[Senate Hearing 110-564]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-564
U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 6, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE,
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Boucher, Hon. Richard A., Assistant Secretary of State for South
and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Joseph Biden............................................... 64
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 67
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 4
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement 3
Hathaway, Dr. Robert, Asia Program Director, the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC.............. 49
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., senior fellow, Center for American
Progress, Washington, DC....................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Kunder, Hon. James R., Acting Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC.................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 69
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Schaffer, Hon. Teresita C., director, South Asia Program, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC........ 37
Prepared statement........................................... 40
(iii)
U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2007
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Development and
Foreign Assistant, Economic Affairs, and
International Environmental Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Feingold, Casey, Lugar, Hagel,
and Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM
NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. This hearing will come to order. I want
to express from the outset that we're a strong believer in
democracy and free speech but we are also a believer in order.
So, we expect our audience to act accordingly within that
context.
Pakistan is currently in the midst of its worst political
crisis since the October 1999 military coup when then-Army
Chief General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the democratically
elected government. After September 11, our relationship with
Pakistan became more complex and urgent. As has become all too
clear, the U.S. policies and assistance toward Pakistan since
September 11, while not without some successes, have failed to
neutralize western militants or reduce religious extremism.
These policies have failed to contribute sufficiently to the
stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan and failed to secure
civilian governance and rule of law in Pakistan.
This subcommittee's intention is to conduct a broad
reevaluation of the policies that are shaped by the U.S.
assistance package to this important ally. Since our policies
are often best understood by following the numbers, we are here
today, in part, to look at those numbers.
The United States has provided about $10 billion in
financial assistance to Pakistan since 2001. In spite of that
$10 billion, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have a safe haven in the
FATA region. Osama bin Laden is still on the loose in the
region. Anti-Americanism remains high and Pakistan's President
has repeatedly exercised the powers of a dictator. Do we dare
call our policies in that respect a success?
What I want to discuss today is how we should be using our
assistance to develop and support a moderate center in
Pakistan. My concern is that we may be spending this money to
simply prop up a dictatorial ruler with a poor and worsening
record and in so doing, we may be alienating a large and
important moderate center.
I understand President Bush doesn't think that President
Musharraf crossed the line on November 3, when he instituted
emergency rule and then simultaneously arrested thousands of
political opposition figures, human rights activists and
lawyers. But in my judgment, he did cross the line. President
Bush even characterized Musharraf as someone who truly believes
in democracy. But even his own Department of State had the
wherewithal to say that they were, ``deeply disturbed'' by the
events in Pakistan.
So what does the Department of State do in response? As a
start, Secretary Rice announced that they were conducting a
``review'' of the assistance to Pakistan. I was encouraged to
hear that this review was taking place and sent a letter to
Secretary Rice requesting that the review be completed promptly
and that she report back to this subcommittee. However, it
turned out that what I assumed to be a careful and
comprehensive strategic and programmatic review might have
instead been simply a statutory review of any legal triggers
that might restrict the flow of U.S. assistance; legal triggers
that the administration largely opposed in the first place and
largely do not exist.
So I look forward to hearing more about this today since
the subcommittee still has not received any details of this
review. Now, we all have a lot of questions to answer today. As
the chair of the subcommittee, I am constantly looking at how
our foreign assistance resources can be spent more effectively
and Pakistan is no exception, especially in light of the fact
that a significant segment of the Pakistani population views
U.S. support for the Musharraf government as being an
impediment to, rather than a facilitator of, the process of
democratization. In addition, the recent political turmoil
provides an even greater justification for careful review of
our assistance program, the strategy behind the assistance and
the progress being made.
Now, since the Coalition Support Funds comprise about 60
percent of the overall assistance package to Pakistan, it's
hard to have a serious discussion about U.S. assistance to
Pakistan without also discussing the Coalition Support Funds.
It's like trying to read a book when 60 percent of the lines in
the text have been redacted. I invited Secretary of Defense
Gates to come and testify or to send those who could testify
and not only did he decline but he couldn't find anyone on his
staff who could speak knowledgeably about the Coalition Support
Funds for this hearing. Apparently, the only two individuals
that have any knowledge about this are out of town for this
hearing. I hope this doesn't mean that there are only two
people in the entire Department of Defense who have substantive
knowledge of the $6 billion that we have provided to Pakistan
in Coalition Support Funds since 2001.
I'm aware of the jurisdictional designations regarding
these funds but I believe that the administration needs to work
together so that the American people can trust that their
government has a clear picture, a clear strategy, and a clear
path toward progress.
So here's the first question. Are we getting the most bang
for our buck? What happens if Pervez Musharraf is suddenly no
longer the leader of Pakistan? Have we put too much emphasis on
individuals at the expense of institutions? Have we engaged a
few Pakistanis at the top while simultaneously alienating tens
of millions of others? Have we compromised the long-term
structural progress because we have been distracted by a short-
term security imperative?
Now let me be clear. I do believe we have a short-term
security imperative. Pakistan's support to help root out
terrorists is very important for the security of our country
and the stability of the region. I don't believe, however, that
we need to sacrifice democracy and the road toward democracy in
order to achieve our national security.
Last month's events in Pakistan have highlighted the
concern that we have. We have to ask if our assistance programs
are achieving the goals that we have set and after $10 billion,
have we really improved our security?
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I want to
welcome particularly Ambassador Boucher, who has been, as a
result of his service, ill for a while and is coming, I guess,
to one of his first public appearances. You look great,
Ambassador. It's a hard way to lose weight but we're glad
you're back with us, and of course, Mr. Kunder, and before we
hear from you, I want to turn to the distinguished ranking
member of the subcommittee, Senator Hagel.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you and I, too, add my
welcome to our witnesses as well as our second panel of
witnesses that will follow the administration testimony. I have
a prepared statement that I would ask be included for the
record.
Senator Menendez. Without objection.
Senator Hagel. And would leave any further comments I have
to the time we have for questions.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator From Nebraska
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this important hearing
regarding Pakistan and U.S. assistance. I want to join you in welcoming
Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, Acting Deputy Administrator Jim
Kunder, and the second panel of distinguished experts.
Pakistan today is in the middle of its most significant domestic
political crisis in nearly a decade. At the same time, Pakistani
politicians are confronted with an unyielding threat of Islamic
extremism. The outcomes of these events in Pakistan remain unclear--and
undetermined--but carry significant implications for regional stability
and security--and America's interests.
The United States would welcome a more stable political process in
Pakistan, where leading opposition figures and parties can openly and
fairly compete for political office. We would welcome further education
and economic reforms. We would welcome having Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations that are framed not by tension and difference, but by common
interests. We would welcome joint United States-Pakistan-Afghanistan
efforts in the border regions that would begin to chip away at this
stronghold of extremism: Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And, of course,
sustained progress toward improved relations between India and
Pakistan--two nuclear powers--would carry significant regional security
implications.
In all, this region represents one of the most geostrategically
significant areas of the world for the United States. America's
interests in Pakistan are framed by Pakistan as a country--and go well
beyond any one man. And, since 2001, Pakistan has been one of our most
important and significant partners across nearly all of our interests
in that region. And, the nearly $10 billion in U.S. assistance to
Pakistan since 2001 reflects this reality.
In the last several months, we have watched as the political crisis
in Pakistan has deepened with setbacks in democratic reform, and
extremist forces have sought to exploit the situation with gains
against any and all Pakistani politicians--and in Afghanistan.
Yet, the U.S. must recognize that our influence in Pakistan is
limited. We do not have the capability to control the course of events
there--as is the case with nearly every other country around the world.
We must take great care not to overextend--overreach--in an attempt to
push, or force, Musharraf too far, too fast. He has taken off the
uniform. He has pledged to end emergency rule on December 16. He has
pledged to hold free and fair parliamentary elections.
The United States should continue its quiet, firm diplomatic
engagement with President Musharraf and all elements of Pakistani
politics. Our objective should be to help move Pakistan toward some
level of political consensus, rather than a deepening of the political
crisis that will only work in the favor of the extremists.
Public admonishments, punitive conditions, and absolute demands are
unlikely to be productive. That is particularly the case now, when the
situation in Pakistan remains fluid.
At a time when global opinion of the United States is at an all-
time low, we must take care to avoid creating a situation in Pakistan
where going down the right path is seen as doing America's bidding.
Today's hearing is focused on understanding the scope, breadth, and
objectives of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Is direct budgetary support
an effective use of assistance? What is the administration's assessment
of the $5.7 billion in direct assistance to the Pakistani military? How
effective has U.S. assistance been in meeting the long-term economic,
educational, and health needs of Pakistani society? How does the
administration evaluate the results of spending on International
Military and Education Training (IMET)? Is the administration
considering any changes to military or economic assistance to Pakistan?
Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for holding this important hearing.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I'm waiting.
Senator Menendez. Waiting for questions. Senator Casey, do
you have any opening statement?
Senator Casey. No.
Senator Menendez. Senator Corker.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was--last week
sat down with President Musharraf and former Prime Minister
Bhutto and I have a slightly different perspective than what
you just laid out but I think I'll wait until we have a little
discussion and talk about that but I appreciate you having this
hearing. I think it's always healthy to review our aid and to
look and make sure that we're getting our money's worth, if you
will, through the aid that we supply. I think it's also helpful
to sort of understand the circumstances on the ground and some
of the things that are actually taking place there. But I
appreciate you chairing this meeting and I hope that we can
approach this in a way that's not partisan but really looks
after our country's interests and I'm sure that's what you
intend to do.
Senator Menendez. With that, Ambassador Boucher, thank you
for coming. It's great to see you and in the interests of time,
we'd ask you to try to summarize your testimony in about 7
minutes. Of course, your full testimony will be included in the
record.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Boucher. Thank you very much, Senator. It's a pleasure
to be here and this is one of the first public things that I've
done since I've come back to work about 10 days ago. A lot has
happened in Pakistan in the last few months and what I'd like
to do is talk a little bit about the questions you raised about
our aid program; how is it spent, where does it go, and what
does it do and then talk a little bit about our main focus
right now. I think we have to start from the premise that
Pakistan's success as a nation, as a stable, moderate,
prosperous and democratic nation, is really essential to our
security and our future as well as the security and future of
166 million people. It's a key ally in a key region for the war
on terror. Stabilizing Pakistan is essential in stabilizing
Afghanistan but also in the broader Muslim world in showing
what can be done in a stable, prosperous Muslin democracy. It
can be an anchor of achievement or an impossible obstacle to
success and we're determined to keep working at it to make it a
success and to give the people of Pakistan a success.
Over the last--let's say since 9/11, I think, you have to
look at the big picture first, I guess, and say that Pakistan
has actually moved forward considerably. Its growth of the
media has been enormous and almost all the ones that were shut
down are back on the air. The growth of civil society has been
spectacular. There is strong support for the judiciary although
the judiciary, as in previous periods, has had problems. There
have been reforms in education. There has been enormous
economic growth that has doubled the GDP and opened up economic
opportunity to many, many more of the citizens. And they've
carried forward on the fight against extremists and terrorists,
both in the border area and also in the maritime sphere, where
for the second time, Pakistan is now heading up the taskforce
that patrols the seas near Pakistan and in that area.
Despite many, many difficulties, some--many of them self-
imposed, Pakistan is making a historic transition at this time.
They now do have a civilian President. The political party
leaders are back and they are moving toward the election of a
civilian Prime Minister. United States assistance to Pakistan
is designed to help them to deal with these problems and
overcome the challenges that they face.
If you look at it in general terms this year, the biggest
categories would be dealing with the terrorist threat and
security threats and narcotics problems. That's about $338
million this year in our assistance program. Expanding health
and education is about $257 million this year. Making a
successful transition to democracy is about $55 million.
Providing economic opportunities to the citizens of Pakistan is
about $87 million and there's about $100 million still in
earthquake relief out of the money that was pledged a couple of
years ago after the earthquake.
I think we should also note that this year is marked by the
startup of some programs, special programs for the tribal and
border areas of Pakistan where the terrorists and extremist
problem has been most acute. We are supporting a tribal area
development strategy that was developed by the Pakistanis in
conjunction with AID and I'm sure Mr. Kunder can talk more
about that. But that will be about $750 million spread over 5
years so we've gotten close to $150 million for that this year.
We're also starting to support the transformation to the
Frontier Corp, which is the local armed force in that area.
There are actually three armed forces that are local. So
supporting the conversion of local armed forces into a capable
fighting force so that the army doesn't have to come in from
outside to maintain security in that area and that's starting
up this year with some funds but they are requesting a
supplemental in future budgets to try to continue that process.
Third of all, we're looking to help create reconstruction
opportunity zones that we've been working on since the
President announced them in March 2006 and we have legislation
that we hope to see presented to the Congress and hopefully
passed by the Congress in the near future that would allow
duty-free entry into the United States of products that are
made in the border areas of Pakistan and in Afghanistan. The
economic feasibility studies say that this could help with
economic growth and job creation in these areas so that people
go to work in regular enterprises instead of pickup ones.
The goal, I think that we share with the Pakistani
Government, the Pakistani people, is to achieve a stable
transition right now to civilian rule. It hasn't gone the way
we would have liked. There have been plenty of bumps in the
road and we've spoken out, as you know, about some of those
things that have happened. And we have reviewed our assistance
programs, especially after the imposition of emergency law in
early November.
First, from a legal standpoint, as you noted, but second,
also from a policy standpoint. We do share your interest in
knowing that our aid is effective and that our aid goes to the
people that it is intended for. In keeping with that, we have
decided to make some changes in the way we spend a good chunk
of our budget, which is the $200 million that's heretofore been
spent through the Pakistani budget, as shared objectives. It
had macroeconomic goals as well as specific goals in education,
health, and other areas. But we've decided at this point that
we'll take that $200 million this year and spend it directly
through aid projects and contracts and we will define those
projects and supervise those contracts through the regular aid
mechanisms so that we know exactly how the money is being spent
and exactly who it is going to so it does reach the children of
Pakistan who need education, the mothers and children and
others who need the health care and the people who need jobs
and job training. So that is one of the changes that we've
decided to make after our consideration and frankly, after
consulting with a number of people up here on the Hill.
The other, I think, is a determination on our part and on
their part to support the fight against extremism and
terrorism. And you know, I think you've watched the news. You
see there is a major military operation going on in the Swat
Valley right now where the Pakistani Army is going up to try to
rid that area of the al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other terrorists
who have taken refuge up there and who have been broadcasting
antigovernment, anti-Western, antieverybody propaganda in
trying to instill their kind of governance in that area. So
that's been going on.
You mentioned the Coalition Support Funds and I'll make a
point now that perhaps we'll differ on again and again
throughout the hearing but we--those are reimbursements. We
don't see those as assistance. We don't lump them in with the
other categories of assistance. It's about $5.3 billion since
9/11. It's a program that was authorized by the Congress to
reimburse allies and friends in the war on terror for their
expenses and that money goes to reimburse the Pakistanis for
the expenses that they incur in terms of food, ammunition,
operating expenses, fuel--all those things that they incur in
terms of fighting the war on terror. It's the money that
supports the Pakistani men and women who are fighting and dying
in the war on terror. And indeed, Pakistan has lost as many as
1,000 members of their armed forces security services in the
war on terror, including 250 people since July. So they've
incurred expenses, which we try to reimburse for and
unfortunately, they've incurred loss of life as well, which
nobody can reimburse them for.
Our goal at this point is to keep working with Pakistan, to
keep working especially on the transition and ensuring a
credible election. We've had democracy and election programs
going for a number of years. We've bought transparent ballot
boxes. We've helped with computerizing the voter lists. We've
helped with training electors and voters and election
observers. We're going to field an observer team. We have
about, I think it's 45 people from the International Republican
Institute and about 25 more from AID, 40 observers from the
Republican Institute and about 25 more that AID is financing.
The Embassy is going to field teams. They have a whole plan to
go out and cover as many as they can of 84 districts that they
feel are the most critical ones and we've been encouraging
other governments working with people like the British, who are
sending observers, encouraging people like the Europeans and
the Japanese to send observers as well.
So we have a very comprehensive program that has been going
on for some time, to try to make this election as credible, as
transparent as possible. The government has pledged to a
transparent election. They've pledged to keep the military and
the intelligence services out of it. They've pledged to have
transparent counting.
There are going to be a lot of charges in Pakistan after
the election. It's never--not going to be perfect. But we want
to see an election that represents the will of the Pakistani
people and gives them real choice over their leaders.
Finally, sir, let me just say, there are other
institutions, there are a number of institutions in Pakistan
that it's important for us to work with. With the government
and a newly elected Prime Minister, whoever that may be; with
the army, which is a vital institution for securing and
stabilizing the nation and they have a new chief there; with
the new civilian----
Senator Menendez. Excuse me. I would just advise members of
the audience that we all might have comments to make. But we're
not going to have them here in this setting. We appreciate your
opportunity to be in a public setting to hear what witnesses
are saying but we are not going to allow commentary on them.
The committee will be in order. The gentleman will be
seated. I would ask the officer to have the person be removed.
Ambassador.
Mr. Boucher. Thank you. In addition, we do have a new
civilian President, President Musharraf, as a civilian and
exactly how he is--what his role is going to be, how he is
going to interact with the political parties. It is going to be
interesting to see how that evolves in the Pakistani system.
Then you have civil society, business, political actors,
media--really, I think, a new environment there and so we hope
in January to see a credible election. We think making this
successful transition to civilian leadership is the best and
most solid basis for the nation to go forward, including
ridding itself from the threats and terrorism and extremism and
we think the United States should continue to support that
process of change in Pakistan and we'll work with you and them
to make sure that we support that in the best way possible.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asian Affairs, State Department,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to thank
you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss developments in
Pakistan and U.S. assistance to this critical country. As I'm sure you
can imagine, no other policy priority has consumed more of my attention
over the past several months. The United States wants to see Pakistan
succeed in its transition to an elected civilian-led democracy, to
become a moderate, democratic, Muslim nation committed to human rights
and the rule of law. All of our assistance programs are directed toward
helping Pakistan achieve these goals. This is a long-term undertaking
that will require years to accomplish. There will be obstacles in the
road.
President Musharraf's November 3 imposition of a state of
emergency--including reshuffling the Supreme Court, curtailment of
press freedom, and arrests and detention of journalists, lawyers, human
rights advocates, political activists and party leaders--was a setback.
His subsequent retirement as Army Chief of Staff on November 28, his
inauguration for a second term as President on November 29 and his
commitment to lift the State of Emergency on December 16 represent the
most recent developments in this long, sometimes troubling and
sometimes encouraging, chain of events. While we had hoped to see this
transition unfold differently, we are encouraged that at the end of
this chain will be parliamentary elections, currently scheduled for
January 8, that we hope will lead to the formation of a civilian-led
government, under a civilian President for the first time since 1999.
This would indeed be a significant step forward for Pakistani democracy
and a major accomplishment for the Pakistani people.
These results seemed unlikely a month ago, and are owed primarily
to the Pakistani people's demand for democracy, evidenced by the
resilient and steadfast commitment of the democratic supporters in
Pakistan, and the constant pressure from the international community,
especially the United States. However, this progress does not mean that
democratic success is yet fully assured. The upcoming parliamentary
election will be the next big step along Pakistan's bumpy path toward
democracy. I should also note that Members of the Senate have recently
visited Pakistan to reiterate the message of the importance of a
restoration of democracy to that country. Senators Bennett and Corker,
in their meetings with President Musharraf and other political leaders,
made an important contribution to our shared efforts, and I thank them
for that.
It is our fervent hope that these elections will be free, fair,
transparent, and credible. We are working closely with Pakistani
officials and U.S., Pakistani, and international civil society
organizations to ensure that these elections are as transparent as
possible. The U.S. has provided significant assistance over the past
several months in support of democracy and voter education programs in
the runup to what will hopefully be a free and fair election. Do we
expect the election will be flawless? No. In any general election in a
nation with 166 million people and a checkered history of democracy,
there are going to be problems. Our hope is that with all the
preelectoral spadework that has been done by the International
Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, by Embassy
Islamabad, and with the large international and domestic monitoring
teams funded by the U.S., and hopefully the EU, Pakistan will be able
to avoid the large-scale and systematic distortions that have marred
elections in the past.
But elections are not the only measure of democracy. Democracy
requires accountable government institutions, including an independent
judiciary, protection of individual human rights, a free and dynamic
press, an atmosphere promoting open debate, and a vibrant civil
society. Pakistan is making progress toward these goals. Democracy also
requires freedom from the violent extremism that operates outside of
the rule of law. Unfortunately, violent extremist groups have expanded
their influence in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
From there these groups threaten not only the nascent democracies in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also security in the wider region and the
world. Denying these groups safe-haven and ousting them from Pakistani
territory is central to our conduct of the war on terrorism. And, as
the Pakistanis clearly recognize, ending extremism is essential to the
future success and stability of their nation.
Pakistan is, of course, our indispensable ally in that struggle.
The Government of Pakistan is at war with a violent minority that is
seeking to undermine a largely peaceful, law-abiding Pakistani
citizenry deserving of the freedoms their country heralded at its
inception. In many ways, it is the indispensable partner in our
worldwide struggle against violent extremism. Pakistan shares a 1,600-
kilometer border with Afghanistan and is a key factor in the success or
failure of the Afghan and international effort there. With 166 million
people, Pakistan is a leading Muslim country whose future will help
determine the future stability and prosperity of the region--a region
of increasing importance to the United States. It can also serve as a
potential model for our relationships with the Islamic world.
Pakistan is a nation facing enormous challenges, and it is clearly
in our interest to help Pakistan to meet those challenges. Despite
averaging 7 percent annual growth in their Gross Domestic Product over
the last 5 years, many parts of the country remain desperately poor.
This is especially true in the areas along the border with Afghanistan
and in no place more so than in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. These areas have the worst social and economic conditions in all
of Pakistan. In some parts of the tribal areas, 135 of every 1,000
children under the age of 5 die early, often due to treatable ailments.
The female literacy rate is as low as 3 percent in some areas. There is
little access to safe drinking water or to even rudimentary health
care, and public education is largely nonexistent.
One reason for these calamitous social indicators is that the writ
of the central government in the underdeveloped tribal areas is, as it
has been throughout history, marginal at best. These areas are remote
and isolated. This isolation, coupled with social and economic
deprivation, makes them particularly attractive ``targets of
opportunity'' for violent extremists. Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other
violent extremists have exploited these populations and the areas that
they inhabit as hideouts and safe havens. The lack of adequate
educational infrastructure makes traditional madrassah schools and
other unregulated private schools the only alternative. Worse, a small
but nonetheless worrisome number of these schools serve as
indoctrination centers for extremist combatants and would-be suicide
bombers. The area's proximity to Afghanistan makes it an ideal
recruiting ground and a staging area for cross-border operations by
Taliban and other violent extremist groups operating against Afghan and
NATO forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Past efforts by the
Pakistani Government to establish a presence or exert its control in
these areas have met significant resistance. Al-Qaeda has used the
absence of a military presence to increase its training, planning, and
recruiting capacity in hideouts in these undergoverned parts of
Pakistan.
Though the Pakistani Government has generally remained firm in its
resolve to confront the violent extremist forces in the tribal areas
militarily, it has become clear to Islamabad, as it has to America,
that a purely military solution will not work. What is required is a
comprehensive ``frontier strategy'' consisting of military and civilian
security, social and economic development, and political engagement in
these ungoverned areas. And that means nothing less than bringing the
frontier areas, traditionally undergoverned and underdeveloped, into
the mainstream of the Pakistani body politic.
U.S. ASSISTANCE: MONEY BEHIND OUR PRIORITIES
The United States is seeking to help Pakistanis build an
economically healthy, stable, and democratic Pakistan. To this end,
since 2002 we have provided economic assistance totaling $2.4 billion.
These funds have supported education reform, including training teacher
in modern teaching techniques, building schools in the tribal areas,
providing scholarships and fostering science and technology cooperation
between the U.S. and Pakistan. We have also funded governance programs
designed to assist independent radio, reform political parties, train
Parliament members in drafting laws, strengthen Pakistan's Election
Commission, promoted grassroots service delivery and reduce gender-
based violence. U.S.-funded economic growth programs have, among other
things, worked to improve the competitiveness of Pakistani businesses,
provided microfinance and encouraged more effective agriculture
techniques. We have also supported refugee programs and funded
rebuilding efforts following the 2005 earthquake.
Fighting terrorism is, of course, a preeminent goal of U.S. policy
in Pakistan. In support of that goal, since 2002 the United States has
provided security assistance to Pakistan totaling $1.9 billion. This
has included $1.2 billion in Foreign Military Financing, $244 million
in Department of State counternarcotics funding and $87 million in
Department of Defense counternarcotics funding and $37.2 million in
section 1206 counterterrorism funding. These funds have been used to
help Pakistan prosecute the war on terror along the Pakistan-Afghan
border. This money has gone to purchase tactical radios, TOW missiles,
Bell 412 and COBRA helicopters, and night-vision goggles. In addition,
we provide counterinsurgency training, improve counterinsurgency strike
capability and train more effective Pakistani military leaders. Another
purchase under Foreign Military Financing--P-C3C Orion aircraft--is
crucial for maritime surveillance and Pakistan's participation in and
leadership of Combined Task Force-150 patrolling the Horn of Africa and
the Arabian Sea. In addition, we have provided $5.3 billion in
Coalition Support Funds to reimburse Pakistan for expenses incurred in
the war on terror.
