- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

[Senate Hearing 110-394]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 110-394, Pt. 4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3001

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

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PART 4

AIRLAND

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APRIL 1, 3, AND 9, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009--Part 4 AIRLAND

S. Hrg. 110-394 Pt. 4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3001

__________

PART 4

AIRLAND

__________

APRIL 1, 3, AND 9, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
42-632 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi

Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Airland

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JOHN CORNYN, Texas
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN WARNER, Virginia
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JIM WEBB, Virginia SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Army's New Doctrine (Field Manual 3-0, Operations)
april 1, 2008

Page
Caldwell, LTG William B., IV, USA, Commanding General, United
States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth.......... 6

Army Modernization
april 3, 2008

Speakes, LTG Stephen M., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United
States Army.................................................... 34
Thompson, LTG N. Ross, III, USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology..................................................... 39

Air Force and Navy Aviation Programs
april 9, 2008

Balderson, Hon. William M., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Air
Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition, Department of the Navy. 78
Trautman, Lt. Gen. George J., III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for
Aviation, United States Marine Corps........................... 87
Myers, RADM Allen G., USN, Director, Air Warfare Division, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations............................... 96
Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air,
Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements,
Department of the Air Force.................................... 98
Hoffman, Lt. Gen. Donald J., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,
Department of the Air Force.................................... 104

(iii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

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TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

THE ARMY'S NEW DOCTRINE (FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS)

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman and Cornyn.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional
staff member; and Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Ali Z.
Pasha.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C.
Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; and Brian Polley,
assistant to Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Lieberman. Good morning and welcome to this
hearing. I was going to start with an apology that I have a
little bit of a sore throat, but the sound system is so good
that I'll just make believe that I'm all right.
I want to welcome Lieutenant General William Caldwell,
Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort
Leavenworth. This is the first of two Airland Subcommittee
hearings this week that focus on changes to the Army's Capstone
operational doctrine. That is the definitive statement about
war and how the Army expects to fight and win and keep the
peace and what those changes mean for organizing, equipping,
training, and employing the U.S. Army.
At the outset I want to both welcome and thank my colleague
and ranking member, Senator Cornyn, for the work that he and
his staff have done in a real collegial fashion to help the
subcommittee carry out the oversight responsibilities which
we're involved in this morning.
We are here today to continue the important and urgent task
of deciding what kind of Army America needs to have for the
future security and freedom of our country.
The fight against Islamic extremists has been the defining
national security issue of the past 7 years, that is since
September 11, 2001. America's ground forces and especially the
Army have been asked to carry the brunt of that fight and have
done so exceedingly well. But of course that has also caused
some stress on our forces.
Not only has the tempo of operations been extraordinarily
high, but the Army has had to rapidly shift between
conventional warfare and irregular warfare. In 2001, Special
Operations Forces, some on horseback, but employing state-of-
the-art electronics, accompanied Afghan forces into battle to
successfully overthrow and evict the Taliban from Afghanistan,
the place from which the attacks were planned and launched
against the United States on September 11, 2001.
Two years later, Army heavy brigades defeated Saddam's
Republican Guards and raced to Baghdad to topple that murderous
dictator. No sooner had the conventional phase of the war
concluded than the Army found itself confronting Iraqis in
irregular warfare, while at the same time conducting stability
operations and nationbuilding.
As the range of missions expanded, the Army had to
reorganize some units, give others tasks for which they were
not previously organized, equipped, or in some cases trained,
and the Army was forced to develop and field equipment it had
not previously envisioned needing. The fact is that we were
simply not ready for the aftermath of Saddam's defeat,
certainly not as ready as we should have been.
The full Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings last
year at which the Army leadership and some of the most
respected and thoughtful retired officers and outside experts
addressed the question of what kind of Army do we need for the
future. All the witnesses agreed that we went to war in 2001
with the world's best conventional Army, but many of the
experts also said that the subsequent insurgencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of that largely
conventional Army in successfully fighting the kind of war we
are in now, and that we will probably have to continue to fight
in the years ahead.
Of course, the Army has adjusted, as has the Marine Corps
and the other Services, with remarkable skill in dealing with
the new threat environment.
Last year's full committee hearings brought forth what I
would describe as two conflicting recommendations for
organizing, training, and equipping the future Army. The Army's
recommendation, which is embraced I would say generally
speaking in the new Capstone doctrine, was to increase the size
of the Army, create more brigade combat teams, and to add to
some low density, high demand capabilities, to give the brigade
combat teams full spectrum capability, to better deal with both
irregular warfare and conventional warfare.
The different recommendation from some of the outside
experts it seemed to me was to build an Army substantially
changed in both size and structure by creating specialized
units to match the changes in conflict and doctrine.
So there was a difference of opinion expressed and a debate
that began, a healthy debate. It's an important one, too, and
the choices we make as we sift through it are consequential to
our future security. I found the analysis and recommendations
from the outside experts to be both interesting and at some
points persuasive, so I don't think that we should in the
interest of our national security simply accept the Army's
different recommendation without examining it and its
implications closely, particularly because we in Congress are
the people who will now be asked to both authorize and fund the
vision of our future Army.
I think we have to answer three basic questions: First, for
what will we hold the Army responsible? Will we insist on an
Army ready for all possible combat and non-combat operations,
on the full spectrum from stable peacekeeping to general
warfighting? Should we build a force ready for the full
spectrum of missions, but prioritized from higher, more
dangerous or likely threats, to lower, less risky or unlikely
threats? Or should we build a force only for specific missions
on the conflict spectrum and, if so, for which ones?
Second, what operational doctrine should the Army adopt
that provides for the greatest probability of success
regardless of threat or intensity of conflict or commitment?
Should the Army, as it proposes, combine the ability to execute
offensive, defensive, and stability civil support missions
simultaneously and for long duration, or should it adopt some
other concept?
Third, how should the Army organize, train, and equip to
execute its doctrine? Should the Army continue to organize
around brigade combat teams that could be tailored for specific
missions or should it build both conventional units and
specialized counterinsurgency training, advisory,
stabilization, reconstruction units?
The Army recently released, that is earlier in March, Field
Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, which is its new Capstone doctrine
and is really an answer to some of these critical questions. It
places the conduct of stability operations, significantly, on
the same operationally required level as conventional warfare.
As the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has said,
this fundamental change redefines our basic notion of combat
power from how we generate it to how we apply it, and its
impact on the force and the application of the doctrine I'm
quoting, and I agree--``will be revolutionary.''
General Wallace, the TRADOC commander, also notes that ``FM
3-0 adds to the Army's requirements for resources and will
influence the Army's organization, training, equipment,
leadership, education, and soldier concerns.'' I believe that
he's right and that a change of this magnitude therefore
requires a thorough vetting. We have to answer the question,
what kind of an Army, in a way that makes this Army fully
capable of successfully implementing this revolutionary
doctrine. Of course, I hope that today's hearing will do
exactly that.
The fiscal year 2009 Army budget request was developed over
a year ago and delivered to Congress before this new Capstone
doctrine, of course, was released on March 7, 2008. The budget
request is heavily tilted toward resetting, modernizing, and
transforming the existing heavy force. But I think we need to
determine whether it includes enough money to fund the changes
that the new Capstone doctrine logically and inevitably
requires or whether the existing budget has shaped those
requirements. We need to find out whether we should begin to
make changes to either the programs or the priorities that have
been requested. That includes whether the existing
authorization of end strength for the Army is sufficient to
implement the Capstone doctrine that the Army issued less than
a month ago.
Hopefully, our hearing today will begin to answer those
questions. I will note for the record that on Thursday the
subcommittee will ask the Army for an update on its equipment
modernization plans, with an emphasis on transformation to the
Future Combat Systems, which this subcommittee has over the
years proudly played a leading role in supporting.
We will also ask how the Army intends to modernize and
transform the individual soldier to ensure that we begin now to
build the right Army to protect the security and freedom of our
country and our people during the generations ahead.
I thank you for hearing me out on that opening statement
and I'm now honored to call on the subcommittee's ranking
member, Senator Cornyn, from Texas.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to see
you.
Senator Lieberman. You too.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you for scheduling this hearing.
General Caldwell, thank you for being here. I look forward
to your testimony and your answers to the questions that the
subcommittee propounds.
Today the subcommittee will receive testimony on the new
Field Manual for Operations. This edition of the FM represents
the first major update since 2001 and was crafted from the
lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that's what I
would like to focus some of my questions on. The
appropriateness of the Army and the military, as opposed to
other institutions of the Federal Government, how those will be
coordinated in order to leverage and maximize resources--my
impression is post-Katrina Hurricane there was some discussion
about giving the uniformed military services additional roles
in natural disaster relief because, frankly, I think most
people view the military as the most competent institution in
the Federal Government. But the problem is that with that
competence and professionalism, it can clearly be stretched too
thin and overloaded and perhaps given missions that are
inappropriate or divert it from its main mission. So, I'd like
to talk a little bit about some of that.
Recognizing the Army's long commitment to the development
of military doctrine, this can be traced back to the
Continental Army and Valley Forge in the winter of 1777 and
1778. I'm reminded of the connection between the release of the
most recent counterinsurgency FM, just in terms of talking
about what the impact of these manuals can have, the impact of
that counterinsurgency FM and the revised strategy we've had in
Iraq, which has from my perspective turned things around in a
way that's very positive, and I'm not the only one that feels
that way, obviously.
In 2006 the Army and Marine Corps released the new FM on
Counterinsurgency Operations. It had been 20 years since the
Army had published a formal FM devoted to that subject, and of
course, General Petraeus oversaw the preparation of that FM. In
2007, just a month after the release of that FM, President Bush
announced a new strategy in Iraq, and that new strategy has
been sometimes referred to, of course, as the surge strategy,
but closely parallels the doctrine advocated in that new
counterinsurgency FM.
Now, a year later, the subsequent improvements in security
in Iraq have been notable and I believe demonstrate the extant
connection between doctrine, strategy, and change.
General Caldwell, in today's discussion of the Army's new
FM on Operations, I'd like to ask you a little bit about how
and in what respects you consider this to be revolutionary and
whether that revolutionary change is in fact something that the
Army can do, given the fact of our international commitments
and the fact that, as Senator Lieberman said, end strength
concerns remain and stresses on the military given its current
mission, and what changes that you would foresee in the
institutional Army and the organization of the Army's combat
formations, the requirements for future systems being fielded
to the force, the roles and missions of the Army Reserve and
the National Guard, and the mobility requirements of the Army
and the training of young officers and noncommissioned
officers.
I'm particularly interested in whether a career path for a
military officer conducting stability operations is something
that would be considered a plus or a minus and how we deal with
that very practical concern.
In addition, I'd like to ask you a little bit about how
this FM can be harmonized with joint doctrine and how it has
been received by our allies, coalition partners, and other
agencies and departments in the Federal Government with whom
the Army and the military need to work to bring all aspects of
U.S. power to the table.
It's our Army's soldiers, of course, who will execute this
doctrine and learn the new lessons that it requires. Thus,
General Caldwell, we're going to ask you a little bit about the
kind of feedback that you received from soldiers.
There's no doubt that our Nation will require a more agile,
responsive, campaign quality, and expeditionary Army to meet
the challenges of persistent conflict and change that will
characterize the strategic environment well into the 21st
century. I'm confident that this FM is an important
contribution to the Army successfully meeting the high demand
for Army forces and capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for calling this important
hearing and I look forward to the testimony.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Cornyn, for
that excellent statement. I appreciate what you said at the
beginning about the Army. I was just over in Iraq again about 2
weeks ago, and our military is an extraordinary experience in
our society. It's hard to find another group like it that has a
sense, a similar sense of purpose, resourcefulness to respond
to changing environments, a tremendous sense of loyalty within
the group to one another, and a sense of real pride in what
they're doing for our country.
So it's in that spirit, General Caldwell, that I welcome
you again, as I stated for the record, Commander of the
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, in which capacity
you have overseen the drafting of this new FM and doctrine. We
welcome your testimony now. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM B. CALDWELL IV, USA, COMMANDING
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT
LEAVENWORTH

General Caldwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sir, if you
don't mind, I have a written statement I'd like to submit for
the record.
Senator Lieberman. Sure. Without objection, we'll include
it in full in the record.
General Caldwell. Then I just have a brief opening one. If
I may, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and other members of
the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to come here
today to discuss on behalf of our Army our new Capstone manual,
FM 3-0, Operations.
My command at the Combined Arms Center has oversight of our
Army's 17 schools and centers across the country, which have
the responsibility for doctrine, leader development, lessons
learned, capability development, cultural training, education,
and knowledge management. This wide variety of responsibilities
and capabilities, combined with the tremendous pool of subject
matter experts, gives us a unique insight into the state of our
Army and helped us to shape this Capstone manual.
As the intellectual center for our Army, the Combined Arms
Center plays a central role in shaping what will become the
operational Army, from the doctrine that guides the actions of
our forces to the structure and capabilities of those
organizations that prosecute those actions, from the training
and education that prepares our soldiers for the uncertainties
of the future that we see ahead to the leader development
programs that produce those creative thinkers and those
adaptive leaders that are absolutely essential for our Army in
this era of persistent conflict.
Your Army's role through transformation and beyond remains
to fight and win our Nation's wars. However, this new doctrine
puts stability operations and civil support, as you have said,
Mr. Chairman, on an equal footing with offensive and defensive
operations, institutionalizing our commitment to support and
integrate it in a whole new governing approach to future
operations.
This approach will not be easy and it will require a
renewed commitment by all within our Nation's government. Your
Army can win every battle and every engagement. We will never
lose. But we alone can never win the peace. This can only be
accomplished through an integrated effort by both uniformed and
civilian personnel, working in the same synchronized manner as
our joint forces do today.
Additionally, this manual recognizes the unparalleled power
of information that we are seeing here in the 21st century. Our
Army is asking more of our soldiers than ever before and it is
our responsibility as leaders to empower them with the road
map, the skills, and the decisionmaking abilities to complete
their missions. Probably more than at any time in our Nation's
history, our Army requires flexible and agile forces with the
capability to conduct joint and multinational operations at any
point across the spectrum of conflict.
The new FM 3-0 reflects what we believe to be the blueprint
for the future of our Army, one that will take us out the next
10 to 15 years. Although the environment in which we operate
will consistently change, the constant will be our soldiers. I
ask you to join me in sharing and saluting their incredible
sacrifices and join me in reaffirming our commitment as leaders
to provide them with the right combination of skills, training,
equipment, and leadership they need to accomplish the mission
we have set before them.
With that, sir, I'm prepared to take whatever questions you
might have.
[The prepared statement of General Caldwell follows:]

Prepared Statement by LTG William B. Caldwell IV, USA

FM 3-0 represents a break from past precedent and theory within the
Army; in its own right, this edition of our capstone manual marks a
revolutionary shift in focus. Where our capstone doctrine was once
based upon a traditional approach to military operations that focused
operations on seizing terrain and destroying enemy formations, this
edition acknowledges that the current and future operating environments
will be characterized by conflict against amorphous enemies that hide
among and are supported by civilian populations. Consequently,
successful operations must incorporate robust measures to favorably
influence the perceptions of such populations and garner their support.
They must enable the support of our interagency and intergovernmental
partners while facilitating the efforts of non-governmental
organizations operating alongside our formations. In other words, FM 3-
0 places primacy on capabilities that focus on the people among whom we
operate, ensuring their safety, security, and well-being in an era of
persistent conflict.
Two strategic realities shape American landpower in the 21st
century: persistent conflict and change.
Today the United States remains a nation at war. This war is unlike
any other in our history; it represents a fundamental clash of
ideologies and cultures that could span generations. We face an era of
persistent conflict, with intractable enemies intent on isolating the
world from American access and influence extremist enemies of uncommon
resolve fueled by unparalleled hatred for the rights and freedoms
reflected in our democratic society. The enemy of today is patient,
resourceful and committed to bringing terror to the American homeland.
The enemy of tomorrow may possess capabilities and intentions that
challenge the global balance of power. Ours is a complex and volatile
world, where chaos is commonplace and hatred a basic tenet of an
expanding social abyss. Globalization inherently ties our economy to
countless others while the information revolution has eroded the
protection once offered by our borders. American dominance of the
maritime, air, and space domains is no longer the effective deterrent
it once was, although it does give pause to nations who share our
enemies' hatred of the United States.
Success in this era of persistent conflict will require the
steadfast application of land power. The ability to engage, close with,
and destroy our enemy on the ground remains indispensable. But it is
the ``soft power,'' constructive capabilities of the force--or as we
prefer to say, ``smart power'' skills--that we must increasingly
promote as the tools required to make permanent the otherwise temporary
effects of successful combat actions. Armored combat vehicles
patrolling the streets may intimidate our enemies for a period, but
they cannot repair the damaged infrastructure of a failed state or
bring lasting peace and stability to a war-torn country. In this
uncertain future, our Nation requires constructive, nonlethal
capabilities that complement Army combat capabilities. Therefore, our
forces must be as proficient at stability operations as they are at
traditional combat operations. This requirement changes what we as
soldiers must provide our Nation.
The second strategic reality shaping the future of the Army is
change.
In the midst of this historic conflict, the Army has undertaken a
historic transformation effort, reshaping itself into a decisive force
with unique expeditionary and campaign capabilities. The Army has
broken the mold of the traditional divisional army to forge a modular,
brigade-based force capable of prompt, sustained land operations
against any opponent across the spectrum of conflict. With this
transformation, the Army cedes the concentrated tactical striking power
of the division in favor of the elasticity of brigades operating across
widely dispersed land areas. This gives the Nation an Army with much
greater strategic flexibility and the ability to select and deploy
various mixes of forces for crisis response or theater security
cooperation requirements.
We are also transitioning from a Cold War tiered readiness system
to a cyclic Army force generation process that will provide deployment-
ready expeditionary forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to
meet any contingency worldwide, yet it is flexible enough to provide
formations optimized for the fundamentally dynamic environments of an
uncertain future. The impact of this change on the Army will be
profound.
At the heart of the Army's transformation effort is a shift in
doctrinal emphasis that captures the essence of more than 6 years of
current operational experience that has characterized military service
since September 11. For the Army to remain agile and adaptive in this
chaotic and uncertain era of persistent conflict. it is imperative that
we capture and codify this experience within our capstone doctrinal
manual.
Within the Army, doctrine is recognized as a driver for change. It
is a dynamic catalyst that cements organizational change across the
force. Through doctrine, the very institutions that represent the Army
begin to transform, adapting to meet the requirements of the future
while embracing the enduring lessons of our past. This edition of FM 3-
0, our operations manual, is no exception. It represents the collective
experiences of a team of veteran authors, yet was shaped by the vision
of our most senior leaders. This, the 15th edition of the Army's
capstone manual, reflects the lessons learned and best practices of our
troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, yet maintains a strong lineage to
Secretary of War Elihu Root's 1905 Field Service Regulations and Baron
von Steuben's 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the
Troops of the United States.
As with each previous edition, today's capstone manual shapes all
Army doctrine, while influencing our organization, training and
education, leader development, materiel acquisition, and soldier
concerns. But its contents are not truly capstone doctrine until Army
forces internalize it. This requires education, debate and individual
study by all Army leaders, measuring the new doctrine against
strategic, operational and tactical realities. Much of this edition has
evolved from its predecessor, published in 2001. Many of the principles
and fundamentals remain unchanged. However, others reflect the wisdom
gained from our recent operational experience. So, while elements of
this doctrine may be evolutionary, its ultimate impact on the force
will be revolutionary.
This edition of our operations manual reflects Army thinking in a
complex period of prolonged conflict and unique opportunities. The
doctrine recognizes that current conflicts defy solution by military
means alone and that landpower, while critical, is only one element of
a much broader effort. Success in this era of persistent conflict will
require the protracted application of all the instruments of our
national power-diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, as
well as military. Thus, Army doctrine now equally weights tasks that
concern the population--stability or civil support--with those related
to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical: it
recognizes that 21st century conflict involves more than combat between
armed opponents. While defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive
operations, Army forces must simultaneously--not sequentially--shape
the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and
normalcy to the local populations among whom we operate. This is the
essence, the very core of this manual.
Today, I would like to share with you what I see as the four most
significant changes reflected in our new operations manual. While
aspects of the new doctrine are evolutionary in nature, in application
our capstone manual will have a revolutionary impact on the force. This
is a doctrine meant for a force led by creative thinkers, adaptive
leaders, and soldiers who reflect the values of our Nation in every
corner of the world today. Many of you have had an opportunity to
review the manual. You understand that this manual is our
``commitment'' to soldiers to enable their success in an uncertain
future. But this manual is also our ``contract' with Congress and our
Nation: it declares that we are committed to providing our soldiers
with the tools needed to win in this era of persistent conflict.
First, the manual is framed around a central operational concept--
full spectrum operations--that drives initiative, embraces risk, and
focuses on creating opportunities to achieve decisive results. Full
spectrum operations represents the core of Army doctrine. It is more
than just a concept that describes how commanders apply unique,
simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive and stability or
civil support tasks to solve complex operational problems. It
fundamentally redefines our basic notion of combat power, from how we
generate it through the warlighting functions to how we apply it
synergistically through combined arms operations. It drives initiative
and emphasizes accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to
achieve decisive results.
The manual details how the concept applies to every Army operation
across the spectrum of conflict. It explains how Army forces apply full
spectrum operations in every conceivable situation, from stable peace
to general war. It describes how Army forces adapt to the requirements
of a fundamentally dynamic operational environment and how they conduct
operations within that environment combining Joint force capabilities,
synchronized action and mission command. Full spectrum operations
focuses on the Army's preeminent challenge: balancing expeditionary
agility and responsiveness with the endurance and adaptability needed
to carry any campaign to a decisive and successful conclusion,
regardless of circumstances.
Second, this edition of the manual emphasizes the central role of
the commander in operations, recognizing the need for human solutions
to the complexities of conflict. In the future, chaos, chance and
friction will dominate land operations, reflecting the increasing
complexity of the operational environment. Understanding and knowledge
are the commander's greatest weapons in this environment, where the art
of command-drawing on vision gained from years of operational
experience and education-is paramount to success. This edition ties
together battle command and operational art, providing an integrated
model for the creative application of the commander's experience,
knowledge, and intuition in full spectrum operations.
The manual is underpinned by understanding, the expression of
mental acumen by commanders (and their staffs) to define and frame
complex operational problems and design operations that fundamentally
reshape the conditions of the operational environment consistent with
national interests and strategy. It is the creative application of the
agile mind that enables the commander to understand the broader context
of a given situation through the lens of experience, knowledge,
education, intelligence and intuition.
Understanding, the cornerstone of battle command, is essential to
the commander's ability to leverage competent leadership into decisive
action to accomplish the challenging, complex missions our soldiers
face today. Understanding is the driving force behind the operational
concept that frames our capstone doctrine; it provides the impetus to
bridge the chasm between risk and opportunity. Understanding is the
catalyst that fosters initiative, the seasoned expression of the agile
mind. Ultimately, understanding lies at the core of decisive action.
Third, the manual gives equal priority to the skills representative
of nation building, elevating stability operations to an equal status
with traditional offensive and defensive operations. This edition of
the manual addresses the realities of a complex era of persistent
conflict, in which stability operations are as important as offensive
and defensive operations--if not more so. Soldiers will consistently
operate in and among the people of the world, conducting operations in
an environment fundamentally human in character. In this environment,
the efforts of the force must focus primarily on the people. These
efforts--stability tasks--improve the people's safety, security, social
well-being, and livelihood; they shape a ``whole of government''
approach that integrates the activities of a wide array of military and
civilian participants; and they fulfill our legal and moral obligations
under the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
Toward this end, the manual elevates stability operations to
coequal status with the offense and defense. While previous editions
focused on the warfighting capabilities of the Army, this version
acknowledges that secure, lasting peace is only achievable by combining
the destructive capabilities inherent in offensive and defensive
operations with the constructive capabilities innate to stability
operations. Through unique combinations of offensive, defensive and
stability operations, land forces establish the conditions that foster
the success of the other instruments of national power and--through
unified action--enable the processes that engender a stable peace.
Finally, the manual highlights and embraces the unparalleled power
of information in contemporary operations. Successfully executing these
stability tasks also depends on influencing attitudes. The final
success or failure of a stability operation often rests with the
perceptions of the people. The actions of soldiers exert the most
powerful influence on the people. Soldiers and leaders must secure the
trust and confidence of the population; they must be consistent in the
actions and messages. They must master information. For the people,
perception equals reality. Altering perceptions requires accurate,
truthful information molded for broad appeal and acceptance and
presented in a way that accounts for how people absorb and interpret
information. This is the essence of information engagement.
No other military activity has as significant a human component as
operations that occur among the people. Human beings capture
information and form perceptions based on inputs received through all
the senses. They see actions and hear words. They compare gestures and
expressions with the spoken word. They weigh the messages presented to
them with the conditions that surround them. When the local and
national news media are unavailable or unreliable, people turn to the
internet, where information flows freely at unimaginable speeds. Again,
to the people, perception equals reality. This new doctrine--the very
core of our intellectual foundation--ensures that we work to change
these perceptions as we shape a positive future for a people once on
the brink of despair.

