[Senate Hearing 110-749]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-749
PLANNING FOR POST-CATASTROPHE HOUSING NEEDS: HAS FEMA DEVELOPED AN
EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR HOUSING LARGE NUMBERS OF CITIZENS DISPLACED BY
DISASTER?
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HEARING
before the
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 30, 2008
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
----------
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware TED STEVENS, Alaska
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
Donny Williams, Staff Director
Aprille Raabe, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Landrieu............................................. 1
WITNESSES
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Admiral Harvey E. Johnson, Jr., Deputy Administrator, U.S.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
David Garratt, Acting Director of Recovery Efforts, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 18
Jan C. Opper, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Disaster
Policy and Management, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.................................................... 18
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Garratt, David:
Testimony.................................................... 18
Joint prepared statement with Admiral Johnson................ 27
Johnson, Admiral Harvey E., Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Garrett.................... 27
Opper, Jan C.:
Testimony.................................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 37
APPENDIX
Chart entitled ``FEMA National Disaster Housing Strategy,''
submitted by Senator Landrieu.................................. 40
Prepared statements submitted for the Record from:
Kirk H. Tate, CPM, Chief Executive Officer, Orion Real Estate
Services, Houston, Texas................................... 41
National Association of Realtors............................. 47
Questions and responses submitted for the Record from:
Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garrett.............................. 51
Mr. Opper.................................................... 73
PLANNING FOR POST-CATASTROPHE
HOUSING NEEDS: HAS FEMA DEVELOPED
AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR HOUSING
LARGE NUMBERS OF CITIZENS DISPLACED
BY DISASTER?
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:06 p.m., in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary
Landrieu, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Landrieu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Good afternoon. I would like to call the
Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery hearing on Planning for Post-
Catastrophe Housing Needs to order. This is the first
Subcommittee hearing of our housing investigation of FEMA's
handling of the post-Katrina and post-Rita Hurricanes
aftermath.
I would like to begin with an opening statement, and then I
will introduce our panelists. We have two panels today. I will
introduce them in just a moment, but I would like to open with
a statement expressing where we are and what the importance of
this meeting is today.
Today, as I said, is the first hearing of the Subcommittee
on Disaster Recovery investigation of national disaster housing
programs. On February 13, 2008, the Senate provided this
Subcommittee a supplemental budget to fund this bipartisan
investigation. The request and subsequent approval for the
investigations were brought about by a series of problems that
emerged in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
FEMA's housing efforts in the aftermath of the storm failed
to meet, in my view, the desperate needs of the survivors of
the storm, making it clear to the Nation that this agency had
no real plan for how to house tens of thousands, hundreds of
thousands of people in the aftermath of a catastrophic
disaster.
The rush decision to use travel trailers as the preliminary
means of housing is of great concern to this Subcommittee. The
discovery of alarmingly high formaldehyde levels in these
trailers subsequently underscored FEMA's inability to provide
safe choices to house survivors of these catastrophes.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as I have said many times and
as the record will show, was the most destructive natural
disaster in our Nation's history. Over 1,500 people lost their
lives. Ninety thousand square miles of land was impacted, and
entire coastal towns and large portions of substantial cities
in Mississippi and Louisiana were destroyed. The storms sent
over a million fleeing from the Gulf Coast area.
The housing crisis created by the storms was unprecedented;
it destroyed over 300,000 homes, and resutled in billions of
dollars in damage to public infrastructure. Evacuees--as we
remember only 3 years from the end of this next month, August
29, 2005--were forced from their homes and had to take shelter
wherever it was available, whether it was with family or
friends or whether it was in a football stadium or whether it
was on a highway overpass. Some sat in these situations for
days before buses to Houston, Little Rock, Shreveport, Jackson,
Baton Rouge, or other places became available.
Many were flown to places or bused to places where they had
no family, no friends, no jobs, no connections to the lives
that they were living only a few days before.
This catastrophe presented a clear challenge to the people
of the United States, to our nonprofit system, and to all
levels of government. With the impacted States completely
overwhelmed and local governments overwhelmed, the Federal
Government was called upon to fulfill its Stafford Act
obligations to respond, and it was clear that this would take
time and new solutions to rebuild the damaged housing stock.
Creativity and bold action would need to be the order of the
day. Unfortunately, in my view--and I think our Subcommittee
will find this out--it was not to be found.
In this environment, FEMA's decision was to use travel
trailers. They began ordering manufactured housing almost
immediately, eventually resulting in 140,000 travel trailers
and mobile homes in the Gulf Coast area. Group sites at great
expense were set up all over the region. Many homeowners lived
in trailers in their driveways while they made repairs, and
some of that is still going on.
As the recovery effort continued, the situation on the
ground made it clear that FEMA was not ready for this housing
challenge. It was evident that the agency did not have a plan
in place for a housing catastrophe of this magnitude.
Consistent delays, poor coordination, problems with
maintenance, and a seeming lack of leadership sent a message to
the Nation that it was not working, and we must be better
prepared for the next catastrophe.
So Congress acted. Congress drafted legislation. Before I
was even a Member of this Subcommittee, Congress drafted
legislation aimed at getting this situation under control and
giving some direction to this agency that, in the view not just
of Congress, not just of the Governors, but in the view of many
in the Nation, had failed. And on October 4, 2006, the
President signed into law the resulting bill, the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA).
The overarching purpose of this bill was to ensure that a
Federal response, like the one we had in Hurricane Katrina,
would never happen again. A direct result of the Katrina-
created housing catastrophe was the requirement that FEMA
develop and implement a disaster housing plan within 270 days
of the bill's passage--not 15 days, not 60 days, not even 90
days--270 days FEMA had to get this plan together.
As you can see on this chart,\1\ the FEMA National Disaster
Housing Strategy, which is also included in this packet, the
due date for this strategy was July 1, 2007. As I have said,
FEMA was required by law to submit the strategy to Congress.
FEMA did not submit this strategy until 10 days ago.
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\1\ The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 40.
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As you can see from the charts we have put up here, the
Subcommittee has direct oversight jurisdiction of this
strategy, and as part of our investigation we are going to find
out why this was late; and as for the report that was
submitted, does it actually meet the requirements of the law?
I believe, based on my initial review, the strategy fails
to do what is required by the law. The fact that FEMA had 20
months to come up with an innovative and effective plan and
still missed the mark is absolutely unacceptable. I fear that
we are no better prepared today than we were 3 years ago when
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck unmercifully on the Gulf
Coast.
I would like to share briefly some of the Subcommittee's
analysis.
First, the strategy fails to meet the legal requirements of
PKEMRA. Of nine required improvements to FEMA's Disaster
Housing Strategy, FEMA passed off six of them to a yet-to-be-
formed entity called the ``Disaster Housing Task Force.'' In
fact, FEMA passed over one dozen of the most critical planning
duties to this non-existent task force. FEMA was instructed to
make and implement a plan, not hand this job off to an entity
that has yet to be formed. And let me repeat: FEMA was
instructed by a law passed by Congress and signed by the
President to make and implement a plan, not hand the job off to
an entity that is not yet formed.
It has been almost 3 years since Hurricane Katrina, and
that raises several questions. Why did it take FEMA 20 months
to come up with this? What new and creative approaches does
this strategy offer? FEMA openly admits the strategy is not a
plan, so what is the difference between a strategy and a plan?
And how could a strategy operate without one?
Last, are we more prepared today than we were 3 years ago
in the event of a catastrophic disaster, whether it is caused
by a hurricane or an earthquake? We just had a reminder of that
in Los Angeles yesterday. And we could only think of other
situations that could occur where hundreds of thousands or
millions of people are without housing. And we do not have a
plan. I don't know if we have a strategy. And we don't even yet
have a task force, it seems, according to what FEMA has
presented.
As everyone knows, the use of trailers as interim housing
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was pretty much a
failure. Trailer residents were exposed to formaldehyde that
threatens their health. Not reported and undocumented because
we have not been able to receive this information yet, despite
our requests, is the number of fires and explosions that
occurred in these trailers, which will be the subject of
another hearing for me at some time in the future.
