[Senate Hearing 110-693]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-693
HALLMARK/WESTLAND MEAT RECALL
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
FEBRUARY 28, 2008--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont TED STEVENS, Alaska
TOM HARKIN, Iowa ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
PATTY MURRAY, Washington MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
BEN NELSON, Nebraska LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
Charles Kieffer, Staff Director
Bruce Evans, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration and Related Agencies
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin, Chairman
TOM HARKIN, Iowa ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BEN NELSON, Nebraska LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
(ex officio)
Professional Staff
Galen Fountain
Jessica Arden Frederick
Dianne Preece
Dennis Kaplan
Fitzhugh Elder IV (Minority)
Stacy McBride (Minority)
Brad Fuller (Minority)
Administrative Support
Renan Snowden
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statement of Senator Herb Kohl........................... 1
Statement of Senator Robert F. Bennett........................... 3
Statement of Senator Ben Nelson.................................. 4
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nelson......................... 5
Statement of Senator Byron L. Dorgan............................. 6
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin.................. 7
Prepared Statement of Senator Tim Johnson........................ 9
Statement of Hon. Ed Schafer, Secretary of Agriculture,
Department of Agriculture...................................... 10
Al Almanza, Administrator, Food Safety and Inspection Service.... 10
Kate Houston, Deputy Under Secretary, Food, Nutrition, and
Consumer Services.............................................. 10
Dr. Ken Clayton, Associate Administrator, Agricultural Marketing
Service........................................................ 10
Prepared Statement of Edward T. Schafer.......................... 12
Prepared Statement of Senator Tom Harkin......................... 25
Statement of Wayne Pacelle, President and CEO, The Humane Society
of the United States........................................... 34
Prepared Statement of........................................ 37
Addenda.......................................................... 41
Statement of J. Patrick Boyle, President, American Meat Institute 48
Prepared Statement of........................................ 50
Prepared Statement of Temple Grandin, Ph.D., Professor, Animal
Science, Colorado State University............................. 53
Numerical Objective Scoring...................................... 54
Chino Meat Plant Drew Inland Humane Society Scrutiny Years Before
Video.......................................................... 55
Inspectors Say Meat Safety is Threatened......................... 57
Prepared Statement of the Weston A. Price Foundation............. 58
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl......................... 67
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin........................ 70
Downer rule...................................................... 70
Food-borne Pathogens and Downer Cattle........................... 72
Inspectors....................................................... 72
Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan................... 73
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein.................. 74
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson........................ 75
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert F. Bennett................. 78
HALLMARK/WESTLAND MEAT RECALL
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:06 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Herb Kohl (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Kohl, Harkin, Dorgan, Nelson, Bennett,
and Craig.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERB KOHL
Senator Kohl. At this time we'd like to call this very
important hearing to order.
Earlier this month, the Westland/Hallmark Company of Chino,
California recalled 143 million pounds of beef. This is the
largest recall of its kind in our history. It was triggered by
gruesome video images that shocked us all. These images exposed
wholly unacceptable gaps in American meat inspection systems.
These shortcomings were not brought to light by any agency
charged with protecting food safety. They came to our attention
through an independent third party. Americans, myself included,
were appalled to see cattle too sick to stand, much less walk,
being chained, dragged, fork lifted, kicked, jabbed, and then
dumped into America's food supply.
If that is not enough reason to pay attention, we have 30
million more, and that's the number of children who participate
in the national school lunch program. This plant was a major
supplier to that school lunch program.
In 2003, USDA reported the first case of mad cow disease in
this country. USDA's immediate response was to ban downer
cattle from the food supply. Last year, USDA did weaken that
rule. And in the Hallmark/Westland case, there's evidence that
even the weaker rule was being flaunted.
By law, all cattle are subject to inspection prior to
slaughter. Despite the presence of five inspectors at the
Hallmark/Westland Plant, blatant violations had evidently
occurred and for some time. This begs the question, how did
this happen? And in the next breath, a logical question would
ask, what violations are going unnoticed in other plants? Those
are the core questions that we will explore today.
Why was there a failure in FSIS inspection procedures? How
do we know that there are not similar problems in other plants?
What is the effect on the school lunch program and food safety
in general? And what steps should be, and will be taken to
correct these problems?
No one wants another Hallmark/Westland situation anywhere
in the country, cannot allow--we cannot allow a single downer
cow to enter our food supply under any circumstances. We need
to have tougher standards, around the clock surveillance, and
stiffer penalties.
Mr. Secretary, the American people don't want bureaucratic
double-speak about the mess in Chino. They are watching and
listening to this hearing, and they want to know what we're
going to do to clean it up. They want to know what we can
commit to today. They want a solid plan for the future.
Something has to change, and if change doesn't come quickly,
then we believe that some people should be thinking about new
careers.
We're particularly troubled by the implications that this
has for the school lunch program. There is no room for error,
especially when children are involved. What happens in the
feedlot or the slaughter house ends up in school lunch rooms.
As a starting point, Mr. Secretary, we want you to commit to
something very specific, we want you to do an audit of every
single plant, to make sure that they have language appropriate
materials for their workers. We are only as good as the workers
that we have at these plants. Plant workers must be properly
trained so that there can be no confusion. We would like to
have an audit of the plants who supply the USDA Nutrition
Programs here, to this Committee, in 30 days or less.
Next, we want to put three specific items on the table and
discuss exactly where USDA stands on these items. Number one,
is a strict, bright-line, downer ban. Number two is stiffer
penalties for inhumane treatment of animals. And number three
is the need for continuous surveillance of live animals. We
need a more fool-proof system, allowing plant personnel to
signal one another when a USDA inspector is on his way, is
simply not tolerable. There is a saying that the camera never
blinks. USDA inspectors must have the capability to know that
violations are not occurring behind their backs. Camera
monitors would go a long way towards accomplishing that.
People need to understand this, while inspectors are always
present in operating plants, there is no requirement that the
live animals be continuously monitored for humane treatment or
to determine downer status. It is interesting that one of the
firsts step taken by Hallmark/Westland after they got caught,
was to install live television monitors. In their case, it was
a nice step, but one that came too late.
You may need to do things for which additional statutory
clarification or authority is required. We are prepared,
hopefully with you cooperation, to make those changes into law.
We want a commitment that you will work with us to get it
right, and craft changes that will work in the field. As we
know, this is a very serious issue, it affects food safety, it
affects our children, it affects our trade partners, and it
affects our markets. There are things we can do to fix this
problem. To strengthen our laws, and to protect our children,
we're committed to doing this.
Mr. Secretary, USDA is often criticized for trying to
regulate an industry it's also trying to promote. Here's an
opportunity for USDA to be part of the solution, rather than
part of the problem, and we hope that you will join us.
Senator Feinstein, a member of this subcommittee is not
able to be here today due to a scheduling conflict with the
Judiciary Committee, and she has asked me to read her following
statement.
``I was appalled to hear of the incidence of animal cruelty
documented by The Humane Society of the United States at the
Westlands meat packing plant in Chino, California, and I am
concerned about the United States Department of Agriculture's
ability to keep sick animals out of the Nation's food supply.
As we have seen, these cruel acts occur when the inspectors'
backs are turned.
It is my view that inspection alone will not solve the
problems in the food safety inspection system. The
responsibility must also rest on the operators of these
facilities. Any company that slaughters downed animals and
knowingly violates the laws and regulations governing sick and
downed animals, should have their operating licenses revoked
immediately.''
Senator Feinstein also provided question, which will be
submitted for the record.
Senator Kohl. Following Secretary Shafer's testimony, we'll
hear from Wayne Pacelle, President of The Humane Society of the
United States, and Patrick Boyle, President of the American
Meat Institute. We've also received written testimony by
professor Temple Grandin of Colorado State University, that we
will make part of the record.
At this time, I'd like to turn to my colleague, the ranking
member in this committee, Senator Bennett.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT
Senator Bennett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for framing the seriousness of this issue as
carefully and thoroughly as you have.
I have some similar things to say, but I won't say them in
the interest of time. I do want to congratulate The Humane
Society for their role in bringing this to light. If The Humane
Society had not produced the video--to which you've referred,
and which is shocking to all who have seen it--we could very
possibly still be going on with these violations happening,
without them being picked up. And so, The Humane Society
deserves our thanks and gratitude and congratulations for their
work here.
I do want to note, so that we don't get undue panic, that
this is a Class II recall, which means that the probability of
getting sick from eating the meat is considered remote. That
does not, in any way, diminish the seriousness of the problem,
but it is something that I think consumers might want to know.
Also, I have been pleased to learn, as a result of the
poking into this particular problem, that the Department does
have a specific oversight set for the National School Lunch
Program, and every lot of beef that is destined for the
program, regardless of which facility it comes from, is
inspected and tested by the Agricultural Marketing Service.
Since January 2006, none of the samples have proved positive
for E. coli, two tested positive for salmonella, and
appropriate changes or steps were taken.
Any product that tests positive for either pathogen is
immediately rejected for use in any Federal food assistance
program. This, again, does not alleviate the seriousness of the
problem we're facing here. And the fact that Hallmark/Westland
violated their contract with USDA for what appears to be a time
of 2 years, treated animals inhumanely during that period of
time, and broke the regulations, is ample reason for your
calling the hearing, and the size of the recall is serious
enough to cause us to give it the kind of attention that you
have given it here.
I'm happy to join you in conducting the hearing, and join
you in your request, that if we need additional legislative
changes, we will do our best to do that. And if we need
additional money, this is after all the appropriations
subcommittee, we need to be told that as well in very clear
terms.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Senator Bennett.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEN NELSON
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, I'm
going to have to preside here rather shortly, and so I'd like
to make some preliminary comments and have my full statement
made a part of the record and then the questions made as a part
of the record when I finish presiding, come back about 3
o'clock if the hearing is still going, then I'd pick up where
I've left off.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate so much your
calling this hearing. We are--we're all just simply, I think
surprised would be a very polite word, to the reaction that
we--our reaction to the videos that we saw. Certainly animal
cruelty is something to be avoided. If there is any silver
lining here, it is that while the animal cruelty situation was
so severe, it does not appear that the food safety situation
was--that there was any contamination, no evidence of any
contamination. And I think we're all--we're all very pleased
about that and maybe surprised about that as well, because of
the treatment and the fact that the animals were lying down in
contaminated areas.
But, you know, I hadn't--I knew when I talked to the new
Secretary, as when he was the nominee, that he was going to be
inheriting some problems that were continuing. I don't think
either he or I knew that he would inherit this one or some of
the others that are out there, that may not involve food
safety, but the U.S. Department of Agricultural sending out
checks, payment checks to deceased individuals, contrary to
what the law was under the Farm Program, and a number of other
areas, particularly as it relates to trade.
This situation with Hallmark is not going to make our trade
situation that much better, because it raises serious questions
about--about the treatment of the food products, which then, of
course, raises questions about the safety of the--of the
facilities, as well as the safety of the processes. The
concerns of my constituents are pretty clear. First, we want
food safety and we believe we have the safest food in the
United States. One of the reasons we believe that we have the
safest food in the United States--in America--in the world, in
the United States, is because of the inspection process. But
when we see a complete failure and--of the process to detect
even animal cruelty, it does raise questions then about what
that process--whether it's sufficient to protect against food
safety as well.
So it's the complete breakdown of the system in this
situation, or the inadequacy of the system in this situation to
catch the treatment, which would then lead, of course, to the
other animal safety questions.
So, we've experienced time and again, failures of the USDA,
as it relates to trade. One of the most obvious areas of the
trade has been, with respect to Korea, we can't get the right
shipments sent to them under the agreements we have with them.
PREPARED STATEMENT
So, I'm hopeful that my good friend and Secretary, who has
his hands full right now, will be able to pick up the slack
that you've inherited, and be able to straighten things out, so
that we don't have these questions continuing into the future.
It's a daunting task. We talked about it at the beginning, and
I want to be as supportive of your efforts as I can possibly
be, and of the agency. But I think we have to have a much
better regimen of inspections and assurances from the
Department that these things are not going to continue, if
they've continued elsewhere.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nelson
I want to thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing
today; providing us with an opportunity to hopefully sort out the
myriad problems and disturbing actions that have led to this
unprecedented recall.
Mr. Secretary, when you appeared before the Agriculture Committee--
which I'm also a member of--for your confirmation I hearing, I
mentioned my concern about all that had been left undone over the last
2 years.
I had not anticipated that the problems would show up this quickly;
or in such a difficult manner.
At the outset, let me be very clear: I believe that our main focus
in this matter should be on ensuring the continued safety of our food
supply.
For too long, we have seen a pattern of mistakes and missteps that
raise serious questions about the competence and effectiveness of USDA.
Inspectors fail to catch domestically-labeled boxes of beef before
they are shipped to Korea--not once, but multiple times--giving Korea
an excuse to halt imports of U.S. beef and further damaging the
reputation of both the beef industry and our inspections system.
And now this situation with Hallmark, leaving us to wonder what
other problems exist.
Since we can't know what problems lie ahead, I want to take the
time today to make certain that we recognize what has gone wrong and
that we understand how best to make sure these mistakes do not happen
again.
So, while I realize that many of the problems did not start on your
watch, you are unfortunately faced with the task of fixing the problems
that have been left to you.
Between the series of news stories on this matter, the concerns of
my constituents and your comments here this afternoon, I am left with a
lot of unanswered questions and I hope to get some answers today and in
the very near future.
I am concerned about the continued safety of our food supply and
the effectiveness of USDA's system for safeguarding it, including the
decisions that have been made in this situation; I am concerned about
the detrimental impact this situation is having on our efforts to re-
open important markets for U.S. beef, such as Korea and Japan; and,
finally, I am concerned for the beef industry and its reputation both
here and abroad and with the agency tasked with regulating the industry
and safeguarding of our food supply.
Without playing armchair quarterback, here, I have to admit that I
am concerned not only about the actions of this company and its
employees but also about the decisions, employees and capabilities of
USDA.
This was a massive recall of beef and it involved the past 2 years
of production--much of the beef has been consumed and you have
consistently stated that it posed no risk to human health or food
safety.
Was this recall proportional to the amount of risk to the food
supply or human health? Particularly since the recall has generated so
much concern amongst parents and consumers.
Was this action wise considering the very delicate nature of our
beef trade with nations like Korea and Japan? Does this add fuel to
their unreasonable claims about the safety of U.S. beef and the
effectiveness of our system of safeguards?
Was there another form of punishment for the company or another
series of actions by USDA that would've better fit this particular
situation without the corresponding fears and concerns and the
implications for trade and the industry?
Although I am very concerned about the safety of our food supply--
and particularly the health of our schoolchildren eating the foods in
the school lunch program--I am also concerned about an overreaction
that gives the appearance of a greater danger than actually exists.
Finally, this situation raises serious concerns about the agency
responsible for our food safety:
--Do we have enough inspectors on the ground to handle the number of
animals and amount of product that needs to be inspected?
--Are these inspectors properly trained and are the correct
mechanisms in place to hold them accountable for mistakes?
--Is USDA wisely allocating the unfortunately limited amount of money
that Congress is able to appropriate--or is too much money
going to too many desk jobs in D.C. and not enough to those on
the front lines?
--What is USDA doing to make sure vacancies are filled in a timely
manner and that all responsibilities are covered?
--Are there enough safeguards in place to ensure that inspectors are
independent from the facilities they inspect and that they are
able to effectively do their jobs?
--Why are we witnessing so many missteps on the part of USDA for
something as important as the safety of our food? What is it
going to take for these problems to be corrected and what do
you plan to do?
--Since you have come on board, have you initiated any formal review
of on-the-ground capabilities and whether resources are being
effectively allocated?
Thank you for appearing here today, Mr. Secretary, on this
important matter.
I hope you can help us help you fix the problems that you have
inherited.
Senator Kohl. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
I'd like to call upon Senator Dorgan for his comments, and
also some introduction on Secretary Shafer before he makes his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will
be mercifully brief. I think you have really well outlined the
purpose of the hearing and the challenges and problems, and I
won't go over that again.
I was, in reading the briefing material, struck by the
comments of someone that said, you know, we have 7,500
inspectors for 6,300 Federal plants. That's too few eyeballs
watching too much meat. It seems like a perfectly apt
description to me, too few eyeballs watching too much meat.
Secretary Shafer is here today, and we are--it's the first
time he's had a chance to come before the appropriations
subcommittee, and he is, of course, a North Dakotan, and we're
enormously proud of his nomination and the support by the U.S.
Senate for him to serve in this position. He's confronted now
with a challenge, not of his making, and I think all of us
agree there's a real problem here.
I also want to commend the organizations that were involved
in bringing this to light. You know, this is--The Humane
Society has done good work here and I think it's something all
of us should pay a lot of attention to.
And so, again I appreciate your calling the hearing, Mr.
Chairman, and I appreciate Secretary Shafer being here. This is
a search for solutions.
I want to make one other point if I might, following some
questions I will ask about the beef recall, I've sent Secretary
Shafer a letter about the closing of a human nutrition
laboratory, and I want to ask him to respond on the record to
those at some point, in writing perhaps if necessary.
But, this issue is about the beef recall, and I appreciate
your setting the stage in your opening statement.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Senator Dorgan.
Mr. Secretary.
PREPARED STATEMENTS
The subcommittee has received statements from Senators
Durbin and Johnson which will be placed in the record.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Bennett for holding today's
hearing on the Westland/Hallmark Meat Company recall of ground beef. I
would also like to thank the witnesses for being here today--
Agriculture Secretary Schafer and the rest of the USDA team, Mr. Wayne
Pacelle from The Humane Society of the United States, and Mr. Patrick
Boyle from the American Meat Institute.
Last week's announced recall of 143 million pounds of ground beef
stretching back over 2 years of production at Westland's Chino,
California, facility is by far the largest recall in U.S. history.
Included in that recall were 50 million pounds of ground beef sent to
Federal nutrition programs like the School Lunch Program. To give the
situation some context, these programs serve more than 30 million meals
per day to the Nation's school children.
The video footage that brought this situation to light is alarming.
Employees at a federally inspected facility were shown beating animals,
lifting them on a fork lift, spraying water in their noses, and
repeatedly using electric prods on them--all to force them to stand up
and pass inspection.
The video evidence that these sickly, weak animals entered the
human food supply caused the recall and enforcement actions we've seen
over the past 3 weeks. Animals unable to stand on their own are
prohibited from entering the human food supply because they present a
higher likelihood of harboring disease and most importantly because
they pose a risk of harboring BSE or mad cow disease.
To USDA's credit, the response has been swift and tough. USDA
quickly suspended inspection and operations, opened an investigation,
and worked with the company to announce a recall. I hope that the
investigation into the individual criminal acts and the Inspector
General report on why this failure occurred are conducted thoroughly.
However, the events that occurred at this federally inspected plant
are alarming. USDA says that there were inspectors on the premises of
this facility constantly and continuously. How could these events occur
given USDA's in-plant presence?
There are many unanswered questions. There are also vague and
misguided policies in place that need to be adjusted in order to
prevent similar situations from occurring. Some of these issues can be
resolved administratively and some may require congressional action.
First, I'd like to discuss the vacancy rate for USDA FSIS inspector
positions. Through a FOIA request, we learned last year that vacancy
rates hover around 10 percent on average. In Denver, that rate is 20
percent, and Chicago has seen vacancy rates around 15 percent. This
means that there are somewhere in the neighborhood of 700 unfilled
inspector positions according to what FSIS acknowledges it needs to do
its job.
This translates into inspectors forced to cover more territory with
less time to spend in facilities. The status quo is insufficient. To
USDA's credit, it has submitted requests to this Committee to be
allowed to assess and collect user fees for certain activities. Every
year they're proposed and every year they're thrown aside.
In light of this episode and the strains on the Federal budget, I
would like to hear USDA discuss these user fees and what USDA would do
with the revenue generated from such fees to fill this inspector gap. I
also encourage my colleagues to give these user fees a serious look.
Today, taxpayers shoulder the full cost of meat, poultry, and egg
inspection. In return, companies gain the marketing benefit of the USDA
stamp and are able to sell their product. There are also public health
benefits, of course, which is why taxpayers should continue to pay for
the majority of these services.
The USDA proposal would be relatively small. There is a facility
licensing fee depending on the size of the operation, and a fee for
plants that perform poorly. The latter fee kicks in when facilities
have sample failures that result in retesting or are linked to an
outbreak. I can't imagine why the second fee should raise any
objection. The licensing fee is a reasonable approach given the shared
public and private benefits of the inspection program.
The second item I'd like to discuss is a troubling statement I
heard during one of USDA's conference calls regarding this recall. The
quote was from Dr. Clifford from APHIS who said that, ``first and
foremost animal ID within APHIS is for animal health purposes''.
That statement is troubling given our current inability to trace
back where these individual cows came from to determine whether there
was a problem at the producer level, or to trace forward where this
product was distributed. During the Topps recall this summer, USDA was
confronted with similar limitations.
The inability to track and trace is bad for consumers and bad for
the industry. For consumers, it's obvious--we need to be able to
quickly assess where product is located and pull it from shelves. Not
being able to trace back or forward puts consumers at risks and hinders
our ability to target resources to the sources of contamination.
In a similar vein, I recently wrote to USDA and OMB to urge the
promulgation of a final rule giving USDA the authority to publish
retailer information in recalls. It does no good for consumers to know
the packer that had a problem. Consumers need to know where
contaminated product was sold in order to make informed decisions. I'd
like to hear your comments on this long overdue rule.
Getting back to animal ID, there are a host of reasons why the
current state of animal ID is a problem for industry. First, the size
of these recalls is often multiple times larger than the actual
affected batch, because we're unable to trace back to the source of the
recall or trace forward where it's gone. That means bigger recalls that
cost the industry more money and draw alarming newspaper headlines.
It is also troubling to our trade partners, many of whom have more
robust ID and trace-back programs. New Zealand, Canada, and the EU all
outshine us in this area. Over time, this will hurt the competitiveness
of our products and our ability to deliver the highest value products
to markets around the world.
Furthermore, the USDA has squandered millions of dollars on this
taxpayer-funded program that USDA often refers to as a program run ``in
cooperation with industry''. The results have been poor.
We've now spent about $100 million on this program and we have
fewer than 30 percent of all premises registered nationwide. That means
that hundreds of thousands of premises are not even registered. We're
not even talking about identification tags or traceability. Premise
registration is only step one and we're failing miserably.
I hope to hear a clarification from Secretary Schafer that this
program is not just for animal health purposes and is not a handout for
industry cooperative programs. It has clear food safety and trade
implications and it needs to be treated as such. In addition, USDA
needs to get serious about registering 100 percent of premises and that
means mandatory premise registration. It's not a big challenge to
register a premise--it takes a couple of clicks on a website and it
doesn't compromise privacy.
Lastly, I would like to discuss USDA's policy on the use of downer
cattle. The feed ban and our requirement to remove specified risk
material (SRM) are the primary methods for controlling BSE.
The third layer is USDA's ban on using non-ambulatory cattle in the
human food supply. As I mentioned before, downed cattle have a higher
likelihood of harboring disease. A number of the 15 cattle found to
have BSE in North America were non-ambulatory animals.
It is inconceivable why we have a loophole that allows some downed
cattle to enter the food supply. In the July 2007 USDA rule, the
announced ``ban'' on downer cattle allow FSIS personnel to determine
the disposition of downer cattle on a case by case basis. While some of
these animals may be safe for the food supply and may have minor
injuries, it is hard to imagine how FSIS personnel can assess the
source of an injury on the spot with only visual observation. In
addition, this policy assumes 100 percent compliance with the
requirement that plant employees contact FSIS personnel whenever an
animal goes down and that all employees are familiar with this
requirement.
With faster and faster production lines in plants, a workforce with
high turnover, and USDA vacancy rates exceeding 10 percent, it seems
like the loophole in the downer rule presents a risk to our food
supply. Industry can do the right thing here. If the packing plants
raise the threshold for the condition of the animals coming into
facilities, producers will ensure that they send animals that are young
and healthy enough to comply with the standard.
We clearly need to tighten this policy up and I hope Secretary
Schafer will make a commitment to review this issue and do what's right
for public safety. There are steps that USDA can take without
legislative action that would enhance the safety of the food supply,
including tightening the downer ban, requiring testing of animals that
go down but pass inspection, placing cameras in pens, and getting
serious about animal identification.
I thank the witnesses for being here and I look forward to hearing
your testimony.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Tim Johnson
First and foremost, I would like to thank Chairman Kohl and Ranking
Member Bennett for holding this afternoon's hearing on the Hallmark/
Westland meat recall issue. I appreciate your attention to this
important issue and also thank today's witnesses for their time.
We are here today to examine the largest beef recall in history,
totaling 143 million pounds of beef. My office has been in contact with
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) on the subject of
this recall since January, and USDA's communication in discussing and
investigating the recall and inspection procedures is vitally
important.
I am certain the United States has the safest food supply in the
world, and our farmers and ranchers provide a steady stream of
nutritious and wholesome U.S beef on kitchen tables across America. My
confidence in our meat supply has not waned. I am pleased that the
Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee is addressing this recall so as
to ensure our meat supply and the quality product our ranchers and
farmers offer will not be compromised, nor will public perception be
further impacted.
Roughly half of the beef obtained for South Dakota schools in the
2007 and 2008 school years was supplied through the Hallmark/Westland
meat packing plant in Chino, California, and the majority of the beef
that was distributed to South Dakota schools was fed. Schools in my
home State received nine truckloads of Westland Company product, each
truckload carrying roughly 40,000 pounds of beef.
Thankfully, we have not heard of a single illness reported in the
State, or Nation for that matter, related to the consumption of this
beef. The company voluntarily recalled the product, and the USDA's Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has suspended the Hallmark/
Westland meat packing plant. Schools in South Dakota did not expect any
additional product from this plant and will not be faced with a product
shortage during these upcoming months, as their beef demands were
expected to be met through other suppliers.
FSIS did conduct ante-mortem inspections at the Hallmark/Westland
meat packing plant in Chino, California. However, FSIS wasn't contacted
for evaluation of subsequently non-ambulatory cattle that had passed
the ante-mortem inspections. The treatment of cattle at the packing
plant sends a very negative image to consumers, consequently impacting
public perception of the cattle industry.
USDA's investigation is ongoing. Evaluating oversight to ensure
this type of treatment does not occur in the future is a critical
component of that investigation, for consumers and ranchers alike.
STATEMENT OF HON. ED SCHAFER, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
ACCOMPANIED BY:
AL ALMANZA, ADMINISTRATOR, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE
KATE HOUSTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, FOOD, NUTRITION, AND
CONSUMER SERVICES
DR. KEN CLAYTON, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, AGRICULTURAL
MARKETING SERVICE
Secretary Shafer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee. I'm pleased to be here today to address the
ongoing investigation of the Hallmark/Westland meat packing
company in Chino, California, and to assure you that I am
deeply and personally concerned about the inhumane treatment of
cattle in that facility.
I'm joined today by Ken Clayton, the Associate
Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service, Al
Almanza, the Administrator of the Food Safety and Inspection
Service, and Kate Houston, the Deputy Under Secretary for Food,
Nutrition, and Consumer Services. And we look forward to
answering your questions.
The American people rely on the United States Department of
Agriculture and thousands of front-line inspectors, and the
safeguards we have developed through decades of experience, to
ensure the meat, poultry, and processed egg products that they
consume, are safe and wholesome. That is one of our fundamental
missions, and it is a trust that we take very seriously.
I want to be clear and right up front, our food supply is
safe. However, there are serious violations of USDA regulations
that warranted action and we issued a Class II recall. The
Class II recall means that the probability is remote that there
is a risk to human health.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that--that cows were hit and
rolled and jabbed and dunked before they went into the food
supply. We see no evidence that that is a correct statement. We
have seen animals that have been previously approved by a
certified veterinarian, an employee of USDA, to go into the
food supply, that then went down. But we have no evidence that
there are sick animals that went into the food supply.
I also want to tell you now about how proud I am of leading
USDA at this time. Our employees have shown their dedication to
our food safety mission in the outstanding way that they have
responded to this crisis. I have witnessed them working around
the clock and sacrificing personal time with their families.
They are committed, knowledgeable, and caring, and their
performance has left me even more confident about the safety of
our food supply than I was as a private citizen just a month
ago.
I can only describe the video that was brought to the
public attention on January 30, about the way cows were being
handled at the Hallmark/Westland Plant, as alarming and
disturbing. But I appreciate The Humane Society of the United
States for exposing the rule violations that were taking place.
No one wants to see animals treated that way. It is shameful
and it is irresponsible.
We are determined to find out what went wrong at this
plant, and to hold anyone involved in violations fully
accountable for their actions. We are also examining our
inspection system, to make sure that we have the best possible
policies and practices in place to deter future violations at
the facilities under our jurisdiction and stop them if they do
occur.
Once we had reviewed the Hallmark/Westland video, we
immediately put the administrative and regulatory tools to our
disposal at work. We launched investigations by our Office of
Inspector General, to utilize its investigative resources and
powers, and by our Food Safety and Inspection Service, and
Agriculture Marketing Service as well. We also put an immediate
administrative hold on the use of Hallmark/Westland products,
by participants in the school lunch program or any of our other
nutrition assistance programs.
Over the past 4 weeks, as more information has become
available to us, we have taken further actions against Hallmark
and Westland. After determining that there was evidence that
animals had been egregiously mishandled at the plant, FSIS
suspended inspection on February 4. While Hallmark/Westland had
already stopped their slaughter operations, this action by FSIS
collectively, effectively blocked the plant from operating
until a corrective action plan is approved.
Based on evidence from the ongoing investigation, FSIS
recommended to Hallmark/Westland that it recall all products
produced at the plant since February 1, 2006. On February 17,
Hallmark/Westland commenced a voluntary recall of 143 million
pounds of fresh and frozen beef. The reach of this recall is
broad and deep. It extends to school districts throughout this
country, as well as to commercial distributors, processors,
wholesalers, and retailers.
But I also want to stress to you that because USDA
recommended this action, it is because of serious violations of
our animal slaughter rules, and it is extremely unlikely that
the mishandled animals pose a risk to human health.
We are going to pursue these investigations wherever they
may lead, and promptly take whatever corrective actions are
called for. But we believe there are actions that we can take
now, before we have the full results of the investigations at
hand. That will help strengthen our food safety system, and
help deter and detect violations like these that we believe
took place at Hallmark/Westland.
While the investigation proceeds, we are taking the
following steps to enhance oversight policies and procedures of
humane handling. I am directing our inspectors to be more
resourceful in how they do their inspections. That will mean
being more random when they are in and where they do the
inspections, when they're making use of additional tools, such
as off-site video surveillance at regulated establishments.
We are also prioritizing inspections, based on a set of
objective criteria, so we gather the most information on
plants, that we believe humane handling violations will most
likely occur. We will be drawing on the data generated by our
humane activities tracking system, to more precisely target our
inspection and surveillance efforts.
In our purchasing activity, we will immediately increase
the frequency of unannounced audits conducted at the 23
approved slaughter facilities that provide beef under our
Federal Purchase Program.
We have also asked our Inspector General to perform an
audit to determine whether our rules and procedures for
ensuring that only animals fit for slaughter enter the food
supply were both being followed at Hallmark/Westland and other
selected slaughter facilities that we oversee.
Mr. Chairman, I said at the outset that I take this issue
very seriously, and I mean it. We recognize that these actions
have--that we have taken in this case have caused and will
cause a lot of pain. The shutdown of Hallmark/Westland means
workers in an economically depressed area will lose their jobs.