The United States has also recently begun to implement a 5-year,
$750 million development strategy for Pakistan's frontier region that
supports the Government of Pakistan's 9-year, $2 billion program for
the tribal areas' sustainable development. The people of the tribal
areas need to have a stronger connection to their central government if
they are to resist violent extremism effectively and over the long
term. The plan seeks to develop the capacity of tribal area authorities
and local leaders to plan, administer, implement, and monitor
development assistance programs; to strengthen the strategic
communication capacity of civilian administration bodies; and to
improve planning and coordination between civilian and security
organizations.
In addition, the plan seeks to more effectively address security
concerns in the tribal areas, which is a prerequisite for a successful
development strategy. To accomplish this, we have been working with and
will continue to work with the Pakistani Government to increase the
size and enhance the capabilities of the three law enforcement entities
that have a traditional presence in the tribal areas and whose ranks
are filled with predominantly locally recruited ethnic Pashtuns. I
believe these pieces of our assistance to Pakistan are some of the most
crucial elements of the war on terror. These forces are doing much of
the fighting against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other violent extremist
groups in the tribal areas and elsewhere in the Northwest Frontier
Province, such as Swat.
REVIEWING U.S. ASSISTANCE
When the State of Emergency was announced on November 3, the
Department of State examined our assistance programs to determine
whether the Emergency would negatively impact our ability to continue
assistance. We concluded that imposition of a state of emergency did
not at that time trigger any automatic aid cutoffs. However, it was
also clear that taking a thorough look at our assistance programs
across the board was warranted.
Barring further setbacks, we have come to some important
conclusions. We believe that maintaining funding levels for Economic
Support Funds and Foreign Military Financing is crucial. Doing
otherwise would not further our interests with Pakistan at a time when
Pakistan plays a critical role in the war on terrorism and is about to
have elections that need to be free, fair, and credible. As you in the
Congress do, we would want to be quite clear on what our money
supports. Thus, we've made the decision that the $200 million in Fiscal
Year 2008 Economic Support Funds used for budget support will be
projectized to ensure money is targeted at the most urgent priorities.
We believe these funds can be most productively used for programs that
directly benefit the Pakistani people and will make Pakistan a stronger
and more secure ally in the war against terrorism. We have the capacity
to do so, as proved during the October 2005 earthquake. Foreign
Military Financing to the Government of Pakistan's counterterrorism
program is another area we could not want to cut, as cuts would be
counterproductive to military-to-military programs and could affect
Pakistan's willingness to continue to support coalition access to
Afghanistan.
Our $300 million per year in Economic Support Funds and $300
million in Foreign Military Financing for Pakistan are part of a 5-
year, $6 billion Presidential commitment made by President Bush in
2004, with funding to be provided from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year
2009. This commitment supports our long-term, broad-based strategic
partnership with Pakistan. Programs like these I've just outlined,
combined with complementary projects that create jobs, help address the
fundamental economic problems that block Pakistan's progress and
stability. It is the people of Pakistan to whom we want to demonstrate
our long-term commitment--and the Department of State believes firmly
that now is not the time to cut assistance levels.
OVERSIGHT
Our strategic goals in Pakistan are broad and our programs will
require strong oversight to ensure that our assistance is accomplishing
our foreign policy goals. We have been clear with the Government of
Pakistan in our conversations on development cooperation that we would
need to work closely with one another in monitoring and accounting for
the use of our assistance. The bulk of U.S. assistance to this region
will be implemented through contractors and grantees, and will be
monitored per standard USAID and inspector general oversight
guidelines. I will defer to my colleague from USAID, whose
understanding of these mechanisms is much greater than my own.
Security assistance is typically subject to even more stringent
monitoring and evaluation requirements than other foreign assistance
programs. The Government of Pakistan has entered into an agreement
regarding end-use and retransfer and security of defense articles
provided on a grant basis. Each Letter of Offer and Acceptance pursuant
to the Foreign Military Sales program contains end-use, retransfer, and
security obligations.
Coalition Support Funds are a Department of Defense program to
reimburse war-on-terrorism partners for logistic, military, and other
expenses incurred in supporting U.S. operations. Pakistan's Coalition
Support Fund claims are validated by the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and
by U.S. Central Command. The Department of Defense's Office of
Comptroller further evaluates each claim to ensure that the costs are
reasonable and credible. After this validation, the Department of State
must concur on the reimbursement and the Office of Management and
Budget must be consulted. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) then prepares a determination for the Deputy Secretary of
Defense to sign, as well as a formal notification to Congress. Only
after a 15-day notification period expires are funds released to the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency for repayment to Pakistan. Embassy
Islamabad is working with the Department of Defense and the Government
of Pakistan to make the Coalition Support Funds reimbursement process
more supportive of U.S. policy goals and to ensure that we get maximum
value for the money expended. Embassy Islamabad has, on more than one
occasion, denied or sent claims back to the Government of Pakistan for
further clarification.
CONCLUSION
The United States assistance policy in Pakistan is a multifaceted
and strongly monitored array of programs, ranging from support for
Pakistani military efforts to oust militant extremists from the border
area with Afghanistan, to on-going support for rebuilding following the
2005 earthquake, to working with Pakistani civil society organizations
to train election monitors to ensure credible elections. U.S.
engagement with Pakistan is a centerpiece in our efforts to combat
extremism worldwide and of our work with the developing countries in
advancing economic and social development and promoting the growth of
democracy. All of our efforts in Pakistan are geared toward creating
the vibrant, modernizing, and democratic state that Pakistanis desire
and U.S. policy envisions as a partner in advancing stability and
development in a key region of the world.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me today. I look forward
to taking your questions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Kunder.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. KUNDER, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Kunder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my written
statement, I've tried to answer in detail each of the questions
the committee asked about the expenditure of approximately $2.1
billion of U.S. foreign assistance since 2000, by USAID and
what I would like to do, just very briefly highlight items I've
included in this chart in front of the committee and in each of
the statements. What this chart attempts to address, Mr.
Chairman, is your fundamental questions about whether we're
trying to take on the long-term development issues facing
Pakistan.
Essentially, this tries to lay out what we believe to be
some of the critical development challenges in our four major
areas of U.S. foreign assistance, which are education, health
care, governance, and economic growth. For example, education
is our largest single sector of assistance to the Pakistani
people. We have looked at data like the ones I've listed there,
5 to 6 million school-age children out of school, increased
enrollments in madrassas and we've designed our program around
the kinds of issues that will address the specific development
challenge. For example, building more schools, training more
teachers, working with administrators, assisting the Pakistani
Government in developing a more modern curriculum, awarding
higher education scholarships within the country and then also
post-graduate training in education in the United States.
I won't go through each one of these, but what we believe
we're doing, sir, is to try to take on the critical development
challenges identified by our staff on the ground, by the World
Bank, and certainly by the Pakistani Government itself. There
are some very profound development challenges in this country
of 160 million people and I throw that out because some of the
numbers are, in fact, large for assistance numbers but Pakistan
is one of the 10 largest countries in the world, and across
that very large country, we've got data that indicates, for
example, that less than half of the primary age cohort of
children is currently enrolled in school. I'm not talking about
junior high school, high school students. If we just look at
the primary school cohort, grades 1 to 6, fewer than half of
Pakistani children are actually in a school setting, and those
kinds of numbers indicate that we've made some very serious
advances, very significant advances, and I completely agree
with what Richard said about those.
We have seen a substantial increase in the economic growth
rate in the country. We have seen increases in primary school
enrollment. We've seen increases in the literacy rate. We've
seen increases in child survival rates but we have very
profound development challenges still facing us and facing the
Pakistani Government.
In addition to answering the committee's questions in my
written statement, I would just like to emphasize two other
areas where there is going to be dramatic change or new
direction in our program. One is, as Richard mentioned, we are
planning to increase dramatically our assistance in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Government of
Pakistan has a very comprehensive and, we believe, well-
designed development plan to address the root causes of
extremism in the FATA region. We plan to be major supporters of
that effort. That is an area where we can provoke a reaction,
if we don't proceed in a measured and analytical and thorough
fashion. But we believe there are real development
opportunities in the northwest and we plan to increase
dramatically our support to that region.
The second is--I would emphasize what Richard just
mentioned about the ``projectization,'' as we would call it, of
the $200 million per year that we have been providing in cash
transfers to the Pakistani Government. That $200 million was
carefully monitored in terms of what the outcomes were. We had
agreed with the Pakistani Government on what we expected the
money to be spent for in education, health care, and so forth
and then we tracked whether they were actually expending the
money in those areas. But what Richard has announced here today
is another step toward increased engagement directly by moving
that from a cash transfer into projects that we will manage on
the ground in these four critical areas of education, health
care, governance, and economic growth.
As Richard mentioned, we are heavily engaged. I just spoke
with our staff in Islamabad in the last couple of days about
our preparations for upcoming elections. We intend to use every
tool in our toolkit to ensure that those elections are free,
open, and transparent, and if the Chair would just allow me 30
more seconds, I would like to introduce, seated two chairs
behind me, Mr. Agha Mohammad Asim, a member of our Pakistani
staff from Islamabad who happens to be in town for training. We
invited him to come here today so he could see American
democracy in action.
Mr. Asim is one of the ways we reach out to the broader
Pakistani public. Mr. Chairman, to answer your question, our
staffing ratio in Islamabad is probably pretty typical. We have
10 American Foreign Service officers on the ground and 44
Pakistani professionals. This is one of the best ways that the
United States gets its message across and we wanted to invite
Mr. Asim to join us here today. I'm pleased to answer any
questions that the committee has, sir.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James R. Kunder, Acting Deputy
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, other distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the
critically important topic of ``U.S. Assistance to Pakistan.''
I would like to incorporate your questions and structure my
testimony around three core themes today, laying out USAID's strategy
for Pakistan, the impact that USAID has achieved, and the support that
we provide to priorities of both the U.S. Government, and the Pakistani
people.
the usaid strategy
In discussing strategy, it may be useful to provide some historic
context. United States foreign assistance to Pakistan began in 1948
with education as one of our major priorities. This has included
programming in partnership with Pakistanis at both the national and
local levels. In 1987 we funded the establishment of the Lahore
University of Management Sciences (LUMS)--now the premier institution
of higher education in Pakistan. USAID's support to higher education
also helped to build a cadre of expertise and leadership in the areas
of public administration, education, health, and business. In the
health sector, USAID's support for childhood mortality has contributed
to a one-third reduction over the last four decades.
Our relationship with Pakistan changed abruptly in the 1990s when
USAID halted its assistance to Pakistan due to the Pressler amendment.
Enacted in 1985, the Pressler amendment specifically prohibited U.S.
assistance or military sales to Pakistan unless annual Presidential
certification was issued that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
explosive device. This certification was denied in October 1990,
triggering wide-ranging sanctions against Pakistan. In 1995, USAID
closed its mission and pulled out of Pakistan.
In early 2001, USAID received specific legislative authority to
work directly with the Government of Pakistan in education, which was
the precursor to the current program. Post 9/11, the U.S. again
redefined its relationship with Pakistan. In 2002, USAID came back to
reengage our Pakistani allies in the war on terror to deal with issues
of poverty, lack of access to a quality education, and substandard
health care alternatives for their children.
What is USAID's strategy and objective in Pakistan?
USAID's strategy and objective is to help Pakistan develop into a
moderate, prosperous, and democratic nation by addressing some of the
most pressing needs of the Pakistani people: Education for their
children; health care, especially for mothers and children; economic
opportunities, particularly jobs for young people; and building
democratic institutions and practices to help the Pakistani people gain
a voice in their government.
How has this strategy been translated into specific programs?
Pakistan needs to respond to the urgent problems facing its
children and youth by providing a quality basic and higher education
program which will give them the skills to find jobs in the modern
economy. The U.S. is helping upgrade public education, placing emphasis
on improving the quality and affordability of Pakistan's public
schools. This allows parents of limited means to pursue educational
opportunities for their children beyond religiously oriented
madrassahs. At the same time, we are aware that an educated population
will pave the way for long-term and lasting benefits for all
Pakistanis--economically, socially, and politically.
USAID also recognizes that the level of health in Pakistan,
particularly maternal and child health is among the worst in the world.
USAID's program is helping save the lives of thousands of Pakistani
mothers and children from illnesses which can be prevented--such as
polio and tuberculosis.
USAID developed a program to promote democracy and governance in
Pakistan in order to help the Pakistani people develop more responsive
political parties, and the legislative, civil, and legal institutions
needed to change this status quo.
Economic recovery and growth has begun, but is not yet providing
the rural poor opportunities to improve their livelihoods, nor is it
producing enough jobs to keep pace with Pakistan's burgeoning
population. USAID has undertaken activities to help Pakistan compete in
the world arena--by providing microfinance and larger loans for small-
and medium-sized business and boosting the competitiveness of
industries such as furniture, marble, and granite that can potentially
be exported.
What is the strategy driving the various components of this support?
What are the goals?
USAID's strategy in Pakistan addresses four major development
areas: Education; maternal and child mortality; democratic institutions
and civil society; rates of poverty and unemployment. Components of the
program give particular attention to relieving these constraints in the
earthquake-affected areas and in the FATA.
Pakistan's education sector faces immense challenges. Of 22 million
children between the ages of 5 and 9, only 42 percent attend school.
Historically, less than half of Pakistani children who enroll in school
complete 5 years of schooling; for every 100 children beginning first
grade, only 6 complete grade 12. Poor teaching and learning results in
students leaving the system with no capacity for critical thinking, or
much worse, remain illiterate. Male literacy (65 percent) is much
higher than adult female literacy (40 percent); the disparity is more
pronounced in rural areas (58 percent for men and 29 percent for
women). Teacher absenteeism is high and many schools are in disrepair.
Pakistan has several excellent universities, but social and economic
costs place higher education beyond the reach of most poor students,
especially women.
USAID's education goal is, ``Increase Knowledge, Training, and
Infrastructure to Develop High Quality Education Programs.'' USAID's
existing education strategy supports basic and higher education. USAID
has supported the following components of the Government of Pakistan's
education reform strategy: Improving education policies and
administrative and management capacity; providing support to teacher
education and professional development; improving access to education
by building and upgrading schools; and addressing special needs in the
FATA and the earthquake-affected areas. The current program increases
access to higher education by providing needs or merit-based
scholarships to Pakistani students and by supporting the world's
largest Fulbright scholarship program.
Health indicators in Pakistan continue to be among the worst in the
world. Seventy-eight of every 1,000 live births result in infant deaths
and 350-500 mothers per 100,000 die every year from pregnancy and
delivery complications. Other health problems afflict thousands more;
these include malaria, communicable diseases including tuberculosis and
acute respiratory infections. Pakistan remains one of only four
countries worldwide that suffer from endemic polio.
Pakistan's unhealthy population puts a huge burden on national
resources and stifles economic growth. Good health improves learning
and increases labor productivity, leading to improvement in other
crucial indicators such as literacy and economic growth. Healthier
people can contribute economically and are less likely to lose hope and
turn to extremism. USAID's maternal and child health program has
already produced tangible improvements in the lives of Pakistanis, a
major objective of the USG's Muslim Outreach Initiative.
USAID has adopted several approaches to improve democracy and
governance in Pakistan.
One of the goals of U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan is to
strengthen the country's democratic institutions and practices.
Legislatures, in particular, can play a strong and positive role in
governance. USAID efforts to strengthen democracy support: (1) Improved
representation and responsiveness of national and provincial
legislatures; (2) greater civil society, media, and political party
engagement in policy dialog; (3) devolution of authority and operation
to local government institutions, making them more responsive to the
public; and (4) strengthening the electoral system and public oversight
of the election process.
In the long term, USAID's work to strengthen democratic
institutions will help establish a stable and democratic future for the
people of Pakistan. In the immediate future, this work will encourage
Pakistan to hold free, fair, and credible elections in early January
2008. USAID provides assistance to Pakistan for voter education,
political party development, computerization of the voting rolls,
training of political poll watchers, and domestic and international
election observation missions to ensure that Pakistan follows a path of
democratic change.
Economic growth in Pakistan has averaged 7 percent over the past 5
years, which has resulted in a decrease in the percentage of Pakistanis
living below the poverty line from 33 percent at the end of the 1990s
to around 25 percent today. However, not all Pakistanis have benefited
from this sustained economic growth; income distribution particularly
in the rural areas remains very unequal.
The Government of Pakistan has made progress on major economic
reforms, including restructuring the financial and telecommunications
sectors; foreign and domestic investment; strengthening state
regulatory entities; and devolving governance and fiscal management
responsibilities to the local level. The multilateral development banks
have played a substantial role in the reform effort, from technical
advice to budget support. Positive impacts from these efforts include
robust economic indicators, record levels of foreign investment, and
the largest foreign reserve levels in Pakistan's history. These
results, in combination with Pakistan's strong support for the war on
terrorism, have led to increased donor investments in social sector
support in recent years.
Continued economic growth will produce more jobs, which can
accelerate and thwart those who would recruit the unemployed for
terrorism. Given Pakistan's demographic bulge (63 percent of the
population is under age 24), job creation is paramount.
USAID's programs support the Government of Pakistan's strategy to
reduce poverty and encourage economic growth, and are helping create
new employment opportunities for poor Pakistanis, especially in rural
areas. USAID/Pakistan has increased economic opportunities for the poor
by: (1) Increasing community development programs, especially small
infrastructure projects; (2) increasing access to microfinance in rural
and urban areas; and (3) assisting small and medium enterprises in key
sectors, helping them to generate improved employment opportunities.
Nonproject assistance provides cash to support mutually agreed upon
objectives. Since September 11, the U.S. has provided very substantial
nonproject assistance to the Government of Pakistan. A $600 million
Economic Support Funds (ESF) grant in November 2001 (FY 2002) paid down
debt owed to the U.S., the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.
The Government agreed to disburse the equivalent amount of rupees to
support a dozen social sector line items in the Federal budget. (In
fact, the rupee disbursements for the agreed upon social sector
programs far exceeded the equivalent of $600 million.) In FY 2003,
approximately $186 million in ESF was used to fund the subsidy cost of
debt relief for the Government of Pakistan and that forgave $1 billion
in outstanding U.S. official debt, approximately one-third of its
outstanding U.S. debt at that time. No conditionality was attached to
the FY 2003 program.
Beginning in FY 2005, the U.S. has been providing $200 million
annually in nonproject assistance.* Dollars are exchanged for rupees,
and the Government of Pakistan and the USG negotiate and agree on the
purposes for which the Government of Pakistan will use those rupees.
[* This is part of a larger administration commitment to Pakistan that
began in FY 2005 and continues through FY 2009 of $300 million per year
in economic assistance and $300 million per year in military
assistance.]
Now, as Assistant Secretary Boucher has indicated, in FY 2008, the
full $300 million in Economic Support Funds will be projectized. This
additional project funding will be implemented through U.S. contractors
and grantees who would work with provincial and local governments as
well as Pakistani NGOs and private sector organizations. We are still
developing the program plans but we expect that the additional
programming will impact three program areas. The first is education,
which we believe is fundamental to Pakistan's forward progress toward
democracy, prosperity, and stability. Our approach to education
assistance in Pakistan is comprehensive--training teachers, building
schools, providing scholarships with the premise that these actions
will reduce the number of children exposed to extremist teachings.
Second, we will direct resources to improving child and maternal
health, thereby allowing the U.S. to visibly touch the lives of
millions of Pakistanis and fill a critical need. Third is an economic
element--we want to expand job training for unemployed youth, generate
jobs by building small infrastructure in communities, and help farmers
get out of poverty.
Earthquake reconstruction began after the devastating earthquake on
October 8, 2005. The USG pledged to spend $200 million over 4 years on
a wide range of activities to rebuild the area. Individual activities
were undertaken to clear rubble, help the landless get housing, rebuild
schools and health facilities, improve health conditions, and increase
rural incomes. Systemic changes were also targeted to improve the
capacity of the health and education systems, and to increase economic
activity by helping important industries to expand and generate more
jobs.
Fiercely independent, some people in FATA do not want to be
governed by the Government in Islamabad. Some feel alienated from the
Government of Pakistan because they have received very little. Security
concerns make it difficult for the government to provide social
services, and the lack of social services make it more difficult for
the Government of Pakistan to increase security in the FATA. USAID's
strategy is to improve economic and social conditions in the FATA
through a broad range of programs consistent with the Government of
Pakistan's FATA Sustainable Development Program.
What is the detailed breakdown of all USAID support to Pakistan since
fiscal year 2000?
The following table provides a breakdown of funding since 2000 per
USAID sector.
Education............................................... $256 million
Democracy and Governance................................ 84 million
Emergency Economic Assistance........................... 1.6 billion
Economic Growth......................................... 70 million
Health.................................................. 169 million
Earthquake and Reconstruction........................... 106 million
Program Support......................................... 9 million
FATA.................................................... 105 million
--------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total............................................... 2.4 billion
the impact of usaid in pakistan
Are these goals being achieved?
Since 2002, USAID has achieved the following:
In education:
More than 400,000 children have benefited from USAID
education programs--resulting in a 15.5-percent increase in
student enrollment in USAID-supported school districts.
USAID trained 45,600 teachers and administrators in improved
teaching techniques. These people were then observed to be
practicing what they had learned in the classroom setting.
These techniques positively affect student achievement and
educational advancement.
USAID awarded 906 in-country higher education scholarships
since the program started in 2004. Since 2005, 235 Pakistanis
started master's or Ph.D. studies in the U.S.
In health:
USAID's support to the tuberculosis efforts in Pakistan
helped district governments improve diagnosis and treatment
quality, and provide better access to public care facilities
for TB patients. This has helped the case detection rate to
reach the WHO standard of 70 percent, and meet an 85-percent
treatment success rate.
Since 2004, the number of children vaccinated during every
national immunization polio day campaign rose from 29.8 million
to 33.5 million. The number of polio cases dropped from 40 in
2006 to 18 in November 2007--with most areas not experiencing
an outbreak for over 2 years.
USAID has trained 1,404 traditional birth attendants since
2004--preventing unnecessary deaths from obstetric
complications.
In democracy:
USAID has helped the Electoral Commission of Pakistan to
curb vote tampering by updating the national voter registration
list, computerizing electoral rolls, improving election
complaints, and providing transparent ballot boxes and security
seals for the January 8, 2008, elections. USAID has also
provided voter education, political party assistance, and
training and support of domestic and international observers.
USAID trained 1,290 local leaders (including 283 women) in
budget oversight, leadership skills and participatory planning
for better service delivery. In one of the targeted six
districts, USAID-trained public health workers began to track
the usage of medicines in clinics, and have prevented stock
shortages using information technology.
In economic growth:
USAID provided over 350,000 microfinance loans in 25 rural
districts and periurban areas--generating business
opportunities for over 100,000 entrepreneurs.
USAID's competitiveness program has brought together
businesspeople in six sectors. These business people developed
strategies to improve their industries' competitiveness in the
global marketplace. USAID's $11 million investment generated
over $50 million in new private investment and over $102
million in government support--creating more productive
businesses and employees.
What determined the mix of programs across sectors?
USAID sectoral activities address the root causes of poverty and
instability in Pakistan. Lack of education and poor health impede
productivity. An absence of economic opportunity and political choice
fuels frustration and violence.
In the spring of 2001, USAID received specific legislative
authority to work on education with the Government of Pakistan. USAID's
Pakistan Planning Framework document of May 2001 states that USAID
received this authority in response to ``the grave state of the public
education systems and the belief that a poorly educated populace
impedes economic development and more readily supports extremist
actions.''
Thus, from the beginning of USAID's reengagement with Pakistan,
education has played the central role. When USAID reestablished a full
mission presence in Pakistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001,
attacks, programs to address needs in health, economic growth, and
democracy were added creating the current robust assistance program.
Administration commitments made in conjunction with high-level
negotiations have played a role in further program selection, e.g., the
commitments to provide $300 million per year from FY 2005-09 for
economic aid ($100 million in project support and $200 million in
nonproject or budget support), $50 million per year from FY 2007-09 for
earthquake reconstruction, and $750 million over 5 years (FY 2007-2011)
for sustainable development in the FATA. All these activities are
directed toward the overarching goal of helping Pakistan develop into a
moderate, prosperous, and democratic nation. These activities also
complement existing programs of other donors in the country, such as
the U.K.'s Department for International Development, or in other cases
working jointly on programs such as with the Government of Japan in the
FATA education response.
What oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that this assistance
is being used for legitimate purposes?
