[Senate Hearing 110-394]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-394, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3001
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
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APRIL 2, 2008
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
S. Hrg. 110-394 Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3001
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
APRIL 2, 2008
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN CORNYN, Texas
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Proliferation Security
Initiative at the Department of Defense, and Nuclear Proliferation
Programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration
april 2, 2008
Page
Tobey, Hon. William H., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy........................................... 3
Benkert, Joseph A., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Security Affairs, Department of Defense..... 16
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM AND THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed and Dole.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff member present: Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Jennifer Cave, assistant to Senator Warner; and Lindsey Neas,
assistant to Senator Dole.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. Good morning and welcome to our witnesses. I
want to thank my ranking member, Senator Dole, for being with
us this morning.
This morning we have Will Tobey, the Deputy Administrator
of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and
Joseph Benkert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Defense (DOD) Policy Office. We welcome both of you back to the
subcommittee.
Mr. Benkert, congratulations on your recent nomination to
be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security
Affairs, the office which has policy responsibilities for the
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and other
nonproliferation programs. Good luck.
Mr. Benkert. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Both the NNSA nonproliferation program and
the CTR program received funding for fiscal year 2008 over and
above the amount requested in the President's budget. In
addition, the CTR program received new authorities to expand
activities beyond the former Soviet Union.
We look forward to hearing from each of you how the
additional funds are being applied and the plans for using the
new CTR authority. At the same time, we are interested in
understanding how the nonproliferation partnership with Russia
has changed and how it should continue to change in the future.
With a rapidly growing economy, Russia is now able to become an
equal partner with the United States in ensuring nuclear
weapons and nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological
weapons, and usable materials and technologies are not stolen
or fall into the wrong hands. I will be interested in your
thoughts on how to maintain a close working relationship with
Russia in light of the significant improvement in the Russian
economic circumstances and the value of the ruble.
Also on the agenda today are the issues of plutonium
disposition, the second line of defense, megaports and Global
Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) for these
programs at NNSA, and also the Russian chemical
demilitarization program, Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) at DOD.
We have a lot to cover today. So I will now turn to Senator
Dole for an opening statement. Senator Dole?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE
Senator Dole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
certainly want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this
morning.
I look forward to hearing your testimony on the DOD CTR
program and the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs. We
welcome your thoughts on these ongoing programs and on what
more the United States Government might do to address the
threat of proliferation in the post-September 11 world. Weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) getting into the hands of terrorists,
of course, remains the preeminent threat to our country and our
allies, and the Director of National Intelligence, I believe
recently stated in testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee exactly this point. The programs for which both of
you are responsible are aimed at reducing that threat and
managing the consequences, should such weapons ever get into
the wrong hands or be utilized. These programs are, indeed,
absolutely vital to our national security.
The CTR program was an imaginative response to the
unprecedented situation that arose at the end of the Cold War
when Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union
were left with the legacy of large WMD stockpiles and
infrastructure no longer needed or wanted, but expensive to
eliminate or safeguard.
Now with the new authorities granted by Congress last year,
as the chairman has mentioned, and given the growing terrorist
threats we face, CTR has the opportunity to expand into a
program that can address nonproliferation threats and
opportunities existing beyond the borders of the former Soviet
Union.
The Department of Energy (DOE) also has an impressive and
growing array of nuclear nonproliferation programs, including
megaports and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
that are reducing the opportunities for terrorists to access
and transport nuclear or radiological materials worldwide.
The plutonium disposition program, however, faces daunting
challenges in Russia, the United States, and in Congress. We
look forward to a dialogue with you, Mr. Tobey, about the way
forward for that program.
More generally, we are interested in our witnesses'
assessment of the progress made to date and your vision and
recommendations regarding how these programs in both
departments should proceed in the future.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today as
to whether the fiscal year 2009 and Future Years Defense
Program reflect the proper prioritization and sufficient
resources and authorities for addressing the continuing threat
that we face. I believe that we in Congress must maintain and
strengthen our support for these vital nonproliferation
programs now and in the future.
Let me again join our chairman in thanking both of you for
your service and for appearing before us today. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Mr. Tobey and Mr. Benkert, your statements are part of the
record. There is no need to read them. If you want to highlight
and summarize, we would appreciate that, and we look forward to
your testimony. We will begin with Mr. Tobey.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Tobey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure
to be here this morning for a couple of reasons. First of all,
I am deeply proud of our programs and the men and women who
execute them, and it is always a pleasure to talk about them. I
also am deeply grateful to the members of this committee for
the strong support that they have given to these programs. I
believe they are important to U.S. national security, and we
enthusiastically execute them.
The fiscal year 2009 budget request for the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation totals $1.247 billion. This
amount will allow us to continue our mission to detect, secure,
and dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials,
strengthen the international nonproliferation partnerships, and
meet the evolving proliferation and international security
threats.
Specifically, this funding will advance defense nuclear
nonproliferation priorities to enhance nuclear capabilities to
detect and interdict nuclear and radiological materials at key
seaports and border crossings, reduce and eliminate stores of
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and vulnerable radiological
materials across the globe, and work to ensure the
sustainability of nuclear security upgrades in Russia and
elsewhere.
Many of our efforts focus on nuclear materials and facility
security. We recognize that the best way to reduce the threat
that a proliferator or terrorist could acquire nuclear weapons
is by denying them access to the necessary nuclear and
radiological materials in the first place. To that end, our
fiscal year 2009 request will allow us to accelerate our work,
including installation of radiation detection systems at nine
additional ports under our megaports program, for a total of 32
megaport sites worldwide, helping to secure 49 border crossings
and other high-risk points of entry under our second line of
defense program, and expanding export control and commodity
identification training activities with more than 50 countries.
Additionally, in 2009, we will undertake a new initiative
to strengthen international safeguards to prevent the diversion
of nuclear material to nonpeaceful uses. This next generation
safeguards initiative will develop the safeguard technologies
and human resources needed to sustain our nonproliferation
efforts, while promoting international partnerships and meeting
the challenges of growing nuclear energy demand. Just as our
nuclear energy industry had lain dormant for several decades,
the technology related to safeguarding nuclear energy has also
lain dormant, and we believe that with the resurgence of
interest in nuclear energy around the globe, it is now time to
also increase our efforts with respect to safeguards
technology.
Underpinning all of these efforts is our nonproliferation
research and development (R&D) work, through which we will
continue our leadership as the principal Federal sponsor of
long-term proliferation-related R&D on nuclear detection and
characterization.
Our 2009 request will allow us to accelerate our efforts
under the GTRI to convert HEU-fueled research reactors around
the globe and to use less proliferation-sensitive low-enriched
uranium (LEU). We will also continue to repatriate U.S. and
Russian origin HEU to secure storage sites, secure high
priority nuclear and radiological sites globally, and secure
and remove orphan radiological sources that could be used in
dirty bombs. To date, we have removed enough nuclear material
for nearly 70 nuclear weapons and secured more than enough
radiological sources for over 8,000 dirty bombs. In fiscal year
2009, we will convert an additional eight HEU reactors to LEU,
remove an additional 700 kilograms of HEU, and secure an
additional 125 radiological sites across the globe.
Last year, I updated you on our progress under the
Bratislava Joint Statement on Nuclear Security by Presidents
Bush and Putin in which we partnered with Russia to secure its
nuclear weapons and sites of highest concern. I am pleased to
report that we have completed 85 percent of these key upgrades.
Work is underway at the remaining sites, and we are on track to
complete that work by the end of this year.
In fiscal year 2009, should Congress grant our request for
resources, our focus will be on completing additional high
priority security work beyond the Bratislava agreement and
working with Russia to put in place systems and procedures to
sustain the security upgrades that we already have in place.
Additionally, our fiscal year 2009 budget request includes
funding to ensure the shutdown of the last remaining Russian
plutonium production reactor in 2010, which will prevent the
production of about a half ton of weapons-grade plutonium
annually.
We will continue our efforts to disposition excess U.S. HEU
and facilitate Russia's commitment to dispose of 34 tons of
weapons-origin material.
These material security efforts enhance our work to
strengthen the nonproliferation regime and the multilateral
partnerships supporting it. In this regard, we will continue to
support the work plan of the global initiative to combat
nuclear terrorism and to advance the objectives of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which mandates
effective export controls, criminalizes proliferation of WMD by
non-state actors, and requires states to secure proliferation-
sensitive materials.
We will, likewise, continue our technical and diplomatic
support of U.S. efforts on the Nonproliferation Treaty within
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and on multilateral initiatives
such as the international fuel assurances and disablement of
North Korea's nuclear facilities through the use of Department
of State (DOS) funds.
We recognize that just as today's proliferation and
terrorism threats are global in scope, so too must be the
responses that we undertake to address them. As I stated
earlier, these are dynamic programs designed to address today's
evolving proliferation and nuclear terrorism threats. We have
made a lot of progress in tackling a threat many people thought
we could not effectively address. We will continue to undertake
our global mission as smartly and as efficiently as possible.
To that end, in fiscal year 2009, we will continue our
efforts to accelerate our programs where we can and create
synergies among our efforts, emphasizing cost-sharing and
sustainability with our international partners and strengthen
our commitment to program and project management.
If I could just have a couple of more minutes to address
the questions that you alluded to, Mr. Chairman, in your
opening statement. With respect to additional monies that were
provided by Congress in the current fiscal year appropriation
and the changing nature of Russia, I think it was here a year
ago that when asked about the possibility that more funds might
be forthcoming, I stated that if they were and if the President
had signed such legislation, we would spend them
enthusiastically. I can report that we are doing so.
Our priorities in that regard I think also have remained
largely unchanged from last year in which, as we complete our
material security work in Russia, we are moving in two
directions. We are moving both to emphasize the second line of
defense, which was, I think, correctly lower priority in the
initial circumstances in the 1990s. Then we are also moving
from the nuclear threat to the radiological threat, again
appropriately a lower priority, but still a significant threat.
Those are the ways in which we would emphasize the spending of
additional monies, and frankly, I think that is reflected in
what Congress did.
With respect to Russia, as I know you are aware, the plan
is for us to complete our work by 2012. We are actually in a
somewhat interesting period because I think for the first time,
it is necessary for us to coordinate our expenditures with
Russia. In the past, frankly, we were providers. They were
recipients. What we did added to the security there, but it did
not much affect what Russia was doing. We have told them, and
they have agreed, that the funding for security upgrades will
end in 2012, and further, we have made the point to them that
we want to see that the investment that we have made, the
substantial investment that we have made, in Russian nuclear
security be sustained and that will require the expenditure of
Russian funds. As we ramp down our spending, they will need to
ramp theirs up. For the first time, they have told us about
what their spending plans were and we intend to try and talk to
them about how we expect to spend our funds over the next
several years and to coordinate those efforts to make sure that
we sustain the investments that we have made.
I would say as a second point and recognizing the very
valid point that you made about the changing nature of the
Russian economy, we are tending to expect more cost sharing. So
the agreement that we reached with Russia at the end of 2006 on
completion of Russian border crossing work by 2011, 6 years
ahead of schedule, calls for roughly 50/50 cost sharing with
Russia. Of course, that was now a little more than a year ago.
Economic conditions have improved further, and I think we would
tend to try and take into account those changes in economic
conditions as we work with the Russians.
Still, I think it is important that we fulfill the
agreements that we have made, and we intend to do so. We think
that the support that Congress has given us will allow us to do
so.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]
Prepared Statement by William H. Tobey
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal
year 2009 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). I want to thank all of the Members for their
strong support for our vital national security missions. In the 8th
year of this administration, with the support of Congress, NNSA has
achieved a level of stability that is required for accomplishing our
long-term missions. Our fundamental national security responsibilities
for the United States include:
assuring the safety, security, and reliability of the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile while at the same time
considering options for transforming the stockpile and the
complex infrastructure that supports it;
reducing the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear
weapons, material, and expertise; and
providing reliable and safe nuclear reactor propulsion
systems for the U.S. Navy.
NNSA is examining how to proceed into the future to address
evolving national security needs in a manner that anticipates
significant changes in how we manage our national security programs,
our assets and our people. To that end, the fiscal year 2009 budget
request for $9.1 billion, a decrease of $35 million from the fiscal
year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supports NNSA's crucial
national security mission. My testimony today will focus on NNSA's
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request for fiscal year 2009.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
The possibility that rogue states or terrorists might acquire
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related
technologies, equipment and expertise, poses one of the most serious
threats to the United States and international security. The continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorists and states of concern
underscores the urgency of NNSA's efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material, to detect and interdict
nuclear and radiological materials and WMD-related equipment, to halt
the production of fissile material for weapons, to dispose of surplus
weapons-usable material, and to contain the proliferation of WMD
technical expertise. The fiscal year 2009 Budget Request will enable
NNSA to continue these critical activities that support threat
reduction initiatives vital to U.S. national security.
Preventing access to nuclear weapons and fissile material has many
dimensions. Our highest priority is to keep these dangerous materials
out of the hands of the world's most dangerous actors. Absent access to
a sufficient quantity of essential fissile materials, there can be no
nuclear weapon. The most direct way to prevent acquisition of nuclear
weapons is by denying access to fissile material. Historically, much of
our materials security emphasis focused on Russia because that is where
most of the poorly secured material was located. We have made
remarkable progress cooperating with Russia to strengthen protection,
control, and accounting of its nuclear weapons and materials. We
recently completed security upgrades at 25 Russian Strategic Rocket
Force sites and will meet our commitment to conclude agreed-to security
upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by the end of this year, as
provided for under the Bratislava Joint Statement signed by Presidents
Bush and Putin. Although these direct upgrade efforts are largely
drawing to a close after over a decade of work, we will continue
security upgrade work at some sites added to our work scope after the
Bratislava summit, and will continue to work cooperatively with Russia
to ensure the long-term sustainability of the systems and procedures
already implemented. We recently reached agreement with Russia on a
sustainability plan that identifies the requirements for long-term
Russian maintenance and infrastructure of security upgrades under our
cooperative program.
However, not all nuclear material of proliferation concern is
located in Russia. We are also working with other partners to secure
weapons-usable nuclear materials in other parts of the world, and to
strengthen security at civil nuclear and radiological facilities. One
area of particular concern is research reactors, which often use
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel otherwise suitable for bombs. Our
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) converts research reactors
around the world from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The GTRI
program, and its antecedents, have removed approximately 68 nuclear
bombs' worth of HEU and secured more than 600 radiological sites around
the world, collectively containing over 9 million curies, enough
radiation for approximately 8,500 dirty bombs. In the United States the
GTRI program has removed over 16,000 at-risk radiological sources,
totaling more than 175,000 curies--enough for more than 370 dirty
bombs.
