[Senate Hearing 110-506]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-506
NATO: ENLARGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Asmus, Ronald D., executive director, Transatlantic Center,
German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium........................ 42
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Craddock, GEN John, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, NATO Headquarters, Mons, Belgium............ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Fried, Hon. Daniel, Acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Gordon, Dr. Philip H., senior fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy,
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.......................... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Jackson, Bruce, president, Project on Transitional Democracies,
Washington, DC................................................. 59
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Townsend, James J., Jr., director, International Security
Program, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC...................... 67
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
DeMint, Jim, U.S. Senator from South Carolina, prepared statement 86
Obama, Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, prepared statement.... 85
(iii)
NATO: ENLARGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS
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TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Menendez, Casey, Lugar,
Hagel, Voinovich, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Assistant Secretary, welcome back. It's been only about
a couple of days since you've been here. It's good to have you
back. And, General Craddock, welcome. And thank you both for
being here today.
Next month, the 26 Member States of the NATO Alliance will
gather in Bucharest, Romania. And central to the discussions
will be the questions of Ukraine and Georgia, bringing them
closer to the Alliance, and Croatia, Albania, and FYROM--or
Macedonia, as our Government refers to it--into the Alliance.
The other major issues that will be front and center is the
effectiveness of NATO in its first out-of-area military
commitment in the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
Summits have a tendency to force events and a time for
actual decisions on hard issues, so it's no surprise that, in
the runup to this summit, disagreements among allies sometimes
get the spotlight. Even so, I am deeply concerned that, on the
eve of this summit, the Alliance is especially fractured and
incoherent. And, quite frankly, Senator Lugar and I have been
here a long time. I don't know how many conferences I've
attended about whether NATO will survive? I know we always have
these discussions, but this is a particularly difficult moment.
First, there appears to be a total lack of clarity on how
to respond to the applications of Ukraine and Georgia for
Membership Action Plans, or MAP. I believe--speaking for myself
only, that we should encourage Ukraine and Georgia by granting
their requests for MAP. Both countries have made substantial
progress toward consolidating gains of the Orange and Rose
Revolutions, and have made substantive contributions to NATO
operations. A Membership Action Plan, as you both know better
than anyone, is not an irrevocable step for either the
applicant state or for the Alliance. The decision on an
invitation to join the Alliance can take as long as NATO wants
or the applicant state requires.
Second, there is no apparent consensus on the three
countries who are candidates for actual membership. During the
1990s, NATO became a force for promotion of a Europe whole and
free in ways that its founders, I don't think, ever fully
imagined. The prospect of membership encouraged Europe's newly
liberated countries to settle longstanding disputes, to deep-
root democracy and human rights, and, of course, to build
competent militaries. I am proud, along with Senator Lugar and
my deceased colleague Senator Roth and others, to have played a
part in helping the initial enlargement of NATO after the wall
came down. It remains my conviction that we should extend an
offer of NATO membership to any country that applies and meets
the criteria.
As a strategic matter, the admission of Croatia and Albania
and Macedonia to NATO would bring the Balkans closer to the
European future its people deserve, and it would strengthen, in
my view, regional security. But, that doesn't mean these three
candidates, in my view, must enter as a block. Each country
should be judged against the established criteria and on its
own merits. Of course, NATO's current members must still agree
on the decision to invite new ones, period.
I've strongly urged Greece and FYROM, or Macedonia, to find
a reasonable compromise to the name dispute that stands as a
bar to Macedonia's membership. If they're unable to do so in
time for the summit, that failure should not, in my view,
penalize the prospects of Croatia or Albania. I expect our
witnesses to address the readiness of these three countries to
join NATO, and our second panel includes two prominent experts
who disagree on whether these countries are ready. And it's
important, I think, to hear this debate here in the Foreign
Relations Committee.
And finally, the other critical issue in this summit is
Afghanistan--the forgotten war, in my view. I was there, along
with Senator Lugar and Senator Kerry, just a few weeks ago.
Each of us has spoken to our deep concern that, while
Afghanistan remains winnable, we are not winning. In my view,
we need a new strategy for success and a new NATO commitment,
in terms of the individual countries and their rules of
engagement. This should not be America's fight, alone. Our
allies joined this war from the very start. This was not a war
of choice; this was a war of necessity. And they have as much
at stake as we do, I'd respectfully suggest.
Since 9/11, Europe has been repeatedly targeted for terror,
and virtually every attack can be traced back to the Afghan-
Pakistan border regions. The heroin Afghanistan produces winds
up in the streets of Madrid and Berlin, not in New York. In
fact, since 2001 far more Brits have lost their lives to Afghan
drugs than to Taliban arms. Many of our NATO allies thought
they were signing up for a peacekeeping mission, not a
counterinsurgency operation. And many are fighting like it is a
peacekeeping operation: Not fighting. Some are fighting with
incredible bravery, particularly in the south. But, the so-
called national caveats are making a mockery, in my view, of
NATO and the notion of a unified mission. One ally can fight
here, but not another place; another ally can do this, but not
that. In my view, you're either in this fight or not you're
not, and it's time for NATO to be fully in the fight. I believe
that the future of NATO is at stake in Afghanistan.
The NATO summit must bring these issues to a head. We are
right to expect more from our allies and from NATO, but they
are also right to expect more from us. When I first went to
Afghanistan, right after the Taliban fell, in January 2002, I
asked the commander of British Forces how long his people would
allow him to stay in Afghanistan, and I'll never forget what he
told me. He said, ``We Brits have an expression, Senator. As
long as the big dog is in the pen, the small dogs will stay.
When the big dog leaves, the small dogs will go home.'' Well,
the big dog left, in my view, in 2002. The big dog left, and we
diverted so much of our attention and so many of our resources
to Iraq, there wasn't a lot left for Afghanistan. Instead of
finishing the war of necessity, we started a war of choice. I'm
not here to debate that war of choice. I'm here just to make
the point that we--and interesting to me, and I don't know
whether my colleague from Nebraska found the same thing--
whether we were talking to diplomats, military personnel, or
NGOs, they all, when we asked them about the situation in
Afghanistan, they'd all say something to the effect of, ``It is
true, from 2002 to 2006 we didn't do much, but we began to
change policy and make--regain some ground in 2006--late
2006,'' an interesting admission that we heard uniformly,
across the board.
I commend Secretary Gates, who acknowledged, last month,
that the Europeans tend to project the hostility they feel for
the war in Iraq onto the fight in Afghanistan. I would also
point out, I think that's happening here in the United States.
The hostility toward the war in Iraq is being--coloring the
attitude of Americans toward the war in Afghanistan.
I think this represents a fundamental misreading of the
facts. But, we have done a poor job in distinguishing the case
for one war from the other. And I'm glad Secretary Gates has
dedicated himself to correcting the record.
We always say that the summit is critical, but I think this
one really is; it's critical for the construction of Europe,
for the war in Afghanistan, and, I think, the future of the
Alliance, itself.
So, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses,
particularly our colleagues sitting before us, and I would now
yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate this opportunity for the committee to once
again talk about and examine the future of NATO, and I join you
in welcoming our very distinguished witnesses.
The NATO Alliance is preparing for an historic summit in
Bucharest, Romania, next month. And the Bucharest summit finds
NATO facing new challenges, adjusting to new priorities. Much
attention is being focused on NATO's role in Afghanistan, which
is, as you pointed out, the most demanding and defining combat
operation in Alliance history. European troop contributions to
the Afghanistan operation and the removal of caveats
restricting how troops are employed will be the subject of
intense discussions, surely, at the summit.
But, even as we work through the important issues related
to Afghanistan, I would urge the administration to bring an
even broader vision to deliberations in Bucharest. The recent
announcement of independence by Kosovo; President Putin's
statements that we are in the midst of a new arms race; Russian
threats against Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine; and
Moscow's intransigence on issues ranging from the shutting down
of British cultural affairs offices to abandonment of the CFE
Treaty, require strategic leadership from the United States and
close cooperation with NATO allies.
At the summit, I believe the Alliance must invite Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. Each is working hard to
meet the specified requirements for membership. They occupy
critical geostrategic locations, and are best situated to deter
any efforts by any party to destabilize the Balkans through
violence. These three candidate countries also have proven
their commitment to making meaningful contributions to the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
NATO also must extend Membership Action Plans to Georgia
and Ukraine. The governments of both countries have clearly
stated their desire to join NATO, and both have made remarkable
progress in meeting Alliance standards. Both countries have
made as much progress on democratic, economic, and military
reform as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania had made
when they received MAPs in 1999.
I understand that Georgia and Ukraine must accomplish much
more before they can be offered NATO membership, but extension
of these MAPs is an important symbol of Alliance intent.
In January, I traveled to both Georgia and Ukraine. And
during my visit in Georgia, President Saakashvili reiterated
his hopes for a MAP. In Ukraine, President Yushchenko, Prime
Minister Tymoshenko, and the Speaker of the Parliament signed a
letter to the NATO Secretary General signifying the unity of
purpose behind their MAP request. If NATO is to continue to be
the preeminent security alliance and serve the defense
interests of its members, it must continue to evolve, and that
evolution must include enlargement. Potential NATO membership
motivates emerging democracies to make important advances in
areas such as the rule of law and civil society. A closer
relationship with NATO will promote these values and contribute
to our mutual security.
In addition to membership issues, we must ensure that
meaningful progress is made on energy security. Today, the
denial of energy resources is a weapon that can cripple a state
as effectively as traditional armies. NATO must recognize the
risks we face and begin to implement a strategy to prepare us
for future energy contingencies.
Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, and Lithuania have all faced
hostile energy supply actions from Russia. Today, Germany,
Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Hungary, and others have signed
bilateral deals with Russia that could have serious
implications for European energy security and for the NATO
Alliance. In my judgment, NATO is the only institution capable
of uniting the transatlantic community under a common energy
policy with the urgency that this threat warrants.
Three years ago, the U.S. Senate unanimously voted to
invite seven countries to join NATO. Today, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are making
important contributions to NATO, and are among our closest
allies in the global war on terrorism. It is time again for the
United States to take the lead in urging its allies to
recognize the important efforts underway in Albania, Croatia,
Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, and offer them membership and
Membership Actions Plans, accordingly.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I'll suggest, Mr. Chairman,
we have 7-minute rounds when the testimony is finished. We have
good attendance here.
Let me begin with you, Mr. Secretary. Why don't you begin
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Fried. Thank you, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar,
and members of the committee. I'd like to thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the world's most successful alliance.
NATO is more than a military alliance, it is an alliance of
values. NATO's mission remains the same: The defense of its
members. But, how NATO fulfills this mission is evolving.
During the cold war, NATO was superbly prepared to face the
Soviet Army across the Fulda Gap. It never fired a shot in
anger, but, by maintaining the peace in Europe, the Alliance
provided time for the internal decay of the Soviet system.
NATO's other historic achievement is also important, though
sometimes less remarked. It was the security umbrella under
which Europeans settled centuries-old national rivalries. On
September 12, 2001, NATO invoked, for the first time, the
Washington Treaty's Article V Clause of Collective Defense. I
was in the White House on September 11 and 12. I remember, and
greatly appreciate, NATO's solidarity, as did all of us there
on that day.
But, let me be frank, in 2001 NATO lacked the capacity to
respond to the challenge of September 11; yet, within months,
several allies had joined us in Afghanistan, and by August
2003, NATO took over the U.N.-mandated International Security
Assistance Force, the ISAF mission, in Kabul. This accelerated
NATO's geographic and capabilities transformation.
NATO has also tried to build a new kind of relationship
with Russia, although we've been disappointed that the NATO-
Russia Council has not yet fulfilled its potential. President
Putin's plan to attend the summit in Bucharest next month
represents both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity
is to renew efforts to work together with Russia. The challenge
is to make sure that NATO takes decisions on issues based on
what is good for the Alliance, not based on a veto by outside
actors. Whether on enlargement, missile defense, or granting
aspirants a Membership Action Plan, NATO must make its own
decisions, for the right reasons.
Mr. Chairman, Senators, you will find in my written
statement a section on how NATO has strengthened, and is
strengthening, its capabilities. This includes ongoing work in
two areas where this committee has provided leadership: A NATO
Cyber Defense policy and a new focus on energy security.
Today, I will report to you about NATO's ongoing
transformation, and indicate how we believe this can be
addressed in Bucharest and beyond: First, how NATO is bringing
its new capabilities to bear in ongoing operations in
Afghanistan and Kosovo; and, second, about enlargement.
NATO is in action in two major operations: Afghanistan,
through ISAF, and in Kosovo, through KFOR. More than anywhere
else, Afghanistan is the place where our new capabilities are
being developed and tested.
Now, let me be blunt. The Alliance faces real challenges
there. Levels of violence are up, particularly in the south.
The border areas with Pakistan provide a haven for terrorists.
Civil/military cooperation does not work as well as it should.
We welcome, in this regard, the appointment of Kai Eide, a
special representative of the U.N. Secretary General for
Afghanistan, which will help. Narcotics remains a serious
problem. Efforts to counter this challenge, this scourge, are
working in some, but not all, parts of the country.
There is good news, also. Operationally, NATO has had real
successes. It's worth recalling that 6 million Afghan children
now go to school, one-third of them girls; that's 2 million
girls in school, when, under the Taliban, there were none.
Zero. Afghan soldiers are increasingly at the forefront of
operations. And the number we have trained and equipped has
swelled to almost 50,000. This spring, we will send an
additional 3,500 Marines to capitalize on these gains and
support the momentum.
NATO commanders, with strong U.S. support, are looking at
force contributions, and hope to have more forces identified at
Bucharest. In addition, we must give allied commanders on the
ground more flexibility.
I had the privilege of testifying on Kosovo before this
committee last week, and so I'll keep my remarks on this topic
brief.
I was there last Friday, and I found the Kosovo leadership
rightly focused on building their country and reaching out to
the Kosovar-served community. I also met with Serbian community
leaders, including two members of the Kosovo Government. They
said they intend to remain in Kosovo. They hope their
communities will remain in Kosovo. And this is good news.
NATO, through KFOR, is continuing to provide security,
freedom of movement, and protection for minorities and
religious and cultural sites in the world's newest state.
Almost 90 percent of the KFOR forces are European, and I am
happy to report to this committee that, so far, the security
situation in the country is as good as we expected, and much,
much better than we had feared.
Let me turn to NATO enlargement. Now that Kosovo is
independent, we need to look at how to help the entire Balkans
region leave behind the crises of the 1990s and strengthen,
stabilize, secure, and democratize their societies in the 21st
century. To complete this job, the administration strongly
supports the aspirations of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to
join NATO. They have made significant progress in their
reforms. All three have shown a clear commitment to bearing the
responsibilities of membership; for example, by sending troops
to Afghanistan and supporting NATO's mission in Kosovo.
Supporting their aspirations following Kosovo's independence
helps us take the Balkans into the 21st century and
demonstrates to the world that NATO's enlargement process, a
great success, is still running.
Albania has made steady progress on combating corruption,
with arrests of high-level government officials, substantial
progress on judicial reform, and progress on laws to increase
judicial transparency.
Croatia has a proven track record of political and economic
maturity, and is also an important partner on the battlefield.
Significant progress on military reforms has created a more
modern armed forces.
Macedonia has made strides since 2001 in building a
multiethnic democracy. It has taken strong steps on the rule of
law by implementing critical laws on its courts and police, and
by taking action against trafficking in persons.
One issue threatens Macedonia's candidacy: The dispute with
Greece over Macedonia's name. Without a resolution, Greece has
said that it will block an invitation for Macedonia to join
NATO. The administration is urging both parties to work
together, and with U.N. negotiator Matt Nimetz, to come to a
solution before Bucharest. And if we can do so--if our
Government can help these countries on a national basis, we are
also prepared to do so.
All three aspirants have work to do, but they've already
done significant work, and, critically, they have put
themselves on a trajectory for success. The United States and
our allies need to consider whether it is better for the
security of the Alliance and the stability of the Balkans to
invite these countries in or to keep them out. We know, from
experience, that countries who join NATO continue to reform.
Ukraine and Georgia have expressed an interest in joining
NATO. They are not ready to be members now, as they recognize.
But, we can help them help themselves and prepare themselves
through NATO's Membership Action plan, as they have requested.
The timing of that step will be a key issue at the Bucharest
summit.
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia were invited to
join NATO's Partnership for Peace in November 2006. While it
was a controversial issue then, I think the doubters now see
that it was the right decision. NATO's door must remain open.
The Alliance's decision to invite a country must be made
according to that country's performance, willingness, and
ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area
and its desire to join. No country outside of NATO has the
right to decide these questions for them.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, other members of the committee,
several administrations have worked to build a Europe whole,
free, and at peace. NATO has been an indispensable instrument
of this noble objective, and NATO is becoming a multilateral
instrument of transatlantic security for the 21st century. This
administration will strive to hand over to the next this great
undertaking.
Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Fried, Acting Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of this committee,
thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful
political-military alliance the world has ever known.
NATO is not just a military alliance; it is an alliance of values,
and NATO's success in the past and promise for the future reflect its
fusion of strength and democratic values. I will speak today about how
the alliance is transforming itself to address global security
challenges; its current missions and challenges, including ongoing
operations in Afghanistan; and our goals for the Bucharest summit and
beyond.
NATO provided a foundation for freedom's victory in the cold war.
It is now evolving into its 21st century role: Defending the
transatlantic community against new threats and meeting challenges to
our security and values that are often global in scope.
NATO's mission remains the same: The defense of its members. But
how NATO fulfills this mission is evolving. Much of what I discuss
today has to do with this important ongoing adaptation.
During the cold war, NATO was superbly prepared to face the Soviet
Army across the Fulda Gap, but never fired a shot. Yet, by maintaining
the peace in Europe, the alliance provided time and space for the
internal decay of the Soviet system and the Warsaw Pact, and for forces
of freedom in Warsaw, Vilnius, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, Kyiv, and
even Moscow to prevail.
NATO's other historic achievement is not mentioned often, but is no
less important: It served as the security umbrella under which
centuries-old rivalries within Europe were settled. NATO provided an
essential precondition for the European Union, a united Europe, to take
shape. Since 1945, Western Europe has enjoyed its longest period of
internal peace since Roman times.
After the end of the cold war, NATO faced two fundamental
challenges: First, should it remain fixed in its cold-war-era
membership? Second, should it remain fixed in its cold-war activities?
Three successive American administrations--those of President
George W. Bush, President Bill Clinton, and President George H.W.
Bush--have demonstrated leadership in helping transform NATO from a
cold war to a 21st century profile. Members of this committee played,
and continue to play, a major part in that bipartisan policy effort.
In the 1990s, under American leadership, NATO enlarged its
membership for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It did
so again in 2002.
Also in the 1990s, NATO engaged in its first military combat
operations to force an end to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. NATO's
operational role has continued to grow since then.
On September 12, 2001, a day after the attacks on New York and
Washington, NATO invoked for the first time the Washington treaty's
critical article 5 clause of collective defense. In the 52 years of
NATO's existence prior to that date, no one ever expected that article
5 would be invoked in response to a terrorist attack; an attack on the
United States rather than Europe; and an attack plotted in Afghanistan,
planned in Pakistan, Malaysia, and Germany, carried out inside the
United States, and financed through al-Qaeda's fund-raising network.
I was in the White House on September 11 and 12; I remember and
greatly appreciate NATO's act of solidarity. That decision, and its
implications, eventually brought an end to NATO's now seemingly
``quaint'' debate about going ``out of area.''
But let me be frank: In 2001, despite this decision, NATO lacked
the capability of responding to the challenge of September 11. And, to
be even franker, at that time the United States had not thought through
how to work within NATO so far afield as Afghanistan. But within
months, several individual allies had joined us in Afghanistan, and on
August 11, 2003, NATO took over the U.N.-mandated International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul. From that moment,
NATO had crossed into a new world, and transformation became an
operational as well as a strategic necessity.
NATO has come far since the cold war. In the early 1990s, NATO was
an alliance of 16 countries, which had never conducted a military
operation and had no partner relationships. By the middle of this
decade, NATO had become an alliance of 26 members. And its soldiers and
sailors had experienced:
Bringing security and stability to Afghanistan;
Maintaining security in Kosovo and Bosnia;
Supporting and training peacekeepers in Africa;
Training the Iraqi security forces;
Delivering humanitarian aid in Pakistan after the earthquake
and in Louisiana after Katrina; and
Patrolling shipping in the Mediterranean to prevent
terrorism.
NATO also has established partner relationships with over 20
countries in Europe and Eurasia, seven in North Africa and the Middle
East, four in the Persian Gulf, and has global partners such as
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore, which are working with
NATO in Afghanistan.
I should also add that one of the transformations we have tried to
make at NATO is to build a new kind of relationship with Russia--one
where NATO and Russia can work together to address common interests.
This was the thinking behind the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, and
the NATO-Russia Council, created in 2002. I must admit that we have
been disappointed that the NATO-Russia Council still has not lived up
to its potential.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has announced that President Putin
plans to attend the meeting in Bucharest. This represents both an
opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is to renew efforts to
work together on issues where NATO and Russia really do have common
interests--from nonproliferation, counterterrorism, to border controls
and counternarcotics with respect to Afghanistan. The challenge,
however, is to make sure that NATO takes decisions on issues on their
own merits--based on what is good for the alliance and good for the
issues at hand--without undue pressure from any outside actors. Whether
on enlargement, missile defense, or a Membership Action Plan, NATO must
make its own decisions for the right reasons.
Fifteen years ago, no one would have predicted such far-reaching
changes for NATO. So we must be modest about predicting the future
challenges NATO will face, and the way NATO will adapt to them.
But I can report to you about NATO's ongoing transformation to
address global security challenges, and indicate how we believe this
will be addressed at NATO's summit in Bucharest next month and beyond.
First, I will deal with capabilities NATO must build in this
new era. NATO is making progress, but this task is not done.
The second issue is how NATO is bringing these new
capabilities to bear in ongoing operations, particularly:
In Afghanistan, where NATO is helping establish security and
stability, to enable reconstruction, development, and good
governance.
And in Kosovo, where NATO is maintaining peace and freedom of
movement in a now independent and sovereign country.
Third, I will speak about enlargement. NATO is taking on new
members and helping others prepare to become members in the
future if they so desire.
CAPABILITIES
NATO must strengthen its capacity in three key areas: An
expeditionary capacity to operate at strategic distance against new and
diverse threats; a comprehensive capability to better integrate
military and civilian activities; and a missile defense capacity to
protect alliance territory and populations against emerging missile
threats.
First on hard capabilities. NATO is developing these step by step.
NATO has established:
A NATO Special Operations Coordination Center in Mons,
Belgium, that boosts the effectiveness of allies' special
operations forces by increasing interoperability between
nations, sharing key lessons learned, and expanding and
improving training, all of which are yielding concrete gains on
battlefields in Afghanistan.
A NATO Response Force that is being ``updated'' to make it
more usable and deployable if the need arises.
A strategic airlift consortium to allow interested allies
and partners a mechanism to pool limited resources to own and
operate C-17s.
An initiative to enhance NATO helicopter capacity, first in
Afghanistan, to lease private helicopters for nonmilitary
transport. In the medium- and long-term, we are examining ways
to pool support and maintenance functions and to acquire
additional helicopters.
A NATO Cyber Defense Policy, to be endorsed at Bucharest,
will enhance our ability to protect our sensitive
infrastructure, allow allies to pool resources, and permit NATO
to come to the assistance of an ally whose infrastructure is
under threat. I thank the Senators on this committee for
focusing attention on this issue following the cyber attacks
against Estonia.
A new focus on Energy Security, for example, by reviewing
how NATO can help mitigate the most immediate risks and threats
to energy infrastructure. I appreciate the leadership of
Senators on this committee for their involvement in energy
security and believe NATO is building a response to the
concerns you have raised.
A Defense Against Terrorism Initiative, in which allies have
improved their precision air-drop systems and enhanced
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies to
detect terrorists. The allies have also equipped large aircraft
to defend against Man-Portable Air Defense (MANPADs) weapons,
and worked together on technologies to detect and counter
improvised explosive devices.
A NATO Maritime Situational Awareness initiative, to ensure
Information Superiority in the maritime environment, thus
increasing NATO's effectiveness in planning and conducting
operations.
I could go on. But let me stop here just to note that,
notwithstanding all the concerns we have about levels of defense
spending among the allies, and allies' need to develop and field more
expeditionary forces for NATO operations, NATO's military capabilities
are better off than they were 7 years ago. We are continuing to work to
make them better still.
Many of these new capabilities are being tested in Afghanistan--
which is also where we are learning how to better integrate civilian
and military efforts. With each passing month, all of us allies learn
more about what it takes to wage a 21st century counterinsurgency
effort--a combined civil-military effort that puts soldiers side by
side with development workers, diplomats, and police trainers. Whether
flying helicopters across the desert at night, embedding trainers with
the Afghan military and police, conducting tribal councils with village
elders, or running joint civilian-military Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, our institutions are reinventing the way we do our jobs.
As Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said, this requires new
training, new equipment, a new doctrine and new flexibility in
combining civil and military efforts in a truly comprehensive approach
to security.
And a final point on capabilities is missile defense. Article 5 of
the NATO Treaty says NATO allies will provide for collective defense.
It does not allow for exceptions when the threat comes on a missile.
NATO has been studying missile defense for years, and we expect that at
the Bucharest summit, NATO will take further steps to acknowledge
growing missile threats, welcome U.S. contributions to the defense of
alliance territory, and task further work in strengthening NATO's
defenses against these new threats. We have taken on board advice from
some in Congress, and some of our allies, as we have advanced a more
NATO-integrated approach to missile defense.
NATO's work is focused on the short-range missile threat, technical
work regarding future decisions on possible long-range threats, and
possible opportunities for cooperation with Russia. The United States
and NATO efforts are complementary and could work together to form a
more effective defense for Europe.
AFGHANISTAN
NATO is in action in two major operations, ISAF in Afghanistan, and
KFOR in Kosovo.
More than anywhere else, Afghanistan is the place where our new
capabilities are being developed and tested. Allies are fighting and
doing good work there, but NATO--all of us--have much more to do and
much more to learn.
Let me be blunt: We still face real challenges in Afghanistan.
Levels of violence are up, particularly in the south, where the
insurgency has strengthened. Public confidence in government is shaky
because of rising concerns about corruption and tribalism. And the
border areas in Pakistan provide a haven for terrorists and Taliban who
wage attacks in Afghanistan.
Civilian-military cooperation does not work as well as it should,
and civilian reconstruction and governance do not follow quickly enough
behind military operations. In this regard, we welcome the appointment
of Kai Eide as Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for
Afghanistan. In this capacity, Ambassador Eide will coordinate the
international donor community and raise the profile of the U.N.'s role
in Afghanistan, in supporting the Government of Afghanistan. The United
States will lend its strongest support to Ambassador Eide's efforts. It
will be critical to ensure that he is empowered to work in concert with
NATO and to coordinate broad civilian efforts--and go back to capitals
for more resources--in support of the sovereign Government of
Afghanistan. We look forward to Ambassador Eide's confirmation by the
U.N. Security Council later this week and hope he will be present at
the Bucharest summit in April.
Narcotics remain a serious problem. Efforts to counter this scourge
are working in some but certainly not all parts of the country. The
Taliban are using the profits from drug revenues and the instability
spread by corruption and lawlessness to fund their insurgent
activities. Helmand province continues to be the epicenter, with fully
53 percent of total cultivation, and our eradication efforts there have
had insufficient traction, significantly due to the absence of adequate
force protection for our eradication force. Yet there is good news too.
In much of the north and east, poppy cultivation is down. In a secure
environment, farmers can more easily exercise alternatives and are not
subject to the same threats and intimidation by insurgents. According
to U.N. data, we expect that this year 22 of 34 provinces are likely to
be either poppy free or cultivating fewer than 1,000 hectares of
poppies. With improved governance and security conditions, we believe
it will be possible to achieve reductions in cultivation in the
remaining provinces in coming years.
NATO is working hard, but needs to focus on counterinsurgency
tactics, provide both more forces in order to facilitate increased and
faster reconstruction assistance and improve performance in supporting
robust Afghan counternarcotics efforts. Fundamentally, NATO needs to
show greater political solidarity and greater operational flexibility
for deployed forces.
But while we are sober about the challenges, we also must recognize
our achievements. There is good news. NATO had some real operational
successes last year with our Afghan partners. Despite dire predictions,
the Taliban's much-vaunted spring offensive never materialized in 2007.
Think back to a year ago, when the Taliban were on a media blitz
threatening to take Kandahar. Today we hear no such claims because we
stood together--Afghans, Americans, allies, and our partners--to stare
down that threat.
We pursued the enemy last year, and over the winter we maintained
NATO's operational tempo, capturing or killing insurgent leaders and
reducing the Taliban's ability to rest and recoup. Some districts and
villages throughout eastern and southern Afghanistan are more secure
today than they have been in years or decades.
Roads, schools, markets, and clinics have been built all over the
country. Six million Afghan children now go to school, one third of
them girls. That is 2 million girls in school when under the Taliban
there were none--zero. Some 80 percent of Afghans have access to health
care--under the Taliban it was only 8 percent. Afghan soldiers are
increasingly at the forefront of operations and the number we have
trained and equipped has swelled from 35,000 to almost 50,000 in the
last year. This spring, the United States will send an additional 3,200
marines for about 7 months to capitalize on these gains and support the
momentum. Of this number, 2,000 marines will be added to ISAF combat
missions in the south and 1,200 more trainers for the U.S.-led Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. We are urging allies to match
these contributions so they can take on the same roles when our Marines
leave this autumn.
Afghanistan is issue No. 1 for NATO's Bucharest summit next month.
NATO is preparing a common strategy document on Afghanistan that will
help explain to publics the reasons we are fighting in Afghanistan, and
how we are going to succeed.
We will also look at force contributions, and hope to have more
forces identified at Bucharest. All contributions are valuable--from
all 26 allies and the 14 partners there with us.
Some allies deserve special praise for taking on the hardest
missions in the south--particularly the Canadians, British, Dutch,
Danes, Australians, Romanians, and Estonians.
Others deserve recognition for increased contributions over the
past year. Top of that list is Poland, a new and committed ally that
has twice sent in more troops to eastern Afghanistan--first in fall
2006 when it added 1,000 and then again in this winter with a pledge
for 400 more troops and eight vital helicopters. Australia more than
doubled its forces in 2007, to a total of 1,000 in the southern
province of Uruzgan. The U.K. has added over 1,400 troops in Helmand
province since late 2006 to meet increased security needs, while
Denmark added 300 to double its contribution in the same area. France
meanwhile has moved six fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to
Kandahar, and pledged four training teams.
Do we need more allies fighting? Yes. With this in mind, we very
much welcome President Sarkozy's pledge that ``France will stay engaged
in Afghanistan for as long as necessary because what is at stake there
is the future of our values and that of our Atlantic alliance.''
We also need allies and partners to do more to train and equip the
Afghan national security forces--the Army and the police. NATO is
providing small embedded teams directly into Afghan forces to serve as
coaches, trainers, and mentors to the Afghan Army units. Currently,
there are 34 NATO training and mentoring teams (called Operational
Mentoring and Liaison Teams--OMLTs) deployed in Afghanistan. But we
need at least 22 more by this time next year and we are asking all of
our allies and partners to step up and do more.
In addition to more troops, we need to give allied commanders on
the ground more flexibility so they can use their forces most
effectively. We understand the political constraints under which our
allies operate, but less flexibility requires more troops and prolongs
the mission.
At the same time that we build a more capable NATO, we also want to
see a stronger and more capable EU. If Afghanistan has taught us
anything, it is that we need a better, more seamless relationship
between the two. Bureaucratic hurdles should not put soldiers' lives on
the line. We can't keep showing up side by side in far flung parts of
the world and play a pickup game. We must work together to develop
better NATO-EU cooperation.
KOSOVO
Let me now turn to Kosovo, NATO's second largest operation after
Afghanistan. We all know the history. In fact, I was there a few days
ago. As I had the privilege of testifying on Kosovo before this
committee last week, I will keep my remarks brief.