I know FEMA includes trailers in the strategy as a last
resort to be used only when requested by States during
catastrophes and for short periods, not just the past 6 months.
My problem with this strategy is since it outlines no other
options, we are going to get to the last resort pretty quickly.
And I have serious problems with this part of the plan. The
strategy's lack of detailed plans, programs, roles, and
responsibilities leaves the American people at risk for future
catastrophes.
For those of you that are tired of hearing about Hurricane
Katrina and Rita, I can most certainly understand why. I am
actually tired of saying those names myself. And I am even more
tired of going home to Louisiana and still seeing people that
have been displaced, victims living under overpasses, having to
fight for 18 months for 3,000--only 3,000--housing vouchers
that took us 2 years to fight this Administration to get,
because we cannot afford to send even the most vulnerable
people a voucher to live in a decent place. So their choice is
either live in a trailer with formaldehyde or under an
overpass. I think America can do better.
What is worse is this problem which was discovered during
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For the rest of the country, it
could happen to you. Again, an earthquake in Los Angeles
yesterday, we are blessed that the damage was relatively
minimal. What is going to happen if we have a major earthquake
in this country and hundreds of thousands of people are
displaced from their homes? We do not even have a task force
organized to come up with a plan, let alone have come up with
one.
The lack of a plan should not imply a lack of effort on
Congress' part, and let me say on behalf of my colleagues, both
Democrats and Republicans, I don't know what more Congress
could do. I don't know what more Congress can do. They have had
hearing after hearing, documents submitted, laws drafted, laws
passed, deadlines set. This is not a blame of Members of
Congress, Republican or Democrat. This problem falls squarely,
Admiral Johnson, at your feet and the leadership of FEMA and
the Administration.
The strategy takes pains to place a higher burden for
preparation on individuals. That is one of the things in the
strategy that we received, as if the individuals themselves did
not do a good job or swim fast enough out of their homes. I
think we all agree that people can be more prepared, people
should be more prepared, and, in fact, people should have an
evacuation strategy. But, again, I will remind you that in this
disaster, just like in the next one that will occur, people
will say after it happens, ``This has never happened here
before. We have never had this kind of water before. We have
never had an earthquake before.''
It is your job to recognize that people will not normally
know that they are in a danger zone, and when disaster strikes,
the government must be able to act swiftly and boldly. And,
yes, we do have to encourage individual effort. I was happy to
see that, but to rely on this is just, I think, wholly
inappropriate.
It also overlooks the fact that it is difficult to contact
FEMA when your home is a pile of rubble and you do not have
access to telephones or Internet, which was another interesting
aspect of our Federal Government's requirement. For people who
had lost everything in their home, before they could get a loan
through the Small Business Administration, they had to provide,
as I recall, five clean copies--not in blue ink, but in black,
as the requirement of the Federal Government--of their last tax
returns before they could apply. When the Small Business
Administration sits somewhat in proximity to the IRS, it would
seem to be impossible for the Federal Government to work with
the agency across the street, and yet expected disaster victims
to provide five clean copies of their last 5 years' tax returns
before they could even request help. So if you are expecting
someone to pick up the phone and call you, your plan should
realize they may not have phones, and we need to think about
that--or the Internet.
Our investigation has uncovered stories of families
sleeping in shifts so they could pass the phone around as they
waited for a FEMA representative to pick it up. And I want to
repeat that. We know of families that slept in shifts so that
when the FEMA representative answered the phone, someone would
be awake to take the call. And my question in this Subcommittee
is: What have we done to correct that?
The strategy reflects progress in some areas. The
appointment of State and local emergency managers to coordinate
the emergency shelters is a good recommendation, but, on the
other hand--since I am on Appropriations, I will put my hat on
here. On the other hand, while you all appointed more people at
the State level to do their job and basically said this is
about individuals and the State, this Administration cut
funding for training. So I just want that to be part of the
record.
I was pleased to see that FEMA now requires formaldehyde
testing, certification for all manufactured housing, should the
States request it. However, I did get a call from the Governor
of Iowa, who after the storms last week asked me if he had to
take trailers with mold, or was he allowed to return them. I
told him to return them with dispatch and suggest that FEMA
send him trailers without mold. I hope that was done.
I expected a detailed plan or at the very least one that
complied with the law because FEMA told Congress time and time
again it would be something we could be proud of and, more
importantly, something that would help prepare disaster
mechanisms for a catastrophe in the future. Neither of these
seem to be true.
In addition to the strategy, we will consider whether the
Hurricane Pam simulation in 2004 led to the development of a
plan or not. The exercise did in 2004, as you all remember,
right before the storms, predict how a massive hurricane would
impact New Orleans. The outcome yielded very important
predictions, but, sadly, none of that information seems to have
gotten into the hands in a useful way of this agency to do
anything before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which happened
later in the summer.
So let me close by saying this: I speak confidently for
myself and my colleagues when I say that we want FEMA to be
successful. We are doing everything we know how to do to help
you be successful. We have passed laws. We have increased your
funding. We have given you flexibility. We have provided
everything that you have asked of us to my knowledge. And yet
today, 3 years later, we sit with what you have submitted as a
housing plan which basically says our plan is to establish a
plan by creating a task force that does not yet exist. Admiral
Johnson, this is unacceptable.
So, with this opening statement, we are going to start this
hearing, and we are going to continue to have hearings until we
can find out, using all appropriate investigative techniques,
why we are in this situation because, obviously, we must figure
that out so we can move forward.
I am going to ask Admiral Johnson to begin the first panel.
I do not think he need any introduction, but for those that
might not recognize his name, he is now the Deputy
Administrator officer at FEMA. He was commander of the Coast
Guard Pacific Area before joining FEMA in 2006. He served as
Director of Homeland Security Task Force Southwest, and he has
extensive background and capabilities, obviously, in these
areas.
So I thank you for being with us today, Admiral. We look
forward to your testimony. And then we will have a round of
questions.
Unfortunately, I am going to have to close this hearing at
1:40 because of a previous commitment. We may be joined by
other colleagues. But if you could--I think we have limited
your opening statement to 5 minutes, and then we will have a
round of questioning.
Please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HARVEY E. JOHNSON, JR.,\1\ DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Johnson. Chairman Landrieu, Senator Stevens when he
arrives, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
challenges of disaster housing, and specifically FEMA's recent
release of the draft National Disaster Housing Strategy. This
draft inviting us to testify on the subject of disaster
housing. This draft strategy was released last Wednesday to
initiate a 60-day public comment period and as required by the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, it has been
specifically provided to the FEMA National Advisory Council, to
the National Council on Disabilities, as well as the pertinent
Federal departments and agencies for their review and comment.
I expect to engage with each of these groups and many others
over the next 60 days, actively seeking comment and suggestions
such that later in the fall we can release the final strategy
and embark on a deliberate course to achieve the visions and
goals outlined in the strategy.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garrett
appears in the Appendix on page 27.
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The draft National Disaster Housing Strategy is likely one
of the most significant documents prepared by FEMA and released
under the umbrella of the National Response Framework. The
strategy describes how the Nation currently provides housing to
those affected by disaster, and, more importantly, it charts a
new direction for where our disaster housing efforts must focus
if we, as a Nation, are to better understand and meet the
emergency disaster housing needs of disaster victims and
communities.
This strategy captures lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina and subsequent disasters. It embraces the larger issues
of disaster victims beyond simply providing a structure and
seeks innovative and creative housing options. It also elevates
issues of safety and security and access to those within
disabilities, emphasizes again and again the value of planning,
and differentiates the catastrophic event above all other
disasters.
For the first time in a single document, the strategy
addresses all forms of housing and suggests that these issues
merit full-time attention before and between disasters, not
just traditionally at just-in-time, short-term, sporadic
interest just after a specific disaster.
There are three attributes that distinguish the strategy
and the role that it will have to shape the disaster housing
efforts across the Nation.
