need to devise incentives that will recognize and
reward Moscow's efforts to deal responsibly with the many
common challenges we face. Conversely, if Russian leaders
continue pursuing zero-sum diplomacy, then it's time we address
the issue together with our allies.
I look forward to our discussion on these and many other
questions, and I hope it will yield ideas for how to manage
this critical relationship in the future.
I now yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
join you in welcoming this opportunity for the committee to
examine United States-Russian relations.
In recent months, newspaper stories have speculated about
whether our relations with Russia were descending to the point
where the cold war would return. Clearly, Washington and Moscow
have disagreed on many topics lately. We have disputed aspects
of policy related to energy security, missile defense, the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, democracy in general, human rights,
Iran, Kosovo, Georgia, Moldova, and other items.
While Americans prepare to celebrate Independence Day,
President Bush will be hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin
in Kennebunkport, Maine, and I applaud the President and his
efforts to engage his Russian counterpart. I encourage him to
do so even more regularly. The Kennebunkport meeting will not
resolve all disputes, but establishing a commitment to
diplomacy is important. The United States-Russia relationship
is critical to the security and prosperity of the international
community. Kennebunkport provides an opportunity for the two
Presidents to give direction to their bureaucracies and to lead
our countries toward a stronger partnership.
During the last 15 years, United States-Russian
relationships have gone through geopolitical roller-coaster
rides, but, throughout the highs and lows, both sides have
understood that our work confronting the dangers of weapons of
mass destruction was too important to be sidelined. We have
worked together to implement nuclear and chemical arms-control
treaties. The two countries cooperated closely in the
denuclearization of Ukraine, of Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and,
through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we
have dismantled more than 2,000 intercontinental missiles, we
eliminated 1,000 missile launchers, deactivated 7,000 nuclear
warheads. In addition, our experts have worked together to
remove nuclear material from vulnerable locations around the
world, and to secure it in Russia. Such cooperation provides a
foundation on which to rebuild trust and confidence.
I urge the Presidents to solidify new areas of cooperation
on weapons of mass destruction. First, the United States and
Russia must extend the START I Treaty's verification and
transparency elements, which will expire in 2009, and they
should work to add verification measures to the Moscow Treaty.
Unfortunately, some bureaucrats on both sides are balking at
such efforts in favor of less formal language that is not
legally binding. I am concerned that transparency and
verification will suffer if legally binding regimes are
permitted to dissolve. The predictability and confidence
provided by treaty verification reduces the chances of
misinterpretation, miscalculation, and error.
The current U.S. policy is at odds with the Bush
administration's assurances to Congress during consideration of
the Moscow Treaty. Secretary Rumsfeld and others testified that
the START regime would be utilized to bolster the Moscow
Treaty, which did not include verification measures. The
current Russian-American relationship is complicated enough
without introducing more elements of uncertainty into the
nuclear relationship.
A second area of cooperation relates to the coming surge in
global demand for nuclear power, which may provide a pretext
for more nations to seek their own nuclear enrichment
facilities. The spread of this technology to additional states
poses long-term risks for both the United States and Russia.
While the technology may be intended to produce reactor fuel,
it can also produce materials for nuclear weapons. Both
Presidents have offered plans to establish nuclear fuel
assurances.
Senator Biden and I have introduced Senate bill 1138, which
proposes that countries who give up their enrichment and
reprocessing programs have an assurance, either bilateral,
multilateral, or both, of nuclear reactor fuel at reasonable
prices. Under such a regime, nations would be prohibited from
using the template of nuclear energy to develop nuclear
weapons. I remain hopeful that the chairman will hold a hearing
on this important subject.
Now, third, the United States and Russia should be
exploring how the Nunn-Lugar experience can be applied to North
Korea. While difficult diplomatic work remains, we must be
prepared to move forward quickly if the six-power talks
succeed. The Nunn-Lugar program would have a different
orientation in North Korea than it does in the former Soviet
Union, but the program has the authority, flexibility, and
experience to adapt to the Korean situation. Equally important,
Moscow and Washington have proven that former enemies can work
together to achieve shared security benefits. Such a track
record will be critical to a successful diplomatic process on
the Korean Peninsula.
Fourth, Russia and the United States must come together to
address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program. For
too long, our governments have been at odds over how to respond
to Tehran's behavior. The differences in our approaches have
narrowed recently, and there are prospects for continued
cooperation between Moscow and Washington within the U.N.
Security Council. I am hopeful this renewed collaboration will
extend to missile defense, as well.
Other subjects must be discussed at Kennebunkport, but
weapons of mass destruction remain the No. 1 national security
threat to the United States and to Russia. Success in this area
would enhance international security and improve the prospects
of United States-Russian cooperation in other policy areas.
This year is the 200th anniversary of United States-Russian
bilateral relations and the 15th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar
program. These anniversaries provide an occasion for both
Moscow and Washington to rededicate themselves to a close
partnership to address common challenges.
And I join in welcoming our very distinguished witnesses,
each of whom has been a very good friend of our committee, and
I look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
With the indulgence of my colleagues, I would like to do
two things. One, I would like to make an additional brief
statement, 2 minutes, and we'll have 7-minute rounds.
Let me emphasize, Mr. Secretary, what Senator Lugar said. I
think there's a dangerous drift in the way in which we deal
with the notion of strategic weapons. The lack of regard on the
part of this administration for the Moscow Treaty is
frightening. It is my understanding that START is set to
expire. The next President of the United States is going to
have less than a year to have to deal with this. And what I see
is counterproductive actions on the part of this
administration. Moscow appears to be willing to reduce the
number of strategic nuclear warheads below the Moscow Treaty
levels, limit systems, as well as warheads, and is looking for
verifiability and transparency. I hope what I'm hearing about
the administration's attitude toward this is incorrect.
Second--and I want to reemphasize--this Nation owes Senator
Lugar an incredible debt, along with Senator Nunn. There are
700 to 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium in Russia--700 to
1,400. We're talking about worrying about Iran having 3,000
centrifuges running for a year, getting 25 kilograms--we're
talking about going to war over 25 kilograms--that that's what
these centrifuges could produce in a year if they run. And
you've got 700 to 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium, over
100 tons of plutonium. And, according to Russian security
officials, only about 30 percent of that amount of material is
secured.
So, we've got a lot to talk about, Mr. Secretary. But let
me also state, at the outset, I have great respect for you.
You've served in administrations, and you know a lot about this
subject. We're thankful that you're prepared to come before the
committee.
And I will now yield for your testimony, and then we'll go
to questioning. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ambassador Fried. Thank you, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member
Lugar, Senators. I appreciate the invitation to appear before
you.
Russia is a great country, and one with which we must work.
We have significant areas of common interest, we have
significant differences. We are in a complicated period in
relations with Russia, and so, this hearing is well timed.
Our strategic approach to Russia means that we defend and
advance our interests while building on areas of common
concern, as we have done. It means we must find the right
balance between realism about Russia and the higher realism of
commitment to defend and advance our values.
Russia today is not the Soviet Union. As President Bush has
said, the cold war is over. But the world has recently
witnessed statements and initiatives from Russia that puzzle
and concern us. In the past few months, Russian leaders and
senior officials have threatened to suspend Russia's
obligations under the CFE Treaty, criticized United States
plans for a modest missile defense system, attacked United
States agreements with Romania and Bulgaria to establish joint
training facilities in those countries, and resisted a
realistic prompt resolution of Kosovo's final status.
These and other policy concerns have been accompanied by an
inconsistent, but worrying toughening of Russian rhetoric about
the United States and the outside world. And all this occurs
against a background of steady deterioration of democratic
practices within Russia.
Yet, in other critical areas, our cooperation is advancing.
These include nonproliferation, including nuclear
nonproliferation; cooperation on North Korea, and, in general,
Iran; counterter-rorism--and here, I would like to note Senator
Biden's important proposal to create an international nuclear
forensics library; cooperative threat reduction efforts which
result from Nunn-Lugar legislation; the NATO-Russia Council,
and the WTO accession process.
Against this complex background, President Bush and
President Putin will meet in Kennebunkport, a venue intended to
allow the leaders to step back, consider how to avoid
rhetorical escalation, and concentrate on a common agenda.
Many ask why Russia has sharpened its rhetoric. While
Russia's electoral season may play a role, there may be deeper
causes having to do with Russia's view of its recent history
and its place in the world.
Most in the United States and Europe saw the end of
communism and breakup of the Soviet Union as an extension of
the self-liberation of Eastern Europe starting in 1989. We
hoped that Russia, liberated from communism and the imperative
of empire, would follow the same pattern. But many Russians see
the 1990s as a decade of decline and chaos. Many have bitter
memories of that time: The wiped-out savings, the increasing
dysfunctionality of the state, the rise of corrupt oligarchs.
Many Russians associate these internal problems with democracy
and reform, and also link them with the trauma of perceived
external retreat. In Russia, the perception exists that the
collapse of the Soviet Bloc undid Russia's political gains in
Europe in the 20th century, and that the dissolution of the
Soviet Union undid much of Russia's territorial expansion from
the mid-17th century.
In fact, the 1990s brought about a Europe, whole, free, and
at peace, working with the United States, and with Russia
welcome to play its part as a valued partner. In the view of
many Russians, however, the European order that emerged in the
1990s was imposed on a vulnerable Russia. Many Russians cite
NATO enlargement, the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and,
to some extent, Ukraine, and the unqualified and enthusiastic
integration of the Baltics, and even Central Europe, into the
Euroatlantic community as an affront. For many Russians, this
order is unjust and something to be challenged, and perhaps
revised.
In Russian history, periods of domestic disorder ended with
the reemergence of strong rulers. President Vladimir Putin is
often seen by Russians in this context, as a popular restorer
of order and a state-builder. President Putin's popularity
appears partly related to Russia's new wealth, generated in
part by high world prices for oil and natural gas. But Russians
also see him as a leader who has halted Russia's international
retreat and sought to reverse it.
Mr. Chairman, to understand is not necessarily to agree.
The United States does not regret the end of the Soviet Bloc.
The United States does not believe that any nation has the
right to a sphere of influence over unwilling countries. My
purpose is not to justify, but to explain, and this may provide
context for current Russian-American relations and some recent
Russian rhetoric and actions.
President Bush and the administration have avoided a
rhetorical race to the bottom. We have sought to address
problems in a constructive spirit wherever possible, while, at
the same time, remaining firm in defense of our principles and
our friends. The administration seeks to protect and advance
the new freedoms that have emerged in Eastern Europe and
Eurasia in parallel with the development of partnership with
Russia. Nevertheless, Russia's historical view seems to affect
its relations with the world and the United States, especially
in the region close to Russia. Zero-sum thinking is evident in
Russian allegations that United States plans to establish
rotational training facilities in Romania and Bulgaria are a
potential threat to Russia and constitute permanent stationing
of substantial combat forces. They charge that these plans
violate the NATO-Russia founding act. Neither is true, however.
Last April 26, President Putin suggested that he would
consider suspending Russia's implementation of the CFE Treaty.
At the Extraordinary Conference on CFE in Vienna last week,
which I attended as head of delegation, we and our allies
stated that we regard CFE as a cornerstone of European
security. We will work to address Russia's problems, but not at
the expense of the integrity of the treaty regime. Russia has
reacted with hostility to plans by the United States to place
elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and the
Czech Republic, intended to protect us and our allies from
threats from the Middle East.
At the G-8 summit, President Putin proposed that the
Russian-operated radar in Azerbaijan be used jointly for
missile defense purposes. This promising proposal implicitly
acknowledged the potential ballistic missile threat from Iran,
though recent statements from Russia are mixed. We look forward
to discussions.
In Kosovo, a U.N.-mandated negotiating process led by
Martti Ahtisaari has concluded that the only solution is
internationally supervised independence for Kosovo. We now seek
a U.N. Security Council resolution to bring into force
Ahtisaari's plan. The status quo is not stable. U.S. and
European troops under NATO must not be put into an impossible
position.
In rejecting independence, Russia suggests that a Kosovo
solution will constitute a precedent leading to the recognition
of the independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Transnistria. We've made clear that these are very different
situations.
Russia's energy resources constitute a source of national
wealth, but also leverage, in its region, and perhaps beyond.
Last month, the Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan issued a declaration pledging to cooperate on
increasing natural-gas cooperation and development. This
declaration attracted misplaced speculation. In reality, it
need have no direct impact on U.S. Government efforts to
develop multiple gas pipelines from the Caspian region to
Europe. We do not believe in monopolies, but in competitive,
open markets. We seek an open and cooperative energy
relationship with Moscow. The United States also strongly
supports Russia's WTO accession and seeks prompt graduation of
Russia from Jackson-Vanik restrictions.
Russia's relations with its neighbors, Europe, and the
United States, take place alongside of broader troubling trends
within Russia itself. Increasing pressure on journalists is
especially troubling. Most television networks are in
government hands or owned by allies of the Kremlin. Attacks on
journalists, including the murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna
Politkovaskaya, among others, chill the media.
The United States and its European allies continue to
support Russian democracy and civil society. We are not,
charges to the contrary, seeking to interfere in Russia's
domestic political development. We will, however, always stand
for the advance of freedom and democracy. America and most of
Europe abandoned, some time ago, the notion that the internal
character of nations was none of our business.
Mr. Chairman, we will be working with a more assertive
Russia for some time. We welcome a strong Russia, but one that
is strong in 21st-century, not 19th-century, terms. A modern
nation needs strong, democratic institutions and civil society
groups. A truly strong and confident nation has respectful
relations with sovereign neighbors. We must remain steady. And,
as a steady country, we must work with our European partners to
devise common approaches. We cannot give way to lurches of
exaggerated hopes followed by exaggerated disappointment. We
must simultaneously advance our interests and values, pushing
back when necessary, while seeking to broaden and deepen
cooperation with Russia.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee,
three American administrations have achieved much in Europe and
with Russia since 1989. I hope we can take lessons from our
successes, as well as learn our lessons about continuing
challenges. And I look forward to your questions.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Fried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to appear before you to discuss Russia and
U.S.-Russia relations.
Russia is a great country; one we must work with on important
issues around the world. We have significant areas of common interest
and want to build on these. We also have significant differences with
certain policies of the current Russian Government. This hearing is
well timed, because we are in a more complicated period in our
relations with Russia than we've been in some time.
Our differences notwithstanding, Russia today is not the Soviet
Union. As President Bush has said, the cold war is over. But the world
has witnessed a series of statements and initiatives from Russian
officials in recent months that have left us puzzled and in some cases
concerned.
In the past few months, Russian leaders and senior officials have,
in quick succession:
Threatened to suspend Russia's obligations under the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty;
Criticized U.S. plans for a modest missile defense system
based in Europe and rejected our explanation that it is
intended to counter potential threats from Iran, only to
propose missile defense cooperation in Azerbaijan;
Attacked U.S. agreements with Romania and Bulgaria to
establish joint training facilities in those countries, even
though this would involve no permanent stationing of U.S.
forces;
Left the impression that there's no will to find a
realistic, prompt resolution of Kosovo's final status;
Threatened the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova
by giving renewed support to separatist regimes and issuing
veiled threats to recognize breakaway regions in those
countries;
Further restricted freedom of assembly and association by
preventing peaceful demonstrations as well as hindering the
operation of organizations such as Internews.
These and other policy concerns have been accompanied by an
inconsistent but still worrying toughening of Russian rhetoric about
the United States, Europe, and some of Russia's neighbors. The Russian
media--increasingly state controlled--frequently paint an ``enemy
picture'' of the United States. We have seen Russian efforts to
strengthen monopoly control over energy resources in Central Asia and a
willingness to use this control for political purposes. All these
concerns, moreover, occur against a background of a steady
deterioration of democratic practices within Russia.
