- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

[Senate Hearing 110-394]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 110-394, Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3001

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

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PART 7

STRATEGIC FORCES

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MARCH 4, 12; APRIL 1, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009--Part 7 STRATEGIC FORCES

S. Hrg. 110-394 Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3001

__________

PART 7

STRATEGIC FORCES

__________

MARCH 4, 12; APRIL 1, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

42-635 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
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Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER WICKER, Mississippi

Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Space Programs
march 4, 2008

Page
Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Programs................................................. 3
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command. 7
Shelton, Lt. Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space, United States Strategic Command... 16
Deutsch, RADM Kenneth W., USN, Director, Warfare Integration,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations........................ 18
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 21

Strategic Forces Programs
march 12, 2008
Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
april 1, 2008

Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department of Defense.. 141
Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency......................................................... 143
Campbell, LTG Kevin T., USA, Commanding General, United States
Army Space and Missile Defense Command......................... 155
McQueary, Dr. Charles E., Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 161
Francis, Paul L., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
Government Accountability Office............................... 163

(iii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

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TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Sessions, and Thune.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff member present: Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; and Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator
Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN

Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. The hearing will come
to order. After this open session, we will adjourn to S-407 of
the Capitol, where we will continue this on the classified
level.
I'm going to forgo a statement and put it in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Welcome to all of our witnesses this afternoon for the Strategic
Subcommittee's hearing on military space programs. General Kehler, it
is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee in your capacity as the
new Commander of the Air Force Space Command.
This afternoon we have, as I have mentioned, General Kehler,
Commander Air Force Space Command; Lieutenant General Shelton, in his
capacity as the Strategic Command Joint Functional Component Commander
for Space; Rear Admiral Deutsch, Director, Warfare Integration
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Gary Peyton, the
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs; and Ms.
Cristina Chaplain, from the Government Accountability Office. Many
years of space experience are represented on this panel and we look
forward to a good discussion.
With the launch of the first Wideband Global Satellite last
October, the first launch of the GPS-2F satellite scheduled for early
next year, and the news that the first Space-based Infrared System HEO
sensor is performing remarkably, the recapitalization of space systems
is clearly underway. The extensive space recapitalization efforts come
with many challenges, however, including the new problems with the
Spaced-based Infrared System GEO satellite, the delay in the T-Sat
program, and concerns about the scope of the GPS III program. In
addition, we continue to be concerned about improving space situational
awareness and making sure that space protection efforts are fully
coordinated.
Last year, the National Defense Authorization Act contained a
provision directing development of a joint space protection strategy,
with the hope that this would be a first step toward ensuring that
space protection is fully coordinated. Hopefully there is good progress
on this strategy.
There is good news as well, the EELV program continues its string
of successful launches with a significant number of launches scheduled
in 2008 and 2009. Progress is also being made in the area of
operationally responsive space and the standup in May of last year of
the new ORS Joint Program Office.
We have a large number of witnesses this afternoon and you all have
submitted prepared statements, which, without objection will be
included for the record.
At the conclusion of the hearing, at about 4 p.m., we will move to
room S-407 of the Capitol and receive some classified briefings at the
SCI level. All members and appropriately cleared staff are invited.
As I mentioned, each witness has provided substantial statements
that have been included in the record, so now I would like to hear,
briefly, from each of you about your most important issue or the one
about which you worry the most, and take the opportunity to discuss
those issues in a conversational style. We have found that these
sessions are much more useful approached as a conversation.
With that Mr. Peyton, will you begin, and then we will go to
General Kehler, Lieutenant General Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms.
Chaplain.

Senator Bill Nelson. When Senator Sessions gets here, we'll
do whatever he wants. I am going to put into the record each of
your opening statements, and we are not going to take the time
for you to sit here and read to me your statement, it's in the
record, we'll move directly to questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
Mr. Chairman, I join with you in welcoming today's Air Force, Navy,
Strategic Command, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
witnesses as we examine the state of U.S. military space programs,
particularly with respect to the fiscal year 2009 budget request.
The past year has been a good one for our military space
professionals. They should take great pride in providing daily space
support to our forces operating abroad, and for continuing to provide
the backbone for our Nation's strategic nuclear deterrent.
Air Force Space Command continues to add to its record of
successful national security payload launches, with a total of 56
consecutive launches, including five successful launches of the Evolved
Expendable Launch vehicle last year.
Air Force space acquisition programs, though heavily criticized in
the past, appear to be moving in the right direction. Our GAO witness
notes that recent actions taken by the Air Force and the Department of
Defense (DOD) to address acquisition problems ``are a good first
step.'' That the back-to-basics policy and Operationally Responsive
Space represent significant shifts in thinking about how space systems
should be developed.
The fiscal year 2009 budget request for space programs--almost $9
billion--represents approximately 7 percent of the $117 billion Air
Force budget, and 21 percent of the Air Force Modernization and
Recapitalization budget request of $41 billion.
Despite these significant sums, the Air Force and the DOD still
felt it necessary to reduce funding for critical military satellite
communications programs over the Future Years Defense Program, and
provided only a modest increase in funding for space protection
programs.
The subcommittee will want to better understand how the Air Force
and the Department rationalize these choices.
I thank the witnesses for their service to the country and look
forward to hearing their testimony.

STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gary E. Payton
introduction
It is an honor to appear before this Committee as the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, to discuss with you our
National Security Space activities. I support the Secretary of the Air
Force with his responsibilities as the Service Acquisition Executive
for Space Programs and the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent
for Space, where his role is to ``develop, coordinate, and integrate
plans and programs for space systems and the acquisition of DOD space
Major Defense Acquisition Programs to provide operational space force
capabilities to ensure the United States has the space power to achieve
its national security objectives.''
The U.S. relies upon space capabilities not only to meet the needs
of joint military operations worldwide, but to underpin our Nation's
diplomatic, informational, and economic strengths as well. Because of
this, it is important to ensure that our National Security Space (NSS)
systems and our space professionals are integrated across our peacetime
and wartime operations--providing robust and responsive space
capabilities around the globe--particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Americans also rely on the access and use of space capabilities in
many areas of everyday life. Whether using satellites for navigation,
communications, or the forecasting of severe weather, America
increasingly depends on its space systems. To ensure the availability
of these systems, the NSS community continues to program, and provide,
for continuity in key mission areas, while simultaneously working to
modernize and recapitalize our aging satellite constellations and
supporting infrastructure.
At the same time, the global rate of change for technology and the
number of nations directly engaged in space continues to increase. As a
result, the ability of an adversary to contest our space capabilities
is growing. In such an environment, we must improve our space
situational awareness (SSA)--enabling a better understanding of objects
and their activities in space.
We must ensure mission continuity in several key space
capabilities, such as: Strategic Communications; Missile Warning;
Launch; and Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (i.e., the Global
Positioning System (GPS)), while pursuing increased Space Protection.
Over approximately a 2-year period, beginning with the Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS) launch in October 2007, we will deliver five ``first of''
satellites. These include: WGS; Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF); Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS); GPS IIF; and Space Based
Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites.
Always seeking ways to improve, we look forward to the
recommendations of the congressionally-directed Independent Review and
Assessment of DOD Organization and Management for National Security in
Space. In the interim, I offer that the Secretary of the Air Force
should remain the DOD Executive Agent for Space, and that this position
has been critical in aligning space efforts across the DOD and other
government agencies.
back to basics in space acquisition
We continue to institutionalize our ``back-to-basics'' acquisition
philosophy, which emphasizes increased discipline in the development
and stabilization of requirements, resources, engineering practices,
and management. It also promotes a more deliberate acquisition planning
strategy, firmly focused on mission success and delivering on our
commitments.
Our acquisition philosophy can be viewed as a continuous process
with five distinct but interdependent stages. The first stage is
science and technology (S&T), where we conduct basic research and
explore the possibilities of new technologies. In the second stage,
technology development, we mature technologies into proven components
and subsystems exploiting discoveries made in the S&T stage. The third
stage is systems development. Here, we take the most promising
technologies and mature them to higher technical and manufacturing
readiness levels as part of integrated systems which can be produced in
operational platforms in the fourth stage, system production. Thus,
technology is matured through the first three stages. We are
emphasizing early technology development to ensure mature component
technology is available for our production systems. Entering the system
production phase with mature technology reduces cost, schedule, and
performance risk. This allows confidence in predicting which new
capabilities can be delivered when. The fifth stage is Sustainment,
where the goal is increasing systems availability while reducing
Operations and Support costs. Integration of acquisition and
sustainment early in life-cycle development is key to achieving these
goals.
A block approach acquisition strategy delivers systems through
discrete, value-added increments which reduces production risk,
delivers incremental capabilities to the warfighter sooner, and
maintains continuity of service. This concept is consistent with
current policy specifying ``evolutionary acquisition as the preferred
strategy'' for DOD acquisitions. Specific capability increments are
based on a balance of warfighter needs, delivery timeline, technology
maturity, and budget. Well-defined increments help reduce many of the
potential instabilities in requirements, budget, and workforce. An
overarching goal is increased confidence, both in terms of cost and
schedule, for our space acquisition programs. Therefore, I ask for your
continued support, not only for the current generation of satellites
and supporting technologies, but for the next generation technology
development and the generation after next S&T, to ensure that we are
able to continue this block approach strategy.
update on space
Today, I would like to briefly discuss some of the achievements we
have had over the last year and some of our NSS initiatives.
Launch
Over the past year, we launched the last Defense Support Program
satellite, our first Wideband Global SATCOM satellite, two additional
GPS IIR-M satellites and extended our string of consecutive, successful
NSS launches.
The December 10, 2007 launch of a National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) satellite marked the 56th consecutive, successful launch of a NSS
Medium or Heavy payload--extending an incredible record. This
unprecedented string of launch successes, which started in 1999, is a
testament to the knowledge, skill, and commitment of our space
professionals--particularly in the areas of Mission Assurance and
attention to detail.
Missile Warning
Our Nation continues to rely on space-based missile warning--and
for over 35 years, our legacy space-based sensors, in conjunction with
ground-based radars, have done an excellent job of meeting the Nation's
missile warning needs. On November 11, 2007, the 23rd, and final,
Defense Support Program satellite (DSP-23) was successfully launched.
This legacy constellation, however, continues to age, while threats
such as the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles and advanced
technologies continue to grow. These threats are driving the need for
the increased coverage and resolution that will come with the SBIRS.
SBIRS supports four mission areas: missile warning, missile
defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and will be
comprised of both GEO satellites and highly elliptical orbit (HEO)
payloads. The first HEO payload was launched in 2006, and its on-orbit
performance is exceeding expectations. Launches of the first SBIRS GEO
satellite and the second HEO payload are both scheduled in fiscal year
2009.
Our funding request supports the procurement of three GEO
spacecraft, two additional HEO payloads, plus the necessary ground
elements. We continue to work with our industry partners to resolve
challenges on the SBIRS GEO-1 spacecraft, specifically with respect to
the Flight Software Subsystem, to ensure the successful launch of this
critical capability. Our budget request also funds the Third Generation
Infrared System program to develop wide field-of-view technologies.
This is the technology development necessary reduce cost, schedule, and
performance risks for the next generation of missile warning
satellites.
Communications
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) is another critical space
capability for which we must ensure mission continuity. The U.S.
military is a highly mobile and dispersed force that relies heavily on
wideband, protected, and narrowband SATCOM for command, control, and
coordination of forces. SATCOM also enables forces to receive real-time
images and video of battlefield and targets, thereby accelerating
decision-making from the strategic to the tactical levels. These images
and video often come from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) controlled
via SATCOM links, allowing the UAVs to fly far beyond the line of sight
and to collect information without endangering U.S. forces.
On October 11, 2007 we successfully launched the first WGS
satellite as part of the Department's constellation of wideband
satellites, significantly increasing the on-orbit capacity--a single
WGS satellite has greater capacity than the entire legacy Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS) III constellation. This success
represents the first step in the Department's transition from its aging
DSCS satellites to an increased capability for the effective command
and control of U.S. forces around the globe. The Department also signed
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Defence of
Australia on November 14, 2007, forming a partnership for the
production, operation, and support of the WGS constellation. Our
funding request supports the launch and on-orbit check out for two WGS
satellites in fiscal year 2009.
In the protected SATCOM portfolio, this year we are scheduled to
launch the first AEHF system--the follow-on to the Department's current
Milstar satellites. This initial AEHF launch will complete the
worldwide Medium Data Rate (MDR) ring, increasing the data-rate for
these low probability of intercept/detection and anti-jam
communications from tens-of-kilobytes per second to approximately a
megabyte per second. Our funding request supports the procurement of
four AEHF satellites.
The next generation of SATCOM satellites, the Transformational
Satellite (TSAT) Communications System, will support both wideband and
protected requirements. We are continuing with TSAT technology
development and risk reduction efforts, and this past year we completed
the Systems Design Review (SDR). In 2007, an independent Technology
Readiness Assessment determined the program is prepared to enter the
next phase of development. With the addition of the fourth AEHF
satellite, the Department is currently conducting a MILSATCOM
investment review to ensure the program's overall affordability and
synchronization with user platforms.
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
The U.S. GPS continues to be the world standard for positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT). As a result, GPS has been incorporated
into military, commercial, and civilian applications, to include
navigation, agriculture, banking, cartography, telecommunications, and
transportation. Last year the GPS Program Office seamlessly implemented
the Architecture Evolution Plan upgrade to the existing GPS Operational
Control System. This upgrade increased sustainability and provided the
ability to control the new GPS IIF satellites. Perhaps most notably,
these upgrades were implemented with no impact to day-to-day operations
and did not require any modifications to existing user equipment.
Later this year, there are three GPS IIR-M launches scheduled and
we will begin to launch the next generation, GPS IIF, satellites in
fiscal year 2009. These satellites, along with their ground control
system and associated user equipment, continue to ensure constellation
sustainment, increase the number of on-orbit M-code capable satellites,
and introduce the ``L5'' civil signal. At the same time, the Air Force
is developing the next generation of PNT satellites through the GPS III
program.
GPS III will offer significant improvements in navigation
capabilities by improving interoperability and jam resistance. The
procurement of the GPS III system is planned for multiple blocks, with
the GPS IIIA portion currently underway. GPS IIIA includes all of the
GPS IIF capability plus up to a 10-fold increase in signal power, a new
civil signal compatible with the European Union's Galileo system, and a
new spacecraft bus that will allow a growth path to future blocks. As
for the development of the ground infrastructure, we recently awarded
two contracts for the System Definition and Risk Reduction phase for
the associated ground segment, OCX. These two OCX contracts will each
deliver prototypes and lead to a competitive selection of a single
contractor in late fiscal year 2009.
Space Situational Awareness
Mission continuity is critical for persistent space based PNT,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, strategic
communications, and global environmental monitoring. As nations, and
non-nation state actors, demonstrate both the capability and will to
disrupt our space operations, we risk losing that continuity. Anti-jam
SATCOM technologies, higher power GPS M-Code navigation signals,
radiation hardened technology, on-orbit reconstitution, and dispersed
ground segments are all part of our improved space survivability. We
must also account for the possibility that new capabilities to deny,
damage, or destroy our on-orbit assets will be arrayed against us. We
are expanding our SSA to provide the ability to fully characterize and
understand these new threats as they mature, as well as clearly
discriminate between a hostile act and a naturally occurring event. In
parallel, we are developing the organizational, operational, and
technical enablers that will allow us to react swiftly and decisively
when these threats materialize.
New systems that will contribute to SSA include the Rapid Attack
Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) program, the
Space Fence, SBSS, and the Integrated Space Situational Awareness
(ISSA) program.
RAIDRS develops ground based systems that rapidly detect, locate,
characterize, identify, and report interference with DOD-owned and DOD-
used space assets, and it is being developed via a block approach. In
the next year, Block 10 will provide initial capabilities that detect
and geo-locate SATCOM interference via fixed and mobile ground systems.
Future development of the Block 20 system will provide automated data
access/analysis, data fusion, and detection support capabilities.
The Space Fence is planned to replace the aging Air Force Space
Surveillance System with a higher radio frequency system to detect and
track smaller sized space objects, and provide worldwide coverage for
the first time. It expands the terrestrial based detection and tracking
capability, supporting SSA while working in concert with other
networked sensors.
The SBSS program is planned to deliver optical sensing satellites
to search, detect, and track objects in earth orbit--particularly those
in geosynchronous orbit--building upon the success of the Space-Based
Visible (SBV) technology demonstration. Surveillance from space will
augment our ground sensors, and the initial SBSS Block 10 will replace
the aging SBV sensor in 2009.
To combine all of the various inputs and provide a single picture
for decisionmakers, we are also pursuing the ISSA program. When
delivered, ISSA will have the capability to acquire, process,
integrate, and fuse SSA data to create the awareness we need, with an
ability to attribute actions. Currently, our operators and warfighters
must assemble an understanding of the global space picture from many
disparate sources, including telephone calls, classified chat rooms,
intelligence web sites, and imagery feeds. We have acknowledged this
shortcoming and have initiated programs to bring data together, filter
it for relevance, and aid the commander in making a timely decision
that could attribute an attack or malfunction, preserve health of a
constellation, or re-task sensors to track a new launch. The
cornerstone program for this is the ISSA program, which will interact
with the space command and control (C2) system to provide automated
decision tools supporting decisionmaking on a timescale appropriate for
today's and tomorrow's challenges in space. The space operating
environment is becoming increasingly complex; we need to equip our
Nation's space operators with the tools necessary to characterize space
activities and accurately attribute actions.
Operationally Responsive Space
Another key initiative is Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), and
I thank you for your continuing support for this program. On May 21,
2007, the Operationally Responsive Space Office was stood up at
Kirtland AFB, NM, to develop, acquire, and deploy a tiered capability
consisting of responsive spacecraft, launch vehicles, and ground
equipment. The ORS Office is a jointly manned entity that reports to
the DOD Executive Agent for Space, and will have representation from
the defense, intelligence, civil, and international communities--to
include Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines, personnel from NASA, NSA,
NRO, and Sandia National Laboratory--and we are pursuing allied partner
representatives. Many other organizations, while not providing direct
staff in the office, are planning to establish liaison relationships
with the ORS Office to ensure synergy and close coordination.
Through a series of tactical satellite (TACSAT) operational
experiments, we are exploring affordable and responsive launch,
checkout, and theater integration of space systems to better support
the needs of the combatant commanders. TACSAT experiments will test
concepts such as common interfaces, subsystems, new payloads, and new
concepts of operations. The 2009 request for the ORS program element
funds the TACSAT-4 launch and development of TACSAT-5, a plug and play
spacecraft bus. Additionally, responding to urgent warfighter
requirements, vetted by U.S. Strategic Command, the ORS office is
initiating communications and SSA programs in 2008 and 2009.
workforce
Our DOD space professional workforce includes our military Active,
Reserve, and Guard components, and our civil service personnel. We are
currently coordinating a new DOD Directive that will clearly outline
responsibilities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Services for the education, training, and management of these critical
space professionals.
Looking beyond the DOD, a healthy space industrial base is one of
our top priorities. The Space Industrial Base Council (SIBC) which is
co-chaired by Secretary Wynne, as the DOD Executive Agent for Space,
with the Director of the NRO, Scott Large, brings together stakeholders
from across government and industry to coordinate actions on critical
space industrial base issues. The SIBC has taken a quantitative look at
the health of U.S. companies and how they are balancing competitiveness
and security concerns. We are all committed to protecting sensitive
space technology while allowing our companies to compete
internationally. We will continue to strengthen our understanding of
the U.S. space industrial base to ensure that it remains viable in the
future--we cannot afford to lose this national capability.
I would also like to thank the committee for its support of the
National Defense Education Program (NDEP), which supports scholarships
in Math, Science, Engineering, and Foreign Language, with a focus on
critical skills for clearable people. The NDEP began in fiscal year
2006 with $10 million, and is funded at $44 million in fiscal year
2008. The Department is requesting $69 million for this program in
fiscal year 2009, and I solicit your continued support to ensure we can
continue to attract and retain these professionals.
conclusion
We must ensure continuity of service for critical missions such as
Missile Warning, Strategic Communications, Launch, and Positioning,
Navigation and Timing; while improving our SSA. Our strategy over the
recent years is showing promising results, as we continue toward
securing the world's best space capabilities today and ensuring the
same for our Nation's future generations.
Our Nation prefers to deter or dissuade potential adversaries, and
space systems are critical to this strategy. When deterrence and
dissuasion are not adequate, we too often must employ our military--and
our space systems are even more critical then. Fortunately, our systems
are the envy of the world. Our infrared surveillance satellites are
able to detect missile launches anywhere in the world. Our strategic
communications systems allow the President precise and assured control
over our nuclear forces in any stage of conflict, and our wideband
SATCOM systems rapidly transmit critical information between the
continental U.S. to our front line forces. Our weather satellites allow
us to accurately predict future conditions half a world away as well as
in space, while our GPS constellation enables position knowledge down
to centimeters and timing down to nanoseconds. These sophisticated
systems make each deployed soldier, sailor, marine, and airman safer,
and more capable.
The space constellations that deliver these capabilities are a
critical asymmetric advantage. We must ensure the recapitalization and
health of these constellations. While these systems are expensive, not
having these space capabilities could be even more expensive, both in
terms of lives lost and our national defense.
I look forward to continuing to work with this committee and thank
you for your continued support of NSS.

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND

[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today as an Airman
and, for the first time, as the Commander of Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC).
I am proud and humble to lead and represent over 39,000 Active
Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen; government civilians; and contractors
who deliver space and missile capabilities to America and its
warfighting commands 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. We
do this as an integral part of the United States Air Force (USAF)--an
Air Force which operates in and through air, space, and cyberspace in
order to deliver Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for
America. Assuring the Nation's access to space, protecting our freedom
to operate in space, and providing joint warfighting capabilities from
space are core Air Force missions.
The men and women of AFSPC serve around the globe. From AFSPC
Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force (14 AF), Twentieth Air Force (20
AF), Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Space Innovation and
Development Center (SIDC), and a host of deployed and forward
locations, our space professionals are organizing, training, equipping,
and providing the space capabilities needed to fight and win the global
war on terror. Today, I can report confidently that the space and
missile capabilities acquired with your help and support and delivered
by the airmen of AFSPC to the Commander, United States Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) are helping to maintain America's freedom, security
and prosperity.
Last month, I visited a number of units and commanders in the
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).
At one stop I received a mission briefing from a B-1B Lancer bomber
pilot. He reflected that while preparing for the briefing, he came to
realize that space capabilities were embedded throughout the planning,
execution and debriefing phases of his mission. His bomber crew planned
their missions using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) terrain mapping and weather data from space systems; the aircraft
carried Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAMs); when they were flying, real-time updates from a
variety of space-based and other sources flowed to them over satellite
communications (SATCOM) data links; the tanker and bomber crews
coordinated air-refueling operations using GPS; and strike assessment
was conducted. This pilot also knew that a combination of space, air,
and terrestrial assets would immediately come to his assistance if his
crew came down in hostile territory. In effect, space assets would take
the search out of search and rescue. In the AOR, I saw first-hand how
space plays a crucial role in virtually every mission and every
operation. Every commander I visited confirmed this assessment.
Space power gives America's joint forces a decisive advantage and
has shaped the ``American way of warfare.'' Today, America's joint
forces are interconnected, have global cognizance, and can produce
swift and precise effects providing overwhelming and decisive results
with minimum collateral damage. Our friends and adversaries alike have
noted this decisive advantage. As a result, having witnessed or learned
the cost of challenging the United States head-on, would-be adversaries
are actively pursuing asymmetric strategies to challenge our advantages
in air, space and cyberspace. The evidence is clear and convincing.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we experienced GPS jamming and
since then we have witnessed a worldwide proliferation of technology
that can be used against our space systems. Our space capabilities face
a wide range of threats including radio frequency jamming, laser
blinding and anti-satellite systems. The emergence of these threats
requires a broad range of capabilities, from diplomatic to military, to
protect our interest in space.
Our National Space Policy acknowledges that space is vital to our
national security. We are not alone in our use of space. Today, 28
foreign militaries operate in space.
We can no longer take freedom of action in any of our warfighting
domains for granted. From this point forward, we should expect to be
challenged not only in the air, but in and through space and cyberspace
as well. We clearly recognize that no future conflict will be won
without the ability to achieve air, space, and cyberspace superiority
when and where required and we face significant challenges as we look
to the future. Therefore, it is crucial that we develop and resource a
strategy that protects our space advantages and ensures we remain a
world leader in space.
It is my distinct pleasure to define the strategic way forward for
AFSPC and to describe for you our plan to conceive, acquire, employ and
execute Air Force space and missile capabilities in an increasingly
complex, dynamic and challenging global environment. I will present our
mission and vision, affirm the guiding principles that characterize our
approach, highlight some of our recent successes and describe how the
fiscal year 2009 budget request supports our strategic way ahead.
As always, AFSPC undertakes our important mission with three USAF
priorities in mind--win today's fight, take care of our people and
prepare for tomorrow's challenges. We look forward to working with your
committee and Congress to achieve our goals.
Mission
Deliver space and missile capabilities to America and its
warfighting commands

Our mission is clear. For over 50 years, the Air Force has led the
Nation's military space efforts and AFSPC continues that heritage as we
deliver space power to STRATCOM, Joint Force Commanders around the
globe, the Services, the Intelligence Community (IC), civil agencies,
commercial entities and Allies.
Vision
America's space leaders . . . delivering responsive, assured,
decisive space power

The USAF provides air, space and cyberspace power as part of a
joint warfighting team. As we look to the future, the military space
power element must become more responsive to the warfighter, it must
remain assured under stressing conditions, it must contribute
decisively as an integral piece of the larger whole, and it must be
developed and wielded by space professionals who are recognized leaders
in both the space domain and in joint warfighting operations.
Guiding Principles
The following principles shape our approach and underpin our
mission and vision.

The USAF space mission serves joint forces, our
Nation, and the world at large. The Nation has entrusted the
Air Force and AFSPC with advocating, acquiring, and operating
capabilities that are vital to our national security, economic
growth, public safety, and welfare. The men and women of AFSPC
help defend our homeland and our global interests abroad with
space and ground-based missile early warning systems; connect
national leaders and the military with secure global satellite
communications; assure access to space for military,
intelligence, civil and commercial purposes with medium and
heavy space lift and range capabilities; keep watch over the
space domain by tracking thousands of space objects; provide
planners and commanders with critical environmental
information; and deliver persistent position, navigation and
timing signals to worldwide users from GPS, which provides
multiple military benefits as well as a free, international
utility. Many of these space systems are also called upon for
help in disaster relief and search and rescue operations, at
home and abroad. Additionally, our Nation places trust and
confidence in AFSPC to secure, maintain, operate and support
America's land based strategic deterrent, the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force.
Nuclear forces underwrite our Nation's security.
Nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate backstop of our
security by dissuading our opponents and assuring our Allies
through extended deterrence. Our Nation's security relies
heavily on the responsive and stabilizing attributes of AFSPC's
ICBM force.
Space is one of three interdependent USAF warfighting
domains. Air Force operations extend across the mutually-
supporting and reciprocally-enabling domains of air, space and
cyberspace. Thus, airmen who are experts in the space domain
play a key role in integrating capabilities to create a
decisive joint military advantage. Cross-domain integration is
the key.
Space and ICBM forces are global in their effect.
AFSPC delivers capabilities that transcend national and
military boundaries and are intrinsically and simultaneously
tactical and strategic, local and global. As a result, the men
and women of AFSPC have a global perspective that influences
the command and control of our forces and the way we provide
and present them to STRATCOM. At the same time, we recognize
the unique space requirements of U.S. Geographic Combatant
Commanders around the world, and know that we must provide
Joint Force Commanders with the space capabilities they need to
see, know, and decisively act.
Like air power, space power shapes the U.S. approach
to warfare. Our increasingly net-centric Joint expeditionary
force operates with smaller forward footprints and a greater
dependence on reachback organizations. Space capabilities are
inextricably embedded in an ever-more effective arsenal of
modern weaponry and are threaded throughout the fabric of the
Joint warfighting network. Without space, military operations
would be far less precise, focused, timely, coordinated or
efficient and much more costly in every respect.
Space is a challenging, demanding, and contested
domain. Space acquirers, developers, and operators must be
technically astute and tactically competent to ensure mission
success in the space domain. While necessary, technical
competence alone is not sufficient to meet 21st century
challenges. Today, AFSPC people must be adequately prepared to
operate space assets and assure space capabilities in an
increasingly contested environment.
Airmen are the core of America's space team. The
airmen and civilian space professionals of AFSPC serve a
national mission and our skills and expertise are national
assets. Since the beginning of the space age, airmen have
contributed significantly to the national space enterprise.
While airmen are serving the military space mission today in
AFSPC, many other airmen are working elsewhere in the
government within national security and civil space
organizations. Commercial space companies and the space
industry also abound with space professionals who gained
training and experience while serving our Air Force.

While these principles shape our views, our sights are set directly
on supporting the Air Force commitment to provide forces across the
range of military operations to protect U.S. interests and values; to
assure Allies; to dissuade and deter potential adversaries; and if
deterrence fails, to defeat those who choose to become our enemies. In
answering this call, with congressional support, the space
professionals of AFSPC last year delivered space and missile
capabilities with great success.
a year of successes
AFSPC activities in 2007 supported the Expeditionary Air Force,
delivered and demonstrated space and missile capabilities, improved
relationships across the space enterprise, and cared for our airmen and
their families. We are also optimistic that we have made progress
toward solving our systemic acquisition problems with our back-to-
basics approach. Here are several of our key accomplishments.

We forward-deployed nearly 4,000 airmen--further
developing a strong bond between AFSPC and the airmen,
soldiers, sailors, and marines who rely on our capabilities.
The end of 2007 marked 5 consecutive years without
premature failure of any AFSPC on-orbit system--many of our
satellites are lasting years beyond their original predicted
life spans and are exceeding expectations every day.
AFSPC added to our all-time record which now stands at
56 successful national security payload launches in a row--we
continued a string of excellence with 19 out of 19 successful
operational launches using the Atlas V and Delta IV Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs).
In November, AFSPC conducted the first operational
launch of a Delta IV Heavy EELV which carried the last Defense
Support Program (DSP) satellite into orbit.
Without interruption of services, AFSPC completed the
transition of the GPS ground control segment to the new
Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP) system--replacing a 20-year-
old command and control (C2) architecture with one that enables
responsive Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services.
Last year, AFSPC launched Glory Trip-193 to certify
the use of the Mk 21 Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) on
the Minuteman III (MM III) ICBM. Additionally, this test
demonstrated the capability of our ICBM force.
AFSPC and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
further solidified our operational relationship.
In addition, AFSPC sustained and expanded use of the
Total Force. Last year, at Minot Air Force Base, ND, we stood-
up the first-ever Air National Guard unit to support
intercontinental ballistic missile field security forces. At
Schriever Air Force Base, the AFSPC Reserve Forces are growing
with the transition of the 310th Space Group to wing status.
We privatized nearly 2,500 military family housing
residences at Peterson, Schriever, Los Angeles and Vandenberg
Air Force Bases. Additionally, 351 AFSPC families moved into
newly-privatized units at Buckley Air Force Base.
Finally, AFSPC experienced one of the safest years in
its 25-year history--we lost no airmen in off-duty accidents.
Moreover, AFSPC has had zero major weapons mishaps in over 4
years, zero major flight mishaps in 8 years and zero major
space mishaps in over 2 years.

As proud as we are of our success, AFSPC's strategic way forward is
to focus on delivering the space and missile capabilities needed today
and tomorrow by balancing recapitalization and modernization
investments, implementing organizational and cultural changes and
maturing our space professionals.
the way ahead
To defend America and provide needed capabilities to the joint
team, AFSPC solidified over the last year a deliberate approach to
confront the challenges of a dynamic strategic environment. The fiscal
year 2009 budget request carefully balances a number of critical
priorities.

Maintain perfection as the standard for nuclear operations,
maintenance, security, and support.

In AFSPC, we are absolutely committed to providing a credible, safe
and secure strategic deterrent. At any given moment, about 1,200 of the
nearly 10,000 airmen in 20 AF are on duty in the Nation's MM III ICBM
missile fields in Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska, and
Colorado. These young professionals understand the awesome
responsibilities entrusted to them and will never take those
responsibilities or the Nation's trust and confidence for granted. This
year we will continue to sustain the Minuteman ICBM system as we
selectively improve security measures and implement any necessary
recommendations resulting from various nuclear reviews.

Standards. We have defined perfection for ourselves
through tough standards--which have been tested and proven for
five decades. We follow these standards to the letter and focus
on structured, intensive training for our maintenance,
security, and operations personnel.
Minuteman Life Extension. The fiscal year 2009 budget
request continues the congressionally-approved $6.7 billion
life extension programs that will sustain the MM III to 2020 as
we work to identify further investments that may be required to
sustain the MM III force to 2030. In January 2008, we completed
deployment of the Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) which
replaced some of the 1960s generation electronics in the
guidance system. Currently the Propulsion Replacement Program
(PRP), which replaces aging motors and propellant as well as
environmentally unsafe materials and components, is 82 percent
complete. The remaining MM III modification programs (the SERV
and the Propulsion System Rocket Engine Life Extension Program
(PSRE LEP) upgrade) are still on target for completion by 2012
and 2013 respectively. The SERV program enables the use of the
Mk 21 reentry vehicle on MM III missiles, providing STRATCOM
planners with increased targeting flexibility and enhanced
safety. The PSRE LEP is extending the design life of this
subsystem by replacing components originally produced in the
1970s.
Security Modernization. AFSPC is also continuing to
field robust capabilities funded under the ICBM Security
Modernization Program (ISMP). Last year, we completed the
installation of concrete headwork barriers at all operational
launch facilities (LFs) to ensure the safety and security of
our nuclear arsenal. In 2008, we are continuing to improve
real-time situational awareness for our security forces through
the Remote Visual Assessment (RVA) program. AFSPC is also
replacing LF access doors with ones that enable our personnel
to more quickly secure the silo hatch in case of a security
threat during maintenance operations. In addition, we are also
increasing the physical protection of our LFs with better
technology and more effective tactics. AFSPC is also taking
additional steps within our budget this year to add security
surveillance cameras at our Missile Alert Facilities (MAFs) and
to add GPS tracking capability to Payload Transporter (PT)
vans.
Prompt Global Strike (PGS). Looking to the future, the
fiscal year 2009 budget request responds to STRATCOM's PGS
needs by developing and demonstrating critical concepts and
technologies for a conventional strike alternative. To increase
our deterrence and conventional strike capabilities, AFSPC is
investing in research and development of technology for
guidance, reentry vehicle and propulsion systems with the ICBM
Demonstration/Validation (ICBM DEM/VAL) program and are
aligning these initiatives with the results of the recently
completed PGS Analysis of Alternatives and with the
congressionally-directed DOD-wide investment account.

Ensure mission success while delivering planned capability
improvements.

Joint Force Commanders and the forces they lead rely on the
capabilities provided by AFSPC and our operational commitment to
deliver those capabilities to them every day can not falter. In
addition to this operational commitment, we must also meet our
aggressive program commitments to field and sustain leading-edge space
capabilities on time and on cost. AFSPC is on final approach to deliver
several major new Military SATCOM (MILSATCOM); PNT; and ISR
capabilities over the next 18 to 24 months.

MILSATCOM. The demand for satellite communications and
bandwidth continues to grow. Aged in many cases beyond their
design, Milstar and Defense Satellite Communications System-III
(DSCS-III) continue to provide critical communications services
for much of the Nation's daily secure and unsecure military and
diplomatic activities as we deploy the next generation of
advanced MILSATCOM capabilities.

The Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) program
provides communications capabilities greater than the
entire constellation of DSCS-III satellites and
increases coverage, capacity and connectivity for
deployed tactical forces. In 2007, AFSPC launched WGS-1
and the Air Force negotiated a partnership with
Australia to use the constellation and fund the
procurement of a sixth WGS satellite. The fiscal year
2009 budget request funds continued operation of WGS-1,
on-orbit checkout and operation of WGS-2, and launch
technical support and on-orbit checkout of WGS-3. WGS-4
and WGS-5 are currently in fabrication.
Our Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
program affords strategic and tactical users with
secure, survivable anti-jamming and anti-scintillation
communications. Each AEHF satellite has about ten times
the capacity of Milstar II. The fiscal year 2009 budget
request supports the launch and on-orbit checkout of
AEHF-1; completion of integration and testing of AEHF-2
for launch in 2009; continued assembly, integration and
testing of AEHF-3; contracting of AEHF-4; and work on
the Mission Control Segment.

Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). AFSPC is
delivering PNT capabilities which are providing critical
military benefits as well as a free international utility. Our
GPS is the centerpiece of global PNT services and the GPS
constellation enables an ever-increasing arsenal of precise
munitions from the mainstay JDAM to the Air Force's new Small
Diameter Bomb and from the Army's Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System to its Excalibur 155mm artillery round. Airmen in C-130
and C-17 aircraft are resupplying ground combat units in nearly
impossible-to-reach places in Afghanistan by using the
remarkable Joint Precision Air Drop Systems which have
steerable parachutes with GPS guidance.

Last year, AFSPC launched two modernized GPS
IIR-M satellites configured with new signals for
increased anti-spoofing and anti-jamming capabilities
for military users and more robust capabilities for
civil users. With five of eight GPS IIR-M satellites
on-orbit, AFSPC is launching the remaining three in
2008.
The follow-on block is GPS IIF which will have
an extended design life of 11 years, include additional
civil signals for improved accuracy and safety-of-life
services and increased power to reduce vulnerability to
signal jamming. The ground segment includes a master
control station and a worldwide network of dedicated
antennas and monitoring stations. The fiscal year 2009
budget request supports launch and support of two GPS
IIF satellites and delivery of the final architecture
evolution plan.
In concert with upgrades in the GPS space
segment, we are also improving the GPS ground segment.
AFSPC launched the last two GPS IIR-Ms using the new
Launch, Anomaly Resolution and Disposal Operations
system; replacing an obsolete command and control
system with a more modern and sustainable one.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Our
Nation has relied on Air Force space-based missile warning
systems since the early 1970s.

AFSPC's Defense Support Program (DSP) provides
missile warning, missile defense, battlespace awareness
and technical intelligence collection capabilities.
The SBIRS program provides missile warning,
missile defense, intelligence and battlespace awareness
capabilities and will replace DSP. The SBIRS
constellation will consist of four Geosynchronous Earth
Orbit (GEO) satellites and two Highly Elliptical Orbit
(HEO) payloads.
The first on-orbit SBIRS-HEO payload continues
to exceed expectations in its checkout phase resulting
in approval for early use in December 2007 and is on
track to reach full operational acceptance in mid-2008.
Additionally, HEO-2 has been built. On SBIRS GEO-1,
AFSPC is correcting a safety issue in the flight
software and is planning a launch in 2009. The fiscal
year 2009 budget request for SBIRS funds development,
integration and test of GEO-1 and GEO-2 satellites and
ground system; funds initial HEO operations; fully
funds HEO-3 and GEO-3 procurement; funds HEO-4 advanced
procurement; and funds HEO ground system modifications
and upgrades. The HEO-3 and HEO-4 payloads are
designated as constellation replenishment assets.

Launch, Ranges and Networks. Delivery of space
capabilities begins with a successful launch. Our two space
launch ranges at Patrick and Vandenberg Air Force Bases
continue to be the lynchpin for America's assured access to
space.

At our Eastern and Western Ranges, AFSPC
supported 23 successful military, civil and commercial
launches in 2007. The fiscal year 2009 budget request
supports sustainment and modernization of our launch
ranges.
This year, AFSPC is deploying a new Air Force
Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) antenna at Vandenberg
Air Force Base which will facilitate over 30 satellite
contacts per day. The AFSCN continues to be the
Nation's backbone for satellite operations. AFSPC is
upgrading antennas with the Remote Tracking Station
Block Change to ensure command and control of on-orbit
capabilities is efficient and more accurate. The fiscal
year 2009 budget request funds the operation and
gradual modernization of the AFSCN.

Increase space protection capabilities.

The USAF and AFSPC play a key role in defending the Nation's
military, intelligence, civil and commercial space capabilities. The
Air Force is uniquely charged with mission responsibilities to provide
forces to defend United States space capabilities. Our strategy and
investment approach balances the need for space situational awareness,
protection of space capabilities and protection of terrestrial forces
from threats posed by adversary use of space against our interests.

We must increase space situational awareness (SSA)
while we address operational and physical vulnerabilities in
our space, ground and link segments. The challenge is to find
an affordable pathway to protect space capabilities that
strikes the right balance among awareness, hardening,
countermeasures, reconstitution and alternate means.
The Integrated SSA (ISSA) program provides STRATCOM,
Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-SPACE) and
the joint community with an integrated source of current and
predictive space events, threats and space activities. By
employing a near real time, net centric construct, AFSPC is
achieving higher accuracy space surveillance through fusion of
other SSA elements. Funding from the fiscal year 2009 budget
request increases our ability to characterize the space domain
by focusing on space event processing and analysis to include
high accuracy conjunction assessments and rapid maneuver
processing.
AFSPC is also planning to field ground and space based
sensors to improve space surveillance capabilities. The Space
Fence program provides the capability to find, fix and track
small objects in Low and Medium Earth Orbits (LEO and MEO)
using three ground sites. The fiscal year 2009 budget request
for this program supports development awards to at least two
contractors. Additionally, the Space-Based Space Surveillance
(SBSS) program offers the ability to detect and track space
objects; primarily those in GEO. With the fiscal year 2009
budget request, AFSPC is completing development of SBSS Block
10, launching the satellite in fiscal year 2009 and working
towards development of SBSS Block 20.
The Rapid Attack Identification Detection and
Reporting System (RAIDRS) Block 10 program detects and
geolocates satellite communications interference via fixed and
transportable ground systems. In 2007, AFSPC activated the 16th
Space Control Squadron at Peterson Air Force Base to operate
RAIDRS and we deployed one system to the CENTCOM Theater to
protect over 400 SATCOM links. The fiscal year 2009 budget
request continues funding for the RAIDRS Block 20 update which
is introducing an automated means to characterize anti-
satellite (ASAT) and directed energy attacks on space systems
and services.
Building a comprehensive SSA picture includes a fully
collaborative, net-centric space command and control
architecture that links JFCC-SPACE to the joint fight. AFSPC
improved our Nation's global space C2 infrastructure in 2007
when the 614th Air and Space Operations Center, the core of
STRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) transitioned
to an expanded facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. This
effort modernized the JSpOC, streamlined operations, and more
than doubled its physical size allowing for expanded missions
and creating a platform for the future. With the fiscal year
2009 budget request, AFSPC is furthering development of a
comprehensive SSA picture via the Space C2 program.
AFSPC is committed to improving protection of ground,
link and space segments. While some of our space capabilities
are well protected, AFSPC is taking into account that we will
likely face a wider range of threats in the space domain and on
the ground through links that control these systems. As we move
forward to modernize and recapitalize, the nature of these
threats means we are going to engineer space protection into
our new systems.
To help us make informed decisions about how best to
preserve space capabilities, AFSPC is establishing the Space
Protection Program. This program will focus our efforts and
provide decision makers with strategic recommendations on how
to best protect our space systems and stay ahead of the threat.
We are already strengthening and unifying relationships across
the defense and Intelligence Community.

Attract, develop, and retain space professionals.

While AFSPC is developing and wielding remarkable capabilities, the
source of our tremendous accomplishments is our space professionals.
Our challenge is to continue attracting, developing and retaining
airmen with the skills necessary to maintain our competitive advantage.
AFSPC is working with our partners in Air Education and Training
Command (AETC), academia and elsewhere, to educate, train and cultivate
experts in the space domain who are both technically and tactically
competent, and who are skilled in integrating with other warfighting
domains.

Since 1996, the United States Air Force Weapons School
(USAFWS) has graduated 180 space instructors from a pool of
AFSPC's best and brightest. Last year, AFSPC and the USAFWS
continued their partnership in developing and delivering world-
class graduates to expertly employ space and missile
capabilities and to instruct the next generation of space
operators.
The tactical mindset is also evolving on the nuclear
side. AFSPC is operating a world-class center focused on
training nuclear security professionals. To ensure we are
providing the most secure nuclear deterrent, 20 AF operates the
Nuclear Space Security Tactics Training Center at Camp
Guernsey, WY. In 2007, this facility trained over 1,700
security forces on nuclear security and expeditionary tactics.
AFSPC's National Security Space Institute (NSSI) is
establishing itself as America's premier campus for superior
space professional training and education. Last year, the NSSI
taught 71 courses to 1,700 students--a 17 percent increase from
2006. Over 350 of those students were from other Services and
for the first time, NSSI instructors taught our Allied
partners. In 2008, AFSPC is partnering more closely with Air
University (AU) as we look to transition more classes to AU in
2009.
In 2007, AFSPC competitively selected twenty officer
and enlisted space professionals for a fully-funded University
of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) Space Certificate pilot
program consisting of five courses focused on space and space
systems, engineering management, information and communications
systems and space policy. This year, AFSPC is selecting our
second class and is using this pilot program as a catalyst for
a master's degree.

Sustain AFSPC's enduring missions and mature emerging missions.

To better meet 21st century challenges, AFSPC will recapitalize its
force to sustain enduring space force enhancement capabilities while
designing a future force to ensure flexible, responsive capabilities in
a contested domain. Fully recognizing we do not currently have a
capability to perform maintenance or repairs on orbital assets, we are
committed to protect and reinvigorate satellite constellations to
provide the level of utility expected by users all over the globe.
Additionally, AFSPC will work with appropriate government agencies to
explore opportunities for enhanced commercial, Allied and international
partnerships.

Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications
System. Since last year, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) validated requirements for increased worldwide
protected communications capabilities to extend the ground-
based Global Information Grid (GIG) to deployed and mobile
forces and to support Comm-on-The-Move, the Army's Future Force
Initiatives, the Navy's ForceNet, and the Marine's X-Net
warfighting visions. AFSPC is pursuing transformational
communications capabilities and is studying a future MILSATCOM
architecture investment strategy in response to congressional
direction to procure a fourth Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) satellite. The fiscal year 2009 budget request continues
technology maturation and design of TSAT.
Global Positioning System III (GPS III). With GPS III,
AFSPC is planning to further enhance military and civilian PNT
capabilities by providing higher power, increased anti-jamming
capability, and compatibility with European Galileo signals. By
implementing a block approach, AFSPC will use the fiscal year
2009 budget request for GPS III Block A development and
preliminary design review, capability insertion for Blocks B
and C and risk reduction and concept development of the control
segment.
Third-Generation Infra-Red Surveillance (3GIRS). In
addition, AFSPC is planning to continue the critical space-
based infrared warning systems into its third generation. With
the fiscal year 2009 budget request, we will continue wide
field of view sensor testing and technology maturation
activities along with development of an integrated test bed.
Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR). AFSPC is also
embracing emerging missions such as missile defense. Last year,
our UEWR program achieved several milestones when STRATCOM
operationally accepted two UEWRs. As a key player in a recent
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) flight test, the Beale UEWR and
its crew acquired and tracked a flight-test target reentry
vehicle launched from Alaska; enabling the successful
destruction by an interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air
Force Base. The fiscal year 2009 budget request supports
sustainment and operation of the Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs.
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). Last May, AFSPC
successfully teamed with our sister services and interagency
partners to stand up the ORS Office. AFSPC is working closely
with the ORS Office to develop innovative acquisition
approaches and capabilities to prepare the United States to
respond to a contested space domain, to better respond to
urgent warfighter needs and to deploy small satellites and
associated launch and control systems. AFSPC is continuing to
work with the ORS Office to develop ORS as a national strategic
capability and to export concepts to the broader Air Force
space enterprise. The fiscal year 2009 budget request supports
the launch of TACSAT-4 and continues the development of the
first ORS spacecraft and enabling capabilities.

Improve the strategic acquisition, delivery, and sustainment of
space capabilities.

In today's world of rapid technological advancement and
proliferation, we cannot afford to do business as usual when it comes
to delivering space capabilities. We require a new strategy for how we
develop, deliver and sustain space systems that is more than an
incremental progression of acquisition processes and management
methods. Such a strategy requires a paradigm shift with an end-state
that deploys needed space capabilities more quickly than in the past
while still executing efficient, business-like acquisition practices.

To effect organizational and cultural changes, AFSPC
is reviewing and adjusting our organization construct and
processes. At the beginning of 2008, we reorganized
Headquarters AFSPC activities, functions and relationships to
enhance our ability to act as a single, integrated
organization.
Our next step is fostering external relationships.
AFSPC is clearly articulating our needs for science and
technology, research and development, acquisition, sustainment
and training to Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and AETC. We
are also intensifying collaboration with Air Combat Command
(ACC), including the USAF Warfare Center (USAFWC). Furthermore,
AFSPC is supporting other major commands with space expertise
and analysis.
We are also working on proper alignment of
development, acquisition and sustainment activities. We
continue to build a more powerful and effective partnership
with AFMC and SMC through better definition of roles,
responsibilities and authorities.
Finally, we have chartered a special study group to
examine alternative acquisition strategies and recommend ways
to shorten the time it takes to put space capabilities in the
hands of the warfighter.

Improve integration across the air, space, and cyberspace domains.

Integration across air, space, and cyberspace is more than
combining and disseminating data among interrelated architectures. If
air, space and cyberspace power each have a value of one, the sum of
these capabilities is far greater than three. AFSPC is working with the
other Air Force major commands and domain experts to develop shared
strategic plans, operational concepts and architectures, doctrine, as
well as tactics, techniques and procedures for the next conflict--one
where emerging technologies in air, space and cyberspace domains can be
leveraged and mutually supported within a joint construct.

AFSPC is teaming extensively with the USAFWC and
STRATCOM to increase space scenarios across the full spectrum
of exercises. In March 2007, AFSPC conducted the most
comprehensive space wargame to date with 470 participants,
including 74 flag officers or equivalents and 38 Allied
partners. This wargame focused on the future and explored
global space system architectures, technologies and C2
relationships; tackled concepts for integrating space with
other warfighting domains; and examined potential policy trends
and their implications. We look forward to the next game in
2009.
conclusion
The Total Force AFSPC team plays an important role in delivering
space and missile capabilities to America and its warfighting commands.
These capabilities provide a decisive advantage for our national
security and prosperity. With the continued support of Congress, AFSPC
is postured to continue to maintain a crucial leadership role as we
realize our vision of delivering responsive, assured and decisive space
power.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER,
JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC COMMAND

[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. William L. Shelton, USAF
Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to be here today for my second opportunity
to appear before you as United States Strategic Command's (STRATCOM)
Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (CDR JFCC
SPACE).
It's a distinct privilege to address you on our space posture, and
to represent the men and women of JFCC SPACE who employ space
capabilities around the globe every day. These soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines are a dedicated and innovative joint force, working
hard to conduct efficient and effective space operations. Their
professionalism ensures our joint forces can exploit space-based
capabilities to the maximum extent.
I know this subcommittee is fully aware of the growing importance
of space capabilities to our national security, as well as to our
national economic element of power. So rather than belabor those
points, today I will focus on our efforts to improve employment of our
vital space capabilities, and identify some of the challenges we face
as we work to meet national and combatant commander objectives.
employment of space capabilities
CDR JFCC SPACE is designated by Commander, STRATCOM, as the single
point of contact for military space operations. As such, I am tasked to
provide tailored, responsive, local and global space effects to the
various combatant commanders. My STRATCOM-delegated authorities include
Global Space Coordinating Authority, which makes me the primary
interface with supported joint commanders for operational-level
planning and execution to provide space effects in support of those
Combatant Commanders' objectives. CDR JFCC SPACE also is assigned
Operational Control and Tactical Control authorities for designated
worldwide space forces. These authorities provide STRATCOM a single,
globally focused component commander to enhance functional integration
of space capabilities for the joint warfighter and for the Nation.
Over the last year, JFCC SPACE made huge strides in operational
space employment by consolidating previously separated elements of the
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). The centerpiece was the move of
the 1st Space Control Squadron (1 SPCS) and Unified Space Vault from
Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg AFB. 1 SPCS, in particular, plays a key
role in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by planning, tasking, and
directing the Space Surveillance Network as part of the JSpOC. This
transition, coupled with the JSpOC's relocation to a new facility,
created opportunities to integrate the total package of space command
and control functions and lays the foundation for future modernization.
The payoff from these moves was clearly demonstrated during the recent
NRO satellite intercept as planning and direction of ground radars and
space assets resulted in seamless integration to provide target vectors
for the shooter, and enabled quick characterization and reporting of
the success of the event. We continue to vigilantly track the debris
generated by the intercept, which will allow us to predict its reentry
and ensure safe launch and on-orbit operations.
challenges
Our number one operational need is for improved SSA capabilities.
SSA is the understanding of the space medium to include tracking all
manmade objects in space, discerning the intent of others who operate
in space, knowing the status of our own forces in real-time, and
understanding the natural environment and its effect upon space
operations--simply stated, SSA is foundational for all space
operations. By fusing intelligence on potential adversaries, space
surveillance information on all space systems in orbit, status of
friendly systems, and space weather, we will be able to not only know
what objects are in space and where, but we will also understand the
purpose of these objects, their capabilities, and their owners' intent.
This comprehensive knowledge enables decisionmakers to rapidly and
effectively select courses of action to ensure our sustained freedom of
action in space.
The January 2007 Chinese test of an anti-satellite (ASAT)
capability continues to shape our future planning by tangibly
demonstrating the potential vulnerability of our space assets. This
irresponsible space operation by the Chinese left over 2,300 pieces of
orbital debris that we're still tracking, and tens of thousands of
likely smaller pieces our sensors can't track. Only 25 items have
reentered so far, with the remainder expected to be in orbit for
decades. This debris will slowly decay due to natural forces and will
remain a hazard to manned and unmanned spaceflight in low earth orbit,
or transiting low earth orbit on the way to higher orbits. In contrast,
over 99 percent of the debris from the recent intercept of the NRO
satellite will reenter the atmosphere within approximately 3 months.
We've derived many lessons from the Chinese ASAT event, chief among
them being the tremendous wealth of SSA data available, albeit in many
disparate systems and security channels. It took the heroic efforts of
many to manually assemble this information ad hoc, then pass it to
senior decisionmakers. While we were very successful in this case due
to the outstanding cooperation between the intelligence and operations
communities, we clearly need improved processing and analytic systems
that continually compile and automatically fuse SSA information in
real-time to keep us abreast of space events. Our lessons learned from
the Chinese test will continue to guide our future improvements and
developmental efforts for the JSpOC.
Every significant military operation uses space capabilities in
some way--these ubiquitous capabilities are truly integral to military
operations in the 21st century. Also, there is a tremendous national
economic impact from commercial space systems that provide many crucial
services to the American public--services the public relies on and has
come to expect. However, it is clear our operating environment is
changing.
Access to space and space products becomes cheaper and more widely
available every year. The commercialization of space has allowed many
developing nations and non-state actors to acquire space-based
capabilities such as imagery and satellite communications that were
previously the exclusive purview of superpowers. With more space
players, space is more crowded than ever--we currently track over
18,000 manmade objects, to include everything from active satellites to
debris. The potential for a catastrophic collision in space increases
as the number of objects increase. Finally, the kinetic ASAT threat is
not the only threat to our space assets. The capacity to jam satellite
communications links is within the capability of many nations, as well
as non-state actors. Space-related ground sites can be damaged by
direct attack. Several nations are working on high-energy lasers that
could damage or destroy our satellites. The potential proliferation of
nuclear weapons is also a threat to space systems. Such a device could
cripple our space assets with the persistent effects of an exo-
atmospheric electromagnetic pulse. With the exception of the high-
energy laser, all of these threats to our satellites exist today.
Clearly, we can no longer view space as a sanctuary.
Our Nation's growing dependence on space-based capabilities,
coupled with the increasing risks we face, creates corresponding
potential economic and military vulnerabilities. Therefore, we must
protect our space assets against intentional and unintentional acts in
order to preserve our essential space capabilities. Solid protection
also requires us to have the ability for rapid recognition and
attribution of space events--the prerequisite that enables full
consideration of response options. Thus, the basis for an adequate
protection capability is robust SSA. In the future a decisionmaker's
ability to quickly answer the "who, what, when, where, how, and why"
questions will not only help determine the proper course of action, but
is the necessary foundation for deterring potential adversaries from
hostile acts against our space assets.
Other needed improvements to our SSA capabilities include networked
sensors and information systems that seamlessly share information to
more effectively use our current resources, and allow future sensors to
``plug and play.'' Our array of radar and optical space surveillance
sensors around the world provide acceptable coverage in the northern
hemisphere, but we have an exploitable lack of coverage in the southern
hemisphere. This gap greatly increases the time required to
characterize new payloads and maintain awareness, or ``custody,'' of
maneuvering spacecraft. Finally, we need the ability to track and
assess smaller objects if we are to keep pace with the potential
threats that stem from the emergence of small satellite technologies,
and to gain better awareness of the hazards posed by small space
debris. For the reasons cited above, SSA improvements are a top
priority within Air Force Space Command.
The increasingly threatened, highly dynamic environment of space
requires us to build more automated, net-centric capabilities to
command and control space forces. Along with essential SSA, we will
need the ability to act rapidly. Events in the space domain unfold
quickly, often at the speed of light. Our playbook must be ready to go,
with modeling and simulation tools, decision aids, and operator alerts
forming the automated solutions. Rather than the labor-intensive
command and control processes we currently use, machine-to-machine
interfaces must enable decisionmakers to quickly and accurately assess
the situation, and promptly direct actions.
conclusion
The nature of space operations is rapidly evolving. The United
States' absolute dependence on space across our military, civil, and
commercial sectors, coupled with the increased and diverse threats to
our space assets, requires improved SSA and command and control
capabilities to ensure our ability to effectively operate in an
increasingly dynamic environment. This is an exciting time in the
evolution of Joint Space Operations and I am truly honored to be
leading such a talented group of men and women as they expertly tackle
the challenges we face every day. I thank the subcommittee for your
continued strong support as we work to preserve our vital space
capabilities for the Nation.

STATEMENT OF RADM KENNETH W. DEUTSCH, USN, DIRECTOR, WARFARE
INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

[The prepared statement of Admiral Deutsch follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Kenneth W. Deutsch, USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, as the
Director of Warfare Integration on the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) staff, I am honored to appear before you today to
address Navy space activities. I am the Navy's resource and
requirements sponsor for Space. This sponsorship includes the Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS), the new Joint Narrowband Military
Satellite Communication System. I am also the Navy's Subject Matter
Expert for Space, responsible for reviewing and approving navy space
systems being reviewed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
(JROC) as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
(JCIDS). The committee has asked several specific questions which I
would like to address, one of which is a request for Navy's thoughts on
the organization and management of space, including Navy's role
therein.
space organization and management, and navy's role in space
Space systems are a critical enabler for maritime operations. The
Navy has a long and proud history in space, having developed a number
of technological breakthroughs. The list of Navy advances in space is
expansive and includes: the first space communications used for
operations; the first controllable space launch vehicle; the first
satellite tracking system; the first successful electronic intelligence
reconnaissance satellite; the first space object tracking system; the
first demonstration of on-orbit atomic clocks; the first military
broadcast satellite; and the first astronauts to orbit the earth, orbit
the moon and crew the Space Shuttle. The 20 February interception of a
nonfunctioning National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite
illustrates Navy's continued critical role in Space and Space Control.
The Navy AEGIS warship, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70), fired a single
modified tactical Standard Missile-3, hitting the satellite
approximately 133 nautical miles over the Pacific Ocean as it traveled
in space at more than 17,000 miles per hour.
Today, the Air Force, as the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive
Agent (EA) for Space has DOD-wide responsibilities for planning and
acquisition of most DOD major Defense space acquisitions. In addition,
the NRO is responsible to both the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of National Intelligence for national space reconnaissance
activities. While the Navy continues to serve as the Program Manager
for DOD narrowband ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite communications
systems, which includes the new MUOS and the UHF Follow-on system, and
conducts smaller space-based experiments, most large-scale national
security satellite programs will be developed through the Space EA and
NRO. With limited funding and more narrowly defined scope, Navy has
focused energy on leveraging existing space capabilities and aggressive
engagement within the requirements and acquisition processes to ensure
maritime operational needs are met.
Satellites provide global access and enable the Navy to establish
global presence. The process for designing, building, launching and
operating modern satellite systems has increasingly become both a
lengthy and an expensive proposition lasting decades, meaning a new
satellite program that is currently in the concept phase could remain
in service well into the 2020-2030 timeframe. Unlike other major DOD
programs, however, satellites cannot be modified or repaired once they
are placed into orbit. Due to the long lead times involved, it is
therefore critical that naval requirements and maritime missions be
factored into the pre-launch design and planned in-orbit operation of
all future satellite systems being considered for acquisition through
the DOD EA for Space, the NRO and the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Without active Navy involvement
today in ongoing deliberations over future satellite programs, the Navy
risks operating in future scenarios with multi-billion dollar National
Security Space systems sub-optimized for the maritime environment,
which is increasingly important as Maritime Domain Awareness
requirements are developed.
The Navy remains heavily reliant on space systems to conduct its
wartime and humanitarian missions. A wide array of national, joint and
commercial satellites currently provide Navy commanders with essential
communication capabilities, position, navigation and timing support,
missile warning, meteorological data, and over-the-horizon surveillance
and reconnaissance capabilities on a worldwide basis. Future U.S.
satellite programs are now being developed that could provide
additional benefit and capabilities to Navy warfighters. Many of these
programs, however, face technological and budgetary hurdles which could
force future capability trade-offs affecting the maritime environment
and could ultimately impact their utility to the Navy. For these
reasons, the Navy will actively engage with key national and joint
space-related entities at the appropriate levels to ensure current and
future Navy needs in space are identified, understood, resourced and
protected. This requires close cooperation between the Navy and various
space-related entities within the DOD, the National Intelligence
Community (IC), the NOAA, as well as those commercial partners who
develop and manage satellite systems.
The various U.S. satellites and space support systems that
constitute National Security Space generally fall under six distinct
mission areas, all of which directly or indirectly support Navy
operations. Furthermore, virtually each of these mission areas involves
one or more future satellite systems currently in the design or
development phase. The six mission areas are Intelligence/Surveillance/
Reconnaissance, Communications, Position/Navigation/Timing, Space
Control, Ballistic Missile Warning/Defense and Metrological and
Oceanographic. One of the primary goals contained within the Department
of Navy Space Policy is to shape the outcome of joint deliberations on
future space capabilities these mission areas to maximize combat
effectiveness and to ensure supremacy of the naval force. Within the
Navy, various space-related functions and responsibilities are
distributed among different commands, but jointly constitute a
functional ``Navy Space Team'' which works collaboratively to advance
Navy's many goals in space. The Navy Space Team is composed of several
Navy organizations that span the full spectrum of Navy warfighting and
have key roles to play in advancing the Navy's role in space:

a. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for
Communication Networks (CNO N6) is responsible for leading the
overall Navy Space Team, developing Navy space requirements,
making resource recommendations, funding designated space
acquisition programs, and coordinating with the National
Security Space Office;
b. The Deputy CNO for Manpower, Personnel, Training and
Education (CNO N1) is responsible for managing and developing a
core group of Active Duty and Reserve enlisted, officer, and
civilian personnel with specialized space expertise known as
``Navy Space Cadre;''
c. The Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO N2) is responsible
for incorporating space capabilities into the larger Navy-wide
ISR strategy, advocating Navy's space-related requirements
within IC and joint ISR programs, and representing the OPNAV
staff within key IC and joint space-related forums;
d. The Deputy CNO for Integration of Capabilities and
Resources (CNO N8) is responsible for making resource decisions
on relevant Navy space assets, and incorporating space
capabilities into Navy campaign/mission modeling and simulation
efforts;
e. The Oceanographer of the Navy (CNO N84) is responsible for
coordinating space-related portions of the Navy's Oceanography
and Navigation programs with appropriate commands, agencies and
commands outside the Navy;
f. The Office of Naval Research is designated as the Navy
Space Scientific and Technical Executive; and
g. The Program Executive Office Space Systems (PEO Space) is
responsible for acquiring space systems for the Navy, and for
working with PEO Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence (C\4\I) and Space for acquiring Navy space-
related terminals.

A number of other space-related Navy organizations and offices play
key roles in supporting the primary Navy Space Team. These key
organizations include:

a. Navy-NRO Coordination Group: Responsible for coordinating
Navy space-related issues between the OPNAV Staff and key Navy
personnel working within the NRO, and linking ongoing Navy-
related activities at the NRO with the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for C\4\I/Space;
b. Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
Office: Responsible for conducting rapid prototyping involving
national reconnaissance satellites and related systems in
support of Navy operations; and
c. Naval Research Laboratory's Naval Center for Space
Technology: Exploits and develops space-related technologies in
support of DOD, Navy, and other agencies.

Additionally, the Navy maintains a key flag-level joint billet at
the NRO. This senior officer oversees a team of Navy Space Cadre
members, who collectively provide invaluable support to the Navy Space
Team on a number of space-related issues.
mobile user objective system
The committee has requested a clearer understanding of the MUOS.
The Navy's major space segment responsibility to the joint community is
the narrowband satellite communications constellation. Today it
consists of UHF Follow-on (UFO) and two residual Fleet Satellites
(FLTSATs) and one Leased Satellite (LEASAT) which will begin to be
replaced by MUOS in 2010. MUOS will provide communications-on-the-move
at high data rates (up to 64 kbs per access) to disadvantaged users
such as handheld terminals, aircraft, missiles, UAVs, and remote
sensors. Additionally, MUOS will provide these capabilities in such
challenging environments as double canopy foliage, urban environment,
and high sea state. MUOS will bring a 4-fold increase in the number of
accesses (1997 vice 500) and a 20-fold increase in throughput (39.2
Mbps, total system capacity vice 2 Mbps) in comparison to the legacy
UFO constellation. MUOS is the common denominator for command and
control providing the capability to communicate from tactical to
theater levels and between defense and non-defense agencies. MUOS will
allow a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to regional
engagement, providing the capability to synchronize efforts with other
Services, agencies, and allied nations.
MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite
communications. During Operations Enduring freedom and Iraqi Freedom,
UFO, FLTSAT, and LEASAT 5 were only able to support 80 percent of the
narrowband tactical UHF satellite communication requirements.
Additionally, in the 2010 timeframe, LEASAT 5 will reach its end of
service life, and the UFO constellation is expected to reach an
unacceptable level of availability in May 2009. We have a mitigation
plan to minimize the operational impact of a potential gap in
capability (seven operational satellites vice the required eight)
before MUOS is operational and MUOS-capable terminals are available. It
includes the use of commercial bandwidth and the dynamic management of
existing bandwidth as mentioned previously. A ``Sources Sought for
Additional UHF Capabilities'' was released on 09 August 2007 with the
objective of supplementing the current UHF SATCOM resources with
additional commercial services. Of the six options presented by four
vendors in response to this RFI, Navy chose Intelsat's Skynet leased
services and is initiating a competition for a hosted payload option.
Navy has identified funding in PB09 to fund both of these mitigation
plans. Intelsat's Skynet services will supplement UHF resources in
fiscal years 2009-2010 while the hosted payload option will tentatively
be available beginning in 2010. Today, UFO supports approximately 500
simultaneous accesses worldwide. Based on evolving future war fighting
concepts in support of the Guidance for Development of Forces, UHF
SATCOM access requirements are expected to grow by at least a factor of
four and MUOS, as designed, will be able to support that requirement.
The MUOS program is currently preparing for the October 2009
Follow-On Buy Decision. MUOS' advanced capabilities can only be
realized with the fielding of MUOS-capable Joint Tactical Radio System
terminals or by upgrading existing UHF legacy software programmable
terminals to MUOS capability.
Lastly, the committee asked for Navy's thoughts on Space Protection
Strategies. The Navy continues to work with U.S. Strategic Command, the
Joint Staff and other Services to ensure appropriate means of Space
Control Protection are addressed systematically as space systems are
being developed. Navy supports Space Control Protection becoming a
mandatory JCIDS Key Performance Parameter. This will ensure the
warfighter and the JROC understand and approve the trade offs between
advance performance and enduring protection. Navy also advocates the
National Security Space Office standing up a Space Control Functional
Integration Office (FIO) using the current Communications FIO as the
model.
summary
Navy's mission of keeping the air and sea lanes open and ensuring
the security of our citizens at home and abroad requires a global reach
and persistent presence. We must be constantly ready, whether it is to
deliver on a mission of mercy or more lethal measures to respond to a
specific threat. Our ability to respond, as well as work with our
coalition and other maritime partners, will depend on space
capabilities for the necessary flexibility and speed to support our
worldwide responsibilities. Navy's ability to leverage DOD and IC space
capabilities, and to have an impact on future space developments is
critical in ensuring its ability to successfully conduct maritime
operations and in fulfilling Navy missions.
We look forward to delivering MUOS for the joint warfighter.
Finally, we intend to be an important contributor toward the
development and implementation of space protection strategies.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.

STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of
Defense's (DOD) space acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of
dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military
and other government operations as well as to enable DOD to transform
the way it collects and disseminates information, gathers data on
adversaries, and attacks targets. In fiscal year 2009 alone, DOD
expects to spend over $10 billion to strengthen space-based
capabilities and $7.6 billion of this amount is targeted for selected
major space acquisition efforts. At the same time, however, DOD's space
system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several
decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even
billions, of dollars; stretched schedules by years; and increased
performance risks. In some cases, capabilities have not been delivered
to the warfighter after decades of development. Today, we are here to
comment on what problems affecting space acquisitions still persist,
what actions DOD has been taking to address these problems and what
remains to be done. In general, we found this year that space programs
that have been troubled in recent years still face problems that are
driving up costs and schedule. At the same time, senior leadership has
remained committed to reducing technology risks and ensuring newer
programs are more affordable. Investment prioritizing, realistic cost
estimating, policy changes, and other actions we identify can help this
commitment take further hold.
space acquisition problems persist
The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio
have experienced problems during the past 2 decades that have driven up
cost and schedules and increased technical risks. Several programs have
been restructured by DOD in the face of delays and cost growth. At
times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing
DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other
problems without realizing a better return on investment. Along with
the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule
delays--as much as 7 years--postponing delivery of promised
capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in
some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider
new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. As figures 1 and 2
below indicate, five programs that were begun in the late 1990s/early
2000s to replenish aging constellations of satellites have incurred
substantial cost growth and schedule delays, including the:

(1) the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
communications satellite program,
(2) the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS), which DOD is jointly developing with
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
(3) the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which detects
missile launches,
(4) the Wideband Global Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
(WGS), another communications satellite, and
(5) the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF program. Last
year we reported that AEHF and WGS had worked through the bulk
of their technical problems.

Since our testimony, the first WGS satellite was launched, but the
AEHF program experienced technical problems with hardware components
that have pushed back its first launch date by 6 months. Also, this
year, as described below, we found that NPOESS and SBIRS still face
very high risks, even after recent replanning efforts. Further, GPS IIF
has experienced additional technical problems.

SBIRS continues to face cost and schedule setbacks.
Software problems have recently delayed the first satellite
launch by about a year, which will likely increase the
program's overall delay to roughly 7 years. Correcting the
problems may necessitate hardware and software changes that
could, according to the Air Force, also drive cost increases up
to $1 billion, which would be in addition to the $6 billion
cost growth already incurred. Management-reserves expenditure
continues at an unsustainable rate. Program officials
acknowledge that management Reserves set aside to fix
unexpected problems will likely be depleted in early 2009, even
though the Reserves were intended to last through 2012. Given
the complexity of the SBIRS satellites, it is possible that
further design flaws may be discovered, leading to more cost
and schedule increases. If management Reserves are depleted and
not replenished, the program will likely experience further
cost and schedule problems.
In July 2007, the NPOESS program finalized its
restructure in response to a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433)
program acquisition unit breach of the critical cost growth
threshold. The restructure included about an additional $4.1
billion, or about a 49 percent, life-cycle cost increase for
fewer satellites to be acquired, delays in satellite launches,
and deletions or replacements of satellite sensors. The
restructure also included removing 7 of the original 14
critical technologies from the program. Furthermore, three of
the remaining technologies remain immature and the program
continues to experience development problems, increasing risks
of further problems. At this point, the program has seen a 153
percent unit cost increase.
The GPS IIF program has faced technical challenges in
completing development and production, causing another schedule
delay in the launch of the first IIF satellite--over a 2-year
slip from the original launch date of December 2006 to February
2009. Moreover, the program continues to face cost increases
due to these technical problems. Specifically, the program has
requested over $100 million for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to
cover the estimated cost overruns to complete production of the
first three space vehicles. In addition, program officials are
concerned that additional funds may be needed to complete this
program if additional delays are incurred--the program has
already spent $1.2 billion to date, which represents about 77-
percent of the total cost originally estimated for the program.
(Note: The chart below reflects a larger cost because it
includes estimates for the GPS IIR, IIR-M, and IIF blocks of
the GPS program.)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Not all of DOD's space programs are facing the problems being
experienced by GPS, NPOESS, and SBIRS. For example, the Navy's Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS), another communications satellite program,
is meeting cost and schedule goals. Further, as discussed later in this
testimony, newer Air Force acquisition efforts such as the
Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications System and Space Radar
have been taking actions to ensure they can meet their cost and
schedule goals, though their funding has been reduced in light of
overall affordability of space acquisitions. These two efforts were
highly complex and ambitious and were predicted to be the most
expensive military satellite developments ever.
In addition, in December 2005, the Air Force was directed to begin
efforts to develop competing capability in parallel with the SBIRS
program; this effort was previously known as the Alternative Infrared
Satellite System (AIRSS). We reported in September 2007 that DOD had
not positioned the AIRSS effort for success. DOD agreed, and revised
the effort's development strategy to reflect best practices. The effort
has a new name, the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (Third Gen),
and is now a follow on to the SBIRS program. The first sensor
prototypes are expected later this month.
Lastly, our annual weapons system assessment this year will be
reporting on challenges faced by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) program, as the two providers--Boeing and Lockheed Martin--
undertake a joint venture that will provide U.S. government launches of
medium- to heavy-lift rockets. The consolidation of production,
engineering, test, and launch operations under the joint venture,
called the United Launch Alliance or ULA, is expected to yield cost
savings in the future, but when and how much remains unknown. ULA
expects the consolidation to be nearly complete by the end of 2010, but
there are preliminary indications that some elements of the
consolidation are falling behind schedule.
Furthermore, the Air Force revised its acquisition and contracting
strategy for EELV in 2005, which among other things increased program
office oversight responsibilities. The change in contracting strategy
created new data analysis activities for the program and expanded the
types of expertise needed by the program office to utilize the new
information provided by contractors. Despite its increased
responsibilities, the program office is experiencing staff reductions
and expects staffing vacancies to continue in the near term. The
current military staff lacks some of the technical expertise needed to
fully analyze contractor performance data now being collected under the
new contracting strategy.
causes of acquisition problems in space programs
Our work has identified a variety of reasons for this cost growth,
most notably that weapons programs are incentivized to produce and use
optimistic cost and schedule estimates in order to successfully compete
for funding. We have also found that DOD starts its space programs too
early, that is, before it has assurance that the capabilities it is
pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time
constraints.
We have also tied acquisition problems in space to inadequate
contracting strategies; contract and program management weaknesses; the
loss of technical expertise; capability gaps in the industrial base;
tensions between labs that develop technologies for the future and
current acquisition programs; divergent needs in users of space
systems; diffuse leadership; and other issues that have been well
documented in DOD and Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies.

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Many of these underlying issues affect the broader weapons
portfolio as well, though we have reported that space programs are
particularly affected by the wide disparity of users, who include DOD,
the intelligence community, other Federal agencies, and in some cases,
other countries and U.S. business and citizens. Moreover, problematic
implementation of an acquisition strategy in the 1990s, known as Total
System Performance Responsibility, for space systems resulted in losses
of technical expertise and weaknesses in contracting strategies that
space programs are still dealing with the effects of.
actions needed to address space and weapon acquisition problems
Over the past decade, we have identified best practices that DOD
space programs can benefit from. DOD has taken a number of actions to
address the problems that we have reported on. These include
initiatives at the department level that will affect its major weapons
programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air Force
programs. Although these actions are a step in the right direction,
additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that
reforms that DOD has begun will take hold.
Our work--which is largely based on best practices in the
commercial sector--has recommended numerous actions that can be taken
to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended
that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and
demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
of other aspects of acquisition program management that space programs
could benefit from. Table 1 highlights these practices; appendix II
provides more detail.