All USAID contracts and grants are supervised by trained personnel
to ensure the activities spend resources in order to obtain the agreed-
upon objectives. Regular financial audits are performed. Evaluations of
projects after they end--and in some cases earlier--are part of our
business approach. USAID has been hiring additional staff to increase
project monitoring.
supporting usg and pakistani priorities
To achieve the end-state of a prosperous, moderate, and stable
country, the United States and the Government of Pakistan are working
together very closely to strengthen opportunities for Pakistanis. USAID
has been very responsive to the evolving situation in Pakistan--
supporting the earthquake relief efforts, assisting with Cyclone Yemyin
this past summer, and in developing a long-term plan to address the
needs of the tribal areas.
What proportion of USAID assistance is spent in the FATA region?
We estimate that USAID allocated 6 percent of funds for FY 2002-07
to activities in the FATA.
What are the goals for assistance in this region and are they being
achieved?
The goals of USAID's assistance program to the FATA are to help the
Government of Pakistan integrate the people of this strategically
critical region into the rest of the country--economically, socially,
and politically--to give the people of the FATA a stake in Pakistan's
development and to help them experience the economic and social
benefits and services that come with this integration. Most
importantly, this program will work on strengthening the capacity of
local government institutions in the FATA to address the needs of
citizens there.
USAID has designed a comprehensive program for the region that
addresses the major constraints that impede development in the region,
with a focus on promoting economic growth through development of small
and medium enterprises, markets, education, job training, health care,
and community development activities.
How is the civilian assistance coordinated with the U.S. support for
the Pakistani military?
Coordination takes place at weekly FATA meetings which are chaired
by the DCM and attended by representatives of the U.S. military, USAID,
and all other members of the Embassy team that provide assistance to
FATA. Similarly, thrice weekly country team meetings chaired by the
Ambassador, address coordination issues. The U.S. Embassy has recently
filled a FATA assistance coordinator position in Islamabad.
Does USAID have a strategy to sustain support for Pakistani
institutions over the long-term?
USAID builds sustainability into the design of each program. The
major role of USAID technical assistance is to undertake the training
and capacity-building that will ensure we leave behind teams and
institutions in place that have the skills and systems needed to keep
programs operating after USAID projects end. These efforts form the
heart of USAID activities worldwide. Thus, in earthquake
reconstruction, we not only rebuild schools, but also work with
communities and schools to improve the quality of classroom instruction
and establish parent and teacher groups that will take responsibility
for upkeep and maintenance of school buildings. In higher education, we
have a long history of creating and sustaining high-quality schools
that provide leadership for Pakistan. In health, USAID's work supports
public and private institutions that provide services and strengthen
human resources for health care. These include district-level
governmental institutions as well as commercial institutions providing
health care products to communities and individuals.
In FATA, we face many development challenges. However, one of the
largest components is capacity-building of the FATA government so that
it can more effectively govern this territory.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, although we have come a long way in Pakistan, no one
seeks to underestimate the challenges ahead. Recent events have shown
that the road back to democracy in Pakistan isn't as smooth as we would
expect it to be. Our commitment is to the people of Pakistan, as they
embark upon a long-term development course. The strong, long-term U.S.
commitment that we display is making the difference, and it must
continue with intensity.
We at the U.S. Agency for International Development appreciate all
that your committee does to support this most important endeavor. Thank
you again for this opportunity to appear before this committee. I look
forward to taking your questions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you for your testimony. We'll start
with 7-minute rounds and the Chair will recognize himself.
You know, Mr. Secretary, I listened to your testimony. I
read your testimony and it is fair to say we have no particular
criticism. We're happy with Pakistan because all I heard
verbally is that we're pretty much happy with the way things
are.
Mr. Boucher. No; I think we've been quite critical. We were
quite critical with the state of emergency. We were very
critical in the crackdown on the media. We've been critical of
some of the arrangements made for the election. We just keep
pushing and try to overcome these obstacles. I think in terms
of our assistance programs, I think we can be quite proud of
what we've done to help the education system, the health care
system, things like that and economic growth.
Senator Menendez. Why do we take 6 years to come to the
conclusion that the $200 million that we are now providing was
much better served in having it be programmatically delineated
versus just giving it to the Pakistani Government?
Mr. Boucher. This money was part of the Presidential
commitment that started in 2004 and I think at that time, the
decision to do it this way was in part based on the fact that
we didn't think we had the ability at that point, to spend all
$200 million on the economic side. Jim, you might been around
and know that better than me. But I think also, as the
situation evolves, as it develops and as there are concerns
about sort of the gross, the general nature of some of the
budgetary support, even though we know its goal is to increase
spending in certain categories so they have increased health
care spending by 59 percent in the last couple of years;
education spending by 58 percent because in part of our
support. But even though we know the macroeconomic effects and
the budgetary effects, I think everybody with the state of
emergency as with recent events felt they wanted more direct
knowledge----
Senator Menendez. Obviously, we are unhappy about something
if we have come to the conclusion after this experiential
factor that we as a government are better served, as are the
Pakistani people, by having a programmatic designation of a
significant amount of money, $200 million versus continuing to
just have it flow. I heard Mr. Kunder try to suggest that
everything was great with what we did and I heard you make a
statement that you've made a major decision to move in a
different direction. You know, it seems to me that we obviously
have found some significant reason to change the course.
Mr. Boucher. I think we heard a lot of concerns on the Hill
and we shared those concerns, given the recent turmoil and the
politics that we all wanted to know more specifically that our
money was going to the kids who deserve a better education and
the mothers and children who deserve better health care.
So, it was--we had a discussion within the administration.
The economists said no, you're better off doing it as budgetary
and macroeconomic support because it serves both the economic
benefit and an education and health care benefit. But I think
we all kind of decided it was better at this juncture to make
sure it was spent directly on the people we wanted to target
with that money.
Senator Menendez. Let me turn to the Coalition Support
Funds. I know you want to distance yourself from it. The
reality is that on November 5 of this year, the State
Department Deputy spokesperson, Tom Casey, when asked about aid
figures for Pakistan, gave a figure of $9.6 billion since 2001.
Now, that obviously includes Coalition Support Funds. Otherwise
he's way off base.
But I'm sure he's not that off base so clearly. He was
talking about the Coalition Support Funds as aid and I look in
your testimony of today, on page 7 and you say in your
testimony, ``The Department of State must concur on the
reimbursement.'' We're speaking about Coalition Support Funds
and the Office of Management and Budget must be consulted.
Embassy Islamabad is working with the Department of Defense and
the Government of Pakistan to make the Coalition Support Funds
reimbursement process more supportive of U.S. policy goals and
to ensure that we get maximum value for the money expended and
Embassy Islamabad has, on more than one occasion, denied or
sent claims back to the Government of Pakistan for further
clarification.''
So it seems to me that the State Department has a
significant role to play here, even though you want to distance
yourself from it. I would be interested in what is it that the
Embassy has done when it has denied or sent claims back that it
thought was not appropriate. What role is the Embassy playing
in trying to make sure, quote from your words, ``that we get
maximum value for the money expended?''
Mr. Boucher. Sir, I'm glad to address these funds. Just try
to remember, they have a slightly different character than the
assistance money. This is not in general, adding to the money
available----
Senator Menendez. Well, it's all our citizens' money.
Mr. Boucher. It's all our citizens' money and we want to
make sure it pays--it goes to the ends that the Congress
appropriated it for, frankly and that is to support the people
who are fighting and dying in the war on terror.
Our Embassy has a role. First they receive the receipts
from the Pakistani Government. They review them. They ask
questions about them. They try to identify the exact purposes,
make sure that the receipts are well substantiated. Then they
pass them on to the Central Command, which validates the link
to our military operations so that it is seen clearly as a part
of the war on terror. Then it goes to the Department of Defense
Comptroller that evaluates to ensure the costs are reasonable
and credible. Then they do a determination by the Deputy
Secretary of State, send a notification to the Congress. It
comes up here for 15 days and then the Comptroller releases
funds to the Defense Security Corporation.
Senator Menendez. Well, I appreciate you reading----
Mr. Boucher. A lot of people go through them.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. The procedure. That's not my
question. Maybe let me try to synthesize it better since I know
you were the Department spokesperson for one time and can deal
very well in foiling with words.
The question is, Does the Department of State and your
Embassy, other than this perfunctory role you just described,
do anything to ``make sure that we get the maximum value for
the money expended''? Other than saying, yeah, this is
appropriately in accordance and pass it on.
Mr. Boucher. Yes; and I think the----
Senator Menendez. What exactly is that?
Mr. Boucher. I think the most direct way that takes place
is at the interface between the Embassy and the Pakistanis. It
is the Office of Defense cooperation the Embassy that does it
but the Embassy Ambassador is responsible. They look at the
receipts. They ask questions. They ask, you know, who is this
fuel for? What's that--where has that road been built? And they
look at it to make sure that in their mind, before it goes up
this long chain of people to review, it really is directed at
the ends it has been appropriated for; that is, fighting the
war on terror.
We are constantly working with the Pakistanis, sometimes
holding up receipts, asking questions; sometimes rejecting
them. But we're constantly working with them to make sure that
they know that we want to spend our money, we want to reimburse
them for real costs that they incur in fighting the war on
terror and not for more general costs they might incur.
Senator Menendez. Not for like putting the police and the
military on the streets arresting lawyers and doing all of
those activities that we just saw. So I hope we're not
reimbursing them for that.
Mr. Boucher. That's right.
Senator Menendez. Because when they're doing that, they're
obviously not fighting terrorism.
Mr. Boucher. OK, exactly.
Senator Menendez. I have more questions but I'll turn to
the distinguished ranking member, Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You, in your
testimony, Secretary Boucher, noted a couple of times the state
of emergency conditions in Pakistan emergency rule. My question
is, If in fact, President Musharraf lifts the emergency rule on
December 16--by December 16--do you believe then that--and you
touched upon this to some extent in your comments--that there
can be free, fair elections held in January or February of
parliamentary and local elections?
Mr. Boucher. I do think they can have a good election. They
can have a credible election. They can have a transparent
election and a fair election. It's not going to be a perfect
election. One would not want to have such disruption with the
media and the political parties this close to any election.
That obviously changes the atmosphere a bit but I think
particularly if we keep working at it and they keep working at
it and they do what they've pledged, what President Musharraf
and the political party leaders have pledged. They can have an
election that really does reflect the choices made by the
people of Pakistan.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe that he, in fact, will lift
the emergency rule by December 16?
Mr. Boucher. I think he has made a very, very clear public
statement that he will do so and whenever he has done something
like that, for example, on taking off the uniform and becoming
a civilian, he's carried through on it, at least in recent
months. So yes; I do believe he will lift it on December 16.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Kunder, do you wish to respond to this
question?
Mr. Kunder. We've put in place, working with the electoral
commission, widespread distribution of transparent ballot
boxes, building up the kinds of observer systems so with regard
to technical support, I believe that many of the tools will be
in place to guarantee a free and fair election.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, what would be your analysis
of former Prime Ministers Bhutto and Sharif's political impact
on the elections and on politics in general and the direction
of Pakistan as they have now returned?
Mr. Boucher. Senator, I want to make sure you ask that
question of some of the experts on Pakistan who are coming
after me and I'll listen very intently to their answers because
they really--they have probably a broader and longer
perspective than I do.
I do think it is important for the election that the major
political party leaders are back. Each of them has faced
different circumstances in being out of the country. Some of
those were resolved and they were able to come back and I do
think that given the nature of politics in Pakistan, where
there is a lot of personality involved, there's a lot of sort
of loyalty to parties based on families and leaders, that their
return helps mobilize major political forces in Pakistan and
that will lead to a better contest. So I think, in the end,
it's a good thing for the election to have those people back in
the country, leading their parties.
Senator Hagel. So it's a positive effect?
Mr. Boucher. Yes.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Kunder, would you wish to respond?
Mr. Kunder. Nothing on that one, sir.
Senator Hagel. Let me turn to the IMET assistance. Could
you explain a little bit how those IMET funds have been used,
are being used, what you believe has been achieved through the
IMET program?
Mr. Boucher. Sir, I think around the world, IMET is one of
the most important programs that we have. It's the way of
connecting with military leaders in other countries, many of
whom sometimes get involved with politics; but hopefully don't.
But we also do a lot of professional training, not just in how
to shoot guns and command units but how to act professionally,
how to work with civilian authority, how to engage in the
appropriate practices for an army, human rights practices, and
things like that and I think the kind of training they get in
the United States is very good.
There was a period when we didn't do any training for the
Pakistani Army so there is a group, a cohort of officers that
have not had a lot of training and what we're trying to do with
our IMET money now, is to continue the long-term engagement of
the Pakistani Army and the training that we've done but also
play a little catchup, too, and make sure that we are training
and working with some of those officers who missed out on an
experience in the United States.
You talk to individuals in Pakistan, as in other places,
and you find that the experience of getting military training
in the United States, along with American military, not only
improves them as officers, as officers in terms of their
carrying forth the battle but also in terms of the way they
respond to civilian authority, the way they respect the rights
of civilians that they might encounter along the way and I
think it is a positive impact. So we've had substantial
programs these last few years and we want to continue that.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Kunder, do you want to say anything?
[No response.]
Senator Hagel. Secretary, you testified and I think this is
in your written testimony that the Embassy and DOD are working
to make sure that Coalition Support Funds are, in your words,
more supportive of U.S. policy goals and you, I think, noted
this in your response to the chairman on a review of assistance
programs recently. My question is, What are the concerns that
have prompted this effort, this question about or assurance
that these funds are more supportive of U.S. policy goals, the
previous close to $6 billion. Have they not been supportive of
U.S. policy goals or where have they not been supportive? Can
you clarify that?
Mr. Boucher. You know, I think--let me say, I do think it
definitely has been supportive of U.S. policy goals and the
number I have, I think, is $5.3 billion. But I understand also
the committee just got today some information, some responses
from the Defense Comptroller and they're the ultimate authority
on these things.
Looking through what they've got, I'm not sure I see a
number but anyway, I guess the way I would characterize it is
since this is a reimbursement, we look at receipts. I'd say for
the last year or more, we've been asking more questions about
those receipts to make absolutely sure they are for the things
that they are intended for.
Second of all, I would say we've had more of a dialog
recently with the Pakistanis, saying hey, you know, what we
want to do is pay for this, that, and the other. I've been out
to the border. I've seen the fishing scouts who guard the
border down near Quetta and they've got some things provided
through our narcotics program but they're missing night vision
equipment. There are a lot of guys out there that need various
kinds of support and you do more border posts, we'll do more
support for them.
So more of a dialog in terms of saying, here's what we
really want to reimburse you for. These are the kinds of things
that we'd like to see you do and we'll be glad to reimburse you
for them.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Kunder, would you like to respond?
Mr. Kunder. There has been, as Richard said earlier,
frankly sir, a raging debate about the best way to do this. I
mean, purely from a technical point, there are a lot of my
colleagues who would say, if you really want to build the long-
term institutions of Pakistan, probably the best thing you can
do is work in a cash transfer mechanism with the Ministry of
Education, with the Ministry of Health instead of bringing in
outside experts from the American consulting community and the
American NGO community. So we've had a serious debate about
this.
Just to take a second to explain how this works--we have
sat down with the Ministry of Education, for example, and if
we've agreed that a certain portion of the cash transfer would
go to that Ministry, we've worked out in pretty good detail
whether that money would then generate more resources for
teacher training academies and then we've tracked whether, in
fact, the budget line item for that went up. So I believe there
has been accountability and there has been impact.
But now what we'd like to be able to say is, maybe there's
a particularly innovative program in Sindh province or in a
city somewhere that we really want to focus attention on, and
that's the added value that you get for moving to a projectized
system where we'll be more directly involved. From a technical
point of view, it's been a pretty solid debate about what is
the right way to get the kind of maximum systems impact you
want to have in Pakistan.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the witnesses. To begin, I'm very concerned that the
administration support for President Musharraf is shortsighted
and misguided. Obviously, serious questions remain about
President Musharraf's assistance in fighting al-Qaeda, which
has strengthened and reconstituted itself on the border between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the extraordinary and
antidemocratic measures President Musharraf has taken are
inconsistent with American values and likely to increase the
appeal of extremist groups in that country. So I'd like to
have, at this point, each of you address the impact of our
support for President Musharraf has had on stability and
democracy in Pakistan.
Mr. Boucher. I guess I would say that, I mean, first you
have to understand. The man is the leader of Pakistan,
Pakistan's key ally. We work with him and his government as a
key ally in the war on terror and he is someone who has set
broad strategic goals for the country that are indeed
compatible with ours, of moving it away from extremism, of
opening up the economy, of emphasizing better education and
other services for the citizens.
We've also worked, as you've noted, in our aid programs.
We've spent a lot of money on education, a lot of money on
health, a lot of money on economic growth, where they've
achieved remarkable successes, which have benefited people
throughout the country. We're now spending more money on
developing the tribal areas, giving these people there an
opportunity to find jobs, to get education, to get health care.
And that goes along with the Pakistani program. We're putting
in $750 million over 5 years. They're putting in $1 billion in
the same timeframe. So their money is going in there, too. So
we cooperate on these things.
I think our assistance, frankly, in some of these areas
that directly benefit the Pakistani people, is probably
underappreciated for a variety of reasons. But we do work with
the government and we look forward now to a democratic
transition. We've seen bumps in the road, mistakes, setbacks,
an emergency rule, which we thoroughly disagreed with, a
crackdown on the media, we thoroughly disagreed with and then
we've seen some of those things pulled off and for better or
for worse, through all these problems, we're going to have a
different situation in a couple months. We will have a civilian
President. We will have a civilian elected Prime Minister.
We'll have a different Chief of the Army and a different sort
of political configuration in Pakistan between the different
parties and the different people and the different centers of
power. Power will be more dispersed and we'll work with that
situation, too.
Senator Feingold. I want a chance to follow up here. I
listened to your answer. Bumps in the road? This is a lot more,
Mr. Boucher, than bumps in the road. This is a frightful
situation of an attack on a democracy and my question to you
was regarding the impact our support for President Musharraf
has had on stability and democracy in Pakistan, not how you can
justify what he has done. What impact has our support had on
stability and democracy in Pakistan? Are you saying it hasn't
had any negative impact?
Mr. Boucher. I think that our emphasis, our pressure on
moving to a democratic transition has had an impact on
President Musharraf. Part of the reason why we are in a period
of transition to democracy right now, part of the reason why
there are political leaders in Pakistan contesting elections
that will be held in a month, part of the reason why the state
of emergency, once imposed, is going to be lifted soon, is
because of the role of the United States because we do--it
works both ways. Yes; we support what the Pakistani Government
is doing against terror but we also push very hard for the
transition to democracy.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Kunder, do you want to respond?
Mr. Kunder. Just to supplement, sir, what I mentioned in my
opening statement, is that the aid that has gone in has, in
large part, gone to institutions of the Pakistani Government,
like the Independent Electoral Commission or to strengthening
the Parliament and, we believe, have continued to support the
long-term growth of democracy or have gone directly to benefit
the Pakistani people.
Senator Feingold. Let me go to human rights. The State
Department's 2007 Report on Human Rights gives Pakistan poor
marks on human rights, citing police corruption, lack of
judicial independence and serious gender discrimination. Can I
ask you gentlemen how we're addressing these concerns in our
aid programs?
Mr. Boucher. Do you want to take that one?
Mr. Kunder. Well, specifically sir, you mentioned the
judicial sector. This is an area where we are, in fact,
spending a large number of our democracy and governance funds
to strengthen the independent judiciary, to strengthen the
legislative functions of the government and so while I take
your point, sir, my point is that we are, in fact, addressing
those issues head on with our aid program.
Senator Feingold. Well, give me more specifically, update
me on how State and USAID development and application of
conditions, benchmarks or goals is being done. What--give me a
little more detail on what you're doing.
Mr. Kunder. I have to say, I'd have to read it. I don't
read the Human Rights Report every week, sir. But the judicial
system is an area where, for example, what we've done is offer
technical assistance to build up the judicial research
capacity, to build up the institutions in the Parliament. I can
tell you, specifically, there was not the kind of legislative
recordkeeping, there was not the kind of staff support for the
individual parliamentarians and what we looked at was a long-
term, institution-building perspective. We did not put
conditions on the Parliament as part of receiving that aid but
rather, we looked at what we thought were the underlying
elements of fragility in the democracy and tried to design the
programs around strengthening democracy in the long run.
On the electoral commission side, we've tried to strengthen
the Independent Electoral Commission as an institution and then
put in place the--as I mentioned earlier, literally the
transparent ballot boxes, the corps of election observers and
then strengthening the political parties to become more issue
oriented in their discussions. So what we tried to do is assess
the underlying weaknesses in the system and then put some of
the resources into those areas.
Mr. Boucher. Well, if I could add something, sir?
Senator Feingold. Yes, please.
Mr. Boucher. A couple examples--$13 million of our money
this year is for local government and decentralization. These
are programs that work on a local level to develop
representatives for the people, better local government systems
and gender issues are always a part of those projects, as they
are throughout our aid programs.
In our education programs, one of the emphases is keeping
girls in school and there are a variety of very innovative
programs, reading programs and things, just building dorms near
the schools. We're doing this up in the tribal areas so that
the girls can be safe when they go to school and that's trying
to redress gender issues, gender problems that have been
throughout Pakistan.
So better local governance in particular, is an area of
emphasis as well as, as I say, gender issues permeate our aid
programs throughout.
Senator Feingold. I thank the witnesses. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I'd like to inquire more about the election
preparation. As your testimony points out, the state of
emergency is to be lifted on December 16 and the election is
scheduled for January 8. That is just 23 days after the
emergency is lifted and although the Republican and Democratic
institutes, the Embassy, others have been setting up the
transparent election system and various other aspects, which
you have experienced, a question arises. As you say, in a
country of 160-some million people, a good many of them lacking
literacy, the school children you pointed out and adults,
certainly at this point, confusion as to who the competitors
are, who in fact, will be running in this election? The
communication to a country this large and this diverse or the
alternatives, is to say the least, daunting.
Now, it's a Pakistani decision. I'd assume we'd take that
for granted and try to do the best that we can to be helpful.
But at the same time the undercurrents, at least of accusations
in Pakistan, are that President Musharraf, fearing that the
supreme court was going to rule adversely on his election,
displaced the supreme court and declared a state of emergency,
claiming that he was fighting terrorism, while many in Pakistan
would claim he was attempting to preserve his Presidency. Now
he has appointed new judges who have ruled in his favor
partially and he is President again while others remain
displaced from the judiciary.
Having been an observer of many elections in Latin America
during a period, and all around the world, there was a fairly
well developed system of electoral competition. There were
parties. There were persons who could be identified as
candidates, whether the people voting were literate or not,
with symbols in nature utilized so that people could make
choices, even if they could not identify names or words; and at
this particular point, it's not clear any of the above is a
part of this procedure in Pakistan. So I just inquire the two
of you as experts on the ground, is it our hope that the two
leaders that have returned, Mr. Sharif and Ms. Bhutto, will in
fact be identified as two competitors? Will Pakistanis see that
they have a choice between the two and that somehow a majority
may form behind one or the other party and on the basis of
this, some type of parliamentary majority might be formed that
would be a check and balance with President Musharraf and/or
the commander in chief of the armed forces or the courts; what
is the most optimistic outcome of this scenario with the
election on January 8?
Mr. Boucher. Senator, you know from your experience
observing elections that an election, a good election is not
made on election day. It's made in the months that preceded it;
in fact, in the years that preceded it and we've had a large
number of political programs, election programs going since
about 2004, most of them--big funding was in 2006-07. We've
been working with the parties, with the election commission.
We've worked on voter lists, ballot boxes, counting procedures,
voter education--just a whole slew of things to try to prepare
the field. Journalists--teaching journalists, getting American
journalists to go over and talk to Pakistani journalists about
how to report and cover an election and how to do--we're
financing parallel counts.
Senator Daschle has led two or three, several delegations
going back months ago, way before the emergency, to go out and
look at the election systems and look at what needed to be done
to improve them. We've taken his recommendations. We've taken
recommendations of political parties. We've taken
recommendations of voting experts who have been out there
working and tried to push on the things that we thought were
most crucial, like having a good voter list, which there is a
good voter list but probably--it was missing a lot of people
and the court intervened and fixed it, perhaps in a way that
may not have fixed it properly but we've pushed a lot on
transparent counting so that every stage of the way, there is
good count and numbers can't be inserted throughout there and
indeed, President Musharraf and the election commission have
promised a transparent vote count.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Boucher, let me just say, I accept now
the fact that you've done this technical work. Are we even
assured the two leaders are going to run at all?
Mr. Boucher. We--no, we don't know for sure. They have not
declared for sure but the last part of the question I should
answer is that there has been a lot of politicking in Pakistan
throughout. These leaders have been exiled but their parties
have remained strong and active within Pakistan. Their return,
I think, gives them leadership in the election. They have a lot
of automatic support from the faithful and they have the
opportunity now to sort of go out and try to build that to a
broader base. It makes it a better election. It's not
necessarily going to make it as good as it should be.