In this context, some observers have suggested that Russia's
relations with the West are at a post-cold-war low. Yet in other
critical areas, our cooperation is advancing. These include:
Nonproliferation (including nuclear);
North Korea and Iran;
Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement--and here I'd like to
commend Senator Biden for his proposal to create an
international nuclear forensics library;
Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts, which result from
Nunn-Lugar legislation;
NATO-Russia Council (including the Status of Forces
Agreement recently approved by the Russian Duma and President
Putin);
Some investment and business opportunities; and
Progress in negotiations on Russia's accession to the World
Trade Organization, including conclusion of our bilateral WTO
market access agreement in November 2006.
Against this complex background, President Bush and President Putin
will meet in Kennebunkport, a venue intended to allow the leaders to
step back, consider how to avoid rhetorical escalation, and concentrate
on a common agenda for efforts against common threats and to achieve
shared goals.
Many ask why Russia has sharpened its rhetoric in the last few
months. While Russia's impending electoral season may play a role,
there may be deeper causes having to do with Russia's view of the world
and its history over the past 16 years--that is, since the end of the
Soviet Union.
Most people in the United States and Europe saw the end of
communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union as an extension of the
self-liberation of Eastern Europe starting in 1989. In these countries,
regained national sovereignty was accompanied by difficult, painful,
but generally successful political and economic reforms. It was also
associated with the emergence of democratic, free market systems that
are fully part of the Euroatlantic community. We had hoped that Russia,
liberated from communism and the imperative of empire, would follow the
same pattern.
But the Russian Government and official media, and to a significant
extent Russian society, see the 1990s as a decade of domestic decline
and chaos. Many have bitter personal memories of the hardships of the
1990s: The wiped-out savings; the increasing dysfunctionality of the
state; the rise, especially after 1996, of massively corrupt and
massively rich ``oligarchs.'' Many Russians associate these problems
with ``democracy'' and ``reform'' and see these domestic traumas
through the external trauma of retreat. In Russia the perception exists
that the collapse of the Soviet Bloc undid Russia's political gains in
Europe in the twentieth century, and that the dissolution of the Soviet
Union undid much of Russia's territorial expansion from the mid-17th
century.
In fact, the 1990s brought about an Europe, whole, free, and at
peace, working with the United States in the wider world, with Russia
welcome to play its part as a valued and respected partner. In the view
of many Russians, however, the European order that emerged in the 1990s
was imposed on a weak, vulnerable Russia. Many Russians cite NATO
enlargement, the pro-Western orientation and aspirations of Georgia and
to some extent Ukraine, and the unqualified and enthusiastic
integration of the Baltics and even Central Europe into the
Euroatlantic community, as an affront. They seem to hold the
development of military relations between the United States and
countries of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union as a painful
reminder of a period of weakness. They view the support of the United
States and European Union for the Euroatlantic aspirations of former
Soviet states with suspicion.
This order was, in the view of many Russians, unjust; a function of
a latter day ``Time of Troubles'' to be challenged and to some extent
rolled back. We are witnessing a backlash.
The 1990s, in this narrative, are a modern-day ``Time of Troubles''
for Russia: A period of weakness with antecedents to Russia's past. In
Russian history, periods of disorder ended with the reemergence of
strong rulers who restored Russian power. In this current case,
President Vladimir Putin is often seen as a restorer of order and a
state builder, and on the international stage, as a leader who has
halted national retreat and sought to reverse it. Russians attribute to
Putin a return to national pride.
The United States does not believe any nation has the right to
impose a sphere of influence on unwilling countries. We do not miss the
end of the Soviet bloc but celebrate the fact that Central and Eastern
Europeans gained their freedom after 1989. We welcome the states of
Eurasia into the family of nations that can choose their own destinies
and associations. My purpose is not to justify, but to explain, the
sources of Russian behavior.
President Putin's popularity appears to be a function of Russia's
new wealth--spectacularly concentrated in a small class of super rich
Russians but spreading beyond to a growing middle class. This rising
wealth is generated in part by high world prices for energy. In fact,
much of Russia's new confidence and assertiveness is underpinned by
this new affluence. High prices for oil and natural gas are not just
bankrolling the government. Because of the dependence of many
surrounding states on Russian energy supplies provided by Russian
state-owned companies, the new riches give Russia greater influence.
Russia's current political situation is also influenced by the lack
of a free media or robust opposition that would critique and critically
analyze the government's performance. Russian citizens who want a wider
view must make an extra effort to find such opinions in the remnants of
the free press and local electronic media or on the Internet.
This is the context for Russia's relations with the United States,
some of its neighbors, and Europe. We do not share many elements of the
Russian view of recent history, but it is important to understand the
Russian mindset, which may account for some of the current rhetoric
coming from Moscow.
President Bush and the administration have avoided a rhetorical
race to the bottom as we approach our relationship with Russia. We have
sought to address problems in a constructive spirit wherever possible
while at the same time--and this is important--remaining firm in
defense of our principles and friends. Strategically, the
administration seeks to protect and advance the new freedoms that have
emerged in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and to do so in parallel with
the development of a partnership with Russia.
We want to address problems around the world where we have common
interests. Indeed, much of Russia's recent rhetoric about the United
States is harsher than the reality of our cooperation. In our efforts,
both to develop partnership with Russia and deal with challenges from
Russia, we are working with our European allies. Given the Russian mood
that I have described, this will take time and strategic patience in
the face of problems and pressure. It will require steadiness on our
part and that of our European allies, and steadfast adherence to
fundamental principles.
Nevertheless, the historical forces that I have laid out have had a
deep impact on Russia's relations with the world.
They may explain, for example, why the Russians have alleged that
U.S. plans to establish rotational training facilities in Romania and
Bulgaria are a potential threat to Russia and constitute permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces. They charge that these plans
thus violate political commitments made in the NATO-Russia Founding
Act, signed in 1997.
Neither is true, of course. Our plans do not involve substantial
combat forces, nor would U.S. forces be permanently stationed in those
countries. Our plans are for periodic rotational training deployments
of one brigade combat team. This is no threat to Russia, which has the
largest conventional military forces on the continent, nor is it
intended to be. Training and temporary movement of brigade-size units
to Bulgaria and Romania can hardly threaten Russia.
Last April 26, the day of a NATO Foreign Ministers and NATO-Russia
Council meeting in Oslo, President Putin suggested he would consider
suspending Russia's implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE) if no progress were made on ratification of the Adapted
CFE Treaty by NATO Allies.
This declaration triggered immediate concern that Russia intended
to weaken or even end this highly successful multilateral arms control
regime. At the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, and last week at the
Extraordinary Conference on CFE in Vienna, which I attended as head of
delegation, the United States and its allies made the point that we
regard the CFE regime as the cornerstone of European security; that we
welcome the opportunity to address Russia's concerns about the treaty;
and that we are eager to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. We also made
clear, however, that we looked for Russia to fulfill the commitments it
made when we signed the Adapted CFE in 1999 in Istanbul, including the
withdrawal of Russian forces that are in Georgia and Moldova without
those governments' consent.
The United States and our allies are prepared to be creative in
helping Russia meet its Istanbul commitments and open to addressing
Russia's concerns about the Adapted CFE Treaty. We hope that Russia
will work with us, and not simply make ultimatums and withdraw from the
treaty, damaging European security to no good end.
For many weeks, Russia chose to react with skepticism verging on
hostility to plans by the United States to place elements of a limited
missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This modest
system is intended to protect the United States and its European allies
against missile threats from the Middle East. We have sought to address
Russian concerns through more than 18 months of consultations, seeking
to assure Russia that this system cannot possibly damage their own
nuclear force.
We have also sought Russian cooperation on missile defense. for
many years and last April proposed a comprehensive package of
suggestions for cooperation across the full spectrum of missile defense
activities.
At the G-8 summit 2 weeks ago in Germany, President Putin put forth
his own ideas for missile defense cooperation. Meeting with President
Bush, President Putin proposed that the ``Gabala'' Russian-operated
radar in Azerbaijan be used jointly for missile defense purposes. The
proposal acknowledged the potential ballistic missile threat from Iran
and the need to protect Europe, Russia, and the United States from such
a threat.
We look forward to discussing with Russia all ideas for missile
defense cooperation. Europe, the United States, and Russia face a
common threat and should seek common solutions. Of course, any U.S.-
Russia discussions regarding the use of the existing Azerbaijani radar
for missile defense purposes would be done in full consultation and
cooperation with the government of Azerbaijan.
Finding a solution for the status of Kosovo constitutes one of the
most acute problems in Europe today, and one in which Russia's position
will make a critical difference. The stakes are high. Resolution of
Kosovo's status is the final unresolved problem of the breakup of
former Yugoslavia. Eight years after NATO forces drove out the
predatory armies of the nationalist Milosevic regime, a U.N. Envoy for
Kosovo Status, former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, has concluded
that the only solution is Kosovo's independence, supervised by the
international community, and with detailed guarantees, enforceable and
specific, to protect Kosovo's Serbian community. The comprehensive plan
developed by President Ahtisaari has the full support of the United
States and Europe.
We now seek a U.N. Security Council Resolution to bring into force
Ahtisaari's Plan and pave the way for Kosovo's supervised independence.
Russia played an important and constructive role in framing the
Ahtisaari Plan, which in fact meets Russia's concerns about protection
of Kosovo's Serbian community and Serbian Orthodox religious sites. We
are eager to find a solution at the Security Council that Russia can
support. But further delay and endless negotiations will not solve the
problem. And we must solve it, because the status quo is not stable.
U.S. and European troops under NATO are keeping the peace but must not
be put into an impossible position.
So far, Russia continues to reject any solution that is not
approved by Serbia, even the creative compromise suggested by French
President Nicholas Sarkozy at the G-8; and Serbia has made clear that
it will never agree to Kosovo's independence. Moreover, Russia suggests
that a Kosovo solution involving independence will constitute a
precedent leading to the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Transnistria, as well as drive separatist movements
elsewhere around the globe.
We believe that such a position is destabilizing and reckless.
Kosovo is a unique situation because of the specific circumstances of
Yugoslavia's overall violent and nonconsensual breakup, the existence
of state-sponsored ethnic cleansing, the threat of a massive
humanitarian crisis bringing about NATO intervention to prevent it, and
subsequent U.N. governance of Kosovo under a Security Council
resolution that explicitly called for further decisions on Kosovo's
final status. It constitutes no precedent for any other regional
conflict anywhere in the world.
We will move forward. As President Bush said in Tirana on June 10,
``I'm a strong supporter of the Ahtisaari plan . . . [T]he time is now.
. . . [W]e need to get moving; and . . . the end result is
independence.''
Delay or stalemate will likely lead to violence. Russia can yet
play a helpful role.
Let me be clear. There is no linkage or similarity between Kosovo
and Georgia's breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and
Moldova's breakaway Transnistria region. That said, we want to work
with Russia to help resolve these conflicts peacefully. Russian-
Georgian relations, after a period of extreme tension, have shown
tentative signs of improvement, but we hope that Moscow does more to
normalize relations. Russia should end the economic and transportation
sanctions it imposed against Georgia last fall.
For its part, Georgia needs to continue to avoid provocative
rhetoric and to pursue exclusively peaceful and diplomatic means of
resolving the separatist conflicts, as indeed it has for some time now.
Moscow should recognize that a stable, prospering Georgia is surely a
better neighbor than the alternative.
We do not believe that Georgia's Euroatlantic aspirations, or
Ukraine's, need drive these countries from Moscow; we do not believe in
a zero-sum approach or that these countries must chose between good
relations with Moscow and the Euroatlantic community.
Russia's energy resources, and its position as transit country for
the energy resources of Central Asian states, constitute a source of
national wealth and a potential source of political power and leverage
for Russia in its region. We have seen this demonstrated in the case of
Ukraine in 2006. Russia also faces growing domestic demand for energy
and thus needs massive investment and technology even to maintain
current production levels. At the same time, and somewhat
inconsistently, Moscow seems to want to circumscribe foreign presence
in its energy sector and maintain its near-monopoly over Central Asian
energy exports to Europe. Thus, Russia's energy policy sends mixed
signals to its foreign partners as Moscow seeks to balance these
competing demands.
For our part, we seek an open and cooperative energy relationship
with Moscow and have sought to use our bilateral energy dialogue,
launched with high hopes in 2003, to this end. We have enjoyed some
successes, such as the ConocoPhillips-Lukoil deal, the success of
ExxonMobil in Sakhalin-1 in Russia's Far East, and the continued
presence of U.S. energy services companies in Western Siberia and the
Volga-Urals. But recent state pressure on foreign energy investors has
limited the scope for cooperation.
The Caspian region is ripe for further energy development. The key
question is what form this will take. Russia will be a major player in
Central Asia's energy sector under any scenario. We believe that
Central Asian countries would be wise to court more than one customer
and more than one source for energy transport. The U.S. Government does
not support monopolies or cartels. We believe in competitive markets
for energy and transport of oil and gas. America's Eurasian energy
security policy promotes diversification, and that includes efforts to
advance reliable, long-term flows of natural gas from the Caspian
region to European markets.
Last month, the Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
issued a declaration pledging to cooperate on increasing natural gas
exports from Central Asia to Russia. This declaration attracted
attention and misplaced speculation in the press. But in reality, the
three Presidents' statement need have no direct impact on U.S.
Government effort to develop multiple gas pipeline routes from the
Caspian Sea region to Europe.
We continue to convey the message that despite continued strong
economic growth, Russia must look to the long-term and attract
investment into its energy sector. Greater U.S. investment in this
sector would serve the interests of both countries: American companies
have the capital and high technology Russia needs to exploit many of
its oil and gas fields.
Although the investment climate has improved on some fronts,
investment in Russia--in energy and other areas--presents a mixed
picture. Many American companies are doing well in Russia and we wish
them success. The best way to sustain Russia's development is through
judicial reform to strengthen rule of law, banking reform to improve
the capacity of the financial sector, accounting reform to promote
greater transparency and integration into international business
standards, improved corporate governance, and reduction of government
bureaucracy.
Following the bilateral market access agreement we signed last
November, the United States strongly supports Russia's WTO accession.
Russia is the largest economy remaining outside of the WTO, and there
is still a considerable multilateral process to complete, but we
believe it is important for Russia to become more integrated into the
world economy.
As we continue to work with Russia in the multilateral process, we
are focusing on some key outstanding concerns, particularly on
intellectual property rights (IPR), market access for beef, and
barriers to trade in agricultural products (SPS issues). Russia will
need to resolve all outstanding bilateral and multilateral issues
before it accedes to the WTO. We hope this process, and also prompt
graduation of Russia from Jackson-Vanik restrictions, can be completed.
The complexities of Russia's relations with its neighbors, with
Europe and with the United States reflect broader, negative trends on
human rights and democracy in Russia itself. As President Bush said in
his recent speech in Prague, ``In Russia, reforms that were once
promised to empower citizens have been derailed, with troubling
implications for democratic development.''
Curtailment of the right to protest, constriction of the space of
civil society, and the decline of media freedom all represent serious
setbacks inconsistent with Russia's professed commitment to building
and preserving the foundations of a democratic state. And these
setbacks ultimately weaken any nation as well as the partnership we
would like to have with Russia.
The increasing pressure on Russian journalists is especially
troubling. Vigorous and investigatory media independent of officialdom
are essential in all democracies. In Russia today, unfortunately, most
national television networks are in government hands or the hands of
individuals and entities allied with the Kremlin. Attacks on
journalists, including the brutal and still unsolved murders of Paul
Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya, among others, chill and deter the
fourth estate.
Also deeply troubling, the Kremlin is bringing its full weight to
bear in shaping the legal and social environment to preclude a level
playing field in the upcoming elections. There have been many instances
in which the authorities have used electoral laws selectively to the
advantage of pro-Kremlin forces or to hamstring opposition forces.