CONCLUSION

Today's FM 3-0 recognizes that the United States faces a global
security challenge and should expect to remain fully engaged throughout
the world for the next several decades, locked in a persistent conflict
against an enemy dedicated to our defeat as a nation and eradication as
a society. This conflict will be waged in an environment that is
complex, multi-dimensional and rooted in the human dimension. This
conflict cannot be won by military forces alone, but instead requires
close cooperation and coordination among the diplomatic, informational,
and economic instruments of our national power. This doctrine embraces
that reality, and sets a waypoint that ensures the close
synchronization of landpower with a broader, ``whole of government''
effort. As Army training evolves to meet the requirements of this
doctrine, the result will be a true full spectrum force: one balanced,
versatile, and able to provide expeditionary and campaign capabilities
to joint and combined-force commanders. Full spectrum operations
emphasize the importance of adaptive, flexible forces able to prevail
in any situation, whether facing an intractable terrorist group bent on
destroying our way of life, or a population in crisis relying on our
benevolence for its very survival. Ultimately, however, it is
soldiers--defined by their valor, devotion to duty and commitment to
one another and the United States of America--who execute full-spectrum
operations, and it is soldiers who remain the centerpiece of our
formations.

Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, General. We certainly
join you in that commitment to our troops.
I think we'll do 10-minute rounds and see how long we
continue to have questions for you.
Let me go back to my opening statement and ask you to
respond to what I believe I heard at the hearing that the full
committee held last year on the future of the Army and try to
relate that to this new FM 3-0, which is that--and this is
obviously taking a lot of testimony and simplifying it, but
there seemed to be a difference of opinion as to whether,
essentially, the existing brigade combat team structure could
be made into a full spectrum structure or whether, on the other
hand, we needed to develop highly specialized units to engage
in the different kinds of operations that the Army says it will
have to engage in, from low intensity peacekeeping stability
operations, to the broadest notion of general warfighting.
So did I hear that correctly, what's the answer that FM 3-
0, in your opinion, gives to that good healthy debate we had
before the full committee last year?
General Caldwell. Sir, it's an excellent question. I can
tell you from the symposiums we conducted out at Fort
Leavenworth just over the last 8 months that I've been in
command out there, that was one of the very subjects we took on
and addressed, because it is a great intellectual debate and
it's one that should be done. Out of that, though, the position
that the Army has taken we have codified in the FM, is that in
fact we will take these brigade combat teams, this modular
force, and develop within it the abilities so that it can, in
fact, conduct full spectrum operations from literally
peacekeeping type operations to major combat operations, rather
than developing unique and specialized forces, other than,
obviously, our special operating forces. We will continue to
grow.
Senator Lieberman. So do I understand correctly that the
vision, the policy decision in the FM 3-0, is that each of the
brigade combat teams will have the full spectrum capabilities?
General Caldwell. That's correct, sir. Now, Mr. Chairman,
there are 76 brigade combat teams in the total Army. We have
another 223 additional combat teams that are of other types. We
have recognized that elements like civil affairs are critical
in this type environment. So from one Active Duty civil affairs
battalion, we now have an Active Duty civil affairs brigade,
and we're growing to two Active Duty civil affairs brigades.
So it's not that the brigade combat team alone can do it
all, but there will need to be other combat-type multipliers
that can be augmented with them and support them in that
effort. Fortunately, through the authorization that Congress
gave us, we're growing the Army by about another 76,000 people,
and in that growth we will find those additional enablers being
added into the force structure that will give us that enhanced
capability.
Senator Lieberman. So what were the people who were on the
other side of the debate last year and at the symposium asking
as you understood it? That, essentially that the existing
brigade combat team structure and organization be set aside and
that you organize separate units for separate purposes? Was
that the debate?
General Caldwell. Yes, sir. Obviously, if you take a tank
battalion, about a 600-person unit that has to go through the
qualifications of tank gunnery and learn how to operate as a
combined force, and then as a combined arms force, and then ask
it to do something like stability operations, entirely
different skill sets are being applied at that point. So there
will be a decrement in their tank gunnery skills and their
ability to conduct tank operations, which they're going to have
to go back and recalibrate.
But in fact, we recognize that with the agility we have
built into the soldiers today in our Army, Mr. Chairman, we
literally have--I brought with me today Captain Kuhlman who is
sitting behind me. Captain Kuhlman just came out of Iraq, has
just been assigned out there to work with me. I asked to have
him because I had met him one time when I went to the Beiji oil
refinery.
He's an infantry company commander from the 82nd Airborne
Division. He went over there with his 140-man company with the
primary mission to bring peace, security, and stability to the
country. The next thing he knew, he had an area of operations
and he's now responsible for literally helping run
infrastructure. He has the Beiji oil refinery, the number one
major oil-producing oil refinery in Iraq. He's handling the
electrical plant. He's dealing with the local governance
committees. He's working through corruption issues. He's having
to deal with the interagency.
He literally has taken on, become a full spectrum type
adaptive leader that we're finding across the Army today, that
are just doing incredible things. Through our educational
process, the experiences we give them, the training that they
have, and now they find themselves in this case in this
situation in Iraq, and he's having to apply all those diverse
kind of skills, as are his soldiers, as he can talk about how
he took and formed Task Force Oil with a young sergeant E-5 and
a young specialist, who took on working within the plant on a
daily basis to understand better the operations of the plant.
These are military members who are having to work at that full
spectrum.
In the debates we had at Fort Leavenworth at the symposiums
was whether or not there should be an organization that doesn't
have tanks, that is given the sole mission to conduct stability
operations, that becomes very specialized in those skills. The
challenge you do find as we've continued this debate is,
Captain Kuhlman still had to conduct force-on-force combat
operations at different times. It wasn't like he was free of
the ability to not have to worry about some external threat.
As they found themselves being more successful in reducing
the level of the corruption and increasing the output of oil
through the refinery there, the insurgents did, in fact, start
conducting more attacks against his forces and against the
truck drivers and other things like that, where he was then
required to use his military force in response to that. So he
became a full spectrum unit operating over there in Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. That's a really interesting response and
story. I guess in a way you're saying that there will be some
specialized units to supplement the brigade combat teams--and
this gets to the individual soldier and certainly the
individual officer, such as the captain you've described, which
is the remarkable, you might call it, agility or
resourcefulness that our troops have demonstrated in Iraq, and
Afghanistan, but I'm focused on Iraq now, that allows them to
do this range of assignments.
Is there a way you try to train somebody to be an officer
like this?
General Caldwell. Yes, sir, that's a great point. Out
there, as the educational director for our Army on behalf of
our chief of staff, that's, in fact, what we do at the Combined
Arms Center, with our 17 schools and centers. We have taken a
lot of time and effort to inculcate into the educational
process the development of those very skills.
The importance of taking this manual--sir, I spent 30 years
in the Army. I was in Panama and then had to work the aftermath
when we had to get the basic services going and stand up the
police. Then I went to Operation Desert Storm and found the
same thing up in Iraq. Then I went into Haiti, did it all over
again, trying to get the police stood up and trying to get
basic services going.
Here we are now in Iraq, we are doing the same thing. The
Army has always withdrawn from those kind of skill sets after
we've been required to do them and we have had to do them in
every conflict, and has refused to inculcate them into our
educational process, to recognize them and to say that this is
a responsibility that we have to be able to execute. We now
have done that in FM 3-0. We have observed what's occurring in
Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 6 years. It's, in fact, a
skill set that they're demonstrating on a daily basis, those
remarkable young men and women in uniform, and we have codified
it now and said, this will be something that we're going to
capture and bring into the educational and training process and
put into our doctrinal manuals, so that we don't lose that
skill set in the future, but rather continue to reinforce it
and, as you asked earlier, sir, reward those and develop the
incentives so that if, in fact, they have done those type of
skill sets it's something that's recognized by our Army as
being very important and not something that's not important.
Senator Lieberman. That's an excellent answer. So in a way,
we train the brigade combat teams for full spectrum, but we're
training individual soldiers to have the really mental acuity
and individual leadership capability and resourcefulness to
deal with an array of different problems. What you're saying is
that FM 3-0 now accepts an institutional responsibility of the
Army to the best of their ability, of your ability, to train
our forces to carry out that range of responsibilities, and, in
fact, puts it at a level that's equal to the traditional
warfighting.
General Caldwell. Exactly right, sir. That's so important
because there are those who are very comfortable with offensive
and defensive, the kinetic type operations, and the recognition
of making stability operations as equally important,
recognizing that we simultaneously are executing all of those
in these current operations today and will in the future, now
is, in fact, reinforcing and going to reward those who, in
fact, engage in those type activities.
Senator Lieberman. That was great, thank you.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Caldwell, this significant development of this FM
to incorporate into Army doctrine the requirement of stability
and civil support in a much more formal sort of way, do you see
any conflict between the traditional warfighting function of
the Army and providing enhanced responsibilities for these kind
of operations, or do you believe it's inherent in that
warfighting capability?
General Caldwell. Sir, I believe it's inherent, and it's
something we'll be doing for the next 10 or 15 years. We've
spent a lot of time looking at the threat out in the future and
examining that as part of this manual development, and one
thing we do say is that there will continue to be these type of
operations for the next 10 or 15 years.
Senator Cornyn. After September 11 we heard a lot about
stovepipes in the intelligence community, and of course in the
military we've been working a long time to build a joint
capability between the various branches of the military. But
I'm wondering whether it's time to look at removing some of the
stovepipes in terms of all U.S. Government power through
greater interagency cooperation, to perhaps engage in a more
meaningful way from my perspective the State Department and
other U.S. Government agencies in these stability and civil
affairs operations.
Could you comment on that?
General Caldwell. Sir, I have three objectives out in my
command. First is leader development, obviously; and second is
interagency. I am aptly passionate and cannot agree with you
more. If you just take our educational process, where we have
to start it, if you go out to the Command and General Staff
College, our mid-grade level leaders at 10 years we're bringing
out there and educating, I have 1,100--I'm the commandant of
the college out there. I have 1,100 majors. 100 of them are
from other nations. I have 82 different nations represented to
give me the international flavor so that we can have that kind
of cultural dialogue exchange between us.
I have 200 from the other Services, from the Navy, the Air
Force, and the Marine Corps. I'm down now to about 800 Army
officers. I have three from the interagency. Two of them are
from the Diplomatic Security Corps, and one is from the Defense
Intelligence Agency. I literally have, for the last 8 months,
put a team together to try to somehow get the interagency to
participate and be a part of the educational process, because
if we don't train and educate together we're going to be
challenged when we go into the type of situations we see in
Iraq and Afghanistan today.
Sir, just having come out of Iraq, I can tell you that the
members of the U.S. Government that are there other than the
military are incredible heroes, putting forth a 110 percent
effort. They're absolutely committed and dedicated and they're
working every day with us. But they just aren't resourced and
funded to be able to do what's necessary there, nor in this
case to provide, like students, who can come out to the Command
and General Staff College and spend 10 months in an educational
process with all those other students out there, to enrich the
training environment so that we educate and train ourselves as
we will find ourselves operating in future environments in the
world that our Nation may commit us to.
Senator Cornyn. You mentioned funding and of course a key
to stability operations that you outlined are the provincial
reconstruction teams (PRTs) and their efforts to rebuild key
infrastructure. A large portion of the PRT funding, the
economic support fund, was in the fiscal year global war on
terrorism supplemental funding request. In December, Congress
appropriated only $15 million out of the $797 million requested
to fund the PRTs.
In your opinion, how does this impact the PRTs' ability to
provide stability operations?
General Caldwell. Sir, it obviously starts much earlier,
because the other branches of the government are challenged to
find the people to put into the PRTs because they aren't
resourced with that kind of expeditionary capability. Given,
though, that the members that we do find there--the PRTs are
essential if we're going to eventually transition and provide
greater stability and quality of life for the Iraqi people or
the Afghan people.
Captain Kuhlman can share a personal example of how, here
he is at the Beiji oil refinery, where you think you would find
every element of U.S. Government engaged up there, and he has
one person that he's able to find from a PRT that's nearby,
who's coming in and working with him and helping provide some
connectivity back into the whole government, and that's it. Had
it not been for that PRT, had it not been for that one
department person outside the U.S. military, he would have had
no outside engagement with him through his first 6 or 7 months
there in trying to figure out, how do we help the Government of
Iraq get the Beiji oil refinery, its major number one refinery
in the country, more operational and functioning better.
Senator Cornyn. I was interested to see in chapter 7 of the
FM, it's about information superiority and particularly
information operations. Information operations divides into
five Army information tasks, with particular emphasis on
information engagement. Could you explain a little bit what you
see as the proper role of the military when it comes to
information superiority?
General Caldwell. Sir, in the 21st century, as we all know,
the information medium has exploded, and the messages and ways
people can transmit information have quadrupled. So the
question is, are we as a military going to understand and
embrace this information medium and establish the procedures,
the methods, the means by which we can, in fact, use it to
educate and inform others and help work and understand that the
perceptions of the people, because we're working among the
people, in fact, becomes reality, and therefore your actions on
the ground, that of the American soldier, he or she and what he
or she does on a daily basis has a tremendous impact.
But then there's also the other medium of conveying a
message through the Internet, through radio, through TV,
through newspapers, that are out there, and we need to
understand better and take advantage of. We haven't fully
embraced and taken hold of that medium yet. We need to. It's
critical to the 21st century.
Some people call it ``soft power.'' In the Combined Arms
Center we prefer to call it ``smart power.'' It's taking these
nonlethal elements like information and figuring, how do we
take and use that in the 21st century, where, in fact, force-
on-force is not necessarily the means by which you're going to
achieve an objective, but rather informing and educating people
and making them understand what's going on will, in fact, many
times change their behaviors and their attitudes much more
quickly than anything else will.
So this information medium is absolutely paramount. It's a
major change in this manual. If you were to say what are the
four major things, one of them of course is elevating stability
operations equal to and as important as offensive, defensive.
Another one is this information domain. I had the opportunity
yesterday to talk to every public affairs officer in the United
States Army at a worldwide public affairs conference and share
with them and talk to them about this information domain,
because it is so critical and they're a key element of helping
us get at that. They're not alone in this effort, but they're
an aspect of it, because we do have to figure it out if we're
going to better inform and educate others about what the
objectives are of our U.S. Government.
Senator Cornyn. I'm glad to see the emphasis on that and
the emphasis on that issue, because frankly, I think the enemy
we are confronting is a master of using information tactics to
enhance, to advance their cause. I remember being with a
bipartisan group of members of this committee in Kirkuk in
August 2003 with General Odierno and General Petraeus at the
time, and listening to a briefing of the good work that was
being done there, and marveling that that information just
never seemed to get out.
Obviously, in terms of the public support for the mission
of the military, I think it's important for the public to know
what the military's doing and not to leave it to the halls of
Congress for people to spin and characterize it for whatever
their motives might be, but actually to get good solid
information. So I'm glad to see that the FM does view that as
an important part of the function of the military, to make sure
that information, accurate information, does get out in a way
that enhances our ability to do the job.
Mr. Chairman, I'll turn it back to you for right now.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Cornyn.
General Caldwell, let me come back and ask you to talk some
about the process that led to the FM and the Capstone doctrine
that we're focused on, which is a very important document. The
first question is, what were the Army's assumptions about the
likelihood of employment of Army personnel at different points
on the conflict spectrum over the next generation and the
resultant priority among expected missions?
In other words, did you go through a process where you
reached some assumptions about whether it was more likely that
you be called on for conventional, irregular, or stability
operations, and if so, what kind of priority was there?
General Caldwell. Sir, we did, in fact, do that, and our
assumption is that we will be called on over the next 10 to 15
years on a somewhat regular basis, and that, in fact, there
will be more of the lower end kind of operations, not major
combat operations.
Senator Lieberman. So lower end, define it a little bit for
the record?
General Caldwell. The best way I could tell you, being
responsible for helping put together our Army doctrine, we're
rewriting right now our Army training manual, the manual that
will tell you how we're going to train the United States Army.
What we have done, sir, we've laid out that spectrum of
conflict and we have actually put a circle on it and said, here
is the area in which we think we'll most likely see U.S.
military forces operating over the next----
Senator Lieberman. You mean geographically or in terms of?
General Caldwell. Geographically, yes, sir. We haven't
published it yet, sir. We're publishing it in about 90 days.
We're out briefing it. We're conducting the sensing sessions.
We're talking to the other Services. A lot like we did with FM
3-0, to ensure there's not something we've missed before we
publish this.
Senator Lieberman. That's very important to know. So
hopefully this hearing can be a part of that process, too.
General Caldwell. Yes, sir. What we're telling everybody is
that, instead of focusing on major combat operations, we're
going to focus on slightly less than that.
Senator Lieberman. So give us an example of what slightly
less, something we've experienced?
General Caldwell. Yes, sir. Like out at our Combat Training
Center, sir, at the National Training Center and the Joint
Readiness Training Center, instead of just having major force-
on-force operations, we have over the last couple of years now
been building large urban areas out of different elements,
makeshift towns. We've hired on lots of Afghan Americans or
Iraqi Americans, depending on what unit is going to go to what
area of the world, and have brought them in and they're doing
role-playing, and they're in native costumes, with
organizations set up. Then we bring the unit just before it's
prepared to deploy about 3 months out there for what we call a
mission rehearsal exercise, where they're rehearsing their
final mission before they deploy and have them actually
exercise and go through about a 10-day iteration out there,
giving different challenges, situations changing, very dynamic
depending on what they do and how the people react, putting
them through the challenges of IEDs, and everything else we do.
Senator Lieberman. So is it fair to say that you think that
we're going to face more situations like we're facing in Iraq
and Afghanistan today in the next 10 or 15 years, or are those
more large-scale than you anticipate as the most significant
responsibilities the Army will be asked to take on?
General Caldwell. Sir, our assumption is that there will be
like type operations in a smaller scale.
Senator Lieberman. On a smaller scale. Then how about, what
ranking do you give stability operations?
General Caldwell. Sir, we really do see it as coequal, it
truly is. I know we say that in doctrine, but when we put them
out through our--and again, I have oversight for our Army, of
our combat training center exercises. The Army has given us, we
educate, we write it in doctrine, and we also collect the
lessons learned, and then we go out and do the collective
training, too, out there.
So we've, in fact, incorporated that in so that everybody
has to go through the stability operations aspects when they're
doing a rotation at either the National Training Center or the
Joint Readiness Training Center.
Senator Lieberman. Let me go back to the question that I
raised on my first round and just see if I can ask you to focus
in on this aspect of it, which is, in the same way you've
described some of the assumptions that you've made about the
likelihood of the threat environments or activities you'll be
called on, what was the process that you followed that led to
your decision to rely more on the full spectrum general purpose
units than on the specialized units organized, trained, and
equipped for specific missions?
In other words, you made a decision here that did reject an
alternative view and I want to understand on what basis you
made that decision.
General Caldwell. Sir, what we're experiencing over the
last 6 years in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that a military
unit when it goes in, who may be one day conducting stability
operations, can very well the very next day be conducting
combat operations. Given the complexities of that environment,
it's just not sterile enough where you can just do one thing.
Senator Lieberman. So the alternative view is in some sense
unrealistic, is that what you're saying, the one that focuses
on more specialized units?
General Caldwell. We want specialized like units that can
bring in and augment.
Senator Lieberman. To supplement or augment.
General Caldwell. That's absolutely imperative, sir, like I
said, with the civil affairs. One battalion was not enough for
our United States Army. We're literally going to have six times
as much here because of what Congress gave us in allowing us to
have the growth we're experiencing right now.
Senator Lieberman. So I think I better understand why you
made the decision, and it was that in what you see as the
normal circumstance now it's not--and this is why I used the
word ``realistic''--realistic to think you can send in one unit
to perform one kind of operation and have another ready for
another operation, whether it's on the conventional, irregular
warfare spectrum, or information, or peacekeeping, stability
operations. Presumably based on what our troops are being
called on to do now, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, that
their presence there puts them in a position where it's much
more realistic and, I suppose you're saying, efficient to train
those units for a broad spectrum of responsibilities, rather
than thinking you can send in specialized units to deal with
whatever problems emerge.
General Caldwell. Yes, sir. I can share a personal
experience. One of our great coalition partners, the Republic
of Korea, has sent a unit into northern Iraq that is providing
great stability operations assistance. That's all they're able
to do and that's all that their government has allowed them to
do. They're providing medical care and training in how to
operate heavy machinery. They're educating them in bakery
goods. They're doing a lot of great things for the people of
Iraq.
But they're very, very limited in what we can do with them.
They're only able to stay just within their operating base and,
although they're able to perform self-defense if attacked, we
are unable to use them for anything else. So if some incident
occurs in a nearby town, we have to bring in additional forces
from outside the area to assist the Iraqi forces.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you about another assumption.
You had a very interesting, I think important, exchange with
Senator Cornyn about the fact that we know that the Army and
the Marine Corps are being called on to perform an
extraordinary range of functions that go well beyond what most
people would think our military should be doing or would be
asked to do. We're very lucky, blessed, that you're doing it so
well.
But you get very little help from other Federal agencies
and as a result you're doing stuff not only that in the normal
organizational chart we would assume that the State Department,
the Treasury Department, the Agriculture Department--you could
go on--would have been asked to do, but they don't have the
personnel to do it.
So my question is, is one of the assumptions that you've
made here as you put together this new doctrine that, in fact,
in the next 10 to 15 years the Army won't be getting much more
help from other Federal agencies than you are today?
General Caldwell. Yes, sir, it is. But we also talk about--
--
Senator Lieberman. Talk about reality. I'm afraid you may
be right, but it's unfortunate.
General Caldwell. But we make sure that they understand how
critical it is that we don't want to ever lose, and continue to
push, to try to get the whole of government engaged and
involved in this process. Again, sir, I'd just go back to my
personal experiences. Literally, I sat there in Panama after we
did Operation Just Cause, and I remember my division commander
turning to me and saying: ``Okay, Bill, how are you going to
get the police force up now?'' I was the plans officer and I
said: ``Get the police force up? We haven't even thought about
that and what we went through.'' Then I watched in Haiti.
Again, it was standing up a police force and working to get the
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistant Program
and Ray Kelly down and everything else, and then how are we
going to pay them and what are the standards. Then I walk into
Iraq, sir, and it's deja vu all over again.
So this manual, which I am very thankful we're finally
codifying it there, has recognized the importance of that
aspect of stability operations and ensuring that it's in our
educational processes and we do train to it and we have
discussions about it.
We're writing right now, sir, FM 3-07, called ``Stability
Operations.'' We, in fact, will host an interagency conference
on it, out at Fort Leavenworth in the late part of June for 2
days. We will have the ambassador who's in charge of the
Department of State security and reconstruction come out and be
our keynote speaker, because he understands how critical this
is to the whole of government. He's assisting us, his office
is, greatly in this effort, as are many elements of the U.S.
Government. But at the same time, everybody recognizes they
don't have the resources they can contribute to the effort.
But we're still going to write the manual. We'll have it
out by this fall and it will be truly a U.S. Government manual.
Although it will have an Army stamp on it, it will be anything
but an Army manual. It will be a ``How the U.S. Government
should conduct stability operations.'' We will not publish
anything that everybody is not comfortable with, because it's
that critical to us that we have it right for the whole
government.
Senator Lieberman. Good for you. Look, we have an
obligation on our side, and obviously whoever is president in
the years ahead has the same obligation, to try to get some of
those other Federal agencies to pick up more of the
responsibility.
But in the mean time, again it's amazing what the Army and
the Marine Corps are doing over there on the ground. People
talk about economic development and microfinancing and building
up self-government, the Iraqis' capacity to protect their own
people and local police forces. It's astounding the range of
functions that the Army is carrying out successfully on our
behalf.
I know General Petraeus said to me at one point that the
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds are so
critical that he'd trade a lot of other things he's getting
money for so he'd have enough of that CERP money, because
that's actually helping, now that the surge has created some
security, to build the country back up, to help the Iraqis take
control of their destiny. It's quite something.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There was some criticism that going into Iraq we were
looking for a replication of what happened in Afghanistan, and
we found something entirely different due to the failure of
intelligence to let us anticipate what we encountered. I don't
mean from a military standpoint. I mean in terms of the
disintegration of civil society, the insurgency, and the like.
Are you concerned at all that this FM, responding as it
does to the current need for increased stability and civil
affairs operations, is a response to what we've experienced in
Iraq, that may or may not be present, a need that may or may
not be present in future conflicts?
General Caldwell. Senator, that's a great question. We've
had a lot of discussion on that. The lessons we have learned
over the last really 7 years now from both Afghanistan and Iraq
have been taken and used in helping formulate this manual, but
it's much more than that. It's also, as the chairman asked,
what assumptions do we make in trying to look to what we're
going to foresee that we could face in the future, and then
having that as a major building block, too.
But very much so, we are influenced by and wanted to ensure
we didn't lose the lessons learned from the last 6 or 7 years.
Senator Cornyn. My notes tell me here that more than 90
percent of civil affairs troops are reservists currently. Could
you confirm that or not? Do you expect the regular Army as it
adopts a larger role in the stability and civil affairs
operations to--now that it's been doctrinally elevated to a
core Army mission, is it going to change the need to have more
of that capability in the regular Army?
General Caldwell. Sir, I'd have to come back to you on the
exact percentage. I don't believe it's 90 percent any more. But
I would really want to come back to you if I could on that and
give you a definitive answer I'd like to be correct.
[The information referred to follows:]