Senator Lugar. Well, who will people vote for if the two
leaders do not run?
Mr. Boucher. Who will they vote for?
Senator Lugar. Yes. Who----
Mr. Boucher. Well, because it's parliamentary, you have
party candidates with symbols at each district level throughout
the country. If the parties decide to boycott, I presume their
people would not be on the ballot but I think, at least they're
talking about the conditions under which they would
participate. So we'll have to see. Certainly, we think that
everybody--having everybody participate, having the leaders
take an active role, would improve the quality of the election
and improve the ability of the Pakistani people to see their
choices reflected in the outcome.
Senator Lugar. Let me just ask this. Regardless of who is
elected, does the potential President or Prime Minister,
Parliament or anyone else, share our fight against the Taliban
and against
al-Qaeda? Even after we see the parliamentary situation resolve
itself, arise and come about, is there actually a sharing of
our concerns? Is it not a fact that Pakistan has supported the
Taliban historically?
Mr. Boucher. They have and they changed that. I mean, that
was a decision they made very shortly after 9/11. It was a big
decision for them and what we've done since then is try to work
with them to get them to carry that out. I would say--my basic
answer would be yes. All the major political party leaders do
share our goals and share the goal of ridding Pakistan of
extremism and not having it be a haven for al-Qaeda and other
extremists. Some would go about it perhaps in different ways.
Some may share those goals more than others but I think our
intention is to work with whoever is elected and work with all
the institutions of society, from the army and the Presidency
to the civil society and the business community, to try to help
Pakistan with what we think the vast majority of the Pakistani
people want and that's a stable, democratic, and prosperous
society.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
both for your testimony today and your service to our
government. Mr. Secretary, Secretary Boucher, I was struck by
one of the first sentences in your testimony, your written
testimony. At the beginning of the second paragraph, you state
and I quote, ``President Musharraf's November 3rd imposition of
a state of emergency, including reshuffling the supreme court,
curtailment of press freedom and arrest and detention of
journalists, lawyers, human rights advocates, political
activists and party leaders, was a setback.''
I have to tell you, I mean, part of what's in the room
today is a real concern about credibility and a concern about
how we present information. Now, there are a lot of ways to
describe that list and I had an exhaustive list of problems and
we could add to them. But I think to describe it as a
``setback'' is really downplaying the grave concerns that we
have and I think that people in Pakistan and human rights and
legal experts the world over have concerns about. So you can
address it or not but I think there are better ways to
describe--that list of problems doesn't even begin to describe
what's been happening there.
Mr. Boucher. I take the point, sir. I don't think--I've
never been given to dramatic terms of phrase. I do think, you
know, we made very clear in public and in private, this was a
very serious problem. It was a serious mistake and it created
serious trouble for the elections. Thankfully, much of this has
been reversed to some extent. Political party leaders and
activists are back out of jail. Most--almost all, I think, all
but GEOTV, the TV stations are back on the air. The radio
stations are pretty much back. I heard today about one more
that was back on the air. The lawyers are out there
demonstrating. Human rights and civil society people have been
released. We still do have a state of emergency, which is a
serious--you know, it's a real distortion of the election
process but despite all that, we seem to be heading back in the
right direction and some of these serious mistakes are being
reversed.
Senator Casey. I take you at your word. I hope that your
description reflects the reality on the ground. But let me move
on to a related point. It's within that context of how we talk
about this country but in particular, how we discuss the
forthcoming election and I think there's a crisis of confidence
there, too, that this election, no matter what you can put on a
piece of paper as it pertains to changes that have been made or
safeguards in place for the election, there is a real concern,
I think, that even if you have--and I know that your colleague
talks about USAID on page 8 of your testimony, sir, about the
USAID help for the electoral commission and what's been
happening there. But some have a real concern about the
electoral commission, how it's put together and whether or not
that commission can not only be independent but it can execute
the way it has to execute to have a free and fair election. I'd
ask each of you to comment, if you can, on how that commission
was put together and whether or not you have concerns about the
membership of it or the constitution of it or the methods or
the methodology that was used to put it together. What can you
tell us about that commission?
Mr. Boucher. I guess what I'd start by saying is, I can
come up with a long list of problems in this election. The
voter lists still aren't completely straight. The counting
process, we think has improved. We think there are plenty of
safeguards. We're not clear it's going to be fully transparent.
We certainly pressed and hoped for that and worked to that.
The election commission has been, I would say, somewhat
neutral but often ineffective. We've tried to get them to work
with all the political parties and indeed; they've done that a
little bit but not half as much as we think they should have.
We think, throughout this process, they should have spent more
time listening to the political parties and taking onboard
their concerns and criticism and trying to fix those things.
They've done a little bit of that but not enough.
There are dozens more. We have experts in the election
commission pushing on these things every day. The Embassy
pushes on them. We're still pushing on them. The big think
coming up is the election. We have to make it as good and as
credible as possible.
Senator Casey. Sir.
Mr. Kunder. I take your point, sir. I would not say that I
depend solely on the electoral commission to drive all these
processes. That's why we're trying, and in response to your
question and Senator Lugar's question, we've got some pretty
smart, tough-minded people at State and USAID and the party
institutes out there, thinking this through. We've been on the
phone to them. We're trying to distill our lessons from what
just happened in Venezuela with the referendum there. We
learned some additional things, some lessons we're trying to
apply, especially on, for example, critical linkages between
observers and the media because if observers are getting
certain election results at 11 p.m. and they can get that to
the media and then you're announcing the results at 11 and
midnight and 1 a.m., it's a little bit hard to change the
election results at 8 o'clock in the morning. So we're trying
to take our best lessons learned and try to build both on the
civil society side and on the electoral commission side, the
best tools we can to guarantee as free and fair an election as
possible.
Senator Casey. I've only got about a minute left. I want to
get in one other major question. It pertains to their nuclear
program and also the impact of potential terrorist activity as
it pertains to their nuclear program. What can you tell us and
I guess this is more directed to Mr. Boucher, what can you tell
us, if anything, about whether or not--and I hope the answer to
this is no--whether or not there has been any deterioration or
weakening of their command and control infrastructure within
their military or otherwise, as it pertains to their nuclear
capability in the context of all this unrest?
Mr. Boucher. We would answer no to that. We don't think
there has been a weakening. They--we're, I think, fairly
confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards
in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and
not to allow any compromise.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate it
and I appreciate both of you coming to testify today. I want to
say to the Secretary that we had an excellent visit last
Thursday with Ambassador Peterson and with former Prime
Minister Bhutto and President Musharraf and I know that you
used the word, a bump in the road and Senator Feingold took
issue with that and I know that I would just say that none of
us really look at it as just a bump in the road and I know you
didn't mean that. It was obvious that your Ambassador there is
taking very seriously some of the miscues that occurred before
and is stressing heavily with all of us and certainly with
them, as we did with them, the need for fair and free
elections, transparent elections.
I would say to Senator Lugar that I was struck in meeting
with Ms. Bhutto at her home in the dining room, with her strong
desire to counter terrorism and I think that sometimes we
forget the fact that terrorism is a far greater threat to
Pakistan itself internally than it is even to us today, here.
So I think they do, in fact, take it very seriously.
I was also struck by the--sort of the emotional impact, if
you will, to President Musharraf in taking off his uniform.
Somebody who had been in the military for 40 years and the
impact on him and we remarked jokingly how good his suit looked
on him instead of having the uniform and it actually did look
sharp. But you know, I think he is very committed to being
legitimate and trying to do those things to make him
legitimate.
I do have concerns, like everyone here, that the
infrastructure is not in place for that to occur; that those
underneath him, mayors at the local level, the transporting of
ballets, all those things, can, in fact, cause the election
certainly to not be viewed as legitimate and not happen as
legitimate and we have stressed heavily with him the fact that
international observers need to be allowed in the country; that
no visas should be denied and I think that's one area that can
greatly taint this process.
I'd love for you to remark, if you might, about anything
you're doing to ensure that international observers are allowed
in the country and that no one in that regard is barred.
Mr. Boucher. Sir, let me, Senator, if I can, just start by
thanking you for going to Pakistan and for what you did there.
It's very, very strong supporters of congressional travel and I
read the cables on your meetings and I think you really helped
us advance the agenda and show that all Americans, from all
parts of the government and throughout the body of politics in
the United States want to push, want to see this to be a stable
and safe transition and we want to see a result and a good
election and an election that is free and fair and that they
fix a lot of these real problems that they have created or
allowed to persist, even at this late stage. There are many
things they can do to help make the elections more free and
more credible and that's what we are continuing to push for and
you are.
The terrorism directed against Mrs. Bhutto on her return;
that the rallies that were held on her return is one of the
most horrible acts of terrorism that has occurred in Pakistan
in a long time and I think it just shows that the terrorists
are as much against this election as anybody is. They want to
stop political forces from coming in. They want to stop
moderate political forces from coming in and they want to stop
the Pakistani people from being able to choose their government
because they certainly would not be chosen.
On the observer question, we do think that having observers
there, along with things like the parallel vote count and the
transparent ballot boxes; all these things we've talked about
but having observers is one of the most important, one of the
best things we can do to help ensure a fair and free election.
There are 20,000 domestic observers that we've helped train
through a project with the--one of our cooperating partners--I
can look it up but 20,000 domestic observers. They are the bulk
in the eyes and ears at the polling places. In addition, there
will be observers from the United States, Britain, other
countries and as I said, we're encouraging Europeans and others
to go as well. We've talked to the government. The government
has said they welcome observers, that they will issue the
visas, that they will facilitate the work of the observers as
they go in and we'll hold them to that standard.
Senator Corker. I think anything we might do to even help
facilitate it and I think even in our government, which is
very, very different, we have sometimes difficulty in calls and
things to be carried out beneath, if you will, to the
satisfaction that we'd like and I think that anything you might
do through our offices there, really, to put the word out to
international observers to facilitate even that visa process. I
think that he was visibly stunned at some of those--you know, I
hope this was the case. It appeared that it was sincere--
stunned that some of those visas had been denied and I think,
wants to do what is necessary but I think we may need to help
in that regard and I think a big outreach on our part would be
very useful in this regard.
Mr. Boucher. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Corker. Let me just ask a couple questions. How
long has it been since there has been a peaceful transition of
power in Pakistan.
Mr. Boucher. Let me commend the experts to you one more
time. I don't think any of these previous transitions can be
described as very smooth or peaceful. They were all the result
of----
Senator Corker. I think it's been about 60 years----
Mr. Boucher. Since the beginning.
Senator Corker. I think that--while certainly I think a
hearing to justify the aid that we're spending and I think for
us to constantly analyze, I think for us to actually see what
occurs over the next couple months is maybe most appropriate
for us and to actually do everything we can to ensure these
elections are free and fair and transparent and to hold him at
his word. I think we'll know very soon whether this is actually
occurred or not and I do wonder whether that's not a better
time to even look at where our aid is going and how it is being
measured. I'd love to have any response you might give in that
regard.
Mr. Boucher. I think that's true. We will be working with a
new situation in Pakistan, a new Government, a new Prime
Minister as well as a civilian President Musharraf, a new head
of the army and we'll, I think, continue to work with people
and talk to them about their priorities and how we can help but
also look at the situation and decide how to spend our money.
Senator Corker. We've had a situation where we've had a
leader who has acted as the political leader but also the
military leader. I know that most people believe General Kiyani
will be the new military leader there. My sense is that is
something that could be very good for us; that we'd have one
person totally focused on political issues. We then would have
a military leader that is solely focused on terrorism and
solely focused on military activities. I'd love for you to
respond to that.
Mr. Boucher. I think that's true. I think part of this
transition is because of the strength, the growth of civil
society, the strength of the democratic forums, the pressure
from people like us from outside but part of it is also because
the army was tired of being blamed for everything; tired of
being blamed for university admissions and the price of sugar
and everything else and wants to get back to their real job,
their real work and so I think everybody felt it was time to
make this transition in Pakistan.
Senator Corker. So just to summarize this segment, I know
my time is up. It seems that we actually have an opportunity
over the next couple months, if we keep the pressure on and the
partnership going, to actually have a peaceful transfer. We
actually have an opportunity to potentially have a military
leader that may even be stronger as a partner because of more
full focus and I think that maybe it's good for our country to
focus on trying to make sure this all occurs in an appropriate
way over the next 60 days and then reassess how our aid levels
ought to be, based on the situation at hand. Is that correct?
Mr. Boucher. I do think that's true. I think however it
turns out, it's very important for us to maintain a substantial
level of assistance for Pakistan because we want them to be
able to fight the war on terror. We want them to be able to
develop their democracy. We want them to be able to educate
their children, take care of the babies and the health care
needs of the population and recover from the earthquake. Those
fundamental interests of the United States in seeing success in
Pakistan in developing as a nation and fighting the war on
terror are not going to change too much but how we go about it,
how we work with a new situation is going to change and we'll
have to be open to making any adjustments that are appropriate
in the way we spend our money.
Senator Corker. Thank you and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you. I do have one other set of
questions, some of it is derived from what I've heard here, and
I just have got to make sure I hear you right, Mr. Secretary.
You know, in America, we have an election process that
takes a year and a half to try to get to its ultimate
conclusion. What you described as a bump in the road when
people like Chavez do what they do in their country, we have
much more specific language about that. So do you want to
reiterate for me again that in response to Senator Lugar that
when you take to these facts, you have the leaders of the
opposition parties exiled from their country until recently?
You have an emergency proclamation that is lifted 23 days
before the election and you have the rest of the people who
only just recently were released and all of those facts leads
us to believe that the election is going to be, as you said, an
election that is good, transparent, and fair. That's what
you're telling the committee?
Mr. Boucher. I think those were all very bad things. Those
were all very negative for the process but they are reversible.
The fact that there are the leaders back, that there is
politicking going on means there is a chance and we all ought
to work for it.
Senator Menendez. And it will be good, transparent, and
fair? Your words, not mine.
Mr. Boucher. It can be good, transparent, and fair.
Senator Menendez. Even with all of that as a background?
Mr. Boucher. Even with all that----
Senator Menendez. Even with 28 days to the election?
Mr. Boucher. Even--because it wasn't just those 28 days.
Senator Menendez. It's not just a question of 28 days. I
can set a series of efforts to try to professionalize an
election but if then I take the candidates and have them out of
the country, if I then take my opponents and arrest them, if I
shut down the press, if I ultimately don't lift the
proclamation until less than a month before the election, I
think that in other parts of the world, we'd have a much
different view.
Mr. Boucher. I think we were very clear, sir, on the
emergency. We were very clear on the media. We've been very
clear on the need for the political transition of the
President. I don't--you know, I don't know what the proper
metaphor is. We were heading toward a transition. We were
working on all these issues to make the election free and fair.
We got hit by a car along the way. It was a serious problem,
made it much more difficult. We managed to reverse some of the
effects of the declaration of emergency and we have a shot at
doing a good election. I think you and others ought to try to
make it that way.
Senator Menendez. I want to look at the other comment you
made that however it turns out, substantial funds have to
continue to flow. That's the reality of what we're dealing with
here in terms of the security equation to this and it's not an
insignificant equation. But I think you pretty much said it.
However it turns out, significant funds have to continue to
flow so I think maybe we should be a little intellectually
honest about this and say that that's really where our interest
is but trying to move democracy down the road suggests that the
framework that you describe can possibly be good, fair, and
transparent is mind-boggling for me.
But let me ask one other set of questions here. No. 1, yes
or no, Did the strategic review that the Secretary of State
announced as it relates to Pakistan funding, produce any change
outside of the $200 million going to programmatic versus
general support for ESF?
Mr. Boucher. At this point, we haven't decided on any other
changes.
Senator Menendez. Is this review continuing?
Mr. Boucher. We'll keep the situation under review because
as we said, we're coming up on some big events.
Senator Menendez. But does it----
Mr. Boucher. And those will determine how we spend our
money.
Senator Menendez. Does it have an end to it? Is there going
to be a report about what the strategic review provided?
Mr. Boucher. I don't think there will be a formal report.
We're glad if, you know, some time after the election, after we
see how that turns out, we're glad to come back before the
Congress and the committee and try to explain, if we have any
further conclusions.
Senator Menendez. It sounds to some of us that the
strategic review was just to swage the bump in the road along
the way.
Mr. Boucher. Sir, I know I said bump in the road but I said
a lot of other things, too, and I do agree with you, these were
terrible events that shouldn't have happened.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask one last set of questions. A
witness on the next panel, who we'll hopefully have up shortly,
paraphrased to some of the opinions that several of them have,
says the following: ``The United States has made no effort to
distinguish between military assistance, which is useful for
our common counterterrorism efforts and aid with little or no
connection to the war against al-Qaeda nor made provisions of
the latter contingent upon cooperation with combating the
extremists hiding in the FATA region and elsewhere in
Pakistan.'' They also go on to say that the United States has
``established economic and development programs that have
frequently been unfocused, poorly conceived, or lacking in
responsible oversight.'' How would you respond to that, Mr.
Kunder?
Mr. Kunder. I would respectfully disagree. I read the
statement. I just saw that it was a stand-alone statement so
I'd like to see what analysis--if I have time, I'll sit and
listen to the next panel but I simply disagree with that. As I
tried to lay out in my testimony, we think our development
program has been very carefully focused on what we think are
the long-term problems facing the Pakistani people.
If I could just make one more comment, sir, I think this
whole question about whether we review a program after an
election and so forth is important. The Foreign Assistance Act,
as you know, has not been rewritten in more than four decades
now and buried in there is language that talks about how we're
using foreign assistance to support our national security
objectives and there's a lot of language in there that talks
about how we're trying to advance human progress. I think the
kinds of issues that Senator Corker raised are very profound
issues because to some extent, numbers should vary as
democratic performance varies but, it's a long-term process,
and we should continue investing in the institutions in a big,
poor country like Pakistan, to some extent, regardless of who
the President or Prime Minister is, and I think it's on that
issue that this debate turns because some of us think that
regardless of who wins this election, the literacy of Pakistani
citizens is critically important to our country in the long
term.
So, to some extent, yes, we need to be doing reviews and we
need to be examining who wins or loses elections but I think
also buried in the Foreign Assistance Act, for those of us who
are trying to be guided by law, is a lot of language that tells
us to stick with it and turn the country around. These are
profound issues, which I suspect I will not resolve with this
statement.
Senator Menendez. I think that's why probably everybody
universally wants to work to turn the country around. They want
literacy for the Pakistani people. They want those things that
would help strengthen civil society. I just question about the
way we're going about it.
Mr. Kunder. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. Last, $10 billion later, Mr. Secretary,
has the United States had access to A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani
scientist who gave nuclear weapon----
Mr. Boucher. We have not had direct access.
Senator Menendez. $10 billion later? Do we not believe we
should have access?
Mr. Boucher. We've had good cooperation. We've had
information. We've seen them provide information to the
international community so they can follow up and destroy the
network.
Senator Menendez. $10 billion later, we have not had
access.
Mr. Boucher. We've had good cooperation in getting infor-
mation----
Senator Menendez. But not direct access?
Mr. Boucher. But not direct access, yes sir.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Boucher. Can I address the military side of your
question? Because the FMF funds and you sort of made reference
to them, they're very much focused on things that help in the
war on terror--tow missiles, helicopters, P3s that help them do
the maritime patrols that will help them support the maritime
patrols that they're already doing. So very much a lot of
those--that $300 million that goes to FMF annually is support
for equipment and needs, training that will help them in the
war on terror.
Senator Menendez. It also gives them the ability to
strengthen their military beyond on the war on terrorism, does
it not?
Mr. Boucher. I would say that it's not--if you think of it
sort of as the old NATO and the Warsaw Pact, they've had an
army that was designed to defend the Plains of Punjab. This is
money that's more attuned to the kind of things you have to do
against extremism and terrorism.
Senator Menendez. Any other Senator? If not, thank you both
for your testimony. We'll keep the record open for a few days
and any questions that may be submitted to you, we'll ask for
your expeditious response. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Kunder. Thank you very much.
Mr. Boucher. Thank you, sir.
Senator Menendez. Let me welcome the second panel to our
hearing today. We want to thank all of our witnesses for
joining us: Ambassador Teresita Schaffer; the director of the
South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Dr. Lawrence Korb, the senior fellow at
the Center for American Progress, and Dr. Robert Hathaway, the
director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. We're going to proceed to
opening statements of all of our witnesses. Just as we had for
our first panel, we ask you to synthesize it in approximately 7
minutes and we will, of course, include your full statement for
the record.
With that, Ambassador Schaffer, it's good to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. TERESITA C. SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Hagel, for inviting me to share my thoughts this
afternoon at a critical time in Pakistan's history and in the
long and turbulent history of United States/Pakistan relations.
Pakistan's location alone will guarantee that the United
States needs to remain engaged with Pakistan over the long
term. This is a hearing that I was told was about foreign
assistance, which is not the only tool the United States brings
to bear on this situation but it is a very important and highly
visible one.
I believe that the United States needs to use its aid to
invest in Pakistan's future and in the long-term viability of a
decently governed state. At the same time, we don't want to
encourage policies we find perverse or at variance with U.S.
interests. These principles are not as contradictory as they
may sound and I think they give us a pretty good guide to
structuring our assistance in the future.
Let me start with U.S. economic assistance, which is our
best instrument for investing in Pakistan's future. I believe
we should shift the balance of our assistance toward economic
aid and reduce the percentage of military assistance. I would
suggest a ratio of about 2 to 1, between economic aid and
security-related aid and I'm not including Coalition Support
Funds in that calculus.
Within the economic assistance portfolio, our assistance
should all be given in the form of projects rather than cash or
budget support and I was delighted to hear that the
administration wants to move in this direction. I am much less
sanguine that Mr. Kunder about how meaningful it is to do the
accounting exercise involved in having the receiving government
prove how they have spent our cash money. All too often, the
needle doesn't move in terms of the percentage of GDP that's
being devoted to these efforts, which is what ought to mean
something to us.
We need to invest in Pakistan's people, particularly
education and health and I know those are important on AID's
list. These sectors have been disastrously underfunded for over
three decades and our aid should help redress that balance. But
our investments also need to be visible to the people they are
supposed to help. I actually agree with what Mr. Kunder said
about institution-building but I think at a time when anti-
Americanism is at such a high point, that it's important to
capture people's imagination. For example, we might want to
encourage visits by Project HOPE and similar special teams and
then try to use them to drain people who will continue to staff
rural clinics after the big white bird has left.
I'm not going to address Coalition Support Funds other than
to say that I strongly support efforts to increase the
accountability of how the money is spent.
On military assistance, I think my colleagues may have more
to say. My only point is that we need to give priority to those
things that directly support counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency and things like F-16s are hard to justify on
that basis. I know that the F-16 transaction has a lot of
emotional baggage in Pakistan so I'm not here recommending that
we pull the plug on that. I'm only suggesting that it is
possible within the category of military assistance, to be
selective and to calibrate that to our larger foreign policy
goals.
You asked what impact U.S. assistance has on Pakistan's
internal security and on its path toward democracy. The honest
answer is, not very much. The United States, as you have just
heard, has funded some valuable programs designed to improve
election transparency and I certainly support those. I should
say that I was a member of an NDI delegation that visited
Pakistan in May and we spent a lot of time looking at the
election procedures. We put out a very specific list of things
that needed to change. I'm glad that the U.S. Government is now
focusing on things like precinct by precinct announcements of
election results. This was one of the things we picked up.
There are lots of problems and they need to be dealt with.
But overall, U.S. policy toward Pakistan, until very
recently, gave no serious attention to encouraging democracy.
In the past 6 months that has begun to change and Ambassador
Patterson has undertaken a remarkable outreach campaign to show
United States support for a free press and free and fair
elections. Unfortunately, I think her efforts are undercut by
broad statements from the White House and elsewhere, suggesting
that Musharraf is indispensable.
Mr. Chairman, I would suggest to you that working with
Pakistan is indispensable but that no one leader merits that
designation. What Pakistan needs to be able to work with us
over the long term is a government that enjoys widely accepted
legitimacy and is capable of pushing back against violent
extremists that are challenging the writ of the state. I'm
actually more concerned about the extremists' challenge in
places that are within the settled areas of Pakistan, like the
Swat Valley.
Legitimacy was never President Musharraf's strong point and
he has lost popularity, legitimacy and ultimately, much of his
political strength during the 9 months since he first tried to
fire the Chief Justice. To me, this means that the United
States should now focus on the process of elections rather than
picking a candidate. An ugly election, which is likely unless
things get turned around very quickly, will not settle the
issue of Pakistan's governance or of its ability to defend the
legitimate authority of the state.