The ban on domestic nonpartisan monitors also seems to have been
based on political criteria. The challenges to rights of expression,
assembly, and association also run counter to a commitment to free and
fair democratic elections. Last year, the Duma enacted amendments to
the criminal and administrative codes redefining ``extremism'' so
broadly and vaguely as to provide a potent weapon to wield against and
intimidate opponents. Greater self-censorship appears to be a major
consequence in this effort.
Against this background, the United States and its European allies
and friends continue to support Russian democracy and civil society. We
speak out and reach out to civil society and the opposition, and will
continue to do so. We also maintain an open dialogue with the Russian
Government on these issues. We are not, charges to the contrary,
seeking to interfere in Russia's domestic political affairs. Such
charges of outside interference are as misplaced as they are
anachronistic.
We will, however, always stand for the advance of freedom and
democracy. Russia's development of democratic institutions is not of
marginal interest to us. America along with the rest of the
international community, including Russia, some time ago abandoned the
notion that the internal character of nations was none of our business.
As the President said at the recent Prague summit on freedom and
democracy, attended by representatives of Russia's democratic forces,
expanding freedom is more than a moral imperative--it is the only
realistic way to protect free people in the long run. The President
recalled Andrei Sakharov's warning that a country that does not respect
the rights of its own people will not respect the rights of its
neighbors.
The United States and the Euroatlantic community must accept that
we will work with, and live with, a much more assertive Russia for some
time to come. We welcome a strong Russia; a weak, chaotic, nervous
Russia is not a partner we can work with or count on. But we want to
see Russia become strong in 21st century and not 19th century terms.
Some stabilization after the 1990s was inevitable and positive. But
a modern nation needs more than a strong center. It needs strong
democratic institutions: Independent regulatory bodies, independent and
strong judicial organs, independent media and civil society groups. In
this century, strength means strong independent institutions, such as
the judiciary, the media, and NGOs, not just a strong center. And it
means political parties that grow from and represent and reflect the
interests of the entire citizenry, not merely those of a government
bureaucracy or a small number of oligarchs. Russia's modernization may
yet produce a property-owning class that will come to demand a
different relationship with the state than Russians have traditionally
known.
In its foreign policy, a truly strong and confident nation has
productive and respectful relations with sovereign, independent
neighbors. Strength in this century means avoiding zero-sum thinking.
It means especially avoiding thinking of the West in general and United
States in particular as an adversary or independent neighbors as a
threat. And we must avoid thinking of Russia as an adversary, even as
we deal with serious differences.
We must also remember the many areas where we continue to cooperate
well with Russia. One of these is counterterrorism, where, sadly, the
United States and Russia have been victims and where we enjoy strong
cooperation. The U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group met last
fall and will meet again in a few months. Its mission is to continue
and deepen cooperation on intelligence, law enforcement, WMD, terrorist
financing, counternarcotics, Afghanistan, U.N. issues, MANPADS, and
transportation security. Under our Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, we
also work closely on transnational crime, which covers terrorism, but
also addresses drug-trafficking and organized crime, human-trafficking
and child exploitation, Internet fraud, and violent crime.
Last year, the United States and Russia worked together to create
the Global Initiative on Nuclear Terrorism. In the span of a year, over
50 countries have joined the Global Initiative, which fosters
cooperation and improves the abilities of partner nations to counter
various aspects of nuclear terrorism. In that year, the United States
and Russia have continued to work hand in hand on expanding the
Initiative's scope and depth in what serves as a real example of
bilateral cooperation.
Our strategic cooperation is intensifying. Last year we renewed
until 2013 the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which
facilitates dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in the former
Soviet Union.
We cooperate well on nuclear nonproliferation, both common global
nonproliferation goals, and specifically to contain the nuclear
ambitions of North Korea and Iran. Although Moscow has sometimes voiced
disagreement with our approach to sanctions and other measures, Russia
voted for U.N. Security Council Resolutions that impose sanctions on
North Korea and Iran. The United States and Russia also participate
productively in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, and we and Russia
are cooperating well on complex banking issues having to do with North
Korea.
We continue to pursue cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council,
the NRC. We have a broad menu of cooperative NRC initiatives involving
diverse experts on both sides, including Russian participation in
Operation Active Endeavor and counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan.
The Russian Duma's ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement
(SoFA) with NATO opens up greater opportunities for cooperation.
Despite the differences, then, cooperation between the United
States and Russia is broad, substantive, and includes cooperation on
critical, strategic areas.
Our areas of difference are also significant.
We face a complex period in relations with Russia, as I have said.
The past months have been especially difficult and the issues that we
face, Kosovo especially, may strain our relations.
In this context, we must remain steady. We cannot give way to
lurches of exaggerated hopes followed by exaggerated disappointment.
The strategic response to the challenges presented by the Russia of
today means defending our interests while building on areas of common
concern, as we have done. It means finding the right balance between
realism about Russia and the higher realism of commitment to defend and
advance our values. It means offering the hand of cooperation and
taking the high road wherever possible, but standing up for what we
believe is right and in all cases working with our allies.
The last three American Presidents have sought in various ways to
find this balance. All faced the fact that relations with Russia cannot
be resolved on a timetable or according to an agenda that we prefer.
But since 1989 we have seen a cold war end, an empire dissolved, and
the beginnings of partnership take root.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, I hope we can take lessons from our
successes as well as learn our lessons about continuing challenges.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I'm sure all of us have
many questions, but we'll stick to 7 minutes on a first round.
I have made no secret of the fact that I find the two
witnesses we're going to have on our next panel two of the most
insightful foreign-policy analysts of this generation, and I
find myself in agreement with Mr. Brzezinski--and I'm going to
unfairly and--characterize, summarize what I think is one of
the elements of his argument. I'd like you to respond. He
suggests, in the paper he submitted, that there is a new elite
that's emerged in Russia, that Putin has surrounded himself
with former KGB operatives in--from, sort of, top to bottom.
And this new elite has embraced a--for a lot of reasons,
some of which you referenced--a strident nationalism as a
substitute for communism, and that the United States has been
largely silent, in response to many of the actions that Russia
is taking--because of our loss of legitimacy, with Guantanamo,
and because of our inaccuracy about the war in Iraq. Our power
has been viewed in diminished terms, because of us being tied
down in Iraq. And that has produced a heightened need for us to
seek Russia's support in, for example, Korea and Iran, where we
otherwise would not have needed that much support. That has
emboldened Russia to act with impunity in its geopolitical
backyard--Georgia, Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Central Asia.
How do you respond to that broad assertion? Has our being
tied down in Iraq, our conduct of our war on terror, put us in
the position where we have diminished capacity to deal with
Russia's aberrations under Putin?
Ambassador Fried. At a first cut of an answer, I would say
it is simply not true that we have been silent in the face of
Russian pressure on some of its neighbors.
The Chairman. But has it limited our efficacy when we've
spoken?
Ambassador Fried. I'd put it this way. I think, in the
period 2003-2004, it weakened the dispute over Iraq, weakened
transatlantic solidarity on other issues, and that was a very
difficult period. It's a period when President Chirac,
Chancellor Schroeder, were toying--seemed to be toying with the
notion of Europe as a counterweight to the United States, and,
in that context, it was harder to develop what you, sir,
rightly say ought to be a common United States-European
approach to Russia.
However, since 2005, and since President Bush went to
Europe, after his reelection, and reached out to Europe, that
period has been put in the past. We're working very well with
the Russians on some issues. We're working very well with the
Europeans as we deal with Russian issues. We've been working
with the Europeans on Baltic issues, on CFE, on issues of
energy security.
So, I think that the linkage that Professor Brzezinski
makes is not accurate with respect to current United States-
European cooperation. And I'd like to cite Chancellor Merkel,
who has managed to work with us very well while maintaining a
somewhat critical position on other issues, such as Guantanamo.
The Chairman. OK. I have a number of specific questions
I'll submit for the record.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
by Chairman Biden to Ambassador Fried
Question. President Bush has made democracy promotion a defining
rhetorical feature of his foreign policy and I assume that he's
disappointed in Russia's regression toward authoritarianism. But when
the President met with Mr. Putin on the margins on the G-8 Summit a few
weeks ago, he reportedly didn't even mention the issue of democracy in
Russia. Is that correct? If so, why not?
Answer. President Bush has a strong relationship with President
Putin that enables him to raise in their personal discussions important
issues that concern the U.S. government, including the rollback of
democratic reform in Russia.
Moreover, President Bush has not shied from raising his concerns
publicly, as he did in Prague on June 5, when he said, ``In Russia,
reforms that were once promised to empower citizens have been derailed,
with troubling implications for democratic development.''
We raise our concerns on democracy and human rights with the
Russian government, at many different levels and in many different
fora. Our message is consistent and clear--adherence to democratic
principles is part of the fundamental ``rules of the road'' in world
society today. Russian democracy remains one of several very important
issues in the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship, and we continue to
engage the Russian government on democracy and human rights at the
highest levels of government and at the working level.
Question. For the last several years, the Russians have proven very
adept in dividing traditional allies within the Euro-Atlantic
community. What are the prospects for forging a common approach to
Russia now that there is new leadership in Germany, France and in the
U.K.? What incentives could we offer Russia to act more responsibly at
home, in its neighborhood and on issues of common concern like Kosovo
and Iran? What leverage do we have to change Russian behavior if
incentives do not work?
Answer. Beyond managing current difficulties, we seek a long-term
partnership with Russia. To achieve that goal, the United States and
our traditional allies within the Euro-Atlantic community should
cooperate with Russia when at all possible; push back when necessary;
and at all times be realistic about Russia.
In this regard, the United States is intensifying strategic
dialogue with Russia, including on CFE, missile defense, and post-START
arrangements. Secretaries Rice and Gates have agreed to a ``two-plus-
two'' format with their counterparts, suggested by the Russians, to
consider these issues. We seek common approaches on missile defense,
not rhetorical sparring.
The booming Russian economy and huge energy resources ensure that
Russia is a major player in the world economy, and the GOR is
increasingly focused on being taken seriously in international economic
fora, such as the G-8, WTO, among others. Engaging Russia in these
fora, while insisting that it plays by the rules in them, can help
induce changes in Russian behavior as Russia gradually conforms to
international norms in these organizations. At the same time, we need
to avoid thinking that we have great leverage and influence over Russia
these days.
We should approach Moscow as a friend and potential ally everywhere
in the world, but we should not pay a price for cooperation, nor
indulge Russia when it behaves as if a residual sphere of influence
over its neighbors is its due.
Europe and the United States should continue to speak out honestly
and if necessary frankly about the use of political and economic
pressure against smaller, vulnerable neighbors, such as Estonia and
Georgia. Russia should recognize that it is in its own interest to
cooperate constructively on issues of common concern like Kosovo and
Iran.
Question. In terms of changes in U.S. policy, what consequences has
the Kremlin faced as a result of its many actions that threaten
democracy and stability inside and outside of Russia? What consequences
will the Kremlin face for using Russia's Security Council veto to
prevent adoption of a UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo?
Answer. We are concerned about domestic political developments in
Russia in the past few years, particularly the concentration of power
in the Kremlin. We hope that there will be free and fair elections--not
just on election day but in the days leading up to the election
providing space for media and civil society--for the Duma this December
and for the Presidency in March 2008, though we are not under any
illusions on this score. President Bush has discussed our concerns
frankly and openly with President Putin, and we continually urge the
Russian president to continue democratic reforms in his country.
Furthermore, we expect Russia to be a responsible participant in
international organizations such as the OSCE.
We also consistently stress to the Russian government that the
presence of stable and democratic neighbors around its borders is a
positive development, one that should not feel threatening to Russia.
We also insist that wherever democracies emerge, be it in Georgia,
Ukraine or elsewhere, the United States will have good and sound
relations with those countries.
On Kosovo, the United States remains committed to working with our
partners to find a peaceful solution. The United States supports the
Troika-led negotiations process to find common ground between the
parties. However, should there be no agreement by the December 10
expiration of the Troika's negotiating mandate, we remain committed to
the Ahtisaari Plan and internationally supervised independence as the
best way forward. The status quo in Kosovo is not tenable and
negotiations cannot continue indefinitely. We continue to stress to
Russia that failing to find a timely solution will lead to instability
in the region. All of us have a common interest in preventing new
instability in southeast Europe.
Question. Where does the administration think Russia will be in
five or ten years? Where would you like Russia to be? To what extent
will our current policy toward Russia allow us to bridge the gap
between those answers?
Answer. Russia is experiencing what will be a complicated period as
it moves toward an expected transfer of power this year and early next.
We are clear about what sort of Russia we want to see emerge from its
unfinished transformation. We do not want a weak Russia. This does
nothing for America. But a strong Russia must be strong in 21st
century, not 19th century terms.
In this century, a strong state must include a strong civil
society, independent media, a strong independent judiciary, and a
market economy regulated by independent state institutions. On this
basis, a nation may build the rule of law, which makes a good life
possible. A strong center is part of this healthy mix, but a strong
center in a state of weak institutions, is not.
Harnessing the Russian economy productively requires entwining it
with the world economy, which is a goal that serves not only U.S.
economic goals but also our geopolitical goals. Russia's membership in
good standing in the WTO and OECD are two goals we hold out for Russia,
in considerably shorter time (we hope) than five years out.
Relations with Russia in the near term are likely to remain a
complex mix of cooperation, some friction, and some perceived
competition, but over time, we hope to strengthen and deepen our
partnership. We cannot resolve all our differences immediately. But we
can put relations with Russia on a productive and frank path.
Question. Russia faces a host of serious threats to the country's
future--demographic collapse, an insurgency in the North Caucasus,
depopulation of the far east, and a failure to invest in the country's
domestic energy infrastructure to name a few. How effective has the
Russian government been in dealing with these challenges? Is the
Kremlin attempting to manufacture conflict with the West in an effort
to deflect attention away from these domestic problems?
Answer. In recent months there has been an inconsistent, but still
troubling, toughening of Russian rhetoric about the United States,
Europe and some of its neighbors. Indeed, some observers have described
Russia's relations with the West as at a post-Cold War low, and have
asked why Russia is taking such an approach.
It is, of course, possible that the increase in hostile rhetoric is
simply the result of political campaigning in the lead-up to the
December Duma and March 2008 Presidential elections. While likely an
important piece of the puzzle, it is not the entire explanation,
however.
As you note, Russia is dealing with a number of domestic
challenges. This, combined with Russia's experience since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, has undoubtedly colored Russia's worldview. The
Russian government, official media, and even many in Russian society,
see the 1990s as a very difficult time, characterized by domestic
decline, chaos, and weakness. Russia's financial collapse of 1998 added
to the already considerable economic woes induced by almost a decade of
transitional chaos. As Russia has emerged from that period in recent
years, riding a wave of high oil prices and a subsequent economic boom,
we have witnessed a backlash at home and assertiveness on the
international stage, where Russia seeks to resume its role as a global
leader.
It is important to note, however, that while Russian rhetoric may
be harsh, the reality of Russian cooperation with the United States is
much different. The United States and our European allies are working
hard to develop a stronger partnership with Russia. This work has borne
fruit in a number of areas, including counterterrorism and counter
narcotics. The U.S.-Russia business relationship is flourishing, with
U.S. businesses reporting that some of their most profitable overseas
investments are in Russia. It is important not to lose sight of the
things that are going right in our relationship with Russia, while we
at the same time hold the GOR accountable in areas where we wish to see
improvement.
Question. Corruption is reportedly endemic in Russia. What--if
anything--is the Russian Government doing to combat it?