The recall means processors around the country will suffer
losses because they use Hallmark as a supplier.
We believe we are taking the right actions, but we also
recognize that they are difficult for those whose lives or
businesses are being upset. But by taking these actions, we are
also assuring the children around the country, who rely on us
for their school lunches, that rules do matter. And we are
assuring mothers that the food their kids eat at school and at
home is safe. We are also sending a clear message to consumers,
both our domestic and international markets, that we will
continue to uphold the highest standards to protect our food
supply, and these are very important things.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I look forward to coming back and visiting with you in the
near future to share what we learn from the actions I have
outlined, as well as from the investigation once it is
complete. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today.
Our written testimony has been submitted for the record, and we
look forward to answering your questions, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward T. Schafer
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to appear before you today to address the ongoing investigation of
the Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company (Hallmark/Westland) in
Chino, California. I want to assure you that I am deeply concerned
about the inhumane handling of non-ambulatory disabled cattle in that
facility.
I want to further assure you that, as soon as I learned of the
problems at Hallmark/Westland, I took immediate steps to determine if
the allegations made public by The Humane Society of the United States
(HSUS) were accurate. I called on our Office of Inspector General (OIG)
to work with USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) to conduct a thorough
investigation into this matter and stated that any violations of food
safety or humane handling laws would be immediately acted upon. In
addition, product from Hallmark/Westland involved in the Federal
nutrition assistance programs was put on hold pending further
information from the investigation. An administrative hold prevents
program operators from using the product until further notification
from USDA.
To that end, as soon as FSIS determined that humane handling
regulations were violated, plant operations were suspended.
Additionally, immediately upon conclusive evidence that non-ambulatory
animals were allowed into the food supply, FSIS worked with the company
to initiate a voluntary recall even though the risk to public health is
remote.
I remain confident in the safety of the U.S. food supply. To help
ensure its safety, we take a number of steps to prevent food-borne
illness. FSIS employs over 9,000 personnel, including 7,800 full-time
in-plant and other front-line personnel protecting the public health in
approximately 6,200 federally-inspected establishments nationwide. FSIS
personnel must be continuously present for slaughter operations and
must inspect processing plants at least once per shift per day. Under
the FSIS verification sampling program, FSIS samples meat, poultry, and
processed egg products and analyzes them for the presence of microbial
pathogens. The agency has paid particular attention to E. coli O157:H7
in raw ground beef and Salmonella in raw meat and poultry products
through the E. coli initiative announced last fall and its ongoing
Salmonella strategy. To protect against bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE), the Federal Government also has an interlocking
system of safeguards, which I will describe in more detail later.
USDA Agency Responsibilities
USDA takes very seriously its food safety mission. There are a
number of agencies at the Department working together on this matter.
FSIS is the public health regulatory agency in USDA responsible for
ensuring that meat, poultry, and processed egg products are safe,
wholesome, and accurately labeled. FSIS enforces the Federal Meat
Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, and the Egg
Products Inspection Act, which require Federal inspection and
regulation of meat, poultry, and processed egg products prepared for
distribution in commerce for use as human food. FSIS also enforces the
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, which requires that all livestock at
federally inspected establishments be handled and slaughtered in a
humane way.
AMS purchases food product for the USDA nutrition programs. In
order to be eligible to sell meat or meat products to AMS, processors
must derive the meat and meat products from livestock that are humanely
handled and harvested in accordance with all applicable FSIS
regulations, notices and directives. In addition to this requirement,
AMS has specification requirements for food purchased for USDA
nutrition programs that preclude the use of meat and meat products
derived from non-ambulatory disabled livestock. In making commodity
purchases, AMS relies on FSIS and Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
food safeguards; explicitly incorporates FSIS and FDA requirements into
procurement contracts, as appropriate; and requires good manufacturing
practices for sanitation and food safety.
The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) administers USDA nutrition
programs. FNS programs affected by the recall include the National
School Lunch Program, the Emergency Food Assistance Program, and the
Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations.
In the event of an administrative hold or a product recall, FNS is
responsible for notifying each affected State agency through the FNS
Rapid Alert System (RAS). The RAS is in place to communicate critical
information to State Agencies and to ensure that action is taken
quickly with as little disruption to normal operations as possible.
State Agencies are responsible for working with schools and other
operators of USDA nutrition programs at the local level to trace
deliveries of affected product and to report the status of the product
to FNS. In the event of a recall, State Agencies are responsible for
working with schools to verify product destruction and for submitting
records to FNS for reimbursement and product replacement. Throughout
the process, FNS provides State Agencies with continual technical
assistance and other support to ensure compliance with a hold or
recall.
USDA Actions
On January 30, 2008, USDA learned about the original HSUS video
regarding violations through the media. While needing to investigate
the potential violations, we thought it prudent to immediately and
indefinitely suspend Hallmark/Westland as a supplier to Federal
nutrition programs. Hallmark/Westland was not permitted to produce or
deliver any products under contract, and, under the suspension, no
further contracts could be awarded to the company. In addition, USDA
placed an administrative hold on all Hallmark/Westland products we
identified that were in, or destined for, Federal nutrition programs
since October 1, 2006. The October 1, 2006, date for the start of the
initial hold period was chosen to capture a of Hallmark/Westland
product that was in the Federal nutrition program supply chain.
On February 1, 2008, Hallmark/Westland voluntarily stopped
slaughter operations. As a result of FSIS findings, FSIS suspended
inspection at the plant on February 4, 2008. This action was based on
FSIS findings that the establishment failed to prevent the inhumane
handling of animals intended for slaughter at the facility, as required
by FSIS regulations and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act.
Through the ongoing investigation, FSIS obtained additional
evidence that, over the past 2 years, this plant did not consistently
involve the FSIS public health veterinarian in situations in which
cattle became non-ambulatory after passing ante-mortem (prior to
slaughter) inspection, as required by FSIS regulation. It is important
to note that older cattle can be ambulatory when they pass ante-mortem
inspection, then become non-ambulatory from an injury or for other
reasons. If such a situation occurs, FSIS regulations require the
public health veterinarian to inspect the animal again before the
animal is permitted to go to slaughter. In this case, the evidence
demonstrates that the FSIS public health veterinarian was not
consistently involved. This failure by Hallmark/Westland led to the
recall of February 17, 2008, in which Hallmark/Westland voluntarily
recalled 143 million pounds of fresh and frozen beef products produced
at the establishment since February 1, 2006.
On February 17, 2008, FSIS amended the suspension to reflect the
fact that Hallmark/Westland had allowed cattle passing FSIS ante-mortem
inspection that subsequently became non-ambulatory to be slaughtered
without further inspection by FSIS personnel. The suspension will
remain in effect and the establishment will be unable to operate until
corrective actions are submitted in writing and verified through a full
review by FSIS. This verification process will ensure that animals will
be handled humanely and not allowed to proceed to slaughter until
Hallmark/Westland complies fully with FSIS regulations.
While it is extremely unlikely that these animals posed a risk to
human health, the recall action was deemed necessary because the
establishment did not comply with FSIS regulations. The recall was
designated Class II because the probability is remote that the recalled
beef products would cause adverse health effects if consumed. This
recall designation is in contrast to a Class I recall, which is a
higher-risk health hazard situation where there is a reasonable
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death.
As is the case for all recalls, FSIS is following its established
procedures of conducting effectiveness checks to verify notification of
the recall and product control and disposition. The recalling firm
notifies all consignees of the recalled product and provides
instructions for the control and disposition of products. If the
recalling firm's consignees have used the recalled products in whole or
in part for another product, those consignees must also notify their
customers and remove these products from commerce. FSIS personnel are
in the process of verifying that Hallmark/Westland has been diligent
and successful in notifying its consignees of the need to retrieve and
control recalled product, and that the consignees have responded
appropriately.
Immediately following the FSIS announcement of the Hallmark/
Westland recall, FNS issued instructions to States and program
cooperators for the recall and destruction of the Hallmark/Westland
beef placed on hold on January 30, 2008, as well as Hallmark/Westland
beef dating back to February 1, 2006, the time period covered by the
recall. Following FSIS requirements and procedures, FNS instructed
State distributing agencies and other program cooperators to destroy
all products covered by the recall in a manner compliant with local and
State health agency requirements. The process of control and
destruction is nearing the final phase. The State distributing agencies
and other program cooperators are required to submit documentation to
FNS when the destruction has been completed.
Since January 30, 2008, FNS has provided ongoing technical
assistance to State distributing agencies, industry partners, and
schools to assist program cooperators with the initial administrative
hold and the ensuing recall. In addition, FNS collaborated with the
U.S. Department of Education to disseminate information to school
officials in every school district across the country. USDA thanks the
Department of Education for supporting the FNS outreach efforts.
AMS is working to purchase ground beef from other eligible
suppliers for schools and other domestic recipients to replace
destroyed product. Purchases and deliveries of replacement ground beef
products are being prioritized and expedited to ensure that sufficient
products are available to local nutrition program operators.
USDA places high priority on providing safe and wholesome food to
children served through the National School Lunch Program and other
Federal nutrition assistance programs. We are proud of our record in
this regard and believe that our purchase programs provide children and
other program participants with safe and high-quality food.
Safeguarding Against BSE
I am aware that this situation has raised questions about the risk
of BSE. I would like to take this opportunity to give you a brief
summary of the safeguards against BSE that we have in place to protect
our food supply.
Since the discovery of the first case of BSE in Great Britain in
1986, we have learned a tremendous amount about this disease. That
knowledge has greatly informed USDA's regulatory systems and response
efforts. It has also given us the opportunity to examine our own cattle
herd, which is why we know that the risk of BSE in the United States is
extremely low.
As noted earlier, non-ambulatory cattle are excluded from the food
supply as part of the Federal Government's interlocking system of
controls to protect the food supply from BSE. These BSE security
measures include the ban on non-ambulatory cattle, but that is simply
one of the multiple measures in place.
We have learned that the single most important thing we can do to
protect human health regarding BSE is the removal from the food supply
of specified risk materials (SRMs)--those tissues that, according to
the available scientific evidence, could be infective in a cow with
BSE. FSIS requires that all specified risk materials (SRMs), including
the brain and spinal cord, are removed from carcasses so that they do
not enter the food supply. Slaughter facilities cannot operate without
the continuous presence of FSIS inspection personnel to ensure safe and
wholesome product, including the removal and segregation of SRMs.
According to the 2005 Harvard Risk Assessment, SRM removal alone
reduces the risk to consumers of BSE by 99 percent. FSIS line
inspectors are stationed at key points along the production line where
they are able to directly observe certain SRM removal activities. Other
off-line inspection personnel verify additional plant SRM removal,
segregation and disposal.
Likewise, another significant step we have taken to prevent the
spread of BSE and bring about its eradication in the animal population
is the ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban. In 1997, the FDA implemented a
mandatory feed ban that prohibits feeding ruminant protein to other
ruminants. The feed ban is a vital measure to prevent the transmission
of BSE to cattle.
BSE testing is best used as a surveillance tool. By testing animals
that show possible clinical signs of the disease, we can document the
effectiveness of our security measures.
USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has
conducted targeted BSE surveillance testing since 1990, including an
enhanced surveillance effort that was initiated after an imported cow
tested positive for the disease in December 2003. The goal of the
enhanced effort, which began in June 2004, was to test as many animals
in the targeted population as possible over a 24-month period. This
intensive effort detected only two animals with the disease, out of
over 759,000 animals tested. Both of those animals were born prior to
initiation of the FDA feed ban and neither entered the food supply.
This testing confirms an extremely low prevalence of the disease in the
United States.
The enhanced surveillance program provided sufficient data to allow
USDA to more accurately estimate the prevalence or level of BSE within
the U.S. cattle population. Based on this analysis, we can definitively
say that the incidence of BSE in the United States is extremely low.
APHIS continues to conduct an ongoing BSE surveillance program that
samples approximately 40,000 animals annually. This level of
surveillance significantly exceeds the guidelines set forth by the
World Animal Health Organization, which has affirmed that U.S.
regulatory controls against the disease are effective.
It is because of the strong systems the United States has put in
place, especially these essential firewalls, that we can be confident
of the safety of our beef supply and that the spread of BSE has been
prevented in this Nation.
Further Actions
The investigation led by OIG with support from FSIS and AMS is
ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have additional
information to determine the actions for FSIS oversight, inspection and
enforcement that may be required. Furthermore, until that investigation
is completed and reviewed, we are taking a number of steps to
strengthen our inspection system and I expect to announce those steps
in the near future.
In addition, the Department will make sure that all remaining
Hallmark/Westland product provided to USDA food and nutrition programs
is destroyed. Replacement product from other eligible suppliers is
already being purchased and provided to schools and other recipients.
Given the monetary implications of the recall on this firm, I have
directed USDA's Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
to closely monitor the company's financial status to ensure prompt
payment to producers should Hallmark/Westland resume operations.
Additionally, I have directed AMS to exercise every legal recourse
possible under the terms of the contracts with Hallmark/Westland to
recover the costs of the recall to States and other food program
operators, as well as to the Department.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the serious inhumane handling witnessed on the HSUS
video is clearly unacceptable. Let me be clear that, as soon as we
became aware of the conduct documented on the video, the Department
took immediate action. We have worked expeditiously with our State
partners to remove, destroy and replace product in our Federal
nutrition assistance programs. We have also reached out to all our
stakeholders throughout the process.
We will continue to provide the public with an update of our
actions at www.usda.gov/actions. Thank you and I will be happy to
answer any questions that you have.
Senator Kohl. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I want to
make our position clear and see if we are on the same
wavelength, my position, I'm not speaking necessarily for my
colleagues.
I believe we would all agree that diseased or maimed
animals should not be allowed to infiltrate the system, they're
called downers, but diseased or maimed in one way or another.
They should not be allowed to infiltrate the system. Then we
need to have a set of procedures and regulations and manners in
which we conduct ourselves, so that it doesn't happen.
It seems to me, the only way we can do this, is by having
complete surveillance of the line that leads into the
slaughter, not 50 percent of the time, not random, but that
surveillance has to be like a 100 percent. Whether it's a
person standing there or a camera which is being watched by a
person, but that line needs to be under total surveillance.
And the third thing, is that companies that violate this
policy should be, obviously, put to the most severe kind of
penalty. So those are the three things. Do we agree with that?
One, that we have no tolerance for animals that are downers
into the food system. Number two, we have a surveillance system
that assures that this does not take place. And number three,
we have penalties for violators.
Secretary Shafer. If I may take them in reverse order, Mr.
Chairman. The penalties for the violators here are strong and
swift, as we have shown through the actions we've taken, and
this business is likely not going to survive. So, you know, I
believe that those strong actions will be taken and should be,
by recalling the meat in question, by the penalties that will
take place, and financially for being responsible for the
financial recall, the cost of the recall. And so, you know,
yes, people need to be responsible, and from the USDA
standpoint, they will be held responsible.
The second item is the stiff penalties. You know, the stiff
penalties here, certainly are the recall basis. Employees are
losing their jobs, as I mentioned, and financially I don't see
how this company can survive.
As far as the, you know, downer cow situation goes, I would
point that these animals were inspected by a veterinarian. That
veterinarian views animals, both at rest and ambulatory, and
when doing so, animals that are sick or aren't appropriate to
be into the food supply are removed and put at the rendering
facilities. The animals that are approved by a veterinarian go
in--go into a pen to move into the processing plant.
I do believe there are cases in that scenario where downer
animals can be approved by the veterinarian, as required by
USDA rules, and put into the food supply. I think they are not
sick and having a veterinarian there on--in every facility in
place, allows a judgment on a case by case basis, whether they
go in or do not.
Senator Kohl. Let's get back, because I think there's some
imprecision there, in terms of my understanding. It is not a
fact, according to my understanding, that there is a total
surveillance of every animal, to determine whether or not it's
a downed or maimed animal. There is not a surveillance or an
inspection, as that animal is led into the slaughtering
activity, that there's an inspection that occurs prior to that,
but there's--which is intended to determine whether or not
there's a downed animal involved.
But as that animal then leaves the pen and makes its way
towards the slaughtering activity, there is no inspection, it's
a random inspection that takes--there are inspectors, but they
do not--they're not operative at all times.
So that there is the opportunity for a downed animal to
make its way into the system. It may be rare, it may not occur
often, but the opportunity is there, and we have had, you know,
a thing as serious as this recall, partly as a result of this
kind of an inspection system, which as is--you might describe
it as very good--but it's not total. I think we're all pretty
certain that we can say the inspection system is not 100
percent. It may be close, but it's not there.
And I believe the American people want to know that the
inspection system is 100 percent. So, are we on the same
wavelength?
Secretary Shafer. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the
surveillance doesn't take place 100 percent of the time. I
outlined a couple of actions, which we're taking into
consideration, but----
Senator Kohl. But you said you're going to increase----
Secretary Shafer. We are.
Senator Kohl. But are you--are we prepared to say that we
will work together to see to it that the inspection that takes
place of these animals, to prevent downed animals from
infiltrating the system, the system we put in place will be a
100 percent-type system?
Secretary Shafer. Mr. Chairman, I believe where I'm coming
from here, is that you know, I believe we have rules and
regulations that need to be followed. It is correct to say that
we do not have 100 percent supervision--surveillance.
It is also correct to say that the rules are if a cow goes
down--after it's been approved into the slaughter pen, by a
veterinarian--that a veterinarian must be called to make a
judgment whether it goes in or out. That rule was violated. And
we see the impact that this company--on violation.
Now, I would submit to you that there isn't a
slaughterhouse facility in this country that doesn't understand
now that we're going to play by the rules, and that the rules
say, ``If one goes down, you call the veterinarian,'' or--to
make the judgment.
So, as we go through the investigation, and as we find out
more how things happened, why it happened--why did employees
feel the need to do this--we are going to take the proper
corrective action.
And we're looking at different surveillance methods. Some
facilities, as you mentioned, have put up cameras. I'm a
technology guy, I kind of like that idea. But as we get through
the investigation, we need to find out why it happened, how it
happened, and what corrective procedures we have to take to
make sure it doesn't happen again.
And, should we arrive that 100 percent surveillance is
appropriate, I'd be glad to work with you to figure out how to
do that. Today, I'm convinced that the rules in place are such
to where we're protecting the supply, and we have a safe
entrance into the food supply. And if a downer cattle happens
after a veterinary inspection, that the veterinarian will be
called.
Senator Kohl. I think we can see where we're not exactly on
the same wavelength with respect to what needs to be done, but
I'm glad we've had this opportunity to have this exchange.
Senator Bennett.
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me just
go further down the road the Chairman has gone down.
As I understand it, what you're saying is, that an animal
gets inspected by a veterinarian at the front-end of the chute?
Secretary Shafer. Correct.
Senator Bennett. Okay. The animal then goes down the
chute--this is a virtual chute----
Secretary Shafer. Right.
Senator Bennett. I don't know what else to call it because
I'm not in the business, but he goes down the chute, and if he
stumbles and falls down, that's not necessarily an indication
that he's sick--he may have just stumbled. I have stumbled and
fallen down in front of the Capitol myself, and I'm glad no one
took me out and shot me.
Senator Bennett. But I----
Senator Kohl. But you should have been inspected by a
veterinarian----
Senator Bennett. I was inspected by the Capitol equivalent
of a veterinarian----that is, I went into the Capitol physician
and he checked me out, and all of the rest of it.
So, if I'm understanding you correctly the animal passes
the first test that he's healthy stumbles somewhere along the
way, and you're saying, the regulation requires that there must
be a veterinarian called to make sure he passes the second
time--that he didn't just stumble because he tripped, but maybe
he was ill and just got missed the first time. Do I have that
correct?
Secretary Shafer. That's correct.
Senator Bennett. So, you're saying that the proper
enforcement of the rule would guarantee that any animal that
was diseased wouldn't get into the food supply.
If I understand what the Chairman is asking, it's that you
put a camera in the chute. If you have a camera in the chute--
and I don't think it's going to cost all that much--you have
evidence that can be examined if, in fact, a veterinarian was
not called. If somebody said, ``Oh, I'm competent to notice
that the cow just tripped, and we don't need to bother calling
a veterinarian, just push him along.'' And the Chairman is
saying, ``No, even at that point, you need some kind of
surveillance.''
And, unless the cost is somewhat prohibitive beyond a level
that I can conceive of--cameras are everyday kinds of items
that we have, certainly everywhere around the Capitol, just to
have the record so that if something goes wrong, the Capitol
Police can find out who did it? Who was there? Let's go back
and re-run the tape. It strikes me that that's a very
reasonable request that the chairman is asking for. Is that
basically where we are?
Senator Kohl. Something like that.
Secretary Shafer. And I appreciate the position, Senator.
Senator Bennett. Yes.
Secretary Shafer. You know, I understand it. I also know
that putting up a camera--full surveillance--and having it on
record, as you say, you can go back and review.
Senator Bennett. Yes.
Secretary Shafer. We went back and reviewed this case,
fortunately, because The Humane Society pointed out the
problem.
Senator Bennett. Yes.
Secretary Shafer. But--we went back and reviewed here. It
doesn't mean that you have--it does mean you have to have a
monitor someplace, and you have to have somebody sitting there
watching the monitor. And while the rules here were violated,
the rules for electronic surveillance can be violated, as well.
The point is, here, our strong actions in a Class II recall
have shown that if you have full surveillance, if you have
camera surveillance, if you have requirements to call the
veterinarian, whatever it is--you've got to play by the rules.
Senator Bennett. Yes. Well, I take your point--I'm sure
that the chill has gone through the meat industry--this is one
of USDA's biggest suppliers. And, as you have said here, its
financial viability is now over.
If I were CEO of one of its competitors, I would be very,
very careful not to get anywhere near a similar kind of
activity in my facility, regardless of how I may have felt
about The Humane Society or anybody else who was checking up on
me. I mean, this would get my attention if I were running one
of these businesses, so I can understand your point.
But, let's not micro-manage it. I just wanted to understand
exactly where you were.
Secretary Shafer. And, Senator, to be clear, you know, as I
said, we have an ongoing investigation here. Something happened
that pushed these employees to these egregious acts, why? How
come? Something happened in the facility that they didn't call
when the cow went down, our veterinarian, on site.
Senator Bennett. Yes.
Secretary Shafer. That has to be on site, or the plant
can't operate. They didn't do that. We need to find out why
that happened, and should a solution for 100 surveillance be
appropriate, and the rules in place to----
Senator Bennett. Okay.
Secretary Shafer [continuing]. Watch the cameras and to
review them and all of that kind of stuff, could we do it? You
know, then I'm fully on board with working with you to make
sure that happens.
Senator Bennett. Yes.
Secretary Shafer. The big issue here is what happened? What
do we need to do to make sure it doesn't happen again?
Senator Bennett. Well, I'm encouraged by the strong and
swift action you have taken, because as I say, it would send a
very strong message through the rest of the industry.
Having been a CEO myself, I know that one of the most
fundamental questions you can ask in any organization is, what
does it take to get fired around here? And somehow, the message
went through the employees of that organization that breaking
the FSIS rules is not something it takes to get fired around
here. You don't get fired if you do that.
Indeed, there may be a culture there--we're guessing, and
probably at this point there is no point in finding out,
because the company's going to disappear. Maybe it's a culture
where you get fired if you don't break the rules. You get fired
if you don't keep the line moving, at all costs. And if that
was, in fact, the company culture, it came from the top, and
the company deserves what it's gotten.
So, I think you have now sent the signal--what does it take
to get fired around here? Break the FSIS rules, and you're
going to get fired--that's a very good first signal. But, even
as you were enforcing that rule and sending that signal, don't
forget the suggestion that the chairman has made.
Secretary Shafer. And I appreciate that. And I also
appreciate that our Office of Inspector General that we
recommended do an audit, hopefully will give us the results as
to what that culture was in that plant. Was the culture to
break the rules, and keep your job? Or was the culture, if you
break the rules, you lose your job?
Senator Bennett. Right.
Secretary Shafer. We don't know, but we're going to find
out.
Senator Bennett. Right. The only other comment I would make
is to have you confirm what I said in my opening statement,
that in spite of the egregious behavior, in all likelihood,
this is not a major health problem.
Secretary Shafer. That's correct.
Senator Bennett. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kohl. Thank you.
As I turn it over to Senator Dorgan, I just want to say to
you--and I'm sure you agree--the worst message we,
collectively, could send from this hearing, is that we don't
think that we have a serious problem. The American people would
recoil, if they thought that we had this hearing and
concluded--without an accord on the seriousness of the problem
and the requirement that strong actions be taken.
Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want
to, Mr. Secretary, focus on this issue of too few eyeballs
watching too much meat.
Assume, for a moment, there was not a Humane Society, and
not a camera, and no presence there, at that moment. We
probably wouldn't be having this hearing, we wouldn't know what
had happened. And, my question is, is this a self-assessment
kind of approach at these plants? Would we expect to have meat
inspectors at the plants in sufficient numbers, to be able to
observe, watch, catch some of these things? Or is it a self-
assessment, in which the plant tells its employees, ``Look,
here are the rules, we expect you to abide by them,'' and only
if at some point a Humane Society person or somebody else shows
up with a camera, do you see the infraction and do you see the
cruelty to the animals.
So, tell me about this issue, and that relates to the too
few eyeballs watching too much meat.
Secretary Shafer. You know, I believe that, you know, first
of all, Senator, the responsibility of this is from the
industry. I mean, the people that operate these facilities have
the responsibility for operating them properly, et cetera, our
inspection service is there to oversee it, and to make sure
that that gets done.
With your permission, I'd like to ask Mr. Almanza to answer
that process, because he is a person who has actually worked in
a facility, and you know, and is now the Administrator for
FSIS.
Senator Dorgan. All right.
Mr. Almanza.
Mr. Almanza. Thank you, Senator.
I would say that we have an adequate number of inspectors
in those facilities. Recently, we have seen the number of
facilities throughout the Nation decrease by about 300, 350--in
that neighborhood--of Federal establishments. And, whenever we
have inspection personnel in, well, continuous presence in
slaughter facilities, we expect them to perform certain
activities that will confirm that what they're telling us that
they're going to do, that they are, in fact, doing them.
Such as the HATS, or the Humane Activities Tracking System
that the Secretary mentioned in his opening remarks. We monitor
those areas, in the pens and in the alleys, at random times
throughout the day. We try to vary those, because--or and
also--the places that we come through, sometimes we'll come
through the outside area, sometimes we'll come through the
facility--and try to vary those different things that we're
doing, to inspect or to do ante mortem inspection.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Almanza----
Mr. Almanza. Yes, sir?
Senator Dorgan [continuing]. How many inspectors were at
this plant, that we're talking about?
Mr. Almanza. We had five, sir.
Senator Dorgan. You had five? How many were on duty that
day when someone captured on camera what was going on?
Mr. Almanza. We have five assigned there, but we weren't
shorthanded at that location. We had three line inspectors, an
off-line inspector, and a veterinarian.
Senator Dorgan. What I'm trying to get at is, is it dumb
luck that we know this? Just, somebody was there with a camera,
and shows the world, and we're all aghast? Would we have known
it as a result of inspectors being on this site? I mean, that
actually is the way we should catch circumstances where rules
are not being followed--we shouldn't rely on somebody with a
hidden camera posting to YouTube or something, it should be our
inspection. So, is it kind of dumb luck that we're now
understanding this happened?
Mr. Almanza. Well, certainly the investigation will turn up
the reasons why this occurred. But, we are increasing our level
of monitoring those situations in the slaughter facilities, and
I think as Senator Kohl stated, as well, that we need to be
more vigilant in those areas, and so those are some of the
things that we immediately started to do.
Senator Dorgan. And your position is that we do not need
additional inspectors, you think the number of inspectors is
sufficient? Because there are many who feel strongly that we're
short of the number of inspectors, given the number of Federal
plants they are required to inspect.
Mr. Almanza. Yes, sir. Well, we're continuing to hire, but
we also have about 200 more inspectors today than we had a year
ago, at this same time. And so we continue to hire, we have
about a 4.1 percent vacancy rate at the slaughter level----
Senator Dorgan. But, my question is how many do you have
relatively--how many, relative to how many do you think you
really need? That's the question. Do you think we have
sufficient inspectors, given the need out there?
Mr. Almanza. Yes, sir, I certainly do.
Senator Dorgan. All right.
My time is almost up, Secretary Shafer, I had sent you a
note because I--and I know this is about meat inspection and--
but I did want to have the opportunity while you testified, to
discuss the issue of the human nutrition laboratory.
The proposal in the budget, and this was not on your
watch--because you've come on after this was all prepared--is
to close a very important human nutrition lab and move the
functions--to California and to Maryland. And there are some
internal studies and observations about this suggesting it's
going to end up costing us more money.
I'm not going to ask you to go at length on the record
today to answer that, but I would like--if you could--to submit
answers to me, in writing, so that at least we have a base of
understanding as we consider the President's budget request on
this, in terms of whether it makes sense or not for the future.
Secretary Shafer. I will do so, Senator.
Senator Dorgan. All right, that will be helpful. Can you do
that within the next couple of weeks? That would be helpful.
Secretary Shafer. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a really
important issue. That the meat supply in this country is a very
important issue, and I think the one thing that we don't want
to come out of this hearing is some suggestion or some notion
that we don't have a safe supply of meat. One--the important
element that comes out of this is that we are determined to do
everything we can to make certain that the supply of meat
remains safe, and that the rules that we have are followed, and
strengthened, if necessary.
I think the proposition that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
makes some good sense. It is very simple, and not very costly,
these days, to have detection cameras in a plant like a
slaughterhouse. And I think that might well be a pretty useful
thing--going back and investigating this circumstance, one
would have a really interesting and complete record, wouldn't
they? Of what has happened at this plant. So, Mr. Chairman, I
think you've made a pretty useful suggestion.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Senator Dorgan.
Senator Craig.
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing.
Mr. Secretary, thank you. Do you have reason to believe--or
not to believe--that what occurred at this facility is an
isolated situation in the slaughter industry?
Secretary Shafer. We don't know that, Senator. Our
investigation is ongoing, and we are trying to find out the
reasons why, what incented these folks to treat animals in this
manner. And, as was mentioned here, we may not have known this
had not The Humane Society of the United States brought this to
our attention.
We're trying to get to the bottom of that during the
investigation. We've asked our Office of the Inspector General
to pursue that, and as you know, that's a arms' length entity
within the organization. And we anticipate that one of the
answers that we will receive is, as they do that audit of other
facilities, is this been happened elsewhere? We hope to get
that answer, and I can share with you the results.
Senator Craig. In that context, do you believe that the
rules and regulations that are on the books today, as it
relates to how animals are handled and how they're slaughtered,
is adequate?
Secretary Shafer. I do, sir. I believe that the regulations
on the books today clearly state that if an animal goes down,
after it has been inspected by a veterinarian and approved, and
assigned a tracking number that goes through all the way, you
know, the carcass, all the way through the process, that a,
that veterinarian must be called. They broke the rules. That
doesn't mean the rules are wrong, we've got to figure out why
this facility broke the rules.
So, I believe that the rules are adequate, I believe that
if you look at the record of USDA, we've had many plant
shutdowns because of inhumane treatment, we have had many
incidences in this very plant, where veterinarians were called
to make judgments of whether an animal goes, you know, into the
process, or is pulled back. So, when the rules are followed,
they are adequate, and I believe those rules are adequate.
Senator Craig. It's my understanding that, due to the
violations, the beef is unfit for human consumption. But is it
necessarily unsafe?