First, the strategy is, in fact, a strategy. It is an
essential precursor to a plan, but intentionally not a plan in
and of itself. As a strategy, it captures the challenges of
disaster housing, clarifies roles and responsibilities,
establishes key principles, and sets courses for new directions
and pragmatic solutions in sheltering, interim housing, and
permanent housing. As a strategy, it describes the national
vision and strategic goals--neither of which, by the way,
existed before--key building blocks for plans, policies, and
procedures. Its purpose is to frame the issue, engage in
collaborative discussion, and ensure that every subsequent
action taken contributes to strengthening the disaster housing
capabilities at every level of jurisdiction.
Differentiating a strategy from a plan is not an issue of
semantics. It is an issue of leadership to effectively meet our
shared objectives. A national strategy is the first step in
developing integrated disaster housing plans across the Nation
that all support a common vision and goals. The strategy will
provide a common basis for synchronized disaster housing plans
at the local, State, and Federal Government, as well as plans
of our key partners, including nongovernmental organizations
and private sector.
Second, this strategy is imbued with the imperative that
disaster housing solutions be defined and achieved
collaboratively. Addressing challenges of disaster housing
should not be driven from the Federal level; rather, we must
provide leadership, set the pace, and actively engage and gain
commitment from individuals and communities from States,
Federal partners, NGOs, and the private sector, and from other
elements in order to achieve the strategy.
Third, the strategy embraces the need for immediate action
by framing FEMA's establishment of a Standing National Disaster
Task Force charged specifically to aggressively implement the
strategy. Far from passing the buck, reassigning duties,
handing off, or outsourcing the problem, FEMA will own the
strategy. FEMA will retain responsibility, and we will lead the
charge and reach to the representatives of State and local
governments, people with disabilities, NGOs, the private
sector, individuals, and other constituents to implement the
strategy and achieve its purpose.
While we may not have described the task force as well as
we could have, one point should be made very clear. This is no
other entity in government or elsewhere that offers a full-time
daily focus and commitment to addressing what you, Madam
Chairman, and most disaster victims would describe as one of
the most important elements of disaster response and recovery,
that being disaster housing.
While this strategy has only been in the public view for
just one more day than week, it has drawn a number of comments,
some favorable and some not. On the downside, I acknowledge
that the document is late. It was due in July last year. I
apologize for FEMA that we did not meet this date, but the time
has been well spent as we continue to learn, understand, and
appreciate the many elements of disaster housing. We could not
have produced this document 1 year ago, and I trust that the
value of having a strategy will overshadow the late date of its
delivery.
Another criticism is that the strategy is not responsive to
the requirements set forth in PKEMRA. While a fair observation
of the draft strategy, the elements specified in PKEMRA will be
contained in the final version of the strategy, yet the point
must be made that, absent this document, the collection of the
specifications in PKEMRA would not have made a strategy as
collectively they do not create a vision or an integrated set
of goals. Yet with this strategy as a foundation and with the
Standing National Disaster Task Force as the engine, the
specifications enumerated in PKEMRA will find their value.
On the positive side of the ledger, there are those who
recognize the value of a strategy, see that we for the first
time in a single document have described all the elements of
disaster housing in terms of challenges and new directions.
There are those who recognize that existing housing plans are
not integrated, but that by bringing these efforts together, we
will be able to make more progress and address the diverse
needs of communities and States across the Nation.
There are those who appreciate recognition of the broader
human need as an element of disaster housing. There are those
who are standing in the aisles even now, ready to support the
implementation efforts of the National Disaster Housing Task
Force.
Madam Chairman, as you and your staff took pen to paper and
had a large hand in drafting the requirements for the strategy
within PKEMRA, I trust that you as well will see that this
strategy meets your purpose to establish valuable and pragmatic
public policy that will elevated preparedness and provide
better assistance to disaster victims. While understandably
impatient that this could not have been accomplished long ago,
I trust that the point now is to draw on the State and local
partners, Federal partners and the NGOs, the private sector and
all those who work in disaster housing to roll up their sleeves
and do the work necessary to develop plans and, more
importantly, the capabilities to implement effective disaster
housing plans. These plans need to be effective for all
hazards, for all disasters, from small to catastrophic, and to
meet the full and broader needs of disaster victims. FEMA
recognizes those challenges and is ready to provide the
leadership to accomplish all of those objectives.
Thank you for this opportunity, and I am prepared to
respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garratt
follows:]
Senator Landrieu. My first question is that there are seven
provisions, as you are aware, that are the core of the law that
Congress passed requiring this strategy. And I have in my hand
the requirements of the law, and Congress said in this law that
a strategy should be developed--not may be developed, but a
strategy shall be developed.
The seven missing annexes, though, that were required by
Congress, the first is Annex Number 1, Housing Programs; Number
2, and it is blank, as you can see; Number 2, Methods of
Housing Victims, that is blank; Number 3, Programs for Low-
Income Housing Populations, that is blank; group site housing.
These seven provisions were the core of the law that
Congress asked you all to provide. Why are these seven mandates
required still blank? And when do you think the law requires
you to fill them in?
Admiral Johnson. Madam Chairman, in the strategy, in
developing the document in response to Katrina, which did ask
for a strategy, these seven annexes are under development. We
have staffs working to complete those now, and we anticipate
that when we publish the final strategy in the fall, they will
have each of those components fairly represented. And as we are
writing these annexes, we are reaching out to involve all the
relevant agencies, State and locals and others who have equity
inside each of those annexes to be part of that process.
In my view, those elements in and of themselves would not
have met your purpose. They would have been without any
foundation. They are almost independent efforts that
collectively will help to respond to what the Nation needs in
terms of disaster housing. They will all find greater value
when the foundation which is there, which is, I believe, the
strategy we provided in draft. And so as a complete package, I
believe we will meet your objectives. We will meet every letter
of the law.
Senator Landrieu. But why, in your view, since I am not
privy--and no one is--to even the drafting of these annexes
that are blank, why, in your view, would it have been
inadequate, do you think, for this Subcommittee? What in the
draft would lead you to that conclusion?
Admiral Johnson. As you commented in our separate meetings
and in multiple hearings, you pointed to an array of issues
that we must confront as a Nation. And in confronting those
issues, we can have a bunch of independent discussions which
each of these elements of the annexes could very well generate
independent discussions of those important issues. But nothing
brings them together, nothing draws focus to where they really
are. And the language of the law asked us to describe, and so
in at least four or five of those seven is to describe.
Describing will not tell us where we need to go as a Nation to
improve our capabilities. So we believe that the strategies we
provide--it does bring into a single document the elements of
shelter, interim housing, and permanent housing. It does
clearly realign roles and responsibilities, which I think--I
hope you would acknowledge were misaligned in Katrina. It sets
the foundation of perspective and context to take each of now
these seven annexes and to bring them together into an
effective plan that approaches disaster housing.
So I believe this is really the glue that pulls them all
together and ties them and gives them a sense of direction and
purpose.
Senator Landrieu. But I think what is puzzling, if I might,
Admiral Johnson, is the law says the National Disaster Housing
Strategy--it does not say ``plan.'' It does say ``strategy.''
But it says ``. . . shall, one, outline the most efficient and
cost-effective Federal programs that will best meet the short-
term and long-term housing needs of individuals and households
affected by a major disaster; two, clearly define the role,
programs, authorities, and responsibilities of each entity in
providing housing assistance.'' Some of these entities are HUD,
Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services,
Indian Affairs. None of that was done.
It says, ``Three, it should describe in detail the programs
that may be offered by entities.'' That has not been done.
``Outline any funding issues.''
It is hard not to conclude that someone either instructed
or suggested that none of those details be filled in because it
might cost something. I have to just say the law required you
in very clear English to come up with these strategies, and you
have turned in a report with blank paper saying, well, we know
we were supposed to do it, but we did not do it, and now we are
going to set up a task force to do it, and it is 3 years? Not
30 days, not 90 days, 3 years. I don't know how to conclude
this. I am looking for an answer. Was it that no one in the
Administration or maybe someone else in the Cabinet said you
could not put anything down on the paper if it cost anything?