Answer. Although President Putin has publicly pushed the fight
against corruption to the forefront of the political agenda ahead of
the upcoming Duma and presidential elections, it remains to be seen how
serious will be the prosecution of high-level corruption, particularly
given that the problem remains endemic in Russian society and a
challenge within the Kremlin. At the end of 2006, the Russian Finance
Ministry estimated that 26.1 percent of budget spending was being
stolen by bureaucrats. In all the cost of corruption to business is
estimated to be on the order of 10 percent of GDP and is rising to
about $150 billion per year. According to Transparency International
(TI), Russia scored 2.3 out of 10 this year, down from 2.5 in 2006, and
indicating ``very serious'' levels of corruption. Of the 180 nations
surveyed in TI's 2007 Corruption Perception Index, Russia took 143rd
place (deteriorating from 121 in 2006), placing it on the same level
with Indonesia, Gambia and Togo. The implication is that the Russian
government's anticorruption efforts have not yet led to any measurable
improvements. However, Russia did sign and ratify the UN Corruption
Convention and has become a member of the Group of States Against
Corruption, part of the Council of Europe, but again, implementation
will be key. Russia's bid to accede to the OECD will require it to sign
and implement the OECD Bribery Convention, which may give some impetus
to Russia's anti-corruption efforts.
Since the start of 2007, a growing number of high profile anti-
corruption investigations have been launched, as much to set an example
to other bureaucrats as to catch wrong doers. Examples include Oleg
Alekseev, deputy chief of the Federal Tax Service credit organizations
department, and Alexei Mishin, a lawyer in the Central Bank's Moscow
branch, who were both found to be abusing their position to demand tens
of millions of bribes from banks to ``loose'' tax claims. Prime
Minister-designate Viktor Zubkov--himself a veteran head of the Kremlin
committee tasked to combat money laundering--stated in September that
fighting corruption would be the main theme of his administration.
An interdepartmental working group on tackling corruption has been
preparing a package of anti-corruption legislation to be considered by
the Russian National Security Council this fall. Putin, who sees a
direct link between money laundering and financing of terrorism, has
supported and presumably will continue to strongly support Zubkov's
efforts. There is reason to be skeptical, however, that any government
crackdown on corruption will affect anyone other than those at the
lowest levels of government. To combat high-level corruption, Putin
needs to anchor any resolve with action and results.
Question. Prior to her assassination, Anna Politkovskya was widely
known as one of the bravest voices for decency in Russia. While she
never stressed the point, she was also an American citizen. What has
the U.S. Government done to help identify the individuals responsible
for her murder?
Answer. The U.S. remains deeply concerned about the murder of Anna
Politkovskaya and other journalists in Russia.
We have repeatedly called for vigorous investigations of her
murder, and urged the Russian authorities to pursue all those
responsible. We are disturbed that those responsible for her murder
have not yet been brought to justice. We continue to monitor the course
of the investigation, will press for progress as necessary, and stand
ready to assist, should Russian government authorities so request.
Ms. Politikovskaya was a true Russian patriot who worked to build a
better Russia through her reporting. It is important that those
responsible for her murder be brought to justice. The intimidation and
murder of journalists is an affront to democratic values and must not
be tolerated.
Question. As part of the Kremlin's opposition to the Bush
Administration's plan to site missile defense installations in Europe,
Mr. Putin has said he will suspend Russian compliance with the
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty--a key arms control agreement. How
seriously does the Administration view this threat? How do you intend
to respond?
Answer. The Russian Duma has begun the process of officially
suspending Russia's participation in the CFE treaty, and is scheduled
on October 9 to look at the first draft of the law suspending
participation.
The United States and its NATO allies have consistently advised the
Russian government that we regard the CFE regime as the cornerstone of
European security; that we welcome the opportunity to address Russia's
concerns about the Treaty; and that we are eager to ratify the Adapted
CFE Treaty. We have also made clear, however, that we expect Russia to
fulfill the commitments it made when it signed the Adapted CFE Treaty
in Istanbul in 1999. These commitments include the withdrawal of
Russian forces that are in Georgia and Moldova without those
governments' consent.
The United States is ready to help Russia meet its Istanbul
commitments. In addition, we are also open to addressing Russia's
concerns about the Adapted CFE Treaty, and we will reiterate that
message when Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates meet with their Russian
counterparts at talks in Moscow in mid-October.
The Chairman. But I'm trying to get a sense of the sort of
factual basis that is the predicate for United States
determinations relative to how to respond to these differences
we have with Russia, and how we view the present circumstances
of the Russian Government and Russian people.
And three of the areas relate to the demographic collapse
that I referenced, where the World Bank says that the
debilitating decline in the Russian population is unprecedented
among industrial nations. Without studying the statistics or
the bad jokes you hear in the Kremlin, which are, you know--the
jokes circulating in Moscow asks, ``What are the three most
popular cars in Russia?'' And you know the answer: A Mercedes,
BMW, and a hearse. And do we start off with the proposition--
with the premise that Russia does have a demographic collapse
on its hands that has to be dealt with?
Ambassador Fried. Demographic trends, until very recently,
have been very bad for Russia; that is, the lowered life
expectancy, less-than-replacement birthrate. Public health
issues have been of great concern to the Russians, and the
statistical basis for that is clear. I should add, as a
footnote, that the--in the last year, some of these statistics
have begun to turn around, so we have to withhold judgment
about projecting into the future.
What it means, if you think strategically, 15 or 20 years
out, it may mean that Russia's current tensions with the United
States and some of its neighbors are not necessarily the future
that a future Russian leadership may look differently about
Russia's priorities. A strong Russia may find its way, not by
getting into wrangles with the United States, but by addressing
some of these problems internally; at least that is to be
hoped.
The Chairman. Well, I have a number of other things I
wanted to get into, but let me conclude by asking, Would you
characterize, to the best of your knowledge, what the
administration's present attitude is about extending and/or
amending, or replacing, the START Treaty, which is due to
expire in December 2009?
Ambassador Fried. I'm not one of the experts on that. There
are people who are working on it. We do want to work with
Russia to develop a post-START regime. We want to maintain
transparency. We want to maintain predictability. There are
discussions going on with the Russians now about how to do
that. There are ways--there's a--there are a range of options,
some more formal and elaborate than others, but we certainly do
want to have a predictable and confidence-building post-START
regime.
The Chairman. Well, I hope that the administration can at
least give the next President the opportunity to deal with it
by extending START. I think it would be the single greatest
negative legacy this administration could leave, if it leaves
us in a situation where there is no future architecture to
follow on to START. I think this administration would be judged
incredibly harshly by history if they leave it undone, or
unresolved by the time it leaves. I pray to God that won't be
the case.
I yield the floor. I yield to my colleague Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on the chairman's last question. In the
last few days the McClatchy News Service reported that
administration officials queried about the START regime's
coming to conclusion, and what would follow it, indicated that
we do want to know a lot about what is going on, but we don't
need to know everything. This was attributed to an unnamed
administration official.
This is consistent with the testimony that the chairman and
I heard from former Under Secretary John Bolton, when he came
before the committee to testify on the Moscow Treaty. At that
time, we were told that the need to pin down and verify how
many missiles, submarines, bombers and warheads were being
destroyed on a month by month, or year by year basis, was an
old-regime idea, and not consistent with the views of this
administration. Instead, the administration was in a more
modern phase. However, we were reassured, those of us who were
still fussing about these details, that the START regime was
still there, and it would govern this process. But now, we find
that the administration is not committed to continuing the
START regime in its current form. As you suggested, it is the
intent of the United States to replace verification with a yet
to be defined transparency whatever this may mean.
Now, from my standpoint, we appreciate the Department of
Defense sending to our office, every month, a scorecard of how
many warheads were separated from missiles, how many missiles,
bombers, and submarines were dismantled under the Nunn-Lugar
Program. Last month, nine warheads were deactivated. This is a
small detail in the midst of the 13,300 warheads Russia
inherited from the Soviet Union, but this is something in
which, as a Senator, I'm very much interested.
I hope the administration is as interested as I am, and the
chairman is, in ensuring that these weapons of mass destruction
are destroyed. I hope we are not in a situation that we're
saying, the START Treaty was ``not invented on my watch,'' and,
therefore, we are prepared to let it expire in favor of a more
``modern'' idea of transparency. I believe it is in U.S.
national security interests to know what and when Russia
dismantles weapons systems under their treaty obligations. The
Russians probably need to know a good bit about what we are
doing, and that has been the basis of our trust, back to the
``trust, but verify'' idea. I take verification very seriously.
So, I appreciate you testifying to the chairman you're not
an expert on this issue, but I'm hopeful that you will carry
back to those who are expert on the issue, that whatever
they're having to say on these issues isn't selling. And they
need to know that these issues need to be rectified soon,
because START I is coming to an end, and its continuation is
important to many of us.
Do you have any further comment about this general issue?
Ambassador Fried. Senator, I will certainly take back to my
colleagues the--your strong views. I can only add that we take
seriously the need for a post---for post-START arrangements
that will make both sides believe that they are better off.
We're working with the Russians now, working through the
details. The negotiations are going on. We've exchanged ideas.
And we're looking at this in a cooperative, collaborative
spirit.
So, post-START arrangements certainly belong on the
positive side of U.S.--the ledger of United States-Russian
relations, and it's our intention that they stay that way.
Senator Lugar. Now, on a second issue, efforts are underway
to find common ground on both President Bush and President
Putin's proposals on bilateral and multilateral nuclear reactor
fuel assurances to countries who forfeit enrichment and
reprocessing regimes. What is the current status of
negotiations on a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, a
``123 agreement'' with Russia? Are discussions underway between
the United States and Russia that would set up a means to
provide countries that forego dangerous dual-use technology
that could lead to potential weaponry, with nuclear fuel
services available at reasonable prices? Do you have any
general comment on progress in that area?
Ambassador Fried. Here, too, we are making good progress
with the Russians. We hope to be able to conclude a ``123
agreement,'' which provides for peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and would allow for commercial trade of nuclear
materials and technologies, to some of the ends you've
suggested, sir.
We are also working with the Russians on what's called the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, so-called GNEP. This is a
joint initiative that we've been working on for a year. It's a
very bold initiative that does, as you said, expand nuclear
energy--peaceful nuclear energy development and mitigating
proliferation risks.
Under this--under GNEP, supplier countries would provide
fuel services on a commercial basis, but an attractive basis,
to countries that employ nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
but forego the acquisition of sensitive fuel-cycle
technologies. This is a serious initiative. It is moving ahead.
We need a ``123 agreement'' to keep moving, but, happily, this
is an area where we are making steady progress, and hope to
continue to do so.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's good news. And I know you'll
try to keep the committee abreast with how that's proceeding,
because it's of intense interest to many of us here.
Ambassador Fried. This is an issue on which we're working
actively, and, I'm happy to report, productively.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask, finally, currently Russia is
engaged in multilateral negotiations on WTO accession. What is
the administration's view on Russian entry to the WTO? Do you
believe this would bring about greater transparency and rule of
law in Russia? What would be the repercussions should Congress
not approve permanent normal trade relations? Give us a general
forecast on WTO.
Ambassador Fried. We support Russia's entry into the WTO.
They're the--one of the largest nations in the world not in the
WTO regime. We think it would be helpful, for all of the
reasons you cited.
That said, we're not going to cut Russia a special deal,
they have to meet the requirements that we put forward for
every country. We're working through that. We have had a--some
successes, and we've concluded our WTO bilateral agreement.
We're now working through the multilateral WTO process, and
issues like agricultural trade, intellectual property rights,
are things that we're still working through. But there is no
question that the administration supports Russia's early
accession to the WTO, and we're putting our energy into this.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, welcome.
Can you give us a sense of the agenda objectives for the
Bush-Putin meeting Kennebunkport on July 1 and 2? What,
specifically, are we looking at, as to objectives? What are the
main focuses of the agenda? And what do we hope that we will
attain from that meeting?
Ambassador Fried. I have to start with the caveat that it
is always difficult to predict what the two Presidents, or any
two Presidents, will, in fact, discuss. We, in the bureaucracy,
can serve up any number of papers, and then they do what they
want.
But, that said, we are looking at a couple of things.
First, it's an opportunity to get out of Washington and out of
Moscow, and to have in-depth conversations about the
relationship and where--and the direction it's going.
Kennebunkport is--can be the setting for informal discussions,
and I think that we're looking at this in that context.
There are a number of issues that could easily come up.
During the President's discussion at--on the margins of the G-
8, there was a lot of time devoted to missile defense. Issues
that could come up include missile defense, Kosovo, the general
tone of relations, nuclear cooperation in some of the areas
where we're making real progress. But, again, this is more of
an occasion for an in-depth look at the strategic direction of
relations, and an effort to put things on a good course for the
future. The advantage of a site like Kennebunkport is that it
provides a venue for just that kind of discussion.
Senator Hagel. Well, are you saying that--then there is
very little structure to the exchange as to specific topics
that we would want to engage President Putin on?
Ambassador Fried. There are a number of topics which we
would like to engage President Putin on. I'm just being
realistic about the way these things work. There are a number
of particular items high on the bilateral agenda now. I
mentioned some of them. And I don't--I expect they will come
up. But there's a larger context, and I think that the two
leaders may discuss--again, ``may discuss''--the broader
direction of relations and developments in Russia and its
neighborhood, and some of the things that have been troubling
United States-Russian relations in recent months.
Senator Hagel. Well, then could you give us a status on
where you believe the current relationship stands concerning
the missile issue in Eastern Europe, where we stand on Kosovo?
And I assume those will be two topics that the two Presidents
will take up, since they are as important in the short term as
any two issues that we have with Russia.
Ambassador Fried. That's certainly the case.
With respect to missile defense, we were intrigued, and
remain very interested, in President Putin's proposal, which he
made at Heiligendamm, to allow for joint use of the Russian
radar facility in Azerbaijan. Our view is that the Russians, by
opening up this possibility, have opened up the way for a much
larger discussion of missile defense, and the possibility of
United States-Russian cooperation on missile defense. In our
view, missile defense is not intended to degrade the Russian
nuclear arsenal, but is intended to deal with much smaller
threats to missiles--you know, two, three missiles from a
regime like Iran or some other regime in the region, in the
future.
Since Russia is not intended as the object of the missile
defense system, it stands to reason that we would want to work
with Russia to deal with common threats. Ideally, the United
States could work with Russia, we would work with our European
allies, we would work with the Poles and Czechs, and all of
these systems could be made compatible so that everyone's
security would benefit.
We hope to have experts-level discussions on the Russian
proposal soon. We've offered to engage in discussions with the
Russians on President Putin's proposal. We hope they take us
up.
With respect to Kosovo, we have had intense discussions
with the Russians for some time now. The issue has moved to the
United Nations, where we and our allies have introduced a
resolution to implement the Ahtisaari plan. Ahtisaari plan
provides for Kosovo's supervised independence and for extensive
protections for the Serb community. Russia has not accepted
this approach. They have said that this whole issue needs more
time. In our view, this--the situation on the ground will only
deteriorate with time. As President Bush said last week in
Albania, the time is now to get moving on a solution. So, we
have some intense work to get--ahead of us with the Russians.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
How are we engaging the Russians on energy, and energy
security issues, in light, specifically, of a couple of weeks
ago, the announcement by the Russians of the new pipelines
coming up from the south, and--Turkmenistan's gas and
Kazakhstan's gas connecting to the main pipeline into Europe?
Give us a sense of this issue--energy--and our relationship and
our engagement with the Russians on it. In particular, as you
know, we've had some issues where Shell Oil and other companies
have lost some ground----
Ambassador Fried. That's quite right.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. As the Russians have
nationalized those interests.
Ambassador Fried. Senator, we believe in an open and
competitive energy regime--open upstream, at the producers;
open through transport, open pipelines; and downstream, at the
consumer level. We don't believe in monopolies or cartels. We
think that there ought to be multiple sources of transport,
multiple sources of gas for Europe, and we've made our views
very clear.
We're doing several things at once. We are working with the
Europeans on a common energy strategy, based on these
principles. We're also working with the Russians so that they
properly understand our policy. We want--we believe that
Russia's energy future will require massive upstream technology
and investment, and we think that a open and welcoming
investment climate is conducive to that. So, we are working on
multiple levels at once, with the Russians, with the Europeans
and with the producer countries, including in Central Asia.