An additional nuclear security challenge concerns the effectiveness
and credibility of international nuclear safeguards. Against the
backdrop of growing nuclear energy demand, concerns over the diffusion
of sensitive nuclear technologies, and the challenges posed by Iran and
North Korea, international safeguards are coming under increasing
strain. To address this challenge, NNSA has launched the Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), which will ensure U.S.
leadership and investment in our technologies and experts in the
service of nuclear nonproliferation. Enhanced and revitalized
international safeguards will also help ensure the sustainability of
the gains made by our associated threat reduction efforts.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2009, we will continue to lead the
U.S. Government efforts to oversee the disablement and dismantlement of
North Korea's nuclear program. However, in order to continue our
support for these critical disablement and dismantlement activities, we
will require a waiver of the Glenn Amendment restrictions that were
triggered by North Korea's 2006 nuclear test, as well as more
substantial funding. The Glenn Amendment prohibits the Department of
Energy (DOE), which would otherwise fund denuclearization activities,
from providing any financial assistance to North Korea. Without this
waiver, the Department will be unable to complete Phase Three
denuclearization activities. NNSA and the administration have been
working to insert language into the fiscal year 2008 Iraq War
Supplemental, or any other appropriate legislative vehicle, to provide
such a waiver.
We are also taking aggressive steps to interdict illicit transfers
of weapons-usable nuclear materials and equipment, and to prevent
dissemination of related sensitive nuclear technology via strengthened
export controls and cooperation. We currently provide export control
and commodity identification training to over 50 countries across the
globe, in order to improve nations' capabilities to deter and interdict
illicit WMD-related technology transfers. As an important complement to
physical security improvements, the Second Line of Defense (SLD)
Program enhances our foreign partners' ability to interdict illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials through the deployment of radiation
detection systems at high-risk land-border crossings, airports and
seaports. These efforts increase the likelihood of interdicting illicit
nuclear materials entering or leaving the country. To date, 117 Russian
border crossings have been equipped with radiation detection equipment
under this program.
As part of the SLD, the Megaports Initiative, established in 2003,
responds to concerns that terrorists could use the global maritime
shipping network to smuggle fissile materials or warheads. By
installing radiation detection systems at major seaports throughout the
world, this initiative strengthens the detection and interdiction
capabilities of our partner countries. At the end of 2007, the
Megaports program was operational in 12 countries and being implemented
at 17 additional ports. In addition, we continue to carry out
nonproliferation research and development (R&D) activities, developing,
demonstrating and delivering novel nuclear material and nuclear
detonation detection technologies for nonproliferation and homeland
security applications.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Nation's adversaries have been
quick to adapt to technological improvements. Staying ahead of the R&D
curve is critically important to keeping our Nation safe and secure. As
the principal Federal sponsor of long-term nuclear nonproliferation-
related R&D, NNSA focuses its R&D investments on leading-edge, early
stage basic and applied R&D programs, including testing and evaluation,
which lead to prototype development and improvements in nuclear
detection and characterization systems. By concentrating on these key
R&D components, NNSA helps strengthen the U.S. response to current and
projected WMD threats.
These critical steps are only part of a comprehensive
nonproliferation program. In addition to these efforts to secure,
detect, and interdict weapons-usable materials, we also work to
eliminate weapons-usable material. Indeed, there remains enough fissile
material in the world today for tens of thousands of weapons. An
integral part of our strategy, therefore, has been to encourage other
states to stop producing materials for nuclear weapons, as the United
States itself did many years ago. For example, Russia still produces
weapons-grade plutonium, not because it needs it for weapons, but
because the reactors that produce it also supply heat and electricity
to local communities. We are helping to replace these non-commercial
style reactors with fossil fuel plants, thereby eliminating their
production of plutonium. This year two of the remaining three
plutonium-producing reactors in Russia will shut down permanently at
Seversk, 6 months ahead of schedule, and the third at Zheleznogorsk
will shut down in December 2010, if not, as we hope, sooner.
As previously indicated, there are a number of effective synergies
between NNSA's defense activities and our nuclear nonproliferation
objectives. For example, we are disposing of the substantial quantities
of surplus weapons grade HEU that has resulted from the thousands of
warheads we have dismantled, by downblending it to lower enrichment
levels suitable for use in commercial reactors. This past February
marked the 15th anniversary of the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement--
one of the most successful nonproliferation programs ever conceived.
Under the HEU Purchase Agreement, over 322 metric tons of uranium from
Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons--enough material for more than
12,000 nuclear weapons--has been downblended for use in commercial
power reactors in the United States. Nuclear power generates twenty
percent of all American electricity, and half of that is generated by
fuel derived from Russian HEU. As a result, one-tenth of U.S.
electricity is made possible by material removed from former Soviet
nuclear weapons.
Similarly, disposition of surplus U.S. HEU through downblending to
LEU has been proceeding for nearly a decade and progress is continuing.
As of the end of December 2007, approximately 92 metric tons of HEU,
equivalent to over 2,000 nuclear weapons, have been downblended and
converted to power or research reactor fuel, and an additional 13
metric tons have been delivered to disposition facilities for near-term
downblending. This HEU disposition progress has already contributed
substantially to nuclear material consolidation efforts in the DOE
complex, eliminating the necessity for high security storage at two
sites, and greatly reducing it at several others.
In addition to the efforts on HEU, the United States and Russia
have each committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-
grade plutonium. In November 2007, we signed a joint statement with
Russia that represents a technically and financially credible plan to
dispose of 34 metric tons of Russia's surplus plutonium in fast
reactors. Under this approach, Russia will pay for the majority of
costs and begin disposing of its surplus plutonium in the 2012
timeframe. Last year, the DOE began construction of a Mixed Oxide (MOX)
Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site. The facility
originally planned to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade
plutonium by converting it into MOX fuel to be irradiated in commercial
nuclear reactors, producing electricity and rendering the plutonium
undesirable for weapons use. Last September, at the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference in Vienna, Secretary
Bodman announced that an additional 9 metric tons of plutonium, enough
to make 2000 nuclear weapons, would be removed from such use and
eliminated by conversion to MOX fuel. The MOX facility is a critical
component of the Department's surplus plutonium consolidation efforts
and is essential to the goal of transforming the complex.
Our efforts at home are not enough, in and of themselves. We need
cooperation from our international partners as well, and if we are to
encourage responsible international actions, the United States must set
the example. We have dramatically improved physical security of U.S.
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials in the years since the
September 11 attacks. We have made substantial reductions in our
stockpile and made additional plutonium available for conversion into
civilian reactor fuel. Additionally our complex transformation will
further reduce the number of sites and locations where we store special
nuclear materials, providing for improved security of these materials.
The risk of nuclear terrorism is not limited to the United States.
The success of our efforts to deny access to nuclear weapons and
material is very much dependent on whether our foreign partners
similarly recognize the threat and help us to combat it. To this end,
we undertake efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and
expand international nonproliferation efforts. We continue to provide
technical and policy support to U.S. efforts within the
nonproliferation regime, including support to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, and a
wide range of U.S. diplomatic initiatives, including the efforts in
North Korea. We also have strengthened international collaboration and
dialogue on nonproliferation efforts, including developing an
international mechanism through which seven countries have pledged some
$45 million in contributions to our nonproliferation programs.
In July 2006, Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to strengthen cooperation
worldwide on nuclear materials security and to prevent terrorist acts
involving nuclear or radioactive substances. By the end of 2007, 64
nations had joined this Global Initiative, and a number of subject
matter expert conferences and training activities have been conducted.
Most recently in December 2007, representatives from 15 nations
participated in Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Radiation
Emergency Response workshop held in China by the NNSA. Paired with UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 and working closely with our overseas
partners, we now have both the legal mandate and the practical means
necessary for concrete actions to secure nuclear material against the
threat of diversion.
fiscal year 2009 budget request programmatic detail
The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request for NNSA totals
$9.1 billion, a decrease of $35.0 million or 0.4 percent less than the
fiscal year 2008 consolidated appropriations level. We are managing our
program activities within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning
envelope, and are successfully balancing the administration's high
priority initiatives to reduce global nuclear danger as well as future
planning for the Nation's nuclear weapons complex within an overall
modest growth rate.
The NNSA budget justification contains information for 5 years as
required by section 3253 of P.L. 106-065, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. This section, entitled Future-
Years Nuclear Security Program, requires the Administrator to submit to
Congress each year the estimated expenditures necessary to support the
programs, projects and activities of the NNSA for a 5-year fiscal
period, in a level of detail comparable to that contained in the
budget.
The fiscal year 2009-2013 Future Years Nuclear Security Program
(FYNSP) projects $47.7 billion for NNSA programs though 2013. This is a
decrease of about $2.3 billion over last year's projections. The fiscal
year 2009 request is slightly smaller than last year's projection;
however, the outyears increase starting in fiscal year 2010.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Summary
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program mission is to detect,
prevent, and reverse the proliferation of WMD. Our nonproliferation
programs address the threat that hostile nations or terrorist groups
may acquire weapons-usable material, equipment or technology, or WMD
capabilities. The administration's fiscal year 2009 request totals
$1.247 billion for this program, reflecting a return to measured growth
from the fiscal year 2007 appropriation level, but a decrease from the
final fiscal year 2008 appropriation, which included a large
congressional plus-up over the President's request. The decrease also
reflects congressional action to transfer funding for some construction
projects to other budget accounts, and the anticipated decrease of
other major construction activities under the Elimination of Weapons
Grade Plutonium Production Program in 2008, following completion of
major elements of that program's work scope.
global threat reduction initiative
The fiscal year 2009 request of $220 million for the GTRI is an
increase of $27 million over the fiscal year 2008 operating plan. This
funding will support GTRI's mission to reduce and protect vulnerable
nuclear and radiological materials at civilian sites worldwide by
converting reactors from HEU to LEU, removing excess nuclear/
radiological materials, and protecting high priority nuclear/
radiological material from theft and sabotage. Specific increases in
the GTRI budget reflect an acceleration of (1) Bratislava efforts to
repatriate Russian-origin HEU and convert HEU reactors to LEU; (2)
efforts to develop a new ultra-high density LEU fuel needed to convert
28 high performance reactors around the world; (3) the removal of
nuclear materials not covered under other existing programs; and (4)
security upgrades on high priority HEU and radioactive materials
located in the United States.
international material protection and cooperation
NNSA's International Material Protection and Cooperation fiscal
year 2009 budget request of $429.7 million represents a decrease of
$194.8 million from the fiscal year 2008 appropriated level. This large
decrease reflects: (1) the anticipated completion of major elements of
nuclear security upgrade work performed under the Bratislava Agreement;
(2) completion of the majority of nuclear security upgrades in
countries outside of Russia; and (3) large Congressional increases for
this work over the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request. During
the past 15 years, the Material Protection Control and Accounting
(MPC&A) program has secured 85 percent of Russian nuclear weapons sites
of concern, and work is underway to complete this work by the end of
fiscal year 2008. To maintain this progress, MPC&A and Rosatom have
developed a new joint plan identifying elements required for Rosatom's
long-term sustainability of U.S.-installed security enhancements. In
fiscal year 2009, international material protection activities will
focus on the continued enhancement of Russia's capability to operate
and maintain U.S.-funded security improvements in the long-term. The
MPC&A Program is also focused on reducing proliferation risks by
converting Russian HEU to LEU and by consolidating weapons-usable
nuclear material into fewer, more secure locations. In fiscal year
2009, we will eliminate an additional 1.4 metric tons of Russian HEU
for a cumulative total of 12.4 metric tons.
Our SLD Program installs radiation detection equipment at key
transit and border crossings, airports and major seaports to deter,
detect and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive
materials. The SLD Core Program, which installs radiation detection
equipment at borders, airports, and strategic feeder ports, has
equipped 117 sites in Russia. The U.S. and Russia have agreed to
jointly fund work to equip all of Russia's border crossings with
radiation detection equipment by the end of 2011, 6 years ahead of
schedule. The Core Program has also equipped 33 sites outside of Russia
with radiation detection systems. The SLD Megaports Initiative has
deployed radiation detection and cargo scanning equipment at 12 ports
to date in the Netherlands, Greece, Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Singapore,
Spain, the Philippines, Belgium, Honduras, Pakistan, the United
Kingdom, and Israel. Various stages of implementation are underway at
ports in 16 other locations.
During fiscal year 2009, the SLD Core Program is planning to
complete an additional 49 sites. The SLD Megaports Initiative plans to
complete work at nine key ports in fiscal year 2009 in Israel, Jordan,
Spain, Mexico, China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and
Taiwan. We will continue progress on separate ports in Spain and
Mexico, and will initiate new work in fiscal year 2009 at ports in
Argentina, Brazil, and Malaysia. The Megaports program is also pursuing
outreach activities in northeastern Africa and other key regions of
concern. Fiscal year 2009 funding will also support the procurement of
Advanced Spectroscopic Portals and mobile detection systems, including
Mobile Radiation Detection and Identification Systems and Radiation
Detection Straddle Carriers. The Megaports Initiative also works
closely with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) by making technical resources
available to complement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) at international ports. Under SFI, all
U.S.-bound containers are being scanned at three ports in Pakistan,
Honduras, and the United Kingdom, fulfilling the 2006 SAFE Ports Act to
couple non-intrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection
equipment in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of 100 percent
scanning of U.S.-bound containers. SLD Megaports has also partnered
with CBP at four, limited capacity SFI locations in Hong Kong, Oman,
Korea, and Singapore. The Megaports Initiative is installing radiation
detection equipment at all CSI ports and has worked with CBP to pursue,
where feasible, joint agreements with host nations to implement both
the Megaports and SFI programs.
nonproliferation and international security
The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) mission is to
prevent, mitigate, and reverse WMD proliferation by providing policy
and technical support to strengthen international nonproliferation
regimes, institutions, and arrangements; promote foreign compliance
with nonproliferation norms and commitments; and eliminate or reduce
proliferation programs and stockpiles. Major NIS strategic priorities
in fiscal year 2009 include supporting the safe and secure expansion of
nuclear energy use and disablement, dismantlement, and verification of
nuclear programs in North Korea. NIS will also support the NGSI to
strengthen international safeguards, revitalize the U.S. technical and
human resource base that supports them, and develop the tools,
approaches, and authorities needed by the IAEA to fulfill its mandate
far into the future.
In fiscal year 2009, NIS also will confirm the permanent
elimination from the Russian weapons stockpile of 30 metric tons of
HEU; control the export of items and technology useful for WMD
programs; continue an augmented export control cooperation program
involving emerging suppliers and high-traffic transit states; break up
proliferation networks and improve multilateral export control
guidelines; develop and implement policy in support of global
nonproliferation regimes; train 2,500 international and domestic
experts in nonproliferation; provide technical expertise to the U.S.
Government to support various WMD interdiction activities; develop and
implement transparency measures to ensure that nuclear materials are
secure; transition 300 Russian and former Soviet Union WMD experts to
long-term private sector jobs; and make the preparations necessary for
the U.S. Government's $50 million contribution to the IAEA for the
establishment of the International Nuclear Fuel Bank--an international
effort to establish a back-up nuclear fuel supply for peaceful uses.
elimination of weapons grade plutonium production
Turning to programs that focus on halting the production of nuclear
materials, the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
Program is working towards completing the permanent shutdown of the
three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in Seversk
and Zheleznogorsk, Russia. The fiscal year 2009 Budget request of $141
million reflects a decrease of $38 million from the fiscal year 2008
level, following the planned completion in December 2008 of the fossil
fuel plant at Seversk. The budget profile provides the funding required
to replace the heat and electricity these reactors would otherwise
supply to local communities with energy generated by fossil fuel,
permitting the Russians to permanently shut down these reactors by
December 2008 in Seversk and no later than December 2010 in
Zheleznogorsk. This construction activity thus leads to the elimination
of more than one metric ton of weapons-grade plutonium production per
year.
fissile materials disposition
The Fissile Materials Disposition program request for fiscal year
2009 is $41.8 million. The program retains three principal elements:
efforts to dispose of U.S. HEU declared surplus to defense needs
primarily by down-blending it into LEU; technical analyses and support
to negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and the IAEA on
monitoring and inspection procedures under the 2000 U.S.-Russia
plutonium disposition agreement; and limited support for the early
disposition of Russia's plutonium in that country's BN-600 fast reactor
including U.S. technical support for work in Russia for disposition of
Russian weapon-grade plutonium in fast reactors generally.
The fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161)
appropriated funding for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility Project in
South Carolina in the DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy account and
funding for the related Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility/Waste
Solidification Building projects in the NNSA Weapons Activities
account. These projects remain important components of the Nation's
nuclear nonproliferation efforts. In total, the funding commitment to
the DOE's nonproliferation activities is $1.853 billion in 2009. The
MOX project is a key component of the U.S. strategy for plutonium
disposition. It is the centerpiece of a comprehensive approach for
disposing of surplus weapons-usable plutonium by fabricating it into
mixed-oxide fuel for irradiation in existing nuclear reactors. This
meets key national security and nonproliferation objectives by
converting the plutonium into forms not readily usable for weapons and
supports efforts to consolidate nuclear materials throughout the
weapons complex.
In addition to its role in the disposition of excess nuclear
materials at home, the U.S. views the MOX project as a key component of
U.S. global nuclear nonproliferation efforts in which fissile material
disposition is the final step in a balanced nuclear nonproliferation
strategy aimed at employing measures necessary to detect, secure, and
dispose of dangerous nuclear material. In 2007, the U.S. and Russian
governments agreed on a framework for a technically and financially
credible Russian plutonium disposition program based on the irradiation
of plutonium as MOX fuel in fast reactors. When all required steps have
taken for implementation, it will enable the U.S. and Russia to meet
their commitments under a 2000 agreement to dispose of a combined total
of 68 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium--enough material
for approximately over 4,000 nuclear weapons.
This budget request also seeks funding to dispose of surplus U.S.
HEU, including downblending 17.4 metric tons of HEU to establish the
Reliable Fuel Supply, which would be available to countries with good
nonproliferation credentials that face a disruption in supply that
cannot be corrected through normal commercial means. This initiative
marks an important first step creating a reliable nuclear fuel
mechanism that could provide countries a strong incentive to refrain
from acquiring their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
nonproliferation and verification research and development
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $275 million for
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D. This effort encompasses two
primary programs that make unique contributions to national security by
conducting R&D into new technical capabilities to detect illicit
foreign production, diversion or detonation of nuclear materials. The
Proliferation Detection Program conducts research across a spectrum of
technical disciplines that supports the NNSA mission, national and
homeland security agencies and the counterterrorism community.
Specifically, this program develops the tools, technologies,
techniques, and expertise required for the identification, location,
and analysis of facilities, materials, and processes of undeclared and
proliferant nuclear programs. The Nuclear Detonation Detection Program
produces the Nation's space-based operational sensors that monitor the
entire planet to detect and report surface, atmospheric, or space
nuclear detonations. This program also produces and updates regional
geophysical datasets that enable and enhance operation of the Nation's
seismic nuclear detonation detection network.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Tobey. Thank you for
your excellent statement.
Mr. Benkert, please.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. BENKERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator
Dole, it is an honor to appear before you once again to discuss
the CTR Program and the PSI. As did Mr. Tobey, I would like to
express my appreciation and the Department's appreciation for
the strong support that this committee has provided for the CTR
Program over the years, and I am, I think, pleased to be able
to report that we are making good use of the funds and the
authorities that you have provided us, and I will touch on some
of them further in this statement.
Senator Dole, in your remarks, you mentioned the vital
importance of programs that keep WMD out of the hands of
terrorists. So permit me first to begin with a few words about
the strategic framework which guides our many and varied
efforts to combat WMD and to keep such weapons out of the hands
of terrorists and where CTR fits in that.
We have, during this administration, created a number of
documents that provide, I think, evidence of the priority that
this country places on combating WMD and WMD terrorism,
including a national strategy to combat WMD, a national
military strategy to combat WMD, and a strategy to combat WMD
terrorism. Underlying all these strategies are four themes or
pillars.
First is the need for good and continuously improving
intelligence on these threats.
The second is the importance of securing or eliminating WMD
at its source, which is one of the principal purposes of the
CTR program.
Third is interdicting WMD and related materials on the
move, in transit.
The fourth is developing consequence management resources
should a WMD event occur.
Clearly, CTR and PSI, which I will talk about later,
contribute very directly to two of these four underlying themes
or pillars under all of our strategies.
Our strategies for combating WMD also note the importance
of international partnerships. I think it is noteworthy that
our department's Quadrennial Defense Review, in particular, was
noteworthy in its emphasis on the essential nature of
strengthening international partnerships and building the
capacity of friends, allies, and partners. I think it is not an
overstatement to say that our first line of defense in
combating WMD is international cooperation, and clearly CTR and
PSI are prime examples of our Government's efforts to address
this important issue.
For 2009, the President has requested $414 million to
continue CTR activities and $800,000 for PSI exercise support.
We ask for your support in these pending budget requests for
CTR and PSI, and I would note that the budget request for CTR
at $414 million is substantially above what we requested last
year, reflecting an attempt to come close to the additional
funds that you have provided us.
I would like to just bring the committee up to date on the
status of CTR projects, what we have done in the last year, and
new initiatives that will be started this year.
As you have noted, the authorizing legislation added an
additional $80 million to the President's budget request for
CTR. I would also note that the legislation removed the
requirement for us to certify that countries receiving CTR
assistance met certain conditions before authorized funds could
be obligated. The certification process took time and every
year it caused obligations to be delayed. So we greatly
appreciate its repeal.
You also removed the geographic limitation that confined
the program largely to the states of the former Soviet Union,
for the first time, authorizing specific funding to expand
beyond those borders, and that was a noteworthy development,
and we are now working to develop the program to implement
that.
Mr. Chairman, you noted the changing nature of the Russian
economy in our programs in Russia. I would note that we
continue to have a significant CTR program in Russia, and I
think it is important that we do so. With its oil wealth,
Russia is certainly not the economically hobbled nation whose
WMD legacy CTR was originally intended to address.
It is important, I think, to remember why CTR in Russia
remains in our interest, despite the changing economy in
Russia. I think, for example, it remains in the U.S. interest
to ensure the elimination of strategic delivery systems at
their source, even in the face of Russian modernization of its
strategic systems. Clearly Russia is going to modernize its
strategic systems and would do so whether or not CTR existed.
The issue is, I think, whether we would have confidence that
Russia would dispose of its old systems in a responsible and
nonproliferable way. CTR is one of the methods by which we can
have such confidence.
I would also note that above the level of what is
accomplished in specific programs, the CTR program has been
characterized by a very professional and business-like
relationship with our Russian counterparts despite the ups and
downs in the overall relationship with Russia over the last few
years. I think it is important that we continue to have such a
foundation in the relationship with Russia and continue that.
Let me just mention some highlights of what the CTR program
in Russia has done over the course of the past year.
First, in coordination with our colleagues at DOE and in
accordance with the 2005 decision by Presidents Bush and Putin
at Bratislava to accelerate implementation of the warhead
security program, last year DOD provided upgrades for security
systems at 4 Russian nuclear weapons sites, bringing to 16 the
total number of upgraded sites. Work is now in progress at the
remaining eight sites where DOD has commitments, and we expect
to complete the installation of these security upgrades by the
end of 2008, which was the goal of the program.
The warhead security initiative also includes close
coordination with our Russian counterparts to structure a
system that gives the Russian military the means to sustain the
operational readiness of these security systems into the
future. A key component of this warhead security program is
obviously to sustain what we have put in place, and that is
largely a Russian responsibility.
Second, I would just note that a week from today on April
9th, a ceremony will take place in Perm, Russia, celebrating
CTR's final action in the elimination of the SS-24 rail
mobilized intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, a
system that originally was capable of delivering some 460
warheads. I think this is a significant milestone in the
program.
While work on the SS-24 is complete, we continue to work on
eliminating other intercontinental and submarine launch
ballistic missiles, their launchers and associated submarines.
Last year, the Department eliminated 20 submarine launch tubes,
20 sea-launched ballistic missiles, 76 ICBMs, and 31 mobile
launch platforms.
Third, I think as you know, one of our great challenges in
CTR in Russia was finding an effective and efficient way to
complete the construction of the chemical weapons destruction
facility at Shchuch'ye on time and within budget. I think as
you know, the Shchuch'ye project will safely destroy over 2
million artillery shells and rockets filled with nerve gas, the
most deadly of chemical weapons. In the past, escalating costs
and, frankly, the uncertain political commitment of our
interlocutors in Russia to this project posed major challenges
in completing the project. I am happy to report that I think
these challenges are now largely resolved in large part due to
the work of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's CTR
implementation team which spent a number of weeks in Moscow
about a year ago negotiating new arrangements for project
completions of the chemical weapons destruction facility.
I would note that for the first time we have a written
Russian commitment as part of these arrangements to complete
the project at Russian expense should be DOD contribution prove
insufficient. We expect that the Shchuch'ye facility will
become operational by the end of this year.
I think it is also noteworthy that in 2008 for the first
time, the level of CTR activities outside of Russia will exceed
the level of CTR activities inside Russia, and that trend will
continue in the coming years. In fact, in 2009, the total will
be about $100 million more outside Russia than inside Russia.
While a continued CTR relationship with Russia is clearly
in the U.S. interest, as I have said, CTR's future going
forward, I think, lies largely outside the Russian Federation.
Let me then note some of the highlights of CTR work outside
Russia.
The biological threat reduction program, one of the
hallmark programs outside Russia, continued its work in five
countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Ukraine. It is focused on consolidating countries' dangerous
pathogen collections, providing security for dangerous
pathogens, providing disease surveillance monitoring, and
enhancing strategic research partnerships. A milestone is the
construction of a central reference laboratory in Tbilisi,
Georgia, which began last year and is on track to be completed
in February of next year. At the request of the Georgian
Government, we are working on making this central reference
laboratory a joint U.S.-Georgian overseas laboratory. I would
just note that cooperation with Georgia in the CTR Program has
been excellent.
We have also completed a WMD proliferation prevention
initiative project in Uzbekistan to install radiation portal
monitors, a project we implemented in cooperation with and for
the DOE's second line of defense program.
Proliferation prevention projects in Ukraine are on track
to install surveillance command and control systems to
complement DOE's radiation portal monitor installations, as
well as working with Ukrainian border forces to enhance the
maritime detection of WMD interdiction capabilities in the
Black Sea. I would note that this is an example of, I think,
the strong partnership between our departments in this goal
where DOE has put in land border and port monitoring portal
monitors to monitor for WMD, for nuclear materials. We are
working then, in a complementary fashion, on the maritime
detection and interdiction capabilities for Ukraine which, of
course, has a substantial maritime border.
I would also note that in July 2007, CTR completed its
first project outside the former Soviet Union, and this was in
Albania with the elimination of Albania's chemical weapons
stockpile. With CTR support, Albania became the first state
party of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to eliminate
fully its declared chemical weapons stockpile.
I am happy to report that with the authorities you gave us
last year, we are ready to move forward with CTR to begin
addressing proliferation threats more globally. We are looking
at ways to streamline the legal requirements for CTR
activities, and we are working to explore less expensive ways
to accomplish CTR goals.
We recently briefed your staff on several potential CTR
projects. One such activity is in the Republic of Armenia,
which has requested assistance with biosecurity, to which we
will respond.
I would also note that our thinking about CTR expansion is
going to be informed by several studies on the matter, which
you have directed us to conduct. The National Academy of
Sciences will conduct two studies mandated by last year's
legislation, one on CTR expansion outside the former Soviet
Union and the other specific to expansion of CTR's biological
threat reduction programs. We look forward to working with the
National Academy of Sciences on these studies.
Let me turn briefly now to PSI.
Through PSI, the United States collaborates with like-
minded countries to build capabilities for interdicting WMD and
missile-related shipments, their delivery systems, and related
materials to and from non-state actors and states of
proliferation concern.
I think it is useful to think about PSI on three levels.
First, governments in PSI make a political commitment to
stop the proliferation of WMD materials. They sign up to a
declaration of principles and PSI commitments. Today, the
United States and any other adherent to the PSI principles can
call on any one of over 85 other states to take action based on
the commitments that they have signed up to in PSI. This alone,
I think, is a singular innovation brought about by PSI.
Second, there is a significant capacity-building component
of PSI that is spearheaded by countries that participate in an
operational experts group that meets regularly to explore
aspects of interdiction from operational, law enforcement,
legal, and diplomatic arenas. The Operational Experts Group
develops outreach and capacity-building activities for the
benefit of all PSI partners, and the list of capacity-building
efforts is long but includes such things as, from New Zealand,
the publication of a model national response plan; from the
United States, from the DOE, a WMD commodities technical
handbook to help identify those things we care about in
interdiction; a Web-based platform that will help record
lessons learned; and then from a number of countries, over 30
live and table top exercises involving over 70 PSI partner
states exploring all modes of transportation, ground, air, and
sea. I would note that we have seen over the 5 years of PSI
this exercise program evolve from one that was dominated by a
focus on military interdiction to one that appreciates the true
complexity of interdiction, integrates legal, law enforcement,
intelligence, and policy challenges in a way that more
accurately reflects real-world proliferation situations.
The third level of PSI is, of course, international
collaboration on real-world interdictions. Building on the
commitment in PSI, the United States has been able to work more
effectively with many of its PSI partners in interdictions. PSI
effectively sets the conditions that make success in
interdiction possible. Put another way, PSI allows partner
countries to improve and practice interdiction-related actions
so that we are ready to work together on game day.
Finally, let me just say a couple words about PSI in the
future. This May, PSI partners will mark the fifth anniversary
of PSI here in Washington. Senior leaders from all over the
world will come together to take stock of this initiative and
how to strengthen it for the future.
Congress has also shown similar interest in this program,
asking in last year's legislation that the President include in
his annual budget submission of a description of PSI-related
activities, including associated funding that will be carried
out by each participating U.S. Government agency or department.
This requirement presents us and other agencies with a
challenging task since PSI was conceived by the President and
is executed by the participating countries as a flexible and
adaptive initiative that intends to leverage existing
capabilities and activities and authorities rather than
creating new ones or creating a program of its own. That said,
we will work diligently to answer your questions.
Finally, I would just want to reemphasize the point I made
at the beginning of my statement. CTR and PSI are but two
pieces of a much larger national strategy to combat WMD. Since
September 11, 2001, I think we have made significant progress
in these areas. CTR and PSI are key examples of this progress.
PSI did not exist in 2001, and CTR was really a different
program then. But despite the good work we have done with CTR
and PSI, we have much more to do across the spectrum of WMD
threats before we can testify with confidence that all of our
Government's tools to combat WMD are being integrated fully and
effectively. We look forward to continued close coordination
and cooperation with you as we address this challenge.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time. That concludes my
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benkert follows:]
Prepared Statement by Joseph A. Benkert
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
appear before you to discuss the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), two elements
of the broader U.S. strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).