Kosovo's declaration of independence ends one chapter but our work
is not yet done. We must deal with short-term challenges of security
and longer term challenges of Kosovo's development. These are serious.
But the status quo was unsustainable; and seeking to sustain it would
have led to even greater challenges.
NATO, through KFOR, continues to provide security, freedom of
movement, and protection for minorities and religious and cultural
sites in this, the world's newest state. There has been no significant
interethnic violence, no refugees or internally displaced persons, and
no trouble at patrimonial sites. KFOR remains authorized to operate in
Kosovo under UNSCR 1244. Almost 90 percent of the KFOR forces are
European.
We expect that NATO will also play a key role in the establishment
of a new, multiethnic Kosovo Security Force and a civilian agency to
oversee it, as well as in the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection
Corps. Kosovo is eager to contribute to NATO, the organization that
intervened to save the people of Kosovo during their darkest hour.
Our current challenge is dealing with Serbian extremists who seek
to foment violence, chaos, and perhaps de facto partition of Kosovo.
NATO and UNMIK are responding to this challenge firmly, defusing
conflicts before they escalate, and KFOR deserves credit for its
prompt, effective actions thus far. KFOR however is just one piece of
the puzzle, and we are working closely with the U.N., EU, and the
Kosovo Government itself.
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Now, let me speak about NATO enlargement, a major part of the
Bucharest summit.
NATO enlargement has been a major success, thanks to the work of
many on this committee. The administration strongly supports the
aspirations of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. They have
all made substantial progress, especially over the past 1 to 2 years.
Their forces serve with us in Afghanistan and other global peacekeeping
operations. They continue to play important roles on Kosovo. In short,
they have shown a clear commitment to bearing the responsibilities of
NATO membership.
Albania has made steady progress on combating corruption, with
arrests of high-level government officials among others, substantial
progress on judicial reform, and progress on laws to increase
transparency and efficiency within the court system. In addition to the
strong support and leadership on Kosovo, Albania is the greatest per-
capita contributor to NATO and coalition operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
Croatia has a proven track record of political and economic
maturity and is also an important partner on the battlefield.
Significant progress on military reforms has created more modern and
deployable armed forces, in addition to Croatia's support in promoting
regional stability.
Macedonia has made significant strides since 2001 in building a
multiethnic democracy. The government has taken strong steps on rule of
law by implementing several critical laws on its courts and police and
taking action against trafficking in persons. Macedonia, like the other
aspirants, is punching above its weight in operations, and its progress
on defense reforms has been impressive.
One issue threatens Macedonia's NATO candidacy--the dispute between
Greece and Macedonia over Macedonia's name. Without a resolution of
this issue, Greece has said it would block an invitation for Macedonia
to join NATO. The administration repeatedly has emphasized its support
for the ongoing U.N.-facilitated talks on the name issue. It has urged
both parties to work together and with U.N. negotiator Matt Nimetz to
use the time remaining before Bucharest to come to a win-win solution--
and not to allow this issue to prevent Macedonia from being invited to
join NATO.
Are the aspirants perfect? No. Have they done significant work and
put themselves on a trajectory for success? Yes. The United States and
our allies need to consider whether it is better for the security of
the alliance and the stability of the Balkans to have these countries
in or to keep them out. We know from experience that countries who join
NATO continue to address remaining reforms, and build security in their
region and the world. An invitation for membership is not a finish line
and these countries know that.
Ukraine and Georgia have expressed an interest in joining NATO. We
have always supported their aspirations. They are not ready to be NATO
members now, as they themselves recognize. We can help them to help
themselves, as they are asking, just as we have helped others, through
the Membership Action Plan (MAP). MAP is the next step for them, and
the timing of that step will be a key issue for the Bucharest summit.
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia joined NATO's
Partnerships for Peace in November 2006. While it was a controversial
issue at the time, I think that doubters now see that it was the right
decision. These countries are also members of the Euro-Atlantic
community and must be supported in their efforts to join its
institutions, to the degree they are prepared and seek to. Montenegro
and Bosnia-Herzegovina have expressed interest in beginning an
Intensified Dialogue (ID) on membership issues with NATO, and we
believe that NATO should extend those offers at Bucharest. And when the
day comes and Serbia is prepared to take up its European future, make
further reforms, and seek closer cooperation with NATO, we will welcome
that as well.
NATO's door to enlargement must remain open. Every country has the
right to choose its relationship with NATO, and the alliance's decision
to invite a country to become a member will be made according to its
performance, willingness, and ability to contribute to the security of
the Euro-Atlantic area, and desire to join. No country outside of NATO
has a right to decide that question for them. No amount of outside
pressure or intimidation should sway allies from doing what is in
NATO's best interests.
Depending on the decision at Bucharest, we look forward to working
with the Senate to ratify additional protocols to the North Atlantic
Treaty for each state's new membership.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, and other members of the committee,
several administrations have worked assiduously to help build a Europe
that is whole, free, and at peace. NATO has been an indispensable
instrument of this noble objective and NATO is becoming a multilateral
instrument of transatlantic security for the 21st century--far afield
but closely tied to its original purposes and values. We will strive to
hand over to the 44th President of the United States in 2009, whoever
he or she may be, this great undertaking.
The Chairman. General.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, NATO HEADQUARTERS, MONS,
BELGIUM
General Craddock. Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss NATO's operation in
Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, and the future of NATO.
I have submitted a written statement, Chairman, and I ask
that it be inserted into the record.
The Chairman. It will be, without objection.
General Craddock. Thank you.
I am especially fortunate to be here today with Secretary
Dan Fried. I couldn't ask for a more capable wingman, and I am
grateful for the opportunity. We have appeared at other times
in the past, in other committees.
Dan, thank you.
The International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan--ISAF--remains NATO's most important and
challenging mission, one that includes more than 47,000 forces
from 40 nations, including some 19,000 from the United States.
The security situation remains difficult, especially in the
southern and eastern parts of the country. Our metrics
highlight that 70 percent of the recorded security incidents in
2007 occurred in only 10 percent--or 40--of the 398 districts
in Afghanistan. These 40 districts are home to approximately 6
percent of Afghanistan's population. The Afghan National Army,
the ANA, continues to grow in size, in combat capability, and
will exceed the size of ISAF in 2008. We are seeing an increase
in the number and complexity of operations led and executed by
the ANA; and in the most hotly contested regions, it
participates in more than 90 percent of all ISAF operations,
that is in the east and the south.
The Afghan National Police Force has grown quickly in
numbers, but it continues to lag significantly behind the ANA.
Police performance needs to be urgently enhanced. Recent pay
and structural reforms will help, but corruption, criminality,
and lack of qualified leadership remain the most pressing
issues.
In the development area, the World Bank reported some
32,000 projects are underway, with some 15,000 completed. Phone
usage has increased from just 25,000 land lines in 2001 to
nearly 4 million cell phones today. The child mortality rates
have decreased by 25 percent since 2001. And 7 million children
have been immunized against polio. The education of
Afghanistan's children continues to move forward. Enrollment
now exceeds 6 million students, including more female students
than ever before.
Security progress in Afghanistan is slowed by force
shortfalls in some key locations and capabilities. We are at a
critical juncture in Afghanistan, and the ISAF mission needs
its military requirements filled immediately. Our opponents in
Afghanistan operate and sustain their opposition against the
international community within the gap that exists between the
forces we need and the forces we have in theater.
Additionally, the numerous national caveats restricting the
use of NATO forces limit the employment of forces both among
and within regional commands. These caveats, like shortfalls,
increase the risk to every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine
deployed in theater.
Having said that, I still remain firm in my conviction that
NATO's efforts in Afghanistan are making a difference. We are
succeeding, but, indeed, not as fast as we, the international
community, are capable of succeeding, but I believe we are
making progress. We are improving the lives of many Afghan
citizens. We are creating the conditions for a better future.
But, the reality today is, NATO and its partners throughout the
international community can, and must, do more.
Turning to the subject of enlargement, I believe that NATO
enlargement has been a historic success, strengthening our
alliance and serving as a powerful incentive to promote
democratic reforms among expiring members. I believe the
process of NATO enlargement is not complete. NATO's door must
remain open. Candidate nations must provide added value to the
Alliance. They must be contributors to security, not consumers
of it.
In this transitional period, I'm concerned about the
Alliance's collective ability to match its political will to
its level of ambition. Forces in ongoing operations, the
command structure, theater and strategic reserves, and the NATO
response force are demands on the NATO force pool, demands
that, arguably, may be draining the force pool into a puddle.
Key capability resourcing is crucial to ensuring NATO's ability
to simultaneously execute its main task: Respond to crises and
transform to meet future challenges.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Commander, U.S.
European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, NATO
Headquarters, Mons, Belgium
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in
order to provide an update on NATO enlargement, NATO's operations in
Afghanistan, and the future of NATO as it pertains to military
activities. I intend to devote the majority of my testimony to NATO's
operations in Afghanistan, but I would like to comment briefly on NATO
enlargement and the future of NATO.
nato enlargement
To fully appreciate the NATO enlargement decision, it is important
to provide the committee a context for the decisions under
consideration. NATO has an open-door policy on enlargement. Any
European country in a position to further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area
can become a member of the alliance, when invited by the existing
member countries. At the 2006 Riga summit, NATO heads of state and
government declared that the alliance intends to extend further
invitations to countries that meet NATO standards to join NATO during
its summit in 2008.
Aspirant countries are expected to participate in the Membership
Action Plan to prepare for potential membership and demonstrate their
ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future
membership. In particular, countries seeking NATO membership must be
able to demonstrate that they are in a position to further the
principles of the 1949 Washington treaty and contribute to security in
the Euro-Atlantic area. They are also expected to meet certain
political, economic, and military goals, which are laid out in the 1995
Study on NATO Enlargement. These include:
Each nation possesses a functioning democratic political
system based on a market economy;
Each nation treats minority populations in accordance with
the guidelines of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE);
Each nation works to resolve outstanding disputes with
neighbors and makes an overall commitment to the peaceful
settlement of disputes;
Each nation has the capability and willingness to make a
military contribution to the alliance and to achieve
interoperability with other members' forces;
Each nation commits to democratic civil-military relations
and institutional structures.
Accession talks follow the formal invitation. They are the dominion
of NATO headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO
experts and representatives of the nations pursuing the Membership
Action Plan. Their aim is to obtain formal confirmation from the
candidate nations of their willingness and ability to meet the
political, legal, and military obligations and commitments of NATO
membership, as laid out in the Washington treaty and in the
aforementioned Study on NATO Enlargement.
As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe I believe NATO enlargement has
been a historic success, strengthening our alliance and serving as a
powerful incentive to promote democratic reforms among aspiring
members. The process of NATO enlargement is not complete, and NATO's
door must remain open. I also believe that candidate nations must
provide added value to the alliance. They must be contributors to
security, not only consumers of security. At present, three countries--
Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are
members of NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP). While there is a
military component of MAP, and while Allied Command Operations has been
working with the three nations in MAP on defense and military reforms,
enlargement is a political decision under the control of the 26 NATO
members. It is not a strategic military decision, nor is it a political
decision in which I participate. Since the Riga summit, the 26 NATO
nations have discussed and assessed the progress of these three
countries in the MAP process. I have been asked to provide my input in
the enlargement process at this time, and I confirmed that the security
of NATO members will continue to be maintained with the inclusion of
these nations into the alliance. In Bucharest, heads of state and
government will provide an authoritative statement with respect to
invitations for membership or continue to encourage the nations to make
more progress.
NATO IN AFGHANISTAN
While NATO enlargement is a critical aspect of the alliance's
adaptation to the evolution of security in Europe, NATO's role in
Afghanistan is a vital security mission and critical to enhancing
security at the national, regional, and strategic levels in the 21st
century. It is also critical to demonstrate NATO's ability to operate
and provide security at strategic distance, and to address the
important challenges we face in the 21st century. NATO's approach in
Afghanistan is three-pronged:
First, NATO provides leadership of the U.N.-mandated
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an
international force of more than 47,000 troops (including
National Support Elements) that assists the Afghan authorities
in extending and exercising its authority and influence across
the country, creating the conditions for stabilization and
reconstruction;
Second, NATO has a Senior Civilian Representative,
responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the
alliance's commitment to the country, who works closely with
ISAF, liaises with the Afghan Government and other
international organizations, and maintains contacts with
neighboring countries; and
Third, NATO has a substantial program of cooperation with
Afghanistan, concentrating on defense reform, defense
institution-building, and the military aspects of security
sector reform.
I would like to focus my comments on NATO's ISAF operation. The
International Security Assistance Force remains NATO's most important
and challenging mission. With over 47,000 forces from 40 nations,
including 19,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the United
States, the alliance has responsibility for ISAF operations throughout
Afghanistan. Working alongside an additional 11,500 U.S.-led coalition
forces of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and other international
actors, ISAF's role is to provide a secure and stable environment in
which Afghan institutions can develop and expand their influence, while
simultaneously developing an enduring Afghan capability to provide for
its own security. The mission in Afghanistan is a complex one,
involving the cooperation of NATO and non-NATO nations, the Afghan
Government, and many international and nongovernmental organizations.
The opposing militant forces (OMF) consist of disparate groups,
including the Taliban, Haqanni, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG),
tribal warlords, drug traffickers, and other extremists. While in most
cases the OMF does not work in an organized fashion, they do work
toward a common goal--that of preventing the democratically elected
Government of Afghanistan from extending its control and reach
throughout the nation. In addition to the ISAF forces conducting
security and stability missions across the country, the 25 Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are at the leading edge of NATO's
efforts for security and reconstruction, and are an important component
of a comprehensive approach that works with local and national
authorities and the various organizations of the international
community to achieve our goals as stated in the United Nations Security
Council Resolutions and NATO OPLAN 10403(rev).
ISAF UPDATE: CAMPAIGN PROGRESS
Progress in Afghanistan continues. NATO has three lines of
operation: Security and stability; enhancing governance; and
facilitating reconstruction and development. Over the past 6 months,
NATO has adopted Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) to assess its
performance in Afghanistan. Our intent is to more accurately provide
objective trend analysis to inform our assessment of progress. We
developed 63 metrics to measure progress toward our three stated
campaign objectives from the operational plan approved by NATO's North
Atlantic Council. As we gain fidelity over time, we expect to see
trends develop. I will now provide a look into our advancement on these
three objectives.
Our first objective is the extension of the Afghan Government's
authority across the country. ISAF's high operational tempo and
focused, intelligence-led operations, have forced the OMF to resort to
terrorist tactics to pursue their strategic objectives. Their
indiscriminate but calculated attacks are designed to strike at the
resolve of the Afghan people and those committed to progress in
Afghanistan. While the security situation remains difficult, especially
in the southern and the eastern parts of the country, our metrics
highlight that IED incidents and numbers killed and wounded are
decreasing. The increased attacks aimed at ISAF and the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) does not reflect a deterioration of the security
situation but are a consequence of our successful tactical activity.
Seventy percent of recorded security incidents in 2007 occurred in only
10 percent, or 40, of the 398 districts in Afghanistan. These 40
districts are home to only 6 percent of Afghanistan's population.
Despite this analysis, recent surveys have indicated a decrease in
the perception of security amongst the population of Afghanistan. I
offer three reasons for this. First, by its nature, terrorism aims to
incite fear in the population--while actual attacks are not far-
reaching, the fear of a potential attack remains. NATO works diligently
toward timely and relevant communications to mitigate the information-
based effects of OMF tactics. Second, NATO's inability to fill its
stated military requirements in order to deny the OMF freedom to
operate and to better create the conditions for reconstruction and
development undermines the confidence of the local population. Third,
widespread corruption, especially amongst the Afghan police, and the
pervasive influence of the narcotics industry further serves to instill
doubt in the local populace. Public perceptions will change when it
becomes clear that good governance is a better choice than tyranny, and
the rule of law a better choice than terror. NATO's strategy is sound,
but it will only prevail if it has the forces needed without caveats
that constrain its use. Closing the gap between what we have and what
we need will deny the OMF the space it needs to operate against us.
Our second objective is the development of the structures necessary
to maintain security in Afghanistan without the assistance of
international forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to grow
in size and combat capability. The successful operation to retake Musa
Qala, an operation planned and controlled by the ANA with ISAF in
support, was evidence of its increased effectiveness. In support of
this objective, NATO aims to deploy more than 70 Operational Mentor and
Liaison Teams (OMLT) across the country. These teams provide mentoring,
training, and a liaison capability between the Afghan National Army and
ISAF, coordinating the planning of operations and ensuring the Afghan
units receive vital enabling support. The Afghan National Police has
grown quickly in numbers but continues to lag significantly behind the
Afghan National Army in professional ability. Collectively, therefore,
the Afghan National Security Forces still lack the capacity to hold and
stabilize areas that ISAF has secured. Unquestionably, this slows
progress toward a safe and secure environment and has an adverse effect
on the public's perception of progress.
Our third and final objective is the development and maintenance of
a countrywide stable and secure environment by Afghan authorities, in
which sustainable reconstruction and development efforts have taken
hold. NATO, however, is not the lead organization for most aspects of
Afghanistan's nation-building. The tasks of stabilizing and rebuilding
the country include development of democratic institutions, which
extend effective governance and rule of law throughout the country, in
a manner developed by, and acceptable to, the Afghan people. These
tasks include many key subtasks: Training of government officials at
all levels, reduction of corruption, effective counternarcotics
efforts, and delivery of social services and economic infrastructure.
Although many major projects are underway, measuring advancement is
difficult, as the periodicity of reporting differs among the agencies
involved. Nonetheless, it is clear we are experiencing progress, as
evidenced by projects such as the ring road and the Kajaki dam. The
World Bank reported some 32,000 projects underway and 15,000 completed.
Macroeconomic reporting indicates that the Afghan economy has
recovered to 1978/1979 prewar levels. Phone usage has increased from
the 25,000 landlines in 2001 to nearly 4 million cell phones today with
a current growth of 150,000 cell phones per month. Additionally, we
have seen an increased medical capacity as well as improved health
care. Child mortality rates have been reduced by 25 percent since 2001
and 7 million children have been immunized against polio. The education
of Afghanistan's children continues to move forward in most regions.
Enrollment exceeds 6 million students, including more female students
than ever before. Although NATO does not have the lead for those
efforts, what NATO does, or does not do, has a far-reaching impact. The
unique value of NATO's network of partnership with the Afghan
Government and the international community is that it allows like-
minded countries that have a shared responsibility for international
peace and stability to unite efforts and pool resources.
ISAF UPDATE: OPERATIONS
ISAF operational tempo throughout 2007 was high. In 2007, 144
members of ISAF were killed in action; 970 more were wounded.
Casualties amongst Afghan forces rose as their involvement became more
significant. A heavy price is being paid to achieve the alliance's and
our national security objectives.
ISAF has developed a series of rolling, theaterwide operations
designed to maximize the impact of our effort in building a secure and
stable environment. For example, in late fall of 2007, ISAF initiated
Operation PAMIR, a theaterwide operation that was designed to maintain
the initiative through the winter and into the spring. The operation
exploited the historical migration of the opposing militant forces to
their winter sanctuaries, both inside and outside of Afghanistan. ISAF
and Afghan National Security Forces have conducted intelligence-driven
operations oriented toward interdicting logistical support, disrupting
command, control and communications, and degrading OMF leadership,
while simultaneously supporting the Afghan Government's winter outreach
efforts. Targeted Information Operations were designed to enhance
public confidence in the Afghan Government, Afghan National Security
Forces, and ISAF. These efforts were focused on strengthening the
support of the loyal, gaining the support of the uncommitted, and
undermining the will of those left behind to fight during the winter.
Particular emphasis was given to publicizing the authority, capability,
and effectiveness of the Afghan Government, as well as supporting the
promotion of reconstruction and development. By demonstrating the
linkage between security and the government's ability to deliver
development, ISAF seeks to drive a wedge between opposing militant
forces and the Afghan population.
The trend toward more complex, rolling, theaterwide operations is
having a positive impact on the security situation. Operations this
spring will exploit the success of Operation PAMIR with focused
operations against the OMF where their influence and freedom of
movement is greatest. We are already witnessing an increase in the
number and complexity of operations led and executed by the Afghan
National Army. Improved security will allow for improved governance at
district and provincial levels and set the conditions for coordinated,
focused reconstruction and development into the summer and beyond.
Local liaison between Pakistan, ANSF, and ISAF in the border area
is increasingly effective, and at a higher level, the Tri-Partite
Commission remains an effective mechanism for coordination. The
situation in Pakistan could have an impact on the stability and
security in Afghanistan and we continue to work closely in all these
forums with the Pakistani military to enhance our mutual understanding
and advance ISAF military operations.
ISAF UPDATE: CJSOR AND NATIONAL CAVEATS
Contrary to some reporting, the number of NATO troops in
Afghanistan including some retained under national control has risen by
more than 8,700 over the past year and continues to increase. It is
also not well-recognized that ISAF exceeds requirements in many areas.
Yet, ISAF still has shortfalls against the minimum military requirement
in some key locations and in certain key capabilities. Specifically, a
major shortcoming in the ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
(CJSOR) is the deficit in Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. The
absence of OMLTs undermines the development of the Afghan National
Security Forces, largely because U.S. Embedded Training Teams that
could be supporting police development are compensating for OMLT
deficiencies. ISAF's stated strategy is to secure, and where and when
necessary, hold until competent, capable ANA forces are able to take
over. Competent ANA forces are essential in order to move to the
transition phase of the ISAF operation. We will need to field 22 OMLTs
between now and the end of the year to keep pace with ANA growth. In
addition, the absence of two Provincial Reconstruction Teams, three
infantry battalions, shortcomings in Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance capabilities, shortfalls in rotary wing aircraft for
lift, medical evacuation, air support, as well as the need for
forcewide enhancements in Counter-Improvised Explosive Device measures
are the key unfilled elements of ISAF's minimum military requirements
as stated in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements.
There are over 80 restrictions or constraints, or caveats, on the
use of NATO forces imposed on national contributions by national
authorities. These are political constraints, which limit the
employment of forces both among and within regional commands. ISAF
needs the freedom to make the most effective use of its forces if NATO
is to prevail. In particular, national caveats constrain ISAF's freedom
to concentrate force and prevent it from compensating, where necessary,
for CJSOR shortfalls. Caveats, like shortfalls to the CJSOR, increase
the risk to every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine the alliance
deploys as part of ISAF. Our Nations' forces are exceptional, but they
need as much flexibility as possible to be effective on this
asymmetric, irregular battlefield.
ISAF UPDATE: AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
The development of the Afghan structures necessary to maintain
security in Afghanistan without the assistance of international forces
is a strategic objective of ISAF. Capacity-building is central to the
long-term success of Afghanistan and to reaching NATO's end state. The
Afghan National Army continues to grow in size and combat capability
and will likely exceed the size of ISAF in 2008. To reiterate, the
successful operation to retake Musa Qala, planned and controlled by the
ANA with ISAF in support, was clear evidence of increased effectiveness
and a template for the future. Today, in the most hotly contested
regions, the ANA participates in more than 90 percent of all ISAF
operations--this is certainly a positive trend. It is important to note
that OMLTs have played a critical role in nurturing this capability and
have been a critical link to ISAF assets in operations. They are our
most important military contribution to Afghanistan's long-term future.
Leaders across Afghanistan agree that improved policing would lead
to improved security overall. The Afghan National Police has grown
quickly in numbers, but continues to lag significantly behind the
Afghan National Army in professional ability. This distracts the ANA
who are required to take on police tasks. Collectively, therefore, the
Afghan National Security Forces still lack the capacity to hold and
stabilize areas that ISAF has secured. This sets back advancement
toward security and has an adverse effect on the public's perception of
progress. In the longer term, slower capacity-building in a more
fragile security environment delays the point at which we can hand
responsibility for security to the Afghans. Consequently, police
performance needs to be urgently enhanced. Recent pay and structural
reforms will help, but corruption, criminality, and a lack of qualified
leadership remain the most pressing issues. In an effort to address
these concerns, a focused and intensive training program was recently
implemented by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
(CSTC-A), a program which holds promise in facilitating more rapid
police reform. Finally, the lack of police mentors below provincial
level is a significant impediment. I again point out that, by providing
more OMLTs, the coalition can divert more of its teams to develop the
police force. In sum, while there are positive indications, there is
much more work to be done toward building an indigenous security
capacity.
ISAF UPDATE: SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
ISAF is also focused on the strategic objective of establishing a
countrywide stable and secure environment by Afghan authorities, in
which sustainable reconstruction and development efforts have taken
hold. NATO does not compete with other organizations for the
humanitarian and development space. Our efforts to establish security
and assist with capacity-building allow other international and
nongovernmental organizations to work more effectively in this complex
environment. This is, in effect, the comprehensive approach undertaken
by NATO and its partners. NATO policy recognizes the essential
requirement to work with Afghan national authorities and numerous
organizations in the international community to deliver human security
in a coordinated way. The North Atlantic Council's approved Operations
Plan articulates the need for a comprehensive approach. Our Provincial
Reconstruction Teams spearhead this effort on a daily basis. Their
impact is significant at the tactical level and we are now seeing
progress in the implementation of a cohesive approach at the
operational and strategic levels with Afghan authorities and the
international community.
As I mentioned earlier, it is clear we are experiencing progress,
as evidenced by numerous nation-building projects, the positive
indications of macroeconomic activity, improved health care, and
advances in the reach of education. The Afghan National Development
Strategy is Afghanistan's chosen path for the future. It is an
important next step which must be supported by robust implementation at
all levels. The international community needs to make every effort to
assist the Afghan Government in achieving its objectives in national
development. Regardless of military success, we will struggle to
succeed in Afghanistan unless others meet their responsibility to build
governance and stimulate sustained development in a coordinated manner.
The international community moves into the space created by our
security operations to commence work. Lack of progress in
reconstruction and development undermines public opinion at home,
erodes support within Afghanistan for ISAF, and jeopardizes hard-fought
security.
ISAF UPDATE: COUNTERNARCOTICS
Eliminating the illicit production of opium in Afghanistan is vital
to the long-term security, development, and effective governance of
Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation continues to be a problem in areas where
there is a relative lack of strong governance. The narcotics trade,
encouraged and supported by Taliban extremists, funds and supports the
insurgency, drains the legal economy, promotes corruption, and
undermines public support.
NATO does not have the lead for the counternarcotics effort. The
Afghan Government, supported by the international community and in
particular, the United Kingdom as the lead G-8-nation, has the primary
responsibility for counternarcotics efforts.
While supporting the Afghan government counternarcotics programs is
an ISAF key supporting task, ISAF is not directly involved in poppy
eradication. ISAF is not a direct action force in counternarcotics and
it is not resourced for this role. When requested by the Afghan
Government, ISAF's support consists of the sharing of information, the
conduct of an efficient public information campaign, and the provision
of in-extremis support to the Afghan National Security Forces
conducting counternarcotics operations. ISAF also assists the training
of Afghan National Security Forces in counternarcotics related
activities and provides logistic support, when requested, for the
delivery of alternative livelihood programs.
ISAF is committed to the full implementation of its
counternarcotics tasks as outlined in the current ISAF mandate. NATO,
at the strategic political level, must do what it can to support and
encourage those in the lead and to ensure ISAF is resourced to perform
assigned counternarcotics tasks. At the operational and tactical level,
ISAF is effectively coordinating its support efforts with the Afghan
Government's counternarcotics forces as well as other CN actors from
the international community. ISAF is operating at the limit of its
existing authority to synchronize and coordinate its actions with those
of Afghan counternarcotics efforts as provided for in the OPLAN.
UPDATE: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
NATO's action plan on strategic communications reflects a growing
recognition that we still have much room to improve in this area, an
area that comes with a significant resource bill for nations. To ensure
that we are properly supporting NATO and national strategic
communications we need to ensure our public affairs capabilities are
effective and relevant for the 21st century. We need action at two
levels. In theater, nations need to ensure we have the right caliber
people, properly trained and with appropriate equipment and resources
for the job. The appointment of a General Officer spokesman in ISAF is
a positive step. I asked Chiefs of Defense to ensure they now place
talented people at every level of our public affairs organization.
Nations need to make significant investment to build and sustain these
capabilities.
At the strategic level, we have made some progress in public
affairs but have a way to go. We need to invest more effort now to
ensure we are able to take the information provided from theater and to
use it to support our common messaging themes. In the end, strategic
communications is more about what we do as an alliance than about what
we say. Our inability to resource the CJSOR, the effect of national
caveats, and other issues play into the hands of our opponents in
Afghanistan. We need to avoid the consequences of losing the
information war with the Taliban, and we cannot afford to lose the
support of our public. An integrated, harmonized strategic
communications plan, both in and outside of the operational theater, is
vital.
UPDATE: CONCLUSION
A recurring theme in my testimony is NATO's inability to completely
fill our agreed upon statement of requirements for forces in
Afghanistan. We are still short key capabilities and enablers; enablers
such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications,
engineering, and air support. It is noteworthy that none of today's
priority shortfalls are the result of nations reneging on an agreement
to provide resources. Rather, offers against those stated requirements
have never been made. Each nation has its own internal issues that it
must address, but a completely resourced force sends a clear message to
our adversary and the Afghan people--the message that NATO is committed
to achieving success. We are at a critical juncture in Afghanistan, and
the ISAF mission fundamentally needs minimum military requirements as
outlined in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements filled
immediately. Our opponents in Afghanistan operate and sustain their
opposition against the International Community within the gap that
exists between the forces we need in-theater and the forces we have in-
theater. In particular, the aforementioned Operational Mentor and
Liaison Teams are an urgent priority. By January 2009, we need NATO
nations to provide 22 additional OMLTs to train and mentor the Afghan
National Army in order for it to more rapidly and successfully assume
responsibility for security. At every opportunity, I continue to
encourage the NATO nations to make their offers to fill the remaining
OMLTs before the Bucharest summit to provide for timely and effective
deployment to theater by January 2009.
To conclude, I remain firm in my conviction that NATO's efforts in
Afghanistan are making a difference. We are succeeding, indeed not as
fast as we, the international community, are capable of succeeding, but
we are making progress. We are improving the lives of the vast majority
of Afghans and we are creating the conditions for a better future. Yet,
NATO and our partners throughout the international community can and
must do more. Success in Afghanistan will never be attributed to
operational military victories alone. It is only through a
comprehensive approach that true success can be realized. NATO, the
military, will set the conditions to allow the people of Afghanistan,
the governments, whether they are provincial or national, to provide
infrastructure to create jobs. It is the long-term investment and
development by the international community and the growth of commercial
activity that will, in the end, make the real difference. It is an
endeavor in which the international community must succeed in
integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing its efforts. It cannot
afford to fail or appear to be failing. Finally, everything we do must
be seen in the context of how it helps the Government of Afghanistan
achieve its good governance mandate. We need to work diligently with
the Government of Afghanistan, at all levels, to reduce corruption and
enable better governance.
FUTURE OF NATO
With respect to NATO's future, heads of state and government
endorsed its ``Comprehensive Political Guidance'' at the Riga summit,
laying out broad parameters for how NATO should develop in response to
the challenges of the 21st century. The document captures the future
direction of the alliance and I highlight for the committee the
following key points from the document:
The alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to
security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the
fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security,
consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and
partnership.
The alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and
by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention
and to engage actively in crisis management, including through
non-Article 5 crisis response operations. A premium will be
placed on NATO's ability to cooperate with partners, relevant
international organizations and, as appropriate,
nongovernmental organizations in order to collaborate more
effectively in planning and conducting operations.
The alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain
concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for
collective defense and crisis response on and beyond alliance
territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance.
Among qualitative force requirements, the following have
been identified as NATO's top priorities:
Joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and
sustain them;
High-readiness forces;
The ability to deal with asymmetric threats;
Information superiority; and
The ability to draw together the various instruments of the
alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to
the best effect, as well as the ability to coordinate with
other actors. In this context, the NATO Response Force
(NRF) is a fundamental military tool in support of the
alliance and a catalyst for further transformation and will
have the top priority together with operational
requirements.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
NATO has demonstrated a remarkable capability to adjust to the
rapid changes confronting North American, European, and global security
since the end of the cold war. The alliance has been confronted with
instability, humanitarian crises, regional conflict, and terrorism on a
multinational scale. Simultaneously, we witnessed an increase in the
speed of global change, the emergence of new threats and risks to our
collective security, and the direct impact of second and third order
effects of these types of threats from events around the world. In my
view, human insecurity knows no borders in this interdependent,
interconnected world. This is the reality of the 21st century and NATO
has responded with capabilities at hand and has developed new
capabilities, new policies, and new partnerships to meet these
challenges beyond the expectations of the 2002 Prague summit.