The percentages of all soldiers assigned to structured Civil
Affairs units are as follows. This is based upon approved Civil Affairs
growth through fiscal year 2011.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Component 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Army Civil Affairs Personnel.............. 409 409 618 757 898 898 898
Active Army (Percent).......................... 7 7 10 12 13 12 12
Army Reserve Civil Affairs Personnel............. 6,240 6,248 6,176 6,532 6,924 7,231 7,295
Army Reserve (Percent)......................... 93 93 90 88 87 88 88
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Caldwell. But what I can tell you, sir, is we only
had one Active Duty civil affairs battalion when September 11
occurred. We're going to have six of them very shortly. It's an
acknowledgment of how critical that asset is, and that will be
six in the Active-Duty Force, not--there will be still some in
the Reserves, but it's going to be six in the Active-Duty
Force, because we also recognized that we did put too much of
it into the Reserve component. Again, but it's because we had
not said stability operations are equal and are as important as
offensive and defensive operations. We have now, and in doing
so therefore must have more civil affairs in the Active-Duty
Force.
Senator Cornyn. As this becomes a core Army mission of
stability and civil affairs operations, I read one article
suggesting that some military officers may not see this as
particularly an advantageous career path leading to a
promotion. Are you concerned about that?
General Caldwell. Sir, I am. I can tell you one thing that
we have just done in the Army, too. We have taken and put all
our leader development under the Training and Doctrine Command.
In fact, today General Wallace is chairing the first of the
quarterly leader development reviews so that we can look
specifically at leader development issues. They were very much
dispersed across the Army in different areas. We've now just in
the last 6 months pulled them all together. We have a team out
at Fort Leavenworth that's working this for him, and we're
having our first quarterly review today, which literally will
include everybody in the Army, from the Army G-3, the G-1, our
personnel people, our Training and Doctrine, our Forces
Commands. They're all coming and meeting, with General Wallace
chairing the session, as we work through and then not only
prioritize these leader development things, but then put the
resources against it, which is the part that has also been
missing. So that he has been given the authority to move
resources within the Army, so that we ensure if we say this is
our number one critical thing that it will be resourced so that
it occurs, which would then follow on with things like board
instructions that give instructions for promotions and
acknowledgment of how important those kind of skills are.
Senator Cornyn. We all know that the current conflicts in
which our Nation is engaged have put a lot of stress on the
Army with repetitive deployments. Of course, one way we're
responding to that is by growing the end strength of the Army
and the Marine Corps. Does this change in the Army FM call for
any changes in your opinion with regard to the numbers of new
members of the Army or the Marine Corps that we're going to
need?
General Caldwell. Not directly, sir. If we're trying to
figure out end strength, I think perhaps what we do is we look
at what do we think are the mission requirements and then what
are the forces to accomplish those missions.
Senator Cornyn. I guess to clarify my question maybe, since
we're talking about more than offensive and defensive
operations, more than just being the most lethal force on the
planet, but expanding the role, it would seem to me you're
going to need more people if your role is going to be expanded.
Now, maybe you'll tell me you're doing it anyway now and really
it's just recognizing reality. But I would be interested if you
do believe--and you can certainly take it under advisement,
come back to us if you think there is any need to increase the
numbers or growing our end strength in the Army or the Marine
Corps as a result of this new core requirement of the FM.
General Caldwell. Sir, what I can say, in the current
growth that's been approved, the 72,000, over 65,000 or so is
Active Duty. That's where, in fact, we're doing the civil
affairs growth and some of these others. As we say, this
doctrine is evolutionary in nature because there has been the
acknowledgment that these kind of things have been required,
but it's revolutionary in that we codified it in writing. So
that's the revolutionary aspect of this.
So in the growth that Congress did approve already for the
United States Army, a lot of that is already starting to occur
and has been looked at. I will tell you there are still ongoing
reviews, again because we also do that out of Fort Leavenworth
for the Army, in the overall force structure. We are not
finished with it. There are still dialogues and discussions. We
will go back here in about 2 more weeks with another major
series of events that will lead up to about the 1st of July
where we will go back to the Department and make a
recommendation on some further changes within our force
structure.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate your candor in responding to
Senator Lieberman's question about whether you can rely on
other agencies of the Federal Government to perform this
function or whether the uniformed military is going to have to
do it because, frankly, there is not going to be a lot of help
from elsewhere. I would be interested if you have
recommendations--I believe your staff and mine have talked a
little bit about--what over and above the Army FM and this
elevation of this stability and civil affairs operations to a
core part of the Army doctrine, what other ideas you might have
about how we could engage the full spectrum of the Federal
Government to assist.
I think you've acknowledged reality and I happen to agree
with you under present circumstances. But I don't think we
ought to give up. If there are things that we could do that
would supplement or enhance this capability of the Army in
providing these operations by funding or training or some other
reorganization of U.S. Government power, I would appreciate the
benefit of your thoughts and ideas on that.
General Caldwell. All right, sir. We'll come back to you on
that, sir. You are right, sir. Our staffs are engaged, and I
appreciate that dialogue that's been going on.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is currently
working with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) to extend a successful
Interagency Exchange Program that was approved by the Chief of Staff of
the Army. This program provides education and training to the key
agencies and departments of government to improve the capability of
these organizations to meet the challenges of conducting stability
operations in difficult areas of the world through an effective ``whole
of government'' approach. Results of this program have been successful
thus far, with 17 students from 8 departments/agencies coming to CGSC
for classes beginning in July 2008 and continuing through June 2009.
In turn, the Army is sending seven officers as interagency interns
to work in six departments/agencies to gain broadening experiences for
the interns while contributing knowledge to the host departments/
agencies. Instructors and guest lecturers are also coming to CGSC from
the interagency to assist in the cross-pollination process. It is
recommended that this type of collaborative learning be expanded
further within the Army and the interagency to maximize the ability to
train together as we intend to operate together in the theater of
operations. To accomplish this, the Army and the individual agencies
will need additional budget authority from Congress for added personnel
and travel expenses that will accrue.
The above is just one example. What we need overall to continue
this type of cooperation between the military and the interagency is
for Congress to help with the following:

a. Provide additional funding to the concerned agencies so
they can participate in individual and collective education and
training for joint Army/interagency operations without
sacrificing other ongoing requirements for which they are still
responsible. This should include opportunities at CGSC as are
already underway under the above initiative, as well as
exercises and simulation opportunities at the CAC Centers and
Schools, and the Combat Training Centers.
b. Staff the respective agencies so they have the personnel
to send for education and training with the military forces
they will be working with in the theater of operations.
c. Provide authorization and funds for exchange assignments
where a member of one organization is temporarily assigned to
another organization for broadening opportunities that will be
of value to both organizations. This should go both ways, i.e.,
military to interagency, and interagency to military to provide
the needed learning experiences for all parties. The
authorization should enable use of military funds for sending
an individual to an interagency assignment and use of
interagency funds for sending an individual to a military
assignment for the purposes of broadening the education and
training of each organization.
d. Implement some sort of congressionally endorsed
Presidential Executive Order or a Goldwater-Nichols Act for
interagency (akin to what was done for joint service
operations) that will provide directives and incentives to
cooperate in the changes needed to make ``whole of government''
operations feasible and effective.
e. Enforce (d) above just as occurred with the individual
Military Services to require all the Services to work together
with interoperable capability. Make it enticing to participate.
Career paths must support training and interagency education,
which should in turn be made a key element for promotion. In
the beginning some Services were slow to fully embrace Joint
Professional Education programs, as it was viewed as a
detriment to an operational career path. However, that view was
changed as a result of policies enacted to support promotions.
So this is needed to ensure cooperation by all Services,
departments, and agencies.
f. Produce written guidance and codify actions in support of
nation building. This includes economic development, the Rule
of Law, humanitarian assistance and social well-being,
governance, reconciliation, strategic infrastructure, etc. To
date, there has been marginal support for efforts to capture
and codify tasks as they apply to each agency.
g. Develop a process to establish unity of command amongst
the interagency and intergovernmental organizations. For
example, there are periods in reconstruction operations when
the Department of Justice (DOJ) should have primacy due to the
need to establish the rule of law. However, there are times
when economic development must take center stage because it is
the overriding concern. When this occurs, someone must be in
charge. To date, there is no formalized process in establishing
unity of command and the subsequent unity of effort among the
key agency players.
h. Establish a coherent and synchronized training program for
interagency and intergovernmental personnel deploying in
support of reconstruction operations. For example, there is no
place for DOJ, Department of State (DOS), and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) to send their
personnel for integrated training. In the military we have the
CONUS Replacement Center where all military personnel go for
training prior to deploying. There is no such location or
organization in the interagency and intergovernmental
community. The training does exist for some organizations, but
it is not synchronized and unstructured.
i. Rotational cycles for the interagency and
intergovernmental community serving in operational areas are
not standardized. DOS, DOJ, Department of Transportation, et
cetera, all have different rotational polices, that's if they
can even require their personal to deploy. The non-standard
tours create perpetual turbulence in the execution of
reconstruction tasks. This is exacerbated by the lack of
deployment policies that require personnel to deploy in support
of reconstruction efforts.
j. Many of the interagency and intergovernmental personnel
are not integrated into existing command and control
structures. As a result, their actions are not synchronized
with the military or other agencies executing reconstruction
tasks. There are no such things as command or support
relationships in the interagency and intergovernmental
community. As a result, everyone is establishing their own
priorities when it comes to rebuilding a country.
k. Many of the government agencies are understaffed to allow
them to contribute to both ``whole of government'' operations
in theater and to training our forces before they deploy. DOS
and USAID are two organizations that come to mind, since they
are currently working very hard with us to provide their
expertise to support training at the Army's four combat
training centers. If Congress could expand the size of the
agencies normally involved in stability operations it would be
a positive step to improving the current training situation.

The importance of interagency personnel training with the Army
cannot be understated, since it is a reciprocal learning experience.
That is, by training together, our soldiers and agency personnel learn
about each other's operational capabilities, and--more importantly--
internal cultures--i.e., how each thinks and conducts business. Without
those agencies personnel, we are forced to contract personnel to role
play our interagency partners. Ideally, those contracted role players
have been in those actual roles in a former life; for example, we have
used the services of contracted retired ambassadors to act out those
roles in exercises. Naturally, we would like to have other
organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central
Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency routinely train
with us. Having enough people in the agencies so that they could be
part of the train up of our uniformed forces would greatly improve pre-
deployment training and provide subject matter experts with current
experience.
This interaction would help make the agency personnel and our
soldiers smarter to leverage each other's capabilities and establish
relationships to work together as a unified team. The more
opportunities there are to work with our joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational partners in training, the more
likely we will be successful in actual operations.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Cornyn. Very good
questions.
I just have a couple more. I want to pick up on one of the
exchanges with Senator Cornyn about end strength and whether
the new doctrine, FM, requires additional end strength even
beyond what we've authorized. Let me focus in on this part of
it. To carry out these full spectrum of missions, you're going
to need good time for training of our troops. Under the current
deployment schedule, obviously, there is less time, to some
extent even less resources. The institutional Army has been cut
back some to enable the Army out there on the field to carry
out its responsibilities.
So my question is, as deployments are more frequent, do you
see that the Army will have enough time to train our troops to
carry out the extraordinary range of responsibilities that the
doctrine will give them individually?
General Caldwell. Sir, with the current deployments that
are ongoing today, we are only able to train our forces for the
mission which they have been directed to execute. So the forces
that we are sending into both Iraq and Afghanistan today are
trained not to conduct high-end operations. We recognize what
the environment there is and we train them for that
environment. It still requires them to have the capability to
conduct force-on-force and stability operations, but they are
not taught to conduct major force-on-force operations.
We are sacrificing that part of our ongoing training so
that they are fully prepared and ready for what they will face
in Iraq or Afghanistan. We call it their directed mission
essential task list.
It takes about 18 months dwell time in between deployments
in order for us to get at the full spectrum of the military
skill sets which every military unit needs to have the
capability to execute. Right now, we're at about a 12-month
rotation between deployments. So therefore we are challenged
and have a difficulty in getting at that full spectrum.
But what we do ensure is that every man and woman who is
deployed into theater has all the training they need for that
environment upon which they're going to operate.
Senator Lieberman. I hear you. So I think you're doing the
best you can and really damn good under trying circumstances. I
think as you consider some of the questions that Senator Cornyn
asked, I'd like you to consider that question of whether
there's a real need for greater end strength to allow the Army
to train our troops more broadly for the missions, the broad
spectrum of missions that they're going to be given under the
new FM doctrine.
My own hope--I appreciate your testimony today--is that
this is the beginning of a dialogue. I understand this is a
proposal that you're now vetting and I hope that you'll
continue, if you will, to vet with us also, because we have the
ultimate responsibility, obviously, along with the President,
but Congress has a unique responsibility under the Constitution
to fund our military. I think we want to understand what the
doctrine is and make sure that we can support it and also to
fund it, so that we're reducing the stress that the Army is
feeling in carrying out the responsibility that you take on for
our country.
General Caldwell. Yes, sir. Sir, if I could just say, from
having again had the privilege and opportunity to serve with
our men and women over there, we are extremely grateful for the
support that Congress has continued to give to us and the
American people. It's just absolutely overwhelming. I've never
seen anything like it in my military career. We're greatly
appreciative. On behalf of all of us serving in uniform, I just
want to say thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman. General, we owe it to you. This has
been, as is obvious in this room, a controversial war in terms
of the politics of it. But I think what's not controversial,
although the two occasionally have bumped into each other on
the floor of the Senate anyway, is our support for the troops.
I think the general notion of supporting the troops is broadly
held in our society. Sometimes the specifics of how we do it in
terms of funding on the floor has come into confrontation
politically.
But I go back to what Senator Cornyn and I both have said.
This is a remarkable Army that has found itself being asked to
do things that really it could not have anticipated--maybe it
should have anticipated, but it didn't--it would be asked to
do, not just within the foreseeable range of Army
responsibilities, but all these other departmental
responsibilities that the other agencies of the Federal
Government are not carrying out, not picking up.
It's really one of the great untold stories of this
conflict, both Iraq and Afghanistan, the tremendous human
commitment by individual soldiers to make this work, beyond the
warfighting--living in the neighborhoods, interacting with the
people. When I was there, not this last time 2 weeks ago, but
the time before on Thanksgiving, I was hearing one of the
marines telling me about how they used some CERP funds to help
the local imam fix up the mosque and not a lot of money really,
but a tremendous impact on the attitude of the local population
toward us and toward their own future.
So bottom line: Let's continue the discussion.
I have some further questions which I'm going to submit to
you in writing for you to answer. We'll keep the record of the
hearing open if Senator Cornyn or I or you want to add to it,
for 15 days from this date. But for now, thank you for your
testimony. Thank you for your leadership and, through you,
thanks to all the men and women who wear the uniform of the
U.S. Army and are performing with extraordinary honor and
effect. We can't thank you enough.
General Caldwell. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS

1. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, the Military Transition
Teams' (MiTTs) success in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been
incredible, and has proven invaluable in not only advising and
mentoring local security forces, but also setting an example of
military professionalism. It was unfortunate that we did not have this
capability established earlier and lost valuable time creating it ad
hoc. If this specialized type of unit had been part of the standard
Army organization, we may not have lost that valuable time. This new
Operations Manual directs that stability operations will be a major
part of future operations. It would make sense that elements such as
the MiTTs would be an inherent and major part of these operations. What
is the Army doing to ensure that we have this capability in the future?
General Caldwell. To ensure the Army has this capability in the
future, the Army is currently developing the training operational
concept and training organizational design for an enduring capability
to train Full Spectrum Army forces for the advisor/trainer mission.
This capability is planned to reach full implementation no earlier than
December 2011, and is currently planned to collocate at Fort Polk, LA,
with the Joint Readiness and Training Center. It will have the ability
to train individuals and units to conduct the advisor/trainer mission.
The Army must be ready to train and advise foreign security forces
through both pre-conflict security cooperation activities, such as
ongoing efforts in Colombia and Saudi Arabia, and post conflict
conditions, such as our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
type of training and advising required spans from the ministerial level
through the institutional army and from national army headquarters to
small tactical units. The ministerial level requires a joint solution
that the Army contributes to, while foreign army institutions require
assistance from the Institutional Army such as the Training and
Doctrine Command. Full Spectrum Army modular forces are ideally suited
to train and advise foreign army tactical forces.
For all these forces, the key consideration is expertise in their
core function--something not necessarily resident in an advisory corps.
For example, U.S. Army infantry, medical, or engineer units are experts
at conducting their wartime function and therefore ideally suited to
train and advise counterparts. Future requirements to train and advise
foreign security forces will be addressed with a combination of U.S.
embassy military groups, Special Operations Forces, full spectrum
modular forces, and small scale specialized forces. However, before
Army forces conduct a training or advising mission, they must prepare
for the unique aspects the mission entails. To that end the Army is
creating an enduring advisor/trainer training capability.

2. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, will the Army expect
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to be capable of transitioning to the MiTT
mission seamlessly?
General Caldwell. If directed prior to deployment during the reset
phase of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), BCTs can execute the
training with personnel and equipment required to support the MiTT
mission seamlessly. BCTs have a rich history of training and advising
the forces of partner nations in peacetime, and have continued that
tradition during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan today.
FM 3-0, Operations (Feb 08), recognizes that battlefield success is
not longer enough ultimately, success requires concurrent stability
operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace. Army BCTs are
designed to conduct Full Spectrum Operations--simultaneous offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. Emerging Army training doctrine
requires BCTs to initially achieve proficiency in their core mission-
essential tasks as part of the ARFORGEN process. These tasks are full
spectrum tasks and are based on the as-designed mission of the unit
prior to deployment. This core mission essential task list provides the
baseline skills for the MiTT mission. Army forces will not train on
these core mission essential tasks lists, until the dwell time is at
least 18 months, unless otherwise directed. However, since BCTs have
been involved in all aspects of stability operations, to include
understanding the Afghan and Iraqi cultures and languages for the past
5 years, as well as working with transition teams during that time, it
will be easy for them to assume they are capable of transitioning to
the MiTT mission seamlessly.
If a BCT is directed to conduct the MiTT mission, the commander
will analyze that mission's requirements and develop a directed mission
essential task list (DMETL)--the tasks that are essential to accomplish
the MiTT mission, as well as personnel, training, and equipment
requirements for the MiTT mission. Internal sources of a MiTT changes
the usual duty positions of soldiers within the BCT and redirects them
from their core missions. However, as we have seen in OIF and OEF,
soldiers are very adaptive. The train-up time necessary to provide new
skill requirements to soldiers and leaders is included in the force
generation training cycles.

3. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, the Army has created
significant advisory structure currently deployed throughout Iraq and
Afghanistan. If we assume that we will need teams similar to the
structure of the MiTT over this period of extended conflict, would it
make sense to build this force structure permanently?
General Caldwell. The MiTTs were created specifically to meet the
operational needs of the Iraqi and Afghan armies at a time when U.S.
Army BCTs were committed to counterinsurgency operations. However,
MiTTs may not be the best structure for requirements beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan, but the lessons learned about trainer/advisor roles,
missions, and skills will apply in the future as the Army develops the
capability for an enduring advisor/trainer institution.
To help capture this expertise, the Army is tracking soldiers with
transition team experience by assigning a Project Development Skill
Identifier (PDSI) to soldiers who successfully complete transition team
training. As of 17 April 2008, 2,829 soldiers have been awarded a PDSI.
Further, both officer and enlisted selection boards include specific
instructions that explain the duties and responsibilities of those who
have served on transition teams and emphasizes the importance of the
transition team mission.
Future requirements to train and advise foreign security forces
will be addressed with a combination of U.S. embassy military groups,
Special Operations Forces, full spectrum modular forces, and small
scale specialized forces. Organizations such as the U.S. Army Security
Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) will continue to
provide small scale security assistance teams (SATs) to train and
advise foreign militaries. For example, in fiscal year 2007, SATMO
provided 29 permanent SATs in 15 countries and 36 temporary SATs in 24
countries executing over 8,400 overseas workdays in security assistance
to foreign militaries.

brigade troops battalions and maneuver enhancement brigades
4. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, the Brigade Troops
Battalions (BTBs), and at higher levels, the Maneuver Enhancement
Brigades (MEBs), seem to be the elements best suited to conduct
stability operations. These units have organic military police,
engineers, and intelligence forces that are combat multipliers in
stability operations. Will stability operations become a mission
essential task of these elements, and if so, do they have the proper
equipment for these tasks?
General Caldwell. The Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB)
doctrinally is primarily organized to provide command and control for
the BCT company and smaller units. The BSTBs subordinate units are
military intelligence, communications, engineer, military police, and
CBRN reconnaissance. The BSTB provides these capabilities to the BCT
and the Combined Arms Battalions during offense, defense, stability,
and civil support operations in addition to securing BCT command posts.
As part of a BCT conducting simultaneous operations, the BSTB would
have the task to conduct stability operations. However, the current
BSTB design is not resourced, based on recent staff reductions and lack
of maneuver companies, with the required capabilities to plan and
execute, other than non-kinetic, stability operations.
One of the MEB's Core capability mission essential tasks is to
conduct stability operations. The MEB is optimized to conduct stability
operations and with its unique breadth and capabilities of the staff
and the likely mix of units, it will become the preferred headquarters
to conduct stability operations. Since an MEB is a multi-functional
organization that is task-organized based on mission requirements, the
MEB can be optimally tailored with the requisite capabilities to
provide the required support for stability operations.

5. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, will these organizations
(the BTBs and MEBs) have enough training to both support the combat
mission and exercise mission command over and execution of
stabilization efforts?
General Caldwell. All Army forces train for combat missions, which
include offense, defense, and stability operations tasks. A unit's
training plan is developed based on its DMETL. Each DMETL is tailored
for the mission the unit is being deployed to conduct and involves some
level of offensive, defensive, and stability operations used in
combination. A BTB can train and execute command and control of its
forces for the mission they will execute in support of its parent BCT.
This includes offense, defense, and stability operations tasks.
However, since the BTB contains unique units that support the entire
BCT, those units will often be controlled directly by the brigade or by
other subordinate battalions they are directly supporting. A MEB is a
multi-functional brigade able to train and execute command and control
over a varying amount and type of Army functional units such as
military police, engineers, chemical, air defense, and maneuver units.
The MEB, like a BCT, is capable of battlespace management, command and
control, and conducting full spectrum operations (including offense,
defense, and stability tasks).

6. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, is the Army modernizing
these combat support elements with the same priority as our combat
elements?
General Caldwell. Yes. We are modernizing and modularizing forces
in all capability areas. BSTBs are being ``modernized'' and
``modularized'' with their parent BCTs. MEBs are being built in new
modular formations and are receiving a whole host of modern equipment.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER SERVICES

7. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, FM 3-0 discusses the
importance of the Army fighting as part of an interdependent joint
team. A new Capstone doctrine would be incomplete if it were not fully
coordinated and supportable by the other Services. What coordination
did the Army conduct with the Joint Staff and staffs of the other
Services in the development of this doctrine?
General Caldwell. From the outset, development of FM 3-0 was
coordinated closely with our sister Services and the Joint Staff. We
staffed each draft through the other Services' doctrine centers, and
collaborated with Joint Forces Command on specific aspects of the
manual to ensure that we cemented the linkages between Joint and Army
doctrine. This collaboration was essential in shaping the final content
of FM 3-0 and was instrumental in articulating the role of the Services
in achieving true joint interdependence in the land domain.
We also played a key role in the development of the joint doctrine
from which the underpinnings of FM 3-0 were derived. By synchronizing
the development of FM 3-0 with the writing of Joint Publications 3-0
(Joint Operations) and 5-0 (Planning for Joint Operations), our team
was able to collaborate closely with writers from Joint Forces Command.
Key elements of FM 3-0 emerged from that process, and were further
developed through ongoing discussion with individual representatives of
Joint Forces Command.
This level of coordination also extended beyond the Department of
Defense. In August 2007, the other agencies of the United States
Government provided their assessment of the manual. We captured that
input and rewrote parts of the text to better reflect the role of the
interagency in the conduct of land operations. That synergy is vital to
ensuring the coordination and collaboration required among the
interagency to achieve success in future operations where outcomes will
be wholly dependent on ``whole of government'' engagement.
Overall, FM 3-0 is probably the most widely-vetted doctrinal manual
the Army has ever produced, and that trend will only continue to expand
as we develop and institutionalize other key aspects of our doctrine.
We recognize that we will never conduct operations again as a single
Service or even a joint force; we will always do it with other elements
of our national power. As we enter this era of persistent conflict and
confront the uncertain future before us, we will engage as a Nation,
where the solutions to the complex challenges we face will only be
resolved through the integrated employment of all the instruments of
national power--diplomatic, information, military, and economic--in a
true, ``whole of government'' approach that brings to bear all the rich
capabilities of our interagency partners. We recognize the nature of
our future, and have engaged our sister Services and the Joint Staff in
forging a doctrine that truly supports the great challenges of the
future before us.

8. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, how detailed was the
coordination to determine the other Services' ability to support this
doctrine with changes in air lift, sea lift, and information,
surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance assets?
General Caldwell. FM 3-0, Operations is the most thoroughly-vetted
doctrinal manual the Army has ever produced, and included an
unparalleled level of participation and support from our sister
Services and the Joint Staff. As we developed FM 3-0, we staffed each
draft through the other Services' doctrine centers, and collaborated
closely with Joint Forces Command on specific aspects of the manual to
ensure that we cemented the linkages between joint and Army doctrine.
This collaboration was absolutely essential in shaping the final
content of FM 3-0; it was fundamental to capturing and accurately
articulating the roles of the Services in attaining true joint
interdependence in the land domain.
Through joint interdependence, the Services are able to achieve an
unprecedented level of effectiveness, producing complementary and
reinforcing effects that maximize the ability of the Joint Force while
leveraging the strengths of the individual Services to achieve decisive
results as a coherent, integrated force. This interdependence begins
with doctrine, which provides the theoretical and intellectual
foundations that enable the Joint Force ``to be greater than the sum of
its parts.'' Doctrine cements change in our institutions and sets the
waypoint for applying our individual capabilities in integrated,
synchronized joint operations. Now that FM 3-0 is published, our sister
Services will need to conduct a more deliberate review to assess their
ability to meet the requirements established within the new doctrine.
As the new manual is based on a foundation of expeditionary and
campaign capable forces, there may be changes necessary to ensure broad
joint interdependence is maintained across each domain--air, land,
space, maritime, and information. This is a normal element of the
capstone doctrine development process, but was facilitated through
the collaborative efforts initiated early during the writing of
FM 3-0.
As we continue to develop the body of doctrine that
institutionalizes the precepts of FM 3-0 throughout Army doctrine, this
trend toward inter-Service collaboration will only expand. It is
already encompassing the interagency in the development of our
stability operations doctrine and must continue to do so if we are to
forge the ``whole of government'' approach so critical to the success
of our Nation in this era of persistent conflict.

9. Senator Lieberman. General Caldwell, did the other Services
concur with the revisions to the doctrine, including their capability
to meet requirements?
General Caldwell. From the outset, development of FM 3-0 was
coordinated closely with our sister Services and the Joint Staff. We
staffed each draft through the other Services' doctrine centers, and
collaborated with Joint Forces Command on specific aspects of the
manual to ensure that we cemented the linkages between Joint and Army
doctrine. This collaboration was essential in shaping the final content
of FM 3-0 and was instrumental in articulating the role of the Services
in achieving true joint interdependence in the land domain. However,
that does not mean they agreed with every aspect of the manual during
the development process. In fact, in some cases, our sister Services
presented strong objections to certain elements of the manual. But that
is why close collaboration is so important to this process, and to the
ability of our Services to work together in an environment of trust and
mutual respect. In every case, we reassessed those potentially
contentious elements of the manual and rewrote that content in a manner
we could all agree upon. In developing this Capstone doctrine, we could
not simply ``agree to disagree'' with our sister Services; to achieve
the level of integration required for true joint interdependence
requires a precise and accurate understanding of the capabilities of
each individual Service, and that understanding was the ultimate focus
of our collaborative efforts. Therefore, we did not publish this manual
until we had the support and concurrence of each of our sister
Services. We also extended collaboration beyond the Department of
Defense and into the interagency. We recognize that the nexus of
interagency cooperation and coordination exists within the land domain;
as a result, we also ensured that FM 3-0 was thoroughly vetted through
the other agencies of the United States Government. We captured that
input and rewrote parts of the text to better reflect the role of the
interagency in the conduct of land operations; that synergy is vital to
ensuring the ability of the interagency to achieve broad success in an
uncertain future where outcomes will be wholly dependent on ``whole of
government'' engagement that brings to bear the full capabilities of
the instruments of national power--diplomatic, information, military,
and economic. As we enter this era of persistent conflict and confront
the uncertain future before us, we will engage as a Nation, where the
solutions to the complex challenges we face will only be resolved
through the integrated employment of all the resources available to our
leaders.

[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

ARMY MODERNIZATION

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Inhofe, and
Cornyn.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; and
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Benjamin L. Rubin and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator
Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I.
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J. Lazarski and
Nathan Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler,
assistant to Senator Sessions; and Brian Polley, assistant to
Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
I apologize both to our witnesses and, of course, to my
colleagues. I blame this totally on the acting ranking member
of the committee, the former chairman, Senator and squire from
Virginia, John Warner, who engaged me in conversation on the
floor during this vote. I apologize.
Before we begin, I want to take a moment to embarrass Dan
Cox; or to recognize Dan Cox. That is what I meant. [Laughter.]
Dan is a longtime staff member of this subcommittee and, if
I may say so, a true patriot who has dedicated his entire adult
life to public service. He came to this committee after a
distinguished career in the U.S. Army and has staffed the
members of this subcommittee ably for the past 11 years.
He is now leaving the U.S. Senate family for a position in
private industry, which is not unrelated to the work that we do
here, and perhaps, after the passage of a year or so, we may
bump into him again.
But this is the last hearing of this subcommittee for Dan,
and I did not want this occasion to go by without thanking him
for his service to our country, for his service to the Senate,
for his service to this committee and subcommittee, and to tell
him what a pleasure and an honor it has been for me to work
with him. Thank you, Dan. [Applause.]
Today we welcome Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant General Ross
Thompson, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
This is the second Airland Subcommittee hearing this week
which will focus on the urgent and important task of answering
the big question, which is what kind of Army do we want to have
for the future.
The Army recently released Field Manual (FM) 3-0,
Operations, its new Capstone Doctrine, which is its answer, if
I can put it that way, to that big question. This new doctrine
places the conduct of stability operations on the same
operationally required level as conventional warfare, and that
is very significant.
Today's hearing is in some sense a continuation of
Tuesday's hearing. We want to ask about how the Army is
adapting its program to the requirements that have emerged from
this new Capstone Doctrine.
The fiscal year 2009 Army budget request was developed over
a year ago and delivered to Congress before FM 3-0 was released
on March 7, 2008. The Army's unfunded priority list does not
appear to support either the Army's priorities, nor does it
address the additional need for resources. The budget request
is heavily tilted toward resetting, modernizing, and
transforming the existing heavy force.
So we need to find out whether it includes enough money to
fund the changes that the new doctrine would seem, logically,
to require, and we need to find out whether we should begin to
make changes to either the programs or the priorities that have
been requested.
Today, we also look forward to hearing from the witnesses
and receiving from them an update on the Army modernization
plan with emphasis on transformation to the Future Combat
System (FCS), Army aviation modernization, and the individual
soldier programs, weapons, mobility, and protection and
situational awareness programs, which will give our troops
engaged in both irregular warfare, conventional warfare, and
stability operations capability equivalent to the best that we
would want them to have.
I look forward to your testimony. Again, I apologize to my
colleagues, and I would call at this point on my distinguished
colleague and ranking member, Senator Cornyn.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for calling
this hearing, and I join you in welcoming Generals Speakes and
Thompson to this hearing and expressing my appreciation, along
with all of us, for your many years of distinguished service to
our Nation.
The transformation and modernization of our Army is vital
to maintaining our technological edge over potential
adversaries, providing better protection for our soldiers and
giving our men and women in uniform significantly improved
capabilities to accomplish their mission. These are matters of
the highest priority.
In testimony before the full committee in November and
again in February 2008, Secretary Geren and General Casey
testified that our Army remains the best led, best trained, and
best equipped army in the world, but is out of balance. They
described a plan to return the Army to a proper balance. The
plan stressed four imperatives: sustain, prepare, reset, and
transform.
Today's hearing follows logically, as the chairman said, on
the subcommittee hearing we had on the new Army FM and provides
an opportunity to explore in greater detail the Army's plan for
transformation and modernization. An area of special interest
to the subcommittee will be the FCS. This multi-year, multi-
billion dollar program is at the heart of the Army's
transformation efforts. It is also the Army's major research,
development, and acquisition program. The witnesses will be
asked about the importance of FCS, the cost of the program, the
characterization that FCS is high risk, the challenge of
networking all of the FCS subsystems together, and the testing
of the FCS technology currently ongoing at Fort Bliss in El
Paso, TX.
In addition, the witnesses will be asked, among other
things, about how the Army's modernization program will meet
Army Reserve and Army National Guard requirements, progress
toward resetting all components of the Army, how Army
modernization and transformation plans will impact future
requirements for strategic and tactical mobility, the Army's
requirement for joint cargo aircraft, the modernization of the
Army's helicopter fleets, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles, whether or not the Army's transformation and
modernization plans are in concert with the new Army doctrine,
and specifically whether or not the Army's modular organization
in FCS can meet the Army's requirements for full spectrum
operations as described in the new FM.
In closing, I would like to say that though the focus of
this hearing will be on Army programs and systems, it is the
individual soldier identified by his or her courage,
dedication, and loyalty who is the core of our Nation's
military forces.
Mr. Chairman, thanks for convening the hearing and I look
forward, along with you, to hearing the testimony.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Cornyn.
Normally the subcommittee practice is to limit opening
statements to the chair and the ranking member, but Senator
Inhofe, if you would like to add anything, I feel that I now
owe you because I was 15 minutes late.
Senator Inhofe. No. You do not owe me a thing. I am anxious
to hear the opening statements, and I have a couple of
questions and areas I want to pursue having to do with FCS. So
we can just get on with the hearing.
Senator Lieberman. Good. Thank you.
General Speakes, thank you for being here. We look forward
to your testimony now.

STATEMENT OF LTG STEPHEN M. SPEAKES, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, G-8, UNITED STATES ARMY

General Speakes. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Cornyn,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
Army and our great soldiers, Lieutenant General Thompson and I
thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of you today
to discuss Army modernization in all of its aspects, as you
have illuminated in your opening statements.
I would like to submit our written statement for the
record, and I would also like to ask that we be permitted to
make a short opening statement to put in perspective the
questions you have.
Senator Lieberman. Please do. We will accept your full
statement, and it will be printed in the record.
General Speakes. Thank you, sir.
Our modernization strategy is designed to ensure that we
accomplish every mission that is given to the Army and that our
soldiers are never placed in a fair fight.
Our testimony today will focus on two specific topics.
First, we will talk about the implementation of FM 3-0. I
brought it with me here today to symbolize the continuity in
our testimony to that of General Caldwell who has appeared
before you earlier. He eloquently shaped for you the
perspective of an Army at war that understands the nature of
the war that we are fighting and understands how we must
continue to transform and shape this Army not just for today,
but for tomorrow in an era of persistent conflict. So FM 3-0
provides that perspective and it also shapes and illuminates
the programs that General Thompson and I are jointly
responsible for developing.
FM 3-0 is important because, in addition to the offense and
defense operations that we are familiar with, it also adds to
stability operations. Stability operations are vital for all of
us as we consider the nature of involvement today and what we
project for the next several years of this century, which is
that we will operate among soldiers in a network-dependent
environment, and we will have to put great trust and confidence
in soldiers who are on their own to carry out the Nation's
bidding. So, thus, FM 3-0 is very important for all of us as we
shape the strategy and the equipping that will illuminate the
way for our soldiers.
Modernization is the strategy that we use to improve the
capabilities and to enhance the ability of our soldiers to
accomplish their missions. The Army modernization strategy has
four essential elements to it.
First, what we want to do is ensure that we provide
soldiers the very best possible new equipment, and with your
support, and I would like to single out this committee in
particular for the extraordinary support you have given the
Army, we have 94 new systems that we have been able to field to
the tune of over $100 billion worth of new capability over the
course of the last 5 years since the start of the war. I would
single out, for example, the support of the MRAP vehicle
program, a capability that Lieutenant General Odierno, as he
left command in Baghdad, singled out as being responsible for
saving the lives of soldiers as an example of the quick
response between the identification of a capability and then
the immediate ability to field that, thanks to you.
Also, we see the need to upgrade and modernize existing
systems. For example, if we take a look at the tanker Bradley
that we have today that soldiers are fighting with in Iraq, it
is substantially improved over the tanker Bradley that we
started this war with, once again thanks to vigorous support of
recapitalization and modernization programs that have enabled
us to materially advance the quality of the current formation
and the current fleet.
Then, third, we have to incorporate new technologies that
are derived from FCS. You rightly singled out FCS as absolutely
essential to the Army. For the last several years, it has been
our single major focus for research and development (R&D). That
R&D that you have so well supported is now bearing fruit. So as
we look at soldiers in Baghdad today, we see capabilities that
are directly traceable to the investments we made in FCS.
Now, as we look forward to Fort Bliss, TX, and the soldiers
who are operating with FCS capabilities, the first spin-outs
that are now in evaluation by the Army, we also see FCS bearing
fruit.
So the point is where FCS was once a distant promise, FCS
is now a reality. It is directly benefitting soldiers in combat
today, and it has immediate promise for the future. We are
excited about that promise and we will be thrilled to tell you
about it.
Finally, we have to set conditions to field actual FCS
brigade combat teams. Those have remarkable promise. Stryker
showed us the benefit of a common platform with a common view
for creating a brigade combat team. FCS will bring that to the
next level.
So for all these reasons, the Army modernization and its
four elements is a vital strategy for us. It is one that is
absolutely essential. As we look at soldiers today, we know
that they are brilliantly equipped because of you. We also want
to ensure that soldiers that go into whatever it is we ask them
to do in harm's way in future years are properly supported and
equipped. Our modernization strategy is designed to do that and
will continue to do that with your support.
So thank you very, very much. I would like now to defer to
General Thompson.
[The joint prepared statement of General Speakes and
General Thompson follows:]

Joint Prepared Statement by LTG Stephen M. Speakes, USA, and LTG N.
Ross Thompson III, USA

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Cornyn, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee: on behalf of the Army and our great
soldiers, Lieutenant General Thompson and I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Army Modernization.
Army modernization is instrumental to ensuring that our Army remains
the preeminent landpower on Earth, one fully capable of meeting any and
all missions across the full spectrum of operations. Our modernization
strategy is designed to ensure that we accomplish every mission, now
and in the future, and that our soldiers are never in a fair fight.
Today's testimony focuses on the Army modernization strategy, which
is informed both by lessons learned from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the Army's operational concept of full-spectrum
operations, recently unveiled in the revised Field Manual (FM) 3-0,
Operations.
FM 3-0 reflects the Army's thinking, in an era of persistent and
complex conflict, where stability operations are given the same level
of importance and emphasis as offensive and defensive operations
(Figure 1). Stability Operations encompass various military missions,
tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in
coordination with other instruments of national power, to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief. The goal of stability operations is to create
conditions that support the transition to legitimate host nation
governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy.

Given the nature of the current international security environment,
soldiers will consistently operate in and among the people of the
world, conducting operations in an environment fundamentally human in
character. FM 3-0 also recognizes the unparalleled power of information
in modern conflict, and the fact that information has become as
important as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations. In
addition, FM 3-0 provides the detailed doctrinal foundation to optimize
the operational agility that we have designed into our modular
formations, giving us true capability across the full spectrum of
operations. Finally, concepts embedded in FM 3-0 will shape future Army
budgets.
Modernization provides the materiel solutions to improve
capabilities that enhance the Army's ability to conduct full-spectrum
operations, and meet the demands of persistent conflict in the 21st
century.
The Army Modernization Strategy seeks to ensure that we remain the
preeminent landpower on Earth, an expeditionary force with full
spectrum capabilities. To achieve this end, our strategy employs four
ways or what we call the four elements of modernization. They are:

Rapidly field the best new equipment to the current
force
Upgrade and modernize existing systems within modular
formations to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they need
Incorporate new technologies derived from Future
Combat Systems (FCS) research and development as they become
available
Field FCS Brigade Combat Teams (FCS BCT)

The Army has modernized core systems and updated key weapons and
equipment since the early days of the war; working steadily to improve
speed and efficiency in this area. Modernization is essential for
closing both current and future capability gaps.
Modernizing the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) fleet is a
critical imperative that strives to provide the soldier the best
possible protection, payload and performance in each vehicle in the
fleet. The TWV Strategy will achieve the proper balance between
numerous competing factors: support of current operations and fleets,
Army Transformation and future fleet capabilities while optimizing
strategies for procurement, recapitalization, and sustainment. The
strategy seeks to ensure fleet viability and combat effectiveness for
the next three decades. A modernization plan is being developed for
each category of the TWV fleet: light, medium, and heavy wheeled
vehicles and trailers. A couple of key vehicles of our TWV Strategy are
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle and Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
MRAP vehicles are being procured as rapidly as possible and provide
more advanced, armored protection against the greatest casualty-
producing threats in Theater, underbelly improved explosive devices. It
is a new class of medium tactical vehicle that provides our operating
forces multiple mission-role platforms capable of mitigating roadside
bombs and mines. It has already proven its effectiveness on the
battlefield.
JLTV is a hoint program with the U.S. Marine Corps that will
replace the Uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(UAH). As currently planned, JLTV has the potential to provide
significant and revolutionary increases in protection, performance, and
payload capabilities beyond those available in the current HMMWV or
UAH. This family of vehicles will provide greater force protection and
payload than the current UAH. The JLTV has been designated as an FCS
complementary system.
We have made great progress in Army Aviation modernization. Army
Aviation is transforming and modernizing to meet current and future
full spectrum aviation requirements. The aviation transformation plan
restructures Army Aviation warfighting units into Combat Aviation
Brigades, ensuring that aviation units are modular, capable, lethal,
tailorable, and sustainable. Their inherent mobility, flexibility,
agility, lethality, and versatility are instrumental in enabling the
air-ground task force commander to conduct decisive joint operations.
The transformation plan also addresses the urgent need to address the
steadily deteriorating condition of the aviation fleet, and accelerate
Army National Guard and Army Reserve modernization. The affected
Aviation platforms include the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, the UH-
60M/HH-60M Black Hawk, C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft, commercial, off-the-
shelf UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter, CH-47F Chinook, and AH-64
Apache helicopter fleet.
Success of the Army's Battle Command Strategy is indispensable to
Army future operations. We are developing robust networking solutions
that will enable commanders, leaders, and soldiers to access critical
data and information any-where, anytime. We are accomplishing this by
migrating existing systems where possible and developing new net-ready
programs to meet the unique challenges of a net-centric environment
resulting ultimately in a robust and revolutionary communications
capability while on the move--anywhere on Earth.
Central to this overall strategy is our approach of moving beyond
the era of `stovepiped' networks to deliver multi-functional, multi-
band tactical Army communications systems. The Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) will contribute to that capability. JTRS is a family of
ground, airborne and maritime domains of common software-defined radios
that provide seamless network connectivity throughout the battlefield.
We will begin to see the initial capabilities of this revolutionary
modernization effort in 2010 when Spin Out 1 delivers a sensor-to-
soldier link through the network.
As the Army's cornerstone modernization effort, the FCS program
will provide our soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their
operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and
enhanced survivability. The FCS program is structured to bring advanced
capabilities to today's force as rapidly as possible in a process known
as ``Spin Outs.'' Spin-Outs are a product of the technological
capabilities achieved from FCS research and development.
FCS capabilities will be integrated into our current BCTs to
increase their capabilities and to maximize their interoperability with
FCS BCTs. Integrating Spin-Outs and other technologies onto other
combat platforms, such as the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker, will allow
these battle-proven platforms to fight in concert with FCS BCTs well
into the 21st century.
Indeed, several ``FCS like'' capabilities are already being used in
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and are protecting our
soldiers today. These technologies include:

Frag Kit 5 armor protection is used on Up-Armored
HMMWVs.
The Gas Micro Air Vehicle, an early precursor of the
FCS Class 1 Unmanned Air Vehicle, has been highly effective in
Navy explosive ordnance disposal operations in Iraq and is
planned for use by 25th Infantry Division soldiers in urban
warfare operations in Iraq this year.
The iRobot Packbot robot being used by soldiers and
marines in Iraq and Afghanistan is the precursor of the FCS
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle. This manpackable robot has been
invaluable during urban warfare and explosive ordnance disposal
operations. This is also a shining example of the ingenuity and
entrepreneurial strength that small American businesses bring
to enhance our National security.
The Excalibur Artillery round that is currently being
used in Afghanistan is being adapted for use with the FCS Non-
Line-of-Sight Cannon.

Finally, the Army's concept of the soldier as a system envisions
equipping individual soldiers with an integrated ensemble, providing
mission tailorable capabilities. Figure 2 depicts the soldier as a
system concept and the relationships among core, ground, air, and
mounted soldiers. All soldiers are equipped with the Core Soldier
System, enabling them to train on, and perform Basic Warrior Tasks and
Battle Drills. When added to the Core Soldier System, the Ground, Air,
and Mounted Soldier Systems enable soldiers to perform warfighting
functions based on position and role within their unit.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of our
soldiers, we greatly appreciate the tremendous support we receive from
this Congress. In order to successfully implement the plans we have
shared with you today, we urge you to provide full, timely, and
predictable funding. The Army is modernizing, while simultaneously
conducting wartime operations, and preparing for the future defensive
challenges our Nation will likely face. Our challenge is to balance
these two requirements to ensure that we can defend the Nation today
and tomorrow. We never want our soldiers to be in a fair fight. The
Army's partnership with Congress demonstrates our collective commitment
to ensure that we remain the preeminent landpower on Earth, an
expeditionary Army, capable of full-spectrum operations--The Strength
of the Nation. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you
today.

Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General Speakes.
General Thompson?

STATEMENT OF LTG N. ROSS THOMPSON III, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY TO
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS,
AND TECHNOLOGY