This is--this issue is going to take some years to develop.
We've had some successes with the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the
Shtokmanese gas pipeline, and we want to build on that. There's
much more I could say, but that's a--that sketch covers the
bases.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. First of all, I want to thank you,
Secretary Fried, for the cooperation that you have given me by
providing information on the tentative future of Serbia and
Kosovo. I would like, if possible, to get another update on the
infrastructure to support the U.N.'s comprehensive proposal for
the Kosovo status settlement based on those recommendations
from Kai Edie. I would like to see how that has progressed.
I also am worried about whether the Europeans are as
concerned with that infrastructure as they should be. I would
like you to comment on that and on the status of NATO forces,
international police, and the governance model that would be
put Implemented. I am very concerned about whether there would
be sufficient infrastructure in place to support the proposed
settlement, in the event that the U.N. Security Council should
go forward with it.
Second, I am interested in your comments about why Russia
is not supporting Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari's plan in the
U.N. Security Council. Russia says the problem is that a
precedent that would be set for Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Transnistria to demand independence. But I wonder if that
really is the reason. Is Russia just trying to extend its
influence with the Serbs in Southeast Europe? Is it looking for
a quid pro quo--for example, for something in return for the
Western missile defense deployment in Poland and the Czech
Republic? What are the Russians really up to here?
Ambassador Fried. Sure.
Senator Voinovich. And, last, but not least, if we cannot
able to get a U.N. resolution through the Security Council,
what other options are available for dealing with the final
status of Kosovo, where you have just said the situation on the
ground is real cause for concern?
Ambassador Fried. Senator, those are excellent questions.
And those are the ones we are dealing with on a daily basis.
First of all, the good news is, I think we--the
international community is ready to support a settlement based
on the Ahtisaari plan. NATO has increased its forces, its
readiness, and its ability to keep order. We have been working
very closely with our NATO allies, and we're confident that
they're in much better shape than they were during the March
2004 riots, and they're ready to handle security challenges.
On the civilian side, we are ramping up, preparing for the
international civilian supervision of Kosovo during its
transition phase. The European police mission and--law
enforcement mission--is also similarly ramping up. I'm
confident that we're ready to do this.
Under Ahtisaari, there would be 120-day transition period,
where we would actually stand up these bodies, but a lot of
work is being done on the ground right now. And, Senator, I'm
happy to provide details to you.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Ambassador Fried. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced on August
1 [2007] the initiative of the Contact Group to undertake a period of
intensive engagement with the Serb government and the Kosovar Albanian
authorities to discuss Kosovo's future status and asked the Contact
Group to report back to him by 10 December. The United States welcomes
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's announcement.
The Troika's objective is to seek an agreement between the parties
on Kosovo's status.
The U.S. views this period as a serious, final attempt to reach an
agreement between the parties. Ambassador Frank Wisner, U.S.
Representative to the Kosovo Status Talks, will represent the United
States in this troika.
UN Special Envoy Martii Ahtisaari and his staff will remain
associated with the process.
The Troika will stay in close touch with the Contact Group and meet
regularly to report on its activities.
Ambassador Fried. And I appreciate both your interest and
your insights that you've shared with us over the past year and
a half.
Your second question has to do with Russian motives. And,
of course, that's hard, as an outsider, to evaluate. The
Russians have not linked Kosovo with other issues, such as
missile defense. They've just not made the linkage. They have,
however, made the linkage between Kosovo and other separatist
conflicts: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Georgia;
Transnistria, in Moldova. In our view and the view of our
European allies, Kosovo is a unique case. It has no precedent
value. It's unique because of the way Yugoslavia fell apart,
unique because of the Security Council Resolution that has put
Kosovo under U.N. administration for the past 8 years. It has
no bearing on the other separatist conflicts. Russia disagrees.
They have said that, if Kosovo is independent, it is possible
that Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be, as well. We consider
that to be an--we disagree with that position. We believe, and
have said so publicly and privately, that we support the
territorial integrity of Georgia. So, we do--we want to draw a
hard-line under Kosovo and say that this is a one-off case. We
don't like it--we don't like the notion of precedent.
If there's no U.N. resolution, we obviously have a much
more difficult situation. It is much better to do this with a
Security Council resolution than without. There is no advantage
to doing it without a resolution, there are only disadvantages.
However, the situation, as I've said, will not improve with age
and neglect. We can't stay where we are and hope just to kick
this can down the road. There are some problems that have to be
dealt with. We're in very close consultations with our European
partners about exactly this question, and, as President Bush
said last week, the time is now to move ahead--hopefully,
through the U.N. process, but, in any event, we can't simply
kick this down the road and hope for the best.
Senator Voinovich. I am concerned about the availability of
viable options and the involvement of the European Union,
because I have talked with a couple EU members, and they have
some questions about the legality of taking action without a
U.N. Security Council resolution.
I think it is extremely imperative that we allow the
Europeans to take a leadership role here, because it is their
problem more than ours. They will be responsible for the
governance and enforcement of the recommendations and so on.
And I think that perhaps the President might have been more
careful about his statement he made in Albania. I know he
probably wanted to say something that would be well received,
but I think in some quarters, particularly with members of the
European Union, there was a feeling that they would have
preferred him not making that statement.
So, I think everyone must pay careful attention to dot the
I's and cross the T's in the event we decide to proceed without
a U.N. resolution because I do not want to see another Iraq. If
we do not handle this situation carefully, it could blow up. It
will not be as much of a problem as Iraq, but it could be
something that destabilizes the area and does great harm to the
steady progress built up over the last several years there. It
would impact Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
you name it.
Ambassador Fried. It could be very difficult, indeed, and I
completely agree with you that we need to be working in
lockstep with our European partners. We're--we are going to
work with them every step. We're in close consultation with
them. And you are right, that Kosovo affects their security
more than ours. So, when I say that we're working through these
issues with the Europeans, I do mean it. We take that very
seriously.
I also agree that it is in no way advantageous to do things
without a Security Council resolution. Doing things with a
resolution certainly is our preference. Yesterday, we and our
allies introduced a resolution in New York. We stand by that.
And we want to work through the U.N. process. That certainly is
our preference, and we would--we hope that Russia will help us.
But, in any event, we're going to work with our European
colleagues very--and allies--very closely.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fried, thank you for testifying.
I'd like to talk for a minute about the state of democracy
in Russia. You said at a May hearing with the Helsinki
Commission, that Secretary Rice is well informed of issues of
civil society and democratization and the Russian political
scene, and that she had extensive discussions both with
President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov about these issues.
So, how seriously does the Russian Government take United
States concerns about these issues, and has there been any
relaxation of current restrictions on civil society and
political organizations? And, if there has, which elements are
due to U.S. initiatives, and if not, how does the
administration intend to engage with Russia on these essential
democratic tenets?
Ambassador Fried. We have made issues of democracy, press
freedom, civil society, and, in particular, Russia's NGO law, a
subject of bilateral discussions with Russia on many levels.
Secretary Rice has done this. Under Secretary Burns has done
this. I've done this. Our Assistant--my colleague, Assistant
Secretary Lowencron, for Human Rights, has done this.
I can't give you, with certainty, a causality between what
we say to the Russians and their actions. I'll give you an
example; it is not necessarily proof. We did raise the civil--
the NGO registration bill with them, we talked about it with
both the government, the Presidential administration, and with
the Duma. As that bill was going through the committee process,
some changes were made that made it somewhat less onerous. Its
application has not been as--has not had the negative effects
that some people feared. Is that the result of what we and the
Europeans said to Russia? I can't make that claim. I can only
tell you what we did, and I can tell you what the result was.
Do the Russians listen to us? They don't like, I don't
think, to be lectured to. They think that the 1990s was a
period that they were ``talked at,'' and they are resistant.
But we have to speak out where we see problems. And we do. We
have to find the right way to speak out, but we have to
continue to do so. We work with civil society groups. We work
on behalf of a free press. We keep in contact with various
opposition groups.
In the end, Russia's fate is going to be in the hands of
the Russians, both the government, civil society. The role of
outsiders--well-meaning, otherwise--is going to be--is going to
be second order. Russia will find its way, for good or ill.
But, in any event, we should not be silent. We are well past
the point where we regard another country's democracy, or lack
thereof, with indifference.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that candid answer.
I'd now like to briefly touch on the Russia-Iran
relationship and its relevance to the United States. I
understand you believe Russia has been a cooperative player as
of late with regard to sanctioning Iran. In the past, Russia
has been a principal source of assistance in Iran's development
of nuclear power, but now seems to have reversed course of late
by informing Iran that it expects ``spent'' nuclear fuel to be
returned. Russia has also refused to deliver nuclear fuel to
Iran, stopped construction on a nuclear plant, and agreed to
U.N. Security Council sanctions, albeit somewhat weak ones.
What do you think accounts for this reversal? What is driving
Russia's apparent about-face, and can we take it at face value?
Ambassador Fried. Russia's policy and its actions have
moved slowly but steadily in a more positive direction, from
our point of view, over the past 5 or 6 years. I can't say for
certain what accounts for it, but I suspect that some of it has
to do with impatience with the way the Iranian regime has
defied the world and missed opportunity after opportunity to
respond to reasonable proposals.
I think that the Russians do not appreciate the resistance
that Iran has shown to their efforts to advance reasonable
settlements, and I think that we've seen a tightening of
Russian attitudes toward Iran. Certainly, the Russians were
helpful on the two Security Council resolutions we have passed.
And if we get into a third resolution, as I suspect we will, I
hope the Russians will be equally helpful.
Senator Feingold. Well, in that vein, obviously a critical
component dealing with Iran is forging a strong multilateral
consensus, which some elements of this administration seem to
embrace and others do not. And it seems to me that this needs
to include a positive and active engagement from Russian, which
you were just talking about. If Iran continues to move forward
in the direction it is currently headed, and does not cease
uranium enrichment, do you think Russia would be supportive of
more punitive sanctions? I don't know if that's what you were
referring to when you just talked about----
Ambassador Fried. Uh-huh.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. The next phase, but, through
the U.N. Security Council on Iran even though, in the past it
has resisted harsher measures?
Ambassador Fried. I can't make a prediction as to Russian
policy in the future. But the Russians, over the past years,
have moved steadily in a direction of putting more pressure on
Iran to come into compliance with what the United Nations asks
of it. They have done so step by step, in a measured fashion,
but they have moved in this direction.
Sometimes they have not moved as fast, or as far, as we
would like, but, in the end, we've had some pretty good
results. We certainly do believe in a multilateral approach to
this problem. It's been a difficult approach, but we've made
real progress over the past 2\1/2\ years, and we intend to keep
working in this direction.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Voinovich is the preeminent Balkan expert, as far
as I'm concerned, and I pay very close attention. He's been
there many, many times. I've only been there three times, but
I've been to Kosovo as recently as back in January. First
question, do we know for sure if Russia would veto a Security
Council resolution for Kosovo independence?
Ambassador Fried. They have said that they cannot accept,
at this point, any resolution that would provide for Kosovo's
supervised independence. I can't say for sure what they would
do--what they will do with the resolution we introduced
yesterday. They have already publicly said it's inadequate. We
hope to be able to work with them on a resolution that would
let us move forward.
There were a lot of discussions at the G-8 summit about
Kosovo, as you heard. We hope that the Russians will allow this
process to move ahead. It is certainly, as Senator Voinovich
said, much, much better to do this through a Security Council
resolution, and we hope that the Russians make this possible.
Senator Isakson. That is the first best choice. There's no
option----
Ambassador Fried. It is most certainly the first best
choice. There are no advantages to doing this outside of the
Security Council. It is the worst choice than all, except
perhaps doing nothing.
Senator Isakson. Well, I understand the ``kick the can''
comment and the ``do nothing'' comment, with which I also
associate myself. I do think what Senator Voinovich said, in
the possible situation where there is a veto, if things move
forward, hopefully, the first step will be with the European
Union and our European partners. They need to be a critical
part of whatever happens, in the absence of that resolution, I
would think. And I agree wholeheartedly with Senator Voinovich.
Ambassador Fried. As do I, sir.
Senator Isakson. In January, I had the privilege of being
at the International Security Conference, in Munich, with
Secretary Scowcroft, who's here and going to testify later, and
heard the Putin speech that's gotten so much comment. You made
a statement in your testimony--and I heard it, I didn't read
it, so if I said this wrong--but you said, ``The United States
and Russia wish to avoid a rhetorical race to the bottom.'' I
believe that was the quote. Is that right?
Ambassador Fried. Almost. The United States wishes to avoid
a rhetorical race to the bottom.
Senator Isakson. Well, I'm glad you said it that way in
response, because when I heard that speech, which Secretary
Scowcroft and I were just discussing, there very definitely was
the return-to-the-cold-war mentality at the beginning. There
definitely were some less-than-positive comments about the West
in the middle. But, in the end, there appeared, to me, a little
bit of a plea for recognition, and that that was the motivation
of the speech, more than taking the rhetoric to the bottom.
So, with that, my comment on what you've said about the
agenda coming up at Kennebunkport, I think, is very important,
because the rhetoric that comes out of that, and the commentary
that comes out of that, will be that two roads diverged in a
yellow wood, you're going to go down one or the other. And I
hope they come out of it with a little bit better message than
has happened in the individual comments that have been made,
including the speech by Putin, in January, and subsequent ones
that have been made.
Ambassador Fried. I accompanied Secretary Rice in her most
recent trip to Moscow, where she made the point to the
Russians, and publicly, that it was important to keep rhetoric
reasonable and not allow rhetoric to get in the way of
cooperation, where it is possible. But I--and, although I
wasn't at Munich, I certainly read President Putin's speech,
and have read subsequent speeches. So, we all understand that
there has been some rather sharp rhetoric coming from Russia,
and it's important to look at the motivations behind that, but
also to be steady, ourselves.
Senator Isakson. Last, on the Iranian situation and
Russia's recent positive moves, over the missile defense, the
President did quite a good job of--to me--of explaining the
missile defense idea was not aimed at Russia, but it was aimed
at a potential rogue nation that might have one or two or three
warheads in the protection of that area. Do you think making
that point helped Russia take a look at the United Nations and
the world concerns with Iran, and maybe be more positive than
he had been in the past? Because--and I say that, because--
excuse me for interrupting before you spoke--because they have
their difficulties, such as Chechnya, and things of that
nature, so they very well, themselves, could see themselves as
a potential beneficiary from a missile defense system.
Ambassador Fried. We certainly hope that the Russians will
come to understand that our missile defense plans are not
aimed, in any way, at degrading their nuclear arsenal, but are
aimed to deal with future potential threats coming from Iran or
other areas--other countries in the region, and that, on this
basis, they would be prepared to explore with us possibilities
of cooperative arrangements.
Now, if it turns out that President Putin's offer of joint
use of the Qabala radar facility in Azerbaijan, is an opening
to that kind of cooperation, it could be a very important and
positive development. Signals from Russia are mixed, but we
intend to explore the Russian proposal in a very positive
spirit, and we hope that it means what we hope it means.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The chairman is
absent, but he asked to join me in thanking you for your
testimony today, and your forthcoming responses to our
questions for the record. It is always great to have you before
us.
The chairman asked me now to call before the committee our
second panel, and that will be composed of Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski and General Brent Scowcroft. If those gentlemen
would come to the witness table, we would appreciate it, and
we'll proceed, then, with their testimony.
Ambassador Fried. Thank you for your attention, Senator.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Would our next panel please be
seated?
We are, indeed, fortunate to have two former National
Security Advisors, but, much, quite frankly, more consequential
than that, two men who, for the better part of the last two
decades, have played a major, major role in our foreign policy
and strategic doctrine, and two of the most outspoken and well-
respected voices from both a Republican and Democratic
administration. And I welcome you both.