Secretary Shafer. We do not believe that this a food safety
issue. We've issued a Class II recall, which says there is no
apparent health food risk here. The reason for the Class II
recall was because this was not a sick animal, this was an
animal that went down after it had been inspected by a
veterinarian, so we believe that there is no reason to be
concerned about the safe food supply here, as well.
Does anybody else want to answer?
Senator Craig. While I was late in coming, and did not--and
I've not read your full testimony, and I will--you did, I hope,
define a downer cow versus mad cow, and the difference, did you
not?
Secretary Shafer. Yes.
Senator Craig. Good. Because there are very clear
differences, and I think there's a frustration in the public
eye as to what all of this means, based on the visuals of the
video--not the reality of what is safe versus unsafe. And I
think it's very important that that be clarified, if it is in
any way frustration of the consuming public.
Secretary Shafer. And it was frustrating to myself,
personally, Senator. These were difficult videos to watch. And,
importantly, there must be a distinction made of animals that
are downed, that are sick, that we saw being pushed around with
forklifts and things like that--that were not approved by the
veterinarian to go into the meat supply.
The animals that were approved to go in, we do have
evidence--video and otherwise--that cows that were approved,
and afterward went down, that do have tracking systems on them,
all the way to the process that shows they are, they are
approved, you know, that's where the rule violation took place.
Senator Craig. That's right.
Secretary Shafer. But I'm confident that the veterinarian
on staff approved or disapproved the appropriate animals to go
into the system.
Senator Craig. Well, catching the bad guys is always
important, but helping create a culture in which bad guys
cannot exist is more important. And I think Senator Bennett is
clear--we can put all kinds of cameras up, we could line
things, line the runways with inspectors. If you have a culture
out there that will fudge, then you've got a problem. And,
obviously enforcement is one thing--establishing or insisting
on a culture that plays by the rules is critically important.
Do you believe the American beef supply, currently on the
shelves, for the consumers, is safe?
Secretary Shafer. Senator, we issued a Class II recall,
which is a rule violation, not a food safety issue----
Senator Craig. I wanted you to repeat that, for the record.
It's important that the American public know exactly what
you've said.
Secretary Shafer. We believe that's important, as well. And
while this is not a food safety issue, we don't need/want to
duck the point that this was a violation. And our suppliers our
there now--our slaughterhouses and processes--know that rule
violations count.
You know, this isn't--you know, we have a lot of
interlocking inspections for food safety--one of which is
downer cows. We have a feed ban that's been put in place by the
FDA, we have inspections ongoing on every carcass that goes
through a facility--they check for bacteria, and other signs of
ill health. So, we're pretty sure that the meat that gets on
the market, and on the shelves of this country, is safe. And we
continue to operate in that manner.
Senator Craig. Well, I appreciate the way that you have
handled this. You know, most people who know me, know I have a
bias--I grew up in the livestock industry. At the same time, I
want it to be what it is--a supplier of high-quality beef to
the marketplace, that is healthy and in all ways, desirous of
the consumer.
And I've watched over the years--with great frustration--
when something like this happens and these sweeping attitudes
happen, or there's been a failure to clearly communicate what,
in fact, was happening, did happen, and did it, in any way,
impact the food supply. And, I think you've been as clear as
possible in this. I think the American consumer was simply
over-powered by a video--that's not to condemn it, at all--
that's simply the reaction.
Your due diligence is going to be very important here,
thank you.
Secretary Shafer. Thank you.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Senator Craig.
Senator Harkin.
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just ask
that my statement be made as part of the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Tom Harkin
Thank you to Chairman Kohl and Ranking Member Bennett for holding
this timely hearing on the Hallmark/Westland meat recall. The
circumstances surrounding this particular recall are unique: the recall
was triggered because of an undercover video released by a non-profit
organization.
Most people have seen the video in question, where Hallmark/
Westland employees are seen inhumanely handling cattle as well as
forcing nonambulatory--or downer--cattle to stand, apparently to get
these animals to pass inspections conducted by the Department of
Agriculture (USDA). USDA regulations expressly prohibit downer cattle
from entering the human supply because the inability to stand or walk
can be a clinical sign of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). This
regulation, made permanent last year, is one of USDA's safeguards to
keep cattle that may be infected with BSE out of the food supply.
Because of the violations by this company of USDA regulations, the
company was forced to recall 143 million pounds of beef, covering beef
produced from February of 2006 through January of 2008. To make matters
worse, about 50 million pounds of the recalled beef went to Federal
nutrition programs such as the National School Lunch Program, the
Emergency Food Assistance Program, and the Federal Distribution Program
for Indian Reservations.
This incident raises numerous questions that I hope the Department
of Agriculture can answer for us today. I am especially concerned about
whether our food safety inspections are adequate and if existing
regulations are being enforced. It is frustrating for me to see that
USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has many of the tools
necessary to ensure the safety of our food supply, but in this case,
did not adequately use them. I expect to learn more details about what
happened at the Hallmark/Westland establishment, including actions that
USDA is taking to prevent this from happening again, what kind of
assurances USDA can provide that this is not a systemic problem in our
food safety inspection system, and whether USDA's FSIS has the
resources it needs to continue its mission of protecting public health.
Senator Kohl. It will be done.
Senator Harkin. And then, let me dissent a little bit from
my friend from Idaho. If there was no safety problems, why did
we destroy 143 million pounds of beef, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Shafer. I appreciate the question, Senator, and
it's nice to see you in a different arena than the farm bill,
by the way.
But, the meat has been recalled----
Senator Harkin. Yes.
Secretary Shafer [continuing]. And has to be destroyed
because the Federal law says that rule violated declared the
meat ``adulterated,'' and adulterated meat is to be recalled.
Senator Harkin. Right.
Secretary Shafer. This is not--and that's why we have
different classes of recalls. We have a Class I recall, which
is a food safety issues, and we've certainly had that and
overseen those at the agency, and at the Department. We have
Class II recalls which say, ``Rule violations are important,
there's no health risk, but we must pull it back,'' and there's
a Class III recall, as well.
Senator Harkin. But, the fact is----
Secretary Shafer. So, that's why we have the different
variations of the recall.
Senator Harkin. But the fact is, that we don't know if
these animals that were portrayed on this video were, indeed,
sick or not. Do you know that?
Secretary Shafer. I would submit, you know, Senator--I want
to say Mr. Chairman----
Senator Harkin. Not here.
Secretary Shafer. Yeah, not here.
I would submit, Senator, that we believe, and the USDA has
deemed through the process that the food supply is safe.
Senator Harkin. Listen, Mr. Secretary--I agree with you.
But, the fact remains, there are rules in place to protect the
safety of food.
Secretary Shafer. Yes.
Senator Harkin. Now, you do have Class II recalls for rule
violations, but the fact is, unless you can inform me
differently--or someone else, maybe Mr. Almanza or someone
can--the fact is, we don't know if those animals that we saw
that were being scooped up by a forklift and stuff, that
couldn't stand--we don't know if they were sick or not. We
don't know that. And because we don't know it, we had to recall
143 million pounds of beef, because we don't really know.
Secretary Shafer. Senator, what we do know is that the cows
that go--went into processing facility that are suspect for
being downer cows--were passed by a veterinarian and approved
to go into the food supply. They did not----
Senator Harkin. Was this before--was this before the
animals were depicted on the video?
Secretary Shafer. I would say from watching the video and
I----
Senator Harkin. Yes.
Secretary Shafer [continuing]. You know, I wasn't there, I
watched it, like you did. I would say that there were some cows
on that video--this is my opinion----
Senator Harkin. Yes.
Secretary Shafer. There were some cows on that video that,
when I saw them on the ground being rolled around with a
forklift, I--my thought is, they were not approved by the
veterinarian, and that there were cows that went down after the
inspection. And we saw one cow, in the video, that was pushed,
tugged, pulled, into the knock box right at the entrance--not
laying in the field, not being rolled around, not being pushed
or prodded--but it went right into the knock box, it went down.
That was the violation, a veterinarian is supposed to be called
there, and was not.
So, I don't see any evidence to the effect that----
Senator Harkin. Yes.
Secretary Shafer [continuing]. There were sick cows that
went into the food supply.
Senator Harkin. But, I think the facts are--at least what
we do know, already--I think what we know is that the company
did not call any veterinarian, did not call for veterinarian
inspections after that.
Secretary Shafer. That's correct.
Senator Harkin. Well, we know that, so therefore we don't
know if they were sick or not.
Now, faced with that, and faced with the possibility that
people could become sick, the reason for the rule, as you know,
on downer cattle, is because downer cattle are susceptible to
salmonella, E. coli, who knows what else? And that's why we
have these rules on downer cattle.
It's nothing new, I remember something that happened on
this back in Colorado 30 years ago, with the Stankey boys.
Well, I won't get into that right now. Do you remember that?
Secretary Shafer. Sure.
Senator Harkin. So this is nothing really new. But you'd
think we'd have learned our lesson from that--that was almost
30 years ago, if I'm not mistaken. I went out there and held a
hearing at the time, in Colorado on this. So, when I saw this
again, I thought, ``Wait a minute, I thought we took care of
this, 25 years ago. Here it comes back again.''
But, look, I'm as strong as anyone, wanting to reassure the
American people that our food supply is safe, but we cannot
keep saying these things if we don't really know. And I think
we do a disservice to our own honesty and truthfulness if we
aren't level with the American people. That, in fact, there are
rules, and the reason those rules are there is because downer
cattle can be sick, and if they aren't inspected afterward, we
don't know if that meat that got into the food chain was safe
or not. And that's why 143 million pounds of beef was recalled.
If you are there, Mr. Secretary, saying, ``Absolutely, that
meat was all okay for everyone to eat,'' then I've got to ask,
``Why was it recalled?''
Secretary Shafer. Okay, and that's a fair question.
First, let me point out that a downer cattle--and the
reason for, to call a veterinarian for further inspection, is
because some animals do go down after they've been inspected. I
would point out to you, sir, that there are interlocking
inspection services and procedures in place to make sure that a
BSE concern--which is a downer cow concern--is not a factor to
the American public.
And I want to assure the people here that the specified
risk materials are removed from carcasses as they go to the
plant. Those have been deemed, maybe, possible for BSE, and we
have inspectors that make sure they are removed properly from
the meat supply.
We have an FDA food ban in place, and the feed for cattle
has been suspect as a BSE issue, and that has been in place.
And also, that the cows going into this facility were younger
cows, and the BSE symptoms and infections show up later in life
in animals. So, with the interlocking concerns that are in
place here, we have deemed this food supply as being safe.
Now, my point with asking the slaughterhouse here, the
Hallmark/Westland Plant, to pull back their beef for rule
violations, is because I believe it's important. And as I
mentioned in my opening statement, I believe that the
schoolchildren who are eating this must know that rules count,
that rules matter.
And I had lunch with kids in California last week. So, you
know, I think that's important. I think it's important for moms
to know that their food supply is safe, and good, and that the
rules are being enforced, and we are making sure that happens.
Senator Harkin. Well----
Secretary Shafer. And I think it's important for our
consumers--both here and internationally--to know that we're
going to enforce our rules very strongly, whether it's a health
food risk, whether it's a downer cow risk, or whether these
are--you know, whatever the rules are, they're there for a
reason. And it's not a food safety case here, but we're going
to follow the rules.
Senator Harkin. Well, we can parse words and we can try to,
but the fact is, downer cattle, the reason we have the rules is
because downer cattle are more susceptible. And as I understand
it, there was not a veterinarian called in to examine these
cattle afterwards, so we don't know. Unless some evidence
proves me wrong on this, we don't know, and therefore, for
public safety and public health, we do a recall on this.
I agree that recall ought to be done, but I don't know, I
think we're parsing words to say, ``Well, it's done, not
because it was a safety reason, just because someone violated a
rule.''
Secretary Shafer. That's a----
Senator Harkin. When they violate a rule, and there is
concern that violation could be harmful to the public health
and public safety of people who eat that beef--we don't know
then there is a recall. And that's why it's done. Better to be
safe than to be sorry.
But, my point is--so, I just want to make that clear. I
dissent from just the fact that you say, ``Well, there was
absolutely no risk to the public health at all,''--we don't
know. And because we don't know, we act on the safe side.
Now, now that gets me back to the--the whole inspection
service itself, and I heard you say, Mr. Almanza, that you had
a 4.1 percent vacancy rate. Well, I was told, as of September
2007, the vacancy rate for in-plant inspectors was about 9 to
10 percent nationwide--11 percent in the Alameda District,
where this took place. Dr. Peterson told reporters on February
21, the vacancy rate is 9 percent, and that to be at full
employment, USDA would have somewhere north of 8,000
inspectors. Well, you've got about 7,500 inspectors now. So, we
have a shortage of about 500.
The budget that you've sent down to us doesn't include any
money for any new hires, so--is the vacancy rate 4.1 percent?
Is it 9 percent? What is it?
Mr. Almanza. When I was referring to 4.1 percent, Senator
Harkin, I was talking about in the slaughter plant, the
slaughter line positions. And even though those positions are
vacant, we still fill them everyday, by taking offline
inspectors, and we also have relief inspectors that are roving
inspectors that fill those line positions. So, never do we have
a line position that's not filled on a daily basis, but we have
those backups to substitute when they're there.
So, when I--and I'm sorry if I misled you--but the 4.1
percent was just the slaughter vacancy rate. So, it is higher
in the offline inspections positions, Consumer Safety inspector
positions, but--that's why I thought we were focusing more on
the slaughter end of it, and that's why I used that.
Senator Harkin. I just don't know if I understand that.
You're short 500 inspectors, but you say you're not short any
inspectors in the slaughter lines, whatsoever. Is that what
you're telling me?
Mr. Almanza. Well, we have vacancies, yes sir, we have
vacancies--but we fill those vacancies with offline and also
inspection personnel that we have to back up when people go on
vacation, when people--when some of our inspectors are off for
other things. And we use those inspectors to substitute for
them. So, we always have our slaughter lines fully staffed with
USDA inspectors.
Senator Harkin. Do you need 500 more inspectors, or not?
Mr. Almanza. We'll--certainly if we can hire----
Senator Harkin. Are you short 500 inspectors?
Mr. Almanza. To be at 100 percent, yes, we are. However,
we've never been at that level before.
Senator Harkin. What's the highest level you've ever been
at?
Mr. Almanza. I think where we are today--at 7,500, today.
Senator Harkin. Well, it would just seem that, lines being
faster, more meat products--not just beef, but poultry, also,
going through lines faster than we ever have before, and with
the safety concerns that we've seen here, that perhaps we ought
to take another look. And I don't know whether we have the
money for it or not, but we ought to have more inspectors.
The last thing I wanted to bring up is this case, here,
about the video. And I think my staff told me that the chairman
had recommended maybe a permanent type of a surveillance system
or something like that out there, which seemed to make some
sense to me, that we might do that.
But, I just want to ask you, Mr. Secretary, if an
inspector--if an inspector had seen these violations, what
would have been the normal course of action to be taken by the
USDA? Or maybe Mr. Almanza can answer that.
Secretary Shafer. Go ahead.
Mr. Almanza. We would suspend them immediately.
Senator Harkin. You would have suspended?
Mr. Almanza. Yes, sir.
Senator Harkin. The plant?
Mr. Almanza. Yes, sir.
Senator Harkin. And stopped their operations right there?
Mr. Almanza. Yes, sir. And we did that 12 times last year
in other locations.
Senator Harkin. Let me ask, let me delve a little further.
Let's say an inspector had been out there and had seen
this, and had stopped operations, would there have been a
recall? Or would the company simply have been required to take
corrective action, so it wouldn't happen again?
Mr. Almanza. Actually, they would be required to submit
preventative and corrective measures, in order for us to allow
them to begin operations again. And then we would have set up
some verification activities, which we would monitor on a daily
basis, to make sure that they are adhering to those.
Senator Harkin. One of the points I'm getting to here is if
an inspector had been out there, and had seen this, and had
stopped everything, we would have been assured that none of
those downed animals went through the facility.
Secretary Shafer. That's not--that's not totally correct.
Senator Harkin. Oh.
Secretary Shafer. Because a veterinarian is called after
the ante mortem inspection. And if there's a downed cow, the
rules say an inspector is called, and observes an animal, and
either further approves it, or rejects it.
Senator Harkin. But the company would have been shut down
during this period of time, the line would have been shut down,
Mr. Secretary, is that right?
Secretary Shafer. That's my understanding.
Senator Harkin. So, the inspector would have seen this
happen, and he would have shut everything down--you've got to
stop all of your operations. They would have called in a
veterinarian. The veterinarian then would have done his
inspection, and would have certified that the animal was not
sick?
Secretary Shafer. Correct.
Senator Harkin. And could have gone through?
Secretary Shafer. Correct.
Senator Harkin. That's what did not happen here.
Secretary Shafer. That's what did not happen here, the
veterinarian was not called.
Senator Harkin. No, what didn't happen here was, also, that
the inspector wasn't outside to stop it, either.
Secretary Shafer. What happened here is that, that the
veterinarian was not called, the rules and regulations that the
USDA set for that plant were not followed.
Senator Harkin. But the inspector was not out there to stop
it. If the inspector had been there, he would have stopped it.
Secretary Shafer. The inspector was to be called, and was
not.
Senator Harkin. To be called by whom?
Secretary Shafer. By anybody that saw the downed animal.
Senator Harkin. But why isn't the inspector out there?
There were four inspectors, I understand, at this plant.
Secretary Shafer. Five, I believe, sir.
Senator Harkin. What? Five?
Secretary Shafer. Five, I believe.
Senator Harkin. But not one was outside?
Secretary Shafer. The--the process is, the ante mortem
takes place and cows are rejected or approved for processing.
Senator Harkin. Yeah?
Secretary Shafer. The approved go into a facility after the
veterinarian does that, and then the veterinarian goes onto
other inspection services in the plant.
Senator Harkin. So, you leave it up to the company, if they
see a downer animal, to call the veterinarian or to get the
inspector out there, I guess.
Secretary Shafer. We don't leave it up to them, we require
them to do so, and as seen here--you know, the penalties have
been severe.
Senator Harkin. Well, I think that's a very poor
requirement. You know? Talk about the fox guarding the hen
house, boy this is a classic case of it.
I think what we've got to do, Mr. Chairman, is ensure--I'll
work with you on this, as both authorizing and appropriating
committee, to ensure that in these facilities, that we have on-
site inspectors. I think the public requires it. I think the
safety of our food requires that. And we can't just rely upon
the company, I mean, they--what the heck? They may not want to
call them. They may say, ``Ah, it's okay, just shove it in
there,'' you know how that goes.
As I said, I saw this 20--what year was that thing there
out in Colorado? That must have been about 1981 or 1982 or
1983--somewhere in that timeframe out there.
Mr. Almanza. That was that the Stanko----
Senator Harkin. Stanko thing.
Mr. Almanza. Yes, that was in about 1978.
Senator Harkin. Okay, it was even before that. I was
chairing the Livestock Subcommittee on the House side, on the
Agriculture at that time.
Mr. Almanza. Yes, sir.
Senator Harkin. That's what they were doing.
Mr. Almanza. Well, first----
Senator Harkin. They were dragging in downer cattle, and
slaughtering them, and stuff, at the same time. They actually
went to jail for it.
Mr. Almanza. Yes, they did.
Senator Harkin. And I thought, you know, you'd think
through the years we'd learned our lesson on that, but
evidently we haven't. I just think that we've got to re-think
about our inspection system, there have to be on-site
inspectors that are there, and that they aren't just all in the
building at one time. And I've heard all talk about, well,
people did walkie-talkies, and warned people when they were
coming out, and stuff like that--and you can't rely on the
company to do it. You've got to have inspectors, and by the
way, if I don't mind saying so right now--inspectors who are
paid for by the taxpayers of this country, and not paid for by
user fees put upon companies.
I, to me, I've fought this all my life here, this idea--and
every administration, you aren't the first, one before you
tried it, too, so it's Democrats and Republicans both, so it's
not one party or the other--they keep trying to put user fees
on there. And I said, no. This is for the public health, and
they ought to be public employees and paid for by the public,
and not by the companies. Then you get back into that old fox
in the hen house again. So, I just wanted to make that
statement.
But, I really think that we've got to reexamine the number
of inspectors, and how those inspectors are assigned to do the
ante mortem type of inspection. Post-mortem seems to be okay,
the ante mortem, though, now I'm concerned about what's going
on in other places.
Mr. Almanza. If I may?
Senator Harkin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Almanza. I started my career as a slaughter inspector,
and did ante mortem on thousands of animals, and so I
understand where you're coming from.
However, there is--the inspectors go out there with the
veterinarian, they go out there and they do ante mortem
inspection of 100 percent of the animals that are presented for
inspection. So, every single animal that's going to come in,
gets viewed by either an inspector, or a veterinarian.
Now, what we were--what you're alluding to in that area of
the alley way, as they refer to it in the meat establishments--
is the area between the pens and the knock box. And it's a very
narrow passageway to keep the animals from being disturbed, and
try to turn around in these areas. And so that area is where
that cow went down, the cow that the Secretary was talking
about. It was after it had received ante mortem inspection, in
the pen, and it was being run through the alley, down to the
knock box. And that animal went down in that area, which is in
close proximity to the knock box.
So, it had received inspection. And so what should have
occurred was, someone from the plant should have come and
notified the veterinarian that an animal went down, and then
the veterinarian should have come out there and looked at the
animal, and if it was an acute injury of some sort, then he
would make the determination of whether it would go into the
food supply, or not. That's the way it's supposed to work.
Senator Harkin. Well, it obviously didn't work that way,
because in the video I saw, there was no way you could get a
four-wheel forklift in that narrow passageway.
Secretary Shafer. Yes, and we should be clear that that
video had animals in it that obviously would not have passed
veterinary inspection for further processing. There were many
animals that were shown here that were not approved by this
veterinarian.
We have evidence of, cows after the inspection, that went
down in the alley way that Al talked about. But everything in
that video did not----
Senator Harkin. The animals I saw in that video were
approved by the inspector before that, is that what you're
saying?
Secretary Shafer. No, no sir. That's not what I'm saying.
Senator Harkin. Okay, then let's be clear, I think people
need to know what we're talking about, I think there's some
confusion.
Before those animals, when they were in the holding pens,
before they were sent down that chute, you just told me that
each one of them was visually inspected by some inspector, each
one of them, is that what you said?
Secretary Shafer. Senator, Senator--I think the issue here
is we are not aware, and we have The Humane Society here, and
maybe could answer this question. We're not aware that every
animal in that video went into the food supply. It's my
contention that some of those animals that were being rolled
around, did not--and were not passed by the veterinarian. Some
that did, were passed, went into the alley way and went down
before it went into the knock box.
So, I think we have to investigate, and part of our
investigation is to be clear about the video, and which animals
did go into the food service, and did not.
I believe that there were some efforts in The Humane
Society's video that mixed cattle that were sick and
inappropriate to go in, and cattle that were not sick, and were
deemed, that would have been deemed to go in.
So, I think--I think we have to be careful that everything
on that video doesn't show animals that went into the food
supply.
Senator Harkin. Thank you.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Senator Harkin.
Senator Harkin. I went over my time. Thank you very much.
Senator Kohl. We're going to move on to the next panel. I
just want to make this comment, I said to you about an hour
ago--the last thing we want, I think, any of us, is to leave
the impression with the American people that we don't have a
serious problem. We need to be careful.
Secretary Shafer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kohl. A 143 million pounds of product were
recalled. People across the country saw those pictures--they
recoiled. They said, ``There's a problem, somewhere, somehow,
that is serious.'' And we don't want this hearing to give the
indication that the problem isn't a serious problem, that
requires some strong action.
Isn't that true, sir?
Secretary Shafer. That is true, Mr. Chairman, and I think
that we've shown that we are--it is a serious problem--and
we're taking strong action.
I also don't want to leave this hearing with the impression
that this is not a Class II recall--which is not a public
health issue. A Class II recall says there's a remote
possibility of a problem----
Senator Kohl. But isn't it also true that this whole
problem was uncovered by a camera that wasn't even yours? It
was from The Humane Society.
Secretary Shafer. Absolutely.
Senator Kohl. Shouldn't you be responsible for uncovering
these situations yourself? Isn't that serious? Do we need an
implant, or somebody who figures out a way to get in, and
unnoticed, and then takes these pictures, and the American
people see them?
Secretary Shafer. I----
Senator Kohl. Why don't you have a system that uncovers
this kind of inhumane treatment of animals? Which is--what you
call--a violation of rules, call it whatever you want. That's
your responsibility to deal with, isn't it, sir?
Secretary Shafer. It is, sir. And----
Senator Kohl. That's all we're saying----
Secretary Shafer. And the point is we have----
Senator Kohl. We keep on coming back to the fact that this
is not really a--this is a rule two violation, which means,
``Hey, it's not all that serious.'' But, the American people
don't feel that way.
Secretary Shafer. Well, and neither does USDA. We've taken
it seriously, which is why we asked the meat be recalled. But I
would point out that it is a Class II recall. And the American
people should not be concerned about the safety of their food
supply.
You are right. The Humane Society brought this to our
attention, and that is inappropriate for USDA. We need to be on
top of these inspections, we need to understand it, and I'm
confident that our--now-investigation will lead us to finding
out how it happened, why it happened, and what corrective
measure we have to take for the future to make sure it doesn't
happen again. And we are committed to doing that.
Senator Kohl. That's great. Thank you, we appreciate your
coming today.
Secretary Shafer. Thank you.
Senator Kohl. Thanks, Tom.
Thank you so much.
Secretary Shafer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kohl. And now we will, we will go to second panel,
we'll take testimony from Wayne Pacelle, who is President of
The Humane Society, and from Patrick Boyle, who is President of
the American Meat Institute.
Mr. Pacelle, go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF WAYNE PACELLE, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE
HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Pacelle. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your
colleagues for not only having this hearing today but also for
this committee's consistent--I want to thank this committee for
its consistent attention to the issues of ante mortem
inspection, and the humane treatment of animals at
slaughterhouses.
You--also full committee Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member
Bennett--since 2001, have added $39 million to the budget for
ante mortem inspections, because you've long been concerned
about this, and we deeply appreciate that at The Humane Society
of the United States.
It was in 1956, 1957, and 1958 that Fred Myers, who was the
founder, the first CEO of The Humane Society of the United
States, first testified on the problem of cruelty in American
slaughterhouses before congressional committees--including
this, this same subcommittee.
It was 50 years ago, this summer, that the Congress passed
the Humane Slaughter Act, codifying the point that there are
certain practices--at that time, the use of clumsy, long-
handled, pull-axe hammers--that are repugnant to the Nation's
moral code, that were used.
Half a century has passed, and we are once more before you,
to draw your attention to certain other cruelties that, we
believe, are not only repugnant to our Nation's moral code
today, but also a threat to the safety of the food supply.
Mr. Chairman, you spoke movingly about the video and the
cruelty that occurred. And I won't regale the subcommittee with
all of the details of all of this cruelty. But I will tell you,
addressing the comments of the Secretary of Agriculture who, I
think, has taken this matter very seriously, and it's very much
appreciated by The Humane Society--that this notion that
there's some great safety net here, that these veterinarians
are doing very close inspections of these animals--is false.
Let me tell you about this plant, according to our
investigator. This was a small, to medium-sized, plant--really
on the smaller side. They're doing 500 cattle a day, almost all
of them were spent dairy cows.
And the veterinarian would come at 6:30 in the morning, and
then he would come back at 12:30 and he approved about 350 in
the morning, and then 150 in the afternoon. He would make a
visual inspection, at a distance, of 25-30 animals at a time.
The idea that there's some, you know, very close scrutiny
that's occurring with each individual animal, that we're really
safeguarding the food supply is just not the reality of what is
happening on these plants.
And you can imagine, if we're talking about a higher volume
of animals going to slaughter, and you have one ante mortem
inspector who is there for 2 or 3 hours a day, making a distant
visual inspection--we should not provide false assurances to
the public of the food supply. Nor do we need to be alarmists,
but we need to be cognizant of, really, the situation on the
ground, and how the inspections are occurring.
And that's why, you know, we are concerned--not about just
exposing this particular company--but what this case
illuminates about the larger circumstances in American
slaughterhouses, and what's happening on the ground.
Mr. Chairman, we heard--I think--real parsing of this
issue, on the whole issue of downers, and I just wanted to make
it clear what's going on, on the whole downer issue.
For years, we were allowing downers into the food supply--
for years. Not only 30 years ago, in 1976, but just up until a
few years ago. The only reason it changed is we had the first
case of a BSE-positive cow in the United States. There have
been several in Canada, but finally we had one in the United
States. It was a downer cow, and it was precisely the
circumstance that we had warned against for years, that the
downer cows--as Senator Harkin has indicated--are more
susceptible to certain pathogens than ambulatory, or walking
cattle.
So, this downer cow found its way into the food supply--44
nations closed their markets to American-produce beef within a
couple of weeks. The Nation was scared, then Agriculture
Secretary Veneman passed a rule--an emergency rule--to ban any
downer cows in the food supply. We supported that, it was the
right policy--it would have been the right policy 10 years
before, it would have been the right policy 30 years before.
But it took a crisis to precipitate action.
Yet, unbelievably, USDA didn't make that rule final until
July 2007. Doing the math, that's 3.5 years later, after they
published the emergency rule. They didn't finalize it, and when
they finalized it, they weakened it.
And they weakened it to allow this notion, which is still
mystifying to me, that if the animal goes down later in the
process--after the ante mortem inspection, which I mentioned,
is not all that vigorous--that somehow the veterinarian can be
called back, and make a judgment, again, with a visual
inspection, not a lot of tests going on here, and then allow
that animal to be slaughtered.
Well, the animal is down for a reason. And the idea that
somehow you can detect an acute physical injury by a broken
leg, and say that's the sole reason that the animal is down--
Senator Bennett is not here, but he said he fell and, you know,
one time, and went down.
Well, people may fall because they're ill--they just don't
fall out of nowhere. They may fall because they have a
neurological problem, they may not be feeling well, they may be
dizzy. The reason that they fall is because there's an
underlying medical problem. And some animals may slip and fall,
and maybe no medical problem at all with the animal, but you
have many animals that may fall because they're injured. And
you cannot separate the acute injury from a longer-standing
illness, and that's why we need a ``no downer'' policy--as you
said, Mr. Chairman, that's a bright-line policy that doesn't
allow any of these animals into the food system, because we're
being penny-wise, and pound-foolish.
They want to squeeze these animals, they want to squeeze
every last dime out of them, and what's the consequence? Our
export markets are closed, consumer confidence is diminished,
companies go out of business--does this make any economic
sense, except in the narrowest terms?
We need to strengthen enforcement in addition to dealing
with the downer issue. We need more inspectors observing live
animals, we need rotations of the inspectors, we need actual
criminal penalties for forcefully striking an animal with an
object, dragging an animal, ramming, or otherwise attempting to
move an animal with heavy machinery, using electric shock,
water boarding the animals--putting a hose in their mouth and
their nostrils and attempting to simulate a drowning effect, to
get these poor, hapless animals up, because they're in such a
state of torment, that they will try to get away and get up?
Those should be criminal penalties. We shouldn't just have to
shut down the plant for an hour or two hours. These people
should be subjected to criminal penalties.
We also, we need a comprehensive animal welfare set of farm
animal policies that we don't have. And I just wanted to say
that this issue of isolated case--you know, if USDA had known
about this, which obviously they did not, as Secretary Shafer,
I'm sure, would have done something if he had known about it--
if they had known or the industry had known, they would have
shut this plant down. Now, they're telling us that there are
more than 600 other cattle slaughterhouses--while they didn't
know about this one, in Chino, but they know about all of these
others?