I last testified before you on CTR and PSI in April 2007. In the
intervening 11 months, we have continued to make progress in all the
traditional CTR activities and have begun to consider how to proceed
forward into new areas. PSI has also made progress and will mark the
fifth anniversary of its announcement in May 2008. Since I last
appeared before you, Congress has also considered how CTR should
function in the future and saw fit to streamline significantly CTR
operations. Congressional action during the fiscal year 2008
legislative cycle will result in more direct obligation of CTR funds,
as well as revised procedures for expanding CTR activities beyond the
borders of the former Soviet Union.
For fiscal year 2009, the President has requested $414 million to
continue CTR activities and $800,000 for PSI exercise support. The
Department asks for your support for the President's pending budget
requests for CTR and PSI.
combating wmd
Let me first begin with a few words about the strategic framework
which guides our many and varied efforts to combat WMD. We have a host
of documents that provide evidence of the priority we place on
combating WMD and WMD terrorism. These documents, including the
National Strategy to Combat WMD and the National Military Strategy to
Combat WMD, proceed from four common themes or pillars: 1) the need for
improved intelligence; 2) the utility and priority of securing WMD at
the source; 3) interdicting WMD and materials of concern on the move:
and, 4) developing consequence management resources should a WMD event
occur.
Our strategies for combating WMD all note the importance of
international partnerships. The Department of Defense's (DOD)
Quadrennial Defense Review in particular was noteworthy in its emphasis
on the essential nature of strengthening international partnerships and
building the capacity of friends, allies and partners. But, I think
many don't appreciate fully how important this type of coalition
activity is in the fight against WMD. An essential element of our
defense in combating WMD is international cooperation, and CTR and PSI
are but two examples of our government's efforts to address this
important issue.
cooperative threat reduction
Mr. Chairman, the committee is well acquainted with the history and
activities of the CTR Program. The national security of the United
States has been enhanced by the Program's efforts over the years to
facilitate secure transportation, storage, safeguarding and destruction
of WMD and the means of their delivery and to assist in the prevention
of weapons proliferation as envisaged in the original legislation.
CTR Today
I would like to bring the committee up to date on the status of CTR
projects, the achievements made over the past year, and the new
initiatives that will be started this year.
In coordination with the Department of Energy (DOE),
DOD is in the process of upgrading security systems at nuclear
weapons storage sites in the Russian Federation. During this
past year, four more sites were completed, bringing to 16 the
total number of sites that DOD has upgraded. Work is in
progress at the remaining eight sites where DOD has
commitments, and we expect to complete installation of those
security upgrades by the end of this calendar year. With
security upgrades at more than half the storage sites now
completed, DOD and DOE are coordinating closely with the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Russian Navy and the
Strategic Rocket Forces to structure a system that gives the
Russian military the means to sustain the operational readiness
of those security systems far into the future. In addition, DOD
is updating the automated inventory control and management
system previously provided while simultaneously expanding it to
manage the warhead inventory at 13 additional sites.
Presidents Bush and Putin took the initiative to accelerate
this warhead security work at the February 2005 Bratislava
Summit. When this work is complete, we will be able to say that
we have worked with our Russian partners to help them improve
security at every Russian warhead storage site where they have
requested U.S. assistance. This will be a significant
achievement, both from a technical and a political perspective.
However, the security of Russia's nuclear warheads and related
materials is first and foremost a Russian responsibility. What
we will have done through the Bratislava Initiative is
accelerate all of the work Russia asked us to do on its warhead
security program. DOD has worked closely with the Russian MOD
to ensure that sustainment for these security upgrades is fully
integrated into their security program. Russian MOD leaders
responsible for warhead security have proven to be
professional, motivated, and committed to the mission of
nuclear security. The long-term security of these weapons is
not just a function of the equipment DOD and DOE have
installed, but also the professionalism of our Russian
colleagues who bear ultimate responsibility. This means finding
ways to continue engaging with Russia on nuclear security and
related topics.
CTR has cooperated with the Russian MOD to securely
transport nuclear warheads from operational locations to
dismantlement facilities or secure storage locations. As part
of this program, we began delivery last year of new cargo
railcars with special physical security features. One of these
new cars is provided for every two Russian railcars taken out
of service. We also provided armored transport vehicles to
bolster security for warheads being transported between the
sites and the rail transfer points.
The greatest challenge over the past year was finding
an efficient and effective way to complete construction of the
Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye on
time and within the budget of $1.039 billion. Progress on
construction was halted for a time because the Department was
unable to obtain fair bids from Russian subcontractors for key
components of the CWDF. A report on the situation is included
as an appendix to the CTR Annual Report for 2009, pursuant to
congressional requirement. I will touch on some key elements of
this situation here.
First, it is important to recall why we began the Shchuch'ye
project. Shchuch'ye is intended to safely destroy some 2.1
million artillery shells and rockets filled with nerve agent. A
decade ago, this stockpile was poorly guarded and weakly
secured at its depot near what would become the CWDF site we
have today. We judged this stockpile to be among the most
dangerous in the former Soviet inventory because it was
composed of nerve agent-filled projectiles--the most deadly of
chemical weapons. Moreover, we judged this stockpile to be
doubly dangerous because the projectiles were comparatively
small--perhaps even manportable. Those factors have not
changed, although the depot has received security upgrades and
the Russian Federation is generally a more secure place. We
committed to construct the CWDF and we are following through on
that commitment.
Second, the escalating cost and uncertain political
commitment of interlocutors in Russia have been major
challenges in completing this project. When we were repeatedly
unable to secure reasonable bids, the viability of the U.S.
position was called into question. We stopped that effort and
made our serious concerns very plain to the other side. Much
credit is due to CTR's implementation team at the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, which spent weeks in Moscow
negotiating terms of a set of arrangements for completing the
CWDF. These arrangements protect DOD's financial equities by
capping our contribution to the project at slightly more than
$1 billion; the arrangements also protect our equities in non-
proliferation by winning--for the first time--a written Russian
commitment to complete the CWDF at Russian expense should the
DOD contribution prove insufficient. The new arrangements
between the Department and Russia's Federal Agency for Industry
(FAI) were signed in May 2007. The U.S. maintains oversight of
the project through rights to verify the completed work. By
December 2007, FAI had awarded contracts for all remaining
major construction activity. As of now, FAI fully expects the
CWDF to be operational by December 2008. As of today, our
report card on the new arrangements for the CWDF at Shchuch'ye
is ``so far, so good.''
In ongoing activities in strategic offensive arms
elimination in Russia, in the past year, the Department
eliminated 20 submarine launch tubes, 20 sea-launched ballistic
missiles, 76 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 31 mobile
launch platforms.
Ongoing projects to enhance biosafety and biosecurity
at five research facilities in Russia will be completed in
2008.
Outside of Russia, CTR has helped improve the
capabilities of Azerbaijan's Coast Guard to interdict WMD
smuggling in the Caspian Sea. We are also in the final stage of
installing a comprehensive surveillance system that will cover
the major shipping lanes in the Caspian.
Our WMD-Proliferation Prevention projects in Ukraine
are on track. Working with the DOE, we are installing a
surveillance and command, control and communications system to
complement DOE's radiation portal monitor installations, as
well as providing enhanced WMD detection and interdiction
capabilities to their maritime Border Guard forces on the Black
Sea.
The Biological Threat Reduction Program continues its
work in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Ukraine to consolidate each country's pathogen collections,
provide security for extremely dangerous pathogens, provide a
capability for disease surveillance using molecular diagnostics
with real-time reporting, and enhance strategic research
partnerships. Construction on the Central Reference Laboratory
(CRL) in Tbilisi, GA, which began last year, is on track to be
completed in February 2009. Currently, at the request of the
Georgian government, we are working on making the CRL a joint
U.S.-Georgian overseas laboratory.
In December 2007, the Secretary of Defense and the
Kazakhstan Ambassador, on behalf of his government, signed an
extension of the CTR Umbrella Agreement with Kazakhstan. This
agreement is essential for the continuation of CTR activities.
The decision to extend the CTR legal framework shows the
continued importance Kazakhstan places on the value of
international cooperation in the area of nonproliferation. This
important political commitment needs to be matched by improved
regulatory processes in Kazakhstan if CTR is to be able to
provide the best support it can. Specifically, processes for
exempting CTR assistance from Kazakh taxation still have not
been resolved satisfactorily, although we are aware that our
counterparts in Astana are seeking solutions in good faith.
We completed a WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative
project in Uzbekistan to install radiation portal monitors--a
project we implemented for the DOE's Second Line of Defense--
but fell 10 percent short of the targeted 90-95 percent
international traffic coverage due to continued access
problems. We also abandoned a planned land border project in
Uzbekistan because the Uzbek government blocked necessary
interaction with its Border Guard.
While working with Uzbekistan on border security has
proven problematic, CTR's Biological Threat Reduction Program
is proceeding in Uzbekistan, albeit on a scaled-down basis.
A key test of Uzbekistan's commitment to international non-
proliferation cooperation will come this year as we work to
extend the CTR Umbrella Agreement.
In July 2007, CTR was able to mark a double milestone:
completion of its first project outside the states of the
former Soviet Union and elimination of Albania's chemical
weapons stockpile. With CTR's support, Albania became the first
State Party of the Chemical Weapons Convention to eliminate
fully its declared chemical weapons stockpile.
The Future of CTR
Mr. Chairman, it is important that we continue to have a CTR
program in Russia. With its oil wealth, Russia certainly is not the
economically hobbled nation whose WMD legacy CTR was originally
intended to address. However, it is important to correct misperceptions
and remind ourselves why CTR in Russia is in the U.S. interest.
At the political level, cooperation from Russia has at
times been difficult for CTR. However, at the level where the
work gets done, the cooperation has been professional and
business-like. Significantly, we have enjoyed a relationship of
mutual respect with the Russian MOD on CTR projects. This is an
important channel we should work to preserve.
These relationships more broadly are important when
viewed against the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations.
Russia, for example, has responded positively to U.S. requests
for non-proliferation assistance--jointly leading the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism with us.
We continue to review the value of each of our
activities in Russia. I would remind the subcommittee that we
reviewed each of our projects in Russia in 2003 and revalidated
their non-proliferation value. We turned some activities over
to Russia completely and downsized our support for other
activities during that effort which was called the
``rescoping'' in our testimony to this subcommittee. What
happened in 2003 was not intended to be the last word, and we
continue to seek opportunities to streamline our activities in
Russia. One example is the recent initiative by Russia to
assume partial responsibility for sustainment of nuclear
warhead security upgrades. We have a national security equity
in ensuring that the program is not turned over to Russia
precipitously, but we will not extend our presence any longer
than necessary.
Among CTR activities in Russia, it remains in the U.S.
interest to eliminate strategic delivery systems at their
source, even in the face of Russian modernization of its
strategic systems. Russia is going to modernize its strategic
systems with or without CTR assistance. The issue is whether we
have confidence that Russia will dispose of its old systems in
a responsible nonproliferable way. For the future we would have
less insight into, and less confidence in, the secure
elimination of decommissioned systems and launchers in Russia
if we were not participating in that process through CTR.
CTR activities in Russia, with the exception of road-
mobile missile elimination, have surpassed the half-way point
in execution. From a fiscal perspective, infrastructure
investment is complete.
In 2008, the level of CTR activities outside Russia
will exceed the level inside Russia, and this trend will
sharpen in the coming years.
CTR advocates have been asking when CTR will ``go global.'' It is a
good question, and we are looking at opportunities. Congress has been
very supportive in improving CTR's flexibility for different
activities. But it is important to maintain perspective on a ``global
CTR'' program. I would offer the following thoughts in this regard.
CTR will always be ready to address stocks of WMD if
they are found, and if applicable governments ask for our
assistance to eliminate them. However, the WMD threat is no
longer only about addressing WMD at its source. As we think
about CTR in a global context, it must be in the way CTR has
already been moving--increasing foreign institutional capacity
to address WMD threats. The bio-security case is a good
example. CTR's biological threat reduction program was
originally conceived to address the threat posed by the legacy
of the Soviet Biopreparat--a complex of especially dangerous
pathogens, infrastructure and scientific expertise. Biopreparat
doesn't exist outside the states of the former Soviet Union,
although a bio-terrorism threat does exist. Our challenge is to
make the original CTR bio-security model applicable to the
global threat. This is going to focus much more on building
foreign capacity than the infrastructure-heavy work that was
necessary to address the legacy of Biopreparat.
We should bear in mind that money is not necessarily
the best measure of non-proliferation success. As we look to
the future addressing the global WMD threat through partners'
political and policy commitments is as important as how richly
we fund our non-proliferation programs. Measuring success in
the non-proliferation business is not about money alone. We
will continue to work with Congress on this challenge.
With the forgoing in mind, I am happy to report that we are ready
to move forward with CTR to address global threats. We are ready to
streamline legal requirements for CTR activities to match the type of
activity being contemplated; we also want to begin working with DTRA to
explore less expensive ways to accomplish CTR goals.
We recently briefed congressional staff on our thinking about
several potential CTR projects in sensitive areas. I should emphasize
that CTR activities remain directed solely at combating WMD--no other
purpose. However, some foreign partners might prefer that our
cooperation not be made public. One new activity we can report is the
Republic of Armenia's request for assistance with bio-security, to
which we are actively responding. I should also note that the
administration does not currently contemplate using CTR to address
nonproliferation challenges in North Korea. CTR would have the
technical capability to do so, but DOD is currently barred from
providing assistance to North Korea by law; moreover, the
administration has chosen to use other resources to pursue this work.
Our internal thinking about CTR expansion will be informed by
several studies on the matter. The National Academy of Sciences will
conduct two studies mandated by legislation, one on CTR expansion
outside the former Soviet Union and the other specific to expansion of
CTR's Biological Threat Reduction Program outside the former Soviet
Union. Additionally, a panel composed of independent experts was
established in August 2007 to review future directions for Defense
Threat Reduction Agency missions and capabilities; possible expansion
of the CTR Program is one of the areas examined by the panel. In
addition to these projects, we've asked the National Defense University
to examine CTR's WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative for WMD border
security, its achievements to date, and offer recommendations for
possible future direction.
the proliferation security initiative
The United States continues to work with the international
community on strengthening the PSI, which President Bush launched in
May 2003. Through the PSI, the United States collaborates with like-
minded countries to build capabilities for improving the interdiction
of WMD and missile-related shipments, their delivery systems and
related materials to and from non-state actors and states of
proliferation concern.
It is useful to think about PSI on three different levels, each
strengthening the initiative but also mutually reinforcing each other.
First, there is the political commitment that governments make when
they endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles. Since I last
testified before this Subcommittee in April 2007, the number of
countries that have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction
Principles has increased to over 85. This is more than a seven-fold
increase since the eleven original PSI states launched the Initiative
in 2003 and reflects the widespread recognition that PSI serves a
unique role in a multi-faceted approach to non-proliferation. This May,
PSI partners will commemorate the fifth anniversary of PSI in
Washington. Senior leaders from all over the world will come together
to take stock of the Initiative since its inception and share ideas on
how to strengthen it for the future.
The political commitment which underpins PSI is no small matter.