General Thompson. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and
Senator Inhofe, first I want to thank you for holding this
hearing today because the modernization of our weapon systems
and equipment is absolutely essential to our soldiers. Every
day our soldiers make great sacrifices to help win the global
war on terror and to fulfill our other worldwide commitments.
I want to thank you, as General Speakes stated, for your
strong and steadfast support of all of our men and women in
uniform and particularly the Army. We are meeting our equipping
demands for our soldiers because of the guidance and the
resources we are provided by this committee and Congress. We
constantly strive to be good stewards of these resources.
I would just like to echo your comments about Dan Cox and
his long service not just to the committee, but to the United
States Army. He is just an example of the many professional
staffers and personal staffers represented around the room
today in this committee where you can always have a candid and
frank dialogue and see a reasoned approach to where we need to
go with our Army modernization programs. But in particular, I
would like to thank Dan today because this is his last hearing.
I was here yesterday before a different subcommittee, and I
would just like to go on record here and say I do not want to
make this a daily occurrence, nor do I want a building pass.
But I am delighted to be here again today.
Mr. Chairman, we are a high technology Army and we have a
comprehensive strategy for our continuous modernization. Of all
of our high priority programs, force protection is probably the
number one concern, and that includes the continued fielding of
MRAP vehicles and eventually our joint light tactical vehicle.
Our other high priority programs, and they are in no particular
order, are improving the soldier and the system, our tactical
wheeled vehicle modernization program, modernizing our aviation
platforms, fielding the first increment of the warfighter
information network tactical, fielding unmanned aerial systems,
and the continued development of our command and control
enhancement to provide the means to share critical and timely
information.
Our FCS is the foundation of our Army modernization and the
cornerstone of the Army's future modular force. The FCS program
is structured to bring advance capabilities to today's force as
rapidly as possible in a system or process known as spin-outs.
Our first spin-out equipment set is currently in the hands of
combat-experienced soldiers at Fort Bliss, TX, as part of the
Army Evaluation Task Force. The FCS program is currently
undergoing 75 tests. So it is no longer just a development
program. When you start to test capabilities, you are on the
cusp of fielding those capabilities to soldiers, and we are
starting to do that today in Fort Bliss, TX.
Mr. Chairman, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recently issued its annual report on FCS, and the Army welcomes
the helpful insights from the GAO and I mean that sincerely. I
want to provide my perspective on just a couple of key areas
out of that GAO report, and I will take some further questions
on that during the hearing.
First, GAO pointed out that capability demonstrations
frequently fall late in the schedule. Like I just stated, we do
have the Army Evaluation Task Force in Fort Bliss, and we have
75 tests ongoing today.
One of the things that GAO stated was there was less
content in this program, and that is true from the standpoint
of we went from 18 to 14 systems because of our experience in
Iraq and Afghanistan that led to a reduction of the number of
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms and the elimination of
the armed reconnaissance vehicle and our intelligent munitions
systems.
Independent cost estimates are pointed out by GAO that are
higher than the Army's, and I would say that we have
consistently demonstrated the credibility of our cost estimates
by operating within our budgets.
Then finally, high level requirements, GAO pointed out, are
poorly defined and/or late. The yearly budget cuts that have
been inflicted on this program have driven the program to
change its schedule, and in many cases it changed the work to
be performed. This was reflected also in the software
development process, and we will talk about that more later in
the hearing.
We are continuing to conduct wartime operations while
preparing for our future commitments. Our challenge is to
balance these two requirements to ensure that we can defend the
Nation today and prepare ourselves to continue to do so
tomorrow.
I would just like to leave you with two thoughts. First,
our 19-year-olds today use cell phones to talk to one another,
access the Internet, send e-mail, transmit photographs, and
transmit videos. Should these young people as soldiers not have
the same capabilities? On today's battlefield, they do not in
many cases. We are working through our modernization programs
to make sure that they do as quickly as possible, and FCS is
the cornerstone of our modernization programs.
Second, we face an adaptive enemy who is always acquiring
new technologies and new ways to frustrate and defeat us. In my
opinion, our greatest risk is the failure to realize that the
world has changed and so too must the Army. We must stay ahead
of a resourceful enemy, and our comprehensive modernization
strategy is designed to do just that. It is a living, working
document that reflects current operational experience and
results.
This concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, General. I appreciate
the opening remarks.
Perhaps we will go to 8-minute rounds so we can keep it
moving.
I want to focus in first on the FCS. This subcommittee has
been quite supportive of FCS and actually has gotten into some
battles over the years over it. We continue to believe in it.
But let me express some concerns and invite your response.
FCS has, I worry, become a bill payer for other programs in
the last few years. It was cut by over $300 million last year
and over $200 million the year before. Some have criticized it
now for being over budget and over schedule, but these
shortcomings have been compounded, I am afraid, by
congressional cuts and unpredictable funding, which is
unfortunate because as you have said and as I believe, this is
the Army's number one modernization program.
There are now reports that I have heard that the Army is
working on a plan to accelerate aspects of the program,
possibly fielding the first FCS brigade combat team and
producing prototypes of the manned ground vehicles (MGVs)
earlier than originally planned.
So I want to ask you to respond to some of those concerns
and describe where the program is basically to talk about the
current issues being faced as a result of past cuts in the FCS.
What are the military risks that could result from future
restructuring of the program?
General Speakes. Mr. Chairman, if it is all right, what I
would like to do is start and discuss the fiscal element and
then turn it over to General Thompson who has the specific
programmatic responsibility.
Senator Lieberman. That is fine. Sure.
General Speakes. Sir, you are absolutely right. From the
standpoint of our fiscal program, the cuts are a serious
concern, and the fact that it has been an annual event for the
past 3 years has greatly complicated the work that General
Thompson and his team have had to undertake.
We have a plan. It is a performance-based plan in which
early on we undertook the research-development activity that
would then bear fruit as we begin to bring the first elements
of the strategy forward for formal evaluation this summer. The
challenge of delivering these capabilities to the level
required on the schedule has been something that has been very
complicating as we try to bring this program along.
From my standpoint, the other challenge is this, that in an
Army at war, we seek to balance the needs of soldiers at war as
our preeminent requirement. But we also recognize the vitality
and importance of this strand of modernization.
So the first point that we make is that right now FCS is
about no more than one-third of our basic investment strategy
out of the base program of the Army. So as we look at the base
program of the Army, we think it is eminently affordable within
the current construct that we are operating under.
We seek then to ensure that we keep this program moving
ahead and delivering capability. The first critical evaluation
will be Spin-Out 1 this summer, which then sets conditions for
the fielding of Spin-Out 1 to the force in fiscal years 2010
and 2011.
We are, obviously, always looking at opportunities to
accelerate capability. In fact, part of the concept of spin-out
says evaluation of capabilities is done as they are developed
and then they are spun out to the force as fast as we can. You
identified in your question some of the things that we would
like to consider accelerating.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Speakes. You talked specifically about some
capabilities such as MGV. There is enormous attraction, for
example, in accelerating MGV because what you bring is modern
capabilities in terms of efficiency, you bring modern
capabilities in terms of the ability to protect soldiers. So to
the extent possible, we would always look at opportunities to
ensure that we do it correctly.
However, as GAO noted in their report, there is the issue
of the technical maturity of the systems we are trying to bring
and the ability to ensure, when we bring these systems forward,
they have the requisite capabilities to meet the needs of
soldiers at war. As we evaluate these twin dynamics, we will
always try to ensure we do the right thing and do not rush to
something that would not bear fruit and properly protect
soldiers.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. I think you have answered the
follow-on I was going to ask, which I appreciate, which is you
want to accelerate some of these programs, but obviously, you
do not want to move them out before they are ready to be moved
out.
General Speakes. Absolutely, sir. That is a key issue
because we have a responsibility, obviously. There is nothing
like having soldiers in combat to steel the eyes of all of us
who are in a support role right now to ensure that the
capabilities we bring will stand the test of soldiers.
That is the great thing about the Army Evaluation Task
Force. We are not going to speed a system now quickly to Iraq.
What we are going to do is we are going to bring it to the
Evaluation Task Force and they, under the tough leadership of
soldiers who are combat-experienced, will evaluate these
systems before we bring them to the Army. That is the first
challenge, sir.
Then I would defer to General Thompson to talk about what
he is trying to do to manage the program to deliver capability.
Senator Lieberman. Go right ahead.
General Thompson. Steve, I am not sure I have a lot to add
to what you just said because your answer was very thorough and
comprehensive.
I will say from an acquisition perspective that the
insights that we gain from the soldiers at the Army Evaluation
Task Force at Fort Bliss really help us to adjust the program.
There have been reductions to the program over the last three
budget year cycles. We have adjusted the cost schedule and
delivery inside of the program. We continue to operate within
the budget.
The program is very well run. We have an annual review not
just inside the Army, but also with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to look at all the requirements of that program. We
will have another one of those annual reviews again this
summer.
We are looking, as General Speakes pointed out, at existing
spin-outs and then beyond those spin-outs, which have four of
the FCS systems that are planned to be part of the Spin-Out 1,
is what else can we accelerate. What else we can accelerate is
dependent on the technological maturity and also the resources.
We are taking a very balanced approach, and that is really no
different than what we do anytime we build the program, for not
just the next budget year, but also for the 5 or 6 years after
that. We always look at what is the balance, and FCS, since it
is such a large program and is really the cornerstone of our
modernization efforts, is central to that.
Senator Lieberman. But, obviously, there are no second
thoughts about the priority of the program. This remains, as
you just said, the cornerstone of the Army modernization
program.
General Thompson. Yes, sir, and I chose those words very
carefully.
Senator Lieberman. Understood.
What is your response to the adequacy of the funding for
the program in the budget presented to Congress this year?
General Thompson. We think that the funding in the budget
presented this year is adequate, but I would say there is a
caveat. We do have currently a reprogramming request that is on
the Hill for $27 million that gets at the issue of accelerating
the small unmanned ground vehicle and the class 1 UAV, to put
that capability in the hands of the soldiers at Fort Bliss.
Candidly, we have already cash-flowed that a little bit, and
that is in the hands of the soldiers at Fort Bliss today, and
we would like to continue to do that because that is one of the
challenges that the Chief of Staff gave us.
Senator Lieberman. Are you meeting any resistance on that
reprogramming?
General Thompson. It has passed through three of the four
committees, and we are working our way through the last
committee right now.
But beyond that, Mr. Chairman, there is another
reprogramming request coming that allows us to keep the non-
line-of-sight (NLOS) cannon and the Spin-Out 1 capabilities on
track. That is a larger reprogramming request. It is a result
of the budget cuts that have happened over the last 3 years.
The last budget cut in 2008 was a little too much, and we are
committed to keeping the NLOS cannon and the Spin-Out 1 on
track. Therefore, we need to get the support for the
reprogramming request to go with that.
So the short answer is the budget is nearly adequate but
not quite, and that is going to be reflected in the
reprogramming request that comes over here.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up, but I want to ask you a
big question and ask for a short answer.
Is there any potential for the other Services to
participate in this program? You are doing some really
pioneering breakthrough work. Is it possible that they may
consider procuring parts of the system? What effect might that
have on the cost sharing?
General Speakes. Sir, the first thing is this is a joint
program in the sense that the network, for example, is a system
that comes out of the joint network concept. In terms of
Service integration, we have had a sharing relationship at the
program office level with the Marine Corps because, obviously,
it is our fellow member of the ground component. We have to
develop systems that at least have compatibility, if not the
same capabilities. We are working that now, and there is
vigorous information sharing between us and the Marines.
General Thompson. Beyond just the FCS program, Mr.
Chairman, if I might, the Army and the Marine Corps have an
Army-Marine Corps board where we meet at different levels, the
three-star level, even on a very periodic basis, to share ideas
on how do we do things jointly together.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
We are about 8 minutes into a vote. Do you want to go
ahead?
Senator Cornyn. I will go vote and come back.
Senator Lieberman. All right. If you do not mind, with
apologies, we are going to recess. We will go vote quickly and
then we will be back. Senator Cornyn will be next. [Recess.]
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. If I could have your attention,
I am going to go ahead and reconvene this. Are we in recess
now? Is that where we are? All right. Well, we are now out of
recess. I thought I would get a chance to ask a couple of
questions while we are waiting for them to return since I have
another commitment.
I think the chairman was getting into most of the concerns
that I had. I think this is unique, though, that we have the
two of you. I do not want to lose this opportunity. As I said
to you earlier, we had General Thompson on how do we get it and
then General Speakes on what do we do with it once we got it.
My concern has always been, of course, the sliding of FCS,
going back in years when some of our areas of weakness were
there, such as the NLOS cannon. We are still using the
antiquated Paladin. At one time, we were going to go into the
Crusader, and it was President Bush that axed that program.
Quite frankly, there was no warning. I thought it was the end
of the world. I believe that probably has a silver lining in
that we would not be where we are today with the FCS, in my
opinion, if that had not happened. This is far, far more
significant and more important.
I know that with all the competition that is out there, and
with the testimony of General Cody and others talking about how
stressed things are, the way we respond to things is you just
let off what is not bleeding today. That has been my concern
about the modernization program.
I gave a talk on the floor this morning about how we got
into this position of where we are today. During the 1990s we
let the military slide and some of the modernization programs
lost about $412 billion over what it would have been if we just
had level spending. We saw a lot of programs falling behind at
that time.
The chairman asked you about the possible acceleration of
the FCS program, and I think I left right before we got the
full answer of that. I would like to ask you to comment on the
discussion that has taken place on accelerating the FCS
program. But more importantly, do we have the necessary
resources to keep FCS on track as it is today?
General Speakes. Sir, let me address the adequacy of
resources. You correctly identified the challenge of the 1990s
and the fact that we lost critical capabilities to bring R&D
through its cycle so we could field capabilities. We have spent
the first years of this decade now recovering from those
challenges. Thanks to your support and the support of other
members, we have been able to generate the capital to invest
and bring programs very quickly to the Army, an Army that very
much needs additional capabilities for protection and a host of
other issues.
So at this point, within an overall budget that we
understand, we believe we have put FCS into a place in our
modernization strategy that is approximately one-third of our
overall investments that we are making for new capability. We
think that third of a share of investments is affordable. We
think it enables us to proceed with the other elements of
modernization that are essential. Obviously, we need trucks.
Obviously, we need command and control capability. So we need a
host of other capabilities that essentially must move along
with FCS to bring the Army as an entity forward.
So we are in the process of continuing that balanced
strategy, a strategy that will bring us forward, and bring
capabilities online in a balanced way. We believe that this
program is appropriate for the size budget that we have today,
and for the planning period we have out through 2015.
So in short answer, the plan that we have today will
provide us an FCS program that will give the Army what it
needs. It is affordable within the overall construct of an Army
at war. We will continue to work that.
General Thompson has identified in his testimony the impact
of the cuts that we have taken over the past years, and those
cuts are important because they disrupt the program's ability
to execute the plan that they have. They also cause this issue
of realignment of program requirements over time that causes
others to believe that we have challenges with the delivery of
programs and the ability to make the contribution that people
would expect.
Senator Inhofe. That is a good answer, and that is what I
wanted.
General Thompson, did you have anything to add to that?
General Thompson. Sir, what I said when you had to step out
is that we have a near-term reprogramming request that has been
through three of the four committees on the Hill. We are
working our way through the last committee--to accelerate the
small unmanned ground vehicle and the UAV to get that into the
hands of the soldiers at Fort Bliss to be able to experiment
and test with that.
Following behind that is another reprogramming request that
is essential for us to be able to keep the NLOS cannon and the
Spin-Out 1 program on track. If you take the fiscal year 2006,
fiscal year 2007, and fiscal year 2008 reductions to the FCS
program that were taken in the budget, it totals $789 million.
We have not reduced the scope of the FCS program as a result of
those cuts. So of those two reprogramming requests, one is an
add to accelerate, and the other one is to maintain the
schedule for near-term capability. But we will have to put
money back into the FCS program in order to keep the scope and
maintain the schedule, and that is one of the things we are
looking at in our 2010 to 2015 program objective memorandum
(POM).
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
You were talking also about the spin-out program and what
is happening at Fort Bliss. I told my friend, Senator Cornyn,
that I had already planned one trip to come down. I would like
to see what is happening there. Do any of these spin-out
programs adversely affect the ultimate fielding of the total
system in a negative way?
General Thompson. No, sir, they do not. As a matter of
fact, it helps us reduce risk. When the technology readiness is
such that we can accelerate those and put them in the hands of
soldiers, we will do that. I characterize the FCS blueprint as
still being the blueprint of capability that we want to see in
the future. I can deliver against that blueprint sooner with
some capabilities, and that is what we are trying to do when we
look at acceleration.
Senator Inhofe. I have often said, not because of any
parochial concern, but the NLOS cannon and NLOS mortor are two
of the areas we are most deficient in with what we have right
now. That is why I want to make sure they are going to be the
first components that we will be fielding and that it stays
that way.
What I would like to ask of you is if either of you
gentlemen see a problem that you do not see today coming up, if
you would let me know and advise your staff accordingly, I
would appreciate that very much.
General Thompson. One comment on the NLOS cannon system. It
is the first of the eight MGVs. Because of the way the program
has been constructed, which is good operational sense and good
business sense, that is the foundation for the common chassis
for the other prototypes. So 70 percent of the MGVs are going
to be common from a components standpoint.
So this year at the Army birthday, the Chief of Staff gave
us a challenge of having on display the first prototype of the
NLOS cannon. So when you attend our Army birthday in June, we
will show you that capability here in Washington, DC.
Senator Inhofe. I will be there singing.
Thank you, Senator Cornyn, for allowing me to go in front
of you.
Senator Cornyn. Happy to do it.
I know Senator Lieberman is en route back, and I think we
will just stand down until he returns.
Senator Inhofe. His staff advised me we could go ahead.
Senator Cornyn. Is that right? Okay. I did not want to
usurp any privileges of the chair. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Gentlemen, forgive me if I am repeating some things that
you have already responded to, but due to the centrality of the
FCS being so much of what we are talking about in terms of
modernization, I think it bears nailing down some of these
things that I want to ask you about specifically.
While everyone in the room appreciates the importance of
this weapons system, I think it is important for the American
public that we get it on record for this hearing why FCS is
important to our men and women in uniform. I would ask you to
briefly tell us why FCS is important so the public can fully
understand the critical role in our Nation's defense.
The reason why I say that is so important is because some
elected officials have stated that they want to slow down the
development of FCS, implying that it is not taxpayer money well
spent. I will just footnote that by saying I am one of those
that if our military tells me they need something to do their
job, as far as I am concerned, I am going to do everything I
can to see that they get it. On the other hand, if it is going
to result in waste of the taxpayers' dollars and it is not an
efficient use of those resources, then I want to know that too
so we can take appropriate corrective action.
So if you would just tell us and the American people why
you think development of FCS is important, why its development
should not be slowed down, and why you believe, if in fact you
do, and I think you do, that it is taxpayer money well spent.
General Speakes. Sir, let me begin. The first point that we
would make is FCS has the kinds of capabilities that are
directly needed and identified as being essential. FM 3-0 lays
out a blueprint for what we think is going to be the
operational environment that we are going to be able and
required to operate in both today and tomorrow. What this
manual says is that we are going to operate with the American
soldier on land, that on land we will have a need to defend
this country, and that America's critical interest will be
involved on land and the American soldier will have a pivotal
role to play.
We have also said that when we put that American soldier
out wherever it is to defend American interests, he or she will
have to operate in and among other populations. So what we need
then is a capability that we can deploy, that we can operate
with efficiency, and that enables us to be able to be precise
and also to be economical. We cannot afford large operating
footprints and we cannot afford cumbersome and inefficient
systems. We need to bring the power of the network to not just
the headquarters, the general, the colonel, but to the soldier
on patrol or to the soldier at the checkpoint.
So all of this is reflected right now when we assess the
adequacy of our current equipment. Our current equipment is the
best in the world at this point, but what we have had to do is
invest major efforts just to make it operational for this war.
We have essentially put appliques of new capability on to try
to make it relevant. We would liken it to your 20-year-old
family car that you put a global positioning system (GPS) on.
Yes, it has GPS capability, but it is not the same as a car
that was born and bred with that capability in it.
So although we have made enormous investments and
improvements in our current force, we see the need for the
future. We see the need for an Army that is able to operate
much more efficiently and much more effectively and an Army
that we think will have the need to be committable and usable
to a greater degree than many of us would like.
So if that is the case, then what we need is the power of
the network. We need the power of a common platform to drive us
to greater efficiencies and operating capabilities, and we need
the ability to be precise with everything we do because we are
going to be operating in populations, among people where there
will be both friend and foe, and we need to be able to
distinguish between them.
So these are the capabilities that we see in FCS. So we
replaced a series of platforms that were born and bred to
operate in Central Europe in the last century, and now we face
an Army that must operate in very different environments with
much more taxing capabilities. We believe FCS answers those
requirements.
General Thompson. Senator, if I can just?
Senator Cornyn. Please.
General Thompson. Very briefly from an acquisition
perspective. It is really a misperception that some people may
have. FCS is not just one MGV platform. It is a family of
systems designed to provide a capability for our brigade combat
team, and a brigade combat team in today's Army is the coin of
the realm. The FCS program has the network and the connectivity
we want, as I said in my opening remarks, to give the soldiers
out there, whether they are in a vehicle or dismounted from a
vehicle, the ability to see, transmit information, to know
where their buddies are, to know where the enemy is, and to be
able to operate and create an environment where they are in an
unfair fight because they are so advantaged that the enemy does
not have an opportunity.
So you have the network. You have eight MGVs. You have a
couple variants of unmanned ground vehicles, and you have a
couple variants of UAVs. You look today in Afghanistan and Iraq
at the great success that we are having with UAVs, and the FCS
UAVs, if I can use the acronym, are the next generation of
that. Again a powerful, powerful capability to give the
information and the surveillance and the reconnaissance
capability and link it not just down to the commander but link
it all the way down to the soldier level.
So there is that misperception that FCS is just a system.
It is a family of systems. The function that FCS performs is it
causes us to have to align all of the other modernization
capabilities in the Army. So we call all of these things
complementary programs.
In the last year in great detail, I have personally gone
down and looked at 67 other programs that are not part of FCS
to make sure that the schedule, the operational capability and
the technical capability of those programs, like the Joint
Tactical Radio System, Warfighter Information Network-Tactical,
and the joint light tactical vehicle are all aligned so that
they operate together as a brigade combat team. We do not
develop individual systems and then later on figure out how
they have to work together. That is the different approach that
we are taking from an acquisition perspective.
Is it challenging? Yes, it is. Do I have the best people in
the Army and the best people in the country working on this?
Yes, we do, and we are getting there.
Senator Cornyn. Perhaps it is because while this
subcommittee and the Senate, I believe, have been very
supportive of FCS in particular, I think the House has cut FCS
a number of times. It's to the point now where, if I understand
correctly, it is not just cutting fat or even muscle. It is
cutting into the bone; perhaps creating the impression that FCS
can pay for other programs, other weapon systems, and the like,
which I think is wrong from what you have told us and
everything I know.
Could you elaborate on the negative effects slowing down
and consequently delaying the fielding of FCS would have on our
troops? I am thinking of a conversation I had with General
Odierno, who just got back from Baghdad, and what you alluded
to in terms of the spin-out capability and its present-day
applications to the warfighter in Iraq and Afghanistan. What
would be the effect of slowing down or delaying the fielding of
FCS in its entirety?
General Speakes. Sir, I think that there is one very simple
answer right now, and that is that when we take a look at the
operational needs statements that are the commanders' call for
help as they communicate back to the Pentagon and tell the
Pentagon that they need capabilities they do not have, 80
percent of the operational needs statements that we have seen
in this war have been directly related to our ability to
deliver capability in FCS.
In other words, we answer their calls for help when we
bring FCS on because what they are asking for are the critical
capabilities that General Thompson so well explained: the
ability to ensure that we bring the network to soldiers so we
can get them the communication they need, the ability to put a
UAV out overhead, the ability to use robotics to separate the
soldier from the improvised explosive device (IED). All those
things that are so obvious and so relevant that we see that are
lacking, to a large degree, in some of the formations we
fielded over the last years are now fixable and eminently
improvable if we bring FCS online.
That is why the urgency of the program is so obvious to
those of us in the Army who understand the nature of this war
and understand that FCS has a direct relationship to fixing
those issues, as General Thompson said so well, on a systematic
basis.
We are fielding a brigade system when we bring the first
brigade combat team with FCS capabilities online. It is
harmonized. It is synchronized. There is enormous agility in it
because it has a common platform, common logistics, and common
operating capabilities. Today we are fielding individual
capability improvements incrementally, and then what the
soldier in the field has to do is make them work together. That
puts the soldier in the field under enormous stress that he or
she should not have to operate under.
So this is important. You are exactly right, sir. We need
to field the capability. It answers directly the requests of
commanders in the field, and that is what makes us so excited
about FCS.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Cornyn.
Let me ask one follow-on question on FCS. General Speakes,
you used a phrase, which is a common-sense phrase, that we are
in a period of persistent conflict and that will continue with
all probability in the generation ahead. Part of that
persistent conflict brings us into counterinsurgency warfare.
I have seen some comments from independent military
analysts who have expressed a concern that the Army may be
overstating the role for FCS in counterinsurgency warfare. I
wonder if you have seen any of those and whether you would
comment on that.
General Speakes. Sir, that is a very challenging point. I
think the first thing that FM 3-0 tells us is that the Army of
today and tomorrow must be full spectrum. We cannot have a
myopic focus on today's war and ignore the potential for what
we may have to do in a year or 5 years or the next decade. The
great thing about FCS is it is deliberately designed to provide
us capabilities that are not just usable in counterinsurgency
operations. I think they are very usable, very flexible, and
very applicable, but it also gives us the kind of capabilities
that would be enormously important should we be in a mid- or
high-intensity operation.
When we take, for example, the capabilities of active
protection, the ability to essentially repel an inbound threat
to an armored vehicle, we are giving ourselves capabilities
that if you would have asked me 10 years ago could you even
imagine such a capability, I would not have believed it
possible. Now in testing, we are getting positive results and
we believe that it is part of the capabilities we want to bring
forward.
So those are the things that tell me that this FCS concept
is applicable for the future operating environment, one in
which we cannot predict how it will be used. We cannot predict
the nature of the enemy. We cannot predict the operating
environment.
Senator Lieberman. Including counterinsurgency work.
General Speakes. Absolutely.
General Thompson. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. Do you want to add to that, General
Thompson?
General Thompson. I would just like to make a couple of
clarifications. General Speakes used the term operational needs
statement, and I know many of you know the answer to this, but
we normally develop a requirement through the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council process. An operational needs
statement is a statement of need from a commander in the field
today that we try to meet very quickly.
What General Speakes was adequately pointing out is that a
lot of the operational needs statements that we see from
commanders today, 80 percent he referred to, could be met by
FCS capabilities. To me that means that FCS has applicability
in the counterinsurgency environment and then beyond that.
You know the challenges we have today with IEDs. The active
protection system is the ability to sense an incoming rocket
propelled grenade or an incoming missile and take it out before
it hits the MGV platform. You will be able to sense it. The
testing is going on right now at White Sands Missile Range for
the active protection system as part of the FCS program, actual
rockets being fired where the sensor sees the incoming missile,
fires a rocket, orients itself, and it takes out the incoming
missile before it hits the vehicle. That is an incredible
capability, and that is one of the things we would spin out
early on.
Senator Lieberman. That is miraculous. Of course, this is,
over the history of warfare, the ability to take the
technologies that are breaking through in the rest of society
and then apply them first and best to warfare, which you are
doing in this program.
Let me ask you a very different kind of question. You
happen to be here today and you probably saw in the Washington
Post this headline story, Contracts for Body Armor Filled
Without Initial Tests. The lead sentence is, ``Government
auditors said yesterday that nearly half of 28 contracts to
manufacture body armor for Army soldiers were completed without
the gear ever going through an initial test.'' Of course, we
all remember the emotional reaction here in Congress and the
pressure that we all put you under and the money we
appropriated because of the public concern about the inadequacy
of body armor. So it is in that context.
I wanted to give you an opportunity, since you are here, to
let us know, this committee, and for the record what the Army
position is on the findings of the Department of Defense (DOD)
Inspector General (IG). I suppose the bottom line is whether
the people to whom we are giving the body armor, our troops,
can have some confidence that it will work to protect them.
General Thompson. Sir, the first thing I would like to say
is the troops can have absolute confidence that they have the
best body armor in the world.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Thompson. We will meet tomorrow inside the Army and
then meet with the DOD IG and then come over next week and talk
to any Member of Congress or any of the professional staff
members or individual staff members to explain the position.
Let me just point out a couple of things that I think are
very important to understand.
First off is a First Article Test (FAT). A first article
means a pre-production model, or an initial production sample.
We do FATs before we go into a contract with any producer.
Every producer of body armor has had to go through a rigorous
FAT to make sure that what they are going to potentially
contract for passed that rigorous testing.
Once a producer begins to produce body armor for the Army
and they stay in continuous production and there is no change
to the design, we do not go back and do a very expensive FAT.
However, we do lot acceptance tests (LATs) on every batch of
armor that is produced.
Every producer of body armor for the United States Army has
gone through a FAT and passed and every lot that has been
produced under contract has had a LAT and sampling done. We
reject some of those lots and do not take them until we have
confidence that the body armor produced in that lot is to our
standards. There may be a change in the manufacturing process,
but we do the proper sampling. We have that data to be able to
demonstrate that we have done the FAT. This is called out in
the Federal Acquisition Regulation. It is the way it is taught
in the Defense Acquisition University.
I do not quite understand why the DOD IG drew the
conclusions that they did. I have great confidence in the DOD
IG, but we need to reconcile the scope of this audit and the
evidence that we have that we have done the proper testing. I
can assure you and I assure the soldiers out there in the field
that we have the best body armor in the world. We will be over
next week with the DOD IG in order to explain that.
Senator Lieberman. Good enough. I appreciate the answer.
Let me go back to FM 3-0 and ask you a similar question
that I asked General Caldwell. From your perspective, what
impact does this new Capstone Doctrine have on the Army's
fiscal year 2009 budget request and, insofar as you can see, on
succeeding budget requests? Obviously, the doctrine is
important. It has some quite revolutionary changes in it, but
it is not going to mean as much as it should mean if we are not
giving you the money to carry it out.
General Speakes. Sir, the value of doctrine is something
that our Army recognizes. We had the last publication of
doctrine right before the events of September 11. Over the
course of the period of the time from September 11 to now, the
Army has been living an update of how we are doctrinally
organized. I would typify that with the modular transformation
of the Army that we began with some detailed thinking in 2003,
put into execution in 2004, and now are more than 50 percent
through.
We also took a very serious look at the other elements of
how we operate. For example, we have already done major work to
transform how we train our formations. Formations now, as they
prepare for combat, are trained in substantially different ways
than we used to train formations prior to the September 11
experience.
Those are but two examples of the kinds of very important
changes that our Army has been making in progress.
FM 3-0 was about 2\1/2\ years in the writing and
coordinating and vetting. I think that is very important
because the Army leadership took the view that when we put this
together, we would ensure we had it right because everybody who
had a view about what the Army was doing within the Army had a
chance to work it, comment, and have their voice heard. So at
this point then, the publication of this manual in February
only recognizes or documents what most of the Army has been
operating on and changing the face of the Army over the course
of the past several years.
Senator Lieberman. So you would say that the budget request
for fiscal year 2009, therefore, reflected the changes that are
expressed in FM 3-0?
General Speakes. Yes, sir. But I would also liken it to
building an airplane in mid-flight. What I do not want to
portray is that we have made all the changes and that they are
all complete. This voyage of putting together the airplane in
flight continues.
So part of the challenge of the Secretary of the Army and
the Chief of Staff of the Army is to continue a very thorough
evaluation of how we can continue to improve and transform our
Army to make it more relevant for what we see as the future
operating environment. We are, for example, changing the way we
train leaders. Leaders require a different education than what
we knew before.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Speakes. That is a part of this voyage in progress.
So the Army will continue to change and evolve. This is a
continual process.
I can assure you that the basic operating concepts that are
in FM 3-0 are understood and supported by what we have in
fiscal year 2009 even though this document was produced after
we had submitted the fiscal year 2009 budget.
Senator Lieberman. I am a little over my time. I would ask
Senator Cornyn's indulgence just to ask a final question that
is relevant.
General Caldwell said, and I am sure you agree, that FM 3-0
will add mission requirements and appropriately so. Looking
forward, what kind of investment changes do you think we will
need to make to meet the additional mission requirements that
are associated with this new Capstone Doctrine?
General Speakes. Sir, you ask a question that we do not
have a final answer to. But I can point to several
illustrations of the kind of effort that is underway within the
Army to continue the transformation of the Army to support the
vision that this manual outlines.
One element of it is a concept that says we have to
continue to develop new ways to train the force. The Chief of
Staff of the Army has been in dialogue with the leaders of our
training community over the past several weeks. His challenge
to them is now how do we align what we call our combat training
centers, the places you know as Fort Irwin or Fort Polk, to
support not just a mission rehearsal exercise for forces that
are bound for Iraq or Afghanistan, but let us look past that to
where we want to be in several years when we begin to actually
prepare forces that are not immediately destined to go back
into combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. So what he described was
training in a more full spectrum way where, yes, they would be
counterinsurgency capable, but they would also have within that
same experience the ability to do high-intensity training
verification. So that is one of the challenges that we point
out.
The other issue in this same vein that is being worked very
seriously is a concept for how we alter the training of leaders
and the educational programs of leaders. Obviously, language is
an area that the Army has found itself very deficient in.
Another area that the Army is exploring, for example, is
how we train and educate our civilians. The civilian work force
of the Army has been enormously important and, frankly, ill-
recognized in our training strategies. General Casey's
challenge was let us figure out how to institutionalize that.
So there are additional resource requirements that we will
have to build into our program in the upcoming years. Our
assurance is that they are going to be thoughtful, they are
going to be well-considered, and they are going to be relevant
to the kind of Army we need for the future.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much. I note in your bio
that you speak both Mandarin Chinese and Spanish. Presumably
you do not speak Mandarin Chinese with a Spanish accent.
[Laughter.]
General Speakes. It was a challenge, sir.
Senator Lieberman. That is very impressive.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Last year, Secretary Gates established the
MRAP vehicle as the top priority program within DOD, and
Congress responded with $22 billion to fully fund more than
15,000 of these armored vehicles. Today, almost 3,600 MRAP
vehicles are operating in Iraq.
I might say that when I was there back in January, I had a
chance to visit Ghazaliya on the edge of Baghdad and ride in an
MRAP vehicle. I can tell you that the soldiers are very happy
to have that capability and it has served as additional
protection for them.
We know the enemy in Iraq has been extremely effective at
adapting to past protective measures to our troops. Things like
the Iranian-provided explosively formed penetrators come to
mind for one. Could you tell us how these may affect the future
production needs for these vehicles or additional requirements
over and above what is already contained in the 2009 budget?
General Thompson. Sir, let me start and I will ask General
Speakes to jump in for any amplifying points.
First off, the MRAP vehicle has been a very successful
program and one where every soldier and marine out there truly
appreciates the support of Congress to give us the resources to
accelerate that capability.
We have pretty much settled on what the requirement is,
although we are not quite to the definitization stage for the
Army requirement. The Marines, I know, have settled on their
number for the MRAP vehicles. We are still in a range of
somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000, and we have adjusted the
production of the MRAP vehicle over time so that the
acquisition and the delivery matches up with the requirement.
That capability will be used in the future. One of the
things that we have done with our route clearance companies,
which go out and obviously clear a route in advance of a convoy
or a soldier patrol, and our explosive ordnance disposal teams
is we looked at the need for the vehicles for those kinds of
units. And 1,000 of the MRAP vehicles we will buy will meet
those long-term enduring needs. So we have tried to not look at
MRAP as just a now capability, but also what will be the
capability that it will be used for in the future.
So 1,000 of the Army's MRAP vehicles will have an enduring
mission, and I am pretty sure that is not going to be the end
of the use of the MRAP vehicles. I suspect a large number of
them, when the requirements come down for the demand for
forces, will probably be reconditioned and put in preposition
stocks. We are looking at what is the right number of those
vehicles to do that.
We are also looking inside the Department at the
rationalization of our long-term vehicle strategy for both
combat vehicles and wheeled vehicles. MRAP vehicles are part of
that equation. We have close to 150,000 high mobility, multi-
purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) in the Army today. We are
looking at the future requirement for the joint light tactical
vehicle (JLTV), which is out on the street right now with a
request for proposal, and we expect the industry bids back in
here in about 30 to 45 days. But MRAP vehicles are part of that
equation.
So it is the rationalization of the HMMWVs today, the JLTVs
in the future, and the MRAP vehicle is part of that. We owe an
answer back to ourselves and also to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense here within the next couple of months on
what is that long-term strategy.
Senator Cornyn. I know just while we have been in Iraq, we
have seen where HMMWVs, which were the standard transportation
because of force protection concerns, were then uparmored and
then, of course, now the evolution into the MRAP vehicle with
enhanced protection due to the V-shaped hull and other aspects
of it.
You did describe, General Thompson, that the Army is
looking at this vehicle design not just for today's threat but
for threats that may arise in the foreseeable future. I realize
you cannot predict everything, but that process is going
forward.
General Thompson. Yes, sir. If I can name another thing
that comes to mind, it gets back to the importance of the FCS
program. The continued investment by the FCS program in armor
development has been the foundation for the armor protection
kits that we have put on HMMWVs and has been the foundation for
the armor protection we have put on the MRAP vehicles. So it is
a very smart acquisition decision on our part.
That is another strength of the FCS program. So we look at
the testing on the MRAP vehicle and it informs the future
development of FCS just like the development of armor in the
FCS program has informed what we have put on the uparmored
HMMWVs and on the MRAP program.
Senator Cornyn. As I noted earlier, as far as I am
concerned, whatever warfighters need I am willing to support
appropriations for that need. But occasionally you will have
people come up, constituents and others, who say the Army and
the military is not providing X, body armor. I do not know
whether you call them urban myths or not about soldiers having
to purchase their own body armor.
I know that the requirement in the case of these vehicles
has changed over time. I do not know and perhaps maybe you
could comment on whether there has been an evolving standard in
terms of what the Army would provide the warfighter in the
field in terms of body armor and other equipment and resources.
Could you respond to that?
General Thompson. Yes, sir, I can. We are on our fifth
upgrade of body armor since the war started. It is Frag Kit 5,
the armor protection kit, that is on most of the HMMWVs today
and we are looking at the development of Frag Kit 6, which gets
after the explosively formed penetrator threat. So it is a
continual evolution of capability.
Going back to the FCS program, one of the strengths of that
program is the fact that we will be able to have the attachment
points for upgraded armor on the vehicles that we produce under
FCS, so we do not have to bolt them on after the fact. So it is
an integrated development approach.
We do the same thing with all of our systems, whether it is
rifles, body armor, or night vision goggles. We are always
looking at cutting in upgrades or changes of those programs
that make sense. So there is no static program out there,
helicopter to what the individual soldier wears. I use the body
armor as a great example.
Senator Cornyn. I know that seems like a shocking statement
for someone to make, that a soldier would have to buy their own
body armor. I have never really confirmed that to be the case.
I am wondering with this evolution of systems, whether it
is body armor, uparmored HMMWVs or MRAP vehicles we are
continually setting a higher standard. In one sense, there may
be the perception that because the latest and greatest is not
deployed universally, somebody is getting less than what we are
capable of providing them for either their protection or
ability to do their job.
General Thompson. I think we can say, though, Senator, that
the latest and greatest of the capability that we have is with
the soldiers that are deployed in harm's way or the soldiers
that are getting ready to go into harm's way. So you are always
chasing that next increment of capability, and once we achieve
that next increment of capability, it first goes to the
soldiers that are in harm's way.
Senator Cornyn. I cannot help but recall what Chairman
Lieberman said when the stories broke in the Washington Post
over Walter Reed and the outpatient housing. I remember his
statement that this was embarrassing. I thought that was a good
way to describe it because I have to tell you that our
commitment is to do whatever is needed to provide for our
warfighters and servicemembers and our veterans. That is, I
would say, a universal commitment of this committee and
Congress.
So when somebody throws out a curve ball like that and
suggests that we are not doing it, my first reaction is I hope
that is not true. Second is if it is, this is embarrassing
because certainly it runs counter to every impulse, every
instinct that I know Congress has when it comes to providing
for our warfighters or their families or veterans across the
board.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Cornyn. Of
course, I totally agree with what you have said.
I have just one or two more quick questions for you. I
wanted to talk for a moment about the Land Warrior program
which is one that I have been quite interested in. It just
strikes me that with the formal recognition of the equal
importance of stability operations, which will be executed in
large part by small units of dismounted soldiers, that the Land
Warrior program, which was the program of record, as I saw it,
for modernizing those dismounted soldiers' abilities may
deserve a second look.
Obviously, it was cut after a decade of development and
right after it was being sent into theater for its true
operational test, which I gather has been extremely successful.
I have heard reports from the 4th Battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment that they feel it has really added to their
capabilities and also their protection.
So I wanted to ask you, in terms of our own work here this
year in authorizing and appropriating, whether you have
thoughts about expanding the fielding of Land Warrior, and
whether, if that is the case, we can help you avoid some
undesirable reprogramming by authorizing and appropriating for
that purpose. So overall, give me your sense of the importance
of Land Warrior, whether you are leaning forward on it now, and
to what extent we can help by funding it instead of forcing you
to reprogram.
General Speakes. Sir, your knowledge that we have a very,
very strong basis of support from 4-9 and the Manchus who are
using it in Iraq today is absolutely correct.
Accordingly, the strategy that has been adopted by General
Wallace, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
commander in collaboration with the Chief of Staff of the Army
and the Secretary of the Army, is to move forward with this
program. The concept would be that the next thing we need to do
is equip a brigade combat team. The brigade combat team would
then use it as a part of their pre-deployment training and then
as a part of our process of preparing forces and certifying
them for deployment. They would then deploy with this
capability.
So at this point what we have is a request for
reprogramming that is about $102 million, and $102 million is
approximately what it takes to equip one brigade combat team
with this capability.
Now, the capability that we tested several years ago and
the capability that is now in Iraq today are substantially
different. We have cut the weight, for example, of the radio
that is on the back of each individual soldier by about one-
third. It is a remarkable transformation that shows, just like
our cell phones today, we are evolving capability with
incredible speed. So we continue to develop and refine, based
upon this experience in combat, what Land Warrior is, what
forms it takes, what information it displays for the soldier,
and how it integrates with the rest of our tactical operating
environment.
We will continue that effort then with the brigade combat
team, and we would like to go ahead and prepare that brigade
combat team with a set of this stuff and then deploy them as a
part of our normal force generation process.
Senator Lieberman. That is great news. I really appreciate
that decision. I think this is a great program. I know
everything you give a soldier that is improved is good for the
soldier, but listening to the exchange you had with Senator
Cornyn about the body armor, this Land Warrior program,
obviously, not only increases the capability of the individual
soldier, but I think also increases his security and
protection.
We will take it under advisement, if we can help you by
authorizing and appropriating to that level so you do not have
to reprogram more. But I thank you very much for that decision.
That is great to hear.
The final question is on the Army's current basic rifle
needs. There have been some statements that the Army's current
basic rifle needs to be replaced, and I wanted to ask you what
the current requirement, as you see it, is and what kind of
program you have for the rifles within the Army at this point.
General Thompson. Sir, the current rifle in the Army
is an M-16A4, and the current carbine is the M-4 carbine.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Thompson. We are looking with a capabilities-based
assessment, which is done by the requiring activity, TRADOC, at
what should be the future requirement for the rifle. That
capabilities-based assessment took a long time to develop. It
is now out of the infantry school and has been reviewed once at
TRADOC. It is soon on its way to the Pentagon to go into that
staffing process and then to go into the joint requirements
process.
We feel like we have very capable individual weapons out
there in the hands of our soldiers today, both with the M-16
version and the carbine, which has been evolutionarily changed
over time with engineering change proposals. We always continue
to evaluate all of our weapons. We recently ran a test on the
M-4 carbine and found some issues when we were working with the
manufacturer in order to improve that capability.
We also found with that test that we need to replace the
magazines because the magazines were the source of some
failures in the testing that was done. We had an ongoing
development program to improve the magazine. We are going
rapidly into production on that, and then by the end of this
year, every soldier in theater will have an improved magazine
to reduce the possibility of stoppages with the weapon.
We have done a number of independent surveys not done by
the acquisition community. The one survey that was done
recently I think was done by the Center for Naval Analyses to
give some independence. The soldier feedback has been positive
on the weapons.
The weapons work well. They are engineered well. They have
to be properly taken care of. The soldiers that have the least
problems with weapons are the soldiers that use them because
they are infantry men, are out there on the front lines, and so
it is not just the weapons themselves but also how you take
care of it. So it is a package deal in making sure they meet
the requirement.
The short answer is we are updating the requirement and
then we will look at that and decide whether an acquisition or
a materiel solution is the best thing in order to upgrade the
capability.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Is Senator Cornyn returning, do you know? I am questioned
out. So let us assume that Senator Cornyn is too.
I want to thank the two of you. I was thinking, as I was
listening to you, that we really ought to thank you not only in
general for your service to our country, but you are really two
impressive individuals. You are obviously smart. You are very
well-spoken. You give me a sense of confidence that you are on
top of the very significant responsibilities you have. So I did
not want this occasion to go by. We hear a lot of people
testify in a lot of committees up here in many subject areas,
but honestly, I would say no witnesses have handled questions
with more authority and directness in any of the committees I
have been on over the long-term than the two of you. Therefore,
we ought to express our gratitude to you that not only are you
good witnesses, but you happen to be wearing the uniform of the
United States Army.
Senator Cornyn, do you have any additional questions?
Senator Cornyn. I do not. Thank you very much.
General Thompson. Sir, I do not want the last word, but
this body armor thing is really so important. I would just like
to make a clarification on something I said earlier because I
always like to be as precise as possible.
I said something about the FAT. Obviously, we award a
contract because a manufacturer is not going to give us an
article to test unless he has a contract. But we do not go into
production unless that manufacturer passes that FAT.
I have a quote from a GAO report that was just issued in
April about the body armor for the Marines and the Army. I just
pulled this piece of paper out, and it is so significant to
make the point. This is from the GAO report, ``In this review,
we found that the Army and Marine Corps have taken several
actions to assure testing. They have controls in place during
manufacturing and after fielding to assure that body armor
meets requirements, and they share information between the
Services regarding ballistic requirements and testing and the
development of future body armor systems.''
On page 5 of the report, ``The Army and the Marine Corps
have controls in place during manufacturing and after fielding
to assure that it meets requirements.'' I am restating that.
``Both Services conduct quality and ballistic testing prior to
fielding and lots are rejected if the standards are not met.''
That is the GAO report from April.
So again, I go back to we have to reconcile the differences
between the DOD IG report. I regret sincerely that it made the
NBC nightly news. I am not sure that all due diligence was done
before that was reported. But my key point here is I want
soldiers in the field to understand that there is no reason for
them to have a lack of confidence in the equipment that we give
them today and particularly the body armor. That is my last
statement.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that statement.
General, you were not suggesting that a television station
or network would put a story on without due diligence? You do
not have to answer the question. [Laughter.]
I can testify by personal experience to the accuracy of
that suggestion. [Laughter.]
Thank you both.
We are going to hold the record of the hearing open for 10
days in case any of the members of the subcommittee want to
submit questions to you in writing or you want to add any
testimony in writing.
Again, thank you very much for your service and your
assistance to this subcommittee today.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