Why isn't anything on this paper?
Admiral Johnson. One of the comments that you made at the
very beginning was that the lack of a plan does not indicate
the absence of effort on the part of Congress, and I think that
is exactly right. And I would say that the lack of words on
that paper----
Senator Landrieu. This is not about--excuse me.
Admiral Johnson [continuing]. Does not indicate a lack of--
--
Senator Landrieu. Excuse me, Admiral Johnson----
Admiral Johnson [continuing]. Effort on the part of FEMA.
Senator Landrieu. This is not about Congress. I said
Congress could not have done any more than Congress has done--
let me finish. One of Congress' jobs is to pass laws. We did
pass a law.
Admiral Johnson. Right.
Senator Landrieu. And the President signed it into law. And
the law is very clear. We required your agency, with some
specificity, to develop a strategy that could be described as a
plan, because it is very clear, and the fact is that we do not
have one. And I am trying to find out why these pages are
blank, and I don't understand your answer. So try again. Why
are these pages blank? And what was it actually that prevented
you, if you could name two or three things that prevented you
from filling in some of this detail.
Admiral Johnson. First of all, I think the law is a very
good law, and the law is very clear. And when FEMA publishes
the final strategy in the fall, it will, in fact, have each of
those elements in it. And so what you are reviewing is the
draft strategy, so the draft does not have those annexes
complete. We are working those annexes concurrently, and when
we publish the final strategy in the fall, that will have those
annexes.
But, again, I believe that while each of those are very
well directed, we have no quarrel with any of the seven. They
were very well chosen. They are very well described in the law.
And just as building a house, for example, every house needs a
foundation, I view this as the strategy that we provided is the
foundation to advance the issues of disaster housing. And on
top of that foundation, with the course set by that strategy,
each of these becomes very implement.
And so when we do complete these and publish the final in
compliance with the law, admittedly late, you will find that we
address each of those issues in the final version of the
strategy.
Senator Landrieu. OK. Let me just remind everyone for the
record that the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee's Hurricane Katrina investigation staff called 325
witnesses. It had over 838,000 pages of documentation and 22
public hearings, which we thought--and, again, I was not a
Member of the Committee but was influential in some of this, as
you know. We thought, I know the Members of Congress thought,
that was a pretty good foundation to give you all a head start.
So, again, 325 witnesses, 838,000 pages, and 22 public
hearings was the foundation. We handed all that information,
which is the public record, over to FEMA and said, ``We know
this is a difficult time. Take this information from all
comments and build a housing strategy that we can provide to
the Nation.'' We gave you a time frame, and we get blank pages
late.
Now, I just cannot tell you how upsetting this is to not
just me but to the Members of Congress that have worked so hard
on this. And my question is again--I am going to ask you for
the record. When will you complete the strategy as required by
the law?
Admiral Johnson. Let me respond and preface that by saying
again that you have about seven blank pages, but you have 81
pages that are filled, and those 81 pages provide a very
valuable foundation and, again, a good synopsis of our current
practices. It reflects all the issues that you have personally
advocated in terms of differentiating catastrophes, in terms of
recognizing the broader needs of disaster victims beyond just
the structure itself, in terms of providing access to those who
have disabilities and young and old and other issues. Every
issue that you have raised personally and advocated for you
will find inside that document as a solid foundation for the
strategy.
It is our full intent to--as you know, there is a 60-day
comment period. That will end September 22. We will receive
those comments back, adjudicate those comments, go through a
clearance process, and we will release it in the fall.
I have learned my lesson from my first appearance and my
first date not to offer a specific date, but I would say in the
fall we will present the strategy. As we go through the comment
period, we will be very open with you and your staff to let you
know how many comments we receive, and it will give a sense for
what the degree of difficulty or the challenge may be in
adjudicating comments. So I can provide a better estimate once
we have begun to receive comments.
But, again, I think that you will find immense value in the
81 pages that precede those 7 pages of the annexes.
Senator Landrieu. I am going to have to ask you to be a
little bit more clear than ``the fall.'' Could I ask you what
month you might have this ready?
Admiral Johnson. Madam Chairman, with the best of
intentions, on your chart I indicated I would have the strategy
on the 1st of April. We all know that did not happen. I
subsequently indicated I thought we could get it done in June,
and we all know that we did not come quite close to the end of
June in that strategy.
And so, again, I think I am, candidly, very hesitant to
give you a date. But, again, I think in the fall, early fall,
we hope to have this strategy in final form.
Senator Landrieu. OK. Let me ask this question: Since you
have missed two deadlines and you are reluctant to give me a
third, I have to ask you this: What three things--there could
be 15, but just give me three things that are preventing you
from meeting these deadlines? Just three.
Admiral Johnson. The number one is a desire for a quality
product. It did take extra time to do strategy, more so than I
expected it to take. I personally labored over this strategy,
and I am very pleased with the product that you have as a draft
document.
Senator Landrieu. OK. What the second thing?
Admiral Johnson. So the number one is to provide a quality
product.
The second is to be truly collaborative, as we have
indicated we intend to be over this 60-day comment period. As
required by law, the National Advisory Council has this
strategy. So we want to make sure that we do reach out and seek
comments and take suggestions and bring those in.
Senator Landrieu. But who would you consider your major
collaborative partners? There are many, but who would you
consider--other agencies are you talking about?
Admiral Johnson. I think three groups, and it is--the
National Advisory Council is our avenue to state and locals.
There is a Subcommittee of the National Advisory Council that
met just yesterday. I briefed them yesterday on the strategy.
And they have local elected officials, they have
representatives from NEMA, IEM. So that is the avenue to those.
The second, of course, is to the Federal departments and
agencies, and we are going through that administrative review
now.
And the third, I think, is the general public and make sure
we really do hear the voices of disaster victims.
Senator Landrieu. OK. That is a fair answer to that. What
would be the third? You said quality, collaboration. What is
the third barrier?
Admiral Johnson. I think the third barrier--i think those
are really the two. Those are the two things we need. The third
barrier is really we want to be--it gets back to--first, we
want to be thoughtful in how we accomplish this. We want to
make sure that we do reflect good public policy.
Senator Landrieu. Let me ask this: Since HUD, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, is one of the
collaborative partners, Can you tell us how many meetings you
personally have had with high-level HUD officials on this?
Admiral Johnson. I have probably had--between meeting
personally and telephone calls, I have probably had a dozen
meetings with HUD.
Senator Landrieu. How many meetings besides telephone
calls?
Admiral Johnson. Probably a dozen meetings with HUD, with
senior officials of HUD, Jan Opper who is here to testify
today, either over in his offices, our offices, meeting with
other officials in HUD. This has been discussed at the Deputy
Secretary level. This has been briefed both to Secretary
Chertoff, of course, to Secretary Preston. And so between FEMA
and HUD, there has been a lot of attention to those sections of
the strategy.
Senator Landrieu. And how many meetings do you think you
have had with the first partner that you outlined, which is the
local collaborative of State and local emergency managers,
approximately, that you personally have been involved in?
Admiral Johnson. That I have personally been involved in?
Not very many. In the early stages of our----
Senator Landrieu. Well, who is your designated person? Who
do you designate as tasked to get this done?
Admiral Johnson. One of our other witnesses is Dave
Garratt, the Disaster Assistance Director, who has been
primarily involved in helping draft this strategy. In the very
early drafts of this strategy, they reached out to the Red
Cross, to Federal departments and agencies, to several States.
Senator Landrieu. So while you have not been engaged
directly in some of those meetings with your local and State
partners, David Garratt has been engaged.
Admiral Johnson. And his staff has been engaged.
Senator Landrieu. I will ask him how many meetings he has
been engaged in.
Why didn't FEMA establish this task force 2 years ago when
this bill was signed into law?
Admiral Johnson. Well, I think they--again, I think that
would have been the cart before the horse. I would certainly
want a task force to implement a plan, and so I think we would
have wanted to do the groundwork before we had a task force and
not to do that early.