Prior to PSI, interdiction activities existed. However, they were
conducted principally through sensitive channels only. Today, the
United States and any other state which has endorsed the PSI principles
can call on another PSI adherent to take action based on their PSI
commitments. This alone is a singular innovation brought about by PSI.
Second, there is a significant capacity-building effort that is
spearheaded by countries that participate in the Operational Experts
Group (OEG), a group of 20 PSI partners that meets regularly to advance
PSI objectives on behalf of all PSI participants. The OEG meets several
times per year, most recently in London where the Ministry of Defence
hosted the 16th OEG meeting in February. France will host the next OEG
meeting in September 2008. OEG-participating countries bring their
experts from the military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and
diplomatic arenas to develop new operational concepts for interdiction;
organize a program of exercises; share information about national legal
authorities; and pursue cooperation with industry sectors that can be
helpful to the interdiction mission. These capacity-building activities
have positive spillover effects, such as helping countries fulfill
their obligations to implement United Nations Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR) 1540 (Preventing WMD proliferation), 1718 (DPRK
sanctions) and 1737/1747/1803 (Iran).
To date, PSI partners have conducted over 30 live and table-top
exercises, involving over 70 PSI partner states and exploring all modes
of transportation: ground, air, and sea. Perhaps most importantly, we
have seen the PSI exercise program evolve over time, from one dominated
by the military's role in interdiction to one that appreciates the true
complexity of interdiction and integrates the legal, law enforcement,
intelligence, and policy challenges in a way that more accurately
reflects real-world proliferation situations.
Other notable achievements of the OEG include the publication of a
model national response plan spearheaded by New Zealand, traffic
cartography created by France, and a WMD and Missile Commodity
Reference Handbook developed by DOE. These and other products are
easily replicable and available to use in all PSI outreach efforts.
Additionally, Germany is in the process of developing a web-based
platform that will help record PSI lessons learned. These are only a
few examples of tangible tools that have evolved out of the close
cooperation among PSI partners.
The U.S. plays an active role in the OEG and its capacity-building
efforts. While DOD is responsible for leading the U.S. interagency's
participation in the Operational Experts Group process, the full U.S.
Government PSI team consists of experts from the Department of State,
Department of Homeland Security (including Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Coast
Guard), DOE, Department of Justice, the National Counterproliferation
Center and the broader intelligence community, Department of Commerce,
and the Department of Treasury. In June 2007, the U.S. Naval War
College hosted a week-long PSI game in Newport, Rhode Island in which
18 PSI countries participated (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S.). In September 2007, the U.S. hosted Exercise Panamax that
included a PSI interdiction scenario led by the Chilean Navy. In
October 2007, the U.S. was represented robustly in Japan's Exercise
Pacific Shield, contributing two Navy ships, one combined USN/USCG
boarding team, and a broad interagency team of subject-matter experts
to participate and observe. Additionally, Customs and Border Protection
made two presentations on in-port operations. Most recently, in March
2008, the U.S. participated in a maritime exercise called Guistir, co-
hosted by France and Djibouti, which was the first PSI exercise
conducted in Africa.
Looking ahead, the U.S. will send delegations of operational
experts to participate in several foreign-sponsored PSI exercises,
including Exercise Guistir which is jointly hosted by France and
Djibouti and Exercise Adriatic Shield which will be hosted by Croatia.
Finally, the U.S. has been busy contributing exercise and issue-
specific expertise to a major PSI exercise scheduled for September 2008
in New Zealand. I am also pleased to report that DOD led a U.S.
interagency team to Malta in February of this year to run the first
ever tabletop exercise of one of our PSI bilateral shipboarding
agreements. The exercise was an unqualified success and helped prepare
both sides for the type of interagency coordination and time-sensitive
decisionmaking that is required in any maritime interdiction
opportunity.
The third level of PSI is international collaboration on real-world
interdictions. PSI has been an indisputable success in this regard.
Building upon the shared commitment against a common threat and
leveraging the capacity-building activities I just described, the U.S.
has been able to work together more effectively with many of its PSI
partners. Put another way, PSI allows partner countries to improve and
practice interdiction-related actions to ensure our readiness to work
together on ``Game Day.'' I want to clarify this element of PSI--the
actual execution of an interdiction. When countries work together to
impede, inspect, or actually interdict movement of suspect cargo, it is
not done under a ``PSI treaty,'' or under the flag of PSI. However, as
I mentioned previously, there is a commitment to PSI principles. Being
able to invoke this commitment is a significant nonproliferation tool.
There also are the habitual relationships, transparency and mutual
understanding of capabilities built through the PSI process. This
results in real world activities being conducted by the same people who
work with each other during scenario-driven PSI exercises and
information exchanges. Because of PSI, we understand better the
differences in national authorities and processes. We also have a
better sense of which PSI partners will be more willing to ``lean
forward'' in certain circumstances, especially those located along
primary routes of proliferation activity.
Finally, let me address the issue of positioning PSI for the
future. As we prepare to commemorate the fifth anniversary of PSI at
the end of May, we are naturally looking ahead to plan ways to grow and
strengthen the Initiative. Congress has shown similar interest, asking
in recent legislation that the President include in his annual budget
submission a description of the PSI-related activities, including
associated funding, that are planned to be carried out by each
participating U.S. Government agency or department. This requirement
presents DOD and other participating agencies with a challenging task,
since PSI was conceived as a flexible, adaptive initiative that
leverages existing capabilities, activities and authorities rather than
creating new ones. For example, PSI-related interdiction scenarios are
often injected into existing military exercises, as was the case with
Southern Command's Panamax 2007. Furthermore, since the majority of PSI
exercises in which U.S. assets participate are foreign-hosted, there is
significant difficulty associated with aligning our own planning and
budget cycles with those of foreign governments.
Congress is entitled to timely, accurate information about PSI
activities. I can promise that we will work diligently to ensure that
your questions are answered and that oversight is accomplished for PSI.
PSI has helped to address an important aspect of our
nonproliferation challenge. We will continue to work closely with our
PSI partners and with Congress to maximize its potential.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize a point I made at the outset of
my statement: CTR and PSI are but two pieces of a much larger national
strategy to combat WMD. Since September 11, 2001, we have made
significant progress. I think that CTR and PSI are key examples of that
progress. PSI, of course, did not exist in 2001, and CTR was a
different program. Despite the good work that has been done by CTR and
PSI, we have much more to do across the spectrum of WMD threats before
we can testify with confidence that all of our Government's tools to
combat WMD are being integrated fully and effectively. The Department
looks forward to continued close coordination with Congress as we
address this challenge.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Benkert, again for
your excellent testimony.
We will begin a 7-minute round. I believe Senator Nelson is
going to join us also, but I assume we will do at least two
rounds. We have lots of questions.
Also, the record will remain open for 2 business days after
the hearing if other members want to inquire by writing
questions to you, Mr. Tobey and Mr. Benkert.
Let me ask a general question, one that is I think is
necessary to get on the table. I understand that you support
the President's budget, but are there any particular areas
where additional funds could be used and are needed? Let me
start with Mr. Tobey and then Mr. Benkert.
Mr. Tobey. We believe that the budget that we have put
forward is sufficient for our needs.
I think the best way for me to answer that question would
be perhaps to talk about the priorities that we see. There
again, I would return to the themes that I outlined at the
beginning which are that we are actually accomplishing our
tasks in a couple of areas, the first line of defense, and the
security upgrades in Russia. That work is winding down I think
in good ways. We are also completing our tasks on the
elimination of weapons grade plutonium production with the
construction of fossil fuel power plants that will allow the
shutdown of the last three remaining plutonium production
reactors in Russia.
At the same time, we have set out the need to beef up our
work on the second line of defense, the megaports and the
border crossings, and we are shifting resources in that
direction. We believe that we need to spend more time and
effort on the radiological threat, and we have devoted more
resources to that. I should actually maybe characterize it as
the civil nuclear and radiological threat. So that would
include both the reactor conversions and the radiological
material. Then there is a significant R&D piece that undergirds
all of this.
Then the final thing that I would say--and I am sure you
will want to discuss this in greater detail--is we have a
contingent liability with respect to North Korean disablement
and dismantlement which we are, frankly, uncertain about. We do
not know what the opportunities will be to disable and
dismantle their program this year, and therefore, we are
uncertain as to exactly how much in the way of funding we would
need. But the needs could be quite substantial if progress
would be as we hope.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Benkert.
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am obliged to note, I think, first that it is probably
the case with CTR that the budget is, of course, not the only
measure of the performance of the program and the value that
you get from this program. That said, we greatly appreciated
the additional funds provided last year, and I think my answer
this year would be similar to what it was last year.
The budget request, as we have submitted it, as I noted, is
above what we provided last year, and I believe it is adequate
to the task. I would note, in particular, as I mentioned in my
oral testimony, the fact that the program in Russia, in terms
of dollars in particular, is declining, as we work our way
through these older CTR programs which were very heavy on
infrastructure and therefore more expensive.
The growth areas in the program and the areas where we are
putting additional funds and would put additional funds are in
programmatics. It is the biological program, the biological
threat reduction program, which has grown substantially over
the last several years, and what we call the proliferation
prevention initiative, which is this program to build border
security capabilities to interdict WMD and related materials in
transit to get at one of these fundamental requirements that I
mentioned in my testimony to try to stop WMD or related
materials on the move or in transit.
Those are the two areas that are growth areas, and they are
growth areas not only because they are important in states of
the former Soviet Union, but they are also programs that are
very relevant as we look at expanding CTR outside the former
Soviet Union. So I think that is where our focus will be. As we
look at additional funds for the program, it will be in areas
outside the former Soviet Union and primarily in being able to
bring these programs, which we have now developed and I think
are applicable outside the former Soviet Union, the biological
threat reduction and the border security proliferation
prevention initiative.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
You have both commented on the changing nature of Russia
both economically and otherwise. One of the issues I think--and
this is more general in particular--is to what extent they have
internalized these efforts. We started off in a relationship
where we were pressuring them, I think fairly said, to do this.
We were providing money. Now we have reached a point where
their economy is robust.
Are they going to be able to pick this up, and from your
perspective, have they made this internal to their
decisionmaking? They understand it is in their best interest.
They understand that this is in the interest of the broader
world community. Or is this a situation where our decrease in
resources may signal to them that it is not important any
longer?
I know this is more impressionistic than analytical, but I
would like your impressions. Mr. Tobey and then Mr. Benkert.
Mr. Tobey. I think the evidence is somewhat mixed on that
point. I would note, first of all, that just because, for
example, the Russian oil and gas sector is much more prosperous
than it has been in the past, that does not necessarily
transfer automatically to the nuclear weapons sector. I would
note further that there are disparities even within that sector
where some institutes are more prosperous than others. So the
flow of resources is not yet perfect.
Second, I would note that empirically the Russian
commitment to these issues has not been what we would hope it
to be, and that is why we had to take action in the first
place. I think that is improving. As I alluded to during my
statement, we had for the first time a real discussion with
senior military officers about how our budget is coming down,
yours must come up, and we have to coordinate these
expenditures. The statement about what they had allocated was
new to us. It was a relatively modest sum of money. It is not
going to be sufficient over the long haul, but I was encouraged
by the fact that they had asked for it and they had received
what they had asked for.
I would add further that you may know that we have reached
an agreement with Rosatom on principles for sustainability, and
we will be attempting to make sure that that is implemented.
I would say that with respect to the military, while we do
not have a formal agreement with them, my impression is that
their commitment to sustainability may actually even be
stronger.
Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert?
Mr. Benkert. I would agree with Will Tobey's assessment,
that it is a mixed bag and it is a mixed track record. I think
there are a number of positive signs, though, and let me just
mention two.
First, on this issue of sustainment, particularly of the
warhead security upgrades that we have done with DOE, the
Ministry of Defense at the end of last year advised us that
they acknowledged that it was their responsibility to sustain
the security upgrades at the permanent sites where we have
installed these upgrades and informed us that funding would be
provided in the budget for the entity within the ministry that
would be responsible for this. That is good news, and now we
have to see how this plays out over time. But that is a
positive development because, clearly, we want them to pick up
the responsibility to sustain these things we put in place.
The second example that I would point to--and I mentioned
this in my oral statement--is the commitment that they have
made at Shchuch'ye in this joint commitment on both of our
parts to make sure this facility gets completed and begins
operations at the end of this year on time. The fact that the
Russians acknowledge that as part of these new arrangements
that we have made for how we would do the contracting to
complete this facility, the Russians made a written commitment
that if it turned out that U.S. funding was not adequate to
complete the work that we have signed up to do, that the
Russians would provide the funding. Now, that has not been an
issue yet because the funding that we have is adequate for what
we are doing so far. So this, again, remains to be tested.
Nonetheless, I think it was a serious commitment, and I
think it reflects the fact, for example, that the Russians
understand that it is in their interest to destroy these
chemical weapons. They want to meet the commitments, I think,
that they have signed up to under the CWC, and they realize
that they have to take responsibility to get there rather than
just relying on help from the international community to get it
done. So I think these are positive signs.
Looking down the road, the thing that I think is the
highest on my radar screen at least of the things to watch is
how they do with sustaining these warhead security and related
security initiatives, which clearly are going to require a
long-term commitment, and are one of the things that we really
want to watch over the long term as evidence that they have
really taken this aboard.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. I have many other
questions, but now let me recognize Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Benkert, you mentioned the work with Albania and also
that you are looking to help in Armenia as well.
I understand that there are some stockpiles--this goes back
to pre-1991--of chemical weapons in Iraq, and they are in a
bunker under our guard. I am wondering if using CTR assistance
to help Iraq destroy those chemical weapons is something that
is being contemplated. If so, what factors is the
administration considering as it weighs these decisions? What
would be the estimated cost and timeline? If you could just lay
out where you are with regard to Iraq.
Mr. Benkert. Certainly CTR is a possibility in dealing with
these weapons. Let me just give you where we stand with this.
As you said, there are a number of old Iraqi chemical
weapons, and these are old weapons in various states of
degradation that are at a facility in Iraq. They are secure. We
have invested in some security upgrades to make sure that the
weapons are secure where they are, that they are properly
monitored, and that there are quick response forces and so
forth which are able to deal with any potential threat. So the
weapons are secure as they are.
The issue will be the disposition of these weapons in the
long term. Iraq will likely accede to the CWC in the near
future, possibly as soon as the next session here this month.
When they do, then they will have to address the issue of what
to do with these old weapons that they have.
As I said, our assessment is that there is not a great
security threat to the weapons now because of the security
upgrades we made on the site, but there is an issue of what
Iraq does with them in the long-term. So we are working through
this internally, as well as the Iraqis, on what we might do
once the Iraqis have signed up to the CWC and what their
obligations will be about these weapons. There is a very
practical issue of whether they can simply just be secured
where they are and if that would be adequate or whether they
need to be destroyed.
The destruction of these weapons would not be a trivial
task. As I said, the assessment before they were sealed up was
they were in bad shape. The weapons are in various states of
decay, and to get at them and destroy them would probably be an
expensive proposition and not easy. But that may be the way we
need to go, and we are examining that now.
Senator Dole. What about Libya? Libya was seeking
assistance, and there was a phase there with DOD. Where do we
stand on that, and is that a possibility that CTR might
undertake?