This was a random selection. Our investigator chose this
site at random. This was not some broad risk assessment of 50
plants, and then we said, ``Okay, here's the highest-risk
plant, let's do a deeper dive, and find out what's going on,''
we chose this at random. That is a troubling fact in this
circumstance.
And I'll also tell you--going to the point that it is
probably not an isolated case--that it was the USDA's own
Office of Inspector General that chastised the agency in
January 2006, for its inconsistent application of policies and
regulations related to downed animals, after observing downers
processed at two facilities.
I just wanted to remind you, it was January 2004--right
after the mad cow case--Veneman passed the rule. Yet, FSIS
issued this, this inspection guideline that told inspectors
that they could approve animals that went down, after ante
mortem inspection. FSIS was violating their own rule that USDA
had publicly promulgated, and assured the public that the
product was safe.
So, it was the OIG that found this, so it's not isolated--
and we can submit the OIG report. I know that your staff has
seen it.
You know, we need a rigorous inspections program, because
reckless behavior by a single company can have national and
global implications. How many other crises, recalls and public
scares will we tolerate, before we adopt an unambiguous policy
banning downer cattle in the food supply?
You know, we went through this with the mad cow case, and
now are we going to fine-tune this again, we're going to allow,
you know, a little more inspection of downers? But, we're still
going to have them get into the food supply? We need a bright-
line on this.
You know, we are pleased to work with the USDA, we'll offer
honest criticism, when warranted, but at the end of the day we
want the agency to do better in, an admittedly difficult
assignment, of assuring humane handling of so many animals that
go to slaughterhouses. That's why we worked hard with your
committee to get more funding for this program.
PREPARED STATEMENT
But today, we need a new commitment, and perhaps new
approaches to handling the questions before us today. We need
to apply innovations, such as surveillance cameras, and humane
handling, because there's a moral imperative to do so. What
happened to these animals is unconscionable. We should not
tolerate this abuse of living, suffering, feeling creatures.
These animals are killed so that people can eat them. And
the least we can do is to see that their suffering and fear are
minimized to the greatest extent possible.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Wayne Pacelle
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify in the wake of a hidden-camera investigation of
a dairy cow slaughter plant in southern California conducted by The
Humane Society of the United States. The Humane Society of the United
States, as you know, is the Nation's largest animal protection
organization with 10.5 million supporters nationwide, and I serve as
president and CEO of the organization.
Our undercover investigator worked at the Hallmark/Westland Meat
Packing Company for approximately 6 weeks at the end of 2007. The
investigator witnessed and documented egregious mistreatment of
animals, particularly downed cows too sick or injured even to stand or
walk. He filmed workers ramming cows with the blades of a forklift,
jabbing them in the eyes, applying painful electrical shocks often in
sensitive areas, dragging them with chains pulled by heavy machinery,
and torturing them with a high-pressure water hose to simulate
drowning, all in attempts to force crippled animals to walk to
slaughter. In one case, he videotaped a cow who collapsed on her way
into the stunning box. After she was electrically shocked and still
could not stand, she was shot in the head with a captive bolt gun to
stun her and then dragged on her knees into slaughter.
This investigation has done more than expose one company's abusive
practices. It has led us to the inescapable conclusion that there are
serious shortcomings in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's)
policy on handling downer cattle and the agency's ante-mortem
inspection program.
Downed cattle are more likely to be infected with BSE--bovine
spongiform encephalopathy or ``mad cow disease.'' Studies also suggest
that they may be more likely to harbor foodborne bacteria, such as E.
coli and Salmonella, which kill hundreds of Americans every year, as
these non-ambulatory animals often lie in bacteria-laden waste and may
have higher levels of intestinal pathogens due to stress. Children and
the elderly are more likely to fall victim to severe illness requiring
treatment and hospitalization as a result of both of these pathogens.
For a more detailed discussion of the human health risks associated
with the slaughter of downed cattle, please see the addendum to this
testimony.
The Investigation
In fall 2007, our investigator applied for a position with the
Chino, California-based Hallmark Meat Packing Company, a federally
inspected slaughter plant, which supplied carcasses to Westland Meat
Company, which, in turn, processed the carcasses into ground beef. The
companies were affiliated and essentially treated as one entity; they
operated from the same building and shared the same USDA registration
number. From USDA's own records, we learned that in 2007 Westland was
the second-largest supplier of beef to USDA's Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS). As you know, AMS purchases beef for distribution to
needy families, the elderly, and also to schools through programs,
including the National School Lunch Program, administered by the Food
and Nutrition Service. Westland was named the USDA ``supplier of the
year'' for the 2004-2005 academic year.
It is critical to point out that we did not do a broad risk
assessment of a large number of plants and then conduct a more thorough
examination of a high-risk facility. The plant was selected at random,
and during the course of the investigation, we learned that Westland
was the number-two beef supplier to the National School Lunch Program
and to other USDA commodity distribution programs. We learned after the
field portion of the investigation that Hallmark/Westland had
previously been cited for mishandling animals.
The investigator's job at Hallmark was to help drive cattle from
transport trucks and holding pens into a chute that led to the killing
floor. He regularly worked grueling 10-hour days, 5 or 6 days a week.
The job of getting tired, bewildered, and hungry cattle to move is
challenging and made even more difficult when the animals are primarily
end-of-production, or ``spent,'' dairy cows, who are often sick,
injured, and suffering.
Every day, he witnessed blatant and commonplace cruelties inflicted
on animals by employees who purposefully ignored regulations meant to
prevent the torment and abuse of downed animals simply so they could
get these cattle who could not even walk into the kill box. These were
not isolated incidents of mistreatment of downed cattle, but deliberate
acts that happened routinely at the plant. They were part of the
culture of the operation.
A USDA inspector was only present in the live animal area twice
daily at 6:30 a.m. and 12.30 p.m.--predictable times at which he merely
noted those animals who could not stand and then approved the remainder
for slaughter. Let me emphasize the lack of rigor in the approval-for-
slaughter process. The veterinarian did not make an animal-by-animal
inspection, but simply took a look at large groups of animals, 30 or 35
at one time, as they passed by him, and if the animals could stand or
walk, he would approve them. The inspector typically approved 350
animals for slaughter in the morning and then about 150 animals in the
afternoon inspection.
The horrific treatment of animals we documented is being downplayed
as an unconscionable aberration--the work of just a handful of rogue
employees. We do not believe this is an accurate characterization. It
has come to light that Hallmark/Westland had a long, documented history
of abusing downed cattle. In fact, the Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) cited Westland in 2005 for mishandling animals, and the
local Pomona Valley Humane Society and SPCA notified USDA three times
about possible violations in 1996 and 1997. In 1996, the Pomona Valley
Humane Society sent a letter to Hallmark, with a copy to USDA, stating:
``We have had numerous incidents with your facility in the past
involving downer animals and loose animals creating public safety
issues.'' In 1993, Farm Sanctuary produced undercover footage of
downers being lifted by forklift at Hallmark, prompting introduction of
a California downer cattle law the next year. Either management
provided instructions to get the downers moving or was asleep at the
wheel and let employees run wild--in either case, it's an indictment of
management.
USDA Policy
In terms of the larger picture of USDA oversight, we also know that
slaughtering nonambulatory cattle was not isolated to this plant. It
is, in fact, allowed under current USDA rules. A shift in policy to
allow downed cattle in the food chain marks a retreat from a strict no-
downer policy that USDA had in place on the books since the beginning
of 2004.
Specifically, on December 30, 2003, USDA announced: ``Effective
immediately, the USDA will ban all downer cattle from the human food
chain.'' This announcement came 1 week after public disclosure of the
first U.S. case of BSE--a dairy cow in Washington State who was
identified by a USDA veterinarian as downed due to calving injuries and
later tested positive for BSE.
USDA has broadcast its no-downer policy as a key protective
firewall against BSE. Most Americans had no idea that meat from animals
too sick or injured to walk on their own could end up on their dinner
plates. The agency's announcement helped ease public panic in the
United States over the first domestic BSE case and maintain consumer
confidence both in the safety of the food supply and in the basic
humane treatment of animals at slaughter plants. The announcements were
also widely publicized to provide assurances to America's trading
partners, dozens of which had closed their markets to U.S.-produced
beef after the BSE finding.
Unacceptable Loophole
In January 2006, the USDA's own Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) chastised the agency for its inconsistent application of policies
and regulations related to downed animals after observing downers
processed at two facilities. The use of a forklift was observed to
transport the animals to the slaughter area. The OIG found that 29
downer cattle were slaughtered for human food at a sample of 12
slaughter plants checked during a 10-month period. If this were a
representative sample it would suggest that more than 100 slaughter
plants may be processing downed cattle across the country. The OIG
audit noted the lack of documentation on the animals' fitness for
consumption.
For years, USDA has publicly boasted about its comprehensive no-
downer policy but circumvented it behind the scenes with a loophole
that permitted slaughter of some cattle unable to walk. The agency has
failed to follow its official interim policy published on January 12,
2004, which specified that all downer cattle would be excluded from the
human food supply, ``regardless of the reason for their nonambulatory
status or the time at which they became non-ambulatory. Thus, if an
animal becomes nonambulatory in route to the establishment due to an
acute injury, it must be humanely removed from the truck, humanely
euthanized, and the carcass properly disposed of. Likewise, cattle that
become nonambulatory on the establishment premises, such as an animal
that breaks its leg as it is unloaded from the truck, are also required
to be humanely moved, humanely euthanized, and the carcass properly
disposed of.''
The agency's January 12, 2004 regulation defined ``nonambulatory
disabled'' cattle as any who ``cannot rise from a recumbent position or
. . . cannot walk, including, but not limited to, those with broken
appendages, severed tendons or ligaments, nerve paralysis, fractured
vertebral column, or metabolic conditions.'' \1\ Since BSE can result
in an animal going down either directly, because of brain damage, or
indirectly, by predisposing an animal to injury, these downed cattle
were to be euthanized rather than slaughtered for human consumption.
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\1\ U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection
Service. 2004. Prohibition of the use of specified risk materials for
human food and requirements for the disposition of non-ambulatory
disabled cattle; meat produced by advanced meat/bone separation
machinery and meat recovery (AMR) systems; prohibition of the use of
certain stunning devices used to immobilize cattle curing slaughter;
bovine spongiform encephalopathy surveillance program; interim final
rules and notice. Federal Register 69(7):1861-74. http://
www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/03-025IF.pdf. Accessed February 19,
2008.
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The same day that the regulations were published, however, the USDA
issued Notice 5-04 behind-the-scenes, instructing inspecting
veterinarians how to carry out the regulations. In contrast to both the
public claims by USDA and the interim rule itself, the agency
instructed inspectors to allow downed cattle to be slaughtered for
human consumption if they initially appeared otherwise healthy but went
down within the slaughter plant itself due to an acute injury.\2\
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\2\ U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection
Service. 2004. Notice 5-04. Interim guidance for non-ambulatory
disabled cattle and age determination, January 12. http://
www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/5-04.htm. Accessed February
19, 2008.
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In July 2007, USDA finally made permanent its so-called ``ban'' on
slaughtering downer cattle. But instead of closing the loophole
identified by the OIG, the agency codified it, acknowledging that some
downer cattle have been, and will continue to be, processed for human
food. USDA's final rule specifies that ``FSIS inspection personnel will
determine the disposition of cattle that become non-ambulatory after
they have passed ante-mortem inspection on a case-by-case basis.'' In
other words, those who are able to walk when initially inspected by
USDA but then keel over and cannot stand up again can nevertheless be
slaughtered, and the meat can be sold.
This loophole is reckless from a public health perspective and
promotes the inhumane handling of downer cattle. It is unacceptable on
both counts.
A food safety system that relies on inspectors evaluating downers
on a case-by-case basis is unworkable. Determining why an animal is
down is challenging if not impossible for inspectors because injury and
illness are often interrelated--e.g., a broken leg may simply be the
observable result of the weakness, abnormal gait, or disorientation
associated with an underlying disease. At least three of the documented
cases of BSE in North America were identified as downers due to injury,
not illness, showing how difficult it is for inspectors to reliably
sort out which non-ambulatory animals are ``safe.'' The first case of
BSE discovered in Canada was thought to be ``suffering from a broken
leg.'' \3\ The first identified case in the United States similarly did
not seem to display any BSE symptoms, but was reported down due to a
calving injury.\4\ She was seemingly picked at random as one of perhaps
less than 1 percent of the downed cattle tested for mad cow disease in
the United States up until that time.\5\ Another Canadian case was
suspected of injury rather than disease. The farmer reportedly ``didn't
suspect anything was seriously wrong when one of his cows slipped on
the ice and hurt itself . . . '' \6\
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\3\ Campbell D. 1993. Killer mad cow disease strikes in Alberta.
Calgary Herald, December 9, p. D1.
\4\ U.S. Department of Agriculture. 2003. USDA BSE update (press
release), December 27. http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/
_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB/.cmd/ad/.ar/retrievecontent/.c/6_2_1UH/.ce/
7_2_5JM/.p/5_2_4TQ/.d/7/_th/J_2_9D/_s.7_0_A/
7_0_1OB?PC_7_2_5JM_contentid=2003/12/0445.html&PC_7_2_
5JM_navtype=RT&PC_7_2_5JM_parentnav=TRANSCRIPTS_SPEEC. Accessed
February 19, 2008.
\5\ Assuming an incidence of 500,000 nonambulatory cattle a year
[Stull CL Payne MA Berry SL and Reynolds JP. 2007. A review of the
causes prevention and welfare of nonambulatory cattle. Journal of the
American Veterinary Medical Association 231(2):227-34] and that such
cattle represent 75 percent of the those tested over the 14 years of
USDA testing as was the case in 2002-2003 [USDA Release No. 0457.04
Office of Communications 202 720-4623 BSE Update January 2 2004.
www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/
7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2004/01/0457.html. Accessed
February 19, 2008.].
\6\ Johnsrude L and Richards G. 2005. Feed bought after ban fed to
latest mad cow: 104 other calves had access to same feed in spring of
1998, Innisfail-area farmer says. Edmonton Journal, January 14, p. A1.
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Even if ``only'' a broken leg is involved, dragging an animal with
a fracture is just as cruel, if not more so. If you've ever suffered a
broken bone, you can imagine the pain of being pulled by chains or
rammed with a forklift in that condition.
Lack of Enforcement
The problems engendered by USDA's loophole are exacerbated by its
lax enforcement of the downer rules. As documented by our undercover
investigation, USDA inspectors may only conduct cursory observations,
coming to check on animals just once or twice a day and disregarding
their condition for the remaining hours. While USDA inspectors are
required to monitor and verify humane handling in connection with
slaughter, including offloading, holding and driving animals in pens
and chutes, a USDA inspector was rarely present during offloading and
never observed by our investigator in the pens, except during the
aforementioned predetermined twice-daily times of 6:30 a.m. and 12:30
p.m., or by the chutes.
Despite all the media attention surrounding our investigation and
the subsequent beef recall and criminal charges against plant workers,
sick and injured cattle can and likely will still be slaughtered and
put into the American food supply unless changes are implemented to
protect animal welfare and protect human health and that of the
Nation's most vulnerable citizens.
Needed Steps
--Close Loophole.--An unequivocal, truly comprehensive ban on the
slaughter of downed animals for human consumption is needed to protect
food safety and animal welfare. The current protocol that allows
inspection personnel to ``determine on a case-by-case basis the
disposition of cattle that become nonambulatory after they have passed
ante mortem inspection'' is unrealistic and unworkable, and places an
impossible expectation on the inspector. It also creates financial
incentives for precisely those abuses that we witnessed in the
undercover footage.
A highly visible and vigorously enforced total no-downer rule is
the right policy. For the animals, removing current incentives that
encourage workers to try every cruel tactic imaginable to move downers
to the kill box would alleviate suffering. If crippled animals cannot
be sold for food, slaughter plants have no reason to prolong their
misery to try to get them through the slaughter process. Closing the
loophole would also help create an incentive for all involved in the
production chain to minimize hazards that can cause animals to become
downed in the first place.
USDA can revise its rule immediately, restoring the language it
promulgated in January 2004. And the Congress can pass the Downed
Animal and Food Safety Protection Act (S. 394/H.R. 661) to codify a
national no-downer policy.
--Strengthen Enforcement.--The USDA must rework its inspection
program to ensure meaningful compliance. We recommend a combination of
measures. More inspectors observing live animals are needed, and all
inspectors should be trained and directed to monitor the treatment of
live animals to ensure that they are handled humanely. Inspectors must
understand that their oversight responsibilities begin at the moment
animals arrive at slaughter premises, including when the animals are on
trucks at slaughter facilities. An inspector should meet each truck
when it arrives on the premises and should order the immediate humane
euthanasia and condemnation of any cattle who are non-ambulatory.
Egregious conduct such as forcefully striking an animal with an object,
dragging an animal, ramming or otherwise attempting to move an animal
with heavy machinery, or using electric shock, water pressure, or other
extreme methods, should be explicitly prohibited and those policies
established in a formal rule to take effect immediately. Inspections
should be unannounced and not on a predictable schedule. They should
include undetectable inspections on hidden catwalks close enough to the
animals to allow accurate observation or through video surveillance
accessible for viewing by independent third parties. Slaughter plants
should be encouraged to install video cameras that would allow for
viewing of all of the animal handling prior to slaughter. Finally, it
would be helpful to rotate inspectors to ensure that they do not become
too close with plant personnel.
--Establish Criminal Penalties.--Current Federal law does not
provide for criminal penalties, even in cases of repeat or egregious
offenses, for violations of humane handling standards.
--Ensure Humane Federal Procurement.--H.R. 1726, the Farm Animal
Stewardship Purchasing Act, would set basic animal welfare standards
for producers who sell food to the National School Lunch Program and
other Federal programs, including requiring veterinary treatment or
humane euthanasia for downed animals.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today on this
important food safety and animal welfare issue.
Addenda
Timing of HSUS Contact with USDA on Case
HSUS conducted a thorough investigation that took several months,
with our investigator undercover at the plant for 6 weeks during
October and November 2007, and then the investigation continuing after
he left the site as we analyzed documents and compiled further
evidence. These are long-term investigations, and we don't parachute in
and know everything there is to know in a single day. If we are going
to accuse a company of wrongdoing, with broader implications for the
public, we want to make sure we collect as much evidence to support our
claims as possible, and we want to be sure to present a fair and
accurate picture of what went on at the plant.
Because USDA has rarely taken action against slaughter plants for
violating humane handling protocols, and also because few local law
enforcement agencies have ever taken on animal cruelty cases involving
the mistreatment of farm animals, we thought it essential to amass a
preponderance of evidence at this plant before terminating the field
portion of the investigation. There were fundamental humane treatment
and food safety issues at issue, and we did not want to see the proper
authorities dismiss the investigation as incomplete or inconclusive,
and to decide not to take corrective action.
As soon as the field portion of the investigation concluded and our
team assessed and organized the enormous volume of video and other
research materials, we met with staff from the San Bernardino District
Attorney's office in mid-December. At that time, we provided them the
evidence of criminal conduct and encouraged them to prosecute the
perpetrators. Animal cruelty crimes are typically prosecuted by local
and State law enforcement, and we knew the unacceptable abuses captured
in the video footage showed that California animal cruelty and downer
protection laws had been violated.
The D.A.'s office asked for extra time to assess this information
before we released it. Staff at that office indicated to us that they
planned to take action but they were unable to provide a specific time
line. Because of our history of working cooperatively with local law
enforcement on animal cruelty cases, and the obvious intention of the
personnel in the D.A.'s office, we acceded to their request. But at the
end of January, we decided that we had an obligation to make the
information public and could wait no longer, even if the D.A.'s office
was about to take enforcement action and file charges against the
perpetrators. Although the D.A.'s office had indicated that they
planned to share the information with USDA, before we released the
information to the press, I personally called a senior official at USDA
to make sure the agency knew what was about to be brought to public
attention.
Frankly, we did not turn to the USDA first because the agency has
too often ignored complaints about serious animal welfare abuses, even
when they are associated with known public health risks. We didn't want
to turn down a dead end with so much at stake. In fact, it's been
reported during the past few weeks that other animal protection
organizations had investigated downer cases at this same Hallmark plant
and brought the information to USDA's attention on several occasions,
yet the mistreatment persisted.
Moreover, USDA was directly implicated in the problems we uncovered
at this plant. The agency has day-to-day oversight responsibility, and
was complicit in the failures there. Not only was USDA on site
throughout every shift when these abuses occurred, the agency was a
primary purchaser of meat from the plant and had awarded the company
the honor of being named USDA ``Supplier of the Year'' for the 2004-
2005 academic year. Westland was the #2 beef supplier to the National
School Lunch Program and to other USDA commodity distribution programs.
We're glad that USDA is taking this matter seriously now, and we're
cooperating fully with the agency as it considers this case and the
broader implications for industry oversight. I also note that we have
led the effort to marshal substantial congressional support each year
since 2001 to increase funding for USDA to better enforce the Federal
humane slaughter law and prevent this type of animal cruelty.
Human Health Risks Associated with the Slaughter of Downed Cattle
The slaughter of downed cattle raises several serious food safety
issues. Some studies have shown that nonambulatory cattle may suffer
from higher rates of foodborne pathogens.\7\
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\7\ Stull CL, Payne MA, Berry SL, and Reynolds JP. 2007. A review
of the causes, prevention, and welfare of nonambulatory cattle. Journal
of the American Veterinary Medical Association 231(2):227-34.
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Texas A&M University researchers were among the first to alert the
medical community of the potential for downed cattle to present a
vehicle to contaminate the human food supply with bacterial pathogens.
They studied 30 downed cattle who had no outward signs of illness,
except for inability to rise, and had all passed ante mortem
inspection. Even though these nonambulatory animals appeared otherwise
healthy, when the researchers took bacterial cultures, they found cows
infected with Salmonella and E. coli. The researchers concluded:
``Results of this study of 30 cattle indicate that pathogens may be
circulating in the blood of some recumbent cattle at the time of
slaughter.'' \8\ Commenting on areas of concern, the scientists noted:
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\8\ Edwards JF, Simpson RB, and Brown WC. 1995. A bacteriologic
culture and histologic examination of samples collected from recumbent
cattle at slaughter. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical
Association 207(9):1174-6.
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It should be remembered that much of the meat from recumbent cattle
goes into the production of ground beef, which, because of the grinding
process and extra time it spends at a temperature higher than the whole
carcasses, usually attains a high bacterial cell count per gram by the
time processing is finished. Contaminated meat used to make ground beef
would also contaminate subsequent clean meat exposed to common
machinery (e.g., grinders) and, thus, would increase the danger of
contamination.\8\
This research shows that even when downed animals appear otherwise
healthy, they may be harboring dangerous pathogens.
The majority of nonambulatory cattle are dairy cows.\7\ Virtually
all dairy cows are ultimately slaughtered for human consumption in the
United States.\9\ Annually, 6 million culled dairy cows enter the food
chain as ground beef,\10\ accounting for at least 17 percent of the
ground beef produced in the United States.\9\ Since the muscles of
dairy cows have a lower fat content, they are commonly used in
producing the more expensive ``lean'' hamburger.\11\
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\9\ Troutt HF and Osburn BI. 1997. Meat from dairy cows: possible
microbiological hazards and risks. Revue Scientifique et Technique de
l'Office International des Epizooties 16(2):405-14.
\10\ Hussein HS and Sakuma T. 2005. Prevalence of shiga toxin-
producing Escherichia coli in dairy cattle and their products. Journal
of Dairy Science 88(2):450-65.
\11\ Spika JS, Waterman SH, Hoo GW, et al. 1987. Chloramphenicol-
resistant Salmonella newport traced through hamburger to dairy farms: a
major persisting source of human salmonellosis in California. New
England Journal of Medicine 316(10):565-70.
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According to a 2003 review, downed dairy cattle ``may harbor
greater numbers of pathogens, and their slaughter may increase spread
of pathogens at the slaughter establishment.'' \12\ In Meat & Poultry,
research is cited to explain why nonambulatory cattle tend to have
higher levels of bacteria on their carcasses: ``Lame animals spend more
time lying down, which increases the likelihood they will be
contaminated with fecal matter.'' \13\ In addition to the potential for
contamination of the meat with fecal pathogens, when dairy cows are
slaughtered, ``[k]nives, carcasses and the hands of personnel may be
contaminated by contents of the mammary gland when this is removed from
the cow during processing.'' \9\ Intramammary infections (mastitis)
affect up to nearly two-thirds of cows in U.S. dairy herds \14\ and are
one of the most common reasons dairy cows are sent to slaughter.\9\
Inappropriate excision of the udder during the slaughter process can
contaminate the rest of the carcass with milk that could contain
Listeria and other milk-borne pathogens. A 1997 review of the
microbiological hazards of eating meat from culled dairy cows
concluded: ``In the USA, dairy cattle are raised and managed with
increasing intensification, and this intensification may promote the
maintenance of a variety of micro-organisms which could be pathogenic
to humans through food.'' \9\
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\12\ Vanbaale MJ, Galland JC, Hyatt DR, and Milliken GA. 2003. A
survey of dairy producer practices and attitudes pertaining to dairy
market beef food safety. Food Protection Trends 23:466-73.
\13\ Grandin T. 1999. A.M.I. sponsors stunning and handling
conference. Meat & Poultry, March, p. 48.
\14\ Nickerson SC, Owens WE, and Boddie RL. 1995. Mastitis in dairy
heifers: initial studies on prevalence and control. Journal of Dairy
Science 78(7):1607-18.
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E. coli O157:H7
In 2003, a study funded by the USDA was published that investigated
the ``potential impact to human health that may occur following
consumption of meat derived from downer dairy cattle'' by measuring
infection rates of one of the most virulent foodborne pathogens, E.
coli O157:H7. The investigators found that downed cows were 3.3 times
more likely to harbor the potentially deadly E. coli strain than
walking culled dairy cows. The researchers concluded that ``downer
dairy cattle harboring E. coli O157:H7 at slaughter may be an important
source of contamination and may contribute to the health risk
associated with ground beef.'' \15\ The results of this study led USDA
Microbial Food Safety Research Unit Research Leader John B. Luchansky
to question whether, based on E. coli alone, nonambulatory cattle
should be excluded from the U.S. meat supply.\16\
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\15\ Byrne CM, Erol I, Call JE, et al. 2003. Characterization of
Escherichia coli O157:H7 from downer and healthy dairy cattle in the
upper Midwest region of the United States. Applied and Environment
Microbiology 69(8):4683-8.
\16\ Luchansky JB. 2002. Pathogen Reduction Dialogue Panel 4.
Characterization and Control of Food Borne Pathogens. May 7.
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E. coli O157:H7 infects tens of thousands of Americans every year,
causes dozens of deaths,\17\ and may be the leading cause of acute
kidney failure in previously healthy U.S. children.\18\ Speculatively
blamed in part on the increasing intensification of dairy farming,\19\
prevalence rates in U.S. dairy herds have ranged up to 100 percent.\20\
Quoting USDA researcher Caitriona Byrne and colleagues: ``Due to the
ubiquity of E. coli O157:H7 among cattle, as well as its low infective
dose and the severity of the resistant illness in humans, effective
control of the pathogen may be possible only by eliminating this
microorganism at its source rather than by relying on proper food
handling and cooking thereafter.'' \15\
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\17\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2006. Escherichia
coli O157:H7. National Center for Infectious Diseases Division of
Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, December 6. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacoli_g.htm. Accessed February 19, 2008.
\18\ Razzaq S. 2006. Hemolytic uremic syndrome: an emerging health
risk. American Family Physician 74(6):991-6.
\19\ Armstrong GL, Hollingsworth J, and Morris JG Jr. 1996.
Emerging foodborne pathogens: Escherichia coli O157:H7 as a model of
entry of a new pathogen into the food supply of the developed world.
Epidemiologic Reviews 18(1):29-51.
\20\ U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1997. An update: Escherichia
coli O157:H7 in humans and cattle. www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/taf/
emerginganimalhealthissues_files/ecoupdat.pdf. Accessed February 19,
2008.
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A 2005 review in the Journal of Dairy Science likewise concentrated
on the risk of contracting virulent strains of E. coli from eating
ground beef from dairy cows that may be tainted with fecal material.
These toxin-producing strains can cause hemorrhagic colitis and
progress to kidney failure, coma, and death, particularly in young
children.\18\ Dairy cattle ``enter the food chain as ground beef,'' the
review reports, and ``[a]s a result, downer dairy cows harboring STEC
[Shiga toxin-producing E. coli] at slaughter can be a health risk to
humans.'' \10\ Meat from diseased and disabled cattle has also been
implicated in a similar life-threatening disease in dogs.\19\
Salmonella
Salmonella infection hospitalizes thousands of Americans every
year, kills hundreds, and can lead to chronic conditions such as
arthritis, bone infections, cardiac inflammation, and neurological
disorders.\21\ According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Salmonella strains in the United States are growing
resistant to nine different antibiotics.\22\ One strain, known as
Salmonella Newport MDR-AmpC, is even growing resistant to ceftriaxone,
a powerful antibiotic vital for combating serious infections in
children.\22\
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\21\ D'Aoust JY. 1994. Salmonella and the international food trade.
International Journal of Food Microbiology 24(1-2):11-31.
\22\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2002. Outbreak of
multidrug-resistant Salmonella newport--United States, January-April
2002. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 51(25):545-8.
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Multiple outbreaks of this new multidrug-resistant Salmonella
strain have been tied to dairy farms,\23\ ground beef made from dairy
cows,\24\ and dairy products.\25\ Investigating one deadly outbreak of
antibiotic-resistant Salmonella involving hundreds of people,
California public health officials traced the cases back to meat from
infected dairy cows slaughtered for hamburger. In their report
published in the New England Journal of Medicine, they were able to
correlate risk of contamination with the slaughter plants that received
the most moribund and dead cattle. The researchers noted: ``Stressed
animals are more likely to shed Salmonella in large numbers.'' \11\
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\23\ Gupta A, Crowe C, Bolstorff B, et al. Multistate investigation
of multidrug-resistant Salmonella serotype Newport infections in the
Northeastern United States, 2000: human infections associated with
dairy farms. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,
Massachusetts Department of Public Health, and Vermont Department of
Health.
\24\ Gupta A, Fontana J, Crowe C, et al. 2003. Emergence of
multidrug-resistant Salmonella enterica serotype Newport infections
resistant to expanded-spectrum cephalosporins in the United States.
Journal of Infectious Diseases 188(11):1707-16.
\25\ McCarthy T, Phan Q, Mshar P, Mshar R, Howard R, and Hadler J.
2002. Outbreak of multidrug-resistant Salmonella Newport associated
with consumption of Italian-style soft cheese, Connecticut.
International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases. Atlanta, GA,
March. http://www.cdc.gov/enterics/publications/184-mccarthy_2002.pdf.
Accessed February 19, 2008.
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In addition to the immunosuppressive effect of stress,
nonambulatory animals may also be more likely to shed pathogenic
bacteria, ``[s]ince animals going to slaughter are generally in a
temporary state of starvation, and it is known that starvation causes
E. coli and Salmonella to proliferate'' due to changes that occur in
the animal's rumen. By the time most cattle are slaughtered, they have
been starved for variable periods of time, in part because empty rumena
are easier to eviscerate.\19\ This may be particularly relevant to
downed cattle populations who may be left to starve for extended
periods before they are finally slaughtered.