I think it came out--when we began this strategy, our
thought initially was not about a task force. Our thought came
in, as we began to learn and absorb more about disaster
housing, recognized that there had never been a strategy
before, recognized that there really was no single focus on
disaster housing. We began to see the value of actually having
a task force with people who do this as a full-time job. So I
think that came out of our learning process in developing the
strategy.
Senator Landrieu. Let me move to a different line of
questioning. This Subcommittee remains very confused about
FEMA's position on travel trailers, and you can understand why,
because Administrator Paulison appeared before, I think it was,
the entire Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
and stated that, ``FEMA was never going to use trailers
again,'' when he was questioned not just by myself but other
Members of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee. And yet this strategy, basically its main focus
still remains, after all of what has been said and done about
the inadequacy of using travel trailers, particularly, it seems
as though trailers are still a part of our housing strategy for
catastrophic disaster.
So could you please clarify? Was Administrator Paulison
confused at the time? Was it something that had been decided
and then it has been changed? Could you help clarify that?
Admiral Johnson. Certainly. First, Mr. Paulison, I think,
has never been confused. He is a wonderful person, and I think
he provides strong leadership in FEMA. And I think in the
strategy and in the plan--which I know that you have seen a
copy of the 2008 Disaster Housing Plan--it certainly is not
primarily going to travel trailers. We go out of our way in the
strategy to emphasize the desire for alternative forms of
housing. FEMA stood up--after Hurricane Katrina, we stood up
the Joint Housing Solutions Group to identify alternatives to
mobile homes and travel trailers. Congress provided $400
million to find alternatives to mobile homes and travel
trailers.
This very day on the street is an application Request for
Proposal due by August 1, 2008, offering FEMA funds to have any
entity who has another alternative idea, a creative idea, to
apply for funding.
The City of New York has a competition which we are
participating in that is going to provide $10,000 to winners of
a contest of some competition to identify alternatives to
trailers. And so we have a number of initiatives to find
alternatives to travel trailers.
I think what you find in our strategy and what you find in
the housing plan is a recognition that in a catastrophe where
we do need to find all forms of housing beyond what is
existing, which is our first line, use all rental and all
existing resources, go through all of our alternative forms,
create a form such as you will recall, as you mentioned, cruise
liners and other forms of housing. We may very well find
ourselves in a position to needing travel trailers, and so we
did not want to take that off the table.
Senator Landrieu. Well, for the record--go ahead--I am
sorry.
Admiral Johnson. Let me just add one point. We also have
contract specifications I know that you are aware of, 0.016 for
formaldehyde. It is the lowest contract specification that has
ever been written with regard to formaldehyde. We have awarded
one contract for park models. We will award a second within the
next few weeks, and we will award a contract for mobile homes,
all with that low level of formaldehyde. And so we are looking
at a number of alternatives so we do not have to go back to
travel trailers.
Senator Landrieu. OK. Let the record reflect that no plans
or funding requests for alternative future disasters was
requested by FEMA to date, to our knowledge. And if we are
wrong, we will be corrected by the record.
The alternative housing money was put in the Appropriations
Committee by myself and Senator Cochran, actually over the
objection of FEMA, who never requested the money. We could see
clearly we needed an alternative. FEMA never requested the
money. The Administration never requested the money. So we
appropriated, aggressively appropriated the funding, only then
to find out that the way that funding was distributed was
wholly inadequate to Louisiana's situation, which is the topic
of a whole other hearing which I will not get into now.
In addition to FEMA not requesting any money for
alternatives, despite your acknowledgment that trailers have
many problems, not the least of which is that it was hard in
the California fires to lug them to the top of mountains--so
this is not just about Louisiana and Mississippi. We have had
testimony from California officials that said, ``Senator, does
FEMA realize these trailers are heavy and sometimes it is hard
to get them to tops of mountains?'' I said, ``I do not think
they have weighed them yet, but let me try to convey that to
them.''
So despite that, we set up a rental repair authority and
said, ``trailers are not working real well, here is some money
for alternative housing, which in my view you all messed up as
well.'' So then we said, ``well, why don't we just repair some
of the rental units to give people a place to live, which might
cost less money than the $50,000 to $70,000--and it is
arguable, but anywhere from $30,000 to $75,000 to put people in
a trailer 16 by 8.'' Maybe we could give them $30,000 to repair
a unit that people could live in.
Now, we appropriated this money. To my knowledge, you have
not used it. My question is: Why?
Admiral Johnson. We have developed the IA pilot project
which came in PKEMRA, and we are evaluating a complex right now
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and we expect that we will be able to
use that authority and do a pilot project to see if we cannot
help refurbish units so that people in Iowa will not have to
move into a travel trailer but can go into a rental----
Senator Landrieu. OK. And what do you call this pilot
again? What is the name of it?
Admiral Johnson. IA, the Individual Assistance pilot
project.
Senator Landrieu. OK, Individual Assistance pilot project.
You say it is underway in Iowa.
Admiral Johnson. We are finalizing our project plan, which
we would be glad to provide to your staff when it is complete
here in the next few days. And we expect to do this first pilot
project here in Iowa shortly.
Senator Landrieu. And the scope of it is for how many
families, approximately? Would you know?
Admiral Johnson. Our first project is probably going to be
about 20 units to get this concept down, and then we will
consider other units in Iowa.
Senator Landrieu. OK. So you think you have a pilot for
maybe 30 families. How many families are you trying to provide
housing for in just Iowa? I know the tornados were in other
States, but just approximately give us----
Admiral Johnson. In Iowa, it may be upwards of a thousand.
Senator Landrieu. A thousand, OK. So in Iowa we have a
challenge of trying to find housing for a thousand people. In
the Gulf Coast, we were trying to find housing for upwards of
300,000.
Admiral Johnson. Correct.
Senator Landrieu. That is a thousand households as opposed
to 300,000 households, not people. This program expires
December 30, 2008. Do you intend to ask for its extension?
Admiral Johnson. We have not considered yet whether we will
ask for the extension. Our expectation is that we will execute
this pilot project, evaluate the pilot project, come back and
find that, in fact, it does work, it is successful, and then
may ask for continued authority to keep that as a program
within FEMA. But we would like to go through the process,
evaluate the pilot, and come back with a thoughtful proposal.
Senator Landrieu. OK. Administrator Paulison told this
Subcommittee in April that the Stafford Act needs to be amended
because it is too restrictive and does not work for
catastrophic disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. One of
the provisions in PKEMRA invited FEMA to describe any
additional authorities necessary to carry out the strategy, and
yet according to our initial review, this strategy does not
request a single change to the law.
Why does FEMA fail to recommend any changes when even the
Director of FEMA suggested that the underlying law is not
adequate to provide you the legal foundation you need to
respond adequately to victims of a disaster? Why does this
report fail to even ask for any changes to the law?
Admiral Johnson. One of the items in the annexes, Annex 6,
which is consistent with PKEMRA, asked us to identify what
authorities would be required, so I certainly would expect to
have that annex complete as well when we publish the strategy
in the fall.
Senator Landrieu. So it is your intention to ask for
specific changes to the law that would allow you all to have a
better effective housing strategy in the future?
Admiral Johnson. We certainly expect to comply with your
request with the law and indicate those additional authorities
that are required.
Let me say again, though, that Director Paulison has also
said----
Senator Landrieu. Wait, hold on. I just need to get this
clear for the record. It is not the law, PKEMRA, that requires
you, I do not believe, to come up with law changes. Secretary
Paulison himself has testified that the law is inadequate. So
you are his representative. Are you going to recommend changes
to the law that might help us to provide a better housing
strategy for people in the future?
Admiral Johnson. It is our intent, when we publish the
final strategy, to have in there what additional statutes are
required, what additional authorities are required in order to
carry out the strategy. Again, that is required here--I mention
that because it is required as part of PKEMRA in the strategy.
I want to also say that Administrator Paulison has also
been very vocal to say that the Stafford Act is a very flexible
piece of legislation, and that, in fact, perhaps an area of
great focus should be in regulatory reform and policy reform.