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constructive actions are being taken
DOD is attempting to implement some of these practices for its
major weapons programs. For example, we recently reported that DOD
released a strategy to enhance the role of program managers in carrying
out its major weapon system acquisitions. As part of this strategy, DOD
established a policy that requires formal agreements among program
managers, their acquisition executives, and the user community intended
to set forth common program goals. In addition, DOD plans a variety of
actions to enhance development opportunities, provide more incentives,
and arrange knowledge-sharing opportunities for its program managers.
Within this strategy, the department also acknowledged that any actions
taken to improve accountability must be based on a foundation from
which program managers can launch and manage programs toward greater
performance, and must include an overarching strategy and
decisionmaking processes that prioritize programs based on a match
between customer needs and available resources. DOD highlighted several
initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide
such a foundation. Some of these include establishing an early decision
gate to review proposed programs at the concept stage, testing
portfolio management approaches in selected capability areas and using
capital budgeting accounts for programs in development.
Additionally, as we reported previously, the Air Force adopted a
``back-to-basics'' policy for space designed to reduce technology risk
and ensure programs were more executable. Specifically, for its TSAT
and Space Radar acquisition efforts, the Air Force committed to
delaying product development until critical technologies could be
demonstrated to work in a relevant environment. This stood in sharp
contrast to previous programs, started with immature technologies, such
as NPOESS and SBIRS.
The Air Force also committed to deferring more ambitious technology
efforts associated with these efforts to science and technology
organizations until they are ready to be added to future increments.
TSAT, for example, deferred the wide-field of view multi-access laser
communication technology, and contributed about $16.7 million for
``off-line'' maturation of this technology that could be inserted into
future increments. It laid out incremental advances in other
capabilities over two increments. Space Radar has deferred lithium-ion
batteries, more efficient solar cells, and onboard processing for its
first increment, and like TSAT, contributed toward their development by
space and technology organizations. Further, both efforts have used
systems engineers to help determine achievability of requirements.
In our experience, the Navy has tended to follow good acquisition
practices for its space programs, especially in relation to keeping
technology risks out of programs. The Navy's MUOS is an example.
Specifically, the MUOS acquisition effort began development with almost
all of its critical technologies mature. Additionally, about 95 percent
of design drawings had been completed at the critical design review
milestone in March 2007. Since MUOS's development start in September
2004, the program has been meeting its overall cost and schedule goals,
with the first satellite expected to become operational in March 2010.
Furthermore, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, and other key
organizations have made progress in implementing the Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. This initiative encompasses several
separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical
capabilities as well as identifying and implementing long-term
technology and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of
developing and delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. ORS
provides DOD with an opportunity to work outside the typical
acquisition channels to more quickly and less expensively deliver these
capabilities. In performing a review of ORS for this committee, we
found that DOD has made progress in putting a program management
structure in place for ORS as well as executing ORS-related research
and development efforts, which include development of low-cost small
satellites, common design techniques, and common interfaces.
Other parts of DOD are also moving towards space programs with less
risk and that have a greater chance of being more successful. The
Missile Defense Agency's Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
program office is seeking an operational constellation that would be
easier to produce than originally envisioned for the constellation. The
new development approach for the constellation would involve no
technology breakthroughs or scientific discovery, and the program
office wants to scale the system design so that it will only require
only a 5- to 6-year build cycle.
DOD has also pushed back the decisions to start the TSAT and Space
Radar acquisitions so it could reformulate their acquisition schedules
and approaches to make them more affordable within DOD's overall space
portfolio. For example, TSAT is currently being assessed by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to better ensure that proposed future
funding levels for TSAT are affordable in the near term. In the
meantime, the program office is continuing to fund risk-reduction
efforts between two separate contractors to further reduce overall risk
in TSAT. Similarly, the Space Radar program office told us that it is
adjusting its acquisition approach to better balance affordability
through incremental evolution of the Space Radar capability. In both of
these cases, DOD will likely be better positioned with acquisition
programs that are more affordable and executable in terms of meeting
cost, schedule, and performance goals.
additional actions needed
The actions that the Air Force and OSD have been taking to address
acquisition problems are good first steps. The back-to-basics policy
and ORS, in particular, represent significant shifts in thinking about
how space systems should be developed as well as commitment from senior
leadership. But, there are still more, significant changes to
processes, policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can take
hold.
First, while DOD pilot initiatives related to portfolio management
are targeted at addressing funding pressures, there has not been a real
commitment to prioritizing investments across DOD. For the past several
years, we have emphasized that DOD starts more space and weapon
programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that
encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising,
suppressing of bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the
opportunity to identify and assess potentially better alternatives.
Programs focus on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound
management. Invariably, with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is
forced to continually shift funds to and from programs--particularly as
programs experience problems that require additional time and money to
address. Such shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects.
This year, significant cuts were made to several major space programs
including TSAT, Space Radar, and STSS largely in light of the
realization that new, expensive programs were not affordable at a time
when DOD was attempting to upgrade other capabilities and still
contending with problematic programs like SBIRS. In the case of TSAT,
resulting delays in capability could have a dramatic effect on other
new programs, such as the Army's Future Combat System, which were
counting on TSAT-like capabilities to enhance their performance.
Second, as we have testified before, space programs are facing
capacity shortfalls. These include shortages of staff with science and
engineering backgrounds as well as staff with program-management and
cost-estimating experience. Several of our reviews of major space
programs have cited shortages of personnel as a key challenge that
increases risk for the program, specifically in technical areas. In
addition, during our review of DOD's space cost estimating function,
Air Force space cost-estimating organizations and program offices said
that they believed their cost-estimating resources were inadequate to
do a good job of accurately predicting costs. Because of the decline in
in-house cost-estimating resources, space program offices and Air Force
cost-estimating organizations are now more dependent on support
contractors. We recognize that there are actions being taken to
strengthen the space acquisition workforce, but we have not yet seen
the condition get much better at the individual program office level.
Our past work has also pointed to capacity shortfalls that go
beyond workforce. For example, in 2006, we reported that cost-
estimation data and databases are incomplete, insufficient, and
outdated. In previous testimonies, we pointed to limited opportunities
and funding for space technologies, and the lack of low-cost launch
vehicles. The ORS initiative is designed to help alleviate shortfalls
in launch and testing resources, but one concern raised in interviews
with launch providers was that there was still not enough investment
being directed toward low-cost launch.
Furthermore, policies that surround space acquisition need to be
further revised to ensure best practices are instilled and sustained.
For example, DOD's space acquisition policy does not require that
acquisition efforts such as TSAT and Space Radar achieve a technology
readiness level (TRL) 6 (that is, testing in a relevant environment) or
higher for key technologies before being formally started--key decision
point B (KDP B). Instead, the policy suggests that TRL 6 be achieved
later--at preliminary decision review (KDP C) or soon after. In fact,
the back-to-basics policy that was adopted by the Air Force has not
been incorporated into the space acquisition policy. Given that there
are many pressures and incentives that are driving space and other
weapon programs to begin too early and to drive for dramatic rather
than incremental leaps in capability, DOD needs acquisition policies
that ensure programs have the knowledge they need to make investment
decisions and that DOD and Congress have a more accurate picture of how
long and how much it will take to get the capability that is being
promised. In addition, although the policy requires that independent
cost estimates be prepared by bodies outside the acquisition chain of
command, it does not require that they be relied upon to develop
program budgets. Officials within the space cost-estimating community
also believed that the policy was unclear in defining roles and
responsibilities for cost estimators. We continue to recommend changes
be made to the policy--not only to further ingrain the shift in
thinking about how space systems should be developed, but to ensure
that the changes current leaders are trying to make can be extended
beyond their tenure.
Last, while DOD is planning many new practices that will provide
program managers with more incentives, support and stability, the
overall environment within which program managers perform their work is
very difficult to change simply with policy initiatives. Policies
similar to the one DOD issued in 2007 to increase accountability of
program managers have existed for some time, but according to DOD and
Air Force officials, they have not always been practiced. For example,
while DOD policy provides for program managers of major defense
acquisition programs to serve as close to 4-year tenures as
practicable,\1\ many serve for only 2 years. One example is the SBIRS
program, which has had six program managers in 12 years. In fact, our
work has shown that rather than lengthy assignment periods between key
milestones as suggested by best practices, many of the programs we have
reviewed had multiple program managers within the same milestone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ DOD policy provides for the tenure of program managers of major
defense acquisition programs to last until the completion of the major
milestone that occurs closest in time to the date on which the person
has served in the position for 4 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusions
In conclusion, senior leaders managing DOD's space portfolio are
clearly working in a challenging environment. There are pressures to
deliver new, transformational capabilities, but problematic older
satellite programs continue to cost more than expected, constrain
investment dollars, pose risks of capability caps, and thus require
more time and attention from senior leaders than well-performing
efforts. To best mitigate these circumstances and put future programs
on a better path, DOD needs to continue with the actions it has begun
undertaken. However, these measures should be complemented by realistic
estimating of what it will take to complete space programs,
prioritizing programs for investment, and strengthening DOD acquisition
policy for space. At the same time, DOD should ensure its ORS program
is well-supported and focused on alleviating capability gaps as well as
developing longer-term solutions for space programs. Taken together,
such actions, with the support of Congress, should help senior leaders
negotiate acquisitions in a challenging environment and ensure their
commitments to reform can be sustained into the next administration.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions that you have.

Senator Bill Nelson. Let us just get right on into the
questions.
We constantly hear about the spiraling need for
communications. Let's talk about the transformational satellite
(TSAT). It's supposed to address some of the growing
communications requirements and has been described by the Air
Force as the linchpin for the 21st century net-centric warfare.
TSAT was, at one point, supposed to launch in 2012. Congress
removed $130 million from the program and then in the next year
$150 million, mostly to allow technologies to mature so that
the program wouldn't be high risk.
When the fiscal year 2008 budget was submitted, the first
launch was supposed to be in the first quarter of 2016. The
fiscal year 2009 budget request completely undermines the
program. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force have
pulled $3.6 billion out of the program through fiscal year 2013
and have delayed the first launch until 2018 at the earliest,
and the requirements for TSAT haven't changed. So what's going
on?
Mr. Payton. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could address that. The
TSAT spacecraft will be an immensely capable vehicle. It will
serve a large number of users, first and foremost perhaps is
protected strategic communications for our nuclear command and
control systems. Additionally, it will serve relay for airborne
intelligence, surveillance, and reconaissance (ISR) assets like
Global Hawk, and also space-borne ISR assets. It will serve
fleets on the high seas. It will serve communications on the
move for our land forces, and of course, it is closely related
with the Army's Future Combat System (FCS).
As we move to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)-4,
the fourth AEHF spacecraft, that vehicle completes a global
ring of geosynchronous satellites for protected strategic
communications. With the fourth AEHF spacecraft, we now have no
longer that first immediate schedule driver for the first TSAT
spacecraft. With that as a fact, we are now looking at that
first block of TSAT spacecraft and how we can best marry its
capabilities to the schedules of its users.
Again, with AEHF-4 filling the ring for protected strategic
communications, we can now rephase the TSAT capabilities so
that it can service the most important users first, again,
amongst all the large number of different users it will have.
We are taking this time from December until this spring to
rephase the first block of TSAT capabilities and redefine that.
We are not necessarily married to a 2018 launch. Again, that is
part of the trade space to link up TSAT capabilities with its
users.
Senator Bill Nelson. What you have said is that part of the
cut in TSAT is justified by the Air Force as a payment for the
fourth AEHF, and I guess there were other higher DOD
priorities. So I go back to the initial question. If TSAT is
still the linchpin for the 21st century net-centric warfare,
what is the higher DOD priority?
Mr. Payton. Sir, again, it is a program-management,
program-risk perspective of properly marrying and fielding the
TSAT capabilities with its next immediate users.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did you say that you were on a 2018
launch date instead of a 2016 launch date?
Mr. Payton. No, sir. We do not know yet what the first
spacecraft launch schedule is like until we define the content
of that first block of spacecraft.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you don't even know that you are on
a 2016 launch date?
Mr. Payton. Any schedule prediction right now is premature,
sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is some new information.
Mr. Payton. We are currently in work with both the user
communities, the Marines, the Army, the Navy, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to identify the schedules for their top users. We are
working with the technology folks, obviously. We have spent
several years proving the technology readiness at the subsystem
level. So, we are again in the process of re-architecting that
first block of TSAT capabilities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tell me, if we are going to have this
kind of delay, is there also going to be a requirement to buy
more wideband global satellite communications (SATCOM) systems?
Mr. Payton. That is part of the analysis that is in work
this spring. Yes, sir.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, if I could also add something
to what Mr. Payton is saying? Sir, you said it exactly right
when you said the requirement for warfighting capabilities that
are promised through TSAT have not gone away.
We know that the objective here is to get protected
communications farther and farther and farther down into the
forward echelons, which allows them to communicate in a
protected way on the move, and that really is one of the key
drivers to go beyond where we are right now with the Wideband
Global Satellite (WGS) and AEHF.
But we should not lose, sir, sight of the facts, sir, that
we have just launched the first of what will now be six WGS
satellites, which are a quantum leap in wideband
communications.
We are about to launch within the next year, we believe,
the first of now four AEHF satellites, which again are in a
quantum sense far more capable than the systems that they
replace.
Military satellite communications remain a top priority for
the combatant commanders. We understand that it does. We think
that the steps that we are taking right now are giving them
vastly improved communications. What this does allow us to do
with the insertion of the fourth AEHF is to take the investment
that we have had in TSAT so far, particularly in the ground
system, which we will have to continue regardless, and it
allows us now to take the next couple of months to assess what
the pace and scope of TSAT needs to look like.
That is the pathway that we are on. There is a study
underway. It is not a brand-new study. We have looked at this a
lot of different ways, and we owe you some answers on this.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, what does the Navy think
about the delay on TSAT?
Admiral Deutsch. Sir, obviously, we have stated our
requirements for protected communications a number of times,
and how those protected communications are delivered to our sea
base and our fleets at sea is certainly important. But as long
as they are delivered, that is the most important thing.
We are very concerned that the protected communications
remain available and that they are in sufficient capacity to
allow us to have the reach-back that we need based upon the way
we intend to fight the future conflicts.
Senator Bill Nelson. You said as long as they deliver it,
but the question is ``when?''
Admiral Deutsch. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. So what do you think about that?
Admiral Deutsch. Sir, we certainly are interested in more
protected communications available as soon as possible. With
the current schedule, we believe that the sea base will remain
viable. We would like to see more.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, GAO has been critical of
this acquisition path for TSAT. What is your assessment of this
progress, and what is your assessment of this new information
that we just got today?
Ms. Chaplain. I think everything that has been described
today is actually good in that some actions are being taken to
make the TSAT program more executable, more affordable, and
also to ensure that there are no capability gaps in the
upcoming years.
But I have always said that this investment needs to be
looked at in the context of the DOD-wide systems portfolio, not
just space because, as you said, it is the linchpin for the
future global information grid. There are a lot of huge systems
depending on this to achieve their kinds of capabilities. I
think it is not just FCS. So I think when we talk about
priorities, they need to be discussed in the context of the
whole portfolio of weapon systems and just not the space
portfolio.
In terms of dates being in question, I think it is
important to go back to all of these major systems and really
get a good sense of what are their schedule delays. They are
also facing delays themselves. So is any TSAT revised schedule
still in synch with schedules like the FCS program, and what
are their backup plans if TSAT is not available?
I don't think just saying we can rely on other assets may
be totally an answer for them. They probably need certain
capabilities in the TSAT program to do what they are supposed
to do.
Mr. Payton. Mr. Chairman, I may have left an improper
impression. The 2018 date is based on the classic analysis if
you take so much money out of the program in these years, it
will then slip the program so many years in the future. We are
looking at something a little more granular than that or
something a little more than just dollars out and schedule
slipped. We are looking at the actual content. Clearly,
protected communications is the top priority for the TSAT
program.
I am just not accepting 2018 and the analysis that led to
the 2018 as being thorough enough. It could be earlier than
2018. Again, depending on the needs of the warfighters and the
TSAT's many, many different customers.
Senator Sessions. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I went to the
other room, and I had been told you were here. I should have
remembered that.
Senator Bill Nelson. I went to the wrong room also.
Senator Sessions. General Shelton, what is your take,
Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) view of the TSAT delay?
General Shelton. Senator, STRATCOM has polled--as General
Kehler has said, all the other combatant commanders (COCOMs),
and the other COCOMs have military SATCOM very high on their
priority lists. So STRATCOM is awaiting this analysis that is
being conducted right now, anxious to see what the output of
that analysis will be.
Clearly, AEHF-4 is a priority now because of the slip to
TSAT, but we are anxious to see what this analysis in the
spring will yield.
Senator Sessions. General Shelton, again, can you tell us
what role the U.S. space assets and space personnel played in
the recent successful intercept of our out-of-control National
Reconaissance Office (NRO) satellite? Was that a joint
operation? What lessons are we learning from this operation
about command and control and integration of space assets?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. It was very much a joint
operation. In fact, STRATCOM was lead for planning for this
event, not only for the intercept itself, but also the
consequence management and dealing with the aftermath of the
intercept.
So assets included, of course, the----
Senator Sessions. Did you decide that the Navy's SM-3 was
the right vehicle to utilize to take out that satellite?
General Shelton. Sir, that was General Chilton, in
consultation with the Joint Staff and, ultimately, the national
leadership that decided that that was the proper weapon. Yes,
sir.
Senator Sessions. Did I cut you off there? I'll let you
finish?
General Shelton. Let me just say that between Navy assets,
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) assets, Air Force assets, a
tremendous joint effort, probably a national effort pulled off
in a very short period of time. It is almost unprecedented.
Senator Sessions. I felt it was a good surprise test for
the entire effort. It tested a lot of different things,
including your ability to coordinate. I understand the Air
Force had a role. What was their role in the process?
General Shelton. Air Force assets were used to track the
target satellite.
Senator Sessions. To track the satellite?
General Shelton. Track the satellite and produce a very
precise vector on where that satellite would be, because when
it broke the horizon for the Aegis shooter, it needed to be in
a certain size box. We were well inside that box. So it gave a
very good target for the shooter. The shooter was able to lock
on, and the results speak for themselves.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Payton, maybe you can comment on
that, and did the Air Force incur costs in the course of what
they were doing? Have they had to defer any other work as a
result of that?
Mr. Payton. The tracking sensors that General Shelton
referred to are something that the Air Force has going on 24-7,
365. So there's perhaps some overtime for analysts, I honestly
don't know. But there were no extra immediate costs for the Air
Force to participate in this exercise.
Senator Sessions. Are you satisfied with the coordination
and cooperation of so many entities that were involved in this?
Did we learn anything that we could do better?
Mr. Payton. I came from MDA before my current job, and this
was executed as in a similar fashion as many MDA operations,
where they do rely on several different assets from the Air
Force, from the Army, from the Navy, to execute their mission.
So this was just another routine exercise from the perspective
of the coordination that was conducted.
General Shelton. Senator, let me make one other comment on
that in terms of lessons learned, if I could? The Chinese Anti-
Satellite (ASAT) test as well applies here. But there is a
tremendous amount of data that is available, but because of the
way we are architected right now, you have to pull all of that
data together ad hoc. It is different networks. It is different
levels of security. There are many different problems in
pulling that data together.
Yet again, we did it this time. But what we need is a
system that pulls this together on a routine basis, and that is
exactly what we are working for: integrated space situation
awareness.
Senator Sessions. I will ask whoever, I am not sure who the
appropriate person is. But one of the things that I know we
were concerned about is that the Chinese attack on the
satellite was 450 miles up above the International Space
Station, and it was going to create space debris that could
endanger space activity for years to come.
This was about 100 miles up, I believe, and we thought that
the debris would re-enter the atmosphere. That is below the
Space Station, of course. Did those facts bear out, and how are
we doing with the debris situation? Were you accurate in your
projections that the debris would not threaten the Space
Station?
General Shelton. Sir, for both the Chinese ASAT test as
well as the intercept, the models that predicted the debris
field did a pretty good job. Chinese ASAT test produced debris
up at 850 kilometers, the engagement altitude, and that debris
will literally rain down, naturally decay over decades.
The test that was done occurred at 247 kilometers. That
debris will probably, 90-plus percent of it, will be down
within the next 2 months. What we can track right now is 10
centimeters, roughly. We are tracking about 193 pieces left on
orbit right now, and that will rapidly decay.
So very different not only in terms of motivation for the
event, but very different in terms of debris fallout.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, let us go to another program,
the Multiple User Objective System (MUOS), ultra-high frequency
(UHF)-band communication satellite. It is scheduled to launch
around March 2010. What is the current status on this? Is its
launch still on?
Admiral Deutsch. Senator, I would like to say that it is
doing fairly well on schedule. As a matter of fact, I think the
schedule performance index is at about .97 right now. So we are
still doing very well on schedule.
Sir, I think the actual launch will be in December 2009,
with initial on-orbit capability of March 2010. There is
pressure on the schedule. I won't sit here and promise you that
that will definitely be the date that it will launch. We are
now in single-line flow, and with your experience, you are well
aware of what happens at that time.
That is where you get into the situations where, if you
have a problem, you may have to stop and redesign a component.
We have had a couple of components that have had some issues
and have eaten up some of the margin. Having said that, we have
successfully solved those component issues, and we believe that
we are still on track for the initial launch in the winter of
2009.
Senator Bill Nelson. There have been technical issues with
the ultra-high frequency follow-on (UFO) satellite, so that
there is likely to be a gap in UHF capability. What is your
analysis of this gap?
Admiral Deutsch. Senator, the gap that you referred to is
the gap between the likelihood or the probability of eight
functioning satellites on orbit, eight UFOs, if you will. That
has been established by STRATCOM, in consultation with the
COCOMs, to be a 70 percent figure is what is desired.
As of this month, the likelihood that there will be 70
percent of the satellites still on orbit, that date is now
within 9 months of the on-orbit capability of the first MUOS.
So we have about a 9-month gap between the 70 percent
availability and then a replacement satellite capability, which
each MUOS not only carries a MUOS package, but also a UHF
legacy package as well. So about a 9-month gap right now, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now that capacity, is that the
commercial UHF capability?
Admiral Deutsch. No, sir. The commercial capability not
only the leased satellite (LEASAT) that is currently up and its
fuel is expected to remain through about 2010, that is not
factored into the 70 percent availability, nor is the
commercial UHF capability that we are working on providing as
part of the President's submit to Congress.
Senator Bill Nelson. Has the Navy started the process to
acquire commercial UHF?
Admiral Deutsch. Yes, sir. Not only leasing, but also a
hosted payload option. The leasing is besides what we have
right now on LEASAT, as I just mentioned, we also are working
on with Intelsat's Skynet. We have money programmed in the 2009
submittal for fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 leases. We
are also in the pre-solicitation synopsis release phase for the
hosted payload.
We have an industry day this month, as a matter of fact, to
talk to industry about potentially hosting a payload. In our
submittal to you, sir, we have money dedicated towards that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. The Chinese counterspace program by all
accounts represents a significant commitment on their part.
Yesterday, DOD released its 2008 report: ``The Military Power
of the People's Republic of China.'' It highlighted their
growing counterspace capability, which includes nuclear-tipped
missiles; direct ascent ASATs, which we have seen; jammers;
ASAT lasers; and radio frequency weapons. They are also
building a domestic capability for the production of micro
satellites, which could be used as space mines or space
parasites.
I will just ask this to you, and I am not sure who should
be in priority to answer it. What value does China see in these
counterspace weapons? How would they use them in a conflict?
What do you think their ultimate objective is in terms of size
and scope of the program? General Kehler?
General Kehler. Sir, let me try this on. As a force
provider for STRATCOM, which is what Air Force Space Command
is, we wind up having to provide the STRATCOM space
capabilities that can operate during times of conflict, and so
this is a big issue for us.
Let me start by saying, though, that as we look at the
space domain today, the evidence that we see looks to be pretty
clear. We have to expect that the space domain will be
contested in any future conflict. We see evidence that
potential adversaries and others are preparing to deny us the
advantages that we have in space in lots of different places.
The Chinese are one of those.
As we look at them, the answer to the questions that you
posed, though, is probably the most puzzling to us, and that is
we don't know. It isn't clear to us what their intent really
is. In terms of their acquisition, in terms of the ASAT test
that they conducted a little over a year ago, and what those
implications are for us for the future.
What we believe we have to do, though, is be prudent.
Therefore, we are preparing to have to continue to provide our
space capabilities in a contested environment. We are working
very hard on that, and so, sir, I can't answer for you
directly--I am not sure anyone can answer directly where we
think the Chinese are going here.
I did read the report from yesterday. Fundamentally, it is
information that we have been reporting to Congress in various
venues. The key question, I think, and the report poses this
question is ``why?'' What is it that they are doing, and what
is their intent behind the visible activity that we can see?
I can tell you that it is concerning to us, and those of us
that are forced to prepare to provide military capability in
conflict have to take account of the fact that we see the kinds
of things that were shown in the report that was issued again
yesterday. I believe that we are on a good pathway to address
those. I also want to suggest to you that the Chinese are not
the only folks that we watch with concern.
Senator Sessions. I am sure that is true. What about
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)? It seems to me that
throughout our DOD procurement, we need to be looking for
capabilities that are less expensive and have substantial
volume and a quick response time and ability to deploy
promptly.
I had a professor in college that talked about before it
became, I guess, so common to think about the Russian tanks and
the German tanks. The German tanks had leather interior and
cost a fortune. But, as he argued, all it was was a piece of
metal with a gun that could hit his target. You get more of
them, you are better off. So it could be less attractive and
superb in a lot of ways, but still to be able to do the job
that we need to be doing.
So let me ask this, General Kehler first. What are we
starting to learn from the TSAT-2 experiment that we had in
terms of, one, developing small technology satellite
technology; two, improving our acquisition approach to
satellites and launch vehicles; and, three, operational
concepts related to warfighter? Would you start off with that,
and I will ask anybody else to contribute?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. First of all, I believe you are
referring to Tactical Satellite (TACSAT)-2, and let me say at
the outset that improving our responsiveness across the board
is something that we think is critically important.
Senator Sessions. What do you mean by ``responsiveness,''
for someone who might be listening in and not know what you are
talking about?
General Kehler. It covers a range of things for us, as a
matter of fact. We have chunked this up, if you will, into
three tiers' worth of what we think about responsiveness. The
first is how do you make your existing capabilities more
responsive? My colleagues and I believe that helping ourselves
on the ground--which may sound a little odd here--is the first
step to being more responsive. That is, how do we make more
responsive the things that are on orbit today?
In many cases, the way we have to go about that is by
making the ground systems more responsive, using those
platforms that are on orbit in better and more efficient ways
and handing information, in many cases, directly from the
platforms to the warfighters, which is something that the
warfighters have always demanded.
So the first step for us is to make sure the existing
systems are more responsive, and largely, that is something----
Senator Sessions. More responsive basically to the
warfighter?
General Kehler. More responsive to the warfighter in terms
of being more timely and handing product over to them, whether
that is imagery or whether that is communications product,
whatever. Getting that farther down into the warfighting
echelon sometimes is helpful as well.
Then the second step for us is how do we make in big terms
acquisition more responsive to the warfighter needs. As the GAO
points out, it takes us too long to put things on orbit, and we
have been addressing those issues. Part of our back-to-basics
approach, for example, in acquisition, part of acquisition
corrections that were made as a result of decisions we made in
the 1990s, et cetera, all apply here. I believe that we can
even do more in terms of coming up with a strategy that helps
us to deploy capability sooner.
In fact, we have people off looking at that and maybe we
can come back and have a discussion with you at some point
about the strategy that we have been on, the relatively small
number of large platforms versus a large number of small
platforms. Your tank analogy, if you will. I think that is a
great question for us to ask ourselves.
Of course, ORS. Then how can we position ourselves to have
the ability as a national strategic capability to put platforms
on orbit maybe within months as opposed to years? That is what
ORS is all about. How do we make that affordable? How do we
make that achievable? How do we make all of that feasible?
To come full circle to your question, I think what TACSAT-2
showed us, which was really the first of the experiments that
we put on orbit that tries to follow a more rapid, smaller way
of conducting our business, what that showed us more than
anything else, more than the technical capability of the
platform was it validated the concept.
It validated for us that this makes sense for us to have in
our toolkit as we try to improve our responsiveness across the
board that at the one end of our ability to deploy capability,
we want to have something that can put a smaller platform up
there, maybe has a single purpose, doesn't last more than a
couple of years, applies its output directly to the warfighter,
is controlled by the warfighter, and is something that we could
have as a replenishment, for example, capability if, in fact,
we take losses on orbit or augmentation to supplement some
capability that is up there.
It is very, very promising to us, and I believe that the
output of TACSAT-2 was a validation of the concept, not as much
about the technology, that, we will get better at as time goes
on. There were technologically good things about TACSAT as
well, but I think, more importantly, it was a validation of the
concept. It also helped us understand better where the gaps
were in the concept. So, it helped us come back and address
where those are and get those closed.
Senator Sessions. I guess we know that there is a threat to
any satellites we put up, that a lot of nations have the
capability, if they put their mind to it, to threaten those
capabilities. One response to it would be to be able to put
another one back up on a very short notice, would it not? Would
you agree with that?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. So I guess my question is, are we moving?
We talk about it, but my question is, are we moving to have a
low-cost launch system? Are we going to have a low-cost
satellite that would meet just those qualities and capabilities
you mentioned for the warfighter and make sure that at least
the people we have in harm's way are able to maintain the
capabilities of our FCSs that all require satellite capability?
General Kehler. The answer, Senator, is, yes, sir, we are.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Payton, do you want to comment?
Mr. Payton. One of the critical elements of shortening that
timeframe to be more responsive to the COCOM is to shorten the
amount of time it takes to assemble the spacecraft and put the
requisite payload sensors on that spacecraft. That is called
plug-and-play spacecraft.
We currently have four TACSATs that have been defined. One
has been launched. The other three are in different stages of
preparation for launch. The fifth TACSAT will fly that
conceptual plug-and-play spacecraft, a demonstration where we
can plug together a spacecraft similar to the way laptop
computers are plugged together after you phone the company and
say, ``I need this kind of hard drive and this kind of memory
and this kind of display.'' They plug-and-play a laptop for
you. That is the same construct that we will demonstrate on
TACSAT-5.
Senator Sessions. It seems to me we would want to have in
inventory some satellites that, I don't mean weeks, I mean
within days, could replace one that fails or is damaged in some
fashion. Is that part of your vision?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. Again, we are headed in that
direction. I would describe the current ORS effort, though, in
crawl, walk, and run terms. We are crawling. I believe we are
about to start walking.
When we cross those thresholds, what we are doing with the
ORS program right now is we are essentially developing the
piece parts that allow you to get to a more and more and more
responsive solution. When you get there, I believe you are then
to the point where if you decide, some things may go on the
shelf for immediate use, some things may be assembled and
purchased within months, which may be sufficient to respond to
warning. We will have the capability----
Senator Sessions. I see the fiscal year 2009 through the
fiscal year 2013 budget calls for $550 million for ORS. It
appears to me to be modest. Who wants to comment on that? You
are required to answer. What do you think?
Mr. Payton. I will give that a shot, Senator. Again, we
have to crawl, walk, run. Our first investments are into what
we call enablers, like the plug-and-play spacecraft, like a
spacecraft control center that can handle more than one kind of
satellite constellation at a time, a multi-mission spacecraft
operations center, where one person flies a certain kind of
satellite in the morning and that same person is trained and
qualified to fly a different kind of satellite in the
afternoon.
Additionally, we have to improve some of our ground support
equipment. Right now, there is a launch vehicle called the
Minotaur. We can only process one Minotaur at a time. Now we
may need to be in the business of processing a Minotaur up in
Kodiak, AK, for a launch and at the same time, one out of
Wallops Island here in Virginia.
So we have to invest in some of the fundamental enablers
that sometimes are exotic, but typically are not. Those are
where we are putting our money right now. Equally important, we
are working with STRATCOM, who represents the combatant
warfighters--the geographical combatant warfighters in this
case--and quantifying what sort of capabilities, what sort of
needs do those theater COCOMs have for systems like ORS. So, we
are in the business operations side of it, quantifying what the
theater commanders need, while additionally in parallel, we are
working on those enablers that allow us to migrate from crawl
to walk to run.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, with regard to this ORS, are
you satisfied you are part of this? You have at least one
senior scientist in the office.
Admiral Deutsch. Yes, sir, we are satisfied. We would like
to play a larger role. We certainly would like the Naval
Research Laboratory, which has a pretty distinguished history
in space and has a lot of talent, to also play a larger role.
We are working it through the requirements process.
Of note, like the fellow Services, we are strongly in favor
of making the ORS office a joint office with a rotating
director. This year, we will nominate an individual to perform
as the director of the ORS office. So if we are lucky, we would
certainly like to have that individual serve, and we look
forward to, as General Kehler and Secretary Payton mentioned,
advances in ORS.
We think there is a need for it within Navy's requirements.
There will be a growing need, as recent events have shown, in
the future to be able to rapidly replenish and to put
capability on orbit.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do any of you all need any new
authority to make the office more efficient, more effective?
Mr. Payton. We looked at that closely. Initially, we
thought there were all sorts of inhibitions to an organization
like we have in Albuquerque. Come to find out the single
largest benefit would be if their money were all research and
development (R&D) money, instead of being divided up into
procurement or operation and maintenance or science and
technology (S&T) money. If all of their budget were single
color money, R&D money, that adds a lot of flexibility to how
rapidly they can respond to warfighter needs.
Senator Bill Nelson. There was an issue about the
electronic intelligence payload on TACSAT-2. What was the
issue, and what was the resolution, and what was the lesson
learned?
General Shelton. Senator, the problem was signal
intelligence operational tasking authority, and that is the
purview of the National Security Agency (NSA). So getting that
authority had not been worked out ahead of time. That is one of
the key lessons learned from TACSAT-2. That, I am confident,
will never happen again. We will work that well ahead of time
and get the NSA's permission to have that operational tasking
authority that is needed.
Senator Bill Nelson. TACSAT-1 is supposed to launch this
June or July. Are you ready to go? Are all of the issues
resolved?
General Shelton. To my knowledge, Senator, we are ready to
go. I think it is more of a booster problem than anything.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, GAO has been looking at
the standup of the ORS office. What do you say?
Ms. Chaplain. As you can hear the talk about ORS today, you
realize that there are a lot of efforts involved with this
program. Many on the short-term side, which involve developing
these TACSATs and launching them, and also addressing potential
capability gaps in some of the acquisition programs.
There is also a very long-term effort to ORS to get to this
vision of having satellites on the shelf ready to go at any
moment. In addition to plug-and-play, that includes having
common interfaces, having well-understood common design
practices, and also having low-cost launch. Our concern, while
we thought the ORS effort is doing a pretty good job of
standing up the program office and getting staff and
progressing with these S&T efforts, our concern is that over
the long run, there is a chance that some of these short-term
demands may end up overwhelming the long-term effort.
So we have to keep our eye on things like getting low-cost
launch and keeping up with the design effort and things like
interfaces. So, in our review, we are going to be recommending
that there be an investment strategy to help guide this program
office. It is a small office. It doesn't have longstanding
clout, like a huge acquisition program has. So it may have
trouble negotiating a lot of the demands being placed on it if
it doesn't have strategy and good support from above.
General Kehler. Sir, if I could add something to that?
Inside Air Force Space Command, we now have the Space and
Missile Systems Center, the large acquisition house. A key
issue for us all along here for ORS has been how do we attach
the ORS office so that it can leverage the capabilities that
are brought in, the money that is brought by the Space and
Missile Systems Center.
We are still working our way through that. The way we have
done it today is that we have dual-hatted the director of the
ORS office. So not only is he the director of the ORS office,
but he also has a role in the Space and Missile Systems Center.
That has been very helpful to us. It is a joint office. So,
regardless of where we go with the leadership, we intend to
make sure that relationship remains in whatever way we can make
that happen because GAO is exactly right, that there has to be
some attachment here for a smaller organization that will have
to leverage the larger organization. We are committed to making
that happen.
Mr. Payton. Speaking on organizations, again, the ORS
office has Air Force, Army, and Navy people onsite in
Albuquerque. Additionally, there is a NASA representative
onsite in Albuquerque from NASA Johnson Space Center, and even
an NSA person is assigned there now, again to help us with the
lessons that we learned from the first TACSAT-2.
Senator Bill Nelson. Back on the issue of debris, General
Shelton, what is your modeling and simulation roadmap?
General Shelton. Right now, Senator, we have an Aerospace
Corporation effort that provides that modeling and simulation
capability for debris. That is also peer reviewed by some NASA
work, and I think there are very consistent results between
NASA's modeling efforts and aerospace's modeling efforts. So I
think we have the best of all worlds here, where we have
experts in DOD, experts in NASA whose results agree very
closely.
Of course, NASA is focused on the manned spaceflight side
of things, and DOD is focused on the broader issues of
spaceflight. But to have that agreement, I think we are doing
very well on debris modeling.
Senator Bill Nelson. On this same issue, we had to move
some satellites to avoid debris from the Chinese. Has there
been any satellite that has been damaged by the debris?
General Shelton. Not to our knowledge, Senator. We have
moved a couple, as you are aware. But neither of those resulted
in damage, nor anything that we have seen to date that we can
track that back to debris from the Chinese ASAT test.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, and what have your models
shown that the Chinese debris is no longer going to pose a
risk?
General Shelton. It will be decades before all of that
debris is down. Now, having said that, the models put the
overall spaceflight risks on the order of 10 to the minus 6,
which is 1 in 1 million. But that is if you take great solace
in probabilities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, I am going to go to the Space-
Based Infrared System next. Senator Ben Nelson, did you want to
get in on any of these issues we have discussed thus far?
Senator Ben Nelson. I am not sure I know all of the ones
that have been discussed so far, but I do have a couple of
questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, and then you finish and we
will let you take off.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to welcome all of you here today. Thanks for
your service, and much of what you are involved with today is
clearly going to assist us in this global war of terrorism.
My first question relates to the recapitalization and
modernization. General Moseley has already said that the Air
Force needs to recapitalize and modernize its fleet of both
air-breathing and space systems. Of course, we are familiar
with the new fighters, new bombers and tankers, and everything
that is on the drawing board as well as those that have not
been financed so far.
But as we look at the Space Command, what space systems
might be old and failing? I am thinking in part about all of
the assets that are in the ground out in Nebraska and other
areas, the missile systems that are there. Consequently, would
that be part of the recapitalization to try to extend the life
20 to 30 years of some of those assets that are already in the
ground there?
I guess I would ask you, Secretary Payton?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. We have a plan to go to 2020 with our
Minuteman fleet, and we have just finished a series of
significant upgrades to that fleet. As we conduct aging tests
with the technology in that fleet, we will be able to judge
more accurately, but we think the technology improvements we
have made recently can probably go to 2030.
So we do know certain areas of the missile system that will
need upgrading--avionics in the guidance package, for
instance--but we are confident that we can get at least to 2020
and high likelihood to 2030 with the upgrades that we have just
finished for the Minuteman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do the generals agree with that?
General Kehler. Sir, let me put a little bit finer point on
what Mr. Payton has said. The Air Force Space Command does, in
fact, have responsibility for the Nation's land-based
intercontinental ballistic missile force. Congress has
approved, over the last 5 or more years now, almost $7 billion
in service life extension, if you will, to Minuteman. We are
getting to the end of that time.
We are very confident that we can take Minuteman to 2020.
This has been service life extension of the boosters, the
guidance system, the bus that carries the payloads if the need
should arise, et cetera. We have also made some substantial
investment in security improvements with additional concrete on
the launch facilities, remote cameras, and other things. So we
are very confident we can go to 2020.
You in Congress have asked us about going from 2020 to
2030, and quite honestly, we are still looking at that very
hard. There is one school of thought that says that we can go
to 2030, and I tend to think that is possible. But what I don't
know is what additional investment will be required to do that,
and so, we owe you some answers on that.
We owe ourselves some answers on that as well. I am not
ready to stand up and say that system definitely can go to
2030. It looks like the work that has been done and the
congressional support that has gone on so far puts us in a good
position for that, but I think it is fair for us to take a
harder look.
We have never gone there before, sir, and much like some of
our aging aircraft that we had some issues with, we don't know
what Minuteman as a system behaves like when it gets over the
age of 50 or 60 or approaches 70. So, that is something that we
are going to have to come back and tell you.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, 5 years ago, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense signed out a policy letter designating the
Air Force as the executive agent for space. That seems to have
been successful for us because at least the back-to-basics
approach seems to generate what we would hope in the way of
expertise as well as a plan.
But the position of the Under Secretary of the Air Force is
vacant, and I guess, Mr. Secretary, what is the Air Force's
view regarding that position, if you know? Will it remain
vacant until the end of the administration's time, and is the
Air Force's view of the executive agent still operative today?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The DOD instruction, the DOD document
that empowers the executive agent for space says that the
Secretary of the Air Force is the executive agent for space.
That individual can delegate that to the Under Secretary of the
Air Force. The Under Secretary position is vacant right now. I
cannot predict if it will be filled. It is a nominative,
confirmed position.
But we are fortunate in that Secretary Michael W. Wynne,
the Secretary of the Air Force, is extremely knowledgeable in
the space business, both launch vehicles and ground control
segments and satellites, due to his background.
Senator Ben Nelson. I certainly wouldn't suggest that he is
not knowledgeable. I guess my concern is that without that
position being filled, that he already has enough to do without
taking on the Under Secretary's position. Or if he could do it,
maybe we don't need the position of the Under Secretary?
I am just hopeful that we won't saddle the Secretary with
more than we should.
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Based on the fact that position is
there.
Mr. Payton. Sir, again, I cannot project into the future if
there will be any nominees or anyone that----
Senator Ben Nelson. Maybe I should call him and ask him,
huh? I won't tell him you suggested that. It was my idea.
One final thing, with the end of the Cold War, there seems
to have been a pause in our investment in the U.S. nuclear
community. So, in a February 10th LA Times article, the U.N.'s
chief watchdog, Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, warned that the most
imminent threat is not a new nation joining the nuclear club,
but rather deadly material falling into the hands of
extremists.
With the risk of extremists pursuing dirty bombs, as we
know, and also concern about anti-proliferation, are we in a
position where we need to reinvest in new personnel and in new
technology and new assets in this area? I guess I would ask
you, General Kehler.
General Kehler. Sir, first of all, proliferation concerns
us very much. Attempts at counterproliferation, of course, are
ongoing at all levels. In terms of our own nuclear forces, I
can speak for, again, land-based strategic deterrent inside Air
Force Space Command. When I took my job in October, the first
question that I had was are we being good stewards of the
Nation's land-based strategic deterrent? The answer that I came
to was, yes, we are.
I did that in a combination of visits to our field
commanders, some assessments that our field commanders had
done. The fact that we went back and reviewed the standards
that we have for our nuclear activities, which, by the way,
have been in existence for over 50 years now and, in some
cases, since the end of the Cold War, have gotten more
stringent.
But what has changed since the end of the Cold War, there
are some things out there that concern me. One is security. The
good news is that the number of weapons since the end of the
Cold War have declined drastically, and that is good. That is
the way all of us wanted--
Senator Ben Nelson. That is assuming that we know where the
decline, where those that have declined are resident right now.
Is that right?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. We certainly do. We know where
ours are.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, but I am obviously concerned about
where ours are.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. But I am less concerned about that than
perhaps where the others are.
General Kehler. That is the proliferation issue. What we
have seen, again, in our own house is certainly with the
decline in numbers came the decline in number of people
associated with the nuclear mission, which inherently in that
decline in the number of people, we have a decline in
experience, and that is what concerns me.
So we have done a number of studies in the Air Force, and
those outside the Air Force have helped us look at this, in the
last 6 months or so. There have been a number of
recommendations made that we are now in the process of
implementing to try to make sure that our experience base is
firm, that we have made the investments that we need to make,
that we are complying with our standards, that we have not
taken our eye off of this most important, in my view, of all
the balls that we have.
So, we are addressing some recommendations at this point in
our command that get to, for example, even increased security
beyond where we find ourselves today. It gets to some changing
in operating concepts and the way we do our business in the
missile complexes to put security and surety first. So, I am
very comfortable that we are on the right paths.
I will remain concerned about our experience level. We have
gone back to basics on that as well. We are going to make sure
that we have done everything we can do to grow people with the
appropriate experience, and we will pay attention to that and
are already paying attention to that in many different ways.
So the long answer to your question is I believe that we
can have high confidence in the way we are operating our land-
based deterrent force today. I am concerned about
proliferation. Of course, that is a concern across the board
with us, and we do have some issues to go address in light of
some of the reviews that we have done recently, and we will go
address those.
Senator Ben Nelson. Will the authorization request that we
have, and are looking at, adequately handle the staffing
requirements that you are talking about with developing the new
expertise or the expertise in light of where we are today, and
is at all adversely affected by the reduction in end strength
within the Air Force?
General Kehler. Again, speaking from within my command, I
do believe we are adequately addressing this. This is largely
the use of the people that we have, and it is making sure that
we are fostering the development of certain folks who, from
second lieutenant all the way up, are going to be developed as
nuclear experts. I think we have a commensurate concern with
the laboratories and elsewhere across the nuclear enterprise of
whether we have the appropriate experience, whether we have the
appropriate industrial capacity here to do what we need to do,
and I think those are all good questions that are being
addressed.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay, as long as the budget request is
adequate for that. Because what I don't want to find is that,
for example, the Air Force budget for planes and so forth is
inadequate to the tune of $20 billion per year for each of the
next 5 years, which is outside the budget and not part of the
authorization request at all, but we are going to be presented
with trying to deal with that.
I hope there are no surprises of that kind dealing with the
nuclear arsenal and the space issues.
General Kehler. Sir, again, I can't speak outside my
command. I can tell you that inside the command, I believe that
we are adequately resourced.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay, all you can do.
General Kehler. I will also add, though, if I may? One of
my concerns in extending Minuteman from 2020 to 2030 is beyond
the boosters, et cetera, it also goes to the weapons and
whether we will have the appropriate industrial capacity to do
everything we need to do for the weapons.
Senator Ben Nelson. When will you know what would be
required?
General Kehler. Those assessments go on all the time. In
terms of the stockpile, the warhead stockpile, those
assessments are going on constantly. What we don't know yet is
what we don't know about how some of these things age.
Again, there are other efforts underway to make sure that
we don't find ourselves in a very awkward position, and there
are other folks besides me working with other committees here
on the Hill to take a hard look at the weapons complex itself.
I can't speak for that here other than as a consumer, as a
customer of that, making sure that we are addressing it.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been very tolerant. Thank
you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Thune?
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all
very much for your service and for being here today.
I know the Chairman is anxious to move into closed session,
but I wanted to find out and maybe these are questions that
could be asked in that setting if they can't be answered in
open session. But I wanted to get to this issue of the
shootdown of the malfunctioning spy satellite a few weeks ago.
I applaud the Navy's successful shootdown, but I also, at the
same time, want to touch a little bit on the cost of a
malfunctioning satellite because, obviously, whenever we shoot
down something like that, we are blowing up a large amount of
money on that particular item.
So, I guess to the extent that you can discuss this in open
session, I am curious to know, do we know what the malfunction
was? What caused it? What is the cost of losing that satellite?
Perhaps then maybe the question about how do we hold the
contractor accountable? Do they reimburse the Government? Those
sorts of questions, if anybody, Mr. Secretary, can answer that?
Mr. Payton. I believe what we can say at this juncture is
that it is an NRO satellite that was the target, and that is
the limit of what we can say in this forum.
Senator Thune. Okay, so those are all questions for another
time.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you can go with us to S-407?
Senator Thune. That is where we are going to go next?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes. Ask that same question there.
Senator Thune. Okay.
General Kehler. Yes, sir. However, I would just add one
other thing here. None of us sitting here represent the
National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) today.
Senator Thune. Right.
General Kehler. So I know I can't answer the specifics of
your question. So I don't want to create an impression that we
can go somewhere else and answer. I can't, and I don't think
anybody else at the table can either.
Senator Thune. Okay, let me ask, Mr. Secretary, last month
the Chinese and Russians put forward a treaty proposal that
would ban space programs. I am wondering if you could comment
on that proposal and what the administration's position is on
the general principle of a space weapons ban?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The presidential policy from August
2006 on space says that arms control agreements or restrictions
must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct
research, development, testing, or operations in space. That is
founded on a couple of principles. As a military acquisition
group, we respond to what the President would say, clearly. But
some of the difficulties of a space treaty of some sort would
revolve around definitions and verification.
Some of the best strategic treaties in recent memory have
been founded on trust, but verify. So the verification regime
would be very difficult for space weapons. For instance, a
routine satellite that is up there doing a normal job could,
toward the end of its life, as its last act, run into another
satellite and, therefore, become an ASAT.
So it is how do you verify that it won't do that? How do
you define an ASAT in the first place? Early in the Shuttle
era, the Soviet Union was concerned that the Space Shuttle was
an ASAT, which, of course, it could not be. So the basic
fundamentals of trust, but verify would be fundamentally
impossible to do in space.
Senator Thune. I know you have exhausted the Chinese ASAT
test last year, and you talked, I think before I got here,
maybe a little bit about the whole issue of proliferation. But
I am curious to know if the panel could discuss how the notion
of prompt global strike fits into countering those types of
ASAT attacks. General?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. I will take a stab at this,
again, as a force provider for STRATCOM. The commander of
STRATCOM has asked us to participate with both the Navy and the
Army in investigating technologies and how we might give to him
a capability to do prompt global strike. The objective is
deterrence.
At least from our perspective, as we would be looking to
provide such capability to STRATCOM, the objective would be to
enhance our deterrent posture. In any ways that we can enhance
our deterrent posture, we think that we are preventing,
hopefully, a conflict to begin with. If we can prevent a
conflict, then we are into this discussion of a contested space
domain as part of a conflict.
So our view is that this has potential to contribute to our
deterrent posture and in that way gives the commander of
STRATCOM another arrow, if you will, in the quiver to use
potentially in a conflict and, therefore, could hold some very
important things around the world at risk. Whether that is a
proliferating weapon that we discover somewhere or whether
those are other kinds of targets, the commander of STRATCOM has
seen the need to be able to hold those risks.
Senator Thune. Okay.
General Shelton. Senator, as we think through the threats
to our space systems, some of them are ground based, some of
them are space based. But in dealing with the ones that are
ground based, our only option right now seems to be a kinetic
strike against that ground-based asset that is engaging our
space assets.
That leads you down that road of prompt global strike. You
also could consider a non-kinetic computer network attack or
something like that, if you could get into the network, if they
were even reliant upon a network, which is a huge intelligence
challenge to start with. But as we think about either
reconstituting or augmenting, you have to consider that that
threat is still extant and deal with that threat on the ground
before you put something into space and put it at risk just
like the thing that was just taken out.
So it is a complex problem, and as General Kehler said,
dealing with that threat on the ground with some sort of weapon
has to be a priority for us if we are going to consider
contested domain as part of a conflict.
Senator Thune. Thank you, all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Payton, are you going to be
able to answer his question in classified session?
Mr. Payton. I am not knowledgeable on the details of the
NRO spacecraft.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, your boss would be the Assistant
Secretary, would he not?
Mr. Payton. I work for Secretary Wynne.
Senator Bill Nelson. Right. The Assistant Secretary
position is vacant, isn't it?
Mr. Payton. Under Secretary is vacant, yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Under Secretary. That is the one that
is dual-hatted?
Mr. Payton. When the Under Secretary job is vacant, Mr.
Wynne is dual-hatted.
Senator Bill Nelson. He is also the Secretary of the Air
Force and the Executive Agent for Space?
General Kehler. I think he is talking about NRO.
Mr. Payton. NRO. No, the dual-hatted position for both
military space and NRO, that dual-hatted position evaporated in
2005.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So to get Senator Thune's
question answered, are you saying that there is nobody in your
bailiwick, including the Secretary of the Air Force, that can
answer that question, that we would have to go to the head of
the NRO?
Mr. Payton. That is accurate. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would the Director of National
Intelligence be able to answer the question?
Mr. Payton. If he could not answer it immediately, he could
get it for you, to be sure.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, and is there anybody in DOD that
could get it? Could the Secretary of Defense get it?
Mr. Payton. I could ask the question and run down the
answer for you. But again, the spacecraft was an NRO
responsibility.
General Kehler. Senator, it isn't about us being able to
get the answer. I just wanted to point out to you that those of
us sitting at the table don't have the answer.
Senator Bill Nelson. The head of NRO jointly reports to the
DNI and the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. So we could get it from either one of
them. All right. What we need to do is to move quickly to S-
407, and we will resume in classified session. We will submit
written questions for the record that we haven't had time to
ask here. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
evolved expendable launch vehicle
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, I recognize
that this has to be a rough ballpark estimate as each launch will carry
different satellites and booster configurations, but we need some rough
estimate to determine if there are really savings to be achieved from
the creation of United Launch Alliance (ULA). What is your best
estimate as to what an average evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV)
launch costs?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. There are five classes of launch
vehicles with a corresponding cost for each class used in the budget.
The fiscal year 2009 EELV Launch Services costs follow:

[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal
Class Year 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medium...................................................... 85.614
Intermediate
Small..................................................... 102.405
Medium.................................................... 124.792
Large..................................................... 146.060
Heavy....................................................... 207.624
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Costs associated with EELV missions are distributed between two
contract structures: EELV Launch Capability (ELC) provides the minimum
capability required for the United States to maintain assured access to
space and EELV Launch Services provides for booster production,
materials and touch labor.
ELC is a ``must-pay'' bill and provides a minimum national
capability for space launch. This allows the Air Force to comply with
the direction of the National Space Transportation Policy. The ELC
contract funds both families of launch vehicles to a basic minimum
capability (support four launches, surge to five launches, per family
each year).

2. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, when do you
expect to see the beginning of savings from the creation of ULA, and is
the advertised 25 percent cost savings realistic?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The formation of ULA will result in
cost savings to the Government. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget
reflected savings beginning in fiscal year 2011 as the ELC contract
budget line was reduced by $105 million (the Air Force share of $105
million annual savings to the total program based on a 70/30 cost ratio
between the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Organization
(NRO)) as shown in the table below. As far as projected ULA cost
savings being realistic, the proposed savings are currently being
evaluated by Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contracting
Audit Agency.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Historically, the 25 percent savings, as defined in the EELV
Operational Requirements Document (ORD), was used to measure savings
for EELV over heritage launch costs. The program is currently exceeding
the 25 percent savings. The program has always met this objective with
the current savings at 45 percent.

using the espa ring
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the March
2007 Air Force Space Test Program (STP) launch was the first time the
EELV secondary payload adapter (ESPA) ring was used and with remarkable
success, launching seven satellites from the adapter ring. This seems
to be a ready option for more space test launches or for operationally
responsive space (ORS) launches that should be used whenever possible.
What are the plans to use the ESPA ring on future EELV launches?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The Air Force has a goal to launch
at least one ESPA ring mission per year beginning in fiscal year 2012.
Implementation of the ESPA ring program is an important milestone in
our efforts to provide affordable access to space for scientific,
research, and development efforts. This secondary mission is contingent
on missions with excess margin and appropriate launch profiles,
spacecraft availability, funding availability, and acceptable
operational mission risk.

4. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shelton, do you think the ESPA ring
could be used for more ORS launches?
General Shelton. ESPA rings could enable more ORS launches. ESPA
rings on all EELVs would reverse the downturn in the size of the
Secondary Test Program (STP) launch manifest that has declined mostly
as a result of fewer space shuttle opportunities. For example, the
percentage of Navy STP experiments lifted into space declined from 2000
when 23 percent were launched, to 2005 when only 5 percent launched.
ORS could use the ESPA for S&T/R&D development in the same manner
as STP does. ORS could also use ESPA for other activities provided the
schedule and orbit are flexible, and the capability can be achieved
with less than 200kg.

5. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Deutsch, would the Navy be able to
utilize or have an interest in using the ESPA ring for small satellite
launches?
Admiral Deutsch. Yes, increased use of EELVs equipped with EELV
ESPA rings would help reverse the downturn in STP launch manifest slots
resulting primarily due to declining space shuttle opportunities.
Navy STP experiments reaching space declined from 2000 when 23
percent were launched, to 2005 when 5 percent were launched. The EELV
program will have thousands of pounds of excess throw weight. The smart
use of this excess EELV capability would help to reinvigorate Navy
space S&T. At least nine Navy current payloads have weight and orbital
parameters that are compatible as a secondary payload for an ESPA-class
launch.

operationally responsive space
6. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shelton, a lot has happened with
ORS since last year. The ORS office was stood up in May and the
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) issued an initial concept of operations.
From a STRATCOM perspective, what are the goals and requirements for
ORS?
General Shelton. STRATCOM's intent is to assure and enhance the
space contribution to joint warfare by enabling timely support to
emergent needs of Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and other users.
STRATCOM has expressed three desires with regard to ORS: first, to
rapidly exploit and infuse space technological or operational
innovations; second, to rapidly adapt or augment existing space
capabilities and when needed to expand operational capability; and
third, to rapidly reconstitute or replenish critical space capabilities
to preserve operational capability.

7. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shelton, is there anything--
capabilities, experiments, or analysis, etc.--that you want to see the
office do that is not planned now, either in the future or in addition
to what the office is doing now?
General Shelton. I believe the ORS office is on track with their
approach to pursuing responsive capabilities. We work closely with the
ORS office, and provide them operational needs and operational
perspective as they pursue initiatives. Clearly this is still a work in
progress, but the vector is certainly positive.

8. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, what is your organizational
vision for the ORS office?
General Kehler. The ORS office currently operates under the
authority, direction, and control of the Department of Defense (DOD)
Executive Agent (EA) for Space. The Director of the ORS office reports
directly to the DOD EA for Space for program execution. Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC) is posturing itself to meet ORS expectations of
executing projects under highly accelerated timelines. DOD understands
the benefits and limitations of the current organizational structure
and is prepared to reanalyze the organization of ORS after an
appropriate amount of time has passed to observe ORS execution.
The ORS concept is maturing and will continue to develop throughout
the first few years of execution. The current focus of ORS is
developing architectural concepts and enabling technology for
responsive space. A joint office with an abbreviated chain of command
provides a great opportunity to maximize the contributions of the
Services and agencies.
At some point in the future, the responsive space concept will need
to shift from the technology demonstration phase into fielding
operational systems. The Services, and in particular the Air Force, are
charged with the responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping
joint military forces for space operations. AFSPC takes this Service
responsibility seriously and intends to work closely with the ORS
office to plan for the transition of the concepts they develop into the
Air Force organizational structure. We believe that the right place for
a jointly staffed responsive space program office is as part of AFSPC.
We look forward to fully integrating responsive space concepts into our
portfolio of space programs.

9. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, are you getting cooperation
from other entities?
General Kehler. Yes, we are getting cooperation on ORS. Each of the
Services and several government agencies have provided representatives
to the ORS office. The two recent examinations of urgent STRATCOM
requirements in communications and space situational awareness (SSA)
involved the joint participation of all the different defense space
organizations. We achieved superior responses to these needs by
capitalizing on the different institutional capabilities.

10. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Deutsch, I understand that the
Navy has at least one senior scientist in the ORS office. What else can
ORS bring to the Navy and can the Navy bring to ORS?
Admiral Deutsch. What can Navy bring to ORS? Navy recently
transferred an 0-5 Space Engineering billet to the ORS office and Navy
is working to find the best qualified individual to fill the position
given constraints on the force due to other commitments such as global
war on terror and sea duty demands. The ORS office should avail itself
of the work performed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and
continue to use NRL's proven ability to develop and transition
operationally-relevant capabilities as they have done over the last 50
years using integrated government and industry teams. NRL also has
exceptional assets, such as Blossom Point Ground Station, which have
capacity and many of the characteristics needed to support ORS.
What can ORS bring to Navy? Being forward deployed, naval forces
are often the first responders in a crisis and are heavily dependent on
space capabilities to support planning and operations. The ability to
augment and reconstitute space capabilities, especially in denied
areas, is critical to winning in maritime-dominated major conflict
operations. ORS can help meet warfighter end-to-end needs for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) programs,
communications, battlespace management, command and control, position,
navigation and timing (PNT), and meteorological support. ORS resources
could provide Navy with flexible options to protect and extend space
capabilities in denied and restricted environments, reducing the impact
of satellite vulnerability and reducing risk in strategic and tactical
warning.

11. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, are there any new
authorities that the ORS office needs to operate more efficiently or
effectively?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The ORS office does not currently
require any additional authorities to achieve the desired results.
However, the greatest benefit to the program would be to receive all
funding as research and development (R&D) funding instead of being
divided into procurement or science and technology (S&T) funding.
Having the ORS budget as R&D would add flexibility and speed in
responding to warfighter needs.
General Shelton. From a STRATCOM perspective, the ORS office has
the authorities required for success. As the staffing levels mature in
the ORS office, we expect their efforts and effectiveness will increase
commensurately.
Admiral Deutsch. Navy believes the ORS office has the appropriate
level of authority at this time.
Ms. Chaplain. The ORS initiative is just getting underway so it is
premature at this point to definitively answer whether new authorities
are needed. The joint ORS office intends to leverage off existing
contracting and acquisition authorities of other organizations, as well
as their resources, in meeting unmet space requirements. The office
expects these leveraging efforts to streamline the overall process for
delivering capabilities as soon as possible.

12. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, TACSAT-1 is scheduled to be
launched in the June-July timeframe and also has an electronic
intelligence payload. Are the issues all resolved with TACSAT-1 so that
there are not similar problems?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The DOD will ensure needed
authorities are in place prior to future TACSAT and ORS launches.
TACSAT-1 was scheduled for launch in 2004 on a SpaceX Falcon-1 launch
vehicle. Since the Falcon-1 launch capability is still not available,
the ORS office is evaluating options for how to best use the existing
TACSAT-1 space vehicle hardware.
General Shelton. TACSAT-1A has been developed in response to a
STRATCOM and ORS office request to upgrade the payload, utilizing
lessons learned from TACSAT-2. One of the lessons learned was that
SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) needed to be fully
justified and approved for all appropriate future ORS projects. This
will ensure authority for tasking, as well as allowing data to be
released for processing. All parties involved in TACSAT-1A understand
the importance of SOTA approval as a precursor to operations.
Admiral Deutsch. Navy defers to STRATCOM.
Ms. Chaplain. The joint ORS office expects to have a decision by
July 2008 regarding the sensors that are to be incorporated on TACSAT-
1. Two issues surrounded the operation of TACSAT-2. First, the
encryption device that was to be used in conjunction with the
electronic intelligence payload on TACSAT-2 failed after launch. This
caused concern regarding how to securely transmit information between
platforms, for example, from satellite to aircraft. The second TACSAT-2
issue pertained to the potential for misuse of the automatic
identification system (AIS). While AIS is used to identify and locate
ships, there was some concern that this sensor could be used to collect
space intelligence information. Regarding TACSAT-1, it will not host an
encryption device like TACSAT-2, so these satellites could not share
this same problem. As for AIS, currently there is no sponsor willing to
pay to add the AIS sensor to TACSAT-1. Without a funding source for AIS
and commensurate operations and maintenance activities, AIS will not
pose an issue to ORS.

joint space operations center
13. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shelton, the Joint Space
Operations Center (J-SPOC) stood up at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB)
in 2005 and is currently completing a move into its permanent space at
Vandenberg. Based on a J-SPOC fact sheet, the center ``provides a focal
point for the operational employment for worldwide space forces'' and
that it ``creates a single integrated space picture.'' Part of this
responsibility, as I understand it, is to track all objects in space,
including debris and understanding what the objects are doing. Modeling
and simulation capabilities are key to presenting this space picture
and to have the necessary SSA. My assumption is that your capability to
do this is limited. What is your modeling and simulation roadmap?
General Shelton. AFSPC's Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), as
well as Air Force Materiel Command's Electronic Systems Center (ESC),
has the responsibility for developing the tools we need to modernize
the J-SPOC. This modernization effort will enable command and control
of space forces, and provide the SSA necessary to underpin all space
operations. We need tools that combine vast amounts of data into
decision-quality information, that help us analyze trends, and that
provide decision aids for our operators. SMC and ESC are currently
working with the Air Force Research Laboratory to accelerate work on
prototype tools that will improve our capabilities while reducing the
risk for the Integrated SSA and Space C2 acquisition programs.
Additionally, AFSPC and AFRL have engaged with Department of Energy
(DOE) modeling and simulation experts via technical interchange
meetings to leverage DOE's considerable expertise in this area.

spaced-based infrared system
14. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, with the recent delay in the
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program it appears that management
reserves for SBIRS will likely be depleted in early 2009, several years
earlier than intended when the program was restructured in 2006. If
this is true, what, in your view, are the Air Force and the DOD going
to have to do to address the problem?
Ms. Chaplain. To keep the SBIRS program on track to meet schedule
milestones, DOD will likely have to provide additional funds to address
unanticipated problems, given the high complexity of the integration
that remains on the first satellite, and the recently identified design
flaw on the flight software. If DOD decides not to replenish management
reserves once they deplete, unanticipated problems will consume these
resources much earlier than planned, causing SBIRS to suffer additional
schedule slips.

15. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, is the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) planning to assess the efforts to resolve
the software problems on the first SBIRS Geostationary (GEO) satellite?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes, we have recently initiated an effort to
determine the events and circumstances that contributed to the SBIRS
flight software problem as a follow up to this committee's earlier
request to review SBIRS. Through this effort, we intend to determine
what software plans and alternatives DOD is considering, and the
commensurate risks of each, as well as an approach for resolving the
software problems. In addition, we will determine whether DOD has
identified the cost and schedule implications to the SBIRS program as a
result of the problems encountered with the flight software.

schedule and need for follow-on program
16. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, in the fiscal year 2008
budget request, the Air Force submitted a request for a program called
the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS) which was an
alternative infrared program to SBIRS. By the time the budget request
was submitted, the reason for the program was largely overtaken by
events and Congress directed that the program be restructured. In the
fiscal year 2009 budget request, the AIRSS program is gone and a new
program called Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS) is in the
budget. This is supposed to be the follow-on to SBIRS. Have you had a
chance to review the request for this third generation follow-on to
SBIRS to determine if the program is appropriately timed and structured
to address technology risk and readiness, and to meet the requirement
for missile warning systems?
Ms. Chaplain. We have not been requested to conduct an in-depth
review of the 3GIRS, but we plan to continue to work informally with
the program office to keep apprised of its overall plans and progress.

17. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General
Shelton, what is the need date for a follow-on program and in this
instance, is there an advantage to continue with the SBIRS program?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. Continuing to procure the SBIRS
through GEO-4 is the lowest risk approach for continuity of service to
meet critical national defense needs of missile warning, missile
defense, battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence. SBIRS is
the successor to the Defense Support Program (DSP) with increased
capabilities to meet the four mission needs. The first SBIRS Highly
Elliptical Orbit (HEO) payload is on orbit and test results are
exceeding performance specifications. SBIRS GEO-1 satellite is making
integration and test progress and the program is resolving flight
software issues. GEO-1 is baselined for a December 2009 delivery. The
infrared (IR) sensors for GEO-2 are proceeding well in thermal vacuum
testing, and the GEO-2 satellite delivery is baselined for December
2010. The fiscal year 2009 budget has procurement funding for GEO-3 in
fiscal year 2009, and funding GEO-4 beginning with advanced procurement
in fiscal year 2010. We will still require space-based infrared
surveillance continuity of mission after SBIRS GEO-4. The 3GIRS
program, which is currently focused on full-earth staring IR technology
maturation and system definition, is also in our fiscal year 2009
budget. There is adequate funding in the fiscal year 2009 budget
request for 3GIRS to complete technology maturation and system
definition activities. These efforts will inform the DOD to make a
system design decision in late fiscal year 2010 and proceed with system
design and development of 3GIRS.
General Shelton. The missile warning, technical intelligence, and
battlespace characterization missions that DSP and SBlRS perform are
critical to the United States. The sensor sensitivity that SBIRS will
provide will greatly improve our battlespace characterization, thereby
increasing the value of this infrared data to our warfighters. As we
consider a future that will see further proliferation of ballistic
missiles with shorter burn times and lower heat signatures, our sensor
capabilities need to keep pace. STRATCOM will continue to advocate for
robust, capable IR sensors in space.

18. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General
Shelton, what are the disadvantages?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The key disadvantages of continuing
to build SBIRS GEO satellites are parts obsolescence, older technology,
and complex designs resulting in high recurring costs. The evolution to
3GIRS would result in smaller, lighter, and mechanically simpler IR
payloads to maintain the continuity of critical mission areas (missile
warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
awareness).
General Shelton. From STRATCOM's operational perspective, a
continuing strong IR sensor development program is needed. Whether that
is accomplished under the rubric of the SBIRS program or some other
avenue, it's clear that we must continue the research to constantly
improve our space-based IR capability. Missile defense, missile
warning, battlefield characterization, and technical intelligence are
all enhanced by improved IR sensors in space.

synchronization of equipment
19. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, user equipment to allow
troops to use the special new military signal on Global Positioning
System (GPS) satellites--the M code--is not yet available and may not
be available until after all M code satellites are on orbit. Is the
equipment to utilize the capabilities of other new satellites as they
become available, such as the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS), Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, and the Multiple User
Objective System (MUOS), on track to utilize the new satellites as soon
as they become available?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. Terminal and satellite deployments,
which for the Air Force include WGS and AEHF, are programmed to enable
users to operate on the new systems as follows:

(1) With the submission of the fiscal year 2009 FYDP, the Air
Force has synchronized the development of M-Code receiver
technology with the on-orbit availability of M-Code service.
(2) At first WGS launch, over 885 currently fielded, joint
terminals, will be able to use the system's legacy X-band
capability. At the time of the sixth and final WGS launch,
4,586 joint terminals are programmed to be fielded to take
advantage of the new WGS Ka-band capability.
(3) At first AEHF launch, over 1,290 currently fielded, joint
terminals, will be able to use the system's legacy MILSTAR-like
capabilities. At the time of the fourth and final AEHF launch,
83 percent of the joint terminals planned to take advantage of
the new AEHF waveform are programmed to have been fielded.

General Shelton. The WGS Ground Multi-band Terminal started
fielding last year before the launch of the first WGS. The initial
fielding of these terminals will be complete by the end of fiscal year
2011 (FOC by fiscal year 2014). There are currently a significant
number of terminals already in the field which have already been
passing communications over the satellite.
The first AEHF satellite will be launched in January 2009 with only
the Low Data Rate and Medium Data Rate capability, so AEHF is backward
compatible with existing Milstar terminals. Once the second AEHF
satellite is launched in fiscal year 2010, the Extended Data Rate
capability will be made available to users; however, there will be
limited terminals available initially (approximately 80), but
increasing as the Services field the new terminals through fiscal year
2016.
The first MUOS satellite will be launched in December 2009, and it
is backward compatible with the legacy UHF terminals. The legacy
terminals, however, cannot fully utilize the increased channel capacity
until the new terminals are fielded beginning in fiscal year 2011.
STRATCOM emphasized terminal synchronization via our Integrated
Priority List for fiscal years 2010-2015.
Admiral Deutsch. Navy terminals for WGS and MUOS advanced waveforms
are lagging behind the current satellite launches. WGS Ka capability is
also being incorporated into the NMT terminal, and therefore, lags
behind the WGS constellation IOC, however, the WSC 6 SHF SATCOM
terminals are being upgraded to access the WGS Ka capability and
finding for this has been programmed for procurement and installation
beginning in fiscal year 2009. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
Airborne, Maritime/Fixed Station (AMF) terminal, required to access the
MUOS constellation, has experienced delays and will lag the satellite
by approximately 4 years.
Ms. Chaplain. We have expressed concerns about synchronization of
ground assets for these systems in previous reports and believe those
concerns are still valid. We plan to provide your staff with more
detailed concerns in briefings later this spring.

20. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, has GAO looked at the issues
and problems associated with matching up user equipment and satellites,
and if so, what are your recommendations for fixing this problem?
Ms. Chaplain. As stated above, we are aware of sonic of the
potential synchronization problems that may be occurring in the area of
matching user equipment with satellite development. While we are
currently studying this issue as part of an ongoing review of the GPS
program, we have not been requested to perform other in-depth reviews
matching user equipment development with space segment development for
other space programs. Consequently, we are not ready at this point to
make any recommendations on this issue.

21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler and General Shelton, it
appears the backup ground station will control SBIRS rather than the
main mission control station. The main control station for SBIRS, which
also operates the DSP satellite, was supposed to begin operating SBIRS
as soon as the HEO sensor was certified. Now it appears that the backup
station will control SBIRS. We need an explanation of the schedules and
funding for the mission control stations. Can you explain the schedule
for the mission control station for SBIRS?
General Kehler. The Mission Control Station (MCS) has command and
control of the DSP satellite constellation under Increment 1 of the
SBIRS program. The plan is for the SBRS MCS to control and report on
all of the SBIRS assets, DSP, SBIRS HEO, and SBIRS GEO except for the
period when the MCS is upgraded for SBIRS Increment 2.
The Mission Control Station Backup (MCSB) is planned to be the
primary peacetime backup to the MCS. To meet 1996 SBIRS ORD and CJCSV
National Security Space Policy directives, the MCSB must have the same
global and theater missile warning, missile defense, and battlespace
awareness mission processing; ground station control; communications;
satellite and payload command and control; and mission planning
capabilities as the MCS.
Since June 2004, the SBIRS ground baseline has included the MCSB
HEO (MCSB-H) as the prime facility to operate and process data from the
SBIRS HEO payloads. The MCSB-H will process HEO mission data and create
HEO-only track data for the SBIRS MCS to fuse with DSP event data. The
MCS will then report the consolidated event messages to the combatant
commanders worldwide. A NORAD-STRATCOM operational acceptance decision
and certification for HEO is currently scheduled for October 2008.
The primary MCS is scheduled to be upgraded (hardware/software/
communications) for Increment 2 mission operations (consolidated DSP,
HEO, and GEO) in fiscal year 2013. The Command will address potential
MCSB-H upgrades in future budget submissions.
General Shelton. The MCS at Buckley AFB is scheduled to be upgraded
to perform the SBIRS HEO mission by first quarter fiscal year 2012.
During the upgrade, residual DSP and SBIRS GEO mission processing will
be done at the training facility at Buckley, and SBIRS HEO processing
will remain at the MCSB at Schriever AFB. Following that upgrade the
DSP, SBIRS GEO, and SBIRS HEO mission processing all will be performed
at the MCS. The MCSB will be upgraded to provide a backup capability by
third quarter fiscal year 2012.

space weather
22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, General Shelton, and
Admiral Deutsch, a February 11, 2008, article in Space News discusses
the NASA Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) Satellite. This satellite,
which transmits information about space weather and solar wind, is now
10 years old. According to the article, it could fail any day and there
are no plans to replace it. What are your concerns if this satellite
should stop functioning?
General Kehler. The DOD has a long history of partnering with other
U.S. agencies such as NOAA and NASA to meet the Nation's space
environmental support needs. To avoid duplication of effort and to
achieve least-cost solutions, these partnerships have routinely
involved the sharing of data obtained by one agency, but used by all
agencies. The data obtained by the NASA ACE satellite falls into this
category. The ACE spacecraft is a key national asset providing data
exploited by both the DOD, civil, and international operational and
research communities. This data is essential to providing DOD SSA.
As a Nation, theses partnerships between the DOD, NOAA, and NASA
are essential to the success of our space environment support
infrastructure. No single agency has the manpower or fiscal resources
to complete this task alone. By better institutionalizing strong
partnerships to leveraging one another's resources, we look to develop
near-term mitigation strategies for ACE, while building a comprehensive
long-term strategy to obtain environmental capabilities to meet
evolving SSA requirements.
General Shelton. We view space weather information as an essential
piece of SSA. The ACE provides important information that offers a
timely warning on approaching solar activity and gives our satellite
operators 30-180 minutes lead time before our satellites experience the
impacts of space environmental events. The loss of ACE would result in
decreased forecast accuracy and reduced warning time of solar events
for our satellite, ground radar, and communications system operators.
Currently, there is no near-term program to replace ACE. STRATCOM will
continue to advocate to replace this vital capability as we continue to
utilize the remaining space and ground space weather sensors.
Admiral Deutsch. If the ACE satellite stops functioning, the
resulting degraded ability to predict the onset of geomagnetic storms
will prevent operational space weather forecasters from providing
accurate predictions, alerts, and warnings of harmful environmental
conditions. The resulting reduced time available for operators and
engineers to safeguard assets, invoke protective measures, engage
backup network systems, and retain SSA during solar storms would
severely compromise military operations for missile defense radars and
GPS-guided munitions.

23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, General Shelton, and
Admiral Deutsch, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite (N-POES), a joint Department of Commerce-DOD satellite
program, was supposed to carry a sensor that would help GPS satellites
maintain accuracy in the face of solar activity that can disrupt GPS
accuracy. This satellite is no longer on the N-POES manifest. What are
the plans to get this capability in the future?
General Kehler. The sensors you are referring to are part of the
NPOESS Space Environmental Sensor Suite (SESS). These sensors are
designed to sense conditions in the near-Earth space environment that
can impact space services such as GPS and UHF SATCOM. These same
capabilities have contributed to our space environmental situational
awareness for the past 2 decades with similar sensors on our Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program weather satellites and were expected
to continue on NPOESS. SESS was demanifested during the NPOESS Nunn-
McCurdy process. To address potential sensing gap shortfalls, AFSPC is
working with Air Force Weather Agency, Air Force Research Agency, and
our national partners to examine alternative options such as purchasing
sensors to fly on other agency platforms. Other alternative concepts
include examining small satellite sensor packages that can take
advantage of room on ESPA and commercial satellites. This analysis
effort is focused on examining the entire space environmental
architecture supporting SSA operations and is expected to be completed
in time for input into the 2012 POM.
General Shelton. STRATCOM is working with AFSPC to advocate for a
replacement program for those sensors canceled from the NPOESS program.
Admiral Deutsch. Navy defers to Air Force's response.

acquisition
24. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, could you please give a
brief summary of where progress has been made on improving acquisition
programs for space systems and where you think there is still
improvement needed?
Ms. Chaplain. Progress has been forthcoming on improving
acquisition programs for space systems, particularly in approaches to
technology development for programs such as TSAT. However, progress has
been somewhat slow due in large part to the fact that DOD is still
suffering the consequences of historical problems in its space
portfolio and is not prioritizing investments in a concerted fashion.
As I commented in my statement, there are also critical shortages in
technical and program management skills. It is also not clear to what
extent improvements have been made in cost estimating for space. We
previously reported that program assumptions were optimistic in areas
such as technology readiness, industrial base capabilities, reliance on
heritage systems, complexity of software, etc.

international cooperation opportunities
25. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, recently the United States and
Australian governments announced that Australia would participate in
the WGS communication satellite system and that an additional sixth
satellite would be purchased. This is really a win-win situation. Are
there other opportunities to partner with allies and friends in
satellite communications?
Mr. Payton. The Air Force, in partnership with the National
Security Space community, actively explores opportunities to build and
expand partnerships on current and future satellite communications
programs. As we continue to assess future satellite communications
requirements and capabilities, we will explore opportunities for
building and expanding our partnerships with friends and allies.

science and technology
26. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, the Services, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and other agencies invest in
basic research for space and related technologies. How do program
requirements shape S&T expenditures?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The Air Force S&T community works
closely with system developers and operational users to identify those
technologies that could enable future warfighting capabilities, thus
shaping S&T investment and expenditures. AFSPC prepares the ``AFSPC
Science and Technology Guidance for the Air Force Research Lab'' each
year to provide recommendations in the context of programmatic guidance
and Air Force priorities. The latest guidance, dated April 2007,
includes the integrated space technology needs of STRATCOM and other
Combatant Commands in support of their operational requirements from
the Future Years Defense Program through fiscal year 2030. The Air
Force then balances these needs with other Air Force needs to pursue
integrated technology capabilities that support our warfighters'
highest priorities.
General Shelton. STRATCOM works with DARPA and the Services' S&T
organizations to ensure they understand our longer term operational
needs. The Services' acquisition agencies determine actual program
requirements and drive the priorities for S&T expenditures. STRATCOM
provides general advocacy for needed space technologies by hosting
Senior Warfighter Forums and creating an Integrated Priority List,
which informs both the S&T and acquisition processes. Additionally
STRATCOM participates in prototyping and rapid development processes,
such as sponsoring Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.
Admiral Deutsch. Basic and applied research goals tend to focus on
enabling fundamentally new capabilities and are usually not tied to
existing program requirements. As investments move into more advanced
technology areas, they are rooted more and more closely to programs of
record. These investments are often in capabilities ``within reach'' of
being proven in the near-term and transitioned to the operational
community. NRL is Navy's corporate laboratory for basic and applied
research. NRL leadership rigorously reviews proposals every year with
the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the resulting investments make
up the NRL ``Base Program''. These investments are made typically made
based on the potential for enabling new foundational understanding and/
or breakthrough capabilities; they are not tied to program of record
requirements. Navy's decades-long investment in developing clocks for
precision time which enabled the GPS is a space-based example of this
process.
ONR invests broadly in S&T for the Navy. ONR divides S&T
investments into categories described as Discovery and Invention,
Innovative Naval Prototypes, and Future Naval Capabilities. The Future
Naval Capability (FNC) program focuses on providing Enabling
Capabilities (ECs) to close warfighting gaps. A three-star Navy and
Marine Corps Board of Directors, the Technical Oversight Group,
approves the FNCs based on their contribution to closing a warfighting
capability gap. The FNCs must provide measurable operational
improvement within 5 years and are inherently the S&T investments most
closely tied to existing programs of record. ONR's recent and current
space S&T investments were made within the Innovative Naval Prototype
category; this investment is often called the ``Space INP''. While the
Space INP did not require an operational program sponsor prior to
investment, the Space INP prototypes selected for development (i.e.
TACSAT-4) were directly traceable to either naval analysis of needs
(such as data exfiltration from buoys) or to jointly-validated
requirements known to be only partially met.
Ms. Chaplain. We have previously reported that there are mechanisms
within the space community and DOD designed to ensure S&T efforts are
coordinated and are focused on achieving broader goals and that
redundancy is minimized. For example, within the space community, a
forum called the Space Technology Alliance was established in 1997 to
coordinate the development of space technologies with an eye toward
achieving the greatest return on investment. At the DOD-wide level,
there was also a Joint Warfighting S&T Plan, which ties S&T projects to
priority future joint warfighting capabilities identified by higher-
level documents. These overall plans, in turn, are used by DOD
laboratories to direct investments in S&T. Further, in 2004, DOD was
directed to develop a strategic plan for space S&T investments to
further tie S&T efforts to program requirements. However, while there
are processes in place to link program requirements to S&T
expenditures, our work has generally found that large space acquisition
programs tend to conduct the technology development needed to achieve
desired capabilities.

27. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, several years ago, at
congressional direction, a space S&T roadmap was prepared. Has this
roadmap ever been used to guide investments? Is there a need for an
updated roadmap?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The 2004 DOD Space S&T Strategy was
prepared in response to congressional direction for a space S&T
roadmap. Supporting this strategy are four S&T Vector Roadmaps used to
guide investments. The Vector 1 Roadmap identified and estimated costs
for technologies to enable next generation launch capability and
continues to guide technology investments. The Vector 2 Roadmap
established the initial technical guidance for the ORS office, while
the Vector 3 Roadmap has been used to guide investments in space
control technologies focused on SSA and defensive counterspace
capabilities. Finally, the Vector 4 Roadmap identified and estimated
costs for enabling technologies for Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR)
capabilities. From an Air Force perspective, updated roadmaps would be
beneficial and the Air Force is currently developing a Research and
Development Strategic Plan that will provide a space S&T roadmap to
guide investments in this area.
General Shelton. I would defer to the Air Force to answer this
question.
Admiral Deutsch. The space S&T roadmap was developed in 2003/2004
and did help guide S&T investments. The roadmap also helped validate
existing investments. Two of the four roadmap vectors were related to
ORS. The jointly-developed Plan for ORS, submitted to Congress in April
2007, intended for the management of these two vectors to be tasks for
the Joint ORS Office. These vectors are specific to the most recent
roadmap. Updating the roadmap has inherent value due to the increased
communication that occurs within the S&T community as each organization
explains their priorities and current investments.
Ms. Chaplain. If done effectively, roadmaps can lay out an
incremental path toward achieving significant advances in capabilities,
and help ensure overall investments in technology development are
affordable. The space S&T roadmap was an outgrowth of the DOD space S&T
strategy, which DOD was directed to develop in 2004. We found that the
strategy provided a foundation for enhancing coordination among space
S&T efforts since it specified overall goals and established several
mechanisms to help senior leaders gauge whether investments were
focused on those goals. Moreover, the development of the strategy
itself helped spur collaboration within the DOD space S&T community
since it required diverse organizations to come together, share
knowledge, and establish agreement on basic goals. Since the strategy
had only recently been issued, it was too early to assess whether the
direction and processes outlined in the strategy would be effective in
supporting and guiding future space S&T efforts. Additionally, DOD
officials were still working out the details of some implementation
mechanisms, including the roadmap. Since our January 2005 report, we
have not conducted any subsequent reviews of DOD's utilization of the
space S&T strategy or efforts to update it.

28. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, transitioning successful
S&T efforts is always difficult. What in your view leads to better
transition?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The Air Force's ``back-to-basics''
concept and Block Approach, work to deliver systems through discrete,
clearly defined increments, based on sound systems engineering
principles. This approach reduces development and production risk by
maturing technologies prior to system development, deferring some
capabilities to later increments when their technologies are mature.
The Air Force has also increased its emphasis on technology transition
and is using knowledge management tools and databases to track
promising technologies and determine how they might impact current
programs. Additionally, the Air Force is exploring ways to better
achieve advanced technology/manufacturing readiness levels through
prototyping to demonstrate capabilities in an operational environment.
General Shelton. Successfully transitioning technology requires
significant interaction among the operational, acquisition, and S&T
communities. A regular, ongoing dialogue helps focus the efforts on
compelling, future operational needs. In the space arena, designing
experiments with residual operational capability in mind certainly
eases the transition.
Admiral Deutsch. Transition is always a delicate process because
managers of formal programs have not budgeted to assume responsibility
for capabilities that evolve from S&T efforts of an outside office.
Navy experience with transition suggests two steps are crucial for this
process: (1) as soon as a S&T project shows serious potential to
satisfy an operational need, make candidate long-term sponsors aware of
it and attempt to get them involved in the development process, and (2)
obtain strong support, in writing, from operational commands that want
the capability.
Ms. Chaplain. We have found through our acquisition best practices
work that leading commercial companies use three key techniques for
successfully developing and transitioning technologies, with the basic
premise being that technologies must be mature before transitioning to
the product line side.

Strategic planning at the corporate level: Strategic
planning precedes technology development so managers can gauge
market needs, identify the most desirable technologies, and
prioritize resources.
Gated management reviews: A rigorous process is used
to ensure a technology's relevancy and feasibility and enlist
product line commitment to use the technologies once the labs
are finished maturing them.
Corroborating tools: To secure commitment, technology
transition agreements solidify and document specific cost,
schedule, and performance metrics labs need to meet for
transition to occur.

We found that DOD had taken steps to improve its technology
transition processes, but it lacked many of the techniques that are
hallmarks of leading companies' ability to transition technology
smoothly onto new products. From a strategic perspective, we found that
the Department lacked strong influence at the corporate level to guide
the Department's technology investments. In addition. DOD was not using
a gated process with criteria that would allow lab and program managers
to know when a technology was ready to transition. Consequently,
technologies were often not ready when needed and acquisition programs
pulled the technologies into their programs too early, leading to
inefficiency during product development, and cost and schedule
increases. Furthermore, we found that while the military Services were
using technology transition agreements, use of these agreements was
low.

29. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, DARPA launched and
successfully demonstrated Orbital Express to show that a satellite
could be refueled on orbit. Does this demonstration play a role in
future acquisition decisions?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The lessons learned and capabilities
demonstrated by Orbital Express (OE), particularly the ability to
service a satellite on-orbit, will help inform future plans for the
development and fielding of responsive space systems. In the near-term,
DARPA is developing the Front-end Robotics Enabling Near-term
Demonstration (FREND) program. FREND is a follow-on project to OE that
allows for interaction with military and commercial spacecraft in a GEO
with the potential to extend spacecraft service life.
General Shelton. OE helped demonstrate the art of the possible. The
remaining questions center on the operational utility of the concept.
On the surface, on-orbit refueling and/or servicing is appealing. But
the cost-benefit trades must consider satellite components that either
age or are outdated (e.g., computers, solar panels reaction wheels),
calling into question life extension by refueling. Designing component
replaceability into the satellite also is questionable, given the
current nature and design of satellites. In fact, it may prove more
cost-effective to launch a new satellite rather than design in repair
on orbit capability. An exception may be satellites that would be
highly maneuverable by design, for any number of reasons. In this case,
on-orbit refueling might be desirable. Much more trade study is
required to fully explore these concepts.
Admiral Deutsch. We believe the capabilities demonstrated by OE
will inform space acquisition programs to consider employing them in
future space vehicles.
Ms. Chaplain. Though the concept behind OE is one that is believed
to be a key enabler for more responsive, self-maintaining space
systems, we do not know yet whether or how this particular DARPA
project will enable future acquisition efforts. It is not currently a
key enabling capability for the ORS initiative's conceptual construct.

30. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, much of the work of the S&T
community is focused on high risk concepts, where as much is learned
from failure as from success. Are the space capabilities being looked
at in the high risk programs generally the sort of capabilities in
which the acquisition community is interested?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. Yes, space capabilities are reviewed
by the Space S&T Council, which meets twice a year to assess
investments and provide for a coordinated space S&T program. The Air
Force S&T community works closely with system developers and
operational users to identify those technologies--whether high risk or
lower risk--that could enable future warfighting capabilities and in
which the acquisition community is interested. The S&T program strives
to reach a Technology Readiness Level that supports Product Center
prototyping, productization, and tech insertion into systems
development. The Air Force continues to rebalance and focus its core
S&T competencies to aggressively pursue high payoff technologies
directed towards countering the new threats of today, while modernizing
weapon systems for tomorrow.
General Shelton. I would defer to the Air Force to answer this
question.
Admiral Deutsch. Naval space S&T investment, while often using some
aggressive Technology Readiness Level items, tends to focus on
operational prototyping to prove system level performance and
demonstrate operational capability. S&T investments of lower risk are
generally targeted toward moderate enhancements to current capabilities
and are part of ONR's FNC investments. FNCs are expected to transition
in the near-term and therefore involve the acquisition community from
the start. In general, the higher the risk of the S&T investment, the
further from transition to the acquisition community the capability is.
Ms. Chaplain. It is appropriate that the acquisition community be
focused on technologies that can be matured in the near-term rather
than technologies that are still in their nascent stages. Including
such high-risk development in an acquisition program would likely
render cost, schedule, and performance estimates unreliable.

coordination across services
31. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Deutsch, do you see any areas
where the Services and other agencies could improve cooperation in
providing space capabilities, including coordination in planning for
terminals and user equipment?
Admiral Deutsch. The Services look for every opportunity to develop
satellite capabilities based upon validated requirements. The Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process provides a
means to coordinate requirements between Services.

space industrial base study
32. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General
Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, the DOD recently completed
a space industrial base study that looked at, among other things, the
space workforce. This study identified some alarming gaps in the space
technical design, integration, and systems engineering disciplines. Are
you familiar with the study and what can be done, or are you doing, to
address some of these problems?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. A DOD Space Industrial Base study to
include the space workforce was recently finalized. The study
identified gaps in the space technical design, integration, and systems
engineering disciplines. DOD and AFSPC concerns are in the following
specific disciplines: science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM). Excellence in STEM disciplines provides an asymmetric advantage
to DOD, AFSPC, and all warfighters.
DOD, with AFSPC support, is taking steps to address workforce
issues through the National Defense Education Program (NDEP). NDEP is
striving to meet the challenge of educating, training, recruiting, and
retaining workers in the STEM disciplines. NDEP encourages K-12
students' interest in science and math and funds scholarships and
fellowships in critical DOD research areas.
The scholarships and fellowships are provided through a program
within NDEP called Science, Math, and Research for Transformation
(SMART). This program provides graduate education in science and
engineering areas. In turn, the graduates incur a DOD service
commitment.
The NDEP also funds scholarships and fellowships in research areas
critical to DOD. The SMART is the largest program in the NDEP
portfolio. In place since fiscal year 2005, SMART provides graduate
level schooling in 15 different science and engineering disciplines in
return for a DOD service commitment. The first of the SMART graduates
are now entering the DOD workforce and making important contributions
to our Nation's defense.
NDEP and SMART are important initiatives in addressing education
issues and experience levels in our workforce today. However, we must
continue to concentrate on the human capital challenges in the space
workforce.
General Shelton. I would defer to the Air Force to answer this
question.
Admiral Deutsch. Navy provided inputs to the National Security
Space Office (NSSO) on the Space Industrial Report. Navy understands
the importance of the recommendations in the report and continues to
implement programs to address our concerns with the space industrial
base.
The Navy is an active participant in the K-12 STEP program. Our
leadership across the space enterprise consistently completes community
outreach in this area. Navy commands such as Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command (SPAWAR) and NRL have college internship programs where
students can participate in the space system design process. The Naval
Academy's Aerospace Engineering Department offers an astrospace track
where approximately 40 students graduate each year. As students, they
collaborate with industry, the NRO and NRL on small satellite and
system design. Some of their systems are selected to be manifested for
flight with the DOD's STP. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) plays a
critical role in the development of this Nation's space professionals.
The Space Systems Engineering and Operations curricula provide robust
technical education to officers and government civilians of all
Services. Additionally, NPS offers distance learning opportunities for
officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians to earn a Masters in Space
Systems Operations or a 4-course certificate in Space Operations.
The Navy is lock-step with the NSSO as they prepare the way ahead
for a National Security Space Cadre. The Navy Space Cadre Office
participates in the Space Professional Working Group (SPWG) where the
roadmap is developed and refined. The Navy has identified its officer
billets and personnel and is working with the SPWG to find a DOD
solution to identifying the civilian space workforce.
All Navy acquisition personnel are held to the high standards of
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and complete
continuous education from the Defense Acquisition University and
acquisition curricula at the NRO, SPAWAR, Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR), and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Additionally, the
Navy depends on the NRO and the National Security Space Institute for
additional space training ensuring that its acquirers have a well-
rounded space and acquisition foundation.
Ms. Chaplain. We are aware of this particular study but have not
been provided a copy or briefed on it. However, our work has also
identified gaps in technical and program management skills in space
programs and made numerous recommendations for closing these gaps.
These include recommendations to the Air Force to conduct a zero-based
needs assessment of its space acquisition workforce, recommendations to
DOD to adopt best practices to support program managers and hold them
accountable, and recommendations to DOD to address critical skill
shortages in the area of cost estimating. We are happy to brief your
staff further on this work as well as the scope and methodology of
ongoing work we are doing for the committee on broader acquisition
workforce issues.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Inhofe, Sessions, and Graham.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; and
Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; M. Bradford Foley, assistant
to Senator Pryor; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; and Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN

Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning. Thank you all for being
here today.
We are starting out with the first of two panels, and we
are privileged to have General Chilton, the Commander of
Strategic Command, with us.
General, we will put your written statement in the record.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions' and my written
statements will be in the record so that we can get right into
questions.
[The prepared statements of Senator Bill Nelson, Senator
Sessions, and General Chilton follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
I would like to welcome our witnesses this morning. On the first
panel we have General Kevin Chilton, the new Commander of the Strategic
Command. On the second panel we have with us Assistant Secretary of
Defense Michael Vickers; General Weber, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Air Force for Air, Space, and Information Operations; Admiral
Stephen Johnson, Director Strategic Systems Programs; and Tom
D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. We welcome all of you and look forward to a good
conversation this morning. We will move to the second panel at around
11:00 or so.
General Chilton we welcome you this morning in your new role at the
Strategic Command.
Both panels have submitted statements that will be included in the
record, so there is no need to read formal opening statements.
The record will remain open until close of business Monday for any
additional questions for the record.
______

Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
We meet today to receive testimony from two panels on strategic
forces programs in review of the National Defense Authorization Request
for Fiscal Year 2009 and the Future Years Defense Program. For the
first panel, we welcome General Chilton, who is making his first
appearance before the subcommittee as Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command. General Chilton, you are now responsible for assisting this
subcommittee in our evaluation of whether our U.S. strategic forces and
policy are appropriate to the post Cold-War security environment in
which we find ourselves. We are pleased to be working with you in this
capacity as we examine these important efforts.
The second panel will provide an opportunity to delve more deeply
into the various service plans and programs for strategic forces as
well as examine plans for revitalizing our nuclear infrastructure.
Witnesses on the second panel include Mr. Vickers, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities; Major General Webber, USAF; Rear Admiral
Stephen Johnson, USN; and Mr. D'Agostino, the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an element of the
Department of Energy.
This hearing is an opportunity to assess the progress our Nation
has made toward adapting our strategic forces and deterrence doctrine
to a new security environment characterized by terrorist groups and
rogue nations--groups against which traditional deterrence approaches
may not work--as well as the need to defend our interests against more
traditional threats and peer competitors.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established a conceptual
framework for thinking about deterrence in this new strategic age, and
serves as a useful guide for understanding the relationship between
offensive and defensive strategic forces, as well as the relationship
between nuclear and conventional weapons--all of which must play a role
in deterring strategic attacks against the United States, its forces,
and its friends and allies. If we examine how well we have done in
drawing down our nuclear forces while simultaneously improving our
conventional strike capabilities, fielding missile defenses, and
securing a responsive nuclear infrastructure that hedges against future
changes, I assess that our progress has been mixed.
While the nuclear-drawdown appears to be proceeding in good order,
the same cannot be said about the fielding of the advanced conventional
strike capabilities necessary to reduce reliance on nuclear strike
forces. We lack today the capability to deliver prompt, conventional
strikes against fleeting, high value targets at extremely long ranges.
The development of this capability, sometimes referred to as ``Prompt
Global Strike,'' lagged in the past due to a lack of consensus between
Congress and the administration over the administration's preferred
approach, known as the Conventional Trident Modification. Congress,
however, has demonstrated a willingness to consider alternative
approaches to PGS, and has provided funding in a defense-wide account
to do so. We look forward to hearing from the witnesses about their
respective PGS candidate solutions.
The most impressive change in our strategic posture since the NPR
lies in the area of missile defense. In 2001, we could count only upon
our Patriot batteries to provide limited missile defense protection
against short range ballistic missiles. Today, we deploy over 24
ground-based interceptors for the defense of the United States against
long-range North Korean ballistic missiles; a similar number of SM-3
missiles are available for deployment on some 17 Aegis BMD ships to
defend against short to medium range ballistic missiles; and the Army
deploys thousands of improved Patriot PAC-3 missiles to defend our
forces against short-range threats. Supporting these interceptors is a
global system of upgraded early warning and tracking radars and the
command and control system necessary to link together these multiple
sensors and interceptors. We must continue to field missile defense
capabilities in numbers sufficient to address the threat, while
ensuring sufficient testing and improvements to these systems to stay
ahead of adversary capabilities. Additionally, we must continue to
extend missile defense coverage to our allies, who arc now under
increased risk of ballistic missile attack; by doing so, we preserve
alliance cohesion and freedom of action in defense of our combined
national interests.
The NPR also called for a threat and capabilities-based approach in
the area of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the NPR called for a
transition from a nuclear stockpile with large numbers of deployed
warheads to a smaller stockpile augmented with a responsive
infrastructure which would be capable of responding to emerging threats
and to changes in the global security environment. Although the concept
of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) emerged after the development
of the NPR, the RRW was--and perhaps still is--viewed as a key enabler
on the path to this smaller stockpile. This committee, on a bipartisan
basis, authorized funding to continue the study of the RRW but the
final Omnibus Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2008 did not provide
funding. In spite of that outcome, I am pleased that the administration
has requested funding, once again, in fiscal year 2009 for continuing
the design definition and cost study for the RRW.
General Chilton, in a speech you gave in January, you addressed the
topic of RRW in very plain terms. You said, ``This is not a problem
that we can push down the road to another generation to worry about.
This is a problem that we have to face today. . . . I don't say we need
a decision right now, but we ought to be spending the resources to
answer the questions . . . that are on the table today. A decision on
which way we are going to go to make sure we have the most capable
nuclear deterrent . . . that we can provide for the citizens of this
country for the remainder of this century. . . . These are century-long
decisions. I say let's get on with it.''
I agree with your comments, General, and hope the committee will
again this year--as it has done in the past three authorization bills,
support funding for the RRW.
The subcommittee will also hear today from Mr. D'Agostino, on the
progress being made in developing the ``responsive infrastructure''
called for in the NPR. My own assessment is that metrics of
responsiveness were slow to be developed; that progress against
existing metrics was not rigorously exercised or measured; and as a
result, progress has been largely unrealized. Last year, Los Alamos
successfully re-established the capability of manufacturing plutonium
pits for use in the stockpile. Prior to this achievement, however, the
Nation had been without the capability to manufacture this essential
nuclear component for over 18 years. I take nothing away from the hard
work it took to achieve this milestone. I ask only if this is the pace
of progress that was contemplated in the NPR and if not, what can we do
to move toward a more responsive infrastructure.
The NNSA has also embarked upon an analysis of alternatives for
what it calls ``Complex Transformation.'' The objective of this
transformation is to make the nuclear weapons complex smaller, more
responsive, efficient, and secure by consolidating operations and
relocating activities among sites. These consolidations would result in
a reduction in total facility square footage of approximately 9 million
square feet. I believe that it is important to size our nuclear weapons
complex for the stockpile we are supporting while maintaining the
essential capabilities. I hope that this important initiative will be
sustained over time.
I look forward to discussing these and other topics with our
witnesses today. I thank them for their service to our Nation.
______

Prepared Statement by Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee:
Thank you for the invitation to be here today. This is my first
opportunity to appear before you as Commander of United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). I look forward to further strengthening
our relationships in pursuit of our common enduring goal of protecting
this great Nation. The men and women of USSTRATCOM are committed to
achieving this goal as well. They have performed superbly over the last
year, demonstrating dedication across the breadth of our assigned
missions both at home and abroad.
Under the superb leadership of my predecessor, USSTRATCOM underwent
remarkable change in a very short period of time to stand up new
organizations to address a broad range of mission assignments.
USSTRATCOM is now in the process of maturing these organizations with
an increased focus on day-to-day operations and integration. I am here
today to provide my thoughts on the challenges we face, and to ask for
your assistance to ensure USSTRATCOM possesses the means to accomplish
our missions.
national security challenges
Many of our national security structures, processes, and
capabilities were developed during the Cold War, shaped by DOD's focus
on a singular, symmetric threat. The dangers of the past have evolved
and are complicated by new sources of conflict and challenges to
stability. These new and evolving challenges defy the primarily force-
on-force solutions of yesterday; requiring more complex, and in some
cases, elegant solutions tuned to each adversary and circumstance.
Our Nation faces four persistent and emerging global challenges.
First are the challenges posed by established nation-states, some
resurgent, others emerging, who seek to undermine or subvert U.S.
policy objectives.
Second, we note the continued rise of non-state actors,
predominantly in the form of global terrorists rooted in extremist and
violent ideologies. These new adversaries are distributed, networked,
and fleeting. Enabled by information technology and financial support,
they are able to maintain a global presence by recruiting, training,
inciting, and directing attacks in a variety of ways, including through
cyberspace.
Third, we continue to face the potential catastrophic use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We believe the most dangerous threat
to the U.S. today is that of non-state terrorist groups acquiring and
subsequently using WMD against the U.S.
Finally, we see both state and non-state actors attempting to
supplant our advantage in various operational domains. The ``global
commons'' of space and cyberspace are vitally important to our way of
life. Our civil, military, and commercial activities are dependent upon
access to cyberspace and space-based capabilities, and we can expect
future adversaries to attack these dependencies. Our dependence on
these capabilities and their associated vulnerabilities requires us to
focus our efforts to ensure U.S. freedom of action in these domains.
assessment of the command
Following my confirmation, I conducted a review of USSTRATCOM's
roles, missions, capabilities, and priorities. I discovered a command
working arduously to execute a diverse set of global missions, each
vital to the security of our Nation. On advice from Members of
Congress, I toured our National Laboratories to better understand our
nuclear stockpile. I also met with a number of Members of Congress and
their staffs to determine how we might work together to resolve
outstanding deficiencies in critical capabilities.
I believe USSTRATCOM's missions can be divided into two major
categories. In the first category are global missions that require us
to operate across physical and/or functional boundaries. The three
mission areas within this category are Strategic Deterrence Operations,
Space Operations, and Cyberspace Operations. We have forces assigned to
USSTRATCOM in each of these mission areas that execute operations every
day. All of these missions are global in nature and are insensitive to
lines drawn on a map.
The second category is comprised of those global missions where our
purpose is not to operate across boundaries, but rather to knit
together seams between boundaries. Today, USSTRATCOM is not assigned
operational control of any forces within this category of missions.
However, we have dedicated teams addressing the challenges of fielding
and advocating for an integrated Missile Defense system; integrating
Department of Defense (DOD) planning and advocacy efforts to better
combat the threats posed by WMD; managing the allocation of DOD's high
demand/low density Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
assets; and integrating Information Operations (IO) in support of all
combatant commands. As our missions develop, we are placing emphasis on
readiness, detailed planning, command and control, and execution;
supported by robust, realistic, and periodic command-wide exercise
programs.
strategic deterrence
During the Cold War, the U.S. model for deterrence was based upon a
robust capability to employ nuclear weapons via aircraft,
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Known classically as ``nuclear
deterrence'', this original Triad was designed to deter the Soviet
Union. When combined with razor-sharp readiness and a bilateral
dialogue that stressed both a mutual understanding of one another's
capabilities and decisionmaking processes, the Triad underpinned the
U.S. deterrence posture that successfully kept the peace for over 50
years.
Although the strategic landscape has dramatically shifted since the
end of the Cold War, the concept of deterrence and the need to deter
adversaries from attacking our vital interests is just as important in
the 21st century as it was in the last century. However, today's more
complex strategic landscape demands excellence and nuance across a much
broader set of national security challenges. To address these
challenges, our model for deterrence has evolved. Today, strategic
deterrence is embodied by a new Triad borne of the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review. The Triad now emphasizes the integration of offensive
capabilities, both nuclear and conventional; defensive capabilities;
and a responsive defense infrastructure, all enabled by intelligence,
planning, and global Command and Control (C2). These efforts are ably
led by our Joint Functional Component Command (JFCC) for Global Strike
and Integration (JFCC-GSI).
The nuclear capability of the original Triad remains a vital part
of our deterrence strategy. In light of this, USSTRATCOM is re-
examining our oversight role of the Nation's strategic nuclear forces.
We reviewed the U.S. Air Force report of the Minot weapons transfer
incident, as well as other independent investigative reports, and have
implemented organizational and oversight changes to refocus USSTRATCOM
on our nuclear mission responsibilities. We also intend to increase the
oversight of Operational Readiness and Nuclear Surety Inspections of
our assigned or gained units.
While our nuclear capability remains vital, our ability to
integrate conventional long-range precision weapons is every bit as
important. Although our conventional forces are second to none, we no
longer have these forces forward-deployed permanently throughout the
world. Therefore, it is prudent to have the ability to defeat attacks
and eliminate high value targets at global ranges on short notice. We
have a Prompt Global Strike delivery capability on alert today, but it
is configured only with nuclear weapons, which limits the options
available to the President and may in some cases reduce the credibility
of our deterrence.
The capability we lack is the means to deliver prompt, precise,
conventional kinetic effects at intercontinental ranges. The ability to
hold at risk sites in otherwise denied territory is a key element of
our strategic deterrent capability. At present, the complex and
evolving threat environment necessitates the rapid development and
demonstration of a prompt conventional global strike capability. I
appreciate past congressional discussions concerning the need to fill
our Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability gap and wish to thank
Congress for providing the fiscal year 2008 resources as we continue to
address this capability shortfall. The Air Force, Navy, and Army are
coordinating with USSTRATCOM and the DOD Office of Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to conduct research, development, test, and
evaluation of technologies which hold the greatest promise for new
capability development. While we are making progress, we must place
emphasis on a near-term solution to fill a gap that exists today.
Reliability, Safety, and Security of the Nuclear Stockpile
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and DOD share
responsibility for the reliability, safety, security, and effectiveness
of the Nation's stockpile of nuclear warheads, and for the quality and
responsiveness of the enterprise necessary to sustain it. I want to
assure the committee that as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC), I appreciate the concerns expressed by Congress with respect to
both the status of our nuclear stockpile and the role nuclear weapons
will play in our Nation's defense in the 21st century. Congress has
directed a number of activities in the coming year which will provide
opportunities to further the national dialog on our strategic posture.
We look forward to participating in this national discussion.
Our strategic nuclear forces have stood watch over the Nation for
over 50 years, always prepared to conduct a mission we all hoped would
never be necessary. Supported by weapons and infrastructure that were
as modern as we could make them, and military and civilian personnel
that were ready 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, we succeeded in
deterring our adversaries, assuring our allies, and preserving the
peace.
Our Nation has invested heavily in increasing our scientific
understanding and extending the life of nuclear weapons designed during
the Cold War. To date, these efforts have successfully provided
confidence in the reliability of our weapons without the need to
conduct nuclear tests. Today the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is
working--our nuclear stockpile remains reliable, safe and secure. Our
assessment is based upon a solid foundation of past nuclear testing and
augmented by cutting-edge scientific and engineering experiments and
analysis, advanced computing and simulation, and extensive flight tests
of warhead components and subsystems.
However, we are not confident that the SSP, or any conceivable
weapon's life extension program will provide future USSTRATCOM
Commanders the same level of confidence that I am pleased to express to
you today. We recognize the current path of indefinitely relying on
legacy nuclear weapons refurbished through a series of life extension
programs entails accepting significant future risks to reliability,
safety, security, and maintainability, as well as considerable expense.
Our legacy weapons were designed to maximize destructive capability
while minimizing weight and volume, facilitating long range weapons
delivery with great effect to deter a threat with a similar symmetric
capability. Weapon performance margins, maintainability, and longevity,
while important design criteria, were made a lower priority in the
manufacture of these weapons to facilitate higher yield to weight
ratios. These design trade-offs were acceptable at the time for several
reasons. First, our Nation maintained a robust nuclear weapons
production infrastructure that was able to quickly fabricate large
numbers of weapons. Second, we produced successive generations of
nuclear weapons every 15-20 years. Finally, we were able to routinely
test our weapons.
As the threat to our Nation has evolved, so have the requirements
driving nuclear weapons design. Emergent states seek a nuclear weapons
capability and non-state actors and terrorists seek to acquire nuclear
weapons. Other declared nuclear powers continue to modernize their
nuclear weapons, delivery platforms, and infrastructure. Conversely,
the U.S. has effectively eliminated its nuclear weapons production
capacity and allowed its infrastructure to atrophy. We no longer
produce successive generations of nuclear weapons and we have
discontinued underground testing. Current U.S. policy is to retain the
fewest number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons required to
meet national security objectives.
Over time, the environment degrades the functionality of both non-
nuclear and nuclear weapons components, negatively impacting extremely
tight performance margins that exist in our weapons today, thereby
reducing weapon reliability. The highly optimized designs of our legacy
weapons limit opportunities to improve safety and security standards
through a warhead life extension strategy. A broad suite of modern
safety and security features that were not available during the design
and development of our legacy systems are available today and could be
used to help prevent exploitation by terrorists, rogue nations or
criminal organizations. Modern design technology will dramatically
increase the maintainability of our stockpile which will serve to
maximize long term reliability while minimizing long term costs.
Finally, modern warhead designs offer a high potential for avoiding
future nuclear testing.
In light of these changes in the strategic environment and the
aging of our stockpile and its supporting infrastructure, we recommend
pursuing an alternate weapon modernization strategy. This strategy
should focus on improved weapon reliability, safety, security, and
maintainability. These are the priorities for 21st century nuclear
weapon design, not the 20th century criteria of maximizing destructive
capability and minimizing weight and volume.
If the Nation is going to maintain a nuclear deterrent, the
capabilities that support this deterrent should be second to none. We
must care for the stockpile whether we possess one weapon or thousands.
It is important to note that improvements to our aging infrastructure
will be required whether or not we decide to pursue an improved warhead
design. This cannot be accomplished without investment in requisite
infrastructure and human capital. The last nuclear design engineer to
participate in the development and testing of a new nuclear weapon is
scheduled to retire in the next 5 years. The transition to a more
modern stockpile will re-invigorate the design and engineering
technology base--especially its human resources--and enable a more
responsive and cost-effective infrastructure. A revitalized
infrastructure will facilitate a reduction of the large inventory of
weapons we maintain today as a hedge against strategic uncertainty and
weapon reliability concerns, and will allow us to sustain our nuclear
capability and expertise throughout the 21st century.
Some contend that an effort to modernize our nuclear stockpile
would lead to increased proliferation. We assert a modern stockpile
designed to provide a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear umbrella will
serve to dissuade and deter our adversaries, and assure our allies,
reducing their perceived need for an indigenous nuclear program.
To facilitate an informed national debate of all of these issues,
USSTRATCOM supports the continuation of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) Design Definition and Cost Study to explore a replacement
for aging warheads in the stockpile. Completion of this study during
fiscal year 2009 in parallel with the planned Nuclear Posture Review
will provide Congress and the administration the information needed to
effectively evaluate alternative strategies for the long-term
maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The information
from this study is critical to developing a comprehensive nuclear
strategy that meets future national security requirements.
National Command and Coordination Capability (NCCC)
The strategic environment is fundamentally more complex than it was
when our current point-to-point nuclear command and control (C2) system
was developed more than 50 years ago. For example, the threat that some
states will acquire and deploy ICBM technology, combined with our
ability to counter these threats with missile defense systems, demands
a C2 capability that rapidly and efficiently provides assured and
responsive connectivity between national leaders. This scenario reduces
our decision time to mere minutes and calls for a C2 capability that
extends beyond legacy Cold War systems and capabilities. We have set a
course to modernize our single-purpose and aging C2 system to allow for
secure, enduring, and continuous communications under current scenarios
as well as those emerging threats that we are likely to confront.
Our strategy is to sustain our legacy nuclear C2 system while
expanding our capabilities to address a broader scope of military
challenges. We are transforming the circuit-based, point-to-point
communications systems that comprise our legacy nuclear command and
control capability to a system that fully leverages new information
technologies. Furthermore, we are focusing resources and efforts to
implement a C2 architecture that provides global C2 capabilities, as
well as systems that can be seamlessly integrated with the broader,
national capabilities that support the President and senior leaders. We
are working diligently to ensure our ability to provide end-to-end C2
under the most stressful scenarios envisioned.
Our concept of operations calls for the enduring and survivable
ability to conduct operations from geographically dispersed locations
through collaborative access to data, services, and information. The
evolution of our legacy nuclear command and control system will undergo
careful evaluation and review to ensure no reduction in capability. It
is imperative that as we assess and deploy our new systems and
capabilities, they be subjected to rigorous testing to ensure
interoperability with other ongoing initiatives to enhance national and
senior leader communications capabilities.
space operations
During the 20th century, the Nation approached space as a new
frontier. Our focus was to win the exploration race and to understand
and develop our capabilities in this ultimate high ground. Today, we
depend upon space-based capabilities to conduct commerce, advance our
interests, and defend our Nation. To this end, USSTRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-SPACE) conducts space
operations on a daily basis.
Increasingly, space-based capabilities enable all other war-
fighting domains. In the 21st century, the mindset of space as purely
an ``enabler'' must change. We must view our activities in the space
domain in the same way we regard activities in the domains of land,
sea, air, and cyberspace. As space-based capabilities provide critical
support to forces in other domains, space operations must also receive
support from forces outside the space domain.
The Chinese kinetic antisatellite test (ASAT) conducted in early
2007 made it clear that space is not a sanctuary. We can expect similar
challenges in the future. To ensure our freedom of action in space we
need to maintain an acute awareness of the objects in space, and the
terrestrial threats that could interrupt or deny our space operations.
Our adversaries understand our dependence upon space-based
capabilities, and we must be ready to detect, track, characterize,
attribute, predict, and respond to any threat to our space
infrastructure.
Space protection requires robust Space Situational Awareness (SSA).
While sustaining our current space surveillance systems, we need to
simultaneously improve our sensor coverage of the space domain with a
mix of ground and space-based sensors, and improve the data
transmission architecture and equipment necessary to fuse the data we
collect into useable information. Additionally, we must continue to
foster collaborative datasharing with our allies to enhance global
coverage. The analogy of a 1,000 ship navy built through a coalition of
nations can be applied to space, and the ability to leverage and expand
space partnerships with our allies holds the potential to dramatically
improve Space Situational Awareness.
Global satellite communication to include nuclear command and
control, uninterrupted position, navigation, and timing, missile
warning, intelligence collection, and environmental observation are
essential space-based capabilities required by the warfighter and the
Nation. These existing space-based capabilities must remain viable
while conducting research, development, and fielding of replacement
capabilities. We must also ensure that the current space-based
capabilities we provide to the Nation can be either adequately defended
or delivered by alternate means in times of crisis. We ask for funding
support to ensure there is no interruption in the provision of these
capabilities to our warfighters and our Nation.
Assured access to space will remain an imperative for the U.S.
Today, the dominant threat to access does not come from an external
threat, but from the need to properly sustain and modernize our launch
ranges at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral. We ask for continued attention
to and appropriate investment in these mission assurance programs.
We must also continue to make investments in the human capital that
will enable USSTRATCOM to face the challenges of tomorrow. These
challenges require the development of a cadre of space professionals,
in all Services, with the requisite skill, talent, training, and focus
that will ensure our ability to develop new or improved capabilities
and operate and defend them in the future.
cyberspace operations
Like space, cyberspace is a unique global domain in which the U.S.
must maintain freedom of action. It serves as a worldwide neural
network, a conduit that links human activity and facilitates the
exchange of information at speeds measured in milliseconds. Potential
adversaries recognize the U.S. reliance on the use of cyberspace and
constantly probe our networks seeking competitive advantage.
In this emerging warfighting domain, USSTRATCOM, through the Joint
Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and the Joint
Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), in
partnership with the Joint Staff is leading the planning and execution
of the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. In this
role, we coordinate and execute operations to defend the Global
Information Grid (GIG) and project power in support of national
interests.
Over the last year, the Defense Department has sought to enhance
the security of the GIG by improving personal identification and
authentication measures, standardizing operational security procedures
and software, and reducing access to non-mission essential web sites.
While generally effective, these defensive measures require
augmentation to defeat sophisticated adversaries. As the cyber attack
on Estonia demonstrated, the Defense Department must also plan and
train to operate the GIG while under attack. USSTRATCOM is actively
planning and executing operations to detect and counter attacks on the
GIG while coordinating responses with other DOD and interagency
elements.
For as much as USSTRATCOM has accomplished in this domain,
cyberspace operations is the least mature of USSTRATCOM's operational
mission areas. Our challenge is to define, shape, develop, deliver, and
sustain a cyber force second to none. We pledge to continue to work
with Congress as we continue to develop future resource and manpower
requirements. As we continue to define the necessary capabilities to
operate, defend, exploit, and attack in cyberspace, we ask for
increased emphasis on DOD cyber capabilities. Our most immediate
challenge is adequately trained personnel. USSTRATCOM needs a dedicated
and highly trained force provided by the Services to conduct network
warfare. As we continue to develop our cyberspace capabilities, we look
forward to the day when we have trained and equipped Service
organizations (e.g. brigades, battalions, wings, groups, and squadrons)
assigned to USSTRATCOM to conduct network warfare.
information operations
The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) remains
the center of excellence for DOD IO. Through JIOWC, USSTRATCOM has
refocused our IO efforts to reinforce and support our three global
missions of strategic deterrence and space and cyberspace operations.
Specifically, we shifted from regionally focused efforts centered on
individual combatant commands to concentrate on integrating Strategic
Communication planning, Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception
(MILDEC), and Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to enable
USSTRATCOM's global mission sets. Additionally, USSTRATCOM recognizes
that controlling the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and ensuring
its constant availability to friendly forces is not only of fundamental
importance to all three of our operational missions, but to every other
combatant command. To that end, we have undertaken a DOD-wide effort to
identify joint EW effects requirements, highlighting Service-level EW
capabilities and gaps in order to provide joint solutions for ensuring
global electromagnetic spectrum access.
missile defense
Missile technology continues to proliferate, thereby increasing the
need for a credible missile defense capability as an essential element
of America's National Security Strategy. Missile defense systems raise
our adversaries' ballistic missile development costs by reducing their
systems' effectiveness. In addition, our missile defenses enhance
deterrence by denying adversaries the benefits they might seek by
threatening the U.S. or our forces and allies with a missile attack.
Our missile defense systems must be ready to defend against a
missile that launches and lands in the same combatant commander's
region; a missile that launches from one region and lands in an
adjacent region; or is launched from one region, overflies an adjacent
region and lands in a third region. It is our responsibility to ensure
concepts of operations, the design and integration of sensor suites,
missile warning systems, and the mechanics of battle management systems
all address these scenarios.
As we move forward in the next year, USSTRATCOM, through our Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD)
is leading a collaborative effort with geographic combatant commanders
to develop a global integrated missile defense concept of operations
that will lay the groundwork for our future Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) Command and Control architecture. We are also examining
the merits of incorporating cruise missile defense capabilities into
the BMDS Command and Control architecture to address this growing
threat in a cost-effective manner. We continue to support DOD and
Department of State efforts to deploy the BMD mid-course radar and
Ground-Based Interceptor capabilities in Europe, which are an integral
part of the transition from limited defensive operations against a
North Korean ICBM attack to an architecture capable of defending the
U.S. and Europe from missile attacks originating from Southwest Asia as
well.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had an excellent year. In 2007,
MDA conducted five successful AEGIS Standard Missile flight tests (one
in conjunction with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force) and four
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) flight tests. Additionally,
they conducted one Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) test on-
orbit, and one Network-Centric Airborne Defense Element (NCADE) air-to-
air test. In September 2007 a successful ground-based midcourse
interceptor test was conducted using operational crews. In July 2007,
the early warning radar at Fylingdales Royal Air Force base completed a
major hardware and software upgrade to improve detection, object
classification, and precision tracking of ballistic missiles launched
against the U.S. This site, along with the site at Beale AFB is now
equipped with the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), making both
sites critical components of the BMDS. These modernizations contribute
significantly to the accuracy, and hence effectiveness, of missile
defense tracking information and provide a single configuration that
will enhance the sustainability of these radars.
The BMDS was exercised extensively throughout 2007. Between April
and August, operational warfighters exercised missile defense
operations in six joint and combined combatant command level exercises.
These efforts dramatically increased the level of operational
warfighter involvement in the development and fielding of the BMDS.
In the coming year, multiple BMDS exercises and tests, complemented
by the development of the global integrated missile defense concept of
operations will serve to validate our ability to ensure the efficient,
coordinated, and prioritized use of limited missile defense resources.
In support of the development of critical capabilities, USSTRATCOM has
also continued to perform its advocacy responsibility for the global
missile defense mission area, in full collaboration with the MDA and
the combatant commanders.
As our missile defense system continues to mature, it will continue
to influence our adversaries' perception of the economic and political
cost they must incur to pursue missile technologies. While missile
defense as a defensive shield is important, its ability to assure
allies, dissuade competition, and deter adversaries is equally vital.
To achieve these goals, we need your continued support.
I would like to emphasize that the recent successful operation to
intercept the decaying satellite was not a test of our missile defense
system. Some components of the system underwent a one time modification
to facilitate accomplishment of this mission. However, these components
are being returned to their original configurations to continue
defending against the ballistic missile threat.
combating weapons of mass destruction (cwmd)
For more than half a century we lived in a world in which a few
major powers possessed nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons.
The U.S. has led efforts to encourage nuclear-capable nations to secure
their materials and technology, as well as encourage those nations
retaining chemical and biological weapons to disavow them as the major
powers did long ago. While we have had some successes, such as Libya,
and more recently, progress with North Korea, a number of nations
continue to possess or seek WMD. Additionally, some nations with WMD
capability are experiencing political unrest, thus placing their
weapons at risk of capture by those hostile to the United States and
our allies.
Presidential direction, the National Strategy to Combat WMD, and
the recently publicized Inspector General report on DOD Initiatives for
CWMD made it clear the U.S. requires an integrated approach to
deterring our adversaries and protecting our Nation from those who
would employ WMD against us.
While every regional combatant command is assigned the mission to
counter WMD in its geographic area of responsibility, it is
USSTRATCOM's responsibility to integrate the family of DOD CWMD plans
and to advocate within DOD for desired CWMD capabilities from a global
perspective. We do this through the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC). Last year the Department's concept
plan to integrate and synchronize CWMD operations and activities was
approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This plan provides the
blueprint to coordinate worldwide CWMD operations by supplying an
effects-based template for regional combatant commanders to use in
tailoring their regional CWMD plans, operations, and activities.
USSTRATCOM has enhanced DOD's operational capability suite by
initiating the standup of a Joint Elimination Coordination Element
(JECE) to conduct operational level WMD-Elimination planning (including
deliberate, crisis action, and adaptive planning), joint training,
command and control, and elimination operations exercises in support of
joint force commander requirements. The JECE focuses on the activities
and operations necessary to train and prepare joint forces and command
and control elements to conduct WMD-Elimination missions. Recently
deployed in support of U.S. Pacific Command's major force exercise,
Ulchi Focus Lens, the JECE performed admirably, supporting the
formation of the first Joint Task Force Headquarters for the
elimination of WMD.
In our advocacy role, leveraging the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency's (DTRA) WMD expertise, SCC completed the CWMD Joint Integrating
Concept (JIC) outlining the future integrated architectures and
capabilities (2015-2027) for the CWMD mission. We have used this
visionary document as the foundation for development of the first CWMD
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
requirements document which provides a holistic prioritization of
current combatant command capability needs.
Over the past year, Congress supported our top two capability
needs; technologies for detecting shielded nuclear materials at
standoff distances, and a joint effort with United States Special
Operations Command to develop a CWMD intelligence predictive assessment
capability. USSTRATCOM continues to support DTRA through the
integration of interagency activities with the Departments of Energy,
State, Homeland Security and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency to accelerate research and development efforts for critical
standoff detection capabilities. Timely response to nuclear and
radiological events through enhanced sample collection, packaging,
transport, and precise data analysis is required to establish
attribution, thus contributing to deterrence.
We ask for your continued support in helping us build on the
successes realized through Proliferation Security Initiative programs
and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative, the DTRA
CWMD mission portfolio, and the Chemical/Biological Defense Program.
These programs enhance the capacity and capability of partners and
allies to better secure and govern their own countries. By building
global partnerships, the U.S. enhances the development of resident
counterproliferation capabilities. This strategy facilitates the
interdiction and elimination of WMD by other nations, promotes regional
stability, presents a consolidated front to the threat, and enhances
U.S. security by eliminating threats far from our shores.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
In 2007 USSTRATCOM and our Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) led ISR
planning in support of the operational surge in Iraq. The planning,
allocation, execution, and assessment of ISR missions have been vital
to the improvement of the security situation in that region. We
continue to improve our global ISR management processes. As the
sophistication and volume of warfighter ISR needs continue to grow, so
does the need to employ DOD's limited ISR assets in close coordination
with the rest of the Nation's surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities, as well as those of our allies.
To that end, we have invested significant effort in strengthening
DOD's internal and external organizational relationships to enable more
efficient ISR operations. When we assessed strategies to achieve a more
efficient ISR enterprise, the need to integrate national and Defense
ISR capabilities to satisfy the Nation's intelligence requirements
became clear. In October 2007, the DOD took a major step toward
improving the Defense ISR Operations Enterprise by integrating the
functions performed by JFCC-ISR and the Defense Joint Intelligence
Operations Center to form the Defense Intelligence Operations
Coordination Center (DIOCC). The DIOCC serves as the primary focal
point for interface with the recently established National Intelligence
Coordination Center and is part of a strategy to help ensure our
limited surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are aligned with
the Nation's and the Department's strategic priorities. These changes
reflect the direction, concurrence, and collaboration of the SECDEF and
the Director of National Intelligence.
In addition to improving our organizational approach, we are
reviewing USSTRATCOM's intelligence structure. When USSTRATCOM
established joint functional component commands, some of its key
intelligence functions were divested. We are reviewing our intelligence
support requirements at the component and headquarters level to better
posture intelligence support for each of USSTRATCOM's mission areas.
conclusion
We live in a world where threats to our safety and security emerge
and change daily. USSTRATCOM's missions and capabilities support our
national objectives of protecting and defending the homeland, assuring
our allies, dissuading undesirable competition, and deterring and when
necessary, defeating our adversaries. The men and women of United
States STRATCOM form a responsive warfighting command with a global
perspective that is in the fight today, and perhaps even more
importantly, is uniquely positioned to anticipate, prepare for, and
deter future crises.
I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts with you and I
look forward to partnering with you in the future as we work together
to ensure our Nation is secure. Thank you.

Senator Bill Nelson. I want to give the courtesy of turning
that opportunity over to Senator Sessions for his questioning.
I'm going to have to step out of the room for just a minute,
and will be back in, so Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

Senator Sessions [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your leadership and commitment to the subject of
our subcommittee. It's an important subcommittee.
General Chilton, thank you for being here. We value your
leadership.
Senator Inhofe, I know you have another committee hearing,
at this very moment. If you'd like to go first or--I will be
pleased to yield to you--if that would be convenient with your
schedule.
Senator Inhofe. Here's the observation I want to make, and
I wanted to do it when the chairman was here. We actually have
two hearings going on at the same time now, the Readiness and
Management Support Subcommittee and this one. I was looking
forward to hearing the opening statement of General Chilton,
and what I'd like to do is get an opinion from General Chilton
on the three phases of missile defense: the boost phase, the
midcourse phase, and the terminal phase and to get, in your
opinion, your thoughts on where we are on each one.
This is one of the major areas of misunderstanding by the
American people. I can remember people introducing amendments
on the floor of the Senate that we never did consider. But,
they were there, saying, well, we don't need to have redundancy
in midcourse, for example, and we don't need to be putting
money into kinetic energy booster, would, in fact, on the boost
segment we're pretty much negative right now, we don't have
anything that's out there working.
So, I'd just like to have you give us a little update on
where you think we are--what our timing is, and what is really
important that is coming along in these three phases of
progress.
General Chilton. Senator, I'm happy to discuss that. I'll
caveat my comments, first, by saying that, of course, the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is the technical expert in this
area.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Chilton. But as a warfighter, when I look at
missile defense, writ large, I do look at it in those three
phases that you described, for the following reasons. Again,
I'll tell you, I'm a little colored by my youth, where my
father worked, actually, on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
system, way back in the early 1970s, and I remember him telling
me, as a young man, he said, ``Son, the best way to get these
things is in the boost phase,'' he says, ``because that's when
they're hot, the thrust is coming out, you can see them,'' he
says, ``but it's a challenge, because you have to get a little
closer. The hard part is the later you get into the flight.''
That wisdom of my father has not changed.
Boost phase: you have the rocket coming off the pad, it's a
limited 2- to 3- to 4-minute time period, where it's very
visible and trackable and discernible, and it's very
vulnerable. The key there is to be able to bring effects to
bear against it, ordnance to bear against it. There's the issue
of being close enough and having a weapon that can do that.
It's an area that we are probably least mature in. I'd say we
are, as you look at what's deployed today. But, an area we want
to continue to work very strongly, because every warfighter
will demand that.
The midcourse phase we're talking about is when the rocket
quits and before the reentry vehicle enters the atmosphere, so
it's actually in space as it's transiting space at this phase.
It's another time when, if you can get at the threat early in
that phase, that's desirable. It's also, obviously, desirable
to develop and field technologies to interdict in this phase.
The ground-based missile defense system that we have deployed
in Alaska and in California addresses this.
Envisioned improvements to the sea-based system will add
another weapon system that can address this phase, and it's an
equally important phase. What gets hard in this phase is you go
from tracking a really hot booster to a very cold reentry
vehicle up in space. So different sensors are needed, and it's
a different challenge, but one that we've worked through pretty
successfully with our deployed systems.
Probably our most mature, if you think about how long we've
had them deployed, is the terminal phase. Now you're talking
about the reentry vehicle as it starts coming down through the
atmosphere into the local area. We've started that, back in
1991, in Operation Desert Storm, with the improvements to the
Patriot system, and we've advanced those with PAC-3. That is
your last effort, last opportunity to do it.
The terminal systems are not particularly capable, if at
all, against intercontinental-range missiles, but they are more
capable against--theater-based short-range to medium-range
missiles. So, when you look at the threat in total, whether it
be that you're concerned about defending the United States of
America from an intercontinental attack or a region, forces
deployed in a region from a short- or medium-range attack, I
think the approach that we're taking, the layered approach of
trying to address the vulnerabilities of these systems in
boost, midcourse, and terminal is the right approach to take.
Senator Inhofe. I think the greatest deficiency to work
with right now is the boost phase.
General Chilton. It's the most challenging, for sure,
Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Sessions and I have been around
long enough to remember when this all started, and fighting the
battle that's been in a continuous fight, particularly through
the 1990s. We even had one veto of a defense authorization
bill, in 1996. The reason was that we don't need to be moving
as fast as we're moving on this whole system.
If you're going to get into this cyber thing, this might be
a good time to do it, because I was fascinated by his
discussion, there.
Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. You all go ahead and
continue your questions, both of you.
Senator Sessions. Since Senator Inhofe has another
committee at the same time, but----
Senator Bill Nelson. Sure.
Senator Sessions. Why don't we follow up a little, for the
record, on the discussion we had about cybersecurity.
I would just note that, World War II, decisive events
occurred when we were able to break the Japanese and German
codes and have information that was critical to the war, and
saved lives, and assisted us dramatically. We're so committed,
as a nation, to computer systems: our Future Combat System
(FCS) for the Army, and our Air Force and Navy systems are all
computerized.
First, to what extent is maintaining security of those
systems your responsibility, General Chilton? Can you tell us
whether or not you have a plan in place, that you're moving
forward with, that will provide us confidence in the security
of this system? If you haven't gotten it, how close are you to
getting it?
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
You're exactly right, there's good analogies to the World
War II time period and to now and the future, when we think
about how we protect that critical information to our military
operations. When I think about where we are in computers, I
just put it in respect that we've transitioned from the ways
that we used to transmit and store information, which was in
file drawers and paper and through, maybe, radio frequency
communications, to this network that we're involved with now,
where we store information on, and transmit information.
Senator Sessions. Could I ask a question on that?
General Chilton. Sure.
Senator Sessions. Would one difference in today and in
World War II be that in World War II you had to intercept the
message while they were being sent, which is a very short
period of time, but today so many of these messages are
permanently recorded, if you could penetrate the system, you
could recall those messages years before?
General Chilton. That's a great point, Senator. If what
we're seeing today, in the taking of information from networks,
or storage devices on the network, is akin to what? I would say
espionage. So, in your analogy, in the old days, you would have
to go and break into those files with a flashlight in your
teeth and a camera, or take them away. Now you can do that from
the comfort of your desk and your access to a computer system,
or attempt to go into stored information on the network. So we
have to be very cognizant of that vulnerability.
What Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has been chartered to do,
with regard to the network, is to operate and defend the
Department of Defense (DOD) portion, which you'll hear it
referred to as the Global Information Grid. That's another
coined phrase to talk about the set of addresses that end in
.mil, for military, or .smil, for classified military.
What we're not chartered to defend--and I think this is
important to understand--is the .gov--so, probably the domain
that you operate in quite frequently on the Hill--or any other
agency within the government; the .edu, which our science and
university systems exchange a lot of information on, and we
actually go out and get information whether it be through
Google or whatever search engine; or the .com networks that a
lot of our financial systems or other systems throughout the
infrastructure of the country rely on for their operations.
STRATCOM is not chartered to defend those.
Senator Sessions. Who defends those?
General Chilton. The Department of Homeland Security is
chartered to do that. The President's initiative that was just
signed out in his recent National Security Presidential
Directive is the kickoff, really, of a large effort to go off
and address that.
Senator Sessions. Are you responsible for the Services--
Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines?
General Chilton. We're responsible for the network, and
they use that network: .mil and .smil. So we have set up a
construct, under the Joint Task Force for Global Network
Operations, under the command of General Charles Croom, who
reports to me, to operate that military network and to
promulgate orders to bring unity of command and effort, to make
sure we're configuring it using the right defensive systems,
the right procedures, to protect that DOD portion of the
network.
But, it's not just enough to build defenses, in my mind;
because no defense will ever be impenetrable. I think, as we
think about defending this vital domain, we have to go from the
high end of technology investments all the way down to the
lowest end, which is your newest recruit coming in, and he's
going to get on and use that system, whether he be a soldier,
sailor, airman, or marine, and to make sure that individual
knows that the way he behaves and utilizes his or her computer
on their desk can affect the entire system. They can create
vulnerabilities by not following the correct procedures. They
can also be a defender, even though they may be a maintenance
officer working on airplanes, or enlisted person working in
administration, they can be part of a network of people who are
watching out for people misusing or abusing that network.
So when I think about our responsibilities, and I think
about it from a very low to a very high-end continuum, and I'm
very encouraged by the seriousness with which the Services are
taking this issue, and the attention they're bringing to it, to
address it across the spectrum.
Senator Sessions. There's an article, recently, indicating
that our networks are increasingly under attack. Can you, in
this open forum, share some of the things that----
General Chilton. Yes, Senator, and I would characterize
them not ``under attack'' as much as being exploited. When I
say that, to go back to what I talked about earlier, from an
espionage perspective. There are individuals or entities coming
into the networks and downloading vast quantities of
information. Now, that doesn't impede the way we work, day in
and day out, but it's a collection of unclassified information
that, if you put those pieces together, you can, maybe, discern
certain things about the way we operate or uncover certain
vulnerabilities in the way we might operate. You're doing that
without having to actually train someone to infiltrate the
United States of America and get access to files in a file
cabinet.
Senator Sessions. You could do that from a foreign nation.
General Chilton. You could, and so, that to me is different
than an attack. I think what we saw in Estonia, previously, was
more of an attack, where there was an effort by an unknown
entity or group of people to come in and actually slow down the
network and the responsiveness of the Estonian network. That
was more of an attack, rather than espionage. But you have to
worry about both. We have to be worried about both.
Senator Sessions. General Chilton, I don't think this would
break the defense budget. I think it is very important. My
personal view is that you should have the money and the
personnel needed to do this job. In the scheme of things, it
would be a small investment that could be exceedingly important
to us, because there's just no doubt, if our adversaries have
figured out a way to penetrate our systems, the costs could be
far greater than we would have to expend to make them more
secure.
General Chilton. Senator, I would agree with you, but I
would also add that it's not just operating and it's not just
defending. We have to make sure we have the focus on operating,
because I'm convinced, after the Estonia incident, that we'll
never build the perfect defense. We will be attacked in time of
war, and we need skilled people who understand, and that can
train to continue to operate that system and make it fight,
even though it's under attack, just like we do in every other
domain. We don't shut down our airfield operations just because
we're under attack. We keep working through it, and we have the
right equipment, et cetera, to do that. So, we need to be
thinking about that.
But, we also need to be thinking about offense through this
domain. The New Triad talks about having strike capabilities
that include kinetic nuclear, kinetic non-nuclear, and
nonkinetic. This is the perfect domain to conduct nonkinetic
attack in the event of war in the future, and to have those
capabilities. This is the area, I would say, where we are least
mature or robust in manpower, expertise, and focus. We at
STRATCOM right now, are doing studies with the Services and
with our partners at the National Security Agency (NSA), who
are a big part of this program, in bringing capabilities to
understand exactly what we need as we go forward in this
century. I expect that, when we come in, in the fiscal year
2010 budget, the 2010 Program Objective Memorandum, we'll have
laid out those requirements and started to see the investments
in the offensive part of this domain, which is equally
important, in my view, to the defense. If for no other reason,
it's because we've always looked as having offense as part of
any good defense in any domain.
Senator Sessions. That's well said.
Mr. Chairman, I'll be glad to turn back to you. I have a
few more questions, but I'll be glad to follow up.
Senator Bill Nelson. As a courtesy to the Senator from
Nebraska, and rather than hold you up, I've flipped it to our
colleague from Alabama. Just be mindful that we have to finish
the first panel in 30 minutes, and I have a stack of questions.
So, the other Senator Nelson is recognized.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll be
mindful of the time requirements.
Thank you, General Chilton. We are very pleased that you're
at the helm for the STRATCOM. With all the elements that are
required to be on both offense and defense, we believe that
you're well positioned to do it. We want to make certain that
you have all the financial tools and other tools necessary to
be able to do that.
If we think about Cold-War legacy, and you've indicated
this before--that we can't just maintain that deterrent that
we've enjoyed in the past indefinitely by extensions and by
life-extension programs. At what point in time, in your
opinion, do we reach a tip-over, where we just are only trying
to extend the life of that deterrence? Then, number two, what
is your sense of the importance of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) as a key component of both land-based and sea-
based deterrence, respectively?
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator, for that question. I
want to begin by thanking the chairman for some advice he gave
me as I was leading up to confirmation hearings. Senator
Nelson, I think you'll remember an office call, where you asked
me some questions, and used some acronyms that I confessed
ignorance to, and you commended that I go out and immerse
myself in the nuclear enterprise early in my command. I have
done that, sir, and I've learned a lot.
Senator Bill Nelson. There's the expert, right over there.
General Chilton. I know.
I have gotten to know Secretary D'Agostino very well. But,
I have done that, Senator, and I've formed some views, and also
some concerns. Your first question would be one of my concerns
that I've come to appreciate better.
Every year, STRATCOM is required to certify the
reliability, safety, and security of our current nuclear
stockpile. Every year, that stockpile gets older, and we do
this on 1-year increments. The program put in place, the
Stockpile Stewardship Program has been a tremendous thing for
the United States of America. It's identified issues with our
old weapons early enough for us to start working on them, and
that has led to the Life Extension Programs that we're seeing,
particularly in the W-76 right now.
What I can't get comfortable with is you know there's an
edge out there that you're creeping toward with regard to these
weapons, because they were designed to be 15- to 20-year-life
weapons. Because of the way we made them, and our whole
architecture that was in place in the Cold War, which was based
on: if you have a problem, test or make a new one; and when you
had an infrastructure that could produce thousands a year, that
was a reasonable way to approach it. Now we don't want to test,
and we don't have an infrastructure that can really produce
anything. That makes me nervous, as you go forward, about any
problems that might develop in the current old inventory.
I try to pin down the scientists, but they will not be
pinned down, because they are very objective about this, and
rightfully so. I liken it to approaching a cliff, and I don't
know how far away from that cliff I am, and that gives me
discomfort with regard to continuing a strategy of life
extension.
I think there's an economic side of that, too, that I'm
probably not the best to speak to, but I liken it to trying to
maintain our 40-year-old automobile vanishing vendors, parts,
and technologies, suppliers change. Not only that, these 40-
year-old automobiles were not designed to be maintained, they
were designed to be replaced at about 15- to 20-year intervals.
That gives me pause, as you go down a life-extension approach.
That said, I think we need to answer these critical
questions, and address them.
As we look to the future, I support a modernization of the
weapons that we put on top of these delivery platforms, which I
think the Services have done a very good job in modernizing and
sustaining. But, they do us no good if we don't have a warhead
on top of them to provide the deterrent for the future. I
believe that deterrent will still be required in the 21st
century. I believe we need a modern weapon that's designed with
21st century requirements, as opposed to 20th century Cold-War
requirements, that can meet those future requirements. Those
are some of the conclusions that I've drawn on that.
Senator Ben Nelson. If we look at the fiscal year 2009
funding as it is at the moment, do you think it's sufficient to
complete the Phase 2A study? Is it possible to get us some idea
of what the costs might be in order to do that, particularly if
this budget's not sufficient to do that, because I agree with
Senator Sessions that we want to make certain you have the
tools that are necessary to carry out the responsibilities for
deterrence.
General Chilton. Senator, the funds to do the Phase 2A
study are in Dr. D'Agostino's portfolio. I don't want to speak
for him, and he will be on the second panel, and will perhaps
address them more specifically. What I can tell you, in the
2008 submission there is an estimate in the order of around $60
to $80 million, if my memory refreshes me, to complete that
study. I think that is still a valid number required somewhere
near the high 60s or high 70s--million dollars--and he can give
you the exact number--that's needed to finish the study. What's
important about doing that study is, it's not a decision to go
down the path; it will inform a decision for the next
administration, next year. My concern as the warfighter is, as
I look at the enterprise, in general and across the needs to
the future, it's just clear to me that this is a problem that's
been brewing for a while, and now is the time to address it,
now is the time to answer the questions, so that we can come to
a decision in the next administration, preferably early, and
move out, both to guarantee our security posture for the
future, but to make sure we're heading down the correct
business path for the country to achieving that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Whether it's the airplane life
extension or whether it's the life extension of the weapons,
there has to be a point where it's no longer either
economically feasible to do it, nor is it possible to get that
extension, indefinitely. So, that's why I think it's extremely
important that we know what it's going to take, and some idea
of what kinetic nuclear and kinetic non-nuclear warheads are
going to be required as a replacement, over some period of
time, of what we currently have.
General Chilton. I couldn't agree more, Senator. Thank you
for the question.
Senator Ben Nelson. As probably a lot of people know,
western Nebraska hosts the balance of the missile fields of the
90th Space Wing, the Mighty Ninety. Last year, the Air Force
was directed to extend the life of its intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet from 2020 to 2030. I'm assuming,
based on what you've said, that we've been able to modernize
and keep the lift instrument in a modern state of preparation.
Is that fair?
General Chilton. Senator, there's two parts to that. One is
the security of those systems, and the other is their
capability to launch. I bring a bias to this, I'll admit to
you, because my job was to make sure both of those were
adequately supported in my last job. But I think the record
will show that the Air Force has made substantial investments
in improving the security of the launch facilities and the
training of the forces that protect those facilities, and I
think they're moving in the correct direction there.
With regard to the life extension of the Minuteman III, the
big issue last year was not having enough test resources to be
able to certify its readiness to the 2030 time period, and that
was addressed in the funding, and supported.
We knew, at the time, though, that, since the rest of the
infrastructure was set for a 2018-2020 comfort level, that
there would probably be additional investment required in some
areas. This would be in support equipment, like transporters
that move the missiles to and from the field, or when you have
to pull one out for maintenance, various test equipment in the
back shops, that, maybe in the past, if you said, ``I only had
to get to 2018, I don't need to put any more money into these,
but now, if I'm going to go to 2030, there'll be some level of
modernization or refreshment, or at least sustainability for
another 10 years, that's required.''
So, I anticipate that the Air Force will take a real hard
look at that to make sure that they've crossed the t's and
dotted the i's in their investments to be able to get out 2030
across the spectrum. That's important to do.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, share with the subcommittee
what you think is the most significant management issue and the
programmatic issue that you're concerned about.
General Chilton. Yes, with regard to all the programs
across STRATCOM?
Senator Bill Nelson. STRATCOM.
General Chilton. I have two that come to mind, Senator, if
I might say two. One would be the--and it's not quite a program
yet--and I've already referred to it--and this is the
modernization effort for our warheads. I think the investments
need to be made to answer the tough questions now.
For an established program, the Transformational Satellite
Communications (TSAT) program, I would say, comes to mind,
Senator. Where we are on that program in this submission is the
Air Force is going off and restudying the program, with
responses to be provided in the April time period, as far as
the way ahead for that program. As the combatant commander
(COCOM), I hesitate to champion any one particular system. My
charter, I think, is to talk to capability. So, Senator, what
I'd like to address is my capability concerns here, that I've
felt that particular program was addressing. Now I ask: So, how
do we get there from here?
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me just ask you, right there since
it looks like it's going to be delayed to 2018, what are the
options?
General Chilton. Sure. I shared that same question with the
Air Force, Senator. Because here's what I'm worried about: one
is, our nuclear command and control relies on a survivable and
secure connection that runs through the satellite constellation
belt in the Extremely High Frequency (EHF) radio frequence
spectrum. We get that today through Military Strategic and
Tactical Relay (MILSTAR). It will be replaced by the Advanced
EHF (AEHF) satellite system. In the last design construct, the
TSAT system, that would be one element of the TSAT system that
would continue that capability.
This capability is one that I would lump with Global
Positioning System, I'd lump with weather, I'd lump with
intelligence gathered from space, as a capability we have just
become used to and we just don't envision ever having to
tolerate a gap in these capabilities. We wouldn't want to plan
for it, that's for sure.
So, the risk in that EHF connection was always on the back
end, because we were only getting three Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) satellites, and you really needed four. What
was the fourth? TSAT was a vision. The acquisition of the
fourth AEHF, kind of, addresses that back-end concern, but only
sort of. Here's where I have my concern. We're still going to
launch the very first one in calendar year 2008--by the
schedule, early fiscal year 2009. So, it only lasts so long.
So, you have to be looking long range, out in the 2018 time
period, the 2020 time period there, on how you're going to
continue this connection. I haven't seen a complete storyline
of how you're going to do that for that capability. Now that's
a STRATCOM parochial perspective.
The second area where I'm chartered to look across all
COCOMs needs would be the ever-increasing bandwidth demand that
we see coming down the road, whether it be for our increased
investment and fielding of systems like the Global Hawk, full-
motion video systems like Predator, et cetera, of envisioned
space architectures that will demand higher bandwidth, of
systems like the Army FCS that demands higher bandwidth. In
that regard, it's not so much a uninterrupted capability that I
worry about, it's a step up in capability that seems to be--on
the horizon to be demanded. So, probably like you, I await,
anxiously, for the Air Force's report back, in April, to see
what they're going to do with the remainder of the money in the
program, how they're going to reconstruct that to address these
capability issues that I'm concerned about.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, they delayed the program between
2008 and 2009. I'd like to know, for the committee, were you
consulted when $3.6 billion was removed from the program in the
2009 budget request?
General Chilton. Senator, as far as the 2008 reduction and
time schedule, I was part of that. So I was very aware of that,
and the development of it, and I believe I testified to this--I
was comfortable with a 2016 initial launch date, because it,
classically, takes about a year and a half, a year, to check
out the first satellite on orbit--a year. I like that extra
year of pad to support what we envision as a 2018 need date if
you didn't have an AEHF-4, which was not in the program then,
and so I was comfortable with that.
Now we have an AEHF-4, and the question is, how long does
AEHF-1 last? Are we comfortable with that? When does the fifth
element, whether it's TSAT or something else, come onboard? Is
2018 the right time period? 2020? That's the decision space
we're in.
With regard to the reduction in the program that was taken
when it was and I was not consulted when that decision was
made.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think that's significant.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
On the TSAT, my understanding of the concept was that we
needed to transition to a more capable satellite, and the TSAT
would replace the fourth, and would put us on the road of
increased capabilities. That's the leap-ahead technology that
President Bush talked about, and others have. So, the sooner
you can do this, the better. But, if we can't get there, we
need to know that. How do you see that possibility of--
occurring now?
Have we given up? I mean, we've basically made a decision
not to go with a fourth?
General Chilton. Sir, I've heard no one say that, with
regard to giving up, in any conversation I've had. I've had
multiple conversations since this----
Senator Sessions. Giving up, in terms of----
General Chilton. Going to the next level, at some point.
Senator Sessions. But, didn't we originally plan to do it
with the fourth satellite?
General Chilton. That was going to be the beginning of the
next level, because, really, to get there, you have to add more
than just the one new satellite. Most every constellation we
have requires three to four to complete the global-nature
capability of this. That first satellite's schedule was
primarily being driven by the first need that I said STRATCOM
has, which was to make sure we could sustain that command-and-
control network that I needed in STRATCOM for our nuclear
command-and-control mission. But, it was also the first step up
in capability to a new approach to moving information around.
Senator Sessions. Has that slipped? I know we've been
discussing that. Is it still possible that we can bring TSAT
online--I mean, I guess what I'm saying is, if you're going to
put a--launch a satellite--AEHF, I guess, is what we call it.
But you could put a TSAT instead of that, then you've begun the
new system, and have greater capability, instead of our
bringing up a fourth older satellite system and always slipping
that.
General Chilton. Yes. What the Air Force is going to answer
for us in April is what the actual schedule impacts and
capability impacts. I'm not sure which way they're going to go,
if they're going to reduce the delivery time or the
capabilities, or whatever. They're going to have to make some
decisions, though, because of the reduction.
But, when you think about it, AEHF is a tremendous step up
from where we are today. I mean, it's a tenfold increase. So,
don't get me wrong on my support for that program. I'm excited
about AEHF coming up, and the increased bandwidth that'll
provide to the warfighter.
TSAT, though, was a whole different approach. I use the
analogy from the old Laugh-In days, when Lily Tomlin was
sitting there, plugging in telephone calls. That's kind of the
way our satellites work today. You have to have dedicated
switching between the two people that are communicating. The
promise of TSAT was, it would take us to the way our Internet
works today, where you don't have to dial up somebody, you can
just message, and it'll get to them through the network system.
If you want to get information from the system, you don't have
to have a specific phone number, you can search and find a menu
of opportunities, and pull that information down. That's the
vision of TSAT as we move into that new technology in space,
that we really enjoy today in our networks on the ground today.
Again, I'd reiterate, I've heard no one in the Services say
we want to step back from moving to that step. They are my
concern's as I've described them.
Senator Sessions. Let me follow up on your study on the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). We need to make a decision
about that. I think you are correct that now's the time to do
so, and we're not prepared to make it, because we don't have
enough information and we haven't studied the issue
sufficiently. Is that correct?
General Chilton. That's fair, Senator. I think what the
RRW-2A proposed study was to answer questions, to tee us up for
a decision.
Senator Sessions. Now, you just indicated it would take $60
to $80 million to complete that study. That's the best estimate
we have?
General Chilton. I would defer the exact number, to the
next panel. But, my understanding is around $66 million to
complete that study.
Senator Sessions. Well, our difficulty, Senator Nelson, is,
the President's budget is only a $10-million request, and we
have some members in the House that are not supportive, and
that may have had some impact on the budget request they made.
I just think this is, in the scheme of things, a real important
decision, and we might as well do it now and not put it off. If
the report comes back and says, ``RRW is not the best way to
go,'' so be it. But, to continue to muddle on with life-cycle
improvements or trying to keep these systems going is worrisome
to me. So, that's just something I think we're going to have to
confront. Are we going to put the money up and make this
decision, or are we going to let it go without the kind of
analysis that ought to be given to it?
On the RRW, we're drawing down nuclear weapons now,
according to our Moscow Treaty we signed, and we will
dramatically reduce the numbers to, what, 1,700 to 2,200----
General Chilton. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions.--warheads, and there are fewer types of
warheads in our inventory, in the stockpile. All of these
warheads will also have exceeded their designed lifetimes, and
some have aged to multiples of their designed lifetime.
So, now, do you do the certification of the warhead?
General Chilton. A group that does report to me, and then I
certify the reliability and safety and security of the
stockpile.
Senator Sessions. So, it's the fact that concerns over the
age of these warheads. Now that we have a lot fewer of them, so
if a defect appears, we have a problem. We don't have, at this
time, an ongoing system to build any warheads. We may be the
only nuclear-power country in the world that does not have an
ongoing manufacturing system. Is that correct?
General Chilton. I'll take that for the record, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

All other declared nuclear weapon states, to include Russia, China,
Pakistan, India, United Kingdom, and France are continually improving
their nuclear delivery systems, weapons infrastructure, weapons,
testing facilities, and technologies. Since the early 1990s the
Presidential moratorium on nuclear testing and suspension of new
warhead development, the U.S. no longer maintains the continuous cycle
of new development, production, deployment and retirement of warheads
that other nuclear weapon states sustain. Our current focus is on
extending the lives of existing warheads in the stockpile well past
their original design lives. We currently only have the capability to
produce individual replacement components and are currently producing
about 10 plutonium pits per year in a converted research and
development lab to replace pits destroyed during surveillance testing.
This lack of production capability and responsive infrastructure forces
the U.S. to maintain a larger stockpile than necessary as a hedge
against a technical failure of a weapon or unforeseen geopolitical
risk. The result is the U.S. is the only nuclear weapon state that is
not modernizing its weapons to increase their performance margin
confidence, security, safety, and maintainability.

General Chilton. But, your assessment, I would not call
what we have today any kind of a manufacturing capability. We
have a laboratory-type environment that can produce, at best,
eight, my understanding, a year. So I don't consider that it's
certainly not robust, and I don't consider that a manufacturing
capability.
Senator Sessions. So all of these factors that lead you to
believe it's time for us to do a study and make a decision
about the future needs and other factors that you've mentioned?
General Chilton. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Have you personally reviewed this, as
commander of STRATCOM--do you favor moving to an RRW, based on
what you know today?
General Chilton. Senator, based on what I've learned over
the last several months, and my look at this, I won't pick a
design here, but I'll tell you, as a COCOM and as someone who's
chartered to provide a nuclear deterrent for this Nation, in
the future, I would say we need a modernized nuclear warhead
that has high reliability, safety and security features that
are improved over what we currently have, and maintainability
of design, which we absolutely do not have in the basic design
today. Those would be my capability requirements for our
warheads. In the safety and security area, they are safe and
secure today, by 20th-century standards. But, I think we are
responsible to look forward, and a lot has changed since 2001
with regard to threats to these weapons from terrorist-type
organizations that didn't exist before.
The reliability issue is important, because, as I stated
earlier, these weapons were designed in a time period where you
would refresh them about every 20 years, you could produce
thousands in a year, and you could test, if you had a question.
So reliability was pretty low on the design criteria for these
weapons, as compared to where it needs to be today, which is
right up at the top, if you don't want to test.
Then the maintainability issue, I've said also, I think
they were not designed to be maintained, and, as we look to the
future, both from an economic standpoint and from a standpoint
of being able to make sure we can continue to preserve the
capability, we need to put that in the design criteria right
upfront.
Senator Sessions. Well, I thank you for that, and just
mention one question, and our time is running short. I know we
need to get to the second panel. Some notable strategic
experts, such as former Secretary of Defense William Perry and
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, have written an
article calling for the United States to set nuclear
disarmament as a goal. Perry and others believe that the goal
of nuclear disarmament accords the United States the high moral
ground for its nonproliferation initiatives. On the other hand,
such a goal makes it more difficult for the United States to
achieve a national consensus on nuclear weapons policy, because
compromise is unattainable between those who support and reject
that goal.
How would you assess the strategic implications of a world
in which the United States does not possess nuclear weapons?
General Chilton. Senator, first, I do not consider those to
be diametrically opposed positions. As a father, and someday,
hopefully, a grandfather, I would, of course, love to envision
a world free of nuclear weapons. But, I also envision, and
desire to envision, a world that is free for my children and
grandchildren to grow up in, a country that is free to do that.
Unilateral disarmament will not preserve that in a world where
other countries possess nuclear weapons, particularly in
quantities enough that could destroy our way of life, if they
should decide to use them against us.
Senator Sessions. So, if a country had a few nuclear
weapons, and let's say, they knew we considered them a rogue
state, and we were to abandon our nuclear weapons, would it not
be in their interest to seek to achieve checkmate potential by
expanding their production of nuclear weapons?
General Chilton. Well, I think that's good logic. I think
the possession of nuclear weapons by other countries demands
that the United States have a nuclear deterrent. I would like
to see that day when there aren't any, but I don't envision
that, personally, from a practical sense, in the remainder of
this century. Given that position, and given the, I think, very
important mission that this command has been given, to preserve
our strategic deterrence for the preservation of this country,
it is time for us to make the hard decisions and the
investments to answer the questions of: how are we going to
posture ourself for this century, while, at the same time,
working to achieve that other goal? I don't think that it's an
either/or. I think we need to dream and work toward the day,
with other countries, hand in hand, not unilaterally, to
achieve that vision someday. But, at the same time, we cannot
let our guard down, so long as they're a threat to this
country.
Senator Sessions. You have to go on. You just made me
recall the late William Buckley, I think, on Firing Line with
Norman Cousins on the Saturday Review. He was editor, I think,
of that, at the time. Cousins waxed eloquent on the need to
reach out and be peaceful and create a world in which a war
didn't take place. Buckley listened patiently and concluded,
saying, ``Well, Norman, I'm glad you're working for those
goals, and I'm very supportive, but I hope you won't mind if I
take care to preserve and protect the security of the United
States while you're working all this out.'' I think it's fine
for people to talk about ideas, but I want to see if it's going
to work before I buy into it. I think perhaps we've over-
interpreted, perhaps, what they were saying. I don't think they
expected us to act in any reckless way. But we need to confront
these issues, deal with them effectively, make our plans for
the future. I can't imagine it would result in the elimination
of warheads, although we are drawing down the number
dramatically.
General Chilton. Dramatically.
Senator Sessions. If we're going to maintain warheads,
should there be a newer, safer, more reliable warhead, or can
we continue the whole stockpile? Those are the questions that
we need to be making now, I think and answers that we need to
be getting.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, let me pose a series of
questions, here, to you, and let's get them on the record, and
then we'll get on to the second panel.
General Cartwright had said, when he was the Strategic
Commander, ``It's very important to me, the expansion of the
system beyond the long-range ICBMs, to start to address those
that hold at threat our forward deployed forces, our allies,
and our friends.'' Those are more in the short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles, things that Patriot and Standard
Missile II and III will be able to address, and Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), as it comes on. Do you agree?
General Chilton. I do, Senator. I would say that I'm much
encouraged by the block approach that MDA has taken. I think it
has added clarity to the investment, and also helps us focus on
how we're moving forward. Block one being initial capability to
defend against North Korea; and block two focused on the
regional area and increasing investments there; and block
three, for steps to take to defend to the United States against
Iran; four, to expand that defensive capability to include our
allies; and five, to flesh out the second major contingency
approach to the regional threat. So, as you see that, we have
fielded the North Korean portion of that already, and I think
we are taking the appropriate emphasis in block two right now,
while working in each of the blocks across the board.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. There's something called
the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study. Now there's a second
version. It suggests that we need more THAAD and Standard
Missile III interceptors than envisioned in the first study. Is
that correct?
General Chilton. Senator, I'm not sure that that has
reported out formally; let me take that for the record, to get
back to you on that, because I want to be absolutely certain.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, the recently completed study, which I believe you refer to
as the second version, was a sensitivity analysis on the Joint
Capability Mix (JCM) Study II called JCM II Plus. With this additional
information, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the JCM
II Study recommending an increase in minimum quantity of upper tier
interceptors needed beyond those programmed in the President's budget
2008.