Institution-building is absolutely vital, but I was
distressed that the judiciary figured only very belatedly in
the two previous witnesses' account of what institutions we
need to support and when Mr. Kunder said we were supporting the
judiciary, he was referring entirely to technical assistance at
the lower levels. This is needed but there also needs to be an
independent higher judiciary.
Your final question deals with the proposed assistance
package for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas known as
FATA. I support a major U.S. assistance package. The stakes
could not be higher, both for our efforts in Afghanistan and
for Pakistan's future as a decently governed modernizing
moderate state.
Once the Pakistan Army went into FATA under heavy U.S.
pressure, they started a process that they now have to finish,
integrating this largely ungoverned region into the Pakistani
state and society. This has involved, and will involve, heavy
sacrifices for them. It requires a three-pronged strategy:
Military, political, and economic. The part that we can help
with is the third prong or the economic one.
Let's be clear. There is no school solution to the economic
problems of the region. The social structures that once ran it
are problematic and now largely destroyed without a good
substitute in place. Whatever we do will involve risks, risks
that it won't work and high risks that some of the money will
go astray.
I think we need to try anyway, in spite of these risks, but
we need to be both strategic and flexible in our funding. The
two key objectives are job creation and popular impact, and the
popular impact needs to be structured so that both Pakistan and
the United States are seen in a favorable light. We need to
gain the support of tribal leaders to the extent that they are
still in place. In the short term, this probably means an
emphasis on public works, especially for roads and
infrastructure and on health.
I wouldn't start with education, though. That's a cause
I've been pushing passionately for decades. However, it is not
welcomed by tribal leaders and an effective program desperately
needs their buy-in. I think that will work better on the second
wave rather than the first.
But we also ought to experiment and encourage the Pakistan
Government to experiment with ways of encouraging job creation
through business development. Reconstruction opportunity zones
are a great idea but right now, this region doesn't produce
anything exportable.
Why? The entrepreneurial talent is there. Part of what's
missing is capital, not just microcredit but financing for
small- and medium-sized businesses that can employ people. Part
of what's missing is equipment, not necessarily complex and
fragile equipment but tools that will permit those with some
skill--marble cutting, furniture-making or some similar craft--
to get greater economic benefit from it. Part of what's missing
is infrastructure, especially roads and electricity. It's not
just a question of building more. It may also be necessary to
set up the system so that potential employers can access it and
pay for it without the distribution lines having to go through
nonpaying customers first.
We should encourage the agencies and the U.S. Government,
whose expertise lies in encouraging business in tough places
and here, I'm thinking particularly of OPIC, to go in there and
try out a few things. Some of them may fail. That's what
happens if you try something tough but if some succeed, we may
sow the seeds of progress in the most demanding and most
important challenge facing Pakistan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Schaffer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Teresita C. Schaffer, Director, South Asia
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, thank you for inviting me to share my
thoughts with you at a critical time in Pakistan's history and in U.S.-
Pakistan relations.
United States ties with Pakistan have had a long history of
turbulence and of contradictions. That is still true today: Pakistan is
a critical partner in our struggle to keep terrorists out of South and
Central Asia. It is also a troubled country, struggling to fulfill the
people's desire for democracy and for good governance. Pakistan's
location next to Afghanistan, where the United States has a major
military presence and where a Taliban-led insurgency is under way, and
next to India, with whom Pakistan has a major unresolved dispute,
guarantees that we will need to remain involved for many years to come.
Assistance is not the only tool that the United States brings to bear
on this situation, but it is a very important one, and a highly visible
one.
I believe that the United States needs to use its aid to invest in
Pakistan's future and in the long-term viability of a decently governed
state. At the same time, we don't want to encourage policies we find
perverse or at variance with U.S. interests. These principles are not
as contradictory as they sound, and I think they give us a pretty good
guide to structuring our assistance in the future.
U.S. economic assistance is our best instrument for investing in
Pakistan's future. We should shift the balance of our assistance toward
economic aid, and reduce the percentage of military assistance. I would
suggest a ratio of about 2:1 between economic aid and security-related
aid (not including Coalition Support Funds).
Within the economic assistance portfolio, our assistance should all
be given in the form of projects rather than cash or budget support.
This is more labor-intensive for AID, but it is the only way to ensure
that our money is supporting what we want it to. Dispensing cash in
return for a statement that the receiving government has spent the
equivalent amount on agreed development objectives is usually an
accounting exercise that glosses over the fact that the government is
not spending its own resources on these objectives.
We should invest in Pakistan's people--primarily education and
health. These sectors have been disastrously underfunded for over three
decades. We need to help redress that balance. Our investments need to
be visible to the people they are supposed to help. The only recent
time when U.S. assistance boosted people's attitudes toward the U.S.
was 2 years ago, when the U.S. military provided such effective
earthquake relief. Health spending could have some of the same effect.
Together with the policy-related programs that we usually do, for
example, we could capture people's imaginations by encouraging visits
by Project Hope and similar special teams--and then using them to train
people who will continue to staff rural clinics after the special teams
have left.
The largest single expenditure in our assistance profile is
Coalition Support Funds. Technically, it's not assistance but
reimbursement, but it is a major part of our budget. I support the
calls for greater accountability of how this money is spent.
Others plan to address how our military assistance funds are spent,
so I will not get into detail on this subject, except to say that the
most important part of our military assistance is the part that
directly supports counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
That needs to be the priority.
You asked what impact U.S. assistance has on Pakistan's internal
security and on its path toward democracy. The honest answer is, not
very much. The U.S. has funded some valuable programs designed to
improve election transparency, and I certainly support those. But
overall U.S. policy toward Pakistan until very recently gave no serious
attention to encouraging democracy in Pakistan. In the past 6 months,
that has begun to change, and Ambassador Patterson has undertaken a
remarkable outreach campaign to show U.S. support for a free press and
free and fair elections. Her efforts are, alas, undercut by broad
statements from the White House and elsewhere suggesting that Musharraf
is ``indispensable.''
Mr. Chairman, I would suggest to you that working with Pakistan is
indispensable, but that no one leader merits this designation. What
Pakistan needs,
to be able to work with us over the long term, is a government that
enjoys widely accepted legitimacy and is capable of pushing back
against violent extremists that are challenging the writ of the state.
Legitimacy was never President Musharraf's strong point, and he has
lost popularity, legitimacy, and ultimately much of his political
strength during the 9 months since he first tried to fire the Chief
Justice. To me, this means that we ought to focus on the process of
elections rather than picking a candidate. An ugly election--which is
likely unless things get turned around quickly--will not settle the
issue of Pakistan's governance or of its ability to defend the
legitimate authority of the state. That goes beyond the scope of this
hearing, but will profoundly affect the effectiveness of our
assistance.
Your final question deals with the proposed assistance package to
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). I support a major U.S.
assistance package for this area. The stakes could not be higher, both
for our efforts in Afghanistan and for Pakistan's future as a decently
governed, modernizing, moderate state.
Once the Pakistan Army went into FATA, under heavy pressure from
the U.S., they started a process that they are now obliged to finish--
integrating this largely ungoverned region into the Pakistani state and
society. It has involved, and will involve, heavy sacrifices for them.
Accomplishing this task requires a three-pronged strategy: Military,
political, and economic. Our package can help with the economic
program; the Pakistan military will need to develop a more effective
military approach; and the political part of the puzzle is largely
lacking.
So our aid package contributes to only one of the three key
ingredients in a FATA strategy. Let's be clear: There is no ``school
solution'' to the economic problems of the region. The social
structures that once ran the region are problematic, and are now
largely destroyed, without a good substitute in place. So whatever we
do will involve risks--risks that it won't work, and high risks that
some of the money will go astray.
This has led some people I respect to recommend that we stay away
from funding development in FATA. I disagree: I think we need to try,
and we need to accept those risks. But we need to be both strategic and
flexible in our funding. The two most important objectives are job
creation and popular impact; and the popular impact needs to be
structured so that both Pakistan and the United States are seen in a
favorable light. We need to operate in ways that will gain the support
of the tribal leaders, to the extent they are still in place. In the
short term, this probably means an emphasis on public works (especially
for roads and other infrastructure) and on health. I wouldn't start
with education, though that's a cause I've been pushing passionately
for decades. However, it is not welcomed by tribal leaders, and an
effective program needs their buy-in. We will, therefore, be more
effective if we make education an issue for the ``second wave'' rather
than the first.
But we ought also experiment, and encourage the Pakistan Government
to experiment, with ways of encouraging job creation through business
development. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zones that the
administration supports are a great idea in principle, but right now,
this region produces little or nothing that's exportable. Why?
Entrepreneurial talent is there. Part of what's missing is capital--not
just microcredit, but financing for small- and medium-sized businesses
that can employ people. Part of what's missing is equipment, not
necessarily complex and fragile equipment but tools that will permit
those with some skill in marble-cutting, furniture-making, or some
similar craft to get greater economic gain from it. Equipment leasing
might be a good way to fill this gap. Part of what's missing is
infrastructure, especially roads and electricity. It's not just a
question of building more, there may also be a need to set up the
system so that potential employers can access it (and pay for it)
without the distribution lines having to go through nonpaying customers
first.
We should encourage the agencies in the U.S. Government whose
expertise lies in encouraging business in tough places--I'm thinking
especially of OPIC--to go in there and try out a few things. Some of
them may fail--that's what happens if you try something tough. But if
some succeed, we may sow the seeds of progress in the most demanding
and most important challenge facing Pakistan.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Dr. Korb.
STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Korb. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Hagel, Senator Lugar. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today. I can't think of a more critical issue
facing the country than our relationships with Pakistan and
obviously foreign assistance plays a key role in our ability to
influence events there.
There's no doubt about the fact that Pakistan is a
difficult ally. It has nuclear weapons, as you pointed out
before. It's a nuclear proliferator and it has allowed the
Taliban and al-Qaeda to reconstitute itself on its borderlands
from which they are causing us problems in Afghanistan and
could be a potential for launching attacks around the world.
I believe that our current foreign assistance strategy no
longer serves U.S. national interest nor is aligned with the
values our country stands for and I think we must rethink our
aid package. It's important to keep in mind that we've had an
on-again, off-again relationship with Pakistan in the aid area.
If you go back and you take a look going back to the beginning
of the cold war up until 2001, it's been--we've changed several
times but one thing becomes clear. During that period, if you
take a look, there was more economic aid than military aid.
Since 2001, we've tilted the balance the other way and
emphasized much more in military assistance than the economic
assistance.
Now as was pointed out here earlier that if you take a look
at the--about, somewhere between $10 and $11 billion in foreign
assistance to Pakistan since 9/11, about 60 percent goes to the
Coalition Support Funds. I think it's unfortunate that people
from the Department of Defense are not here to talk about that
but if you take a look at that, you'll find out that while we
consider it a form of repayment rather than assistance, it's
very hard to tell where all of that money is going.
Another 15 percent has been spent on security assistance
and again, as has been pointed out here, a lot of that goes to
purchase major weapon systems such as F-16s, which would be
certainly more applicable for a conventional war with what the
Pakistanis perceive as their major rival, India.
Fifteen percent has gone toward budget support or direct
cash transfers to the Government of Pakistan and only 10
percent has been used specifically for development and
humanitarian assistance. I believe that this has got to change
and I've got a couple of recommendations that I'd like to put
forward.
First of all, when giving our aid, we need to develop a
relationship with the people of Pakistan. We need to focus on
institutions not individuals and we cannot let particular
changes of government or particular leaders influence our
relationship with the Pakistan people. And in order to maintain
our influence with Pakistan, we must engage with all of
Pakistan's institutions and promote--place a greater emphasis
on promoting democracy, economic development and education,
which leads to my second recommendation.
We need to expand nonmilitary aid. As has been pointed out
already, the best we can calculate and this is one of the other
things that's very frustrating. It's hard to find out how much
aid is going and who is in charge of it in terms of the
coordination but it seems about 75 percent has gone to
security-related assistance. I support Senator Biden's proposal
to guarantee approximately $1.5 billion as a baseline for
nonsecurity-related aid as a sound recommendation. He says
unconditional but I don't think unconditional should mean
unmonitored or unaudited, which leads to my third
recommendation.
I think we need to increase the transparency and
coordination of our aid. As you've seen with the Special
Inspector General for Iraq, we instructed you many times that
the aid doesn't get to where it's supposed to and I think what
we need to have is the same level of scrutiny with our
relationship with the money we give to Pakistan.
There should be conditions on the aid. I agree there should
be a baseline but over and above that, there should be
conditions and one of them--and I've been urging this before
the Congress and publicly for the last 2 years, is on the
debriefing of A.Q. Khan. I think that is very, very critical
that we find out because the proliferation of weapons, of
nuclear weapons and them possibly falling into the wrong hands
is a tremendous threat to our security.
I think we also need to maintain a continuing relationship
with the Pakistani military. As my colleague will point out,
everybody knows that the new Army Chief of Staff went to
Leavenworth. We don't want to publicize that too much because
we don't want him to be seen as a tool of the United States.
But if you take a look at the number of military officers from
countries around the world, Pakistan is not near where it needs
to be. It's below countries such as Egypt and Jordan and we
need to increase that number.
Then finally, we need a regional approach. As we've seen in
so many conflicts around the world, we can't do it by
ourselves. We need to reengage with all the countries in the
region, including China, India, and Saudi Arabia.
In the final analysis, a stable and friendly Pakistan is
critical to our interests in South Asia as well as the Middle
East but our aid policy has to ensure that we maintain that
stability and the good relations and I hope that this hearing
is the beginning of a renewal of that process.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Korb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow, Center for
American Progress, Washington, DC
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign
Assistance, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you with
these distinguished experts to discuss the critical subject of
reassessing our foreign assistance to Pakistan. I cannot think of any
issue more important to our future security and I commend you for
holding this hearing.
Recent developments in Pakistan are deeply troubling to U.S.
interests both in the country and in the region. Without question,
Pakistan is at best a difficult ally and poses some of the most complex
and dangerous challenges to the security of the United States. Not only
is it a nuclear-armed state and a nuclear proliferator, but it has
allowed al-Qaeda and the Taliban to establish safe havens in its
territory from which it is able to conduct terrorist operations in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world. Furthermore, Pakistan
faces growing instability as extremist elements have gained control in
the border regions and as democratic forces finally begin to challenge
President Musharraf's increasingly autocratic rule.
The Bush administration has been a steadfast supporter of President
Musharraf since he said he would help the United States in our war
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda following the September 11 attacks.
Since that time, the United States has provided nearly $11 billion in
aid to Pakistan, mostly to the Pakistani military to support what can
only be described as a discombobulated policy.
I believe that the policy of the Bush administration toward
Pakistan is no longer serving U.S. national security interests; nor is
it aligned with the values that our country stands for. Part of the
problem with our policy is how we, and ultimately the Pakistanis, allow
our aid to be allocated. Congress must rethink its U.S. aid package.
While not the only factor, this aid gives us some leverage to influence
events in Pakistan and enhance our security interests.
Before providing a short list of recommendations on future foreign
assistance, I will outline briefly the history of U.S. aid to Pakistan,
and analyze current aid levels to Pakistan. This will place these
recommendations in their proper context.
history of u.s. aid to pakistan
Over the past half century, the United States assistance to
Pakistan has been intermittent. As a result of a 1954 mutual defense
assistance agreement, the United States provided nearly $2.5 billion in
economic aid and nearly $700 million military aid to Pakistan between
1954 and 1964. (Since the United States first began its aid program to
Pakistan, our assistance has come in many forms from a number of
different agencies. Throughout the report, I have broken down our aid
assistance into two broad categories: Wide-ranging economic aid and
purely military aid. It is important to note that the category of
economic aid includes large amounts of Security Support Assistance
(SSA) as well as other security-related loans and grants.)
The Indo-Pakistani conflicts of 1965-1971 led the United States to
suspend nearly all aid to Pakistan (as well as to India) assisting them
almost exclusively with economic aid for the next 15 years ($1.45
billion in economic aid, $26 million in military assistance from 1965-
1971; $1.1 billion in economic aid, $2.9 million in military assistance
from 1972-79).
In 1979, the Carter administration suspended all aid to Pakistan
(except for food aid) because of Pakistan's development of a uranium
enrichment facility. With the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union, U.S. assistance again increased dramatically, and this high
level of aid continued throughout the 1980s as Pakistan became the
intermediary and central staging ground for covert U.S. support to
anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Aid rose from around $60 million in
economic and development assistance in 1979 to more than $600 million
per year in the mid-1980s. In total, the U.S. gave $3.1 billion in
economic assistance and $2.19 billion in military assistance from 1980
until 1990.
Even while the U.S. was pumping large amounts of aid into Pakistan
and Afghanistan to help defeat the Soviets, concern within the U.S.
about Pakistan's nuclear ambitions led Congress in 1985 to pass the
Pressler amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler
amendment required the President to certify that Pakistan did not have
a nuclear weapon for the fiscal year in which aid is to be provided.
Throughout the 1980s, President Reagan and George H.W. Bush certified
that Pakistan did not; however in 1990 the elder President Bush refused
to confirm that Pakistan did not have nuclear technology, and as a
result most economic and all military aid was cut off. Aid to Pakistan
dropped dramatically from 1991 to 2000 to a mere $429 million in
economic assistance and $5.2 million in military assistance. The U.S.
blocked delivery of major military equipment, including approximately
28 F-16 jets that Pakistan had already paid for. Pakistan continued to
receive only a small amount of economic assistance, mostly in the form
of food aid and counternarcotics support. Aid to Pakistan was further
restricted after its 1998 nuclear tests and General Musharraf's 1999
coup.
Not surprisingly, this on-again, off-again history of U.S.
assistance has left the people of Pakistan and its leaders with serious
concerns about the depth and reliability of the U.S. commitment to
their well-being. This was especially true after the withdrawal of the
Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1988 and the end of the cold war when
many leaders in this country mistakenly concluded that Pakistan had
lost much of its strategic and geopolitical value. Aid levels reflected
this belief, they dropped from $726 million in 1988 to $24 million 4
years later (after President George H.W. Bush refused to certify
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon). This has led many
Pakistanis to conclude that they could not count on us and that the
U.S. is an unreliable ally at best.
Squares= Economic Aid Triangles= Military Aid
USAID Greenbook of Foreign Assistance. All figures are in millions
of dollars. All figures are in historic dollars. http://qesdb.cdie.org/
gbk/index.html.
current u.s. aid to pakistan
Our current aid to Pakistan has been characterized by a lack of
accountability, transparency, coordination, and shortsightedness.
Immediate U.S. security-related goals, while critical in our efforts in
the current fight against radical extremism, undermine and are often
contradictory to our long-term strategic objectives for the country and
the region. An analysis of where current U.S. assistance is going is an
indication of our priorities and our long-term challenge in Pakistan.
The best estimate is that since 2001, the United States has given
about $10.6 billion in foreign assistance to Pakistan. It appears to be
distributed as follows:
Sixty percent of U.S. aid has gone toward Coalition Support
Funds (CSF). These funds are given to reimburse the Government
of Pakistan for its efforts in what the Bush administration
labels the ``Global War on Terrorism'' (GWOT). They are
considered by the U.S. administration to be a repayment rather
than assistance. However, since there has been little
accountability or transparency of this funding, it is uncertain
if in fact these funds are being used to fight the GWOT.
Fifteen percent, or close to $1.6 billion, has been spent on
security assistance. The Pakistanis have used the majority of
these funds to purchase major weapons systems, such as F-16s,
for possible use in a conventional war with India, the country
they perceive as their major strategic threat.
Another 15 percent has gone toward budget support or direct
cash transfers to the Government of Pakistan. This money is
supposed to provide macroeconomic stability and to free up
funds for social spending, but few transparent accountability
mechanisms are built in.
The remaining 10 percent has been used specifically for
development and humanitarian assistance.
This breakdown makes it clear that the vast majority of current
U.S. assistance goes to the Pakistani military. This is exactly the
opposite of our aid policy prior to 2001, where military aid was the
smaller portion. Comparatively little has gone toward economic
development, institution building, or education assistance despite the
fact that improvements in these fields are central to eradicating
extremism, which thrives in the absence of development. The areas of
most concern to the United States, the borderlands of Pakistan--where
al-Qaeda and the Taliban thrive--have some of the lowest human
development indicators in the world. Approximately 60 percent of the
population lives below the national poverty line and female literacy is
3 percent in this area, among the lowest in the world. People's
livelihoods in this area depend on subsistence agriculture and
smuggling of items, such as opium and weapons.
It is also important to note that because of a lack of
transparency, the exact amount of total aid to Pakistan is unknown.
This lack of transparency is an enormous impediment to understanding
not only our aid's ultimate destination but also its effectiveness.
Furthermore, there is little coordination among the various agencies of
the U.S. Government which disperse aid to Pakistan. The various
departments and agencies responsible for allocating aid to Pakistan are
each responsible for only one aspect of the total program in Pakistan
and oversee fragmented pieces of the overall assistance picture. While
this practice is not limited to our aid to Pakistan, it is a part of a
much larger problem which will be discussed later on in the
recommendations section.
These problems notwithstanding, the magnitude of U.S. aid to
Pakistan and the importance of Pakistan to U.S. national security
demand that Congress answer the question: Is this aid advancing our
long-term goals both within Pakistan in particular and the region in
general?
To answer this question, it is important first to define current
objectives for U.S. aid to Pakistan. The Bush administration's primary
focus is on short-term military objectives, specifically
counterterrorism measures. These include the killing, capturing, and
detaining of domestic and international terrorists. The priority given
to this goal is reflected in the distribution of the aid package. As
noted above, the vast majority of assistance is directed toward
coalition-related activities in fighting terrorism, benefits to the
Pakistani military in the form of security assistance, and direct cash
transfers, to be used essentially at the government's discretion. In
all, this represents an overwhelming proportion of the aid given since
9/11, 75 percent or some $7.5 billion.
While the Pakistani security forces have provided some assistance
in the killing and capturing of a number of high-profile al-Qaeda
terrorists and other militants, this purely militaristic approach has
not been effective in defeating the extremists. In fact, as last
summer's National Intelligence Estimate revealed, in the Pakistani
borderlands al-Qaeda and the Taliban have reestablished their command
and control and have reconstituted their training camps for suicide
bombers and other extremists. Cross-border attacks into Afghanistan
from Pakistan have increased dramatically in the last year. Moreover
Talibanization is increasing all throughout Pakistan, as members of the
Taliban have gained control in the Northwest Frontier Province and
increased suicide attacks throughout the country.
The allocation of military aid by the Musharraf government has only
compounded the problem. It has committed an overwhelming portion of
security-related aid to noncounterterrorism related programs and
weaponry, which have little to do with U.S. national security. For
example, instead of Pakistan spending the bulk of U.S. assistance on
counterterrorism measures (such as training, hardware, and equipment)
for regular and irregular Pakistani military forces, the vast majority
of our foreign military financing (FMF) has gone toward the purchase of
major weapons systems such as F-16 fighters and other aircraft,
antiship, and antimissile capabilities. In FY 2006, Musharraf's
government signed an arms deal with the U.S. for $3.5 billion, making
Pakistan the largest recipient of U.S. arms in the world in that year;
this amount nearly matches the total value of all Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program purchases by Pakistan from the United States for
the entire period from 1950 to 2001 (in current dollars). These systems
have no role in counterterrorism missions against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban but are geared primarily to fight India, which Pakistan sees as
its major conventional rival.
Apart from killing and capturing some key leaders, the Pakistani
military has been very ineffective at meeting U.S. goals. In fact, on
September 6, 2006, it actually signed a deal with tribal leaders in
North Waziristan to withdraw the Army and leave the area under the
control of the militants. Three months later, al-Qaeda and the Taliban
used this deal to consolidate their control over the tribal regions on
the border with Afghanistan. It is only now, more than 6 years after
the September 11 attacks, that the Bush administration, in
collaboration with the Pakistani Government, has finally begun working
on a counterinsurgency strategy along the borderlands of Pakistan to
address the safe havens for al-Qaeda and the Taliban and the growing
extremism.
Recently, the administration has outlined a plan to enlist tribal
leaders to fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The primary
objective of this plan will be training, equipping, and financing a
tribal paramilitary force, the Frontier Corps. The proposal is modeled
on the U.S. success in allying with local Sunnis against al-Qaeda in Al
Anbar province in Iraq. However, the circumstances in Pakistan are
fundamentally different from Iraq. The conditions, which caused Iraqi
Sunnis to turn against a foreign al-Qaeda presence, do not exist in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Taliban is an
indigenous force with deep roots in the area, and it is supported by
many of the tribes that this plan would attempt to enlist. In the
absence of reliable allies or a coherent strategy, flooding an
unstable, hostile region with money and arms is a recipe for disaster.
The last thing that Pakistan needs is more unaccountable,
unconstitutional, and uncontrollable militias. We should rather give
priority to the political and administrative integration of FATA and
the extension to this area of constitutional, legal, and other public
services.