NATO is now entering its most challenging period of transformation,
adapting not only to the realities of a changed Europe, but also to
those of a changed world. This is essential if we are to affirm the
alliance's role as a modern instrument of security and stability for
its members. NATO is taking important steps to complete its
transformation from a static, reactive alliance focused on territorial
defense to an expeditionary, proactive one that works with nations to
deter and defeat the spectrum of 21st century threats confronting our
collective security. The alliance is overcoming institutional inertia,
out-dated business practices, and a cold-war-era stereotype
understanding of its role, thereby eliminating self-imposed limits that
directly reduce the security of its members and partners, both
individually and collectively. At the same time, the alliance is
assessing the threats we face, understanding better their interaction,
and developing new capabilities and partnerships to successfully
address these threats.
NATO has a narrow margin for error in this new world. We must
balance a cross section of global interests, 21st century threats, and
the asymmetric warfare utilized by terrorists. At the same time, NATO
cannot ignore the challenge of dealing with the unresolved problems of
20th century Europe in order to realize the fundamental objective of a
``Europe whole and free.'' These 20th century legacy security problems
are difficult, real, and impact on the sense of security of the
alliance and its members. As we assume new roles and new capabilities
to deal with new problems, we must continue to devote our efforts to
resolve those legacy issues such as Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, frozen
conflicts, uncompleted economic, social, and political reforms in the
former Soviet Union, nationalism, and ethnic conflict.
Consequently, alliance transformation reflects the requirements of
this transitional period. Most significantly, it retains the commitment
between its members on mutual defense and maintains the alliance as a
Trans-Atlantic Forum for strategic dialogue on an ever-expanding array
of security challenges, while simultaneously operating at strategic
distance to address direct and indirect challenges to our collective
security. The 60,000 deployed NATO military forces on three continents
under my command as Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, are a visible and
effective demonstration of NATO's resolve to collectively meet global
security challenges. The men and women of the alliance plus other non-
NATO troop-contributing nations are essentially redefining the role of
NATO by their actions in operations.
The alliance is adapting, will continue to adapt, and will
successfully meet the diverse and complex challenges in the future.
However, in this transitional period, I am concerned about the
shortcomings that directly impact on the alliance's collective ability
to respond and react to crises. NATO's adoption of a crisis management
role at the Brussels summit in 1994 opened a new chapter in the
alliance's history, with capabilities, policies, and operations
evolving over the last 14 years. Forces in ongoing operations, the
command structure, theater and strategic reserves, and the NATO
Response Force (NRF) are the force pool to meet current
responsibilities and unforeseen crises. By not resourcing these key
elements of the alliance's overall military capability, we place at
risk NATO's transformation to meet future challenges, as well as its
ability to execute its main tasks while simultaneously responding to
crises.
During the cold war, NATO did not conduct any combat operations,
but today it is involved in six operations on three continents
performing a variety of missions--the NATO military structure is
operating at an unprecedented operational tempo. The delta between our
political will to take on missions and our political will to resource
them translates into a delta between success and nonsuccess. It is the
linkage between under-resourced operations at the tactical level,
under-resourced theater and strategic reserves, under-resourced NRF,
and under-resourced manning in the command structure that combine to
place enormous limitations on the ability of the alliance to prosecute
its missions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. I
continue to encourage NATO nations to further examine their ability to
resource adequately all NATO operations and the NATO Response Force in
order to minimize the risk to ongoing operations and secure the
alliance's crisis management capabilities for current and future
challenges.
It is my view that the alliance also continues to be questioned
about its political will to meet both new 21st century challenges and
unresolved 20th century challenges. Demonstrating political resolve and
reaffirming NATO's unity of purpose and mission in addressing
challenges to our security are vital requirements. At the end of the
day, this cannot be demonstrated in words, but can only be demonstrated
in the commitment made by nations, the leadership provided by nations,
and the resources allocated by all nations to NATO's ongoing
operations. NATO's role and credibility as a security provider in the
post-cold-war era will be determined and judged by how the alliance
performs in its military operations.
The overarching agenda for the alliance in the 21st century is
deeply rooted in its operations, how the alliance functions and
performs vis-a-vis current and future challenges and how our publics
judge our success or lack of success. We must ensure at the highest
political and strategic level that the ``State of the Alliance'' to
defend and secure our vital interests is strong, that our strategy is
correct, and that our resources flow in support of our vital interests
and priorities.
In shaping the NATO of the future, we also need to ensure that we
forge a common strategic perspective on the security environment, on
our operations with strategic impact, and on the implications of
success and failure. Strategically communicating these views to our
publics is vitally important. Much is at stake. In this context, there
is no strategic message to communicate about NATO's future absent
strategic success. Success depends on adequate resourcing.
NATO operations should be the beneficiaries of a resource system
that accords its top priority to deployed forces. Quite simply, NATO's
deployed forces need to be fully resourced. It is the single most
important means to demonstrate political will and symbolize our
collective accountability to the servicemen and servicewomen put in
harm's way. It is clear that absent real progress in resourcing the
alliance's mission, our message will remain hollow with our publics and
critics. I strongly encourage NATO nations to reinvigorate their
political commitment to sustaining alliance operations. In so doing, we
protect the tactical and operational successes in multiple theaters in
order to achieve the strategic successes we desire in the context of a
challenging security environment.
I am convinced that the alliance will successfully meet the diverse
and complex challenges of the future. As we prepare for that future, it
is important to remember that in the same way our opponents in
Afghanistan operate and sustain their activities in the gap between the
forces we have in-theater and the forces we need in-theater, our future
opponents will operate and sustain their activities against the
alliance in the gap between the capabilities and policies we have and
the capabilities and policies we need.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General, let me start where you left off, the forces we
need and the forces we have, as it relates to Afghanistan. How
big is that gap?
General Craddock. Chairman, it is a moving gap, and it's--
it deals with assignment of forces against the minimum military
requirement. NATO has a combined joint statement of
requirements for every operation they do, and they have one for
ISAF. In terms of numbers, I don't know the numbers. We talk
capabilities--battalions, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, aircraft, things like that.
We have, over the past year, increased the number in
Afghanistan upward of 12-13,000, but not all of those forces
have been assigned against this CJSOR. So, they come in under
national control, essentially working for the commander at
ISAF--some with, some without constraints--the caveats. So, the
shortfall, right now, is--against the CJSOR is about three
infantry battalions, it's some heavy-lift helicopters, medium-
lift helicopters, and some significant numbers of enablers,
such as intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, streaming
full-motion video, things like that.
The Chairman. Well, that's exactly what the ISAF commander
told us when we were there a couple of weeks ago. He said--I'm
not quoting him, but the way I read it, he needs 10,000 folks
that can shoot straight and kill people if they have to, and--
and are willing to shoot--and which leads me to--I have been a
strong proponent, as the Secretary knows and my colleagues
know, along with those up here, of the expansion of NATO. I
don't think there's any argument about the political rationale
for the expansion. I mean, it's overwhelming. But, if I can be
devil's advocate for a moment, some have suggested that the
political aspect of it, or, to use your phrase, a slightly
different way of saying it, that we have more consumers than
contributors, that we may build this so big that it can't
function, it becomes a jerry-rigged operation. As you expand it
to 30, or heading toward 30, it becomes more cumbersome. If you
look at the GDP of most of our European allies--I'm not even
talking about the aspirants, their allocation of resources,
percent of their GDP to their defense budgets, in relative
terms, is embarrassing. And so, how do you respond to the
notion that bringing in three countries--potentially, three
countries--who have strong political rationale for it--how is
that really going to enhance or further drain NATO's resources
in trying to integrate them and actually make up for some
obvious shortcomings?
General Craddock. Thank you, Chairman. I think if one looks
at the aspirants today and what they are contributing to, for--
let me use Afghanistan as an example--ISAF--if we look at those
three nations in the context of the 14 non-NATO troop-
contributing nations, in terms of the numbers of personnel they
are providing, they rank number 3, 4, and 5 of 14. If you look
at the 26 NATO nations who are participating, they rank ahead
of five. We are--we've looked at, through the MAP process over
time, their security-sector processes, reforms, innovations,
transformation, and all the aspirants have made progress to the
standard that we believe is acceptable. Because they are
contributing now and we find them continuing to do so in a
larger manner, we think that's a positive signal.
The downside for membership would be air defense. There is
a requirement in NATO to provide for your own national air
defense. We have assessed that they are not capable of doing
that. One nation has some MIG-21s, but they are not
operationally ready. So, that would be a burden assumed to
NATO. There is precedent for that. We are doing that now in the
Baltic nations and Iceland. So, we don't see that as an
overwhelming burden. It's manageable for the future.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the first time around, the
administration, in 1996, concluded that Romania wasn't ready
for membership, and it held off the invitation at the Madrid
summit. Romania used that decision to redouble its efforts to
get prepared; and a few years later, it got an invitation to
join. Did the Alliance make the right decision, in 1996, with
Romania?
Mr. Fried. It certainly turned out well; that is, Romania
has been a good NATO member, a contributing member. And we saw
that, both before the invitation, in 2002, which was then they
got it, and afterward, they've continued their reforms.
In retrospect, could we have invited them in 1997?
Possibly. They made good time. They did well, over the next 5
years, getting ready. Had we known then what we know now, we
might have invited them. But, the honest truth is that we've
seen NATO enlargement in practice, and we have the track
record, and we now know, with great confidence, that NATO
enlargement does work, both in theory and in practice, and that
when nations are invited to join the Alliance, and do join,
their reforms continue.
The Chairman. General, in 2007, the Secretary General of
NATO wrote about the need for better integration in the
Alliance and more reform in NATO headquarters. In an article,
he claimed that there are still too many vestiges of the cold
war in the way in which NATO's structure is organized. I know
that's probably--
actually, it's unfair to ask you that one, only 20 seconds left
in my time, but what kind of success have we had with NATO
reform? And what's on the agenda for 2009?
General Craddock. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can't speak for
2009, at this point. I think that's work in progress. I
absolutely agree with the Secretary General, we are still
hidebound into the cold war, planning and preparing for
something that never happened, thank goodness. And we must
transition to the 21st century fact of life, which is fast-
paced operations, requirements for support of the soldiers, the
commanders in the field, and break through this enormous number
of committees and this bureaucracy, that it just beats us back
all the time with a never-ending set of questions. At the end
of the day, it doesn't make any difference anyway.
The Chairman. Well, I wish you luck.
Let me, with the permission of my colleague, point out one
thing to the Secretary. In 1998, in the context of giving its
advice and consent, the Senate, with regard to Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic--the Senate required the President to
submit reports to the appropriate congressional committees on
states being considered for NATO membership prior to an
invitation to such states being--to begin accession talks and
prior to conclusion of any protocol providing for such
accession. To date, we've not received the required report for
this proposed round of enlargement. Is it due to anything we
don't understand? Because it's due prior to the invitations
being extended in Bucharest. Are you planning on submitting
that?
Mr. Fried. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. OK, good. Thank you. Some parts of the
administration don't think they have to respond to us. It's
nice to know you think you should.
Mr. Fried. We look forward to sending it before Bucharest.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
I yield to my colleague.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Fried, just along the same line, you've
indicated, in your testimony, the administration favors
accession of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, and MAP programs
for Georgia and Ukraine, but what kind of personal dialogue or
advocacy is the President of the United States prepared to give
to this effort? In other words, as many of us read press
accounts, quite apart from your testimony, it would appear that
there are several--in fact, maybe a couple of major European
countries--that have grave doubts about these proposals. Is
there a danger that we could all go to Bucharest and sit down
around the table, and suddenly we learn that we're not all on
the same page at all. So, I'm simply asking, between now and
early April, what is the President prepared to do? What sort of
program are you going to prescribe for him, if he hasn't made
up his mind?
Mr. Fried. Senator, we are working within the Alliance on
this issue. Secretary Rice discussed this at last week's NATO
ministerial at length. The case we're making, that you already
are aware of, is roughly as follows: MAP is not the same as
membership; Ukraine and Georgia have a long way to go before
they would qualify for membership; at the same time, no country
outside the Alliance, should have a veto; these countries have
to be considered for MAP according to their own merits and the
interests of the Alliance; and, quite honestly, it's hard to
say no to young democracies. A compelling case can be made for
MAP for both of them. We're consulting with our allies, and
discussing the best timing and the best way to move ahead.
As you know, and as you pointed out, there is not yet a
consensus. We're working within the Alliance to try to find
one.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's reassuring. And, you know, we
obviously wish you success, because, otherwise, it's likely to
be an, unfortunately, unsuccessful meeting, at least in my
judgment.
Now, let me just add this thought, to be provocative. Many
people writing about Europe, as a whole, would say that the
continent does not anticipate a war; does not anticipate
aggression against its Member States. And, therefore,
rationally, parliaments do not support spending additional
money on defense that they might have, because they don't see
the threat in light of other priorities--social programs,
subsidies, safety nets, economic advancements. They believe the
rational thing to do is spend money there, and they're doing
so.
Likewise, although we talk about Afghanistan, and we
discuss various potential threats to Europe, as well as the
United States, European capitals do not feel the urgency of the
terrorist threats as we do here in the United States. European
colleagues do not see this as a worldwide war. There are
unfortunate incidents but those are perhaps better addressed by
immigration policies, diplomacy, and developmental assistance.
Now, under those circumstances, NATO has invited President
Putin to the summit meeting at Bucharest, after the heads of
state have met for a day or so. It would be a wonderful thing
if President Putin came in as a European and suggested how we
all might work together. But, most recently, President Putin
held a press conference with President Yushchenko of Ukraine,
in which Yushchenko went to Moscow to solve an energy crisis
regarding debts that Russia alleges are owed to Gazprom. During
the press conference, the President of Russia indicated that,
because Yushchenko has written a letter to NATO, Russia may
target nuclear-tipped missiles at Ukraine to ensure the defense
of Russia. President Putin made similar threats to the Czech
Republic and Poland, who have been discussing missile defense
cooperation with the United States. This occurred even as
Secretaries Gates and Rice are visiting Russia to meet with
President Putin about how we all might work together in a more
comprehensive missile defense situation, as opposed to threats
to the Poles and the Czechs for having the temerity to discuss
such a thing.
And my point is, given the indecision, right now, of major
European countries as to whether we should invite new members
to join NATO, extend Membership Action Plans to two new
governments, increase defense spending, or increase
expeditionary forces, to invite President Putin into this
situation is, I suspect, to give him a meeting in which he
intimidates them further. Now, they will say, ``We're not
intimidated,'' but, the fact is, on energy issues, they have
been, and they are in a box because of it.
If you were a European President, and you faced dire
economic circumstances, granted you don't face an invasion, but
you're in trouble. What would you do in such a situation? as a
result, I question the strategy, at this particular moment. I'm
certainly for one of visiting with President Putin at every
opportunity, but, in this context, this seems to me to be very
dubious.
Now, what thought do you have about all that?
Mr. Fried. Secretary Rice responded, I believe, in
testimony, or to questions afterward, about President Putin's
reference to targeting Ukraine with nuclear weapons, and she
responded very strongly and rightly.
President Putin's presence at the NATO summit is going to
be, as I said, a challenge. And it will be a challenge for the
allies to find the right balance of willingness to work with
Russia on a common agenda, which is in our interests, and
determination to conduct the Alliance's business without
reference to threats from Russia, such as the threat to target
Alliance members, such as Poland, with nuclear weapons. Finding
that balance is easier to articulate than it is to do in
practice, but I'm convinced the Alliance can do it. It means
that the Alliance has to work hard on decisions like--for
example, on missile defense or Georgia-Ukraine MAP--and to do
so for the right reasons. I think the Alliance can handle this,
and it will be one of the more interesting summits, I'm sure.
Senator Lugar. Well, best of luck. You know, I hope that--
--
[Laughter.]
Senator Lugar [continuing]. You and the Secretary are well
prepared, because at least this hearing will have had an early
warning signal that there is a challenge.
Mr. Fried. We are aware of that, and you outlined the
challenge accurately.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar.
Thank you both for your testimony.
Mr. Secretary, one of NATO's fundamental successes is its
commitment of its membership to that core mission. That's how
it was created, 60 years ago, it's what's made it successful.
And, in that respect, I want to focus on one country's
dedication, in particular, because it's at the core of whether
this enlargement takes place, at least as it relates to one of
the countries under consideration, and that is Greece. You
know, whether it has been staffing NATO operations,
contributing to NATO's defense efforts, or providing vital
operational logistical support, Greece has been a vital member
of NATO. And last year alone, it supplied nearly 2,000
soldiers, between Kosovo and Afghanistan, in NATO and U.N.-led
efforts. In terms of our own interests in a bilateral context,
it has, in Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield, Enduring
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, provided some critical aircraft
refueling support and provided for military transiting and free
passage. It has made one of the most significant investments in
the Balkans, with nearly $20 billion, created over 200,000
jobs, and contributes over $750 million in development aid to
the region. So, it's been a very significant ally. And, as we
speak, and you referenced it in your opening statement, these
negotiations between Athens and Skopje are going on.
And over the issue of the use of the name of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this administration announced
that it would use the name of the Republic of Macedonia. NATO
and the United Nations continue to refer to the country as the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Some think that this is
just semantics. Obviously, it's not, as it relates to this
process. It's about history and territorial integrity. It's
about a whole host of things. I'm sure the United States would
be alarmed if, all of a sudden, our neighbor to the north or
the south would call themselves the United States of America.
So, my question is, Where are we in terms of the
negotiations? What role are we playing, if any, in this regard,
to move this to a successful conclusion?
Mr. Fried. Senator, you're certainly right that the issue
of Macedonia's name is not just a semantic issue; it resonates
deeply with the people of Greece and the people of Macedonia.
So, it's laden with emotion and complication.
You're also right that Greece has been a good ally in NATO.
We all recognize this, and we appreciate Greece's contribution
to the Alliance.
The United States has supported, and continues to support,
the efforts by Matt Nimetz, who's the U.N. negotiator, on the
issue of the name. In addition to that, we stand ready, because
we have good relations with both governments, to facilitate
progress that they may want to make.
I should add that on Friday night I was in Skopje. I met
with the leadership of Macedonia, the President and the Prime
Minister. I encouraged them to work to try to resolve this
issue in a fair way before Bucharest, and made clear that the
United States was willing to do what it could to help.
Senator Menendez. What's your sense of it, at this point in
time? Do you think it's going to resolve before----
Mr. Fried. I honestly don't know. I think that the
Macedonians are thinking very hard about the prospect of a NATO
membership invitation and how good this would be for their
country, how this would help them. I think their point of view
is one of frustration. The Greeks have a point of view, also, I
suppose, of frustration. But, we have encouraged both
governments to look to a future in which this is resolved,
which will be better for everyone in the region.
Senator Menendez. Well, clearly, we start off with those
who are NATO members presently. And I doubt very much that
Greece wants to use its veto, or its lack of invitation; but,
at the same time, if it comes to such a high standing in their
government that this is an issue, I would hope that we would be
looking at how we are responding in this respect, outside of
just simply saying, ``Well, we stand ready to be helpful.'' If
we think that the inclusion of Skopje is that important, then I
would hope that we are more than just a passive bystander----
Mr. Fried. Well, that----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. At the end of the day.
Mr. Fried [continuing]. That's why I went down to Skopje on
Friday night.
Senator Menendez. Let me just shift gears for one moment
and ask General Craddock, Why are some governments reluctant or
unable to send combat forces to fight in southern and eastern
Afghanistan? And what's been the response to Secretary Gates's
letter appealing for another 7,000 troops for ISAF?
General Craddock. Thank you, Senator. The second question
first. I don't know the response, because those letters were
sent on a bilateral basis, and, as a NATO commander, I just
don't have the view of that.
Senator Menendez. It hasn't been shared with you, a
response?
General Craddock. No; it has not.
First, ``Why are nations reluctant to do that?''--I think
there are a few reasons. I think there is, as stated earlier,
some positions being held by nations, that they didn't fully
appreciate what they were getting into. They thought it was
peacekeeping, though it was never billed that.
Second, I think that there are sensitive political
coalitions that watch very carefully where the winds are
blowing, and they do not want to commit to unfavorable
positions that could topple a government, so they don't want to
push out, even at the request of NATO to do so.
And, last, I think that there is some hesitancy because
their forces, while wanting to do all they can, lack some of
the capabilities of their neighbors, because they're not yet
fully transformed into these agile, capable formations. Too
often, they are still heavy territorial forces, not like what's
needed in Afghanistan. They don't go with the enablers. An
infantry battalion shows up with no helicopters, no
transportation, no international capability, and these are
things, then, we have to add on. So, we have--we are building
that; it's getting better, but it takes time, and it's
expensive.
The 26 nations, right now, NATO benchmarks 2 percent of GDP
for their security forces, for their Ministries of Defense. Six
of the twenty-six are meeting the benchmark. And, when you talk
about the cost of deploying forces, it's very expensive, the
cost of transformation is----
Senator Menendez. General, one very quick question,
because----
General Craddock. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. My time is up. I appreciate
your answer. Isn't the first part of your answer a dangerous
precedent? The political will and decisionmaking that you
describe, which I accept, isn't that a dangerous precedent for
NATO, in terms of when members of the Alliance decide they will
or will not participate based upon those considerations?
General Craddock. Indeed it is. I don't dispute that at
all. I think, as I have said, that NATO's level of ambition has
exceeded its--has exceeded its political will to support. I
will say that in a blanket statement. Indeed.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Welcome, gentlemen.
Secretary Fried, you noted, in your statement, the
appointment of Kai Eide as the new Special Envoy, United
Nations Special Envoy for Afghanistan. And my question is, Can
you tell this committee what authorities he will have, what
flexibilities he will have, within his portfolio as the Special
Envoy for Afghanistan representing the United Nations? More
coordination? What will he do? What will be his role?
Mr. Fried. His role will be to pull together the
international effort in--the international civilian effort in
Afghanistan, and help link up the civil and military efforts by
liaison with the ISAF commanders. He will formally report--he
will formally have only a U.N. hat. He won't be triple-hatted.
But, he will have--he will have an ability to coordinate the
international effort.
We have learned, and learned the hard way, that success in
Afghanistan will come if, and as, we're able to observe and
practice the theory of combined civil/military operations,
which is a bit of a jargon-laden way of saying that you have to
get the security right, and you have to get the development
right, just about district by district in Afghanistan. And when
you have the United Nations, the European Union, the United
States, other bilateral donors, all playing, if there's going
to be a successful effort, it has to be coherent, it has to be
focused, and there has to be somebody--someone at the end of
the telephone with whom you can work to bring to bear our
resources in a focused way. That's really his job. And, of
course, paramount is his ability to work with the Afghan
Government. It's their country, their development strategy that
he is supporting.
Senator Hagel. Any additional authorities, would you say,
as opposed to past U.N. Special Envoys, in situations like
this?
Mr. Fried. We have a lot of experience with Special
Envoys--with similar cases. His position will not--he's--he is
a--an actor in support of the Afghan Government and pulling
together the international effort. He's not any kind of
viceroy. It looks as--it looks, now, as if his powers are
sufficient, but I'm saying that in advance of the launch of his
mission. I think that the relationships he creates on the
ground are going to be more important than the pieces of paper
that give him various authorities.
Senator Hagel. Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary, because
I want to get to a couple of other questions. One last question
on this. Would his authorities, his presence, be the same as
would have been the situation with Paddy Ashdown?
Mr. Fried. No; because Paddy Ashdown was, in a sense, had a
kind of overseer role. And in Afghanistan, you have a
government which is in charge, so he doesn't have the Paddy
Ashdown role. I understand the question. It is a little
different than that. He will--he's supposed to bring to bear
the international community, focus it, work with the Afghan
Government, and then make this work, help us make it work on
the ground, where it's needed.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Also, in your testimony, you singled out allies that
deserve special praise--in your words, ``for taking on the
hardest missions in the south, particularly the Canadians, the
British, Dutch, Danes, Australians, Romanians, Estonians.''
What can you tell us about where the Canadians are in--with
their force in the south, especially in regard to comments they
have made over the last few weeks? If they don't get some help
and replacements in the south, then they may well--my
understanding is--replace those troops, or bring those troops
out.
Mr. Fried. I should also add to that list the Poles, who
have stepped up with some very significant contributions of
combat forces, without caveats, plus combat helicopters. So,
they have--they have really stepped in--since we've talked
about NATO enlargement, they're really pulling their weight and
more.
With respect to the Canadians, they have made it clear that
they want more Alliance help, about a battalion strength, down
in Kandahar. They've said that they need that politically, but
also militarily. And I'll defer to General Craddock, but we've
been working diplomatically to see what can be done. They have
done a terrific job, suffered casualties, and, frankly, we
think they deserve the help.
Senator Hagel. But, so far, unless General Craddock has
anything to add, nothing new, as far as any replacements for
the Canadians or anyone stepping up to take on some of that
role?
General Craddock. Senator, I do not have any hard, positive
answers, at this point. There's a lot of give-and-take
machinations, ``What if,'' ``Could you then''--but we don't
have a solid commitment, at this point.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Let me ask another manpower issue of you, Mr. Secretary.
You also note, on the same page of your testimony, that the new
President of France has pledged that France will stay engaged
in Afghanistan for as long as necessary, so on. What does that
mean? Are they adding troops, or have they committed new
troops?
Mr. Fried. Obviously, I don't want to speak for a foreign
government, but it is clear that the French are thinking
through their contributions in Afghanistan. President Sarkozy
is looking at his options, and we're working with the French.
Senator Hagel. General, you want to add anything to that?
General Craddock. We have been engaged with the French for
the last 15 months that I've been the SACEUR. Obviously,
they've added a few helicopters. We think there's a possibility
for some movement of forces in-country, and we're always
prodding and poking to try to get additional forces. We, again,
don't have anything firm, at this time.
Senator Hagel. So, nothing in addition to what the
President said, that he'll stay engaged.
General Craddock. Yes, sir.
Senator Hagel. OK.
One last manpower issue. This is for both of you. It was
noted here in your testimony, as well, Mr. Secretary, that the
3,200 marines that will be soon moving into Afghanistan. Your
testimony notes that about 2,000 will be added to the ISAF
combat missions in the south. When Senators Biden and Kerry and
I were there a couple of weeks ago, the same time General
Craddock was there--in Afghanistan--a senior general told us
that he believed that it would require another two combat
brigades in the south, in addition to the 3,200 marines going
in--2,000 to the south is what he felt he really needed. I'm
going to ask each of you to comment on that, because I doubt if
he's going to find two more combat brigades, at least from the
American Army or Marines. And if he doesn't get this, which is
probably unlikely, but I would like for each of you to respond
to that, then what might be the consequences?
General, let's start with you.
General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.
We periodically review the CJSOR. I've asked COMISAF to
assess his requirements and forward whatever revisions are
required. That is in process now; I should have it by the end
of this week. We'll review it. It may well show two combat
brigades for the south. The likelihood? As you said, probably
unlikely. What's the impact? It will take longer. It will cost
more, in terms of fiscal resources. It will cost more in terms
of national treasure, in terms of sons and daughters who will
get banged up in the fight. Eventually, we will prevail, but I
think it will take much longer and at greater cost.
Senator Hagel. May I add--Mr. Chairman, I know I'm a little
over on--but, I--for me, this is an important point, because if
I understand what the General is saying, that means more
American casualties.
General Craddock. That is correct.
Senator Hagel. If we don't find the kind of force structure
required to do the job that this senior general thinks that we
can do, but it--what would be required by additional manpower.
General Craddock. More American, more British, more
Canadian, all in the regional command south.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Fried. You're rightly focused on the job that has yet
to be done, but I want to point out that, since we started
pushing for additional forces in late 2006, non-U.S. NATO and
other contributions have accounted for about 6,500 troops in
Afghanistan since late 2006. So, it's right to focus on what's
undone, but we should keep in mind that those 6,500 troops are
6,500 troops that would otherwise not be there, or be filled by
Americans. So, that's important. The U.K.'s put in an extra
1,800; Italy, an extra 1,000; Poland, an extra 1,000, with
another 400 on the way; Canada, 800--you get the----
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, my time's up. Let me ask you
just this very simple question. How many American forces are in
Iraq?
Mr. Fried. Now? 165,000.
Senator Hagel. And how many American forces in Afghanistan?
Mr. Fried. 25.
General Craddock. About 29, 30. I've got 19----
Mr. Fried. OK.
General Craddock [continuing]. In ISAF--19,000.
Mr. Fried. All right. Forgot the Marines. Sorry.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Can I--a point of clarification.
The additional 6,500 troops you referred to from various
nations, do they have national caveats in their participation,
those troops you referenced, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Fried. Some do, some don't. The British--the largest
contributions--the U.K., 1,800--do not. The Poles do not. The
Canadians and Australians are in the south, where the fighting
is. Others do. I think the Italians do, in the west. But,
someone has to be in the west, someone has to be in the north.
There are over 3,000 German troops in the north. And, while we
would obviously like the caveats to be gone, they are doing a
good job. And if they weren't doing it, somebody else would
have to be.
The Chairman. Well--thank you.
Senator Dodd is prepared to yield, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. He said, ``Let's not make this a habit, Mr.
Chairman.'' [Laughter.]
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Dodd. Thank you, again,
Senator Dodd. [Laughter.]
He's also a chairman, the Banking Committee. [Laughter.]
Which I'm on.
But, first of all, General and Mr. Assistant Secretary, we
appreciate your presence here, your testimony, and your
service.
This weekend, I'm going to be chairing the United States
Congressional Delegation visit to the Brussels forum. And,
among other things that I want to say, if our budget gets
through and we can actually make opening remarks, is to remind
all of us there, especially our European friends, about the
importance of Afghanistan. A topic that we've already spoken
of, today, and, really the central nature of that battle
against the terrorists, not just there, but around the world.
And I think--you know the history--both of you know the history
better than I do, of NATO--it's been successful over all these
generations because of the unity of purpose. And, in this case,
if there was ever an example of that--of what we have to do--
it's the unity of purpose with regard to Afghanistan.
And there will be some there who are friends of ours who
will say, ``Well, look, you're part of the American Government,
and all we hear from the American Government, in terms of
rhetoric in this administration, is that the President often
refers to Iraq as the leading front against the terrorists, the
leading front on the war against the terrorists.'' The Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently said, ``In Afghanistan,
we do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must.'' So, it's the
impression conveyed, intended or not, is the downgrading of the
importance of Afghanistan, and, frankly, classifying as ranking
of second; at least that's the impression that's conveyed to
too many people around the world, too many nations.
So, I would ask you, not just in the context of what I
might hear this weekend, but in the more important context of
what we tell the world, the message we're sending to the world,
especially our allies, when they interpret some of the rhetoric
by the administration, as I just outlined. What do we tell
them? What's the response from the administration when that
charge is made?
Mr. Fried. We respond that the mission in Afghanistan was
an immediate response to the attack on the United States on
September 11, that it is, as the chairman quite rightly pointed
out, a war and a fight of necessity, not of choice; it is a
struggle we have to win; and that it is a struggle whose
outcome will affect the security, not just of the United
States, but of Europe. And that--and I believe it important to
make that case to the Europeans. And, in that context, I wish
you all luck and godspeed at the Brussels forum, a very good
place to make that case.
Secretary Gates certainly made clear that--in his Munich
speech last month--that Afghanistan is not a secondary or
forgotten theater, it is much on his mind. It is a struggle
we've got to--that we are getting better at, and have to get
right. And it is something that the Alliance, as a whole, has
to learn to get right. It is, as I said, where the Alliance's
new challenges are being met directly, and where the Alliance
is learning, and has to learn, new skills and adopt new
capabilities.