General Chilton. I have heard the same reports that you
have had on that, but I have not seen the second JCM study that
would say that. It wouldn't surprise me. I think it's certainly
recognized in the block approach by MDA, that's saying that,
no, what we're today is not going to be adequate for the long
term.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, when you find out, then, we want
to be briefed on that second version of the study, as well.
General Chilton. Absolutely, Senator. I'd be happy to.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Now, your command had the
lead for planning the shootdown of the satellite that just came
down. I need you to be brief, because we need to change panels,
here, but I want you to explain the process, which started back
in December, including when the decision was made that it was
possible to get it, and the agencies involved.
I want you to do that right now, and then I want you to
provide, for the record, the modifications that were made to
the Aegis Ballistic Missile System to enable to do that, those
modifications that you made on the software and all that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, go on and answer that quickly.
General Chilton. Sure.
Senator, I'd like to provide, for the record, a written
portion of what you asked for, for me to do quickly, verbally,
here, because I'm sure I'll not be able to do it very fast,
because it was pretty extensive, all the work that was done
there.
Let me begin by saying first, how proud I am of STRATCOM
and all the agencies that participated in this. Just to be a
part of that, it was such a humbling experience to watch this
Government, this Nation, come together in the fashion that it
did to solve this problem as quickly.
It began before Christmas, when the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) expressed a concern about
the frozen hydrazine aboard this satellite, his concern that it
could endanger the populace on the ground, and his question to
the Director of MDA, ``Is there anything you can do?'' I was
brought into the loop immediately, when those questions were
asked, in a phone call from General Obering to me that said,
``Here, take a look at this. We'll get back to you after
Christmas.'' Between Christmas and New Year's. I received a
call from General Obering, and he says, ``We're not there yet,
but so far, on where we've looked at this, our experts say they
don't see any showstoppers. This is going to be challenging.
The schedule's going to be an issue, because we knew about when
the satellite was going to come down.'' Essentially, they had 6
weeks to do what they would normally do in 6 months. We knew,
at STRATCOM, there was going to be a lot of information brought
together to help advise a decision on even--if we determined
was technically feasible; in parallel, we had to be building a
decision package to decide even if you could do it, ``Assuming
you could do it, would you do it? What are the pros and cons of
that?'' Sir, that took the great support of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the NRO, Air Force Space
Command, contractor workforce, MDA, to do that.
But, as this moved forward to the culmination of this
event, the United States Navy was obviously at the tip of the
spear there and did a marvelous job. It was a complete joint-
service approach and interagency, too. If you numbered them all
up, I think we counted 16 different organizations in our
Government, from organizations like Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, et cetera,
that helped us be successful in mitigating this threat to the
people of the world.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Now, why isn't that an
antisatellite capability (ASAT)?
General Chilton. Well, Senator, I think we approached this
completely--and the analogies have been made in the press,
``What's the difference between you, and what you did, and the
Chinese?'' I think they're absolutely, completely apples-and-
oranges in the description of them.
First of all, we told the world what the problem was and
what we were going to do. We did extensive analysis and
research, and have been very transparent on what our
estimations of the increased risk to on-orbit vehicles would be
as we approached the decision, and we've continued to publish
exactly what's happened as a result of that. The Chinese, on
the other hand, didn't tell anybody what they were going to do,
they didn't advise anybody of the risks they were going to
increase. We took steps to make sure that we mitigated the
risks, not only to the populace of the planet, which was our
mission and why we did this, but we were worried about on-orbit
capability, and we took this intercept at an altitude that
would ensure that that problem would go away in short order.
The Chinese effort will be and the consequences of that effort
will be with us for estimates of up to a century, the risk that
that will pose.
Their intentions on why they developed this system have not
been stated. Our intentions have been clearly stated, and our
transparency in what we have done and our modification of a
system to do this, and our intent to unmodify those systems and
go back to what they're originally intended to do, has been
very transparent, I think, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. The bottom line is that the Chinese
have left tens of thousands of pieces up there, at least 250
miles high and higher, that are going to be up there, as you
say, for decades, and that pose a threat to everybody else's
space assets; whereas, our intent, in shooting this down, was
exactly the opposite, at about 120 miles high, get it so it's
going to degrade faster and it's going to have a more
predictable landing, and you're going to bust up that thousand
pounds of hydrazine.
General Chilton. That's correct, Senator. I'd only just
make one minor correction. I would have liked to have waited
til it was down to 120, because our vision of shooting it as
low as possible. What turned out to be as low as possible was
around 150 nautical miles. But, that said, our pre-shot
estimates were tracking very closely, if not better, to those
estimates, because the intercept was so successful, it really
fractured the satellite dramatically, and we think the size of
pieces that we can trace will all be down in the next 60 days,
and the modeling of the pieces that are too small for us to see
will be down before the end of the year. So I think that's a
dramatic statement, that we took that level of interest and
sensitivity into the mission that we executed.
[The information referred to follows:]

Previous testimony addressed the meetings and discussions that
occurred during the December 2007 timeframe between Mr. Large
(Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)), Lieutenant General
Obering (Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA)), and General Chilton
(Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM)) which lead to the
initial planning efforts.
The planning team met in early January 2008 to determine potential
options for presentation to the NSC. This team included personnel from
USSTRATCOM and its Joint Functional Component Commands, NRO, MDA and
Aegis-MDA. In mid-January CDRUSSTRATCOM presented the concept brief for
satellite engagement to the President and received direction to focus
on a course of action involving intercept with an SM-3 missile.
This direction permitted MDA to begin software and system
modifications enabling the SM-3 to execute the intercept. MDA spent
months altering software to permit optimal target recognition. Target
characterization and desired aim point determination were key
parameters to be addressed by the software.
In late January, CDRUSSTRATCOM presented the refined course of
action and was directed to begin operational planning for the satellite
intercept. MDA continued to work on ship and missile system
modifications necessary for successful engagement.
All modifications and deliveries took place on schedule in the
first half of February 2008. In mid-February, CDRUSSTRATCOM presented
the Operational Intercept Plan to the NSC; received Presidential
authorization for intercept which culminated in a Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Execution Order.
Following this execute order, CDRUSSTRATCOM began rehearsals for
the intercept operation. Six days after being directed to intercept the
satellite, all engagement parameters were favorable and the satellite
was successfully intercepted on February 20, 2008.

Senator Bill Nelson. Well, congratulations to you and to
all your team and all the multiple agencies that were involved
on this.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. As you look at the Minot-Barksdale
problem, do you think that your command is going to have the
oversight and the inspections to see that we have this nuclear
security for the future?
General Chilton. Yes, Senator. We've taken some steps since
then. Now, what I've found out is that, over years gone by, the
STRATCOM went from actively participating, in the days of
Strategic Air Command, before STRATCOM, to the migration
through the post-cold-war period, had stepped back from,
obviously, conducting, because that was no longer their job,
but to even monitoring, kind of, over-the-shoulder, if you
will, these inspections. That was reinstituted immediately
after the Minot incident. So, all the inspections then--and we
intend to move forward, to have a member of our inspector
general team, not conducting the inspection--that's not our
job--but, to be there when they're done, and make and report
back to me about how comfortable they are with the way these
inspections are being conducted: Are they standardized? Are we
satisfied with the level of scrutiny being taken? That's only a
minor step that we have done, but important.
Additionally, we've increased focus, up to the commanders
level in STRATCOM, on the status of our nuclear forces. It's
part, in my immersion in the weapons side that we've discussed
already here, but weekly I am briefed on our entire nuclear
force structure, all our task forces, their readiness, any
issues that may come up; and those are done to--a weekly
briefing to me and the entire staff, that everyone is aware of.
That's new.
In addition to that, we've set up a construct within the
headquarters that will report up to the vice commander of
STRATCOM, on a quarterly basis originally, that is chartered
from a colonels working group, general officer intermediate
group, to take a look at the entire nuclear enterprise, so that
we're not only watching security of the weapons, we're watching
security of the facilities, we're paying attention to the
health of the launch platforms and delivery platforms, as well
as the weapons. So, an across-the-board enterprise examination
that will address issues that, maybe, before were understood at
lower levels, but not being elevated to the appropriate levels
in the command. These are a few of the steps we're taking.
I'll tell you, we're also going to robust our exercise
program in this area. We had devolved to--I believe, into a
kind of a checklist or command-post-type exercise when we
exercised these systems. I'm a little bit from Missouri on
this. If you tell me you can do this, I'm going to ask you, on
occasion, through exercises, to show me that you can still do
that. That's above and beyond the safety and security
inspection; this is more of an operational focus. So, we're
going to increase that emphasis in the command, as well.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Last question, and then we'll
bring the other panel up, and the record will remain open for
any questions that we want to submit in writing.
We have this little conflict here between the warfighter in
the area of title 10 military authority and title 50
intelligence authority as we look at this cyberspace operation
and responsibility. So, can you give your thoughts of what you
think it's going to take to resolve this quandary? Could you
tell us if you think legislative action is needed?
General Chilton. Right. Senator, I do not think legislative
action is needed. I think there's honest disagreement among
some people, but pretty good agreement among others. I'll give
you an example. I mean, title 50 is an important law that we
have, that protects the citizens of the United States from
intelligence--the intelligence collection that is rightly
targeted at adversaries. There are some who think, because of
that, that only people with title 50 organizational
responsibilities, that those organizations should be in charge
of anything that would have title 50 associated with it. But,
we have examples today where we maintain that protection of the
U.S. citizens, we maintain the rules of title 50, but we
actually use the title 50 assets in combat operations. The
examples I would use would be the RC-135 platform, which is
stationed at Offutt Air Force Base, the U-2 platform, a unit
that I used to command, where we have people that have title 50
authorities, that examine the intelligence collected by those
platforms, but day-in and day-out, they're deployed, working
for the CENTCOM commander, and they're using that information
to conduct combat operations. At the same time, the title 50
chain-of-command authority has to certify that they are
following the rules, and that they're trained and certified to
do that. So, there you see a classic case of title 10 combat
operations being closely supported by people with title 50
authorities, that are certified and kept--and held to be
accountable to those laws, that's in a very effective
application of those two titles.
I think that, as we look forward into the cyber domain, is
a model that I would advocate for.
The tension today is based, in a lot of areas, on the
limits of resources that we have. As I spoke with Senator
Sessions earlier in the testimony, growing and--for us,
identifying the requirements and growing those capabilities,
which is primarily human capital for the future, is very
important for us in this stage of development of the cyberspace
domain and how we think about how we would conduct warfare in
the future there. They're just aren't quite enough people that
we need in some areas; in other areas, it's a matter of focus.
There are talents that we can use, and we just need to bring
them to bear to this command. As a COCOM, I need to demand the
Services provide those resources so that I can conduct the
mission that I've been assigned. The Services, we've had good
dialogue with them and they are excited about doing that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, thank you, General. We
appreciate it. Thank you for your service to our country, and
you are always welcome in this committee.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. We look forward to the continuing very
good relationship.
May I call up the second panel, please.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. [Pause.]
We're pleased to have Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Michael Vickers. We're pleased to have Major General Richard
Webber, who is the Assistant Deputy Chief, Operations, Plans,
and Requirements; Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of
Strategic Systems Programs for the Navy; and the Honorable Dr.
Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
Each of your statements will be put in the record.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Vickers, Major General
Webber, Rear Admiral Johnson, and Mr. D'Agostino follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael G. Vickers
opening remarks
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee: I welcome the opportunity to describe our progress in
transforming the Nation's strategic capabilities to meet 21st century
security challenges. I know that you understand the importance of this
effort, and I want to thank the members of the subcommittee for your
support. Successful transformation of our strategic capabilities will
require a sustained partnership between the Department of Defense (DOD)
and Congress.
implementing the nuclear posture review (npr)
The NPR determined that the Cold War Triad of nuclear strike
systems is not adequate to address the range of potential challenges in
the new security environment. Accordingly, the NPR established a New
Triad possessing broader capabilities, including offensive strike
systems (nuclear, non-nuclear, and non-kinetic); defenses (active and
passive); and a revitalized defense infrastructure, supported by
enhanced Command and Control, Intelligence, and adaptive planning
capabilities. Though not explicitly addressed in the NPR, capabilities
in the areas of space and Information Operations are clearly among
those needed to meet current and future security challenges.
We have had mixed progress to date in fielding these capabilities.
We have had significant success in achieving an initial capability to
defend the United States against the emerging long-range ballistic
missile threat from North Korea and the Middle East, and in fielding
defenses to protect U.S. deployed forces and those of our coalition
partners. Much more challenging has been the effort to sustain nuclear
force capabilities and revitalize the nuclear infrastructure, and to
develop a prompt, non-nuclear global strike capability.
nuclear forces and a responsive infrastructure
We continue to draw down the number of operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads, as well as our supporting stockpile of
nondeployed warheads, to the lowest level consistent with our national
security requirements and commitment to allies. That said, nuclear
forces remain the ultimate deterrent capability that supports U.S.
national security. Even as they decline in numbers, nuclear weapons are
an essential and enduring element of the New Triad, and they underpin
these New Triad capabilities in a fundamental way.
The extended nuclear deterrence commitment the United States
provides is key to assuring allies and friends of the credibility of
U.S. security commitments. U.S. nuclear weapons deter potential
adversaries from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction
against the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies and
friends. In the absence of this ``nuclear umbrella,'' some non-nuclear
allies of the United States might perceive a need to develop and deploy
their own nuclear capability.
At present, the United States is the only recognized nuclear
weapons state that does not have the ability to produce new nuclear
weapons in quantity. Accordingly, the lives of existing warhead types
are being extended through refurbishment. Successive programs to extend
the service life of the current inventory of warheads, however, can
decrease our confidence in their performance as these warheads deviate
from their baseline designs validated using nuclear test data.
Our long-term goal is to rely more on a revived infrastructure and
less on the nondeployed warhead stockpile to respond to unforeseen
events. We seek replacement of existing warheads with Reliable
Replacement Warheads (RRW) of comparable capability to our current
weapons that would be less sensitive to manufacturing tolerances or to
aging of materials. They would be certifiable without nuclear testing,
and have advanced safety and security features that can not be built
into our current weapons.
Safety and security take on enhanced importance in the post-
September 11 world. While our current systems are safe and secure, RRW
will incorporate improved, state-of-the-art safety and security
features that will reduce still further any chance of unauthorized use.
The desired size of a responsive nuclear infrastructure, measured
in terms of the number of warheads it could produce or refurbish per
year, would depend on a number of key variables; but once RRWs are
deployed in significant numbers, many of the warheads now retained in
the stockpile as a hedge against reliability problems could be retired.
Until a truly responsive nuclear infrastructure is operational,
however, the United States will need to retain an appropriate inventory
of nondeployed warheads to manage geopolitical, technical, and
operational risks. The Department will soon provide a white paper,
``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,''
discussing the considerations behind U.S. requirements for nuclear
weapons in greater detail. This paper will help inform the Nuclear
Posture Review to take place next year.
non-nuclear prompt global strike
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted an important gap in
prompt, long-range conventional (non-nuclear) strike capabilities.
Land-based conventional forces, such as fighter and bomber aircraft,
could take hours to days to deploy and strike a target. Prompt Global
Strike capabilities may be needed for time-sensitive operations such as
interdicting the transfer of WMD to terrorists, or preventing a rogue
state from launching a ballistic missile armed with a WMD payload.
Today, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are the only means the United
States possesses for engaging distant, fleeting targets promptly
(within about an hour from the time of an execution decision).
Last year, in response to our request for funding for the
Conventional Trident Modification program, Congress appropriated funds
for research and development of technologies that could be applied to a
wider range of concepts that might provide a prompt, non-nuclear,
global strike capability. I want to thank the members of this
subcommittee for your support of Prompt Global Strike. DOD accordingly
will continue to develop and propose options to expand the range of our
strategic capabilities in this area.
missile defense capabilities
Missile defense remains a top priority for the administration.
Missile defenses constitute an essential element of our overall
national security strategy to dissuade and deter states of concern from
acquiring or using ballistic missiles, and to protect our citizens from
the threat of missile attack should deterrence fail. We greatly
appreciate the strong support this subcommittee has provided toward
developing and procuring this critical capability.
We continue to make good progress in providing an initial
capability to protect our population and territory against the emerging
long-range ballistic missile threat from North Korea and the Middle
East. At the same time, through deployment of Aegis SM-3 and PAC-3
systems, and continued development of Theater High Altitude Area
Defense and the airborne laser, we are ensuring we can protect our
forward-deployed forces and those of our coalition partners against
shorter-range missile threats.
We have already seen the benefits of the initial defense against
long-range missiles when we activated the system during the North
Korean ballistic missile tests in July 2006. The capability to engage a
missile launched in the direction of the United States allowed U.S.
leaders to consider a wider range of options than would have otherwise
been available. This capability also serves to devalue any future North
Korean attempt to use its missiles to threaten or coerce the United
States.
international missile defense cooperation
The United States is committed to working with allies and friends
to strengthen our collective capabilities to deal with the dangers of
WMD and ballistic missiles. Our largest missile defense cooperation
partner is Japan. Facing a direct threat from North Korean missiles,
Japan is acquiring both Aegis SM-3 interceptors and PAC-3 batteries.
Japan achieved a major milestone in December 2007, when its destroyer
Kongo successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target with an SM-3
interceptor--a first for an allied naval vessel. In March 2007, Japan
deployed its first PAC-3 firing unit, which together with the Kongo
affords the Japanese a layered capability to defend against ballistic
missiles. With Japan, the United States is co-developing the SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor, a more capable version of the current sea-based
interceptor, and we are developing operational plans to share
information and to integrate our systems more effectively.
Another important area of missile defense cooperation is our work
with Israel. We continue to cooperate on the Arrow missile defense
system and have begun to explore with Israel options for addressing
ballistic missile threats that exceed the Arrow's defensive capability.
An important component of our missile defense cooperation is an
ambitious bilateral exercise program over the next 2 years that will
realistically test our joint capability to address ballistic missile
threats.
european missile defense sites
In January 2007, the President directed us to proceed with
negotiations on basing U.S. missile defense elements in Poland and the
Czech Republic. These defenses are intended to counter the emerging
threat both to the United States and to friends and allies in Europe
posed by Iranian development of longer-range ballistic missiles. We
have had several rounds of negotiations with Poland on a draft
agreement to base ground-based missile defense interceptors on its
territory. These sessions have been productive, and we have made good
progress on a draft text. While the new Polish Government has
emphasized its position that the agreement should result in a net
benefit to Poland's security, it recognizes the growing ballistic
missile threat to Europe and the contribution these missile defense
assets can make to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
security.
In parallel, we have had a number of rounds of negotiations with
the Czech Republic on an agreement to base a missile defense tracking
radar on its territory. These talks have also made great progress and
we are in the process of addressing a small number of issues that, once
resolved, will allow us to finalize the draft text. Czech officials
have shared our commitment to concluding these agreements, while at the
same time ensuring that U.S. missile defense assets in Europe will be
interoperable with, and complementary, to ongoing NATO missile defense
efforts.
missile defense at nato
In addition to pursuing bilateral cooperation programs in missile
defense, we are working within NATO on the Alliance's response to the
growing ballistic missile threat. We are pleased with the progress
being made in the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(ALTBMD) program, which will provide the Alliance's deployed forces a
defense against short- and medium-range missiles.
To protect the indivisibility of Allied security, it is important
for the rest of the Alliance to be protected against ballistic missile
attack. NATO Heads of State and Government recognized the technical
feasibility of missile defense at the 2006 Riga Summit, and NATO
continues to make progress in this area. While the planned U.S. sites
in Poland and the Czech Republic will be important contributions to
Allied security, these elements will not protect Allies in southeastern
Europe from shorter-range ballistic missile threats. It is our hope
that at the Bucharest summit in April, the Alliance will be in a
position to recognize the growing missile threat; support territorial
defense as a means of addressing that threat; and welcome the
contribution that European-based U.S. missile defense assets will make
in protecting most Allies against long-range ballistic missiles. NATO
also continues to cooperate with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council on
Theater Missile Defense, and we have expressed our willingness to work
with Russia on broader Missile Defense in the NATO context.
missile defense cooperation with russia
Because we are building a new security relationship with Russia
whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation,
and because we believe that Russia also faces an emerging ballistic
missile threat from states such as Iran, we have invited Russia to join
us in a cooperative effort to pursue missile defense.
U.S. and Russian missile defense experts have met a number of times
over the last year to share intelligence assessments of the Iranian
ballistic missile program; discuss transparency and confidence building
measures that could address Russia's concerns about our planned missile
defenses in Europe; and seek ways in which we could work jointly with
Russia to address ballistic missile threats. We have proposed
cooperation in such areas as modeling and simulation; sharing of early-
warning data; building a joint regional missile defense architecture;
and conducting joint exercises and wargames. Missile defense also
featured prominently in last October's ``2+2''meeting in Moscow, where
Secretaries Gates and Rice discussed a number of strategic issues with
their Russian counterparts. We remain committed to showing through our
continued discussions, and through our concrete proposals, our sincere
desire to work with Russia to address an emerging threat that affects
us all while demonstrating that our missile defense program poses no
threat to Russia.
space capabilities
We rely on services provided by space capabilities in all facets of
our daily lives, and these capabilities are vital to our national
security and the global economy. At the same time, potential
adversaries continue to seek means to counter the advantages we obtain
from space and to use space capabilities against us. Our space
capabilities face a wide range of threats such as radio frequency
jamming, laser blinding, and anti-satellite systems, including the
anti-satellite capability demonstrated by China last year. In this
regard, we are working to assess the strategic implications of such
counter-space capabilities for our vital interests in space, and are
carefully factoring the results of our assessments into our
architecture planning efforts and investment priorities.
U.S. National Space Policy is based on a number of longstanding
principles. The U.S. rejects claims of sovereignty by any nation over
space; rejects limitations on the fundamental right to operate in or
acquire data from space; and retains the right of free passage through
and operations in space without interference. Consistent with these
principles, the U.S. views purposeful interference with its space
systems as an infringement on its rights and will take those actions
necessary to preserve its freedom of action in space.
U.S. National Space Policy directs the Secretary of Defense to
develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in
space, and if directed, to deny such freedom of action to adversaries.
The Department's investment strategy for space and space-related
activities seeks to balance a number of requirements. We need to:
modernize space situational awareness capabilities to ensure ample
warning of hostile acts; improve protection plans to ensure required
capabilities are available in a contested space environment; develop
architectural solutions, including Operationally Responsive Space
concepts, to ensure capabilities are available when needed; establish
an operations posture, to include appropriate planning and exercises,
to respond to attacks on U.S. space interests; and ensure the ability
to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities to harm our forces or
our homeland.
The DOD further implements our National Space Policy by supporting
efforts to promote safe and responsible use of space. We seek mutually
beneficial international cooperation on space activities, and support
commercial and foreign space surveillance needs to ensure safe space
operations. DOD seeks to promote compliance with existing legal
regimes, acceptance of international debris mitigation guidelines, and
development of additional voluntary guidelines for safe and responsible
space operations. We also do our best to protect mutual security
interests related to dual-use space technology and services.
information operations and cyberspace
Providing our combatant commanders the capability to integrate into
their planning the various elements of Information Operations--computer
network operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations,
military deception, and operations security--has become even more
important in the information age. Our potential adversaries, both
nation-states and non-state actors, continue to seek ways and means to
counter the advantages we obtain from our use of information, and to
turn those same advantages against us in both conventional and in
unconventional ways. We are assessing the strategic implications of our
potential adversaries' capabilities in this regard, and factoring those
results into our planning and investment priorities for information
operations.
We are continuing to develop deterrence strategies to address
potential adversaries' attempts to counter our information advantages.
We are working closely with our interagency partners, to define this
domain in terms that will allow us to scope the missions that we will
be asked to conduct. This domain crosses the physical boundaries within
which we operate--space, air, land, and sea--as well as the
organizational boundaries--military, civil and commercial--making this
a complex problem. It is imperative that we understand our roles, both
active and supporting, so as to provide the best possible options for
the Nation.
The ability to operate freely within cyberspace is critical to
military operations and U.S. national security, but the threats to our
computer networks are real and growing. Numerous organizations, such as
the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations, the Defense Information
Systems Agency, U.S. Strategic Command, and the National Security
Agency's Information Assurance Directorate are working together to
defend our Global Information Grid. But while these significant
resources and effort are devoted to defending our computer networks
against attempted intrusions on a daily basis, technology changes, and
so do the threats. We recognize that this will be a long-term effort,
and while much remains to be done in this area, we are making progress.
conclusion
Transformation of our Nation's strategic capabilities to meet the
uncertainties and challenges ahead depends critically on a sustained
partnership between DOD and Congress. We need to continue the progress
on missile defense; sustain our nuclear capabilities through the RRW
program and revitalization of the nuclear infrastructure; develop and
deploy a conventional, prompt Global Strike capability; ensure
continuity of service of our space systems as we recapitalize and
modernize these capabilities; and protect our ability to operate freely
within the information environment while preventing adversary use of
information against our interests. I look forward to working with you
to achieve these goals.
______

Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Richard Webber, USAF
i. introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss our Strategic Nuclear posture. Your
Air Force is fully engaged around the world fighting terrorism and
insurgents in the global war on terror and fulfilling our roles as
Airmen for the joint team. Simultaneously, we stand prepared for rapid
response to conflict around the globe as our Nation's strategic
Reserve. Air forces succeed when they have the resources to shape the
future strategic environment and prepare for tomorrow's challenges. Air
forces succeed when they remain focused on their primary mission as an
independent force that is part of an interdependent joint team. Above
all, the U.S. Air Force delivers sovereign options for the defense of
the United States and its global interests: To fly and fight in air,
space, and cyberspace.
ii. win today's fight
Supporting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the global war on
terror is a portion of what your Air Force does for our Nation's
defense. Your Air Force is prepared to respond across the entire
spectrum of conflict from rapid humanitarian aid to major combat
operations.
Fighting and winning the global war on terror is the number one
priority; however, it is important to focus on protecting our Nation
from other potential enemies, both traditional and nontraditional.
Air Force engagement in CENTCOM is only the tip of the iceberg.
Your Airmen operate around-the-clock and around-the-globe to provide
all Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) with critical capabilities. Over 40
percent of the total force and 53 percent of the Active-Duty Force are
directly engaged in or supporting COCOM operations everyday. On any
given day, the Air Force has approximately 206,000 airmen (175,000
active duty plus an additional 31,000 Guard and Reserve) fulfilling
COCOM tasks. This includes approximately 127,000 airmen conducting
activities such as operating and controlling satellites, standing alert
in our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) facilities, operating
unmanned aerial vehicles, launching airlift and tanker sorties,
providing intelligence assessments, and many other functions critical
to each of the COCOMs. Also included are 57,000 airmen stationed
outside the continental United States in direct support of the Pacific
Command and European Command missions. Finally, a portion of the above
forces plus an additional 22,000 airman from the current AEF rotation
are made available for deployments in support of other COCOM
requirements. At any given time, 34,000 of these airmen are deployed
with 25,000 of them deployed to the CENTCOM AOR of which approximately
6,600 are in-lieu-of (ILO) taskings. Since 2004, we have deployed
approximately 24,000 airmen to perform ILO taskings.
iii. strategic nuclear forces
The United States Air Force has underwritten the national strategy
for over 60 years by providing a credible deterrent force, and we
continue to serve as the ultimate backstop, dissuading opponents and
reassuring allies by maintaining an always-ready nuclear arm. Airmen
continue to stand silent sentry around-the-clock to protect our
national security, and respond to any adversary should deterrence fail.
Since the weapons-transfer incident of 30 August 2007, we have
initiated multiple levels of review to ensure we have not only
investigated the root causes of the incident, but more importantly
taken this opportunity to review Air Force policies and procedures in
order to improve the Air Force's nuclear capabilities. The Commander of
Air Combat Command commissioned a Commander Directed Investigation
(CDI), a tactical level investigation that focused on the facts of the
incident and determined accountability. The Chief of Staff of the Air
Force (CSAF) commissioned the Blue Ribbon Review, an operational-level
review that focuses on the entire Air Force enterprise including both
the aircraft and ICBM and reviews policies, procedures. The Secretary
of Defense commissioned the Defense Science Review Board (DSB) review,
a strategic-level independent review that focuses on the Department of
Defense (DOD) enterprise and joint organizations. The Air Force takes
its nuclear obligations seriously, and will continue to take any
measure necessary to deliver this strategic capability safely.
Consequently, we have identified the actions required to both enhance
our strengths and correct those areas needing improvement. We have also
submitted the Air Force unfunded requirements list to the House Armed
Services Committee with a number of nuclear surety and security
initiatives for consideration. The United States Air Force is committed
to the nuclear mission.
Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Minuteman is and will remain the Nation's land-based strategic
deterrent through 2030.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007
mandated that the Air Force modernize Minuteman III (MM III) ICBMs in
the United States inventory as required to maintain a sufficient supply
of launch test assets and spares to sustain the deployed force of such
missiles through 2030. The Air Force is currently analyzing MMIII
missile and ground systems to determine what activities are required to
sustain the force through 2030. The Air Force has ongoing life-
extension programs designed to extend ICBM service life beyond 2020.
During the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Defense
Department agreed with the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
recommendation to reduce the ICBM force from 500 to 450. The USSTRATCOM
analysis concluded a 450 Minuteman III force was sufficient to assure
allies and deter potential adversaries. Headquarters Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC) recommended and the USAF agreed that the 564th Missile
Squadron (564 MS) at Malmstrom AFB, MT, was best candidate for
deactivation. The 564 MS increased logistics sustainment costs because
of its unique operating system versus other Minuteman III squadrons.
Reduction of 564 MS also standardized the unit size and configuration
at three bases.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to the Congressional Defense Committees ``. . . on the
feasibility of establishing an association . . .'' between the 120th
Fighter Wing, Great Falls, MT (Air National Guard) and the 341st Space
Wing, Malmstrom AFB, MT (Active Duty Air Force). The Air Force must
submit the report 15 days before removing the 41st missile from the
564th Missile Squadron. The report is currently in coordination and
anticipated delivery to Congress is April 2008.
AFSPC commenced deactivation activities within the 564 MS in June
2007. The Air Force will retain and modernize the 50 removed ICBMs for
use in the Force Development Evaluation (FDE) program. Conversion of
the 50 missiles for use as flight test, replacement and aging/
surveillance assets meets congressional direction to extend Minuteman
operations through 2030.
ICBM Life Extension Programs (LEP)s
1. Guidance Replacement Program:
Replaces guidance set electronics on MMIII and improves reliability
on the ground and in flight. The replacement program calls for 652
kits: 450 are fielded; 180 are used for tests, spares, etc.; the final
32 will be delivered in fiscal year 2009.
2. Propulsion Replacement Program:
Extends booster life through 2020 by re-pouring stages one and two,
and re-manufacturing stage three. The replacement program calls for 605
kits: 376 are fielded; 173 are used for tests, spares, etc.; the final
56 will be delivered in fiscal year 2009.
3. Propulsion System Rocket Engine Program:
Refurbishes seven components and assemblies in the liquid
propulsion post-boost vehicle. The Air Force installed 154 kits and
will purchase 96 additional kits in fiscal year 2009. The future
installation of 574 total kits will complete the program.
4. Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV):
Enables MMIII to carry the more advanced Peacekeeper MK 21 Reentry
Vehicle (RV) while retaining the powerful MMIII MK 12A RV multiple
independently re-targetable RV (MIRV) capability. Retirement of the
older MK 12 RV is now possible, avoiding a costly $1 billion LEP. The
Air Force fielded 75 kits and will purchase the 111 additional kits in
fiscal year 2009. The fielding of 570 total kits completes the program.
Deployment of the MK 21 RV enhances nuclear safety because the MK 21 RV
design incorporates three additional safety features: Insensitive High
Explosive, Fire Resistant Pit, and Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety,
which the Drell Commission recommended, but not incorporated in the
older MK 12 RV design. The Insensitive High Explosive and Fire
Resistant Pit features reduce the likelihood of plutonium dispersal in
cases of inadvertent impact or accident. The Enhanced Nuclear
Detonation Safety design protects those electrical components critical
to detonation from sources of unintended energy in order to prevent
premature arming in abnormal environments. The Air Force is continuing
to deploy SERV, with 75 kits already fielded, and will purchase 111
additional kits in fiscal year 2009. The program will procure 570 kits
total.
5. Environmental Control System:
Modernizes cooling system equipment in the Minuteman launch
facilities and missile alert facilities. The Air Force installed 71
launch facility kits and 6 missile alert facility kits and will
purchase 126 kits in fiscal year 2009. Deployment of 499 total kits to
all the launch facilities, missile alert facilities, and training sites
will complete the program.
6. ICBM Security Modernization Program:
This three-part program consists of concrete enhancements, a fast-
rising secondary personnel access hatch, and a Remote Visual Assessment
(RVA) camera. This comprehensive program began in fiscal year 2004. The
Air Force completed concrete enhancements at all 450 launch facilities
in 2007, more than a year ahead of schedule and 35 percent under
budget. The Air Force installed fast-rising secondary personnel access
hatches at 21 launch facilities. The Air Force also installed RVA at 5
missile alert facilities and 50 Launch Facilities. The $10.5 million
Congressional increase in fiscal year 2008 allowed the Air Force to
purchase 90 additional RVA kits, enough to complete deployment at the
first wing. Taken together, these programs give responding security
forces situational awareness and adequate time to deny adversarial
access to our launch facilities. In fiscal year 2009, the Air Force
will purchase 100 fast-rising secondary personnel access hatches and
147 RVA kits.
Helicopters
The primary AFSPC helicopter mission, flown by UH-1N platforms,
provides security forces with a continuous contingency response
capability for the National ICBM complex. The Air Force District of
Washington (AFDW) and several other MAJCOMS also use the UH-1N as an
Operational Support Airlift/Very Important Person Special Air Mission
(OSA/VIPSAM) platform. The UH-1N has noted deficiencies in payload,
speed, range, endurance, battle space awareness, survivability, and
adverse weather operations.
Your average Air Force UH-1N airframe is 39 years old and some
aircraft in the inventory exceed 13,000 flight hours. The UH-1N fleet
shows its age with fatigue-related cracks in the tail boom and is
currently undergoing its second tail boom replacement that will enable
it to meet flight safety standards.
The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) is an Air Force
effort to replace these UH-1Ns. AFSPC is the designated lead command
and is in the process of finalizing the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
to scope the available pool of platforms capable of accomplishing the
multiple missions required by all users of the UH-1N. Following the
AoA, AFSPC anticipates a final Capability Development Document (CDD) in
early fiscal year 2009. Once the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense approve all requirements,
the Air Force will develop an acquisition strategy to field this
capability.
Nuclear Cruise Missiles
The Air Force analyzed current and future roles for nuclear cruise
missiles during the 2005 QDR and the fiscal year 2007 budgeting cycle.
The Defense Department issued guidance on 20 December 2005 directing
USSTRATCOM and the Air Force to study the nuclear cruise missile force
structure, including the Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM) -86, Air Launched
Cruise Missile (ALCM), and the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM).
The guidance also directed the Air Force to build a retirement schedule
for the missiles.
The USSTRATCOM/Air Force study examined considerations such as
cruise missile inventory, operational capability, reliability, DOD
direction and COCOM requirements. Based on these factors, the study
recommended that the Air Force retire all ACMs, reduce the ALCM force
to 528, retire all excess ALCMs, consolidate the ALCM force at Minot
AFB, and retain ALCMs in the inventory through at least 2020, possibly
2030. On 12 April 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense accepted the
study recommendations. On 23 June 2006, the Commander of USSTRATCOM
sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense supporting the study's
findings and advocating adoption of the ALCM/ACM force structure
recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security
Council endorsed the study recommendations as they pertained to the Air
Force. On 17 October 2006 the Secretary of Defense directed the Air
Force to retire the ACM and reduce the ALCM fleet to 528 missiles.
The Air Force is removing from service, demilitarizing and
destroying all ACMs and the excess ALCM missile bodies at the rate of 6
ACMs and 12 ALCMs per month. We forecast completion of demilitarization
for excess ALCMs in fiscal year 2011 and all ACMs in fiscal year 2013.
The remaining nuclear cruise missile force will be consolidated at
Minot AFB, North Dakota. These cruise missile force structure changes
are part of a balanced force reduction that supports both the
President's direction to reduce the active nuclear stockpile, and the
United States' obligation under the 2002 Moscow Treaty to reduce the
number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-
2,200 warheads.
Warhead Replacement and Refurbishment
A viable program of warhead replacement and refurbishment is
essential to sustain a nuclear weapons stockpile of any size. Warhead
replacement concepts continue to show promise for increasing long-term
confidence in warhead reliability, and this strategy offers other
advantages when compared with refurbishment. For example, a replacement
warhead could incorporate improved safety and security features not
considered feasible in a refurbished weapon, and replacement weapons
could be better designed to interface with modern delivery platforms
such as the Joint Strike Fighter. Decisions must be made very soon if
we are to find the most cost-effective strategy to meet current and
projected requirements. To that end, it is imperative that we pursue
and complete the studies needed for informed decisions.
In the absence of a replacement warhead, the Nuclear Weapons
Council commissioned a 1-year phase-one study to define concepts for
refurbishment of existing warheads for current and future air-delivered
systems in November 2006. We are reviewing the findings of this study,
and expect to recommend further studies to the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Strategic Bombers
A new bomber is critical to upgrading the Nation's long-range
strike capability to ensure range and payload, and ability to hold any
target anywhere at risk. The Air Force has a three-phased approach to
meet the Nation's long-range strike requirements. The first phase is to
continue with the modernization of legacy bomber fleet to ensure
sustainability and increase combat effectiveness. The 2008 NDAA
mandated that the Air Force maintain a 76 Total Aircraft Inventory
(TAI) for B-52s. This inventory includes 44 combat-coded, 15 training,
4 test, 11 backup, and 2 attrition reserve B-52s. Additionally, the Air
Force is complying with congressional language, which directs that no
funds be obligated or expended for retiring any of the 93 B-52H
aircraft 60 days after the Secretary of the Air Force submits a bomber
force structure report prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA). The IDA will deliver its report to the Air Force later this
month and the Secretary of the Air Force will subsequently forward the
report to Congress. The Air Force will retain the B-2 fleet at the
current TAI. The second phase of the Air Force's approach is to
leverage near-term technologies to field a next-generation long-range
strike (NGLRS) capability to replace the oldest B-52s by 2018. This
could include beginning the divestiture of legacy bombers as the NGLRS
bomber reaches initial operational capability. The final phase consists
of a quantum leap in technology and capability that employs a system of
systems technology push for advanced improvements in speed, range,
accuracy, connectivity and survivability in the 2035 timeframe.
iv. closing
The United States Air Force continues to serve as the ultimate
backstop, dissuading opponents and reassuring allies by maintaining an
always-ready nuclear arm. Airmen continue to stand silent sentry
around-the-clock to protect our national security, and respond to any
adversary should deterrence fail.
Your Air Force is preparing to dominate in the 21st century
strategically, operationally, and tactically. Air Force strategic
forces, the bulwark of our strategic deterrent capability, give us the
means to ensure Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power, and
worldwide Expeditionary Combat Support by providing sovereign options
for the defense of the United States and its global interests: These
capabilities are essential to the joint fight and are a critical
component of the future joint force. The Air Force is committed to
advancing strategic capabilities to fully support the joint team. In
order to maintain our strategic dominance, the Air Force must
recapitalize and also be allowed to divest itself of outdated, excess
platforms. Divesting excess platforms will provide the means to shift
vital funds to recapitalization and modernization of the Air Force and
to maintain a strategic deterrent second to none. Your Air Force
appreciates your continued support in turning our vision into an
operational reality. Above all, our Nation must invest today to ensure
tomorrow's air, space, and cyberspace dominance.
______

Prepared Statement by RADM Stephen Johnson, USN
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
Strategic Forces subcommittee. Thank you for affording me the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss our Navy's deterrent fleet
and the ongoing efforts to ensure the continued reliability of our
submarine strategic forces. The men and women of Strategic Systems
Programs (SSP) are committed to maintaining the high reliability of our
deployed Ohio class submarines with their Trident II D5 Missiles and to
supporting emerging requirements of our combatant commanders. I am
pleased to report to you that the Trident Strategic Weapons Systems
continues to exceed the operational requirements established for the
system. On 29 November 2007, U.S.S. Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730)
conducted the 120th consecutive successful missile launch as part of
her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation. This record is unmatched by
any previous missile launch system.
Our 14 Trident Submarines, 8 of which are deployed in the Pacific
and 6 in the Atlantic fleet, continue to provide an affordable and
credible sea base deterrent for our national leadership. Two of our
submarines, U.S.S. Alabama (SSBN 731) and U.S.S. Alaska (SSBN 732), are
undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls. U.S.S. Henry M Jackson has
completed her overhaul and post availability testing and is preparing
for her strategic outload and return to the operational cycle.
d5 life extension
The Trident II missile continues Life Extension on schedule and on
budget. The Life Extension program procures an additional 108 missiles
and redesigns missile and guidance electronics due to obsolescence to
meet long-term inventory requirements which will ensure that our Ohio
class submarines are fully out loaded throughout their service lives.
The first Life Extended missile will be delivered to the Navy in
fiscal year 2011. Testing of all components has gone well. Continued
production of rocket motors has proven to be successful in maintaining
our capability to field these critical assets.
In Partnership with the United Kingdom, the Navy is evaluating a
follow-on platform to replace the current Ohio Class SSBNs. The U.S.
lead-ship will occur in fiscal year 2019.
nuclear weapons security
SSP continues to pursue technologies which will provide credible,
cost effective security for the nuclear assets entrusted to our watch.
Our Marines and Navy Masters at Arms are providing an effective and
integrated elite security force at both of our strategic weapons
facilities. We will soon begin construction on our Limited Area
Production Security Complex at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific,
Bangor, WA. When complete, this facility will provide a significantly
higher degree of security for our ashore operations.
The first of our Maritime Protection Force Units has been
commissioned at Kings Bay Georgia in support of the Transit Protection
System (TPS). The recently commissioned United States Coast Guard
Cutter Sea Dragon will comprise a major part of our TPS, providing a
security umbrella for our Ohio class submarines as they deploy and
return from their deterrent patrols. The United States Coast Guard has
been an exemplary partner in this essential mission.
phase 2 study in support of the reliable replacement warhead (rrw)
The Strategic Systems Program chaired and coordinated the RRW Phase
2A design definition and cost study until the suspension of work by our
national laboratories in accordance with congressional direction. The
first order analysis of mass properties for the entire system are
satisfactory, which means a modern warhead approach will fit within the
space and weight constraints of our missile. At the stop work point,
the directors of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories remain confident
that a modern warhead design:

Can be certified without underground testing;
Will significantly improve safety and security;
Will significantly reduce the use of toxic material;
and
Can significantly improve manufacturability.

It is important this study or one similar be resumed so that the
next administration has the information it needs to complete, as
mandated by Congress, a timely review of its nuclear posture. We should
be developing the technologies needed for a modern warhead approach
now, regardless of specific program application, in order to make these
safety and security capabilities sufficiently mature for future
application.
ssgn
The flexibility of this new capability was clearly demonstrated in
May 2007 when U.S.S. Florida launched two Block IV Tomahawks from the
same tube. The following day one Block IV and Block III were launched,
demonstrating system capabilities of the Attack Weapons System
including in-flight updates and retargeting, the first time this had
been done from a submerged submarine. All missiles flew their complete
profiles flawlessly to target. All four submarines have completed their
conversion to SSGN Attack and Special Operating Force Platforms, with
U.S.S. Georgia being returned to service later this month. U.S.S. Ohio
(SSBN 726) has recently conducted the first operational SSGN deployment
in the Pacific and is on her second deployment. U.S.S. Florida has
completed her initial load out of Tomahawk missiles and is making final
preparations for her first deployment.
prompt global strike
SSP will leverage our successes with ongoing programs such as our
Reentry Systems Applications and Guidance Applications programs and
collaborate with other services as we participate in a new Defense Wide
Conventional Prompt Global Strike Initiative to deliver a new
conventional strike option to the combatant commanders. SSP continues
to investigate technologies which will become viable for use on future
Prompt Global Strike weapons systems which could be tailorable and
adaptable into several platforms across the Department. Technologies
such as thermal protection, navigation guidance and control, and
advanced fuzing concepts must be further developed.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
sincerely appreciate your continued support of Strategic Systems
Programs and our Deterrent Fleet. Your efforts will ensure the
continued credibility and reliability of our Trident II Weapons System
and its remarkable Trident II D5 Missile, maintaining an unmatched
record of success by any missile system. The men and women of Strategic
Systems Programs are committed to the highest standards of safety,
surety, and reliability of this remarkable system. Thank you again for
the opportunity to appear before you today.
______

Prepared Statement by Thomas P. D'Agostino
introduction
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. nuclear
weapon policies and programs. My remarks focus on our efforts to
transform the nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century national
security enterprise. I will address why we believe that the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) concept should be pursued notwithstanding the
recent decision by Congress not to fund completion of the RRW design
definition and cost study.
Before I begin, I want to remind you of the tremendous progress
made over the past few years in reducing the size of our nuclear
weapons stockpile. As you recall, in 2002, President Bush and President
Putin signed the Moscow Treaty, which will reduce the number of our
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 by
2012. In 2004, the President issued a directive to cut the entire U.S.
nuclear stockpile--both deployed and Reserve warheads--in half by 2012.
But this goal was later accelerated and achieved 5 years ahead of
schedule in 2007. As of the end of 2007, the total stockpile was almost
50 percent below what it was in 2001, when the President took office.
On December 18, 2007, the White House announced the President's
decision to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile by another 15 percent
by 2012. This means the U.S. nuclear stockpile will be less than one-
quarter its size at the end of the Cold War--the smallest stockpile in
more than 50 years.
My Department of Defense (DOD) colleagues are prepared to address
fundamental questions of why in the post-Cold War era we continue to
need nuclear forces and why, although dramatically reduced, we need the
number of nuclear warheads in the stockpile that we plan to have. My
testimony will focus more narrowly on our efforts to ``transform'' the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure. In this
regard, further stockpile reductions rest on: (1) our ability to
transform the nuclear weapons complex into a more responsive
enterprise, (2) ongoing efforts to understand challenges to the
stockpile and modern means of addressing these challenges such as the
RRW, and (3) efforts between successive administrations and Congress to
restore a consensus on the future nuclear deterrent, force posture and
resulting nuclear weapons stockpile.
transforming the nuclear weapons complex
The Nuclear Weapons Complex is at a crossroads--maintaining the
status quo is not an option we can afford. Delay and inaction will only
increase the costs and elevate the risks associated with maintaining an
aging stockpile. Regardless of stockpile transformation plans, these
facilities need to be upgraded. The challenge for us will be to move
from an aging nuclear weapons complex designed for the Cold War to a
smaller 21st century national security enterprise that is integrated,
modern, cost-effective, and that eliminates unnecessary redundancy, but
that is also at the forefront of science and technology and responsive
to future national security requirements.
Complex transformation is more than simply replacing an aged
physical infrastructure, it includes transforming our contracting,
procurement and management practices to embrace the best in business
and human capital practices. We also seek to leverage our core
competencies in nuclear weapons design and engineering to advance our
leadership in counterterrorism, nonproliferation, physical security,
cyber security and support of the Intelligence Community. Our
transformation strategy relies on four pillars:

Transform the nuclear stockpile through the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP) in partnership with the DOD.
Transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear
weapons complex to support needed capabilities in our physical
infrastructure.
Create an integrated, interdependent enterprise that
employs best business practices to maximize efficiency and
minimize costs.
Advance the science and technology base that is the
cornerstone of our nuclear deterrence and essential to our
national security.

Infrastructure improvements are a major part of complex
transformation and we have made important progress in this area. For
example, with the support of this committee, in 2007, we produced
tritium for the first time in 18 years, and the Tritium Extraction
Facility at Savannah River is now online. Still, some major facilities
date to the Manhattan Project and cannot easily meet today's safety and
security requirements, and the capabilities they provide must be
restored. Let me cite two key examples:
Plutonium ``Pit'' Production:
A sufficient capacity to produce plutonium pits for nuclear
warheads is an essential part of a responsive national security
enterprise and is required for as long as we retain a nuclear
deterrent. Currently, we have a very small production capacity at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (about 10 pits per year in Technical Area 55
(TA-55). This capacity took 10 years to reconstitute, using aging
scientific and manufacturing facilities. It is insufficient to support
the stockpile for the long term and, if not redressed, requires
maintaining a larger stockpile than would otherwise be desired. There
are two key reasons why this is so:

Depending on warhead type, our best estimate of
minimum pit lifetime is 85-100 years. While this lifespan
exceeds previous estimates, degradation from plutonium aging
still introduces uncertainty in overall system performance,
particularly for lower margin systems. As the stockpile ages,
we must plan to replace many pits in stockpiled weapons.
As the stockpile continues to be reduced, we must
anticipate that an adverse change in the geopolitical threat
environment, or a technical problem or development, could
require manufacture of additional warheads on a relatively
rapid schedule. Currently, if we found a major system-wide
problem in the stockpile requiring pit replacement, we have
insufficient capacity for a timely response.

As part of our transformation, the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has evaluated a variety of future pit production
alternatives. NNSA's preferred alternative is to retain and build on
the existing production facilities at Los Alamos. Whether we continue
on our existing path or if we move towards an RRW based stockpile, we
will need a capacity to produce about 50-80 pits per year. To do this,
we would use existing facilities in TA-55 with the addition of a new
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research-Replacement (CMRR) Nuclear Facility.
In addition to its role in pit production, the CMRR will be the sole
facility where we will be able to carry out pit surveillance, essential
to maintaining the existing stockpile, as well as plutonium and
actinide research and analysis. Our approach would provide sufficient
production capacity to support smaller stockpile sizes, particularly
when coupled with potential reuse of pits. A production capacity of 50-
80 pits per year is less than one-tenth of Cold War levels, when we
were producing not 10 or 100, but thousands of warheads a year.
Uranium Component Production:
As with plutonium, regardless of the type of stockpile we maintain,
we will require a responsive capability and capacity to produce uranium
components. Our uranium component production facilities date to the
Manhattan Project. Securing these facilities from terrorism threats we
face after September 11 is increasingly difficult and costly, as is
operating them to modern safety standards. Every warhead, whether
refurbished or replacement, will require uranium component manufacture.
Construction of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at the
Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge will allow us to
consolidate uranium storage with a significantly reduced security
``footprint.''
Although our emphasis has been on maintaining the stockpile by
embarking on complex transformation and examining the potential promise
of RRW, we have not lost focus on meeting our commitments to the
Defense Department and to other customers. As I pointed out earlier,
last year we reconstituted a limited plutonium pit manufacturing
capability and produced new pits for the W88 warhead. This year we will
continue to produce new W88 pits and begin installing equipment to
increase pit production capacity to 30-50 pits per year by 2012-2014.
In 2006 and 2007, respectively, we delivered the first refurbished B61-
7 and B61-11 bombs to the Air Force. We intend to maintain on-time
delivery of these weapons to the Air Force in 2008.
In addition, our 21st century national security enterprise will
continue to leverage the scientific underpinnings of its historic
nuclear weapons mission to respond to a full range of national security
challenges beyond nuclear weapons. Indeed, the scientific capabilities
and infrastructure developed for nuclear weapons are already being
utilized by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, and by
the Intelligence Community, and are recognized as essential to
fulfilling the responsibilities of these organizations. For example,
the NNSA laboratories have participated jointly with other government
agencies in addressing a wide range of national security challenges--
all of which leverage NNSA's core mission of nuclear weapons
development and sustainability. Recent examples include:

Supporting warfighter needs in Iraq with modeling,
analysis and systems to counter improvised explosive devices
(IEDs).
Supporting the DOD and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in emergency render-safe and post-event technical
nuclear forensics.
Aiding the Intelligence Community in its
counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts by drawing upon
our nuclear weapons expertise.
Developing and deploying integrated systems for
countering biological releases and bio-decontamination
technologies.
Developing and deploying portal detector technology to
prevent smuggling of special nuclear materials.

Our challenge is to maintain these scientific and technical
capabilities, which evolved from the weapons program when budgets were
expansive, into the future when resources will be relatively
constrained. We must find ways to leverage key capabilities by
developing and strengthening strategic relationships with other Federal
agencies in meeting our Nation's security needs.
Our plan for transforming our physical infrastructure, released
this past December and detailed in the draft Supplemental Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act, will consolidate special nuclear materials to
fewer sites and locations within the nuclear weapons complex, close or
transfer hundreds of buildings that are no longer required for the NNSA
mission, and reduce NNSA's overall footprint by as much as a third.
Over 10 years, we expect to eliminate at least 9 million square feet,
or the equivalent of almost 200 football fields of floor space!
Additionally, by eliminating multi-site redundancies and consolidating
both mission and capability at our sites, we expect to dramatically
improve efficiency and cut costs.
evolution of our strategy for sustaining the nuclear stockpile
Let us turn to the problem of stockpile stewardship and recall how
we got to where we are today. In the years following the end of the
Cold War, budgets for nuclear weapons programs were in ``free fall''--
funding was simply not available to sustain both research and
development (R&D) and production capabilities. A strategic decision was
made to emphasize R&D to ensure future capabilities to certify the
stockpile while neglecting production--we mortgaged the present to
ensure the future.
That future was seen as science-based stockpile stewardship and
life extension of our Cold War legacy warheads. When the U.S. stopped
nuclear testing in 1992, it sought to replace this critical tool with a
new SSP that: (1) emphasized science and technology coupled with a
vigorous experimental program as a means to understand better the
physics and chemistry of nuclear weapons and their operation, and (2)
provided enhanced warhead surveillance tools so that we would have a
much better chance of detecting the onset of problems in the stockpile.
The goal of the SSP was to predict the effects of aging in our
warheads so that we could replace aging components before they degraded
overall system reliability. The end of the Cold War provided this
opportunity--our focus was no longer on a continuous cycle of fielding
new warheads to provide new military capabilities, but on sustaining
existing nuclear capabilities.
We call this ``life extension''--the process of observing the aging
of individual components of warheads and replacing them before they
fail. Consider this challenge. Your vintage 1965 Ford Mustang--
maintained as a collector's item--has been sitting in your garage for
40 years. You monitor it for such items as a clogged carburetor,
corrosion in the engine block, battery discharge, and you replace parts
when you deem it necessary. But you don't get to start the engine and
take it for a test drive. The trick is to assure that if you do need it
right away--to take your wife (or husband) to the hospital in an
emergency--that it would work with certainty. That's sort of what we
have to do with nuclear weapons LEPs.
Following the administration's Nuclear Posture Review, in 2003 we
``took stock'' of 10 years of the SSP and came to some important
conclusions.
First, the SSP is working--today's stockpile remains safe and
reliable and does not require nuclear testing. This assessment is based
on a foundation of past nuclear tests augmented by cutting edge
scientific and engineering experiments and analysis, and improved
warhead surveillance. Most importantly, it derives from the
professional (and independent) judgment of our laboratory directors
advised by their weapon program staffs.
Second, as we continue to draw down the stockpile, our laboratory
directors are concerned that our current path--successive
refurbishments of existing warheads developed during the Cold War to
stringent Cold War specifications--may pose unacceptable risks to
maintaining high confidence in warhead performance over the long-term
absent nuclear testing.
These concerns arise as we move further and further away from
designs certified with underground nuclear tests, resulting from
inevitable accumulations of small changes from a continuous process of
aging, and refurbishment of aging components, over the extended lives
of these highly-optimized systems.
So, while we are confident that the SSP is working and that today's
stockpile is safe and reliable, it is only prudent to explore alternate
means to manage risk in seeking to ensure stockpile reliability over
the long term.
This is, in part, the impetus for our proposed work to study
reliable replacement concepts: to ensure the long-term sustainment of
the military capabilities provided by the existing stockpile, not to
develop warheads for new or different military missions as is often
portrayed.
Specifically, we have examined the feasibility of providing
replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile. By relaxing Cold War
design constraints that sought maximum yield in a minimum size/weight
package, it would allow design of replacements that are easier and less
costly to manufacture, are safer and more secure, eliminate most
environmentally dangerous materials, and increase design performance
margins, thus ensuring long-term confidence in reliability without
nuclear testing.
Finally, we need to transform our complex with or without RRW. That
said, we believe that RRW would offer means to transform to a more
efficient and responsive, much smaller, and less costly nuclear weapons
R&D and production infrastructure.
urgency of rrw
We are often asked: If today's stockpile is safe and reliable, why
do we believe it is important to start on RRW now? Why not wait a few
years when you know more? There are four main reasons why I believe it
is important to complete the reliable replacement study now.
First, the study will provide critical information to insure that
the next administration, as well as the bipartisan commission
established by this committee, can complete a timely review of U.S.
nuclear posture as mandated by Congress.
Second, as I raised earlier, there are concerns about our ability
to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of today's stockpile
absent nuclear testing. For example, the first RRW was intended to
replace a portion of W76 warheads deployed on the Trident SLBM system.
That warhead comprises a large fraction of today's, and an even larger
fraction of our future strategic deterrent force. It has no ``back
up.'' Although we have not uncovered any problems with the W76, it is
prudent to hedge against a catastrophic failure of that system by
introducing a significantly different warhead design into the SLBM
force. Our ability over the next 15 years to produce new plutonium
parts is limited--the sooner we start the sooner we could achieve this
diversity.
Third, after September 11 we realized that the security threat to
our nuclear warheads had fundamentally changed. The security features
in today's stockpile are commensurate with technologies that were
available during the Cold War and with the threats from that time.
Major enhancements in security are not easily available via retrofits
in the life extension programs. The car analogy is again relevant.
Today's Mustang remains a high-performance automobile, has about the
same dimensions and weighs only a few hundred pounds more than the
first Mustangs, and has all the modern safety and security features we
expect today--air bags, anti-lock brakes, GPS navigation, satellite
radio, theft deterrent, and alarm systems. The 1965 version had none of
these features, not even seat belts! We deploy warheads today that have
1970-1980's safety, security, and anti-terrorism features. It does not
mean that these warheads are not safe and secure, but we can do better
and we should do better. Based on our initial assessments, I believe
that RRW provides opportunities to incorporate the latest technological
advances for precluding unauthorized use in a post-September 11 threat
environment.
Fourth, the RRW effort thus far has provided a critical opportunity
to ensure the transfer of nuclear design and engineering skills from
the generation who honed these skills with nuclear testing to the
generation who will replace them. These skills are absolutely vital to
the Nation, not just for sustaining our deterrent but in such areas as
nuclear counterterrorism which will become even more important in the
future. In a few years, nearly all of the older generation will be
retired or dead. Without this opportunity coming at this time (and not
5 years hence), we would not be able to sustain key capabilities.
response to arguments against rrw
A number of concerns have arisen in our deliberations with Congress
and others about the RRW program. Specifically, critics argue that:

RRW will undermine the nonproliferation regime either
by providing incentives for states to acquire or improve their
nuclear arsenals, or by impeding U.S. leadership in pursuing a
strengthened nonproliferation regime.
RRW will cause us to carry out an underground nuclear
test.
More broadly, the U.S. ``doesn't have its nuclear act
together''--its nuclear policies are not clearly embedded in a
broader international security framework. At minimum, it hasn't
communicated its nuclear policy clearly to Congress. Until it
does, some would argue, we should delay RRW and Complex
Transformation.

On that last point, the United States has a coherent and rationale
policy overarching nuclear weapons programs as reflected in the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Presidential directive (NSPD-28)
addressing command and control and safety and security of U.S. nuclear
forces, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plans issued annually by the
President, among others. But we have not done as good a job as we
should communicating these policies to Congress and the public. We are,
however, doing better and I will return to this at the end of my
statement.
How is our proposed reliable replacement strategy consistent with
nonproliferation and arms control? Some of you may be convinced that
there might be valid reasons for going forward but are concerned that
these reasons do not outweigh an overriding concern that such efforts
could undermine U.S. leadership in the fight against proliferation. I
appreciate such concerns, but ask that you consider the following
points:

The RRW, by design, would not provide a new role for
nuclear weapons or new military capabilities, but rather would
help sustain the military capabilities of the existing arsenal.
Fielding the RRW would not increase the size of the
nuclear stockpile, rather it would enable further stockpile
reductions. Once a transformed production complex demonstrates
that it can produce replacement warheads on a timescale
responsive to technical problems in the stockpile, or adverse
geopolitical changes, then many Reserve warheads could be
eliminated--further reducing the nuclear stockpile and
reinforcing our commitment to Article VI of the
Nonproliferation Treaty.
Because replacement warheads would be designed with
more favorable performance margins, and therefore less
sensitive to incremental aging effects, introducing them into
the stockpile would reduce the possibility that the United
States would be faced with a need to conduct a nuclear test to
diagnose or remedy a stockpile problem. This supports overall
U.S. efforts to dissuade other nations from conducting nuclear
tests.
By incorporating modern security features, RRW would
strengthen security of U.S. nuclear weapons against
unauthorized use (e.g., in the event of a terrorist attack on
one of our storage facilities).
Finally, a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear
deterrent, credibly extended to our allies, supports U.S.
nonproliferation efforts because allies confident in U.S.
extended nuclear deterrence guarantees will not be motivated to
pursue their own nuclear forces. This nonproliferation role of
U.S. nuclear weapons is often underestimated. Indeed, the
nuclear weapon programs of North Korea and Iran have made our
nuclear guarantees to allies such as Turkey, South Korea and
Japan take on renewed importance.

In summary, our vision to transform the nuclear stockpile and
supporting infrastructure through reliable replacement concepts is
complementary to, not inconsistent with, our nonproliferation policies
and with the long-term goal of global nuclear weapons elimination.
nuclear testing
Let me turn in more detail to the nuclear testing issue. I am most
concerned about some misunderstandings expressed in the public sphere
about our views on the possible need for nuclear testing. Let there be
no doubt: Today's nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable and
has not required post-deployment nuclear testing to date, nor is
nuclear testing currently anticipated or planned. But keeping this
stockpile healthy is becoming an increasingly difficult challenge.
Periodically we identify problems with warheads that in the past would
have been resolved with nuclear tests. Our SSP has worked well so far
to help us to avoid that prospect. The considered judgment of the
national weapons laboratories directors, however, is that maintaining
certification of the finely-tuned designs of an aging Cold War
stockpile through the LEP effort and absent nuclear testing involves
increasing risk.
An alternative path is a stockpile based on replacement warheads
that, unlike Cold War legacy warheads, would be designed for
certification without additional nuclear tests. Indeed, our experts
best technical judgment today is that it will be less likely that we
would need nuclear testing to maintain the safety, security, and
reliability into the future of the nuclear stockpile if we pursue a
reliable replacement path employing all the tools of the SSP, including
advanced quantitative means, than if we continue to rely on today's
legacy warheads. In December, I provided Congress classified
information giving further details on these matters.
Why then do we think it's feasible to field an RRW without nuclear
testing? There are four basic reasons:

First, replacement warhead designs would provide more
favorable reliability and performance margins than those
currently in the stockpile, and would be less sensitive to
incremental aging effects or manufacturing variances.
Second, feasible replacement designs would be firmly
rooted in the past nuclear test data base.
Third, by pursuing reliable replacement designs now,
we would be able to fully utilize the experience of those
remaining designers and engineers who successfully fielded our
current stockpile during the period of nuclear testing.
Fourth, the SSP over the past decade has provided
improved scientific and analytic tools, including advanced
supercomputer simulation and sophisticated experimental
capabilities, which were not available to the previous
generation of designers/engineers. These tools have led to a
much better understanding of the intricacies of nuclear weapons
physics and engineering. Indeed, we know more about the complex
issues of nuclear weapons performance today than we ever did
during the period of nuclear testing.

These four factors, taken together, provide a solid foundation for
our confidence that we can certify RRW designs without nuclear tests.
factors affecting future adjustments to our nuclear posture
It is important for us to describe how our concept for
transformation--in light of evolving geopolitical threat environments--
could provide opportunities for further stockpile reductions. In this
regard, the current plan for the nuclear force posture--developed in
the 2001 NPR--established objectives for a range of deployed nuclear
warheads, a nuclear force structure, and nuclear stockpile for 2012 as
well as a general approach to sustain this force beyond 2012. Future
administrations will of course adjust, refine and make changes to our
posture in response to future events and circumstances. These changes
might be unilateral or taken in concert with other nuclear powers. In
any case, these changes will be governed by three basic factors: (1)
the future geopolitical threat environment, (2) the success of
technical efforts underway to ensure a safe, reliable and credible
nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future and to transform the
nuclear weapons R&D and production infrastructure that supports it, and
(3) our progress in fielding other strategic capabilities, including
missile defenses and conventional precision strike.
Geopolitical uncertainties are likely to dominate future
considerations of an adjusted force posture. Will Russia succeed in
transforming to a democratic society with rule-of-law, respect for
human rights, and integration, both economic and political, with the
west? Will China's military modernization and political trajectory
affect the ability of the United States to protect key interests in the
Pacific region? Will nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, or emerging
proliferants cause a proliferation ``cascade'' in which U.S. allies and
friends in key regions contemplate ``going nuclear''? How such
questions evolve over the next decade and more will affect how future
administrations assess national security needs--including plans for
assurance of allies--and adjust the level of deployed nuclear warheads
(up or down), the composition of deployed nuclear forces, or both.
There are other major uncertainties that are largely domestic in
nature, and related to our efforts to sustain and, as necessary,
modernize our forces. With regard to nuclear delivery systems, the
planned force of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs will begin to reach end-of-
life in 2018. Will there be support to develop and deploy a follow-on
capability to the Minuteman III ICBM? If so, when and how many will we
deploy? If the ICBM force is not replaced at its end-of-life but
retired, other nuclear force elements may need to be bolstered to take
its place. There are comparable decisions regarding a possible next
generation long-range bomber (sooner) and/or replacement of nuclear
ballistic missile submarines (later) that will factor in as well to
considerations of adjusting the future nuclear posture.
With regard to the development of U.S. non-nuclear strategic
capabilities, there is another set of uncertainties. Will prompt, long-
range conventional global strike weapons be developed and deployed?
How many? What types? With what effects? What will be the future
direction and scope of ballistic missile defenses? What technical
advances/breakthroughs (e.g., hypersonic delivery systems) by the U.S.
or potential adversaries will occur? Could these affect the military
balance? Answers to these questions will determine whether such
capabilities could complement nuclear strike capabilities or
conceivably replace nuclear weapons for certain missions and thus lead
to further adjustments in our posture.
With regard to the nuclear warheads themselves, our long-term goal
is to rely more on the capabilities of the infrastructure and less on
Reserve warheads in the stockpile to respond to unforeseen events.
Until we are confident that we have the capability to respond to
unexpected developments, however, we will need to retain more Reserve
warheads than otherwise would be desired. Specifically, our inability
to produce plutonium pits in sufficient quantities means that
additional warheads are kept in Reserve to hedge against technical
problems that could arise in the stockpile or adverse geopolitical
changes.
If we have an opportunity to realize the benefits of the RRW
program, and a more responsive infrastructure that the RRW could
facilitate, there will be opportunities for additional stockpile
reductions. We are examining a series of potential milestones,
reflecting progress on RRW and a responsive infrastructure, that would
allow consideration of further adjustments to the Reserve stockpile.
Accomplishing these milestones would represent levels of confidence
gained, or uncertainties reduced, as we proceed forward with stockpile
and infrastructure transformation. At various points, accumulated
progress would be assessed to see if further adjustments to the Reserve
stockpile are warranted. To the degree that geopolitical trends evolve
in more favorable directions, opportunities exist to consider options
for lower deployed as well as Reserve Forces.
current status of the rrw program
As I said at the beginning of my statement, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 did not fund completion of the RRW design
definition and cost study. The Departments of Defense and Energy
continue to believe that the warhead features characteristic of the RRW
are the right ones for ensuring the future of our Nation's nuclear
deterrent. Moreover, Congress specifically requested that the
administration continue related work in fiscal year 2008 in three key
areas:
First, the act provided $15 million for a new
``Advanced Certification'' campaign designed to address issues
raised in the recent JASON's study of the feasibility of
certifying reliable replacement designs without nuclear
testing.
Second, the act added $10 million to the Enhanced
Surety campaign ``to increase the safety and security of
weapons in the existing stockpile and develop new technologies
for incorporation into potential future systems.'' This is
fully consistent with efforts to apply state-of-the-art
technology to replacement warhead designs to enhance security
and prevent unauthorized nuclear weapons use by terrorists.
Third, Congress appropriated $15 million in the
National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 for
the U.S. Navy to carry out studies related to the integration
of an RRW warhead with the Trident SLBM reentry system.

NNSA's fiscal year 2009 budget request continues and extends fiscal
year 2008 related activities in the following areas:

Advanced Certification ($20 million request): To continue
efforts begun in fiscal year 2008 to review, evaluate and
implement key recommendations from the JASON's RRW study
regarding approaches to establishing an accredited warhead
certification plan, without nuclear testing, in an era where
changes to nuclear components will occur due to aging or design
defects.
RRW ($10 million request): To enable maturation of the RRW
design in order to address questions raised by the JASON's
review of RRW feasibility study activities. Design refinement
is necessary to establish parameters for potential impacts on
certification. It will also facilitate documenting the work
that has been completed through 2007 to support future
administration decisions on options for our nuclear weapons
stockpile.

Completion of the RRW study was not funded in part due to concerns
that the administration had not fully communicated its policies which
guide nuclear forces, posture and programs, including the RRW program.
The administration will shortly provide to Congress a second paper to
accompany its white paper on nuclear policy transmitted to Congress in
July 2007 by Secretaries Rice, Gates, and Bodman. This second paper
outlines in detail the overall strategy which guides nuclear weapons
programs including the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile and
operationally-deployed strategic forces, and how we manage the risk of
a less-than sufficient warhead production infrastructure. Our goal is
to restore a consensus with Congress to complete the reliable
replacement study as a means to ensure that the next administration, as
mandated by Congress, can complete a timely review of its nuclear
posture.
Let me conclude my statement here. I thank the chairman and the
committee for the opportunity to discuss these critical issues for our
Nation.