Combating extremism and terrorism in Pakistan will require much
more than military solutions. The Bush administration has almost
exclusively focused on these elements, despite the recognition in its
own National Security Strategy of 2006 that democratic forces are in
fact the real antidotes to terrorism.
The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) plan to
provide $750 million in economic assistance to the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a move in the right direction.
While this may be a good start, it is late in the game. Furthermore, it
is unclear what the strategy is, or whether realistic accountability
mechanisms can be put in place in such an unstable area. Moreover,
given that the region is openly hostile to foreign influence, the U.S.
must be cautious about putting a ``Made in America'' stamp on our
assistance. In many of the programs already in place in FATA, aid is
delivered anonymously to avoid the complications of association with
the U.S. Government.
recommendations
In considering the configuration of aid to Pakistan, it is
important to keep in mind the warning of Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, ``Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are
recruiting, training, and deploying against us?''
In analyzing the current structure of U.S. assistance to Pakistan,
I am convinced this is not the case. Battling extremism and terrorism
in the long term in Pakistan will require a shift in U.S. aid toward
Pakistan. I recommend the following actions to bring about this shift:
Developing a relationship with the people of Pakistan
In order to effectively battle extremism and terrorism in Pakistan,
the U.S. must shift from an aid policy centered in short-term military
cooperation with an individual leader to one focused on developing a
long-term relationship with Pakistan and its people. In order to
maintain our influence in Pakistan, we must engage with all of
Pakistan's institutions and place a much greater emphasis on promoting
democracy, economic development, and education. Throughout the country,
ties to the Pakistani military will continue to be important, but the
U.S. must balance support for the military with support for democratic
development.
Expand nonmilitary aid
The United States should expand aid toward nonmilitary elements in
Pakistan, addressing the roots of the growing threats of extremism and
terrorism and supporting democratic forces in Pakistan. As noted above,
75 percent of our current aid (more than $7 billion since September 11,
2001) has gone to security-related assistance. This must change.
Nonmilitary aid should be increased and directed toward strengthening
governmental institutions, moderate education, economic development and
civil society. As part of this, we must be careful about how we provide
aid, as assistance from the United States will be looked on with
suspicion. We must be wary of a ``Made in America'' tag. Senator
Biden's proposal to guarantee approximately $1.5 billion as a baseline
for nonsecurity-related aid unconditionally is a sound recommendation
and should be supported. But unconditional cannot mean unmonitored or
unaudited.
Increase transparency and coordination
U.S. aid toward Pakistan must be more transparent and coordinated.
There has been insufficient oversight of how U.S. taxpayer dollars have
been spent in Pakistan and insufficient coordination within the U.S.
Government. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction
(SIGIR) has been a critical tool in determining the impact and efficacy
of billions of dollars in reconstruction money to Iraq. The
overwhelming financial burden to the United States, not to mention the
stakes of the effort in Pakistan, call for the same level of financial
oversight in Pakistan. Similarly, the National Security advisor and his
staff should ensure that all U.S. agencies are on the same page.
Condition Aid
Congress should condition some portion of the military aid on
future political developments in Pakistan's transition to a more
democratic future. While this is not feasible for all military
assistance, Congress should put conditions on aid for big-ticket weapon
systems. Conditions should have performance criteria including:
Ensuring that the State of Emergency is lifted as planned; releasing
political prisoners; restoring of the constitution (including
restoration of the rights of assembly, free speech, and other civil
liberties); and restoring civilian rule of law and an independent
judiciary. In addition, the U.S. must insist on debriefing A.Q. Khan to
learn the full extent of his proliferation activities. The ability of
Saudi Arabia to get Musharraf to allow former Prime Minister Sharif to
return from exile demonstrates that outsiders can influence the
Pakistanis.
Maintain a relationship with the Pakistani military
Conditioning aid on political developments is obviously a difficult
balancing act. The military has been and will remain a major force in
uniting the country, and its cooperation is essential to the fight
against al-Qaeda and by extension, our efforts to stabilize Pakistan.
The United States needs to maintain its military-to-military contacts,
even while threatening a withdrawal of some aid from the military if it
refuses to give more priority to counterinsurgency operations.
conclusion
These recommendations should not and cannot occur within a vacuum.
Several diplomatic, political, and military steps are also necessary to
achieve an enduring relationship with Pakistan. Our aid must move
beyond a largely transactional relationship between the United States
and Pakistani leaders toward addressing the country's main drivers of
instability and extremism. Our aid must empower the secular, civilian,
democratic political leaders to bring real improvements in the lives of
everyday Pakistanis.
Pakistan has a strong and influential moderate majority. If that
majority is not allowed to express itself and voice its grievances with
the government, this group will build an alliance of convenience with
Muslim extremists who, today, are still in the minority. To prevent
this, we must move away from a personal relationship with whoever is
controlling Pakistan at a particular time to a long-term relationship
with Pakistan's people and institutions. To put it bluntly, the U.S.
must engage the Pakistani people, not just its rulers.
The U.S. should also adopt a regional approach. This will include
reengaging with all the countries in the region including China and
India, renewing our focus in Afghanistan, and beginning a phased U.S.
troop withdrawal from Iraq in order to provide more forces for
Afghanistan, the real central front in the GWOT.
This will allow the U.S. to address core issues that are relevant
to the Pakistani people. These include existential concerns with India,
the occupation of Iraq, core Palestinian issues as well as our
inconsistent policies on human rights and nuclear weapons.
A stable and friendly Pakistan is critical to the United States
interests in South Asia as well as the Middle East. While our continued
relationship and vast foreign assistance gives us leverage in Pakistan,
we must begin to reassess our current aid policy as well as our overall
strategy toward Pakistan and with its people in order to maintain our
influence in the country over the long term. I hope that this hearing
will be the beginning of this process.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Dr. Hathaway.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT HATHAWAY, ASIA PROGRAM DIRECTOR, THE
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, WASHINGTON,
DC
Dr. Hathaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being
asked to testify today. Thank you, Senator Hagel and Senator
Lugar, for being here. I need to say that I speak just for
myself and certainly not for my institution, the Woodrow Wilson
Center.
Mr. Chairman, I want to applaud you for your lead on this
issue, your leadership, for your interest in the issue. I noted
in the letter that you wrote to Secretary Rice last month, to
which you referred, that you had raised sweeping questions
about whether we were getting good value for the $10-plus
billion we've spent in Pakistan since 2002. You didn't remark
publicly today but I think it's worth pointing out that you
also, in this letter, took pains to emphasize that you value
Pakistan as a strategic ally and that your concerns about the
purposes to which United States assistance is being put and
about its effectiveness don't in any way suggest that you have
doubts about whether or not this is an important relationship
for us.
To the contrary, I take your interest in this issue as a
signal that you believe this is a very important relationship
and that's why we have to make it work. I'd like to simply
concur in that judgment and if I have critical things to say
today, it certainly doesn't suggest that I in any way think we
can afford to, or ought to, abandon Pakistan.
I'd like to touch--I'd planned to spend all my time talking
about aid but I would like to shorten what I planned to say
because I'd like to respond to a couple of other things that
have come up. First of all, I want to associate myself with
what my two colleagues here have said. I think their advice is
very well taken. I think all of us agree that we have not
gotten good value for the money we have spent in Pakistan. I
say this as someone who cares about Pakistan, who thinks that
Pakistan is going to play a large role, for good or ill, in the
coming years. I think this is really a wasted opportunity on
our part. As a taxpayer, I also resent that we have not gotten
better value for our money. I think we can do better but
equally important, I think we have to do better.
Given the modest record we have compiled with our aid
program in recent years, I'm pleased to hear that a review of
the aid program is underway, but I would like to join you, Mr.
Chairman--and I really am emphasizing one thing and then
raising a second point. You cannot have a serious review of the
aid program if you simply fence off the three quarters of that
aid which goes through the Department of Defense. Now, I know
this raises certain jurisdictional questions for this
committee, but I would urge you, Mr. Chairman, and the other
members of the committee, to perhaps think about joining forces
with other committees to do a thorough going top-to-bottom
review of the entire package of aid and other transfers to
Pakistan in recent years. Otherwise, I don't think we're going
to get very far.
The other thing I would like to say about this review is
that I'm extremely troubled by the notion that it's going to be
carried out exclusively by agencies in the executive branch.
I'm not sure you're going to get the level of thoroughness or
incisiveness if you ask those who are responsible for the
program themselves, to then give you a critical assessment of
it, and I would urge you to go to another independent body--
maybe the GAO, maybe an ad hoc congressional group. I'll leave
that to you but if we're going to have a serious review of what
I think is an important issue, then I think it has to be done
correctly.
Another point, I think it's important to reiterate that
despite our rather indifferent record in Pakistan in recent
years, American aid can make a difference. There has been a
reference, I think several times already today, to the timely
American response and the generous response in the aftermath of
the horrific Kashmir earthquake 2 years ago. Clearly, we saved
lives and clearly we made friends. Pakistanis even 2 years
later, continually make a point of thanking Americans who visit
their country, for the American response.
This episode, to me, underscores the fact that aid can be
effective; that aid can win friends for the United States. But
it also serves to highlight the missed opportunities that
characterize, I think, so much of the rest of our program.
If I may now, I'd like to skip away from aid a bit and
refer to a couple of other things that have been said. A
sense--some in this discussion, some outside this room, a sense
that some people feel that things have turned a corner; that
things are now heading in a better direction in Pakistan. They
refer, for instance, to President Musharraf's resignation from
the army, the fact that you now have a firm date for the
election, the fact that Musharraf has promised to lift the
state of emergency in 10 days, to the fact that the two most
prominent opposition politicians have returned to the country.
Mr. Chairman, this represents a fundamental
misrepresentation of the actual situation in Pakistan. Things
are not getting markedly better. Pakistan still faces a very
real and indeed, even a growing crisis. Just this week,
professors and students at one of Pakistan's most prestigious
universities were arrested for doing nothing more than
criticizing the imposition of the state of emergency. Just this
week, new blows were struck against the judiciary in what
appears to be an effort to impinge upon the independence of the
judiciary. Just this week, it was ruled that Nawaz Sharif was
ineligible to run in the elections next month.
A great deal of stock has been placed on the fact that
emergency rule is to be lifted in 10 days but this is not going
to return us to the status quo ante. You will still have
restrictions on the media. Someone earlier today talked about
virtually all the radio and television stations are back on the
air, but only those who have signed a pledge not to ridicule
the government, not to criticize the government, in fact, are
back on the air. Restrictions even after the end of emergency
rule will be placed on politicians and on political assembly.
The charges that have been lodged against the lawyers will
remain in place. The judges that were fired will still be
fired. It will still be permissible for civilians to be tried
by military tribunals.
So, I don't think that we can assume that things will
simply be grand once the emergency rule is lifted. I would
remind you what also has been referred to, that serious
observers, both inside Pakistan and outside observers, have
been talking for well over a year about the difficulties of
having genuinely free and fair elections. One of your
colleagues, former Senator Daschle, went to Pakistan in
October, before the imposition of emergency rule, and he came
back and issued a report expressing very grave concern whether
or not there was a possibility of having genuinely free
elections. Those concerns have not yet been adequately
addressed.
So, I would simply suggest that one of my nightmares is
that we wake up on the 9th of January, the day after the
elections, and we find ourselves faced with a new Parliament,
which has been selected by patently fraudulent means; that has
no credibility, that has no legitimacy in the eyes of the vast
majority of the Pakistani people and then what do we do?
Rather than finding ourselves in that position, and here
I'd like to associate myself with something that Senator Corker
said, rather than finding ourselves in that position, I hope
very much that we put a great deal of pressure on the Pakistani
Government at this point. Now, I think I would disagree with
Senator Corker's assessment that we are putting pressure. I
don't think we're putting nearly as much pressure as we ought
to. I would refer you to President Bush's ABC interview just a
couple weeks ago, where he praised Musharraf--this is after the
imposition of emergency rule, where he praised Musharraf for
his democratic credentials. I would refer you, as Ambassador
Schaffer mentioned a moment ago, to the repeated references by
senior American officials to Musharraf as ``indispensable.'' I
think these types of messages simply send the wrong signals to
the Pakistanis, including to our friends or those who should be
our natural allies in Pakistan. They feel betrayed by us and I
would hope that between now and January 8 as well as afterward,
we would make it clear that Americans stand not with an
individual--or not, frankly, with a political party, but with
the country and with the people of Pakistan.
Last, if I may, simply address--because, Mr. Chairman, you
read two statements from my testimony and our previous panel
took issue with them. If I might simply address both of those
issues very briefly.
You first of all read my passage saying the United States
has made no effort to distinguish between military assistance
useful for our counterterrorism efforts and that which has
little use in combating al-Qaeda. I, in fact, had in mind
things like F-16s, like air-to-air missiles. To the best of my
knowledge, al-Qaeda has neither a navy nor an air force. One
can, I think, perhaps make a minimal argument that in a broad,
generalized way, this may help the Pakistani Army, maybe
confidence, maybe something else. But the troops on the ground,
particularly the paramilitary forces in the tribal areas, they
don't have night vision goggles, we just heard. They don't have
protective vests. In some cases, they apparently don't even
have proper boots. If we're providing or making available these
other types of major systems and simultaneously not providing
the things that are clearly and directly related to
counterterrorism, then I think perhaps we're making a wrong
judgment.
My last point, Mr. Chairman, you read my comment about
economic and development programs that frequently have been
unfocused, poorly conceived or lacking in responsible
oversight. Let me just give you two examples so you'll know
what I had in mind. Two examples don't prove the case but I do
think they're illustrative.
I think it's well documented. In fact, I've gotten this
from a very senior AID official that we have provided hospitals
and clinics in Pakistan with these very fancy surgical lights
which don't cast a shadow, and with autoclaves and other
equipment that requires electricity, only to find that these
hospitals don't have electricity and that moreover, there are
no plans to hook them into the electrical grid. So I asked, how
is this possible? And I was told, we signed a contract with a
firm who provides this equipment. We go back and ask the firm,
how come this is the case and the firm, the contractor says,
it's not our business. We didn't sign a contract to provide
electricity or to make sure this equipment was used. We simply
signed the contract to provide the equipment.
A different case, again, a story I've heard from a senior
AID official. We are giving scholarships to young Pakistanis to
study in the United States and I absolutely applaud this, but
I'm also aware of a particular instance where we awarded a
scholarship to a young man from the tribal area who spoke no
English, who speaks no Urdu. He speaks Baluch. So he was asked,
through a translator, so how is he going to benefit from this
experience? And after further questions, it turned out, in
fact, there was no possibility of him benefiting and in fact,
all his family had been killed in the tribal areas and the
chances of him even going to school were very minimal. The
chances of him then returning to Pakistan were virtually
nonexistent.
Again, two examples don't prove a case but they are the
types of things I had in mind. I could go on at greater length.
I'm not going to try your patience.
Thank you for your interest in this.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hathaway follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Robert M. Hathaway, Asia Program Director,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 2002 has been far too
heavily weighted in favor of military assistance, without
requiring or even expecting commensurate results in the
struggle against extremism.
We have made no effort to distinguish between military
assistance useful for our common counterterrorism efforts, and
aid with little or no connection to the war against al-Qaeda,
nor made provision of the latter contingent upon cooperation in
combating the extremists hiding in FATA and elsewhere in
Pakistan.
We have allowed a blanket justification of counterinsurgency
to be used to rationalize assistance programs and arms sales
with minimum or nonexistent connection to that objective.
America's seemingly open-ended largesse to the Pakistani
military has encouraged the widespread belief in Pakistan that
the United States sides with that country's dictators rather
than its democrats. In this fashion, we have alienated
potential friends and embittered those Pakistanis who share our
values and our vision for their country.
We have established economic and development programs that
have frequently been unfocused, poorly conceived, or lacking in
responsible oversight.
We have required neither stringent accountability mechanisms
for our aid,
nor the sorts of performance benchmarks we routinely impose on
other aid recipients.
General precepts for thinking about American assistance to Pakistan:
1. American aid as a two-way bargain
American assistance, to Pakistan as to all recipients, is not
simply an act of altruism. The United States has every right to expect
something in return for U.S. aid. Administration officials have never
adequately explained why Washington should not require that vigorous
U.S. support requires vigorous Pakistani support in return.
2. Failure to balance U.S. objectives
The administration has allowed its understandable preoccupation
with punishing those responsible for 9/11 to obscure other equally
important priorities--combating domestic extremism within Pakistan;
building strong political institutions; supporting constitutionalism
and the rule of law; stopping the leakage of dangerous nuclear
technology.
3. Beware of a counterterrorism justification that justifies all
The administration has justified virtually all U.S. assistance to
Pakistan in terms of counterterrorism. To the extent that the Pakistani
security apparatus has been employed since November 3 in rounding up
lawyers, opposition politicians, journalists, and human rights
activists, it is difficult to argue that unconditional backing for
Pakistan's military supports the war against terrorism.
4. Inaction conveys messages just as forcefully as action
Pakistanis will draw conclusions about Washington's position and
preferences regardless of whether the White House or Congress endorses
or condemns, issues tepid equivocations, or remains absolutely silent.
Under these circumstances, it behooves us to stand with those who
should be our natural friends in Pakistan.
5. Be mindful of history, but not bullied by it
If the United States and Pakistan are to build a successful
partnership for the long haul, the stripping away of the mythology
behind this relationship--of which the narrative of American perfidy is
a prime example--must be a priority.
6. Be sensitive to Pakistani political realities
It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain
Pakistani cooperation for any U.S. action that suggests American
dictation. This is especially true in the field of counterterrorism.
7. Be modest in our expectations
We should be very careful not to overestimate the amount of
influence U.S. aid gives us. The United States has very little ability
to force Musharraf--or any other Pakistani leader--to act contrary to
what he believes his interests are, or to compel Pakistan to do what it
would not otherwise do. As an instrument of coercion, U.S. aid is an
exceedingly blunt weapon.
8. Build for the future
American assistance, if employed deftly, gives the United States
tools with which to nudge Pakistan in desired directions. At a minimum,
we can do a better job of laying the groundwork for a post-Musharraf
United States-Pakistan partnership that would enjoy broad popular
support in both countries. By supporting those Pakistanis whose values
parallel our own, U.S. aid can help prepare the way for a more
sustainable relationship in the long run.
Finally, Congress should insist upon a thorough review of U.S.
assistance to Pakistan since 2001, including assistance funneled
through the Department of Defense. This review ought to be conducted by
a fully independent body, and not simply by the Department of State.
______
Pakistan's post-9/11 partnership with the United States has brought
Islamabad diplomatic support, political protection, international
legitimacy, and immense sums of aid. Yet, Pakistan is a huge
disappointment to many Americans. In their eyes, there exists a gaping
disconnect between the strong backing and abundant assistance
Washington has provided Islamabad over the past half dozen years, and
what the United States has received from Pakistan in return.
Notwithstanding the close official partnership between Washington
and Islamabad that has developed since 2001, Pakistan today is a scary
place for Americans. Polls suggest that it is one of the most anti-
American countries in the world. Since 9/11, Islamist political parties
harboring a vision for Pakistan, that produces nightmares for
Americans, have achieved unprecedented prominence. Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
provide a safe haven for the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, as well as for
Taliban insurgents battling U.S. and NATO forces in neighboring
Afghanistan. Suicide bombings and wanton violence are increasingly
common in the settled areas of Pakistan, provoking warnings of a
``creeping Talibanization'' of the country. Many informed analysts
worry that Pakistan is in danger of becoming the center of global
Islamic terrorism. Rather than close relations producing a Pakistan
comfortable for Americans, the post-9/11 partnership between the two
seems to have tied the United States to a Pakistan inimical to American
interests and American values.
I appear before this committee today as a firm supporter of the
United States-Pakistan partnership. I believe that American national
interests require a cooperative and mutually supportive relationship
with Pakistan. I salute the courage and leadership displayed by
President Musharraf in the days after 9/11, when he aligned his country
with the United States in the effort to punish those responsible for
the horrific attacks on New York and Washington. And I am a strong
advocate of a robust U.S. assistance program for Pakistan.
Indeed, it is for these very reasons that I am troubled by the
nature of the American assistance program to Pakistan in recent years,
and most especially by the failure of this program to bring the results
we had hoped for.
In my judgment, U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 2002 has
been far too heavily weighted in favor of military assistance,
without requiring or even expecting commensurate results in the
struggle against extremism.
We have made no effort to distinguish between military
assistance useful for our common counterterrorism efforts, and
aid with little or no connection to the war against al-Qaeda,
nor made provision of the latter contingent upon cooperation in
combating the extremists hiding in FATA and elsewhere in
Pakistan.
We have allowed a blanket justification of counterinsurgency
to be used to rationalize assistance programs and arms sales
with minimum or nonexistent connection to that objective.
We have largely ignored the impact that America's seemingly
open-ended largesse to the Pakistani military has had in
encouraging the widespread belief in Pakistan that the United
States sides with that country's dictators rather than its
democrats. In this fashion, we have alienated potential friends
and embittered those Pakistanis who share our values and our
vision for their country.
We have established economic and development programs that
have frequently been unfocused, poorly conceived, or lacking in
responsible oversight.
We have required neither stringent accountability mechanisms
for our aid, nor the sorts of performance benchmarks we
routinely impose on other aid recipients. Indeed, in our
eagerness to solidify our post-9/11 partnership with Islamabad,
it has sometimes seemed as if we were simply throwing money at
Pakistan, without asking whether it was being used in ways that
would promote American objectives.
But most troubling of all, we do not seem to have accomplished very
much with the more than $10 billion we have provided Pakistan since
2001.
Clearly this assistance has not enabled the Pakistan
military to eliminate the safe havens on Pakistani soil enjoyed
by al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
It has not prevented militants based in Pakistan from
slipping across the border into Afghanistan and attacking
American and NATO forces, as well as Afghan civilians loyal to
President Karzai.
It does not seem to have assisted in bringing internal
stability to Pakistan.
It manifestly has not promoted either democracy or a respect
for human rights and the rule of law in Pakistan.
It has not given us a Pakistani leadership prepared to do
American bidding--though certainly this is not the intent of
U.S. assistance, nor should we ever expect that U.S. aid will
produce a compliant recipient government.
While U.S. assistance has played a useful role in addressing
the basic human needs of some Pakistanis, Pakistan's
deficiencies in this area are so great that American aid has
been little more than a drop in the bucket.
And obviously, if the polls about anti-Americanism in
Pakistan are to be believed, this $10 billion has not won many
friends for the United States.
And indeed, this $10 billion figure that is customarily mentioned
represents only part of the story. The size of the classified transfers
from Washington to Islamabad can only be guessed at. Some analysts
suggest covert payments may have exceeded $10 billion, raising the
total U.S. assistance package to Pakistan over the past 6 years to
something approaching $20 billion.
There is, fortunately, one significant exception to this otherwise
discouraging record. Pakistanis of all political persuasions
acknowledge the importance of U.S. aid in the immediate aftermath of
the October 2005 Kashmir earthquake. Without a doubt, there are people
alive today only because of the timeliness and generosity of the
American response. More than 2 years later, Pakistanis still make a
point of thanking Americans for their help in the days and weeks
following the earthquake. This episode underscores the fact that aid
can be effective, and thus serves to highlight the missed opportunities
that characterize much of the rest of the U.S. assistance program to
Pakistan since 2001.
Those who believe in the importance of the United States-Pakistan
partnership, and all those concerned that taxpayer money be spent
wisely, need to ask why, given the magnitude of American assistance to
Pakistan over the past 6 years, and given the commitment and good
intentions of countless hard-working American officials and their
Pakistani colleagues, the U.S. assistance program has produced such
indifferent results. There are, I believe, a number of explanations:
First, the sheer size of the problem presented by Pakistan.
With 160 or more million people and woefully low rankings on
virtually all measures of human security, Pakistan presents
monumental development challenges. Its political and
educational institutions are similarly deficient. Patience and
a long-term vision are absolutely essential when considering
assistance to Pakistan. Progress is unlikely to come quickly,
or cheaply.
Also handicapping American assistance efforts was the
absence of a U.S. aid infrastructure in Pakistan, because of
the termination of virtually all U.S. assistance programs in
that country in the 1990s, as a result of the Pressler
amendment.
Washington's preoccupation with the war on terrorism, as the
United States has defined that war, has given the U.S.
Department of Defense an insurmountable advantage in shaping
the American aid program for Pakistan. This has ensured that
the bulk of U.S. assistance would be military in nature, and
would be directed toward the Pakistani military. As important
as the security dimension of our relationship with Pakistan is,
this heavily military tint to U.S. aid has served to limit its
long-term effectiveness.
The U.S. aid effort in Pakistan has also been skewed by the
ease of working with the Pakistani military, in some respects
the only functioning institution in the country. This too has
encouraged an approach in Washington that gives precedence to
the security component of the relationship.
And finally, the political reality in Washington is that it
is infinitely easier for the Pentagon to secure congressional
approval for large sums of money to be spent overseas than for
the State Department and its aid arm. This is a political fact
of life at any time, but the shock of 9/11 tilted the political
balance in Washington even further toward the Pentagon.