With your permission, I'll put your bios in the record,
since you're probably two of the best-known folks in the
foreign policy field. And, without objection, I'd like to be
able to do that.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Brent Scowcroft
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), a counselor at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, is president of the
Scowcroft Group, Inc., an international business consulting firm. He is
also the founder and president of the Forum for International Policy, a
nonprofit organization providing independent perspectives and opinions
on major foreign policy issues.
General Scowcroft served as assistant to the president for national
security affairs in the Ford and bush administrations. He also served
as military assistant to President Nixon and as deputy assistant to the
president for national security affairs to Presidents Ford and Nixon.
Prior to joining the Bush administration, General Scowcroft was
vice chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc. He serves as director on
the boards of Pennzoil-Quaker State and Qualcomm Corporations. He is
also on the board of advisors of ExpertDriven, Inc.
In the course of his military career, General Scowcroft has held
positions in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
headquarters of the U.S. Air Force, and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Other
assignments included faculty positions at the U.S. Air Force Academy
and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and assistant air attache
in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
General Scowcroft had an aeronautical rating as a pilot and has
numerous military decorations and awards. In addition, President Bush
presented him with the Medal of Freedom Award in 1991. In 1993, Her
Majesty Queen Elizabeth presented him with the insignia of an Honorary
Knight of the British Empire (K.B.E.) at Buckingham Palace.
General Scowcroft was born in Ogden, Utah. He received his
undergraduate degree and commission into the Army Air Forces from the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He has an M.A. and Ph.D. from
Columbia University.
__________
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski is counselor, Center for Strategic and
International Studies; and the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American
Foreign Policy, the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.
From 1977 to 1981, he was National Security Adviser to President
Carter. In 1981 he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom ``for
his role in the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations and for his
contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the
United States.''
Other Current Activities
Public and Pro Bono: honorary chairman, AmeriCares Foundation (a
private philanthropic humanitarian aid organization); co-chairman,
American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus; member, board of
directors, Jamestown Foundation; member, board of trustees,
International Crisis Group; trustee, Trilateral Commission (a
cooperative American-European-Japanese forum); member, board of
directors, Polish-American Enterprise Fund and of the Polish-American
Freedom Foundation; member, Honorary Board of American Friends of Rabin
Medical Center; chairman, International Advisory Board for the Yale
Project on ``The Culture & Civilization of China''; member,
International Honorary Committee, Museum of the History of Polish Jews
in Warsaw, etc.
Private Sector: international adviser to major U.S./global
corporations; frequent participant in annual business/trade
conventions; also a frequent public speaker, commentator on major
domestic and foreign TV programs, and contributor to domestic and
foreign newspapers and journals.
Past Activities
U.S. Government: 1966-68, member of the Policy Planning Council of
the Department of State; 1985, member of the President's Chemical
Warfare Commission; 1987-88, member of the NSC-Defense Department
Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy; 1987-89, member of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory board (a Presidential
commission to oversee U.S. intelligence activities).
Public and Political: 1973-76, director of the Trilateral
Commission; in the 1968 Presidential campaign, chairman of the Humphrey
Foreign Policy Task Force; in the 1976 Presidential campaign, principal
foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter; in 1988, co-chairman of the
Bush National Security Advisory Task Force; past member of boards of
directors of Amnesty International, Council of Foreign Relations,
Atlantic Council, the National Endowment for Democracy; 2004, co-chair,
Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force, Iran:
Time for a New Approach.
Academic: On the faculty of Columbia University 1960-89; on the
faculty of Harvard University 1953-60; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1953;
B.A. and M.A., McGill University 1949 and 1950; his most recent book is
``The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership''; also author of
``The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives''; the best selling ``The Grand Failure: The Birth and
Death of Communism in the 20th Century,'' as well as ``Out of Control:
Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century''; ``Game Plan: How To
Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest''; ``Power and Principle: Memoirs of
the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981''; ``The Fragile Blossom:
Crisis and Change in Japan''; ``Between Two Ages: America's Role in the
Technetronic Era''; ``The Soviet bloc: Unity and Conflict''; and of
other books and many articles in numerous U.S. and foreign academic
journals.
The Chairman. And I would now, because we're very anxious
to hear what you have to say, turn to you, Dr. Brzezinski, by
pointing out, by the way, that you and I suffer from a similar
fate; we have children who are better than we are. Your
daughter is incredible. I don't know whether you get a chance
to watch her on television, but she is--she's tough, and she's
smart, you've trained her well. My dad used to say, ``The
greatest satisfaction a parent can have is to look at their
children and know they had turned out better than they did.'' I
think that can be said about you--as well as your sons.
But, at any rate, I welcome you, and the floor is yours,
and, after that, we'll turn to you, General Scowcroft, and
we're anxious to hear from you both.
STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR; COUNSELOR AND TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have totally
disarmed me. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Though it happens to be true.
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I realize that. I'm now at a stage in
my life in which, when I go into a restaurant, people come up
to me, and I puff up, because, you know, I feel I'm being
recognized, and they say to me, ``Are you the father of Mika?''
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, I'm known as Beau Biden's father, in
Delaware. He's the attorney general. So----
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much for having me here, and
the issue that you're focusing on is obviously important and
timely. I'll make a few comments about it, in general, but let
me start by giving three capsule formulations which guide my
approach to this issue. The first is: Don't dramatize. The
second is: Don't propitiate. The third thing is: Don't
personalize.
In my view, we're not facing a renewal of the cold war. I
think that is an overdramatization of the present state of
American-Russian relationships. But we are in a phase of a cold
peace, and that cold peace is related to Russia's internal, and
rather difficult, historical transition.
Russia is in the process of moving from an imperial
consciousness, an imperial evocation which has defined it over
the centuries, to being a national state imbued with
nationalism as the source of its internal unity, as the source
of its political impetus.
It has, as a consequence, regional ambitions. And we have
seen them reflected in some one-sided, highhanded actions by
Russia toward Estonia or toward Georgia or toward Ukraine. And
it is still motivated, at least on the top elite levels, by
what might be called an imperial nostalgia.
But the basic fact is, it is no longer a superpower. Its
economy is one-dimensional. It's an energy-exporting economy,
but it has a very antiquated industrial infrastructure. Its
social conditions outside of the major cities are still rather
poor and primitive. And Russia faces an extremely serious
demographic crisis in which its population is declining
rapidly, and, while declining, it is also aging rapidly, which
is a rather incongruous combination, but it maximizes the
economic and social weaknesses of Russia.
Russia today, worldwide, has no ideological appeal. The
Soviet Union did. Russia cannot exploit an ideological appeal,
because it doesn't have it. It tries to substitute for it by
money. And it's learning to play the money game, including, I
may add here, in Washington. If there is any doubt about it,
you should have your staff dig up for you an article which
appeared in the Wall Street Journal about a month or so ago on
how Russian money is used in this city to buy services and
influence.
But money, unlike ideology, does not buy commitment, it
doesn't generate devotion. It can capitalize on opportunism,
and it can be very useful, but not as a powerful source of
influence.
Russia is, therefore, in no position to reignite a cold war
with us, either. And it's rather interesting to me to note that
Russian observers say that quite often. A leading Russian
geopolitical thinker recently observed, in writing--Dmitri
Trenin is his name--``Energy superpower is a myth, and a
dangerous one, because it may mislead the Russian leaders into
thinking they have more influence than they actually can
generate thereby.''
An article in a major Russian paper, Novaya Gazeta,
recently said the following: ``Would a confrontation,''
presumably with the United States, ``be beneficial to Russia?''
The answer: ``Obviously not. Russia's economic resources are
not comparable to those of the West. In the event of a
confrontation, our country would certainly have to choose
between guns and butter, while the West, much to the
displeasure of many Russian,'' quote/unquote, ``patriots,'' can
afford both. A confrontation would not be good for the budgets
of Russian corporations, some of them already burdened with
debts to Western creditors; neither would it increase dividends
for their shareholders. That's the best-case scenario. In the
worst-case scenario, the Western creditors would call in their
debts, and a substantial part of those debts would be paid by
the state at the expense of the people.''
In brief, I don't think we are moving toward a
confrontation of a cold-war type, but it is a process of
accommodation to the new realities prevailing between us and
the Russians and involving, also, Russia's new, different
position in the world.
A broader accommodation between the United States and
Russia, which one had hoped for in the early 1990s, I think has
been delayed by two wars and their destructive impact on the
policies, both of Russia and of the United States. I have in
mind, first of all, the war in Chechnya, which badly damaged
democratic prospects in Russia and set in motion political
processes which have emphasized authoritarian institutions of
power. And, I think, by and large, the West ignored that.
Interestingly, only one Western leader who is now in power has
made an issue of that war, its destructive and immoral aspects,
and that's President Sarkozy, who explicitly said, recently,
that he condemns the silence about the 200,000 dead and 400,000
war refugees in Chechnya generated by the war. He's been quite
outspoken on that subject.
The war in Iraq has damaged American position in the world,
and that's created temptations for the Russians, for Putin
personally, to exploit the consequences of that war, and some
of his rhetoric clearly reflects that, the recent rhetoric; and
some of his statements addressed towards Western Europe, such
as about targeting sites in Western Europe, or their other
excessively energetic reaction to the Estonian incident
involving the Russian War Memorial, or the CFE issue that was
recently raised in Vienna, reflects, in my judgment, an
excessive reaction, which has rebounded negatively against
Russia.
Having said this, I will also argue that the Putin regime--
probably followed before too long by, perhaps, the Ivanov
regime--is gradually coming to an end, in the sense that that
regime reflects the last gasp of the old Soviet elite. They are
the products of the KGB, once the pampered children of the
Soviet system with access to the world, with access to the
Western literature, trained in politics and hard-nosed playing.
But, within a decade they're going to be replaced, probably by
a new generation of leaders, many of them trained in the West,
much more open to the West, not brought up in this imperial
atmosphere. And hence, in the longer run I think we can more
optimistic and expect steady improvement in American-Russian
relations.
In that context, Mr. Chairman, I think our policy should
reflect the mixed nature of shared, as well as conflicting,
interests with Russia. We should emphasize nonproliferation as
a shared interest. And I think we do, to some extent. The
growing interdependence, economically, is to be welcomed. I
think, personally, the Jackson-Vanik amendment should be looked
at critically. The WTO issue is, I take it, maturing, and,
before long, Russia will be entering.
But we should, at the same time, support the new states
around Russia in the preservation of their independence. We
should further economic cooperation, particularly in energy,
but avoid dependence. And we have been slack in exploiting
opportunities in Central Asia, with the risk to potential
diversification. And, above all else, our long-range goal ought
to be to create a context in which Russia sees its own interest
in becoming more closely associated with the Euroatlantic
world, because, in my view--in fact, historically--there is no
other option for Russia. Russia, as an imperial undertaking, is
already historically assayed.
Russia, as a regional dominant power, will simply stimulate
the resentment of all of its neighbors, and it has, to some
extent, already. Russia alone, between the Euroatlantic world
and China, runs the risk, eventually, of losing its vast
eastern spaces to China. Russia really has no choice but to be
part of the West, and we should try to catalyze that.
And an important way of catalyzing that is to help Ukraine
become part of the West. And I emphasize that. Helping Ukraine
to be part of the West is not an anti-Russian policy, it is a
policy which paves the way for Russia to be part of Europe,
because if Ukraine moves to Europe, to the West, Russia will
have to follow suit. So, it is a strategic objective that is
actually in our shared interest.
Let me conclude by one final point. The President will be
entertaining Mr. Putin in Kennebunkport. In my view, personal
theatrics should follow progress in strategic relationships,
but should not create deceptive illusions. If I may say so, it
is lesson to be drawn from the experience of the Bush-Gorbachev
relationship in which Brent was involved. That was a
relationship in which personal cordiality was closely linked to
strategic progress, and strategic progress preceded personal
cordiality, and that, in my judgment, was the way to do it.
To do it the other way is to create illusions,
misconceptions; it breeds assertions such as the one made not
long ago by the Secretary of State, that the American-Russian
relationship is the best in history. It isn't. And it takes a
long time and effort to make it the best in history. But
personal relationships should formalize and express a changing
reality.
And I hope that, before the President meets Putin in
Kennebunkport, and entertains him in this family setting, which
is likely to create illusions, that he reads an important book.
And I brought it here. It's called, ``A Russian Diary,'' by
Anna Politkovskaya. And this is the Russian journalist who was
shot to death in Moscow not long ago.
Mr. Putin dismissed the significance of her killing. The
killers have not been discovered. And the book is a remarkable
statement of personal courage and decency by a sensitive
Russian woman who just kept a diary about what is happening
today in Russia, day after day after day, noting the things
that troubled her, politically and morally. And it conveys what
is good about the Russian people, some of them: their depth of
feeling, their ability to empathize, their sense of history.
But it also conveys what's wrong, and what shouldn't be
ignored: The brutality, the insensitivity, the mendacity, the
cruelty, particularly--and she was concerned with that--in
Chechnya, but, more generally, in the system at large.
We have to have that mixed perspective to understand what
is going on, and we have to feel for someone like Politkovskaya
to have a better understanding of both the opportunities and
limits of the personal relationship with a President who
originates from a very particular institution of the Soviet
state, and whose traditions, to some extent, he still embodies.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security
Advisor; Counselor and Trustee, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
how to avoid a new cold war
America's relationship with Russia is on a downward slide.
President Vladimir Putin's recent threat to retarget Russian missiles
at some of America's European allies is just the latest flash point.
The elaborate charade of feigned friendship between Putin and
President George W. Bush, begun several years ago when Bush testified
to the alleged spiritual depth of his Russian counterpart's soul,
hasn't helped. The fact that similarly staged ``friendships''--between
F.D.R. and ``Uncle Joe'' Stalin, Nixon and Brezhnev, Clinton and
Yeltsin--ended in mutual disappointment did not prevent Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice from boasting not long ago that U.S.-Russian
relations were now the best in history. Surely it would be preferable
to achieve a genuine, sustainable improvement before staging public
theatrics designed to create the illusion that one has taken place.
It's a lesson Bush should keep in mind in July, when Putin is scheduled
to visit the President in Kennebunkport, Maine.
There are many reasons for the chill but none greater than the
regrettable wars both nations have launched: Russia's in Chechnya and
the U.S.'s in Iraq. The wars have damaged prospects for what seemed
attainable a decade and a half ago: Russia and the United States
genuinely engaged in collaboration based on shared common values,
spanning the old cold war dividing lines and thereby enhancing global
security and expanding the transatlantic community.
The war in Chechnya reversed the ambiguous trend toward democracy
in Russia. Mercilessly waged by Putin with extraordinary brutality, it
not only crushed a small nation long victimized by Russian and then
Soviet imperialism but also led to political repression and greater
authoritarianism inside Russia and fueled chauvinism among Russia's
people. Putin exploited his success in stabilizing the chaotic post-
Soviet society by restoring central control over political life. The
war in Chechnya became his personal crusade, a testimonial to the
restoration of Kremlin clout.
Since the beginning of that war, a new elite--the siloviki from the
FSB (the renamed KGB) and the subservient new economic oligarchs--has
come to dominate policymaking under Putin's control. This new elite
embraces a strident nationalism as a substitute for Communist ideology
while engaging in thinly veiled acts of violence against political
dissenters. Putin almost sneeringly dismissed the murder of a leading
Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, who exposed crimes against the
Chechens. Similarly, troubling British evidence of Russian involvement
in the London murder of an outspoken FSB defector produced little more
than official Russian ridicule. All the while, Russia's mass media are
facing ever growing political restrictions.
It doubtless has not escaped the Kremlin's attention that the West,
including the United States, has remained largely silent. The Bush
administration was indifferent to the slaughter in Chechnya, and after
9/11 it even tacitly accepted Putin's claim that in crushing the
Chechens, he was serving as a volunteer in Bush's global ``war on
terror.'' The killing of journalist Politkovskaya and Putin's dismissal
of its import similarly failed to temper the affectations of personal
camaraderie between the leaders in the White House and the Kremlin. For
that matter, neither has the general antidemocratic regression in
Russia's political life.