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Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions, I'll certainly turn
to you, if you want to go ahead, depending on your time
schedule.
Senator Sessions. Please go first, Mr. Chairman. I'll be
here, and thank you for the courtesy.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
Secretary Vickers, when your position was reorganized, the
position picked up new areas of responsibility. These areas
included the strategic and nuclear matters, missile defense,
and space policy. This is pretty large and diverse. What do you
do to manage all of that diversity? Do you have any
recommendations for changes?
Mr. Vickers. Sir, I believe the reorganization which
created Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities is actually working quite well.
We've had extensive discussions with the Government
Accountability Office about this. What it has provided is a
single senior civilian official for--to have oversight of the--
from a policy perspective, the Department's operational
capabilities, from strategic to conventional to special
operations and irregular warfare. It's enabled us to bring this
together at a higher level in the Department than we had
before, for integrated documents, such as the Guidance for the
Development of the Force, which is the Department's strategic
plan for capabilities out to 2020 and beyond.
My portfolio, as you said, is rather extensive. It divides
between oversight of current operations worldwide, and then
responsibility for the future force, but I believe it is
consistent with the responsibilities of other assistant
secretaries. I do have four excellent deputies--Brian Green
being one of them, who does strategic capabilities. I try to
concentrate my efforts among the different Deputy Assistant
Secretaries of Defense (DASDs) in high-priority items; for
example, our space protection strategy and space control in the
strategic area, which has a lot of attention since the Chinese
ASAT test; our cyber policy, and particularly cyber deterrents;
and the issue you just raised earlier about the division of
labor between Title 50 and Title 10, while monitoring our
missile defense efforts and our nuclear modernization efforts.
Brian, for instance, has been taking the lead on negotiations
in Europe in support of the State Department and Acting Under
Secretary John Rood, and then do that correspondingly with the
other areas, as well. But, strategic capabilities gets every
bit as much of my attention as the other areas, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Graham, we just started the
second panel. As a courtesy to you, Senator Sessions and I
would defer, if you have a few questions. We're going to be
here and we have a long list of questions.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much. I'll be short.
One, I appreciate you both allowing me to do this. Senator
Sessions has been a great help with the mixed oxide (MOX)
program.
My questions will be to Tom, over here.
The MOX program, Mr. Chairman, in case you're not familiar
with it, we entered into an agreement with the Russians, many
years ago now, during the Clinton administration, to take 34
tons of excess weapons plutonium that's not needed to maintain
our nuclear arsenals, that's very dangerous weapons-grade
plutonium, and convert it to commercial fuel. This is called
MOX, and we're going to do that at Savannah River site. It will
allow us to take 34 tons off the market, save hundreds of
millions of dollars in storage costs, because it would go from
being stored in an indefinite period to becoming commercial
fuel. It'll go from swords to plowshares. We're building that
facility at Savannah River site, and the House constantly cuts
funding for this program. I think it's a huge nonproliferation
effort by both countries to take weapons plutonium off the
market, and turn it into commercial fuel.
Tom, could you give us an update of construction on MOX and
where we stand financially?
Mr. D'Agostino. Certainly.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
committee, and Senator Graham, for your question.
The MOX program is incredibly important to the United
States Government and, I believe, the citizens of this country,
because it will not only eliminate the 34 tons that you
described, sir, but, I feel, provides an opportunity actually
to eliminate additional tonnage of plutonium that we feel is
not needed for national security purposes----
Senator Graham. How much money would we save if we don't
have to store this forever?
Mr. D'Agostino. Well, it's as you described. From a life-
cycle-cost standpoint, right now we spend $750 million a year
in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to
protect the weapons that we have and the material that we hold.
Now, not all of that is for just plutonium, but a significant
chunk of that is. It's spread out, as you described, across a
few sites--Los Alamos, Livermore, and the Pantex plant. So a
good chunk of those hundreds of millions of dollars that we
spend would have to continue to be spent, out in the future,
even if you immobilize it, because it still has to be
protected. We feel, as you've described, it's much better to
actually extract the resources out of that material. This
country has invested a lot of money to make that material, we
don't want to continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars
indefinitely out into the future. We'd like to extract the
financial resource and the gain out of that material for the
benefit of the citizens of this country, which, clearly, the
MOX plant will do.
It's a demonstrated and proven technology. The French have
been doing it for multiple decades without any safety
incidents. We feel that, as General Chilton looks at the
stockpile out into the future, we've already declared an
additional 9 metric tons, that there may be opportunities to
add more material to that inventory to be downblended and
ultimately used to generate electricity.
Senator Graham. Where do we stand in terms of construction?
Mr. D'Agostino. The design is well over 90 percent
complete, so we have a very good handle on the costs and
schedule of this project. Constructionwise, overall, both
design and construction, we're well over 20 percent on the
construction path. We have already put down many thousands of
metric tons I should say, cubic yards of concrete; the
foundation is in, the construction is well underway. It's
looking marvelous, actually.
Senator Graham. In the House budget, what does it do to our
construction schedule?
Mr. D'Agostino. As a result of what we have right now in
the omnibus, we will have an impact on the construction
schedule. I can't tell you exactly, because we're going to do a
detailed cost. What we would have to do is rebaseline the
project. But we did lose more than $100 million out of that
project. That will have to be added onto the project, unless,
of course, it gets restored in the future 2009 budget.
Senator Graham. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino. I'm very concerned that it adds to the
cost. We don't think it's an optimal way to put together a
large project, sir.
Senator Graham. Now, the nonproliferation aspect, it was
under the nonproliferation part of the Government, and that's
been moved. Is that a good idea?
It is a nonproliferation program.
Mr. D'Agostino. In my view, it's a nonproliferation
program. It's a program that this administration should, and
will, take credit for as a nonproliferation activity. My focus
is to get the project built. I mean, I think that's what we
have to do. Clearly there's energy benefits to it, but it's
primarily conceived of as a nonproliferation program to
eliminate this material from further use in a warhead, either
by this country or any other country.
Senator Graham. Well, anything you could provide to this
committee about the importance of this program.
Mr. Chairman and ranking member, South Carolina has agreed
to accept 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium that exist in
different sites around the country, consolidate it at South
Carolina, save a lot of money over time, take this excess
plutonium, build a MOX plant, turn it into commercial-grade
fuel that can never be used in bombs again, and it can go into
our commercial reactors to provide power. South Carolina has
agreed to do this, and we're a couple of years behind schedule,
so anything this committee can do to get this program moving
forward would be a great benefit to the country, because the
Russians have agreed to do the same thing. You know, 34 tons of
weapons-grade plutonium is a large amount of plutonium existing
here and in Russia, and if we can turn that sword into a
plowshare, I think the world will be safer. We're willing to do
that in South Carolina, save the system billions of dollars
over the life of this plutonium, but we just need to get it
moving.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So thank you for the opportunity to put
that on the record.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tomorrow at 2:30, the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee is having a hearing on this
subject, and they will go into detail. So, you might make a
note of that.
Senator Graham. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions was great, last year, making sure we keep this
thing on track.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions, go ahead.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Vickers, can you bring us up to
date on the Department-wide activities to implement the Prompt
Global Strike concept? This is the concept that we would be
able to strike, globally, within minutes, without using a
nuclear warhead, just a conventional-type missile, and maybe
even an inert warhead. The plan had originally been to convert
Trident submarine missiles for this project, and Congress has
not approved that. Where are we heading on that?
Mr. Vickers. I'd be happy to, sir.
As you noted, the near-term operation of Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM) has moved into a defense-wide
account to look at a broader range of technologies, from
hypersonics to conventional ICBMs to new reentry vehicles that
could be used in our sea-based platforms. Common aerospace
vehicle is another air option that's under consideration. So,
there's a fairly wide range of technologies that have different
characteristics, in terms of overflight, but still meet the
Prompt Global Strike requirement.
The key aspect of that is that they are in the research-
and-technology phase, and they're basically oriented at the
midterm efforts, so 2015 CTM remains our, really, only near-
term option in the next 3 years, so we continue to pursue, as
aggressively as we can, this wide range of technologies, and
that's where we are right now.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Johnson and General Webber, would
you describe your services' ideas and alternatives that you're
looking at?
General Webber. I'll go first.
Yes, Senator Sessions. On the Air Force side, again, it's a
technology effort. We are working carefully with a program that
started off under the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, called hypersonic technology. We're looking at a
potential test in the fiscal year 2009 timeframe, to start
making sure that we understand and are properly developing that
technology. But, it's a technology effort, at this time.
Admiral Johnson. Sir, the Navy has proposed several
technologies to Secretary Vickers and the team that's working
the defense-wide account. We think that there are a wide range
of opportunities, including scaling up the Flechette warhead
that was the previous research and development effort that the
Navy did. That warhead's been tested at 5,000 feet per second
and a little over 7,000 feet per second. It's particularly
effective for the purposes, and it can be used in a wide range
of applications, other than Navy. So, we would propose two
flight tests, one to meet the necessary range safety
requirements, whether it would be a ballistic missile or some
other Air Force options, but it would be a common range-safety
approach; and then further tests on warheads.
Mr. Vickers. Senator Sessions, if I could just add one
point and this is very important. We talked about the
technology options that we have in the midterm--it's a very
important capability, to give future presidents additional
options for this Prompt Global Strike requirement that we don't
have today, for terrorists transferring nuclear material, a
ballistic missile launch, or perhaps a space control ASAT
launch, or something else, where we have, essentially, nuclear-
only options for Prompt Global Strike today.
Senator Sessions. I agree that this is an alternative to
nuclear weaponry. It's a concept that is really part of a
drawdown of our nuclear stockpile. It's something that we need
to work out. I offered the amendment--which lost--to convert
our Trident missiles--conventional Trident missile modification
that we talked about, and so I'm worried about it.
It's not any large change, except we can go longer
distances, quicker. I mean, if we're having aircraft in the
air, and they could use a missile to strike a target if they
happened to be there, and they happened to be close--so, this
is--in terms of--if it doesn't have a warhead on it, it's
really no different than that, is it, Secretary Vickers?
Mr. Vickers. It is not, sir.
Senator Sessions. Now, General Webber, the Air Force
concept concerns me, because it seems to run afoul of the same
criticisms that Congress, who didn't agree with me, the
majority, found fatal with the conventional Trident
modification. Can you tell us, is this a concept that would in
any way be more palatable than what we have now?
General Webber. Senator, absolutely. I think it starts to
get at the issues of ambiguity that Congress was concerned
about. First, you worry about, where did this item launch from?
Is it coming from a platform that's a declared strategic
platform or from a location on the Earth, like an ICBM field,
that's a declared strategic location? So, this concept could be
moved to a different location.
The second step is, when it launches out, what does that
profile look like, in terms of the flyout of the trajectory?
What does it look like to sensors, in terms of the kind of
missile it is, how hot it burns, et cetera? We're looking at
profiles, trajectories, and missiles that would be completely
different from declared strategic platforms. So, you'd have a
different location and a different profile.
Senator Sessions. I think we need to look at that, Mr.
Secretary, because, rightly or wrongly, if our colleagues here
think that's going to somehow implicate the same risk that we
had before, that it might be misinterpreted, then we don't have
enough money to do everything we'd like, so we're going to have
to be careful about that.
General Webber. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Vickers, the European site--I won't
go into detail about that. I had the opportunity to meet with
the Czech ambassador last night. We know the President has met
with the Polish leadership. Can you give us any update on the
current status of the negotiations between Poland, the Czech
Republic, and the United States with regard to establishing
what I think to be very important--a strategic missile defense
site in Europe?
Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to have General Obering
here on April 1.
Senator Sessions. All right.
If you'll be brief on that----
Mr. Vickers. I will, sir. We're very close with the Czechs,
we believe we essentially have concluded negotiations for the
remaining environmental issue. With the Poles, we are a bit
further behind. It has been brought up with modernization
issues, with the discussion the President's just had with Prime
Minister Tusk. But, we're very optimistic that we can conclude
both agreements this year.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think that's important, and I
think we need to do our part, in the U.S. Congress. It's going
to protect the United States and would keep our allies in
Europe far safer than they would be, far less subject to
intimidation and threats from a nation like Iran, who continues
to develop missile systems.
Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, the Defense Science
Board Nuclear Task Force report on this Minot-Barksdale fiasco,
one of the main conclusions of the task force was a decline in
nuclear focus, and I quote, ``characterized by embedding
nuclear mission forces in non-nuclear organizations.'' The
criticism was aimed at both the Air Force and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. One of the recommendations was that there
should be an Assistant Secretary for the nuclear enterprise.
What say you?
Mr. Vickers. Well, I have extremely high regard for General
Welch. I respectfully disagree about the Assistant Secretary.
It is true that, across the enterprise, nuclear weapons issues
have been embedded with other organizations. Before, it was
with regional, Europe and Russia. Today, it is more of a
capabilities focus. But, we've always had a DASD under various
names--forces policy, strategic capabilities--that has had
oversight of those capabilities; Brian Green being the current
one today. I believe the capabilities approach provides a
better approach than the regional approach. Assistant
secretaries are fairly scarce to deal with problems like China,
for example, and to integrate it with other capabilities, where
we want to bring to bear space, information, or conventional
strike options--for instance, next-generation bomber is a
subject near and dear to my heart, both a conventional platform
and a strategic platform; it's vital for both. So no
organizational arrangement is perfect. I believe the current
one provides good oversight over strategic policy and
operational capabilities across the board. But, again, I have
the highest regard for General Welch.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
General Webber, that same task force took to task the
structure of the Air Force, because they recommended that a
single technical organization be created, headed by a major
general who reports directly to the Chief, and I quote, ``that
has full responsibility and accountability with the Air Force
for, and only for, nuclear systems and procedures.''
What do you think, and what's the status?
General Webber. Sir, we have moved out smartly on all of
these recommendations. When you take the Commanders Directed
Initiative, the Commander-Directed Investigation, the Blue-
Ribbon Review, and the Defense Science Board, and if you roll
them up together, 128, roughly, recommendations, and we are
tracking that with an Air Force general officer, a Nuclear
General Officer Steering Group that has resulted in these
activities. We've upped from a one-star to a three-star to
oversee how we work out all of these recommendations. Of 128,
all but 3 were directly for the Air Force, and those other 3
might be things that were going to go to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), but we're going to follow how we
hook up with those changes in processes.
Now, turning specifically to what we've already changed, in
addition to a three-star now leading the General Officer
Nuclear Steering Group, we have made the decision to have a
two-star-led director for plans, operations, and requirements
on the air staff, that would be a direct-report to my boss,
Lieutenant General Darnell. So that will be the rollup of all
of the nuclear responsibilities.
Also, within the Air Force, on the technical side, we have
now combined, under a one-star--it used to be a colonel--all of
our nuclear weapon activities in the Nuclear Weapons Center.
So, now you have cradle-to-grave responsibilities for Air Force
nuclear weapons in one single activity.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, the Defense Science Board
recommendation that the commander of the Air Combat Command
should ensure that the 8th Air Force has the full authority for
the daily B-52 operations, both nuclear and conventional,
that's not being adopted by the Air Force, is what you're
saying.
General Webber. Sir, that is not correct, and that
recommendation was dealing very specifically with the skip-
echelon relationships that 8th Air Force had with Air Combat
Command Headquarters, in terms of day-to-day responsibilities.
That is one of the activities that's already been changed, and
those responsibilities are now aligned under the 8th Air Force
commander, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about the B-52 initial training
course at Barksdale and the B-52 weapons school course? Will
the flight training include the nuclear mission?
General Webber. Yes, sir. Those are also items that have
already been fixed. We now will have a nuclear curriculum in
the B-52 weapons school curriculum--that's already been added--
as well as, the flight training unit now has a simulator of--
both classroom and simulator profiles that involve the nuclear
mission.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Air Force and the nuclear
community categorizes accidents and incidents involving nuclear
weapons, depending on the nature and the severity of the
accident. The lowest-level category is a ``dull sword''
followed by ``bent spear,'' ``broken arrow,'' ``empty quiver,''
and ``nuke flash.'' Has this Minot-Barksdale incident been so
categorized?
General Webber. Yes, it has, sir, and I am not familiar
with how that was categorized. I can provide that for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Bill Nelson. Well, it appears that over 200 ``dull
swords'' have been categorized since 2001. How many ``dull
swords'' have occurred since the Labor Day incident involving
this Minot-Barksdale incident?
General Webber. I'm not aware of that, and will provide
that for the record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Admiral Johnson, on to the RRW. The first warhead to be
replaced under the original schedule was the W-76. Now, with
the schedule change, what is the decision with respect to the
W-76? Are they going to undergo a life extension?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The W-76 life-extension program
is ongoing. When we met, last year, on these same subjects, we
were about to go into production on the arming, fusing, and
firing circuits, which are provided by the Navy. We have done
that. We are in production on that portion. The warhead
section, which is done by Mr. D'Agostino's team at the
Department of Energy (DOE), is about to go into production. The
W-76, one program, life-extension program, will move forward,
even if we work on RRW or some other variation of a modern
warhead.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, it's run into some technical
problems. Have you been involved in the resolution of the
technical issue?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. Mr. D'Agostino's probably best
qualified to answer the details of that.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, I'll get to him in a
minute.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Has it been resolved yet?
Admiral Johnson. No, sir, although I believe we are about
to resolve our production issues. It's an example of restarting
a vendor base and a capability that existed years ago and has
been shut down. I think, from my perspective, we're
experiencing reasonable and relatively predictable delays,
although you don't know exactly where they'll show up, in
restarting production. I would think we will find similar but
different kinds of delays, if Congress chooses to life-extend
other programs.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Is it going to impact the
schedule of having the first life-extended W-76 ready in early
fiscal year 2009?
Admiral Johnson. I don't know for sure. If we stick with
early in 2009, I think it's likely that we'll make that, or
mid-2009. Most of our decision meetings are, maybe, 60 days
from now, and we can give you a joint technical answer with
more skill then. Part of this--and we're in an open hearing,
but part of the material issues that we're talking about
require time to do tests. Of course, concrete takes 21 days to
set. You can't make it set faster than that. Although this
isn't a concrete material, it has that kind of time-related
testing that goes with it. So, I think we'll know pretty well
in 60 days.
We see no delay whatsoever in our ability to operate the W-
76 warhead series. We have a great deal of flexibility on
schedule, and although it's an important subject, I don't
consider it a crisis, by any means at all. It's, I think,
normal for a restart.
Senator Bill Nelson. So we're looking at the middle of 2009
for the life extension at the earliest.
Admiral Johnson. At the earliest. Yes, sir.
Sir, I lost track of whether you said fiscal year or
calendar year, but I'll go with calendar year--shortly after
the new year, I think, would be about the earliest.
Tom, you're more qualified than I.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, Mr. D'Agostino.
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. Certainly. Admiral Johnson was
actually right on the money. We are continuing the tests on
this particular material. If the tests continue, hopefully, as
we expect they will, we'll be able to make a decision, on being
able to use this material, within the next few months, as part
of our production cycle, which takes us probably to April 2009
to actually get that first production unit up and out the door.
I would note that, of the hundreds of different types of
materials and parts that need to be made, this was the one that
really hung us up, and it's very important, as Admiral Johnson
mentioned, that it really demonstrates the issues associated
with trying to re-establish a capability that was established
many decades ago, and build things exactly the way we did it
during the cold-war era. That is the type of thinking that we
want to make sure that this administration, but, more
importantly, future administrations, aren't hampered by our
inability to replicate the past perfectly. So, this provides us
an opportunity to study different approaches. That was one of
the main ideas behind looking at reliable replacement concepts,
is there a better way, now that we know that we have different
priorities on importance, to do things, out in the future?
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, another reason was the safety
and surety.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, given the fact that, in creating
one of the newest warheads, the W-88, there was a conscious
decision not to use all the available safety features--how can
you assure us, in this RRW, that we're going to have all of the
safety in that or the life-extension program?
Mr. D'Agostino. It's a great question. The W-88 was
designed and fielded in--basically, starting in the late 1970s,
early 1980s time period. So, the design effort actually goes
back to a point in time, as the General described, where we
were constantly in a cycle of designing and building and
replacing warheads, and we weren't as concerned about whether
these things would have the longevity, because we expected, at
least, if the trend would continue, that we would take that
system out of the stockpile and would replace it with new. Now
that we are looking at a different strategic environment, now
that we know a lot more--we have these supercomputers that tell
us a lot more about materials and how things age--now that we
have a security environment that's dramatically different than
we had during the cold war, to evaluate options to input into
future systems, safety features like insensitive high
explosives, security features that would be important, and we
could discuss in a closed session, that reflect future threats.
We think it's important to study those and those are important
things for a future deterrent.
Senator Bill Nelson. Last year, you had some requests
scattered throughout several budget lines in the NNSA budget
for the work in support of the RRW. So, tell us, what's the
scope of the work in support of it?
Mr. D'Agostino. Certainly. Last year, we submitted one
line, actually, for RRW. It wasn't--about $88 million, as
General Chilton described earlier. We felt that it capitalized
on work that we had been doing for the Nation, actually, in
looking at enhanced surety, or enhanced safety and security for
future systems.
What we've proposed in the 2009 budget is activities
consistent with congressional direction, which is to do work in
advanced certification, which is to answer this whole question
of: certification--can you deploy a warhead without underground
testing?--which is a key factor, for me personally, as well as
for this administration, and, I believe, future
administrations, to examine that question, and also to put in
these safety and security features.
So, we have a budget line for advanced certification, of
$20 million. We have an additional $10 million for enhanced
surety, which is the safety-and-security piece. Then, we have
this $10 million requested for RRW in order to be able to
answer the questions that the JASONs asked and that Congress
has asked us to answer.
Realistically, the only work on RRW-type system--type work,
which is specific to the joint Navy/DOE project is this $10-
million effort, and it is focused on answering the questions
that Congress had asked of us.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Webber, on ICBM security, one
measure was the remote visual assessment cameras at the sites,
to monitor them. Yet, the Air Force hasn't funded this. They
put it on their unfunded list, and then, Congress has to add
the funds. So, again, the same thing has happened in your
budget, just $300,000 on the unfunded list, to sustain this
system and install what you all say has high military utility
and avoids a lot of security personnel. What should we assume?
General Webber. Sir, I would take a different perspective.
We are very excited about what remote visual assessment is
doing for us, so much so that in my previous job, before coming
here, I was working with the folks on what the requirements
would be for block one of the capability, so that we could
actually get it out there faster.
We now have 5 missile alert facilities and 50 launch
facilities installed. What you see in that 2009 unfunded line
is the fact that we bought the hardware and installed the
hardware. We didn't program because we were moving it as fast
as we could, we didn't program the satellite access that would
take the pictures and move that back to the missile alert
facilities. So, that's why it showed up in the fiscal year 2009
unfunded requirements list.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, you don't have any money in
there to run them.
General Webber. That's what I'm talking about, sir. We
purchased them through a contract, and the contract folks are--
they're paid for to buy the kits, and install and maintain the
kits. What we didn't purchase was the satellite access fees to
move the picture back to the missile alert facility.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, you want us to do that for you.
General Webber. We put that on the list. But, it's going to
be programmed, from 2010 on out. The fact that we were able to
break the program into a block approach and move capability
forward meant that we got out of our own synchronization.
Does that answer your question, sir?
Senator Bill Nelson. Often, we see things that are put on
the unfunded list that you expect Congress to bail you out. It
looks like this is one.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, I have just a few brief
questions. If we develop a new RRW, will it be your agency that
supervises the production of that?
Would DOE be the entity that procures it?
Mr. D'Agostino. We would be the agency that procures it.
Before we would get to that point, we would finish the study to
tee up for a future administration whether or not to develop--
--
Senator Sessions. You're right.
Mr. D'Agostino. But, the Navy actually has the lead--on the
joint project team, to get that study completed. Then if it
gets to production, then we would produce it for----
Senator Sessions. All right. With regard to maintaining our
current stockpile--you are in charge of that, and you put out
the money to pay for that, right?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Now, the money you put out does not come
from the DOE, does it?
Mr. D'Agostino. The money that I put out to maintain the
stockpile comes from the DOE. It is part of the NNSA budget.
Senator Sessions. Is that Defense Department budget or is
it Energy?
Mr. D'Agostino. It's Energy budget, sir.
Senator Sessions. So, the maintenance of the warhead would
be Energy budget?
Mr. D'Agostino. The maintenance of the stockpile--I mean,
we do it there but it's not completely Energy. The majority of
it is Energy; however, we provide components to the Department
of the Navy and to the Air Force, components that have to be
switched out. So, the Services also have a maintenance
activity----
Senator Sessions. My time's running out--but, with regard
to any new systems, would that come from the Defense budget or
Energy budget? Our RRW, let's say that were approved.
Mr. D'Agostino. With regards to that, we're in charge of
producing and providing it to the Defense Department. That part
would come from the Energy Department budget. Then, once the
warhead is in the Services' custody, they have an obligation
and it depends on the warhead itself, of how often certain
parts have to get switched out, so there's a joint
responsibility for maintenance, which comes out of both
budgets. Once the Services are done, they provide it back to
the DOE, and we have 100-percent maintainability requirement.
There's a period of time in the warhead's life where there
is a joint responsibility for maintaining the warhead itself.
During that time, we integrate quite closely to provide parts.
Senator Sessions. It's a DOE budget request, but it's a
Defense 050 budget category on the Federal budget. Is that
correct?
Mr. D'Agostino. That part is correct. I'm not sure about
the 050 part, but I think that's correct, yes.
Senator Sessions. I just want to point out that there are a
number of instances in this whole process in which Defense
Department needs something, and Energy delivers. I'll just be
frank with you, I sense Energy lacks the intensity of interest
in keeping costs down because it's really coming from another
source other than your budget. If the Air Force needs an
aircraft, and they can save money on it, they can generally
spend that money on other priorities the Air Force needs. You
don't have that intensity of interest. So, I'd encourage you,
because these projects are nuclear, not to yield--not to accept
any bid--any costs we hear about it. I think we're paying too
much for some of these things, and DOE needs to be very
aggressive in containing costs. Just my two-cents worth.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. We're going to wrap up here pretty
quick. I just have a couple of questions.
Mr. Secretary, you heard me talking to the STRATCOM
commander earlier about THAAD and the Standard Missile 3. Were
you consulted on the 1-year delay of the THAAD program?
Mr. Vickers. My staff was aware of it, I was not personally
consulted. I believe the program is now back on track from the
delays of the four firing units; 6 months and 12 months,
respectively, is the latest information I have.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, the information we have is that
the Department has not gone beyond planning for 96 THAAD
missiles and 147 SM-3 interceptors, and that the MDA has
delayed the next version of the SM-3, and the budget request
would produce a 1-year delay in the THAAD system.
Mr. Vickers. What I was referring to, sir, was the four
firing units that had been slipped to schedule--6 months, I
think, for one and two, and 12 months--that I think they have
rejuggled, recently, and brought it back. SM-3, I think, is
still an issue for us, but I'll have to get back to you on
that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

While the February 2008 budget justification for fiscal year 2009
slipped THAAD Batteries 3 and 4 fielding 1 year, the Missile Defense
Agency made internal realignments which restored the $65 million in
fiscal year 2009 to enable award of the THAAD Batteries 3&4 interceptor
long lead contract as originally planned and avoids the delay and
production gap for Batteries 3&4. Delivery of Batteries 3&4 will
complete procurement of the 96 interceptors for the first 4 batteries.
Further, the Agency is working with the Department to address the
procurement of 2 more THAAD Batteries (5&6) with spares, for a total of
128 additional interceptors, consistent with the recommendations of the
Joint Capabilities Mix Study conducted by the Joint Staff in
association with the combatant commands.
In President's budget 2009, the SM-3 Block IB development schedule
was slipped one year, causing a future missile buy to change from an
SM-3 Block IB configuration to Block IA. However, the Agency is working
with the Department to procure an additional 116 SM-3 Block IB missiles
in accordance with the Joint Capabilities Mix Study, resulting in a
total of 263 missiles procured.

Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We put some specific language in
last year's authorization bill about this, and it doesn't seem
like the Department is paying attention to it. So, we'd like
some answers.
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir. The goal of the program is to strike
a balance between short- and medium-range threats, and long-
range, and then near-term and longer-term, and we want to get
as much capability as we can in the hands of the warfighters,
as soon as possible.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me tell you, those COCOMs want
that THAAD, they want that SM-3, and they want those Patriots.
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir, and we need THAAD for southeastern
Europe defense and NATO defense, as well, sir. Yes, indeed.
One point, if I could just add, sir, on our earlier
discussion. It's very important to align OSD oversight with
General Chilton's responsibilities. He is now moving, if he
hasn't briefed you on this already, to broader deterrence plans
against a wide range of actors, looking at nuclear, cyber, and
space, as well, and it's important, I think, that oversight be
aligned in any organizational design, whatever we would look
at.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, your agency seems to
want to finance third-party financing, and you've worked it
into your long-term plan. That's where a private party would
build a building or a facility, and then lease it back to the
Government. Now, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
some pretty strict rules about when and the circumstances that
the Government can enter into that, as does DOE. The facility
must have commercial value, and the arrangement has to be more
economic to the Government than building the building itself
and the facility. The NNSA contractor, in many of the proposals
that have been discussed, would enter into the lease, not the
Government. Why doesn't NNSA enter into the contract?
Mr. D'Agostino. Actually, I'm not aware of that particular
detail. I don't know if that's been completely determined, that
it's the actual NNSA contractor. We do have an arrangement,
right now, at Y-12, in that area, and you're correct, sir, that
we are looking at this approach, see if it makes sense for two
other sites that I'm aware of, off the top of my head. I'll
look into that particular point. I'd like to take that one for
the record, if I could.
[The information referred to follows:]

The NNSA's nuclear weapons complex contains many facilities that
are very old and need to be replaced. Third-party financing is among
the options NNSA considers for constructing facilities that, when NNSA
no longer needs them, could be used by the private sector. Contractors
have signed leases for third-party financed projects in the past
because they are the primary tenants of the leased facilities. If the
Department of Energy (DOE) selects a new contractor in the future, the
lease can be assigned to the new contractor. If the contractor no
longer needs the facility, it can terminate the lease and the developer
would seek a new tenant. The National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) is considering whether it would be advantageous for NNSA to sign
leases as to future third-party financed projects--e.g., for facilities
in which NNSA, rather than a contractor, would be the primary tenant.
Provided below is additional information on specific projects:

To date, NNSA has completed one third-party financed
project under the provisions of OMB Circular A-11. The Jack
Case and New Hope Centers at Y-12 are two office buildings: the
former is 412,700 ft.\2\ facility and the latter is 137,157
ft.\2\ and offers expanded meeting space. These Centers,
occupied in July 2007, were constructed for $125 million, and
leased to the NNSA's M&O contractor, which signed a 5-year
lease with three 5-year options.
At the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), NNSA is
considering the construction of a 450,000 ft.\2\ modern science
complex consisting of offices, light labs, and a self-
sustaining infrastructure using third-party financing. The
contractor is currently working, at their own financial risk,
to develop a business case and acquisition strategy plan, which
includes subcontractor selection which will be submitted to
NNSA. The DOE acquisition process requires the Federal
Acquisition Executive (AE) to make a decision, based on the
Alternatives Analysis and recommended preferred alternative, if
an alternatively financed project provides the best alternative
for the government. This decision would not occur before
December 2008.
At Y-12 NNSA is seeking to replace its outdated
Complex Command Center and is considering using third-party
financing. The acquisition strategy for this potential
construction project has not yet been determined.

Senator Bill Nelson. You can imagine what happens to the
lease if the NNSA outside contractor is no longer the operator
of the facility.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Mr. D'Agostino. I think that's right. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
Now, in many of the proposals, the land on which these
proposed buildings are to be built is government land, behind
the security fence, that would be sold to, or leased to, a
developer. In the lease situation, the lease would contain the
normal clause that the lease could be canceled at any time.
Mr. D'Agostino. That's correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. If that's the case, what would happen
to the building? Would it revert back to the NNSA?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think, in the lease situation, the idea
behind the lease is that, should the Government determine that
it does not have the mission there, or determine--and
essentially would want--maybe, whether it's changing mission or
further consolidation or downsizing--we would have to determine
what is in the best interest of the Government, return that
building back to the NNSA or actually sell it off, in effect.
So, there are probably a couple of different approaches, and I
think it would probably be situation-dependent.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, the other question that's begged
is, does the building behind the DOE security fence have
commercial value, and it could be leased by a private entity if
either the lease or the building lease was canceled?
Mr. D'Agostino. Right. If the determination has to get made
before we'd even enter into this type of an agreement,
recognizing where the building is. If it's determined that the
Government doesn't have a need there before, the fenceline
would have to change, clearly. It would most likely only happen
in the situation where we'd be getting out of that mission
completely in that area. Therefore, moving the fenceline
wouldn't be a problem of having two different types of mission
activities--one, a commercial one, closely located with--inside
an enduring, long-term mission.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, before you jump into this, I
would suggest that you find out about the fiasco in the United
States Air Force with regard to base housing on five Air Force
bases, including Patrick Air Force Base, in Florida.
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay.
Senator Bill Nelson. They are getting themselves into a
situation where they turned it over to a contractor, in some
cases with a lease, and as they come down their checklist, they
can be in a situation where the builder, the lessee of the land
who builds the base housing, would be in a situation that they
could go out and rent that base housing to outside people, and
it's within the security fence.
Mr. D'Agostino. I'll look into that, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. This is a real live one, right now
with five Air Force bases, and the worst, egregious example of
how the contractor has botched it up is Patrick Air Force Base.
So, there's lessons learned. You all ought to pay attention to
that before you start to jump into this.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. In some proposals, the developer would
not be subject to Federal procurement or contracting
requirements, or DOE orders. You have to look at that, and
would that exemption extend to exempting the facility from the
jurisdiction of the Defense Nuclear Safety Board? So what's
wrong with the regular process of seeking funds for the
Government to build a building?
Mr. D'Agostino. My goal is to look at all avenues to
satisfy the mission requirements in the most responsible way
possible, which involves a combination of financial,
programmatic, and the like. I have to make sure that these
considerations are properly reflected in any decision that gets
made to move down in that direction.
What's clear to me, when I look at our current nuclear
weapons complex, is that I have something right now that is
unwieldy, if you will, sir. It has built up over a period of 50
years. Many of these facilities are just right-after-World-War-
II types of facilities, and the status quo of just maintaining
what I have is not appropriate. So, I want to dramatically
shift the footprint, and essentially reduce the footprint by
about 9 million square feet, which will take us from 36 to 25
million square feet.
I've been very clear, not only to the contractors, but,
more importantly, my direct-reports, that I want to make sure
that all options are on the table. I just don't want to keep
doing business like we used to do business, just continuing to
do management and operating-type contracts in the past, and
this is an element of that. I mean, I've been expansive on it
from the standpoint of making sure we look at all options and
to make sure that we meet the criteria, not only from OMB, but
from Congress, as well, from the Public Works Committees, from
the authorization committees, and from our own DOE regulations.
From my standpoint, A.J. Eggenberger, who's the Chairman of
the Defense Board, and I talk, on I won't say--certainly not on
a weekly basis, but talk on a basis where he understands about
our large projects that we have coming out, and we try to work
out and make sure that we don't--we're not compartmentalizing,
if you will, Defense Board oversight, because that--in my view,
it's a very good input for me, an independent input on whether
or not we're doing the right thing, from a safety standpoint.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, you just don't want to get
yourself in a situation, in highly sensitive, secure areas,
such as the DOE that you suddenly have, because of lessees and
lessors the access to secured areas by people that are not
cleared.
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. Yes, sir. I'll take a look at
the Patrick Air Force Base example, as well as relook at your
question, sir, on how the lease payments are made, whether it's
through the Department itself or through the contractor.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Thank you all for your
participation today.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
safety and security
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, some of the work in
relation to a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is focused on
increasing the safety and surety of nuclear weapons. Have the
requirements been determined for just how inherently safe or secure a
nuclear weapon should be?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. There are safety standards and criteria
against which nuclear weapon designs and operations are compared before
the designs are accepted or the operations permitted. Nuclear weapons
must incorporate design features that minimize the possibility of
accidental and/or inadvertent nuclear detonation. The following are
design requirements for nuclear weapons: 1) Normal Environment-prior to
receipt of the enabling input signals and the arming signal, the
probability of a premature nuclear detonation must not exceed one in a
billion per nuclear weapon lifetime; 2) Abnormal Environment-prior to
receipt of the enabling input signals, the probability of a premature
nuclear detonation must not exceed one in a million per credible
nuclear weapon accident or exposure to abnormal environments; and 3)
One-Point Safety--the probability of achieving a nuclear yield greater
than 4 pounds of TNT equivalent in the event of a one-point initiation
of the weapon's high explosive must not exceed one in a million.
However, our understanding of the risks involved and the threats
present in our operational environment have changed over time.
Therefore in accordance with Presidential guidelines, we continuously
examine our designs and procedures to maximize their safety and
security; however, there is not a set definition of an inherently safe
or secure weapon.
A large part of the Department's effort to examine our designs and
procedures is done in the Enhanced Surety subprogram of the Engineering
Campaign. This subprogram develops and matures modern weapon safety and
use-control technologies. All of the technologies being developed
through this subprogram are targeted for the next insertion
opportunity, into a weapon in the active stockpile. Included are
advanced firing-sets and strong-links, surety sensors, power
management, and advanced use-denial technologies. All of these
technologies are technically feasible and are being matured on a pace
intended to allow them to be chosen by the weapon system manager, with
manageable cost risk, based on Department of Defense (DOD) requirements
for the weapon system.

2. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, I ask this because in the
past, specifically with respect to the W-88, one of the newest warheads
in the inventory, there was a conscious decision not to use all
available safety features. How do we, Congress, know that even if we
fund the safety and surety work that it will be incorporated into any
RRW or life extension program?
Mr. D'Agostino. Even though the W88 is the newest nuclear weapon in
the U.S. arsenal, it was still designed, developed, and produced during
the Cold War. The W88 is an excellent illustration of the paradigm
shift embodied in the RRW strategy. The Cold War paradigm was to
optimize yield in the smallest possible package and then include safety
to the greatest extent possible. The W88 is an extraordinary system,
very effective while including some modern safety features. However,
meeting the weight, volume, and material limitations imposed by the
unique environment of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles during the
Cold War constrained the number of surety features we were able to
implement in that system. The end of the Cold War provided the
flexibility to shift from systems optimized for yield and weight that
include surety to systems optimized for surety yet are still sufficient
to meet the current military need. The importance of taking advantage
of this flexibility was punctuated by the events of September 11. We
must continue to evolve and advance our surety to stay ahead of a
threat that is evolving in technical capability and intent.
The decision on the exact types and amounts of surety features to
include will be based on the weapon platform, technology maturity,
threat assessment, risk, cost, and benefit to the stockpile. The RRW
strategy will allow for maximizing the inclusion of modern surety
technologies, while life extension programs will be more constrained
due to low margin, available space, and the need to minimize deviations
from the existing nuclear test base. In all cases, the final selection
will be an optimized set of tradeoffs that the Nuclear Weapons Council
will agree to. We will provide you and your staff with updates on the
design and development of any RRW or Life Extension Programs.

3. Senator Bill Nelson. Major General Webber and Admiral Johnson,
would you like to comment on this?
General Webber. The security environment has changed dramatically
from the Cold War when our current weapons were designed. At the time,
the primary driver was the greatest yield within the allowable weight.
Terrorism had not yet come to the forefront, and security was
maintained with greater numbers of personnel rather than designed into
the warhead. While we cannot comment on the trade-off decisions made
for the W-88, the Air Force position is to increase the surety features
of our weapons either in a RRW or Life Extension Program design. Our
goal is to include as many surety features as possible while meeting
our operational requirements.
Admiral Johnson. The maturity of the surety and safety technologies
and level of risk in the weapons environment are design drivers in the
creation of a new nuclear weapons system, with extra emphasis being
placed on safety and surety. These surety and safety features typically
require additional space and weight that can be more readily
accommodated given the modifications incorporated into the RRW design.

contracting
4. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) transformation plan discussed the idea
of being more DOD-like. In other words NNSA would establish
requirements for an object and then the contractor would deliver the
object from the contractor's facility using a contractor workforce. How
far are you taking the DOD-like approach?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA is currently developing a contract
strategy through an open, public process that is focused primarily on
the three weapons production contracts that expire in 2010, but the
strategy could also affect the other NNSA Management and Operating
contracts. NNSA has issued 2 Requests for Information (RFI), received
written input from industry and other interested parties, and conducted
over 30 one-on-one meetings in March 2008 with RFI respondents to
discuss their ideas in detail. Options being presented include
obtaining nuclear production services and products from a contractor
owned and contractor operated facility; and obtaining non-nuclear
production products and services from a contractor owned and contractor
operated facility. Either of these two options would move NNSA to a
model similar to DOD contracts. There are other contracting options
under consideration, and ideas contained in responses to the two RFIs,
that could move NNSA closer to DOD-like contract structures.

5. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, would this be limited to
having industry building some part of or all of a full-up nuclear
weapon?
Mr. D'Agostino. Since the inception of the nuclear weapons program,
industry has been supplying materials, some weapons parts, and some
components that are used in nuclear weapons. A substantial portion of
the non-nuclear components are ``outsourced'' through the Kansas City
Plant. In this regard, a significant portion of our contracting/
subcontracting fits well into the DOD model asked about in the previous
question. There is a substantial amount of nonrecurring and some
recurring design and engineering work that enables series production or
purchase of products. The ongoing surveillance work can identify issues
with aging of materials that is difficult to define and purchase as a
product. As technologies and environmental requirements change, there
has been a substantial amount of work needed to requalify materials,
processes, and components used in actual weapons and/or the production
of weapons. This workload would also be very difficult to define and
purchase as a product. Where we can, I believe we are doing so, even
for sensitive materials that used to only be produced within federally-
owned facilities.
There are critical aspects which are reserved to federally-owned
sites, and these principally involve special nuclear materials and
surety. What is critical to maintain within effective Federal control,
is explicit weapon design, nuclear material manufacturing processes,
surety (safety, security, and use control), and the assembly and system
integration, testing, and quality acceptance processes necessary to
qualify items for war reserve and other weapon program uses (such as in
support of experiments and testing performed by the nuclear weapon
design laboratories). I do not anticipate that we would ever purchase a
full-up nuclear weapon commercially, but we already purchase a
substantial amount of what goes into our weapons commercially and are
evaluating ways to increase that amount where cost and security
considerations permit.

6. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, how would you get
competition?
Mr. D'Agostino. A key element of our contract strategy is to
identify actual or perceived barriers to competition, and to determine
how best to mitigate those barriers to ensure a robust competition.
Several of the more than 30 respondents to our 2 RFIs identified
concerns regarding the potential for winning a NNSA contract
competition as compared to the resources required to compete. However,
on balance, we are very encouraged by the level of interest generated
by our RFIs, particularly among contractors who have not traditionally
competed for NNSA Management and Operating contracts. Moreover, the
information obtained through the RFIs and one-on-one meetings with
potential bidders should help us to develop contract solicitation
documents and define an open acquisition process that ensures the
desired robust competition.

nuclear incidents and accidents
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Major General Webber, the Air Force nuclear
community categorizes accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons
depending on the nature and severity of the accident and incident. The
lowest level category is a ``dull sword,'' followed by ``bent spear,''
``broken arrow,'' ``empty quiver,'' and ``nuke flash.'' Has the Minot
incident been categorized?
General Webber. [Deleted.]

8. Senator Bill Nelson. Major General Webber, it appears that there
have been over 200 dull swords since 2001. How many dull swords have
occurred since the Labor Day incident involving the unknowing movement
of nuclear weapons from Minot to Barksdale?
General Webber. [Deleted.]

science
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, maintaining premier science
capabilities in the NNSA national laboratories is key to maintaining
the stockpile in the future, recruiting and retaining the best and the
brightest and carry out the many other national security-related work
that the labs perform in addition to the nuclear weapons work. I am
concerned that in the NNSA plans for the future complex there is too
much focus on production and not enough emphasis on maintaining the
science base. In some instances it seems that there is an assumption
that the science can or should be maintained by entities other than
NNSA. Are you sure that we are not diminishing science for the sake of
budgets?
Mr. D'Agostino. No, we are not sacrificing science for budgets. The
science capabilities at the NNSA national laboratories continue to be
world-leading. Our computational capabilities, experimental facilities
and scientific staff have met the tremendous challenge of maintaining
the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile without recourse
to underground nuclear tests. We look forward to even greater progress
in stockpile science as the major new experimental tools become
available in the next few years (e.g., National Ignition Facility and
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility 2nd Axis). The next
10 years will see these tools exploited to solve many longstanding
scientific questions important to our nuclear weapons designs. These
facilities were major investments in the complex since 1992. During
that same time, the infrastructure for production continued to age, and
this coupled with increased demand for security, required that we
invest now in some modernization in the production facilities, as we
have for the past decade invested in Stockpile Stewardship Program
tools. We continue to be committed to stockpile science but in a
constrained budget, we will challenge the science program to operate at
reduced funding while addressing issues in the stockpile.

pit manufacturing
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the NNSA budget request
makes several changes in the way the budget request for pit
manufacturing is configured. The original pit budget line was
established to bring visibility and discipline to process of
manufacturing and certifying the W-88 pits. Will this reorganization of
funding allow visibility to all aspects of the pit manufacturing
process not only for W-88 pits, but also for any future pits?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign
was an important program that achieved success in reconstituting pit
manufacturing within the nuclear weapons production complex (addressing
a serious shortfall in production capability) and establishing a
limited pit manufacturing capability of 10 pits per year. With the
Campaign's objectives achieved, we have placed pit manufacturing and
pit technology development under Directed Stockpile Work as an
established capability supporting the stockpile. In making this
placement, however, we still recognize its continuing importance by
defining specific funding lines under Stockpile Services that ensures
visibility and management consideration during budget preparation and
implementation. Pit manufacturing also continues to be a separate area
for management attention during Quarterly Program Reviews.
Pit certification, as a part of the Pit Manufacturing and
Certification Campaign, also achieved the primary Campaign objective of
assuring that the newly-manufactured pits were certified for use in the
stockpile. Having achieved this goal, and with no clearly identified
next-generation pit build, the pit certification funds were moved to
the Science Campaign to continue work on the development and
improvement of certification capabilities and techniques that are
required to assure nuclear performance in weapon systems. These
activities include a unique dynamic plutonium experiment program to
improve plutonium material models that support our simulation
capability, development of engineering testing and analysis to ensure
that primaries can perform under stockpile to target conditions, and a
universal baselining capability to generically assess the performance
of any new or stockpiled weapon system. These efforts are synergistic
with the elements of the ongoing Science Campaign, and can be managed
more effectively within this structure. Once a new requirement for
manufacture of a specific pit type is established, NNSA management will
reconsider the need for any recombination of pit manufacturing and
certification to ensure success of the mission.

reliable replacement warhead
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, what is the scope of the
work in support of an RRW concept supported in the NNSA budget? I ask
this because last year in the fiscal year 2008 budget request there was
funding for both a specific RRW design in the RRW line and also
engineering and science work to support the RRW concept generally
scattered throughout several budget lines.
Mr. D'Agostino. Funding that specifically applies to the RRW is
located within Directed Stockpile Work. $10 million is requested in
fiscal year 2009 to enable maturation of the specific RRW design to
address the issues raised by the JASON review. The funds are not
sufficient to complete the RRW Phase 2A design study. Consistent with
the fiscal year 2008 appropriations act, work on certification tools
relevant to legacy and future systems continues, and is located within
the campaigns.

12. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, the Navy included funding
in its fiscal year 2009 budget request for the arming, firing, and
fuzing system for the RRW-1. The full amount of this money is early to
need given the actions of the Energy and Water appropriators in fiscal
year 2008. What amount of this money can be usefully used, for what
purpose, and how much is excess?
Admiral Johnson. The Navy placed fiscal year 2008 funding on hold
when Congress zeroed funding for the NNSA in the Fiscal Year 2008
Energy and Water Authorization Bill. No Navy effort on the RRW is
planned unless approved and funded by Congress and coordinated with
NNSA. If approved and funded, the Navy will use $14 million to continue
efforts to define requirements and architectures to support an
integrated/adaptable Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) including
developing Navy/Air Force/U.K. requirements, investigating AF&F
concepts, architectures and technologies needed to support those
requirements and performing an analysis of adaptability. This work is
critical to the next AF&F and should be applicable to Navy, Air Force
or U.K. warheads. The fiscal year 2009 effort is contingent on
congressional approval of the fiscal year 2008 plan.

bombers
13. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, the Air Force is looking
at beginning to field a next generation bomber by 2018 and a more
technologically advanced bomber by 2025. What are your key requirements
for future long range strike platforms?
General Chilton. Our bombers remain a valued element of our nuclear
forces and are expected to remain so into the future. Bombers are
uniquely useful in communicating measured concerns in response to other
nation's activities as we seek to continue to deter the use of nuclear
weapons in the future. In that regard, future bombers must be
survivable against advanced threats and possess the range, endurance,
and payload capability needed to deliver effects against multiple
targets deep within hostile territory and far from their operating
locations.

14. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, after several years of
debate and now a requirement that the Air Force maintains 76 B-52
bomber aircraft, the funding for the B-52 is on the Air Force unfunded
priority list. What is your understanding as to how the 76 will be
funded if Congress does not provide the additional funding?
General Chilton. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is aware of the
funding challenges the Air Force faces in sustaining the 76 B-52Hs and
understands the Air Force is working to resolve the issue.

strategic deterrence
15. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, in your statement you
talked about the importance of bilateral dialogue as an element of
deterrence. The bilateral and multilateral dialogue seems to be more
difficult as our enemies are not really states per se, while States are
competitors. Do you see a need to improve military dialogue with and
among competitors?
General Chilton. Yes, I do see a need to improve military dialogue
with and among competitors. Although many state actors can now be
considered competitors rather than adversaries, numerous state
adversaries still exist. As your question suggests, today's complex
strategic landscape increases our National security challenges. Just as
our model for deterrence has evolved to keep up with these challenges,
so has our realization of a need to broaden military dialogue-not just
with our traditional competitors, but with those who are beginning to,
or are likely to emerge.
The value of military dialogue with our competitors is based on the
ability to build understanding of each others' intentions, and the
ability to identify practical steps to improve bilateral and
multilateral cooperation. Understanding each others' specific
perceptions and respective doctrines goes a long way in ensuring our
force postures are perceived in their proper context. The result is
enhanced strategic stability.

16. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, how would you go about
improving and enlarging such military-to-military dialogue?
General Chilton. We are improving and enlarging our military-to-
military dialogue with competitors by expanding into additional areas
beyond traditional nuclear dialogue. For example, in support of
geographic combatant commands, I have emphasized international
engagement on space. If this avenue of engagement begins to produce
meaningful dialogue, then we'll move on to our cyberspace mission as
the next area for expanded military-to-military dialogue with our
competitors.
In line with new concepts of tailored deterrence, military-to-
military dialogue must also be tailored. These relationships depend,
obviously, on the nature of the relationship with the competitor or
adversary. Our access to certain states and non-state actors is
restricted by limited, and sometimes non-existent, diplomatic
relationships. In these situations, our ability to improve and expand
upon such military-to-military dialogue would depend on proxy
relationships, both through allies and in some cases competitors.
While I am optimistic about the slow but steady military dialogue
with our competitors, it is also important to note that despite a
considerable investment in time and resources last year, many
competitors have shown little interest in completing our scheduled
dialogues. Therefore, we are reducing this year's overall number of
events and refocusing our efforts on the quality and completion rate of
the remaining dialogue opportunities.

missile warning gap
17. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, do the current schedules
for the space-based infrared satellite (SBIRS) geostationary (GEO) and
high earth orbit (HEO) elements, assuming that there are four GEO
satellites and four HEO sensors, avoid a missile warning gap?
General Chilton. Barring unexpected problems with current on-orbit
assets, the schedule for the four SBIRS GEO satellites, plus the two
HEO sensors and their scheduled replacements, will avoid a missile
warning gap.

18. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, do you believe there may
be a need for more SBIRS satellites or HEO sensors?
General Chilton. The United States will need the capability to
provide missile warning for the foreseeable future. At present, the
program of record provides adequate coverage, but we will eventually
need a follow-on capability.

operationally responsive space
19. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, the Strategic Command
sets the requirements for operationally responsive space (ORS). What
are your key priority requirements and are there any areas where more
good could be done?
General Chilton. The key priority requirements for ORS are
determined based upon the urgent needs as expressed by Joint Force
Commanders (to include U.S. STRATCOM) and, in some circumstances, the
needs of services or agencies. In general, the priority areas are
battlefield awareness, communications and command and control. At this
stage of the program it is important to establish common standards and
interfaces to enable a timely responsive capability for the future.

nonproliferation and combating weapons of mass destruction
20. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, the Strategic Command has
the responsibility to coordinate capabilities of the regional
commanders to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). What do you see
as the technology challenges to the commanders and what should be the
development priorities?
General Chilton. Detection of Chemical and Biological Agents, and
Nuclear Fissile material at standoff ranges is one of the greatest
technological challenges to combating the proliferation of WMD. It is
vitally important to increase detection ranges of WMD beyond the
current passive detection capability in order to locate and challenge
the movement of WMD before it reaches our shores.

21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, how does Strategic
Command participate in developing research priorities?
General Chilton. One of my responsibilities is development of
requirements for CWMD on behalf of the Combatant Commanders. These
requirements provide a foundation for Services and Combatant Support
Agencies to focus research efforts and development of state-of-the-art
technologies. As advocate for CWMD capabilities, we closely monitor the
progress and military utility of this research to adjust priorities as
needed. We focus efforts in documents such as the draft Joint
Capabilities Document (JCD), our Integrated Priorities List (IPL) and
the Counterproliferation Review Committee Report to Congress. We then
advocate through various technology development forums such as
exercises and experiments, Science and Technology Symposia and the
Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) process, and finally
through oversight groups such as the Science Advisory Board and the
Strategic Advisory Group.

defense science board recommendations
22. Senator Bill Nelson. Major General Webber, the Defense Science
Board (DSB) recommendations dealing with the Minot weapons transfer
incident took the organizational structure of the Air Force to task.
The DSB recommended that a single technical organization be created,
headed by a major general who reports directly to the Air Force Chief
of Staff, ``that has full responsibility and accountability with the
Air Force for, and only for, nuclear systems and procedures.'' What is
the status of this recommendation?
General Webber. The Air Force continues to take its nuclear
responsibilities seriously. With creation of the Air Force Nuclear
Weapons Center (AFNWC) at Kirtland AFB in 2006, the Air Force
consolidated most nuclear weapons responsibilities in a single
technical organization under the command of an Air Force Colonel
reporting directly to the Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command.
The AFNWC assumed further nuclear responsibilities when it incorporated
the former Air Force Nuclear Weapons and Counterproliferation Agency in
2007. To address concerns of the Defense Science Board the Air Force
has appointed a Brigadier General to command the AFNWC.
The AFNWC includes the 377th Air Base Wing, Kirtland AFB, NM and
the 498th Armament Systems Wing. The 498th Armament Systems Wing
includes the 896th and 898th Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS), the
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC) Cruise Missile Product
Group, and the 498th Nuclear Systems Support Group, Kirtland AFB, NM.
The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) System Program Office
(SPO) is scheduled to move into the AFNWC on 1 July 2008. When this
occurs the AFNWC will encompass, in a single technical organization,
all functions involved in providing end-to-end stockpile management for
all of the Service's nuclear systems.
In addition to the AFNWC, a new organization was created on the Air
Staff, the Directorate for Nuclear Operations, Plans and Requirements.
The organization is headed by a major general and was created to
support the field commander as well as work operational policy issues
that drive the technical requirements.

23. Senator Bill Nelson. Major General Webber, the DSB recommended
that the ``Commander of Air Combat Command (COMACC) should ensure that
8th Air Force has the full resources, authority, and accountability for
daily B-52 operations--nuclear and conventional.'' What is the status
of this recommendation?
General Webber. COMACC directed his staff to review and rewrite Air
Combat Command Pamphlet 38-158, titled ``Manpower and Organization''.
This new version will clearly state the responsibilities of the Major
Command and 8th Air Force. Headquarters U.S. Air Force is the authority
for decisions on organizational responsibilities and corresponding
resource adjustments. COMACC directed the stand-up of a focused Global
Deterrence Force for B-52 and B-2 operations, dedicated to U.S.
STRATCOM, emphasizing the nuclear mission. Standup is expected this
July.

24. Senator Bill Nelson. Major General Webber, the DSB recommended
that the ``COMACC should direct that the B-52 initial training course
at Barksdale and the B-52 Weapons School course include flight training
in the nuclear mission.'' What is the status of this recommendation?
General Webber. Numerous administrative, academic, procedural, and
technical changes were directed and implemented for the B-52 initial
training course. Further changes are currently in coordination for
formal approval by higher headquarters.
The following specific changes have been implemented:

1. Revised: B-52 Formal Training Unit (FTU) course syllabus
incorporated commission and panel recommendations; revisions
were approved by higher headquarters.
2. Added Event: FTU Day 1, Class 1. FTU commander personally
briefs every B-52 student on the incident to include its
causes, effects, and implications to the Nation's deterrent
capability. This brief also includes results and
recommendations of the panels and commissions.
3. Added Event: FTU Day 1, Class 1. FTU commander personally
teaches every B-52 FTU student the nuclear Personnel
Reliability Program academic training.
4. Added Event: FTU Day 2. Aircrew nuclear discipline
academic class taught personally by the Second Bomb Wing Vice
Commander to every B-52 FTU student.
5. Added Event: FTU simulator training. Added nuclear
simulator mission for every B-52 FTU student.
6. Added Event: FTU flight training. Added nuclear flight for
every B-52 FTU student emphasizing nuclear command and control
procedures, nuclear procedures, and nuclear weapons.
7. Added Event: FTU mission training. Nuclear weapons
academic qualification class (both missile and gravity).
8. Changed: All B-52 FTU instructors must maintain combat
mission ready on all nuclear mission qualifications and
currencies to include nuclear command and control testing,
nuclear weapons qualifications, and nuclear alert
qualifications.

The following proposed changes are in review:

1. Added Event: Communication equipment class.
2. Added Event: Additional nuclear simulator.
3. Added Event: Additional nuclear flight.
4. Added Event: B-52 instructor upgrade syllabus-academic
class on instructing nuclear training, simulator on instructing
nuclear items in the simulator, flight on instructing nuclear
items in the aircraft.

The following specific changes have been made to the U.S. Air Force
Weapons School (USAFWS) syllabus:
Nuclear Weapons Physics Lecture (Course PPP208E) Classroom, 2.5 hours
Presentation of the principles of nuclear weapons physics. The
class will include the history of US nuclear weapons development and
deployment, theory, construction, fuzing and firing, and safety and
security features. Permissive action link (PAL)/coded switch system
(CSS) concepts and operations instructions are also included in this
class.
Nuclear Weapons Theory, Effects and Hazards Lecture (Course PPP210E)
Classroom, 1.5 hours
Discussion of nuclear weapons effects and effects of bomber
aircraft in proximity of a nuclear detonation (NUDET). Discussion will
also include closed cockpit operations and flash blindness equipment,
use and considerations.
B-52 Nuclear Weapons Inventory Lecture (Course SSS400E) Classroom, 2.0
hours
Detailed description and breakdown of all bomber deliverable
nuclear bombs, missiles, and their warheads. The lesson will include
operating procedures, delivery parameters, yields, and options.
B-52 Suspension and Release Avionics System for Nuclear Weapons
Employment Lecture (Course AVS265E) Classroom, 1.0hour
Description, weapons installation, operation, applicability and
limitations of B-52 nuclear weapons-associated suspension and release
equipment.
B-52 Nuclear Weapons Preflight (Course AVS262E) Weapons Storage Area,
2.0 hours
Instruction from Weapons School instructors and munitions personnel
plus students hands-on participation in nuclear weapons preflight. At
the completion of this class, the student will have completed the
requirements for 2nd Bomber Wing `OGRE' and 5th Bomber Wing `NEUTRON'
training.
B-52 Nuclear Operations (WST--4 of 5 in syllabus)
Simulator type: Integrated B-52 WST.
Student/instructor ratio: 2:1 Pilot/Radar Navigator, 1:1 Electronic
Warfare Officer.
Support: None.
Configuration: Mission 575, 12 AGM-129, 8 AGM-
86B, 8 B-61, 8 B-83, 900 chaff, 192
flare, 140k fuel load. Mission duration: 4.0 hours.
Mission description: Instructs students on nuclear operations and
malfunctions on all B-52 deliverable nuclear weapons.
Strategic Attack: Global Deterrence Strike-Nuclear (sortie 5 of 19 in
syllabus)
Aircraft type: 2 B-52H.
Student/instructor ratio: 2:1 Pilot/Radar Navigator, 1:1 Electronic
Warfare Officer.
Support: U-TAC/EC range, 1 EA platform, 2 Red
Air.
Configuration: Beyond Line Of Sight data link, Electronic
Countermeasures Improvement, USAFWS Electronic Countermeasures tapes,
220k fuel load. Mission duration: 8.0 hours.
Integration: Red Air requirement may be filled by USAFWS.
Mission description: Instructs students how to employ AGM-86B, AGM-
129, B-61, and B-83 nuclear weapons in a nuclear global deterrence
strike requiring threat defense and package integration against both
air- and ground-based threat systems. This mission emphasizes advanced
planning and employment aspects of nuclear weapons in a simulated
combat environment drawing from academics and student experience.
The B-52 Pilot, Navigator, and Electronic Warfare Officer Initial
Qualification syllabi were rewritten to include nuclear employment
training in addition to the integrated nuclear training simulator
mission from previous syllabi. The FTU and contracted instructors
started Class 08-03 under the new, nuclear added, syllabus 20 Feb 2008.
The B-52 Weapons School Course was approved for implementation in
December 2007. All syllabi listed below were rewritten, staffed and
approved by Air Combat Command operations (A3) on the listed dates.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRACK--NBR TITLE APPROVED--DATE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
B52.03............................ B-52 Aircraft 15 Jan 08
Commander Upgrade
Course.
B52.04............................ B-52 NAVIGATOR AND 08 Jan 08
RADAR NAVIGATOR
BASIC COURSE.
B52.05............................ B-52 ELECTRONIC 09 Jan 08
WARFARE OFFICER
BASIC COURSE.
B52.12............................ B-52 Pilot and 08 Jan 08
Aircraft Commander
Basic Course.
B52.13............................ B-52 RADAR NAVIGATOR 09 Jan 08
UPGRADE COURSE.
WS.11............................. USAF WEAPONS 19 Dec 07
INSTRUCTOR COURSE
(WIC), B-52.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

25. Senator Bill Nelson. Major General Webber, the focus of the DSB
report was on the general organization of the Air Force and the B-52.
Have you or General Darnell, your boss, looked at the training,
organization, and structure of the B-2 force to ensure that the same
weaknesses do not exist there?
General Webber. Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB) and the B-2
enterprise from its inception considered the nuclear mission as the
cornerstone of its training program. Beginning in Initial Qualification
Training and continuing through all formal syllabi including B-2
Weapons School, the nuclear mission is emphasized and competency must
be established before completion. The B-2 flight training tasking
message also emphasizes the nuclear mission and ensures each crewmember
maintains the highest level of competency.
Due to the unique requirements of operating with a small aircraft
fleet size, the B-2 was forced to optimize for the nuclear mission at
its inception. Every squadron including the Weapon School and
Operational Test are located at Whiteman AFB. The two front-line Bomb
Squadrons own all the aircraft and are properly manned for their
nuclear mission requirements.
The results of the limited nuclear surety inspection in the fall of
2007 and the recent nuclear surety inspection (NSI) this June both
support the argument that an effective organization and training
concept of nuclear operations currently exists at Whiteman AFB. In
fact, the recent June NSI was characterized by the Inspector General as
``one of the strongest NSIs on record.''

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:46 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Levin,
Pryor, Inhofe, and Sessions.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
Minority staff member present: Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple
and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon
Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant
to Senator Pryor; and Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator
Sessions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN

Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon.
Mr. Young. Good afternoon.
Senator Bill Nelson. Each of your written statements will
be put in the record, and Senator Sessions and I are dispensing
with our opening statements so we can get right to the
questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces meets today to consider the
ballistic missile defense programs of the Department of Defense, and
the missile defense budget request for fiscal year 2009.
Today, I want to express my deep concern that the ballistic missile
defense program is out of balance. With an annual budget of over $9
billion, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is simply not placing
sufficient priority on near-term missile defense capabilities needed
now by our regional combatant commanders to defend our forward-deployed
forces, allies, and friends against existing short- and medium-range
missiles.
This should be our very first missile defense priority. North Korea
and Iran, to name just two nations, have many hundreds of such missiles
today, and our combatant commanders do not have the capability to
defend their forces, let alone other nations in their regions. This is
not a hypothetical problem; these are real missiles that can reach our
troops today. But the MDA has not planned or budgeted sufficient funds
to provide the defensive capabilities we need, and MDA ought to know
it.
Since 2006, the military has conducted a series of analyses called
the Joint Capabilities Mix Study that looked at what our upper tier
missile defense capabilities and needs were for our regional commands.
Specifically, they were looking at the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
system and its Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
Last year this subcommittee was told that the Joint Capabilities
Mix Study concluded that our military would need about twice as many
SM-3 and THAAD interceptors as the MDA was planning to buy. It turns
out that is the minimum level that we need. So, did the Department of
Defense increase the number of interceptors it planned to buy? No.
Instead, it submitted a budget request for fiscal year 2009 that
would delay THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4 by a year, and cause a production
break of 18 months. It still plans to buy only 96 THAAD missiles and
147 SM-3 interceptors. That is simply not enough to do the job.
By comparison, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). which is a little
smaller than the State of Maine, wants to buy 144 THAAD missiles from
us, which would be 50 percent more than the Defense Department is
currently planning to buy for our own military. The UAE would have
twice as many THAAD interceptors per Fire Unit as our own military will
have.
The MDA could easily plan for and buy many more of these systems
for our own military, and could produce them at more economical rates,
which would bring down the cost per missile and provide the capability
sooner. But instead of making this investment, the MDA has been
spending billions of dollars on far-term research and development
programs that will not provide any operational capability for another
decade.
One example of this misplaced spending is the Airborne Laser (ABL)
technology demonstration program. The original estimate for the ABL
program in 1996 was that it would cost $1 billion and take until 2001
to complete the demonstration. Instead, it has had a 500 percent cost
increase, to $5 billion, and will not be completed until 2009 at the
earliest, a delay of 8 years. This system, if it could be made to work,
would not provide an operational capability for another decade. Given
its many inherent problems, we don't know if it can be made to work, or
whether it will be affordable, or survivable.
Last year, MDA asked for more than $500 million for ABL. Think of
the real, near-term SM-3 and THAAD capability we could buy with half a
billion dollars. Think of the defensive capability we could provide for
our forward-based forces, and allies and friends who are within range
today of hundreds of short- and medium-range missiles.
I believe the MDA should commit to fielding sufficient SM-3 and
THAAD systems to meet the operational needs of our combatant commanders
in a timely fashion. That means putting more money into these near-term
systems, and less money into the far-term, high-risk systems that won't
provide capability for another 10 years. I hope we can finally start
making some progress on this front. We owe our military forces no less.
We have a number of other issues to consider at this hearing,
including the fact that the Department of Defense failed to comply with
a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008. That law requires that, if the Department requests any long lead
items for additional SM-3 interceptors or for THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4
in fiscal year 2009, it should request procurement funds, rather than
research and development funds, for those systems. However, the
Department did not comply with the law. Instead, it requested research
and development funds for buying long lead items for additional SM-3
missiles. That is unacceptable; the Department should comply with the
law.
These are just two of the important issues we will discuss at
today's hearing. I appreciate the witnesses appearing before the
subcommittee, and I look forward to their testimony.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
Mr. Chairman, I join with you in welcoming all our distinguished
witnesses to this hearing on our missile defense programs. I note that
while this is Secretary Young's first appearance before the
subcommittee, it is most likely to be General Obering's last, as he has
announced plans to retire by the end of the year.
May I just say, at the outset, that we owe a huge debt of gratitude
to General Obering for having provided this Nation, our forces, and our
allies a measure of protection against the ballistic missile threat.
Indeed, before 2004, we had no missile defense capabilities, except for
the Army's short-range Patriot system. Today, we have at the ready some
two-dozen ground-based interceptors to protect our Homeland against
long-range ballistic missiles, and a similar number of sea-based
interceptors loaded on naval vessels capable of defending against
short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats far from our shores.
General Obering, you and the men and women of the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) should be proud of your accomplishments. As you prepare
for your retirement, you should take comfort in the knowledge that your
performance in this last duty assignment brings much credit to an
already distinguished military career. You will be sorely missed.
Secretary Young, it is good to have you here. Your views concerning
Department oversight of the missile defense program are eagerly
awaited. As is generally known, the MDA has been granted tremendous
flexibility and freedom from the normal acquisition process.
This new acquisition approach was necessary to enable the
Department to field missile defense capabilities in time to address the
threat. Indeed, it has! I would be interested to learn from you whether
this might not serve as a model for future acquisition programs.
General Campbell, as U.S. Strategic Command's lead for the
integrated missile defense mission, the subcommittee will be interested
to learn how well our missile defense programs are serving the needs of
the warfighter. Important questions we would like you to address
include: Are we fielding missile defense capabilities in numbers
sufficient to pace the threat? Are we paying enough attention to the
improvement of current capabilities to stay ahead of future threats?
Where do we stand with respect to the transition of missile defense
forces from MDA to the Services?
Dr. McQueary, it is good to have you again before this panel. As
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, we look forward to
your assessment of MDA's Integrated Test Plan, and on the operational
effectiveness of our current missile defense systems. It would appear
that your testimony is very similar to last year, in that while you
asses the current missile defense systems to be capable of providing
protection against the threats for which they are designed, additional
operationally realistic testing is necessary to raise the level of
confidence in that assessment.
Finally, Mr. Francis, we look forward to hearing the Government
Accountability Office's recent recommendations with respect to the MDA.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses for their service to the
country and look forward to the hearing.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. John J. Young, Jr.
Good afternoon Senator Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the fiscal year 2009 Department of Defense Ballistic Missile
Defense Program and budget submission. I am pleased to update you on
key issues facing the missile defense program and look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
The Defense Department has made great progress on missile defense
since the President in 2002 made the deployment of an initial defensive
capability a national priority. Indeed, within 18 months of the
President's direction, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) fielded our
Nation's first long-range hit-to-kill ballistic missile defense
capability.
Moving with such urgency has required the MDA to operate with some
flexibility in managing the Agency's portfolio of programs. The MDA has
already fielded a limited capability to defeat a limited ballistic
missile threat from rogue nations. I believe it is vital to the
security of our Nation that we continue work to close system
performance gaps and develop new technology to keep pace with the
threat.
To close these gaps, the MDA will need to continue to use spiral-
development and capability-based acquisition, allowing it to exploit
technological opportunities and place greater capability in the
warfighters' hands.
Capability-based acquisition permits early deployment of limited
capabilities that can be enhanced over time. This approach also allows
requirements and standards to be added as we understand their impact on
cost, schedule, and performance. This approach can help the program
remain relevant to the threat and technologically current while at the
same time providing maximum industry design trade space to deliver
militarily useful, best-value capability. The primary goal is to add
capabilities with demonstrated military utility, rather than to meet
rigid requirements typically defined several years before any
capability can be fielded.
Capability-based acquisition hinges on knowledge-based,
decisionmaking. To reduce risk and ensure program stability, MDA uses
knowledge-point decisionmaking to drive investment decisions. Knowledge
points are tied to the achievement of specific technical or performance
requirements and allow MDA to develop new and advanced capabilities
without having to make a long-term financial commitment. Failure to
meet knowledge points could result in the slowing or even
discontinuation of a program activity.
The Department continues to exercise oversight of the MDA's
development and deployment efforts. The Director of the MDA reports
directly to me on missile defense matters, and we meet periodically to
discuss program issues.
I plan to conduct regularly Program Execution Reviews for all MDA
programs. These reviews will provide me and other senior Department
officials timely and in-depth program execution updates. Among other
things, these reviews will compare actual results against schedule,
budget, and performance goals and baselines, and describe any earned
value cost variances.
In addition, the Department of Defense has established a Missile
Defense Executive Board (MDEB) that makes recommendations to me and the
MDA Director and oversees implementation of the Agency's strategic
policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options. Senior
principals from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, the
Services, the Department's independent test community, the Joint Staff,
and appropriate outside agencies sit on the board, which meets every 2
months to provide oversight and guidance.
One issue currently on the MDEB agenda is the transition and
transfer of Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements once they
reach technical maturity. In 2002 the Department of Defense directed
MDA to focus on developing, testing, and fielding near-term
capabilities; the military departments would be responsible for long-
term procurement and operation and support activities of transferred
BMDS elements. With the successful fielding of BMDS elements in 2004,
the Department looked for ways to facilitate transition and transfer
planning. We developed a master BMDS Transition and Transfer Plan to
document agreements between the MDA and the military departments. My
office updates the Transition and Transfer Plan annually in conjunction
with MDA and the military departments. We have also identified a lead
Service for most BMDS elements.
As the missile defense system has gained technical maturity, it
became clear to me, the Director of the MDA, and other Department
officials that effective transition and transfer planning is the key to
successful operation and support of the BMDS. The MDEB is currently
evaluating proposals to adjust the process in a manner that will
``normalize'' the transition and transfer process and ensure optimal
system operations. The MDEB is also considering a revised BMDS program
planning process which will provide the opportunity for the military
departments and OSD to influence BMDS budget formulation and resource
allocation using all appropriations in a defense-wide account. To
complement this process, we are developing guidelines to specify
military department and MDA responsibilities in preparation for,
during, and after transition and transfer of BMDS elements. The
Department plans to brief this committee in more detail once we have
settled on a new path forward.
I continue to be encouraged by the close interaction among MDA, the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the combatant commanders,
and the Operational Test Agencies within the Services. Together they
have developed an approach to ensure increasingly complex end-to-end
tests of the system. The fact that the Director of the MDA and the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation jointly approve the
Integrated Master Test Plan demonstrates to me the high level of
cooperation between these organizations. Indeed, today you will find
personnel from the Department's independent test community embedded in
the management offices of the missile defense elements.
I believe the close working relationship between MDA and the test
community has also contributed to recent test successes. Last year
alone MDA executed successfully a long-range ground-based intercept,
six SM-3 intercepts of separating and unitary targets, and three
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intercepts of unitary
targets. Each test included elements of operational realism and
demonstrated to the warfighter the capabilities of the BMDS.
While attending to environmental and safety concerns, MDA's future
flight tests will continue to be increasingly realistic in operational
terms. When appropriate to the test objectives and consistent with
MDA's overall test campaign, each test will build on the knowledge
gained from previous tests and add increasingly challenging objectives
with the goal of devising scenarios that test elements of the system
from end to end. This test approach increases knowledge and minimizes
artificiality.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) continues to be actively
engaged in reviewing the Ballistic Missile Defense Program. GAO
conducted eight audits of the missile defense program in fiscal year
2007. To further increase transparency, beginning in fiscal year 2008,
MDA agreed to provide GAO with quarterly summaries that include
integrated baseline review schedules (most recent and projected),
percent complete, 6 month cost performance index, fiscal year cost
variance, and cumulative cost variance. This information will be
summarized annually in the BMDS Selected Acquisition Report for
Congress.
Like many members of this committee, I believe we need to field
additional ballistic missile defense assets in the near-term. System
elements like Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the THAAD could
provide our combatant commanders as well as our friends and allies a
significant defensive capability in just a few years. I am working with
General Obering to achieve this goal through the Department's
programming and budgeting process.
At the same time, we must keep pace with the threat by equipping
the warfighters with advanced BMDS capabilities. In the near future, we
will require advanced discrimination, persistent sensor coverage,
maneuverable interceptors, multiple volume capability, and a robust
inventory. I believe that keeping pace with the threat while continuing
to deliver effective capabilities requires an approach that balances
near-term fielding and far-term development.
The President's budget for fiscal year 2009 reflects the priorities
set by the President and was developed by the Secretary of Defense and
his most senior military and civilian advisors. The budget emphasizes
the need to prepare for an uncertain and unpredictable future. We must
maximize our capabilities gained from our limited defense dollars.
Toward that goal, the Department is requesting $10.4 billion in
fiscal year 2009 for continued development of a multi-layered system to
protect the United States, its forces, and its allies from ballistic
missile attack. $9.3 billion of that request supports the work of the
MDA. The budgeted funds will pay the cost of fielding near-term missile
assets, operating and sustaining these assets, and conducting a missile
defense test program. A robust research and development program is also
needed to keep pace with the advancing threat.
I note that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 required the Department of Defense to transition from research,
development, test, and evaluation-only budget requests for ballistic
missile defense activities to requests with appropriate amounts in each
appropriations title. For the fiscal year 2009 President's budget
submission, the Department identified the operations and sustainment
costs for each BMDS element and requested military construction funds
for the European Site, the European Midcourse Radar and one forward-
based radar. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget did not include
procurement funding for specified BMDS elements, but the Department
will review this issue in preparation of the fiscal year 2010
President's budget.
We are grateful for the support of Congress, which has helped make
fielding missile defense a reality. As we increase the effectiveness
and reliability of the system, congressional approval of the
President's request for missile defense funding will be essential.
Cooperation between the Department and Congress on missile defense
issues is one of the main reasons this program has been so successful
over the last several years. I look forward to continuing that
cooperation.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee.
I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, USAF, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

[The prepared statement of General Obering follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, distinguished
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss
the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 2009 Missile Defense Program
and budget. As Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), I have the
privilege of leading an outstanding group of men and women who are
working hard every day to develop, test, and field an integrated,
layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to defend the United
States, our deployed forces, and our allies and friends against
ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of their flight. I want
to thank this committee for the support we have received for this
critical defense program.
We are requesting $9.3 billion in fiscal year 2009 for missile
defense. Roughly 75 percent of this request, or $7 billion, will be
allocated to the near-term development and fielding of missile defense
capabilities. Of this amount, $715 million is for sustaining the
capabilities we already have in the field today. I also want to
highlight that, as has been the pattern for several years now, we will
be spending about $2 billion of the funding in fiscal year 2009 (more
than 20 percent of the missile defense budget) on test activities.
The BMDS is daily becoming more integrated, robust, and global. The
BMDS already includes fielded assets operated by Air Force, Army, and
Navy units under the integrated control of combatant commanders. Our
current, limited homeland defense against long-range ballistic missiles
will soon be bolstered by additional interceptors in Alaska and the
upgrade of an existing radar in Greenland to protect against enemy
launches from the Middle East.
The defense of deployed forces, allies, and friends against short-
to medium-range ballistic missiles in one region/theater will be
buttressed by additional Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors, more
Aegis BMD engagement-capable warships, 2 Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) fire units, and up to 100 modified sea-based terminal
interceptors. Tying these assets together will be a global command,
control, battle management and communications capability.
Recent flight tests are confirming technological progress and
operational effectiveness for short-, medium-, and long-range defensive
capabilities. Since February 2007, MDA and the military Services have
executed a successful long-range ground-based intercept, six sea-based
intercepts of separating and unitary targets, and two THAAD intercepts
of unitary targets. In the near future, MDA's capability development
program is expected to yield enhanced capabilities to discriminate
between enemy warheads and countermeasures and options for ``multiple
kill'' capabilities to meet future challenges.
To demonstrate the long-range BMDS capability, for example, we
conducted an integrated flight test last September involving a
realistic target launched from Alaska and tracked by the operational
upgraded early warning radar in northern California. An Aegis ship and
the sea-based X-band (SBX) radar in the North Pacific tracked the
target as well. The target was successfully destroyed by a Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) launched from an operationally configured silo in
central California. The data needed to calculate a fire control
solution for the interceptor was provided by the operational system and
the operational command and control, battle management and
communications system was employed by the warfighting commanders.
Overall, this single test included numerous components separated by
thousands of miles and managed by four executing organizations within
the MDA.
As missile defense capabilities expand worldwide, international
cooperation with allies and friends is dramatically increasing.
Assuming we obtain agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic and
obtain congressional approval to proceed, MDA intends to begin site
construction for additional long-range interceptors and a fixed-site
radar in Europe to defend allies and deployed forces in Europe and
expand the U.S. Homeland defense against limited Iranian long-range
threats. Also, we have undertaken substantive cooperative efforts with
European, Middle Eastern, and Asian nations. With the purchase of Aegis
BMD and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 assets, and with our fielding of
a transportable X-band radar at Shariki, Japan, is in the process of
fielding a multilayered system interoperable with the U.S. system.
Further, with MDA's support, the Department of Defense participated
with Israel to develop an Israeli missile defense architecture that can
meet threats expected in the next decade. We also held meetings with
senior Russian officials and technical experts to discuss both threat
perceptions and missile defense cooperation, including the potential
for partnering with Russia in a joint regional architecture.
Mr. Chairman, one last point before I continue. In February the
Department of Defense called on our country's missile defenses to
destroy a large tank of toxic fuel onboard an out-of-control U.S.
satellite about to reenter the Earth's atmosphere. The uncertainty of
when and where the satellite would reenter, and the near certainty that
the fuel tank would survive reentry and possibly break up on Earth,
drove the urgency of this mission. Using an extensively modified SM-3
interceptor and a modified Aegis Weapon System onboard the U.S.S. Lake
Erie, the Navy successfully destroyed the tank. The Department
undertook this operation, carefully choosing an intercept altitude that
would not add to the debris currently in orbit, to protect against the
possible risk to life that a natural reentry of the satellite could
have posed. After engagement, the toxic hydrazine dissipated in space,
and, by now, most of the debris from the satellite body has burned up
in the Earth's atmosphere.
This was a very successful joint mission involving the Navy, U.S.
Strategic Command, the MDA, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the National Reconnaissance Office, and other national
security offices. MDA engineers worked closely with the Navy to modify
the interceptor and the Aegis weapon system for this one-time
engagement. This was a case where the missile defense system was
unexpectedly pushed into service and performed exceptionally well.
While this stands as an example of what the Nation received for its
investment in missile defense, I want to be clear that it does not
represent an operational anti-satellite capability. The time and level
of technical expertise it took to plan and orchestrate this mission,
the split-second fragility of the once-per-day shot opportunities, and
the relatively low altitude of the satellite's decaying orbit did not
approach the responsive and robust capability that would be needed to
attack enemy space assets in wartime.
threat update
To lay the foundation for our budget request, let me review why
missile defense is so critically needed. There remains intense interest
in several foreign countries to develop ballistic missile capabilities.
In fact, there were over 120 foreign ballistic missile launches in
2007, significantly exceeding what we observed in previous years. This
comes on the heels of a very active 2006, during which time both North
Korea and Iran demonstrated an ability to orchestrate campaigns
involving multiple and simultaneous launches using missiles of
different ranges. Currently, North Korea has hundreds of deployable
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and is developing a new
intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new short-range, solid-
propellant ballistic missile, which it test-launched in June 2007. Iran
has the largest force of ballistic missiles in the Middle East (several
hundred short- and medium-range ballistic missiles), and its highly
publicized missile exercise training has enabled Iranian ballistic
missile forces to hone wartime skills and new tactics.
North Korea's ballistic missile development and export activities
remain especially troubling. Pyongyang continues to press forward with
the development of a nuclear-capable ICBM. While the firing of the
Taepo Dong 2 in July 2006, launched together with six shorter-range
ballistic missiles, failed shortly after launch, North Korean engineers
probably learned enough to make modifications, not only to its long-
range ballistic missiles, but also to its shorter-range systems. North
Korea's advances in missile system development, particularly its
development of new, solid fuel intermediate-range and short-range
ballistic missiles, could allow it to deploy a more accurate, mobile,
and responsive force. North Korea's nuclear weapons program makes these
advances even more troubling to our allies and the commanders of our
forces in that region.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Oral Statement by the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment Hearing, 5 Feb 2008
http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/Statement29.pdf; Current
and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,
Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, U.S. Army Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services
Committee, 27 February 2007 http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/
Testimonies/statement28.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to its uranium enrichment activity, Iran continues to
pursue newer and longer-range missile systems and advanced warhead
designs. Iran is developing an extended-range version of the Shahab-3
that could strike our allies and friends in the Middle East and Europe
as well as our deployed forces. It is developing a new Ashura medium-
range ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel and U.S. bases in
Eastern Europe.\2\ Iranian public statements also indicate that its
solid-propellant technology is maturing; with its significantly faster
launch sequence, this new missile is an improvement over the liquid-
fuel Shahab-3.\3\ Iran has reportedly bought a new intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) under development by North Korea; \4\ this
underscores the urgent need to work with our allies in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to field and integrate long-range
missile defenses in Europe. Moreover, Iran's development of a space
launch vehicle using technologies and designs from its ballistic
missiles means Iran could have an ICBM capable of reaching the United
States by 2015.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Statement of Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 5 February
2008.
\3\ Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31
December 2005, Central Intelligence Agency, http://dni.gov/reports/CDA
percent2011-14-2006.pdf .
\4\ Statement of Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 5 February
2008.
\5\ Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United
States, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency Statement For the Record Senate Armed Services
Committee, 17 March 2005 http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/
statement17.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syria is working to improve its ballistic missile capabilities and
production infrastructure. Today Syria is capable of striking targets
in Israel and Turkey, our southern NATO partner, using rockets and
ballistic missiles. Syria can produce longer-range Scud variant
missiles using considerable foreign assistance from countries such as
North Korea and Iran.\6\ So our vigilance must extend well out into the
future, when the threats we face today have grown and new threats may
have emerged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31
December 2005, Central Intelligence Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
new missile defense program structure
We have established a new block structure to organize our program
of work and present our budget. The Agency has made this change to
address concerns about transparency, accountability, and oversight and
to better communicate to Congress and other key stakeholders. The new
approach has several key tenets:

Blocks will be based on fielded missile defense
capabilities that address particular threats and represent a
discrete program of work--not on biennial time periods.
When MDA believes a firm commitment can be made to
Congress, the Agency will establish schedule, budget, and
performance baselines for a block. Block schedule, budget, and
performance variances will be reported.
Once baselines are defined, work cannot be moved from
one block to another.