Mr. Benkert. Again, it is a possibility. There was an
interagency decision several years ago that assistance to Libya
in destroying its chemical weapons will be provided through the
DOS's nonproliferation and disarmament fund.
Senator Dole. Right.
Mr. Benkert. There are a variety of reasons why that was
done, including the fact that the thought was it would be
quicker. CTR has sort of a way of doing business that sometimes
takes time. The idea was this would be faster, and so it would
be better at the time.
The Libyans now, as we understand it, have decided to use
their own funds to contract with companies to destroy these
weapons, which are old blister agent weapons. So we are in
close contact with our colleagues at the DOS to see if any
additional assistance is required. If it is, we certainly have
the authority now to provide that and even some earmarked funds
from last year's appropriation, should there be a desire to do
this. But as I said, we are working with our DOS colleagues
here to see what may be required of us going forward.
Senator Dole. Mr. Tobey, pursuant to the agreement of the
Six Parties with North Korea, of course, they are in the
process of disabling and dismantling the nuclear facility
there. Could you update us in more detail regarding the role of
DOE, what role it is playing now and what you see in the
future, if everything continues to go as we hope it will in
North Korea?
Mr. Tobey. Certainly, Senator Dole. Since roughly November
1st of last year, we have had DOE personnel at the North Korean
nuclear facility at Yongbyon essentially 24/7. They have been
overseeing the task of disabling the three North Korean nuclear
facilities that are in the present stage of the disablement
phase. There were essentially 11 key tasks, 8 of which have
been completed. The DOE personnel, working with DOS personnel,
have been overseeing these tasks.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Mr. Benkert, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2007 required the National Academy of Sciences
to conduct a study that would identify areas of further
cooperation through CTR with Russia and other former Soviet
Union states on biological weapons proliferation prevention.
That report was to be submitted to Congress, I believe, by
December 31 of last year.
Can you give us a brief assessment of the National Academy
of Sciences report, and whether it yielded any suggestions for
future CTR work in this area that the Department views as
potentially valuable? I am interested in where we are on that
report and if you could just update us and when we might expect
to receive that in Congress.
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Senator Dole.
First of all, let me apologize for our delay in submitting
the report, and you are looking at the guilty party here about
why it has not arrived up here sooner.
The National Academy of Sciences did a great job--it is a
good report. Part of the delay was I have actually spent some
time with the authors of the report to make sure we understood
what they had suggested and how we might move forward on this.
The National Academy of Sciences report has six principal
recommendations. Our report to you, which you will, I think,
see within a few days, I hope, will endorse the six
recommendations that the National Academy of Sciences made and
then provide a little detail on how we are moving forward with
these things. In some cases, we have already started doing so.
In other cases, they are new.
The basic theme of the report--and we are very much, I
think, in sync with this--is to move from a program of
assistance to collaboration, that is, on the notion that at the
beginning of CTR, this was mostly a program of us going to
Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union and saying,
okay, here is what we want to do, here is what you need to do,
let us go do it. It was very much an assistance program. The
philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences program is that
as we move forward, particularly as we move outside the former
Soviet Union, that this needs to be a much more collaborative
program. So rather than assistance, that we work with countries
to draw out from them what their needs are, what their thinking
is, and to get them involved in a more collaborative way rather
than simply delivering assistance. We agree with that and want
to build that into our approach, again particularly to
countries outside the former Soviet Union.
So it is a good report, and I am hopeful you will see it
shortly.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
Mr. Benkert, early last year, the CTR program significantly
changed its approach to the Russian chemical weapons
destruction effort by contracting with the Russians to complete
the project for a fixed price. Can you tell us how that is
going and that we have assurances that the funded facility, if
started, will run safely in a timely fashion?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, as you said, this was a change
in the way we did business. My report at this point is so far,
so good. This approach of contracting for a fixed price through
a Russian entity is so far working and we are on track. The
first building and the associated and required infrastructure
will be in operation by the end of the year.
There are a couple of checks and balances to make sure that
it can be operated safely. First of all, the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will see the facility
before it is put in operation. That is one check. Our
contractors will have access to it to verify that equipment has
been installed properly and so forth. That is a second check.
Then I think the third check is certainly that the Russians
themselves have an interest in making sure the facility is
operated safely since they have a large program in front of
them with particularly dangerous materials, and they have
certainly expressed to us their desire to make sure this is
done properly.
But I think so far, so good, but we are watching it
carefully.
Senator Reed. One of the other aspects that we have alluded
to in the questioning is the rising value of the ruble. This
contract is denominated in rubles. Do you have some of the
agida, as we say in Rhode Island, that many people have now, as
the dollar declines and other currencies increase?
Mr. Benkert. Yes. That could be an issue. I think at this
point the project manager's assessment is he has adequate
reserves to deal with this. But that also has to be closely
watched.
Senator Reed. In fiscal year 2008, Mr. Benkert, Congress
appropriated $1 million for chemical weapons destruction to
keep the account open. The $1 million was recently included in
the February notification of CTR funds. No money has been
requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget request. Should some
money be included in the fiscal year 2009 budget line just to
keep the account open?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, we have not requested it for two
reasons. One is because our assessment is with the new
arrangements with Russia, we have adequate funds to complete
the project. Then the second is--and I think this is perhaps
even more important--that the Russians have committed that if,
for some reason, we are not able to complete the project within
the funds that we have, that they will make up the difference.
I think that is significant, and I think rather than us
providing any more money up front, I think we want to let this
play out and test this Russian commitment.
Senator Reed. Let me switch to a topic that Senator Dole
has raised, which is very important, that is North Korea. Today
DOE is doing some work there in support of our efforts. As you
pointed out, Mr. Tobey, in your statement, one of the
uncertainties you face this year is whether or not you will
receive--which may be good news that you have to do a lot more
work there if there is a real breakthrough. Can you give us
your estimate of how much contingency funding you might need?
Mr. Tobey. I can in the abstract, anyway. If we got a full
go-ahead tomorrow to go in and complete the disablement as fast
as we could, we would estimate that we would need an additional
$50 million in fiscal year 2008 to carry out these activities.
Now, some of that might be achieved through reprogramming or
other means. I am talking about absolute amounts, not
necessarily deltas from what we have already received.
Then in fiscal year 2009, as much as $360 million might be
required to continue these efforts. The large jump, of course,
has to do with the fact that it would be the plan to remove the
spent fuel from North Korea which bears plutonium.
I should also add--and I have been chided in the past for
perhaps being too literal in my answers--in response to Senator
Dole's question and our role, I probably should also have added
that our work there is being funded through the DOS because the
Glenn Amendment restrictions apply to us. That is another issue
with respect to the funding for disablement. That is an issue
where, frankly, I personally would very much like to see relief
from the Glenn Amendment, in order for us to be ready to move,
if it is possible to do so. I would hate for us to be caught
flat-footed with an inability to even rearrange the funding
that we now have.
Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, the DOD has a role there too,
particularly if the agreements are reached to destroy the
delivery systems, et cetera. Can you give us a notion of
whether you expect you will have any contingent funding going
forward in 2009?
Mr. Benkert. We have not asked for or planned for
contingent funding. In the interagency discussions so far, it
has not been contemplated that DOD CTR would have a role here.
We also are covered, obviously, by legislative restrictions on
our ability to use CTR in North Korea. So at this point, we
have provided support to the interagency effort through the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and others and would continue
to provide that support, but we are very much in a support role
here and have not planned for the use of CTR funds for this.
Senator Reed. The role is support, very gentle support. You
have not specifically looked at a scenario where you would--and
I think this is a long shot, unfortunately--be called upon to
go in in the immediate future this year or next year to start
dismantling delivery systems.
Mr. Benkert. We have done some internal thinking about
that, but we have not looked at that again, given the division
of responsibilities currently in the interagency.
Senator Reed. Both of you gentlemen are following the
discussions quite closely. Can you give us some insights as to
what seems to be the stumbling blocks at the moment as to
whether this is the usual sort of negotiating style of the
North Koreans or there is a significant impasse or whatever?
Mr. Tobey, your comments.
Mr. Tobey. It is very difficult to speculate about North
Korean motivations. I guess I would say we are still waiting
for the declaration that they have promised, that it would be
full and complete. Until we get that, it is going to be
difficult to move forward.
Senator Reed. Any comments, Mr. Benkert?
Mr. Benkert. I would just second Will Tobey's comment, that
it is very difficult to speculate about North Korean
motivations, and I do not think I would want to do that.
Senator Reed. I think I would concur.
Senator Dole, we could probably do a third round for any
additional questions. Senator Dole, please.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Mr. Benkert, I had asked about the National Academy of
Sciences. This was the 2007, but NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008
requires the National Academy of Sciences study to analyze
options for strengthening and expanding the CTR program. What
is the status of your efforts to contract with National Academy
of Sciences for this study, and when do you expect that study
might be completed? So if you could comment on that one as well
and whether you think this will prove useful to an incoming
administration as they assess and review the current CTR
program and consider policy and program options for the future.
Mr. Benkert. I think this will be a very useful study for
the next administration. So we are pressing the National
Academy of Sciences to get this done by the end of the year.
The National Academy of Sciences does very good work. Sometimes
the timeline is a little longer than one might hope for, and so
in this case, we are trying hard to make sure that they are
able to get this study done by the end of the year so that it
is, in fact, in place and in position for the new
administration.
I think it will be very helpful. I think the track record
of this entity and the previous work that they have done for
us, at your request, has been very good, and I think the timing
of looking at what they will look at in the expansion of CTR
will be very good, if they can get this done before the next
administration is in place and in time to affect next year's
authorization and appropriation.
Senator Dole. Mr. Tobey, a December 2007 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report was very critical of the
GIPP program, which is intended to redirect scientists and
technical personnel with WMD know-how into sustained non-
military employment.
Separately, there were allegations that appeared in the
press that the program has funded institutes and scientists
that have been aiding the Iranian nuclear program.
Could you just share with us your assessment of the GAO
criticisms and tell us what steps are being taken to respond to
that? Then separately, tell us in your view if there is
anything whatsoever to those allegations that have been
separately made.
Mr. Tobey. Sure, and I welcome the opportunity to talk
about this.
With respect to GAO, we actually agreed with all of their
recommendations save one, and that recommendation was to
undertake a comprehensive review of the program. The only
reason why we did not agree with that recommendation was,
frankly, that such a review was undertaken in the summer of
2006, and its results had not yet been fully implemented. We
thought that that review actually addressed the concerns that
the GAO had raised.
As a result of some of the concerns that were expressed by
Members of Congress and in the media, we have undertaken a
thorough assessment of exactly what is going on and taken some
interim steps and are working to consult with other Members of
Congress and stakeholders about longer-term steps.
I should say at the outset that what we have found is that
there were no payments made to individuals or institutes under
sanction by the U.S. Government. There is also no evidence that
U.S. funds or technology supported Iranian nuclear projects,
contrary to some of the wilder claims that have been made in
the media.
What we have found is that in a few cases we have funded
projects at institutes that have conducted work with Iran. Now,
I should note when we undertake these projects, our aim is to
divert scientists from working on projects that would be of
concern. When we do this, we contract with them for specific
deliverables which we insist upon before we make payment, and
we provide a very small overhead, only about 10 percent, which
I think compares quite favorably with overhead rates that are
paid, for example, in the United States where academic
institutions can receive 30-35 percent. So I think that the
overwhelming evidence is that nothing that we did could be
construed as contributing in any way to the Iran nuclear
program.
It is possible that our programs have not been perfect in
diverting all Russian scientists away from activities that we
would prefer them not to do, but frankly, I would never claim
that as a goal for this program. It is simply not possible.
It has seemed to us that a balanced nonproliferation
program must include both material security and technology
security. The material security is relatively noncontroversial
and we have discussed it at length. In terms of technology
security, one of the ways to address this is to try to ensure
that scientists have alternatives to going to work on projects
that would be of proliferation concern.
By definition, I would acknowledge that we cannot guarantee
that they cannot be diverted. We are not in a position, for
example, to bid large amounts of money for every scientist in
Russia that could be bid for by a proliferant state. Instead,
what we can do is try and engage with them to provide
alternatives and also, frankly, to understand better what is
going on at the institutes.
In terms of steps that we have taken--and I would say that
these steps have been taken in response to really four factors:
first of all, the changing conditions in Russia that you have
both alluded to and we recognize; second, the internal review
that was conducted in the summer of 2006; third, the GAO
report; and then fourth, the concerns that have been raised by
Members of Congress.
We have decided on some interim steps which basically were
to try and hold fast and make sure that by any reasonable
standard, we did not somehow make things worse. So we have
placed on hold projects at institutes having any involvement
with Iran.
Now, I should note that some of those projects have to do
with the Bushehr reactor, and it is a matter of interagency
deliberation at the moment as to exactly what status should be
given to that. I would note, for example, that the Bushehr
reactor is specifically carved out in United Nations Security
Council resolutions banning other forms of nuclear cooperation.
In fact, because of our policy on these matters, Russia has
modified the conditions under which it provides some of this
assistance such that there will be fuel returned.
I would also note that I think one of our overall policy
objectives has been, in working with our allies and with Russia
and others, to offer the regime in Tehran a choice between
having international cooperation, including peaceful nuclear
energy, or the present path that they are on which involves an
indigenous enrichment program. That has been an open choice for
now a matter of years that we have attempted to present to
them.
We have also put on hold projects that had to do with fuel
cycle research. We actually feel that it is helpful for
nonproliferation projects to fund fuel cycle research which
would provide technology for a fuel cycle that is less subject
to proliferation. In some ways it is a proliferation twofer.
You get the scientists off of the projects we are concerned
about. You put them on advancing technology that we believe
will be necessary to implement an expansion of nuclear energy
that is, we believe, inevitable. But we recognize that it has
been controversial with some, and therefore, we have placed it
on hold.
Then the third interim step that we have taken was to
engage the U.S. interagency to address some of these questions
that I have already alluded to and also to make sure that our
program is better aligned with exactly what the DOS is doing.
So we want to make sure that the two programs are completely
consistent.
Over the longer haul, we have been talking with Members of
Congress. I certainly appreciate the opportunity to discuss
this issue with you and would welcome input on this. We have
put forward a tentative plan that we would like people to
comment on and to see if we can rebuild a consensus that would
involve continuing work at high priority institutes, but
phasing out the work at institutes of lower priority, gaining
Russian agreement over the next several months to an approach
on cost sharing, continuing programs that deal with scientists
in Iraq and Libya, and maintaining a readiness to support such
projects in North Korea, were it in fact to be possible,
pursuing nonproliferation technologies outside of this program.
In other words, if there were ways in which we can advance
safeguards technology, we would engage directly through a
safeguards cooperation. Then finally, finalizing
interdepartmental and interagency agreement on an approach to
this whole process so that we would be consistent across the
board. This may also entail some cost savings as we phase out
some of these programs.
Our intention, again in consultation with Congress, would
be to shift probably to the next generation safeguards
initiative and North Korea, as required.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Dole.
I have three topics I would like to pursue further, and I
want to thank Senator Dole for her excellent questions. If you
have additional questions, you will be recognized.