Senator Casey. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with what the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, when he said that, ``In
Afghanistan, we do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must''?
Mr. Fried. I wouldn't want to differ with my colleague. I
would put it this way. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are separate
fights, but we must succeed in both of them. The solution in
both of them will be found through the right combination of
political efforts, security and military efforts, and
development. The challenges are different, but it is in our
national interest to prevail in both cases. And we have to.
Senator Casey. And I would argue--and I want to move to
another question, but I would argue that--in your testimony,
when you say that--and we all know we need more help there.
When you list the countries that have helped most recently--
but, as you and the General just pointed out, our contribution
far exceeds even the recent help in--when some countries are
adding 1,000 or a couple of hundred, we're still at current
force--American forces total is what?
General Craddock. Assigned against NATO, 19,000, out of
about 47,000. We'll be at 44 percent of the force when the
Marines get there, of the NATO----
Senator Casey. Forty-four percent.
But, in light of that--and then, Mr. Secretary, you say, on
page 8, ``Do we need more allies fighting?'' You say, ``Yes.''
And you both assert that. But, I think it would be helpful for
the administration, and especially for the President, when he's
talking about the battle for the ages, not the battle for
2008--in this administration or the next--the battle for the
ages is against the terrorists. And I think it would be helpful
to improve our relations with our European friends and other
allies specifically in terms of seeking their help in
Afghanistan, to include Afghanistan in rhetoric about what's
most important, or what's the central front against the
terrorists. So, I would urge you to reiterate that--iterate or
reiterate that to those in the administration, because
rhetoric, I think--as you know better than I--rhetoric, in the
international context, has consequences, especially when it
comes to the grave question of war and the fight that we're in.
I'm almost out of time--but, General, I wanted to ask you
for a brief assessment of where you think we are--and a good
bit of this is in your testimony--nonetheless a brief
assessment of where we are on the ground in Afghanistan,
militarily.
General Craddock. I think we're making progress in the
security area, but not near fast enough. We've localized,
essentially, the fight to the insurgents, the Taliban in the
south, some of the other groups--Agakhani in the east. I think
if one now looks at that, you find that the rest of the country
is pretty secure. The desire would be for the rest of the
countries' NATO forces, then, to pile on, south and east--has
yet to happen. We'll work it. But, I think, also, if you
overlay the poppy cultivation areas, you'll find--where we
still have the hard fight is where those areas are. That's the
next focal point.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Governor.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I've been a
very, very strong advocate of NATO expansion. One of the great
days of my life was during the Prague summit of November 2002,
when I was in the room with Secretary Fried and others, and
then-Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson announced that
Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania were going to join NATO. I think some people have
forgotten that in 2001 the President made it clear, in a very
important speech in Poland, that he was not going to negotiate
NATO expansion on the altar of working out his differences on
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And I'm pleased that, more
recently, he has said he supports granting full NATO membership
to Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, and offering Membership
Action Plan status to Ukraine and Georgia.
I agree with Senator Lugar that securing President Putin's
cooperation in extending MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia is
going to be a bit difficult. It also seems that some of the
preliminarily work for the 2002 Prague summit was handled more
aggressively than preparations for the Bucharest summit next
month, specifically in terms of the countries that are going to
be invited.
I'd like to know where Georgia and the Ukraine stand today
in relationship to where Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and
Albania stood when those countries received their MAP status in
1999. How do they compare, from an objective point of view?
Mr. Fried. In terms of their military, political, economic
accomplishments, a bottom-line judgment would have to be that
they're in roughly the zone of Macedonia and Albania--when they
received their MAP invitations. They are obviously very
different countries, so it's hard to compare. Georgia has
progressed in its reforms extraordinarily fast since the Rose
Revolution. Its political consolidation and the strengthening
of democratic institutions has a way to go. We saw that, last
November. Its economy is moving ahead. Its military is
reforming. So, it's on a good trajectory. It isn't nearly ready
for NATO membership.
Ukraine is a far more developed country. It's had free and
fair elections. Within Ukrainian society, there is not yet a
strong consensus for NATO membership. However, we've learned
from experience that the prospect of NATO membership--that a
Membership Action Plan can help crystalize a pro-Western
consensus.
And, as I said earlier, the Alliance is debating and
working through the issues of when is the best time to offer a
Membership Action Plan to these countries? And that debate, I
think, as you all know, is going on. These are legitimately
tough issues.
Senator Voinovich. Where do you think our allies are on
this?
Mr. Fried. I think----
Senator Voinovich. The other members of NATO.
Mr. Fried [continuing]. Different countries have different
views. Some are more forward-leaning, some are not. And the
discussion within the Alliance is continuing, which is where
the bulk of our efforts now are. We're working with our allies,
and consulting rather closely with them, about all of these
issues.
And, as I said, the criteria ought to be with respect to
Georgia and Ukraine and the interests of the Alliance, not
having to do with an outside veto.
Senator Voinovich. General, prior to NATO granting MAP
status, we usually discuss niche capabilities with the
respective countries. While I was able to visit MAP candidates
several years ago, I have not had a chance to visit Georgia or
the Ukraine this time around. Where are Georgia and the Ukraine
in terms of their niche capabilities, as potential members of
NATO?
General Craddock. With regard to the aspirants, I don't
think that there is a developed niche capability, like, for
example, the Czech Republic, with the chemical capability that
they have. They have focused--the aspirants, by and large--on
providing support to designated operations, because this is a
new area. In the past, we were not focused on operations, to
the extent that we are today, in Afghanistan. We had some in
Kosovo, but of a different nature. The aspirants are providing
quite a bit of support, based upon the size of their
militaries. And we are satisfied with what we see their
capacity and capability in Afghanistan.
With regard to the MAP countries, we've had several
exercises--PFP exercises--I think, six to eight for each
country over the last year, and about the same number in this
coming year. Ukraine, for the first time, is in Active
Endeavor, a maritime operation in the Med. They've joined that.
Very proud to have them there with us. So, Georgia is preparing
to send Special Ops to ISAF. It's in training now. And, you
know, they've got an enormous contribution in other coalition
operations.
Senator Voinovich. Switching subjects, Kai Eide, the former
Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO, is heading to
Afghanistan as U.N. Special Representative. I'm familiar with
his work. In fact, he laid out the blueprint for the issue of
the status of Kosovo, and as the Secretary knows, I've been
underscoring how important the suggestions in his reports are
to the future of stability in Kosovo. Hopefully we will find
out whether the EU and others can implement them. Will one of
Ambassador Eide's new responsibilities be to try to talk NATO
International Security Assistance Force members into taking a
more active role and getting rid of national caveats, so that
NATO is a more effective force there in Afghanistan?
Mr. Fried. He won't be working directly on the military and
NATO side. He will have, let us say, his hands full pulling
together the international civilian efforts, getting the
different international actors in the civilian side to pull
together, and working with the Afghan Government to advance
their development plans. So, he's more on the civilian side and
the coordination side, working the politics of the caveat
issue, but he will have a very busy portfolio.
Senator Voinovich. My point is that if NATO operations are
enhanced with more work on the civilian side, then maybe NATO
allies will understand how important Afghanistan is to the
Alliance and international community, particularly to the NATO
forces that need reinforcements. Not fully appreciating
Afghanistan's importance is a big problem. Secretary Gates made
a real pitch for our NATO allies to become more involved. And I
think that unless a very aggressive effort is undertaken toward
that end, I will be really concerned about the future of our
NATO relationship.
Mr. Fried. I agree with that. And one of our objectives in
the Bucharest summit is to pull the alliance together behind a
strategy of success in Afghanistan, to make sure that if there
is any lingering impression that it is not a front-burner
international priority, that is dispelled, because it is a
front-burner priority.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank our witnesses, as well. And, I, like other
members, will be in Brussels on Monday, as well, and looking
forward to some meetings there. And let me join in thanking you
for your service, as well, and those who are with you here.
Let me pick up on the question that Senator Voinovich has
asked. And it occurs to me, this question of who's going to
lead in setting policy. Is it going to be the European Union or
NATO? And what plans do we have to try and ease the tensions
that exist between the European members of NATO and the
European Union? It seems to me that--the European Union looks
at U.S. foreign policy in terms of one word: Iraq. And it seems
like their political reactions are based on their views of our
policy in Iraq. At least, it strikes me as that. I don't want
to oversimplify this, but the difficulty, politically, in
getting the European Union to be more supportive of a NATO
presence in Afghanistan is contingent upon the ability to see
beyond just the Iraq issue.
And I think the question that Bob Casey raised, and that
Senator Voinovich was talking about--this question of the war
in Iraq--is a question of what we must do, and, in Afghanistan,
of what we can do. Again, I don't want to hang a lot on one
phrase or two, but whether or not that is a political reality
in Europe, and that's how they see it. And, second, whether or
not some of the language we use and the sense that we're
questioning the European community's willingness to be tough
enough, to stand up and willing to be go into harm's way. And I
wonder if that language, in some ways--or at least that
impression--is contributing to some of the political reaction
that is affecting the European membership in NATO's reaction to
all of this. Does that make any sense?
Mr. Fried. There are several--I have to answer it in a
couple of ways, because you've raised some separate and
interesting issues.
First, you mentioned the relationship between NATO and the
European Union. We all--that is, we, Americans----
Senator Dodd. I should have asked you, Do you accept that
there's a tension there?
Mr. Fried. No; I accept that there has been, historically,
a sense that a strong NATO means a weak EU, a strong EU must
mean a weak NATO. And that's not good for either organization.
Senator Dodd. I agree.
Mr. Fried. It's not good for the United States. We need to
get past this. And we and the Europeans need to think of NATO
and the European Union being able to work together seamlessly,
because future challenges are not going to be purely military,
they're not going to be purely civilian. NATO and the EU need
to work to develop a spectrum of capabilities. We talk about
civil/military. That's an easy phrase to throw around. What it
means is that the European Union and NATO and other
organizations need to work together on the ground. It means
that we, Americans, have to be ready to work with the European
Union as an organization, and the European Union needs not to
be defensive about NATO. If we can get past this, we can
strengthen the transatlantic capability of working together.
We've come a long way, actually. We have more to do. But,
the theory of what you're talking about is now more accepted
and far better understood than it was 10 years ago. So, that's
good.
The issue of, you know, ``war of necessity, war of choice,
do what we can, do what we must,'' I think, is--I think, as you
suggest, is a bit of a distraction. We have to succeed in
Afghanistan, we have to succeed in Iraq. There is a whole
political history of both of these issues, which is--I really
can't get into, or pointless to get into--but, we need to
succeed in Afghanistan. We are doing better in Iraq.
And the language we use has to be forward-looking. That's
easy to say and hard to do. President Bush spoke about
Afghanistan, I think, today, and, I think, spoke to--spoke in a
way which reflects the common view that this is a critical
fight, not a second-order one. So, I think we are getting
there.
Senator Dodd. General, do you have any comments on this?
General Craddock. Well, ``what we can'' and ``what we
must,'' I think, resonates in a way that's not helpful.
However, I think the fact of the matter is that what we can do
ought to be matched by our allies, and it is not. What we can
do is put billions of dollars to build an Afghan National Army,
and the European Union is putting 250 police trainers in, we're
putting thousands in--2,500-3,000. What we can do is put all
these forces in, to include 3,200 more marines in the south.
Let's see if we can get our allies to at least match what we
can do, and see if they can do that.
Senator Dodd. Yes. Well, I agree with that. And I'm not
disagreeing with your conclusion. The question is, What plans
do we have to try and exactly get to the point that the
Secretary talked about, recognizing this tension, and, to the
extent that because of our language, there is some problem
here. Because the question of how we approach the political
problem within the European Union to gather the support that
you accurately describe here in NATO, is serious and I wonder
if we're creating more obstacles to that because of the
language we're using and how the European Union is reacting?
General Craddock. If I could, Senator--I can't speak--and
I'll let my colleague speak to the political aspect of it--but,
I think there is, as he stated, a bit of an awakening, a
renaissance, a realization that NATO and the European Union
must find areas for cooperation, not continue areas of
competition.
Senator Dodd. I agree with that.
General Craddock. And we are--we are--NATO--a military--big
military, little civil organization. They are a big civil,
little military.
Senator Dodd. Right.
General Craddock. We've got to find the space and the Venn
diagram to take the challenge and leverage it.
Senator Dodd. Yes. Well, that's the heart of the question.
Let me ask a couple of specific questions that, in some
ways, relate to this very issue. And it has to do with--in
fact, there are two questions; I'll ask them as one question
and give you a chance to respond.
There appears to be an almost inevitable political battle
emerging--I'll address this to you, Mr. Secretary, first--
between Musharraf and the Pakistani Parliament. It seems almost
inevitable. And I wonder if you can speak about the impact that
these elections and this conflict, and what impact it's going
to have on our operations in Afghanistan.
And, second, I was intrigued, recently, to see where the
Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, I think is how you
pronounce the name----
Mr. Fried. Rogozin.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. Rogozin--has indicated that the
Russians would be willing to open its borders to nonmilitary
materials bound for NATO operations in Afghanistan. I wonder
how that will impact the ISAF's ability to operate in
Afghanistan. And how is the State Department planning to build
upon this seeming thaw in the Russian-NATO relations? And maybe
I'm overstating the case in a ``thaw,'' but I found it
intriguing--that offer--in light of some of the hostility that
we've heard in years past about NATO expansion.
I wonder if you could respond to both those questions.
And, General, I'd invite you to respond, as well, if you'd
care to.
Mr. Fried. We would welcome greater cooperation between
NATO and Russia, including on Afghanistan. They have a role--
they could play a role, particularly in transit, as you
suggested.
I'll take a look at Ambassador Rogozin's comments, and if
this is an offer of cooperation with NATO, we will welcome it
and look into it.
Senator Dodd. Are you familiar with him?
Mr. Fried. I'm familiar with him. I wasn't familiar with
the details of this particular offer. And so, I need to look at
this, and I thank you for raising it.
With respect to Pakistan, there are others more qualified
than I to get it--to deal with the complexities and discuss the
complexities there, but let me say that there was an election
in Pakistan, it was a credible election. We now in a--we're
watching a political process, affirming a new government. We
hope that however this comes out, there is a political
leadership in Pakistan with credibility, legitimacy through an
election, and an effective leadership with which we can work.
Clearly, Afghanistan isn't an island. We have--success there
will require also success in working with Pakistan. So, we're
following that situation very closely.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
General, any comments on that?
General Craddock. Just very quickly, Senator.
Diversification of enroute infrastructure to move personnel
and goods is always important. Right now, NATO moves,
basically, by the southern route, through Pakistan. We need to
look at this. This may provide alternatives that are very
helpful.
Second, with regard to Pakistan, the commander in
Afghanistan, COMISAF, tells me he expects to have a stiffer,
tougher fight this year in the east because of the lack of
control yet established, maybe lessening control, in the border
area.
Senator Dodd. So, you're anticipating an increase in
problems in the border area.
General Craddock. His indication is, right now, we'll see
more foreign fighters.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
General Craddock. Yes.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. General, that's exactly what he told us last
week in--it's interesting--it's interesting what the ISI's take
on it was, when we met them.
But--then, let me go back to one thing before--and I'll ask
my colleague----
Dick, do you have any additional questions?
Senator Lugar. No, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. When Senator Dodd was going into some detail
about, quote, ``the tension between the EU and NATO''--and it's
real, it's been around since the EU emerged--but, it seems to
me that the, really, basic, basic problem we have here--and I'm
wondering if you would each be willing to tell me how your
civilian and your military comrades in NATO talk about what I'm
about to raise--and that is, the lack of political will among
the European population to actually support their militaries. I
mean, when we cut through it all, my observation, of all the
years of working with NATO, has been that you probably have
less pushback from your military colleagues. I don't know many
German military officers who don't want to fight if they're put
in a position where there's a fight. I don't know many of our
NATO allies who, when they sit around the table with you,
aren't prepared to shed the caveats. Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe I'm
missing something. But, when we go and have the meetings with
the civilian representatives--as you all know, obviously, the
ambassadors represent the civilian side of NATO and their
governments--they're not getting that signal from their
Parliaments, they're not getting the signal from their Prime
Ministers or their Presidents, because they're not getting it
from their publics. And I get the sense, when I'm there, that
there is no distinction made between America's war in Iraq and
America's war in Afghanistan. You know, it's all about terror,
and ``Americans aren't fighting terror the right way.'' I mean,
when you sit in the coffee shops, or you walk the streets, you
talk to people, this is what you hear. Am I missing something?
Isn't all this, you know, much ado about nothing? Until there's
the political will to actually pull the economic--pull the
budget trigger, you know, in each of these Parliaments to say,
``We're actually going to support the military.'' I mean, isn't
that the lack of resources from our allies the bottom-line
problem?
Mr. Fried. There is, as you rightly point out, an issue in
Europe of support for militaries, in general, and military
operations, specifically. Europeans have lived in--for two
generations in a Europe of general peace, the longest period of
general peace in Europe since Roman times. And it's thanks to
NATO, in large part. It's a great irony. Thanks to a military
alliance, and, under the alliance umbrella, the European Union
formed. That's known, and that's part of the reality.
So, you're not missing something. But, it is true that,
nevertheless, even given those politics, there are thousands of
non-U.S. NATO troops in Afghanistan. Over half the forces are
European. They are there in the south.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, if I could interrupt you,
because I think the point you're making is valid, but, let me
ask you, Do you get a sense, when you talk to your colleagues,
your civilian counterparts or your--I don't get a sense that
there are many citizens walking the streets of, you know, any
capital in Europe who think they're threatened by what's going
on in Afghanistan. I don't get a sense any average people think
that their well-being will be affected by success or failure in
Afghanistan. I don't get that.
I don't want to belabor the point, but it seems to me,
until they get to the point where there's strong enough
political leadership to connect that this affects their well-
being, until that happens, it's kind of hard to get a lot of
this done which raises the question: Has NATO become a
political organization, primarily? Or, was it always just a
political organization? I mean, the expansion of NATO--when I
speak to people in those countries--they want to join NATO
because it's, sort of, the ticket to membership to the West.
It's not about, ``By the way, we're going to join NATO, and I'm
going to send my son to Afghanistan.''
Mr. Fried. The countries that joined NATO after 1989 wanted
to be in NATO for hard security reasons, and for good ones. And
those countries have contributed their forces, their soldiers
to missions far afield.
You're obviously right that there are--that European
publics are much more ambivalent about military missions than
the American public, on average. But, given that, it's
interesting that Parliaments in Europe regularly reauthorize
their contingents in Afghanistan--not as much as we'd like;
we've talked about the caveats, which we think should be
eliminated; they're not as capable, they're not as numerous,
but they are, nevertheless, there. The Dutch are in Uruzgan.
The Canadians are in Kandahar. So, there are European NATO
members in the hot fights. That doesn't mean the problem
doesn't exist; it means that, even given that--some of the
political challenges we face, NATO is in action. After all,
during the cold war, that we all look back on and say it was
the Golden Age of NATO, NATO actually didn't ever fire a shot
in anger. Now it's engaged in operations all over the world.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you--I thank you both. I
personally think there's a need for a change in the political
climate there that generates greater confidence there. I'm not
referring to the military, General, per se.
Well, look, we could talk about this for a long while, and
I--we have a very talented panel that comes up behind you
fellows. And I want to thank you both very, very much for being
here, and we look forward to continuing to work with you both.
And hopefully this expansion can be rational and effective.
I thank you both very much.
Mr. Fried. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Craddock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Our next panel is a very distinguished panel,
every one of whom we are accustomed to having before us, and
we've listened to with great interest: Ron Asmus, Bruce
Jackson, Phil Gordon, and Jim Townsend. Would you all, when you
get a shot, come to the witness table?
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. You're
all very familiar with the committee; we're familiar with you,
and happy you're here.
I will submit, for the record, a little bit about each one
of you, but there's been many, many times you've been here.
Let's start in the order that you were called up--start
with you, Ron, if you would. Welcome, and thank you for being
here.
STATEMENT OF RONALD D. ASMUS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TRANSATLANTIC
CENTER, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
Dr. Asmus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator
Dodd.
I've submitted my longer statement for the record. I want
to associate myself with many of the comments each of you has
made about the overall health of the Alliance in Afghanistan. I
share those. But, I think you've invited me here largely to
focus on NATO enlargement; and, in my very brief comments, I'll
focus on that.
I'm in the unusual position of having--of being one of the
long-time supporters of NATO enlargement who, in a sense, is
the skeptic up here today on this panel. My skepticism is not
about NATO enlargement, which I think has been a great success,
and I want to be clear that I want these countries we're
talking about today to succeed and be in the Alliance.
I have three concerns that I'd like to briefly touch upon
today.
My first concern is the integrity of the process of NATO
enlargement. A decade ago, we wrestled with this question of,
How do we ensure that as NATO gets bigger, it doesn't become
weaker?--one of the questions we've been talking about. And we
came to the compromise that, as we enlarge, we had to be tough
on performance and set standards that we would stick to, in an
attempt to incentivize these countries to do their homework as
they came in, recognizing full well that these were often poor,
weaker countries who had a long ways to go.
And if we ask ourselves, ``Why was performance so
important?'' it was both to keep NATO strong, but also because
we understood that reform in these countries was a contribution
to stability, that it would resolve nationalism, the residual
historical conflicts, et cetera, et cetera. And I think what
we're seeing is that, if I can call them the Class of 1997, the
Class of 2002, and what will be the Class of 2008; each class
is a bit weaker, each of the classes we've seen thus far has
some success stories, but, if we're honest, has some nonsuccess
stories. And we're wrestling with this dilemma, is--are we
gradually lowering the bar, or are we keeping it high? And I
want to raise my hand and say we need to focus on that
question, because I'm not convinced that the countries we're
talking about today, the Adriatic three--Albania, Croatia,
Macedonia--who I want to see succeed, have all received the
same level of scrutiny and are being asked to meet the same
standards as in the past. If they are, I'm in favor of them.
I'm not convinced, as of today, that they have met those
standards.
My second concern--and I'm going to recall a conversation
we had, Senator Biden--is----
The Chairman. That's unfair. [Laughter.]
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. It's a good conversation, though--
and it's this issue of--because of Kosovo, we have to do this
now, because we now need to stabilize this region; otherwise,
it will fall apart. And you may remember, in 1997 you made a
visit to one of the countries that was trying to get in then,
that we considered to be unqualified. You spoke to the
President of that country, and he, in my words now, not his,
more or less said to you, ``If you don't bring us in at Madrid,
we're going to commit political suicide. We will fail. It'll be
the end of reform, and you will be to blame, you Americans.''
And my recollection is that you said to him, ``That's the worst
argument I ever heard for NATO enlargement, and please don't
make it ever again, because that is not why we want to bring
countries into NATO. We want strong, confident, successful
countries be coming to NATO, not countries that think they're
on the edge of failure.''
And there's a little bit of that in this debate today, if
we're honest, that just gives me pause. I, too, want to
stabilize the Balkans after Kosovo, but I want to make sure we
do it right.
And my third concern, very briefly, is Ukraine and Georgia,
because, I believe, if there are any countries out there that
are truly vulnerable today, it's much more Georgia and Ukraine
than the three Adriatic countries in the Balkans. And I think
success in Bucharest is both doing the right thing in the
Balkans and doing the right thing for these countries. And my
concern has always been that we will have underperforming weak
rounds of enlargement in the Balkans and get nothing on Ukraine
and Georgia. And if you ask me today, that is the most likely
outcome of the summit, unless we see a very serious, high-
level, Presidential effort to turn this around, and I don't
believe that would be a definition of success as any of us
would understand it.
I'm also--you know, so my idea was that we should wait and
do a bigger round of enlargement later, but I'm also a realist,
and I realize this administration--and living in Brussels, I
can say, except for the Greek-Macedonia issue, there is a
consensus to do A3--A2 or A3, depending on this issue--so, I
think it is going to happen--raises the question of, How do we
ensure that this round is successful, that these countries do
perform, and that we keep the door open? And I just want to
mention three things, very briefly, that I think we should be
thinking about.
The first one--Senator Biden, you mentioned it--I'm very
glad you recalled that resolution of ratification and the
reports that the administration was required to write, having
written a number of those reports. They are a good test of
forcing the administration to put down in writing, on paper,
where these countries qualify, and don't. So, let's get an
objective benchmark.
I happen to disagree with a couple of things that my friend
Dan Fried said in his assessment of some of these countries,
that we can go back to; but maybe he's right, and maybe I'm
wrong; maybe I'm right. We don't have a baseline that we all
agree on, at the moment, where these countries truly are.
Second, if I look at the calendar, when are we going to
vote on these countries? I think--I defer to your judgment on
this--it may not happen in this administration, it may be
something that slips over into the next President's term. So,
we're going to have 18 months. I think our leverage over these
countries is at its highest when they think they're going to
get in, but they're not quite sure. So, we should use these 18
months to identify their weaknesses, incentive them to as much
homework as possible, and maybe take another hard look at where
they are before you actually vote in the U.S. Senate on
accession, and let's try to get as much additional homework
done before we come to that vote.
Last and finally, I think we need to consider, if we
understand that the countries coming in are--have further to
go, because--not their own fault, but they're coming from a
different place. Georgia was a failed state. Georgia has made
huge progress, but Georgia is nowhere near where the countries
that received MAP in 1999 were. Georgia needs help. Maybe it
should get MAP. But, you know, they have such a long way to go,
they more guidance. But, let's understand that, when we bring
them in, 70 percent of their homework still needs to be done.
And we, sort of, bring them in, check the box, and think that
everything's going to work smoothly.
And, again, I think you can see two classes of new members:
Those who have succeeded and are working hard to be first-tier
allies, and those that aren't. So, I think we--we need to think
through whether we come up--I suggest an amendment, in my
testimony. There may be other ways to do this. We need clear
benchmarks to guide these countries, even after they accede to
the Alliance, and to incentive them and put a little bit more
scrutiny and publicity on some of the shortcomings that are
there, to help them stay on track. And I will tell you that I
truly believe, from talking to their ambassadors and to
reformers in these countries, they want you to pay attention to
them, because that attention helps the people, who truly want
to reform in these countries, succeed, and they will welcome
the attention of the U.S. Senate and of the U.S. Government to
how these reforms are doing, the people who truly want to
change these countries.
I'll limit my opening remarks to that.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Asmus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, Executive Director,
Transatlantic Center, German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify today before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the state of the NATO alliance in the
run up to the Bucharest summit April 2-4, 2008. It has been a privilege
to working closely with you as well as Senator Lugar and the committee
more generally on NATO enlargement issues since the early 1990s. Your
leadership on these issues has been essential. Bucharest looks like it
could become an exciting and potentially controversial summit. The
agenda is full and includes difficult issues such as Afghanistan,
Kosovo, NATO enlargement, missile defense and relations with Russia.
While I will focus my comments today on NATO enlargement, I would first
like to touch briefly on two other critical issues--the overall health
of the alliance and Afghanistan.
NATO'S OVERALL HEALTH
The first is the overall health of this alliance and the trans-
Atlantic relationship more generally. To be honest, it is not good.
NATO today is weaker and less central and relevant than it was a decade
ago. That is disturbing because I believe the need for trans-Atlantic
cooperation is actually going up, not down. As I look out at the world
we face, I see more challenges and problems where the U.S. and Europe
need to find a common approach. They don't all involve NATO but many
do, at least in part. That is why I am worried about the very real
dramatic decline in public support for the alliance and the United
States more generally, especially in countries that have historically
been among our closest allies. As an American currently living in
Brussels, NATO's relative marginalization and decline are striking. I
know full well that I am not the first person to testify before this
committee that NATO is in crisis. But reversing the decline in support
for the United States and the alliance will be a key challenge facing
the next President. I am glad you are holding this hearing so we can
start to shed some light on what is wrong and what needs to be done.
AFGHANISTAN
The second issue is Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I know you recently
returned from a trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have had the chance
to read your thoughts on that trip. I, too, had the chance to visit
Afghanistan for a week last fall with NATO. I came away with three
impressions I would like to share as well, in part to reinforce the
message that a number of Senators on this committee have been trying to
send.
The first one is that this is indeed a make or break issue for this
alliance and for the Western world more generally. This conflict was
not a war of choice, but of necessity. It has every conceivable form of
international and multilateral legitimacy. My impression is that the
vast majority of the Afghan population wants the international
community, including NATO, to be there helping them end this conflict
and rebuild their country. In short, many of the prerequisites that
were or perhaps still are not in place in Iraq do exist in Afghanistan.
Yet, one cannot help but come away from a visit there feeling that we
are fighting this war with one hand tied behind our back, without
sufficient attention, priority or resources. If we were to fail in
Afghanistan--especially if such a letdown were to follow on the heels
of failure in Iraq--the consequences for Western security would be
devastating. So the stakes are extremely high.
Second, the fate of Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. They are
two sides of the same conflict. That means we need a much more
integrated strategy--and not just for the border region but more
generally. We are currently not set up to do that well. NATO is deeply
involved in Afghanistan, for example, but it has little knowledge of,
and no role in, Pakistan--even though events there play a key role in
determining the alliance's success or failure. Our own policies vis-a-
vis both countries need to be better integrated and then coordinated
with our closest allies.
Third, NATO can do everything right as a military alliance but we
can still lose this war. As important as military and security forces
are, NATO and the Afghan Army cannot by themselves prevail in this
conflict for the simple reason that the equation determining success is
not just, or even primarily, a military one. The key challenge is
providing better governance. That is how we will eventually defeat the
Taliban. Visiting Afghanistan, I think we are all struck by the vast
discrepancy between our ability as Western governments to marshal and
deploy military power on the one hand, and our limited ability to do
the same when it comes to the task of reconstruction and helping to
provide better governance. Yet the latter are essential to winning the
peace in Afghanistan. Our armed services are doing a terrific job but
where we are falling down is in our ability to organize and deploy
experts to help in areas like development, agriculture, narcotics, etc.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you and others have proposed legislation
to strengthen our national capacity to do so and I strongly support
such steps.
Last, but not least, I want to offer a thought on why it has been
so hard to get our allies to increase their commitment to Afghanistan.
Clearly we missed the chance to forge a new coalition and common
strategy after September 11 when NATO declared article 5. While we
eventually realized we had made a mistake, we have been playing catchup
ever since. Allies have come on board in a piecemeal fashion with
different understandings of their mission they were signing up for.
Making the shift from peacekeeping to a counterinsurgency mission is a
political difficult step for many allies.
But I think the fundamental problem we face is that our allies do
not really believe the United States has a strategy to win this
conflict--and thus are reluctant to take the political risks involved
in doing more. If they were convinced the U.S. was serious and had a
credible comprehensive strategy to prevail, and if the President of the
United States was directly involved in personally selling this to his
counterparts, then I believe we would be having a different and more
productive conversation. With all due respect to Secretary of Defense
Bob Gates, who has been working hard to increase allied contributions
in Europe, in Europe this issue requires Presidential engagement with
his counterparts. But I suspect that task will unfortunately fall to
the next administration.
GETTING NATO ENLARGEMENT RIGHT
This brings me to the focus of my testimony today which is NATO
enlargement and effectiveness. I have been a strong supporter of NATO
enlargement dating back to the early 1990s. It has been one of our
great success stories of the last decade. After the Iron Curtain
lifted, Western leaders seized a historic opportunity to open the doors
of NATO and the European Union (EU) to Central and Eastern Europe. By
consolidating democracy and ensuring stability from the Baltics to the
Black Sea, we redrew the map of Europe for the better. As a result, the
continent today is more peaceful, democratic, and free. All one need do
is imagine what Europe today would look like today if NATO had not
enlarged. I suspect there would be instability in Central and Eastern
Europe and more tension with Russia. The continent would be even more
self-absorbed with its own problems and we would thus have even fewer
allies willing and able to work with us to address crises around the
world.
That success came about because a lot of people worked hard to make
sure we got NATO enlargement right. That brings us to the question we
are here to discuss today--what does it mean to get NATO enlargement
right at the upcoming summit in Bucharest? In my mind, there are two
central questions we need to answer. The first is whether this is the
right time to extend invitations to the so-called Adriatic 3--Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia--to join NATO. That requires us to assess
whether these countries are qualified and meet the minimal standards we
set for new members a decade ago in NATO and in close consultations
with the U.S. Senate, as well as to decide whether such a move now
would enhance the stability of the Western Balkans and serve NATO's
interest in further consolidating stability in Europe.