The apparent American indifference should not be attributed just to
a moral failure on the part of U.S. policymakers. Russia has gained
impunity in part because of the effects of America's disastrous war in
Iraq on U.S. foreign policy. Consider the fallout: Guantanamo has
discredited America's longstanding international legitimacy; false
claims of Iraqi WMD have destroyed U.S. credibility; continuing chaos
and violence in Iraq have diminished respect for U.S. power. America,
as a result, has come to need Russia's support on matters such as North
Korea and Iran to a far greater extent than it would if not for Iraq.
As a consequence, two dominant moods now motivate the Kremlin
elite: Schadenfreude at the U.S.'s discomfort and a dangerous
presumption that Russia can do what it wishes, especially in its
geopolitical backyard. The first has led Moscow to take malicious slaps
at America's tarnished superpower status, propelled by feel-good
expectations of the U.S.'s further slide. One should not underestimate
Russia's resentment over the fall of the Soviet Union (Putin has called
it the greatest disaster of the 20th century) and its hope that the
United States will suffer the same fate. Indeed, Kremlin strategists
surely relish the thought of a United States deeply bogged down not
only in Iraq but also in a war with Iran, which would trigger a
dramatic spike in the price of oil, a commodity in plentiful supply in
Russia.
The second mood--that Russia has free rein to act as it pleases on
the international scene--is also ominous. It has already tempted Moscow
to intimidate newly independent Georgia; reverse the gains of the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine; wage aggressive cyberwar against EU
member Estonia after the Estonians dared to remove from the center of
their capital a monument celebrating Soviet domination of their
country; impose an oil embargo on Lithuania; monopolize international
access to the energy resources of Central Asia. In all these cases, the
United States, consumed as it is by the war in Iraq, has been rather
passive. U.S. policy toward Russia has been more grandiloquent than
strategic.
Despite the tensions, the uneasy state of the relationship need not
augur a renewed cold war. The longer term trends simply do not favor
the more nostalgic dreams of the Kremlin rulers. For all of Russia's
economic recovery, its prospects are uncertain. Russia's population is
dramatically shrinking, even as its Asian neighbors are growing and
expanding their military and economic might. The glamour of Moscow and
the glitter of St. Petersburg cannot obscure the fact that much of
Russia still lacks a basic modern infrastructure.
Oil-rich Russia (its leaders refer to it as an ``energy
superstate'') in some ways is reminiscent of Nigeria, as corruption and
money laundering fritter away a great deal of the country's wealth. To
an extent, Russia can use its vast profits to get its way. But buying
influence, even in Washington (where money goes a long way), cannot
match the clout the Soviet Union once enjoyed as the beacon of an
ideology with broad international appeal.
In these circumstances, the United States should pursue a calm,
strategic (and nontheatrical) policy toward Moscow that will help
ensure that a future, more sober Kremlin leadership recognizes that a
Russia linked more closely to the United States and the European Union
will be more prosperous, more democratic and territorially more secure.
The United States should avoid careless irritants, like its clumsily
surfaced initiative to deploy its missile defenses next door to Russia.
And it should not dismiss out of hand Moscow's views on, for example,
negotiations with Iran, lest Russia see its interests better served by
a U.S.-Iran war.
But the United States should react firmly when Russia tries to
bully its neighbors. America should insist that Russia ratify the
European Energy Charter to dispel fears of energy blackmail. The United
States should continue to patiently draw Ukraine into the West so that
Russia will have to follow suit or risk becoming isolated between the
Euro-Atlantic community and a powerful China. And, above all, the
United States should terminate its war in Iraq, which is so damaging to
America's ability to conduct an intelligent and comprehensive foreign
policy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Scowcroft.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF (RET.),
FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR; PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT
GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
General Scowcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting us
to appear before you on such an important subject.
Almost everything that could be said about the relationship
has been said this morning, and I will not tread the same path
that Zbig has. I largely agree with his observations. But let
me just say, briefly, where I come from.
I believe that Russia is in the process--Zbig called it a
historical transition--I think it's--it is that, but it is
Russia coming to grips with itself. Zbig said Russia is no
longer a superpower. That is a--we can pass that off our
tongues. That is a traumatic event for Russia and the Russian
peoples. They're used to occupying a huge space, huge
geopolitical space in the world, and this is a traumatic
adjustment for them. And I think this adjustment is taking
place in typical Russian fashion.
We're not going to determine the outcome. We can hasten it,
we can retard it. There are many disagreeable aspects to this
current phase in the transition, different from previous ones,
hopefully worse than succeeding ones. But preaching to them
about how they ought to be just like us is, first of all, not
likely to succeed, and, second, not likely to be useful;
indeed, it could be counterproductive. We ought to make certain
that they understand our views on their policy and what we
think of it, but that's different from harassing them and,
thus, exacerbating the situation.
I think that, on the whole, at this particular juncture, we
ought to focus on the things that we can do together rather
than on the things that divide us. And there are many of those.
I think--Senator Isakson talked about Putin's speech, which
began this rhetorical descent last February, and there were
three parts to Putin's speech. And it--I think it tells more
about what's going on, both in Putin's mind and in the Russian
soul, if you will, than the actual words themselves. He--there
were three parts to his speech. The first part of his speech
was, ``At the end of the cold war, when we were flat on our
back, you walked all over us. You took advantage of us, you
pushed us here and there.'' The facts are almost irrelevant
here; that's the way they feel. This is part of this descent
from superpower into abject poverty and insignificance.
The second part of his speech was, ``We're now strong
again''--largely due to energy, but, ``now we're strong again,
and we're going to push back. We're not going to take it
anymore.'' And that, again, is the Russian bravado in the face
of difficult circumstances.
But the third part of his speech, nobody paid any attention
to. He said, ``But now we need to cooperate. We need to
cooperate on strategic nuclear weapons. We need to get on with
this accession to the Moscow Treaty. We need to cooperate on
nonproliferation, and we need to cooperate so that no country
feels it necessary to nationally enrich uranium.'' Now, that's
a pretty dramatic statement, and nobody paid any attention to
that.
And so, I think what we need to do is to work to
understand--not--we don't need to sympathize with the Russians,
they are where they are, but we need to understand what
motivates them, in part. And I think the trauma they're going
through is probably harder than--for the Russians than almost
any other society of which I'm aware.
But to try to work on the kinds of things that we do have
in common, among them are the things that Putin mentioned--
nuclear weapons, Iran, those kinds of things--we do not differ
significantly on those, and I think we can make progress. The
area around Russia, the former Soviet space, and so on, that is
probably the area where we come close to confronting each other
right now.
On the personal versus the policy, I don't disagree with
Zbig at all, but I think one of the things that has happened
since the end of the Soviet Union is that the leaders have
gotten together--gotten along much better than the
bureaucracies on both sides. I don't think there's ever been a
real reconciliation of the bureaucracies. We don't like dealing
with each other. The first attempt to do it was the Gore-
Chernomyrdin thing, to force the bureaucracies to work
together, and so on.
Then there was personal diplomacy. When President Bush,
early in his first term, met with Putin and says, ``Here's
somebody I think we can do business with,'' and that sort of
suffused a glow, but there wasn't anything underneath it, and
it fell apart, partly because of our actions. Putin reached out
after 9/11, reached out about terrorism, and we pretty much
brushed him aside. I think Putin thought he was going to be
able to participate in Afghanistan and so on, because they knew
much more about it, and so on. So, I think now he feels
rebuffed, and I think this is his answer.
Will this solve the problems? No. But Kennebunkport is
quintessentially atmosphere. And if we can change the
atmosphere, it might affect the policy. But this is going to be
a long road. And, I think, on our part--hey, we're the winners
here--on our part, it's going to take a lot of patience,
understanding, and firmness, when required.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Why don't I yield to Senator Lugar to begin.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Scowcroft, as you commented, there were some areas
of potential cooperation presented by President Putin in the
speech that Senator Isakson and you heard at the Munich
Security Conference. You pointed out that he mentioned
cooperation on weapons of mass destruction, with the goal of
trying to bring proper controls to weapons and materials.
Likewise, the possibility of providing nuclear fuel services to
countries that are prepared to forego enrichment and
reprocessing technologies that could also be used for weapons
purposes. You suggested that perhaps no one was listening to
these proposals, but the chairman, Senator Isakson, and I were.
This is why we queried the previous witness about where our
administration is heading in these areas, where I believe there
are tremendous opportunities which are very important for our
security, as well as Russia's.
You also indicated, however, that there are potential
controversies in so-called Russian space, as they see it,
countries that are near Russia or on their borders.
Specifically on how we pursue energy supplies for ourselves, as
well as for our friends in NATO or Europe, and it's in this
area that I really want you to comment. How do we discuss with
Russia the important work, for instance, that Dr. Brzezinski is
doing in a task force with former Minister Volker Ruhe, of
Germany. The group is advising Ukraine on how it might progress
at a very difficult time in that country's development? Or,
those of us who have been visiting frequently in Georgia, with
a government there that certainly counts upon our understanding
and support. Similarly, our strong support for the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that travels through Georgia and
perhaps, in the future, connecting with Kazakhstan and other
energy sources further east. What is an appropriate way to
approach Russians on these subjects without presenting an in-
your-face-type strategy? These issues are important to us, and
we do not hide that. And we need to engage with Russia in a
dialogue on these subjects, in addition to other areas in which
we might seek cooperation.
General Scowcroft. Well, I think--I think that this is the
most difficult area for us to cooperate. And I think we each
deeply suspect the motives of the other in it. And I think I
would probably disagree with Zbig on Ukraine. I think having
Ukraine lead the Soviet Union to the West probably will
retard--Soviet Union--Russia to the West--will retard Russia
going to the West, because they will look at it as us trying to
tear the brotherhood apart and isolate Russia and bring Ukraine
into the West.
I think we need to be very cautious on this. You know, one
of the problems in the--with the previous witness, we talked
about the NGO, blah, in Russia. Well, look what happened. The
Orange Revolution--we trumpeted the role of the NGOs in the
Orange Revolution. What do the Russians do? They turn around
and say, ``We've got NGOs here, we'd better prevent that from
happening.'' Was it intended? No. No, it wasn't. But we have--
we need to think more--put ourselves in Russian shoes and be
smarter in the way we handle things.
On the other hand, with energy, for example, I think we
ought to make clear to the Russians that we are not content
with them having an energy monopoly, and thus, coercive
capability over Europe. And I think we ought to push hard, just
as an example, for a pipeline under the Caspian Sea, which
would bring Central Asian oil and gas into Europe. It doesn't
hurt Russia, it simply breaks their monopoly.
So, I think we need to be more sophisticated than we have,
because each one of these problems needs to be dealt with on
its own bottom.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Brzezinski, would you want to comment on
Ukraine, specifically, and the difference of opinion that
apparently you have with General Scowcroft?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, first of all, let me say that I don't
think foreign policy is the same thing as psychiatry. Foreign
policy involves defining your objectives, assessing how
reasonable it is to seek them, try to avoid a confrontation
with the other side, while, at the same time, advancing those
objectives, in a manner that doesn't put the other side in
complete jeopardy. That requires careful balancing, but not an
excessive concern for the moods and sensitivities of the
others, because that opens you up to manipulation and
exploitation.
Obviously, it's important to have a sense of history and
understand what is happening in a given part of the world, but,
in doing so, I think one has to have a much broader view than
concentration simply on hurt feelings or complexes.
As far as Ukraine is concerned, I think the argument that
Ukraine moving to the West is going to help Russia move to the
West is sustainable by some degree of evidence. For example,
the fact that Ukraine has been moving forward on WTO has helped
to accelerate Russian interest in moving into WTO. And that's
all to the good. I want Russia in WTO. I'll be very happy to
see Russia in WTO.
I think the question of energy dependence of Ukraine and
Russia, and the issue of ownership of pipelines in Ukraine, has
helped to advance a discussion on access, not only of Russian
capital to downstream arrangements in the West, but Western
capital to upstream arrangements in Russia--again, creating a
suction effect on Russia moving to the West.
So, I rather stick to my position, that advancing Ukraine's
evolution to the West is not an anti-Russian policy, but one
which, in fact, paves the way to Russia moving in the same
direction.
Conversely, if we adopt a policy toward Ukraine which is
dependent on Russian sensitivities, we will help to reawaken
the lingering nostalgia for, essentially, an imperial position
in which Ukraine, Belarus, and the others are viewed as an
extension of a traditional sphere of imperial power.
Finally, when it comes to dealing with the question of the
oil producers outside of Russia, and particularly the Central
Asian states, I think we have to deal with them directly, and
make an effort to deal with them directly, and make it
attractive to them to diversify the sources of access to world
markets.
The fact of the matter is that all of these new states feel
vulnerable in their political independence, and they prefer to
be independent. And they know that, if they have no access to
world markets, they become much more susceptible to pressures.
But to deal with that, one has to negotiate with them and be
prepared to really make serious commitments.
The reason we got the Baku-Ceyhan line was that the United
States was really prepared to put its money where its mouth is
to develop a consortium that was engaged in this effort. I know
a little bit about it, because I was a presidentially emissary
to Azerbaijan, dealing with that issue, and that was a success.
We need to do the same now regarding the Trans-Caspian pipeline
that Brent correctly mentioned. That's very important. But that
means we have to deal with the Turkmeni regime at a very high
level, flatter them, take into account their diverse national
interests; we have to deal with Kazakhstan. And we shouldn't go
too far--in fact, I think we have gone too far--in ostracizing
the Uzbek regime, which is also an important source of
independence for the Central Asian states. So, we have to have
a comprehensive strategy, which is not one of hostility toward
Russia, but which is designed, above all else, to create a
context in which Russia's movement to the West, to the European
community, to a closer association with it, is tangibly
furthered, in keeping with historical dynamics.
Senator Lugar. I thank you both.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, welcome.
A question for each of you. What should be the agenda for
July 1 and 2, in Kennebunkport, when the two Presidents meet?
Dr. Brzezinski.
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, a nice boat trip----
[Laughter.]
Dr. Brzezinski [continuing]. Photo opportunity, family
dinner, showing great conviviality, joint press conference on
the lawn in a nice-scening setting. But then, in addition to
it--and, actually, more seriously--I would hope that the
President would say to Mr. Putin, ``Look, we have a long road
to travel. Your country and my country are going to be playing
important roles in the world. We have to deal with problems in
a calm, nonaccusatory fashion. It would be good if your
neighbors feared you less, hated you less, and perhaps you
ought to think a little bit about that. It might be helpful to
you to know that the road to the West for you is also going to
be open, that we would like to have a closer association with
you in some fashion.''
I am not sure the Russians really want to be part of NATO,
and probably their membership in it would mean the death of
NATO, but we can have a wider security arrangement with them,
particularly focusing on nonproliferation and more tangibly on
Iran.
I think we could say to them that we would help and support
some wider arrangement involving the transatlantic community
and its special association with Russia, historically. If we
look, 20, 30 years ahead, I think the Russians know that they
have a serious problem in the Far East, which is being
depopulated, and which faces an overpopulated and thriving
China; and some shared engagement in the development of a
Euroatlantic community that embraces Russia is a vision that I
think would attract many Russians, who know that their standard
of living is infinitely lower than in the West, and that their
security is threatened by protracted isolation in the
democratic crisis.
I think that would be helpful. But specific negotiating
relationships cannot be negotiated in a weekend in which
neither President is really supported by a lot of the material
that is needed by the complexities of respective positions, and
so forth, and I would not like to create illusions if, you
know, personal friendship that obscures certain problems that
we have to work out in common.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
General Scowcroft.
General Scowcroft. I agree largely with that, except about
the boat trip----
[Laughter.]