Mr. Tobey, let us talk about the fissile materials
disposition program. Specifically, funds were made available by
Congress to support a jointly funded effort between Russia and
the United States to look at gas reactors for plutonium
disposition. Has the funding been released to this effort from
2006, 2007, 2008, and if not, why have the funds not been
released and who is controlling the funds?
Mr. Tobey. We have funded in prior years with the Russians.
In fact, I would note also that one of the institutes that was
of controversy under the previous question is one of the very
same institutes that is working on gas reactors.
My understanding is that there was also funding made
available by Congress through the Office of Nuclear Energy, and
the last I had heard was that they were going to make those
funds available for the project in Russia.
Senator Reed. With respect to the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel
program, it has an interesting appropriations history as well
as authorization history. In fiscal year 2008, the Energy and
Water Appropriations bill moved most of the funding to the
Office of Nuclear Energy. Some money was moved to NNSA for
their weapons program. This committee authorized NNSA to carry
out the program. So there is quite a bit of confusing
direction.
So could you help clarify? Is your office carrying out the
fissile material disposition program in the context of MOX? If
not, why not? How are you sorting out these conflicting
signals?
Mr. Tobey. You are right. It has been a confusing
situation, Mr. Chairman.
The DOE's General Counsel has examined this issue, and what
they have determined is that the provisions of the DOE
Organization Act and the NNSA Act prohibit the Secretary of
Energy from transferring the MOX program outside of NNSA,
absent specific statutory authority to do so. Now, that
decision or that viewpoint is a relatively new one, although I
would say that for at least the past several weeks, they had
been of a view that that was likely to be where they would come
out on this. They were trying to make sure that they had done
all the necessary legal research.
As a result of that, what we had done is executed what they
call an economy act transfer where the money that was
appropriated through the Office of Nuclear Energy would be
transferred to the fissile materials disposition program, which
continues to operate that program. So we have moved forward on
that basis.
I would also note that the Appropriations Act moved the pit
disassembly facility and the waste solidification plant to the
Defense Programs Office, and the restrictions on the
Secretary's authority to move such programs within NNSA are not
present. In other words, the NNSA Act would allow the Secretary
to do that as a matter of comity, and he and the Administrator
of the NNSA have decided to do so. So those smaller projects
will be operated by the Defense Programs Office.
Senator Reed. But you are operating the larger project as
of today.
Mr. Tobey. Correct.
Senator Reed. One of the aspects of the MOX program is the
commitment by the Russians to dispose of 34 metric tons of
plutonium. Will that commitment be made? Are we on track for
that?
Mr. Tobey. Given the long and somewhat sad history of this
program, I am not eager to over-promise exactly what the
Russians will do. But I will say that I think we have made
significant progress over the last year.
Frankly, if I could expand my answer, I think as I had
understood it, when I came before Congress both in my
confirmation and later in budget hearings, we were asked to do
three things. We were asked to make sure that the baseline was
defensible and executable, to look at additional missions for
the facility that would make it more cost effective for the
U.S. taxpayer, and to get the Russian part of the program in
order.
I think we have, frankly, delivered on all three. We
submitted a $4.8 billion baseline for the project. We brought
the preconstruction activities in under cost. There are
substantial reserves within that baseline. We have the design
90 percent complete, and frankly, if it were not for the
funding cuts, we would be confident of being able to keep to
that baseline.
The second thing we were asked to do was look at additional
missions, and there we brought forward three possible options,
all of which could be executed at probably not much additional
cost certainly in terms of either construction or design. As
you may know, the Secretary of Energy decided that an
additional 9 metric tons of plutonium could be moved from
defense stockpiles to disposition, and we have the option to
run that through the MOX facility. Additionally, we believe
that further non-pit plutonium, which had been destined for
other disposition paths, can be put through the MOX facility.
Then finally, should the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP) require driver fuel for fast reactors, we believe that
that could be fabricated through the MOX facility which would
substantially, by more than 25 percent, increase the mission
and therefore cost effectiveness of the facility.
Then finally, with respect to the Russian program, as I am
sure you are aware, Secretary Bodman and Director Kiriyenko
signed a joint statement providing for what we believe is a
technically and financially credible Russian path. I am
encouraged by this not because I necessarily trust that the
Russians are going forward based on this joint statement, but
because I believe it is consistent with the path they want to
take for their own purposes. It relies on fast reactors, and
this is another area in which we have capped our commitments in
terms of providing assistance to the Russians. Under the
original 2000 agreement, while the figure of $400 million was
discussed within the agreement, the Russians would tell you
that they basically expected either the United States or other
members of the international community to pick up whatever
their costs were. Therefore, I think it was less than certain
what would be done. Now we have a joint statement in which U.S.
costs are capped at $400 million, and the Russians have agreed
to move forward with this program regardless of other outside
sources of funding.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Tobey.
You mentioned the topic of my next question, which is the
GNEP. The budget request has NNSA supporting this effort in
many different ways. It is hard to determine precisely where
all the money is going. But it raises a question because the
essential goal of the GNEP is to promote the next generation of
nuclear power. The central mission I think of your organization
is to act as one of the chief watches on proliferation, et
cetera. The question arises to what extent that this work
should really be done by the Office of Nuclear Energy and not
NNSA and also the basics of how much money is being spent by
NNSA on this mission rather than what I would argue are more
centrally commanding missions.
If you could just briefly respond. It might even be useful
to follow up in writing.
Mr. Tobey. Sure. I guess what I would say is that we have a
history of providing funding for proliferation-resistant fuel
cycle technology even before the GNEP. I think it would be
necessary to provide that funding whether or not GNEP existed.
It is my view that regardless of the policy decisions the
United States takes on GNEP, nuclear energy will expand across
the globe. Ambitious plans have been announced by Russia,
China, and India, quite large plans, and then there are a whole
host of countries that are undertaking somewhat smaller plans.
So we think it is important that the proliferation resistance
of the fuel cycle be increased to accommodate the growing
demand for nuclear power.
Our spending on this really has been related to that
nonproliferation goal, and I would argue that frankly we would
be spending about the same amount whether or not GNEP existed.
Senator Reed. Thank you. I think what I will do is ask the
staff to prepare a more specific request and try to detail the
spending and the rationale associated with your logic, that is,
really to make the new generation more resistant to
proliferation and diversion of materials.
Mr. Tobey. Sure.
Senator Reed. The final question, Mr. Benkert, is that you
have noted, we have all noted, throughout that the thrust of
CTR is now moving outside of the former Soviet Union. Can you
give us a notion from your perspective of the priority areas
that you want to be able to engage in based upon both threat
and opportunity?
Mr. Benkert. I cannot give you a definitive answer today
because we are still in the process of looking at this. We have
come up with an evaluation process to look at potential
countries in terms of threat, other opportunities, and so
forth, and are working through this matrix. We would be happy
to come back to you in the not-too-distant future and tell you
what we have.
Again, this is very preliminary. Initially I think there
are some opportunities probably near where we are working now,
that is, Central Asia, South Asia, that look like that would
probably be at the top of the list.
But I think one of the interesting things about, as I
mentioned, these two relatively new areas of CTR, that is, the
biological program and the border security proliferation
prevention program, is these are things that have very wide
applicability. If you are looking to secure nuclear material at
its source, there are only a certain number of places you can
go. If you are worried about being able to deal with places
where someone could, in theory, take a pathogen and weaponize
it, the universe is much greater or places where naturally
occurring diseases could have disastrous impact. So it casts
the net much more widely than we have ever done before. So we
need to go through this in a careful way before we launch off
in these new countries.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that and I would be very eager
to listen to your conclusions when you reach them because I
think we are at a point now where the old rules are changing.
Russia has changed. You have done remarkable work there. Now we
have to look at a new strategy, a new approach going forward.
Just a final point, and this follows on the discussions
that we have had briefly surrounding Iraq. The country still
has a huge reservoir of chemical weapons, and as you point out,
unfortunately, many countries have potentially some biological
weapons, radiological weapons.
Is there any active work going on now to cooperate with the
Government of Iraq to begin a serious reduction of their
stockpiles? There is a very bad outcome if we draw down
militarily there and leave a country which is of questionable
stability with thousands and thousands of nerve gas shells.
Mr. Benkert. As I mentioned before, I think the first
effort was just to secure what is there.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Benkert. I think that has largely been done.
The issue then of disposing or dealing with this in the
long-term is a new issue. The Iraqi Government does not have
the capability to dispose of these things on its own. This
needs to be done, although as long as we are there and can
secure it in place, it is not probably at the top of the
priority list of things to worry about with the Government of
Iraq. So we are at the early stages of this.
I think what will be the forcing function which will make
this ratchet up a bit on the priority list is when Iraq accedes
to the CWC and it takes on these responsibilities that it now
has to deal with these weapons.
Senator Reed. I would assume your organization would be
central to the planning of the United States' participation and
support for those efforts. Is that correct?
Mr. Benkert. That is correct.
Senator Reed. Are you working that issue right now
aggressively? Because, again, flash forward 2 months, 6 months,
5 years, et cetera. You have a country that is of questionable
stability, but it has all these weapons and we missed the
opportunity over 5, 6, or 7 years to destroy these weapons.
Mr. Benkert. Particularly with the stockpile that Senator
Dole mentioned, we are working through the options for what to
do with this. As I said, the first focus is that it is secure,
and then the second piece of this work is what are the various
options to deal with this from the gold standard, which would
be to find a way to destroy it all in what might well be very
expensive and take some time, to other options. So we are in
the midst of that now.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Again, that is another topic of
significant interest, and if you could share it----
Mr. Benkert. I would be happy to come back.
Senator Reed. Let me say once again that the record will
remain open for 2 days in case my colleagues have additional
questions.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your excellent testimony. Thank
you, Senator Dole, for your excellent questions.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
proliferation security initiative
1. Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, in previous years the committee has
asked the Department of Defense (DOD) to identify funds for the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and to specifically request
funds for PSI, if needed. What is the status of the PSI, what is the
funding requested for fiscal year 2009 and what is the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) doing to support PSI in both 2008 and 2009?
Mr. Benkert. Since the President launched PSI in May 2003, the
number of countries that have endorsed the PSI Statement of
Interdiction Principles has increased to over 85. This growth reflects
the widespread recognition that PSI serves a unique role in a multi-
faceted approach to nonproliferation. At the end of May 2008, PSI
partners will commemorate the fifth anniversary of PSI in Washington.
Senior leaders from all over the world will come together to take stock
of the initiative since its inception and share ideas on how to
strengthen it for the future.
The President has requested $800,000 for the DOD to provide PSI
exercise support in fiscal year 2009. These funds are available to
combatant commanders to support PSI-related exercises, either U.S. or
foreign-hosted. At this time, we do not see a need for additional
funds. PSI is not a program in a traditional sense. It does not provide
assistance to other countries on a bilateral basis. Rather, PSI was
conceived as a flexible, adaptive initiative that leverages existing
capabilities, activities and authorities rather than creating new ones.
For example, PSI-related interdiction scenarios are often injected into
existing military exercises, as was the case with U.S. Southern
Command's (SOUTHCOM) Panamax 2007.
DOD is working hard with our counterparts in the Department of
State (DOS), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), Department of Treasury, Department of Justice,
Department of Commerce, and the National Security Council to prepare a
budget report in response to a requirement contained in Public Law 110-
53. This report will provide additional information on the nature and
amount of financial and non-financial resources that are leveraged to
support PSI activities.
CTR and PSI address distinct pieces of the weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) proliferation problem and produce complementary
outcomes. While PSI is fundamentally a political commitment that
facilitates collaboration among like-minded countries and builds
capabilities for interdicting WMD and missile-related shipments, their
delivery systems and related materials to and from non-state actors and
states of proliferation concern, CTR works on a bilateral basis to
provide equipment and training that enhances a state's ability to
detect and interdict WMD within or across its borders. In that regard,
CTR has provided assistance to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine, all
PSI participants, to improve their capabilities. While no more such
assistance to Uzbekistan is contemplated, CTR will still be working
with Azerbaijan in 2009, and will continue to work with Ukraine into
the foreseeable future.
2. Senator Reed. Mr. Tobey, the National Nuclear Security Agency
(NNSA) budget request states that the NNSA ``provides real time
technical and policy support for efforts by the United States
Government to facilitate a wide range of counterproliferation and
counterterrorism interdiction options.'' What exactly is NNSA doing and
is this support to the PSI?
Mr. Tobey. NNSA is a central technical resource that supports U.S.
interdiction efforts. NNSA provides, and maintains the capability to
provide, technical assistance to facilitate a wide-range of
counterproliferation activities. DOE/NNSA headquarters manages this
capability, which consists of dedicated technical experts located
across the DOE/NNSA national laboratory complex who maintain the
ability to monitor, track, and respond to interdiction-related
activities in real-time, including technical assessments on suspect
commodities and their potential use in a weapons program. These experts
also provide technical support to NNSA policymakers to assist in the
development and implementation of counterproliferation and
nonproliferation policies and programs, including the PSI, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, capacity-
building programs, export licensing requests, agreements for peaceful
nuclear cooperation, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Technical Cooperation. NNSA participates in all PSI policy meeting and
training exercises, and develops tools, such as the WMD and Missile
Commodity Reference Manual, which has been provided to the members of
the Operational Experts Group of the PSI to raise awareness of the
importance of dual-use commodities and equipment.
megaports
3. Senator Reed. Mr. Tobey, the NNSA Megaports program provides
radiation scanning equipment at foreign ports to scan shipments bound
for the United States or elsewhere. There is a requirement to scan 100
percent of the cargo coming into United States ports. NNSA plans to
complete work at 32 of the 75 ports by the end of 2009. The Megaports
budget is $134 million in fiscal year 2009, a $4 million increase from
fiscal year 2008. Is there a way to increase the pace of this program,
and what is the impediment--money, agreements, or something else?
Mr. Tobey. The Megaports Initiative is working actively both to
complete work at Megaports where agreements arc in place and to engage
and sign agreements with new partner countries. According to current
plans and budget, the Megaports Initiative will complete work at the 75
ports mentioned above by 2013. Our conservative estimate is that we
will be scanning approximately 50 percent of global shipping traffic
once we have met this goal.
Overall, increasing the pace of the program is limited by several
factors. As you mentioned, engaging and signing agreements with partner
countries can be a lengthy process depending on the country in
question. We have learned that it is imperative to have the buy-in of
the host country if the Megaports Initiative is to be successful and
sustainable in the host country over the longer team. Additionally,
resource constraints, both in terms of personnel and funding, do the
limit the number of countries where we can work concurrently. With
regard to the 100 percent scanning requirement, megaports is partnering
with the DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in a pilot program
under the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to scan 100 percent of U.S.
bound maritime containers at select ports. This pilot program will
certainly provide useful data but it is important to note that in
general we believe that scanning every U.S.-bound container at a
foreign port before it arrives in the United States poses significant
operational, technical, and diplomatic challenges. It is our position
that we must continue to focus our resources on the areas where we
believe we can have the greatest impact and that potentially pose the
greatest risk to U.S. national security. NNSA will continue to promote
the use of a risk-based approach to guide implementation priorities as
we move ahead with any future implementation of the Megaports
Initiative and/or the SFI. This approach will allow us to utilize our
resources and funding in the most effective way possible. NNSA plans to
continue to work closely with host countries as well as the private
sector to cost share where possible to accelerate scanning at foreign
ports.