Based on the above tenets, MDA has currently defined five blocks
(see figure 1). Blocks 1.0, 3.0, and 4.0 deliver capabilities for long-
range defenses, while Blocks 2.0 and 5.0 deliver capabilities to
address the short- and medium/intermediate-range threats.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Future blocks (Block 6.0, etc.) will be added when significant new
capabilities are expected to be fielded based on technological
maturity, affordability, and need. For example, a new Block 6.0 might
include enhanced defense of the United States against complex
countermeasures, drawing on volume kill capabilities from the multiple
kill vehicle (MKV) program, improved discrimination capabilities on our
integrated sensor, command and fire control network as well as upgraded
hardware and software on our weapon systems.
MDA's budget is organized through the period of the Future Years
Defense Program based on the new block structure. Also, program funding
that does not fit into Blocks 1.0 through 5.0 is assigned to four
general categories:

Capability Development--technologies such as the
Airborne Laser (ABL), MKV, Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI),
Far-Term Sea Based Terminal, Project Hercules, and the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), which address future
challenges and uncertainties
Sustainment--operations and support of weapon systems,
sensors, and command and fire control components
Mission Area Investment--activities that support
multiple efforts and cannot be reasonably assigned to a
specific block or capability development program (e.g.,
intelligence and security; modeling and simulation; systems
engineering and testing cores; safety, and mission assurance)
MDA Operations--activities that support the Agency,
such as Management Headquarters and Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC)
highlights of budget submission for fiscal year 2009
Our priorities in the fiscal year 2009 budget submission include
near-term development, fielding, integration, and sustainment of Blocks
1.0 through 5.0; increasingly robust testing; and a knowledge-based
Capability Development program.
Block 1.0
We are nearing completion of the work in Block 1.0. We are
requesting $59 million for fiscal year 2009, mostly to conduct
additional system ground and flight tests to support a final Block 1.0
capability declaration.
This past year we saw an unprecedented pace of fielding of an
integrated missile defense capability, much of it related to Block 1.0.
In 2007 we emplaced 10 additional GBIs, for a total of 24 interceptors
in missile fields at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
CA. In 2008 we plan to increase interceptor inventories up to a total
of 30 at the 2 sites. By the end of 2008, we will complete work
installing the Long-Range Surveillance and Track (LRS&T) capability on
18 Aegis BMD ships. These ships will contribute to long-range defense
by passing early detection, cueing, and tracking data across
communications lines into BMDS communication and battle manager nodes
located at Fort Greely and in Colorado Springs.
This past year we transitioned the transportable forward-based X-
band radar at Shariki Air Base, Japan, from the interim site to a
permanent location. This radar provides precise early detection and
tracking to increase the probability we will destroy any lethal target
launched by North Korea. The SBX completed crew training and testing
off the coast of Hawaii and transited to the North Pacific to conduct a
cold weather shakedown off Adak, AK, where it will be homeported in
2009. The SBX participated in system flight tests this past year,
including the September 28 long-range intercept test and the December
17 engagement of a medium-range separating target at sea by our ally,
Japan. This summer the radar will again participate in a long-range
intercept test.
In 2007 we completed the fielding of Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications (C2BMC) infrastructure to improve our
ability to operate with Japan and receive direct feed from the Space-
based Infrared System. We moved communications equipment and shelters
to support the forward based X-band radar at Shariki and installed a
second server suite at U.S. Pacific Command. We also began fielding
enhanced C2BMC displays and improvements to our communications
capabilities. The Parallel Staging Network we installed at U.S.
Strategic, Northern, and Pacific Commands as part of the Concurrent
Test, Training, and Operations (CTTO) capability, will be completed
this year. Without impeding the operational readiness of the system,
CTTO allows the warfighter to conduct training and the MDA to continue
with spiral upgrades, testing, and development.
By 2009 we plan to install additional planning and situational
awareness capabilities to facilitate executive decisionmaking in the
European Command. C2BMC capabilities also provide our senior government
leadership situational awareness of hostile ballistic missile
activities and updates on the performance of the BMDS.
Block 2.0
Since 2002 we have expanded and improved terminal and midcourse
defenses to defeat short- and medium-range threats from land and sea.
We are requesting about $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2009 for Block 2.0
fielding, development, and integration. This block represents the
foundation of the capabilities required to protect forces we deploy
abroad and our allies and friends, initially in a single region or
theater of combat.
We began fielding SM-3 interceptors in 2004. Block 2.0 comprises 71
SM-3 Block I and IA interceptors (we will have 38 in inventory by the
end of 2008). To date, we have converted 12 Aegis BMD LRS&T ships to
engagement-capable ships. By year's end, we will have 18 Aegis BMD
ships--15 destroyers and 3 cruisers--all of which will have
surveillance and track as well as engagement capabilities. For the past
3 years, the Navy and MDA have collaborated on plans for a Sea-Based
Terminal defensive layer. We are upgrading the Aegis BMD weapon system,
and the Navy is upgrading the SM-2 Block IV missile, the goal being to
deploy up to 100 interceptors to provide a near-term terminal
engagement capability on 18 Aegis BMD ships beginning in 2009.
We are working closely with the Army to begin developing and
fielding by 2009 two THAAD fire units, with the plan to deliver them by
2010 and 2011. THAAD is uniquely designed to intercept targets both
inside and outside the Earth's atmosphere. Consisting of 48
interceptors and the associated radars and C2BMC, THAAD will provide
transportable terminal protection from short- to medium-range ballistic
missiles for our troops and our allies.
Block 3.0
We are requesting about $1.7 billion for fiscal year 2009 to expand
the defense of the United States to include limited Iranian long-range
threats. Block 3.0 builds on the foundation established by Block 1.0.
Block 3.0 provides 14 additional GBIs above what we plan to deploy by
2008, along with 2 key radars needed for protection of the United
States--the upgraded early warning radars at Fylingdales in the United
Kingdom and at Thule in Greenland.
This past year we completed operational testing of the Royal Air
Force Fylingdales radar and made the radar available to the warfighter
for emergency situations. In 2007 we began upgrades to the Thule radar
and will continue to integrate it into the system by 2009. Together
with the early warning radars in California, Alaska, and the United
Kingdom, the Thule radar will ensure coverage of the United States
against threats from the Middle East. In the Pacific theater, we will
continue to enhance additional forward-based X-band radar capabilities
in Japan and at other operating locations to meet warfighter needs.
Block 3.0 also provides capabilities to defeat more sophisticated
midcourse countermeasures. We are pursuing two parallel and
complimentary approaches to counter complex countermeasures: first,
more sophisticated sensors and algorithms to discriminate the threat
reentry vehicle in the presence of countermeasures; and second, a
multiple kill capability to intercept the objects identified by the
discrimination systems as potential threat reentry vehicles. Block 3.0
will focus on the first of these approaches. It includes upgrades to
the GBIs, sensors, and the C2BMC system. The full implementation of
this approach will be conducted in phases, with the first phase
referred to as ``Near-Term Discrimination'' and the second phase as
``Improved Discrimination and System Track.''
Block 4.0
We are requesting about $720 million for fiscal year 2009 for Block
4.0 fielding, development, and integration. Block 4.0 fields sensors,
interceptors, and the C2BMC infrastructure needed to improve protection
of the United States and, for the first time, extend coverage to all
European NATO allies vulnerable to long-range ballistic missile attack
from Iran. This block focuses on deployment of the midcourse X-band
radar, currently located at the Kwajalein test site, to the Czech
Republic and the establishment of an interceptor field in Poland,
pending agreements with both governments. By devaluing Iran's longer-
range missile force, European missile defenses could help dissuade the
Iranian government from further investing in ballistic missiles and
deter it from using those weapons in a conflict. We believe that the
long-range defense assets we are planning to deploy to Central Europe
offer the most effective capability for defeating this threat.
The European Midcourse Radar would complement sensor assets
deployed in the United Kingdom and Greenland and provide critical
midcourse tracking data on threats launched out of the Middle East. The
radar also would operate synergistically with the planned forward-based
transportable X-band radar, jointly providing early threat detection
and discrimination of the reentry vehicles.
An European Interceptor Site will consist of up to 10 interceptors,
the two-stage configuration of our flight-proven three-stage GBI. A
two-stage interceptor has less burn time than the three-stage version,
which allows it to operate within the shorter engagement timelines
expected. Nearly all of the components used in the two-stage
interceptor are identical to those already tested and fielded in the
three-stage interceptor, which means modifications required to design,
develop, and produce a two-stage variant are minimal. Nor are such
modifications unprecedented. In fact, the first 10 Ground-based
Midcourse Defense integrated flight tests, conducted between January
1997 and December 2002, successfully utilized a two-stage variant of
the three-stage Minuteman missile. As we do with all system elements
and components, we have planned a rigorous qualification, integration,
ground and flight testing program for the two-stage interceptor.
Several countries in southern Europe do not face threats from
Iranian long-range missiles. Yet these same countries are vulnerable to
the shorter-range ballistic missiles currently fielded by Iran and
Syria. Mobile system sensors for Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Patriot are
designed to be augmented by other sensors, like the European Midcourse
Radar, and their interceptors are designed to engage slower short- to
medium-range ballistic missiles systems. Together with other NATO
missile defense assets, these missile defense forces will protect
European countries vulnerable to short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles when integrated into the NATO command and control structure.
Block 5.0
We are requesting $835 million for Block 5.0 for fiscal year 2009.
This block builds on Block 2.0 to expand the defense of allies and
deployed U.S. forces from short- to intermediate-range ballistic
missile threats in two theaters. Block 5.0 will increase the number of
SM-3 and THAAD interceptors and improve the performance of the Aegis
BMD Weapons System and the SM-3 interceptor.
The SM-3 Block IB interceptor, a critical Block 5.0 development
effort, will have major modifications to include a much improved seeker
and a Throttleable Divert and Attitude Control System (TDACS). When
combined with processing upgrades to the Aegis BMD Weapons System, the
more capable Block IB interceptor will more readily distinguish between
threat reentry vehicles and countermeasures. The Block IB expands the
battle space and enables more effective and reliable engagements of
more diverse and longer-range ballistic missiles. This year we look
forward to completing design and testing for the two-color seeker and
TDACS and commencing the element integration of the SM-3 Block IB
missile in 2009.
Block 5.0 includes delivery of 23 SM-3 Block IA interceptors, 53
SM-3 Block IB interceptors, 2 additional THAAD fire units with an
additional 48 interceptors, 1 X-band transportable radar for forward
deployment, and the associated C2BMC support.
Development/Operational Testing
Testing under operationally realistic conditions is an important
part of maturing the BMDS in all five blocks. We have been fielding
test assets in operational configurations in order to conduct
increasingly complex and end-to-end tests of the system. Our testing to
date has given us confidence in the BMDS's basic design, hit-to-kill
effectiveness, and operational capability. While the system is
developmental, it is available today to our leadership to meet real
world threats.
Our flight tests are increasing in operational realism, limited
only by environmental and safety concerns. Each system test builds on
knowledge gained from previous tests and adds increasingly challenging
objectives. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the
Operational Test Agencies, and the warfighting community are very
active in all phases of test planning, execution, and post-test
analysis. Using criteria established by the warfighter and the Agency's
system engineers, all ground and flight tests provide data that we and
the operational test community use to anchor our models and simulations
and verify system functionality and operational effectiveness.
In 2007 we conducted many system ground and flight tests. Our
flight test program for Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, Aegis BMD, and
THAAD confirmed technological progress for short-, medium-, and long-
range defensive capabilities. Last year we executed successfully a
long-range ground-based intercept, six SM-3 intercepts of separating
and unitary targets, and three THAAD intercepts of unitary targets. As
of today, we have demonstrated hit-to-kill in 34 of 42 attempts since
2001. Last year alone we successfully intercepted the targets in 10 of
10 attempts.
After a legacy target failure in May 2007, we successfully
completed Ground-based Midcourse Defense Flight Test-03a on September
28, 2007. In this test, an operationally configured GBI launched from
Vandenberg Air Force Base engaged a threat representative intermediate-
range target fired from Kodiak Island, AK, using sensor information
from the operational upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air Force
Base, CA. Trained crews manning fire control consoles reacted within a
specified window under limited-notice launch conditions. This test
leveraged fielded hardware and fire control software as well as
operational communications, tracking, and reporting paths. The
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle successfully collided with the target near
the predicted point of impact, destroying it. This was our most
operationally realistic, end-to-end test of the long-range defenses to
date. Though they were not official participants of the test, the SBX
and an Aegis BMD ship using its onboard SPY-1 radar also tracked the
target and gathered data for post-test analysis.
We also had enormous success with our integrated ground tests,
which involve the operational long-range defense elements and employ
the actual operational hardware. We test the system end-to-end by
simulating engagements. These ground tests, conducted in a lab
environment and in the field, involve the wider missile defense system
community, to include the National Military Command Center, the
Operational Test Agencies, and U.S. Northern Command. They teach us a
great deal and give us confidence to move forward with our intercept
tests. The most comprehensive to date, these tests demonstrated the
ability of the system to execute multiple, simultaneous engagements
using operational networks and communications and fielded system
elements in different combinations. The warfighter also was able to
evaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures. In 2008 and 2009 we will
continue our integrated ground test campaigns.
We completed five sea-based intercept tests in 2007. In all Aegis
BMD tests, we do not notify the ship's crew of the target launch time,
forcing crew members to react to a dynamic situation. This past year we
successfully used Aegis BMD cruisers and destroyers to engage threat-
representative short-range ballistic missiles and medium-range
separating targets. We conducted a test with the U.S. Navy involving
simultaneous engagements of a short-range ballistic missile and a
hostile air target, demonstrating an ability to engage a ballistic
missile threat as the ship conducts self-defense operations. In
November we simulated a raid attack on an Aegis BMD cruiser using two
short-range ballistic missiles. The cruiser destroyed both targets.
The December 2007 test off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii marked the
first time an allied Navy ship successfully intercepted a ballistic
missile target with the Aegis BMD midcourse engagement capability. The
SM-3 successfully intercepted the medium-range separating target in
space, verifying the engagement capability of the upgraded Japanese
destroyer. It also marked a major milestone in the growing missile
defense cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States.
THAAD completed three intercept flight tests against threat-
representative short-range unitary targets in the atmosphere and in
space. In addition, the THAAD radar and fire control participated in
two Aegis BMD flight tests to demonstrate THAAD-Aegis interoperability.
These initial THAAD intercept tests at the Pacific Missile Range
Facility in Hawaii demonstrated integrated operation of the system,
including radar, launcher, fire control equipment and procedures, and
the ability of the interceptor to detect, track, and destroy the
target. Soldiers of the 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade stationed at
Fort Bliss, TX, operated all THAAD equipment during the tests, which
contributed to operational realism.
In 2007 the MDA conducted 25 major tests and successfully met our
primary test objectives in 18 of 20 flight tests. In doing so, we used
the test ranges available to us today to maximum capacity. These totals
include three Patriot tests, two Arrow tests, and the U.S.-Japan
cooperative test. Our test plans for 2008 and 2009 will continue to use
more complex and realistic scenarios for system-level flight tests and
demonstrate interceptor capabilities against more stressing targets.
In 2008 we are planning two system-level long-range intercept
tests, and two more in 2009, all of which will push the edge of the
envelope in testing complexity. The tests in 2008 will involve targets
launched from Kodiak, AK, and missile defense assets separated by
thousands of miles. We are expanding the number of sensors available to
cue the system and engage targets. In our next long-range test, we will
involve the early warning radar at Beale and the forward-based X-band
radar, temporarily sited at Juneau, AK. This test also will demonstrate
integration of the SBX into the sensor support system. The
intermediate-range target will have countermeasures. Later in 2008
Ground-based Midcourse Defense will attempt to defeat a longer-range
threat-representative target and demonstrate the ability of the SBX to
send tracking and discrimination data through Ground-based Midcourse
Defense Fire Control and Communications to the Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle prior to engagement.
We plan three Aegis BMD intercept tests in 2008 and 2009. In 2008
we will demonstrate an intercept of a unitary, short-range ballistic
missile target in the terminal phase of flight using a SM-2 Block IV
interceptor. Later this year we will conduct the second Japanese
intercept test against a medium-range target warhead. In 2009 we will
conduct an intercept flight test against a medium-range target to
demonstrate an expanded battle space.
The first test of THAAD this year will involve engagement of a
separating target low in the atmosphere. In the fall, we plan to
demonstrate THAAD's salvo-launch capability against a separating
target. In late spring 2009 THAAD will engage a complex separating
target in space. In 2009 we will increase test complexity by
demonstrating THAAD's ability to destroy two separating targets in the
atmosphere.
In addition to our system flight- and ground-test campaigns, the
MDA will continue to participate in Patriot combined developmental/
operational tests as well as Air Force Glory Trip flight tests.
Knowledge-Based Capability Development
The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and systems
means we will face unexpected and more challenging threats in the
future. We are requesting about $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2009 for
capability development work to deliver advanced capabilities that will
help ensure America's BMDS remains effective and reliable and a major
element in our national defense strategy well into this century.
Destroying ballistic missiles in boost phase will deprive the
adversary of opportunities to deploy in midcourse multiple reentry
vehicles, submunitions, and countermeasures, thereby reducing the
number of missiles and reentry vehicles having to be countered by our
midcourse and terminal defenses. Success in the boost phase will
increase the probability we will be successful in defeating an attack
in the other defensive phases. As part of this layered defense
strategy, we are developing the ABL and KEIs.
ABL is being developed to destroy ballistic missiles of all ranges.
In 2007 the ABL program met all of our knowledge point expectations and
cleared the way for the installation of the high-power laser on the
aircraft by the end of 2008. We completed in-flight atmospheric
compensation demonstrations and conducted low power systems integration
testing, successfully demonstrating ABL's ability to detect, track,
target, and engage non-cooperative airborne targets. Next we will
integrate the high power systems and gear up for a series of flight
tests leading to a full demonstration and lethal shoot-down in 2009 of
a threat-representative boosting target.
The KEI program will provide mobile capabilities to intercept
ballistic missiles in the boost, ascent, or midcourse phases of flight.
This multi-platform, multi-payload, rapidly deployable capability could
not only extend the reach of the missile defense system, but it also
will add another defense layer. In 2007 we completed hypersonic wind
tunnel testing of the booster and successfully conducted static firings
of the first- and second-stage motors. This year we are focusing on
preparations for the 2009 flight test of the KEI booster, which, if
successful, will demonstrate we are ready to proceed to intercept
testing and integration into the system.
We are pursuing parallel and complementary efforts to counter
complex countermeasures. Project Hercules is developing a series of
algorithms to exploit physical phenomenology associated with threat
reentry vehicles to counter on-the-horizon advanced threats and
counter-countermeasures for employment in system sensors, kill
vehicles, and C2BMC. The algorithms will improve sensor and weapon
element tracking and discrimination via data integration and multi-
sensor fusion data integration.
In the years ahead we expect our adversaries to have midcourse
countermeasures. The MKV program is developing a payload for
integration on midcourse interceptors to address complex
countermeasures by identifying and destroying all lethal objects in a
cluster using a single interceptor. This past year we delivered the
initial models and simulation framework for testing sophisticated
battle management algorithms and developed the liquid fuel divert and
attitude control system.
Our strategy is to manage all future kill vehicle development under
a single program office and acquire MKV payloads using a parallel path
approach with two payload providers pursuing different technologies and
designs. This strategy will allow us to better leverage industry
experience and talent. The MKV approach leverages commonality and
modularity of kill vehicle components on various land- and sea-based
interceptors, to include KEIs, GBIs, and a Block IIB version of the SM-
3. The goal is to demonstrate a multiple kill capability in 2011
through a series of component development and test events.
We are undertaking significant upgrades to the BMD Signal Processor
in the Aegis BMD weapons system. Through our cooperative program with
Japan, we are upgrading the SM-3 Block I interceptor with the SM-3
Block II to engage longer-range ballistic missiles. This faster
interceptor will feature an advanced kinetic warhead with increased
seeker sensitivity and divert capability. We also will implement
upgrades to the Aegis BMD Weapons System. The first flight test is
scheduled for 2012. The Far-Term Sea-Based Terminal program will expand
upon the near-term capability provided by the SM-2 Block IV blast-
fragmentation interceptor by engaging longer-range threats. This year
and next we will define weapons system requirements as we work toward
initial fielding as early as 2015.
We are developing the STSS to enable worldwide acquisition and
tracking of threat missiles. Sensors on STSS satellites will provide
fire control data for engagements of threat reentry vehicles and, when
combined with radar data, will provide improved threat object
discrimination. In 2008 we will deliver two demonstration satellites
scheduled for launch later in the year and a common ground station. We
plan to use both targets of opportunity and dedicated targets to
demonstrate STSS capabilities from lift-off through midcourse to
reentry. The knowledge gained from these demonstrations will guide our
decisions on the development of a follow-on space sensor constellation.
I believe the performance of the BMDS could be greatly enhanced
someday by an integrated, space-based interceptor layer. Space systems
could provide on-demand, near global access to ballistic missile
threats, minimizing limitations imposed by geography, absence of
strategic warning, and the politics of international basing rights. I
would like to begin concept analysis and preparation for small-scale
experiments. These experiments would provide real data to answer a
number of technical questions and help the leadership make a more
informed decision about adding this capability.
We have had to restructure some development activities and cancel
others as a result of reductions in our fiscal year 2008 budget.
Reductions in funding for the European Site Initiative, STSS, ABL, and
MKV programs will result in some schedule delays. Cuts in the system
engineering work, including modeling and simulations, undermine our
ability to develop and field an integrated system, which requires a
collaborative effort by MDA and our industry partners that cuts across
many disciplines and specialties. The ability to do this cross-cutting
engineering work will become increasingly important as we move, for
example, towards developing common kill vehicles and common
interceptors.
I remain deeply concerned about the future threat environment, and
consequently believe each one of these efforts is critical to
maintaining our defenses in the uncertain years ahead.
setbacks in 2007
With our unprecedented success in 2007 came several setbacks. We
experienced a target failure in our first attempt for FTG-03 as
mentioned earlier. While this was only the second complete target
failure in 42 flight tests, it was a signal that we needed to revamp
our target program, which is underway. We are at a critical juncture in
the target program transitioning from the legacy booster motors to the
more modern Flexible Target Family, and I intend to make this a high
priority in 2008.
In addition, we are investigating a nozzle failure that occurred in
the second static firing of the KEI second stage. While investigation
is underway, we plan to execute the first booster flight in 2009.
We also experienced some cost growth in the THAAD, Aegis, and GMD
programs which is being addressed within the overall missile defense
portfolio. The THAAD cost growth was due to test delays, additional
insensitive munitions testing, and its deployment to the Juniper Cobra
09 exercise in Israel. Aegis cost growth was generated from extended
work on the SM-3 Third Stage Rocket Motor and the Divert and Attitude
Control System. This work also delays the delivery of the Block 1B
interceptors by 1 year. GMD cost growth was due to the modifications
required for the two-stage version, the additional missile field in
Alaska, and repair of the water damage silos.
retaining integrated decision authority
I would now like to turn to a topic very near and dear to me. I
urge the committee to continue its support of the integrated decision
authority that the MDA Director has been given for the missile defense
portfolio. Working with the U.S. Strategic Command Commander, I have
the ability to propose the evolution of the missile defense system
based on all relevant requirements, acquisition, and budget
information. This authority was necessary in light of the President's
2002 directive to begin deployment in 2004 of a set of missile defense
capabilities that would serve as a starting point for improved and
expanded missile defense capabilities later.
I present to you two telling quotes from the 2006 Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) report chartered by the
Department.

``[T]he budget, acquisition, and requirements processes are
not connected organizationally at any level below the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. This induces instability and erodes
accountability. Segregation of requirements, budget and
acquisition processes create barriers to efficient program
execution.''
``Acquisition programs need to deliver timely products. Our
assessment is that the culture of the Department is to strive
initially for the 100 percent solution in the first article
delivered to the field. Further, the ``Conspiracy of Hope''
causes the Department to consistently underestimate what it
would cost to get the 100 percent solution. Therefore, products
take tens of years to deliver and cost far more than originally
estimated.''

Well, the DAPA report could have cited the one place in the Defense
Department below the Deputy Secretary where requirements, acquisition,
and budget authority comes together--the MDA. This authority has given
me the trade space to make a balanced recommendation to the Deputy
Secretary that has paid dividends for defense of our Homeland, deployed
forces, allies, and friends.
MDA has fielded an initial capability consisting of 24 GBIs; 17
Aegis BMD warships capable of long-range surveillance and tracking, of
which 12 are also capable of missile intercepts; 23 Standard Missile-3
interceptors for Aegis BMD warships; 18 SM-2 Block IV interceptors; an
upgraded Cobra Dane radar; 2 upgraded early warning radars; a
transportable X-band radar; a command and control, battle management,
and communications capability, and a SBX. None of this capability
existed as recently as June 2004. This rapid fielding would never have
been possible unless I had the integrated decision authority over
requirements, acquisition, and budget. I think it is fair to say that
this capability would have taken two to three times longer to field
under standard Department practices--if not the ``tens of years'' cited
by DAPA.
Should this integrated decision authority be continued now that we
have successfully met the President's injunction to quickly field an
initial capability where no capability had previously existed? I would
make four key points in favor of retaining this authority.
First, the Director of MDA is in the best position to know the
program's progress and challenges. This does not mean that I make
decisions in a vacuum. We work closely with the Intelligence Community,
the warfighter, and the Services on the threat, capability needs, and
available resources. In addition to the external oversight from your
committee and others in Congress and, of course, the Government
Accountability Office, I also receive significant Department-level
oversight from Under Secretary AT&L, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense Comptroller, and the Missile Defense Executive Board. However,
it does mean that I have a degree of control and trade space that is
not available to the managers of other major defense acquisition
programs.
Second, because the ballistic missile threat is always evolving, we
need to be as agile as possible in getting the latest capabilities to
the warfighter. The integrated requirements, acquisition, and budget
authority granted MDA's Director inevitably enables us to deliver a
capability more quickly to meet the evolving missile threat.
Third, while some see MDA's flexibilities as undeserved special
treatment, others view MDA's integrated decision authority as, in
effect, a ``test lab'' for the Under Secretary of Defense AT&L to
examine alternative, creative approaches to acquiring joint
capabilities.
Fourth, ballistic missile defense is and always will be the
quintessential joint program. No one Service could easily or naturally
take responsibility for developing, testing, integrating, and fielding
the BMDS. The trade space offered me as portfolio manager of the entire
BMD program is considerably wider than it would be if MDA were wedded
to one Service or merely an advocate within the Office of the Secretary
or joint staff who is trying to negotiate with a myriad of individual
program managers protecting their own turf.
On a personal level, I take my stewardship responsibilities very
seriously. I will not be in this position forever, and I know how
vitally important it is to put my successor in the best position to
give the warfighter the capabilities needed to negate the threats to
our Homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. The integrated
decision authority granted me as MDA Director does just that, and I
urge your continued support.
organizational reengineering
MDA's reengineering goal is to transform the organization into a
single, integrated high-performance team capable of sustaining its
development and test successes and maximizing its efficiency and
effectiveness in acquiring, fielding, and supporting an integrated,
operational BMDS. To accomplish this goal, I have established policies
and defined responsibilities for providing qualified matrix support to
the program directors/managers (PD/PM) responsible for delivering BMDS
capabilities to the combatant commanders (COCOMs). Matrixing is an
organizational concept that consolidates skills and resources under a
functional manager who, in turn, allocates persons and resources among
executing organizations needing these skills. Matrixed support includes
such functions as engineering, contracts, business/financial
management, cost estimating, acquisition management, logistics, test,
safety quality and mission assurance, security, administrative
services, information assurance, and international affairs. The matrix
management process aims to strengthen PD/PM capabilities by assuring
their accessibility to all expertise available to MDA; increasing
accountability for quality of functional staff work; and allocating
personnel resources according to the Agency's needs.
MDA has established the following objectives to focus the
reengineering efforts:

Implement a full matrix management construct to
strengthen functional responsibilities at both the BMDS and
element level of program execution;
Establish key new or restructured organizations and
centers to strengthen the implementation of an integrated
system;
Establish key knowledge centers to focus MDA resources
on and within critical mission technical areas; \7\
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\7\ Knowledge centers for Interceptors, C2BMC, and Sensors were
established in January 2008. Centers for Space and Directed Energy will
be established later in 2008.
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Complete an organizational alignment assessment to
improve agency efficiency and effectiveness through elimination
of redundancy of functions and infrastructure, multiple layers
of management and noncritical functions, and a verification
that resources are aligned with MDA priorities; and
Relocate MDA offices from the National Capital Region
(NCR) to Huntsville and selected other locations to realize the
benefits of a centralized control/decentralized execution
strategy, facilitate leveraging all resources available in MDA
and propagate better cross-flow of expertise and information.
base realignment and closure
The 2005 Defense BRAC Commission approved recommendations directing
the realignment of several MDA directorates from the NCR to government
facilities at Fort Belvoir, VA, and the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville,
AL. Specifically, a Headquarters Command Center for MDA will be located
at Fort Belvoir, while most other MDA functions will be realigned to
Redstone Arsenal. The transfer of government and contractor personnel
from the NCR is already in progress; by the end of 2008, we will have
transitioned some 1,100 personnel positions to the Arsenal. Also,
construction will start in fiscal year 2008 on additional facilities to
be opened in two phases in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011.
Construction of the MDA Headquarters Command Center is also scheduled
to begin in late fiscal year 2008, with occupancy in fiscal year 2010.
missile defense agency engineering and support services
Consistent with the Agency's reengineering, MDA has undertaken the
task of improving how it procures contractor support services (CSS).
The objectives of the change are to improve oversight, enable matrix
management so the Agency can benefit more from cross-flow of
information among different offices, enhance efficiency and
transparency, and more accurately account for our cost of doing
business. I have determined that the best path forward is to develop a
new Agency-wide procurement; the designation for this procurement is
Missile Defense Agency Engineering and Support Services (MiDAESS).
We currently receive contractor support through a variety of
different avenues, such as contracts, other government agencies, and
General Services Administration orders. Over the next few years, the
MiDAESS procurement will allow us to consolidate the CSS into a more
efficient procurement, focused on the primary areas of technical,
administrative, financial, and other support that our agency requires.
Beginning in March 2007, we began discussions with our industry
partners regarding MiDAESS. Throughout 2007, MDA has received industry
feedback and continues to refine the details of how competition and
contracting within MiDAESS will function. We plan to begin initial
contract awards under MiDAESS in 2008.
closing
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, in closing, I again
want to thank you for your strong support of our program. Since 2002 we
have achieved dramatic program efficiencies and effectiveness because
we have been able to consolidate missile defense expertise and
integrate all missile defense elements into a single, synergistic
system. We have made tremendous progress deploying missile defenses to
protect our Homeland, our troops deployed and our allies and friends. I
also believe we have the right program in place to address more
advanced threats we may face in the future.
Our investment in missile defense is significant, but our
expenditures would pale in comparison to the overwhelming price this
Nation could pay from a single missile impacting America or one of our
allies. We need your continued support to carry on the tough
engineering and integration task of developing and enhancing worldwide
ballistic missile defenses.
This concludes my statement. I look forward to your questions.

STATEMENT OF LTG KEVIN T. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

[The prepared statement of General Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Kevin T. Campbell, USA
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our military and
for the opportunity to appear again before this panel. As I shared last
year, I do believe that this committee is a strong supporter of the
Army and the missile defense community. This is especially important as
we continue to field missile defense capabilities and to continue
development of future capabilities for the Nation and our allies. Along
with those testifying today, I am an advocate for a strong global
missile defense capability.
The committee is no doubt familiar with my duties and
responsibilities as the Army's senior commander for space and missile
defense as well as my position as the Commander of the Joint Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, a part of the U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In this role, I serve as the joint user
representative working closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
other Services, and combatant commanders to ensure that our national
goals of developing, testing, and deploying an integrated missile
defense system are met in an operationally sound configuration.
Mr. Chairman, please rest assured that America's Army stands on
point to defend our Nation against an intercontinental ballistic
missile attack. Our soldiers continue to be trained and ready to
operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Element of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) at Fort Greely, AK, Vandenburg
Air Force Base, CA, and the 100th GMD Brigade's Missile Defense Element
at Schriever Air Force Base, CO. These soldiers, as part of the joint
team, continue to serve as our Nation's first line of defense against
any launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile toward our shores.
I am proud to represent them along with the other members of the Army
and joint integrated missile defense community.
united states strategic command joint functional component command for
integrated missile defense: planning, integrating, and coordinating
missile defense
The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC-IMD), USSTRATCOM's global missile defense integrating
element, has been operational for 3 years. The JFCC-IMD continues to be
manned by very capable Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
civilian personnel.
USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, continues to aggressively execute
its mission to globally plan, integrate, and coordinate missile defense
operations. Through a deliberate training and exercise program, the
JFCC-IMD has improved our collective ability to defend this Nation.
While the organization is still maturing, JFCC-IMD continues to lead
the Department's transformation toward more robust integrated missile
defense capabilities. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civilians of this joint warfighting organization execute our mission to
plan, integrate, and coordinate global missile defense operations and
support by operationalizing new capabilities from MDA, developing
global missile defense plans in collaboration with the geographical
combatant commanders, and conducting cross-geographical combatant
commander exercises to eliminate seams and gaps in order to maintain a
strong defense against advancing threats. In summary, JFCC-IMD
continues to build operational competence and warfighter confidence in
the execution of our mission.
Continued Ballistic Missile Defense System Progress
This past year has been another year of operational achievement for
integrated missile defense. Since the last time I addressed this
committee, the Global BMDS has gone from test bed operations to a
system configured to support continuous defensive operations. Whether a
test bed with a residual operational capability, or an operational
system that supports research and development activities, it is
understood that our efforts and decisions must be entirely focused
along two lines--operational capability and spiral development of the
BMDS. We balance both fielding of near-term and development of long-
term capabilities to meet the evolving threat to the Homeland. This
balance cannot be achieved without comprehensive dialogue between MDA,
the Services, and the warfighters--dialogue that is ongoing today and
dialogue that must continue in the future.
We are continuing to expand the current ballistic missile defense
operational configuration. This past year, the early warning radar at
Fylingdales Royal Air Force Base was upgraded to perform the missile
defense mission. This radar is a key element of the BMDS for providing
the initial limited defense capabilities to counter the emerging
ballistic missile threat from Southwest Asia. The radar will also
continue to perform its traditional role as an early warning radar. The
addition of this radar marks the beginning of the integration of BMDS
capabilities across five combatant commands to counter simultaneous
ballistic missile threats from two ends of the globe. We expect the
warfighting capability provided by such integration of platforms,
doctrine, and personnel to continue to grow in the coming years to
address emerging threats.
Continued Warfighter Contributions to BMDS Development
As warfighters, we continue to participate in key BMDS tests to
build confidence in the system's capabilities and provide input to
future capabilities. For example, the 100th Missile Defense Brigade
provided a trained and certified crew in support of a successful GMD
flight test on September 28, 2007. Their support started with
participation in pre-mission training conducted in both Huntsville, AL,
and at their GMD Fire Control consoles at the Missile Defense Element
at Schriever Air Force Base, CO. The crew provided critical expertise
that enhanced system performance, assisting the engineers with
validation of pre-mission parameters. These pre-mission events
culminated with the conduct of the flight test, where the crew provided
the Human-In-Control actions necessary for a successful launch and
intercept. The brigade will also support the upcoming GMD flight test.
For this flight test, the AN/TPY-2 Forward Based X-Band and Sea Based
X-band radars will be integrated into the GMD system to validate their
operational utility and to provide data for anchoring our modeling and
simulation efforts.
Since last year's testimony to this committee, we successfully
intercepted ballistic missiles at low and high altitudes; in midcourse
and terminal phases; and in endo- and exoatmospheric environments with
our long-range ground-based interceptor, the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD), and several Aegis Standard Missile-3s. We
supported an international BMD partner with a successful exoatmospheric
intercept from a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Destroyer.
Conducting these system level flight and ground tests required the use
of operational assets, the same assets that would be used to defend
this Nation and our allies against a possible rogue state missile
attack. JFCC-IMD worked closely with the combatant commanders and MDA
to coordinate the availability of these assets to ensure sustained
operational readiness during the conduct of the system level tests.
The JFCC-IMD was able to balance the requirements of both
operations and tests. This period of robust achievements underscored
the warfighter's requirement to expedite development and deployment of
a concurrent testing, training, and operations (CTTO) capability. We
have made strides but we still have a ways to go. CTTO will permit
developers and operators to maintain an operational capability of the
BMDS while simultaneously developing, testing, or training on the
system. Absent a mature CTTO capability, JFCC-IMD aggressively conducts
an asset management process to ensure the highest level of operational
readiness during the conduct of materiel development and tests.
Continued Advancements in System Capability
JFCC-IMD, in partnership with MDA and the Services, has integrated
additional missile defense sensors and shooters to enhance theater and
strategic mission capabilities. We have institutionalized the
Operational Readiness and Acceptance process to deliberately activate
capabilities by baselining the known capabilities and limitations.
Through this process, activation criteria, which are critical to
establishing and maintaining capabilities, are clearly defined to
ensure sustainable means are provided to the warfighter.
We continue to refine our processes to ensure the warfighters'
desired operational capabilities are considered by the materiel
developer. Since I last appeared, the Warfighter Involvement Process
(WIP) has matured significantly. Warfighter inputs and subsequent
changes to the overall BMDS of systems started slowly but are steadily
increasing in effectiveness. After 2 years of operator-generated input,
we are now seeing changes incorporated in the BMDS. More significantly,
capability requests are being reflected in USSTRATCOM's Prioritized
Capability List submissions and in MDA's corresponding Achievable
Capabilities List.
A success story in the WIP is our partnership with MDA, the
Services, and the combatant commanders in the expansion of the BMD
capability into the European theater. In my role as the JFCC-IMD
Commander, I have held discussions with the European Command to build
stronger partnerships with our Allies should our Government conclude
agreements for hosting a midcourse radar and interceptor site in
Europe. If approved, the expansion of the BMDS into Europe will greatly
increase the security of the United States as well as provide a measure
of protection to our forward deployed forces and European allies that
currently does not exist.
Looking forward, we are engaged with the Department to balance the
missile defense portfolio to ensure we are addressing both the threats
of today and tomorrow. With more than 20 countries, several of which
have an adversarial relationship with the United States, now possessing
ballistic missile capability and technology, the threat to the United
States and our allies is growing. The missile defense investment
portfolio must address the warfighter needs for the near-term threats
from these countries while developing new technologies to deter
potential adversaries from their continued investment in ballistic
missile technologies.
Taking Care of our Warfighters
If we receive approval to proceed with a European capability, we
need to ensure we provide quality facilities and services to our
soldiers. If built, the European capability will most certainly be an
enduring mission. The mission support infrastructure (barracks and
morale and welfare facilities) is just as important to mission success
as the hardware the soldiers will operate. We believe that the mission
support facilities ``outside the wire'' are an integral part of the
overall system. The investment in mission support infrastructure
contributes immensely to the overall reliability of the system and the
cost represents a very low percentage of the overall system
construction and fielding cost.
We should continue to work to improve the quality of life at our
missile defense garrison at Fort Greely, AK. Soldiers in the 49th
Missile Defense Battalion of the Alaska Army National Guard continue to
defend the United States from ballistic missile attack from the
remoteness of Fort Greely, AK. They continue to do so in an outstanding
manner, without complaint, in an environment with infrastructure that
does not meet current standards. While the Army is taking proactive
steps to improve the quality of life at Fort Greely, the isolation of
this remote location cannot be overstated. On the positive front, the
Army recently awarded a contract to privatize the family housing at
Fort Greely--soldiers and their families should start to realize
significant housing improvements in the near future. Also, the Army is
currently planning to replace an existing substandard fire station with
one that will provide adequate coverage for Fort Greely's population
and infrastructure. Challenges still remain as there is very limited
support in the local community with respect to medical and dental care,
special education needs, higher education opportunities, restaurant
establishments, and other services that the vast majority of us take
for granted. For example, the nearest medical specialist is over 2
hours away. This is very problematic, especially when one considers the
extreme weather during the winter months. Our soldiers and their
families deserve more--we need to provide the adequate facilities and
the services they need. The Army will continue to address these
challenges to ensure better living conditions are realized for our
soldiers and their families.
Army Infrastructure Contributions
The Army also provides key test range assets for BMDS research and
development. In addition to providing other vital Department
capabilities, these unique facilities continue to serve as key BMDS
enhancers for MDA. The United States Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test
Site (USAKA/RTS) in the Republic of the Marshall Islands has been
instrumental in the development and testing of the GMD system. USAKA/
RTS will continue to serve as a significant test bed for future BMDS
technology development. Also, within the BMDS arena, the High Energy
Laser Systems Test Facility on White Sands Missile Range, NM, is
serving as a key lethality test bed for MDA's Airborne Laser Program.
We ask for your continued support to ensure these vital testing ranges
are postured to perform necessary BMDS testing.
air and missile defense--an overview of the fiscal year 2009 army
budget submission
In addition to deploying the BMDS, MDA, the Services, and the
combatant commanders continue to focus on improving theater air and
missile defense capabilities. GMD and Theater Air and Missile Defense
Systems are vital for the protection of our Homeland, deployed forces,
friends, and allies. Air and missile defense is a key component in
support of the Army's core competency of providing relevant and ready
land power to combatant commanders.
As the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army have previously
testified, the Army is stretched after years of operating at war. To
relieve the stress on the force, the Army is embarking on a path to
restore balance. The Army's plan centers on four imperatives--sustain,
prepare, reset, and transform. As we have seen with other Army combat
capabilities, the requirement for air and missile defense units
continues to grow, stretching the force. Operation Iraqi Freedom
consumes significant quantities of our key missile defense
capabilities, leaving other worldwide commitments underresourced.
Already well underway, the Army has created composite air and
missile defense battalions to transform the Air Defense Artillery into
a more responsive and agile organization. These battalions address
capability gaps, permitting us to defeat cruise missiles and unmanned
aerial vehicles while maintaining our ability to defend critical assets
from the ballistic missile threat. Composite air and missile defense
battalions will capitalize on the synergies of two previously separate
disciplines--short-range air and missile defense and high-to-medium
altitude air and missile defense. Additionally, the Army has pooled air
defense artillery battalions at the theater-level to provide air and
missile defense protection based on the situation and mission
requirements. This pooling concept supports the Army's effort to move
to modular designs that allow force tailoring of units better sized to
meet the combatant commander's needs.
With that as a brief background, let me now focus on the Army's
fiscal year 2009 budget submission for air and missile defense systems.
The recently submitted President's budget includes approximately $2.23
billion with which the Army proposes to execute current Army air and
missile defense responsibilities and focus on future development and
enhancements of both terminal phase and short-range air and missile
defense systems. In short, the Army is continuing major efforts to
improve the ability to provide warning, acquire, track, intercept, and
destroy theater air and missile threats.
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) System of Systems (SoS)
In order to enhance its ability to destroy theater air and missile
threats, the Army is continuing to transform its air and missile
defense force from its traditional system-centric architecture to an
integrated, component-based, IAMD SoS. The Army IAMD SoS Program
provides full, network-centric, plug-and-flight integration of existing
and future air and missile defense systems and enables their full
technical, functional, and procedural integration into the joint IAMD
arena. This modularization of air and missile defense capabilities will
allow Joint Force Commanders to scale and tailor air and missile
defense components functioning interdependently to deliver operational
capabilities not achievable by the individual elements of the system.
Given the diversified air and missile threat set and the limited
resources to address the threat, development of IAMD SoS is the Army's
top air and missile defense priority.
In addition to the IAMD SoS interdependent capabilities, the Army's
air defense community has initiated plans to meet the future challenges
and demands, taking steps to sustain, prepare, reset, and transform our
forces and equipment. These plans entail three main component areas of
the Army's air and missile defense construct--terminal phase ballistic
missile defense, cruise missile defense, and force protection.
Terminal Phase Ballistic Missile Defenses
The Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) capability
is designed to counter theater ballistic missile threats in their
terminal phase in addition to cruise missiles and other air-breathing
threats. Combining these systems with the soon to be deployed THAAD
system brings an unprecedented level of protection against missile
attacks to deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies well into the
future.
Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Overview
Patriot is the world's only battle proven theater AMD system and
will be a key AMD element for the next two decades, providing combatant
commanders with modular, scalable, mission-tailored capabilities to
greatly enhance operational force protection in support of the joint
team. The Patriot is the Nation's only deployed, land-based, short-to-
medium range BMDS capability.
The Army recognized that the Patriot force was heavily stressed and
therefore developed a strategy to Grow-the-Force through a combination
of pure-fleeting the existing Patriot force to PAC-3 capability and
standing up two additional PAC-3 battalions. This strategy will
increase our capacity to handle today's threat and alleviate logistical
and training challenges of maintaining two separate Patriot
configurations. Pure-fleeting of the Patriot force with PAC-3 will
allow for improved capability and higher lethality against the Theater
Ballistic Missile (TBM) and non-TBM threat as well as enable
commonality across all Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities domains in the
Patriot force. Also, the additional two battalions of Patriot PAC-3
capability will meet the growing demands of the combatant commanders to
provide global AMD against the entire threat set. Fiscal year 2007
reprogramming actions and fiscal year 2008 funding initiated this
strategy--funding in the amount of $492.8 million in the fiscal year
2009 budget request will complete these initiatives and continue
Patriot modifications.
Last year, my statement addressed the ongoing Patriot fixes to
operational deficiencies that were deemed necessary as a result of
friendly fire incidents. The Army has taken steps to address lessons
learned and correct the deficiencies. Based on the current fielding
schedule, all Operation Iraqi Freedom fixes will be completed during
fiscal year 2009.
Medium Extended Air Defense System Overview
A top Army priority system for defense against short- and medium-
range tactical ballistic missiles and air breathing threats, the MEADS
will be an integral part of the Army Integrated AMD SOS and capable of
operating within a joint and coalition operational environment. The
system will provide wide-area protection at strategic, operational, and
tactical levels.
MEADS, a cooperative development program with Germany and Italy,
will provide a lighter, more deployable, maneuverable, lethal, network-
centric AMD capability. The program also includes development of the
PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) as the objective tri-national
MEADS missile. The PAC-3 MSE is currently under development and will be
integrated into the MEADS program. The MSE missile will provide a more
agile and lethal interceptor that expands the engagement envelope of
this system. The fiscal year 2009 budget request includes funding for
MSE initial production facilities--production of the MSE is scheduled
to begin in 2010. Fielding of MEADS is scheduled to begin in 2015 and
be completed by 2028. We are confident that this path will provide our
forces, allies, friends, and our Nation with the most capable air and
missile defense system possible.
Terminal High Attitude Area Defense System Overview
The Department of Defense is committed to fielding an advanced
capability to defend against tactical ballistic missiles as soon as
possible. THAAD is designed to provide a layered theater ballistic
missile defense in support of the short- and medium-range ballistic
missile threat. MDA is funding and manufacturing four THAAD batteries
for the Army in an accelerated fielding that will commence in 2009.
THAAD capabilities will begin to transfer to the Army in 2009.
Synchronization between the Army and MDA is crucial in both the
development and funding areas in order to ensure that the transition
delivers a supportable warfighting system.
To fully optimize the performance of the Patriot, MEADS, and THAAD
defense systems, effective personnel training and development is
essential. The United States Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort
Sill, OK, will provide our Nation with the best trained, organized, and
equipped Air Defense Artillery leaders and units in response to current
operational needs and future force warfighting concepts.
Joint Tactical Ground Station
Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) is a transportable
information processing system that receives and processes in-theater,
direct down-linked data from Defense Support Program satellites. JTAGS
provides our commanders with early warning of ballistic missile attack
and essential information to defeat TBMs. The system disseminates
warning, alerting, and cueing information on TBMs, and other tactical
events of interest throughout the theater using existing communications
networks. JTAGS determines the TBM source by identifying missile launch
point and time and provides an estimation of impact point and time.
Since the system is located in-theater, it reduces the possibility of
single-point-failure in long-haul communication systems and is
responsive to the theater commander. JTAGS also fulfills the in-theater
role of USSTRATCOM's Theater Event System (TES). It is imperative that
JTAGS be funded to integrate and evolve to use the next generation of
Space Based Infrared System sensors. This will significantly enhance
warning accuracy and timeliness while improving all aspects of theater
missile defense. We request your continued support of this essential
capability.
Cruise Missile Defense
Our adversaries understand the value of cruise missiles. They are
inherently very difficult targets to detect, engage, and destroy, and
when armed with a weapon of mass destruction warhead, the effects from
a cruise missile are catastrophic. The Army's Cruise Missile Defense
Program is an integral element of the joint cruise missile defense
architecture. We are also working closely with the joint community to
assure development of doctrine that synchronizes our military's full
capabilities against the cruise missile threat. Critical Army
components of the joint cruise missile defense architecture are
provided by the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor System, the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-
to-Air Missile, and the Patriot MSE missile. These systems are on
schedule to provide an initial operational capability by 2012.
Additionally, these systems will be networked within the IAMD SoS
architecture, have an integrated fire control capability, and operate
within a common command and control system. Initial operational
capability is planned for 2014.
Force Protection
In the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom, insurgents continue to
pose serious dangers by employing indirect-fire tactics of quick-
attack, low-trajectory, urban-terrain-masked rocket, artillery, and
mortar (RAM) strikes against U.S. forward operating bases in Iraq. To
combat this threat, the Army developed a Counter-Rocket, Artillery,
Mortar (C-RAM) capability--an integrated set of capabilities to provide
warning and intercept of RAM threats. The primary mission of the C-RAM
project is to develop, procure, field, and maintain a capability that
can detect RAM launches; warn the defended area with sufficient time
for personnel to take cover; intercept rounds in flight, thus
preventing damage to ground forces or facilities; and enhance response
to and defeat of enemy forces. C-RAM utilizes a SOS approach and is
comprised of a combination of multi-service fielded and non-
developmental item sensors, command and control elements, and a
modified U.S. Navy intercept system. The system utilizes a low cost
commercial off-the-shelf warning system and a wireless local area
network. Advances in the C-RAM capability will continue with funding
that is requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget submit.
Efforts are also underway to use the benefits of directed energy to
potentially counter the RAM threat. Developmental work by joint
entities within the Department is producing results that are promising.
Within the next few years, through the Army's High Energy Laser
Technology Demonstration Program, we are very hopeful we will produce a
mobile solid state laser weapon system that will serve as a
complementary resource to the present and future kinetic energy
capability in countering RAM projectiles. Your continued support in
this area will ensure we advance indirect fire protection capabilities.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the Army is a member of the joint team fighting an
adaptive enemy in a persistent conflict while transforming to meet
future threats. We have responsibility for GMD, THAAD, Patriot, and
MEADS and will continue developing and fielding an integrated missile
defense for our Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies.
USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, will continue to develop a joint BMDS
capability to protect our Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies.
The fiscal year 2009 budget proposal supports the transformation of the
Army's air, space, and missile defense force to support the Army's
future force, the Joint Integrated AMD System, and our global BMDS. We
will continue to work with MDA, the Services, and component commanders
to define the characteristics of the emerging air, space, and missile
defense force and determine how it can best support the warfighter and
our Nation.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you or the other
committee members may have.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES E. McQUEARY, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

[The prepared statement of Dr. McQueary follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Charles E. McQueary
Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, good afternoon. I am pleased to have this opportunity to
speak to you about the testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS). I will cover five areas.
First, I will give you my current assessment of the capability of
the BMDS.
Second, I will discuss the factor that limited my ability to
provide a thorough assessment as required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
Third, I will discuss the sufficiency and adequacy of the BMDS test
and evaluation program during the past year.
Fourth, I will provide a review of the implementation of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) recommendations made
to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
Finally, I will describe how the MDA is a pathfinder for the
implementation of section 231 language from the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
first: my assessment
As General Obering has already pointed out, the MDA had a good year
of testing in 2007.
Patriot demonstrated that it generally meets its operational
requirements with some limitations for specific threat missiles. Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense demonstrated the capability to detect, track,
and engage short- and medium-range ballistic missile targets in the
midcourse phase with Standard Missile-3 missiles. Although Ground-based
Midcourse Defense is still developmental in nature, it demonstrated to
some degree many of the functions required for system effectiveness.
As a result, I can state that the BMDS has a limited capability to
defend against simple, ballistic missile threats launched from North
Korea toward the United States.
second: the limitation
Mr. Chairman, as I told this committee last year, I was
particularly concerned that verified, validated, and accredited models
and simulations would not be available to help me complete my
assessment of BMDS capability. My concern was well-founded.
Because of the same concern, General Obering diverted MDA resources
to meet our mutual modeling and simulation requirements. He had his
team create an ensemble of models and simulations, called Performance
Assessment 07, to replicate system-level BMDS performance.
Unfortunately, the effort and changes required were too great for the
time available to accomplish them. Although many MDA element models are
well along toward verification and validation, integrating them into a
system-level BMDS performance model that can be verified, validated,
and accredited did not happen and will not happen quickly.
Between the Performance Assessment 07 and the fiscal year 2007
ground test program, the BMDS Operational Test Agency Team attempted to
accredit 33 models and simulations to support my assessment. The team
was able to partially accredit, with caveats, only five of theses
models. From this attempt, however, the MDA learned many valuable
lessons about adequate and effective verification and validation that
it can apply to this continuing effort. It will be some time before
these models are ready and sufficient flight test data exists to anchor
them so they can be properly verified, validated, and accredited for
use.
third: the test program
The pace and content of the MDA test program are proper for the
developmental nature and maturity level of the various elements that
constitute the BMDS. Although some would like to test more frequently,
General Obering's deliberate approach to test-analyze-fix-test is
warranted for this highly complex system. Analysis of large volumes of
test data, frequently measured in terabytes, is an important step in
this process that cannot be short-changed. It is very important to
understand the results of one complex test before proceeding to the
next test. I strongly support his approach.
Unfortunately, the slower test pace results in limited test data
for use in verifying, validating, and accrediting models and
simulations. As I discussed previously, this has impacted my ability to
characterization BMDS performance.
Target availability, reliability, and performance have also been
factors frustrating the flight test program and impacting test
adequacy. During the 18 month period concluding December 31, 2007, MDA
suffered 4 target failures during 20 flight tests conducted by various
elements of the BMDS. These failures not only impacted critical data
collection, but also forced changes to flight test schedules.
To be fair, the MDA is not alone in this experience with a target
program. Targets are a Department-wide problem impacting ground, sea,
and air programs, both for acquisition and training. The targets we
need to adequately test the systems we are acquiring are nearly as
sophisticated and costly as the threats they are trying to replicate
and the weapons we are developing to counter them.
On a positive note, my office and the BMDS Operational Test Agency
Team are active participants in the MDA's test planning and execution
processes. The MDA implements many of our recommendations into the
combined developmental and operational test program. Every ground and
flight test includes both developmental and operational test
objectives. As a group, we attempt to maximize operational realism in
each test without impacting developmental objectives. In lieu of
independent operational testing, this has been a valuable and effective
approach to give warfighters time to operate the system and test their
tactics, techniques, and procedures.
fourth: the recommendations
Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to address the committee, you
asked me to provide an assessment of the MDA's implementation of DOT&E
recommendations made to the Agency. I will do that now.
There were 26 recommendations in the fiscal year 2005 annual
report. Four recommendations are still open, and the MDA is acting on
each of them. Two involve ongoing data collection, one involves the
future test schedule, and one deals with the test planning process.
There were 15 new recommendations in the fiscal year 2006 annual
report. Six of these recommendations remain open; all are being worked
by the MDA. Four involve demonstrations of specific capabilities during
actual intercept tests, one involves Information Assurance, and one
involves targets.
There are five new recommendations in the fiscal year 2007 annual
report. All are still open and being actively worked by the MDA. One
involves targets, one involves ongoing data collection, one is
scheduled for completion during the next Ground-based Midcourse Defense
flight test this summer, one involves modeling and simulation, and one
requires a review of previously completed testing.
The year-by-year reduction in the number of recommendations made by
DOT&E is indicative of the progress the MDA is making in the BMDS
developmental test program.
I only advise the MDA on its developmental test program. General
Obering and his staff recognize the value of our suggestions and
recommendations. A more capable BMDS is our mutual goal. I am satisfied
with the MDA's response to the recommendations in our annual reports.
finally: the pathfinder
On December 22, 2007, Under Secretary John Young and I signed a
revision to Department of Defense Test and Evaluation Policy. The new
policy was a response to the requirement in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, to review and reaffirm or
modify test and evaluation policy as appropriate.
This new policy made developmental testing (DT) and operational
testing (OT) integrated and seamless throughout the system life cycle.
Although we didn't have the MDA in mind when we developed this
policy, the MDA is a model for this approach today as it develops,
tests, and fields the BMDS. Several years ago, General Obering created
a combined test force that embeds the operational test organization
with his developmental test organization while maintaining the
operational test organization's independence. This has worked well. As
a result, the MDA has been able to transition to combined DT/OT as
early as possible during the development and acquisition of the BMDS.
As BMDS weapons elements mature, combined DT/OT test objectives are
moving from a developmental emphasis to an operational emphasis.
The MDA is a pathfinder for demonstrating integrated and seamless
DT and OT in the department. The warfighters are, and will continue to
be, the clear beneficiaries of this new policy.
in conclusion
The MDA experienced another good year with its ground and flight
test programs. Hit-to-kill is no longer a technological uncertainty; it
is a reality, being successfully demonstrated many times over the past
few years. The challenge now is to demonstrate hit-to-kill in more
complex target scenes that include not only target deployment artifacts
but countermeasures as well. General Obering has this in his future
test plans.
Individual element successes indicate their growing capabilities.
Integrated ground testing of the BMDS continues to demonstrate that the
warfighters understand and can operate the system confidently and
effectively. There is still a long way to go, but the MDA's disciplined
and principled approach to flight and ground tests is continuing to pay
real dividends.
This concludes my remarks and I welcome your questions.

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Paul Francis
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) strategy for
acquiring a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and its progress in
fielding Block 2006--its second increment of capability.
MDA has been charged with developing and fielding the BMDS, a
system expected to be capable of defending the United States, deployed
troops, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in
all phases of flight. In fulfilling this charge, MDA placed an initial
set of missile defense components in the field in December 2005. These
components are collectively referred to as Block 2004. Recently, MDA
delivered its second increment of capability--Block 2006--which
includes additional components as well as performance enhancements.
The National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2002 and
2006 mandated that we prepare annual assessments of MDA's ongoing cost,
schedule, testing, and performance progress. In March 2008, we issued
our report covering MDA's progress toward achieving Block 2006 goals
during fiscal year 2007 as well as its efforts to improve transparency,
accountability, and oversight. My statement today will focus on the
issues covered in that report. We conducted this performance audit from
May 2007 to March 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
summary
During Block 2006, MDA fielded additional and new assets, enhanced
the capability of some existing assets, and achieved most test
objectives. In short, MDA increased BMDS capability. However, MDA did
not meet the goals it originally set for the block. Ultimately, MDA
fielded fewer assets, increased costs by about $1 billion, and
conducted fewer tests. Even with the cost increase, MDA deferred work
to keep Block 2006 costs from increasing further, as some contractors
overran their fiscal year 2007 budgets. We could not determine the full
cost of the block as deferred work is no longer counted as part of the
block. Further, several BMDS contractors plan work in such a way that
could result in MDA incurring costs that are not yet recognized. We
could not assess attainment of another MDA goal: the overall
performance of fielded assets as an integrated BMDS. This is because:
(1) there have not been enough flight tests to validate the models and
simulations that are used to predict system-level performance, (2) the
reliability of some interceptors could be affected by problematic parts
that have not been replaced yet, and (3) tests done to date do not
provide enough information for the Department of Defense's (DOD)
operational test and evaluation director to fully determine if the BMDS
is suitable and effective for battle.
MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decisionmaking
flexibility that has expedited the fielding of assets but also lessened
the transparency and accountability provided for oversight. In the past
year, MDA has taken significant actions to improve oversight. First,
MDA has adopted a new block approach that offers several improvements--
unit costs for selected assets will now be tracked and work will no
longer be deferred from one block to another. Second, DOD has
established an executive board to review and make recommendations on
MDA's acquisition strategy, plans, and funding that could play a more
significant role than its predecessor. Third, Congress directed that
MDA begin using procurement funds to purchase certain assets, which
generally means they must be fully paid for in the year they are
bought. Previously, using research and development funding, MDA could
pay for assets over several years, making it difficult to determine
their cost. Some oversight concerns remain, however. For example,
although MDA plans to do so, it has not yet estimated the total cost of
any block, therefore it cannot have block costs independently verified,
as is done for other major programs. While the new executive board
promises to be more substantive than the previous Missile Defense
Support Group, it will not have the information--such as on cost
estimates and operational testing--to provide the oversight the Defense
Acquisition Board provides on other major programs. The new board, like
its predecessor, does not have approval authority. The executive board
also faces the unique challenge of evaluating technology development
efforts that range from $2 billion to about $5 billion a year--efforts
that normally do not have a firm cost, schedule, and performance
baseline.
We have previously made recommendations to improve oversight in the
areas that MDA has recently taken action. In March 2008, we also made
recommendations to build on the actions already taken to further
improve the transparency of block costs and oversight of the BMDS
program. These included having MDA develop a full cost estimate for
each block of BMDS capability with verification of that estimate, and
examine ways to develop a baseline or some other standard against which
the progress of technology programs may be assessed. We also
recommended that MDA and the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation agree on criteria and incorporate corresponding scope into
developmental tests that will allow a determination of whether a block
of BMDS capability is suitable and effective for fielding. DOD
concurred with having MDA develop block cost estimates and obtaining
independent verification of those estimates. DOD partially concurred
with the recommendations regarding examining ways to measure the
progress of technology programs and adding scope to developmental
tests.
background
Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually, MDA's BMDS is
the largest research development program in DOD's budget. Since the
1980s, DOD has spent more that $100 billion to develop and field the
BMDS and it estimates that continued development and fielding will
require an additional $50 billion between fiscal years 2008 and 2013.
Since 2002, MDA has worked to fulfill its mission through its
development and fielding of a diverse collection of land-, air-, sea-,
and space-based assets. These assets are developed and fielded through
nine BMDS elements and include the Airborne Laser (ABL); Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); BMDS Sensors; Command, Control,
Battle Management, and Communications (C\2\BMC); Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD); Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI); Multiple Kill
Vehicles (MKV); Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); and
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).\1\
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\1\ The BMDS also includes a 10th element, Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 which has been transferred to the Army for production,
operation, and sustainment. This report does not evaluate Patriot
because its initial development is complete and is now being managed by
the Army.
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To develop a system capable of carrying out its mission, MDA, until
December 2007, executed an acquisition strategy in which the
development of missile defense capabilities was organized in 2-year
increments known as blocks. Each block was intended to provide
capabilities that enhanced the development and overall performance of
the BMDS. The first 2-year block, known as Block 2004, fielded a
limited initial capability that included early versions of the GMD,
Aegis BMD, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, and C\2\BMC elements. The
agency's second 2-year block--Block 2006--culminated on December 31,
2007, and fielded additional BMDS assets. This block also provided
improved GMD interceptors, enhanced Aegis BMD missiles, upgraded Aegis
BMD ships, a Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable radar, and enhancements
to C\2\BMC software. In December 2007, MDA's Director approved a new
block construct that will be the basis for all future development and
fielding, which I will discuss in more detail shortly.
To assess progress during Block 2006, we examined the
accomplishments of nine BMDS elements that MDA is developing and
fielding. Our work included examining documents such as Program
Execution Reviews, test plans and reports, production plans, and
Contract Performance Reports. We also interviewed officials within each
element program office and within MDA functional directorates. In
addition, we discussed each element's test program and its results with
DOD's Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation.
Regarding transparency, accountability, and oversight, we held
discussions with officials in MDA's Directorate of Business Operations
to determine whether its new block structure improved accountability
and transparency of the BMDS. In addition, we reviewed pertinent
sections of the U.S. Code to compare MDA's current level of
accountability with Federal acquisition laws. We also interviewed
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and DOD's Joint Staff to discuss
the oversight role of the new Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB).
Additionally, we reviewed the MDEB charter to identify the oversight
responsibility of the board.
fielded capability increased, but less than planned at higher cost
MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during 2007.
Additional assets were fielded and/or upgraded, several tests met
planned objectives, and other development activities were conducted. On
the other hand, fewer assets were fielded than originally planned, some
tests were delayed, and the cost of the block increased by
approximately $1 billion. To stay within the revised budget despite
increasing contractor costs, MDA deferred some budgeted work to future
blocks. Such deferrals, coupled with a planning methodology too often
used by some contractors that could obscure cost reporting, prevent us
from determining the full cost of Block 2006. MDA was able to meet most
test objectives despite delays in several elements' test schedules.
Neither we nor DOD could evaluate the aggregate performance of fielded
assets because flight testing to date has not generated sufficient
data. An evaluation of aggregate performance would also have to
consider that: (1) some parts in fielded interceptors identified as
potentially problematic have not been replaced yet, and (2) tests done
to date do not provide enough information for DOD's independent test
organization to fully determine if the BMDS is suitable and effective
for battle.
Fielding of Assets and Cost
During Block 2006, MDA increased its inventory of BMDS assets while
enhancing the system's performance. It fielded 14 additional Ground-
Based Interceptors, 12 Aegis BMD missiles designed to engage more
advanced threats, 4 new Aegis BMD destroyers, 1 new Aegis BMD cruiser,
and 8 Web browsers and 1 software suite for C\2\BMC. In addition, MDA
upgraded half of its Aegis BMD ship fleet, successfully conducted four
Aegis BMD and two GMD intercept tests, and completed a number of ground
tests to demonstrate the capability of BMDS components.
MDA was unable to deliver all assets originally planned for Block
2006.\2\ The Sensors element was the only Block 2006 element to meet
all of its original goals set in March 2005 while the remaining
elements--GMD, Aegis BMD, C\2\BMC--did not meet all of their original
quantity goals. Sensors delivered a second Forward-Based X-Band Radar,
Transportable (FBX-T) in January 2007 while the GMD element fielded 14
of the 15 Ground-Based Interceptors originally planned during Block
2006. Last year, we reported that MDA delayed the partial upgrade of
the Thule early warning radar--one of GMD's original goals--until a
full upgrade could be accomplished. Additionally, the Aegis BMD element
delivered 4 additional destroyers and 1 new cruiser as originally
planned, but delivered 12 of the 19 SM-3 missiles planned for the
block. C\2\BMC did not deliver two of the three software suites
originally planned for Block 2006, but did provide the needed
capability less expensively through Web browsers and other techniques.
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\2\ In March 2006, MDA made reductions to its block 2006 goals. It
was able in nearly all instances to meet or exceed these revised goals.
Two elements--GMD and C\2\BMC--were able to exceed their revised
fielding goals. In addition, the Aegis BMD element was able to meet its
revised block goals for one of its two components. The program upgraded
all planned ships, but fielded three fewer Aegis BMD Standard Missile-
3s (SM-3) than planned because the missiles were delayed into 2008 to
accommodate an unanticipated requirement to deliver three missiles to
Japan.
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The work MDA completed for Block 2006 cost more than planned. In
March 2007, we reported that MDA's cost goal for Block 2006 increased
by approximately $1 billion because of greater than expected GMD
operations and sustainment costs and technical problems. If the
contractors continue to perform as they did in fiscal year 2007, we
estimate that at completion, the cumulative overrun in the contracts
could be between about $1.3 billion and $1.9 billion. To stay within
its revised budget, MDA deferred some work it expected to accomplish
during the block. When work is deferred, its costs are no longer
accounted for in the original block. In other words, if work planned
and budgeted for Block 2006 was deferred to Block 2008, that work would
be counted as a Block 2008 cost. Because MDA did not track the cost of
the deferred work, the agency could not make an adjustment that would
have matched the cost with the correct block. Consequently, we were
unable to determine the full cost of Block 2006.
Another reason why it is difficult to determine the actual cost of
Block 2006 is a planning methodology too often employed by some MDA
prime contractors that can obscure the full cost of work. Contractors
typically divide the total work of a contract into small efforts in
order to define them more clearly and to ensure proper oversight. Work
may be planned into categories including: (1) level of effort--work
that contains tasks of a general or supportive nature and does not
produce a definite end product; and (2) discrete--work that has a
definable end product or event. When work is discrete, delivery of the
end product provides a sound basis for determining actual contractor
performance. When discrete work is instead planned as level of effort,
the contractor's performance becomes less transparent because work is
considered complete when the time planned for it has expired, whether
or not the intended product has been completed. Earned value management
does not recognize such variances in completing scheduled work and to
the extent more work has to be done to complete the product, additional
costs could be incurred that are not yet recognized.\3\ Many of MDA's
prime contractors plan a large percentage of their work as level of
effort. MDA officials agree that its contractors have improperly
planned discrete work as level of effort, and are taking steps to
remedy the situation.
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\3\ Earned Value Management (EVM) is a program management tool that
integrates the technical, cost, and schedule parameters of a contract.
During the planning phase, an integrated baseline is developed by time
phasing budget resources for defined work. As work is performed and
measured against the baseline, the corresponding budget value is
``earned.'' Using this earned value metric; cost and schedule variances
can be determined and analyzed. EVM is program management that provides
significant benefits to both the Government and the contractor.
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We also observed that while several contractors had difficulty with
controlling costs, during fiscal year 2007, MDA awarded approximately
95 percent or $606 million of available award fee to its prime
contractors. In particular, contractors developing the ABL and Aegis
BMD Weapon System were rated as performing very well in the cost and/or
program management elements and received commensurate fees, even though
earned value management data showed that their cost and schedule
performance was declining. Although DOD guidance discourages the use of
earned value performance metrics in award fee criteria, MDA includes
this--one of many factors for consideration in rating contractors'
performance--in several of its award fee plans. The agency recognizes
that there is not always a good link between its intentions for award
fees and the amount of fee being earned by its contractors. In an
effort to rectify this problem, the agency has begun to revise its
award fee policy to align agency practices more closely with DOD's
current policy that better links performance with award fees.
Testing and Performance of Fielded Capability
Most test objectives were achieved during 2007, although several
BMDS programs experienced setbacks in their test schedules. The MKV,
KEI, and Sensors elements were able to execute all scheduled activities
as planned. The Aegis BMD, THAAD, ABL, STSS, and C\2\BMC elements
experienced test delays, but all were able to achieve their primary
test objectives. GMD successfully completed an intercept with an
operationally representative interceptor and a radar characterization
test. A second intercept test employing the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX)
radar has been delayed because a target malfunction delayed the
execution of the first intercept test. The SBX capability is important
as it is a primary sensor to be used to engage ballistic missiles in
the midcourse phase of flight. As of yet, this capability has not been
verified through flight testing.
As we reported in March 2007, MDA altered its original Block 2006
performance goals commensurate with the agency's reductions in the
delivery of fielded assets.\4\ For several reasons, information is not
sufficient to assess whether MDA achieved its revised performance
goals. First, MDA uses a combination of simulations and flight tests to
determine whether performance goals are met. However, too few flight
tests have been completed to ensure the accuracy of the models and
simulations predictions. Second, confidence in the performance of the
BMDS is reduced because of unresolved technical and quality issues in
the GMD element. For example, the GMD element has experienced the same
anomaly during each of its flight tests since 2001. This anomaly has
not yet prevented the program from achieving any of its primary test
objectives, but to date neither its source nor solution has been
clearly identified. Program officials plan to continue their assessment
of test data to determine the anomaly's root cause. The performance of
some fielded GMD assets is also questionable because they contain parts
identified by auditors in MDA's Office of Quality, Safety, and Mission
Assurance as less reliable or inappropriate for use in space that have
not yet been replaced. MDA has begun to replace the questionable parts
in the manufacturing process and to purchase the parts for retrofit
into fielded interceptors. However, it will not complete the retrofit
effort until 2012.
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\4\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy
Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO-07-387
(Washington, DC: March 15, 2007). BMDS performance goals included a
numerical goal for the probability of a successful BMDS engagement, a
defined area from which the BMDS would prevent an enemy from launching
a ballistic missile, and a defined area that the BMDS would protect
from ballistic missile attacks. GMD assets is also questionable because
they contain parts identified by auditors in MDA's Office of Quality,
Safety, and Mission Assurance as less reliable or inappropriate for use
in space that have not yet been replaced. MDA has begun to replace the
questionable parts in the manufacturing process and to purchase the
parts for retrofit into fielded interceptors. However, it will not
complete the retrofit effort until 2012.
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Finally, tests of the GMD element have been of a developmental
nature, and have not included target suite dynamic features and
intercept geometries representative of the operational environment in
which GMD will perform its mission. MDA has added operational test
objectives to its developmental test program, but many of the
objectives are aimed at proving that military personnel can operate the
equipment. Up until 2007, the lack of data limited the operational test
and evaluation Director's annual BMDS assessment to commenting on
aspects of tests that were operationally realistic and recommending
other tests to characterize system effectiveness and suitability. In
2007, tests allowed a partial assessment of the BMDS' effectiveness,
suitability, and survivability. According to the Office of the Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation: (1) further testing that
incorporates realistic operational objectives; and (2) verification,
validation, and accreditation of models and simulations will be needed
before the performance, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS can
be fully characterized.
key steps taken to enhance bmds oversight, but more can be done
Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant
amount of flexibility. While this flexibility allows agile
decisionmaking, it lessens the transparency of MDA's acquisition
processes, making it difficult to conduct oversight and hold the agency
accountable for its planned outcomes and costs. As we reported in March
2007, MDA operates with considerable autonomy to change goals and
plans, which makes it difficult to reconcile outcomes with original
expectations and to determine the actual cost of each block and of
individual operational assets. In the past year, MDA has begun
implementing two initiatives--a new block construct and a new executive
board--to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight. These
initiatives represent improvements over current practices, although we
see additional improvements MDA can make. In addition, Congress has
directed that MDA begin buying certain assets with procurement funds
like other programs, which should promote accountability for and
transparency of the BMDS.
New Block Structure Offers Improvements, but Does Not Resolve All
Issues
In 2007, MDA redefined its block construct to better communicate
its plans and goals to Congress. The agency's new construct is based on
fielding capabilities that address particular threats as opposed to the
previous biennial time periods. MDA's new block construct makes many
positive changes. These include establishing unit cost for selected
block assets, incorporating into a block only those elements or
components that will be fielded during the block, and abandoning the
practice of deferring work from block to block.
These changes should improve the transparency of the BMDS program
and make MDA more accountable for the investment being made in missile
defense. For example, the actual cost of each block can be tracked
because MDA will no longer defer work planned for one block, along with
its cost, to a future block. In addition, MDA plans to develop unit
costs for selected BMDS assets--such as THAAD interceptors--so that the
cost of those assets can be monitored. In addition, the agency plans to
request an independent verification of these unit costs and report
significant cost growth to Congress. However, MDA has not yet
determined all of the assets that will report a unit cost or how much a
unit cost must increase before it is reported to Congress.
Although improvements are inherent in MDA's proposed block
construct, the new construct does not resolve all transparency and
accountability issues. For example, MDA has not yet estimated the full
cost of a block. According to its fiscal year 2009 budget submission,
MDA does not initially plan to develop a full cost estimate for any
BMDS block. Instead, when a firm commitment can be made to Congress for
a block of capability, MDA will develop a budget baseline for the
block. This budget will include anticipated funding for each block
activity that is planned for the 6 years included in DOD's Future Years
Defense Plan.\5\ Once baselined, if the budget for a block changes, MDA
plans to report and explain those variations to Congress. At some
future date, MDA does expect to develop a full cost estimate for each
committed block and is in discussions with DOD's Cost Analysis
Improvement Group on having the group verify each estimate; but
documents do not yet include a timeline for estimating block cost or
having that estimate verified. Other DOD programs are required to
provide the full cost estimate of developing and producing their weapon
systems before system development and demonstration can begin. Until
the full cost of each block is known, it will be difficult for
decisionmakers to compare the value of investing in each block to the
value of investing in other DOD programs or to determine whether a
block is affordable over the long term.
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\5\ There are five blocks included in the new block construct--1.0,
2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0. MDA expects to initially develop budget
baselines and report variances to this baseline for Blocks 1.0, 2.0,
and a portion of 3.0.
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Another issue yet to be addressed is whether the concurrent
development and fielding of BMDS assets will continue. Fully developing
an asset and demonstrating its capability prior to production increases
the likelihood that the product will perform as designed and can be
produced at the cost estimated. To field an initial capability quickly,
MDA accepted the risk of concurrent development and fielding during
Block 2004. It continued to do so during Block 2006 as it fielded
assets before they were fully tested. For example, by the end of Block
2004, the agency realized that the performance of some Ground-Based
Interceptors could be degraded because the interceptors included
inappropriate or potentially unreliable parts.\6\ As noted earlier, MDA
has begun the process of retrofitting these interceptors, but work will
not be completed until 2012. Meanwhile, there is a risk that some
interceptors might not perform as designed. MDA has not addressed
whether it will accept similar performance risks under its new block
construct or whether it will fully develop and demonstrate all
elements/components prior to fielding.
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\6\ See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields
Initial Capability but Falls Short of Original Goals, GAO-06327
(Washington, DC: Mar. 15, 2006).
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MDA has not addressed whether it will transfer assets produced
during a block to a military service for production and operation at
the block's completion. Officials representing multiple DOD
organizations recognize that transfer criteria are neither complete nor
clear given the BMDS's complexity. Without clear transfer criteria, MDA
has transferred the management of only one element--the Patriot
Advanced Capability-3--to the military for production and operation.
For other elements, MDA and the military Services have been negotiating
the transition of responsibilities for the sustainment of fielded
elements--a task that has proven to be timeconsuming. Although MDA
documents show that under its new block construct the agency should be
ready to deliver BMDS components that are fully mission-capable, MDA
officials could not tell us whether at the end of a block MDA's
Director will recommend when management of components, including
production responsibilities, will be transferred to the military.
New Executive Board Offers Improved, but Not Full, Oversight
Oversight improvement initiatives are also underway for MDA. In
March 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a MDEB to
recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans,
program priorities, and investment options for protecting the United
States and its allies from missile attacks. The MDEB is also to replace
existing groups and structures, such as the Missile Defense Support
Group.
The MDEB appears to be vested with more authority than its
predecessor, the Missile Defense Support Group. When the Support Group
was chartered in 2002, it was to provide constructive advice to MDA's
Director. However, the Director was not required to follow the advice
of the group. According to a DOD official, although the Support Group
met many times initially, it did not meet after June 2005. This led to
the formation of the MDEB. Its mission is to review and make
recommendations on MDA's comprehensive acquisition strategy to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is also to provide the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) with a recommended
strategic program plan and a feasible funding strategy based on
business case analysis that considers the best approach to fielding
integrated missile defense capabilities in support of joint MDA and
warfighter objectives. The MDEB will be assisted by four standing
committees. These committees, which are chaired by senior-level
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff, could play an important oversight role as they are expected to
make recommendations to the MDEB, which in turn, will recommend courses
of action to the Under Secretary of Defense and the Director, MDA as
appropriate.
Although the MDEB is expected to exercise some oversight of MDA, it
will not have all the information normally available to DOD oversight
bodies. For other major defense acquisition programs, the Defense
Acquisition Board has access to critical information because before a
program can enter the System Development and Demonstration phase of the
acquisition cycle, statute requires that certain information be
developed.\7\ However, in 2002, the Secretary of Defense deferred
application of DOD policy to BMDS that, among other things, requires
major defense programs to obtain approval before advancing from one
phase of the acquisition cycle to another. Because MDA does not yet
follow this cycle, and has not yet entered System Development and
Demonstration, it has not triggered certain statutes requiring the
development of information that the Defense Acquisition Board uses to
inform its decisions. For example, most major defense acquisition
programs are required by statute to obtain an independent verification
of life-cycle cost estimates prior to beginning system development and
demonstration, and/or production and deployment. Independent life-cycle
cost estimates provide confidence that a program is executable within
estimated cost. Although MDA plans to develop unit cost for selected
block assets and to request that DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group
verify the unit costs, the agency does not initially plan to develop a
block cost estimate and therefore, cannot seek an independent
verification of that cost. Although MDA will not be required to obtain
an independent verification of block costs when they are estimated, MDA
officials told us that they have initiated discussions with the Cost
Analysis Improvement Group on independent verifications of block cost
estimates.
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\7\ The Defense Acquisition Board advises the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on critical
acquisition decisions.
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Statute also requires an independent verification of a system's
suitability for and effectiveness on the battlefield through
operational testing before a program can proceed beyond low-rate
initial production.\8\ After testing is completed, the Director for
Operational Test and Evaluation assesses whether the test was adequate
to support an evaluation of the system's suitability and effectiveness
for the battlefield, whether the test showed the system to be
acceptable, and whether any limitations in suitability and
effectiveness were noted. However, a comparable assessment of the BMDS
assets being fielded will not be available to the MDEB. As noted
earlier, the limited amount of testing completed, which has been
primarily developmental in nature, and the lack of verified, validated,
and accredited models and simulations prevent the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness,
suitability, and survivability of the BMDS in annual assessments.
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\8\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2399 requires completion of initial operational
test and evaluation of a weapon system before a program can proceed
beyond low-rate initial production. According to DOD policy, low-rate
initial production is intended to result in completion of manufacturing
development in order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing
capability and to produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide
production or production-representative articles for operational test
and evaluation, establish an initial production base for the system;
and permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system,
sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful completion
of operational (and live-fire, where applicable) testing.
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MDA will also make some decisions without needing approval from the
MDEB or any higher level DOD official. Although the charter of the MDEB
includes making recommendations to MDA and the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) on investment options,
program priorities, and MDA's strategy for developing and fielding an
operational missile defense capability, the MDEB will not necessarily
have the opportunity to review and recommend changes to BMDS blocks.
MDA documents show that the agency plans to continue to define each
block of development without requiring input from the MDEB. According
to a briefing on the business rules and processes for MDA's new block
structure, the decision to initiate a new block of BMDS capability will
be made by MDA's Director. Also cost, schedule, and performance
parameters will be established by MDA when technologies that the block
depends upon are mature, a credible cost estimate can be developed,
funding is available, and the threat is both imminent and severe. The
Director will inform the MDEB as well as Congress when a new block is
initiated, but he will not seek the approval of either.
Finally, there will be parts of the BMDS program that the MDEB will
have difficulty overseeing because of the nature of the work being
performed. MDA plans to place any program that is developing technology
in a category known as Capability Development. These programs, such as
ABL, KEI, and MKV, will not have a firm cost, schedule, or performance
baseline. This is generally true for technology development programs in
DOD because they are in a period of discovery, which makes schedule and
cost difficult to estimate. Yet, the scale of the technology
development in BMDS is unusually large, ranging from $2 billion to
about $5 billion a year--eventually comprising nearly half of MDA's
budget by fiscal year 2012. The MDEB will have access to the budgets
planned for these programs over the next 5 or 6 years, each program's
focus, and whether the technology is meeting short-term key events or
knowledge points. But without some kind of baseline for matching
progress with cost, the MDEB will not know how much more time or money
will be needed to complete technology maturation. MDA's experience with
the ABL program provides a good example of the difficulty in estimating
the cost and schedule of technology development. In 1996, the ABL
program believed that all ABL technology could be demonstrated by 2001
at a cost of about $1 billion. However, MDA now projects that this
technology will not be demonstrated until 2009 and its cost has grown
to over $5 billion.
MDA Directed to Use Procurement Funding
In an effort to further improve the transparency of MDA's
acquisition processes, Congress has directed that MDA's budget
materials delineate between funds needed for research, development,
test, and evaluation; procurement; operations and maintenance; and
military construction.\9\ Congress gave MDA the flexibility to field
certain assets using research, development, test, and evaluation
funding which allowed MDA to fund the purchase of assets over multiple
years. Congress recently restricted MDA's authority and required MDA to
purchase certain assets with procurement funds. Using procurement funds
will mean that MDA will be required to ensure that assets are fully
funded in the year of their purchase, rather than incrementally funded
over several years. Additionally, our analysis of MDA data shows that
incremental funding is usually more expensive than full-funding, in
part, because inflation decreases the buying power of the dollar each
year. For example, after reviewing MDA's incremental funding plan for
THAAD fire units and Aegis BMD missiles, we analyzed the effect of
fully funding these assets and found that the agency could save about
$125 million by fully funding their purchase and purchasing them in an
economical manner. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, Congress directed that MDA request procurement funding and
advanced procurement funding for long lead items in its fiscal year
2009 budget including funding for THAAD fire units and Aegis BMD SM-3
missiles. MDA did not request such funding because it slipped the
schedule for procuring THAAD fire units 3 and 4 by 1 year and because
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 was not
signed in time to allow MDA to adjust its budget request for SM-3
missiles. However, in MDA's fiscal year 2010 budget submittal, the
agency intends to incorporate a detailed plan of action and milestones
to transition from incremental funding to full funding beginning in
fiscal year 2010 and for all fiscal years thereafter.
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\9\ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-181, Sec. 223.
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actions recommended in our recent report
In our March 2008 report, we made several recommendations to build
on efforts to further improve the transparency, accountability, and
oversight of the missile defense program. Specifically, we recommended
that the Secretary of Defense direct:

MDA to develop a full cost for each block and request
an independent verification of that cost;
MDA to clarify the criteria that it will use for
reporting unit cost variances to Congress;
MDA to examine a contractor's planning efforts when 20
percent or more of a contract's work is proposed as level of
effort;
MDA to investigate ways of developing a baseline or
some other standard against which the progress of technology
programs may be assessed; and
MDA and the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation to agree on criteria and incorporate corresponding
scope into developmental tests that will allow a determination
of whether a block of BMDS capability is suitable and effective
for fielding.