And so we are looking even now in areas of recovery, where
should we be making changes in policy and in regulation that
would de-bureaucratize and make more flexible the ability of
FEMA to provide assistance.
As a matter of fact, in Iowa--the citizens of Iowa,
Indiana, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois are all benefiting from
lessons learned in Hurricane Katrina where we have changed a
number of FEMA policies in recovery that will make it a lot
easier for them to work with us, a lot easier to gain
assistance, and accelerate recovery.
Senator Landrieu. Could you just for the record list two of
those changes that come to your mind that you are implementing
now?
Admiral Johnson. Certainly. The one that I think you
certainly have an affinity for is in education, where we have
looked at improved projects and alternate projects which we did
not have before Hurricane Katrina. And we have found ways to
work with communities and to give them the flexibility then to
reorient their infrastructure to match their new demographics
of where they want to rebuild their city.
And a second also comes out of education, and that is the
contents policy, where we were, as you know, very prescriptive
in what was required--proscriptive in what was required in
order to replace contents within schools. We changed that
policy to the great benefit in Louisiana and Mississippi, and
we expect to apply those same policies in Indiana and Iowa. The
University of Iowa is probably one of the largest applicants as
we get project work sheets completed. So my guess is they will
appreciate the lessons learned in Louisiana with regard to both
contents and improved and alternate projects.
Senator Landrieu. OK. I have no further questions, and I
guess that is a good note to end with. We want to try to remain
positive, but we will not dismiss reports submitted to us late,
blank pages, failed deadlines, inadequate requests for funding
or changes to the law. We consider this to be a very important
work of the Nation. I believe there is some urgency to get it
right, to get it ready, to get it available, and to get it
known. And it is going to take time once this strategy and plan
is developed. That is why there is some urgency to get your job
done because many other people have other jobs that cannot get
started until this job is done.
And so I thank you, and this record will stay open on your
testimony for several days. I would like to call the next
panel. Thank you, Admiral Johnson, and if you could stay for
this next panel, I would appreciate it. It will just be another
30 minutes.
On our next panel, our first witness will be David Garratt,
the Acting Assistant Administrator of Disaster Assistance at
FEMA. He has held various positions at FEMA, including Acting
Director of Preparedness and Executive Operations Officer to
the Assistant Director for Readiness, Response, and Recovery.
He has also led the development of the Catastrophic Incident
Supplement to the National Response Plan.
We will next hear from Jan Opper, Associate Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Disaster Policy and Management of the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. In my view,
HUD has a very particular and important role to play as the
Nation's premier housing entity, and in my view, must work
closely with FEMA to make sure that individuals are housed
after a disaster. He has also managed HUD's disaster recovery
assistance and response to the Northridge earthquake, which was
more than 10 years ago; the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks; and the 2005 hurricanes.
I thank both of you for being with us, and we will start
with you, Mr. Garratt, for a very brief opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID GARRATT,\1\ ACTING DIRECTOR OF RECOVERY
EFFORTS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Garratt. Thank you, Senator. In the interest of time, I
will forego an opening statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The joint prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garrett
appears in the Appendix on page 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Landrieu. OK. Mr. Opper.
TESTIMONY OF JAN C. OPPER,\2\ ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR DISASTER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Opper. Good morning, Madam Chairman. Thank you for the
invitation to testify at this Subcommittee hearing on Planning
for Post-Catastrophic Housing Needs. As you indicated, I am Jan
Opper, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and
Management at HUD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The prepared statement of Mr. Opper appears in the Appendix on
page 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has
traditionally been a key player in recovery from major
disasters, particularly with respect to long-term recovery.
Since 1992, HUD has received 22 supplemental appropriations
totaling approximately $26 billion for recovery. From Hurricane
Andrew to the Midwest floods in 1993, 1997, and now 2008, HUD
was there. HUD was also there following the Oklahoma City
bombing in 1995 and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
on New York City, as you indicated, and offers assistance in
some form after any major disaster--whether natural or manmade.
Much of the HUD disaster funding has addressed housing-
related recovery needs. That is particularly true with respect
to two catastrophic disasters for which HUD received funding:
The Northridge earthquake in 1994 and the Gulf Coast hurricanes
of 2005. In fact, following the Northridge earthquake, of the
$505 million appropriated to HUD for the Community Development
Block Grant program and the HOME Investment Partnerships
program, more than $230 million of that went to restore or
replace housing. And of the $16 billion plus in the first two
supplemental appropriations in CDBG funds for the Gulf Coast,
more than $11.3 billion is going for housing-related recovery
activities. Additional amounts were appropriated for the Gulf
Coast for a disaster voucher program.
The point of this is to say that most of HUD's program
authorities and resources, received through supplemental
appropriations, have focused on recovery rather than response,
and the focus of recovery has mostly been long term. The long-
term recovery activities have covered a broad span of housing,
community and economic recovery, and infrastructure activities.
The Department's programs have been an effective resource
following catastrophic and other major disasters. However, HUD
has almost entirely relied on supplemental appropriations for
funding and only once has that included funding for staffing,
support costs, and IT support. This has been a strain on the
Department's resources and has had an effect on catastrophic
planning as well.
Through the years, HUD has only occasionally been invited
to participate in interagency catastrophic planning efforts. To
my knowledge, HUD was not invited to participate in the
Hurricane Pam simulation in 2004 that was referred to in your
invitation letter to this hearing.
Senator Landrieu. Could you repeat that, please?
Mr. Opper. I said that, to my knowledge, HUD was not
invited to participate in the Hurricane Pam simulation in 2004
that was referred to in your invitation letter.
HUD does not have its own strategy or plan for a
catastrophic event per se, nor is it resourced to conduct
catastrophic planning. Under the National Response Framework
Catastrophic Incident Annex, and under the National Response
Plan Catastrophic Incident Annex before it, the Department of
Homeland Security is assigned primary responsibility for
housing.
HUD looks to FEMA for guidance regarding a strategy for a
catastrophic event, including catastrophic housing. HUD is not
a first responder. It bears reiterating that HUD does not build
housing but instead finances the construction, reconstruction,
and rehabilitation of housing primarily through its State and
local government partners. HUD does participate in National
Level Exercises and numerous interagency coordination meetings
and task forces. It has operating plans and procedures for its
programs that have been used in disaster recovery.
Another topic that has been discussed here by the
Subcommittee is the National Disaster Housing Strategy. HUD was
asked by FEMA to contribute to its development of the strategy.
The strategy describes how the Nation currently provides
housing to those affected by disasters and describes future
directions for disaster housing efforts to better meet the
needs of disaster victims and communities. It promotes engaging
all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and
the private sector in a national housing effort to meet the
needs of disaster victims and enable rebuilding of communities
following a disaster. The strategy identifies key principles
gleaned from past experience, lessons learned that could
benefit current and future disaster housing efforts.
FEMA did consult regularly with HUD on the strategy, asking
us to provide our expertise in interim and permanent housing.
HUD contributed to the interim housing chapter of the strategy
and provided much of the initial text for the chapter on
permanent housing.
The strategy helps further define HUD's and FEMA's roles
with respect to disaster housing. Under the strategy, FEMA and
HUD will partner to provide interim housing assistance, each
bringing its expertise and experience to bear.
When Federal permanent housing assistance is needed for
long-term recovery, the strategy gives HUD the lead
responsibility to coordinate with its partners, such as the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Small Business Administration,
FEMA, and others, to provide housing and community development
resources. The strategy also calls for a National Disaster
Housing Task Force, to be jointly led by FEMA, HUD, and the
American Red Cross that will help achieve the long-term vision
and goals of the strategy. Within the strategy, HUD----
Senator Landrieu. You are over your time. OK? I am going to
have to ask you to stop, if I could.
Are you, Mr. Opper, the person that has been appointed
within HUD to develop, either within HUD or with FEMA, some
part of this housing plan? Are you the person that has been
tasked to do that?
Mr. Opper. I have been the lead person tasked to do that.
Senator Landrieu. And how long have you been in this
position?
Mr. Opper. In the position I am in now, about a year or so,
but I have been working on disasters since 1992.