Given the modest record of the American aid program in Pakistan in
recent years, I am pleased that a review of the U.S. assistance program
to Islamabad is now under way. However, I am troubled that Congress
apparently intends that this review should be carried out primarily by
the executive branch. I would suggest that the historical record of
such reviews over the years raises questions whether a study conducted
by the agencies, and perhaps even the same individuals, responsible for
the program in the first place will meet the level of independence,
thoroughness, and incisiveness Congress expects.
In addition, I am even more concerned by indications that moneys
funneled to Pakistan through the U.S. Department of Defense will fall
outside the purview of this review. Inasmuch as the great majority of
U.S. assistance to Pakistan in recent years has come from the
Pentagon--most notably, Coalition Support Funds (CSF)--I cannot
conceive of any serious review that ignores DOD funding. I recognize
that CSF is not customarily considered foreign assistance, but is
ostensibly to reimburse the Pakistani military for expenses incurred in
the joint fight against terrorists. But accounting procedures for these
transfers appear so lax that it is impossible to say with any
confidence how much of the CSF spigot actually reimburses Pakistan for
counterterrorism operations. I would urge this committee, Mr. Chairman,
perhaps working with other Senate committees, to provide for a
thorough-going review of all U.S. aid and other transfers to Pakistan
since 2001 by a fully independent body.
U.S. ASSISTANCE AND THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN
Since the imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan last month,
Washington has seen considerable discussion concerning how the United
States should react to this unfortunate development. Some of this
discussion has featured calls for the suspension of some or all of the
U.S. assistance program to Pakistan. Other analyses have viewed the
declaration of emergency rule as a further indication that U.S. policy
in Pakistan has failed, and called for a rethinking of the entire U.S.
aid program. With this as the context, I offer a handful of general
observations that ought to guide U.S. decisionmakers in thinking about
American assistance, both between now and the Pakistani parliamentary
elections announced for January 8, 2008, and beyond that point as well.
1. American aid as a two-way bargain
Some analysts argue that since supporting Pakistan at this crucial
time is so clearly in the U.S. interest, this should be sufficient
justification for the Pakistan aid program. We should not, so this
argument goes, expect anything specific from Pakistan in return.
I reject this argument. American assistance, to Pakistan as to all
recipients, should be thought of as a two-way bargain, not simply an
act of altruism. The United States has every right to expect something
in return for U.S. aid. It is not unreasonable, for instance, to demand
that U.S. assistance be spent and managed efficiently, honestly, and
only for the purposes for which it is intended. It is not unreasonable
to insist that U.S. aid not be used to undermine other important U.S.
objectives. These expectations apply to all recipients of American
assistance.
In the case of Pakistan, administration officials have never
adequately explained why Washington should not expect that vigorous
U.S. support requires vigorous Pakistani support in return. At no
point, so far as I know, has a senior American official made the
commonsense observation that a Pakistani failure to live up to its
commitments in our joint enterprise will lessen U.S. obligations in
this mutual partnership. Nor has the administration ever spelled out at
what point Pakistani misbehavior would cause Washington to rethink the
virtues of the blank check. It is little wonder, then, that the results
of America's support for Pakistan have been so meager.
2. Failure to balance U.S. objectives
The United States has a long history of failing to calibrate its
objectives for Pakistan in a balanced fashion. The national priorities
of the two countries have seldom lined up precisely, although neither
has been eager to draw attention to this disconnect. In the early
decades of the cold war, Washington allowed its desire for a staunch
anti-Communist ally in South Asia to blind it to the fact that for
Pakistan, India was the real enemy. As a consequence, American
officialdom was also largely oblivious to the impact its military
assistance to Islamabad was having in New Delhi--a shortsightedness
that greatly handicapped America's relations with the region's largest
power.
Following Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, U.S.
policymakers eager to arm Afghan opponents of the Soviet occupiers paid
scant attention to the extremist views of the Afghan jihadis their
Pakistani friends were recruiting with CIA funds. Many of those whom we
are fighting today first honed their insurgent skills with American
guns and moneys.
In the aftermath of the September 11th horror, the administration
has allowed its understandable preoccupation with punishing those
responsible for the attacks to obscure other equally important
priorities--combating domestic extremism within Pakistan, building
strong political institutions, supporting constitutionalism and the
rule of law, stopping the leakage of dangerous nuclear technology.
This, too, has skewed the overall U.S. assistance program to Pakistan
by channeling the overwhelming preponderance of U.S. assistance to
institutions and personnel who are frequently least sympathetic to the
progressive, moderate Pakistan we wish to see established.
3. Beware of a counterterrorism justification that justifies all
A senior administration official in the immediate aftermath of
Musharraf's November 3 imposition of emergency rule stated that while
all U.S. aid to Pakistan would be reviewed, Washington would be
``mindful not to do anything that would undermine ongoing
counterterrorism efforts.'' Such a declaration would seem to make
eminently good sense, were it not for the fact that the administration
has tended to explain and defend virtually all U.S. assistance to
Pakistan in terms of counterterrorism. One wonders whether Musharraf
did not read this official's remarks to mean that he could safely
ignore calls from the administration to restore constitutional rule.
Of course we must avoid any action that disrupts military
operations against our enemies. But to the extent that the Pakistani
security apparatus has been employed since November 3 in rounding up
lawyers, opposition politicians, journalists, and human rights
activists--people who should be America's natural allies and best
friends--it is difficult to argue that unqualified backing for
Pakistan's military supports the war against terrorism.
4. U.S. inaction conveys messages just as forcefully as action
Well-intentioned persons will warn against appearing to meddle in
Pakistani affairs by threatening to suspend, pare, reprogram, or
otherwise alter the U.S. assistance package at a sensitive moment in
Pakistan's political life. Given the present unpopularity of the United
States in Pakistan, this is not advice to be dismissed. But it ignores
the reality of American power.
In fact, U.S. influence in Pakistan is so pervasive that silence or
inaction on Washington's part constitutes meddling just as much as
blustery rhetoric or coercive legislation. Pakistanis will draw
conclusions about Washington's position and preferences regardless of
whether the White House or Congress endorses or condemns, issues tepid
equivocations, or remains absolutely silent. These conclusions will not
simply influence the actions of Pakistan's central actors. They will
also further the perception in Pakistan that the United States is
trying to manipulate political events in that country.
In other words, given America's power and influence, it is
literally impossible to avoid meddling, ever if that is Washington's
intent. Counsel to stay out of affairs we do not fully understand, no
matter how wise in theory, does not provide adequate guidance to
policymakers.
Under these circumstances, it behooves us to stand with those who
should be our natural friends in Pakistan--small ``d'' democrats, human
rights activists, civil society, the media, and the lawyers who have
led the protests against the government's attack on judicial
independence. Doing so not only supports our values, it also helps lay
the groundwork for an enduring United States-Pakistan partnership once,
as is inevitable, Musharraf passes from the scene. And--although this
is not guaranteed--it may also help garner public support in Pakistan
for a serious fight against extremism.
Congressional actions taken, or not taken, with respect to the aid
program in Pakistan, either before the January 8 polling or after that
election, should reflect an awareness that Washington's every step will
be closely scrutinized in Pakistan. Congress should not hesitate to
act, if action becomes appropriate, for fear of appearing to manipulate
or meddle in Pakistani events.
5. Be mindful of history, but not bullied by it
Administration officials are rightly sensitive to the widespread
perception in Pakistan that the United States is an unreliable ally,
that Washington uses Pakistan for its own purposes and then walks away,
and therefore that Pakistani decisionmakers ought not put all their
eggs into the American basket. This at times has produced an American
approach that subordinates contentious issues for fear of exacerbating
Pakistani distrust or apprehensions of abandonment.
This narrative of American ``betrayal''--widely endorsed in the
United States as well as in Pakistan--points to the termination of most
U.S. assistance to Pakistan in 1990 (pursuant to the Pressler
amendment) as a result of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program as exhibit
No. 1. It is something of a mystery why this historical memory
emphasizes only the American half of the ``betrayal,'' while ignoring
the fact that Pakistan repeatedly lied to the United States about its
nuclear activities over a period of many years, even though Islamabad
knew full well that U.S. law required invocation of the Pressler
amendment unless Washington could certify that Pakistan's nuclear
program was exclusively peaceful in nature.
If the United States and Pakistan are to build a successful
partnership for the long haul, the stripping away of the mythology
behind this relationship--of which this narrative of American perfidy
is a prime example--must be a priority. In considering possible action
on the U.S. aid program to Pakistan, American policymakers must take
Pakistani sensibilities into account. But U.S. officials should not be
cowed by a distorted mythology of American betrayal.
6. Be sensitive to Pakistani political realities
American officials must accept the fact that both the Musharraf
government and any likely successor government will be constrained in
what it feels able to do by Pakistani public opinion. While Musharraf
is sometimes viewed as a military dictator, in fact his freedom of
action is determined in part by what he believes the public will
tolerate. And one factor in his current low standing among the Pakistan
public today--though by no means the only one--is the widespread
perception that he has sacrificed Pakistani interests in order to cozy
up to the Americans. ``Busharraf'' is a widely used term of derision
for the Pakistani President.
Under these circumstances, it will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain Pakistani cooperation for any U.S. action that
suggests American dictation. And this is undoubtedly how many
Pakistanis would interpret any effort to create benchmarks or impose
conditions on future U.S. assistance. This is not an argument against
congressional action of this sort; under many circumstances, such
action may make eminent good sense. But American decisionmakers should
not move in this direction without being mindful of the probable
reaction in Pakistan.
This warning against actions that might be perceived as American
bullying or coercion will be equally valid for any government that may
be formed following next month's elections, and especially should that
government be headed by Benazir Bhutto, who already seems to have lost
support in Pakistan because of the perception that she is America's
preferred candidate.
Such cautions against the perception of American dictation pertain
particularly to counterterrorism. The war in Afghanistan, so utterly
justified in American eyes, is hugely unpopular among Pakistanis.
Expecting Pakistanis to demonstrate their gratitude for American
assistance by working closely with the United States against Taliban
and al-Qaeda fighters in FATA or elsewhere in Pakistan is to court
disappointment.
7. Be modest in our expectations
We should be very careful not to overestimate the amount of
influence over Pakistan U.S. aid gives us. Many Americans assume,
without much reflection or analysis, that Washington's lavish aid to
Islamabad affords the United States immense political leverage over
Pakistan. Other analysts point to America's vastly superior strength
vis-a-vis Pakistan as the source for this supposed leverage. In either
case, so the argument goes, the United States should be able to use
this leverage to persuade, entice, or coerce Pakistan into a more
effective counterterrorism partnership and/or a more democratic
political system.
It is, however, no easy matter to translate great power into
influence. Members of this committee will surely recall that neither
the threat (in the 1980s) nor the imposition (in the 1990s) of U.S.
sanctions terminating American assistance was sufficient to persuade
Islamabad to toe the American line on its nuclear program. The
difficulty of leveraging even a huge aid program into political clout
was once again illustrated last month by the administration's inability
to dissuade President Musharraf from declaring emergency rule.
In reality, the United States has very little ability to force
Musharraf--or any other Pakistani leader--to act contrary to what he
believes his interests are, or to compel Pakistan to do what it would
not otherwise do. While American assistance serves a variety of U.S.
interests, its utility as leverage is highly overvalued. As an
instrument of coercion, U.S. aid is an exceedingly blunt weapon.
Unfortunately, the administration has gone to the other extreme,
and in essence given Pakistan a free hand, no matter how half-hearted
or incomplete its collaboration with the United States. Not only has
this approach eliminated whatever modest leverage our aid program might
have given us. In the eyes of many Pakistanis, it has also placed the
United States on the wrong side in Pakistan's domestic political
struggle for a more democratic government.
8. Build for the future
In fact, American assistance, if employed deftly, can give the
United States tools with which to nudge Pakistan in desired directions.
The U.S. Congress could lay out political or economic benchmarks in
return for the continuation of certain forms of U.S. assistance,
especially that unrelated to the battle against extremism or designed
to meet basic human needs. Assistance to meet basic human needs, such
as medical care, clean water, and schools, should in my judgment never
be held hostage to the performance of a particular Pakistani
Government; it constitutes one of the most tangible signs of a U.S.
commitment to a long-term partnership with the Pakistani people.
What of using the American aid program now either to punish
Musharraf for his declaration of emergency rule, or to pressure him to
open up the system and permit genuinely free and fair elections in the
near future? In truth, the likelihood of successfully pushing Musharraf
to embrace the sorts of democratic reforms that might well end his hold
on power is not very great.
Nonetheless, actions that bear no fruit in the near-term may
produce significant results in the longer term. Ronald Reagan's
denunciations of the ``evil empire'' did not cause the Soviet Union to
collapse, but his words inspired hope and courage throughout the former
Soviet bloc, and won countless friends for the United States.
And so it might be in Pakistan. At a minimum--and perhaps this is
the most that one can reasonably expect--we might do a better job of
laying the groundwork for a post-Musharraf United States-Pakistan
partnership that would enjoy broad popular support in both countries.
Using the U.S. assistance program as a form of coercion may not bring
short-term gains. But by speaking out on behalf of what we call
American values, and by supporting those Pakistanis whose values
parallel our own, U.S. aid may help prepare the way for a more
sustainable relationship in the long run.
MUSHARRAF IS NOT PAKISTAN
Pakistanis are fond of saying that events in their country are
determined by the three As: Allah, the army, and America. Though
frequently uttered in jest, the adage also captures an underlying
fatalism and willingness to avoid blame that is endemic to Pakistan.
Only Pakistanis can write the history of their country. Only Pakistanis
can determine whether Musharraf's avowed goal of a moderate,
progressive Pakistan will be achieved.
But as they take up this task in the months and years ahead, the
United States owes it to its Pakistani friends to remember that support
for a particular Pakistani leader is not the same as supporting
Pakistan. We have seen too much of the former in recent years. It is
high time that we renew our commitment to the country and its people,
who, after all, will remain long after Musharraf passes from the scene.
Senator Menendez. Thank you all for your testimony. We'll
go through a round of questions and the Chair recognizes
himself.
Dr. Hathaway, I just wanted to pick up from some of your
observations a little earlier in your testimony. You heard me
ask the Secretary to give him another shot about making the
record pretty clear. Do you believe that the course that we're
on, 28 days before the election, which is the date in which the
emergency decree is going to be lifted, that we can really
consider the elections good, transparent, and fair at the end
of the day? And if so, what has to happen from here to then to
make that all happen?
Dr. Hathaway. I think all of us are hesitant to prejudge it
but what I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, is this: I've been in
close contact, including trips to Pakistan, but I've been in
close contact with Pakistanis who have been warning me for well
over a year now, under current conditions, there's no chance in
the world that we can have free and fair elections.
I don't think any of the concerns that have been raised and
Secretary Boucher mentioned a number of them, I don't think any
of those concerns have been adequately addressed. It has not
yet been mentioned but it frequently is mentioned, including in
Senator Daschle's report: Intimidation and harassment by the
Pakistani intelligence services. The fact that polling places--
there's a likelihood that the polling places will not be
clearly designated. The fact--and this took place in an
election not long ago, maybe a local election. Women were
simply excluded, were not allowed to vote, even though legally,
they had every right to vote.
What has to be done? I think there is a whole host of
things. A necessary though not a sufficient step is to
immediately lift the emergency rule. We have to give all
parties and all politicians' equal access to the media and it's
not at all clear that that's going to happen. You have to have
a real electoral commission. Again, what others who are far
better informed than I have told me is that no one believes in
the current electoral commission.
Senator Menendez. That's a lot in a little over a month.
Dr. Hathaway. And that's only the beginning of my list but,
yes, sir; it is.
Senator Menendez. Dr. Korb, $10 billion. Do you think we
should be talking to A.Q. Khan?
Dr. Korb. Very definitely. I mean, again, if you go back to
the 2004 campaign, the one thing Senator Kerry and President
Bush agreed on was that a nuclear weapon or nuclear technology
falling into the hands of a terrorist group of a global reach
was the greatest threat to the United States and here is the
person who can tell us more about where that is than anybody
else. So if the fact that we haven't used that leverage up to
now, I think it's high time that we did this, particularly the
military. Now, the military wants to buy a lot of this
equipment and things and they're the ones, I think, that can
lean on the government and if you do have a different
government there, a government that is not under the control of
President Musharraf, they may be more willing to do that. But I
think some part of the aid has got to be conditioned on.
Senator Menendez. Why do you think we haven't used our
leverage in that respect and why do you think there is
resistance to give us access to him?
Dr. Korb. Well, I think that people are concerned that we
will not get the help we want from Pakistan. They overemphasize
the help they've actually given us in terms of fighting the war
on terror and I think there is also a legitimate concern that a
lot of our effort in Afghanistan, supplies have to move through
Pakistan. So I think that's a reason why people have been
somewhat unwilling to do that. But I think it's clear we do
have some leverage. I don't say use all the aid but I think
that some portion of it, particularly the military aid, has to
be conditioned on that.
Senator Menendez. Finally, let me ask you about some
statements both in your written testimony as well as in the
report you coauthored. You call it the Forgotten Front and
while it was focused primarily on Afghanistan, it did talk
about Pakistan as well. You particularly mention there that
there is very little United States support for Pakistan's civil
society or moderate political forces. You also mention that
there are many who believe that military aid is finding its way
back to the Taliban because of linkages between certain groups
in Pakistan's security forces. Do you want to comment on that
for us?
Dr. Korb. Well again, because we don't have any
transparency or accountability, we're not quite sure what
they're doing with that money. Some of it, probably because of
lack of control, some sympathies, particularly among the so-
called ISI there, toward the Taliban would go there. Remember
that many people in Pakistan perceive the Taliban as a check on
what they see as India's influence in Afghanistan. So they're
not completely unhappy with the Taliban's partial reemergence
there.
Senator Menendez. Finally, Ambassador Schaffer, I heard
your testimony and I know you testified before this committee a
little over 2 years ago about our strategy. Then, you
recommended that focusing on counterterrorism alone is a false
choice and the United States should use assistance in three
different ways and you reiterated one of those today again, the
economic assistance. You talked about rebuilding institutions
in that testimony. I think you mentioned that today again. How
would you prioritize the institutions that we pursue trying to
help rebuild directly?
Ms. Schaffer. I would certainly put the judiciary very high
on the list. Now, when you're talking about assistance, what
you are talking about is what I believe Mr. Kunder referred to
before, assistance to help in the functioning of the judiciary,
and I think that is an appropriate thing for us to be doing
with our assistance. It doesn't solve all the problems with it
but it's one of the things you can do with aid.
I would also say that it's very important to continue with
technical assistance for a smoother functioning Parliament
although I suspect that countries with a parliamentary system
may be better placed to do that than we are, because a lot of
the traditions that are so important in the United States
Congress hinge on separation of powers and that doesn't exist
in Pakistan. So it really is a different political environment.
The other one is the civil service, which may sound odd
because the Pakistani Government has always had a very strong
civil service, but it has been much hollowed out through the
years. There was a brave but ultimately not very successful
attempt at reforming the income tax service to increase
professionalism and reduce the temptation to be corrupt. I
would love to see that picked up again but if you're talking
about institutions, these are the ones that are where I think
the United States can make some kind of a difference.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Ms. Schaffer. Could I say one word about A.Q. Khan, though?
Senator Menendez. Surely.
Ms. Schaffer. At the risk of being out of step with my
colleagues with whom I basically agree, yeah, we certainly
should get access to A.Q. Kahn. But before we start thinking
about what kind of heavy artillery we're going to deploy in the
attempt, I think we also ought to think about how much we are
likely to learn 5 years later.
Benazir Bhutto, when she spoke in Washington just before
she went back, was asked the same question and she said, no;
she wouldn't make him available to the United States but she
would make him available to the IAEA and she was absolutely
pilloried for it. This is something that any government of
Pakistan will find very difficult and the fact that it's been 5
years actually makes it harder.
Senator Menendez. I respect that. I'd still like to know.
Ms. Schaffer. Right. So would I.
Senator Menendez. Who he sold to and what he sold because
that would give us a network to pursue. And I find it very
difficult to understand $10 billion later why--whatever
information that would be of value at this point could not be
deduced by having the opportunity to have access to him.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand the
panel has stated in one form or another that President
Musharraf is not indispensable. Despite all of the thought that
had been given by some of the administration that he was
indispensable, but I just want to try to trace through the
testimony we've had, who we anticipate will perform various
functions. Specifically, if our Government is looking to
Pakistan to be an ally against terrorism in the form of al-
Qaeda and/or the Taliban, who, in fact, do we look to, to be
responsible for those results?
Ms. Schaffer. I think that what you're likely to get after
the election is a situation where you will have at least two
and possibly three people who are involved in power. The two
will be Musharraf and the Chief of Army Staff. The maybe third
will be the Prime Minister. If it's a Prime Minister from
Musharraf's party, this isn't going to be somebody who counts
for very much.
Ultimately, what you need to have in order to have an
effective cooperation with the Pakistan Government, is not just
the military but the political legitimacy that goes with an
elected government moving the political needle and mobilizing
more of the Pakistan people behind the kinds of things that we
both agree need to be done, which very much includes defending
the state of Pakistan against violent attack.
Senator Lugar. Well, we've received testimony to that
effect for several years but what is being described today is
the reality; namely these 23 days before an election January 8,
for which our Government has offered some technical assistance
and yet we're not certain who the competitors may be and what
sort of knowledge the voters will have of this election process
and, therefore, what emerges is something short, obviously, of
that hoped for ideal.
Now, we can indicate that we require more but we're not in
a position, nor is it our nature, to direct Pakistanis to in
fact affect the kind of democracy that we believe they ought to
have in order to have the basis for effective government. So I
get back to the realities of the current predicament, and
you've answered that in a sense that there may be three persons
who we look to for performance here, because this is critical
for our troops, especially for the areas next to Afghanistan in
the immediate future as opposed to the evolution of Pakistan
down the trail.
Ms. Schaffer. Senator, we faced a very similar situation in
the 1990s. It was referred to at the time as the Troika, first
with Benazir Bhutto and then with Nawaz Sharif as Prime
Minister and in each case, they shared power with the
President, who was a strong figure although he did not come out
of the military, and with the Chief of Army Staff. It wasn't
the most comfortable organization to work with. I was in
government at the time and was on this beat. It was something
we were able to cope with.
You expressed concern about whether the people of Pakistan
would be able to figure out what their choices were. That's
actually something I'm not particularly worried about. The
strength and weakness of the political system is that they've
got these parties, which have, I think, quite good brand
identity. The bad news is that they're also wholly owned
possessions of one person or one family.
So I think people will perceive that in voting for a PPP
candidate for Parliament or a Muslin League candidate for
Parliament, they are supporting whoever the leader is and they
will perceive that in spite of the fact that Nawaz Sharif is
unlikely to be eligible to run himself.
Making the whole system work may be a bit of a challenge
but it is worth that extra challenge if you get an increase in
political legitimacy. My worry is that we may not see that.
Senator Lugar. We're all worried about that.
Dr. Hathaway. May I add something to that, Senator? The
Pakistani Army is a professional, highly disciplined army. They
have, for the last 8 years, for reasons that we're aware, been
distracted by all sorts of other responsibilities that are not
necessarily their principal responsibility. I think if the army
can step back from the job of running the country and devote
full time to the job of maintaining the security of Pakistan,
it may well be that they will be able to have greater success
than they've had to date, in defeating what I think most of the
senior people in the army understand, is a tremendous threat to
Pakistan's integrity and Pakistan's security.
Now, what you need and what you haven't had, particularly
over the last year, is a political leadership who has
legitimacy and who is supported in a country, who can then go
to the people and convincingly make the case that this battle
against domestic extremists is a battle for Pakistan, for the
future of your children. This is not a battle that has been
foisted upon us by Washington. This is something that we have a
direct and immediate stake in. If you have a government who has
legitimacy because it's popularly elected, then perhaps that
government will be better able to make that case while
simultaneously, you will have a professional army not
distracted by all these other responsibilities unrelated to
security.
Senator Lugar. In the short time I have, let me just follow
on that. What if the army or the military take the position
that in fact, this democracy is not particularly legitimate;
that about 30 percent happen to participate in this election or
maybe less than that and you say they value the fact they've
got to fight for the Pakistani people. They feel that very
strongly. So perhaps in the tradition of some countries we've
seen in our hemisphere, the military decides that all things
considered, in order to further Pakistan quite apart from the
war against terrorism, the military ought to be in charge. In
other words, we're sort of back to ground zero again. Mr.
Musharraf is no longer in uniform but somebody else is and, as
a matter of fact, the people of Pakistan may feel the stability
and the confidence that comes from all of this although
temporary, all things considered, is the way they ought to go.
What are the possibilities of that being the evolution of this
current scene?