DOD concurred with the first three recommendations. DOD partially
concurred with the remaining two recommendations to investigate ways of
developing a baseline or some other standard against which the progress
of technology programs may be assessed and to agree on criteria and
incorporate corresponding scope into developmental tests. DOD stated
that MDA already uses key knowledge points, technology levels, and
engineering readiness levels to assess the progress of technology
programs and that it will continue to investigate other ways of making
such assessments. DOD also noted that MDA's mission is to work with the
warfighter, rather than Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to
determine that the BMDS is ready for fielding. However, DOD stated that
MDA will continue to work with operational testers to strengthen the
testing of BMDS suitability and effectiveness. We believe that DOD and
Congress would benefit from understanding the remaining cost and time
needed to complete a technology program, important information that
MDA's methods do not yet provide. Since BMDS testing will continue to
serve both developmental and operational purposes, its scope should be
sufficient to enable the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to
evaluate the system's operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.
contact and staff acknowledgments
For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-
4841 or [email protected]. Individuals making key contributions to this
statement include David Best, Assistant Director; LaTonya D. Miller;
Steven B. Stern; Meredith Allen Kimmett; Kenneth E. Patton; and Alyssa
Weir.

Senator Bill Nelson. As a courtesy, I want to call on my
colleague, the ranking member, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
That is nice of you, as always. I guess we would thank each of
you for your service to our country.
I know in some ways it sounds like a lot of money we are
spending on missile defense. But at $10 billion out of a $500
billion defense budget, that is not really very much, and it
does provide, both at the tactical level and strategic level,
protections that are exceedingly important to us as a Nation.
So I guess I won't make much more of a statement than that
and to say that the budget is tight. I believe that we can
accomplish our goals with the President's budget, but it is not
a fat budget, that is for sure. There are a lot of things we
are not going to be able to do that we would like to do if we
had more money.
Secretary Young, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been
granted integrated decision authority over requirements,
acquisition, and budget for the missile defense program. This
authority was necessary in order to begin deployment of our
missile defense capabilities by 2004, and it appears to have
been successful. It was a spiral system, or whatever we want to
call it, that gave a certain amount of flexibility.
It is likely that had we not had that flexibility,
personally, I am inclined to believe that we would not be as
far along as we are. Have you had a chance to look at that, or
form an opinion about this different type of development
program, and do you think it has any benefit as a model in any
other acquisition situations?
Mr. Young. Senator, I certainly do. I have looked at it, to
some degree, and I believe elements of it are highly relevant
to our other programs. In particular, across the board, I am
already advocating that program managers take greater
responsibility for engaging the requirements community when the
requirements bar gets put much higher than the money available
or the schedule available because we can't promise to deliver
to those kinds of schedules.
So I think MDA, especially in the confines you outlined of
an urgent need to get capability out there, had the ability to
make those trades efficiently and get capability fielded.
Across the board, we need better ability to make some of those
trades to get the best value for the taxpayer.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, just briefly, based on
your tenure now in this position and your previous experience,
how do you evaluate this acquisition process that we
established, I guess, 8 or 10 years ago for the MDA program?
General Obering. Senator, I would say it has been very,
very successful for us. There has been this approach in which,
first of all, we are able to trade off requirements and funding
and acquisition options to be able to maximize the fielding and
to be able to react to real-world situations like we have
experienced in the past. So I am a very strong advocate for
this type of approach.
When you combine that with the single color of money that
we have enjoyed over the years in research, development, test,
and evaluation, that gives you a very quick reaction capability
to be able to meet those emerging situations. I think that has
been one of the reasons why we have been able to produce,
almost at an unmatched fashion within the department, on the
scale that we have been able to do.
Senator Sessions. It presents some risk, and it has some
dangers. But I think with regard to this immature situation we
started with, it has allowed us to move along rapidly.
Secretary Young, today's Washington Post reports that the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found 95 major
Department of Defense (DOD) systems that have exceeded their
original budgets by a total of $295 billion and are delivered
almost 2 years late on average. Is this correct?
Mr. Francis of GAO testifies today that MDA has increased
cost over projections by $1 billion, as some overran their
fiscal year 2007 budgets. How would you compare, if you are
able, MDA's performance on major acquisitions with the other
areas of the DOD, and what is your fundamental response to this
disturbing report?
Mr. Young. I certainly agree with the concerns. I haven't
had a chance to review all the details of the report. I think
the report documents some of the things that we have been
through before I came into the office. There were six programs
that went through the Nunn-McCurdy process and had cost growth,
and there were programs before that.
I recently decided a program that is probably a part of
that list, the C-5, where we actually made a decision instead
of spending $14 billion and recognizing the cost growth, we
scaled back the program, made sure we met the requirements, and
saved the taxpayers about $10 billion.
So we are going through and attacking these programs
individually, trying to put more discipline in the process. I
need to become more familiar with the details of the report, so
I can't yet say the numbers are accurate. But there have
certainly been a number of programs that have exceeded their
schedule.
In regards to MDA, it highlights the issue you asked about,
where many of these programs have these problems because they
had very strenuous requirements, and in some cases, probably
amazingly, we actually changed and increased the requirements
as we went into the execution of the program. MDA has had the
benefit of not making those in general, in my view, bad choices
and trying to be pragmatic about fielding an incremental
capability as fast as possible and then working to upgrade that
capability as money and time and technology support such
upgrades.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, do you want to briefly
comment on your perception on what this report indicates?
General Obering. Yes, sir. I think that, again, echoing
what Secretary Young says, the flexibilities that we have
allowed and the way that we are able to really, really scrub
down the requirements and also to make the trades has allowed
us to stay in fairly reasonable good shape with respect to our
cost variances.
Senator Sessions. Well, looking at this, maybe you can
correct me, I guess, but your figure is less than some of the
other major procurement agencies--at least being over. Would
you say that is true?
General Obering. Yes, sir. Overall in our portfolio, by our
calculations, we are about 5 percent to 6 percent variance, and
that reflects, by the way, a combination of increases in scope.
For example, if you recall when the North Koreans went on alert
in the summer of 2006, one of the lessons learned from that is
there was an additional missile field that was requested at
Fort Greely, AK, and also an additional interceptor to be
placed on alert, an operational silo at Vandenberg Air Force
Base.
So we get scope changes as part of those cost calculations.
So that is not only just cost growth, per se, it is also
increased capability. So I feel like we are very much, I think,
on the good side of that equation.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Francis, thank you for your analysis.
Do you have anything to add in addition or summary without
repeating your written testimony or any thoughts you have on
that subject?
Mr. Francis. Yes, Senator Sessions. The report that you had
referred to is something that we do every year. We look at
about 70 programs, and we keep that data year in and year out.
As I was saying to Mr. Young before the hearing, I think
one of the main findings is that the programs that get in
trouble, which are a lot of them, are ones that are not abiding
by the types of policies that I think Mr. Young is trying to
get enforced.
It is hard to compare the cost figures on missile defense
with other programs because the other programs are baselined
against a total, and they generally run 10 to 15 years out. So
missile defense, in a number of ways, is a level of effort
program, and scope can move in and out, as General Obering
said. So some scope can increase, and some scope can decrease.
But just taking that $1 billion, that is 5 percent over 2
years, or 2.5 percent a year. But Mr. Young will be certifying
programs with a 25 percent cost breach, but that is because
they last 10 years. So it is a little hard to get it apples-to-
apples, but I think the billion dollars is something to be
concerned about.
Senator Sessions. Do you feel like some of the goals he has
for procurement represent progress and could help eliminate
some of these overruns?
Mr. Francis. Yes, I think one of the fundamental things we
have found is that many programs get started before they are
ready, and a lot of that analysis that we have done has been at
the behest of this committee, benchmarking best practices. In
discussions with Mr. Young's office, I know there are a lot of
things he is trying to do to get programs on a much sounder
footing before they hit that first big milestone, which is the
Milestone B decision.
Senator Sessions. Well, Mr. Young, I would take that as a
pretty good compliment from GAO because they are a tough
watchdog. They don't mind being critical when it is necessary.
But it is my impression that you are seeking to have a tough,
strong approach to cost to keep us within our budgets.
Mr. Young. I do appreciate the kind comments. It is still
results that I have to put on the table. One of those, I think,
and one we would highlight that I think MDA has tried to take
advantage of on their own, is prototyping and to make sure you
do initial prototyping and develop your technology readiness
before you move forward with a product.
Now, if you are urgently fielding, you may move that
prototype more quickly to the field. But across the board in
the department, one thing we have to do, I think GAO has
rightly pointed out, is better mature technology through
prototyping. Congress has actually helped here because you have
given me law. I would rather be running my business, but where
necessary, if you all tell us things that are useful, it
probably helps.
You have directed that we not move things through Milestone
B without them being at technology readiness level 6. I think
that is a helpful standard for Congress to ask us to hold to.
Senator Sessions. All right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will make this brief. I had three questions to ask, and
one has already been answered, and I was just told I have
someone in my office.
General, we talk about where we are, and we constantly
update this. We are still naked in the boost phase. Now I would
like to have you tell us, so we can keep that alive, I know
there are a lot of people that are saying this isn't going to
be necessary. Then, of course, the big target is the Airborne
Laser (ABL).
I would like to have you say, first of all, why this boost-
phase capability is significant and then, second, why it is
necessary to go ahead and continue with the funding of the ABL
through next year?
Senator Inhofe. Through the shoot-down that will be next
year?
General Obering. Yes, sir. Well, first of all, the boost
phase is--in a layered defense is extremely important. First of
all, if you stop and think about it, when you are waiting until
the terminal phase, you are only able to defend a fairly small
footprint from a threat missile. In the mid-course phase, that
defended area expands.
But if you can shoot a missile down in the boost phase, you
are basically defending the entire world from that missile,
number one. Number two, you are forcing the shoot-down
relatively close to the origin of the launch of that missile.
So, oftentimes, the shoot down is over the country's territory
that actually launched the missile. Number three, it really
helps in dealing with the complex countermeasure or decoy issue
that comes up once you get into the mid-course phase and then
into the terminal phase. So, for those reasons, it is a very
advantageous capability.
Now to your point with respect to ABL, first of all, we
have two programs in the boost phase. The ABL continues to be
our primary boost-phase defense capability, and the Kinetic
Energy Interceptor (KEI) was a backup to that in case the ABL
did not prove to be successful.
Where we are on the ABL is we have completed the low-power
systems flight testing. We did that last year. It was very
successful. So between that and the high-energy laser firings
that we accomplished over 70 of in a 747 fuselage at Edwards
Air Force Base, we have now demonstrated all of the key
technical capabilities to be able to shoot down the missile.
We have now put the six laser modules onboard the aircraft,
the high-energy laser modules. We are in the process of
completing the installations for the three lasers that are on
that aircraft--the tracking laser, the atmospheric
compensation, and then the big megawatt-class high-energy
laser. At the end of this year, we should be firing out of the
aircraft on the ground, and we should be going through our
checks and our fire control loops and that type of thing, get
back in the air early next year for the shoot-down.
Senator Inhofe. When next year?
General Obering. In the summer is what we are shooting for
right now for the shoot-down. We think it is important to do
that because, number one, we have learned a tremendous amount
throughout this. It is the largest directed-energy weapon in
the department, and we have really focused the entire directed-
energy community in this country on this program.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is a very good explanation, and
I would encourage you to talk about this because that program
is being attacked by even a lot of people who are very strong
supporters because there is just a lack of an understanding of
it.
Now, lastly, let me just mention to you that on December 2,
2007, I had a chance to meet with the leaders and the
negotiators in Poland as well as the Czech President, Vaclav
Klaus, who is one of my favorite presidents anywhere in the
world. Then yesterday afternoon, I was in Stuttgart with the
European Command and General Catto had all of his people in
there.
I am very interested in the progress that is being made
right now. You have two things with two countries. Of course,
the radar with the Czech Republic and the missiles in Poland. I
got the impression yesterday that between December 2 and
yesterday, there hasn't really been anything that I can
identify as progress.
Now they aren't opposed to it. I know the president of the
Czech Republic isn't. But there is a lot of misinformation
floating around that is creating a little bit of a problem.
Then I got the impression also, as far as Poland is concerned,
that they just want to be sure that there is a lot of money out
there for them. Am I wrong?
General Obering. First of all, sir, you are wrong in one
aspect. That is, there has been tremendous progress since
December. In fact, we have, for the most part, completed
negotiations with the Czechs in a positive way. We are down to
some of the final wording in the agreement. So I expect that to
conclude here in the very near future in a very successful
signing agreement.
With the Polish negotiations, we were set back somewhat
when the new government came in, and of course, as any new
government has a right to do, they wanted to assess the
situation where they were. We have now regained some of the
momentum that was lost as a result of the change in government,
and we have been back under negotiations with our Polish
counterparts.
Senator Inhofe. Do you think you are in the position now
that you were before the change took place in Poland?
General Obering. I think we are close, sir. I think that we
have now gotten down to the specifics on what are the steps
ahead with respect to help with the modernization of their
defenses and what kind of help that may mean and in a
discussion with that, and try to separate that somewhat from
the missile defense agreement that we think is so critically
important from a timing perspective as well.
Senator Inhofe. My thinking was this, that yes, I
understand that a lot of progress has been made in the Czech
Republic. But until you get both of them, it doesn't do any
good to reach an agreement with one without the other.
General Obering. Well, sir. Actually, we fully intend to
get agreements with both nations. The radar itself is a
tremendous capability in terms of the ability of that radar to
feed data into any missile defense system. That could be a
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-deployed capability
or sea-based capability.
Senator Inhofe. In the location?
General Obering. That would be a tremendous benefit to the
overall NATO missile defense architecture. So while we
certainly are on track to get both agreements, even just the
radar would be tremendous progress.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, that is good to hear because I
didn't hear that yesterday in Stuttgart. It was kind of the
impression that you have to get them both in order to make this
thing work. But it does make sense if that radar could be used
to deploy other systems, then that is better than not having
anything.
General Obering. Yes, sir. But just to make it crystal
clear, we need both the interceptors and the radar to provide
the long-range coverage for the protection of Europe. What I
was referring to is any future shorter-range coverages that
NATO may deploy.
Senator Inhofe. I understand. Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. The big chairman has just
come in.
As a courtesy to my colleagues, Senator Levin, I am
deferring to you all before I get into my questions. So let me
call on you.
Senator Levin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just had a few questions, and I don't know whether our
witnesses had opening statements or not.
Senator Bill Nelson. No, we went straight to questions.
Senator Levin. Straight to questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Everything has been entered into the
record.
Senator Levin. I appreciate your yielding to me, Mr.
Chairman. Let me just ask a few questions.
First, Secretary Young, you are supposed to be our
acquisition czar for the entire DOD. Do you have final
acquisition authority over the programs of the MDA? If not, is
that because of law, or is that because of administrative
decision?
Mr. Young. Under the current policy--I have authority, as
you rightly said, over the programs. Under the current
construct, the service acquisition executive exercises
authority over programs that have been delegated to them at
certain levels, and in this case, most of the milestone and
contracting decisions, MDA is currently exercising to move
forward with the capability, the urgent capability deployment.
Senator Levin. Well, do you have the same acquisition
authority over the MDA as you do over the other components?
Mr. Young. I think, theoretically, I do. But right now, we
are not exercising MDA programs with milestones, whereas with
the other Services for the largest programs, I personally
approve the milestones. But there are also many programs in the
Services that are not of such a size that I approve the
milestones or Service level.
Senator Levin. Do you treat acquisition in the MDA
differently than other acquisition in the Defense Department?
Mr. Young. Yes, we definitely treat that program
differently.
Senator Levin. Why is that? Is that law, or is that an
administrative decision?
Mr. Young. I don't think it is law. I think I would say it
is an administrative decision made some years, a few years, ago
to try to urgently deploy capability and let that program be
managed, if you will, as a portfolio in an effort to
expeditiously field capability. Some of those authorities were
delegated to the MDA organization and the director.
Senator Levin. Has there been any discussion about changing
that so they are treated like other acquisition programs?
Mr. Young. I think there have been discussions before my
time, and even now, I wouldn't say that specific issue is being
discussed yet. More so we are looking to improve the department
as a whole on oversight. Because as more capabilities are
delivered by MDA, the Services have growing roles in operating
those capabilities.
We established a Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB)
that has met four times in my tenure to begin to discuss MDA
programs, their status, their execution, and then the
transition of those capabilities. We are taking at least a
first step in better visibility and collaboration on the MDA
programs execution.
Senator Levin. Will you review the relationship of your
office to MDA for this subcommittee?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Get back to us with any recommendations to
change that so that you deal with them on the acquisition end
the same way you do with all other acquisition programs.
Mr. Young. I would be happy to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reports directly to me
organizationally. In accordance with a memorandum signed by Secretary
Rumsfeld, MDA was delegated certain authorities and flexibilities in
order to pursue the urgent objective of fielding missile defense
capability. Within the constraints of this memorandum, I have a set of
responsibilities to conduct oversight of MDA. Under this memorandum,
the authorities that I have to perform oversight of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System are not equivalent to the oversight authorities
I have for other acquisition programs.

Senator Levin. Of course, you would involve the other folks
who are at the table in that. You are not going to do that
unilaterally. But would you set that in motion?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Just on the question of the new block
structure that you have, you are going to be reporting
variances, as I understand it, from the eventual schedule,
cost, and performance baselines in reports that are classified.
That is your current plan for your new block structure. I am
wondering whether or not you cannot make it possible to report
those also in an unclassified form?
I have asked you, General Obering.
General Obering. Sir, we would not have any trouble
reporting any schedule and cost variances unclassified.
Performance variances, depending on the level of the
performance, reporting may be classified.
Senator Levin. Can you then include that in your block
structure planning?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. You will give us all of the cost, schedule,
and as many performance variables as you can?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Now, one other question. You have not yet
set the schedule, cost, and performance baselines, as I
understand it. Is that correct? I am not sure. I guess,
General, I will look at you for that.
General Obering. Yes, sir. We had cost, schedule, and
performance that we were tracking in our old block structure.
What we have gone to now with the new block structure is we
have set the cost and we have allocated the budget. We are in
the process of doing integrated baseline reviews for each one
of these blocks, so that will be forthcoming.
Senator Levin. Then when do you expect those baselines
would be available?
General Obering. This year.
Senator Levin. This year? So it could be many months before
those are available?
General Obering. We want to make sure that we do it
correctly.
Senator Levin. Would you agree, General--and I will ask
also Secretary Young this question. I think both of you have
testified before to this, but I want to make sure that you
understand that for many of us this is a very significant
point. Would you agree that our missile defense systems need to
be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, and
affordable? Secretary Young?
Mr. Young. I certainly would.
Senator Levin. General Obering?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. I would follow up on Senator Inhofe's
question about the situation with regard to Poland and the
Czech Republic. In the course of our deliberations in any bills
that we pass--General Obering, I know you have met with the
Czechs and know you have met with the Poles on many occasions.
Is it important that what this Congress passes demonstrates
that we are committed to this program if and when they approve
it?
In other words, can we afford just to say, well, they
haven't completed all the negotiations with them yet, so we are
going to put no money up? Would that have an adverse effect on
the willingness of our allies to make their commitments that we
need from them?
General Obering. Sir, in my opinion, last year when
Congress indicated that they were going to withhold the $85
million of the $310 million request pending the agreements with
these nations, that sent the message, I think, to our partners
and our allies that as an incentive to try to move on with
getting these agreements.
If we do not fund the program this year, I think that sends
a different message, which is lack of support. That is very
different, and I don't think we want to send that message. I
think, as I said, there is an urgency about this with respect
to the threat, and there has also been such great progress,
with respect to our allies on this, and in the NATO context as
well. I think that would send a very, very wrong signal to, not
only our seriousness in this, but also the role of U.S.
leadership in the overall missile defense area.
Senator Sessions. This week, the President is meeting with
NATO leaders. What is the message we are hearing from NATO with
regard to their view of sites, the radar and ballistic missile
site in Europe?
General Obering. Sir, I think that there are a couple of
facets to that. Number one, I believe that there is a
recognition that the threat is there, and it has to be
addressed, and it is growing and maturing. Number two, I think
that--and there will be, I am sure, more details coming this
week. But I think that there is a growing recognition that NATO
needs to do something about this within the NATO context,
within their active-layer theater missile defense plan and move
on with that program.
I think that there is a growing recognition that the U.S.
proposal could be integrated as we move ahead in the future
with NATO. So I don't know the specific wording that will come
out, but I think it will be along those lines.
Senator Sessions. But overall, the NATO leadership seemed
to understand and made quite clear, and Mr. Sarkozy of France
was quite clear, that there is a threat that Europeans know
they need to deal with.
General Obering. Yes, sir. Also the Secretary General of
NATO has been very vocal and very forceful, I think, in his
description of the NATO position in missile defense and very
positive about that.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, your budget request for
fiscal year 2009 includes $10 million for a space test-bed to
begin a concept analysis in preparation for certain small-scale
experiments. As I understand it, the purpose of this is to
provide data that could help us make more informed decisions
about the utility and feasibility of a space-based interceptor
capability. Give us some more insight into your reason for that
request and how it would be used.
General Obering. Sir, I wish that I could tell you in the
next 20 years what the missile threats to the United States
will be, and I wish the Intelligence Community could see that
with a crystal ball, but they can't. So, I think it is very
prudent that out of a $9.3 billion request, that we allocate at
least $10 million to maintaining our options with respect to
the future, and that future, in terms of flexibility of not
knowing which axis the threat may come from, is in space, and
there are things that we need to understand about that. There
was a lot of work done in a space-based layer back in the 1980s
on the Strategic Defense Initiative program. But a lot of that
was brought to a halt in the early 1990s. We haven't done
anything significant since then with respect to this. Then if
we look out to the future, we need to make sure that we keep
our options open.
We believe that there will be a debate about this,
obviously, as the Nation proceeds. But we would like to be able
to inform that debate with some type of technical understanding
of what is doable and what is not.
We like to use knowledge points, as Secretary Young
referred to, in a prototyping context, we call them knowledge
points. We think it is important to establish some of the
knowledge points that we may need in the future for space-based
capabilities. As you say, it is a very, very, very modest
request, but we think it is important to keep our options open.
If I may, one last example? Many describe this as ``we
don't need to be spending money for futuristic capabilities.''
I would look backwards and say if we had made the same
statements in the mid-1990s about the Ground-Based Mid-Course
Defense (GMD) System that we fielded, beginning in 2004, we
would not have had a system to activate when the North Koreans
launched their missiles in the summer of 2006, and we would not
have been able to give the President an option other than
preemption or retaliation had that been a threat.
I think we have to be very careful about maintaining a
balance. We already are fielding and developing for fielding in
the near term about 75 percent of our budget. Only about 25
percent is allocated to future capabilities such as the space
test bed.
Senator Sessions. Well, you are right. We have emphasized
actually deploying systems that we have developed in work
because we need the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), and this budget
that we talk about is not all ballistic missile defense. It is
not all national missile defense. Huge amounts of it are SM-3s
on ships, THAADs, and Patriots that protect our soldiers in
theaters that could be hostile and dangerous from missile
attack, just essential parts of the Nation's defense.
I think a $10 million request is legitimate to explore what
options might exist out there and, as you said, help inform us
if we were ever to want to move forward with something in that
area.
Mr. Chairman, I will turn it back to you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Well, speaking of THAAD, General Obering, it is a high
priority. You want flexibility. Why did you propose a budget
request that would delay the delivery of THAAD interceptors by
a year and result in a production gap of 18 months?
General Obering. Sir, part of what I do in my job as the
acquisition executive for the missile defense programs is to
make sure that we are holding contractors accountable and that
we are holding our programs accountable. Now in the case of
THAAD, we had good performance with respect to our test
program. They are now four for four in terms of their intercept
testing, but there was cost growth associated with the program
that was unacceptable.
We had worked with the contractors to take a look at the
cost growth and begin to get those under control because we did
not want to have a very successful program that became
unaffordable in terms of the per-missile cost. The initial
attempts at that by the contractor were not successful. So we
zeroed out that portion of what we call the award fee incentive
for them in cost management in the program. We got their
attention, and they began reducing that cost growth to a very
acceptable level.
In the meantime, though, that generated a bill that had to
be paid within the portfolio. Now the initial blush at that was
they were going to have to delay the delivery of fire units 3
and 4. We went back and scrubbed that very hard and said,
``wait a minute, do we have to do that? Why don't we go ahead
and look at other places that are not as much value added to
the program?'' They did that. So now we do not have a delay in
the delivery of those fire units.
To answer your question very directly--I don't want to
reward unhelpful behavior, but at the same time, I want to
maintain a priority on the program.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Can you boil that down then
to a simple answer to the question, why did you propose the
budget request for the delay and a production gap of 18 months?
General Obering. At the time, we were trying to see how we
could reduce the cost, and we had not finished that. Now we
have done that, and we don't believe that there will be a delay
in those fire units.
Senator Bill Nelson. Wasn't it that the staff of this
committee objected to the delay in February that you decided to
change your plans for the 2009 funds to avoid the delay?
General Obering. Sir, we were working that back in
November, actually. So we were continually trying to address
these cost growths.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the fix is now planned for fiscal
year 2009?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. But that is money that we will have to
appropriate in the future, a fix for 2009.
All right. Secretary Young, are you committed to ensuring
that our combatant commanders have sufficient inventory of
THAAD and SM-3 interceptors to meet the requirements of their
operational plans?
Mr. Young. Certainly, sir. Our job is to at least receive
the requirements. Unless there is a cost or a technology issue,
we try to meet them. I know there is a new joint capability mix
study, which you are probably aware of, that General Obering's
organization is digesting and seeking to address because they
have, indeed, indicated they may need greater inventory.
I would tell you that MDA is balancing those demands
amongst the other demands and also doing a very good thing, and
that is making sure we pick the right sets of integrated
capability. It may not just be THAAD, but SM-3 and THAAD that
they need to address the theater threat.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the answer is yes?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell?
General Campbell. Yes, sir. We are committed to working
with the combatant commanders (COCOMs) to give them what they
need, and it is our understanding that MDA is going to adjust
their budget submission so that they can meet those demands we
have identified in the study. That study is going to be briefed
to your staffs this Friday. It is a classified study.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the answer is yes?
General Campbell. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. I can tell you that we hear from the
COCOMs, and they want this system. General Obering, same
question.
General Obering. Yes, sir. In fact, my initial mission is
to do development and initial fielding, and then it is up to
the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the COCOMs, working within
the department as to what the force structure sizes are that we
need to go to address. The joint capability mix number two
study outlined the increases in numbers for both THAAD and
Aegis SM-3s, and we do intend to address that in our Program
Objectives Memorandum-10 (POM-10) submission to be able to get
to the numbers that they have recommended.
That means that we will go in and make adjustments within
our development program to be able to meet that, but that is
our intent.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, speaking of the SM-3 Block
1A interceptors, the authorization for fiscal year 2008
required that any funds in the budget for fiscal year 2009 for
long-lead procurement of additional Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
Block 1A interceptors should be procurement funds. But that is
not what happened.
This has been discussed between Congress and your agency,
and the department has not complied with that requirement of
procurement funds. Instead, the budget request seeks research
and development funds for the long-lead of the additional SM-3
interceptors. So why is your budget at variance with the law?
General Obering. Well, sir, first of all, the law was
passed after the budget had been finalized for 2009. We
attempted because we understood the direction it was headed--to
try to structure the budget for procurement, but we were not
able to do so within the Department because of the timing I
just talked about.
Now if Congress appropriates, obviously, in the procurement
appropriations, we will execute those. But we have to work
within the department's context. We don't do this directly with
Congress.
Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, what do you think
about this?
Mr. Young. I think we need to comply with the law, where
you ask us to, and certainly for POM-10, MDA is committed to
looking to comply with the law. I am not sure about the
timelines for building the 2009 budget and whether we could
have made those changes given the timing of the passage of the
authorization act.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, let me ask both of you, do you
agree that the 2009 funds for the long-lead SM-3 and THAAD
interceptors should come from procurement funds?
General Obering. Sir, like I said, we will execute whatever
is appropriated with respect to those interceptors.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what the law says is that it
should come from procurement funds.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you are saying that the
appropriations may say something different than the
authorization law?
General Obering. Sir, I am saying that we will abide by the
law. We will abide by what Congress has asked for us within the
direction and the guidance that we get from the Department.
Senator Bill Nelson. We are supposed to be oversight, and
we have a law. It is our responsibility to see that the
executive branch of Government carries out the law. Anything
else you want to say on this issue?
General Obering. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. In the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, it required the MDA to
take a number of steps in its acquisition activities to improve
transparency, accountability, and oversight. Those things were
cost, schedule, performance baselines, and so forth. Have those
requirements been fulfilled?
General Obering. Yes, sir. We believe that we have made a
great step forward there. We have totally restructured our
programs into finite blocks of capability that can be
baselined, fielded, and tracked to include the life-cycle
costing of those, and we are working with the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group, and others to be able to provide those. So
we feel that we have taken great steps there.
In addition, as Secretary Young pointed out earlier, we
established the MDEB of which I am the secretary and Secretary
Young chairs. That is made up of principals across the
Department to aid in the oversight of the program and to make
sure that we are complying, obviously with the wishes of the
Department and the wishes of the COCOMs as we move forward.
So I think we have done quite a bit there in terms of
meeting the intent of that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. The question is, with regard to
the law and things such as cost, schedule, performance
baselines, and unit cost reporting, will you provide the
subcommittee with a specific list of all the specific actions
that MDA has taken to comply with this section of the law?
General Obering. I would be happy to, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Pursuant to section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) established schedule, budget, and
performance baselines for each block configuration being fielded
(biennial Blocks 04, 06, and 08 under the previous block structure) and
reported variances annually in the agency's Statement of Goals (SOG).
In 2007, MDA established a new block structure to address concerns
about transparency, accountability, and oversight and to better
communicate to Congress and other key stakeholders our plans and
baselines and our continuing improvements in Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) capabilities. Blocks will be based on fielded
capabilities--not biennial time periods--that address particular
threats, and each block will represent a discrete program of work. When
blocks are established, schedule, budget, and performance goals will be
defined for each block. These goals, revised as necessary, will become
baselines when MDA can make a firm commitment to Congress because we
have a high level of confidence that the baselines can be achieved.
MDA has established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for
Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range
Threats), 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-
Medium Range Threats in One Region/Theater), and Block 3.1/3.2 (Expand
Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats). We
have established goals, not baselines for Block 3.3 (Expand Defense of
the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats--Improved
Discrimination and System Track), Block 4.0 (Defense of Allies and
Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand
Protection of the U.S. Homeland), and Block 5.0 (Expand Defense of
Allies and Deployed Forces from Short- to Intermediate-Range Threats in
Two Regions/Theaters). In the SOG that accompanied the President's
budget for fiscal year 2009, we presented these baselines and goals.
In each subsequent year's SOG, we will explain any significant
variances from schedule, budget, and performance baselines and the
reasons for redefining block goals. We will also explain changes in
year-to-year funding plans for each block over the period of the Future
Years Defense Plan. This level of reporting is a significant
enhancement to transparency.
MDA has also begun establishing unit cost baseline estimates for
BMDS capabilities being acquired and delivered to the warfighter. Our
approach is to build these estimates from the level of selected
components to be fielded (such as the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) Fire Unit) to the element THAAD level and eventually to
the block level. This latter calculation will be a full block cost
baseline estimate. Before establishing cost baseline estimates, MDA
will request an independent review by the Cost Analysis Improvement
Group, Department of Defense's (DOD) independent cost estimating unit.
Once the estimates are established, MDA will report any significant
cost variance to Congress. This information will supplement the
reporting of acquisition cost at the BMDS level in the agency's annual
Selected Acquisition Report. We are now in the process of determining
the thresholds to report such cost variations and will incorporate them
in a MDA directive.
While our capabilities-based, spiral development program may not
provide the identical kind of information and baselines generated under
DOD Instruction 5000 for traditional acquisition programs, our
intention is to fully meet the transparency, accountability, and
oversight needs of Congress and other stakeholders.

Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, would you help
facilitate this to see that these requirements are implemented?
Mr. Young. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Senator Pryor, what I have been
doing is deferring to our colleagues and I've let them ask the
questions first. So I would turn to you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Has Senator Sessions already
asked?
Senator Bill Nelson. He has already, and he is going to
jump in whenever he wants to again. [Laughter.]
Senator Pryor. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you, Senator Sessions, as well. I appreciate your
leadership on this.
Lieutenant General Campbell, let me start with you, if I
may follow up on a question, a line of questions I heard
Senator Nelson asking when I came into the room--I am sorry for
being late--about the THAAD system and the SM-3 system. Let us
see, the original inventory objective for the THAAD program was
1,250 missiles. Our current inventory objective is less than 10
percent of that. As I understand it, the people who have looked
at it said that we need quite a bit more than what we have in
our current inventory, at least that is the concern.
Can you explain how force structure and inventory
objectives are determined for these near-term theater systems
and how the process could be improved to ensure that our
military has the capabilities they need to defend against
existing threats?
General Campbell. Yes, Senator. Normally, we do studies. We
do modeling and analysis in wartime settings by theaters,
taking a look at what the threat has in their order of battle,
what blue forces have in their order of battle, and we look at
all the forces. We look at offensive forces, defensive forces
in combination and make a determination then what is required
to defend critical assets within that particular theater.
In most cases, we are never going to get to the point where
we will have enough missiles to defend against every ballistic
missile that an adversary is going to have. So, therefore, we
consider in these protocols offensive capabilities that could
reduce their effectiveness, other actions, passive defense
measures that a COCOM could take--perhaps moving critical
facilities off of locations further away from the shores of an
adversary.
So then we arrive and have to make determinations on risk.
Do we have a low-risk situation, a moderate risk, or a high-
risk situation? Can we live with those risks, given the
operations we expect to perform in that particular theater?
Then that results in a number that then we will pursue for a
particular system.
Senator Pryor. Let me make sure I understand. The 1,250
original figure, was that just picked out of thin air?
General Campbell. I am not familiar with the analysis that
supported the 1,250. I know that was back in the 1990s, that
particular study, but I am not familiar with what scenarios
they looked at. I am more familiar with what the JCM has looked
at. I am familiar with those scenarios, and I understand the
numbers and how we arrived at those.
Senator Pryor. Do you take into consideration what the
COCOMs are saying in terms of their needs?
General Campbell. Absolutely.
Senator Pryor. Secretary Young, let me ask your thoughts on
this. Does this process of determining how many, in this case,
THAAD missiles--but determining how many missiles we have, can
we improve that process? Does your office play a role in coming
out with those numbers? Could you tell the subcommittee that,
please?
Mr. Young. I think this is a good discussion for this MDEB
we talked about. I would tell you that the updated joint
capability mix study is a good starting point. As General
Campbell rightly pointed out, we may not be able to address
every threat. We may not need to because we have other
offensive strike capabilities that will hopefully take out some
of the threats before they launch.
But I believe we will bring this discussion into a MDEB to
have the discussion. The nice thing or the benefits of having
an MDA organization is that we will look across the full set of
missile defense capabilities and trade THAAD, SM-3, and PAC-3
and do it effectively and get a joint capability instead of
single-service capability. But we will be looking at this, and
we have a good starting point for the discussion with the new
mix study.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
General Obering, thank you again for your leadership on
this, and it is good to see you again. Let me ask about the
Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program. As I understand it, we are
trying to develop this MKV program. Could you give us just a
quick status report on that?
General Obering. Yes, sir. As I have stated and testified
in the past, today we have the ability to deal with simple
countermeasures, and we have flown against those in our flight
test program in the past. When we get to very complex
countermeasures, that gives us a problem. So that is a
limitation of our system. We are addressing that through a
number of ways.
One is to be able to do what we call birth-to-death
tracking of the target suite. The second thing is to employ
more advanced sensors and algorithms, and we have deployed the
radars. Now we are going to be equipping those with the
algorithms that will allow us to do the discrimination. The
third piece of that is being able to equip each interceptor
with more than a single kill vehicle so it can take out more
than one what we call ``credible object.''
So we believe that is very important to meeting the intent
that we have stated all along. It has actually been part of the
criticisms of missile defense that you can't handle complex
countermeasures. This is the way we do that.
We have a plan that we have embarked upon to provide a
volume kill or MKV capability to our GMS interceptors, our KEIs
as well, along with the sea-based interceptors, the SM-3 Block
2A, because it will be large enough to be able to handle the
volume kill capabilities.
Senator Pryor. What impact does that have on Japan? As I
understand it, they were the single kill vehicle?
General Obering. Well, first of all, we are not walking
away from the single kill vehicle. We will have that as a
complement, and that is the baseline right now of the co-
development with the Japanese. What we wanted to do is have a
volume kill capability as a Block B of that and have the SM-3
Block 2A as the unitary kill vehicle and the Block 2B as the
MKV.
I have discussed this with our Japanese friends. Initially,
the Japanese were reluctant because they did not want to have
anything that would perturb the baseline for the unitary kill
vehicle. When we had further discussion with them and we
assuaged those concerns, they actually sent a letter to me
documenting that they were okay with the MKV program, and we
think that we are on track with that.
Senator Pryor. I assume that we are counting on Japan to
play a role with our missile defense system? Is that right?
General Obering. Yes, sir. They are our leading ally right
now. With respect to their own investments in missile defense,
they are approaching about $1.5 billion a year, as I recall.
They are not only procuring capabilities from us, such as the
Patriot 3, they are also co-developing their own capabilities
like the SM-3 Block 2A I just talked about and expanding their
sea-based capabilities and sensor networks as well.
We have a very strong and robust partnership with Japan.
Senator Pryor. This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. Not
to belabor the history on this next question, but I know that
in 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld exempted MDA from some requirements
that you had. There was a concern that maybe the warfighters
were not having their say in the process. So there is a program
that you initiated called the Warfighter Involvement Program.
How has that initiative worked? Are you seeing a positive
change? Has it been successful?
General Obering. Yes, sir. I am glad--thank you very much
for that question.
There was a misconception when Secretary Rumsfeld exempted
us from the operational requirements documents that we were
walking away from warfighter requirements, and we never did
that. What we were trying to do is actually be able to
accelerate to meet the warfighter desires and to be able to
adapt to changes in the threat and to changes in those
requirements.
The requirements process that he exempted us from was a
very tedious and laborious process that was difficult to
change. We went to a different model in which we do much more
collaboration with the warfighter as we go through defining
what the capabilities are that we will be developing and
fielding. In fact, the warfighter involvement process that you
refer to is where STRATCOM, under their unified command plan
responsibility as the arbitrator, so to speak, and proponent
and advocate for missile defense, works very closely with us.
They gather up all of the COCOMs' requirements via their
integrated prioritized list, and when it comes to missile
defense, they meld that into a listing for us. Then we work
with them to tell them what we think is affordable, what we
think is doable from a technical perspective, and when we think
we could deliver that.
But I would encourage you, also, to ask the Commander of
STRATCOM, General Chilton, about that. I think that they are
pleased with that process. In fact, the last discussion I had
with him, he actually wants to accelerate that even more than
we have done in the past with respect to our POM-10.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Several of you have mentioned the
MDEB. So, Mr. Francis, let me ask you, as a part of the
leadership of the GAO, you have been looking at the oversight
of this entire defense program for a number of years. What are
your views on the MDEB?
Mr. Francis. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the executive
board is more substantive than its predecessor. I think the
membership is of a higher level. There are four standing
committees, each with designated responsibilities that I think
are intended to create a better flow of information across
different areas in the Department and different vested
interests.
I think the executive board does have a pretty good charter
about making recommendations and particularly looking at
business cases for making investment. So I think on that score,
the executive board is better than the support group that
preceded it. I think also that Mr. Young has been pretty active
in having fairly regular meetings. I think the old support
group kind of fell into disuse, and it wasn't meeting anymore.
I don't think that the executive board does carry the full
weight, if you will, of a defense acquisition board (DAB) on
other systems, which is set up to inform and help Mr. Young
make milestone decisions. Right now, the executive board is not
an approval board, it doesn't approve missile defense
decisions. So it stops short of that.
I would say there is probably some information, we were
talking earlier about cost, and I think that might get
resolved. But right now, they wouldn't get the full cost
information that a DAB would. To the extent that Dr. McQueary
is not able to do a full evaluation of operational
effectiveness and suitability, that would be something else
that might limit what the executive board could do.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I am going to get to Dr.
McQueary in a minute.
General Obering, your testimony makes a number of comments
about the new block structure. You say, ``Once baselines are
defined, work cannot be moved from one block to another.'' Does
that mean before the baselines are defined that work can be
transferred?
General Obering. Yes, sir, we were talking in the context
of the old 2004, 2006, 2008 block structure, we had the
flexibility to move back and forth in terms of the work scope.
In terms of the new block structure, our intent is that we will
define the fielded baselines. We allocate, as I said, the
budget to those, and then we execute to those baselines.
Now there always may be fact-of-life changes that we will
have to incur. But again, we would report those as part of our
reporting process.
Senator Bill Nelson. Last year's National Defense
Authorization Act required that you obtain independent cost
estimates for the missile defense systems. Will you also seek
independent cost estimates on your block cost estimates?
General Obering. Yes, sir, and by the way, we have been
doing independent cost estimates for quite awhile, so there may
be some misunderstanding. But we have been doing independent
cost estimates, working with the Department in the past, and we
intend to do so with the blocks.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, do you have some comments
about the issue of baselines and cost estimates?
Mr. Francis. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think missile defense
intends to do a total cost estimate for each of the blocks and
to baseline that. So I think one of the advantages of that is
they won't keep moving scope in and out of those blocks and
across them. That has made it difficult for us in the past to
say, ``gee, are you getting value for money?''
One of the things, and I think you cleared it up earlier on
a question, is the timeline. In other words, when is missile
defense going to provide those estimates and those baselines?
What criteria will it use to say when something is ready to be
baselined, and then how is it going to report variances on, for
example, unit costs and what assets?
So I think some of those things are to be determined, and I
think that is something that MDA should work out in
consultation with Congress.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now to you, Dr. McQueary. The law
requires you to report on the operational effectiveness,
suitability, and survivability at the end of each 2-year block.
Now with the changing of the block structure so that there are
no more 2-year blocks, would you be able to provide the report
on the characterization of the effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability on an annual basis in your required annual
report?
Dr. McQueary. That would be the proposal that we would make
to you, sir, if that serves your needs.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Your organization produced a
report last October outlining the concept for a basic test plan
for the proposed European Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
program, and your plan would permit an initial demonstration of
whether that proposed system could accomplish its mission. You
note significant differences between the GMD system and that
already deployed. Your report says, ``Simply testing the new
two-stage booster in a flight test is inadequate to assess the
operational effectiveness of the European deployment assets.''
So do we correctly surmise from your report's
recommendation that it represents minimum testing you believe
to be necessary to permit the initial level of assessment of
the ability of the proposed system to accomplish its goal?
Dr. McQueary. If I could come back to a point that I made
last year of the importance of modeling and simulation? One can
get by with fewer numbers of actual tests if one has high-
fidelity modeling and simulation. General Obering has expended
a great deal of effort this past year. There is much more to be
done in order to reach a point to where we have fully
accredited models and simulation for BMDS.
Now, with that being said, with high-fidelity accredited
models in which we have confidence in those models, based upon
showing that the models themselves are responsive and duplicate
information that we get from actual tests, it is our belief
that for the two-stage rocket, the two-stage motor, that have
one test at what I will call a taped target, not a live target,
and one test that is against an actual target, and the MDA has
that currently scheduled in their plans, I believe. It is our
belief that we need one more such shot that simulates the
actual engagement scenarios that one would see in the European
theater in order to gain confidence in the modeling and
simulation so that one could then explore the battle space in
more detail using the modeling and simulation.
Senator Bill Nelson. So one more would be how many?
Dr. McQueary. That would make a total of three.
Senator Bill Nelson. A total of three.
Dr. McQueary. A total of three in our judgment, yes. These
assume successes on each one of those, by the way.
Senator Bill Nelson. I thought there were three initial
tests?
Dr. McQueary. I believe that the MDA has two, and we had
indicated that we believe we need three, the third one being a
test that is in an actual engagement scenario that one would
see as in the European theater.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, we have a disconnect on that.
Dr. McQueary. Maybe I have caused it.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. MDA, I am told, was
planning to do two. DOT&E says, no, you need to do three.
Dr. McQueary. That is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
Dr. McQueary. But to give full credit to MDA, the test
plans that they continue to develop evolve with discussions
with us over time. So we continue to discuss the issue with
them. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let us go back to the
models and the testing. In your annual report, you said that
the system ``was hampered by the lack of flight test data and
unverified and unvalidated models and simulations.'' So it
seems that that means until these models and simulations are
anchored with enough flight tests, verified and validated, that
you are not going to be able to have confidence in the
operational performance. Is that true?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir. That is true.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Your report also says,
``MDA must accomplish more development, integration, and
testing before it adequately matures its models and simulations
and collects sufficient data to allow for verification,
validation, and accreditation.'' Continuing, ``This critical
step is required before quantitative evaluation of performance
can occur.''
So it says that, ``these models and simulations are a long
way from being ready for accreditation.'' That this situation
``has severely hampered the efforts to characterize'' the
performance of the system. So is it likely going to take
several more years to get these validated and verified models
in place?
Dr. McQueary. Well, I think it will be measured in years.
Whether it is several or whether it is a few I am not sure
because we don't have a schedule for the complete development
yet, and I think that is the important question to be answered.
But I think most importantly, the work that MDA did in this
past year of looking at the some 33 models that actually
represent various elements of MDA and determining whether those
models could be accredited or not was a major step forward
because one has to know where one is before deciding where they
want to go.
So that was done, and there are, I believe, 5 of the 33
that actually received partial accreditation. But that means
there are 26 that did not, and many of those models simply do
not have sufficient data from actual flight tests in order to
be able to help accredit them. Now that is one step. There are
a series of steps associated.
There also must be developed what I will call an MDA model
that one would use for fully exploring the battle space so you
can do what I will call Monte Carlo simulations--these are
looking at variabilities and trajectories and so forth--to gain
the confidence that this system will work in the battle space
in which it is scheduled to be worked. That applies whether we
are talking with the U.S.-based system or the European-based
system.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Now, and your report
further goes on to talk about some of the problems that have
been encountered with the target missiles for flight tests, and
you observe failure rates of 20 percent and cost increases of
450 percent. Do you want to describe some of your concerns?
Dr. McQueary. In the last 18 months, and General Obering
touches upon this same subject in his prepared remarks for the
record, and I believe he mentions 2 complete failures out of
the 42 units. We have looked primarily at the last 18 months
because that is more near-term, and out of that we have had two
complete failures, and there were two partial failures in
systems.
Senator Bill Nelson. Out of how many flights in the last 18
months?
Dr. McQueary. Out of, I believe, 20. I believe the number
is 20.
Senator Bill Nelson. So 4 out of 20?
Dr. McQueary. Four out of 20. So you are talking a 20
percent difficulty rate and certainly a 10 percent failure rate
and 10 percent more of difficulty with the targets.
The targets of necessity have become more and more complex
because, keep in mind, we are trying to simulate what the
threat would be. So inherently the targets will become more
complex. In fact, they will become more complex over time.
So the flexible target approach that General Obering and
his folks have undertaken, I think that is an important step.
But nevertheless, targets have been, to a degree, a limiting
factor in how fast testing could be done because some tests had
to be delayed because of target failures, for example, and you
have to regroup after that.
Senator Bill Nelson. As a matter of fact, you noted that in
your report that a number of the important tests had been
delayed or eliminated because of the target problems. Well,
what about if targets were available, do you think that the
Aegis and the THAAD should conduct four tests per year?
Dr. McQueary. I am an advocate of the test-evaluate-fix
approach that General Obering and MDA has used, and that has
nothing to do with my association with MDA. It has been a view
that I have had for a long period of time in my career. I spent
a couple of years on Kwajalein a long time ago before many
people in the room were born, and----
Senator Bill Nelson. No wonder you look so cool and
collected.
Dr. McQueary. We ran 31 missions in a 2-year period of
time, and I can tell you, we were having difficulty
understanding what the problems were with a given mission
before we went on to the next one. So, I am a very strong
advocate on complex systems of taking the time to analyze the
data that is collected so we can understand because data tells
you, gives you information that isn't always apparent at first
look.
I think it is very, very important in developing highly
complex systems to have good models and simulations to support
them and also to take the time to analyze the data that is
associated with those very expensive tests that are conducted.
Senator Bill Nelson. Therefore, you are saying then that
just as they did previously, you ought to do four tests a year
on Aegis and THAAD?
Dr. McQueary. I don't know whether four is the right number
or not. I would tie it to the ability to be able to analyze the
data and let that be the driving function.
Senator Bill Nelson. What say you, General Obering?
General Obering. Sir, I think we should test to verify, not
test to discover. I believe that you should test based on your
objectives and not on a calendar. As Dr. McQueary stated, if we
were going to go out and fly five, six, or seven times a year
and we are not learning anything different in each flight test,
it is a waste of the taxpayers' money, in my mind. These are
expensive tests. They can be $80 million or more for some of
these tests.
So what we want to do is take complete advantage of the
opportunity to test and understand what we learned from the
previous test, and by the way, we work this very closely with
the testers. We collect just volumes and volumes of data on
these tests. We like to go through and understand all of it.
Sometimes it takes us months to go through and reduce that data
so that we understand where we want to go for the next one.
What we like to do is base our testing on the event
structure, not on a particular calendar. Now, for planning
purposes, what we stated is that we would like to target
anywhere from two to four tests per year depending on the
system and the maturity. But again, that depends on what stage
we are going into.
As we complete the testing on the Block 1A for the SM-3,
for example, we will probably slow that down in anticipation of
more Block 1B testing that is, by the way, a major upgrade to
that interceptor, and is much more dramatic than going from a
three-stage to a two-stage on the long-range interceptor. So we
like to pace our testing based on our development needs, based
on the warfighter objectives, and based on the test team
objectives.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you had more targets, would you do
more tests?
General Obering. It depends. It all depends. If you are
totally success-oriented, yes, sir. If we were continuing to
fly and we were successful in reducing the data, I would say
that even if we were successful on every test, we would
probably not be able to fly more than twice a year for the
long-range program because of the complexity of those tests,
the data reduction timelines, the target complexities, and the
distances, et cetera. We probably could do better on the
shorter range because of the simpler approach to that in terms
of the rate.
But again, if you have a target failure, as Dr. McQueary
referred to, we had one target failure for THAAD. We had a
target failure for the long-range system as well in terms of
our intercept. We only had two target failures in the last 18
months for our intercept test, but we had to go understand what
that failure mode was before we could get back in the air with
another target.
So it doesn't do us any good to have two targets sitting in
the barn--we go out, try to fly one, and it fails and then pull
the other one out--because we need to understand why that first
one failed before we can pull the second one out to go fly it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, in your testimony, you
make the point that the original estimate for the ABL was that
it would cost $1 billion, and it would take until 2001. Now the
program has had a 500 percent cost increase, over $5 billion,
and it won't complete its demonstration until 2009.
At the end of that period, we would expect that there would
be an attempt to shoot down a boosting short-range missile to
demonstrate proof of the ABL system. If that system works, do
you believe that the initial shoot-down demonstration will
constitute proof that the ABL system will work as operationally
effective?
Mr. Francis. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that the lethality
demonstration in 2009 is essential, and it has been kind of a
difficult path to get here. But it is, I think, good that we
are at this point.
I would say that the lethality demonstration by itself
wouldn't be proof that ABL is the system that we are going to
go full with to field for the boost-phase system because it is
a demonstration, and I think what that means is that if it is
successful, it says, gee, we can do this.
Then the next thing you want to do is actual testing. This
is a demonstration. Testing tells you how repeatable this is
and how reliable. Can we do this consistently? That would give
you another data point.
Then you would have to look at and analyze what I would say
is the operational practicality, which is if the asset works,
can we get it where it needs to be and can we keep it on
station so it can do its job? Then I think, finally, you want
to say if we can do all of that, can we provide the basing, the
maintenance, logistics, the people, and so forth to make that
happen?
I think it is a crucial first question here for ABL to
answer, but I think there are other things you want to know
before you are absolutely certain that it is the right system.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you are saying not only
operationally effective, you are saying affordable, suitable,
and survivable?
Mr. Francis. Yes, sir.
General Obering. Sir, may I chime in on that, please?
Senator Bill Nelson. Please.
General Obering. That is a great example of where the
flexibilities and what we are approaching in MDA is offering a
different solution for the department. The ABL program was an
Air Force program before it was transitioned to the MDA. It was
being acquired under the normal rules, the normal approaches.
What they had done is they had established a major acquisition
program. They had built up the army of people to support that,
and they were working on maintainability, supportability, all
of the ``-ilities'' that everybody wants to have, and they had
not even achieved first light out of the laser.
We said stop. When we took over the program, we said, stop,
that doesn't make any sense. You have to go through and show
that you have the knowledge point achieved to take the first
flight of the aircraft that has been heavily modified and be
able to fire that laser for the first time. Since we did that,
and we have seen steady progress by that program going into the
lethal shoot-down for next year.
Now I echo what Mr. Francis says. We are not looking just
at a technical demonstration. We are looking at the lessons
learned in this demonstration and what does it mean for
affordability and for operational suitability? We will collect
all of this data from the test series that we will initiate
here for the lethal shoot-down in 2009 and then make a
determination as to what we need to do to the program, not
unlike, by the way, what happened on the THAAD program from
2000 until about the 2005 timeframe.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are you satisfied that you haven't
sacrificed the development of the kinetic system on the boost
phase?
General Obering. Sacrificed that? No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. By pouring the $5 billion into the
ABL?
General Obering. No, sir. I do not. In fact, we are the
ones that initiated the KEI program, and I was a great
supporter and have been a great supporter of that program over
here on the Hill since I have been the director for the past
3\1/2\ years.
So, no, sir, we were not sacrificing that. We could not get
support from the Hill on the KEI program to get it an adequate
start. We now are getting that support, and so I think we do
want to have an alternative.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Did I hear you say how much money had
been spent on ABL before it was transferred to your direction?
General Obering. Sir, I would have to go get you the
numbers in terms of what that amount was, but we could do that.
Especially what the budget estimates were for it back then, et
cetera, we can do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

(1) The initial estimate for the Airborne Laser (ABL) was $1.3
billion (Base Year 2008) with lethal demonstration scheduled for
September 2002 as disclosed in the ABL Selected Acquisition Report
dated 31 December 1996 (RCS DD-A&T (Q&A) 823); (2) The amount of money
spent on ABL from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2001 prior to
the program being transferred to MDA in fiscal year 2001 was $1.4
billion (Base Year 2008). Current funding for fiscal year 1996-2009 is
$5.1 billion (or $5.4 billion Base Year 2008) with lethal demonstration
slated for August 2009.

Mr. Francis. I think, Senator Sessions, the original, as I
remember the history of the ABL. I think when it was an Air
Force program, it was envisioned to be $1 billion and about 5
years, I think, to get to lethal shoot-down. I think right now
the estimate is about $5 billion and I think about 13 years, if
that is right.
Senator Sessions. The $5 billion includes the date for its
projected test is when?
General Obering. 2009, sir.
Mr. Francis. At that time, I recall the Air Force had the
ABL program, and they transitioned it into the acquisition
process prematurely because they needed to get more money. So
they actually got ahead of their own headlights, I would say,
there. As General Obering said, they were proceeding with the
full-blown program before they had a good understanding of the
basic technologies.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, you recommended last year
an independent assessment of the ABL program. Do you still
believe that would be useful?
Mr. Francis. Yes, I think a separate pair of eyes on--I
think boost phase is something that there has been quite a bit
of debate on, and it is something I think that we probably know
the least about if you look at the full layer of BMDS. So I
still think that is a reasonable thing to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Senator Sessions. On that, because there are real concerns
here, I know that Senator Nelson has done a lot of work on it.
Did I understand that this may be the top directed-energy laser
program in the DOD? Are there any other programs that are doing
study in this area of significance? General Campbell?
General Campbell. Yes, sir. We are doing a study for solid-
state lasers not on the same scope of what General Obering is
doing. But that is moving along, and we are moving towards a
demonstrator over the next about 18 months of a 100-kilowatt
class solid-state laser. It may have potential on the counter
rockets, artillery, and mortar mission.
Senator Sessions. On that subject, it seems to me that we
have proven that capability to some degree. Is it something we
could consider deploying in areas around the globe where our
bases may be subject to rockets or smaller rockets or mortar
rounds?
General Campbell. We think it has potential. The problem
with some of the past developmental systems, they were
chemically-based lasers, and there is a large logistics
footprint, and it is very difficult to move it around and very
difficult in handling the chemicals.
Senator Sessions. Let us talk about that. We have the green
zone and places that are pretty stable, going to be there for
some time. You don't have to move a system around a lot, would
you, even if it is a fairly substantial thing to move?
General Campbell. No, you wouldn't have to move it around a
lot, but the effectiveness of that system against the range of
threats they face, in my estimation, is not what we need today,
sir. Again, it has been very developmental, limited in scope.
Senator Sessions. Do you see a need to accelerate that?
General Campbell. In my view, there is merit in this, and I
think we should go after it sooner rather than later.
Senator Sessions. That is just a sort of a separate issue.
But go ahead.
Senator Bill Nelson. On the high-energy laser systems test
facility out at White Sands, General Campbell, in your prepared
testimony you asked for ``continued support to ensure the vital
testing ranges are postured to perform necessary testing.''
Now, does the Army's budget request for 2009 contain sufficient
funds to keep this test facility open?
General Campbell. The President's budget for 2009, we can
keep the facility open. But what we lose is the contracting
base that runs the existing chemical laser at White Sands. We
are very much customer dependent on keeping that going.
General Obering is committed to doing testing this year,
but when we get into 2009, we will be in the same condition
that we are in this year. The budget was approximately $2.8
million, which keeps the Government crew on station, and we can
educate some of our Government crews on maintaining the
chemical laser in a mothball status. But once we go about 6
months or a year after we have lost the contracting crew, it
could take us 2 to 3 years to recover the capability and quite
a bit more cost to bring it back if we still needed that
facility for testing.
Senator Bill Nelson. But you don't have any customers
except MDA, do you?
General Campbell. That is correct. MDA is the only customer
at the moment.
Senator Bill Nelson. So your funds in your request are just
to keep it open, not to operate it and able to fully support
MDA's testing plans?
General Campbell. That is correct. The current level of
funding would be able to keep it in a mothballed status over
the next few years. But we would not be able to conduct tests
on behalf of MDA.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I want to ask about the
Arrow. Israel is seeking an upper-tier missile defense system
against the Iranian Shahab-3 missiles. They are looking at
possible nuclear warheads incoming. The United States pays a
big share of this. One of the options is considering the
development of a new missile defense interceptor, which would
also require the development of a new long-range radar.
Now, isn't this getting duplicative of THAAD and SM-3
systems?
General Obering. Yes, sir. We believe so, and that is why
we have been championing having THAAD and SM-3 as solutions to
the concern of the Israelis. We have to work through,
obviously, the nondisclosure policy committees to make sure--
even to release the data on the SM-3 and the THAAD's
performances to try to assuage the Israelis' concern. We have
been successful, partially, in being able to do that, and we
are continuing to work that process.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about a SM-3 launch from a
ground-based THAAD launcher?
General Obering. Yes, sir. One of the options that we also
are investigating is taking a look at a land-based version, if
you would, of the SM-3 combined with the THAAD radar. It is a
very powerful combination, and we think, by the way, not only
is it applicable to Israel but also applicable to other areas
for our own defense as well as our other allies.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you think that might be the
solution?
General Obering. Well, sir, that is certainly one of the
options that we are putting into our analysis of alternatives.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about defending NATO Europe,
General Campbell? Could Aegis, BMD, and THAAD have an important
role in defending Europe against Iranian threats that exist
today?
General Campbell. Yes, sir. They would play a role. In
fact, if you look at the planned deployment, there is a
requirement for complementary systems to protect the
southeastern part of Europe.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, and that would be true
against Iranian missiles before they would get the long-range
missiles?
General Campbell. Yes, sir, that is true. They are
developing a missile today that can range parts of southeastern
Europe.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, one of the success
stories is the Aegis BMD system with its SM-3 interceptor. You
may not want to recognize it, but it was a collaborative
program with the United States Navy. That is a joke.
[Laughter.]
General Obering. I hope so, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. You have had impressive results. The
question is, are we buying enough of the interceptors to
continue to develop the system to its full potential? Can you
confirm that this system with the SM-3 will have a greater
capability when it has the improved software and hardware to
allow launching and engaging on remote sensor tracks?
General Obering. Yes, sir. We are planning that. But if I
may, I feel like a proud father because of all of my children.
We have had tremendous success with Aegis. We have also had
tremendous success with our long-range system, and we have had
tremendous success with THAAD. So I am very pleased with that.
We have had our challenges on all of the programs. We have
had our challenges on the long-range. We certainly have had our
challenges on the Aegis as well. We had issues with the third-
stage rocket motor and with the solid divert and attitude
control system. But working together as a team, we were able to
solve those and move ahead, and I feel very comfortable there.
Same thing with THAAD. We have had issues with THAAD that
we had to work through with respect to qualification of
components and that type of thing. But our test program that we
have had going back to 2001, and certainly since 2005, I think
is a tribute to that collaboration across the board.
With respect to the sea-based, as I said in the earlier
THAAD discussion, and by the way, I was asked this question
several years back by Secretary Rumsfeld about whether we don't
need more land-based, silo-based missiles, more than the 54
that we are currently producing? My answer was ``no,'' sir, we
don't because that is enough to provide us the persistent 24/7
coverage that we need for the United States and our allies in
the regions, and where we want to go to next is to more mobile
capabilities and enhance those capabilities to be able to
address the longer-range threats.
So that is why we are moving that way as we move into the
future because we have been able to secure the homeland and our
allies from the initial long-range. Now let us look at what we
can do for the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. The joint capability mix study
indicates that you need to buy about twice as many SM-3
missiles as currently planned. Is that going to be necessary to
have additional procurement?
General Obering. Yes, sir. That is our intent, to be able
to do that. We would flow that in our POM is what we intend. It
would not require any significant capitalization to be able to
do that with respect to a production rate.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is the Aegis BMD program and the Navy,
is that program funding going to be restored from when they
shot down the defense satellite?
General Obering. Sir, that was MDA money that did that, and
we have been working that within the department to be able to
recover that cost.
Senator Bill Nelson. What is the cost?
General Obering. Because we took only one shot, it was
roughly about $70 million total.
Senator Bill Nelson. You are going to get that money back
from whom?
General Obering. We are trying to work it through the
supplemental process is what I understood. By the way, sir, if
I may, while you are on the subject, that was a great lesson in
integration that was learned by many, many folks. It is
something that we have been preaching for a long time.
Senator Bill Nelson. We certainly compliment you on that.
General Obering. The ship could not have done that by
itself. It had to have off-board information to be able to do
that, and it took the whole team to be able to do that. Now
that has implications for, as you stated in your question, how
we integrate land-based radars with the ships, how we integrate
the ships with land-based interceptors. It can tremendously
extend your detection and engagement zone, so it is a very,
very powerful force multiplier.
Senator Bill Nelson. In your proposed Europe two-stage
interceptor, is there going to be any difference between the
two-stage booster that you test and the two-stage booster that
is proposed to be deployed operationally?
General Obering. No, sir, not at this time. This is an
identical configuration with respect to about 95 percent of
that interceptor. We are just removing the third stage. We are
doing some modifications to the adaptors, to the software, as
you state. So there are minimal changes to that.
In addition, we have other upgrades that we will do across
the board to our GMD programs, but they will be factored in as
we go. We are always in a state of continuous improvement, if
you want to call it that. But right now, the configuration that
we plan to fly for the booster verification and the intercept
test is the configuration that we would plan to deploy. There
may be minor improvements, but that is the plan.
Senator Bill Nelson. You have had some quality problems
with the hardware in the Ground-Based Interceptors. What has
been done to replace that equipment, retrofit it, and how about
the flight software?
General Obering. First of all, some of the reliability
issues that we have had, both from a qualification standpoint
on the ground-based--the long-range system, as well as the
THAAD system in terms of the qualifications there, we have
worked through. We have been able to divert funds to do that.
That was more than 2 years ago now, and we are reaping the
benefits of those rewards.
We continue to preach that in terms of the next generation
of improvements on the long-range system and make sure that we
are paying attention to the new configurations and improvements
in the kill vehicle, along with the software improvements as
well. So I feel that we are on track there.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Do you take the interceptors out
of their silos, the ones that are there operationally? Do you
use them as flight test vehicles?
General Obering. The plan is that we take them out and that
we do the refurbishment for those. Some of those will be
outfitted with a flight termination system so that we can use
those in our flight testing. But we like to be able to test the
configurations coming off the line as well.
So we do some improvements. For the most part, we can
upgrade the software right through the umbilicals in the silo.
We remove them for other things, like we have changed the fuel
mixture and some other things to improve its performance. Those
are the things that require the interceptors to be removed.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. You know about Europe and French
President Sarkozy on March 21 said this in Cherbourg, France.
``In order to preserve our freedom of action, missile defense
capabilities against a limited strike could be a useful
complement to nuclear deterrence''--I guess that is mutually
assured destruction--``without being a substitute for it.''
He went on to say, ``It is in this spirit that we are
taking part in the collective work of the Atlantic alliance. We
have solid technical know-how in this area that could be taken
advantage of when the time comes.''
General Obering, that reflects to me a fundamental support
for the concept of a missile defense system in Europe. Would
you agree with that?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. That is somewhat of a change from what we
have seen in the past in France?
General Obering. Yes, sir, and by the way, that is
reflective. Right now, we have about 18 nations around the
world that we have some type of activity on missile defense--
everything from, as I stated earlier, the Japanese involvement
to basic research and development across the board. We are
seeing a resurgence of this because nations are recognizing the
threat. They are recognizing the urgency of this.
Senator Sessions. There is an interesting article on the
25th anniversary of the missile defense program by Mr. Hackett.
It fell on Easter Sunday, and he made reference to the fact
that this is a lifesaving program. It defends against attack.
It doesn't attack somebody else. It defends human beings from
dangerous attacks, and hopefully, we can continue to see that
improve.
Dr. McQueary, I appreciate your role, it is very important.
I respect your ideas about the third test there. I think it is
important that we try to accomplish that if we can. But you
note in your prepared statement that the hit-to-kill is no
longer a technological uncertainty, ``It is a reality being
successfully demonstrated many times over the past few years,''
and you note that the GMD, the BMDS, ``has a limited capability
to defend against simple ballistic missile threats launched
from North Korea toward the United States.''
So I think that represents your analysis a bit detached
from the system that we are onto something that is important
here.
Secretary Young, is the DOD committed not only to deploying
the system that we have, but making it even more effective
against sophisticated countermeasures and other type
capabilities we might face in the future.
Mr. Young. Certainly. The budget request seeks to continue
that process.
Senator Sessions. I will just say this about the funding
that we are in. I think Congress has an obligation to review
where we spend the money and what lower priorities could be
sacrificed in favor of higher priorities. But I really think we
ought to support at least the President's fundamental budget
because we already see things like THAAD we wish we could do
more of. We wish we could do more of some of these other
systems that I think we need to do.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would note that, at least for this
hearing, it may be General Obering's last time before us. I
have to say that during your leadership and your predecessor's,
we have seen our way through some highly challenging
technological problems to a day that when the North Koreans
rattle their missiles, we feel confident that we can knock it
down, or that we have a satellite that endangers life around
the world if not destroyed and we have proven we can knock it
out of the sky.
I do believe that enhances our security. I believe it
enhances the ability of our President to make good decisions
and not have to worry about being intimidated by even a
relatively small nation who may have this technology. I think,
General Obering, you have testified many times, you are a very
good advocate for the program and proven to be a good manager,
and I wanted to express my appreciation.
We may well see you before you get away from us in
November. I understand that is your expected date to depart.
Senator Bill Nelson. We can always call him back.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. What if we had a test failure, do you
think we might call him back?
General Obering. I am sure.
Senator Sessions. Even if you have left, we may call you
back.
Senator Bill Nelson. Or a success.
Senator Sessions. Or a success.
Senator Bill Nelson. We might have you, when is the next
test?
General Obering. Sir, we have a series of tests in June
with Aegis and THAAD, and then we have a July planned test now
for the long-range system, and then we have another one of the
long-range system later in the year, as well as THAAD.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, why don't we have you back in
July, after the July test? Of course, what Senator Sessions
said speaks for the committee as well in thanking you for your
public service.
I am curious in this thought that was brought up early in
the hearing. How would the Poles and the Czechs treat it if we
deployed the radar, but not the launchers?
General Obering. Well, sir, first of all, as I said, they
are meant to go together. That is meant to provide the coverage
that we need for the longer range. It is certainly--the radar
provides value. The interceptors have to have the sensors to
provide value as well. So we are viewing that as a package, and
I think that they probably view that as a package as well.
But the radar, in and of itself, is a tremendous advantage
to the shorter- and medium-range defenses.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you don't have a feeling about how
each of those countries would feel if there were a decision by
the next President just to deploy the radar?
General Obering. No, sir. You would have to ask them.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, we will see you in July
then.
General Obering. Don't feel compelled, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
concurrent development and fielding
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Young and Mr. Francis, to meet the
President's direction to rapidly field an initial missile defense
capability, the Department of Defense (DOD) accepted the increased risk
of concurrently developing and fielding systems. Among other things,
such concurrency poses the risk of fielding prototype systems that
don't work properly, need fixing after they are deployed, and cost
additional money. I know you have both given a great deal of serious
thought to the issues and risks posed by such a highly concurrent
acquisition approach, which is not the Department's normal or desired
acquisition approach. Now that we have achieved that initial rapid
fielding, do you agree that we should consider reducing the degree of
concurrency in the missile defense acquisition program?
Mr. Young. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is an effort
to develop and integrate a number of elements produced in relatively
small numbers. To date, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has used
knowledge points composed of ground and flight testing and modeling and
simulation to assess the performance and maturity of each element and
the system as a whole. As the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation testified, MDA is working to improve the fidelity of the
respective models and to benchmark these models against test results.
The limited fielding of the BMDS has been largely threat and event
driven, with fielding decisions based on available information. You are
correct that some of the urgent deployment efforts have resulted in a
need to modify some of the fielded systems. I plan to conduct
comprehensive evaluations of BMDS Element progress in preparation for
procurement actions, and will consider, among other aspects,
concurrency implications for future development and fielding.
Mr. Francis. Yes, the amount of concurrent development and fielding
of the MDA's BMDS assets should be reduced. In 2002, the President
directed DOD to begin fielding an initial missile defense system
capable of defending the United States, deployed troops, friends, and
allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight
as soon as technically possible. Prior to this directive, MDA had
adopted an acquisition strategy that included many of the knowledge-
based practices that enable leading commercial developers to field
sophisticated products on time and within budget. However, in order to
field an initial capability quickly, MDA accepted the risk of
concurrent development and fielding during its initial block of work--
Block 2004--and departed from its knowledge-based strategy. If MDA had
followed its knowledge-based approach, the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) program would have moved through a sequence of eight
events that included assessing the maturity of critical technologies,
designing the element, and demonstrating the stability of the element's
design in an end-to-end test using production representative
components--all before making a decision to produce and field the
element. Instead, the GMD program concurrently matured technology,
designed the element, tested the design, and produced and fielded the
system, even though the stability of the element's design had not been
demonstrated in an end-to-end test and production processes were not
mature. Consequently, the program encountered quality control problems
and to date, the performance of certain GMD interceptors remain
questionable because the program was inattentive to quality assurance.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) understands that
significant risk had to be accepted to satisfy the President's
directive to field an initial capability by 2004. However, now that an
initial capability has been fielded, MDA should return to an
acquisition strategy that achieves a better balance between expediency
and risk. Although Block 2004 ended on December 31, 2005 and fielded an
initial capability, MDA has continued to concurrently develop and field
assets before they were fully tested. MDA's acquisition strategy should
provide a means for demonstrating design maturity and operational
effectiveness prior to continued manufacturing and fielding of
components. If MDA continues to use concurrency as a means to expedite
fielding, we believe MDA will continue to experience cost growth and
performance shortfalls.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Young and Mr. Francis, what do you
believe would be the major benefits of a less concurrent missile
defense program?
Mr. Young. Benefits of a less concurrent program include increased
performance data prior to fielding, reduced retrofit requirements after
fielding, and increased configuration stability between production and
deployed interceptors which should reduce missile production and
support costs. However, maintaining concurrency allows incremental
improvements to be available for implementation into the deployed
interceptors. Thus, the challenge for DOD is executing a program with
the appropriate balance. I am taking additional steps to ensure that
the Department, through the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB),
maintains the appropriate balance between maturity and production
stability, technical risks and cost to decide when to field a BMDS
capability.
Mr. Francis. GAO has found that fully developing a component or
element and demonstrating its capability prior to production increases
the likelihood that the product will perform as intended and minimizes
the risk of unexpected cost increases. Over the last several years, GAO
has undertaken a body of work that examines weapon acquisition issues
from a perspective that draws upon lessons learned from best product
development practices. Collectively, these practices comprise a process
that is anchored in knowledge. It is a process in which technology
development and product development are treated differently and managed
separately. The process of developing technology culminates in
discovery--the gathering of knowledge--and must, by its nature, allow
room for unexpected results and delays. GAO has found that consequences
accrue to programs that are still working to mature technologies well
into system development when they should be focused on maturing the
system design and preparing for production. For example, while
undertaking a concurrent approach to developing and fielding BMDS
components, MDA experienced cost increases that amounted to $1 billion
each for its first and second increments of work. Additionally, its GMD
element realized in 2005 that the performance of some of its
interceptors could be degraded because the interceptors included
potentially unreliable parts as the program encountered quality control
problems that stemmed from an acceleration of its acquisition cycle.
While MDA has begun the process of retrofitting these interceptors, it
is costing the agency more money and time to do so. If a knowledge-
based approach had been followed to develop and manufacture these
assets, MDA may have fielded more reliable assets as well as reduced
performance risks and costs of those interceptors containing
questionable parts.

missile defense executive board
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Young, the MDEB was established last
year to provide more effective oversight of the missile defense
program. This was a much needed step in the right direction. How does
the MDEB oversight role of the MDA differ from the oversight role that
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) provides to other major defense
acquisition programs?
Mr. Young. The MDEB was established to recommend and oversee
implementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and
investment options to protect our Nation and allies from missile
attack. The MDEB authorities and responsibilities extend to
comprehensive oversight of all of the MDA's activities including those
outside the scope of the traditional milestone review process for
individual programs (e.g., assessments and potential influence on
policy, threat assessments, capability requirements, budget
formulation, and fielding options). Within the MDEB forum, I will be
able to pursue an agenda that examines these topic areas and any other
that will enhance BMDS development and fielding. When compared to a
typical program DAB, the MDEB meets more frequently and, under my
leadership, will continue to meet six times a year, or more often when
necessary, to address appropriate MDA oversight topics. I plan to use
the MDEB in a decisionmaking manner which will be very comparable to
the DAB role.

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Young, does the MDEB consider, as its
charter suggests, how best to field near-term capabilities to meet
warfighter needs against existing short- and medium-range threats in a
timely, efficient, cost-effective manner?
Mr. Young. Yes, the MDEB's Operational Forces Committee is chaired
by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is composed of
other principal members of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
The MDEB relies on the Operational Forces Committee to review and
prioritize BMDS requirements, integrate those current Department
priorities, and provide recommendations. The Policy Committee has
reviewed possible threat expansion, and will continue to influence
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) priorities and MDEB deliberations
regarding deployment capabilities. In addition, the use of research,
development, technology, and evaluation funding allows the flexibility
to redirect resources to meet the needs to counter emerging or evolving
threats.

5. Senator Levin. Secretary Young, has the Board made any
recommendations for the missile defense program? If so, what
recommendations were made, and have they been approved?
Mr. Young. The MDEB recommendations include the following: the lead
Service for the European Midcourse Radar (EMR), expansion of capability
analyses for other than primary BMDS threats and specific language for
a Guidance memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the BMDS
Life Cycle Management Process and Business Rules. The lead Service and
capability analysis recommendations were approved and have generated
work in both areas. The Deputy Secretary of Defense Guidance memo is
currently in coordination with a signature anticipated in the near
term. These are initial steps for the MDEB. I intend to pursue a more
aggressive agenda and role as we move forward and mature the MDEB
process.