Senator Landrieu. OK. So you have been with HUD since 1992?
Mr. Opper. No. Since 1975.
Senator Landrieu. Since 1975. You have been working on
disasters at HUD since 1992.
Mr. Opper. Correct.
Senator Landrieu. And you have been doing this particular
job for a year.
Mr. Opper. About a year.
Senator Landrieu. Who was doing this job before you were
there, in the last 2 or 3 years?
Mr. Opper. This job did not exist before I had it.
Senator Landrieu. OK, so it is a new position----
Mr. Opper. This particular job.
Senator Landrieu [continuing]. That has been created. So it
is your new position that you are in charge of the disaster
recovery. How many meetings have you actually had with high-
level officials over the last, would you say, year on this
housing plan?
Mr. Opper. Quite a few.
Senator Landrieu. Would you say a half dozen? A dozen?
Mr. Opper. At least that, probably.
Senator Landrieu. OK. You said that HUD does not have the
money, in the earlier part of your statement. Can you report to
this Subcommittee what you or the Secretary of the Deputy of
budget has requested in additional funding to help you do your
job?
Mr. Opper. Well, it has fallen in between the budget
cycles, this new job. What I had been doing before that, as you
may recall, I was at your hearing in February 2006, down in New
Orleans, and at that time I was managing our CDBG disaster
assistance. At this point my responsibilities deal more with
coordinating the overall Department role.
Senator Landrieu. OK, but I am going to ask you to stay
focused, if you could, on this request for funding, because you
testified that HUD in your view did not have the resources
necessary to follow. If you could provide to this Subcommittee
any request that HUD has made since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
for additional resources or additional funding relative to
trying to step up, step out, implement any kind of housing
plan, that is what I would like you to submit to this
Subcommittee.
Does HUD consider its responsibility to replace public
housing that you actually do finance? Or is that FEMA's job, in
your view?
Mr. Opper. That is not my area. I can submit an answer for
the record.
Senator Landrieu. Since you have been doing disaster
planning in HUD since 1975, have you ever been involved in any
discussions about HUD's responsibility to actually replace
housing that is destroyed--HUD housing destroyed in a
catastrophic disaster--that you could share with us about what
HUD thinks is its responsibility?
Mr. Opper. My role with disasters since 1992 has been, up
until recently, primarily dealing with the Community
Development Block Grant program and providing disaster
assistance through that program. As you know, we have another
part of HUD, our Office of Public and Indian Housing, that has
responsibility for the public housing.
Senator Landrieu. OK. In your job now that you have, do you
think it is partly your responsibility? Here you are the
Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Disaster Policy and
Management for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. So this is a new position that has been created.
Mr. Opper. Yes.
Senator Landrieu. Do you think it is part of your job to
focus on public housing residents that your agency built the
housing and then it becomes destroyed in a disaster? Is it your
understanding that it is not your job to think of what happens
if that happens, that what do we do when that happens, is that
your job?
Mr. Opper. It is part of my job to coordinate and make sure
that someone is thinking about that, and our Office of Public
and Indian Housing is doing that.
Senator Landrieu. OK. Do you have anything you would like
to share with us, since you have been in this job for a while,
that you have talked with the person that is in charge of
public housing about that?
Mr. Opper. Nothing to share at this time.
Senator Landrieu. OK, because I am going to ask you to
share some details with us at a later date about plans that you
all might have involving what you do when public housing is
destroyed, housing that HUD has financed and built, because HUD
is the primary agency for this in the country. This means
housing for the senior citizens, housing for disabled
individuals, housing for low-income individuals, and other
types of special housing.
Mr. Garratt, in 2002, FEMA prepared a draft catastrophic
housing plan that said, ``Business as usual will not be
sufficient in a catastrophic event.''
I am looking at the strategy today. Obviously, you know I
am very troubled by the blank pages and the lack of what I
would consider details that people in America were expecting.
In 2002, the plan that you all submitted said, ``FEMA's
standard forms of assistance (rent and home repair) will not
necessarily meet housing needs.'' In 2004 and 2005, FEMA spent
millions on another planning effort, the Hurricane Pam
exercise. This exercise actually predicted almost the exact
impact of what actually happened in Hurricane Katrina. It was
almost predicted to the detail of what would happen.
During that exercise, FEMA said, ``Response and recovery
after a catastrophic disaster requires the mobilization of a
gigantic juggernaut, and for this juggernaut to be successful,
it has to be planned in detail.''
If FEMA had come up with a plan in 2002, then we again came
up with a plan during the exercise of Pam, FEMA concluded that
detailed planning was necessary, how can this agency justify
its failure to provide detailed plans in the strategy that is
now before us 4 years later? And, actually, it is 6 years from
2002, 4 years from the Pam exercise. Could you please respond?
Mr. Garratt. Certainly. I am familiar with the 2002
catastrophic plan to which you referred. I would suggest that,
in fact, that is really less a plan, less a strategy, than it
is recognition that we will face a lot of special challenges in
a catastrophe. And it identifies the fact that we are going to
face a number of special challenges and that we need to pursue
new ways to address those.
We recognize that we needed to do that, and it was as a
result of that catastrophic plan or strategy or aggregation of
concerns that really was the impetus for driving us to begin
the southeast Louisiana catastrophic planning effort. You
mentioned that Hurricane Pam cost millions. In fact, the
hurricane planning effort cost millions. I think Hurricane Pam
only cost $800,000 as part of that.
But what that resulted in and what Pam was central to help
us accomplish was to inform our ability in working with the
State and working with the local jurisdictions to develop this,
which was a fairly comprehensive plan for southeast Louisiana.
And this was published in January 2005. That plan, accompanied
by these appendices, again, identified and captured a lot of
the lessons learned from Hurricane Pam. So, yes, it was a very
valuable exercise, and you are exactly right. It did on a
number of scores, on a number of counts, come very close to
identifying exactly the sorts of impacts that we faced
following Hurricane Katrina. What it did not do necessarily was
provide a lot of assistance or information about how to deal
with the housing problem. The focus of Hurricane Pam, the focus
of this effort, was largely around the response effort, so
dealing with the immediate concerns facing that population.
So although it is heavy in sheltering, heavy in evacuation,
heavy on getting supplies, commodities in to provide
assistance, it, in fact, is lacking in the areas of housing.
Senator Landrieu. Well, then, let's talk about sheltering
for a minute. What is your primary remembrance or
recommendation in terms of immediate sheltering for a
catastrophic disaster? Is your recommendation to use public
shelters?
Mr. Garratt. I have to admit I was not personally involved
in the development of this plan. I was, at the time this plan
was being developed, leading a different catastrophic planning
effort, and that was the development of the Catastrophic
Incident Supplement to the National Response Plan. So I was not
personally involved in this, but we saw that there were
opportunities for convergence here, and what we expected was
this particular planning effort to identify and inform how the
Catastrophic Incident Supplement would be used to support an
event in southeast Louisiana.
In terms of the sheltering question, it identified at
least, I think, as a result of Hurricane Pam, if my memory is
correct--and I can probably look in here and find out. I think
it identified between 200,000 and 300,000 people were going to
require either sheltering or housing for families as a result
of the Hurricane Pam scenario.
Senator Landrieu. Did that report--and I know you did not
have anything to do with it, but do you remember in that report
if it had recommended using travel trailers as an appropriate
response to a hurricane-prone area that could not be easily
moved?
Mr. Garratt. I do not recall whether it did. However,
travel trailers have been, at least--and they were at the
time--a standard part and, in fact, an important part of our
response strategy. And they have been--not only travel trailers
but manufactured housing. Mobile homes, park models have for a
very long time been an integral part of our temporary housing
strategy, and an important part of that.
Senator Landrieu. All right. What has FEMA done to help
State and local governments organize their resources and plan
for post-disaster housing, just if you could list one, two, or
three things that FEMA has done in that regard? And have you
all requested the funding for that training?
Mr. Garratt. I am sorry, Senator. I need you to repeat that
question.