The second key question we need to address at Bucharest is the
future of our vision of enlargement. Do we, as an alliance have a
consensus to go beyond the original vision of the 1990s--an expanded
NATO from the Baltic in the north to the western edge of the Black Sea
in the south--and take real and meaningful steps to extend the alliance
deeper into Eurasia to Ukraine and across the Black Sea to the southern
Caucasus by reaching out to Georgia? Bucharest can either be the last
enlargement summit which addresses the Western Balkans and completes
the vision of the 1990s, or the summit where NATO takes the first real
step in sketching out a new and bigger vision of enlargement for the
next decade. We need to be clear that taking such a step, which I
support, will have far-reaching political and strategic ramifications
for NATO, Europe, and our relations with Russia. It is not just ``more
of the same'' but a bold new strategic move that would again redraw the
map of Europe. In my view, the potential strategic benefits of such a
step would be considerable. But we should have no illusions. It will be
difficult and require a new strategic narrative, sustained U.S.
political attention and diplomatic heavy lifting by this country with
close allies and with Moscow if it is to succeed.
WHY PERFORMANCE MATTERS
Mr. Chairman, in an op-ed in the Washington Post last month
entitled ``A Better Way to Grow NATO,'' I expressed my skepticism about
the administration's current approach on enlargement for Bucharest.
That skepticism was and still is rooted in three factors. The first is
performance. As a veteran of these NATO enlargement debates, I am
worried about how performance has become less and less of a factor in
our deliberations. I am not yet convinced the Adriatic 3--Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia--are qualified for membership. While I do not
claim to be the world's leading expert on these countries, I am
skeptical whether they really meet the minimal standards we set a
decade ago. I have spoken to experts in and outside the alliance who
share that skepticism. If we are honest, these countries are probably
weaker and have received less scrutiny than any of the new members we
have brought into the alliance since the end of the cold war. I
therefore commend the committee for holding this hearing and insisting
that the administration report on these countries' qualifications
before the President makes a final decision on enlargement
I am often asked why I am so focused on performance. Can't or
shouldn't we just bring these countries in ``as is'' and fix their
problems later? Isn't that the job of the State Department, OSD, and
JCS--to fix those problems? Unfortunately, the real world is a bit more
complicated. A decade ago we debated how high or low we should set the
bar for new members. We consciously set the performance bar higher than
it had been during the cold war. We adopted this ``tough love''
approach because we felt that their internal reform was an essential
building block of European security and because there was no immediate
external threat to these countries. Nowhere is this more true than in
the Western Balkans today where the real risks to instability are
largely internal and due to the lack of reform. That is why I believe
strongly that it would be a mistake to lower NATO's bar for these
countries. We should ask no more but also no less of them than we did
for previous countries like Poland, the Baltic States, or Romania.
BALKAN STABILITY
This brings me my second concern with the administration's approach
to Bucharest. It seems to me that the crux of the administration's
argument is that we need to do this round of enlargement now to shore
up Western Balkan stability in the wake of Kosova independence. I agree
with the administration on the need for Balkan stability. If anything,
I fault this administration for not paying enough attention to the
Western Balkans earlier. I feel the administration is trying to
compensate for its past inattention by now accelerating the enlargement
debate. But I am not convinced by the argument that we should lower our
performance standards because of the potential instability generated by
Kosova.
Mr. Chairman, I also want these countries to join NATO and the
European Union. But I want them to do it in the right way when they are
truly ready. Enlarging NATO entails logrolling. There are pressures to
include more countries to keep all allies happy. The temptation to bend
criteria is real. But what is good politically can be bad
strategically. I get a bit nervous when I hear the argument that if we
don't bring this or that country in now, it or the region may be
destabilized. I remember a conversation we had in the spring of 1997 in
the runup to the Madrid summit. You had just met with the President of
a country that was pushing hard for an invite but which we did not
consider fully qualified. That country's President had told you that if
it did not receive an invitation to join NATO, its government would
fall and reform would fail.
In short, the argument was that if we did not invite them to join
NATO, they would essentially commit political suicide. You told him--
correctly in my view--that this was the worst argument you had ever
heard for enlargement and that if the reform project in his country was
that fragile you would oppose his country's candidacy. What happened?
We stuck to our guns on the performance issue. That country survived
not getting an invitation, it actually accelerated its reform efforts
and when it joined NATO a few years later, it did so without
controversy because it was a stronger candidate and with fewer doubts
about its qualifications.
I also think we need to keep our eyes on the key strategic issue in
the region which is the future of Serbia. As important as they are, it
is not Albania, Croatia, or Macedonia which hold the key to future
Balkan stability. That key lies in Belgrade. There is a real danger at
the moment that Serbia is moving in an anti-Western direction. That is
what we need to change but this enlargement move now could actually
reinforce the wrong trend in Serbia. I worry that the administration's
proposal is strategically shortsighted. Coming after a messy
declaration of independence by Kosova, the admittance of weak, not-yet-
qualified candidates could actually bring regional instability into
NATO rather than the other way around. It ignores the real prize--
getting Serbia to embrace a westward course.
UKRAINE AND GEORGIA
Mr. Chairman, my third concern about the administration's approach
at Bucharest has to do with Ukraine and Georgia. I am worried that the
administration's approach does not connect the Western Balkans and the
wider Black Sea region and countries like Ukraine and Georgia. I
believe that how NATO addresses the aspirations of these countries is
every bit as important as what it does in the Western Balkans. If we
are honest, Ukraine and Georgia are more vulnerable strategically than
the Adriatic 3 today. They are vulnerable not only because of their
internal problems and the lack of reform but also because they are
subject to external pressure from Moscow. They face repeated Russian
efforts to interfere in their internal affairs and prevent them from
anchoring themselves to the West.
As I mentioned earlier, the alliance is at a critical turning point
in terms of our future vision of enlargement. The challenge of the past
decade was to secure democracy in Europe's eastern half, from the
Baltics in the north to the western edge of the Black Sea in the south.
The challenge today is to extend security further east--into Ukraine
and across the wider Black Sea to the southern Caucasus which is caught
between an unstable Middle East and an increasingly assertive Russia.
Bucharest can either be the last summit in completing the original
vision of the 1990s or the first summit where the alliance embraces a
bigger and more ambitious vision. In the current issue of foreign
affairs, I have argued that NATO must make this second strategic leap.
But I also underscore just how challenging it will be and what it will
take.
My concern is that Bucharest will produce a round of enlargement to
underqualified candidates in the Western Balkans along with little or
nothing for Ukraine and Georgia.
Mr. Chairman, I know and applaud the fact this committee has sent
an important signal to allies by passing Senate Resolution 342, which
supports MAP for both Ukraine and Georgia. But I also think we need to
be realistic. Many of our allies do not believe the enlargement process
should be continued, or even if these countries are truly part of
Europe. Many doubt the solidity of the democratic and Western
orientation of Ukraine and the commitment of the leadership of that
country to NATO. Others doubt the solidity of Georgia's democratic
experiment or how we are going to resolve the so-called ``frozen
conflicts'' on Georgian soil. Many have concerns about the reaction of
Russia and whether we have a strategy to manage a more assertive Russia
that is likely to be more determined in its opposition to further
enlargement.
These are really issues and concerns that we need to address. The
odds of sorting them out by Bucharest are low. Extending NATO to
Ukraine and Georgia is not just more of the same process of enlargement
as we have known it over the last decade. It would be a new and
fundamental strategic move with potentially far-reaching consequences.
Giving these countries MAO would not necessarily mean a commitment to
full NATO membership but it certainly is an important step in that
direction. We also have a complicated doctrinal debate within NATO as
to what MAP actually means. Initially, MAP was indeed intended for
countries that were only a few years away from an invitation and was
designed to help them in essence complete their final round of
preparations. Neither Ukraine or Georgia are at that point today. But I
think we can and should redefine MAP to loosen this linkage for
countries like Ukraine and Georgia which still have a longer way to go
but which clearly need a closer alliance embrace.
I believe that would such a result--enlargement to a weak set of
Adriatic countries plus little or nothing for Ukraine and Georgia--
would not be a policy success. I have argued that a better approach
would be wait or to do a small round of enlargement, perhaps limited to
Croatia, to give the other candidates more time to bolster their
credentials, for the West to sort out regional security in the Balkans
after Kosova, and to work toward a second big bang round of enlargement
down the road that would stretch from the Western Balkans and embrace
Ukraine or Georgia.
I would point to the historical parallel with the Baltic States in
the 1990s. The United States fought a dramatic political battle at the
Madrid in 1997 summit to limit that initial round of enlargement, in
part because we did not think that Romania and Slovenia were qualified
but also to protect the Baltic States. We knew that some of our allies
wanted to make this first round the last and to exclude the Baltic
States. We wanted to keep the door open. The result: Romania and
Slovenia, while disappointed, redoubled their reform efforts; the
Baltic States grabbed their chance to catch up and qualify and did so;
and we laid the foundation for a later but ultimately successful
enlargement that redrew the map of Europe in 2002. Being firm on
criteria and thinking strategically about the long term paid off.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since I wrote my op-ed in the
Washington Post a month ago to alleviate the concerns I expressed then.
I remain concerned that we are going to invite countries from the
Western Balkans that are not yet qualified, that such a step will not
necessarily stabilize the region and that Bucharest will do too little
to support Ukraine and Georgia or make the shift to this bigger vision
of NATO that I am calling for. To be honest, I hope I am wrong. I hope
that in the weeks and months ahead the administration can show that
these candidates are better qualified than I think they are, and that
allies will come together in Bucharest and in the end achieve a
positive result on Ukraine and Georgia.
I am also a realist. This administration has made up its mind to go
forward with invitations to the so-called Adriatic 3 countries at the
Bucharest NATO summit in spite of the concerns people like me have
raised. I am occasionally asked whether I will then oppose the
accession of these countries. I have concluded that I will not for the
simple reason that I do not want NATO or these countries to fail. For
the U.S. Senate to vote down a candidate country that the
administration has invited would, in my opinion, do grave damage to our
standing in the alliance and potentially kill the enlargement process.
But we do need to guard against the risks I have pointed to. Our
Constitution envisions a key role for the U.S. Senate in this
ratification process. I believe this committee should assume a
leadership role to reduce those risks I have pointed to today by
considering several steps.
First, we should actively use the period between possible
invitations at the Bucharest summit and and an eventual Senate
accession vote to scrutinize these countries' performances and to
maximize their incentives for making additional progress. These
candidates have thus far received less scrutiny than any previous
candidates since the 1990s, even though they are weaker and potentially
less stable. We should ask no more, but also no less, of them than
their predecessors. As in the past, the administration should be asked
to testify and report--in open and classified hearings--on how well
they are performing and whether they fulfill the requirements laid down
for membership. I am glad that the administration has now been asked to
report on these qualifications before a final decision on extending
invitations is made, in accordance with previous Senate resolutions on
ratification.
That final Senate vote should not be scheduled until this committee
is confident they fulfill those requirements. If I look at the
legislative calendar, it seems unlikely a Senate vote on enlargement
will happen before the end of this administration. Thus, this vote is
likely to take place under the next President. Given the time required
for the next President to assemble his or her team, one could imagine
it taking place in the summer or fall of 2009. We should use this delay
to our advantage. It provides us with another 18 months to engage these
countries, identify their weaknesses and maximize the incentives for
them to address those weaknesses. In my view, the committee should ask
for another progress report on these countries early on in the next
administration before a final vote. Using this period in this manner
can focus the attention of these countries and help ensure they will be
effective allies. I would hope they would view this as an opportunity
to strengthen their candidacies and erase any doubts about their
qualifications. If they have done their homework and meet those
standards, they have nothing to fear from such scrutiny.
Second, we should also consider establishing clearer benchmarks for
new members to continue to meet after they joined the alliance. We need
to understand that these countries joining NATO does not actually mean
they are ready to be full members. We are asking them to meet a set of
very minimal standards--with the expectation that the lion's share of
reform and work will still take place after they join. It is
increasingly clear that many of these countries continue to need
guidance and support--as well as political scrutiny--after they have
become members. While the NATO system seeks to provide that guidance,
it doesn't work as well as it should. I am sometimes asked whether
there are new members I regret seeing join the alliance. I do not. But
I do also regret not having pushed some countries harder. And I am
disappointed at how reform has dissipated in some new members. I know
from talking to ambassadors and senior officials in these countries
fighting for reform that they, too, have often wished we had at times
been tougher with them--precisely because the voice from Washington can
be so critical.
We should recognize this larger problem of the performance before
it gets any worse. In part, it is the challenge of bringing in
successive waves of new members who are weaker than their predecessors.
But it is amplified by the disappointing performance of some new
members from previous classes of enlargement. With the addition of
these three new members in the Western Balkans, NATO will now have 30
members, nearly half of whom have been members for a decade or less.
All of these countries are still going through difficult reform
processes. There is clearly one group of countries who aspire to be
premier allies and who have become real contributors in a very short
period of time. But there is a second group of allies who are not where
we want them to be and who seem content to do as little as possible.
This of course undermines the credibility of the whole enlargement
process.
Therefore, I would like to recommend that the committee call for a
thorough assessment, of the political and military performance of the
two enlargement classes of 1997 and 2002. Such an assessment should
review the promises made by these countries as well as the testimony
and estimates of our own Department of Defense--both the Office of the
Secretary of Defense as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We should
compare those pledges and estimates with actual military capacities and
performance. This would give us a clear baseline to determine the size
of the gap between past pledges and actual subsequent contributions--
and how well or poorly these members are doing. It will also help us
determine realistic benchmarks for these countries as well as potential
new members going forward.
The lessons from such an exercise should be incorporated into an
amendment to this round of enlargement. Such an amendment could set
clear benchmarks for these countries to fulfill after they join NATO.
These benchmarks would augment the NATO system. Our goal would be to
use the influence and expertise the United States enjoys to help ensure
their reforms stay on track. We could set a time limit of, for example,
5 years, with an option for a further extension. I believe such an
amendment will help those leaders in the region who are serious about
reform. We also need to consider what we do about the poor performance
of some of our poor performers from the enlargement classes of 1997 and
2002, as well as so-called older or traditional allies whose
performance is also lacking.
Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to work with the committee to
develop such an amendment to ensure that enlargement can continue to be
a success story. Taking such steps now can help ensure that down the
road we have more effective allies who can perform in places like
Afghanistan and whose forces can fight without national caveats. I
would also urge the committee to stay fully engaged in and providing
leadership on the issues of Ukraine and Georgia. If the Bucharest
summit produces a weak outcome on these issues, it will be of critical
importance that we find other ways for the U.S. and NATO to step up our
engagement with them to provide the kind of political and strategic
reassurance that can reduce their vulnerability and send the signal
that we are serious about our efforts to anchor them to the West over
time.
The Chairman. Very good testimony.
Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to be
back here, and nice to see you all.
I never thought I'd be at a hearing on NATO enlargement at
which I was more forward-leaning than my friend Ron Asmus, but
that's the position in which I find myself, and I'd like to
suggest why, and then also share a few comments about
Afghanistan.
On enlargement, I think, anytime we talk about enlargement
the discussion has to begin with the overall strategic argument
that the process of enlargement, that began in the early
nineties and that you all supported so strongly, has
contributed to security and prosperity in Europe. The incentive
has led these countries to reform their economies and their
military structures and resolve territorial disputes and
improve human rights. And, once in, they've contributed to
missions in places like the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
And, in turn, I think, NATO membership has reassured many of
their populations of the political and military solidarity of
the United States and the European Union, and that enables them
to focus on the well-being of their people. All of that is a
good thing, and it's in that context that I think that NATO
should extend invitations, at this summit, to Albania, Croatia,
and the Republic of Macedonia.
There is a debate, a legitimate debate, about how ready
they are. I think at a certain point one has to decide that a
line is crossed. You could--perhaps, in an ideal world--you
would always have countries on the verge of getting into NATO,
always with an incentive to do better. At some point, I think
you have to say, 6, 8 years into a process, with significant
progress made, that this is a credible process, and it actually
does have an end point. I think it's time to do that with those
three countries.
On the question of MAP for Georgia and Ukraine, which I
think is even more controversial, for reasons that have been
spelled out: There's Russian opposition, there's even more
questions about their readiness. Despite those concerns, I also
think that NATO should respond positively to their requests to
join the MAP, and I'll tell you why. We can get into it in more
detail. But, for me, the bottom line is that those requests
have come from democratically elected, reform-minded
governments that have pledged, in this context, to seek
consensus within their countries--which is not yet there--and
to continue the reforms to meet NATO standards. And I don't see
how we can or why we should say no to that. I think that
tendency should be encouraged rather than discouraged.
Again, we can elaborate on the reasons. But let me just
address two of the main objections to the position that I have
advocated here on MAP to Georgia and Ukraine.
The first is that it's premature because it would be a
signal of imminent membership, for which they're not ready. I
think Ron has suggested this concern; it's a legitimate one. We
should be honest, we shouldn't kid ourselves. If we give them a
Membership Action Plan, they're going to see it as a ticket to
membership, and the Russians will see it that way, and their
people will see it that way. It's a legitimate concern.
But, I think, as long as we are clear at the summit--and I
would encourage summit leaders to be clear--that participation
in this program, which is meant to facilitate their efforts to
get ready for NATO, is not a guarantee of future membership.
NATO, I think, is quite clear about that. And it is also clear
that you only actually cross that final bar of membership when
you've met all of the important standards on territorial
disputes, human rights, and so on.
So, I think that that very high bar should be in between
the Membership Action Plan and actual membership, not in what I
would consider to be an artificial place between an intensified
dialogue for NATO and the MAP. That doesn't really make sense
to me.
The second objection that one hears in the context of MAP
to Georgia and Ukraine is about Russian opposition. I think
Russian concerns should obviously be taken into account in any
discussion of European security, but I also think that Moscow
can't have a veto over the choices of neighboring democratic
governments. NATO enlargement is not, and has never been, a
threat to Russia, which should understand, actually, that it
can benefit from security and prosperity in these countries.
Senator Lugar, you referenced President Putin's threat to
target nuclear missiles at Ukraine, in the context of a NATO
enlargement. I think that's simply unacceptable as part of
European diplomacy in the 21st century, and perhaps more of a
reason to extend NATO's links with Ukraine, rather than reject
its hopes to get them.
The last point on this is in terms of timing. Because this
is such a controversial issue, there may be something to be
said for getting it off the table now, at this summit, before
there's a new Russian President, and at the end of our own
President's tenure, and then, hopefully, the new administration
can start to develop positive relations with Russia, which I
think are critically important.
Let me very briefly share just three points on Afghanistan,
which, I think, is equally important and deserving of our
attention. In my written testimony, I have provided detailed
analysis of what the challenge is and what we should do about
it, but here let me just underline three big themes.
The first is that, despite all of the challenges and
deficiencies and failures we've heard about, some here today,
some which have been outlined in some recent reports that I
know have been briefed to you--rising violence, weakening
resolve, opium, divisions among allies--despite all of those, I
think we shouldn't forget, in a NATO context, how extraordinary
this mission is when you put it in perspective.
Ten years ago, the idea that NATO would be running a major
military operation halfway around the world was preposterous.
Even 5 years ago, we all remember conversations with European
allies about how this was beyond what NATO should even
consider. And yet, today that theoretical debate is over.
NATO's there. Every single member of the Alliance has forces
there and is committed--42,000 troops, 28,000 of which are non-
Americans. We shouldn't lose sight of that. And, even in the
context of questions about Europeans losing faith in the
mission--which are legitimate; I share those concerns--it is,
nonetheless, the case that there are 5,000 more non-American
troops in Afghanistan this year than there were last year. So,
as we focus on the problems, I think we shouldn't lose sight of
that.
Second, and related to that point, I do think NATO can
succeed in Afghanistan, despite all of these problems. I reject
the conclusion that Afghanistan is lost. It's not lost in the
United States, where more than 65 percent of Americans believe
that overthrowing the Taliban was the right thing to do, and
believe that we should stay, and that has bipartisan support.
It's not lost in Europe, where, despite public apprehensions,
every single NATO government still supports the mission. And,
more importantly, it's not lost in Afghanistan, where more than
75 percent of Afghans say the overthrow of the Taliban was a
good thing, and a majority still says they're grateful for the
presence of foreign soldiers.
Everyone on this committee knows how important succeeding
in Afghanistan is. I think one of our most important challenges
is making sure that the American public, and, even more
importantly, European publics, understand what is at stake.
And my final point--and, again, we can get into all sorts
of details about troops, aid, strategies, drugs, Pakistan, and
so on--
I think, in all of that, we need to remember the most important
thing is the sustainability of this mission. Our wish list for
Bucharest will, frankly, not be entirely fulfilled on all of
these scores. It's easy to hope for a quick fix, it's easy to
dream that the Europeans will lift all their caveats and send
10,000 more troops. They won't. The author and British diplomat
Rory Stewart, who now lives in Kabul, likes to say that if
everything goes perfectly well in Afghanistan for the next 20
years, it will attain a level of development around that of
Pakistan. It's a mountainous, landlocked, arid, and very poor
and divided country, and we shouldn't expect to transform it
overnight, but we also shouldn't lose faith when our efforts
run into inevitable setbacks, and we shouldn't conclude that
they're too difficult or costly. We've already seen the costs
of abandoning Afghanistan, and I think those costs vastly
exceed those we are experiencing in what we're trying to do
today.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow for U.S.
Foreign Policy, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify today on the critical issues facing NATO on the
eve of the Bucharest summit in April. This will be the final NATO
summit of the Bush administration. It comes at a time when there are
serious questions about NATO's vital mission in Afghanistan, and
serious internal debates within the alliance about what to do about
enlargement. Leaders in Bucharest will also have to address a number of
other important issues, including Europe-based missile defense, the
NATO Response Force, Kosovo, European Defense, and the NATO budget. But
here I want to focus on the two that I believe are most essential to
U.S. national security interests and the future of the alliance:
Afghanistan and enlargement.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you, Senator Lugar, and the other members
of the committee for the leadership you have shown on both of these
critical issues and hope my comments can contribute to your ongoing
work.
NATO'S MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
Several prominent reports on Afghanistan have been published in
recent weeks. All underscored the serious and growing challenges to the
NATO mission posed by rising violence, weakening international resolve,
expanding opium production, divisions among allies, and daunting
regional challenges. I will address these serious challenges, but
before focusing on them and what NATO needs to do to meet them, I think
it is worth putting NATO's Afghanistan mission into some perspective.
Ten years ago, the idea that NATO would be running a major military
operation half way around the world would have seemed preposterous.
Even 5 years ago, just after the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban, I can
still remember officials in many allied countries questioning whether
the alliance should take on such a challenging task so far beyond its
original mission. Today that theoretical debate about missions is
over--every one of NATO's 26 members not only supports but has forces
in Afghanistan. NATO has 42,000 troops in-country, 28,000 of which are
from countries other than the United States. NATO's mission began in
2003 with the provision of a single headquarters in Kabul alone, when
no single country was willing to take on that task and it has gradually
expanded to the north, west, south, and east so that it now covers all
of Afghanistan. Despite the perception that European allies are losing
faith in the mission--indeed a serious concern--it is none the less the
case that there are 5,000 more non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan this year
than there were last year, and there are decent prospects that more
European (likely French and British) troops will be pledged at the
Bucharest summit and deployed later this spring.
These facts in no way diminish the reality of the challenges NATO
faces in Afghanistan today or the deficiencies in the alliance's
efforts to meet them. But they do remind us that the slow and difficult
process of transforming NATO from a Europe-only defense alliance into
an effective peacekeeping and global counterterrorism alliance is not
destined to fail. As we focus on the challenges and even failures of
the NATO mission in Afghanistan we should not forget how much worse the
situation would be were NATO not involved there at all and if the
United States had to bear all the burdens there alone.
That said, no one can deny that NATO is at a crossroads in
Afghanistan. The challenges it faces in 2008--as serious as at any time
since the mission was launched--include all the following:
Rising Suicide and IED Attacks. Prior to the overthrow of the
Taliban, and despite the horrific violence that country experienced for
decades, suicide bombings were virtually unheard of in Afghanistan.
Even after the NATO mission began, the practice did not begin until
2005, when 17 suicide bombings took place. Since then, however, there
have been 123 suicide bombings in 2006, 140 in 2007, and the number is
rising further in 2008--a sign that the Taliban and al-Qaeda realize
they cannot defeat NATO with conventional means and instead hope to
undercut support for the mission in ways similar to those that were
effective in Iraq. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has
also proliferated over the past several years. In January 2008, the
Taliban in Afghanistan crossed a new line with a suicide attack on the
Serena hotel in Kabul, a luxury hotel frequented by Western diplomats
and journalists, which killed eight people. Many fear that the Taliban
have been regrouping and will continue to expand their attacks on
Western forces and civilians as the weather improves this spring.
Weakening Allied Resolve, and Growing Internal Divisions. Another
threat to the NATO mission is the growing resentment over the vastly
diverging military missions of different national forces. While all
NATO members have soldiers in the country, national ``caveats'' place
strict geographical or functional limitations on what those forces can
do and where they can do it. Thus, whereas United States, British,
Dutch, and Canadian forces often find themselves fighting and taking
casualties in the more dangerous southern and eastern provinces,
German, French, Italian, Spanish, and other troops are limited to
relatively less dangerous duty in the north and west. Defense Secretary
Gates provoked controversy in Europe recently when he made this point
and appealed to allies to lift some of their caveats, but his central
point cannot be denied: Allied forces are not bearing equal risks or
burdens in Afghanistan. The inequality is exacerbated by NATO's
budgetary rules according to which the costs of any deployment are
borne by the deploying country. The result is that a Member State that
agrees to deploy additional troops or airplanes not only bears
disproportionate risk but also has to pay for the new deployment--a
further disincentive to new and badly needed force contributions.
It is important to understand why most NATO allies are so reluctant
to send more forces to Afghanistan and so determined to limit the
mandates of those that are there. For 50 years, with the exception of
Britain and France, NATO militaries focused almost exclusively on a
territorial defense role, leaving global missions to the United States
and others. Their publics are not accustomed to coping with the
challenges and costs of global security missions--causing and taking
casualties. Some key European leaders are in fragile government
coalitions, which constrains their ability to take controversial
actions abroad. In addition, the unpopularity of the Bush
administration and the psychological link in many European minds
between the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq makes it difficult
for European leaders to stand up in Parliament and make the case for
supporting what is all too often (and wrongly) seen as an ``American''
war.
Growing Opium Production. Opium production, a major source of
funding for the Taliban and a cause of much of the corruption of the
Afghan Government, has also risen in each of the past several years.
Today some 193,000 hectares are devoted to poppy cultivation (up from
165,000 in 2006), and Afghanistan is providing 90 percent of the
illicit global opium trade. NATO officials on the ground in Afghanistan
insist that counternarcotics is the responsibility of the Afghan
Government and not Western soldiers. Regardless of whose formal
responsibility it is, however, the reality is that Afghanistan will
never have a stable, functioning government, and the Taliban will never
be defeated, unless the profits stemming from drug production are
significantly curbed.
A Struggling Afghan Government. President Hamid Karzai, long seen
as a model of the moderate, pro-Western yet authentic and legitimate
leader needed in a place like Afghanistan, is increasingly unpopular
after struggling to bring peace and prosperity to the country after 6
years in power. Seeking to position himself in advance of likely
Presidential elections in 2009, he has alienated some key ethnic
constituencies by trying to consolidate his Pushtun base. The Afghan
police forces are riddled with corruption and despite real gains in
well-being since the Taliban were overthrown (in areas like health care
and education), many Afghans are becoming disenchanted with the lack of
security and pace of social progress. NATO officials have challenged
Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell's recent estimate that
the Afghan Government only controls 30 percent of the country's
territory, but what is certainly true is that Afghanistan's tribal,
ethnic, and regional divisions make it difficult for the central
government to extend its writ outside of Kabul. This makes Afghanistan
even more susceptible to regional leaders willing and able to cut
separate deals with warlords, drug barons, or the Taliban.
Instability in Pakistan. NATO of course has no role in Pakistan,
but those responsible for the NATO mission must understand that no
strategy for Afghanistan can succeed without a Pakistan strategy to
accompany it. Pakistan, after all, is where Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and other al-Qaeda leaders are likely hiding, where the
Taliban and other insurgents receive financing, training, and
sanctuary, and where the majority of Pushtuns--the ethnic group from
which the Taliban draws its recruits--live. Frankly, even if
Afghanistan could somehow magically be ``solved'' (which of course it
cannot), the United States and its allies would still face a major
terrorism challenge from the extremists based on the eastern side of
the border. And Afghanistan certainly cannot be solved so long as
Taliban and other insurgents can operate with impunity in the
ungoverned Pakistani tribal areas, sadly the case today.
Despite these challenges and problems, and contrary to the
impression given by much recent press reporting, Afghanistan is not
``lost,'' and the NATO mission there has not ``failed.'' It is not lost
in the United States, where more than 65 percent of Americans believe
that overthrowing the Taliban was the right thing to do, more than 60
percent believe we should keep our forces there, and leaders from
across the political spectrum still see the mission as legitimate and
necessary. It is not lost in Europe, where despite public apprehensions
every single NATO government still supports the mission and is still
contributing forces to it. And most importantly it is not lost in
Afghanistan, where more than 75 percent of Afghans still say that the
overthrow of the Taliban was a good thing and a majority says they are
grateful for the presence of foreign soldiers--even if they are
increasingly critical of the lack of a coherent international strategy
for the country. Even amidst rising violence, the Afghan economy is
growing and many Afghans remain hopeful. Succeeding in Afghanistan is
not only essential to prevent it from again becoming the sort of failed
state in which al-Qaeda could thrive, but it is possible if the United
States and its allies accept what is at stake and step up to the
challenge. I believe NATO needs to do all of following to increase the
prospects for success of the NATO mission:
Deploy Additional Troops. NATO needs at least 5,000-10,000
additional troops in Afghanistan, to provide adequate security for the
population and to avoid relying so extensively on airpower, which
causes the civilian casualties that put the entire mission at stake. If
NATO had as many troops per capita in Afghanistan today as it did in
Bosnia in 1995, it would have some 400,000 (instead of 42,000). Even
the current NATO mission in Kosovo today (17,000) would be over 270,000
if scaled to the size of Afghanistan. The point is not that such troop
levels are realistic for Afghanistan or even necessary, but simply to
put in perspective the relative commitment we have made to Afghanistan
given the importance of the mission. The new U.S. contribution of 3,200
marines should give the United States the legitimacy to call on its
European allies to make at least an equivalent new contribution and
President Bush should challenge them to do so at the Bucharest summit.
Collectively, the European NATO allies have several hundred thousand
troops in their standing armed forces only a small percentage of which
are deployed abroad, and they should be reminded not only that
deploying them in Afghanistan is a common interest but that the
American public's support for NATO is in many ways a function of
European allies' willingness to bear a fair share of that burden.
Provide Increased and More Sustained Development Assistance.
Improving the security and daily lives of the Afghan people is critical
to defeating the Taliban--as former U.S. Commander General Karl
Eikenberry used to say, ``The Taliban begin where the roads end.'' Yet
we have not been building enough roads. Again to make the Balkan
comparison, U.S. and European financial assistance to Afghanistan has
over the past 6 years been less than one-tenth the level of funding
provided to Bosnia and Kosovo. Ensuring stability in the Balkans is
clearly in the United States and European national interest, but
meeting the same goals in Afghanistan is arguably just as important.
President Bush's February 2007 request for $11.8bn over 2 years was a
belated but welcome step in right direction. It must be funded and
sustained by Congress and matched by NATO allies.
Focus on Training and Resources for the Afghan National Army and
Police. For many poor Afghans, the choice between supporting the Afghan
Government and joining the Taliban has nothing to do with ideology, but
is simply a matter of who will better help make ends meet. None the
less, many Afghan soldiers are still paid only around $100 per month,
while admittedly imprecise reporting suggests that the Taliban pays
many of its fighters around $300 per month. (This can be compared with
costs for each NATO soldier in Afghanistan of around $4,000 per month.)