Dr. Hathaway. You can't rule it out but at the same time,
Pakistan is not a Banana Republic and I believe--I'll let my
other colleagues speak for themselves, but I believe very
strongly that the Pakistani Army wants to get out of the
business of running the country; that they do see this as a
distraction and as something which has an adverse impact on
their professionalism. So I certainly am not going to tell you
that it's not possible, but I think if the army has its choice,
it will gladly hand at least the appearance of power over to a
civilian Prime Minister. Obviously the army is going to retain
a very important role, particularly on security issues. But I
think they're eager to get out of the business of running all
aspects of the country.
Ms. Schaffer. But the army's interest in making some kind
of a move is going to depend critically on whether they think
their former Chief Musharraf can still hack it.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Well, let me
thank our witnesses for their testimony today and for their
insights. The record will remain open for 2 days so that
committee members may submit additional questions to the
witnesses and we would ask that----
Dr. Korb. Mr. Chairman, may I--since you referred to our
report on Afghanistan----
Senator Menendez. If you'd just give me one moment so that
we may ask the witnesses to respond expeditiously to these
questions.
Dr. Korb.
Dr. Korb. Yes, since you referred to our report on
Afghanistan, may I enter that into the record?
Senator Menendez. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The report ``The Forgotten Front'' submitted
for the record by Dr. Korb was too voluminous to be printed in
this hearing. It will be maintained in the permanent record of
the committee.]
Senator Menendez. And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Joseph Biden
Question. You testified that the Department of State ``must concur
on the reimbursement'' of all claims for Coalition Support Funds
submitted by the Government of Pakistan, and that ``Embassy Islamabad
is working with the Department of Defense and the Government of
Pakistan to make the Coalition Support Funds reimbursement process more
supportive of U.S. policy goals and to ensure that we get maximum value
for the money expended.''
Please provide the committee with a complete list, preferably in
electronic format, of all claims in excess of $1 million submitted
since September 11, 2001, by the Government of Pakistan for
reimbursement from Coalition Support Funds.
Please provide the committee with the total number of requests for
reimbursement from Coalition Support Funds made by the Government of
Pakistan, and the total number of such requests that have been denied
or sent back for clarification. Of those denied or sent back for
clarification, please provide details on the request, and on any
subsequent action (i.e., which of these requests were resubmitted and
eventually granted).
Answer. Claims are submitted through the U.S. Embassy where they
are reviewed for completeness and accuracy and then endorsed. They are
then reviewed by U.S. Central Command which validates the link to U.S.
military operations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) evaluates the claims to ensure costs are reasonable and
credible based on the documentation provided, obtains concurrence from
the Department of State, and then prepares a determination for the
Deputy Secretary of Defense to sign a notification to Congress. Once
the 15-day congressional notification period expires, the Comptroller
releases funds to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for payment
to Pakistan.
The State and Defense Departments work closely together on the
consideration of reimbursement claims and each claim is examined
closely by both Departments. Any decision to reject a claim or send it
back for clarification is made jointly by both Departments. As the
Defense Department is responsible for oversight of Coalition Support
Funds, reimbursements, it maintains the records necessary to provide
the details requested here. Consequently, for further details on
Coalition Support Funds and a list of claims, we would refer you to the
Department of Defense.
Question. Please provide a list of all weapons systems primarily
designed for purposes of external security currently scheduled for sale
or transfer to Pakistan, with dates of scheduled transfer and dollar
value of the transaction. A weapons system primarily designed for
external security (for the purpose of this question) may be informally
defined as one primarily designed for conventional combat against a
rival state, rather than one principally intended for counterterrorism
or counterinsurgency.
Answer. Pakistan remains one of the most active countries in
supporting U.S. efforts in the war on terror. While most of the
``conventional'' weapons listed below may have been designed primarily
for external security, Pakistan has dedicated many of these weapons to
support its counterterrorism efforts. The Government of Pakistan's use
of TOW 2A missiles in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and its
F-16 sorties along the border region, to cite two examples, exemplify
how ``conventional'' weapons can be effectively used in
counterterrorism operations. In fact, much of the equipment procured by
the Government of Pakistan has been used in its counterterrorism
efforts along the border and in the tribal areas at some point during
the past 6 years.
The items below, with dates of scheduled transfer and dollar value,
are currently on case as ``conventional'' weapons systems for transfer
to Pakistan. Some are being purchased with Pakistan's own funds, while
others may involve funds from Foreign Military Financing account.
AN/TPS-77 Radars:
Cost: $100 million
Schedule: All six already in country; first turnover will be
February 2008
Phalanx CIWS x 6:
Cost: $79.7 million
Schedule:
Phalanx 1: Scheduled for September 2008
Phalanx 2: Scheduled for October 2008
Phalanx 3: Scheduled for November 2008
Phalanx 4: Scheduled for December 2008
Phalanx 5: Scheduled for January 2009
Phalanx 6: Scheduled for February 2009
Tow 2A Missiles x 2014:
Cost: $65.4 million
Schedule: Earliest delivery January 2008
P-3C Aircraft x 8:
Cost: $295.33 million
Schedule:
P-3C 1: Delivered January 2007
P-3C 2: Delivered February 2007
P-3C 3-7: In refurbishment and update; delivery date unknown
P-3C 8: Logistics spare aircraft
Harpoon Missile x 100:
Cost: $297.823 million
Schedule:
40 Air-launched: Delivered September 2006
10 Ship-launched: Delivered September 2006
10 Ship-launched: Delivered June 2007
10 Ship-launched: Delivered September 2007
30 Encapsulated: Still in production
AIM-9M Missiles x 300:
Cost: $47.548 million
Schedule:
44 Delivered June 2007
36 Delivered January 2008
Remaining 220 waiting for shipment
F-16 C/D Aircraft x 18:
Cost: $1.433 billion
Schedule: Earliest delivery 2010
Mid-Life Update (MLU) for F-16 A/B x 60:
Cost: $890.954 million
Schedule: Earliest delivery 2010
F-16 A/B Modification of Excess Defense Article (EDA)
Aircraft x 12:
Cost: $11.084 million
Schedule:
EDA 1,2: Delivered July 2007
EDA 3-6: To be delivered in June 2008
EDA 7-10: To be delivered in July 2008
EDA 11-12: To be delivered in 2011
M-109 Howitzers x 115:
Cost: $86.442 million
Schedule: 115 to be delivered from March 2008-March 2009
AMRAAM x 500, AIM-9M x 200, JDAM x 500, BLU-109 x 700, MK-
82/84 x 800:
Cost: $666.507 million
Schedule: Earliest delivery 2010
Question. You have testified that ``Democracy requires accountable
government institutions, including an independent judiciary, protection
of individual human rights, a free and dynamic press, an atmosphere
promoting open debate, and a vibrant civil society.''
3a. Given that this sentence contains the sole mention of the
judiciary in your testimony as prepared, please outline what specific
benchmarks the administration will use to assess the extent to which
President Musharraf has restored independence to the Pakistani judicial
system.
3b. Given that all judges and Supreme Court Justices unwilling to
swear an oath to uphold edicts issued during the suspension of the
Pakistani Constitution were forcibly retired and replaced with
candidates willing to take such an oath, can the judiciary as currently
structured truly be deemed ``independent''?
3c. What specific benchmarks will the administration use to assess
the degree to which President Musharraf has restored accountable
government institutions, protected individual liberties, permitted the
operation of a free and dynamic press, and restored an atmosphere
promoting open debate and a vibrant civil society?
Answer. There has historically been great tension between the
executive and judicial branches of government in Pakistan, under
civilian and military governments alike, causing similar periods of
political uncertainty. A long-term solution is required and will take
the energies and attention of the political parties and the government.
Given the proximity of parliamentary elections in Pakistan and the
political sensitivity of the specific issue of reinstating the deposed
justices, we doubt that Pakistan can productively address this issue at
this time. But addressing independence of the judiciary--a key pillar
of democracy--will be incumbent upon the new Pakistani Government that
emerges post-election.
We leave the question on the status of the court for Pakistani
legal authorities to determine and for the Pakistani people to decide.
The U.S. supports a vibrant and independent judiciary and will continue
to urge Pakistan to respect the rule of law as it transitions to a new
civilian democratic government.
Our benchmarks for democracy, government accountability, protection
of individual civil liberties, and freedom of the press in Pakistan are
the same benchmarks that we use with any other country. Specifically,
we have asked the Government of Pakistan to ease restrictions on the
media, lift the media code of conduct, and release remaining prisoners,
including Aitzaz Ahsan and former Chief Justice Chaudhary. The ``Annual
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices'' published annually by the
Department of State documents a range of issues including the rule of
law, civil liberties, and press freedoms.
Question. You testified that, even after the unconstitutional and
destabilizing actions taken by President Musharraf since November 3,
``We believe that maintaining funding levels for Economic Support Funds
and Foreign Military Financing is crucial.'' You also testified the
modest steps back from full martial law announced by Musharraf over the
past 2 weeks are due in part to ``the constant pressure from the
international community, especially the United States.''
4a. If maintaining current funding levels of aid to Pakistan is
publicly declared to be ``crucial,'' what sort of pressure--other than
mere rhetoric--has the administration applied to President Musharraf?
4b. If financial levers are taken off the table, what possible
``pressure'' would the administration consider applying if Musharraf
stages a flawed election (as you testify you believe to be likely), or
if he fails to take the other steps you describe as necessary to return
Pakistan to the democratic path?
Answer. Throughout the state of emergency, we had an ongoing dialog
with President Musharraf in which we urged him to end emergency rule.
We have seen progress, and President Musharraf has taken promising
steps to advance Pakistani democracy. He resigned as Chief of Army
Staff on November 28, 2007, and restored the constitution by lifting
the emergency on December 15. Led by Ambassador Patterson, the U.S.
Embassy in Pakistan has been very active meeting with parties across
the political spectrum, encouraging their participation in the February
18 vote and stressing to the Pakistani Government publicly and
privately that we expect the election to be free, fair, credible, and
transparent.
The U.S. Government will continue to engage in an active dialog
with the Pakistan Government emphasizing the need to create the
conditions for free, fair, credible, and transparent elections--
including the need to lift remaining media restrictions and release all
political prisoners. We have already urged the government to prevent
interference by state agencies, clarify election observer guidelines,
restore media freedoms, and release prisoners who remain under house
arrest.
Maintaining our close relationship with the Pakistanis, especially
with regard to assistance, actually furthers our own national interest.
It also allows us to remain influential. Disengagement is not a
realistic or productive option, as demonstrated by the years during
which assistance to Pakistan was cut off. Pakistan is too critical to
our national security. We ``lost'' a generation of Pakistanis when we
halted much of our assistance during the 1990s. Neither Pakistan nor
the United States can afford to go down that path again.
Question. You have announced plans to projectize $200 million in
ESF funds for FY 2008. Are there any plans to projectize ESF funds in
future years?
Answer. In years past, direct budget support has been successful in
helping the Government of Pakistan to not only increase spending on
education and health expenditures but also improve delivery of those
services. As I said during my testimony, we will use a new approach for
FY 2008. ``Projectizing'' will seek to more efficiently use Economic
Support Funds for programs that directly benefit the Pakistani people
in areas of health, education, and job training. Although a final
decision has not been made, we are working to ``projectize'' Economic
Support Funds in 2009.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Military-Civilian Coordination: Please outline the
management mechanisms and the reporting chain with respect to any
military-civilian coordination in the design, planning, or
implementation of assistance programs in Pakistan. Which programs are
operated solely by one agency and which ones are implemented jointly?
Answer. The Department of State's Director of Foreign Assistance is
ultimately responsible for all assistance programs to Pakistan. Given
that the vast majority of our security assistance funding is
traditionally implemented by the Department of Defense, Defense will
continue to play an important advisory role in security assistance
policy. However, security assistance policy, as an integral element of
U.S. foreign policy, remains the responsibility of the Secretary of
State. As the primary interface between the Defense and State
Departments, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages the
overall Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education
and Training programs, while working with the regional bureaus within
the new foreign assistance process run by the Director of Foreign
Assistance.
U.S. Ambassadors have an important role to play in making
recommendations as to which countries should receive military
assistance as well as providing oversight over the execution of
programs, end-use monitoring and human rights vetting.
Although 1206-funded programs draw on Defense Department resources,
funding the programs requires the Secretary of State's full
concurrence. This requirement ensures the programs' complete fidelity
to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In practice, this has meant close
coordination between U.S. Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders in the
field, as well as between the Departments of State and Defense in
Washington. This collaboration has produced programs that closely match
the military needs of our partners to the overarching goals of U.S.
foreign policy.
Working closely with State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
the Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency
implements the Foreign Military Financing, International Military
Education and Training, and 1206 programs. Each provision of military
equipment provided to Pakistan is carefully reviewed by the Department
of State to ensure that it will not fuel an arms race in the region and
is monitored by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to ensure
proper end-use and compliance with the Arms Export and Control Act and
the Foreign Assistance Act.
The U.S. Agency for International Development does not implement
any programs with the military. The only exception was the case of
humanitarian relief following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, where the
support of the U.S. Armed Forces was vital in providing life-saving
logistical support.
Question. Oversight: Please describe the steps the Department of
State and USAID will take to provide effective oversight of all the
assistance programs in Pakistan to ensure that all the resources are
used for their intended purpose. What legal and administrative
oversight mechanisms exist?
Answer. Assistance funds disbursed by the U.S. Agency for
International Development are subject to that agency's audit
requirements. With the exception of $200 million in annual budget
support which is audited by the U.S. Agency for International
Development and an independent audit agency and guided by mutually
agreed ``Shared Objectives'' most funds pass through U.S. partner
grantees and contractors. We have clear, established controls and
financial records for this portion of our assistance program. All U.S.
Agency for International Development contracts and grants are
supervised by trained personnel to ensure the activities expend
resources to obtain the agreed-upon objectives. Regular financial
audits are performed. Evaluations of projects occur after they end,
and, in some cases, there are mid-term evaluations. In addition, the
U.S. Agency for International Development has hired additional staff to
increase project monitoring.
In particular, the annual $200 million budget support funds are
managed by the Government of Pakistan through the Ministry of Finance
and the Accountant General of Pakistan/Revenue. The U.S. Agency for
International Development Mission in Pakistan monitors these funds at
the national budget level to assure that the U.S. Government
contributions are used in accordance with the agreements. The
Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and
Treasury meet annually with Pakistan's Ministry of Finance counterparts
(most recently in April 2007) to review Pakistan's progress in
achieving our ``Shared Objectives'' before the grant is disbursed. To
ensure greater efficiency of use, the U.S. Government in 2008 plans to
end the direct cash transfer and instead will fund projects through the
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Question. FATA Strategy: Provide a comprehensive strategy and
program description of at least the first 2 years of the $750 million
program for the FATA region. How was this mix of programs determined?
Which agencies were involved in the strategy development? Provide an
illustrative list of potential U.S. Government partners who may have
the capacity to implement such programs.
Answer. The Tribal Area Strategy was created to advance our
objectives in the Global War on Terror. The United States will help the
Government of Pakistan recast its relationship with the country's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas and work to alter the economic and
development landscape. The U.S. and Pakistan agree there can be no
purely military solution to the problem of violent extremism in the
tribal areas. Weak economic fundamentals, rampant unemployment, a lack
of social services (including education and health care), and an
inadequate government presence breed social and political instability
in the border region. Countering extremist influences in tribal areas
will require a robust multiyear program that will address not only
security concerns, but economic, developmental, and governance
problems.
The U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S.
Department of State prepared a 5-year, $750 million Tribal Areas
Strategy that supports the Government of Pakistan's 10-year, $2 billion
Federally Administered Tribal Area Sustainable Development Plan. The
three-pronged Tribal Areas Strategy has economic, development, and
governance components. The programs provided through the U.S. Agency
for International Development support short- and medium-term service
delivery, while addressing the capacity constraints of government
agencies to deliver essential services with speed and effectiveness.
The Tribal Areas Strategy strengthens and expands ongoing U.S. efforts
in infrastructure improvement, education, health, and economic growth.
In addition the strategy will support Pakistani efforts to improve
livelihoods, which has been identified as the tribal areas' principal
immediate need. Community participation and buy-in as well as building
the capacity of government agencies to deal effectively with
communities is critical to long-term success.
In November 2007, the U.S. Agency for International Development's
Office of Transition Initiatives launched its portion of the Tribal
Areas Strategy, focused on building confidence and trust between the
Pakistan Government and tribal area communities through a consultative
approach that identifies and implements small community-improvement
projects.
Question. Coalition Support Funds (CSF): How do the Department of
State and the Department of Defense coordinate on the use of Coalition
Support Funds (CSF)? What formal and informal coordination mechanisms
exist? What is the step-by-step process for approval of the receipts
for reimbursement for the Coalition Support Funds?
Answer. The Department of Defense is responsible for oversight of
Coalition Support Funds reimbursements. Claims are submitted through
the U.S. Embassy where they are reviewed for completeness and accuracy
and then endorsed. They are then reviewed by U.S. Central Command which
validates the link to U.S. military operations. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) evaluates the claims to ensure costs
are reasonable and credible based on the documentation provided,
obtains concurrence from the Department of State, and then prepares a
determination for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to sign a
notification to Congress. Once the 15-day congressional notification
period expires, the Comptroller releases funds to the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency for payment to Pakistan. For further details on
Coalition Support Funds, we would refer you to the Department of
Defense.
______
Responses of Acting Deputy Administrator James Kunder to Questions
Submitted to the Record by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Military-Civilian Coordination: Please outline the
management mechanisms and the reporting chain with respect to any
military-civilian coordination in the design, planning, or
implementation of assistance programs in Pakistan. Which programs are
operated solely by one agency and which ones are implemented jointly?
Answer. USAID does not implement any programs with the military.
The only exception was in the case of humanitarian relief following the
earthquake, where the support of the U.S. Armed Forces was vital in
providing life-saving logistical support.
Question. Oversight: Please describe the steps the Department of
State and USAID take to provide effective oversight of all the
assistance programs in Pakistan to ensure that all the resources are
used for their intended purpose. What legal and administrative
oversight mechanisms exist?
Answer. All USAID contracts and grants are supervised by trained
personnel to ensure the activities spend resources in order to obtain
the agreed upon objectives. Regular financial audits are performed.
Evaluations of projects after they end--and in some cases earlier for a
mid-term evaluation--are part of our business approach. USAID has been
hiring additional staff to increase project monitoring.
The $200 million budget support funds are managed by the Government
of Pakistan (GOP), through the Ministry of Finance and the Accountant
General of Pakistan/Revenue. The USAID Mission in Pakistan monitors
these funds at the national budget level to assure that the USG
contributions are used in accordance with the agreements. The
Department of State, USAID, and Treasury meet annually with Pakistan's
Ministry of Finance counterparts (most recently in April 2007) to
review Pakistan's progress in achieving the ``Shared Objectives''
before the grant is disbursed.
In addition, USAID's Regional Inspector General/Manila has done an
assessment of the capacity of the Auditor General of Pakistan (the
Supreme Audit Institution of Pakistan) and found them capable of
performing audits at acceptable levels of quality. USAID's Regional
Inspector General has asked the Supreme Audit Institution to perform
the audit of the Cash Transfer. USAID's Regional Inspector General/
Manila will approve the scope of work for the audit and the audit
reporting package. The Regional Inspector General also conducts quality
control reviews of the working papers onsite to ensure quality.
Question. FATA Strategy: Provide a comprehensive strategy and
program description of at least the first 2 years of the $750 million
program for the FATA region. How was this mix of programs determined?
Which agencies were involved in the strategy development? Provide an
illustrative list of potential U.S. Government partners who may have
the capacity implement such programs.
Answer. The FATA Development Program was created to help win the
Global War on Terror. In order to do this the United States must help
the Government of Pakistan recast its relationship with the country's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
Since late 2001, Taliban and al-Qaeda elements have exploited
FATA's loosely governed and impoverished environment to plan and launch
attacks on Afghan, Pakistani, United States, and NATO forces in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite successes in the Pakistan military's
campaign against terrorists and militants in FATA, the U.S. and
Pakistan agree there can be no purely military solution to the problem.
Factors such as a weak economy, rampant unemployment, a lack of social
services, and an inadequate government presence breed social and
political instability in the region. Countering extremist influences in
FATA will require, among other approaches, a robust economic
development program implemented with the support and assistance of the
U.S. and the international community.
In response to these issues, the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the U.S. Department of State prepared a 5-year, $750
million development strategy for FATA that supports the Government of
Pakistan's 10-year, $2 billion FATA Sustainable Development Plan. The
strategy supports short- and medium-term service delivery, while
addressing the capacity constraints of government agencies to deliver
essential services with speed and effectiveness.
The FATA development strategy strengthens and expands ongoing U.S.
efforts in infrastructure improvement, education, health, and economic
growth. In addition the strategy will support Pakistani efforts to
improve livelihoods/jobs, which has been identified as the principal
immediate need in FATA. Community participation and building the
capacity of government agencies to deal effectively with communities
will be critical to long-term success.
Long-Term Goals
1. Improve economic and social conditions in FATA communities: The
people of FATA currently lack the most basic of economic opportunities
and social services. There are few employment opportunities and a
woefully inadequate number of functional hospitals and schools. U.S.
support of Pakistani objectives will focus on employment generation and
skills development, basic education, primary health care,
infrastructure and agriculture, and media and public outreach. A key
programmatic area of U.S. assistance in the short term will be the
establishment of employment generation programs that will provide
thousands of unskilled laborers in FATA with opportunities to build
their communities while gaining market-applicable skills.
2. Enhance the legitimacy and writ of the Government of Pakistan in
FATA: Taliban and al-Qaeda elements are able to become established and
successfully operate in FATA largely because the Government of
Pakistan's writ does not extend into most of the region. Generally,
people in FATA live in remote, impoverished conditions, abide by tribal
codes rather than Pakistani law, and do not benefit from Pakistani
Government services. A major goal of the U.S. development strategy in
FATA will be enhancing the Government of Pakistan's capacity to deliver
essential services in FATA, including water and sanitation, health
care, education, and road repair. Improved government access and
delivery of services will help extend the influence and writ of the
government in FATA.
3. Support permanent, sustainable change: It is ultimately the
responsibility of local inhabitants, civil society, government and the
private sector to permanently transform FATA from an impoverished,
ungoverned space into an economically productive and politically stable
region of Pakistan. Therefore, throughout program implementation, the
USG will be mindful that its aim is to leave in place the essential
mechanisms--local institutions, governance structures, and economic
models--that FATA residents can use to sustain economic growth, social
service improvements and political stability.
The FATA Development Program was designed in consultation with the
U.S. Country Team (Office of the Defense Representative-Pakistan and
Department of State-Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS)), USAID/Washington
and other major bilateral and multilateral donors in Pakistan,
including from Britain, Japan, Norway, and the Asian Development Bank.
Implementation Arrangements
Both USAID and the Department of State have done extensive planning
for implementing the FATA Development Program.
NAS will utilize its existing implementation arrangements in
expanding its road program. NAS is planning to assist with the
establishment of an infrastructure unit within the FATA Secretariat to
expedite implementation of its infrastructure activity. Preparations
for a levy training center (local law enforcement) are well advanced
and NAS will be in a position to begin contracting as soon as funds
become available.
USAID will utilize a number of implementation arrangements to
operate its capacity-building, livelihoods development, and service
delivery programming. Implementing partners will include a mix of U.S.
development firms, nongovernmental organizations, community-based
organizations and public international organizations. Agreements will
be through competitive procurements, grants, and indefinite-quantity
contract mechanisms.
Capacity Building: USAID is in the concluding phase of the award of a
Capacity Building Development Program under an existing indefinite
quantity contract mechanism to accelerate the implementation of
activities in the second quarter of FY 2007 in the following areas:
Develop operational plans for each agency and frontier
region;
Establish monitoring and reporting systems;
Improve capacity of government agencies to develop implement
and manage development programs at the agency and community
level;
Improve the capacity of FATA NGOs to develop, implement, and
manage development programs;
Develop media strategies for government institutions;
Improve coordination of civil/military activities;
Identify long-term capacity, organizational, and policy
issues for Government agencies.
Livelihoods Development: USAID has initiated the procurement of a
Livelihoods Development Program through full and open competitive
applications directed at establishing a community-based program
implementing activities in the second quarter of FY 2007 in the
following areas:
Creating jobs, increasing incomes and teaching employable
skills with a focus on unemployed youth;
Revitalizing community infrastructure and essential
services;
Supporting established businesses and developing new
sustainable businesses.
Service Delivery: USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has
conducted a FATA assessment and is now operational, having awarded
grants to Creative Associates and IOM to engage in community
mobilization (small infrastructure projects) and a media campaign to
support/publicize community activities. OTI will work in four
agencies--Orakzai, Kurram, Mohmand, and Khyber. USAID is also amending
its current contracts and grants in health, water and sanitation, HIV/
AIDS, education and economic growth to include work in the FATA.