General Scowcroft [continuing]. Which, in my experience,
could set back U.S.-Russian relations by a few decades.
[Laughter.]
I--no, two people are not going to solve the problems.
There's no question about that. And foreign policy is not
psychiatry, but foreign policy is not made by states. There is
nothing--Russia, United States. It's made by people. And when
you're making policy, you need to figure out, How is the
policy--how is it going to be taken? What you want to do is, do
it in a way that makes it more effective. And I believe Zbig
has been very critical of this administration by saying, ``We
know what's right, you just fall in line behind us.'' We don't
consult, and so on, and so forth.
So, that's what I'm talking about, and, it seems to me,
on--the one area where Russia, putatively, is still a
superpower, that is in nuclear weapons. But the two of them
could sit down and say, ``Look, we're the''--it could even take
off from Putin's speech at Verkunde--``OK, let's do--let's
figure out what we do after 2009. What's the kind of nuclear
world we'd like to see in 30 years? How do we deal with
nonproliferation? How do we deal with nonproliferation in Iran,
North Korea?'' and so on. That is something the two of them
could, in broad outlines, come to an agreement on and set the
course for negotiations, which, right now, I think, are pretty
nonexistent.
Senator Hagel. Also for each of you, what is your sense of
the Putin succession process? We have parliamentary elections
scheduled in Russia this fall--in December--and then a
Presidential succession election scheduled for next year.
Dr. Brzezinski.
Dr. Brzezinski. I think Putin will step aside, and I think
that's an important step. If he does it, he will be the first
ruler of Russia to have ever done so. And, even if he retains
influence behind the scenes, that, nonetheless, is an important
step in institutionalizing regularity and respect for
procedures.
His most likely successor, however, is going to be someone
from his immediate entourage. The one that's talked about the
most is the recently promoted Secretary of Defense Ivanov, who
is also a KGB product, who actually tends to be even somewhat
more outspoken, more--sharper--maybe belligerent is too strong
a word, but more assertive in some ways than Putin has been,
even in the last year. And he may be even more inclined than
Putin to appeal to Russian nationalism and its various roots,
including the resentments and so forth that Brent has talked
about.
So, in that sense, I don't think there's going to be a
significant change of policy. However, I do think that the next
President of Russia is going to be facing a much more serious
economic and social crisis. Putin has been able to consolidate
the chaos that ensued upon the fall of the Soviet Union. And
this year, 2007, Russia regained the same level of GDP that it
had at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, which is also
a measure of the problems that they've had to overcome, because
they've had a lot of growth in recent years, but they have now
reached only the level of the former Soviet Union. But, in
doing so, they haven't really made major investments in social
infrastructure, in addressing the social problems. And these
will come home to roost in the course of the next presidential
incumbency. And that, I think, will be the time when, perhaps,
new voices and new faces will begin to appear on the political
scene.
And I'm preoccupied about the short-term relationship,
because I think we have to have a strategic framework for it,
but I'm, historically, more optimistic about the long range,
once the Soviet elite that Putin and Ivanov exemplify has
passed from the scene and an altogether new political formation
begins to dominate the political scene, people who have been
part of the world, who have dealt with the world, who have gone
to Western business schools and so forth.
So, that is basically the prognosis. Greater difficulties
inside, but also probably, eventually, resumption of more
positive political change.
Senator Hagel. General Scowcroft.
General Scowcroft. I, too, believe that Putin will step
down. I believe he will try to manage things from behind the
scenes. Whether he subsequently will attempt to change the
Constitution to put power on a Prime Minister is another thing.
But they have one great element of cohesion. If you take
what, putatively, are the 10 top people in the structure right
now, they're also chairmen of some of the top corporations
and--commercial entities--in Russia. So, the overwhelming
objective is to preserve that, because, if they leave office,
then they will lose that. So, there is this attempt, which
they're assiduously carrying out, to make sure that there's
nothing that disrupts the transfer of power.
But I think what's likely to happen--Putin ruled in a very
unusual time. He followed Yeltsin--a time of great chaos, and
so on--and there was great angst in Russia about things falling
apart. He brought it back together. I believe his successor
will have a lot more trouble. I think there could be splits
within the leadership, and so on. And I agree with Zbig, that
gradually this will evolve into something which is more
reasonable, more stable, and durable. But--whether it'll happen
immediately after Putin, I don't know, but I think it will
happen.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I'd like to pursue what we've been talking about
the last few minutes. To the extent that it matters, I share
your view that, generationally, there's reason for optimism,
that we're--in the next, whether it's 3 years, 5 years, 10
years, there is likely--there is a greater reason to be
optimistic about developments internally in Russia.
And you said, Zbig, that your present preoccupation--this
was the specific issues that affect our bilateral relationships
now--if--there's only one thing I look at that makes me
pessimistic about the optimistic projection of a emerging
generation educated in the West--different perspective, not
coming out of the security apparatus--that worries me, and that
is strategic doctrine, strategic relationship. If we do not,
during this period of transition, harness and deal with what is
a, I think, very worrisome strategic relationship the next
couple of years--that is, not as it relates to threatening one
another, but as it relates to the continued instability of
stored material--plutonium, highly enriched uranium--failure to
follow through on the Moscow treaty, losing an opportunity to
move toward significantly further reductions--that I don't know
how you recapture that if it begins to erode.
I mean, you know, there's a lot of things we can change. We
can change--almost by treaty, by discussion, by agreement--
energy relationships. We can change relationships as it relates
to our economic relationships, our--but I don't know how you
harness what will become a very--a lost opportunity here, if
something isn't done more concretely to promote this--what has,
heretofore, been a progressively better strategic--a--sort of a
consensus on how to deal with the existence of nuclear weapons
and material, and cooperating together to prevent further
proliferation.
Could you talk to me a little bit about that dynamic? I
mean, it seems to me--Putin talked about it, it's the positive
part of his speech--it seems to me that it raises and ups the
ante on its importance. It's the one place we may be able to
cooperate. And failure to deal with it--because I see no--
I've--I don't detect any sense--and Senator Lugar would be
better prepared to speak to this than I would, in his
relationships with the administration--I don't detect any sense
of urgency. As a matter of fact, I don't detect any sense of
desire to maintain what is viewed as the old regime, in terms
of arms control, even improving it. So, that's a little bit of
a rambling preamble to my question.
Could you guys discuss a little bit about strategic
doctrine, United States-Russian attempts to deal with
proliferation--controlling, reduction, et cetera?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, let me, perhaps, parse what you have
said into three segments. One is the United States-Russian
strategic relationship, strictly speaking. Second is the issue
of nuclear proliferation, including ``loose nukes,'' you know,
theft from arsenals, the Nunn-Lugar Initiative, and all of
that. And the third is the geopolitical context on how it might
interplay, particularly with the second of the three.
I think, basically, the strategic relationship between the
United States and Russia is relatively stable, in the sense
that both sides have an equilibrium that they can live with and
that is reasonable--reasonably understood by both sides. Though
there are some uncertainties that should not be ignored, I
personally think that we may have been somewhat insensitive to
the Russian sense of American nuclear superiority--which, in
effect, does exist--in our pursuit of the missile defense
shield in Central Europe, some aspects of which do impinge on
Russian capabilities, either immediately, in the short run--
that is to say, the radar facility, which would actually cover
part of Russia--not so much the 10 interceptors in Poland, but
if the interceptor system becomes larger in scale, and more
effective, statistically, in probabilities, it could affect, in
the long run, Russian capabilities. So, I think we should have
been a little more prudent in the unveiling of this system.
The second aspect is the ``loose nukes.'' Obviously, much
more needs to be done. And I am deferring, in this respect, to
Senator Lugar, who has been a pioneer in this issue. But
obviously, we and the Russians have, and should have, a
continued stake in making certain that there is no illicit
access to these systems outside of the preeminent state actors
that are responsible for generating the existence of these
systems. And I think a great deal more can be done, and there
are some question marks about the efficacy of some of the
existing arrangements.
But that brings me to the third issue, which is the
geopolitical context. I think much depends, also in this
connection, how the situation in the Persian Gulf and in the
Middle East will unfold. If the United States gets involved in
a protracted war in the Middle East, beyond what it is engaged
in today, and particularly if it spreads to an American-Iranian
conflict, the Russian position on that may very well be very
ambivalent.
On the one hand, certainly, the Russians would not wish the
spread of nuclear weapons to rogue entities, Islamic
fundamentalists, given the fact that a large percentage of
Russian population, now, is Muslim--in the Russian population
is 140-odd-million people, close to 30 million are Muslims,
and, after the war in Chechnya, increasingly self-aroused,
politically, and resentful--a war in Iran would contribute a
great deal of instability to that. At the same time, it would
also have the effect of bogging down the United States to an
unprecedented degree.
And we shouldn't ignore the fact that there's a great deal
of schadenfreude already in Russia about the costs to us of our
present imbroglio in the Middle East. And hence, there may be
some temptation to view that, at least in a limited sense, as
of some benefit in equalizing the status, the very asymmetrical
status of these two powers, America and Russia.
All of that will add further complexity to the
relationship, produce more suspicions, more fears on both
sides; and hence, it is something that we have to try to avoid,
on several levels: Maintain the strategic relationship, but not
be insensitive; tighten controls, to the extent that we can, on
a bilateral basis; and also be very prudent, specifically in
the Persian Gulf area.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General.
General Scowcroft. I think this is a very important area
for us, both of us. As I say, we are still the two big nuclear
powers. And I am less sanguine about the bilateral--yes--is it
stable? Yes. Is it likely to remain stable? I don't know. Four
of our colleagues recently wrote an op-ed saying we ought to
move toward complete nuclear disarmament. You know, I don't--I
don't know how much traction there is in something like that.
But if that gets hold in this country, we could have--be facing
something very different.
And so, I think we ought to consult each other on a nuclear
future. What kind of a nuclear world do we both think would be
the most stable, the most unlikely to precipitate a war--
indeed, the most likely to preserve stability? So, I think we
have discussions at the nuclear level. My guess is that the
arsenals are not ideally configured to long range that way.
In the nonproliferation--that also spills over into
nonproliferation. We still have an NPT. It is flawed. The
Iranians are pushing a--what do you call it?--a gap, a lapse,
whatever, in it. But another part of the NPT is an agreement
among all the nuclear powers to start reducing their nuclear
weapons. So, you can take advantage of that, perhaps, to put
some more pressure on the Iranians.
And I think the--first of all, I think a United States
nuclear--or United States-Iranian military confrontation is not
likely, unless it's by accident. But I think we have
significantly common interests, as Zbig indicated, on Iran and
on the Iranian nuclear development. And I think if we can
cooperate across the board on nuclear issues, we can bring
enough, perhaps, pressure--and solidarity--that Iran will think
twice about proceeding, willy-nilly, ahead.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I can't resist the temptation, I'd like to ask one last
question, if I may.
What should our policy be now, with regard to Iran, if
you're willing to respond? I know that wasn't part of the
hearing, per se. But it does affect the relationship. Are you--
either of you--willing to venture a response to that? I know
that's a essay question, but how would you recommend, were you
in your old positions, we proceed on Iran now? And you can
defer, you can demur, you can--we can end the hearing, if you'd
like, but I--if you----
Dr. Brzezinski. I'm willing to answer that----
The Chairman. Well, please.
Dr. Brzezinski [continuing]. If you want.
The Chairman. I would like to hear your answer.
Dr. Brzezinski. I think we ought to engage the Iranians on
two levels. One, regarding Iraq, because the fact is that every
one of the states adjoining Iraq is going to be threatened if
and when we leave and if then Iraq explodes. So, there is a
kind of latent shared interest here. My own view is that we
ought to leave. And I won't get into that. But if we are ever
going to leave, I think we have to engage the states around
Iraq in serious discussion as to what should be done in
conjunction with our disengagement. And I think Iran obviously
is a major influence, and we have to engage it on that issue.
And my own personal view is: The sooner, the better.
Second, I think if we do that, it'll make it, perhaps,
somewhat easier to engage Iran also in negotiations about a
nuclear weapons program. There, I think we have an opportunity
in the fact that the Iranian posture, publicly, on the nuclear
issue, is different from the North Korean public posture. The
North Korean public posture is, ``We have a nuclear program, it
is also a weapons program. We want weapons, and, at one point,
triumphantly, we have tested weapons.''
The Iranians are saying something quite different; namely,
``We don't have a nuclear weapons program. Second, we don't
want nuclear weapons. Third, our religion forbids us to have
nuclear weapons.'' Now, they may be lying through their teeth,
and we suspect that they might be, but it is still an opening,
which is to say, ``Fine. If that is really your posture, then
we have a shared interest in us believing you. And, therefore,
we ought to negotiate about arrangements, mutually agreed to,
which would enhance our confidence that that really is the
situation.'' And we can, you know, perhaps define some
technical ways of dealing with that.
But, to do that, we have to be willing to sit down. And
here is where I part company with the administration. The
administration says, ``We will not sit down until you stop
enriching.'' The problem with that is that they have a right to
enrich--not to enrich to 95 percent in order to have weapons-
grade uranium, but they're enriching only to 5 percent, which
is in keeping with what a lot of other countries are doing when
they're enriching uranium.
We are, in effect, saying to them, ``Stop your program,
though you have the right to it, for the privilege of
negotiating with us about mutual accommodation.'' That makes it
easier for the hardliners in Iran to say, ``No way.'' It
mobilizes their nationalism. It tempts them to feel that we're
essentially using this as a device to make them stop while
negotiating ad infinitum.
I think our position out to be, ``We want you to stop, at
least for some duration of time, pending the negotiations, but
we are prepared to do something in return, simultaneously.''
And here, I have in mind some substantial lifting of sanctions
that have, over the years, been adopted by the United States,
whether in ILSA or subsequent to ILSA. And these are various
sanctions--financial, banking, trading--toward not only
ourselves, but even to our friends. That would give the
Iranians some sort of quid pro quo, some also facing--saving of
face, and it would probably divide the moderates from the
extremists in Iran, instead of a posture which actually unifies
the extremists with the moderates and stimulates their
nationalism.
Now, whether that will lead to a good outcome, I don't
know, but it certainly would break the paralysis into which I
think we have actually injected ourselves.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General.
General Scowcroft. I, too, think we need--we should talk to
Iran. I don't think they're probably in a mood they feel they
need to do us any favors on Iraq, that they're broadly content
with us being bogged down. But I'm--I think they're prepared to
talk about it. But, most importantly, it could lead to a talk
about the region. And from the Iranian perspective, it's a
dangerous region. And we ought to be willing, both to put
things like ILSA and the other sanctions on the line, but to
say, ``We're prepared to look at security arrangements in which
you could feel secure.''
On the nuclear side, I think it's important that we have a
united front between--or among the United States, the
Europeans, the Russians, and the Chinese. And I think that is
not too hard to maintain, because I don't think anybody wants
Iran to have nuclear weapons.
And there, we proceed toward--whether it's--you call it the
GNEP or other kinds of things, to deal specifically with the
Iranians' objections of what they say is--``We have been
prevented from doing things, because countries--we make
agreements with countries, and then they withdraw.'' If we can
have a process sanctioned by the United Nations that will
guarantee, to any state in compliance with U.N. restrictions,
nuclear fuel for their reactors, it seems to me we have an
overwhelming weapon to use with them. We're not trying to deny
them everything. And it's beyond the right of any one nation to
veto. It seems to me that that's the kind of approach that, in
the long run, might work.
In the short run, it's--they're rug merchants, and they're
skillful at playing one off against the other, and so on. And
it's going to be long and hard, and they're going to say yes
and no and maybe, and up and down. But, I think, with patience
we can avoid what I think would be a real disaster in the
region, and that is an Iran having the capability of--quick
capability to develop nuclear weapons.
The Chairman. Thank you both. My one regret is, you're both
not still in the Government.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]