6. Senator Levin. Secretary Young, the MDEB charter says that it
will ``engage other government agencies,'' among a host of other
institutions, to help ``advance our mission successfully.'' Is Congress
one of the government entities with which the MDEB is intended to
engage? If so, do you plan to engage Congress on a regular basis?
Mr. Young. I believe the MDEB is a unique opportunity to focus
senior Department officials on a national priority, and to positively
influence and closely monitor its development and operations. I
maintain an inclusive approach to provide all stakeholders a voice in
the process, and will engage Congress when appropriate to provide
assessments of insight and oversight progress. Congress is a partner in
the activities of DOD. I am prepared to work with and engage Congress
as requested.

not enough ground-based midcourse defense flight tests
7. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, your most recent annual report on
missile defense says that there have not been enough flight tests of
the GMD system, nor validated and verified models and simulations, to
characterize its performance. You also said that it is ``the least
mature'' and ``least understood'' of the deployed missile defense
systems, and that it ``has undergone less testing in all areas of
effectiveness and suitability.'' For example, your report says that ``a
characterization of suitability is not yet possible,'' and that ``more
flight tests are required to make this characterization.'' The same is
true for characterizing the survivability of the GMD system. So, is it
correct that, based on the limited flight test data so far, and the
lack of validated and verified models and simulations, you cannot yet
say whether the system is operationally effective, suitable, or
survivable?
Dr. McQueary. That is correct.

8. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, with respect to GMD test adequacy,
your report says: ``limited flight test data (two intercepts in 4
years), limited operational realism (target scene presentations), and a
lack of independent accreditation of models and simulations impaired
test adequacy.'' The report notes that, as a result, ``confidence in
the system performance predictions based on the models and simulations
is low.'' So is it correct to understand that, especially if there is
only one flight test this fiscal year, it will likely be some years
before these problems can be resolved and GMD flight testing adequacy
will not be impaired?
Dr. McQueary. Yes. The problems can be resolved as soon as the root
causes are identified. The details are contained in the classified Part
II of our fiscal year 2007 assessment of the BMDS. Unfortunately, one
flight test per year will not be adequate to determine operational
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability, with confidence, anytime
soon. Nor will it be sufficient to assess equipment reliability or show
repeatability. A comprehensive ground and flight test program, combined
with verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations, are
necessary to confidently assess and predict performance.

ground-based midcourse defense salvo and multi-target tests
9. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, the GMD system is designed to
intercept multiple missile targets, and its standard firing doctrine is
to shoot two interceptors at each missile target. When I asked General
Renuart, the Combatant Commander of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) who is
responsible for operating the system, about testing the system in an
operationally realistic manner, he agreed that we should conduct salvo
test launches and multiple target intercept tests. Given the importance
of demonstrating the intended capability of the system so we have
confidence that it works, do you agree that it would be important to
conduct flight tests of the GMD system using salvo launches of two
interceptors, and using multiple targets for intercepts?
Dr. McQueary. I also think the MDA should conduct at least one GMD
salvo launch. Yes, ground testing can demonstrate salvo launches and
multiple targets. However, there are some things that ground testing
cannot demonstrate such as simultaneous communications with two closely
spaced interceptors, or the possible detrimental impacts on the sensor
of the trailing kill vehicle when the divert and attitude control
system (DACS) is firing on the leading kill vehicle. Aegis BMD
successfully conducted a salvo engagement during FTM-13, and Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) plans a salvo engagement on FTT-10.

operational testing still desired
10. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, although missile defense system
testing so far has been developmental testing with operational
characteristics added, there is no dedicated operational testing
planned yet. Operational test and evaluation is the process for
learning how a weapon system will actually work in an operational
setting. Do you agree that, in addition to the current testing effort,
there is still value in operational test and evaluation for missile
defense systems, and that such operational testing should take place?
Dr. McQueary. Yes. We learn things about system performance and
system limitations during operational testing that we don't normally
learn during developmental testing or even during combined
developmental/operational testing. The Secretary of Defense, in his
January 2002 memorandum on missile defense program direction,
recognized this and stated that when a decision is made to transition a
block configuration of an element to a Service for procurement and
operation, an Operational Test Agent will be designated and an
operational test and evaluation will be conducted to characterize the
operational effectiveness and suitability of the block configuration of
the element. I agree with this policy. However, I believe that for the
elements of the BMDS, the scope of the operational test and evaluation
required to determine operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability, could be tailored based on what we previously learned
during the combined developmental/operational testing. Verified,
validated, and accredited models and simulations would also play an
important role in this evaluation. This approach would provide the best
value to the Nation given the expense of testing the BMDS.

operation iraqi freedom consumes missile defense capabilities
11. Senator Levin. General Campbell, your prepared testimony says:
``Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) consumes significant quantities of our
key missile defense capabilities, leaving other worldwide commitments
under-resourced.'' What key missile defense capabilities does OIF
consume, and what other worldwide commitments are left under-resourced
as a result?
General Campbell. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense forces continue
to provide a full range of air and missile defense protection in the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations. Specifically, key
missile defense capabilities provided include:

Patriot missile defense of critical assets;
Counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) protection of
critical assets. The C-RAM mission includes both sensor and
warning and an active intercept capability;
Air defense and airspace management for maneuver commanders;
Performance of a detainee operations mission by an air and
missile defense battalion.

As with virtually all other mission areas within the Army and the
other Services, the operations tempo requirements of OIF have dictated
some difficult decisions to ensure adequate air and missile defense
capabilities within the CENTCOM Theater. Air and missile defense
resources that would normally support other combatant commanders are
assigned to the CENTCOM Theater. A good example is European Command
(EUCOM). There, the U.S. committed to providing theater missile defense
forces, such as Patriot, to NATO's Active Layered Theatre Ballistic
Missile Defense Program which is scheduled to be operational in the
2010-2011 timeframe. We will have to find the right balance between
CENTCOM's missile defense requirements and our NATO commitment.

12. Senator Levin. General Campbell, would it reduce the strain of
this situation if we had additional missile defense force structure
deployed to address the other worldwide commitments, like additional
PAC-3, SM-3, or Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems?
General Campbell. Yes, it would. There is a growing demand signal
from Geographical Combatant Commanders for additional missile defense
force structure to meet regional requirements. This has led the Army to
fund additional Patriot force structure and led the MDA to address the
recent recommendations from the latest iteration of the Joint
Capability Mix Study in the upcoming budget submission. MDA plans to
seek congressional approval to procure additional SM-3 and THAAD
assets.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
oversight of ballistic missile defense programs
13. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, as the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), you are the
senior acquisition official in DOD, with the statutory authority to
overrule service acquisition executives. You are expected to provide
active, rigorous, and detailed oversight of major DOD acquisition
programs, including BMD programs. You are also the Chairman of the
MDEB, which has a responsibility for reviewing and making
recommendations on the programs of the MDA. Please provide a detailed
explanation of the specific steps you are taking and planning to take
to exercise your oversight responsibilities of the BMD programs of the
MDA.
Mr. Young. I will continue to conduct reviews of the BMDS and its
elements to assess program status, and continue the tempo of the MDEB
to provide a broader DOD exposure. For development, fielding, and
support of BMDS blocks and element assessments, I plan to implement a
rigorous baseline agreement with defined cost, schedule, and
performance parameters to allow continuous evaluation of program
execution. I am evaluating the additional steps to be taken to ensure
sufficient Department oversight and influence is exercised. We will
derive an early and continued visibility into BMDS and its elements by
a broad spectrum of the Department, enabling us to provide the
necessary guidance to maintain missile defense priorities within
program cost and schedule constraints. In addition, the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the operational testers are
continuously involved with MDA activities and, together, annually
report to Congress on the status of BMDS testing.

14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, do you believe there are
any additional authorities or responsibilities you might need to
exercise more effective oversight of the MDA and its programs?
Mr. Young. The Department currently provides oversight of MDA in
accordance with the memorandum issued by Secretary Rumsfeld. Within the
constraints of this memorandum, I have the authorities assigned to
USD(AT&L) to exercise oversight of the MDA, and the BMDS and its
elements.

transition and transfer of ballistic missile defense programs
15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, the MDA is notionally the
developer and initial fielding organization for missile defense
systems, with each weapon system expected to be transitioned to one of
the military Services at the appropriate time. The Services would be
concerned about having to pay for expensive missile defense systems in
addition to all their other priorities competing for funding. How and
when do you believe missile defense systems should be transitioned to
the Services and under what circumstances?
Mr. Young. The DOD criteria for transition are consistent with
standard program management guidelines for assessment of element
maturity, effectiveness, and supportability. The criteria include the
maturity of the element design, the testing completed, the assessment
by DOT&E, delivery schedules, funding profile, and planning for
operation and support (O&S). Current Department guidance has the
Director, MDA recommend an element for transition to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who
makes his recommendation to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who
approves the transition.
The MDA and the Services are engaged in near continuous discussions
on how and when to transition and transfer missile defense
capabilities. The Department is considering a BMD Life Cycle Management
Process intended to address these concerns.

16. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, given the many competing
priorities for Service funding, how do you believe these programs
should be funded when they are transitioned to the Services?
Mr. Young. The Department is considering a BMD Life Cycle
Management process to address this issue.

baselines and cost estimates for ballistic missile defense blocks
17. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, your prepared testimony
makes a number of comments about the new block structure that deserve
some clarification. For example, you say: ``Once baselines are defined,
work cannot be moved from one block to another.'' Does that mean that
before baselines are defined, work can be transferred from one block to
another? If so, isn't that the problem we were trying to fix?
General Obering. Congress expects us to be both transparent and
accountable. In that spirit, we intend to explain our plans clearly--
committing only to a program that we can confidently deliver. Prior to
commitment to a baseline, we will establish goals for blocks we would
like to baseline in the future. Within the fiscal year 2008 BMDS Block
Baselines and Goals (SOG) document submitted to Congress with the
fiscal year 2009 President's budget we called these blocks ``Capability
Goals.'' These goals are dependent on the successful completion of
technology development or the occurrence of some event(s) prior to
baseline commitment. It is our expectation that the content for these
capability goals can be achieved and will be baselined. However,
circumstances may arise, such as change of requirements or nature of
the threat that would require us to shift work from one block to
another. Once we commit to a baseline, we intend to field that block
with the promised schedule, budget, and performance and will not move
that work to another block. Before we commit to baselines, we remain
open to moving work in or out of a block if there is a good reason for
doing so, however, we will always coordinate these changes with the
warfighter community and explain the reason to Congress to further the
goals of transparency and accountability.

18. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, you also say: ``When MDA
believes a firm commitment can be made to Congress, the Agency will
establish schedule, budget, and performance baselines for a block.'' It
is not clear what that means, and why you can't make a commitment to
Congress now. Please explain what you mean by this comment.
General Obering. The quoted statement is a general tenet of our new
block structure. We will make a firm commitment when we have a high
level of confidence that the baselines can be achieved. Actually, we
have established those baselines for Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S.
from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats), 2.0 (Defense of Allies
and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One Region/
Theater), and 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited
Iranian Long-Range Threats) and presented them in our fiscal year 2008
BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) document that accompanied the
President's budget for fiscal year 2009. In the spirit of enhancing
transparency and accountability, we comit to deliver on established
baselines. As presented in the SOG, we established goals (not
baselines) for Blocks 3.3 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include
Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats--Improved Discrimination and System
Track), 4.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces in Europe from
Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand Protection of the U.S. Homeland), and
5.0 (Expand Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-
Intermediate Range Threats in Two Regions/Theaters) because we did not
believe a firm commitment can be made to Congress at this time. It
would not make much sense, for example, to baseline the schedule for
Block 4.0 because we are still waiting for host nation agreements to be
finalized. It would also not be reasonable to baseline the performance
of an interceptor that we have not yet built or tested, such as the SM-
3 Block IB interceptors in Block 5.0.

19. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, given that, as you
acknowledge, Block 1 is nearly complete and Block 2 is well underway,
why haven't you already established those baselines for Block 1 and
Block 2?
General Obering. Actually, we have established schedule, budget,
and performance baselines for Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from
Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats) and 2.0 (Defense of Allies and
Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One Region/
Theater), as well as Block 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to
Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats), and presented them to
Congress in our fiscal year 2008 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG)
document that accompanied the President's budget for fiscal year 2009.

20. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, are you saying you don't
expect to establish baselines until a block is completed?
General Obering. Not at all. Our fiscal year 2008 BMDS Block
Baselines and Goals (SOG) document sent to Congress with the
President's budget for fiscal year 2009 was the first under our new
block structure. In this SOG, we presented our baselines for Block 1.0
(Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats),
which is still ongoing but expected to be complete in fiscal year 2009,
and Blocks 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-
Medium Range Threats in One Region/Theater) and 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense
of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats), which are
projected for completion in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2013
respectively.

independent review teams
21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, I understand you have
recently established a number of Independent Review Teams and at least
one Mission Readiness Task Force (MRTF), as well as other Readiness
Review Teams. Please provide a list of each of the review teams you
have established, and explain the specific reasons you established each
team.
General Obering. In March 2005, I established an MRTF under the
leadership of RADM Kathleen Paige to focus our efforts on delivering a
BMDS that is ready to conduct its mission when called upon. The MRTF
was initially focused on the GMD element and its flight test program
with the charter to develop and refine disciplined procedures for the
flight test readiness review process. Admiral Paige's efforts provided
a near-term comprehensive test plan to restore the GM flight test
program, and the guiding principles provided by the task force have
been applied across the BMDS to ensure our readiness to conduct each
system level flight test.
Upon Admiral Paige's retirement from active duty at the end of
2005, I retained Don Mitchell, a key member of the MRTF, to apply
mission readiness principles across all BMDS elements. Mr. Mitchell
heads the Independent Readiness Review Teams (IRRT) for GMD, Aegis BMD
and THAAD, and is my direct representative to the program directors,
providing independent advocacy for mission readiness.
In addition to these element IRRTs, over the past year I convened a
review team to assess the test plan for our Space Tracking and
Surveillance System (STSS) satellite demonstration effort. After a
series of technical challenges in the thermal vacuum testing of the
first STSS satellite, I asked for a team of nationally recognized space
experts from the National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab to review our
program plan and identify any risk areas.

22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, what tasks have you
assigned to each of these independent teams, and when do you expect
them to report back to you?
General Obering. The IRRTs are charged with the following:

(1) Working within the element's mission readiness review
process to identify risks to mission success and offer advice
to mitigate those risks;
(2) Serving as an independent voice to the program directors
on any technical issue affecting the conduct of a mission; and
(3) Providing inputs for consideration as part of the program
director's decision to proceed with a mission or to provide
their own assessment to the Director regarding the element's
readiness to proceed. The element IRRTs provide input for
executive management reviews conducted before the execution of
each mission.

For the STSS independent review, each participating organization
was asked to review our satellite demonstration program and then
provide technical and programmatic recommendations and space
acquisition lessons learned that could be applicable to STSS or future
MDA space elements of BMDS. They provided me a final report in March
2008.

23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, what programmatic
decisions or changes could result from their work?
General Obering. The IRRT provides a non-advocate perspective to
the mission readiness assessment process and is a valuable tool for
assessing and managing risk. This team also provides the Director with
deeper insight into the technical issues surrounding a particular
mission.
The STSS review team validated the program plan. Their
recommendations helped us to improve how we manage risk, and we made
adjustments to our test program accordingly.

operational realism in ground-based midcourse defense flight tests
24. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, your February 2008 annual
report on missile defense noted that for the GMD flight tests,
``warfighters operating from Fort Greely, the primary fire control
facility, did not participate in these tests.'' If warfighters at Fort
Greely were to participate in flight tests by launching the
interceptors, perhaps while the control facility at Colorado Springs
launched the targets, would that add operational realism to the flight
tests, and would it provide additional confidence that the system could
work as intended?
Dr. McQueary. Yes to both questions. Anytime warfighters operate
from their wartime positions, operational realism is enhanced. Fort
Greely is the primary fire control node for GMD; the control facility
at Shriever Air Force Base (AFB) is the secondary fire control node for
GMD. Both locations are designed to fire interceptors from either Fort
Greely or Vandenberg AFB. Although launching interceptors from Fort
Greely in peacetime is unacceptable for safety reasons, launching them
from Vandenberg AFB using the Fort Greely fire control and a formed
warfighter crew should be demonstrated at least once in the GMD test
program and builds confidence.

25. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, your report also notes that
``the addition of limited operational realism to BMDS testing against
strategic threats has uncovered unanticipated deficiencies that will
require additional development and testing.'' You also note that the
MDA ``has not identified their root causes.'' Can you say how much
additional development and testing you believe will be required to
resolve these unanticipated deficiencies and will that require
identifying their root causes?
Dr. McQueary. Until the MDA identifies the root causes and applies
permanent fixes for the deficiencies, we will never have confidence
that the mitigation strategies will work in all circumstances and
intercept conditions. Once the MDA identifies the root causes and
applies permanent fixes, two flight tests should be sufficient to prove
the solutions.

cobra dane flight test
26. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, the primary sensor for the
GMD system that is deployed in Alaska and California is the Cobra Dane
radar on Shemya Island, rather than the Beale radar in California.
Cobra Dane is the radar that would see a potential North Korean missile
launch and provide the data for the GMD interceptors to defeat the
missile. However, there has never been an intercept flight test using
the Cobra Dane radar, and the one target fly-by of Cobra Dane did not
provide a basis for confidence in its performance. If it were possible,
and I know it is difficult given the geography, to have an intercept
flight test using Cobra Dane as the primary sensor, would a successful
test using Cobra Dane increase your confidence in the ability of the
system to work as it is actually intended to work?
Dr. McQueary. Certainly a successful intercept flight test using
Cobra Dane as the primary sensor would increase our confidence in Cobra
Dane performance. My office has been looking at the requirements to
conduct this intercept flight test. When we complete our study, we will
be glad to share it with you.

27. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, your annual report says
that, because there are no validated and accredited models for
operational evaluations of Cobra Dane, ``this will require the MDA to
fly another target through the Cobra Dane field of view.'' Am I correct
that unless there is such a test, your organization will not be able to
assess the performance of Cobra Dane? I presume that is why this is one
of your recommendations to MDA.
Dr. McQueary. We saw some performance issues from the first flight
test that the model did not predict. That is why I support a retest
after all the fixes have been made. Following the retest, the MDA
should be able to verify and validate the Cobra Dane model which will
allow us to more confidently assess Cobra Dane performance. This
approach tracks well with General Obering's ``test-analyze-fix-test''
approach.

28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, since Cobra Dane is the
primary sensor for GMD against a potential North Korean long-range
missile, will you schedule a target fly-by test as soon as possible to
confirm the performance of Cobra Dane and if so, when will that test
take place?
General Obering. Yes. MDA is planning flight test opportunities to
include both dedicated and non-cooperative targets. A flight test is
planned in fiscal year 2012 to test the cumulative Cobra Dane upgrades
planned through software build 2.6.6.1. In the interim, we are actively
evaluating the incremental software changes made to Cobra Dane
subsequent to the September 2005 test using our tactical hardware/
software-in-the-loop based ground test program, targets of opportunity
from foreign launches, and satellites tracks.

MDA PROJECT FTX FLIGHT TESTS FISCAL YEAR 2010-2012
Draft: March 14, 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTX-07 Fiscal Year
2010 FTX-08 Fiscal Year 2011 FTX-09 Fiscal Year 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary.............................. Within a BMDS Within a BMDS Within a BMDS
Objectives........................... framework, demonstrate framework, conduct a framework, Cobra Dane
SCN-06-0027 end-to-end tracking exercise characterization of
simulated engagement (with potential software build 2.6.6.1
of a complex target simulated engagements) (Requested by DOT&E).
launched from KLC with of a medium range
AN/TPY-2 (FB) and AN/ ballistic target as
SPY-1 (if available) risk reduction for
providing initial follow-on theater
track and SBX serving campaign events.
as the commit sensor
using a simulated GBI
launched from
Vandenberg Air Force
Base and perform all
functions to intercept
the lethal object from
a complex target scene.
Sensors.............................. SBX, TPY-2 (FB), Aegis THAAD, Aegis BMD, Cobra Dane, Aegis BMD,
BMD with BSP and Patriot/MEADS, SBX.
sidecar, Beale UEWR. Japanese Participation.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, will you also work with
the DOT&E to determine a means by which to conduct an intercept flight
test using Cobra Dane as the primary sensor, in which it provides the
data to develop the Weapon Task Plan?
General Obering. Yes, I will continue to work with the DOT&E to
explore options to conduct an intercept flight test using Cobra Dane as
the primary sensor. However, due to the alignment of the Cobra Dane, a
representative target with representative track times would need to be
launched from within the Russian Flight Information Region to support
this type of test.

terminal high altitude area defense delays
30. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, during the hearing, you
stated that you decided to delay the THAAD interceptor delivery due to
cost overruns. Please detail and explain what the causes were of the
overruns for the THAAD program, detailing each item with its cost.
General Obering. Let me provide a clarification. The delay to THAAD
interceptor deliveries was driven by both cost overrun and cost growth
for the program. The detailed items that had to be mitigated and
contributed to the fiscal year 2008/2009 shortfalls with their
associated funding across those 2 years were as follows:

$31.4 million - The Development contract's final increment of
the 5 percent cost overrun
$94.0 million - Critical contract changes necessary to
prepare for Fire Unit Fielding (e.g., Fire Control obsolescence
and redesign for the 5-ton truck)
$92.8 million - Insensitive Munitions/Final Hazard
Classification requirements impact
$82.5 million - The impact of target availability slips to
flight tests
$21.5 million - Risk reduction and flight test analysis
additions
$13.9 million - THAAD's participation in Juniper Cobra 09

31. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, is it correct that there
were additional requirements imposed on the THAAD program by the Army,
for an insensitive munitions capability, and for using a 5-ton truck
instead of a Humvee for the THAAD Fire Control Station? If so, why did
you not use your extraordinary acquisition flexibility before the
budget request was submitted to provide the funds from lower priorities
outside of THAAD to meet those new requirements, without delaying the
THAAD interceptor production by a year?
General Obering. Yes, additional requirements for Insensitive
Munitions/Final Hazard Classification compliance and weight limitations
in up-armoring the Humvee-based THAAD Fire Control requiring transition
to a 5-ton truck both contributed to the need for additional funding
for the THAAD program. While 75 percent of our budget is dedicated to
near-term fielding capabilities such as THAAD, resource decisions
between programs must be based on priorities across the Agency. In the
case of THAAD, we have made additional internal realignments which have
restored THAAD interceptor production and precluded the 1-year slip.

32. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, at the hearing you
created some confusion about the fact that your fiscal year 2009 budget
request would delay the delivery of THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4 by a year,
since you suggested that you had been working since November to address
this problem. Do you acknowledge the fact that your budget
justification documents for fiscal year 2009, delivered to Congress in
February 2008, state that the timeframe for contract award for THAAD
Fire Units 3 and 4 fielding is planned for the first quarter of fiscal
year 2010, and had ``slipped 1 year due to fiscal year 2008/2009
funding shortfall'' and also state that the timeframe for delivery of
Fire Unit 3 is planned for the period from the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2012 to the fourth quarter of 2013, and had ``slipped five
quarters due to fiscal year 2008/2009 funding shortfalls''?
General Obering. Yes, the February 2008 budget justification
documents for fiscal year 2009 state contract award for THAAD Fire
Units 3 and 4 fielding had slipped 1 year due to the program's fiscal
year 2008/2009 funding shortfall and delivery of Fire Unit 3 was
slipped from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012 to the fourth
quarter of 2013. Subsequent to the House and Senate Authorization
Staffer Day briefing, the Agency made additional internal realignments
which have restored the $65 million in fiscal year 2009 to enable award
of the THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4 long lead contract as originally
planned and restored delivery of Fire Unit 3 back to the fourth quarter
fiscal year 2012.

33. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, the MDA previously
removed three flight tests from the THAAD flight test program, thus
increasing risk in the program. It appears that four of the remaining
flight tests will now be delayed because you will not have targets
delivered on time for the tests. What were the original schedules for
THAAD Flight Tests 11-14, and what is their current schedule? Please
detail the reasons for the schedule delay in Flight Tests 11-14, and
whether additional funding would have prevented the delays.
General Obering.

Provide the original and current flight test schedule: The
original and current schedule for Flight Tests 11-14 are shown
below. The reason for the revised dates for all four tests was
target availability.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Test Original Schedule Current Schedule Impact
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTT-11............................... 19 Dec. 08............. 22 Jun 09.............. Slipped \6 months
FTT-12............................... 17 Feb. 09............. 14 Sep 09.............. Slipped \7 months
FTT-13............................... 23 Jun 09.............. Feb 09................. Slipped \9 months
FTT-14............................... 1 Dec 09............... Jun 09................. Slipped \7 months
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Would additional funding have prevented the flight test
delays? From a THAAD organizational perspective, additional
funding would not have had an impact on the flight test delays
as the THAAD program was resourced to execute these tests on
the original schedule. From a Targets organizational
perspective, for FTT-11 and -12b, target availability was not
influenced by insufficient funding. The primary schedule driver
for FTT-11 and -12b was the significant disconnect between what
the Government expected to see in the offerer's proposal and
what the contractor proposed for the MBRV-1 re-entry vehicle
work. Issues were associated with resolving technical
disconnects. The proposal value was far higher than anticipated
and technical changes were incorporated during the process. The
FTT-13 and FTT-14 target availability delays were influenced by
a technical review of all BMDS target requirements and
balancing of available hardware resources across all test
events.

joint capabilities mix study ii
34. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, last year you told us
that the Joint Capabilities Mix Study had indicated that we would need
to buy about twice as many Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and THAAD
interceptors as we are currently planning. That would mean buying about
200 THAAD interceptors instead of 96, and about 300 SM-3 interceptors
instead of 147. Does the newest version of the Joint Capabilities Mix
Study support that same conclusion, or suggest that we might need even
more?
General Campbell. The most recent iteration of the Joint Capability
Mix (JCM) Study supported the previous study findings for the minimum
quantities of SM-3 and THAAD interceptors for combat operations in two
near simultaneous conventional campaigns in the 2015 timeframe.

35. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, am I correct in
understanding that the studies are looking at the minimum quantity of
upper tier interceptors required for combat operations? In other words,
this is not the maximum, but the minimum we would need?
General Campbell. That is correct. Both former as well as the
current iteration of the JCM Studies make a recommendation for the
minimum number of interceptors required for 2015 combat operations in
two near simultaneous conventional campaigns.

36. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, what role will this
study have in helping to determine force structure and inventory levels
for THAAD and SM-3?
General Campbell. This study is the starting point in addressing
warfighters' BMD interceptor requirements and serves as an input into
the Department's calculus in developing future force structures. The
Vice Chairman signed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
Memorandum endorsing the study and further directs the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the MDA, and the Services to develop plans for
addressing inventory recommendations.

global concept of operations
37. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, I understand you are
working on a global concept of operations (CONOPs) for the BMDS that is
intended to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the regional
combatant commanders for missile defense. Can you tell me when that
effort will be done, and whether the Commander of EUCOM will have a
command and control responsibility for defending his Area of
Responsibility (AOR) against missile attacks, including with the
proposed GMD system in Europe?
General Campbell. We are currently coordinating with the Joint
Staff and Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop and clarify the
missile defense roles of Regional Combatant Commanders. We expect to
finalize a global CONOPs by mid-summer of this year.
The Commander of EUCOM will always have an inherent responsibility
with commensurate authority to defend his AOR per the Unified Command
Plan and will utilize the resources in his AOR to include the proposed
resident strategic European missile defense capabilities. Because the
proposed European missile defense system would also have the capability
to defend against trans-regional capabilities that threaten other AORs,
the global CONOPs is being written to address both regional and trans-
regional command and control issues. This will ensure we optimize the
overall BMDS. The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has the overall
responsibility to synchronize combatant commander missile defense plans
into a global defense design by mitigating operational seams and
vulnerabilities.

production rate
38. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, General Obering, and Mr.
Francis, the THAAD program is currently planning to build interceptors
at a rate of two per month. The THAAD production facility is already
capable of producing three per month. The contractor estimates that
producing three interceptors per month could save more than $1 million
per missile and result in earlier fielding. Would you agree that two
per month is a less efficient and less economical production rate than
three per month, and that a higher production rate would allow for unit
cost savings?
Mr. Young. Yes, there are efficiencies that result in a reduction
of total contract cost and interceptor unit cost by increasing the
production rate from two to three interceptors per month. These savings
would be realized through the shorter period of performance for
production deliveries and cost efficiencies realized by the higher
production rate.
General Obering. Yes, there are efficiencies that result in a
reduction of total contract cost and interceptor unit cost by
increasing production rate from two interceptors a month to three per
month. The savings would be realized by a shorter period of performance
for production deliveries and cost efficiencies realized by the higher
production rate.
Mr. Francis. I agree that producing three THAAD missiles per month
is more efficient and more economical than producing two per month as
the Government can reduce its costs on subcomponent buys. Moreover,
with a potential requirement to produce additional missiles for Foreign
Military Sales, it may become imperative for the program to increase
its production rate from two to three per month. However, it should be
noted that until the program has proven the performance of its missiles
through testing, increased production rates may lead to costly
retrofits if the remaining testing reveals any significant problems.
Currently, the production rate of two per month is sufficient to
support the program's ground and flight test schedule.
The THAAD program is planning to deliver 98 interceptors to
accompany 4 fire units. The program may also award a foreign military
sales contract for 3 additional fire units including 144 interceptors
in the future. The delivery of 98 THAAD interceptors is paced based on
need dates for flight and ground testing. The additional interceptor
quantities would require an increase in interceptor production rate to
accommodate FMS production concurrent with Fire Units 3 and 4. For the
remainder of development testing, production is scheduled at the rate
of two to three interceptors per quarter. However, the current
production capacity for fire unit interceptor deliveries at Troy, AL,
is three interceptors per month based on a single shift operation.
According to THAAD officials, the interceptor production facility in
Alabama has recently incorporated lean manufacturing principles and
other improvement processes that will allow the production facility to
increase to three interceptors per month. Additionally, the contractor
estimates that producing three interceptors per month could result in a
cost savings of $1 million per missile and accelerate fielding. Based
on the increased production rate, resulting efficiencies and additional
units over which to spread fixed costs, it is estimated the interceptor
average unit cost for Fire Units 3 and 4 would be reduced from $9.8
million to $9.0 million for Fire Unit 3 and from $9.5 million to $8.1
million for Fire Unit 4. The savings incurred based on increasing the
production rate to at least three per month could provide a significant
savings to the MDA and may provide for fielding assets in an
accelerated timeframe. However, until testing of the missile and its
components are complete, increasing the production of these
interceptors increases the potential for costly rework if it is
discovered that the missiles do not perform as intended.

39. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Young, does DOD have the policy
of trying to achieve the most economical and efficient acquisition of
weapon systems?
Mr. Young. The DOD constantly strives to provide the most effective
weapons systems to the warfighter at the most economical and efficient
acquisition means possible. To influence BMDS execution, I plan to
implement a rigorous baseline agreement with defined cost, schedule,
and performance parameters, and increase Department involvement, to
allow continuous evaluation of acquisition and performance metrics. I
have issued multiple weekly AT&L notes which call on all members of the
acquisition enterprise, including MDA, to focus on lowering cost,
executing within budget, trading requirements which drive cost and
schedule, and ensuring budgets match plans, and advocating economic
order quantity purchases. It is DOD policy to seek the most economical
and efficient acquisition approach to weapon systems.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
improved oversight and accountability
40. Senator Reed. Secretary Young, in a significant departure from
longstanding practice, DOD granted MDA exceptional flexibility and
authority in its concurrent development and rapid fielding of an
initial set of limited missile defense capabilities. According to the
GAO, this ``unprecedented funding and decisionmaking authority'' has
``made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than other
major programs, making oversight more challenging.'' Now that the
initial fielding of the limited missile defense capabilities has been
accomplished, what steps will you take to increase and improve
accountability and oversight of MDA and its programs
Mr. Young. I conduct reviews of the BMDS and its elements to assess
program status, and continue the tempo of the MDEB to provide broader
Department exposure. For development, fielding, and support of BMDS
blocks and element assessments, I plan to implement a rigorous baseline
agreement with defined cost, schedule, and performance parameters to
allow continuous evaluation of execution. We will derive an early and
continued visibility into BMDS and its elements by a broad spectrum of
the Department, enabling us to provide the necessary guidance to
maintain missile defense priorities within cost and schedule
constraints. In addition, the DOT&E and the operational testers are
continuously involved with MDA activities and, together, annually
report to Congress on the status of BMDS testing.

slow pace of tests
41. Senator Reed. Dr. McQueary, your most recent annual report on
missile defense concludes that there have not been enough flight tests
of the GMD system to characterize the capability of the system or
validate and verify models and simulations. Although the GMD program
has planned to conduct two flight tests per year, because of various
problems it conducted only one successful flight test last year, and
will conduct only one flight test during this fiscal year. If the GMD
program conducts only one flight test per year, doesn't that mean it
would take even longer than expected to produce sufficient flight test
data to gain confidence in the system's capability, and to determine if
the system is effective, suitable, and survivable?
Dr. McQueary. Yes. Unfortunately, we cannot explore a lot of the
mission battlespace with only two flight tests. Nor can we access
equipment reliability or show repeatability. The key is to employ an
evaluation-based test strategy that gathers the maximum amount of
relevant data during each flight test event to not only document
performance but also to validate the models for simulations. General
Obering's ``test-analyze-fix-test'' approach is the right way to do
developmental testing. Each ground and flight test generates a
significant volume of data that must be analyzed before the next test
can be accomplished. If this important step is not accomplished, there
is a significant risk that the next test will fail wasting time and
resources. Two flight tests per year for GMD is about right.
Unfortunately, circumstances have reduced GMD testing to only two
completed intercept tests in the last 2 years.

growing demands for additional capability
42. Senator Reed. General Campbell, your prepared testimony
mentions the ``growing demands of the combatant commanders to provide
global air and missile defense against the entire threat set.'' Are the
combatant commanders (COCOMs) asking for, or interested in, additional
PAC-3, SM-3, or THAAD force structure or inventory?
General Campbell. Yes, the COCOMs have asked for greater quantity
and earlier availability of missile defense forces. We are continuing
to refine the force structure requirements through additional analysis
and inform the MDA of future COCOM capability needs through the U.S.
STRATCOM led Warfighter Involvement Process, the Joint Requirement
Oversight Council process, and the MDEB.

program element rebaselinings
43. Senator Reed. General Obering, how many times have each of the
following elements been rebaselined or replanned: GMD, THAAD, airborne
laser (ABL), Aegis BMD, multiple kill vehicle (MKV), kinetic energy
interceptor (KEI), STSS, command, control, battle management, and
communications (C2BMC), and sensors?
General Obering.

GMD - 5,
THAAD - 4,
ABL - 5,
Aegis BMD - 1,
MKV - 0,
KEI - 2,
STSS - 0,
C2BMC - 2,
Sensors - 0.

44. Senator Reed. General Obering, what were the cumulative cost
and schedule variances at the time of the rebaselinings or replans?
General Obering.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

airborne laser program estimates
45. Senator Reed. General Obering, what were the planned date of
the lethality demonstration and the estimated cost of the ABL program
through lethality demonstration when MDA assumed management of the
program?
General Obering. MDA assumed management of ABL in 2002. In the
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) dated 31 December 2001 (RCS: DD--A&T
(Q&A) 823), the Approved Acquisition Program Baseline had lethal
demonstration in September 2003 with a cost of $3.02 billion (Base Year
2008 dollars). The current ABL program estimate achieves lethal
demonstration in fourth quarter fiscal year 2009 with a cost of $5.4
billion (Base Year 2008 dollars).

46. Senator Reed. General Obering, what is the current estimated
cost through the lethality demonstration?
General Obering. The total cost for ABL to complete lethal
demonstration, encompasses 13 years, fiscal years 1996-2009. This cost
is $5.4 billion (Base Year 2008 dollars) and $5.1 billion (Then Year
dollars).

new block structure workshare
47. Senator Reed. General Obering, you stated in your testimony
that work for a particular block will only benefit that block. Yet in
the GMD element, money is being requested in Block 3.0 for the purchase
of two-stage test interceptors to be utilized for Block 4.0. Please
reconcile the discrepancy.
General Obering. While the two-stage is being developed
specifically for the European Interceptor Site (EIS), the two-Stage
variant of the GBI provides additional capabilities and engagement
options whether fielded at Fort Greely, AK; Vandenberg AFB, CA; or in
Europe. The GBI two-stage variant development program is considered a
core capability enhancement to the GMD system, and was therefore
budgeted in Block 3. The fielding of the two-stage interceptor is
planned for Europe; European fielding activities are budgeted as part
of Block 4.

new block structure baselines and estimates
48. Senator Reed. General Obering, MDA plans to estimate total
costs for each block and then baseline those costs for the purposes of
reporting variances to Congress. What is the timetable for estimating
total costs and baselining them for each block?
General Obering. We are currently working on cost estimates for
Blocks 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium
Range Threats in One Region/Theater) through 5.0 (Expand Defense of
Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Intermediate Range Threats in
Two Regions/Theaters) and plan on completing these estimates by this
summer. We have also asked the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)
to conduct independent cost estimates. Based on these estimates, we
intend to submit the cost baselines for Blocks 2.0 and 3.1/3.2 (Expand
Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats) with
the fiscal year 2009 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) with the
President's budget for fiscal year 2010. When we have sufficient
confidence that the cost baselines are achievable for Blocks 3.3
(Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range
Threats--Improved Discrimination and System Track), 4.0 (Defense of
Allies and Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/
Expand Protection of the U.S. Homeland), and 5.0, we will submit them
in subsequent SOGs.

49. Senator Reed. General Obering, what criteria will MDA use other
than the qualitative criteria associated with sufficient knowledge
levels and urgency of threat? For example, will there be a dollar or
time threshold for a block that cannot be exceeded before it is
baselined?
General Obering. While we do not have a dollar or time threshold in
mind, we understand the importance of establishing baselines sooner
rather than later for purposes of accountability and transparency. Our
established process is to initiate the block and then to define
baselines for it. A new block will be initiated when a significant new
capability against particular threats is expected to be fielded based
on a consideration of technological maturity, affordability, and need.
Technology maturity and successful achievement of knowledge points will
be a critical factor in the decision to establish a new block. We will
define baselines (schedule, budget, and performance) for block when we
can make a firm commitment to Congress based on a high level of
confidence that the baselines can be achieved.

50. Senator Reed. General Obering, what units will be identified
for unit cost tracking, and what criteria will be used to select these
units?
General Obering. We are still developing our procedures for
establishing and reporting unit cost estimates. In general, our
approach will be to establish unit costs for all equipment being
fielded in the following categories: interceptors and weapons; sensors;
command and control sites, nodes, and equipment sets; and launch
systems. We are still developing these estimates and intend to submit
them with our fiscal year 2009 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG)
with the President's budget for fiscal year 2010.

51. Senator Reed. General Obering, what criteria will be used to
define significant variances and report them to Congress?
General Obering. We are still refining the specific criteria that
will be used to define significant variances; and we intend to define
and report on them in our fiscal year 2009 BMDS Block Baselines and
Goals (SOG) with the President's budget for fiscal year 2010.

52. Senator Reed. General Obering, will you work with Congress to
determine the appropriate thresholds for variances?
General Obering. Yes. In order to achieve the goals of
accountability and transparency, we are now determining the appropriate
thresholds for reporting variances. We are committed to working with
Congress in this regard.

public reporting of block variances
53. Senator Reed. General Obering, at the hearing, you agreed to
publicly report cost and schedule variances, and performance variances
within the limitations of protecting classified information. What form
will this public reporting of variances take?
General Obering. Our reporting of variances to Congress will be
presented in our annual BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) document
and annual BMDS SAR. The former must accompany the President's budget
submission and the latter must follow within 60 days of that
submission. Schedule and cost data are typically unclassified while
performance data are typically classified. To meet the needs of
Congress, we expect to continue the practice of issuing both a
classified and unclassified version of the SOG, and an unclassified SAR
with a classified annex that includes the performance information.

cost estimates for blocks
54. Senator Reed. General Obering, you have indicated that MDA
plans to establish cost estimates for each of the blocks in the new
block structure. What costs will be included in the total costs for
each block? For example, will the total costs include both acquisition
costs and O&S costs? If O&S costs are included, will they be part of
the baseline?
General Obering. As described in our President's budget for fiscal
year 2009 and budget overview and our fiscal year 2008 BMDS Block
Baselines and Goals (SOG), each block includes the fielding and
development funding associated with the specific capability that the
block delivers. Also, O&S costs are not included in block baselines,
but are tracked separately.

55. Senator Reed. General Obering, if O&S costs are included as
part of the baseline, would MDA consider decisions that would change
the estimates for acquisition and O&S costs, but not the total life
cycle cost, to be nonreportable variances? For example, if the
acquisition costs for a block increased but were offset by an O&S
decrease, holding total life cycle costs constant, would this be
considered a reportable variance?
General Obering. Since O&S costs are not part of the baseline,
changes in those costs will not be reported as variances. This
particular example, however, would be a reportable variance, because a
change in the fielding and development costs for a baselined block
would be a reportable variance. Such variances will be reported
annually in the BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) and the BMDS SAR.

56. Senator Reed. General Obering, if O&S costs are included as
part of the baseline, how will acquisition costs be tracked and
reported, in order to ensure accountability and transparency of
variances in acquisition costs?
General Obering. O&S costs are not included as part of block
baselines. Baseline costs include fielding and development costs. We
will report variances to Congress in our annual BMDS Block Baselines
and Goals (SOG) document and annual BMDS SAR.

57. Senator Reed. General Obering, regarding acquisition costs
alone, if a change in the mix of assets occurs, for example, more THAAD
missiles are bought and fewer C2BMC planners are bought--again, without
changing the total cost of the block--would that be a reportable
variance?
General Obering. We intend to report variances in schedule, budget,
and performance from block baselines to Congress. In this example, the
addition of THAAD missiles or subtraction of C2BMC planners would
impact scheduled deliveries and performance and would therefore be
reported as variances, even if total block costs remained the same.

58. Senator Reed. General Obering, given that capability
development items will make up about half of MDA's budget by the end of
the current 6-year program plan, how will MDA track actual execution of
not only technical progress, but progress against the cost and
schedules envisioned for these items?
General Obering. While our President's budget submission for fiscal
year 2009 shows that capability development is more than 50 percent of
MDA's budget toward the end of the 6-year program planning period, we
expect that percentage to decrease over time because, within the next
few years, some BMDS element technology programs will progress to the
point where they can be incorporated within new blocks. Under our new
block structure, a new block will be initiated when a significant new
capability against particular threats is expected to be fielded based
on a consideration of technological maturity, affordability, and need.
As for tracking actual execution of technological progress, we
follow a knowledge-based approach. We use standards--called knowledge
points--to assess the progress of our BMDS element technology programs.
These knowledge points address both technical maturity and
affordability issues. We also pay close attention to technology
readiness levels and engineering and manufacturing readiness levels to
assess progress. Further, we use earned value management systems to
track cost and schedule performance against planned work. However, we
continually seek better engineering and business practices and will
continue to investigate other means for assessing technology maturity.

cost accounting for deferred tests
59. Senator Reed. General Obering, in the normal course of BMD
development programs, changes have occurred in the test schedules for
individual elements. It is difficult, however, to determine how
budgeted funds are accounted for when tests are deferred, combined, or
dropped. When a test is planned and funded for one fiscal year and then
is deferred to a future fiscal year, how are costs accounted for?
General Obering. The MDA accounts for funds budgeted for tests
using traditional Work Breakdown Structure. Funding for system level
tests and element specific tests is delineated within the BMDS Block or
Mission Area Investment (MAI) level with each Program Element (PE).
This Block or MAI level correlates directly to the budget projects
(e.g., AX08, YX04, EX09) outlined in the MDA fiscal year 2009
President's budget (PB09) submission. Test funding is directly related
within these budget projects, and by correlation each BMDS Block or
MAI. An example of this would be the R2a accomplishment entitled
``Element Test and Evaluation'' on page 232 of the MDA PB09 submission.
As the BMDS test program changes (as test activities are deferred,
combined, and/or dropped) the amount of funding MDA accounts to test
activities changes as well. MDA accounts for these changes using a
defined corporate change process which spans the current year of fiscal
execution as well as the follow-on budgeting and planning fiscal years.
This corporate change process allows for the proper and necessary
accounting of MDA test funding whether the test change affects a single
fiscal year or spans multiple fiscal years. Frequently, there are
fiscal expenditures for a test that occurred well in advance of the
actual test date. These expenditures manifest themselves as ``sunk''
costs for these tests whether deferred, combined, or dropped.

60. Senator Reed. General Obering, specifically, are the funds
originally budgeted for the test used for something else, and then new
money requested for the year in which the rescheduled test occurs?
General Obering. If a test is deferred, and funding originally
budgeted for that test has not yet been obligated for the purposes of
that test, MDA corporately determines whether it is appropriate to
realign that funding to support other test priorities or whether to
fully utilize the authority of the research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation and retain those funds for later
obligation against that rescheduled test. Frequently, there are fiscal
expenditures for a test that occurred well in advance of the actual
test date. These expenditures manifest themselves as ``sunk'' costs for
these tests whether deferred, combined, or dropped.

61. Senator Reed. General Obering, please use the specific example
of FTG-04 and track how the costs for the test were budgeted for and
expended. FTG-4 has been budgeted for and rescheduled five times
between October 2005 and February 2008. Can MDA show what the costs of
this test were as originally estimated and budgeted for in October 2005
and compare this with the current estimated costs of the test and where
they are budgeted?
General Obering. The attached Flight Test Replan History chart
tracks the evolution of the GMD program's spiral development approach
with regard to FTG-04. The June 2005 plan was created following the
initial MRTF recommended realignment of the GMD flight test program.
Two target-only flight tests were added into the schedule during this
period, and GMD's consistent flight test successes since the MRTF led
to the acceleration of flight test objectives, a prime example of which
is FTG-04. FTG-04 is a far more complex test now than was envisioned in
June 2005. A comparison between the original FT-4 and FTG-04 today is
shown below:
Original Cost Estimate FT-4 in October 2005: $96 million - planned
as a GMD-only flight test, and the first intercept following the MRTF
re-plan of mid-2005. The target was planned with one pre-selected
engagement radar to generate the weapons task plan and the target was
planned to be a very simple separating target.
Current Cost Estimate FTG-04: $147 million - planned as a full BMDS
test and the third GMD intercept since the MRTF re-plan. FTG-04 is now
planned as a multi-sensor engagement which includes four radars; and
the target now includes countermeasures.

62. Senator Reed. General Obering, have any of the funds budgeted
for this test been obligated and expended? If so, how much and for what
purposes?
General Obering. Approximately $147.1 million (or 100 percent) of
FTG-04 funds have been obligated for all planned test costs.

- $26 million for planning, execution, and analysis
- $9 million for test lab upkeep (the portion attributable to
FTG-04)
- $35 million for target
- $9.5 million for target range
- $50 million for ground-based interceptor (GBI)
- $4.2 million for GMD Core Range
- $13.4 million for Variable Core Range

Approximately $101.0 million (or 68.6 percent) of FTG-04 funds have
been expended through April 23, 2008.

- $11.4 million (or 43.8 percent) for planning, execution, and
analysis
- $9 million (or 100 percent) for test lab upkeep
- $22.126 million (or 63.2 percent) for target (target
acquired through Sandia National Laboratories, expenditures
take approximately 120 days to process through the Department
of Energy)
- $2.8 million (or 29.5 percent) for Target Range
- $48.5 million (or 97 percent) for GBI
- $3.1 million (or 73.8 percent) for GMD Core Range
- $4.03 million (or 30 percent) for Variable Core

ground-based interceptors retrofit program
63. Senator Reed. General Obering, at the hearing, there was some
discussion of the program to retrofit the GBIs with more reliable
components. What are the components to be retrofit on the GBIs (please
list) and what is the cost of each new component?
General Obering. The following table reflects components that will
be replaced in four GBIs planned for refurbishment in calendar year
2008.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

64. Senator Reed. General Obering, please provide an update on the
retrofit program, including how many interceptors have been retrofit as
well as the schedule (by month) to complete retrofitting the remaining
interceptors.
General Obering. Four interceptor refurbishments are scheduled in
calendar year 2008 with planned completion dates of July, August,
November, and December. Two of these four interceptor refurbishments
are currently in process. The basic booster upgrades have been
completed and the Booster Avionics Module upgrades with new Attitude
Control System (ACS) decks are in process and near completion. The
removed ACS decks and all other available parts that are removed during
refurbishment will be used to conduct stockpile reliability analysis.
The original refurbishment study had identified future upgrades for an
additional 13 vehicles to be completed from calendar year 2009 through
calendar year 2012. However, these additional refurbishments are not on
contract and therefore no firm schedule yet exists.

65. Senator Reed. General Obering, please detail the cost to
retrofit and/or refurbish each individual interceptor.
General Obering. Each interceptor is unique in the degree of
retrofit/refurbishment that will need to be completed in order to
provide the warfighter the most operationally reliable system. For the
four scheduled calendar year 2008 refurbishments, the estimated costs
for each are $7.0 million-$9.0 million per interceptor for moderate
refurbishment. The refurbishment study identified upgrades for an
additional 13 vehicles to be completed from calendar year 2009 through
calendar year 2012. In an effort to provide the refurbishment program a
flexible and timely contractual response for unscheduled maintenance, a
Request for Proposal was sent to the prime contractor on April 28,
2008, requesting pricing for three refurbishment options (Minimal,
Moderate, and Extensive). The ranges of cost for each of these options
are expected to be: Minimal - $2 million-$6 million; Moderate - $7
million-$10 million; Extensive - $14 million-$16 million. The details
of what each particular interceptor refurbishment will cost have yet to
be developed given we are still in the early stages of the GBI
refurbishment program.

acquisition approach
66. Senator Reed. Mr. Francis, MDA suggests that its acquisition
approach is both novel and an improvement to the more linear approach
outlined in DOD acquisition policy (referred to as DOD 5000) and, by
association, GAO's work on best practices. What are your views on MDA's
acquisition approach as compared with DOD acquisition policy and best
practices?
Mr. Francis. Our work on DOD weapon systems over the past 6 years
shows that programs have not adopted the knowledge-based approach in
DOD's acquisition policy. Instead, acquisition programs have preferred
to manage technology, design, and manufacturing risks at the same time
which leads to cost growth and schedule delays. MDA's concurrent
development and fielding approach to acquisitions has more in common
with other acquisition programs than with DOD acquisition policy,
because most programs do not abide by DOD policy. DOD policy is linear
only in the sense that it calls for following sound systems engineering
principles for a given scope of work. For example, key technologies
should be mature before committing to system development; a design
should be stable before committing to system demonstration; and the
design and production processes should be mature before committing to
production. This approach, to me, is inarguable and its linearity,
sensible. The policy also provides for non-linear spiral development to
provide evolutionary advances to a basic capability. Thus, I would
characterize the issue as not so much as policy having failed, but
rather as policy not having been tried. Taken in this context, MDA's
approach is not so much a novel departure from DOD policy as it is
taking the de rigueur departure followed by most programs to an even
greater degree.
MDA's acquisition strategy allows its programs to work on maturing
technologies while they are also maturing the system design and
preparing for production. Our work has found that programs following
this practice have higher cost growth than programs that start system
development with mature technologies. As reported in our March 2008
assessment, for DOD programs that similarly began with immature
technologies, their total RDT&E costs grew by 44 percent more than
programs that began with mature technologies.\1\ More often than not,
programs were still maturing technologies late into system development
and even into production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, GAO-08-467SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2008)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on our body of work, in order to have good outcomes, the best
practices contained in DOD acquisition policy require the use of a
knowledge-based approach to product development that demonstrates high
levels of knowledge before significant commitments are made. We have
found that programs managed outside the knowledge-based process are
more likely to have surprises in the form of cost and schedule
increases. MDA has experienced some of these problems, although a full
accounting is not possible because of the flexibilities MDA has had in
using funds, deferring work, and tracking costs. One must also keep in
mind that MDA has benefited from ``linearity'' in a very basic sense.
That is, MDA's ability to accelerate the development and fielding of
assets in the past few years owes much to the advanced development work
that was conducted in the preceding 20 years.

new block structure
67. Senator Reed. Mr. Francis, MDA has changed its block structure
from the previous 2-year blocks to a series of capability blocks that
are intended to respond to particular threats, but without the previous
time limits. How does MDA's new block structure address the issues GAO
has reported on regarding the previous 2-year block structure?
Mr. Francis. MDA's new block construct, which was redefined in 2007
to better communicate the agency's plans and goals to Congress, makes
many positive changes. These include establishing a unit cost for
selected block assets, including in a block only those elements or
components that will be fielded during the block, and abandoning the
practice of deferring work from block to block.
MDA's new block construct provides a means for comparing the
expected and actual unit cost of assets included in a block. As we
noted in our fiscal year 2006 report, MDA's past block structure did
not estimate unit costs for assets considered part of a given block or
categorize block costs in a manner that allowed calculations of
expected or actual unit costs.\2\ Under the new block construct, MDA
expects to develop unit costs for selected block assets--such as THAAD
interceptors--and request an independent verification of that unit cost
from DOD's CAIG. MDA will also track the actual unit cost of the assets
and report significant cost growth to Congress. However, MDA has not
yet determined for which assets a unit cost will be developed and how
much a unit cost must increase before that increase is reported to
Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy
Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO-07-387
(Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The new construct also makes it clearer as to which assets should
be included in a block. Under the agency's prior block construct,
assets included in a given block were sometimes not planned for
delivery until a later block. For example, as we reported in March
2007, MDA included costs for ABL and STSS as part of its Block 2006
cost goal although those elements did not field or plan to field assets
during Block 2006.\3\ Agency officials told us those elements were
included in the block because they believed the elements could offer
some emergency capability during the block timeframe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-07-387.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the new block construct should improve the transparency of
each block's actual cost. Under its prior construct, MDA deferred work
from one block to another; but it did not track the cost of the
deferred work so that it could be attributed to the block that it
benefited. For example, MDA deferred some work needed to characterize
and verify the Block 2004 capability until Block 2006 and counted the
cost of those activities as a cost of Block 2006. By doing so, it
understated the cost of Block 2004 and overstated the cost of Block
2006. Because MDA did not track the cost of the deferred work, the
agency was unable to adjust the cost of either block to accurately
capture the cost of each. MDA officials told us that under its new
block construct, MDA will no longer transfer work, along with its cost,
to a future block. Rather, a block of work will not be considered
complete until all work that benefits a block has been completed and
its cost has been properly attributed to that block.

68. Senator Reed. Mr. Francis, what issues still need to be
addressed with the new block structure?
Mr. Francis. Although improvements are inherent in MDA's new block
construct, its full benefit to transparency and accountability depends
on future actions. MDA has not yet estimated the full cost of a block.
Also, MDA has not addressed whether it will transfer assets produced
during a block to a military Service for production and operation at
the block's completion, or whether MDA will continue its practice of
concurrently developing and fielding BMDS elements and components.
According to its fiscal year 2009 budget submission, MDA does not
plan to initially develop a full cost estimate for any BMDS block.
Instead, when a firm commitment can be made to Congress for a block of
capability, MDA will develop a budget baseline for the block. This
budget will include anticipated funding for each block activity that is
planned for the 6 years included in DOD's Future Years Defense Plan.
MDA officials told us that if the budget for a baselined block changes,
MDA plans to report and explain those variations to Congress.\4\ At
some future date, MDA does expect to develop a full cost estimate for
each committed block and is in discussions with DOD's CAIG on having
the group verify each estimate; but documents do not yet include a
timeline for estimating block cost or having that estimate verified. It
is not clear at this point whether the block cost estimate will contain
acquisition costs only or will include O&S costs as well (a life-cycle
cost estimate). While it is important to have a life-cycle cost
element, it is also important to track acquisition costs separately
from life-cycle costs for reporting purposes. Transparency would suffer
if, for example, an increase in a block's acquisition costs offset by a
corresponding reduction in O&S costs were treated as having no effect
on the life-cycle cost total, thus precluding the need to report the
acquisition cost increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ MDA expects to initially develop budget baselines and report
variances to this baseline for Blocks 1.0, 2.0, and a portion of 3.0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The new block construct also does not address whether the assets
included in a block will be transferred at the block's completion to a
military Service for production and operation. Officials representing
multiple DOD organizations recognize that the transfer criteria
established in 2002 are neither complete nor clear given the BMDS's
complexity. Without clear transfer criteria, MDA has transferred the
management of only one element--the Patriot Advanced Capability-3--to
the military for production and operation. Joint Staff officials told
us that for all other elements, MDA and the military Services have been
negotiating the transition of responsibilities for the sustainment of
fielded elements--a task that has proven arduous and time-consuming.
Although MDA documents show that under its new block construct the
agency should be ready at the end of each block to deliver BMDS
components that are fully mission-capable, MDA officials could not tell
us when MDA's Director will recommend that management of components,
including production responsibilities, be transferred to the military.
Finally, it is not clear, under MDA's new block construct, whether
the concurrent development and fielding of BMDS elements and/or
components will continue. Fully developing a component or element and
demonstrating its capability prior to production increases the
likelihood that the product will perform as designed and can be
produced at the cost estimated. To field an initial capability quickly,
MDA accepted the risk of concurrent development and fielding during
Block 2004. For example, by the end of Block 2004, the agency realized
that the performance of some ground-based interceptors could be
degraded because the interceptors included inappropriate or potentially
unreliable parts. MDA has begun the process of retrofitting these
interceptors, but work will not be completed until 2012. Meanwhile
there is a risk that some interceptors might not perform as designed.
MDA also continued to accept this risk during Block 2006 as it fielded
assets before they were fully tested. MDA has not addressed whether it
will accept similar performance risks under its new block construct or
whether it will fully develop and demonstrate all elements/components
prior to fielding.

69. Senator Reed. Mr. Francis, what challenges do you see that MDA
will face in estimating block costs, baselining them, having them
independently verified, and reporting variances?
Mr. Francis. As MDA continues to implement its new block strategy,
it will have to make important decisions on establishing baselines and
reporting variances. Specifically, MDA must decide what it is going to
include in a block's cost, identifying the assets for which unit costs
will be developed, outlining how much a unit cost must increase before
that increase is reported to Congress, estimating costs capability
development efforts. I believe that MDA should work closely with
Congress in making these decisions.
MDA may find that estimating costs for near-term blocks such as
Blocks 1.0 and 2.0 may be easier to develop since the work for these
blocks is nearly complete. However, estimating costs for work scheduled
to occur in Blocks 4.0 and 5.0 may be more difficult as work for these
blocks is scheduled farther into the future. Additionally, it will be
more difficult to estimate costs for elements captured under its
Capability Development effort, such as the ABL, KEI, and MKV programs.
These programs are in the midst of developing technology. Such programs
generally do not have firm cost, schedule, or performance baselines
because they are in a period of discovery, which makes schedule and
cost difficult to estimate. MDA's experience with the ABL program
provides a good example of the difficulty in estimating the cost and
schedule of technology development. In 1996, the ABL program believed
that all ABL technology could be demonstrated by 2001 at a cost of
about $1 billion. However, MDA now projects that this technology will
not be demonstrated until 2009 and its cost has grown to over $5
billion. It is imperative that MDA establish baselines, because until
it does it will be difficult for decisionmakers to evaluate the
business case for the BMDS.

significance of cost increases
70. Senator Reed. Mr. Francis, in your prepared testimony, and in
your March report, you make the point that the Block 2006 missile
defense system had a $1 billion cost increase. Some might argue that,
in a program with an annual budget of more than $9 billion, such cost
increases are not worrisome, amounting to only a 5-percent increase
over the 2-year block. Would you agree with that argument? If not, why
not?
Mr. Francis. Although we reported in 2007 that during Block 2006
MDA increased costs by about $1 billion, we could not discern the full
cost of the block because the agency deferred some budgeted work to
future costs in order to stay within its revised budget and offset
increasing contractor costs.\5\ Thus, the actual cost increase is
likely higher. Although the measurable percentage increase seems
relatively small, we should not be insensitive to the fact that at $8
to $10 billion per year, the missile defense budget is unusually large.
Thus, a small percentage increase translates into a significant amount
of money. Moreover, even a 2.5 percent cost increase per year for a
more typical major defense acquisition program that would normally span
10 or so years, would, using the Nunn-McCurdy criteria for the current
baseline, be enough to trigger a significant cost growth breach by year
6 and a critical cost growth breach in year 10. That is, at that rate
of cost growth, a program would accrue a 25 percent cost increase over
10 years. Furthermore, every dollar spent inefficiently in developing
and procuring weapon systems is less money available for many other
internal and external budget priorities--such as the global war on
terror and growing entitlement programs. These inefficiencies also
often result in the delivery of less capability than initially planned,
either in the form of fewer quantities or delayed delivery to the
warfighter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy
Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO-07-387
(Washington, DC: March 15, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The consequence of cost growth is reduced buying power and lost
opportunities. Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually,
MDA's BMDS is the largest research and development program in DOD's
budget. Every dollar spent on inefficiencies in acquiring one weapon
system is less money available for other opportunities. As program
costs increase, programs must request more funding to cover the
overruns, make trade-offs with existing programs, delay the start of
new programs, or take funds from other accounts. Ultimately, cost
overruns and delays affect warfighters who have to operate costly
legacy systems longer than expected, find alternatives to fill
capability gaps, or go without the capability.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
thaad system
71. Senator Pryor. General Obering and General Campbell, in your
statements you both allude to the vital importance of THAAD to the
terminal defense segment of MDA for the protection of our Homeland and
overseas bases, our service men and women deployed in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom and OIF, and our friends and allies.
Furthermore, you acknowledge that Iran is expanding its delivery
systems by developing an extended-range version of the Shahab-3 that
could strike our allies and friends in the Middle East and Europe, and
also identify a new Ashura medium-range ballistic missile capable of
reaching Israel and U.S. bases in Eastern Europe. While the THAAD
program is designed to protect the warfighter from these threats today,
it is underfunded by $65 million, effectively delaying the program up
to 1 year. What kind of priority does our missile defense strategy give
the THAAD program? Doesn't it make sense to fully fund THAAD or maybe
even buy back the contract and bring Fire Units 3 and 4 on schedule?
General Obering. The Agency's fiscal year 2009 budget reflects an
overall strategy that focuses on near-term delivery of BMD
capabilities, to include THAAD. It is fully funding the program and has
realigned funding to enable contract award for interceptor long-lead
components which restores Fire Unit 3 and 4 schedules.
General Campbell. The MDA has performed an excellent job in
developing a BMDS capability. The agency has also collaborated with the
DOD, combatant commanders, and Services to deliver capabilities based
on a balance of resources and technological maturity moderated by the
warfighter's priority of need. In recognition of the high priority of
need that THAAD enjoys, I understand the MDA has recently taken steps
to realign internal funding to restore planned procurement and delivery
of these two fire units and interceptors as originally planned and
scheduled. THAAD represents a cutting edge BMD capability that we need
to field as early as possible.

72. Senator Pryor. General Obering, what has contributed to the
cost growth in THAAD and SM-3?
General Obering. The Aegis BMD program of record is and continues
to be an aggressive program from a cost, technical, and schedule
perspective. Aegis BMD is managing eight developments simultaneously
along with a missile manufacturing program and an aggressive ship
installation schedule. There have been unplanned technical challenges
with the Third Stage Rocket Motor and Divert Attitude Control of the
SM-3 Block IA development that required additional ground/element level
testing to ensure all operational modes of the missile were well
understood and available prior to its deployment to the fleet.
Additional engineering was also required to deal with unplanned SM-3
manufacturing and diminishing manufacturing sources issues.
Aegis BMD's aggressive testing schedule has driven an increase in
modeling and simulation and scenario certifications as risk reduction
measures to ensure flight mission success to achieve Operational
Evaluation of the Block 2004 capability. Finally, assessment of mission
assurance and other ``core'' standards within the program, along with
added security requirements associated with Kill Assessment have driven
additional unplanned costs.
Aegis BMD has taken these development and testing experiences into
account with the SM-3 Block IB upgrade, as well as, future spirals of
the Aegis BMD System.
For THAAD, there have been several factors contributing to cost
overrun and cost growth for the program.

The Development contract has an estimate at completion that
is predicted to end the contract with an approximate 5 percent
overrun to contract cost. The overrun has been driven
principally by variances experienced in the interceptor for
design discoveries during assembly/subassembly ground
qualification testing requiring subsequent rework and launcher
component hardware and software complexities.
There has been cost growth in scope to the program caused
primarily by: (a) critical contract changes necessary to
prepare for Fire Unit Fielding (e.g., Fire Control obsolescence
and redesign for the 5-ton truck); (b) Insensitive Munitions/
Final Hazard Classification requirements; (c) the impact of
target availability causing delays to the flight test program;
(d) risk reduction and flight test analysis efforts; and (e)
THAAD participation in Juniper Cobra 09.
______

Question Submitted by Senator John McCain
compliance of section 223
73. Senator McCain. Secretary Young, section 223 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, as passed by
Congress, prohibits the use of RDT&E funds for procurement or advance
procurement of long lead items, including for SM-3 Block IA
interceptors in fiscal year 2009. Yet the fiscal year 2009 President's
budget request for the MDA includes a request for $130.0 million in
RDT&E funds for the SM-3 Block IA interceptor. Please explain why DOD
is not following the law, and what you plan to do to bring MDA into
compliance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008.
Mr. Young. Due to time constraints and the advanced state of the
DOD budget, MDA was unable to incorporate changes to the fiscal year
2009 President's budget submission to be consistent with the
requirements of section 223. However, MDA was able to implement the
direction of Congress to program construction projects in the Military
Construction (MILCON) appropriations. The Department will carefully
consider these requirements as we develop the next budget request.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
compliance of section 223
74. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, section 223 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2008 requires MDA to revise its budget structure to include
procurement, O&S, and MILCON accounts in addition to its traditional
research and development appropriations. The provision also requires
MDA to establish acquisition cost, schedule, and performance baselines
for MDA programs. The purpose of this provision was to provide Congress
greater insight into MDA budgets and to provide greater clarity as to
the true costs of our missile defense programs. It was in no way an
attempt to slow down the fielding of the current generation of missile
defense systems, such as GMD, Aegis BMD, and THAAD. What effect does
this provision have on the pace of development, testing, and fielding
of missile defense systems, such as GMD, Aegis BMD, and THAAD?
Mr. Young. Establishment of baselines for MDA programs should have
no impact on development, testing, or fielding of MDA systems. The
transition by the MDA from use of research and development funding to
research and development, procurement, O&S, and MILCON funding, if
planned and executed in an incremental fashion, should have little to
no effect on the pace of development, testing, and fielding of the BMDS
elements, including the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense, Aegis BMD, and
THAAD. To the extent fielding requires use of procurement
appropriations, normally the full funding policy would apply. In the
absence of any top-line increase, full-funding may require that some
development, testing, or fielding activities be deferred to future
years to stay within budget controls. The Department's MDEB has
reviewed the potential impacts of procurement funding use with the MDA,
and is committed to working with the MDA to meet fielding requirements
and comply with section 223.

75. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, should the bureaucratic
effect of this provision be to hinder the pace of missile defense
fielding, can we be assured that you will inform Congress and take
steps necessary to rectify the problem?
Mr. Young. Section 223 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law
110-181) requires the budget justification materials submitted to
Congress in support of the DOD budget for any fiscal year after 2009 to
set forth separately requested amounts for the MDA for: (1) RDT&E; (2)
procurement; (3) operation and maintenance; and (4) MILCON. I will stay
informed of any hindrance to missile defense fielding, and steps to
correct the problems, and in turn, inform Congress.

certification of system
76. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, section 228 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2008 requires that before more than 40 GBIs may be
installed at Fort Greely, the Secretary of Defense must certify that
the Block 2006 GMD element has demonstrated through end-to-end testing
that it has a high probability of working in an operationally effective
manner. Your predecessor, Ken Krieg, sent a letter to Congress, dated
September 19, 2006, stating that the MDA ``completed a successful end-
to-end flight test of the long-range missile defense capability on
September 1.'' This test included a successful intercept of the target.
There was another successful end-to-end flight intercept test of the
GMD system in fall 2007. In light of these successful tests, when will
the Secretary of Defense certify that the Block 2006 GMD element has a
high probability of working in an operationally effective manner?
Mr. Young. I will review the progress to date, the testing
completed, the assessment by the DOT&E, and planning for O&S, and
determine when a recommendation can be provided to the Secretary of
Defense. The MDA's development program incorporates ground and flight
testing and modeling and simulation to evaluate system and element
performance. I will consider the depth and breadth of their
preparation, resulting performance, and analysis of their results to
formulate the criteria and timing of a certification decision. I will
place a significant emphasis on the DOT&E assessments. In addition, I
will review plans for operating and sustaining the Ground-based Missile
Defense (GMD) element and the funding allocated for Service
involvement.

european missile defense site
77. Senator Sessions. General Obering, please update the committee
on the ongoing work to ensure that the proposed U.S. missile defense
site in Europe is fully integrated into NATO's missile defense efforts.
General Obering. The technical integration between the U.S. missile
defense site in Europe and the NATO missile defense capability will
occur primarily through the command and control (C2) processes and
systems of the U.S. and NATO. The U.S. and NATO are continuing to work
toward integration of our BMD C2 systems. We are working
collaboratively in the following three areas.

1. Integrate U.S. BMDS elements' test beds and NATO test bed.
We are establishing the modeling and simulation and testing
environment for identifying areas for analysis and
demonstrating progress on the integration. We are developing
the connectivity and establishing the infrastructure between
U.S. Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC)
BMD test bed and the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense Integration Test Bed. The MDIOC will be the
single point-of-presence in the U.S. for BMDS elements'
participation with the ITB. The MDIOC is located in Colorado
Springs, CO, and the ITB is located in The Hague, The
Netherlands.
2. Develop technical documentation. We are writing Interface
Control Documents for the non-real-time (i.e., planning) and
real-time (i.e., situation awareness) aspects of C2. Once
completed, these documents will be used by contractors to build
or modify U.S. and NATO C2 systems, as necessary. These
documents will also contribute to the U.S. and NATO standards
process, such as updates to the U.S. Military-Standard 6016 for
exchanging Link-16 information.
3. Demonstrate integration. We are incrementally demonstrating
and exercising the display and information exchange
capabilities via increasing complexity of interoperability
demonstrations and exercises. We have scheduled four C2
demonstrations/exercises in 2008. The first demonstration was
successfully completed in January. We demonstrated the ability
to develop a critical asset list, analyze coverage, and
recommend a specific element of BMDS to protect a specific
asset. We also demonstrated the ability to exchange situation
awareness information (i.e., tracks) and display a consistent
operating picture. We have three more C2 events planned with
demonstrations scheduled in May and June, culminating in a
NATO-led exercise in September.

Activities for 2008 have been discussed and scheduled. Integration
efforts between the U.S. and NATO for subsequent years have not been
finalized. Continued analysis and more complex demonstrations on
planning and situation awareness will be the focus of the efforts.

78. Senator Sessions. General Campbell, please update the committee
on STRATCOM's efforts to develop the CONOPs for the European Missile
Defense Site, and the role you expect EUCOM and NORTHCOM to play in
operating the system.
General Campbell. Extending missile defense to deployed forces,
friends, and allies in Europe, known as European Capability (EC), has
created an intense collaborative planning effort between the MDA, U.S.
STRATCOM, U.S. NORTHCOM, and U.S. EUCOM. The development of the Global
BMD CONOPs provides the overarching framework for EC development and
will guide how the Commanders of NORTHCOM and EUCOM will employ EC in
the defense of Europe and the Homeland. Because the Global CONOPs
continues to be developed and coordinated, detailed command and control
relationships between EUCOM and NORTHCOM have not yet been determined.
We expect the Global CONOPs to be finalized this summer. Concurrent
with Global CONOPs development, STRATCOM is also assisting EUCOM with a
regionally focused European BMD CONOPs.

79. Senator Sessions. General Obering, of the $712 million
requested for the European Missile Defense System, $241 million is for
MILCON. Please explain why these funds are necessary, and the schedule
implications should these funds not be available in fiscal year 2009.
General Obering. This funding provides fiscal year 2009 MILCON
funds in the amount of $133 million for the EIS and $108 million for
EMR to support deployment of a European Capability to expand the
layered BMDS. This European Capability will enhance protection of the
U.S Homeland and provide for the defense of deployed U.S. troops and
European Allies. The fiscal year 2009 MILCON funding is essential to
allow startup of site preparation, contractor mobilization, long-lead
item acquisition, and construction of site and facilities
infrastructure. These activities must be started in fiscal year 2009 to
maintain and execute scheduled development of the site to meet a 2013
capability readiness timeline. Failure to provide these funds in fiscal
year 2009 would result in a 1-year delay in delivery of this vital
capability and preclude operational readiness.
In addition, failure to provide these funds would have diplomatic
implications that could impact the schedule. Full funding is vital to
the conclusion and implementation this year of the bilateral missile
defense agreements necessary to allow the United States to begin to
deploy capabilities critical to the defense of the homeland and U.S.
Allies. Funding cuts could discourage both potential host nations from
expending further political capital in efforts to conclude or implement
these agreements. Furthermore, as Congress has encouraged us to do, the
administration has sought and obtained NATO support for U.S. missile
defense sites in Europe through the unanimous declaration at the
Bucharest summit. Less than full funding for the missile defense sites
in Europe could jeopardize this progress by signaling that the United
States is backing away from its commitment to this program.

operations and sustainment costs
80. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young and General Obering,
approximately $715 million of the MDA request for fiscal year 2009 is
for the operations and sustainment of fielded missile defense
capabilities. Why is the MDA funding operations and sustainment costs?
Mr. Young. The MDA is funding operations and sustainment costs for
BMDS elements to ensure continuous operation of the system, and to
prevent creation of competition from within each lead Service for
limited funding resources. A potential advantage of funding BMDS O&S
through a defense-wide account is the ability to manage BMDS funding as
a portfolio, with the latitude to balance development, procurement, and
support priorities at the Department level, and to rebalance resources
in a timely manner as conditions change. The MDEB will take an active
role in the BMDS Program Objective Memorandum (POM) preparation,
resource allocation, and program execution reviews.
General Obering. MDA is funding operations and sustainment costs
for BMDS elements to ensure continuous operation of the system, and we
will continue to sustain fielded assets until we transition them to the
Services. We are working closely with the Services to transition these
assets. After transition, the lead Service will be responsible for
operations and sustainment of the capability.

81. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young and General Obering, is this
not something the Services should be responsible for?
Mr. Young. At this time, DOD has not decided to make the Services
responsible for O&S funding in the near term. For the next few years,
while we develop O&S cost experience, DOD's approach will be to oversee
the management of the BMDS portfolio, using the MDEB and involving all
stakeholders in annual planning and preparation of the BMDS program
plan. The intent of the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process and the BMDS
Business Rules, which are currently in coordination with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, is to manage resource formulation and allocation
responsibilities at the Department level. In the year of execution,
each Service would receive a funding allocation from the defense-wide
account as a result of the plan endorsed by the MDEB and approved by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense. During the execution year, periodic
reviews will be performed to assess performance against baseline plans.
By doing this, the risk and responsibilities remain at the Department
level.
General Obering. The Services will be responsible for operations
and sustainment of BMDS assets upon capability transition. The BMDS
Life Cycle Management Process and the BMDS Business Rules are currently
in coordination for Deputy Secreatary of Defense signature. These
documents will assist AT&L in managing BMDS sustainment resource
formulation and allocation responsibilities at the Department level.
The current vision is that in the year of execution, each Service would
receive a sustainment funding allocation from defense-wide resources
per the MDEB endorsed and Deputy Secretary of Defense approved plan.

82. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young and General Obering, if not
the Services, then why not create a defense-wide line to fund O&S costs
for fielded missile defense capabilities?
Mr. Young. The MDEB has recently reviewed the draft BMDS Life Cycle
Management Process which involves the MDA, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, STRATCOM, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and the Services
in an annual program plan and budget preparation process to derive a
Deputy Secretary of Defense approved BMDS POM and budget submittals.
The BMDS Life Cycle Management Process will allow development of the
missile defense budget as a portfolio (with input by all participants),
will use a defense-wide account, and will undergo MDEB review prior to
final approval. The DOD is implementing this initiative during POM-10
preparation to learn from the experience and be prepared to fully
influence POM-12. The portfolio managed defense-wide account will
include all types of funding appropriations, and will be the source of
funds transferred to the Services for administration in the year of
execution. O&S funding will be part of this process.
General Obering. Business rules have been developed under the MDEB
that incorporates the defense-wide approach. The business rules are
currently in coordination within the Department. The advantage of
funding BMD operations and sustainment through a single DOD-wide
account is that this approach ensures the funding remains dedicated to
sustaining missile defense capabilities.

transfer of thaad system
83. Senator Sessions. General Campbell, you note in your prepared
statement that ``THAAD capabilities will begin to transfer to the Army
in 2009.'' What does this mean in a practical sense?
General Campbell. The THAAD Project Office of the MDA has developed
and manufactured a mission specific set of equipment that delivers a
capability. The equipment that comprises this capability will be
transferred to the Army. Currently, this equipment includes: 3
launchers; 24 missile rounds; 1 THAAD fire control/communications
(TFCC) component; 1 radar component; and peculiar support equipment.
In parallel, the U.S. Army has defined, structured, and resourced
an organization (battery) of 99 soldiers. These soldiers will complete
new equipment training and collective training in fiscal year 2009, at
which time the THAAD Project Office will deliver the manufactured
mission equipment set along with Army provided command support
equipment to the Army organization.

84. Senator Sessions. General Campbell, will the Army now assume
the O&S costs for the four planned THAAD Fire Units?
General Campbell. The issue of total THAAD transition and transfer
from the MDA to the Army continues to be negotiated. It should be noted
that some O&S costs were assumed by the Army when the initial THAAD
unit began personnel fill. The Army also funds O&S for unit common
support equipment and installation infrastructure. The Army will assume
additional O&S resource responsibilities as each unit is filled and
activated.
The major issue that remains under discussion and negotiation is at
what point does the the Army assume responsibility to resource the O&S
cost for the THAAD mission specific equipment set (interceptors,
launchers, etc.). At present, the MDA is responsible for providing
support to the THAAD mission specific equipment and has committed to
fully funding Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) through fiscal year
2013. In the following 2 fiscal years, MDA will fund CLS as it relates
to consequences of design defect issues and the approved THAAD
Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile.

85. Senator Sessions. General Campbell, who will then be
responsible for purchasing more than the 96 planned THAAD missiles?
General Campbell. Until the THAAD Project Office is transferred to
the Army, along with an appropriate increase in Total Obligation
Authority, the Army position is that responsibility to resource
additional THAAD missiles rests with the MDA.

86. Senator Sessions. General Campbell, clearly, 96 interceptor
missiles will not be sufficient. What are Army plans for acquiring
additional THAAD missiles and Fire Units?
General Campbell. Presently the Army has no plans to acquire
additional THAAD missiles or fire units. However, the MDA does intend
to address THAAD inventory challenges in the next budget submission.
______

Question Submitted by Senator John Thune
airborne laser
87. Senator Thune. General Obering, one of the important components
of missile defense is the ability to attack the missile while it is
still in its boost phase. The ABL is an excellent example of this
capability. What do you need from Congress to ensure that you will be
able to conduct a lethal shoot-down of a threat representative boosting
target in 2009?
General Obering. Continue your solid support for ABL and the MDA
funding requirement in the PB09 submission.

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]