4. Senator Reed. Mr. Tobey, the DHS has several programs working in
overseas ports as well. Although the Megaports program predates the
DHS, does it make sense to maintain programs in two departments at this
point?
Mr. Tobey. DOE and DHS each have important, distinct, and
complementary roles in securing ports worldwide. It is the position of
the DOE that these port security initiatives should continue to be
maintained in two departments. DOE is the primary agency responsible
for international deployments of radiation detection equipment under
the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program of which Megaports is a part.
DOE/NNSA is uniquely suited to carry out the mission of the Megaports
program based on the years of experience we have in fostering
relationships with foreign partner countries throughout the world
through a variety of nonproliferation efforts. Additionally, DOE draws
on the specialized expertise of the national laboratories and their
decades of experience with the U.S. nuclear complex to implement the
Megaports program. The laboratories play a key role in ensuring that
the equipment we deploy can detect materials of concern and that our
partner countries are trained well and arc capable of operating the
system once it is formally turned over to the host country.
With regard to the relationship between Megaports and the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), DOE and DHS/CBP have built a strong,
effective relationship and closely coordinate on the planning and
implementation of their respective programs. The broad extent of
coordination between Megaports and CSI is evident in the 20 joint
outreach missions and port assessments that have been undertaken, the
joint implementing agreements that have already signed, and efforts to
identify additional opportunities to jointly implement both programs.
For example, DOE has committed to providing radiation portal monitors
at all of the 58 CSI ports.
Under the SFI, consistent with the SAFE Ports Act of 2006 and the
September 11 Act of 2007, DOE and DHS/CBP have expanded their
partnership, working together to deploy radiation detection systems
(DOE/NNSA) and nonintrusive imaging systems (CBP) and to integrate the
data from both systems together and provide it to U.S.-based Customs
officials to use in evaluating potential threats from U.S. bound
containers. The first three SFI pilot ports (Puerto Cortes, Honduras;
Port Qasim, Pakistan; and Southampton, United Kingdom) became fully
operational on October 12, 2007. Overall, DOE is pleased with the
success of these pilot projects in demonstrating that 100 percent
scanning of U.S.-bound containers is possible on a limited scale. We
also feel that our partnership with DHS on SFI implementation has been
very successful with each side bringing its unique expertise to the
SFI.
Last, DOE also works closely with DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) to shape the global nuclear detection architecture. DOE
routinely exchanges information with DNDO to ensure that DOE's efforts
support the comprehensive global nuclear detection architecture. In
addition, DOE and DNDO are also jointly establishing operational
requirements to support the development of future radiation detection
systems. DOE supports DNDO's operational testing and evaluation program
and continues to monitor DNDO technology development programs, as
improvements in radiation detection equipment will benefit DOE
international deployment efforts and help to further our
nonproliferation goals.
Overall, we strongly believe that the partnership between DOE and
DHS results in a more comprehensive, layered approach to effectively
deter, detect, and interdict smuggling of nuclear and radioactive
materials through the global maritime system.
5. Senator Reed. Mr. Tobey, will the countries, or the port
operators, in which the equipment is placed be responsible for the
long-term maintenance and replacement of this equipment?
Mr. Tobey. Yes, the long-term maintenance of the equipment deployed
under the SLD Program (both the Core Program and the Megaports
Initiative) is the responsibility of the host country. Following
installation and testing of a deployed radiation detection system, DOE
enters a period of maintenance and sustainability support. Although a
country-specific maintenance and sustainability plan is created for
each country, DOE typically assists the partner country for a period of
up to 3 years following installation and acceptance of a system. During
this period, DOE provides spare parts and maintenance support to the
host country. A key component of the program, both before and during
this period, is training of host country personnel. All host country
personnel who will be responsible for long-term maintenance activities
are trained on each component of the radiation detection system so that
they are ready to maintain the system once it is officially turned over
to the host government.
border security
6. Senator Reed. Mr. Tobey and Mr. Benkert, the CTR efforts to
improve the border security of non-Russia former Soviet Union countries
have increased substantially. The NNSA, through the SLD core program,
is also focused on similar border security efforts. Both agencies are
working in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. How do you ensure that
the border security and export control work in the former Soviet Union
is coordinated and that there is no duplication?
Mr. Tobey. DOE/NNSA's SLD and DOD's CTR programs coordinate closely
on their border security programs in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine. Their efforts arc complementary, not duplicative. In response
to a recommendation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in
their May 2002 report ``U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning,'' DOE/
NNSA and DOD/CTR have agreed that the DOE/NNSA SLD program will be the
lead for installation of radiation detection systems at legal ports of
entry outside the United States. Any deviations from this are carefully
coordinated through meetings between DOE/NNSA and DOD/CTR at the
management and project level, as well as at coordination meetings
chaired by the DOS. Because DOD/CTR had started a program to install
radiation detection at ports in Uzbekistan before this GAO
recommendation, they completed the installation of this equipment at
many border points in that country. DOE/NNSA now is assuming
responsibility for funding the maintenance of those monitors. To
eliminate uncertainty, DOE/NNSA and DOD/CTR signed a Memorandum of
Understanding outlining respective agency responsibilities in
Uzbekistan. DOE/NNSA and DOD/CTR work closely in Ukraine, where DOE/
NNSA is installing detection equipment at ports of entry and DOD/CTR is
addressing the green border threat. The agencies have conducted joint
exercises in Ukraine, have coordinated equipment purchases, and meet on
a regular basis in the United States and jointly with their Ukrainian
counterparts to ensure their efforts are coordinated. Both agencies
also routinely coordinate their efforts in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
NNSA's International Nonproliferation Export Control Program
(INECP), as part of the interagency Export Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) program coordinated by the DOS, assists countries of
the former Soviet Union to develop and maintain effective national
export control systems through long-term partnerships with counterpart
technical experts and agencies that support export control licensing
procedures and practices, industry compliance, and enforcement
capacities. These activities, which are partially funded by EXBS, focus
on controlling and interdicting WMD-related strategic ``dual-use''
commodities, and therefore do not duplicate the nuclear material
interdiction activities sponsored by SLD or DOD/CTR.
Mr. Benkert. The most frequent coordination between WMD-PPI and
DOE's SLD is in regard to our project in Ukraine, where we are
collaboratively engaged in enhancing the detection and interdiction of
WMD and related materials in the Transnistria section of Ukraine's land
border with Moldova. DOE's SLD program is installing radiation portal
monitors and associated equipment at key ports of entry (PoEs) along
this border, whereas the WMD-PPI project is providing WMD detection and
interdiction training and equipment, and is installing a comprehensive
surveillance/communications and command and control system designed to
enforce capabilities along the whole border, with particular emphasis
on the ``green'' border between PoEs. DOE has also collaborated with
DOD in conducting exercises to evaluate the effectiveness of its
assistance and the capacity of the Ukrainian Border Guard to absorb it,
as well as collaborating on a comparative test of selected radiation
pagers.
WMD-PPI projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are maritime projects
and do not overlap with SLD projects at the current time, although in
Azerbaijan, both of our Azerbaijani interlocutors belong to the State
Border Guard.
WMD-PPI program officials work closely and regularly with DOE's SLD
personnel to discuss ongoing and planned future projects and
priorities, thus ensuring that land border projects are complementary
and not duplicative. Additionally, DOE is currently maintaining
radiation portal monitors which were installed by the DOD WMD-PPI
program as an exception on a one-time basis (begun in a year in which
DOE had a funding shortfall). The WMD-PPI program has no plans to
install radiation portal monitors in any other country and considers
DOE to be the U.S. Government lead for that type of assistance.
7. Senator Reed. Mr. Tobey and Mr. Benkert, other agencies, such as
the CBP Agency, the Department of Commerce, and the DOS are also
engaged in related work. How do DOD and the DOE coordinate with other
United States Government entities?
Mr. Tobey. DOE/NNSA participates in coordination meetings chaired
by the DOS, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security
Council, as well as project level meetings with CBP, the DOD, and the
DOS. As an integral part of the U.S. maritime security strategy, DOE/
NNSA's SLD program has established a close partnership with CBP. A
complementary relationship exists between SLD's Megaports Initiative
and CBP's CSI, which permits the two agencies to jointly engage their
partner countries and create valuable synergy between these important
programs. Consistent with the SAFE Ports Act of 2006 and the September
11 Act of 2007, this partnership has developed even further as SLD and
CBP work together to deploy radiation detection systems (DOE/NNSA) and
non-intrusive imaging systems (CBP) and to integrate the data from both
systems together, thereby enhancing risk assessment tools for U.S.
based Customs officials to use in evaluating potential threats from
U.S.-bound containers. SLD and CBP access to foreign counterparts
through these initiatives has been further leveraged by NNSA's INECP,
resulting in the training of frontline inspectors in the interdiction
of WMD-related dual-use commodities at dozens of ports worldwide. DOE/
NNSA's SLD and INECP work closely with DOS's EXBS program and the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Trafficking to ensure U.S.
assistance is not duplicative with other U.S. Government programs.
Through its Interagency Working Group, EXBS provides the venue for
coordination between all U.S. Government programs that address border
security in the region, where embassies as well are sufficiently
informed to understand the intersection of relevant U.S. Government
program missions.
Mr. Benkert. DOD's CTR program supports other interagency and
international donor efforts. In countries where we have WMD-PPI
projects, the U.S. Embassy conducts monthly meetings among U.S.
Government border security assistance program officials to ensure
assistance is complementary and supports U.S. Government objectives.
DOD is working with the DOS's EXBS and other assistance programs to
bolster the abilities of the maritime forces of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan to detect and interdict WMD and related materials on the
Caspian Sea. We also coordinate with a U.S. Coast Guard officer
stationed in Baku, who works with both governments' maritime forces to
provide expert advice and assistance.
DOD is working closely with the other U.S. Government and
international donors, including DOE's SLD, to ensure assistance on the
Ukrainian border with Moldova is complementary and reinforcing.
DOD subject matter experts regularly consult with other U.S.
Government experts and international donors, such as the IAEA and the
European Union/Commission to share lessons learned and, to the extent
practicable, standardize detection equipment.
DOD officials from the policy and implementation (Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA)) arenas are regularly called upon to
participate in a variety of interagency fora and conferences hosted by
the NSC staff and the DOS, DOE, and DHS and in the international arena
(particularly the European Union and IAEA) to ensure WMD-PPI projects
are complementary and do not duplicate the work of other donors.
cooperative threat reduction funding
8. Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, the CTR program has been appropriated
on the order of $85 million above the fiscal year 2008 budget request,
of which $79 million is available for expenditure for a total of $425.9
million in fiscal year 2008. The committee recently received the
notification of $405 million of the fiscal year 2008 funds. What in
this notification was not planned when the fiscal year 2008 budget was
submitted and how is this new work going to be sustained in fiscal year
2009?
Mr. Benkert. The additional $80 million appropriated in the fiscal
year 2008 budget will be used for the following purposes:
to eliminate one Delta III strategic ballistic missile
submarine;
to install additional Automated Inventory Control and
Management System (AICMS) facilities at nuclear weapons storage
sites and refresh technology provided at the original AICMS
facilities (fully funded with fiscal year 2008 funds);
to accelerate the Biological Threat Reduction program (an
ongoing project with its own funding allocation);
to support the proliferation prevention project in Kazakhstan
(fiscal year 2009 funds requested);
to fund storage of Ukraine's remaining SS-24s and reimburse
the Ukrainians for propellant removal from the SS-24 loaded
motor cases (fiscal year 2009 funds requested); and
to contract for studies and assessments regarding new
initiatives outside the former Soviet Union.
9. Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, the CTR program budget request for
fiscal year 2009 is approximately $11 million below the fiscal year
2008 appropriated level, with no funds having been requested for
proliferation prevention work outside of the former Soviet Union in
2009. Why were no funds requested for work outside of the former Soviet
Union?
Mr. Benkert. The Department appreciates the changes provided by
H.R. 1 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
and currently is working diligently with other U.S. Government agencies
to develop projects, within existing authorities, outside the former
Soviet Union. Although most of our large-scale projects in Russia are
nearly completed, DOD remains committed to implementing several major
programs in other former Soviet Union countries. During the fiscal year
2009 budget development process, DOD focused on completing these
programs. At the same time, DOD was in the process of wrapping up the
chemical weapons elimination project in Albania using existing funds,
with no requirement for fiscal year 2009 funds.
At the time the fiscal year 2009 budget was submitted, the CTR
program had only begun to assess candidates for work outside the former
Soviet Union. The Department looks forward to sharing the results of
these assessments as they are developed.
10. Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, the February notification of CTR
funds does not include work outside the former Soviet Union. What is
the plan for that money ($10 million)?
Mr. Benkert. A portion of the $10 million is being used to conduct
the legislatively mandated studies by the National Academy of Science
to analyze options for strengthening and expanding the CTR Program and
to identify areas for cooperation with states other than states of the
former Soviet Union in the prevention of proliferation of biological
weapons.
DOD is now in the process of developing criteria and has opened
discussions with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to
identify appropriate projects to undertake with countries outside the
former Soviet Union. We expect to have our first results by summer.
Based on these results, we will begin negotiations to establish the
necessary framework to provide a capability to reduce threats and
prevent the proliferation of WMD and WMD-related materials, technology,
and expertise in the selected countries. We are also examining options
for conducting CTR work in additional countries to see how we might be
able to simplify the process to make the program more flexible and
effective in the future.
11. Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, the February notification of CTR
funds does not include the $5 million provided in fiscal year 2008 for
chemical weapons destruction in Libya. What is the plan for that money
and what is the status of the Libyan chemical weapons destruction
effort? Is DOD going to take on that project?
Mr. Benkert. Libya has not requested any further assistance since
it chose to terminate joint efforts with the DOS. The DOS has completed
construction of an incinerator, which currently is being held in
storage. As we understand it, the Libyans now have decided to use their
own funds to contract with companies to destroy these weapons, which
are old blister agent weapons. We are in close contact with our
colleagues at the DOS to see if any additional assistance is required.
If no additional assistance is required, the Department would
notify Congress of its intent to use the funds for other CTR purposes.
iraqi chemical weapons
12. Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, when is the study dealing with
destruction and disposal options for Iraqi chemical weapons going to be
completed, and when it is completed, would you please provide a copy of
the study to this subcommittee?
Mr. Benkert. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff, in concert with U.S. Central Command, the military departments,
and the DTRA, are assessing options for the final disposition of
recovered chemical weapons found in Iraq, including the chemical
weapons stored at the Muthanna State Establishment. The assessment
requires a thorough technical feasibility review of each option, taking
into account safety hazards, security and environmental risks, and
potential implications and treaty requirements when Iraq accedes to the
Chemical Weapons Convention. OSD will host a meeting of technical
experts in June to review the feasibility of each of the options.
Additionally, completion of the assessment is dependent on the results
of a site survey at Muthanna. The site survey will take place in two
stages. First, an initial site survey will develop the necessary
courses of action for conducting a second, more intrusive site survey.
The results of the site survey and
the meeting will determine if there is enough information to make a
final recommendation, or if additional steps are required prior to
making a final recommendation. At the conclusion of the assessment, we
will be available to provide a summary of the findings and the
recommended courses of action.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]