Carolyn Stull of the University of California-Davis School of
Veterinary Medicine has studied Salmonella infection in downed cows and
reported results at a 2004 American Meat Institute conference. Fifty
downed cows were sampled and seven were found to be infected with
Salmonella. Despite infection, however, five of the seven infected
cows, including at least one cow who was septicemic, were known to have
passed USDA ante mortem inspection for human consumption.\26\ Stull and
colleagues reportedly identified 6 out of 20 nonambulatory cattle sent
to a slaughter facility to be fecal shedders of Salmonella.\27\
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\26\ Stull C. 2004. Handling non-ambulatory cattle. International
Meat Animal Welfare Research Conference, February 17. http://
www.meatami.com/Content/PressCenter/IMAWRC/Presentation3STULL.pdf.
Accessed February 19, 2008.
\27\ Stull CL, Payne MA, Berry SL, and Reynolds JP. 2007. A review
of the causes, prevention, and welfare of nonambulatory cattle. Journal
of the American Veterinary Medical Association 231(2):227-34, citing:
Maas J, Stull C, Oliver M, et al. 1995. Pilot study to determine the
medical etiology of disabled dairy cattle at slaughter facilities. In:
Proceedings: Production Food Safety Workshop, U.S. Animal Health
Association.
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Anthrax
Anthrax is a farm animal disease that can infect, though very
rarely, the human meat supply.\28\ In 2000, 32 farms were quarantined
for anthrax in the United States.\29\ That summer, at least five people
were exposed to meat ``highly contaminated'' with anthrax from a downed
cow who was approved for slaughter and human consumption. These cases
were reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as
``Human Ingestion of Bacillus Anthracis-Contaminated Meat.'' \30\ Had a
ban on the slaughter of downed cattle been in effect, these people may
have been spared. Subsequently, a family stricken with
gastrointestinal, oropharyngeal, and meningeal anthrax tied to the
consumption of a sick sheep was reported,\31\ suggesting it may be
prudent to exclude all nonambulatory animals--not just cattle--from the
human food supply.
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\28\ Swartz MN. 2001. Recognition and management of anthrax--an
update. New England Journal of Medicine 345(22):1621-6.
\29\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2001. Human
anthrax associated with an epizootic among livestock--North Dakota,
2000. www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5032a1.htm. Accessed February
19, 2008.
\30\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2000. Human
ingestion of Bacillus anthracis-contaminated meat--Minnesota, August
2000. Journal of the American Medical Association 284(13):1644-6.
\31\ Babamahmoodi F, Aghabarari F, Arjmand A, and Ashrafi GH. 2006.
Three rare cases of anthrax arising from the same source. Journal of
Infection 53(4):e175-9.
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Frank Garry, the coordinator for the Integrated Livestock
Management Program in the College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical
Sciences at Colorado State University, reportedly suggests that the
slaughter of nonambulatory farm animals may present a threat to
national security:
The threat of bioterrorism adds one more reason to end the use of
nonambulatory animals in human food. An animal that is unable to walk
because of illness should probably not be processed for human food
consumption, regardless of whether the animal was intentionally or
unintentionally contaminated. As long as the USDA continues to
slaughter diseased livestock, it is possible that a bioterrorist attack
could make people very sick and undermine confidence in American
agriculture.\32\
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\32\ The Humane Society of the United States. 2002. HSUS calls on
FDA, USDA and Congress to halt slaughter of diseased livestock (press
release), January 31.
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Culled dairy cows may present particularly vulnerable agroterrorist
targets as they are slaughtered and ground into hamburger. ``Given that
only a single infected carcass can contaminate a large lot of ground
beef,'' wrote USDA researchers in a 1996 review, ``it is possible that,
whereas in the past an infected animal would produce only a small
number of cases, such an animal could now cause a large, widespread
outbreak.'' \19\ According to Robert Tauxe, Chief of the Foodborne and
Diarrheal Diseases Branch of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, each burger may reportedly be made from the flesh of
hundreds or even thousands of different cows.\33\ One hypothetical
model suggests that a single downed cow infected with a pathogen such
as E. coli O157:H7 could theoretically contaminate more than 100,000
hamburgers with an infectious dose.\19\
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\33\ Public Broadcasting Service. 2002. Modern meat: interview Dr.
Robert Tauxe. Frontline, April 18. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/meat/interviews/tauxe.html. Accessed February 19, 2008.
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy is a transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy (TSE) of cattle that may manifest with behavioral
symptoms, earning the disease its colloquial name ``mad cow disease.''
The rendering of sheep infected with an ovine spongiform encephalopathy
(known as scrapie) into cattle feed may have led to the emergence of
BSE.\34\ In modern animal agriculture, protein concentrates, or ``meat
and bone meal''--terms that encompass ``trimmings that originate on the
killing floor, inedible parts and organs, cleaned entrails, fetuses''
\35\--are fed to dairy cows, for example, to improve milk
production.\36\ According to the World Health Organization, nearly 10
million metric tons of slaughter plant waste is fed to farm animals
every year.\37\
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\34\ Kimberlin RH. 1992. Human spongiform encephalopathies and BSE.
Medical Laboratory Sciences 47:216-7.
\35\ Ensminger ME. 1990. Feeds and Nutrition (Clovis, CA: Ensminger
Publishing Co.).
\36\ Flaherty M. 1993. ``Mad cow'' disease dispute: U.W. conference
poses frightening questions. Wisconsin State Journal, September 26, p.
1C.
\37\ World Health Organization. 1999. WHO consultation on public
health and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies:
epidemiology, risk and research requirements with the participation of
Office International des Epizooties, Geneva, Switzerland, December 1-3.
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/bse/
whocdscsraph20002.pdf. Accessed February 19, 2008.
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Although the first case of BSE was documented in the United Kingdom
in 1986, there reportedly exists ``very sound'' evidence that a rare
form of the disease was already circulating in the United States.\38\
One year before BSE was initially reported in Britain, Richard Marsh,
chair of the Department of Veterinary Science at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, was alerting dairy producers of the possibility that
a ``previously unrecognized scrapie-like disease in cattle'' existed in
the United States \39\--a concern borne out of investigations of sick
mink.
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\38\ McNair J. 1993. BSE: a ticking time bomb in downer cows? Agri-
View (Iola, WI), June 17.
\39\ Marsh RF and Hartsough GR. 1985. Is there a scrapie-like
disease in cattle? Proceedings of the United States Animal Health
Association Eighty-Ninth Annual Meeting (p. 8).
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Mink have proven to be sentinel animals, like canaries in coal
mines. They were reportedly the first, for example, to show toxicity
from the vaginal cancer-causing synthetic estrogen diethylstilbestrol
(DES) and the industrial carcinogens polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs).\40\ Since 1960, there have been four outbreaks of mink
spongiform encephalopathy known as transmissible mink encephalopathy
(TME) on U.S. fur farms.\41\ This was perplexing, as researchers had
been unable to orally infect mink with scrapie-infected sheep
brains.\42\
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\40\ 1992. BSE risk seen in rendered cow protein used in cattle
feed. Food Chemical News 15:13-4.
\41\ Robinson MM, Hadlow WJ, Huff TP, et al. 1994. Experimental
infection of mink with bovine spongiform encephalopathy. Journal of
General Virology 75(9):2151-5.
\42\ Marsh RF and Bessen RA. 1993. Epidemiologic and experimental
studies on transmissible mink encephalopathy. Developments in
Biological Standardization 80:111-8.
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A clue to the origin of the disease came in 1985, when TME
devastated a population of farmed mink in Wisconsin who had reportedly
not been fed any sheep.\43\ The meat portion of their diet evidently
consisted almost exclusively of downed dairy cows.\44\ Marsh
hypothesized that there was a form of BSE in the United States that
manifested itself as more of a ``downer'' cow disease than a ``mad''
cow disease.\42\
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\43\ Beardsley TM. 1990. Tainted feed, mad cows: could a British
cattle disease infect U.S. herds? Scientific American 262(5):34.
\44\ Marsh RF. 1991. Risk assessment on the possible occurrence of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United States. In: Bradley R,
Savey M, and Merchant B (eds.), Sub-Acute Spongiform Encephalopathies
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 41-6).
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Mink were found to be experimentally susceptible to BSE; when mink
were fed BSE-infected brains from British cattle, they died from a
spongiform encephalopathy.\41\ The disease was experimentally spread
from mink to cows and from cows back to mink.\44\ The critical
experiments, though, involved inoculating the brains of U.S. sheep
infected with scrapie into U.S. cattle.\45\ In England, scrapie-
infected cows go ``mad,'' twitching and kicking. But, in the United
States, the ``real surprise,'' \38\ as Marsh recounted, was that
scrapie-infected cattle instead developed difficulty in rising and
terminal recumbancy \46\ like downed cattle do.\45\ ``The signs that
these cattle showed were not the widely recognized signs of BSE--not
signs of mad cow disease,'' Marsh reportedly said. ``What they showed
was what you might expect from a downer cow.'' \47\ Scientists have
identified multiple strains of scrapie.\48\ Marsh posited that one of
the U.S. strains may have jumped to cattle, creating a form of BSE
native to the United States.\40\ Said Marsh to a reporter: ``That's the
only conclusion you can draw.'' \38\
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\45\ Cutlip RC, Miller JM, Race RE, et al. 1994. Intracerebral
transmission of scrapie to cattle. Journal of Infectious Diseases
169(4):814-20.
\46\ Hourrigan JL. 1990. Experimentally induced bovine spongiform
encephalopathy in cattle in Mission, Tex, and the control of scrapie.
Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association 196(10):1678-9.
\47\ Bleifuss J. 2004. How now mad cow? In These Times, February
16.
\48\ Lasmezas CI, Fournier JG, Nouvel V, et al. 2001. Adaptation of
the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates and comparison
with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: implications for human health.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 98(7):4142-7.
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Every year in the United States, estimates range from 195,000 \49\
to 1.8 million \50\ cattle who collapse for a variety of metabolic,
infectious, toxic, and/or musculoskeletal reasons and are too sick or
injured to rise.\7\ Extrapolating from the proportion of nonambulatory
cattle found in European \51\ and United States \7\ surveys, the number
of nonambulatory cattle in the United States may be on the order of
500,000 a year. A governmental survey of dairy producers across 21
States reportedly found that 78.2 percent of dairy operations had
nonambulatory cows during 2004.\52\ Though these animals may not have
been fit enough to stand, a limited investigation of USDA slaughter
plant records between January 1999 and June 2001 showed that most were
still ruled fit for human consumption.\53\
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\49\ U.S. Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General.
2004. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Food Safety and
Inspection Service: bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) surveillance
program--phase I, August 18. www.oig.usda.gov/webdocs/50601_9-
final.pdf. Accessed February 19, 2008.
\50\ Livestock mortalities: methods of disposal and their potential
cost. http://nationalrenderers.org/Economic_Impact/
MortalitiesFinal.pdf. Accessed February 19, 2008.
\51\ European Commission. 2002. Report on the monitoring and
testing of bovine animals for the presence of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) in 2001. http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/
bse/bse45_en.pdf. Accessed February 19, 2008.
\52\ Stull CL, Payne MA, Berry SL, and Reynolds JP. 2007. A review
of the causes, prevention, and welfare of nonambulatory cattle. Journal
of the American Veterinary Medical Association 231(2):227-34, citing:
U.S. Animal Health Association. 2006. Report of the Committee on Animal
Welfare. In: Proceedings of the 110th Annual Meeting of the U.S. Animal
Health Association, pp. 137-43.
\53\ Farm Sanctuary. 2001. A review of USDA slaughterhouse records
for downed animals (U.S. District 65 from January 1999 to June 2001).
Farm Sanctuary, October.
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Based on findings in Europe \51\ and the speculative evidence of a
rare form of mad cow disease striking downed cows for decades in the
United States,\54\ nonambulatory cattle should considered to be a
particularly high-risk population. According to the Food and Drug
Association (FDA): ``Experience has shown that nonambulatory disabled
cattle . . . are the population at greatest risk for harboring BSE.''
\55\ The FDA cites Swiss data showing a 49-58 times higher chance of
finding BSE in downed cattle than in cattle reported to veterinary
authorities as BSE-suspect under passive surveillance.\56\ Indeed, 12
of the 15 BSE-infected cattle discovered in North America by February
1, 2008, have reportedly been nonambulatory.\3\ And the 16th BSE-
infected case found in North America, a cow in Canada reported on
February 26, 2008, was reported to the HSUS as being a downer.
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\54\ Marsh RF, Bessen RA, Lehmann S, and Hartsough GR. 1991.
Epidemiological and experimental studies on a new incident of
transmissible mink encephalopathy. Journal of General Virology
72(3):589-94.
\55\ U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 2004. Use of materials
derived from cattle in human food and cosmetics; and recordkeeping
requirements for human food and cosmetics manufactured from, processed
with, or otherwise containing, material from cattle; final rule and
proposed rule. Federal Register 69(134):42255-74. www.fas.usda.gov/
info/fr/2004/071404BSEFDA1.htm. Accessed February 19, 2008.
\56\ Doherr MG, Heim D, Fatzer R, Cohen CH, Vandevelde M, and
Zurbriggen A. 2001. Targeted screening of high-risk cattle populations
for BSE to augment mandatory reporting of clinical suspects. Preventive
Veterinary Medicine 51(1-2):3-16.
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Though the riskiest tissues--the brains, eyes, and spinal cords--of
most cattle are now excluded from most food items in the United
States,\57\ there may be contamination of muscle meat via aerolization
of the spinal cord during carcass splitting.\58\ Significant amounts of
central nervous system debris found accumulating in the splitting saws
used to halve the carcasses may have the potential to then transfer
contagion from one carcass to the next.\59\ Although, technically,
processors are instructed to knife-trim ``material grossly identifiable
as brain material, spinal cord, or fluid from punctured eyes,'' \60\
researchers have reported finding nervous tissue contaminating muscle
in a commercial slaughter plant.\61\ Contamination of meat derived from
cattle cheeks with brain tissue can also occur if the cheek meat is not
removed before the skull is fragmented or split.\62\
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\57\ Federal Register. Docket No. 03-038IF. http://
www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/03-038IF.htm. Accessed February 19,
2008.
\58\ Harvard Center for Risk Analysis and the Center for
Computational Epidemiology. 2001. Evaluation of the potential for
bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United States, November 26.
\59\ Helps CR, Fisher AV, Harbour DA, O'Neill DH, and Knight AC.
2004. Transfer of spinal cord material to subsequent bovine carcasses
at splitting. Journal of Food Protection 67(9):1921-6.
\60\ U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection
Service. 2004. Questions and answers for FSIS Notice 4-04 regarding
FSIS's BSE regulations, January 14. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/
rdad/FSISNotices/7-04.pdf. Accessed February 19, 2008.
\61\ Prendergast DM, Sheridan JJ, Daly DJ, McDowell DA, and Blair
IS. 2004. Dissemination of central nervous system tissue during the
slaughter of cattle in three Irish abattoirs. Veterinary Record
154(1):21-4.
\62\ U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection
Service. 2002. Current thinking on measures that could be implemented
to minimize human exposure to materials that could potentially contain
the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent, January 15. http://
www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_thinking.htm. Accessed February 19,
2008.
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Captive bolt stunning, the predominant method used to render cattle
insensible before exsanguination,\1\ may blow a shower of embolic brain
tissue into the animals' bloodstream. In one experiment, a biological
marker applied onto a stunner bolt was later detected within the muscle
meat of the stunned animal. The researchers concluded:
This study demonstrates that material present in . . . the CNS
[central nervous system] of cattle during commercial captive bolt
stunning may become widely dispersed across the many animate and
inanimate elements of the slaughter-dressing environment and within
derived carcasses including meat entering the human food chain.\63\
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\63\ Daly DJ, Prendergast DM, Sheridan JJ, Blair IS, and McDowell
DA. 2002. Use of a marker organism to model the spread of central
nervous system tissue in cattle and the abattoir environment during
commercial stunning and carcass dressing. Applied and Environmental
Microbiology 68(2):791-8.
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Captive bolt stunning may also lead to ejection of brain tissue
into the abattoir from the hole made by the captive bolt onto slaughter
plant equipment, as well as the hands and aprons of workers removing
the animals' heads.\61\ A follow-up study published 2004 in the Journal
of Food Protection determined that ``this method of slaughter of an
animal infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy would be likely
to contaminate edible parts of the carcass with infective material.''
\64\ Texas A&M University researchers found bodily brain fragments as
large as 14 cm (5.5 in). The researchers concluded that it was likely
that BSE pathogens could potentially be ``found throughout the bodies
of animals stunned for slaughter.'' \65\
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\64\ Coore RR, Love S, McKinstry JL, et al. 2004. Dissemination of
brain emboli following captive bolt stunning of sheep: capacity for
entry into the systemic arterial circulation. Journal of Food
Protection 67(5):1050-2.
\65\ Garland T, Bauer N, and Bailey M Jr. 1996. Brain emboli in the
lungs of cattle after stunning. Lancet 348(9027):610.
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Despite the potential for CNS contamination and the fact that
peripheral nerves \66\ and blood \67\ found in all muscles may carry
infection, the USDA \68\ and the National Cattlemen's Beef Association
\69\ have attempted to assure consumers that beef is safe to eat,
arguing that the infectious agent is not found in muscle meat. However,
Stanley Prusiner, the director of the Institute for Neurodegenerative
Diseases at the University of California, San Francisco, and winner of
the Nobel Prize in Medicine for his discovery of prions, the cause of
the BSE and other TSEs, proved in mice that muscle cells themselves
were capable of forming the potentially infectious agent.\70\ ``I found
prions in the hind limb muscles of mice,'' Prusiner stated, ``at a
level approximately 100,000-fold higher than that found in blood.''
\67\ Prusiner reportedly described the studies relied upon by the
Cattlemen's Association as ``extraordinarily inadequate,'' \71\ and
follow-up studies in Germany confirmed his findings, showing that
animals who are orally infected may indeed end up with prion
contamination throughout the muscles of their bodies.\72\
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\66\ Herzog C, Sales N, Etchegaray N, et al. 2004. Tissue
distribution of bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
after intravenous or oral infection. Lancet 363(9407):422-8.
\67\ Prusiner SB. Declaration of Stanley B. Prusiner, M.D. United
States District Court for the District of Montana Billings Division
Cause No.CV-05-06-BLG-RFC.
\68\ 2003. First US case of mad cow disease found in WA. The
Bulletin's Frontrunner, December 24.
\69\ National Cattlemen's Beef Association. 2003. National
Cattlemen's Beef Association Statement. December 23.
\70\ Bosque PJ, Ryou C, Telling G, et al. 2002. Prions in skeletal
muscle. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 99(6):3812-7.
\71\ 2003. Mad cow disease in Canada. KQED forum hosted by Angie
Coiro on May 23 at 9:00 a.m.
\72\ Thomzig A, Kratzel C, Lenz G, Kruger D, and Beekes M. 2003.
Widespread PrPSc accumulation in muscles of hamsters orally infected
with scrapie. EMBO Reports 4(5):530-3.
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Although the risk of contracting BSE appears vanishingly small in
the United States given how few cattle have tested positive, the
neurodegenerative disease it can cause in the consumers of contaminated
beef is likely invariably fatal. Because cooking temperatures do not
adequately destroy prions, the onus of responsibility must rest with
the beef industry or, if unable or unwilling to police itself, the
Federal Government, to ensure infected cattle are not slaughtered for
human consumption. There is evidence that the infectious proteins that
cause BSE can survive incineration \73\ at temperatures hot enough to
melt lead.\74\ In response to a question from Cornell University's Food
Science Department asking what food preparation methods could eliminate
the risk of contracting BSE, then National Institutes of Health
Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies chief Joseph Gibbs
remarked tongue-in-cheek that one of the only ways to ensure a BSE-free
burger would be to marinate it in a concentrated alkali such as Drain-
OTM.\75\
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\73\ Brown P, Liberski PP, Wolff A, and Gajdusek DC. 1990.
Resistance of scrapie infectivity to steam autoclaving after
formaldehyde fixation and limited survival after ashing at 360 degrees
C: practical and theoretical implications. Journal of Infectious
Diseases 161(3):467-72.
\74\ Bentor Y. 2008. Chemical Element.com: Lead. http://
www.chemicalelements.com/elements/pb.html. Accessed February 19, 2008.
\75\ Gibbs CJ. 1994. BSE and other spongiform encephalopathies in
humans and animals: causative agent, pathogenesis and transmission.
Fall 1994 Food Science Seminar Series, Department of Food Science,
Cornell University, December 1.
Senator Kohl. Good job.
Mr. Boyle.
STATEMENT OF J. PATRICK BOYLE, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN MEAT
INSTITUTE
Mr. Boyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators Harkin, and
Senators Craig. I want to say at the outset, I found a number
of aspects of Mr. Pacelle's testimony to be quite compelling,
particularly the final concluding remarks, relating to the
moral imperative. Forget the regulatory and the economic
imperative, but the moral imperative, and I would agree with
that aspect of his remarks before the committee.
Since HSUS released its undercover video last month, I've
met and spoken to dozens of leaders from the American Meat
Institute and from all segments of our livestock supply chain.
Universally, they agree that the images of animal abuse are
shocking, gruesome, and atypical in the extreme.
Proper and humane handling of livestock is not just a
priority for AMI and its members, it is part of our culture.
Nearly 20 years ago, AMI created an Animal Welfare Committee,
which began working with the country's recognized animal
welfare expert, Dr. Temple Grandin.
With Dr. Grandin, the Institute developed animal handling
guidelines and an audit guide, for packing houses. These
guidelines not only meet regulatory requirements, they exceed
them, they are utilized throughout our industry, we recommend
them to our members, and they are frequently required of our
customers with whom we do business.
In addition, they have been endorsed by the American Humane
Association, and been certified humane, in fact, HSUS
International outreach programs have relied upon the AMI
guidelines, although they refer to them as ``Dr. Grandin's
guidelines,'' which from our perspective, is fine. We don't
care how they're characterized, but as long as progress is
being made, we don't really care who gets the credit.
Despite the industry's record of measurable progress, we
confront the tragic reality of Hallmark/Westland Plant, and we
must ask ourselves how this happened, and what steps we can
take to ensure that it does not happen again.
First, failures occurred at many levels, here. The first of
the failures occurred in the livestock production and
transportation system that supplied cattle to this plant. Our
industry must lead efforts to minimize the arrival of downers
at plants, by enrolling all beef and dairy producers, as well
as livestock dealers into existing quality assurance programs.
And we must audit the results on those farms and in those feed
lots, against the standards contained in the audits.
Secondly, failures occurred at the slaughter facility.
Plant personnel did not comply with the Humane Slaughter Act,
and the Federal Meat Inspection Act. In the future, all
processing plant employees handling live animals should be
certified for proficiency in proper animal handling procedures,
and have a thorough knowledge of the regulations. To that end,
we strongly recommend that plants use our AMI Handling
Guidelines, and our audit program.
Thirdly, failures occurred within USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service. USDA must require that every inspector
performing ante mortem inspection, be certified for proficiency
in animal handling, have a thorough knowledge of the Humane
Slaughter Act and other FSIS guidance materials.
I also believe that a failure occurred in The Humane
Society of the United States, despite its efforts to document
the practices and bring them to our attention. Its failure to
alert, immediately, Federal authorities to the practices
captured on their video, in a federally-inspected plant, in
violation of Federal laws, only prolonged, for a period of
time, an illegal, inhumane practice.
One can reasonably ask, how could such gross abuse could go
on, unnoticed by so many, for so long? And in that regard, I
commend HSUS for exposing it. But one could also ask The Humane
Society, how could it allow this abuse to continue for almost 4
months, while it edited its video for release--not to the
Federal investigatory authorities, but to the Washington Post.
Finally, I feel compelled to comment upon USDA's record-
setting recall request. The Department classified it as a Class
II recall, which Secretary Shafer has said, on previous
occasions and reaffirmed today, carries a very, very remote
risk.
USDA also reports that the plant had effective food safety
interventions, and that all products distributed to the school
lunch program tested negative for pathogens.
That being said, and as Senator Harkin asked of the
Secretary--how do we find ourselves in the midst of the largest
beef recall in the history of our country?
Well, the impact on Hallmark/Westland will be profound, the
recall will have effect on their customers who use the meat as
an ingredient in further process products, which were also
inspected, and passed, by USDA. So, these middlemen--many
small, family-owned businesses--will bear a large part of the
economic cost of this recall.
And the American consumer, and our foreign trading partners
are needlessly alarmed, and understandably confused by the
anomaly of this large recall of safe product. In the face of
higher food prices in America, the ongoing need for food
donations to help feed the hungry, and the rationing of food
aid through international relief organizations--I'm astonished
at the specter of hundreds of millions of pounds of safe food
being destroyed.
Having said that, there is no doubt that rules and
regulations matter, and violations should have consequences.
For Hallmark/Westland, there are severe consequences, indeed,
and to Mr. Pacelle's point, there are potential criminal
sanction, as well, that could portend jail time.
PREPARED STATEMENTS
But from a public health perspective, risks should matter,
too. In the future, under these circumstances, I believe USDA
would be better advised to conduct an appropriate risk
assessment before determining whether it should require a
nationwide recall of a product when, again, according to
Secretary Shafer, and I'll quote, ``There is no reason to
believe that there is anything wrong with the beef.''
Thank you very much.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of J. Patrick Boyle
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee. My name is
Patrick Boyle and I am the President and CEO of the American Meat
Institute (AMI). AMI has provided service for more than 100 years to
America's meat and poultry industry--an industry that employs more than
500,000 individuals and provides more than $100 billion in sales to the
Nation's economy.
AMI's members include America's most well-known meat and poultry
manufacturers. Collectively, they produce more than 90 percent of the
beef, veal, pork and lamb food products and 75 percent of the turkey
food products in the United States. Among AMI's member companies, over
60 percent are small family-owned businesses employing fewer than a
hundred individuals and some are publicly traded and employ tens of
thousands. These companies operate, compete, sometimes struggle and
mostly thrive in one of the toughest, most competitive and certainly
the most scrutinized sectors of our economy--meat and poultry packing
and processing.
I have spoken over the past 10 days with dozens of industry leaders
from all segments of our supply chain. Universally they agree that the
images of animal abuse shown in an undercover video taken at the
Hallmark/Westland facility in California are shocking and unacceptable.
The gruesome treatment of animals depicted in the video stands in sharp
contrast to the humane animal handling standards that are practiced in
slaughter plants every day across the United States. Our members
condemn the practices the video projects.
Proper and humane handling of livestock is not just a priority for
AMI--it is part of our culture. I believe that our Institute's Animal
Welfare Committee has been an unquestionable force for change. Their
business cards may carry the brands of many meat products you enjoy,
and their titles may say plant manager or vice president of operations,
but they are as much animal activists as any of the groups with
``humane'' in their name that try to discredit these businesses.
Beginning in 1991, our animal welfare committee had the foresight
to recognize the unique abilities of a rising star in the field of
animal welfare: Dr. Temple Grandin of Colorado State University. Dr.
Grandin's autism provides her the unique ability to understand the
world from an animal's perspective and we have learned much from her
insights. Dr. Grandin has crawled through our chutes and alleys,
designed and sat in our cattle holding pens, ridden our trucks and seen
the world and our plants as animals do. There is nothing she will not
do to improve welfare and there is no recommendation from her that we
don't take seriously.
In partnership with Dr. Grandin, we sought not only to meet
regulatory requirements, but to exceed them. Grandin authored the first
ever industry-specific ``Recommended Animal Handling Guidelines'' in
1991. They are distributed throughout our industry in both Spanish and
English.
In 1997, after Dr. Grandin audited plants for USDA, she proposed an
idea that was at the time considered radical, though it is now routine.
She argued that welfare could be measured objectively using criteria
like vocalizations, slips and falls, prod use and stunner accuracy. She
declared that we could ``manage what we measure.'' I will confess that
at the time, the idea of ``counting moos'' sounded almost silly. Still,
our forward-thinking Animal Welfare Committee agreed that the idea had
merit, and Dr. Grandin again did a first for us: she wrote the first
animal welfare audit ever developed.
Today, self audits and third party audits are part of our routine
operations. Our audit guide is endorsed by groups like the American
Humane Association and Certified Humane and is widely used as a
condition of business by major restaurant and retail chains for their
suppliers.
The meat industry's commitment to animal welfare was underscored
when AMI's members voted to make animal welfare a non-competitive issue
in 2002. As a result, AMI member plants share good ideas and assist
each other in developing and refining animal handling programs and
solving challenges. I have seen staunch competitors exchange plant
visits to share best practices and I am proud that we help each other
in this way. All of our ideas, our guidelines and our audits are
available free on our dedicated web site www.animahandling.org.
Both ethical and economic imperatives exist to handle animals
humanely. Study after study shows that optimal animal handling results
in better quality products. However, most importantly, it's simply
``the right thing to do.'' Dr. Grandin's own data shows dramatic and
measurable improvements in animal handling in federally inspected meat
plants since our audit was developed.
Despite this industry track record of proven progress, we confront
the tragic reality of the Hallmark/Westland incident, and we must take
necessary steps to ensure this does not happen again. Federal and State
investigations are still underway and I will refrain from prejudging
their outcome or any judicial proceeding, but it certainly appears that
multiple failures occurred at many levels.
--First, failures occurred in the livestock production and/or
transportation system that supplied livestock to the plant. All
efforts must be taken to minimize the arrival of non-ambulatory
animals, or so-called ``downers,'' at the slaughter facility.
Livestock producers must recommit to culling animals from their
herds before they become ill or disabled, and would
unnecessarily suffer. They must market only those animals from
their dairy and beef operations that will meet Federal meat
inspection requirements, and they have an ethical
responsibility to euthanize on the farm those who are not able
to be transported.
--Secondly, failures occurred at the slaughter facility. Plant
personnel apparently did not comply with the Humane Slaughter
Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act. Humane animal handling
violations caused USDA to withdraw Federal inspectors from the
plant, which resulted in the plant being closed on January 30,
2008. After further investigation by Federal authorities, a
Class II recall of beef products was initiated on February 17,
2008. This recall stemmed from the plant not being in full
compliance with Federal meat inspection procedures when it
processed cattle.
--Third, failures occurred within USDA's Food Safety and Inspection
Service. A total of eight Federal inspectors were stationed at
the Hallmark/Westland facility. By Federal law, Federal
inspectors must be present for the plant to operate.
Apparently, Federal inspectors failed to observe or ignored
animal handling violations and failed to enforce agency meat
inspection policies and procedures.
--And finally, failures occurred at The Humane Society of the United
States by not immediately alerting Federal authorities to the
practices captured on their video. Months of delays in
notifying Federal authorities prolonged a bad practice,
complicated the Federal investigation and created weeks of
uncertainty and needless concern for school districts and
consumers nationwide. When AMI became aware of the incident on
January 5 after Dr. Grandin received the tape, we tried to
identify the plant based upon her description, but we were
unable to do so. Inquiries to AMI members who handle cows
asking them if they used fork lifts to move non-ambulatory
livestock were greeted with responses of ``You must be kidding.
No one does that.'' One can reasonably ask how such gross abuse
could go unnoticed by so many for so long. But one can also ask
of The Humane Society how it could stand idly by and allow this
abuse to continue for almost 4 months.