At these rates, the monthly pay for all 57,000 members of the ANA could
be doubled for $5.7 million--roughly the cost of six of the Tomahawk
cruise missiles we used to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Tripling
their pay would come to some $137 million per year, a fraction of the
$1.5 billion annual NATO budget for Afghan operations or the more than
$15 billion in financial assistance we have provided since 2002.
Strengthening the ANA is essential not only to build its capacity to
fight alongside NATO, but to help NATO put an Afghan face on military
operations, which is critical to their success.
Improving the effectiveness of the Afghan police forces will
require more than just resources; it will also require a significant
mentoring and monitoring effort. The Afghan police has reportedly
reached 90 percent of its projected end strength of 82,000, but it is
riddled with corruption and not trusted by the Afghan population.
Police reform will have to be accompanied by greater efforts to
establish the rule of law, including through greater training for
Afghan judges and lawyers.
Crack Down on Drug Labs and Corrupt Officials. There is no easy
solution to Afghanistan's drug problem, but NATO cannot ignore it
either. Large-scale spraying and eradication efforts are
counterproductive, because they tend to turn poor poppy farmers--who
polls suggest would prefer to grow licit crops but simply cannot afford
to--against NATO and the United States. Rather, NATO should focus its
efforts on helping the Afghan Government identify and punish corrupt
officials who facilitate and benefit from the drug trade. This will
require greater coordination between the international community's
counterinsurgency efforts and its counternarcotics efforts, which at
present are disjointed. And while avoiding attacks on farmers, NATO
forces should not hesitate to conduct operations against the labs that
turn poppies into opium and the trade routes that carry opium to
foreign markets, all of which generate profits that are used by the
Taliban.
Adapt Our Strategy in Pakistan. The outcome of the recent election
in Pakistan--where both President Musharraf's party and the religious
parties suffered major setbacks--provides an opportunity to develop a
new relationship with Pakistan that will serve our mutual interest. I
applaud Senator Biden's proposals to triple our nonmilitary assistance
to Pakistan and to sustain it for a decade and to provide a $1 billion
``democracy dividend'' to the new Pakistani Government if it is formed
and governs democratically. I spent a week in Pakistan last May and am
going back there next week. My sense is that the Pakistani public is
getting fed up with the growing al-Qaeda attacks against them and they
will support efforts to fight
al-Qaeda if we can demonstrate that we are prepared to help them do so.
Pakistanis have long tended to view Americans as ``fair weather
friends'' and have resented seeing too much of our assistance end up in
the hands of the Pakistani military (who use it to buy high-tech
weaponry) rather than be put to use for schools and hospitals and jobs.
Standing with the Pakistani people will make our counterterrorism
cooperation more palatable to the public and the government, and in the
long run providing jobs and economic development in the tribal areas
will make it easier to isolate and root out al-Qaeda.
A Public Relations Campaign in Europe. The weakening of European
resolve in Afghanistan stems less from a lack of official good will
than from the fact that European publics doubt that NATO's mission can
succeed and fail to see the mission's direct relevance to them. To
combat this perception, the United States and its NATO allies should
sponsor a public relations campaign to draw attention to the good NATO
is doing in the country and the consequences of abandoning Afghanistan
to its fate. Europeans need to be reminded that our adversaries in
Afghanistan are the same ones not only who attacked the United States
in 2001 but who killed 193 people on Spanish trains in Madrid in April
2004 and 54 London commuters in July 2005. U.S. and NATO governments
should sponsor nonofficial speakers--from the United States, Europe,
and Afghanistan--to talk to publics and the media about the situation
in Afghanistan and the stakes. Europeans are often quick to dismiss the
Afghan mission as an unnecessary part of President Bush's ``war on
terror,'' but I believe they can be persuaded that the mission is
actually in Europe's own strategic and humanitarian interest.
Better International Coordination. As in many international nation-
building efforts, our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan suffer from the
lack of coordination among various international agencies.
Unfortunately, the recent proposal to send Lord Ashdown as a strong
U.N. Special Representative tasked with eliminating redundancies and
maximizing international assistance was vetoed by the Karzai
government. The new U.N. Special Representative, Norwegian diplomat Kai
Eide, will need strong backing from the United States and other NATO
members if he is to succeed in his mission to better coordinate what is
a currently disparate and disjointed international effort.
I realize that even with the best of intentions, not all of these
recommendations can or will be implemented immediately. The United
States and other NATO Member States have many competing priorities, and
resources--both military and financial--are tight. The key to success,
I believe, is to understand what is at stake and to do a better job of
explaining those stakes to our own public and our NATO partners. While
it would be nice to achieve all of these goals in the short term, what
is truly essential is to commit to Afghanistan for the long-term, and
to put our mission on a sustainable basis. The author and former
British diplomat Rory Stewart--who now lives in Kabul--likes to say
that if everything goes almost perfectly well in Afghanistan for the
next 20 years, it will attain a level of development no higher than
that of Pakistan. Afghanistan is a poor, arid, mountainous, and
ethnically divided country that is emerging from 30 years of civil war
and mismanagement. We should not expect to transform it overnight or
lose faith when our efforts to help it run into inevitable setbacks.
Nor, however, must we conclude that those efforts are simply too
difficult or costly. We have already experienced the costs of
abandoning Afghanistan, which exceed those required to satisfy its
basic interests and keeping it from threatening ours.
ENLARGEMENT
NATO's second major challenge at the summit is enlargement. At
Bucharest, leaders must address two enlargement-related issues, a
decision on current candidates (Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of
Macedonia) and responses to requests to join the Membership Action Plan
(MAP) by Georgia and Ukraine.
I believe that the process of NATO enlargement, begun in the early
1990s, has contributed to security and prosperity in Europe. The
incentive of NATO membership has led aspiring countries to reform their
political systems, liberalize their economies, root out corruption,
resolve territorial disputes with neighbors, rationalize their military
establishments, and improve minority rights. Once in the alliance new
members have contributed troops for vital NATO missions in the Balkans
and in Afghanistan and many sent forces to join the U.S.-led coalition
in Iraq. In turn, NATO membership has reassured their populations of
political and military solidarity with the United States and members of
the European Union, enabling them to focus on improving the well-being
of their citizens rather than worrying about the types of military
threats they had lived with for centuries.
In this context, I support the entry into NATO of the current
candidates, Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia. Each has
been part of NATO's MAP process for 6 or more years and has made
significant progress in reforming their political systems, economies,
and military establishments. All have contributed troops to the NATO
mission in Afghanistan and made progress toward other goals like
civilian control of the military and respect for minority rights. None
is yet a model democracy--but all are moving in the right direction and
have made at least as much progress as those that have preceded them in
the accession process. In the wake of the turbulence surrounding
Kosovo's declaration of independence, I believe that the extension of
NATO membership to these neighboring countries will contribute to
security in the Balkans and underscore NATO's commitment to it. Their
accession after years of preparation will also demonstrate the
sincerity of NATO's pledge that membership genuinely is open to those
European democracies that meet its stringent criteria.
The question of MAP accession for Georgia and Ukraine is perhaps
even more controversial. Russia is strongly opposed to their
participation in the program, and both countries have in recent years
experienced the sort of political instability that suggests more
progress must be made before membership should be considered. Despite
these concerns, I believe NATO should respond positively to their
requests to join the MAP. Those requests came to NATO from
democratically elected governments which have pledged to seek to build
consensus about NATO within their countries and to continue to work to
meet NATO's rigorous standards. So long as NATO makes clear that a MAP
is not a guarantee of future membership, which can only be granted when
an aspirant meets all of NATO's criteria and a consensus exists among
NATO members, there is no basis for rejecting their requests to
participate in this program. The MAP is a logical extension of the
Intensified Dialogues in which they already take part. Their reformist
governments' desire to come closer to the West should be encouraged,
not discouraged.
Despite its recent political problems, including the Saakashvili
government's excessive use of force in response to street protests in
November 2007, Georgia has made significant political progress since
the ``Rose Revolution'' of November 2003. The elections that followed
the November 2007 turbulence were seen to be free and fair, and were
won easily by Saakashvili, who got 53 percent of the vote compared to
26 percent for his rival. In a referendum accompanying the Presidential
vote, 73 percent of Georgians came out in support of eventual NATO
membership. The World Bank has recently given Georgia good marks on
economic reform and anticorruption efforts, even if the November 2007
protests were a warning shot that much of the population remains
dissatisfied with perceived authoritarianism. A positive signal about
the prospect of eventual NATO membership sent by MAP participation will
help encourage positive political trends. It will also encourage
Georgia to seek to resolve the ``frozen conflicts'' in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia that continue to plague its efforts to achieve national
unity--a Georgia with realistic aspirations to join NATO is more likely
to work energetically to resolve these conflicts than a Georgia with no
hope of joining the alliance. Georgia has a long way to go--both in
meeting NATO's democratic standards and in terms of resolving its
internal conflicts--before it can seriously be seen as a near-term
candidate for NATO membership. The question now is how best to keep it
moving in the right direction.
Ukraine has also made significant political progress since its 2004
``Orange Revolution.'' Its parliamentary elections in March 2006 were
judged to meet international standards and took place after free debate
and without incident. While even eventual NATO membership is far from a
matter of consensus among Ukrainians--indeed most are currently opposed
to it--President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko have
encouragingly pledged to work to foster national unity and to consult
the Ukrainian people in a referendum prior to any move toward
membership. The Ukrainian opposition itself once favored NATO
membership and even sought to participate in the MAP but it now opposes
NATO for apparent partisan political reasons. I believe that agreeing
to allow Ukraine to participate in the MAP program at the Bucharest
summit would encourage it to continue to move in the direction of
democratic and peaceful reform.
Some would argue that giving a MAP to Georgia and Ukraine is
premature because it would be a signal of imminent membership, for
which they are not ready. But NATO's own literature on the MAP states
that ``participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership .
. . Decisions to invite aspirants to start accession talks will be
taken within NATO by consensus and on a case-by-case basis.'' NATO also
emphasizes that ``aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain
goals . . . [including] settling any international, ethnic or external
territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to
the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of
their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through
economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.''
These statements make clear that the real bar to NATO membership is and
should be between the MAP and membership, not between the Intensified
Dialogue and the MAP. NATO leaders should reiterate this point at the
summit.
Others will argue that MAP for Georgia should be opposed because it
is opposed by Russia. However, while Russian concerns should obviously
be taken into account in any discussions of European security, Moscow
cannot have a veto on the choices of neighboring democratic
governments. NATO enlargement is not and has never been a threat to
Russia, which should understand that it can benefit from democracy,
stability, and prosperity in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. President
Putin's threat to target Ukraine with nuclear missiles if it seeks to
join NATO has no place in 21st century diplomatic relations and should
be taken more as a reason to increase Ukraine's ties to NATO than to
cut them off. Russia's opposition, then, is perhaps a further reason to
act on MAP for Georgia and Ukraine at Bucharest rather than waiting.
With a new Russian President taking office in May and a new U.S.
administration to take office in January 2009, it makes sense to get
this controversial issue off the table now rather than to have to
confront another MAP decision at NATO's planned 60th anniversary summit
in spring 2009. That way the new U.S. administration could seek to make
a fresh start in rebuilding relations with Russia, which should be one
of its early priorities.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the Bucharest summit provides an important
opportunity to advance U.S. interests by bolstering NATO's mission in
Afghanistan and moving forward on enlargement. I commend your own
leadership in both of these areas and thank the committee for inviting
me to testify before you.
The Chairman. That would be a staggering transformation, to
get to Pakistan.
Mr. Jackson.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON TRANSITIONAL
DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to be
equally succinct.
With regard to enlargement, let me put this in historical
perspective. This is not the third enlargement. There have
actually been five enlargements, up to this point. Your
committee will be considering the sixth. Certainly, the three
countries that may be in the sixth enlargement are more
qualified than Greece and Turkey were, originally; have larger
armies than Germany did in the fifties; and had more social
work done on their behalf than Spain did after Franco. So,
these countries are in a very strong position. I can discuss
their qualities.
It's also important to remember that this is the smallest
expansion this committee has ever been asked to consider. The
total populations of these three countries are less than the
Czech Republic, and they have been in a Membership Action Plan
for 9 years. Instead of--in 1997, in the Visegrad expansion,
the State Department looked at the credentials. One single
country out of 26--at that time, 16--looked at these countries
for a couple of years. Instead, now all 26 countries looked at
them for 9 consecutive years--all 26 of them--and with much
smaller countries. So, the scrutiny has been microscopic. And I
think this committee really should get the annual reports on
these countries, going back over the 9 years.
Just to put this in proportion, Macedonia is only 16 years
old. It has spent 60 percent of its entire nation's history
trying to be qualified for a Membership Action Plan. This is
extraordinary, what they've done.
If we look at, basically, objective criteria--let's take,
say, markets, because the--they say all of the information is
the price. The real estate values around Dubrovnik went from
$20,000 per an apartment, to over $2 million, in this last 10
years. The market is trying to tell us something. These
countries are now, in development terms, on par with Slovenia,
which is already in. And we're seeing this kind of convergence.
Already, they're delivering security goods. There is no longer
traffic in cigarettes running out of Albania across the
Adriatic; as it was, earlier on. The sexual trafficking
throughout has been arrested. And, frankly, they have done so
well that Albanian troops, on one occasion, were basically
protecting the perimeter of our forces in Baghdad. They had the
outside mission. So, they're contributing. And that was years
ago that they were doing it. On a per-capita basis, these
countries are, as you just heard, contributing to a larger
extent than some of our allies.
So, in terms of qualifications--and if we look at
Macedonia, this country, which is barely an infant, in European
terms, has implemented the Ohrid Framework Agreements, has
basically--is reconciling its remaining bilateral issue, and
has built a multiethnic society. This is nothing short of
extraordinary. It seems to me that, in the objective criteria,
these countries--as, I think the chairman and Senator Lugar
have said--have performed the objective criteria.
I do think there's a danger, in my good friend Ron's
remarks, that this process becomes essentially a social-work
process, and we begin to regard NATO as, sort of, an engineer
of European souls. I think that's a mistake. I think, you said
in your opening statement, sir, that, basically, the Americans
played a supporting role. The transformation of Europe is
really a European responsibility. NATO can only support them.
As we turn to Ukraine and Georgia, it seems to me the
greater danger of the Membership Action Plan is that they're
overqualified. They've been left so long in the waiting room of
Europe that they've completed the IPAP, they completed an
intensified dialogue, and most military experts will tell you
they've done most of the military reform and the
interoperability reforms normally required of the countries
which came through in the last round. Georgia, just to name
one, has a rotating battalion system that goes into Iraq, and
they're moving from three battalions to four battalions; and
basically, they always have a battalion rotating into Iraq.
That looks like interoperability to me. Also, when you look at
airlift and the stuff the Ukrainians can contribute, they do
contribute. We stack it up, hour for hour, we'll find that they
contribute more than half of our European allies. So, they are
delivering.
It seems to me what is being asked of us is, At what point
do we have a dialogue with a country like that, where we're
trying to discovery its way? I don't think it's correct to say
that Ukraine has basically asked for NATO membership. In fact,
they've said that they need to have a referendum--a future
referendum about it. They've asked for a dialogue.
And I'm sorry Senator Dodd has left, because I thought his
question about EU and NATO was really kind of profound in this
context. It's precisely--if you look back, the first piece,
after 1949, was built largely by the wartime alliance. The
second piece, after 1989, was built as Americans and members in
this committee supporting the heroes at Lech Walesa, Vaclav
Havel. It was a cooperative piece with democracy in central and
eastern Europe.
The third piece that you're now considering is basically a
partnership that was forged in the Balkans, between the EU and
NATO, that they had certain commitments. At the Thessaloniki
summit, the EU said that they would have membership for all the
Balkan countries. In those terms, it looks like NATO has fallen
behind. Croatia is now on the cusp of a membership decision,
and we're still making a membership decision. Commissioner Rehn
is opening SAAs, perhaps with Serbia, with Macedonia, but NATO
still doesn't know their membership status. It seems to me NATO
needs to keep up with our European allies as they take over for
us in Kosovo and they take security cognizance for southeast
Europe.
Already, the European Union is ahead of us in eastern
Europe, they have opened action plans with Ukraine and Georgia
under the neighborhood policy. We have not. And we're starting
to lose the complementarity with our partners on the other side
of the Atlantic. If we want to solve Senator Dodd's question,
we have to make decisions at Bucharest to keep the parallelism
between these two great organizations, the security
organization that this country has a defining role in, and the
European political experiment that is actually beginning to
build things in Brussels.
Finally, I would just express some reservations about the
suggestion that the Senate would ever consider conditions,
beyond, obviously, the powers that this company already has not
to send things to the floor until they're ready, and to require
the information to make an informed decision. But, having
pressured the Europeans not to impose national caveats or any
limitations on the soul of the Washington Treaty, it would be
impossible if we did the same kind of thing, and avoid any
suggestion that, ``If you have a bad election, we may not honor
our commitments.'' We did suffer through a period with Greece,
in the sixties; with Portugal, in the seventies; occasionally,
dare I say, with Turkey, on human rights, even today. These
are--these may be handled by European courts, by foreign
policy. We can handle those ruptures in our relations. But, we
cannot place limitations which weaken the foundation that sits
under the Transatlantic Alliance.
So, why don't I just stop there.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, President, Project on
Transitional Democracies, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you on ``NATO: Enlargement and
Effectiveness'' as we approach the NATO Summit in Bucharest, which is
now less than 3 weeks away. The NATO allies face a range of decisions
at Bucharest including missile defense and operations in Afghanistan,
as well as the very important question of NATO expansion and the
preparation for membership of potential candidates. I would like to
offer some context for this complex expansion question confronting NATO
heads of state, which, if it goes forward, requires the advice of this
committee and consent of the entire Senate. I believe that the choices
for the United States appear in sharper relief once we understand the
role NATO expansion has played in the development of modern Europe so
far.
For centuries, the Balkans and Europe's East have deserved their
reputations for igniting wider European wars and have given to European
history the place-names of genocide and mass starvation. In 1949, the
creation of NATO secured the post-World-War-II peace in Western Europe.
Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has played a
transformational role in building a second peace--this time in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Now NATO has an opportunity to lay the foundation for a third
European peace--this time in the Balkans--and to open a dialogue that
could lead to a fourth: A more constructive relationship between Europe
and Russia.
The transatlantic allies will face two critical questions when they
gather for their summit in Bucharest in April. The first is whether to
invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO, a decision that is
the culmination of a 15-year effort to end the wars that followed the
breakup of Yugoslavia. The second is what relationship Ukraine and
Georgia will have with NATO in the turbulent early years of their
development: Will they be set on a course that could lead to eventual
NATO membership, or will they be excluded?
Regarding the Balkans, critics say that Albania, Croatia, and
Macedonia are not ready for NATO membership. Farther east, they worry
about the fragility of democratic institutions in Georgia and Ukraine,
and they have concerns about the effect that NATO's engagement with
those countries would have on relations with Russia and on European
publics skittish about further enlargement of the European Union.
These larger questions give rise to a series of interrelated
questions which will shape the decisions of the 26 NATO leaders at the
Bucharest summit on April 2-4, 2008.
(1) How have the two recent expansions of the alliance--in
1999 to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and in
2004 to include Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Romania, and Bulgaria--affected U.S. and European security and
the integrity and capability of NATO? What does this experience
tell us about the prospect of further enlargement?
(2) What are the qualifications of Albania, Croatia, and
Macedonia, as measured against NATO standards and relative to
previous candidates at the point of entering the alliance?
(3) Actually, what criteria does NATO use in making these
important decisions? Are we moving the bar upward or downward?
(4) What is the status of the Western Balkans as a whole and
how will the entry of three new NATO members affect the
stability of Southeast Europe and the security of Europe more
generally?
(5) Assuming that the alliance takes a major step forward in
the Western Balkans, what is being done for the democracies of
Europe's East, such as Ukraine and Georgia, which will not be
considered for membership at Bucharest? Are they being left
behind?
(6) What about Russia? How will the third expansion of NATO
since 1989 and our engagement with Ukraine and Georgia affect
Russia's perceptions of the West and its relations with our
European allies?
(7) Finally, what are the implications of the Bucharest
summit for the foundation of the Atlantic alliance, for how the
United States and Europe share burdens, and for our
effectiveness working together in global politics?
Although these questions are demanding, we have accumulated a great
deal of experience since the fall of the Berlin Wall in the development
and integration of newly freed European states. There is extensive
empirical evidence informing us of how NATO expansion has helped build
the Europe we see today on which we can base an assessment of the role
further expansion will play in Europe's future.
BACKGROUND ON NATO EXPANSION
The post-cold-war expansions of NATO to the Visegrad countries
(named for a 1991 summit in Visegrad, Hungary) of Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary and then to the larger and more diverse Vilnius
Group (named for a 2000 summit in Vilnius, Lithuania) were actually
very different in terms of the process as it unfolded and its
significance for Europe. In terms of process, particularly in the
United States, an organized examination of the democratic credentials
and institutions of the Visegrad countries took a back seat to issues
the Senate (and this committee in particular) might focus on in the
course of a ratification debate. The substantive debate turned on how
expansion would affect relations with Russia and whether the United
States needed to remain in Europe at all. Especially telling was the
moral import of the struggle for freedom in the Visegrad states: The
Hungarian uprising of 1956, the 1968 Prague spring, the birth of
Solidarity in 1980--and the brutal Communist suppression of each.
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join NATO
in the first post-cold-war expansion because of the historical and
moral claim they had to return to the community of European states from
which they had been separated by 20th century totalitarianism. In
addition to the moral claim, the Visegrad accession was the last step
in ending the danger of war on the historically bloody north German
plain, which stretches from Moscow through Poland and Germany into
northern France. More than 10 years after this decision was taken in
July 1997 at the Madrid summit, the NATO allies have every reason to be
proud of their decision.
The second phase of expansion began at NATO's 50th anniversary
Washington summit in April 1999, when the so-called Membership Action
Plan (MAP) process was established for new aspirants in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The list of such aspirants soon grew to
include Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania,
Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. The MAP process was a
response to unwillingness of the NATO allies to go forward with
invitations to Slovenia and Romania at the Madrid summit in July 1997.
While many observers thought these rejections were unfair, NATO leaders
believed that inadequate reform and weak democratic institutions,
particularly in Romania, made the prospect of NATO accession premature
for these countries. They reasoned that the next generation of NATO
candidates would need a self-improvement course before invitations
could be extended.
With this decision, NATO formally entered the business of democracy
support. There were several immediate consequences of the creation of a
class of candidate countries in the process of trying to qualify for
membership. The class of countries granted a potential avenue toward
membership through MAP but no specific date for invitation could be
quite large. The process made it possible to sever the question of
whether one was legitimately an aspirant for membership from the
question of whether a country would actually be invited to join. Ten
candidates came in virtually overnight, some with very weak credentials
and a limited history as democracies. In addition, through MAP, the
class of candidates could be diverse both historically and
geographically, since the Vilnius Group was not claiming a single,
overarching strategic rationale.
In essence, the Vilnius Group claimed to represent a social and
political restoration of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe that
would render ``whole'' a Europe divided in the 20th century. The
unifying character of the second expansion can be seen in the frequent
references to the concept of ``a Europe that is whole, free, and at
peace,'' as President George W. Bush put it in his speech at Warsaw
University in 2001, in which he maintained that Europe must extend
``from the Baltic to the Black Sea'' to achieve this objective. The
Vilnius Group did precisely that, and seven countries from the group, a
self-help political club formed during a conference in Lithuania in May
2000, were invited to join NATO at the Prague summit in June 2002.
Although both the process of qualification and the significance for
Europe were different from the Visegrad round, the result has clearly
strengthened the NATO alliance and Europe itself.
QUALIFICATIONS OF ALBANIA, CROATIA, AND MACEDONIA
In terms of enlargement, the first question facing the NATO allies
as they gear up for the Bucharest summit is whether 9 years into the
Membership Action Plan, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are qualified
to enter NATO. Critics say that they are not. But the fact is that
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have spent 6 more years in rigorous
preparation for NATO membership than the seven other original members
of the Vilnius Group, and it shows.
Today, Croatia has the most impressive all round economic
performance of any country in southern Europe. In recent years, Albania
has contributed more soldiers to missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
international peacekeeping than most NATO allies. And, since the end of
the Balkan wars in 1999, Macedonia has arguably covered more ground in
building an integrated, multiethnic society in a short time than any
other European nation. We now have a chance to bring Catholic Croatia,
secular-Islamic Albania, and multiethnic Orthodox Macedonia into the
Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. If it remains the case that
qualification for NATO is predominantly determined by the ``social
criteria'' of democratic reform as well as military contributions to
international peacekeeping, then the three so-called ``Adriatic
Charter'' countries in the Western Balkans are fully qualified.
But since NATO has changed or adjusted its criteria for membership
and its rationale for expansion in the recent past, perhaps a third
expansion might be driven by different criteria and have unique
characteristics.
In addition to democratic criteria, the NATO allies seem to view
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia strategically in terms of Southeast
Europe, politically in terms of European integration, and
geopolitically in terms of the partnership in the Balkans between the
European Union and NATO.
Strategically, invitations to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia bring
the NATO security architecture inside the Western Balkans, which
remains the last unstable region in Central and Eastern Europe. The
Balkan candidates claim to be instituting a system of shared security
that will contribute to reducing the political instability of the
Western Balkans and thereby strengthening Southeast Europe, in both
political and economic terms.
The strategic claim is closely linked with the political
understanding of the question. NATO's early extension of a membership
perspective to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia and its tenacity in
preparing the Adriatic Charter candidates for membership clearly
reflects a political understanding of what the European Union decided
at the EU summit in Thessaloniki. In the communique from Thessaloniki,
the European Union ``guaranteed'' all the countries of the Western
Balkans eventual membership in all of Europe's institutions. If it is
the intention of the European Union to bring the Western Balkans into
the political and market institutions of Europe, then it is only common
sense for NATO to help strengthen these candidates where it can and to
ensure that a security structure will be in place so that EU
integration goes forward when its leaders see fit. Since Croatia is
already closing in on the final chapters of EU candidacy, NATO
invitations are, if anything, somewhat behind schedule.
The complementarity of European Union and NATO objectives is even
more pronounced if we look at the qualifications of the candidates in
geopolitical terms. Since 1994, the Western Balkans, more than any
other place in the world, has taught NATO and the European Union as
well as the United States and Europe how to work effectively together
across the entire spectrum of human rights, intervention, peacekeeping,
reconstruction, capacity-building, and integration missions--to name
but a few of the tasks that have been undertaken in this defining
collaboration to rescue and rebuild the former Yugoslavia.
What NATO and the European Union achieve or fail to achieve in the
Western Balkans may well define what we will undertake, or fail to
address, in the future throughout the Euro-Atlantic. In this analysis,
the NATO allies face an obligation to take any and all steps to ensure
that the Western Balkans has the highest probability of success. The
issuing of invitations to three qualified candidates is one of those
steps, but the alliance should not stop there. Bosnia, Montenegro, and
Serbia need the so-called ``Intensified Dialogue'' with NATO on
membership issues. This is the preliminary dialogue anticipating formal
adoption of a Membership Action Plan setting forth a path to membership
invitation.
Viewed from the perspective of objective democratic, strategic,
political, and geopolitical criteria--and viewed comparatively in
relation to accessions in the two previous rounds of expansion--the
candidates for invitation at the Bucharest summit have an overwhelming
case in their favor. Moreover, a failure to decide exposes the alliance
to significant risks and negative effects. Any further delay on the
candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia would diminish regional
stability just as Kosovo begins its extended period of supervised
independence. Delay would also confuse and undercut the European Union
as it takes over chief security responsibilities from the United States
and NATO throughout the region. Finally, inability to close the book in
the Balkans would also dangerously slow our engagement with Europe's
East, to which I now turn.
THE REMAINING QUESTION OF EUROPE'S EAST
Assuming that the Balkan accession goes forward at the Bucharest
summit, there remains the question of Europe's East--which might
someday become the territory on which a fourth expansion will take
place. Both Ukraine and Georgia have sent letters to the NATO Secretary
General formally requesting entry into the Membership Action Plan
process.
Both countries have long since completed the Individual Partnership
Program, and they have breezed through the Intensified Dialogue on
membership. Their senior officials argue, and Western military analysts
broadly agree, that Ukraine and Georgia have been in NATO's waiting
room for so long that they have completed the majority of the technical
military reform tasks usually delineated in the MAP process and are
already interoperable with NATO forces. For Ukraine, the Bucharest
summit is the second try for the Membership Action Plan. During the
Istanbul summit in 2004, President Kuchma requested MAP, but the
alliance refused on the grounds that Ukraine had sold radars to Iraq.
Although that charge turned out to be false--we did not find Ukrainian
radars in Iraq--the NATO allies undoubtedly made the right decision.
As we have seen from Poland to the Adriatic Charter countries, the
processes of NATO accession and its purposes evolve over time. Looking
at the requests of Ukraine and Georgia, we already know that military
criteria play very little role in how we define our interest in the
success of the two countries. In fact, these countries are not now
asking for NATO membership, although they would be delighted if we
treated them as prospective members. They are asking for the tools with
which to complete their reforms and ultimately to qualify for
membership consideration. In effect, the Membership Action Plan has
become a preschool for countries seeking to improve their credentials
for an EU perspective, or more extensive engagement with the European
Union. In this respect, the MAP process runs parallel to (while
remaining distinct from) the EU's Neighborhood Policy.
What NATO must decide is how NATO should engage with Ukraine and
Georgia in the course of an extended process of strengthening
democratic institutions, resolving so-called ``frozen conflicts,'' and
establishing their political orientation toward the West. To the degree
that political and democratic criteria will determine the speed and
extent of their integration into the EU and NATO, Ukraine and Georgia
closely resemble Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia at the time the three
entered the Membership Action Plan
Many NATO allies note that despite the astounding pace of reform
since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia stumbled in November 2007
when it cracked down on an opposition demonstration. Likewise, despite
the vibrant political pluralism of Ukraine and its repeated free and
fair elections, it seems that the country cannot maintain a governing
coalition or reach a political decision without a fistfight in
Parliament and a collapse of the government. But these are the familiar
juvenile delinquencies of young democracies finding their way in the
post-Soviet world. Helping them past this early fragility is an
important reason for them to be offered a collaborative relationship
with NATO.
As important as it is to understand that NATO's criteria on
expansion are constantly changing, it is also important to understand
what NATO's engagement and preaccession programs are not. A Membership
Action Plan offers no guarantee of future membership in NATO, let alone
in the European Union. To be precise, MAP would initiate an open-ended
process that anticipates that Georgia and Ukraine will spend many years
resolving critical national questions of stability, territorial
integrity, institutional capacity, and the resolution of frozen
conflicts before either NATO or the candidate country can make an
informed political decision on NATO membership. In this sense, the
first phase of engagement in Europe's East will be a process of
discovery wherein Europe learns more about the character, capability
and political intentions of Ukraine and Georgia--and these countries
understand the evolving requirements of both NATO and the European
Union.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP WITH
RUSSIA
Critics of NATO often cite past expansions as a decisive factor in
the deterioration of Russia's relationship with NATO, the United States
and Europe. Although NATO has an influence on the security,
integration, and engagement of Europe in the East and, therefore, an
influence on Europe's relationship with Russia, it can be argued that
NATO has exerted a positive influence on Russia over the longer term.
To the extent that NATO and the European Union succeed in the
stabilization and integration of the Western Balkans, Serbian
insecurities and historical anxieties may cease to be a neuralgic issue
in Russia's relations with the international community. Similarly,
closer relations with Ukraine and Georgia will remove the security
concerns that make addressing ``frozen conflicts'' extremely difficult
and will serve to further demilitarize the unstable regions of what
Russia once regarded as its ``Near Abroad.''