Senator Landrieu. What has FEMA done to help State and
local governments organize their resources and plan for post-
disaster housing assistance?
Mr. Garratt. Most of the planning that we do with the
States is done either through our regions, dealing with the
unique and special requirements of individual States. They work
with the States to identify what their requirements are, what
their needs are, and then they will augment and provide
assistance to the States in the development of their planning
requirements. And they do that through such forums as Regional
Interagency Steering Committees, which each region sponsors,
which each region has meetings with their State representatives
on a regular basis, as well as Federal representatives.
We also provide assistance through the Emergency Management
Performance Grants program, and that program identified targets
that we want States to meet as part of acceptance of those
grants.
We have also developed in our Preparedness Directorate a
target capabilities listing and other preparedness
documentation that provides guidance to the States on what it
is that they should be trying to achieve in support of
improving their individual and respective preparedness.
What I can do is reach back, and we can provide a more
comprehensive listing of what is being done in the preparedness
realm to work with the individual States to answer the question
that you asked. But I do not have specifics that I can provide
you, just these generalities.
Senator Landrieu. All right. Let me ask you this, because I
am concerned about statements that I continue to see in the
reports that come to us that say this exactly or something like
it: ``All incidents should be managed at the lowest
jurisdiction level possible, and this holds true for disaster
housing assistance as well.'' It is this reliance on everything
local, individuals should be responsible.
Do you think that this makes sense in catastrophic
disasters, as opposed to regular, normal, major disasters?
Mr. Garratt. Senator, I would say that by its very nature,
a catastrophe means that disaster exceeds the capabilities of
State and local governments. So in a catastrophe, I do not
think anyone has the expectation that local governments will be
able to handle that and that Federal assistance is not only
going to be required, it is going to be required quickly and in
a very aggressive way to help them deal with those particular--
--
Senator Landrieu. So I would take that as you are actually
disagreeing with the fact that it says, ``All incidents should
be managed . . . `' It would be, I don't think, leading you to
say that you say certain incidents should be managed at the
lowest jurisdiction, but there might be some of a catastrophic
nature----
Mr. Garratt. No, I think, Senator, what I was trying to say
was I do believe that from a strict management perspective that
the responsibility for management should be at the lowest
level. What I am saying is that the lowest level is not going
to be able to handle or even come close to handling the
requirements that they are going to face in a catastrophe. They
should expect and they should receive a lot of assistance from
the Federal Government and from States and from mutual aid
partners. And we need to be prepared to provide and project
that assistance very quickly. But we should not be running that
response operation unless they cannot do it. If they have the
capability of managing it, we should be folding our resources
in to support their management requirements.
Senator Landrieu. But you just said that, in your view,
they cannot manage a catastrophe, and I actually agree with
you.
Mr. Garratt. Management in the term of assemble and respond
to that disaster using exclusively their own resources is what
I meant when I said that. In terms of providing the command and
control under the Incident Command System, which is the basis--
the National Incident Management System, the basis for how we
deliver and augment response operations throughout the Nation,
we would fold our resources in support of the incident
commander at the very lowest level.
So I think we are saying the same thing in terms of the
overall management and--I believe that we are saying the same
thing in terms of the resources involved. In terms of command
and control, I think that has to rest and continue to be
applied in an Incident Command System structure.
Senator Landrieu. Well, I am not sure we are saying the
same thing, and in large measure, this is the heart of a debate
that is going on right now. Is the Federal Government, even
after all the evidence has been laid down, is the Federal
Government trying to make a distinction between regular
disasters and catastrophic disasters? You claim there is a
difference. I actually agree with you. But I have yet to see
any document that seeks to describe a trigger or seeks to
suggest that there be one strategy for lower-level disasters
and a different strategy for catastrophic. And so while I
continue to hear people say it, I do not see it.
Do you know if this strategy makes any distinction? Because
we cannot find any distinction recommended in your strategy
between catastrophic and lower-level disasters.
Mr. Garratt. You are talking about the housing strategy
now?
Senator Landrieu. Yes.
Mr. Garratt. I would suggest that--to back up a little bit,
certainly FEMA recognizes that a catastrophic disaster does
have and has required a specialized response, and we need to be
able to respond to that in a different way. That was the
genesis of that understanding for the development of the
Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the National Response Plan,
now the National Response Framework. That Catastrophic Incident
Supplement has a special response protocol that is employed
whenever the Secretary of Homeland Security designates a
disaster as a catastrophe. That is implemented immediately, and
it is implemented aggressively.
However, it is designed to cover the first 72 to 96 hours
of that disaster because the prevailing belief has been ever
since the Federal Response Plan and its successors--the
National Response Plan, the National Response Framework--were
developed was that those documents are scalable and that what
we do during the recovery phase is something that needs to be
determined by the characteristics of the situation.
So if we have a large housing mission, then we need to
expand the capability to provide housing to that group. But
what we cannot necessarily do is invent or manufacture a
housing capability for catastrophes that we would not already
have available for any size disaster.
Senator Landrieu. You are going to have to repeat that
because I do not understand it. Let me tell you what I think I
heard you say: ``We have a plan that is a housing plan for
trailers, and if it is a big disaster, we will just get you
more of them.'' That is what I heard you say. So if you did not
say that, please say it again.
Mr. Garratt. I would say it differently than you said it,
Senator. What I would say is that if we have a large housing
mission, we are going to use all of the resources available to
us to meet that requirement, but the size of the housing
mission does not necessarily mean that at this particular size
we are going to invoke and use a housing capacity that we would
not use before that.
All of these forms of housing assistance are available to
us now--alternative forms of housing, temporary forms of
housing, forms of rental assistance, permanent reconstruction.
All of those are forms of assistance that are authorized to us.
When we choose to use them is fully articulated in the National
Disaster Housing Plan--or, excuse me, the 2008 Disaster Housing
Plan. We do that on a staged basis. But we can also, as the
plan indicates, implement them all simultaneously if the size
of the disaster so requires, and that I think is the
fundamental point I am trying to make, which is we have
identified everything that we can do. What we do and when we do
that is dependent on the size of the disaster and the
characteristics of that disaster.
Senator Landrieu. Is there any question in your mind that
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was not a major catastrophe?
Mr. Garratt. No question whatsoever.
Senator Landrieu. So you are testifying before this
Subcommittee that you have all the authority you need right now
in terms of these options--trailers, rental housing, etc.--to
take care of this housing catastrophe.
Mr. Garratt. What I am saying is that for those forms of
housing that are available to us, we can go out and we are
going out--and we are going to be awarding a contract for a
number of alternative forms of housing here in August. We can
secure right now using our authorities whatever we need to
provide housing assistance, just as we did following Hurricane
Katrina. There is no form of housing that is out there that we
did not employ because we did not have the authority to employ
that.
Senator Landrieu. I could not disagree with you more, and I
am actually puzzled, very puzzled to hear you say that you have
all the options you need and you use them all?
Mr. Garratt. No, ma'am.
Senator Landrieu. Do you realize we have had thousands of
people sleeping under interstates for the last 3 years? And you
did not step forward to provide housing vouchers. The Congress
had to basically thrust them to you to make you take them.
Mr. Garratt. Ma'am, everyone who was eligible for
assistance from the Federal Government under our authorities
received that assistance or had the opportunity to receive that
assistance.
Senator Landrieu. I could not disagree with you more, and
the record will reflect that.
[Pause.]
Senator Landrieu. This has been a very interesting hearing,
I want you to know, Mr. Garratt, to me. I am getting such
conflicting testimony between you, who claim that you have all
the authority you need to act, although the budget does not
request any additional funding; a rental housing program that
has yet to be implemented; it is 3 years after the biggest
catastrophe, which nobody on these panels disagrees was a
catastrophe, but there is a wide disagreement as to what
authority you have, what budget you have, what money you have,
and a document that has been submitted with seven blank pages.
So I am very sorry that the time has run out on this
hearing today. I appreciate your testimony, but we will
continue to have several hearings that we can get to the bottom
of what happened, why it happened, and what can be done to
prevent it in the future.
Meeting adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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