These multiple failures surrounding the Hallmark/Westland incident
have severely damaged the beef industry. Strong action is needed to
right the ship and reassure customers that everything possible is being
done to establish safeguards that will prevent such a deplorable
incident from occurring ever again. AMI is considering several
improvements that make it clear that animal welfare is a shared
responsibility, and only a systems approach will ensure that all proper
procedures are followed.
Producers.--Our industry must lead an effort to enroll all beef and
dairy producers in the Beef Quality Assurance and Dairy Quality
Assurance Programs to maintain herd health and assure that only those
animals that will pass Federal inspection requirements are sent to
slaughter. The use of audits to measure welfare at these points should
be encouraged.
Handlers.--Sellers of livestock to slaughter facilities, including
livestock dealers and brokers, should be required to provide documented
training for employees in proper animal handling and transportation of
animals.
Processing Plants.--Employees handling live animals in federally
inspected slaughter facilities should be certified for proficiency in
proper animal handling procedures and a thorough knowledge of the
Humane Slaughter Act.
USDA.--The Department should require that all FSIS inspectors
performing ante mortem inspection be certified for proficiency in
animal handling and have a thorough knowledge of the Humane Slaughter
Act and other FSIS guidance material.
Congress, the regulatory agencies and the industry must carefully
evaluate all proposals that can prevent a problem like this from
occurring in the future. Changes should not be made for political or
cosmetic reasons. The improvements must focus on process design and
changes that rely on sound animal handling practices throughout the
chain.
It is important to remember that the recall is a Class II recall,
and not a Class I recall that is implemented when a clear public health
risk exists. Federal officials have said that the beef supply is safe
and there have been no illnesses associated with the recalled meat.
As one who has overseen the evolution--perhaps better described as
a revolution--in our approach to animal welfare since 1990, I want to
offer my personal assurance that the members of this industry abhor
what has happened and are committed to optimal animal welfare because
it is both ethically appropriate and economically beneficial.
Unfortunately, the media have not reported the story this way, and
there have been numerous baseless linkages made to food safety.
I understand that high profile stories are upsetting, but I assure
you that I remain confident in the safety of the U.S. beef supply, of
our children's school lunches, and in the welfare of animals in our
care.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to present our views
before this distinguished committee.
______
Prepared Statement of Temple Grandin, Ph.D., Professor, Animal Science,
Colorado State University
Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony. I've committed
my life's work to livestock welfare in the meat industry. The Hallmark/
Westland video was atrocious and made me sick.
I have some thoughts about what lessons can be learned from this
situation. I'd like to share the practical knowledge that I've gained
by working in meat plants in the United States and around the world
since the 1980s.
I have stressed for three decades the importance of working with,
and not against, an animal's natural instincts. By understanding animal
behavior, you minimize stress. This approach improves animal welfare
and meat quality. For example, animals, by their nature, are curious.
Circular chutes encourage them to move forward to see what is around
the curve. This minimizes the need to drive animals. Designing lighting
so it does not shine in an animal's eye and ensuring that animals walk
into well lighted spaces instead of what looks to them like a dark hole
helps move an animal in a less stressful way.
I visit many different plants in the United States and estimate
that 50 percent of the cattle and 25 percent of the hogs are
slaughtered in a plant that use my designs. I also have conducted a
survey for the USDA, trained commercial auditors and do audits for
clients like major restaurant chains.
The American Meat Institute Guidelines that I wrote have helped the
industry and their customers measure welfare consistently. They were
developed in 1997 and later came to be required as a condition of doing
business by major restaurant chains beginning in 1999. Since that time,
I have seen dramatic changes. People in the industry focus much more
heavily on animal welfare as part of the daily routine. Plants invest
time in training on site and by sending people to the AMI Animal Care &
Handling Conference each year in February. Some plants use the American
Meat Institute videos to train their workers and other companies have
developed their own.
Federal inspectors could use the same level of training as the
industry provides. In my experience, USDA inspectors are not well-
trained and are very inconsistent in how they enforce the humane
slaughter regulations. One person is super strict and unreasonable,
another is just right, and another is totally lax. The inspectors
working in the field often do not get clear directions on what is
acceptable and what is not acceptable. You only need to look at the NRs
written for Humane Slaughter violations to see inconsistencies even
when they come from the same plant but different shifts with different
inspectors.
In my view, you manage what you measure and know to be true--not
what your opinion or interpretation tells you is true. Welfare must be
measured over time so that you can evaluate plants in the big picture.
You cannot look at a single failure on a given day--like a missed
stun--and make sweeping conclusions that plant is a failure when it
comes to welfare. That's a snapshot in time, not a complete picture.
Shutting a plant down won't undo the rare stun that goes wrong.
The criteria I developed recognize that no one can be perfect all
the time. Equipment fails despite the best maintenance programs.
Animals move when you want them to stand still. Thunderstorms scare
cattle and make them hard to handle some days. Animals that haven't had
a lot of human interaction at the farm may arrive at a plant and be
fearful and difficult to move. Electricity fails. New and inexperienced
employees may invade an animal's flight zone and cause it to balk. And
the list goes on.
Along the same lines, if pigs are slipping and falling on a ramp,
does a plant take actions to regroove the floor? If a handler is
prodding an animal at a level that exceeds what the standards I
developed allow, is the plant offering additional training and teaching
that handler how to use a less stressful driving tool? The important
factor when these problems occur is how a plant responds. Responses to
problems speak volumes about a plant. The effectiveness of these
responses can be determined by collecting more data to see if it
worked.
And the data show that animal welfare is better than it has been at
any time since I've been measuring it. They are endorsed by the
American Humane Association and by Certified Humane. My first graduate
student, Dr. Jennifer Lanier, used the guidelines while employed by The
Humane Society of the United States, and these were part of her
training of the Central American meat industry through HSUS'
international outreach program. McDonald's, Burger King, Wendy's and
many other chains use them to evaluate suppliers.
Given their widespread support, I strongly recommend that the USDA
use the American Meat Institute guidelines as a measurement of welfare.
This would help make enforcement more uniform.
The AMI guidelines have a zero tolerance for the worst practices
and use numerical scoring to assess animal handling and stunning.
Dragging non-ambulatory animals has a zero tolerance on both USDA
regulations and the AMI guidelines. Acts of animal abuse that are
outlined in the AMI guide are also automatic failed audits. There is an
absolute zero tolerance for starting dressing procedures such as
scalding, leg removal, and skinning on an animal showing signs of
return to sensibility. Hanging a sensible animal on the rail is also an
automatic failed audit.
NUMERICAL OBJECTIVE SCORING
For variables such as stunning efficacy and electric prod use,
doing everything perfectly every time is impossible. This is a concept
that some people have a hard time understanding because they do not
work in the world of practical things. I developed the AMI scoring
system from data I collected during a survey I conducted for the USDA
in 1996. The numerical objective scoring system was developed from my
USDA funded research. That report is on www.grandin.com in the survey
section.
Plant managers know that they have to score specific hard numbers
to pass. People manage the things that they measure. A plant can be
held to a high standard, but perfection is impossible. To download the
complete AMI guide and audit forms, go to www.animalhandling.org
The present system of USDA inspection is like having traffic police
giving out speeding tickets when they think cars are speeding. Our
traffic laws work to ensure the police MEASURE a car's speed with radar
and the drivers know what the speed limit is because it is posted on
signs.
The following variables are scored with numerical scoring on the
AMI guideline.
--Percentage of animals stunned with one captive bolt shot.
--95 percent acceptable
--99 percent excellent--missed animals are IMMEDIATELY shot again
before hanging on the rail.
--Percentage of animals with correct placement of an electric stunner
--99 percent to pass
--Percentage rendered insensible before hanging on the rail must be
100 percent.
--Percentage of animals moved with electric prod.
--25 percent acceptable
--5 percent excellent
--Percentage of animals slipping and falling.
--3 percent slipping
--1 percent falling acceptable
--Percentage of animals vocalizing (squeal, moo, bellow) during
handling and stunning.
--Cattle 3 percent acceptable
--Pigs 5 percent in the restrainer acceptable
Vocalization is a sensitive indicator of aversive or distressing
events such as missed stuns, sharp edges sticking into them and
excessive pressure from restraint equipment. In my original USDA
survey, the worst plant had 35 percent of the cattle vocalizing.
People who care about animals are concerned that many animals will
suffer because mistakes are allowed. Even though the guidelines allow 1
percent of the animals to fall, most plants have less than one in a
thousand falling. Numerical scoring is going to reduce suffering
because inspectors will do a more uniform job of enforcement
There is a reality in meat production. The process involves (1)
people (2) who handle animals and (3) who use equipment and (4) all
this is overseen by more people in the form of Federal inspectors.
Without thorough training, and without clear measurable criteria,
people, whether they are inspectors or employees, are prone to make
subjective and inconsistent judgments.
The Chino video is shocking and abusive. It is truly one of the
worst things I've ever seen. But it is not representative of what I
have observed in meat plants. It is simply not ``typical,'' though some
groups and some media reports have tried to say it is.
I received the tape showing this handling on January 5. I
immediately alerted industry officials that horrible handling was
happening at a plant but I didn't know where. I know that AMI officials
called plants to try to figure out who was using a forklift to move
live cows, which is appalling, a violation of the law and a violation
of industry guidelines. In the week after I received the video, I
called HSUS and asked them to name the plant so I could stop it. They
would not tell me because they were working with the State to bring
charges.
I was very angry that the plant was not identified until January 30
and then, it was because the Washington Post had the video. When the
Post reported the story, I learned that the abuse was observed starting
in October. I live in a practical world outside the beltway. Inside the
beltway, too many people are focused on how they might lose or win in
certain situations. I care about animals, and I see and think in plain
terms. I'm sick that this went on for as long as it did in a federally
inspected plant and that people who knew about this behavior waited
until January 30 to announce it publicly.
This has got to stop. We need to measure animal welfare objectively
throughout the industry without exception, show no tolerance for bad
actors, train our inspectors and commit ourselves to welfare in its
truest sense and report abuse when we see it.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony.
______
[From the Riverside Press Enterprise, February 21, 2008]
Chino Meat Plant Drew Inland Humane Society Scrutiny Years Before Video
(By Janet Zimmerman and Ben Goad)
Inland animal welfare officers alerted government officials to the
inhumane treatment of cows at Hallmark Meat Co. in Chino more than a
decade before a recent undercover investigation led to the plant's
closure and the largest beef recall in U.S. history, records show.
The Inland Valley Humane Society and the Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals in Pomona investigated 13 cases between 1996 and
2004--11 of them substantiated--involving Hallmark's treatment of
``downer'' cows, which are those too sick or injured to stand up or
walk on their own.
``It tells you they have a long, ongoing history of not tending to
downer animals in a prompt and humane manner,'' said Brian Sampson, the
society's supervisor of animal services. The Inland Valley group
provides animal control services for the city of Chino.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was notified three times about
possible violations of regulations regarding treatment of downer cows,
twice in writing and once verbally, in 1996 and 1997, according to The
Humane Society's file on Hallmark.
``We forwarded a lot of stuff to the USDA of our findings, but what
action they took I don't know,'' said Sampson, who was a field officer
at the time.
Agriculture Department officials said they would not be able to
comment on the Inland Valley Humane Society's assertions until today.
A woman who answered the phone at Hallmark on Thursday said the
company has no comment.
Steve Mendell is president and a current owner. Donald Hallmark, of
Ontario, said Thursday that he sold the plant 5 years ago and that
earlier problems with the handling of downer cows were corrected.
Federal Investigation
Hallmark and its affiliated meat-packing operation, Westland Meat
Co., have been under fire since The Humane Society of the United States
released an undercover video last month showing plant workers ramming
downer cows with forklifts, shooting water up their noses and
repeatedly zapping them with electric prods to get them upright to pass
USDA inspection.
The two Humane Society organizations are not affiliated.
The meat company, which shut down operations early this month, is
under Federal investigation, and the San Bernardino County district
attorney's office has filed animal cruelty charges against a Hallmark
supervisor and an employee.
On Sunday, Hallmark/Westland recalled 143 million pounds of beef
processed at the Chino plant from February 2006 through this month.
Just over 50 million pounds of the recalled beef went to Federal
nutrition programs, including the National School Lunch Program, said
Eric Steiner, associate administrator of the USDA's Food and Nutrition
Service. Of that meat, 19.6 million pounds has been eaten, 15.2 million
has been located and is ``on hold'' and officials are still working to
track down an additional 15.5 million pounds, Steiner said.
The whereabouts of the other 93 millions pounds have not been
traced.
Hallmark/Westland Meat Co. produced roughly 20 percent of the beef
that went into the school lunch program, said Bill Sessions, associate
deputy administrator for the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service.
The agency has no plans to test any of the recalled meat, said Ken
Petersen, assistant administrator for the department's Food Safety and
Inspection Service.
Petersen said the meat already is being removed from the food
supply, so there is no reason to test it.
``Testing it isn't going to tell me anything,'' he said.
Petersen and other officials said the chance that people became ill
from eating the meat is ``very remote.''
``There's been no reported illness, and we certainly don't envision
any illness,'' Petersen said.
Cows are inspected before slaughter. The Humane Society of the
United States investigation revealed that some cows were not re-
inspected after they went down. That revelation--not a concern that the
beef was dangerous--prompted the recall, Petersen said.
Non-ambulatory animals are not to be used in the human food supply
to prevent the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly
called mad cow disease, a neurological disorder that can be fatal to
humans.
California law enacted in January 1994 prohibits non-USDA inspected
facilities from receiving downer animals. It requires that downers be
immediately euthanized and not dragged or pushed with equipment. The
USDA banned non-ambulatory cattle from the human food chain in 2003.
Petersen, in a telephone briefing Thursday, said both that
violations were a ``very rare occurrence'' at the plant and that they
happened ``with some frequency going over a course of 2 years.''
He declined to elaborate, citing the ongoing investigation. He also
declined to say exactly how the on-site inspectors missed the
violations.
Cows Seen Suffering
Inland Valley Humane Society documents reveal a history of
problems. Sampson said the agency's then-supervisor did not seek
charges because it was assumed the USDA would address the problems. At
most, there may have been failure to quickly euthanize, which is a
misdemeanor, he said.
On May 20, 1998, a humane society investigator found three downers
not signed off by the USDA official on site for an hour. One of the
cows was ``semiconscious and hyperventilating'' and the other two,
though apparently uninjured, ``were breathing with difficulty,''
according to the report.
A week later, the officer returned and inspected 5 days of logs on
downers. He found that the average time span for them to be euthanized
was 2 to 3 hours, a violation of the State law, Sampson said.
On a spot check on May 11, 1998, a humane society officer found a
cow with its right hoof ``hanging by a thread,'' wandering in the
parking lot for 15 minutes before the euthanasia was signed off by a
USDA vet. The officer recommended installing a bar across the downer
shed when no one was around to prevent future escapes.
Handled Too Roughly
A week later, the field supervisor checked the plant again. She
noted that she spoke to USDA brand inspector David Wall about
``unloading problems and mishandling of animals generally at the
plant.''
``Cows are handled too roughly,'' she wrote.
Oct. 8, 1996, a citizen complained about workers repeatedly
prodding downer cows in the face and allowing other cows to trample
them. The USDA veterinarian on site refused to speak to The Humane
Society investigator, who was ordered to leave by the owner when he
refused to divulge who made the complaint, according to the report.
That incident prompted an Oct. 10, 1996, letter from The Humane
Society's then-supervisor of field services, Marsha Wyatt, to the
plant's owners. It said: ``We have had numerous incidents with your
facility in the past involving downer animals and loose animals
creating public safety issues. There is not another slaughterhouse in
this area that has created more problems for the police department and
our agency than yours.''
The letter was copied to the USDA and the city.
A December 16, 1997, letter followed up a meeting with The Humane
Society and the two owners, Donald W. and Donald R. Hallmark, detailing
conditions they agreed to. Among them, that any downer in distress--
marked by vocalization, panting, teeth grinding, broken legs, serious
wounds or split pelvises--will be reported to the USDA vet or inspector
for immediate euthanasia.
The letter, copied to the USDA, concluded: ``We all know that
continued mishandling of downers is unethical and will only lead to
further complaints from the public and possibly interference from the
media.''
______
[February 21, 2008]
Inspectors Say Meat Safety is Threatened
(By Gillian Flaccus)
Los Angeles (AP)--Sometimes, government inspectors responsible for
examining slaughterhouse cattle for mad cow disease and other ills are
so short-staffed that they find themselves peering down from catwalks
at hundreds of animals at once, looking for such telltale signs as
droopy ears, stumbling gait and facial paralysis.
The ranks of inspectors are so thin that slaughterhouse workers
often figure out when ``surprise'' visits are about to take place, and
make sure they are on their best behavior.
These allegations were raised by former and current U.S. Department
of Agriculture inspectors in the wake of the biggest beef recall in
history--143 million pounds from a California meatpacker accused of
sending lame ``downer'' cows to slaughter.
The inspectors told The Associated Press that they fear chronic
staff shortages in their ranks are allowing sick cows to get into the
Nation's food supply, endangering the public. According to USDA's own
figures, the inspector ranks nationwide had vacancy rates of 10 percent
or more in 2006-2007.
``They're not covering all their bases. There's a possibility that
something could go through because you don't have the manpower to check
everything,'' said Lester Friedlander, a former USDA veterinary
inspector at a plant in Wyalusing, Pennsylvania.
Amanda Eamich, a spokeswoman for the USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service, acknowledged that the department has been
struggling to fill vacancies but denied the food supply is at risk.
``Every single animal must past ante mortem inspection before it's
presented for slaughter, so only healthy animals are going to pass,''
she said. ``We do have continuous inspection at slaughter facilities.''
Similarly, Janet Riley, a spokeswoman for the American Meat
Institute, defended the meatpacking industry's safety record. ``It is
interesting to keep in mind how heavily regulated we are,'' she said.
``Nobody has this level of inspection.''
The current and former inspectors and other industry critics
charged that the staff shortages are also resulting in the mistreatment
of animals on the way to slaughter, and may have contributed to the
recall announced earlier this week.
U.S. Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wisconsin, said Thursday that his Senate
Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriations
Subcommittee will hold a Feb. 28 hearing on the recall.
Secretary of Agriculture Ed Schafer and the presidents of The
Humane Society and the American Meat Institute, among others, will
testify, he said in a printed statement.
The USDA recalled the beef after The Humane Society of the United
States released undercover video that showed slaughterhouse workers at
the Chino-based Westland/Hallmark Meat Co. kicking and shoving sick and
crippled cows and forcing them to stand with electric prods, forklifts
and water hoses.
Wayne Pacelle, The Humane Society's president and chief executive,
said the video was filmed over a 6-week period last fall and all the
abuse happened when USDA inspectors were not present.
``The inspection system obviously has enormous gaps if these
routine abuses could happen,'' he said. ``The inspector would show up
and if there were downed animals, the workers would try to get them up
before the inspectors got there.''
Generally, downer cows--those too sickly to stand, even with
coaxing--are banned from the food supply under Federal regulations.
Downer cows carry a higher risk of mad cow disease. And because sickly
animals typically wallow in feces and have weakened immune systems,
downer cows are more likely to carry E. coli and salmonella, too.
Veterinary inspector looks for such symptoms as an unsteady gait,
swollen lymph nodes, sores and poor muscle tone.
Industry critics say the staff shortages are compounded by a change
in USDA regulations in the late 1990s that gave slaughterhouses more
responsibility for devising their own safety checklists and for
reporting downer cows to the USDA when inspectors are not present.
That policy places slaughterhouses on an honor system that can lead
to abuse in an industry that thrives on close attention to costs, said
Stan Painter, chairman for the National Joint Council of Food
Inspection Locals, which represents 6,000 inspectors nationwide.
``The fox is guarding its own henhouse,'' said Painter, who also
works as a part-time inspector at hog and poultry packing plants in the
South. ``If you throw a 3-pound chicken away, so what? But if you throw
a cow away that's 300 pounds of meat, and you can't get any money out
of it, that's a big issue.''
Inspectors whose job is to make sure that the cattle are treated
humanely said staff shortages mean they are forced to adopt routine
hours for their checks, removing the element of surprise.
USDA numbers show anywhere between 10 and 12 percent of inspector
and veterinarian positions at poultry, beef and pork slaughterhouses
nationwide were vacant between October 2006 and September 2007. In some
regions, including Colorado and Texas, a major beef-producing State,
the rate hovered around 15 percent. In New York, vacancy rates hit
nearly 22 percent last July.
To bolster its ranks, the department is offering big signing
bonuses of at least $2,500 to inspectors willing to relocate to 15
States. The agency has 7,800 inspectors covering 6,200 federally
inspected establishments, 900 of which slaughter livestock.
USDA's Eamich blamed the vacancies on competition with private-
sector wages, high costs of living and the often-undesirable rural
locations of many slaughterhouses.
The agency hired 200 new inspectors in the past year, bringing
staffing levels to their highest point since 2003, and cut veterinarian
vacancies by half through hiring incentives, the spokeswoman said.
Felicia Nestor, a policy analyst with Washington-based Food and
Water Watch, said the food supply may be at risk.
``I have talked to so many inspectors who used to work for the
industry, and part of the training is how to get around the inspection.
They've got alkies-talkies to alert each other to where the inspector
is, they double-team the inspector,'' she said.
At two packing houses in Nebraska, veterinarians monitor up to 700
head of cattle at a time for signs of illness--just enough to make sure
all the cows are standing, said one veteran inspector who spoke on
condition of anonymity for fear of losing his job.
The inspector has worked for 15 years as an inspector at two plants
in Lexington and Grand Island, Neb. One-quarter of the inspection
positions at one of his plants have been vacant now for 2 years, he
said.
``There are so many vet shortages out in the field right now, they
can't keep it properly staffed,'' the inspector said. ``When they come
into these big slaughter facilities, they'll put 200 head in a pen. All
you can tell is they're moving.''
Friedlander, who left the USDA in 1995, said he recalled checking
up to 220 cows an hour by standing on a catwalk above a pen of hundreds
of animals. He would also check to see if cows could walk by having
workers drive them from one pen to another, six or seven cows abreast.
``If you're a vet, you see the first cow, you might see the second
cow, but the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh cow you might not see,'' he
said. ``How can we tell if there's any facial paralysis or droopy ears?
You can't tell.''
USDA's Eamich said that there is no limit to the number of animals
an inspector is allowed to look at one time, ``but they have to look at
every single one.''
______
Prepared Statement of the Weston A. Price Foundation
The recent revelation of cruel treatment to downer cows at the
Hallmark/Westland Meat Company has brought important focus on the flaws
in our industrial food system.
Many individuals and agencies will be requesting that USDA put an
end to the practice of cruelly prodding downer cows to make them stand
up so that they can be slaughtered for human food. It is good to close
this loophole but in so doing, USDA will not be addressing the
fundamental problem, namely, the policies that favor the industrial
production of animal foods and the effects of this system not only on
the health and well-being of animals but also on the health and well
being of human beings. (The downer cow that we have all seen on
television and the Internet, by the way, was a dairy cow. It is
unfortunate that the resultant publicity has focused on the safety of
beef. Shouldn't we be looking into the safety and nutrient levels of
milk from confinement dairy facilities?)
The Weston A. Price Foundation promotes the restoration of
nutrient-dense foods to the American diet, and puts particular emphasis
on the fat-soluble vitamins A, D and K2. The research of nutrition
pioneer Weston A. Price, DDS, revealed that the diets of healthy non-
industrialized peoples contained very high levels of these vitamins.
Food sources include certain types of seafood (shell fish, fish eggs,
fish livers and certain oily fish) and the organ meats, fat and butter
fat of grass-fed animals. When our cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and
poultry are raised outdoors in the sunlight, their fat, butterfat,
yolks and organ meats will provide vitamin D; and when their main food
is green grass, their fat, butterfat, yolks and organ meats will
provide vitamins A and K2. These vitamins are essential for numerous
roles including growth, learning capacity, immunity, fertility and
protection against cancer, heart disease, diabetes, osteoporosis and
auto-immune disease.
Through its 400 local chapters worldwide, the Foundation
facilitates the direct purchase of these animal foods from farmers
engaged in pasture-based agriculture. Through our resource guides,
buying groups and food co-ops, we have brought 11-hour rescue, and
indeed prosperity, to hundreds of small farms and in so doing have
provided nutrient-dense animal foods to tens of thousands of
individuals seeking optimal health for themselves and their families.
The reason that most Americans do not have access to nutrient-dense
animal foods from pastured animals today, as they did until the middle
of the 20th century, has to do with a USDA farm policy that favors
centralized agriculture and the confinement system. Public policy that
includes subsidies for large operations, lax environmental laws,
closing down of small meat processing plants, misleading agenda-driven
nutrition advice and health and labeling laws that strongly
discriminate against the direct sales of farm product--these policies
have led to the current system. USDA's proposed National Animal
Identification System (NAIS), promoted under the spurious guise of
animal and human health, would, if implemented, even further
discriminate against small farmers in favor of large confinement
operations. Proponents claim these policies necessary to control the
increasing risk of food-borne illness, the major source of which is the
industrial confinement food system; yet these one-size-fits-all
policies militate against the very practices that can solve the
problem, namely small, grass-based farms.
The Weston A. Price Foundation strongly urges the Senate
Agriculture Committee to examine the policies that have led to
industrial agriculture's current hegemony. This system has led to an
enormous increase in food-borne illness--not only from the animals
themselves, but also from produce contamination due to runoff water
from confinement facilities--as well as the proliferation of chronic
disease, including our biggest killer, heart disease.
Researchers in Holland have discovered that vitamin K2 protects
against atherosclerosis, and they are predicting that in 20 years,
heart disease will be defined as a deficiency of vitamin K2. We also
now know that vitamin D protects against heart disease. The great
increase in heart disease in this country has exactly paralleled the
trend to confinement agriculture and the disappearance of vitamins D
and K2 from the traditional animal foods that formerly supplied them--
liver, butter, cheese, egg yolks and meat fat. Vitamins D and K2 are
also essential for neurological development and fertility.
The confinement animal system is not only cruel to animals and hard
on the environment; not only does this system deplete our animal foods
of vital nutrients; not only does the centralization of animal
production make our food supply vulnerable to terrorism; but it also
raises the specter of actual starvation. The genetic pool of animals
used for industrial food production is extremely narrow and many
veterinarians have expressed concern about the possibility of a kind of
``animal dust bowl'' in which this limited genetic range is wiped out
by an opportunistic organism for which these animals have no natural
immunity. Several years ago the confinement poultry operations in the
Shenandoah were obliged to remove 1,000 tractor trailer loads of
chickens wiped out by bird flu; and as the average lifespan of dairy
cows declines (now at about 42 months, compared to 12 years for a cow
on pasture), the dairy and industry will continue to feel the economic
pressures that allow increasing numbers of sick animals into the food
chain.
These examples are harbingers of greater dangers to come.
Antibiotics and arsenic added to feed can only stave off a mass die-off
for so long, a die-off that could have drastic consequences for
everyone in the country, including your own children and grandchildren.
The only protection against mass animal die-off is a transition back to
small pasture-farms raising a genetically diverse range of animals that
have natural immunity thanks to healthy, traditional animal husbandry
practices. Our farm policy should favor these types of farms as a
matter of human survival.
I would be happy to testify on this subject and request that the
Weston A. Price Foundation be included at future hearings.
The Weston A. Price Foundation is a 501C3 nutrition education
foundation with the mission of disseminating accurate, science-based
information on diet and health. Named after nutrition pioneer Weston A.
Price, DDS, author of Nutrition and Physical Degeneration, the
Washington, DC-based Foundation publishes a quarterly journal for its
10,000 members, supports 400 local chapters worldwide and hosts a
yearly conference. (202) 363-4394, www.westonaprice.org ,[email protected].
Sally Fallon, MA, is founding president of the Weston A. Price
Foundation and author of the best-selling nutritional cookbook
Nourishing Traditions (with Mary G. Enig, PhD). An articulate
communicator, she is a widely quoted expert on traditional diets and a
frequent contributor to holistic health publications.
Senator Kohl. Thank you.
Senator Craig.
Senator Craig. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being with us today.
Mr. Pacelle, you mentioned in your testimony that the
videoing that went on and the observation by a member of The
Humane Society was a random selection at Hallmark?
Mr. Pacelle. That's correct.
Senator Craig. Would you expand on that for us? Is that a
practice that The Humane Society gets involved in on a regular
basis? They select different slaughter environments, and video
for that purpose?
Mr. Pacelle. We've--we've been very concerned, I mean, the
organization has always been concerned, and as I mentioned, the
founder of the organization, in the 1950s, focused on
slaughterhouse abuse and helped stimulate the passage of the
Humane Slaughter Act.
But we have a big charge, at The Humane Society, to protect
pets, and wildlife, and many other creatures, and I'd say we've
re-doubled our commitment to address concerns about the
mistreatment of animals in industrial agriculture. So, we were
putting more resources into that, and this investigation was a
bit of a novel one for us.
Senator Craig. That does not help me in--oh, so--maybe it
does help me, help me understand it. So, the randomness of the
particular action was that, on this day you chose a
slaughterhouse, whereas you might not choose other
slaughterhouses over a period of time, you would look at other
opportunities--or I should say, situations--where there might
be inhumane treatment of animals?
Mr. Pacelle. Our investigators are busy looking at puppy
mills----
Senator Craig. Yes.
Mr. Pacelle [continuing]. Looking at the trade in dogs and
cats in the Philippines for meat--for so many different
reasons, they're spread thin. We chose to take a look at a
place in the Southwest United States, and again, we didn't do a
broad risk assessment and say, ``Okay, let's zero in on this
one,'' our guy just applied for a job at that facility and got
it, they were happy he didn't leave after 4 or 5 days, because
a lot of the employees do. He stuck around for 6 weeks, and he
stuck around because he did see terrible things going on.
But, because there are very few cases made on farm animal
cruelty, and because it is rare for USDA to take serious action
on an animal-welfare related issue, we felt we had to amass a
preponderance of evidence before we released this publicly. And
when we did release it, we gave it to the District Attorney of
San Bernardino County.
Senator Craig. That is my next question, if what you saw,
or what your personnel saw to be so egregious--and a clear
violation of current rules and regulations of USDA--why did you
not immediately come to USDA or the U.S. Attorney General? You
chose a local, elected law enforcement officer, who had no
jurisdiction over that slaughterhouse?
Mr. Pacelle. The District Attorney of San Bernardino County
does have jurisdiction in the sense that California does have a
strong animal cruelty statute----
Senator Craig. That's a local, not a State official, then
why did you not go to the State officials?
Mr. Pacelle. The way enforcement occurs in California is at
a county level.
Senator Craig. Okay, all right.
Mr. Pacelle. The State Attorney General doesn't really have
much authority. We believe that the most serious penalties
could be meted out with the prosecution of individuals who
perpetrated these crimes, through the Office of the District
Attorney. Obviously--and we work on a lot of dog fighting, and
cock fighting, animal cruelty cases--we work with D.A.'s all
the time. Generally speaking, and this one is no different,
they want to keep the information quiet, while they conduct an
investigation. We support----
Senator Craig. No, I appreciate that. But, what this has
spiraled into is a very real question of the quality and safety
of the food supply. And if you are simply working over months
to make a case, and you are only going to choose to prosecute,
and not to stop the food supply from being contaminated by
downer cows, was there not a sense of urgency, here?
Mr. Pacelle. Senator Craig, we have a great sense of
urgency, and that's why we----
Senator Craig. But it isn't demonstrated by the period of
time----
Mr. Pacelle. Well, I'm going to----
Senator Craig [continuing]. You took to expose this.