Over time, Ukraine and Georgia will become more stable and
undoubtedly more prosperous. Invariably, countries in the process of
building closer relations with NATO find they can safely demilitarize
and devote more of their energies to multilateral resolution of
conflicts with neighbors. Ultimately, closer relations between Europe
and Ukraine and Georgia would bring Russia closer to Europe and would
make the needed dialogues with Russia on democracy and energy that much
easier.
As a historical rule, the persistence of political vacuums between
Europe and Russia and the isolation of the fearful, fragile states
trapped within this belt of political instability are a danger to and a
barrier to cooperation between Europe and Russia. Since the mid-1990s,
NATO has done more than any institution to remove the physical
insecurity and end the isolation of Europe's East and Russia. As a
result of NATO's success in these areas, it is now possible to envision
new kinds of relationships with Russia, of which the Russia-NATO
Founding Act and the Russia-NATO Council are distant, cave-dwelling
ancestors.
If the Bucharest summit succeeds, both in the completion of a
Southeast European security system in the Balkans and a decisive, long-
term engagement with Ukraine and Georgia, it is not too early to
speculate about a new Russian relationship.
In the short term, the military dimension of the relationship
between Russia and the West is likely to continue to decline. We are
unlikely to find ourselves embarking on interminable negotiations on
the levels of nuclear and conventional forces reminiscent of the late
1970s and 1980s. These issues are no longer central. The pretense of
the last few years that Russia and the United States had found common
cause in areas such as North Korea, Iran, and counterproliferation
generally has generally proven false. Not only is the Russian
Government reluctant to help Europe and the United States on problems
of the potential development of an Iranian nuclear program, Russia
seems to have even less influence with North Korea than does the United
States. As a result, the Russia-NATO Council remains little more than a
vehicle to allow the Russian President to appear at NATO summits.
By the same token, it is clear that Russia and the rest of the
Euro-Atlantic community are not going to reach a common understanding
on the nature of democracy, the standards of human rights, the
protection of the press, the limitations on state power, and many other
political values that are the foundation of NATO and EU Member States.
However, the decisions at the Bucharest summit may set the stage
for recognition that Russia and Europe have common economic interests
and should begin to discuss the terms of trade. Already, the European
Union is about to open free trade discussions with Ukraine, and NATO
has put Europe's energy security on its agenda. While it is more likely
that the European Union will take the leading role in whatever
relationship develops on energy supply and related issues in trade and
development, it may fairly be said that NATO created the conditions
that made closer relations between Russia and Europe on economic
matters possible--primarily by means of three expansions and a new
engagement in Europe's East
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUMMIT FOR NATO
When the NATO allies met at Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, they
described their next meeting in Bucharest as ``an expansion summit.''
Since then, equally consequential issues concerning the success of NATO
operations in Afghanistan and how missile defenses will work in the
overall security architecture of Europe have been added to the agenda.
Success or failure on any of these questions will affect the strength
and integrity of NATO for years to come.
Still, it was the question of NATO membership that first signaled
that the Bucharest summit is likely to be an historic event in the NATO
alliance and in the development of modern Europe more generally. If the
Bucharest summit does invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join
NATO, if the alliance formally invites Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia
to start on the path to NATO and European integration, and if NATO
invites Georgia and Ukraine to enter the Membership Action Plan, thus
beginning a serious and sustained relationship with Europe's East, what
affect will NATO have had on modern Europe?
Mr. Chairman, in my view:
NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia would be
a major step toward the complete integration of Southeast
Europe into Euro-Atlantic institutions and would provide the
security foundations for an enduring peace in the Western
Balkans.
Invitations to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia to begin a
dialogue on NATO would formally parallel the policies of the
European Union toward the countries of the Central Balkans.
This would be an important signal that NATO and Europe's
Security and Defense Policy are equal partners in future
challenges.
Invitations to Georgia and Ukraine to enter NATO's
Membership Action Plan would signal a breakthrough engagement
with Europe's East which would strengthen the democratic and
economic development of both countries and may, ultimately, set
the stage for closer relations with Russia.
Finally, the decisions at the Bucharest summit, taken as a
whole, would announce that there is a new balance in burden-
sharing between the European Union and NATO. In each
affirmative decision at Bucharest, NATO will be either
anticipating an EU decision (for Croatia, NATO membership would
precede EU membership) or following appropriately on the lead
of EU policy (Ukraine's MAP would follow the EU's Neighborhood
Policy by 2 years).
In conclusion, NATO's adaptability to the changing needs and
various objectives of Visegrad, Vilnius, the Adriatic Charter, the
Western Balkan, and now the post-Soviet democracies in Europe's East is
nothing short of extraordinary. The NATO allies seem quite agile in
changing their mission from ending insecurity in the north German
plain, to completing Central and Eastern Europe, to stabilizing and
helping to integrate the Western Balkans, to strengthening democratic
institutions where it can, and in providing the relationships with
Ukraine and Georgia that may bring them to a political decision on NATO
membership and an EU perspective. NATO's Open Door policy has clearly
played a critical role in the development of modern Europe after 1989
and stands as one of the most clearheaded decisions made by the
alliance since the Marshall Plan. Looking back on the history of NATO's
initial engagements and expansions, there is no positive decision which
the allies have had cause to subsequently regret. Each NATO dialogue,
membership action plan, and NATO invitation has made the trans-Atlantic
alliance more effective and has served to unite and strengthen the
political order of modern Europe.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Townsend.
STATEMENT OF JAMES J. TOWNSEND, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Townsend. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. And it's a
great honor and privilege for me to appear before Senator Biden
and Senator Lugar to talk about these very important issues.
I've also submitted a written testimony for the record, and
that I'd like to have submitted there. Thank you very much.
The candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join
NATO bring with them both the strings that come with new
members, as well as the complex issues reflecting their history
and their geography. Drawing on the core of what is known as
the ``Perry Principles,'' after what Secretary of Defense Bill
Perry identified as the standards for new members, these
principles--civilian control of the military, civil societies
based on democracy, rule of law, a market economy, and good
relations with neighbors--still provide important guidelines
for candidates to know what the Alliance is looking for, in
terms of an ally, and it can also guide our own decisionmaking.
All three countries have reform efforts underway for years,
shaped by the NATO Membership Action Plan and by EU criteria,
as well. Strong majorities favor membership. Defense spending
levels are close to or over 2 percent of GDP.
On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with
affirm that all three nations have enthusiastically met and
implemented most of the military reform suggestions made to
them through the MAP, and are in better shape militarily than
most of the newest members were when they first entered the
Alliance.
But, metrics alone do not provide the justification for why
we may want these nations in NATO. To do that, we must consider
their membership in the context of why we bring in new members
and what our experience has been since 1999.
Since the end of the cold war, the Article 10 standards for
new allies took on a new interpretation based on Alliance
security considerations of a new time. Security was defined in
a more broadly political/strategic way as assuring
transatlantic security through the creation of a Europe whole,
free, and at peace. Bringing former adversaries into NATO and
the EU became an important part of creating this more stable
and integrated Europe. This led to NATO's largest period of
enlargement, when 10 former adversaries entered the Alliance,
beginning in 1999.
Now Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are following in the
train of those first 10. We have to consider their candidacy in
the same context we used to consider the latest 10 new members.
Will their membership help create a Europe whole, free, and at
peace? The answer to that question is that NATO membership for
these three is just as logical, just as consistent with past
decisions, and just as important for Alliance security as was
membership for the 10 newest allies, if not more so, given
Alliance security concerns in their region, especially with
Kosovo's declaration of independence.
Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings
peer pressure on members to act responsibly. Nations, if left
on their own, are freer to exploit regional problems to their
advantage. The pressure by peers and by the institutions will
make it very difficult for members to engage in acts that
contribute to regional instability.
This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the
reasoning behind Slovenia's NATO and EU membership as the first
nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions,
which was partially based on the importance of enhancing
regional stability.
NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will
bring to bear that role of NATO as agent for regional
stability, as described above. Membership will give these three
nations a focus on regional stability and on the responsibility
for security that comes with NATO membership, which will make
these three nations regional activists.
Like with Slovenia, admission of these three nations to
NATO will send an important signal to other nations in the
region that the door to membership is open to those nations
that accept the values and the institutions shared by the
allies.
However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that
remains to be done and the usefulness of a carrot of NATO
membership in helping governments make decisions about reform.
Therefore, I would like to recommend to the committee that, at
the NATO summit in Bucharest, invitations for membership be
extended to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, but it should be
recognized explicitly that each nation still must meet, or make
credible progress toward meeting, an achievable, but essential,
capability, goal, or goals in civil or military areas. If
nations do not meet these goals, or if NATO planners cannot
certify that significant progress is being made toward meeting
them, then accession to NATO membership is postponed until such
time as progress can be certified. I have no doubt that this
committee and the full Senate will want to be assured of that
progress.
As far as Georgia and Ukraine MAP are concerned, arguments
are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO's
Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest
summit. But, I also share my colleagues' views that it must be
understood that being given MAP participation does not mean
membership in NATO is assured.
And in the case of Georgia, the Georgian people and
government have made clear they would like to join the
Alliance, and Georgia has made great strides in military and
civil reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces deployed
in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and especially by improvements in
the Georgian economy.
The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one. MAP
should be extended to Georgia at the Bucharest summit. If,
however, the events during last November's crackdown on
political opposition has weakened allied consensus to extend
MAP at Bucharest, I would like to offer a suggestion made by
former Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer, that NATO Ministers
or Ambassadors decide the question of MAP after the spring
parliamentary elections.
However, in the minds of some observers, the questions
surrounding MAP for Georgia is whether the offer of MAP is
worth it if were to provoke a harsh reaction by Russia to what
it sees as a hostile NATO penetrating into an area that some
Russians consider a part of its sphere of influence. At its
root, the issue is not MAP, but what MAP represents: The
ability of a sovereign Georgia to decide for itself whether it
wants to join a transatlantic institution that Russia sees, at
least here, as encroaching upon its own interests in a way it
regards as unacceptable.
Russia has legitimate interest in the security policies of
its neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if
those neighbors wish to join NATO.
For Ukraine, participation in MAP is a logical next step,
and MAP should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit.
Unlike Georgia, however, support for NATO membership by the
Government of Ukraine has been inconsistent, and support for
membership by the Ukrainian people is weak, reflecting the
internal divisions in that country over the nature of its
relationship with Russia and its Western neighbors. However,
after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine's
President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament signed
a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking
to participate in the MAP process. Low support by the public
for NATO membership has not kept MAP from being extended to
other aspirants in a similar situation. Those nations have used
the MAP, and that time in the MAP process, to help build
support in their country for NATO membership. Despite this weak
support for NATO membership--and membership is not the issue
here--MAP should be extended so that reforms can become sharper
and more focused, while the Ukrainians sort out their future
relationship with NATO.
But, there is a similarity with the Georgia case for MAP,
and that is Russia. Ukraine represents both an emotional and
strategic center of gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian
membership in NATO raises, for Russians, not just misplaced
fears of NATO encroachment on its borders, but a shrinking of
what Russian strategists see as their sphere of influence. But,
Russian pressure should have no control over the decisions that
a sovereign nation like Ukraine should make about what
institutions it wants to affiliate with.
Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and
for Ukraine and for NATO. One of the great disappointments of
the past 10 years is the deterioration in the relations between
Russia and many nations and institutions in the transatlantic
community, even as democracy itself has deteriorated in Russia.
Since Russia joined PFP, the NATO/Russia relationship has been
based on practical cooperation, with NATO/Russia joint
operations in the Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor in
the Mediterranean. A Russian flag officer is even posted at
SHAPE, and NATO-Russia Council II meets regularly. But,
recently there has not been much movement on joint NATO/Russian
initiatives. Just as the history of cooperation should
demonstrate that Russian perceptions of NATO as a threat are
misplaced, and there is a foundation of cooperation that can be
built upon to help dispel this perception, one of the many
challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and strengthen
the NATO/Russia relationship. This will take hard work on both
sides. Russia and the nations of NATO will have to want to make
the relationship work, which we all have an interest in, given
our--given that our security is bound up with each other.
The new President of Russia would be pushing on an open
door at NATO if he chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new
strategic partnership.
Thank you very much for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]
Prepared Statement of James J. Townsend, Jr., Director, International
Security Program, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor and privilege for me to be
invited to testify before you and this committee on NATO enlargement
and other security issues impacting the broader Euro-Atlantic
relationship, recognizing the fact that one cannot talk about NATO
enlargement in isolation from other security issues which will also
shape NATO's future direction.
The Chairman of the Atlantic Council, GEN James Jones, has brought
together from the U.S. and Europe a group of well-regarded experts and
former senior level government officials well-versed in transatlantic
security that he calls his ``Strategic Advisors Group.'' This group
frequently comes together to work through these issues and to offer
policy recommendations to NATO and allied governments. Many of the
ideas in my testimony grow out of the work of this group. That said,
the opinions expressed here are my own.
NATO Enlargement: Should Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia be invited to
join NATO?
When the alliance began to enlarge again at the end of the cold
war, we all knew the day would come when enlargement would present us
with candidates whose histories, geography, and struggles with building
democracies and establishing relations with neighbors would bring more
complex issues into the debate than we had to address in the first
rounds. The candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO
bring with them both the strengths that come with new members as well
as the complex issues reflecting their history and geography.
Many of the questions and issues about their candidacy are
familiar:
Have these nations successfully used the Membership Action
Plan (MAP) to structure their armed forces to be able to work
with allied forces and be ``producers of security, not just
consumers'' and is there civilian control of those armed
forces?
Are the civil societies of these candidate nations based on
democracy, rule of law, and do they have a market economy and
civil institutions which foster these values--and is there
broad support in their societies for NATO membership?
Will all NATO nations be prepared to commit to come to these
countries' aid if they are attacked militarily?
Do the candidates have and can they maintain good relations
with their neighbors?
Drawing on the core of what is known as the ``Perry principles,''
after what Secretary of Defense Bill Perry identified as the standards
for new members, these principles still provide important guidelines
for candidates to know what the alliance is looking for in an ally and
for allies to consider as they decide on accession. They also remind
allies what those values are that we share and that make the
transatlantic community more than just a treaty construct, but a real
community strong enough to stand the tests of time and tensions, which
we have seen in abundance over the past few years.
As we consider whether to invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to
join us as allies, how well these nations are doing in meeting these
principles can guide our decisionmaking. All three countries have had
reform efforts underway for years in both their civil and military
sectors, shaped by their participation in NATO's Membership Action
Plan, their efforts to meet EU Stabilization and Association Agreements
as well as EU membership criteria, and by their work with the U.S. and
other allied nations.
An important indicator of the readiness of these nations to join
NATO is whether their people support membership: Strong majorities in
all three countries favor membership, majorities that should withstand
any changing political winds. Levels of defense spending are another
indicator, with levels close to or over 2 percent of GDP being
consistently maintained, which hits the NATO 2-percent target and is
above the level of defense spending for most allies.
On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with affirm that
all three nations have enthusiastically met and implemented most of the
military reform suggestions made to them through MAP and are in better
shape militarily than most of the newest members were when they entered
the alliance. Their armed forces have been downsized and
professionalized, obsolete equipment and facilities removed, and
brigades reorganized. Croatia has particularly made great strides in
building a deployable and interoperable force. Its Strategic Defense
Review has set a goal of developing ``usable forces'' with 40 percent
of its forces deployable, and 4 percent deployed at any one time. It
even hosted a NATO Response Force exercise last year. All three nations
have forces abroad as part of U.N., NATO, or EU missions, including
ISAF operations in Afghanistan and operations with coalition forces in
Iraq (Albania and Macedonia).
While such metrics show progress and a clearly positive reform
trajectory, there remains work to do by all three nations, especially
on the civil side. But metrics alone do not provide the justification
for why we may want these nations in NATO. To do that, we must consider
their membership in the context of why we bring in new members and what
our experience has been with enlargement since 1999.
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty says that the parties may
invite any other European states in a position to further the
principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area (emphasis added). I find the treaty drafters did a good
job of using just a few words to describe what we want a new ally to be
able to do, while leaving enough latitude for future decisionmakers to
take into account the security requirements of their day as they
consider new members.
Under article 10, NATO has steadily increased its ranks with
nations' allies concluded would further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the alliance. Each
decision was made on the merits of the candidate nation, both their
current capability and their future potential. Most importantly, each
decision was shaped by how the decisionmakers of the day interpreted
the security needs of the alliance and how that candidate could
contribute.
In 1949, as the alliance was going through its first effort to
bring in members, the priority for an allies' contribution to the
security of the alliance was primarily a military one, given the
military threat the West was under from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact. But even during the cold war, an allies' contribution to the
security of NATO did not require that each ally provide military
forces, given that one of the first allies, Iceland, did not even have
a military force. But despite this fact, Iceland was welcomed into the
alliance because it contributed to alliance security in ways other than
by providing military forces (such as political solidarity with the
West and strategic geography).
Since the end of the cold war, the article 10 standards for new
allies to be in a position to further the principles of the treaty and
to contribute to the security of the alliance took on a new
interpretation based on alliance security considerations of a new time.
No longer was the security of the North Atlantic area seen in the
context of facing off against the military threat from the Soviet
Union; instead, security was defined in less immediate military/
strategic terms but in a more broadly political/strategic way as
assuring stability through the effort to create a Europe ``whole, free,
and at peace.''
Bringing former adversaries into NATO (and the EU) became an
important part of creating this Europe ``whole, free, and at peace''
and thereby ensuring North Atlantic security. NATO membership provided
assurance of security and hence provided the psychological
underpinnings for countries to get on with the business of
democratization and developing liberal, Western economies.
The new allies were given NATO membership not because of their
military prowess (though all were expected to modernize their military
forces and did so in fits and starts), but because their membership
helped repair the divisions of Europe left by the cold war. And NATO
membership would help these nations develop the potential we knew they
had for developing over time the Western military and civil
institutions important to the alliance.
So the alliance grew over the past 10 years: First in 1999 came
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, followed in 2004 by Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The
alliance consensus was that all 10 candidates met the article 10
standard that they were in a position to further the principles of the
treaty and would contribute to the security of the alliance. They also
met the Perry principles. However, all of these new allies were given
membership despite still having work to do to meet NATO military
requirements and complete civil reform efforts at home.
Now, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are following in the train of
those first 10 new members and are being considered for membership
after working closely with NATO for years through membership in the
Partnership for Peace and participating in the Membership Action Plan.
But unlike the 10 nations that preceded them just a few years ago,
there is debate about their readiness for membership.
But we have to consider their candidacy in the same context we used
to consider the latest 10 new members--will their membership contribute
to alliance security by creating a Europe ``whole, free, and at
peace''? Like the 10 nations that preceded them as candidates, do
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia meet the article 10 requirements, as we
interpret them today, that they be in a position to further the
principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the
alliance? Will today's NATO allies be willing to honor their article 5
commitments if any of these countries were subject to aggression?
The answer to those questions is that NATO membership for these
three is just as logical, just as consistent with past decisions, and
just as important for alliance security as was membership for the 10
newest allies--if not more so, given alliance security concerns in
their region, especially with Kosovo's declaration of independence last
month.
Bringing in new members to NATO as a way to address European
regional security concerns has been an important role for NATO, dating
back to the inclusion of Germany as a member in 1955 as part of an
agreement to allow Germany to rearm. At the end of the cold war, as the
West began to deal with simmering ethnic tensions, NATO's role as an
agent for regional stability became even more useful, especially in the
Balkans.
This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the
reasoning behind Slovenia's NATO (and EU) membership as the first
nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions, which was
partially based on the importance of enhancing regional stability by
increasing Slovenia's clout as a leader in organizing and promoting
regional confidence-building initiatives. NATO and EU membership for
Slovenia also sent a signal to nations in the region, many with ethnic
problems and civil dysfunction like corruption, that reforming domestic
laws and institutions to conform to European standards can lead to
integration into European institutions.
Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings peer
pressure on members to act responsibly; nations if left on their own
are freer to exploit regional problems to their advantage. The pressure
by peers and by the institutions will make it very difficult for
members to engage in acts that contribute to regional instability. The
personal relationships that develop between leaders, and the peer
pressure and institutional help that come from NATO membership, is one
reason why Turkey and Greece have not engulfed the Eastern
Mediterranean in war over the past 60 years.
NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will bring to
bear that historic role of NATO as agent for regional stability as
described above. Membership will give these three nations a focus on
regional stability, and the responsibility for security that comes with
NATO membership will make these three nations regional activists for
stability. All three have already demonstrated such efforts through
their work in the Southeast European Defense Ministerial initiatives,
participation in its regional peacekeeping force (SEEBRIG) and
leadership hosting PFP exercises and programs. Finally, like with
Slovenia, admission of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to NATO will
send an important signal to other nations in the region, like Serbia,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, that the door to membership is open to
those nations that accept the values and institutions shared by the
allies.
But most importantly, the peer pressure both from fellow allies and
from NATO as an institution will ensure that as the Balkans continue to
move beyond its painful and violent transition to a stable and
democratic region, these three nations will themselves ratify their
roles as part of the solution to regional issues, and not be part of
the problem. These three nations have shown by their actions that they
understand the responsibilities which come with NATO membership, and
are already acting as agents of stability and security in the Balkans.
Europe truly cannot be said to be ``whole, free, and at peace''
without the Balkan nations being part of those institutions, NATO and
the EU, that produce and guarantee that state. It is illogical to leave
these three outside of an integrating Europe at a time when Balkan
tensions can be lessened by adding the presence of three NATO allies in
the region.
However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that remains
to be done and the usefulness of the ``carrot'' of NATO membership in
helping governments make difficult decisions about reform. My
experience with NATO enlargement from its earliest days is that reform
efforts can lose momentum after a nation enters the alliance, as
political imperatives go elsewhere. Increases in military spending and
painful civil reform decisions become harder to make when NATO
membership no longer tops the Prime Minister's priority list.
Therefore, I would like to recommend to the committee that at the
NATO summit in Bucharest, invitations for membership be extended to
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. But it should be recognized explicitly
that each nation still must meet or make credible progress toward
meeting an achievable but essential capability goal or goals in civil
or military areas. A summit deadline to accelerate civil reform efforts
was used with good effect during the first round of enlargement, when
allies felt aspirant progess in key areas was too slow. If nations do
not meet these goals or if NATO planners cannot certify that
significant progress is being made toward meeting them, then accession
to NATO membership is postponed until such time as progress can be
certified.
Timing is key. Invitations extended at Bucharest must then be
ratified by each of the 26 NATO allies, some pro forma and some, like
the approval of the U.S. Senate, both rigorous and systematic. While
time is short for this ratification period, which ideally should be
completed before NATO's 60th anniversary summit in 2009 where it is
intended that new allies will be welcomed into the alliance, there
should be enough time to begin an intensive effort to make significant
progress in important civil areas. I have no doubt that this committee
and the full Senate will want to be assured of that progress.
While I leave the specific capability goals to be determined by
NATO planners and experts, the three nations could use the next year to
intensify efforts to make civil reforms, such as fighting corruption or
organized crime, or military reforms to improve the deployability,
sustainability, or interoperability of their forces. The requirement to
meet civil-military capability goals for NATO accession should provide
ministries political clout in capitals to meet important goals before
the NATO accession process is completed, rather than afterward, when
NATO is no longer the priority.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia should be
offered invitations to join the alliance at the Bucharest summit,
invitations that will continue the construction of a Europe whole,
free, and at peace. But let us use the time between invitation and
accession to initiate an intensive effort to make further progress
toward meeting important objectives in their civil-military reform
efforts.
Should NATO offer to Ukraine and Georgia participation in the
Membership Action Plan (MAP)?
Arguments are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO's
Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit.
While MAP, in and of itself, is not assurance of membership, it is a
powerful tool when used by planners in MAP countries to accelerate
reform efforts, many of which are shaped by the MAP
Georgia
Since the end of the cold war, NATO has developed a number of ways
for nations to establish a relationship with the alliance short of
membership. For example, membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace
(PFP) offers many nations a way to tailor their relationship with NATO
so that it suits their nation's ambition and abilities and has always
been a necessary way station to NATO membership for those who want it.
The Membership Action Plan, by contrast, is a step beyond PFP and is
offered as a further and deeper relationship with NATO for countries
that want to become members. Work with NATO through MAP helps aspiring
members make those additional civil and military reforms necessary to
be considered a viable candidate for membership. But participation in
MAP is no guarantee of membership in NATO, it merely offers a path in
that direction . . . the decision is up to the allies. However, NATO
should not offer--and has never in the past offered--MAP to an aspirant
whom allies collectively do not think has the potential for eventual
membership, or to a nation where the people do not want NATO
membership.
Georgia has been in PFP since 1994 and took another step toward
membership by beginning an Intensified Dialogue with NATO in 2006. The
Georgian people and government have made clear they would like to join
the alliance and Georgia has made great strides in military and civil
reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces deployed in Iraq and in
Afghanistan and especially by improvements in the Georgian economy.
Participation in MAP will help Georgia continue to make progress in its
march toward membership, especially in judicial reform, where NATO has
stressed the need for a more independent Georgian judiciary. The frozen
conflicts in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia complicate
Georgia's relationship with NATO and make some allies squeamish about
extending MAP. Progress must be made in finding a solution to these
problems, and U.S. leadership in helping Georgia to find a way forward
is critical. But as the process toward membership continues, Georgia
should not be penalized if it works to resolve these problems and
others do not.
Georgian aspirations were dealt a blow last November when, in
response to opposition protests, a state of emergency was declared and
there was violence in the streets. Efforts at political outreach by the
Saakashvili government and upcoming parliamentary elections this spring
may help restore faith that Georgian democracy is back on track.
The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one: MAP should be
extended to Georgia at the Bucharest summit. If, however, there is not
consensus to do so, I would like to offer a suggestion made by former
Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer, for NATO at ministerial or
ambassadorial level to decide the question of MAP after the spring
parliamentary elections, if allies need reassurance that democratic
reform is working again in Georgia. At a minimum, the alliance could
offer a program of intensive military reform assistance to Georgia
similar to that between NATO planners and Ukraine to give Georgian
reform efforts a boost until there is consensus at NATO to offer
Georgia participation in MAP.
However, in the minds of some observers, the question surrounding
MAP for Georgia is not just whether it (and NATO) are ready to move to
a closer relationship. The question is whether the offer of MAP is
worth it if it were to provoke a harsh reaction by Russia to what it
sees as a hostile NATO penetrating into an area that some Russians
still cannot accept as no longer a part of its sphere of influence. At
its root, the issue is not MAP, but what MAP represents--the ability of
a sovereign Georgia to decide for itself whether it wants to join a
transatlantic institution that Russia sees, at least here, as
encroaching upon its own interests in a way it regards as unacceptable.
Russia has legitimate interests in the security policies of its
neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if those neighbors
wish to join NATO. At the end of the day, the long-term NATO-Russia
relationship cannot be built on the basis of a cordon sanitare between
Russia and its NATO neighbors.
The issue is not new. When the three Baltic Republics expressed a
desire to join NATO, there was Russian concern about that as well. But
the Baltic nations and NATO pressed ahead with developing a
relationship based on the simple but important truth that the decisions
of sovereign nations were theirs alone to make and not the province of
third parties. Georgia as a sovereign nation has the right to seek NATO
membership, and the alliance should make that decision based on its
needs and its criteria.
Ukraine
NATO has a special relationship with Ukraine and even a special
committee devoted to developing NATO-Ukraine initiatives--the NATO-
Ukraine Commission. NATO has worked closely with Ukraine for years, and
has established an office there, to develop and implement initiatives
that help Ukraine with reform efforts, especially on the military side.
Participation in MAP is a logical next step for Ukraine, and MAP
should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. This will take
Ukraine one step closer to NATO membership. Progress in economic reform
in Ukraine since independence in 1991 is impressive, with a growing
market economy, foreign investment, and consistently some of the
highest growth rates in Europe.
Its military reforms, lacking adequate funding and not keeping pace
with reforms on the more successful civil side, have created smaller,
more deployable units that have deployed abroad, taking part in NATO
operations in the Balkans and in coalition operations in Iraq. Ukraine
is also one of the few European nations with strategic lift. All
indicators show extending MAP to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit as a
logical next step in the NATO-Ukraine relationship.
However, unlike Georgia, support for NATO membership by the
Government of Ukraine has been inconsistent and support for membership
by the Ukrainian people is weak, reflecting the internal divisions in
that country over the nature of its relationship with Russia and its
Western neighbors. While this lukewarm support for NATO membership
should not be an obstacle to extending MAP to Ukraine, it makes allies
doubt Ukraine's commitment and ultimate direction toward membership.
However, after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine's
President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament signed a
letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking to
participate in the MAP process.
Low public support for NATO membership has not kept MAP from being
extended to other aspirants in a similar situation, who have used the
MAP to help build support in their country for NATO membership. But
clearly, successful MAP participation will require on Ukraine's side
not only a clear and unambiguous desire and commitment to undertake the
work that comes with MAP participation, but also real confidence that
that commitment is backed by a broad consensus of the Ukrainian people.
The outreach effort in Ukraine will be hard, especially given the
difficulty in solidifying support for NATO in the government. Despite
this weak support for NATO membership--which is not the issue here--MAP
should be extended so that reforms can become sharper and more focused,
while the Ukrainians sort out their future relationship with NATO.
But there is a similarity with the Georgian case for MAP, and that
is Russia. Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic center of
gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian membership in NATO raises for
Russians not just misplaced fears of NATO encroachment on its borders,
but a shrinking of what Russian strategists see as their ``sphere on
influence.'' Like with Georgia, some Russians still have a hard time
adjusting to a sovereign Ukraine. But, Russian pressure should have no
control over the decisions that a sovereign nation like Ukraine should
make about what institutions it wants to affiliate with. Russia should
have no veto in Kyiv, Tbilisi, or in Brussels.
Russia
Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and Ukraine
and for NATO. One of the great disappointments of the past 10 years is
the deterioration in the relations between Russia and many nations and
institutions in the transatlantic community, even as democracy itself
has deteriorated in Russia.
Since Russia joined PFP, the NATO-Russia relationship has been
based on practical cooperation, with NATO-Russia joint operations in
the Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the
Mediterranian. A Russian flag officer is even posted at SHAPE. The
NATO-Russia Council, too, meets regularly, but recently there has not
been much movement on joint NATO-Russia initiatives. Just this history
of cooperation should demonstrate that Russian perceptions of NATO as a
threat are misplaced and that there is a foundation of cooperation that
can be built upon to help dispel this perception. But the mistrust that
has grown recently between Russia and the West has caused us to lose a
historic opportunity to work together at NATO to ensure transatlantic
security--security just as important to Russia as it is for the other
nations of the transatlantic community.
One of the many challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and
strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship. This will take hard work on
both sides; Russia and the nations of NATO will have to want to make
the relationship work, which we all have an interest in given that our
security is bound up with each other. This will call for creative ideas
and determined leadership within NATO and in Moscow to figure out how
we can get the relationship moving forward again in a practical
direction.
The new Russian President would be pushing on an open door at NATO
if he chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new strategic partnership.
He could begin to demonstrate such leadership by supporting joint NATO,
U.S., and Russian work in missile defense for Europe.
Afghanistan
In my judgment, a vibrant NATO depends on enlargement to bring in
new allies with energy, new ideas, and capabilities to keep NATO
relevant and robust. The NATO of the future that new allies will join
will be shaped by many things, chief among them the outcome of the
international effort to help Afghanistan stand on its own feet as a
sovereign nation and not become a failed or failing state. NATO plays a
critical role in that effort by providing a safe and secure environment
for the international community to assist the Afghans in rebuilding
their country, as well as assisting the Afghan Government in security-
related development, including mentoring Afghan security forces.
The Atlantic Council released an issue brief last month here in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee room that expressed great concern
with the state of this recovery effort in Afghanistan by both the
international community (including NATO) and the Kharzai government.
This study was concerned about NATO efforts because allies were not
providing the capabilities requested by military commanders and lacked
a sense of commitment to see the job through.