Mr. Pacelle. I'm going to tell you why--I'm going to tell
you why it's urgent, and why this case is not so unusual.
We have been demanding to this Senate--and the Senate has
passed it several times, it's really a House issue--to stop the
processing of downer cows in the food supply. That's happening
right now, the OIG demonstrated it in 2006. It's been happening
every week, and every month, and every year--downer cows are
going into the food supply, and it is a risk--it's a terrible
humane handling issue, it's an issue of animal cruelty--but is
the risk here----
Senator Craig. Okay.
Mr. Pacelle [continuing]. Worse than what's going on----
Senator Craig. I'm not sure you and I have a dispute over
that. As long as we understand why that is a downer cow, that
she was not physically injured, but there's an illness, or a
disease or a problem. I used to ship cattle. I was very
cautious on how they got onto trucks, how they were handled,
because I wanted them handled in a humane fashion. I know that
mistreating of animals, packing them into trucks can produce
downers, simply by the crush and the impact of numbers of
livestock.
But, let's go back--if this is a food chain issue, if this
is a worry about the contamination of a food chain, you just
told me you turned it over to a prosecutor to prosecute people,
not to stop the action, and correct the quality of the food
chain. I mean----
Mr. Pacelle. That correction occurred. And it may not have
occurred on the timeframe that USDA wanted--I understand their
interest in getting the information right when the
investigative materials were ready. We turned them over, right
away, to the San Bernardino District Attorney, but I just
wanted to underscore this--that the threat is every day.
Senator Craig. Well----
Mr. Pacelle. The threat is now, and until this policy is
changed, we are playing Russian roulette with the American food
supply.
Senator Craig. So--and I'll close, I'm out of time, and
I'll go to a second round, if necessary.
There is a reality here. One of the first things I heard in
the recall was, from the time it had occurred and been
documented, until the time action was taken--which now appears
to be, in part, a result of your failure to report it to the
right people, immediately--because you were ``attempting to
make a case''--food was consumed, meat was consumed, that might
have been at risk. People could have been injured by that food
that was at risk.
Mr. Pacelle. And that's the USDA's responsibility, to
ferret that out, we----
Senator Craig. But, if you knew a law was being violated
and contaminated animals were going into the food chain, there
is a responsibility on your part, too, is there not?
Mr. Pacelle. The responsibility squarely rests with this
plant that violated the law.
Senator Craig. You and I both agree on that. No question
about that.
Mr. Pacelle. The responsibility from a regulatory and
oversight perspective rested with USDA--we cannot--please don't
take--I'm very confident about the work of The Humane Society,
and I love my staff--but we cannot protect the safety of the
food supply in America. We wanted to make sure there was no
whitewash of this case----
Senator Craig. Okay.
Mr. Pacelle [continuing]. We had a strong case, it needed
to develop. We thought that there were clear violations of
criminal statutes in California--the States prosecute most
animal cruelty, that's why we went there.
Senator Craig. Thank you. My time is up. But there is a
reality of timing that you have not effectively, and
responsibly addressed.
Thank you.
Senator Kohl. Senator Harkin.
Senator Harkin. Should, Mr. Boyle, should all downer cattle
be removed from the food chain? Regardless?
Mr. Boyle. Well, first off, the vast majority of them are,
but not because downers are per se unhealthy animals and unfit
for human consumption, as Mr. Pacelle noted--until we had our
first case of BSE, we did not have the prohibition of the vast
majority of downer animals, that are not allowed to be
inspected ante mortem.
And the reason for that, is that an inspector cannot make a
determination regarding the central nervous system disorders,
or the BSE-related health or illness of an animal while it's in
a reclining position. That determination can only be made when
that animal is ambulatory.
Hence, the prohibition on presenting non-ambulatory animals
for ante mortem inspection. Because you cannot determine
whether there's a BSE risk there.
There is a narrow exception that the Department explained,
that after an animal is presented, and passed for ante mortem
inspection, if that animal subsequently goes down in the
ensuing brief period of time, it does not necessarily mean,
once again, you have a BSE-related issue. It does not suggest
that it has not been appropriately inspected by the inspector.
What is required, under the regs, and what has not happened
here, is that it was not represented as the plant should have.
And that is a significant plant failure, with significant plant
consequences.
Just because an animal is down--as Senator Craig intimated
when he was engaging in the last round of questions--there are
a lot of reasons why an animal may go down. It's always painful
to see, it's extremely regrettable, the industry works very
hard to avoid it, but it is not, per se, a food safety, or a
BSE-related issue. That is why the Department exercised the
discretion in the rulemaking, in the final regulation, in this
very narrow parameter, to allow the inspector to re-inspect the
downed animal to verify that it is safe for harvest for beef.
Mr. Pacelle. I mean, this is the charade of this rule. That
somehow you can parse these cases of illness and acute injury--
the veterinarians cannot, even if they're an outstanding,
fantastic veterinarian--they don't have the tools, there are
too many animals, they don't have the tools, the testing--even
for BSE--is a post-mortem test--there's not some fast test
that's going on.
We also know that downer cows are three times more likely
to have E. coli, they're more likely to have salmonella--
they're wallowing in manure, it's all over their hides.
This persisted for years. The only reason we have this rule
is because we pushed for it, and we had the mad cow case. It
takes a crisis, sometimes, for USDA to act--let's get ahead of
this. Let's have this Congress codify a no-downer ban, and
let's have the USDA go back to the Veneman rule and implement
it properly. They undercut it with guidelines that
countermanded it.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you very much, Senator Harkin.
I'd like to shift back, at least away from the rhetoric,
and the impassioned emotions here, and focus, for a moment, on
the science, and the economics, here.
Mr. Pacelle just said that downed animals in a chute in
that narrow window have a greater likelihood of generating E.
coli-contaminated, and salmonella-contaminated beef.
Theoretically, that's possible. But if you look at the
microbiological test results of the finished product coming out
of that plant, the AMS records will show that all of the lots
they tested--and there was extensive testing, on school lunch
program product, even above and beyond the normal amount of
testing that occurs, which is quite extensive in and of its own
right--none of them were positive for E. coli. And only two
lots--out of 2 years production--were positive for salmonella.
So, the suggestion that we have an increased risk of
pathogen contamination in this situation is not supported by
the test results.
Also, yesterday The Humane Society filed a lawsuit against
USDA, focused upon this issue--to preclude the use of re-
inspection of downed animals in that narrow circumstance to see
if they are healthy for the purpose of harvesting the beef. And
they cited a statistic that--that didn't suggest, they said--
there is a 50 times greater likelihood of BSE in that animal
that, moments earlier, had been inspected and passed during the
ante mortem inspection process. And now that it's gone down,
there's a 50 times greater likelihood that it's now suddenly a
positive animal for BSE? That data is drawn from the experience
in the European Union and the United Kingdom, where they had an
epidemic of BSE, where they had hundreds of thousands of cases
of BSE.
And the findings suggest there's a 20 to 50 times greater
percentage--in that context, in the United Kingdom, in the late
1980s and the early 1990s. But, if you ask the scientists,
given our BSE status, given the fact that we've had three--only
two of them indigenous to our native herd, despite significant,
enhanced testing--a rate of one in a million positive for BSE,
based upon the results of that survey program--the scientists
will tell you there is zero risk, when that animal passes ante
mortem inspection, and then subsequently in the brief period
thereafter, before processing, goes down.
And then, finally, the whole economic implication that the
company wants to do whatever it can to derive whatever profit
by whatever means. I am not familiar with a business school in
the United States of America that would suggest to its students
that violating Federal regulations is a long-term strategy for
economic success. And clearly, the folks at Hallmark/Westland
today, have to be of the same point of view.
Mr. Pacelle. May I--I'm sorry, it's your control.
Senator Harkin. My time is out.
Senator Kohl. Go ahead, go ahead, Mr. Pacelle.
Mr. Pacelle. I just wanted to say that yes, it is the data
from Europe, that's the best data pool to draw from, and that's
why we invoke it, that's why experts invoke it, that's why USDA
invoked it in its Federal Register Notice on the issue,
extensively documented in the USDA rule on the downer issue.
Because it's relevant, and pertinent.
But if we look at the North American experience, we've had
15 BSE-positive animals turn up. Thirteen in Canada, two in the
United States. Thirteen of the 15 were downers. That's a pretty
strong correlation to me.
Senator Harkin. Well, I don't--I thank you, Mr. Chairman--I
don't know how I feel about that issue, I just--I'm going to go
back now, again, and find out--what did we do after the Stanko
incident in Colorado? I actually chaired those hearings out
there, and those guys--both brothers were sent to jail, and
that's what they were doing, they were dragging downer cattle
into the slaughtering room.
That was, I don't know, I got a little confused at the
time--maybe it was the late-seventies. But I was chairing the
Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Subcommittee in the House at that
time and I swear that, after that, we took action, Pat, to do
something about it--I can't remember what it was.
Mr. Boyle. Actually, Senator, that incident in the late
seventies?
Senator Harkin. Yeah?
Mr. Boyle. While it involved downer animals, the violation
was extremely egregious--they were processing animals without
any ante mortem inspection, outside of the inspection
regulations. Not an isolated downer in a chute, or----
Senator Harkin. Well, maybe that was before we had the rule
on ante mortem--I don't, I can't--I don't remember when that
all came in. But, I thought we took care of that, but----
So, I'm not certain about this. That's something we've got
to think about.
Mr. Pacelle. You may have tried diligently, Senator Harkin,
but the effect is that we've had downers, day after day, week
after week, year after year----
Senator Harkin. But, certainly, Mr. Pacelle, you would also
agree that if a cow is going down a chute and trips, and goes
down on his knees--and we see that happen all of the time--
surely, you don't say that that--and that cow is able to get
back up--that somehow you can't go ahead and slaughter that
cow, can you?
Mr. Pacelle. If the cow can get back up?
Senator Harkin. Yeah, if the cow can get back up.
Mr. Pacelle. Oh yeah, no--the definition of a downer is an
animal that can't get up once they're down. They're in a
recumbent position, and they stay in a recumbent position.
But I do dispute the notion--and this is really the crux of
the debate in Congress on the downer issue--that the
veterinarians can distinguish between illness and injury. You
may go down because you have a neurological problem--that's why
you stumble and fall. And it puts too much of a burden on the
veterinarian to make that distinction, and why try to do it,
when it represents a fraction of the animals that are going to
slaughter.
There are 35 million cattle slaughtered in the United
States, a couple of hundred thousands were estimated to be
downers, before the rule was passed by Veneman in 2004--why are
we trying to get these few animals into the system,
compromising their welfare, and threatening the food supply,
because all of the data is overwhelming, and USDA put it in its
rule?
Senator Harkin. But, again, I say, Mr. Pacelle, if the cow
went down, broke its leg, it can't get back up----
Mr. Pacelle. Yes, but how do we know----
Senator Harkin. That doesn't mean it has a neurological
problem.
Mr. Pacelle. But how do we not know that the broken leg was
the consequence of a larger illness. Animals who are ill
stumble and fall.
If you or I had a terrible sickness, as compared to being
perfectly healthy--we would be more likely to fall, if we were
ill.
Senator Harkin. So, you're saying, just because we don't
know. Well, that's probably a legitimate point, maybe. I don't
know, I'll have to think about it.
Senator Kohl. Just to point, Senator Harkin, back in 2004,
Secretary Veneman put in that ``no downer, no exceptions,'' you
know, they thought it was the right thing to do then.
Mr. Boyle.
Mr. Boyle. As an interim final rule, that was the scope of
the interim final rule. When they looked more--and that was a
rule adopted in the wake of our first BSE. And I don't
criticize the Department for promulgating those particular,
responsive rules to that first case.
But upon further reflection, looking at the science
involved, the expertise of the veterinarians, the role they can
play, the Department concluded that in a very narrow
circumstance, the fact that an animal that was ambulatory was
inspected, was passed, and subsequently--in the short period of
time thereafter, before processing, went down--should not
automatically preclude it from going into the food supply.
Instead, the inspector who passed it originally should be
called to conduct a subsequent inspection.
That was the Department's determination, it seems
reasonable. And when it's enforced--as it is throughout the
country--it makes sense, from our perspective, as an industry.
But when it is ignored, it has terrible consequences, and
it should be punished. And I think, in this case, it has been.
Mr. Pacelle. Let's be clear, Mr. Chairman, that if an
animal falls and breaks a leg, that animal may not have
illness. I mean, the broken leg's a problem and it's certainly
not very humane to move an animal with a broken leg--how are
they going to get the animal in there? But the issue is not
that--our argument is not that all animals who break a leg have
the problem--it's that the veterinarian doesn't have the tools
to make an accurate assessment.
And that it's a small pool of animals--why are we risking
so much--we had the mad cow case that cost the industry
hundreds of millions of dollars in 2003. Now, this one is
costing the industry extraordinary sums of money. Why are we
fooling around with this? Why are we messing around with this?
It doesn't make economic sense.
I mean, the science, we think, is all on our side, the
humane issues are all on our side, but the economics--these
guys should be leading the fight? They should be working hard
for this.
Senator Kohl. He's fighting good, Mr. Boyle?
Mr. Boyle. And, my friend, we are. And we're pleased that
you're using our Animal Handling Guidelines, and the audit
tools, as well.
Let me elaborate, briefly, on the standard that applies for
the veterinarian that looks at that animal that has passed ante
mortem inspection, and subsequently goes down.
If the inspector can see an acute injury--if it's plain,
upon visually viewing that animal that it has broken a leg,
then that animal is allowed to proceed. If the veterinarian
cannot physically see an acute injury that can explain clearly
why that previously ambulatory animal is now down, that animal
is not allowed to proceed.
And even with the acute injury, once that animal enters the
chain, there are special procedures that apply at post-mortem
inspection, to reassure and reaffirm that the veterinarian's
initial decision--that it was the acute injury, not some other
disease that caused it to go down--is actually a correct one
that can be verified at post-mortem inspection.
Senator Kohl. All right, Senator Craig--anything more?
Senator Craig. No, I think my next line of questioning was
going to be with Mr. Boyle, as it relates to the industry
guidelines. I think you've already walked us through those.
We've had a bad actor, here. And there's no question about
it. And there is concern about the quality of meat coming out
of that particular slaughterhouse, and there's every reason for
us to be anxious about it, there's every reason for this
committee to hear, and to see if there can't be some way to
improve it.
And I go back to what Senator Bennett said earlier, and
instill with the industry a culture. And I thank The Humane
Society for their due diligence--to a degree. I'm a little
concerned when the hand-wringing occurs that this sense of
urgency that was displayed because of the risk of human injury,
because you were trying to make a legal case, I'm not quite
sure that I can be as responsive to the righteousness of the
argument.
I am going to be very responsive, to make sure that the
industry does it right. And I thank The Humane Society for
their due diligence, in regard to the overall kind of oversight
that you do.
Thank you.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Kohl. Gentlemen, you've been great. You've shed a
lot of light on a serious issue, and we will see what we can do
to make things better, with your support.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Craig.
Mr. Pacelle. Thank you.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
Question. The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) had been
purchasing meat from the Hallmark/Westland plant for the School Lunch
Program and others. Under current law, does AMS allow any downer
animals, regardless of whether or not they went down after their ante-
mortem inspection, to be used for the foods they purchase?
Answer. No. The specification and contractual requirements are very
clear in this regard. Meat products derived from non-ambulatory
disabled livestock are not permitted in AMS purchases. The Hallmark/
Westland recall resulted from deliberate non-compliances with FSIS
regulations and AMS contract requirements.
Question. Can you state with any assurance that what was occurring
at Hallmark/Westland is not occurring at other plants? If so, how can
you confirm that?
Answer. We believe the non-compliances with FSIS regulations and
AMS contract requirements at the Hallmark/Westland facility is an
isolated event. However, we are not waiting for the completion of the
investigation to act.
FSIS has already taken a number of steps to strengthen our
inspection system. As announced on February 28, 2008, FSIS has
implemented a series of interim actions to verify and thoroughly
analyze humane handling activities in all federally inspected
establishments.
FSIS has increased the amount of time allocated per shift by
inspection program personnel to verify humane handling activities and
to verify that animals are handled humanely in ante-mortem areas. FSIS
is also conducting surveillance activities to observe the handling of
animals outside the approved hours of operation from vantage points
within and adjacent to the official premises. A notice has been issued
to all FSIS inspection program personnel to reinforce the work methods
for conducting humane handling verification activities at all levels
and to ensure the greatest utility of the Humane Activities Tracking
System (HATS) Program.
Surveillance and inspection activities are prioritized and focused
based on existing data such as the category of livestock handled at the
facility, humane handling data, observations made at the facility
during regular inspection and a plant's operating schedule.
FSIS will continue to collect information in HATS, which provides
an accounting of the time spent by FSIS inspection program personnel
performing specific tasks and the results of that inspection related to
humane handling and slaughter. Starting on March 3, 2008, FSIS
inspection program personnel assigned to federally inspected livestock
slaughter establishments increased the amount of time that they spend
conducting HATS activities from anywhere between 50 and 100 percent.
This increased HATS inspection will continue for 60 days and will be
closely measured during that time.
Prioritization will help to ensure the optimal use of resources to
ensure humane handling and food safety. FSIS is focusing surveillance
and inspection activities at establishments where older or potentially
distressed animals are slaughtered, such as facilities that handle
dairy or veal cattle. At these facilities, the time spent performing
HATS activities will be doubled. At facilities with contracts from the
AMS for nutrition assistance programs, regardless of the type or class
of the animal slaughtered, HATS verification time is being doubled. At
facilities where non-ambulatory livestock are infrequently presented,
such as in slaughter facilities that handle young market classes
including steers, heifers, market hogs, and lambs, an additional 50
percent of HATS verification time may be required.
At least once every 2 weeks, a District Veterinary Medical
Specialist or a district analyst is verifying that inspection personnel
at each official livestock slaughter establishment are conducting the
appropriate increase in HATS verification time. Any plant found not to
be in compliance will be reported to the in-plant supervisor and the
frontline supervisor.
Meanwhile, FSIS will begin reviewing the HATS to determine what, if
any, adjustments are needed to maximize its utility as a tracking tool
to improve compliance.
FSIS has audited the 18 beef slaughter establishments that contract
with AMS for Federal nutrition assistance programs. This is the first
in a set of audits we will be conducting. AMS has also increased audit
frequencies and oversight at slaughter establishments that supply raw
materials to our purchase programs as a corrective and preventative
measure. Additionally, we are cooperatively working with FSIS on cross-
utilizing AMS employees to provide an enhanced surveillance program for
the livestock holding and movement areas of slaughter establishments.
The investigation being led by OIG with support from FSIS and AMS
is ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have
additional information that, along with the results of the additional
verification activities, will determine the actions for FSIS oversight,
inspection and enforcement that may be required.
Question. Can you tell us how much time FSIS inspectors spent each
day, on average, ensuring that this plant was following USDA's rules on
downed animals and humane slaughter?
Answer. At this facility, on average, 90 minutes throughout the day
were spent verifying humane handling activities in the ante-mortem
area. The number of inspectors assigned to an establishment is
dependent upon the size of the facility, the type of products produced
as well as their production volume. Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing
Company had five FSIS inspection program personnel at the facility each
day of operation. There were three on-line inspectors, one public
health veterinarian and one off-line inspector. FSIS veterinarians and
other inspection personnel are not stationed in the ante-mortem area
for the entire day, although they do return randomly to conduct humane
handling verification activities. Other inspection activities are
conducted off-line when ante mortem inspections have been completed.
These inspectors were present at the slaughter facility every day for
the entire 8-hour shift.
Question. How many plants have cameras or other ways for FSIS
inspectors to observe slaughter operations undetected by plant
personnel?
Answer. FSIS does not track the voluntary use of this type of
equipment by the plant. FSIS inspection program personnel verify that
humane handling requirements are being met through unannounced
inspections.
The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and implementing regulations
provide for 24/7 access to all facilities and access to all plant
recordings, including video records/recordings.
Question. Do you have the authority to require plants to either
install cameras in slaughter areas or otherwise make certain that
inspectors can know at all times what is happening in all parts of the
plant without tipping off the plant personnel?
Answer. The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and implementing
regulations provide for 24/7 access to all facilities and access to all
plant recordings, including video records/recordings.
Question. Will you support the ability of inspectors to improve
their surveillance methods either through the use of cameras or other
means?
Answer. The investigation being led by OIG with support from FSIS
and AMS is ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have
additional information that, along with the results of the additional
verification activities, will determine the actions for FSIS oversight,
inspection and enforcement that may be required.
Question. Can you please provide a brief explanation of the
measures you are using to ensure that meat used in the School Lunch
Program is safe?
Answer. All meat and meat products purchased for Federal food and
nutrition assistance programs must be produced in a facility operating
under FSIS inspection. AMS, like other large-volume buyers of high
quality products, imposes additional requirements in accordance with
the Federal Acquisition Regulation to ensure products are produced in
accordance with best industry practices and meet the needs of the end-
user. To establish the specification and contractual requirements, AMS
used the best science available and benchmarked against other high
quality purchasers. The requirements for ground beef include full
trace-back capability; pathogen intervention at slaughter; statistical
process control evaluation for pathogens, indicator microbes, and fat
content; strict temperature and processing controls; and, tamper-proof
packing. Each contractor is required to provide a detailed technical
document that describes how each specification requirement will be met.
Contractors are subject to routine audits and an AMS employee is
present when the product is processed.
Question. Since much of the Hallmark/Westland products were
provided through USDA programs to the States, how much is this recall
going to cost them? Will USDA see that these States are properly
reimbursed?
Answer. At this time, we are still compiling the costs related to
the recall and precise figures are not available. USDA will reimburse
States in accordance with established procedures for costs associated
with the replacement and destruction of the recalled products.
Question. What do you think the eventual total dollar value of this
recall will be, and how many products will be involved?
Answer. USDA doesn't estimate the dollar value of recalls or
recalled products outside of the Federal nutrition assistance programs.
At this time, we are still compiling costs related to the recall and
precise figures are not available. Any estimate would be premature at
this point. Approximately 50.3 million pounds of coarse and fine ground
beef were purchased from Hallmark/Westland during the period of the
recall. All of the 50.3 million pounds have been accounted for and we
are in the process of destroying those products that remain on hold.
Question. Did this plant have a history of humane handling and
slaughter violations? If so, please provide relevant details.
Answer. In December 2005, an FSIS District Veterinary Medical
Specialist conducted a routine humane handling audit and issued
Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company a humane handling related non-
compliance record (NR) because of overly aggressive driving of animals
and multiple structural inadequacies in the pens. The plant promptly
implemented appropriate corrective measures. In May 2007, FSIS
conducted another audit that noted no excessive use of electric prods,
or any other regulatory non-compliance.
FSIS inspection program personnel conduct carcass-by-carcass
inspection and verify that establishments follow all food safety and
humane handling regulations. FSIS inspection program personnel also
verify that the establishment maintains proper sanitation procedures;
it follows its Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan
and complies with all FSIS regulations pertaining to slaughter and
processing operations. This requires continuous inspection of slaughter
and processing operations. Furthermore, offline FSIS personnel conduct
random humane handling inspections at intermittent times during the
day.
If the establishment fails to maintain sanitation, does not follow
its HACCP plan or violates other regulations, FSIS inspection program
personnel will issue a citation to the establishment in the form of a
noncompliance record to document the noncompliance. If necessary, they
could also take regulatory control action, such as a Notice of Intended
Enforcement or a Suspension of Inspection.
Question. Does USDA have the authority to adopt objective standards
and guidelines similar to those adopted by the American Meat Institute?
Answer. USDA can issue objective humane handling criteria through
the public rulemaking process, as the current statute allows.
Additionally, AMS can, through contractual requirements, impose
objective animal welfare requirements for its purchase programs. At
this time, we are working with academia, industry leaders, animal
welfare experts and others to determine the scope and extent of any
additional requirements that may be implemented for future purchase
seasons.
Question. Can you please explain the penalties, both civil and
criminal that USDA and the Federal Government has available for
companies in situations like this?
Answer. The Federal Meat Inspection Act provides for criminal
penalties and civil injunctive relief.
Question. How many cattle each year are approved by USDA at ante-
mortem inspection, then (a) subsequently go down and are condemned, and
(b) subsequently go down and are approved for slaughter? If you don't
have an exact number, please provide an estimate and explain how it was
derived.
Answer. There are approximately 600 cull cattle that pass ante-
mortem inspection then suffer an acute injury and after additional
inspection by the Public Health Veterinarian are allowed to proceed to
slaughter of the 6.3 million cull cattle slaughtered per year. Of the
27.4 million steers and heifers slaughtered per year, approximately 350
initially passed ante-mortem, were reinspected and then passed for
slaughter. Overall, less than 1,000 of the 34 million cattle
slaughtered per year initially passed ante-mortem, were reinspected and
then passed for slaughter.
Question. What specific humane handling violations would constitute
an immediate shutdown of a plant?
Answer. When inspection program personnel observe animals being
injured or treated inhumanely, they are to take immediate enforcement
action. As stated in FSIS Directive 6900.2, Revision 1, if animals are
being treated inhumanely or injured, inspection program personnel are
to take a regulatory control action (i.e., apply a retain/reject tag)
as set out in 9 CFR 500.2(a)(4), Inhumane handling or slaughter of
livestock.
However, if the observed inhumane treatment is of an egregious
nature, the regulations at 9 CFR 500.3(b) apply. The regulations state,
``FSIS also may impose a suspension without providing the establishment
prior notification because the establishment is handling or
slaughtering animals inhumanely.'' Therefore, the inspector in charge
(IIC) is to orally notify plant management of the suspension and
immediately notify the District Office (DO) and the District Veterinary
Medical Specialist (DVMS) for prompt documentation of the suspension
action. The IIC is also to document the facts that serve as the basis
of the suspension action on a memorandum of interview (MOI) and
promptly provide that information to the DO and the DVMS for their use
in documenting the Notice of Suspension. The DO and the DVMS will make
an official assessment of the suspension, take any action with respect
to it that they deem appropriate, and notify the Executive Associate
for Regulatory Operations designated for the District.
An egregious situation, which would lead to immediate shutdown of
the plant, is any act that is cruel to animals or a condition that is
ignored and leads to the harm of animals such as: making cuts on or
skinning conscious animals, excessive beating or prodding of ambulatory
or non-ambulatory disabled animals, dragging conscious animals, driving
animals off semi-trailers over a drop off without providing adequate
unloading facilities (animals are falling to the ground), running
equipment over animals, stunning of animals and then allowing them to
regain consciousness, multiple attempts, especially in the absence of
immediate corrective measures, to stun an animal verses a single blow
or shot, dismembering live animals, such as removing feet from live
animals, leaving disabled livestock exposed to adverse climate
conditions while awaiting disposition, or otherwise causing intentional
unnecessary pain and suffering to animals, including situations on
trucks.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin
DOWNER RULE
Question. According to the Food Safety and Inspection Service's
(FSIS) final rule regarding the slaughter of non-ambulatory animals, if
an animal is downed after it passes ante-mortem inspection, it is the
responsibility of the plant to notify the FSIS inspector that the
animal was downed after the inspection. The rule prohibits the
slaughter of cattle that are unable to stand or walk upon inspection
because the inability to stand or walk can be a clinical sign of BSE.
Given that ante-mortem inspectors are not outside watching the animals
in the pens at all times, it appears that there is a loophole in this
FSIS regulation which places the burden on the establishment to call
the inspector.
What can USDA do to better enforce this regulation?
Answer. The investigation being led by OIG with support from FSIS
and AMS is ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have
additional information that, along with the results of the additional
verification activities, will determine the actions for FSIS oversight,
inspection and enforcement that may be required.
Question. What assurances does USDA have that this rule of
contacting the Department if an animal is downed after ante-mortem
inspection is being complied with?
Answer. FSIS has already taken a number of steps to strengthen our
inspection system and verify that plants are following proper
procedures. As announced on February 28, 2008, FSIS has implemented a
series of interim actions to verify and thoroughly analyze humane
handling activities in all federally inspected establishments.
FSIS has increased the amount of time allocated per shift by
inspection program personnel to verify humane handling activities and
to verify that animals are handled humanely in ante-mortem areas. FSIS
is also conducting surveillance activities to observe the handling of
animals outside the approved hours of operation from vantage points
within and adjacent to the official premises. A notice has been issued
to all FSIS inspection program personnel to reinforce the work methods
for conducting humane handling verification activities at all levels
and to ensure the greatest utility of the HATS program.
Surveillance and inspection activities are prioritized and focused
based on existing data such as the category of livestock handled at the
facility, humane handling data, observations made at the facility
during regular inspection and a plant's operating schedule.
FSIS will continue to collect information in HATS, which provides
an accounting of the time spent by FSIS inspection program personnel
performing specific tasks and the results of that inspection related to
humane handling and slaughter. Starting on March 3, 2008, FSIS
inspection program personnel assigned to federally inspected livestock
slaughter establishments increased the amount of time that they spend
conducting HATS activities from anywhere between 50 and 100 percent.
This increased HATS inspection will continue for 60 days and will be
closely measured during that time.
Prioritization will help to ensure the optimal use of resources to
ensure humane handling and food safety. FSIS is focusing surveillance
and inspection activities at establishments where older or potentially
distressed animals are slaughtered, such as facilities that handle
dairy or veal cattle. At these facilities, the time spent performing
HATS activities will be doubled. At facilities with contracts from the
AMS for Federal nutrition assistance programs, regardless of the type
or class of the animal slaughtered, HATS verification time is being
doubled. At facilities where non-ambulatory livestock are infrequently
presented, such as in slaughter facilities that handle young market
classes including steers, heifers, market hogs, and lambs, an
additional 50 percent of HATS verification time may be required.
At least once every 2 weeks, a District Veterinary Medical
Specialist or a district analyst is verifying that inspection personnel
at each official livestock slaughter establishment are conducting the
appropriate increase in HATS verification time. Any plant found not to
be in compliance will be reported to the in-plant supervisor and the
frontline supervisor.
Meanwhile, FSIS will begin reviewing the HATS to determine what, if
any, adjustments are needed to maximize its utility as a tracking tool
to improve compliance.
FSIS has audited the 18 beef slaughter establishments that contract
with AMS for Federal nutrition assistance programs. This is the first
in a set of audits we will be conducting.
Question. What incentive is there for a plant to report that an
animal is downed after it passes ante-mortem inspection?
Answer. FSIS regulations require that establishment personnel
notify an FSIS Public Health Veterinarian when livestock became non-
ambulatory after passing ante-mortem inspection and before the animal
proceeds to slaughter. If an establishment violates this or other
regulations, FSIS inspection program personnel will take regulatory
control or enforcement action as warranted. In the case of Hallmark/
Westland Meat Packing Company, this action led to a recall of 143
million pounds and the ongoing suspension of their operations.
Question. Please describe the additional measures taken by AMS to
ensure that meat and poultry products purchased by Federal nutrition
programs are safe.
Answer. AMS, like other large-volume buyers of high quality
products, imposes additional requirements in accordance with the
Federal Acquisition Regulation. To establish the specification and
contractual requirements, AMS used the best science available and
benchmarked against other high quality purchasers. The requirements for
ground beef include full trace-back capability; pathogen intervention
at slaughter; statistical process control evaluation for pathogens,
indicator microbes, and fat content; strict temperature and processing
controls; and, tamper-proof packing. Each contractor is required to
provide a detailed technical document that describes how each
specification requirement will be met. Contractors are subject to
routine audits and an AMS employee is present when the product is
processed.
Question. Should these additional measures be required for all meat
and poultry inspected by USDA?
Answer. No. The specification and contractual requirements for AMS
purchases are designed to ensure products meet specific end-user needs.
These requirements would not always be appropriate for across the board
deployment for products entering commerce.
Question. Were there AMS inspectors at the Hallmark/Westland
facility? If so, could they have played a role in reporting violations
of regulations?
Answer. An AMS meat grader was present at the Hallmark/Westland
facility when ground beef was being processed for delivery under
Federal contracts. Additionally, an AMS auditor periodically audited
the grinding and slaughter processes. The AMS meat grader monitoring
the processing operation would not routinely have performed
surveillance activities in the cattle holding and movement areas. We
have increased AMS audit frequencies and oversight at slaughter
establishments that supply raw materials to our purchase programs as a
corrective and preventative measure. Additionally, we are cooperatively
working with FSIS on cross-utilizing AMS employees to provide an
enhanced surveillance program for the livestock holding and movement
areas of slaughter establishments.
FOOD-BORNE PATHOGENS AND DOWNER CATTLE
Question. A 2003 study led by USDA's Agricultural Research Service
(ARS) suggests that downer cattle have a higher prevalence of E. coli
O157:H7 than healthy cattle.
Has ARS performed additional research to investigate this
correlation?
Answer. ARS was a collaborator in the Downer Cattle/E. coli O157:H7
study published in 2003. The project was funded through a Specific
Cooperative Agreement from ARS to University of Wisconsin-Madison
through the auspices of the National Alliance for Food Safety and
Security. ARS has not conducted or funded any further research in this
area.
Question. Will USDA's FSIS use the information from this study and
subsequent studies to take additional measures and improve current
regulations to keep downer cattle out of the food supply?
Answer. FSIS uses the best available science to continually improve
its regulations, policies, and programs.
Question. Does USDA have plans to test any of the recalled meat for
pathogens that cause food-borne illness, such as E. coli O157:H7? Why
or why not?
Answer. No. The product is already tested for pathogens as required
by the AMS contract. The recall was not due to pathogens. It occurred
due to noncompliance with a FSIS regulation.
INSPECTORS
Question. Mr. Alfred Almanza, Administrator of USDA's Food Safety
and Inspection Service, stated at the hearing that USDA is able to
handle staffing shortfalls by having off-line inspectors fill
shortfalls in on-line positions. One of the primary functions of off-
line inspectors is overseeing the humane handling of live animals and
compliance with the downer rules.
By using off-line inspectors to fill staffing shortfalls for on-
line inspections, is USDA able to ensure the humane handling of animals
and compliance with the prohibition on the slaughter of downed cattle?
Answer. We utilize our HATS, which provides FSIS with an accurate
and complete accounting of the time spent by FSIS inspection program
personnel performing specific tasks and the results of that inspection
related to humane handling and slaughter under the requirements of the
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA).
Under HATS, FSIS Public Health Veterinarians and other in-plant
program personnel report their time and data for specific humane
handling activities into HATS. District Veterinary Medical Specialists
(DVMS) routinely verify the accuracy of the data entered. DVMS also
conduct in-plant verifications of humane handling and slaughter, and
are in regular contact with FSIS in-plant inspection program personnel
regarding humane enforcement issues.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Question. Secretary Schafer, I would like to turn your attention to
another matter, the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2009. I
was disappointed that the fiscal year 2009 budget proposed to close the
Grand Forks Human Nutrition Research Center. What was USDA's
justification for proposing to close the Grand Forks center?
Answer. The Grand Forks Human Nutrition Research Center is one of
six USDA Human Nutrition Research Centers. The past and current program
at Grand Forks has addressed dietary requirements for mineral
nutrition, an undertaking that is considered largely complete and no
longer associated with a severe national health problem or research
priority. In light of this success, the Department is recommending the
consolidation of resources and the redirection of nutrition research to
address the more critical obesity problem, which has become a serious
national concern.
Question. Under the Administration's proposal, the Federal
employees and lab equipment at the Grand Forks Human Nutrition Research
Center would move to nutrition labs in Davis, California and
Beltsville, Maryland. According to an analysis by the University of
North Dakota (UND), the cost to close the Grand Forks Human Nutrition
Research Center and move its personnel and equipment to Davis and
Beltsville would exceed $30 million. Most of this expense would be for
new construction and remodeling at Davis and Beltsville to accommodate
the Grand Forks equipment and employees. Did USDA evaluate the cost of
moving the Grand Forks employees and equipment to the other two
locations? What did it find? Did USDA consider the fact that the two
other locations may not have the facility space to house the
transferred employees and equipment? If so, how much do you expect it
will cost to either renovate or build new space at both Beltsville and
Davis?
Answer. The closure of the Grand Forks center and the consolidation
of its resources with other ARS Nutrition Research Centers located in
California and Maryland will provide a more efficient and effective
research program. Funds for new construction and remodeling would not
be required. The state-of-the-art Nutrition Research Centers in Davis
and Beltsville have the capacity required to accommodate the staff and
resources at Grand Forks. The main cost incurred would be to relocate
the scientists at Grand Forks to Davis and Beltsville, estimated at
$960,000 but upwards of $3.5 million if all employees--scientists and
support staff--opt to relocate. While there will be up-front costs
associated with the move, the avoidance of operating, renovation, and
maintenance costs at Grand Forks will result in substantial savings
over the long term. USDA estimates a one-time deferred-maintenance cost
savings of $2.9 million as well as $1.7 million annual savings in
operating costs.
Question. In addition, the University of North Dakota estimates
that it will cost taxpayers about $4 million more a year for salaries
because the transferred Federal employees would receive an automatic
location pay increase because the Davis and Beltsville labs are located
in urban areas. Did USDA take into consideration location pay rates and
the fact that it will cost USDA more to employ the same scientist in
Davis or Beltsville than it did when that scientist was located in
Grand Forks? What did USDA learn? Where are the cost savings in closing
the Grand Forks center?
Answer. USDA does recognize the fact that locality pay rates in
Davis and Beltsville are higher than in Grand Forks, North Dakota, and
estimates an annual total increase in salary costs of approximately
$50,000. Nevertheless, USDA believes that the long-term cost savings
associated with the Grand Forks center closing will far outweigh the
higher salary costs and will provide the resources necessary to focus
on higher-priority research areas as well as allow the agency to
function more efficiently and effectively.
Question. Were you aware that obesity prevention is already a major
component of the
Grand Forks research portfolio? If so, why would USDA propose to
transfer that research to higher-cost urban areas?
Answer. The past and current program at Grand Forks has addressed
dietary requirements for mineral nutrition, an objective that is
considered largely complete and no longer reflective of a critical
national health problem or research priority. Although a modest level
of new research at the Grand Forks center has begun to address dietary
issues in Native American communities in recent years, ARS has proposed
the redirection and consolidation of this work at Davis and Beltsville
in order to more effectively use available resources to meet the needs
of all at-risk populations.
Question. Mr. Secretary, I applaud the efforts by ARS to focus more
attention on obesity prevention research. Obesity has become a national
epidemic. The problem is particularly prevalent among rural and Native
American populations. The Grand Forks Human Nutrition Research Center
is the only Agricultural Research Service nutrition lab located in
rural America and near Native American reservations. Can you explain
why USDA would remove a major nutrition and obesity research resource
located in rural America when obesity rates among rural and Native
American populations are among the highest in this country?
Answer. It is important for the ARS obesity research program to
study a broad sample of the U.S. population at all risk levels in order
to understand the causes of and solutions to obesity. Consolidated ARS
obesity research programs and resources at Beltsville, Maryland, and
Davis, California, in concert with other ARS Nutrition Research
Centers, will address in a coordinated way the required broad sample of
the U.S. population, including representative research segments in
North Dakota and elsewhere that have significant rural and Native
American populations. The moving of the program will not change the
extent to which ARS research addresses obesity in rural and Native
American populations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
Question. Given the many millions of dollars the appropriations
committee has given to USDA since 2003, specifically for humane
slaughter oversight, can you tell me how this money has been spent?
Answer. Please be assured that USDA shares Congress' concerns about
humane handling and slaughtering and appreciates the Committee's
support for providing resources for humane slaughter oversight. FSIS
inspection program personnel are trained in humane handling, and are
obligated to take immediate enforcement action when a humane slaughter
violation is observed. Our Humane Activities Tracking System (HATS)
provides FSIS with an accurate and complete accounting of the time
spent by FSIS inspection program personnel performing specific tasks
and the results of that inspection related to humane handling and
slaughter under the requirements of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
(HMSA).
Under HATS, FSIS Public Health Veterinarians and other in-plant
program personnel report their time and data for specific humane
handling activities into HATS. District Veterinary Medical Specialists
(DVMS) routinely verify the accuracy of the data entered. DVMS also
conduct in-plant verifications of humane handling and slaughter, and
are in regular contact with FSIS in-plant inspection program personnel
regarding humane enforcement issues.
There are nine specific HATS humane handling categories: adequate
measures for inclement weather, truck unloading, water availability
(and feed, if applicable), handling during ante-mortem inspection,
handling of suspect and disabled livestock, electric prod/alternative
object use, observations for slips and falls, stunning effectiveness,
and checking for conscious animals on the rail prior to processing.
In 2007, FSIS issued a total of 66 suspensions to federally
inspected establishments, 18 percent (12 suspensions) of which were for
egregious humane handling violations witnessed by inspection program
personnel. Of the 6,200 federally inspected establishments,
approximately 800 slaughter livestock and are therefore subject to the
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act. In 2007, FSIS conducted approximately
167,540 humane handling verification activities which resulted in 691
noncompliance records (0.41 percent noncompliance rate) at these
facilities. Noncompliance records for humane handling can be issued
when the violation is less than egregious, such as not having water
available in pens.
The DVMS serves as the primary contact in each district for humane
handling and good commercial practice issues and is the liaison between
the district office and headquarters on all humane handling and good
commercial practice matters.
DVMS personnel provide training for new veterinary employees on
agency humane handling and slaughter regulatory responsibilities,
including ante-mortem inspection (before slaughter). Additionally,
these specialists are responsible for on-site coordination of
nationally prescribed humane slaughter procedures, verification of
humane handling activities, good commercial practices and correlation
(or assessing their knowledge) of information in directives, notices,
and other information from headquarters through the district office to
Public Health Veterinarians in the field.
In fiscal year 2007 approximately 600 DVMS correlation visits
occurred at slaughter plants. Correlation visits are used to make an
assessment of a plant's humane handling activities and to determine
FSIS personnel's knowledge and appropriate application of humane
handling verification procedures.
Question. Is it true, as the inspectors union has charged, that in-
plant staffing shortages are causing inspection officials to be pulled
from ante-mortem and other inspection activities, including humane
slaughter? Are the humane slaughter inspectors being used for other
than this task in violation of our directive?
Answer. In-plant staffing shortages are not causing inspection
officials to be pulled from ante-mortem and other inspection
activities.
When FSIS received its final appropriation from Congress last year,
an aggressive effort was already underway to hire a significant number
of new inspectors. As of October 19, 2007, FSIS had hired more than 600
new in-plant personnel and, as a result, achieved a net gain of
approximately 160 in-plant personnel. On October 27, 2007, FSIS
achieved a net gain of 194 in-plant personnel, surpassing the goal of
184. By December 22, 2007, we had achieved a net gain of more than 220
in-plant personnel, or food inspectors and consumer safety inspectors.
HATS provides FSIS with an accurate and complete accounting of the
time spent by FSIS inspection program personnel performing specific
tasks and the results of that inspection related to humane handling and
slaughter under the requirements of the Humane Methods of Slaughter
Act.
Question. Food safety and animal welfare advocates suggest that
humane slaughter violations may be more systemic, occurring in many
other plants, in part because plant workers know exactly when an
inspector will visit live holding pens, and can ``clean up'' before
they arrive. What is USDA doing to address this--either the charge or
the fact that it's happening?
Answer. The investigation being led by OIG with support from FSIS
and AMS is ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have
additional information that, along with the results of the additional
verification activities, will determine the actions for FSIS oversight,
inspection and enforcement that may be required. In the meantime, FSIS
is conducting surveillance activities to observe the handling of
animals outside the approved hours of operation from vantage points
within and adjacent to the official premises. This is augmented by our
audits and increased humane handling inspection activities.
In 2007, FSIS reported that 66 ``actions to suspend'' were issued
to federally inspected facilities--in effect closing them until a
corrective action plan was approved. Twelve of these suspended
facilities were suspended for egregious humane handling violations.
Question. Were any of these facilities repeat offenders? If so,
where would you draw the line and refuse to allow these facilities
Federal inspection?
Answer. Of the twelve facilities that were suspended in 2007, four
had been suspended more than once: Nicholas Meats, Inc., suspended in
2004 and 2007; Preferred Beef Group, suspended in 2006 and 2007;
Cabrito Market, suspended twice in 2007; and H and P Meats, suspended
in 2007 and 2008.
Noncompliance by establishments is judged on a case-by-case basis.
If a plant is repeatedly involved in enforcement action, FSIS would
work with USDA's Office of the General Counsel to draft a complaint to
withdraw inspection.
Question. As you know, the Federal Nutrition Programs serve many of
our Nation's most vulnerable populations--low income school children
and the elderly. Did any of the suspended facilities supply meat to the
Federal Nutrition Programs? If so, how many?
Answer. Of the 12 facilities suspended for humane handling
violations in 2007, none were contractors or subcontractors for AMS
purchases.
Question. Does USDA have sufficient authority to close a facility
and assess civil penalties when sick or downed animals are found to
have been processed?
Answer. Yes. USDA has sufficient authority to enforce our
regulations regarding non-ambulatory disabled livestock.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson
Question. In your testimony, you state that Hallmark/Westland ``did
not consistently involve the FSIS public health veterinarian in
situations in which the cattle became non-ambulatory after passing
ante-mortem inspection, as required by FSIS regulation.'' Can you
quantify this or give us a better indication of how often this
happened, how many non-ambulatory cattle were slaughtered or some other
idea of the scope and magnitude and its direct relation to the recall?
Answer. This evidence is part of the ongoing investigation.
Question. Additionally, you mention in your testimony that
``evidence demonstrates that the FSIS public health veterinarian was
not consistently involved.'' Can you give us a better idea of what
exactly this evidence is and how extensively it occurred and was
documented?
Answer. This evidence is part of the ongoing investigation.
Question. Is there any evidence that any of the cattle depicted in
The Humane Society's publicly-released video were slaughtered and/or
entered the human food supply? Has USDA discovered any evidence at this
point that any ``downer'' cattle were slaughtered and entered the food
supply via Hallmark/Westland's operation?
Answer. This evidence is part of the ongoing investigation.
Question. You note that FSIS regulations require re-inspection by a
public health veterinarian if a cow becomes non-ambulatory after
passing ante-mortem inspection, but you also testify that Hallmark/
Westland did not consistently ``involve'' a public health veterinarian:
does USDA have any indication as to why Hallmark/Westland failed to
follow these procedures and how often they did?
Answer. This evidence is part of the ongoing investigation.
Question. Is it solely the responsibility of the plant being
inspected to notify and request a public health veterinarian in this
situation?
Answer. Yes, it is the plant's responsibility to notify the FSIS
Public Health Veterinarian when cattle become non-ambulatory after
ante-mortem inspection.
Question. When did this regulation go into affect and what was the
reason for it?
Answer. On July 12, 2007, FSIS announced a permanent prohibition on
the non-ambulatory disabled or ``downer'' cattle from the food supply,
except otherwise normal, healthy animals that become non-ambulatory
after passing ante-mortem inspection. The rule, published in the July
13, 2007, Federal Register, made permanent what had been an interim
final rule from January 2004. The final rule became effective on
October 1, 2007.
In case an otherwise normal, healthy animal that has passed ante-
mortem inspection and that is on its way to the knock box suffers an
acute injury (e.g., when an animal falls or when an animal has a leg
that gets trapped and broken), the Public Health Veterinarian must
verify that the animal suffered such an acute injury in order for the
animal to proceed to slaughter and post-mortem inspection. However, to
help better track the occurrence of such situations and the disposition
of such animals, public health veterinarians are directed to tag these
cattle as ``U.S. Suspect.''
Question. Finally, has there been any review by the agency of the
effectiveness of this system--in other words, do you have a sense of
whether or not it is a good practice to rely on the plant to notify?
Answer. The investigation led by OIG with support from FSIS and AMS
is ongoing. However, we are not waiting for the completion of the
investigation to act.
FSIS has already taken a number of steps to strengthen our
inspection system. As announced on February 28, 2008, FSIS has
implemented a series of interim actions to verify and thoroughly
analyze humane handling activities in all federally inspected
establishments.
Question. In your testimony, you refer to this recall as a
``recall'' a ``voluntary recall'' and a suspension. What specifically
is USDA's action on this matter and is it based primarily on food
safety concerns or humane treatment of the cattle to be slaughtered?
Answer. Certain cattle, while ambulatory when they pass ante-mortem
inspection, may later become non-ambulatory from an acute injury or
another circumstance. If such a situation occurs, FSIS regulations
require the Public Health Veterinarian to inspect the animal again and
determine that the animal did indeed suffer from an acute injury before
the animal is permitted to go to slaughter. This failure by Hallmark/
Westland, based on the evidence from the ongoing investigation, led to
the company's February 17, 2008, voluntary recall of 143 million pounds
of fresh and frozen beef products produced at the establishment since
February 1, 2006.
While it is extremely unlikely that these meat products pose a risk
to human health, the recall action was deemed necessary because the
establishment did not comply with FSIS regulations. The recall was
designated Class II because the probability is remote that the recalled
beef products would cause adverse health effects if consumed. This
recall designation is in contrast to a Class I recall, which is a
higher-risk health hazard situation where there is a reasonable
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death.
Question. You've mentioned that this matter has ``delayed''
negotiations with Japan and Korea; can you be more specific about how
much damage this has done to the progress we have made and what you
think it will take to repair the damage and get the negotiations back
on track?
Answer. USDA does not believe that negotiations to reopen our beef
markets in Japan and Korea have been negatively impacted. While our
negotiations with Korea were intensive, and sometimes difficult, we did
ultimately come to an agreement that allows for U.S. beef imports into
South Korea consistent with World Organization for Health (OIE)
standards. We continue to be engaged with Japanese officials and we
have indicated to them that we expect them to move quickly to resume
beef trade consistent with the World Organization for Health (OIE)
standards just as Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Barbados have,
all within the last several months.
Question. What assurances are you able to give at this point to the
Japanese and Koreans about the effectiveness of our food safety system
and inspections?
Answer. We have been providing extensive information about our food
safety system to both Japan and Korea. As I have indicated, although
the Hallmark/Westland incident was regrettable, it was categorized as a
Class II recall, which means that there is a remote possibility of
adverse health consequences. In addition to the information that has
been provided on our BSE measures, we believe that Japan and Korea
understand that there is no serious food safety issue associated with
this recall.
Question. Before issuing this recall, did you consult with your
trade staff and with USTR about the implications for the Japan and
Korea negotiations? Did you or anyone at USDA or at USTR reach out to
Japan or Korea in advance of the recall?
Answer. Once it became clear that a recall was appropriate, USDA
focused on providing detailed information about our actions to the
public and all interested parties.
None of the recalled product was shipped to either Korea or Japan.
USDA offices in Japan were fully informed of all actions and provided
information upon request to Korean and Japanese officials.
Question. What is the breakdown of personnel at FSIS both on a
national level and on a plant-by-plant basis, such as how many public
health veterinarians, line inspectors, other inspection or
``frontline'' personnel and how many non-inspection or oversight
personnel?
Answer. FSIS program personnel form the backbone of FSIS' public
health infrastructure in establishments, laboratories, and import
houses throughout the country. In fiscal year 2007, the agency employed
over 9,000 personnel, including 7,800 full-time in-plant and other
front-line personnel protecting the public health in approximately
6,200 federally-inspected establishments nationwide.
FSIS assigns inspectors based on a plants current production rates
and in accordance with the national method of assigning work, which was
implemented in 2004. If production and processes change, the number of
inspectors may also change. FSIS has collected in-plant personnel data
by district, since plant-by-plant personnel numbers change daily, and
some establishments do not operate on a daily basis. On-line positions
at FSIS-inspected slaughter establishments are covered daily when the
establishments operate and, as necessary, relief inspectors, inspectors
hired on an intermittent basis, and in-plant off-line inspectors cover
the on-line duties. We use other-than-permanent employees to fill
positions when other employees are on sick leave, annual leave, or are
in training, to make sure assignments are covered each day.
Breakdowns of FSIS in-plant personnel by district as of March 1,
2008, and a history of in-plant personnel by position from 2001 to
2008, are attached for the record.
Question. Aside from the investigations of this particular
instance, what specific reviews or investigations are being undertaken
within the agency to determine whether there are more systemic
problems, where the problems are and what plans are being made to
correct them? What timeframe are you looking at for being able to
report back to Congress on your findings?
Answer. The investigation being led by OIG with support from FSIS
and AMS is ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have
additional information that, along with the results of the additional
verification activities, will determine the actions for FSIS oversight,
inspection and enforcement that may be required.
Question. What is the current vacancy rate at FSIS and what are you
doing to get those positions filled, and what is the vacancy breakdown
among the various positions (public health vets; line inspectors, etc.)
in the food safety and export inspection system? Please provide a
detailed breakdown of the vacancies.
Answer. When FSIS received its final appropriation from Congress
last year, including a budget increase of $27.4 million that we
requested to reduce vacancy rates and meet increased demand for front-
line personnel, an aggressive effort was already underway to hire a
significant number of new inspectors. On October 27, 2007, FSIS
surpassed the goal of an additional 184 in-plant personnel, including
food inspectors and consumer safety inspectors. As of February 16,
2008, our vacancy rate in slaughter establishments was 4.25 percent,
and our vacancy rate in processing plants amounted to 10.23 percent and
our overall in-plant vacancy rate was 6.9 percent.
Attached is a detailed breakdown of vacancy rates among on-line
inspectors (public health veterinarians and field inspectors) and off-
line inspectors (consumer safety inspectors) by district, as of
February 16, 2008.
Question. In a world of budgetary problems where we all may have to
tighten our belts some, have you begun looking at ways to better
allocate limited USDA resources to make sure that the frontline
positions are funded and filled?
Answer. Our employees are our greatest asset. We are only as strong
as that committed workforce. Just as they are committed to keeping the
Nation's food supply safe, we are committed to them. When FSIS received
its final appropriation from Congress last year, an aggressive effort
was already underway to hire a significant number of new inspectors. As
of October 19, 2007, FSIS had hired more than 600 new in-plant
personnel and, as a result, achieved a net gain of approximately 160
in-plant personnel. On October 27, 2007, FSIS achieved a net gain of
194 in-plant personnel, surpassing the goal of 184. By December 22,
2007, we had achieved a net gain of more than 220 in-plant personnel,
or food inspectors, and consumer safety inspectors.
FSIS has employed the aggressive use of existing and new staffing
authorities to fill mission-critical positions, especially for in-plant
and other frontline positions, where 85 percent of FSIS employees are
located. A comprehensive human capital strategy was developed to
improve hiring and retention efforts, to better match resources to
needs, and to develop new skills sets needed by the workforce. As a
testament to those efforts, the agency received a Presidential Quality
Award for Management Excellence for its dedication, hard work, and
outstanding leadership in advancing the President's Management Agenda
through the strategic management of human capital. FSIS received one of
six awards given to Federal agencies for excellence in quality and
productivity.
Question. It appears that in fiscal year 2008, Congress fully
funded the Administration's request for FSIS and that in the 2 previous
fiscal years Congress actually provided more funding than requested.
Are these funding levels sufficient to meet the needs on the ground?
Answer. Yes, the funds are sufficient to meet FSIS' staffing needs.
Question. Looking over the past 4-5 fiscal years, has the agency
reviewed its allocation of funding detailing how much money is spent
for on-the-ground inspectors versus how much is spent on national-level
or non-inspection positions? Can you please provide a breakdown of this
spending information?
Answer. For fiscal year 2008, 80 percent of FSIS' total salaries
and benefits went to the agency's Office of Field Operations for
inspection program personnel and other front-line personnel. Attached
is a detailed breakdown of the spending on salaries and benefits for
in-plant and non-in-plant personnel for fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
year 2007.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert F. Bennett
Question. Secretary Schafer, this is obviously an emotional issue
for many people. The treatment of the livestock at this facility is
shocking and people are very concerned that the Hallmark/Westland
company was a major supplier of beef to the National School Lunch
Program. In addition, many people wonder how it is possible that downer
cattle made it past Food Safety and Inspection Service inspectors and
into the food supply.
It has been suggested that we enhance USDA inspection and increase
oversight of humane handling at slaughter facilities, perhaps by
enacting new legislation or more effectively targeting resources. If
changes are made to the current USDA inspection processes or humane
handling rules, what would you consider changing and why?
Answer. The investigation being led by OIG with support from FSIS
and AMS is ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have
additional information that, along with the results of the additional
verification activities, will determine the actions for FSIS oversight,
inspection and enforcement that may be required.
The recall was initiated because it became apparent to the Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) that Hallmark/Westland was
occasionally slaughtering cattle that went down after FSIS inspectors
had conducted ante-mortem inspection and cleared them for slaughter.
The company slaughtered these downer cattle without notifying an FSIS
veterinarian which is a clear violation of FSIS rules.
Question. Please explain the ante-mortem inspection requirements.
Answer. The inspection process begins with an establishment's
notification to FSIS that they want animals inspected prior to
slaughter. Inspection at a slaughter establishment begins in the ante
mortem area or pen where FSIS inspection program personnel inspect live
animals before moving to slaughter. It is the establishment's
responsibility to follow the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act. Egregious
violations to humane handling requirements can lead to suspension of
inspection within an establishment. This will stop the plant from
operating.
During this inspection, FSIS inspection program personnel observe
all animals at rest and in motion. Inspection program personnel are
trained to look for abnormalities and signs that could indicate disease
or health conditions that would prohibit the animal from entering the
food supply. If an animal goes down or shows signs of illness after
receiving and passing ante mortem inspection before slaughter, the
establishment must immediately notify the FSIS veterinarian to re-
inspect the animal and make a case-by-case disposition of the animal's
condition. Alternatively, the establishment may humanely euthanize the
animal. Re-inspected animals allowed to continue to slaughter are
labeled as ``U.S. Suspect'' and are segregated until the animal has
received additional inspection by an FSIS veterinarian.
FSIS public health veterinarians and other inspection personnel are
not stationed in the ante-mortem area for the entire day. They do
return randomly to verify humane handling, as well as the stunning and
bleeding process. Other inspection activities are also conducted off-
line inside the slaughter facility when ante mortem inspections have
been completed. These off-line FSIS inspection program personnel move
through the different areas of the establishment while performing their
duties. This gives them the ability to vary their assigned off line
inspections.
Question. How long after ante-mortem inspection must an animal be
slaughtered? If there is no time requirement, is there an average or
typical time delay between ante-mortem inspection and slaughter?
Answer. FSIS Notice 16-08 requires that an animal be slaughtered on
the same day that it receives ante-mortem inspection. The Notice
states, ``Generally, inspection personnel should not pass for slaughter
more animals then can be slaughtered in approximately 4 hours.''
Question. Please explain how an FSIS inspector could miss the
activities that took place at the Hallmark/Westland facility.
Answer. FSIS public health veterinarians and other inspection
personnel are not stationed in the ante-mortem area for the entire day.
They return randomly to verify humane handling, as well as the stunning
and bleeding process. Other inspection activities are also conducted
off-line inside the slaughter facility when ante mortem inspections
have been completed. These off-line FSIS inspection program personnel
move through the different areas of the establishment while performing
their duties. This gives them the ability to vary their assigned off
line inspections.
Evidence from the ongoing investigation demonstrates that, over the
past 2 years, this plant did not always notify the Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) public health veterinarian when cattle became
non-ambulatory after passing ante-mortem (prior to slaughter)
inspection, as is required by FSIS regulations. This evidence is part
of the ongoing investigation.
The Hallmark/Westland facility was the second largest supplier of
beef to the National School Lunch Program in 2007. Under AMS contracts,
meat destined for Federal nutrition assistance programs undergoes
additional inspection, above and beyond food not destined for the
School Lunch Program.
Question. Please explain the additional steps taken by USDA to
ensure the quality and safety of the meat product purchased for the
School Lunch Program.
Answer. All meat and meat products purchased for Federal food and
nutrition assistance programs must be produced in a facility operating
under FSIS inspection. AMS, like other large-volume buyers of high
quality products, imposes additional requirements in accordance with
the Federal Acquisition Regulation to ensure products are produced in
accordance with best industry practices and meet the needs of the end-
user. To establish the specification and contractual requirements, AMS
used the best science available and benchmarked against other high
quality purchasers. The requirements for ground beef include full
trace-back capability; pathogen intervention at slaughter; statistical
process control evaluation for pathogens, indicator microbes, and fat
content; strict temperature and processing controls; and, tamper-proof
packing. Each contractor is required to provide a detailed technical
document that describes how each specification requirement will be met.
Contractors are subject to routine audits and an AMS employee is
present when the product is processed.
Question. Why does the Department require additional measures for
Federal food assistance programs above those for the regular food
supply?
Answer. AMS, like other large-volume buyers of high quality
products, imposes additional requirements in accordance with the
Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Question. Of the 143 million pounds of beef that has been recalled,
50.3 million pounds went into Federal food assistance programs. USDA
and State agencies are currently in the process of locating and
destroying this meat. Please explain where you are in this process.
Answer. We have accounted for all of the 50.3 million pounds of
ground beef items subject to the recall. Approximately 33 million
pounds were served prior to the recall and 18.4 million pounds are on
hold awaiting destruction or have been destroyed.
Question. How much of the meat recalled from Federal food
assistance has been consumed, how much is being held, and how much is
still being located? Why is some of the meat still being traced?
Answer. We have accounted for all of the 50.3 million pounds of
ground beef items subject to the recall. Approximately 33 million
pounds were served prior to the recall and 18.4 million pounds are on
hold awaiting destruction or have been destroyed. Therefore, none of
the meat is still being traced.
Question. For the recalled product that went into the School Lunch
Program, are State agencies or schools responsible for any costs
associated with destroying the meat, and will they be responsible for
any additional costs associated with replacing product as a result of
the recall?
Answer. USDA is in the process of replacing recalled ground beef
items that the Department provided that are or will be destroyed due to
the recall. Additionally, States may opt for entitlement credits if
they do not want the replacement ground beef this school year. With
regard to the cost of destruction, States will be reimbursed by USDA
for costs associated with the removal and destruction of recalled
products in accordance with established procedures.
Question. How much do you expect this recall to cost USDA? Can USDA
recover any costs from Hallmark/Westland?
Answer. At this time, we are still compiling the costs related to
the recall and precise figures are not available. We will file, in the
near future, a warranty claim with Hallmark/Westland under the terms of
the contract for recovery of damages to USDA.
Question. As a result of this recall is there a shortage of meat
for Federal food assistance programs? If so, what is the Department
doing to counter this shortage?
Answer. No. AMS and FNS have worked closely with States to ensure
that all local food service authorities have sufficient ground beef
products to conduct their food and nutrition assistance programs. Since
January 30, 2008, AMS has purchased over 26 million pounds of ground
beef items at a cost of approximately $39.9 million for replacement and
scheduled purchases.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Kohl. Thank you all for coming.
Senator Craig. Thank you, all.
[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., Thursday, February 29, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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