Mr. Chairman, I will let our study speak for itself, but among the
recommendations we made, I would like to highlight the need for a
comprehensive strategy that coordinates the civil and military security
and reconstruction effort by the international community in
Afghanistan. We recommended that NATO host with the Afghan Government a
conference that pulls together the parties in the international
community (such as the World Bank, the EU, the major NGOs) who are the
primary contributors to Afghan civil reconstruction. Together with
NATO, the international institutions represented at the conference
could develop such a strategy. Once completed, this comprehensive
strategy could be given U.N. approval and used by the Afghan Government
and U.N. Representative Kai Eide to better coordinate and implement
international reconstruction efforts with the Kharzai government. At
the Bucharest summit, the alliance must address not only the shortfalls
in its ISAF mission in Afghanistan, but its ``Vision Statement'' on
Afghanistan should be strong enough to move the international community
to better organize its reconstruction efforts as well.
Missile Defense in Europe
A future mission for the alliance that new members will face is
missile defense. At one end of the missile defense spectrum, NATO is
considering how best it should protect deployed NATO forces in theater
from missile attack. At a more strategic level, the United States has
embarked on a bilateral--actually trilateral--program to build a third
ballistic missile defense site with elements in Poland and the Czech
Republic to provide most of NATO. Europe with protection from ballistic
missile threats, both today but especially from prospective threats in
the future. NATO has begun internal discussions about expanding NATO's
own planning to include a capability to defend those parts of alliance
territory--in southeast Europe and Turkey--that because of proximity to
the potential Iranian threat will be outside the coverage of the Third
Site.
The Atlantic Council hosted a conference on the U.S. ``third site''
effort last year, and it was clear that most nations, including the two
hosts for the site, were anxious to have the U.S. and NATO efforts
joined together. Having NATO involved in an appropriate way in the
Third-Site effort helps both host nations build support domestically
for participating in the U.S. project and helps build acceptance more
broadly across Europe and makes clear that the U.S. initiative is
genuinely directed at contributing to multilateral security and is not
a manifestation of supposed American unilateralism. There may be other
ways where the U.S. and NATO could cooperate on European missile
defense. NATO and Russia have worked together on missile defense as
well, and it would be a natural fit for NATO, Russia, and the United
States to work jointly on missile defense and so ease the paranoia that
has grown up around the U.S. program, especially in Moscow. Such a
joint approach, should be raised at the Bucharest summit with Russian
President Putin should he participate.
NATO and the New Threats
Another issue that will shape NATO is how it prepares for a future
security environment that includes security threats that are not the
traditional military ones, but can have their own destructive impact,
such as cyber attack or the use of energy access as a weapon.
Certainly, Estonia considered itself under attack last year when its
cyber space was invaded and computer systems brought down.
These new types of nonmilitary threats to the Transatlantic
community call for a new way of thinking for allies as we consider
NATO's role in dealing with a future security environment that includes
such nontraditional threats as cyber attack and energy security. These
issues are difficult at NATO because there is no agreement among allies
that these threats should even involve NATO. If NATO did become
involved, questions are raised about what NATO could do on a practical
basis in response.
First, energy security needs to be recognized at NATO as a
legitimate security issue for the alliance where it has a role to play;
a role perhaps not even imagined today. Therefore, allies need to think
through possible NATO roles in energy security and include them in NATO
defense planning. Ensuring energy security can be an important NATO-EU
mission as well, where both institutions have equities at stake in
ensuring the security of their member's access to energy supplies. Both
institutions would bring to the table important tools to provide for
that security. For example, the alliance could work with the EU and
with nations to help protect vital energy infrastructure in Europe
which much of Europe depends on for energy transport. Both could also
develop together better maritime domain awareness, which would help
NATO and the EU respond to any threats to sea movement of energy
resources. Finally, NATO and the EU could help train the military
forces or law enforcement in energy-producing nations where security of
energy infrastructure is a problem.
Summary
In summary, Mr. Chairman, while I have touched on many issues
today, they all involve NATO's future. I believe bringing Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia into the alliance is important to NATO's future,
but even more important for stability and security in Europe,
especially in the Balkans. These three cannot rest on their oars
however; they have much work to do. Extending a membership invitation
at Bucharest with accession in 2009 made contingent by NATO nations in
the ratification process on their meeting or making progress on
priority civil-military capability goals will help them accelerate
their work. I also believe extending MAP to Ukraine and Georgia is
important for NATO's future; MAP will help these countries take forward
their already impressive reform efforts so that, one day, when NATO
membership for these two countries is before this committee, they will
be ready.
The NATO that nations continue to want to join as members must
remain as vibrant, relevant, and capable into the future as it was when
the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted and signed in 1949. Those first
transatlanticists who drafted the North Atlantic Treaty wrote a
document that continues to speak directly to issues of security and
peace almost 60 years later, when countries unimaginable in 1949 as
allies either have joined or are on the cusp of joining the alliance.
These new nations will meet the challenges laid out by the treaty
drafters in article 10, and will be in a position to take forward the
principles of the treaty and to ensure the security of the alliance. I
hope Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will be joined by other new
members over time. But one thing is certain, members, new and old, will
face new threats to that security, and the alliance needs to begin
planning for those new challenges now.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been
a very good panel.
Let me--because you've answered, succinctly, a number of
the questions each of us have had, I'm going to focus on two
things, if I may.
One is, let me ask a rhetorical question. If we don't grant
MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia, what in the devil does that
say? The Russians threaten to target Ukraine and we conclude
not to offer the status? It seems to me it's almost an
overwhelming reason why you almost have to offer the status.
Anybody disagree with that notion?
Yeah, Ron.
Dr. Asmus. You know, we--just want to add a dose of
European reality to this conversation, since I live in
Brussels. And I'm in favor of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia, but
I would say the chance of it happening at NATO in Bucharest are
about 10 percent today; and they were zero percent a couple of
months ago. And they've only become 10 percent because of the
Russians saying the things they have.
And, when I listen to European colleagues, the first thing
is, many of them don't--start with the question, Are Georgia
and Ukraine part of Europe? And even some, like Vaclav Havel--
--
The Chairman. You said they ``do not start.''
Dr. Asmus. They do start with the fundamental question,
which is not fully answered in NATO----
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. About whether these countries are
part of the Europe that they think should be in the Alliance.
And even a hero of ours, Vaclav Havel--I was stunned--at NATO,
gave a major speech, 2 weeks ago, saying that Georgia is not
part of Europe and should never become a member of NATO. Just
to show you how complicated this debate is. Not some soft
French or British or German--Vaclav Havel, freedom fighter
hero, saying, ``I think Ukraine is in, but Georgia isn't.''
Second, you know, we have this vision of the nineties that
you all contribute to, and we all helped, Baltic to the Black
Sea. Ukraine and Georgia is not like adding Estonia or Hungary.
This is a major strategic move deep into Eurasia and across the
Black Sea. It's not just a little bit more of the same, it is a
fundamental strategic move to transform Eurasia, and, you know,
a huge part of what I still think of as Europe. And I'm in
favor of that. But, not all Europeans have crossed that
strategic bridge and said, ``Yes, we're going to spend 10
years, again, trying to transform the next part of Eurasia.''
And when you--when I go to Berlin--of course, some people, it
is the Russia factor, let's be honest, Senator--but there's a
lot of people--when I go to talk to Chancellor Merkel's
adviser--it's not Russia, it is the--the questions they have
about Misha's democratic credentials, about the solidity of the
Western orientation of Ukraine, and they say, ``MAP, for us,
means a country's in NATO over the next 3 or 4 years.'' Now, I
disagree with that. I think we should redefine MAP to get away
from this issue, and we're not willing to cross that bridge.
So, I think we make it too easy for ourselves if we really
want to convince the Europeans to go down this road with us,
which is what I want to do, to say, ``It's all because of
Russian this, that, and the other thing.'' They're fundamental
strategic questions here that many of us have answered for
ourselves, but which haven't been fully thrashed out in the
Alliance, as a whole, which is why we don't have consensus. And
if we're honest--and I--one or two of you asked the question
to, you know, Dan Fried, our good friend--the United States is
not playing a leader--this Government, this administration, at
this moment, has not made up its mind on the question of
whether MAP should be granted. I think, Senator, you were very
gentile in the way you put the question. But, we know that,
without strong and assertive American leadership, for months,
you're not going to build this consensus and achieve this kind
of strategic breakthrough that I think everyone on this panel,
and probably the vast majority of your colleagues, want.
So, this is a big move. It's a hard move. If we had 6
months to go, I would have been much more optimistic. But, to
think that we can turn this around in a couple of weeks, unless
the President gets on the phone and really engages, personally,
with key leaders, to move them, I think we're going to end up
with very little for Georgia and Ukraine, and then people will
be asking the question, Senator, that you asked, in spite of
all this stuff; then, the Georgians and Ukrainians are going to
be very, very nervous, and we will understand exactly why they
feel vulnerable.
The Chairman. Phil. And then you, Bruce.
Dr. Gordon. Yes, I'll--just two very brief points.
Ron is absolutely right that the Europeans, at present, are
quite hostile to this invitation. But, I would remind us all--
and those of us who have watched NATO for a number of years
have seen this so many times--an issue on which the Europeans
were uncomfortable, skeptical, and opposed, and eventually,
after United States leadership, came around. And that's true
whether it was enlargement to the initial countries who got in,
or to the Baltic States, or the NATO Response Force, or--
earlier, I gave the example of Afghanistan, where, just a few
years ago, it was just--not even a prospect to imagine NATO
doing this mission; and, of course, NATO has now taken it over.
So, I do think that it is possible, with United States
leadership and a bit more help from the Russians, who are
making the case for Ukraine. and NATO, that we could move this
ball.
The second thing I would say, Senator Biden, in response to
your specific question, ``What happens if we don't?''--well,
here's what happens. Then NATO holds a 60th anniversary summit
very early on in the new President's administration, and this
comes up again, because, of course, the Georgians and the
Ukrainians will ask for it again. And then we get to be in the
position then of saying no again, which sort of says, well,
every time the Russians rattle their sabers, we say no, or
saying yes and being able to begin a new administration by
having this crisis with Russia. Not an approach that I would
recommend.
The Chairman. Well stated.
Bruce.
Mr. Jackson. Sir, can I suggest that this--a rejection at
Bucharest would be even worse than you have sketched out.
One, undoubtedly, President Putin will announce at
Bucharest that, under his administration, he has succeeded in
closing Europe's open door, and there is now a Russian space of
influence. And, frankly, the world press will undoubtedly agree
with him, because it appears to be true.
Second, the EU has said, ``If we wait a little bit more,
it'll be easier for us.'' Actually, the reverse is the case.
What you cannot do at Bucharest--Chancellor Merkel is not going
to want to do in Germany, in 12 months; it'll be harder there.
And, frankly--if we delay--we're talking about an extended
period of time.
Also, this will not be the first rejection for Ukraine,
this will be the second, because we rejected the request of the
Kuchma Government on the quality of the government, and on arms
traffic issues at Istanbul. And we said that, ``If you get a
democratic government, conduct free and fair elections, and ask
us again in a clear way, we will say yes.'' Well, they did. It
would be devastating to our credibility if we said, ``Under
those circumstances, where you have''----
The Chairman. Bruce, do you disagree? Ron says that, no
matter what we all say right now, unless somewhere there's a
transformative moment at the White House and the President
wakes up tomorrow morning and decides to make this a priority,
that there is a 10-percent chance that such an invitation will
be made. Do you----
Mr. Jackson. I always get in awkward situations. But, I
think if you're making the case that the administration was
late to the game, and does not get fully engaged in the game, I
think that's a fair criticism, that accounts for----
The Chairman. Well, I'm not making a criticism, I'm just
making an observation. I mean----
Mr. Jackson. That's----
The Chairman [continuing]. Short of the President deciding
this is critical, this is important for Bucharest----
Mr. Jackson. Short of that----
The Chairman [continuing]. Short of him making that clear,
is there any----
Mr. Jackson. Both Paris and Berlin have said we won't be
the only one opposing it, you know, if the others agree.
They're still hiding behind that--if America really wants it,
and the rest of the Europeans come, they will go along. They
have said that. Now, the vote count today is somewhere--we're
short of that position, but there's 3 weeks to go.
I should also point out that, you know, there is a security
liability, basically defining a security perimeter. Today we do
not have a dialogue with these countries. That's devastating.
And also, a point that's persuasive to President Sarkozy. In
the new United States administration, and in 2009, under the
Lisbon Treaty, there are things we need to talk about, such as
energy security and the Russian relationship. The two
countries, we need to participate in that, are Georgia and
Ukraine. We will not be able to begin the dialogues on energy
security without having a relationship with these countries.
The Chairman. Let me ask you--my time is up, but let me ask
you one other question. Am I misreading this, or is it likely
that we're not going to get an agreement negotiated between
FYROM--Macedonia and Greece? Greece is going to veto, if that
occurs. What about the other two? Is it all or none?
Mr. Jackson. Well, sir, I----
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Jackson. Right now, it doesn't look likely. They are
going back again, I guess negotiations are beginning again, but
they are far apart, and, frankly, I didn't--Senator Menendez
isn't here--the Greeks have been hardening their position for
the last 3 or 4 months, and they don't really want an
agreement. And both governments, both in Skopje and in Athens,
are too weak to cut the Gordian Knot, and both of them need
this standoff as a political plus.
The Chairman. What about the other two? They're in? You
mean--you know some are making the argument ``all or none,''
you know, the way to put pressure on the Greeks is to say, you
know, ``If you veto, you know, Macedonia''----
Mr. Jackson. You get into--it seems to me, you're probably
going to find it's one or three. You could probably get away
with Croatia, if you wanted to do an entire round for--what is
it? Three million people. But taking only Albanians after
Kosovo, and then leaving out the only multiethnic Slav
community in the south, basically, it could break the Ohrid
Framework structure.
The Chairman. Anybody have a view on--I'd like all of
your----
Dr. Asmus. I----
The Chairman [continuing]. Opinions on that, and----
Dr. Asmus. Senator, I think----
The Chairman [continuing]. Then I'll cease.
Dr. Asmus. I think you said it in your opening remarks. You
have to treat these countries as individual countries on their
own merits while then thinking about the regional context. We
had this discussion. There was one point, in the late nineties,
where we seriously considered doing two out of three Baltic
countries, because one was falling behind. It scared the
bejesus out of the one that was falling behind, and it caught
up again. Thank God it did. And it was the threat of leaving it
behind that scared it. But, this--Macedonia is hostage to
someone that's a little bit above its head and its paygrade to
being resolved here. I think, in theory, we should be willing
to do A2, but A2--I mean, leave my skepticism aside for a
second--if the goal here is to stabilize the region, the most
fragile country is Macedonia, of these three. So, if you leave
the most fragile country outside and vulnerable, in terms of
what you're accomplishing strategically, you know, I--you know,
I--because, you know, Macedonia is part of the Albanian/Kosovo,
you know, set of issues. And if that's what--if that's what
this round of enlargement is supposed to be about,
strategically, then, I think, you know, you've got to bring
Macedonia in as part of solving that--or your contributing to
progress on that set of issues. And----
The Chairman. But, you can't bring Macedonia in if the
Greeks say no and it seems pretty clear to me, in my meetings,
that it's not likely, between now and Brussels, there's going
to be an agreement.
Dr. Asmus. I think--I have--and I don't mean this as a--you
know, these are issues--if you want to get these issues right,
this really requires some heavy lifting from our President. You
know, this is a--these are Presidential----
The Chairman. Ron, I tried.
Dr. Asmus. You know?
The Chairman. I tried. [Laughter.]
You know, I mean----
Dr. Asmus. I mean----
The Chairman. You know----
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. You're prodding----
The Chairman. And we've both tried.
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. And if you make it absolutely----
The Chairman. You know, I mean----
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. Positively----
The Chairman. The hell. [Laughter.]
Dr. Asmus. You know, I think this could be an issue----
The Chairman. I can't help you there.
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. Like Madrid, that goes--that is
unresolved going into Bucharest, into the meeting of heads of
state, and they have to resolve it at, you know, a closed
meeting----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. Just like we had to do that in
Madrid.
The Chairman. I'm sorry, Mr. Townsend. I--you've----
Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Senator. Not a problem.
I just wanted to say that, while the issue on the name
and--between Greece and Macedonia is a hard one, I will put in
a little bit of optimism, saying, I guess, kind of, what Ron
was saying there, that I have certainly seen, in the past,
very, very tough questions that seemingly look like they're not
going to be resolved by two countries, that melt away as you
get closer to a summit, particularly if one of those countries
wants to become a NATO ally. So, I certainly expect there will
be lots of skirmishing, lots of hand-wringing in the days to
come, but it could very well be, in the day or so, or maybe
even at the summit, as Ron suggested, the doors will close, and
all of a sudden there'll be a new name that pops out for what
we call ``Macedonia.''
And one more point, Senator, if I may, with Ron. Ron, I
also lived in Brussels, and, in fact, worked at NATO, where I
had to exercise that leadership to move allies that were very
reluctant, in a lot of ways, to move in certain directions. And
I think the example of the first round of enlargement is one of
those, as we all worked on that, and we had a lot of heavy
lifting to do, in terms of leadership.
And I just want to go back, as far as Georgia and Ukraine
and MAP is concerned. It is about U.S. leadership. I think we
do have a strategic window of opportunity here to go to just
the Membership Action Plan, and I think we ought to not lose
sight of what we're talking about here. We always say that,
when you into the MAP, obviously there is--membership is an
ultimate goal, but, as far as MAP is concerned, by itself as a
tool, it's a very strong one that nations can use to refine and
to sharpen their ability to take on reform. And I think Ukraine
and Georgia are there for that. And it's--again, it's a
strategic question, here. And I think MAP is the right way to
go. But, we'll never get there unless we have strong
leadership. We can turn those--the same European nations that I
dealt with, that you're dealing now with, Ron.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar, I'm sorry for going over.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just continue on the conversation that you've
initiated here. Dr. Asmus and Dr. Gordon, and Bruce Jackson
have been very helpful to both of us for many, many years as we
have thought about the future of NATO and prepared for summits.
I recall before the Riga summit, we had a number of dinner
discussions with leaders like GEN Jim Jones and others who were
working in Europe--our colleagues pointed out that while there
wasn't a lackadaisical attitude of the Europeans, but there was
not an overwhelming interest in Riga. People were going to show
up and at least record their attendance, sort of like Senators
going over to make sure they vote, but there was no passion for
reform, reformation, and what have you. There was nothing
really in the offing. And, therefore, we weren't going to take
up membership questions at Riga. At Riga, I recall that the
greatest news story was whether President Putin would come.
President Chirac reportedly was going to invite him. And so,
the whole area, for 48 hours, was clouded--will he come, or
will he not? You know, the discussion going on around the
table, about Afghanistan was lost, it seems to me, in
translation. Ultimately, President Putin didn't come, and,
therefore, life went on. But, that was the end of the summit.
Now we come around to another one, but this time the
suggestion is a more serious one, and we're talking about
membership invitations and the extension of MAPs. And so, that
really calls, as we've all said today, for heavier lifting. I'm
hopeful that this hearing may be helpful in ensuring that
occurs. Our friend Secretary Fried has testified, that he's
heard us many times. I know he is working very hard on behalf
of the President. But, I think the President, the Secretary of
State, and others, will really have to focus on this. It's a
short period, but it appears to me that Europeans will once
again show up with little initiative. I am just concerned that
there will not be a sense of urgency at Bucharest with regard
to membership. I think the future of NATO is countermanded by a
feeling that, all things considered, Europe is not at war and
they don't want to rile up the Russians. President Putin has
been extremely aggressive, to say the least, and he has clearly
threatened European governments with violence should certain
actions be taken at Bucharest--almost any action, for that
matter. Russia, at this point, even though it has a
relationship with NATO, really doesn't want to have a better
one, under his regime at least. And that's too bad. We wish
that that was not the case.
But, I would say that this has to be a decision on our
part--that is, the United States--as to what we believe is in
the transatlantic interest, including our own security. And if
we are lackadaisical about the situation, and decide that we'll
just show up and things will just fall into place, I am afraid
it will be a disappointing experience. This is especially true
given that this was supposed to be the year of membership
action--the disappointment and ramifications of why certain
things didn't happen are more severe.
I would just say, with regard to Ukraine, specifically--all
of you have pointed out, correctly, that not only has Mr.
Yanukovych and his supporters demanded a referendum, so has the
President of the country and Prime Minister Tymoshenko. And you
can still, I suppose, take polls in Ukraine that find a
majority of people in that country are not in favor, although
they may be more willing to consider it. At the same time, the
MAP program is an opportunity for a dialogue with a very
important country.
Some of you have testified, as we have, it would be well if
Europe included Russia. This is not an impossibility.
Therefore, Ukraine should not be out of the question.
Now, Georgia, everyone said, ``Well, that really is
provocative.'' People farther away from Georgia than, say, the
Poles, would say, ``You're really asking for it, there. We
didn't want to come to a summit just to have an argument, and
then, worse still, to see President Putin, the next day,
issuing threats that generally censure our activities. This is
just a mess.''
I am afraid that is where we're headed, without leadership
on the part of our country, defining what we believe is in our
own security interests and those of Europe, and trying to be
more persuasive to countries that may feel their stake in all
of this is not that great.
I want to emphasize the energy picture. When I was in
Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan we
discussed about how Europe might gain a degree of security if
some of the natural gas and oil moved along a southern course
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline or various other
pipelines that are suggested going into Europe. The Russians
responded rapidly. President Putin was on the phone with the
President of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and concluded a very
large agreement, which doesn't obviate other possibilities, but
is a symbolic step. This represented personal diplomacy on
Putin's part. Likewise, 3 weeks after I was in the region,
Bulgaria and Serbia reached an agreement with Russia that
included turning over 50-percent control of their pipelines to
Gazprom.
While we're quibbling over NATO membership, the realities
are that the energy situation is being solved to the detriment
of Europe. These countries are choosing to conclude bilateral
agreements with Russia. It has become a bilateral situation, an
existential problem for individual countries. So, it's all well
and good to have a NATO Alliance. The fact is, the whole thing
might crumble, simply because the individual countries have
these very, very tough energy problems they have to solve if
they're going to have economies at all, and Russia is the
answer.
And, finally, Russia is the answer, because it's wealthy.
It's wealthy because it has the natural gas and the oil. It is
not because it developed a sophisticated economy, a rule of
law, courts, all the rest of it. It found more gas and oil. And
it will have a lot more, as a matter of fact.
So, those are the realities that need to be discussed at
the summit. This really isn't even on the agenda. It's always
said to be an EU issue, ``We don't deal with economics in
NATO.'' Well, why not? You know, if there was ever a security
issue or that threatened the future of these countries, energy
is it.
So, this is my own opportunity to give a statement, a point
of view. But, I ask if any of you have any reaction to all of
this.
The Chairman. By the way, before you do, I rest my case why
he should be Secretary of State.
But, go ahead, answer the questions. [Laughter.]
Dr. Asmus. Senator, I think--I suspect many of us agree
with you. And, as I think Bruce pointed out, if you want an
energy security policy, Ukraine and Georgia have got to be part
of it. But, I--you know, I think--you know, we're at this, sort
of, awkward moment in the Alliance, where, you know, this
administration's coming to an end, some of the damage has been
repaired, some of it hasn't. Europeans are also, let's be
honest, calculating, ``How much do you invest in this last
summit,'' versus waiting for the next President? Do we save the
big moves for the first summit with--I mean, there's a lot of
political calculation going on. And, I mean, Phil and I were
just in Moscow together, and I have--we had some meetings
together, and I had one very interesting one, where Phil
couldn't join me. The Foreign Ministry called me in late at
night, and wanted to talk about Bucharest. And I was very
curious to see what their agenda was, because it goes to a lot
of these issues. Well, you know, they were--first, they were
going to make their views on Kosovo well known to the Alliance.
OK. I understood what that means.
And then they said, ``Well, you know, no MAP for Ukraine
and Georgia is a precondition for the President coming--the
President's coming.''
And I said, ``Well, what does that mean?''
And they said, ``Well, we don't expect any surprises, and
we've been assured there won't be any surprises.''
And I said, ``Well, what does that mean?'' You know?
And they said, ``A3''--they said, ``we don't care. We don't
care about A3. But, Ukraine and Georgia are red lines. No visit
if there's movement on there, but our assessment is, you will
do nothing.''
And he said, ``When--and our big goal is to do a deal with
Bush on missile defense.'' That's the Russian priority for
Bucharest. And, you know, that's a different agenda.
And I look at that and say, ``Well, how do I reconcile that
with what I hear in Brussels and what I hear in Washington? And
where are we going to be? And could we--could this be a very
exciting, interesting, controversial--in other words, messy--
summit?'' Absolutely. What are we headed into? And do we really
have this thing under control so that we can take steps that we
can build on, you know, with the next administration?--et
cetera, et cetera. I--the pucker factor is going up to----
[Laughter.]
Dr. Asmus [continuing]. To use an old Midwestern
expression.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Dr. Gordon. Can I just say to Senator Lugar, your--we've
talked about this a number of times--your leadership on the
energy issue has been formidable, and your arguments always
compelling. I think you know the reaction to your statement as
well or better than we do, which is, as compelling as the
arguments are, the Europeans, as I think you pointed out, can't
even agree among themselves--I mean, they say, ``No; this is an
EU matter. Don't get NATO into it.'' But, they won't even do it
as the EU. Every single time Russia has offered a national gas
deal to a European country, they have taken it. So, I think,
you know, again, that--it would be terrific if we could add
energy to the Bucharest summit and get people to do it. It's
not going to happen at Bucharest. Maybe it'll wait until you're
Secretary of State to show leadership on that.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, I thank you very, very much. Your
testimony is always helpful. I hope folks down the street were
listening. And I hope we figure out what it is this Bucharest
summit is about.
But, at any rate, thank you very much.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator From Illinois
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the enlargement
and effectiveness of NATO.
This is certainly a timely hearing. In 3 weeks, leaders of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will meet at a summit in
Bucharest, Romania, to address issues critical to American national
security and the future of the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO leaders
must seize this opportunity to strengthen transatlantic ties, augment
alliance members' contributions to common missions and continue to
build the integrated, stable, and prosperous Europe that is a vital
interest of the United States.
A top priority for the summit must be to reinforce NATO's critical
mission in Afghanistan. The contributions there of all the NATO allies
alongside more than a dozen other countries bear testimony to how the
alliance can contribute to the 21st century missions that are vital to
the security of the United States and its allies. NATO's involvement
provides capabilities, legitimacy, and coordination in Afghanistan that
simply would not be available if NATO did not exist.
Success in Afghanistan is vital to the security of the United
States, to all NATO members and to the people of Afghanistan. NATO's
leaders must therefore send an unambiguous message that every country
in NATO will do whatever needs to be done to destroy terrorist networks
in Afghanistan, to prevent the Taliban from returning to power, and to
bring greater security and well-being to the Afghan people. This will
require adequate numbers of capable military forces and civilian
personnel from NATO members, and putting more of an Afghan face on
counterinsurgency operations by providing more training and resources
to the Afghan National Army and police forces, and by embedding more
Afghan forces in NATO missions. We must also win long-term public
support through assistance programs that make a difference in the lives
of the Afghan people, including investments in infrastructure and
education; the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers
to undermine the Taliban and other drug traffickers; and increased
efforts to combat corruption through safeguards on assistance and
support for the rule of law.
Success in Afghanistan will also require the removal of
restrictions that some allies have placed on their forces in
Afghanistan, which hamper the flexibility of commanders on the ground.
The mission in Afghanistan--legitimized by a United Nations mandate,
supported by the Afghan people, and endorsed by all NATO members after
the United States was attacked--is central to NATO's future as a
collective security organization. Afghanistan presents a test of
whether NATO can carry out the crucial missions of the 21st century,
and NATO must come together to meet that challenge. Now is the time for
all NATO allies to recommit to this common purpose.
The summit must also address the question of the alliance's
expanding membership. NATO's enlargement since the end of the cold war
has helped the countries of Central and Eastern Europe become more
stable and democratic. It has also added to NATO's military capability
by facilitating contributions from new members to critical missions
such as Afghanistan.
NATO enlargement is not directed against Russia. Russia has an
important role to play in European and global affairs and should see
NATO as a partner, not as a threat. But we should oppose any efforts by
the Russian Government to intimidate its neighbors or control their
foreign policies. Russia cannot have a veto over which countries join
the alliance. Since the end of the cold war, Republican and Democratic
administrations have supported the independence and sovereignty of all
the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and we must
continue to do so. President Putin's recent threat to point missiles at
Ukraine is simply not the way to promote the peaceful 21st century
Europe we seek.
NATO stands as an example of how the United States can advance
American national security--and the security of the world--through a
strong alliance rooted in shared responsibility, and shared values.
NATO remains a vital asset in America's efforts to anchor democracy and
stability in Europe, and to defend our interests and values all over
the world. The Bucharest summit provides an opportunity to advance
these goals and to reinforce a vital alliance. NATO's leaders must
seize that opportunity.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim DeMint, U.S. Senator From South Carolina
Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Lugar, I want to thank you for
holding this hearing today and moving forward quickly with the
protocols of membership for Albania and Croatia. I am excited by the
prospects of these two nations joining NATO, but I must also express my
disappointment that Macedonia was not invited at the Bucharest summit.
It is unfortunate that the security of Europe must take a back seat to
other issues--especially at a time like this.
Over the last several weeks we have seen a remarkable shift of
events in Eastern Europe and a reemerging Russia that should make us
all take pause. Clearly, the expansion of NATO is in the best interests
of Europe and the United States, but more importantly it is a matter of
security and safety for our friends and allies in Eastern Europe.
As we all know, no one is ever forced to join NATO, in fact if a
nation wants to become a member, they must work diligently to live up
the standards of NATO, make changes to their political and military
structures, and meet other benchmarks.
For this reason, I reject the notion some have made that NATO
enlargement is designed to threaten the security of other nations.
Rather it is these nations that fear a weakening of their power and
influence because they offer little in the way of prosperity and
security. There may be a lot of tinsel and wrapping, but there is no
substance they can offer. Their power is based on nothing more than
threats and coercion. In this world of competing interests, the
prosperity and security of the West are far more appealing than the old
tired habits of propaganda, corruption, and oligarchs.
Hence, each country has the right to choose if they want to side
with the U.S. and Western Europe or with Russia and the East, but if
they choose the West we should not feel constrained by the tirades of
former KGB officers. We cannot, and should not, abandon the desires of
a sovereign nation to protect and defend their own freedom.
We have seen the security that NATO can provide. In 2004 we
welcomed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the alliance. The same
countries that once fell under the Soviet ``sphere of influence,'' are
now conveniently excluded from the sphere of influence that Prime
Minister Putin and President Medvedev speak of today. We should not
erect fences to others who wish to follow in their footsteps.
In fact, it is the newest members of NATO that have been some of
the most powerful voices and, through their example, models to their
older counterparts of what it means to confront threats and challenge
aggression. They do not place caveats on their forces like other NATO
members, and they are willing to make the case to their citizens about
NATO's missions and why it is important to fight. These newer members
bring a fresh perspective that is healthy for the alliance.
And that brings us to the central point. Under U.S. leadership,
NATO has been and remains the preeminent guarantor of security in
Europe. We should not allow the alliance to be diluted or challenged by
other organizations and policies that duplicate the structures of NATO,
but remove the voice of the United States and other allies. This is
especially true when rival organizations will call on the equipment and
resources the United States provides.
I am especially concerned that these discussions are particularly
distracting when there is a lack of consensus on the strategic threats
that face Europe and NATO. Without a strategic focus, no organization
can be successful for long. And despite the very real threat of
terrorism in Europe, many NATO members feel the war on terror in
Afghanistan is not worth their time or effort. While some in Europe
ignore the terror threat, there are emerging threats to Europe's energy
security. Russia is hording oil and gas and building a network of
pipelines to encircle and individually manipulate each European
country.
Countries like Albania and Croatia, know all too well the threats
that can emerge quickly and need to be vigilant. Their voices in NATO
will serve the interests of NATO and Europe well. They have provided
leadership and demonstrated their commitment to the security and
stability of Europe. It is time we welcome our close friends into NATO.