FIELD MANUAL 3-0

1. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Army's procurement objectives now and into the
future are large and growing, especially considering the growth in end
strength, additional brigades, and additional missions now documented
in Field Manual (FM) 3. Do projected Army research and development and
procurement budgets through fiscal year 2015 fully fund continued
upgrades to M1, M2, and Stryker vehicles; Future Combat System (FCS)
spin outs 1, 2, and 3; other FCS procurement; completion of modularity
conversions for Active-Duty units; fully equipping Army National Guard
(ARNG) units at 100 percent equipment; and modernization of the Army's
wheeled tactical vehicle fleet, including the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV)? If not, which of those efforts is the Army's priority?
General Speakes and General Thompson. With the competing demands on
an Army at war, we are constantly faced with this question. The answer
is one of achieving balance across time, measured against an
anticipated threat. These are difficult choices as our adaptive enemy
gets a vote, planning for natural disasters is uncertain, and
technology successes and failures dictate our program's progress. We
believe we can achieve a balanced plan that meets all of the challenges
you lay out, but also will continue to present opportunities to
accelerate our plans and programs that are beyond our ability to
resource within our obligation authority.

2. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Army also has significant funding and procurement
pressures related to its current and future force structure. Beginning
in fiscal year 2015, the Army plans to have four types of combat
brigades: light, Stryker, heavy, and FCS. Two of those brigades, the
Stryker and FCS, provide a medium weight capability. Heavy brigades
will organize around two types of M1 tanks and two types of Bradley
fighting vehicles. What specific analysis has the Army completed that
demonstrates the need for four different types of brigades and two
types of medium weight brigades?
General Speakes and General Thompson. To inform Army analysis and
decisions related to the mix of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), the Army
relies on several inputs: National Defense and National Military
Strategies, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Department of Defense
(DOD) initiatives, Operational Availability studies, combatant
commander requests, and current operational demands. The current force
is comprised of Heavy BCTs (HBCTs), Infantry BCTs (IBCTs), and Stryker
BCTs (SBCTs). Each of the three current formation types has unique
capabilities best suited for differing parts of the spectrum of
conflict.
The Army uses extensive force design and force structure analysis
to determine the balance of capabilities and capacity. The modular
force reorganization decision in February 2004 used Task Force
Modularity analytical efforts to move from 17 different maneuver
brigade types in the force to 3 standardized organizational designs.
However, we were careful not to swing the standardization pendulum too
far.
The need for a mix of maneuver forces was highlighted during the
Joint Forces Command and Army cosponsored transformation wargames,
Unified Quest 2003 and 2004. This need was later codified in the Army
capstone concept document, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-
3-0, The Army in Joint Operations, The Army's Future Force Capstone
Concept 2015-2024, published on April 7, 2005. This document
highlighted the need to reconcile expeditionary agility and
responsiveness with the staying power, durability, and adaptability to
carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion. It also highlighted the
need to maintain and improve a hybrid mix of capabilities that can be
flexibly combined to address any contingency.
As the Army transforms in the future, the force will incorporate
FCS BCTs (FBCTs). Though medium in weight, an FBCT is capable of
spanning the range of capability from light to heavy. The need for two
types of so-called ``medium brigades'' (SBCT and FBCT) is driven by
more than the weight of vehicles. The requirement for BCT types comes
from the capabilities within a given formation. The weight of its
capital systems is derived from achieving operational requirements,
such as survivability, lethality, or transportability, within an
organizational framework. While affordability plays a role in the final
outcome, the capabilities inherent in a given type unit and the number
of soldiers needed to man the formation are greater drivers for force
design and force mix than simply the dollars for equipment.
Additionally, the Army must weigh the need to maintain the
technological advantage within effective, sustainable, survivable, and
lethal formations to ensure an attainable modernization path for each
type of BCT.
After QDR 2006, Army analysis of the Major Combat Operation
requirements (inherently High Intensity) and the Steady State Security
Posture (spanning the spectrum of conflict from High to Low) identified
a requirement for 76 BCTs. The Army continues to reassess the BCT force
mix to ensure the best balance of capabilities for executing the
National Security Strategy and providing Joint Force Commanders with
multiple options for success.

3. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, what potential conflicts would require that mix of
brigades, or is this mix based simply on affordability?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Strategy and concepts call
for full-spectrum capability with the flexibility to adapt as the
environment and situation demand. The three current types of combat
brigades--heavy, infantry, and Stryker--each have unique capabilities
that provide the Army the best overall ability to meet National
Security Strategy requirements. HBCTs provide the maximum in combat
power and survivability and are optimized for open terrain, but require
the most in strategic lift and logistics. IBCTs provide the lightest
unit for force projection by airlift or air assault, and are optimized
for close terrain. SBCTs are the Army's newest and offer improved
tactical ground mobility with reduced logistics requirements, and have
performed well in urban areas. Future BCTs, scheduled to begin entering
the force in 2015, will join the current three types of combat brigades
and will provide the Army enhanced lethality and survivability with
reduced logistics requirements. Because BCT formations are mutually
supporting and complementary, BCTs can be task organized and tailored
to the required environment and mission.
We cannot know for sure where and against what threat Army
capabilities will be required, so we keep a mix based on operational
planning and future modeling within the DOD Analytic Agenda. We shall
task organize to best match capabilities to the needs of ground force
commanders. In order to operate effectively across the range of
military operations, in all types of terrain, and provide prompt and
sustained landpower, the Army must retain a mix of BCTs. The Army will
continuously evaluate how best to maintain the technological advantage
within effective, sustainable, survivable, and lethal formations to
ensure an attainable modernization path.

4. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, what is the incremental additional operating cost to
the Army of indefinitely maintaining three fleets of combat vehicles:
(1) legacy tanks, Bradleys, and armored personnel carriers; (2)
Strykers; and (3) FCS vehicles?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army estimates operating
costs for units, not vehicle systems. The Army uses the Training
Resource Model (TRM) to compute the estimated operating cost for units
based on previous years' cost experience. The output from TRM serves as
the basis for the Army's base program home-station training budget
requests. Exact operating costs vary substantially based on the unit's
component, location, and mission. For example, the average estimated
operating cost for a HBCT in the active component located in the
Continental United States (CONUS) is approximately $66 million per
year. For a HBCT in the Reserve component, the cost is approximately
$16 million per year. The average estimated operating cost for a SBCT
in the active component stationed in CONUS is approximately $45 million
per year. Since the Army is not scheduled to begin fielding BCTs until
fiscal year 2015, the TRM model is not capable of estimating the cost
of a FBCT. However, operational assessments using modeling and
simulation techniques indicate FBCTs are likely to have lower operating
costs than HBCTs while conducting commensurate missions.
The Army will continue to provide combatant commanders with trained
and ready forces to meet the Nation's national security requirements.
Further, the Army will continue to work with the joint community to
review and update the appropriate mix of forces, including number and
type of BCTs, to meet the Nation's security needs. Thus, future
operating costs for the Army's BCTs will depend on the evolving nature
of operations, the mix of forces chosen to prepare for and conduct
those operations, and the method in which the chosen forces are
employed.

UNFUNDED PRIORITIES LISTS

5. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, over the years, Congress has requested that each
Service chief provide a list of unfunded programs that we can then use
to guide our judgment to ensure that additional resources, if applied,
are focused on priorities. The Chief of Staff of the Army's unfunded
priorities list for fiscal year 2009 apparently does not reflect the
most urgent unfunded requirements of the Army to meet its next most
important operational or investment shortfalls. Rather the list is
crafted to address only the dual use equipment shortfalls of the
National Guard rather than the total Army. Why did the Chief of Staff
decide to use his unfunded priority list this way?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Per the memorandum attached
to the fiscal year 2009 Unfunded Requirements (UFR) list, the Army
believed, ``that the fiscal year 2009 base budget along with the
anticipated fiscal year 2008 global war on terror funding would provide
the necessary resources to grow the Army; sustain soldiers, families,
and civilians; prepare soldiers for success in current operations;
reset to restore readiness and depth for future operations; and
transform to meet the demands of the 21st century.'' The UFR list
focused on ``funding ARNG equipment shortfalls of dual use items.''
The ARNG is engaged around the globe and across the Nation in
support of the global war on terror, Homeland Defense and Civil Support
missions. Accelerating funding for these items would help ensure that
Guard units continue to fulfill a critical role in supporting civil
authorities in domestic disaster relief operations that occur during
fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. The UFR list identified a
list of items the Army ``would accelerate'' if additional funding
became available.

6. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, I note that the Army's list is in alphabetical rather
than in priority order. Please prioritize this list and return it to
the defense committees not later than 2 weeks from receipt of this
question.
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army's most critical UFRs
for fiscal year 2009 focus on ARNG equipment shortages for dual-use
items. This UFR list was approximately $3.94 billion. The original ARNG
equipment UFR list has been modified by the Army to account for
substitutions for seven unexecutable lines on the original list. The
result is a slight decrease in the UFR, which is now identified to be
$3.93 billion. The adjusted ARNG equipment prioritized UFR list is
enclosed.
All lines on the current UFR list will have a positive impact on
ARNG readiness. The acquisition of this equipment will enable the ARNG
to train to a higher level of proficiency to meet both State and
Federal missions while simultaneously supporting current overseas
missions. The most critical of the dual-use items are trucks (HMMWVs
and HEMTTs). The ARNG's on-hand quantity of trucks is at a critical all
time low. The receipt of trucks will have an immediate impact on
readiness and mission effectiveness.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-1 Line NOMEN BAND $ ADJ Amount (k)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4...................................... HMMWV.................... BAND 1................... $1,000,000
---------------------------------------------
Subt................. $1,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7...................................... HEMTT.................... BAND 2................... $572,900
4...................................... HMMWV.................... BAND 2................... $331,300
3...................................... LIQ LOG STORAGE & DISTRO. BAND 2................... $23,200
23 thru 31............................. MILSATCOM................ BAND 2................... $19,000
MOVEMENT TRACKING SYS.... BAND 2................... $23,600
77, 79................................. NIGHT VISION GOGGLES..... BAND 2................... $28,800
143, 144, 151.......................... WATER PURIFICATION SYS... BAND 2................... $1,200
---------------------------------------------
Subt................. $1,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4...................................... HMMWV.................... BAND 3................... $262,000
182.................................... AMC CRITICAL ITEMS....... BAND 3................... $2,400
5, 10.................................. AVN LUH.................. BAND 3................... $47,750
22..................................... AVIONICS................. BAND 3................... $11,300
27 thru 34............................. AVN SPT EQUIP............ BAND 3................... $6,600
27 thru 34............................. AVN SPT EQUIP............ BAND 3................... $1,700
43..................................... COTS TACTICAL RADIOS..... BAND 3................... $22,800
DRIVER VISION ENHANCEMENT BAND 3................... $152,450
137.................................... FIELD FEEDING SYSTEM..... BAND 3................... $5,400
7, 11.................................. HEAVY EQUIPMENT BAND 3................... $43,100
TRANSPORTER.
7...................................... HEMTT.................... BAND 3................... $178,400
10..................................... LINE HAUL................ BAND 3................... $156,300
107, 112............................... LOG AUTOMATION........... BAND 3................... $300
44, 145................................ MEDICAL FIELD SYSTEMS.... BAND 3................... $5,700
(AF) 37................................ NAVSTAR GPS.............. BAND 3................... $16,500
24 thru 45, 49......................... SMALL ARMS............... BAND 3................... $87,300
---------------------------------------------
Subt................. $1,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
165.................................... TACTICAL ELEC PWR........ BAND 4................... $44,600
1 thru 3............................... TRAILERS................. BAND 4................... $46,400
148 thru 160........................... CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT... BAND 4................... $25,000
DRIVER VISION ENHANCEMENT BAND 4................... $473,050
6...................................... FIRE TRUCKS TACTICAL..... BAND 4................... $4,000
78..................................... LONG RGE SCT SURV SYS.... BAND 4................... $17,600
1 thru 3............................... LTV HIGH MOB TRLR........ BAND 4................... $138,800
35..................................... NON-LETHAL AMMO.......... BAND 4................... $4,100
5...................................... PALLETIZED LOADING SYS... BAND 4................... $80,700
166.................................... ROUGH TERRAIN CONTAINER BAND 4................... $8,600
HANDLING.
5, 10.................................. AVN LUH.................. BAND 3................... $47,750
16, 17 & 124, 125...................... TACTICAL BRIDGING........ BAND 4................... $29,000
172 thru 174........................... TEST, MEASURE, DIGITAL BAND 4................... $8,200
EQUIP.
---------------------------------------------
Subt................. $927,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................ $3,927,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

7. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, this subcommittee has been a strong advocate for the
development of force protection technologies to defeat current and next
generation threats to our soldiers. The subcommittee has authorized
additional funding for active protection systems (APS) for Army
vehicles that can help defeat rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and other
weapons systems that are being used in theater and can easily be
proliferated at very sophisticated levels. I know that a number of
contractors are developing APS for deployment on vehicles and that the
Israeli Defense Force is moving towards deploying a system. I believe
that the Army strategy is to develop a vehicle APS through the FCS
program and then to spin-out the technology to current force vehicles,
like Strykers and trucks. Have any realistic live fire tests occurred
on Army vehicles using the FCS APS?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The FCS APS has not completed
any ``full up'' tests on vehicles to date. The FCS APS system is still
being designed under the FCS System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
effort. To date, the FCS program has conducted developmental and
technical tests and is currently scheduled to complete on-the-move
live-fire tests in May-June 2008. These tests will provide supporting
evidence of the FCS APS maturing to Technology Readiness Level 6,
addressing the ``system/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a
relevant environment (ground or space).'' Further, APS design
maturation and testing is planned through the remaining FCS SDD effort.
The FCS program is scheduled for Milestone C decision review in 2013.
At that time, the APS will be integrated on current force platforms
that are capable of meeting its size, weight, and power requirements.

8. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, is the Army evaluating Israeli and other APS
approaches as potential near-term solutions to address RPG threats to
light vehicles?
General Speakes and General Thompson. In May 2006, the APS
developer (Raytheon), the United States Army, the FCS Lead Systems
Integrator, and industry representatives performed a technical trade
study to identify and assess APS alternatives and select an APS design
from among competing alternatives. The APS technical trade study
evaluated 19 ``hard kill'' APS, including Israeli Trophy APS, for
suitability to accomplish the FCS requirements (7 APS alternatives
survived the initial screening process). The study concluded that
Raytheon's Vertical Launch APS solution was the best design approach.
The study did not select the Israeli Trophy system because it failed to
meet several technical threshold requirements imposed by the FCS
Operational Requirements Document.

9. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, does the fiscal year 2009 Army budget request include
sufficient funding to rapidly develop, test, and field an APS that can
defend light vehicles deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan? If not, what is
the shortfall?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The fiscal year 2009 budget
request includes funds to develop APS for Stryker platforms and the
family of FCS Manned Ground Vehicles. The Army is not developing APS
for other platforms. Our current platforms are severely limited in
their ability to accept APS by size, weight, and power constraints.
High priority modifications such as add-on armor and Improvised
Explosive Device defeat systems have enhanced the force protection
capabilities of vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. These modifications
have also exacerbated the size, weight, and power limitations of
deployed platforms by adding weight or consuming the space and power
that would be needed to accommodate APS. For example, the Stryker
Mobile Gun System currently consumes over 91 percent of its generated
power during missions; adding APS results in a power deficit of over 3
kilowatts. The Bradley consumes over 80 percent of its generated power
during missions; adding APS results in a deficit of over 2 kilowatts.
Integrating APS on currently deployed platforms would require costly
power and suspension upgrades at the expense of theater requirements
and may not be achievable based on current platform limitations.

10. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, when do you expect an APS to be operationally fielded
on lighter vehicles like a Stryker?
General Speakes and General Thompson. We expect to achieve a
sufficient maturity level (Technology Readiness Level 6) for the APS
system in fiscal year 2009 (fiscal year 2008) to begin integration work
on existing systems, but we are severely challenged by the limitations
of current platforms in our ability to field APS in the near term. The
current Stryker platform does not currently have the power generation
to support the integration of the APS. For example, the Stryker Mobile
Gun System currently consumes over 91 percent of its generated power
during missions; adding APS results in a power deficit of over 3
kilowatts. The Stryker program is initiating a Stryker Product
Improvement Plan which plans to integrate the power management
sufficient to meet APS requirements. The Milestone A decision will
occur this June, and a Milestone B decision is in planned for the third
quarter of fiscal year 2009. The first unit is expected to be equipped
in fiscal year 2015.

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

11. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Army's science and technology (S&T) budget is
down by over $1 billion relative to last year's appropriated levels. Of
particular concern, is the reduction in investments in energy and power
technologies research. I know that the FCS program is critically
dependent on advanced battery technologies and for energy conservation
and cost reasons, the Army is also interested in fuel cells, hybrid
engines, and other alternative energy technologies. What is the current
investment in Army research in alternative power and energy
technologies?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army's S&T President's
budget request (PBR) for 2008 was $1.7 billion and was appropriated at
$2.9 billion, including $1.2 billion for congressional increases. The
Army's S&T PBR for 2009 is up by $114 million or 6.6 percent over the
PBR for 2008. The 2008 PBR investment in alternative power and energy
technologies is $85 million, while the 2009 PBR is $89.5 million. This
investment supports basic research in biofuels and hydrogen generation;
applied research in manportable hybrids, fuel cells, and solar
technologies; and advanced technology development in batteries and
energy storage, alternative auxiliary power, and hybrid propulsion.

12. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, in general, what are your top areas of budget
shortfalls in S&T?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Despite the demands of the
ongoing global war on terror, the Army has been able to maintain its
S&T investment at over $1.7 billion for the past three PBRs. The Army
S&T PBR for 2009 is $1.8 billion, an increase of $114 million or 6.6
percent increase over 2008. We believe this level of investment is
sufficient to support our acquisition priorities consistent with our
broad resource demands.
Areas of investment that would benefit from additional resources
are those being challenged by the continuing war on terrorism: (1)
force protection efforts like information assurance to keep our net-
centric information technology systems secure and new biometrics
technologies to assure that we can identify and track potential
insurgents; and (2) medical efforts initiated to address issues such as
regeneration of tissue for soldier's skin, muscle, and eventually limbs
and efforts to prevent and ameliorate effects of traumatic brain injury
and post-traumatic stress disorder.

STRYKER MOBILE GUN SYSTEM

13. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) is a recently
deployed vehicle that has received mixed reviews from both operators in
theater and the Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Soldiers operating it in Diyala province are calling it the ``most
lethal ground support vehicle for an urban environment in Iraq today,''
but there are also many complaints about cabin heat. Reports tell of
vehicle temperatures reaching 130 degrees during the day and 115
degrees at night. Some commanders are shutting down the Commander's
Panoramic Viewer during the hottest time of the day to minimize heat
induced failures to the system. There have been stories about soldiers
patrolling while injected with an IV to stay hydrated in the intense
heat before they were issued special cooling vests. These vests seem to
work for soldiers, but cannot be used on the heat sensitive electronic
systems.
Last year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included a
provision requiring the Secretary of the Army to certify that the
Stryker MGS is operationally effective, suitable, and survivable. Will
the Secretary of the Army be able to certify to Congress that the
Stryker MGS is operationally effective, suitable, and survivable or
will he need to request the National Security Waiver Authority provided
to the Secretary of Defense?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Stryker MGS is filling a
much needed capability gap within the SBCTs against the current threat.
As the Army continues to improve the Stryker MGS, it is undertaking an
aggressive program to mitigate limitations, such as those you mention,
which are not uncommon on complex weapon systems.
The Secretary of the Army has requested that the Secretary of
Defense approve and submit a waiver to allow further procurement of the
Stryker MGS in the interest of national security. The decision is based
primarily on the restrictive nature of the language contained in the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. L. 110-181), which requires an
unqualified certification of operational effectiveness, suitability,
and survivability by the Secretary of the Army.

AVIATION MODERNIZATION

14. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the last few years has seen a major shift in Army
aviation modernization funding. The cancellation of the Comanche
helicopter freed up $14.6 billion to be invested in fixing the
remainder of Army aviation. You have been able to procure more Black
Hawks and Chinooks, increase aircraft survivability, and begin
acquisition of new aircraft, including the Light Utility Helicopter,
the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH), and the Joint Cargo
Aircraft. The ARH program experienced some problems that led to a stop
work notice and a shift in funding to extend the life of the Kiowa
Warrior. The fiscal year 2009 budget request includes $439 million for
28 of these aircraft. What actions were taken to ensure that the
program was back on track, both by Bell and in Army oversight?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army has continued to
work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the
contractor to mitigate risks on the ARH Restructure Program. An OSD
Program Support Review team conducted reviews of the ARH Program at
both the ARH Program Office and Bell Helicopter to allow for a common
understanding of the risks. In order to mitigate identified risks the
Army added a second Limited User Test, made program schedule
adjustments to align testing events with decision points relative to
production, added two SDD prototype aircraft to mitigate risks relative
to transitioning to production, restructured the SDD contract to align
cost and schedule estimates, and scheduled a Restructure Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) review on July 2, 2008. At the Restructure DAB
the Army will seek approval of the revised Acquisition Strategy, the
procurement of 10 Production Representative Test Vehicles, the increase
of the Army Acquisition Objective from 368 to 512 aircraft, and a
formal restructure of the Acquisition Program Baseline.

15. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, when is the next assessment to see if Bell has
actually corrected the problems cited?
General Speakes and General Thompson. There are several key events
on the horizon for the program. There is a DAB review scheduled for
July 2008, a second Limited User Test scheduled for the spring of 2009,
and a Milestone C scheduled for the summer of 2009.

16. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, what actions will be taken if you encounter problems
again?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Just as in the previous case,
the Army and the OSD will take a hard look at the program to determine
if it remains the best approach--technically and economically--for the
Army to meet the warfighter's requirement.

17. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, how long can we extend the Kiowa?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior's
(KW) lifespan is based on the actual aircraft condition rather than a
projected hour level or years of service. Due to delays in the fielding
of the ARH, the Army intends to sustain and maintain the capability of
the OH-58D KW to at least fiscal year 2020. Congress provided
additional funding to the OH-58D KW program for the Safety Enhancement
Program (SEP), which brings the fleet to a common configuration by
fiscal year 2011. Known deficiencies with the OH-58D KW require
additional investment in the fleet so that the aircraft remains safe
and combat effective beyond fiscal year 2011.
There are currently 335 KWs in the field today to resource the 368
total aircraft requirement under the current OH-58D KW force structure.
Of the 335 aircraft, 73 are over 20 years old and all have components
that are over 35 years old that were retained from the original OH58A/C
Kiowas built for the Vietnam war. With each passing year, KW fleet
management must address the risk of experiencing systemic component
failures and significant sustainment issues. Based on the current
attrition rate of 5 to 7 aircraft lost per year during our wartime
footing, the fleet size is projected to be as few as 251 aircraft by
fiscal year 2020 without replacement aircraft. This equates to a large
deficit of combat power when we are resourcing units to the warfight
and limited remaining resources for training and sustainment. As
currently planned, the ARH will begin replacing the OH-58D KW in fiscal
year 2011 when the first unit is equipped. However, the first OH-58D KW
will not likely be divested until fiscal year 2013 when the ARH has
replaced three units worth of aircraft.

TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE STRATEGY

18. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Army has plans to purchase around 10,000 Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, as well as over 2,000 new
Stryker vehicles. At the same time, it plans to begin producing the
JLTV. While the JLTV is a much needed improvement in the tactical
vehicle fleet, and would support the power intensive FCS network, it
would still perform many of the same tasks currently assigned to High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and MRAPs.
A Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) decision permitted
the Army and Marine Corps to not pursue a one-for-one HMMWV for MRAP
replacement strategy. The justification for the JROC decision is
unclear to me. Can you clarify the Army's motivation for pursuing a
strategy and a two-thirds MRAP/one-third HMMWV strategy?
General Speakes and General Thompson. A recent JROC validated an
interim requirement for 12,000 MRAP vehicles. The theater MRAP and
HMMWV mix is based on initial feedback from commanders that MRAP may
not be suited to all missions because of its large size: HMMWVs are
smaller and more maneuverable in densely populated areas. Theater
commanders are still evaluating the MRAP's performance and will provide
feedback at a later date.
The JLTV is a separate Army-wide initiative with a potential
requirement for 144,000 vehicles. The Army's emerging JLTV strategy is
focused on Army-wide light tactical vehicle requirements and is not
necessarily tied to theater requirements in the near-term. The Army is
currently developing its Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) strategy, of
which JLTV is intended to be a component.

19. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, how will the MRAP vehicles be integrated into the
force structure and TWV strategy after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
wind down? Will it substitute other vehicles, such as the HMMWV or the
Armored Security Vehicle?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army is still assessing
the MRAP and how it will be used in the future force. Current feedback
indicates that while it provides outstanding protection for our
soldiers, based on these and follow-on assessments, the Army will
explore various options for future placement of the MRAP in the force.
Decisions will be based on a myriad of factors including, but not
limited to, performance of each variant and condition of the fleet upon
completion of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

20. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, in testimony given last November, Marine Corps
Commandant, General James Conway, said that the Marines intended to
half their MRAP vehicle order due to vehicle limitations. This leads us
to question the overall vehicle strategy and what redundancies are
occurring, both in MRAP and JLTV. What is the Army doing to ensure that
the future vehicle strategy will minimize redundancies and support
costs while maximizing commonality?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army is currently
developing its TWV strategy. In doing so it has compared the
capabilities of the vehicles that compose its TWV fleet. The results
indicate that there are redundant individual capabilities between
vehicles there are no two vehicle types with identical capability sets.

RADIOS

21. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, an integral part of the FCS, and Army modernization
overall, is the ability to transmit large amounts of information in a
secure manner. Your testimony states that ``FM 3-0 also recognizes the
unparalleled power of information in modern conflict, and the fact that
information has become as important as lethal action in determining the
outcome of operations.'' The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is the
next evolution in the capability to manage and distribute this
information, but has faced some setbacks in its development. There are
still concerns that it will not be able to meet the challenges in terms
of interoperability, meeting size, weight, and power constraints, and
meeting information assurance requirements.
In January, outgoing Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, Claude Bolton, stated that
within 5 years, the Army may have too little radio spectrum to allow
its next-generation, networked force to work as it is designed to do.
This communication system seems to be a key to connecting our
warfighters. Is the Army's current procurement strategy vis-a-vis the
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) consistent
with the Army's intent to transition to JTRS radios in the coming
years?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Yes. The Army's SINCGARS
procurement strategy is consistent with its intent to transition to
JTRS. The SINCGARS program addresses the Army's current single-channel
line-of-sight (LOS) voice communications requirement. Once JTRS
products are available, the Army will begin its transition to JTRS by
purchasing various JTRS products. In the current Future Years Defense
Plan, the Army programmed funds to procure the Ground Mobile Radio
(GMR) and various JTRS Small Form Fit (SFF) radios.
The Basis of Issue (BOI) for the Army JTRS requirements is
currently being developed and completion is currently scheduled for
July 2008. The BOI will map out the distribution of JTRS products by
type for each brigade-sized unit within the Army, accounting for
distribution quantities from the brigade headquarters down to the
individual soldier. This BOI will be the basis for the inclusion of
additional JTRS procurement funds in the Army's future budget
submission for the procurement of additional GMR and SFF radios, as
well as JTRS Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) and Airborne,
Maritime, Fixed (AMF) radios.

22. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, what is the current status of the development of
JTRS? Is the Army's SINCGARS acquisition strategy a reflection of its
confidence, or lack thereof, in the JTRS program?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Joint Program Executive
Office for the JTRS Program has made significant progress, highlighted
by the AMF radio Milestone B decision and SDD contract award. In
addition, the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) updates for the GGMR,
Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) radio, and Network
Enterprise Domain (NED) were approved and signed by the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). These efforts, in
process since fiscal year 2007, represent major steps toward the
acquisition and delivery of JTRS Increment 1 capabilities.
The JTRS program anticipates a Milestone C for GMR in the 4th
quarter of fiscal year 2010, which supports initial fielding for FCS
Spin Out 1. Full Rate Production is anticipated in fiscal year 2013/14.
The HMS Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is scheduled the third
quarter of fiscal year 2010 and the AMF (rotary wing) LRIP is scheduled
for the first quarter of fiscal year 2013.
The SINCGARS acquisition strategy is not a reflection of the Army's
confidence, or lack thereof, in the JTRS program. The SINCGARS program
addresses the Army's current single-channel LOS voice communications
requirement. When available, JTRS products will be procured to meet not
only the Army's single-channel LOS voice requirement, but other
tactical radio communications requirements, to include mobile ad-hoc
networking and beyond LOS voice and data communications.
Finally, the Army and Defense senior leadership have expressed
concern about the affordability of JTRS GMR. The Army will review and
investigate cost savings options and alternatives that will leverage
and reduce the cost of the JTRS GMR. Any adjustments to the program
baseline will be reflected in the future budget submissions with
required policy changes to support the new acquisition strategy.

23. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, are there potential radio spectrum limitations that
could stop this system from working as planned?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The JTRS program is in the
process of developing multiple radio products with spectrum agility.
The Joint Tactical Radio (JTR) sets are software defined radios that
can be programmed to utilize available frequencies from 2 Megahertz
(MHz) to 2 Gigahertz (GHz). The ability of JTRS to operate between 2
MHz to 2 GHz is a significant benefit in spectrum planning because it
enables many more options than would be the case for radios technically
constrained to particular frequencies. Also, JTR sets can be programmed
to the same frequency utilized by current force radios to achieve
interoperability with Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
(SINCGARS), Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS),
High Frequency (HF), and Ultra HF (UHF) Satellite Communication radios.
Further, through frequency cross-banding, the JTRS family will be able
to connect radios operating in different frequency bands to allow
interconnectivity between disparate radio networks. For example, the
GMR provides interconnectivity between legacy EPLRS and JTRS Wideband
Networking Waveform data networks, and the GMR and JTRS Manpack radio
provides interconnectivity between legacy SINCGARS and JTRS Soldier
Radio Waveform voice networks.
As indicated by Secretary Bolton, our military's demand for access
to the radio frequency spectrum increases with the advent of JTRS and
other radio development programs. These systems compete for spectrum
resources along with industry and commercial applications. A number of
actions are being taken in JTRS Increment 1 to mitigate the spectrum
risk. These include thorough radio frequency communications planning,
and early outreach to nations expected to host JTRS. Additionally,
spectrum related technological enhancements are being considered for
implementation in later JTRS Increments. One promising technology is
dynamic spectrum access. This technology is being developed by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and is expected to
enable radios to find frequencies and operate in temporarily unused
spectrum. This capability would significantly increase the RF spectrum
available during JTRS operations. Preliminary DARPA capability
demonstrations are encouraging and are currently being considered for
incorporation into JTRS and other radio development programs.

ACCELERATION OF GROW THE ARMY

24. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army have
testified that they want to accelerate the growth of Army end strength
beyond its planned 7,000 for fiscal year 2009. Yet the budget request
does not include the additional funds necessary to accomplish this. How
does the Army intend to accelerate end strength growth?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army's planned growth of
Active component end strength at about 7,000 per year is a metered
approach for building total Army capacity and sustaining the All-
Volunteer Force through the foreseeable future. This growth ramp,
however, falls short of alleviating stress on the force in the near
term. The Army's desire to grow end strength more rapidly in fiscal
year 2009 addresses this need by improving manning levels of the next-
to-deploy forces. This provides the much deserved dwell time to
soldiers returning from theater. As a global war on terror-driven
requirement, the Army anticipates a request in the fiscal year 2009
global war on terror funding request to support acceleration of end
strength.

25. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, what are the major investment requirements necessary
to support this growth?
General Speakes and General Thompson. There are no major
investments required to support the acceleration of end strength
growth. The largest preponderance of the costs is associated with
military pay and allowances. There are some requirements associated
with training and base operation support.

ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

26. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Department is moving towards developing joint and
interoperable information systems to support military operations
wherever possible. A major effort in this vein is the development of
joint global command and control systems. My understanding is that the
Services are all driving towards adopting command and control
technologies developed by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
under the Network Enabled Command Capability (NECC) program.
At this point, both the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering have commented in
reports on the technical immaturity and aggressive schedule in the
program. I understand that the Department still plans to migrate
Service command and control problems, like the Army's Global Command
and Control System, into the joint NECC solution around the 2012
timeframe.
Given your current and anticipated future operational needs for
command and control, what risks will the Army be taking if the NECC
program continues to slip its schedule and does not deliver
capabilities on time?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army is a strong
supporter of the NECC joint program as a partner with DISA, the Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force. DISA and the Joint Forces Command lead
this program, with active participation of the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force. All Services agree that further development of
command and control (C2) systems must be done on a joint basis to move
beyond the current systems that have limited horizontal
interoperability. The Army, along with the other Services, has also
been concerned with key program issues such as technical maturity and
the aggressiveness of the program schedule. The Army is an active
participant in the OSD-led NECC Joint Action Team (JAT), established to
mitigate these risks.
The Army has fully funded NECC Increment 1 and is developing plans,
in conjunction with the joint program, to fully replace the Global
Command and Control System (GSSC)-Joint and GSSC-Army (GCCS-A) systems
providing Joint C2 to strategic and operational Army headquarters by
the end of fiscal year 2013. The GCCS-A will not be retired until the
Army replaces GCCS-A functionality with NECC capabilities at all GCCS-A
sites. Maintaining GCCS-A until it can be replaced by NECC at all GCCS-
A sites will reduce the risk to the soldier of losing current
functionality. The Army plans to continue GCCS-A development to support
soldiers through fiscal year 2010. The remaining risk is the need to
continue GCCS-A maintenance funding until NECC has completely replaced
it. The Army has procurement funding to sustain GCCS-A until fiscal
year 2013. If the NECC schedule slips substantially, there is a risk
that the Army would not have sufficient funding to maintain GCCS-A
until NECC Increment 1 is delivered.

27. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, what role is the Army playing to ensure that the NECC
program delivers the command and control capabilities it needs in a
timely fashion?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army is a strong
supporter of the NECC program and participates proactively in all of
the requirements (Joint Capability Integration and Development System),
resourcing (Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution System), and
acquisition (DOD 5000) forums supporting this program. The Army has
fully funded NECC Increment 1 and is developing plans, in conjunction
with the joint program, to fully replace the GCCS-J and GCCS-A systems
providing Joint C2 to strategic and operational Army supported
headquarters by the end of fiscal year 2013. As a partner in this joint
development program, the Army staffs and maintains an Army Component
Program Management Office (CPMO) under the NECC Joint Program
Management Office along with DISA, the USN, USMC, and USAF. The CPMOs
will be the development offices and anticipate developing NECC
capabilities related to their Service operation mission areas. The Army
CPMO is expected to be the developer for the most important
capabilities supporting ground operations across all increments of the
NECC program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM CONVERSIONS

28. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Army's fiscal year 2009 operation and maintenance
budget request for readiness supports the Reserve component conversion
of deployable, brigade-centric forces. The 39th BCT from the Arkansas
National Guard represents this modernization. While the 39th BCT is now
designed to fight without augmentation as a BCT, and are trained to do
so as a cohesive unit, they were not deployed to Iraq last month in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as a BCT. The Army has fragmented
the 39th BCT into company size elements and dispersed the team
throughout Iraq for force protection, support of Joint Visitors Bureau
operations (providing bodyguards for dignitaries and embassy
personnel), and convoy security. Why is the Army budgeting/funding
these BCT conversions if they are not using them in battle?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The 39th BCT is deployed to
the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR), and is
conducting final preparations to assume the mission-critical tasks
assigned by the combatant commander. First U.S. Army provided oversight
of the readiness, mobilization, and training validation for the 39th
BCT, as is the process with all our ARNG units. The unit was brought on
Active Duty with its leadership and organization intact, to train and
deploy together.
Once in theater, the combatant commander is in the best position to
make decisions on command and control of security force units, based on
his awareness of the tactical and strategic situation. Due to the
nature of the mission, some unit dispersal is likely as units spread
out within their respective AORs to provide security at forward
operating bases. Decisions on specific security force missions--convoy
escort, fixed site security, quick reaction force or other
requirements--will be made by the combatant commander based on the
conditions on the ground. The 39th BCT is uniquely well-suited for
these vital missions, and we are proud of their service and their
professionalism.

M4 RIFLES

29. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, in recent comparative tests the M4 rifle performed
worse than three of its competitors, the HK416, the MK16, and the
HKXM8, as the Army's main weapon of choice for its soldiers. Having
experienced a total of 882 stoppages and 19 Class 3 (serious) failures
while being tested in extremely dusty conditions, the Army is standing
by its decision to outfit/modernize the force with the M4 carbine
despite these reliability questions. In spite of this information, the
Army intends to spend $300 million to produce M4 rifles through fiscal
year 2009. Why?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The M4 remains in high demand
by all our deployed units and soldiers and has proven itself through
numerous tests under a wide variety of conditions and in combat
throughout the years. The M4 Carbine is an extremely reliable weapon
design that meets or exceeds the United States Army's requirements and
has the confidence of the overwhelming majority of soldiers based on
post combat and other surveys. The Army considers soldier feedback on
weapon performance very important. A United States Army Infantry Center
post combat survey showed that 90 percent of soldiers armed with the M4
rated it as effective or highly effective. A Program Executive Office
soldier sponsored post combat survey conducted by the Center for Naval
Analyses in 2006 reported 89 percent of soldiers armed with the M4 are
satisfied with its overall performance. In the same survey, only 1
percent recommended the M4 be replaced.
In regard to the tests mentioned, the M4 had more stoppages than
the other three weapons but still only had 1.4 percent malfunctions out
of 60,000 rounds fired. The other competitors experienced less than 1
percent malfunctions out of 60,000 rounds. All of these weapons
performed exceptionally under these extreme conditions. The vast
majority of the M4 malfunctions were Class 1 and 2 malfunctions, solved
either by immediate action or minor remedial action by the operator.
Over 200 of the malfunctions were attributed to the M4 and M16
magazines, and at the time of the tests a program was already underway
to provide an improved magazine to our soldiers.

BODY ARMOR

30. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Army currently uses Enhanced Small Arms
Protective Insert (ESAPI) plates to compliment the interceptor body
armor system used by our soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. The contract
for the acquisition of ESAPI plates ends in May of this year. The Army
has initiated a request for proposal for the next generation Small Arms
Protective Insert plates and intends to award a contract in the fall of
2008. Does the Army have a plan to bridge the gap in this short pause
in procurement to account for an adequate supply of ESAPI plates to
support the readiness of our troops?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army has a plan to ensure
an adequate supply of ESAPI plates supporting soldier readiness after
we procure the Army ESAPI requirement of 966,000 sets by May 2008. The
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is responsible for ESAPI sustainment and
awarded three contracts in December 2007 to provide sustainment
quantities of ESAPI. DLA ESAPI sustainment contracts will mitigate the
time lag for procurement of the next generation ballistic plate. The
ESAPI sustainment contracts also will ensure the industrial base
maintains the capability to manufacture ballistic plates. The U.S. Army
also is working with the vendors to reduce their monthly delivery
requirements to stretch out their production runs. This reduction must
be balanced to ensure there is no gap in addressing fielding
requirements. Fielding requirements will always remain the priority.

31. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, has the Army considered the consequences to the
industrial base as a result of existing contracts and the contracts
projected for award later this year?
General Speakes and General Thompson. From the outset, the U.S.
Army understood the need to have an orderly transition of ESAPI to any
potential next generation body armor production to avoid an adverse
affect on industry. The U.S. Army has had to extend all current ESAPI
supplier contracts several times due to industry requests to delay the
current body armor solicitation that is being competed on a full and
open basis. The U.S. Army will continue to work with industry to
minimize the impact until any potential follow-on contracts are
awarded. However, there will be a reduction of ESAPI monthly production
rates. The DLA is responsible for ESAPI sustainment and awarded three
ESAPI sustainment contracts in December 2007. DLA ESAPI sustainment
contracts will mitigate the delay in procuring the next generation
ballistic plate. The ESAPI sustainment contracts will ensure the
industrial base maintains the capability to manufacture ballistic
plates. The U.S. Army also is working with the vendors to reduce their
monthly delivery requirements to extend their production runs. This
reduction must be balanced to ensure there is no gap in fielding
requirements. Fielding requirements will always remain the priority.

32. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, is the Army still on schedule with its acquisition
goal of 966,000 ESAPI plates?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Yes. The Army completed
fielding ESAPI to deployed forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom in February 2006 and will procure the Army-
wide ESAPI requirement of 966,000 sets by May 2008.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

M4 RIFLES

33. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, the Army recently conducted extreme dust testing of
the M4 rifle and three other carbines. Officials at the Army Test and
Evaluation Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, tested 10 each of the 4
carbine models, firing a total of 60,000 rounds per model. What were
the results of the test?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The results of the test
showed two primary things. First, all four weapons were challenged by
an extreme environment and an extremely constrained maintenance
regimen, yet all the weapons performed well. Each weapon performed
greater than 98.6 percent of the time over 60,000 rounds. Second, all
of the weapons showed wear that was to be expected in a laboratory test
designed to accelerate the individual weapons' expected wear-out
period.
While this test was not scheduled in the programmed life of the M4,
the U.S. Army took the opportunity to use the data produced to further
improve the M4 Carbine. The test showed that in an extreme dust
environment, all weapons needed to be lubricated with a liberal coat of
the U.S. Army standard lube CLP instead of a light coat as previously
thought and all needed regular cleaning in accordance with the current
instructions in the manual which is: before every mission and daily in
dusty environments. There was a very small difference in performance
between all four weapons; i.e., the range in performance differential
between all the weapons was about 1 percent. This confirmed what the
previous market research showed, that there was no significant leap
ahead capability in the current market place. Engineers from both APG
and Picatinny Arsenal are conducting further analysis to further
improve all aspects of the weapon, as we have over the life of the
weapon, which is standard procedure for U.S. Army equipment including
all weapons.

34. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Speakes and Lieutenant
General Thompson, what is the way ahead for the Army and the M4?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army plans to continue
funding the M4 carbine due to high demand for M4s in theater
Operational Need Statements and the constant growth in M4 carbine
requirements experienced each year since September 11. The M4 carbine
requirement will be recompeted after June 2009 as the current
manufacturer, Colt, will no longer retain the Technical Data Package
Rights to the M4. The Army will conduct a full and open competition for
the production of future carbines. Prior to this competition, the
Training and Doctrine Command and the United States Army Infantry
Center will update the requirements document to make it Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System compliant, to
incorporate all modifications in the capabilities since the original
document was approved, and to account for improvements in carbine
technology. Results from testing, such as the recent dust test, any
lessons learned from the current operations, and industry developments
will also be incorporated into the new document as needed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Hillary Rodham
Clinton

ARMY TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEMS

35. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, what is the Army's current
(most updated) SINCGARS request for the fiscal year 2008 defense
supplemental?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army fiscal year 2008
SINCGARS defense supplemental request is $500.4 million.

36. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, has there been a change since
the request was submitted?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Yes. Of the $500.4 million
supplemental request, there was an OSD-directed decrement of $139.3
million applied to this program to address other higher Army
priorities. A supplemental balance of $361.1 million remains.

37. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, the fiscal year 2009 budget
request asks for $84.5 million for SINCGARS. Do you expect the second
supplemental request to ask for additional funding for SINCGARS?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The fiscal year 2009 budget
request was $84.5 million for SINCGARS requirements. This request will
satisfy the Army SINCGARS Radio System requirement. Currently, there is
no requirement to submit an fiscal year 2009 supplemental request for
SINCGARS. However, battlefield operational conditions will dictate
whether additional funding is required to meet any new emerging
requirements.

38. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, is it true that the Secretary
of the Army has recently directed that any future requirements for
SINCGARS capability be met through full and open competition, in
accordance with the specifications of the SINCGARS Operational
Requirements Document (ORD)? If so, why?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Yes. On March 27, 2008,
Secretary Geren received a SINCGARS decision brief on Requirements and
Acquisition Strategy. To ensure all vendors received a fair opportunity
for business, Secretary Geren directed a full and open competitive
procurement be conducted for the remaining 56,000 SINCGARS receiver-
transmitters (RTs) required to satisfy its Army Acquisition Objective
(AAO) of 581,000 RTs.

39. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, given the Army decision to
procure SINCGARS legacy technology over modern JTRS technology, what is
the justification to continue spending additional funds for GMR or
Handheld/Manpack/Small Form Fit (HMS) development (less the small form
factors)?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The JTRS program is the Army
tactical radio of the future. However, current operational conditions
and equipment demands dictate a need for a Combat Net Radio now to
conduct battlefield operations. The SINCGARS, with its proven
technology, satisfies that requirement. Upon validation and approval of
JTRS program milestones, the Army is programmed to migrate to this
future technology when available in fiscal year 2011.

40. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, has an acquisition strategy to
bridge to JTRS been developed? If so, what is it?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Yes. The Army is currently
refining its JTRS migration strategy which bridges current force
tactical radio capabilities to future force JTRS capabilities. The plan
requires internal Army staffing and is scheduled to be completed March
2009.

41. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, have you reexamined the
current tactical radio modernization plan in accordance with the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2008? If so, how?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Yes. The Army is constantly
reviewing its tactical radio modernization plan to ensure current
battlefield operational needs are met. The Army is refining its JTRS
migration strategy which will explain and layout the Army plan to
migrate current force radios to its future JTRS architecture. This plan
will be available March 2009.

42. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, what is the Army's position on
the Army Science Board recommendation to cease procuring SINCGARS and
transition to a JTRS approved product?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army Science Board Summer
study, Options for an Affordable LandWarNet, is being reviewed and
evaluated by senior Army leadership. The study must be briefed to the
Executive Office Council before an official Army position can be
determined. While the study is still in a pre-decisional draft form, we
expect the report will be finalized and released by early spring.

43. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, the Secretary of the Army made
a commitment to reexamine requirements and determine whether the
SINCGARS ORD continues to meet needed capabilities. Has the
reexamination taken place? If so, please explain the reexamination.
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army G3 did reexamine the
requirements and reviewed available commercial off-the-shelf systems to
determine if ``SINCGARS-like'' products could meet our requirements for
full spectrum combat. Our analysis indicated there were certain
operational capabilities that we could not afford to trade off without
significant operational risk. The SINCGARS ORD continues, at this
juncture, as our benchmark which guided our decision to competitively
compete future contract awards.

44. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, does the SINCGARS ORD require
an embedded Global Positioning System (GPS) capability and if so, are
all SINCGARS equipped with functional embedded GPS, including those
procured in the last 2 years?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The SINCGARS ORD, dated
August 14, 1998, states ``the system shall include embedded GPS
capability.'' The SINCGARS RTs procured in the last 2 years do include
an embedded GPS capability.

45. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, has the Army enforced full ORD
compliance for the program of record?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The SINCGARS ORD continues,
at this juncture, as our benchmark for a Combat Net Radio program of
record.

46. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, has the Army altered or waived
any of the requirements for SINCGARS?
General Speakes and General Thompson. No. The SINCGARS ORD
continues, at this juncture, as our benchmark for a Combat Net Radio
program of record. In 2005, because of emerging global war on terror
requirements and ITT's production inability to meet Army surge
requirements, an operational decision was made to accept risk and
procure the Harris AN/VRC-110 and the Thales AN/VRC-111 products which
augment the SINCGARS radio requirement and are currently satisfying a
Theater-specific requirement.

47. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, are all Army units integrated
into the tactical internet (TI) with the SINCGARS radio? If not, is a
JTRS approved product acceptable in non-TI environments?
General Speakes and General Thompson. Not all Army units require
integration into the TI with the SINCGARS radio. Some Combat Support
and Combat Service Support units have voice-only requirements and do
not require TI capability. Yes, a JTRS-approved product has been deemed
acceptable for non-TI environments only in Theater. Current SINCGARS
ORD requirements specify that ORD compliant radios must fill Modified
Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution and
Allowance requirements.

48. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, will the Army consider
utilizing SINCGARS capable commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) radios for
the MRAP vehicles? Please explain.
General Speakes and General Thompson. Yes. The Army is using the
Harris AN/VRC-110 and the Thales AN/VRC-111 radios in its MRAP
vehicles. These radios consist of two handheld RTs which are powered by
vehicular adapters and offer the soldier a ``jerk-n-run'' capability as
well as other multi-band capabilities. The MRAP vehicles are identified
as a Theater requirement. As previously mentioned, the Army has
procured the Harris AN/VRC-110 and the Thales AN/VRC-111, COTS radios
to augment its Theater radio requirement supporting global war on
terror. The SINCGARS radios are still issued against ORD-compliant
Modified Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution
and Allowance requirements.

49. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, please explain why the Army
now considers the AN/VRC-110/111 Vehicular Amplifier Adapter to be a
theater unique requirement.
General Speakes and General Thompson. The AN/VRC-110 and AN/VRC-111
are COTS products procured to augment SINCGARS and to satisfy Army
Theater requirements. Those products are being used to support the
Army's Up-Armored Vehicles requirement and portions of the MRAP vehicle
requirements. The SINCGARS radio is still the primary ORD-compliant
radio which is being issued to satisfy documented Modified Table of
Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution and Allowance
requirements. The Harris AN/VRC-110 and the Thales AN/VRC-111 were
procured, at Army risk, to meet surging operational demands, in which
the prime vendor (ITT) was unable to satisfy and the Army was not
willing to wait. The VRC-110 and VRC-111 offered a Command, Control,
Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance capability with minimal risk, but does not meet all ORD
requirements for a full spectrum capability.

50. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, what contract options are
available to the Army fiscal year 2007 main supplemental funding? Have
these options been exercised? If so, what was the value?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The current SINCGARS contract
with ITT has options which will allow award of fiscal year 2007 main
supplemental funding. The current contract with ITT has options up to
$2.2 billion. There is about $600 million remaining headspace on this
contract.

51. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, is there a ceiling on the
existing tactical radio contract? If so, what is the dollar amount? Has
the ceiling been reached? If not, when do you expect it will be
reached?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The current dollar ceiling on
the existing SINCGARS contract with ITT is about $2.2 billion. There is
about $600 million remaining headspace on this contract. We anticipate
we will reach the headspace on this contract in fiscal year 2008.

52. Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Clinton. Lieutenant General
Speakes and Lieutenant General Thompson, in fiscal year 2008 and
beyond, what other contracting alternatives has the Army explored? Has
the Army made a decision about how to proceed?
General Speakes and General Thompson. The Army has committed to
full and open competition for the next SINCGARS procurement. We are in
the process of reviewing options in light of validated requirements and
will have better fidelity regarding our acquisition strategy once the
competition is completed in late 2008. We will keep Congress informed
in regard to this matter and our acquisition way ahead.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

AIR FORCE AND NAVY AVIATION PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Pryor,
Chambliss, and Cornyn.
Committee staff member present: Cindy Pearson, assistant
chief clerk and security manager.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel;
and Sean J. Stackley, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
Senator Pryor; Samuel Zega, assistant to Senator Warner; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; and David Hanke,
assistant to Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Lieberman. The subcommittee will come to order. I
want to extend a welcome to our distinguished panel of
witnesses and thank each of you for appearing before the
subcommittee today.
This subcommittee meets against the backdrop of continued
bravery and exemplary performance by the members of our Armed
Forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and really throughout the world. I
think we always want to, as we begin specific inquiries, note
that reality with great appreciation.
We convene this session of the Airland Subcommittee to
discuss the present and future of aviation programs which come
under the jurisdiction of this Airland Subcommittee. Every year
we are faced with the challenge of balancing a number of
competing demands for limited resources and in some sense
balancing the demands of current operations with or against the
requirement for future modernization. Decisions we make today I
assure you we understand are important because in the most
direct sense they can result in lives being saved in the next
year or even years down the road.
So with that introduction, let me just touch on a few of
the issues that I hope that we will learn more about from the
witnesses today. Two years ago Congress authorized the Air
Force to enter into a multi-year procurement contract for the
F-22 aircraft program. Now that program is facing a production
shutdown. The fiscal year 2009 budget, that is the one that's
before Congress now, for F-22 includes neither funds for
advanced procurement of additional aircraft in 2010 nor money
to pay for line shutdown charges.
But I think the Air Force's view is clear on this,
particularly noting that General Moseley's unfunded priority
list--underline, ``priority list''--for fiscal year 2009
includes $497 million for advanced procurement for 24 aircraft
that would be produced in a later fiscal year. However, self-
evidently, others within the Department of Defense (DOD) hold a
view that the currently approved program of 183 F-22 aircraft
is enough to meet the needs of our warfighters. Now, the
subcommittee really needs to hear from our witnesses today more
about those differing views.
We should also get an update on where the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) stands today. We all know how important the JSF
is to the modernization of all three Services represented here
today.
Beyond that, there are a couple of other areas of concern
we have. One of these is the prospect for meeting future force
structure requirements. For example, today we are facing the
prospect that the Department of Navy program will lead to
potentially large gaps between the resources that the Chief of
Naval Operations has said he needs and the resources that will
be available to his successors.
Under current plans for Navy and Marine Corps tactical
aircraft acquisition, we are facing a shortfall that
optimistically will amount to 125 tactical fighters needed to
outfit our 10 aircraft carrier air wings and three Marine Corps
air wings. That's an optimistic view that we're going to be 125
planes short of what's needed.
With shortfalls that large, we could be faced with some
tough choices: drastically reducing the number of aircraft
available on short notice to the combatant commanders, either
because we have deployed understrength air wings or because we
did not deploy the carrier at all because of these aircraft
shortages. These are really urgent, important questions.
Perhaps even in asking them and documenting it in this way we
make the point that I know my friend and colleague, Senator
Cornyn, shares with me, which is that, though we are spending
obviously a very large amount in absolute dollars for the DOD
budget, the fact is that we are underfunding with those dollars
some critically necessary programs. So we want to do our best
to try to evaluate the needs and then authorize as close as we
can up to the level of those needs in the interest of our
national security.
I'm now pleased to call on my ranking member and coworker
in these efforts, Senator John Cornyn.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join the chairman in welcoming all of you here today.
While many focus on the contributions of our U.S. ground forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so, the efforts of U.S.
aviators on behalf of our Nation are nothing short of
exceptional. Our aviators have been actively engaged in the
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations for 17 years: the
first Gulf War, the enforcement of the Iraq no-fly zones, and
now Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF).
These deployments, in addition to operations elsewhere
throughout the world in support of humanitarian efforts, have
made maximum use of this Nation's air forces. Of course we all
extend an expression of gratitude to these men and women and
their families as they continue their sacrifice and service to
our Nation.
While we recognize the joint aviation's invaluable
contribution to defense, we face the challenge of balancing
competing demands for funding current operations and investing
in modernization. Since September 11, 2001, the balance has
been tilted toward current operations, to the neglect of
modernization. The shift is partly a result of the needs of the
Army and the Marine Corps ground forces as operations in the
Persian Gulf rightly demanded. Our Nation's ability to put off
aviation modernization, however, is fast coming to an end, and
I offer two quick examples.
For fiscal year 2009, the Air Force submitted an unfunded
priorities list of items that did not make it into the final
budget request totaling $18.7 billion. The Air Force's unfunded
list is 4 times the Navy's list, nearly 5 times the Army's, and
10 times the Marine Corps's list.
Last year during an Airland Subcommittee hearing, Navy
witnesses testified to a potential gap in strike fighters.
While the uncertainties of the service life of the current F-
18s and the production schedules for the future F-35 were
discussed, the potential gap could reach over 220 Navy aircraft
by the middle of the next decade.
We must collectively commit to properly funding aviation
modernization and then support those efforts. Moving forward,
we cannot lose sight of the contributions the current forces
are making, but we must adequately fund and support systems for
the next generation of aviators and airmen.
I'm particularly concerned with the actions taken, reports,
and rumors on the next generation, the so-called fifth
generation, tactical aircraft programs, the F-35 and F-22. Once
again, the F-35 JSF program eliminates funding for the
development of a second engine. Last year we held extensive
hearings on the subject, discussing the pros and cons of
ensuring that a competitive environment is maintained for the
production of aircraft engines. Yet, contrary to expert opinion
and congressional direction, this budget eliminates funding for
a second source, and I'd like to hear from our witnesses why
the Department chose not to follow the law.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently
released a report critical of the F-35 JSF. The GAO took
exception to the program's current risk reduction program,
schedule, and cost estimates. I'd like to hear from our
witnesses their response to the program critique by the GAO.
Recent press reports question the Department of Navy's
commitment to the program and I'd like to hear whether those
reports are accurate or not.
On the F-22, the fiscal year 2009 budget presented to
Congress neither funded advanced procurement for additional F-
22 aircraft beyond fiscal year 2009 nor included funding to
shut down the production line. As presented, the budget for the
F-22 is incomplete. I'd like to hear what our witnesses expect
Congress to do with the F-22 program.
Without getting into proprietary information or
jeopardizing ongoing protests, I'd like an update on other
aviation modernization efforts, including the new KC-45 tanker,
the next generation combat search and rescue helicopter, and
the VH-71 presidential helicopter program. I have concerns in
other areas as well and I hope the witnesses will address these
in their testimony or in the question and answer period that
will follow. The witnesses should expect questions on the
impact of aviation requirements resulting from the planned Army
and Marine Corps end strength increases, the latest DOD
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) roadmap, and efforts to make air
power more relevant to irregular warfare.
I thank the witnesses and I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
I think we'll begin with Mr. Balderson, based on seniority.
I don't know about age. Probably age, but seniority and
position and general civilian authority. We're not going to ask
you for any statements about your age, Mr. Balderson.
Mr. Balderson is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Air
Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development, and Acquisition. It's a pleasure to
have you here and why don't you begin now.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. BALDERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR AIR PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will say I'm
senior only in age at this table.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cornyn: I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss Navy and Marine Corps
aviation programs. I do have a written statement that I
respectfully submit for the record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection.
Mr. Balderson. Out of respect for the subcommittee's time,
I will limit my opening remarks to the following points. First,
the Department of the Navy's acquisition team continues to work
aggressively to identify efficiencies in the development,
testing, and procurement of the products and services we
provide to the fleet. The fiscal year 2009 budget request
reflects considerable effort in identifying affordable
solutions for the Department's aviation programs, and we are
striving to address Navy and Marine Corps warfighting needs in
the most cost effective way possible. As a prominent example,
60 percent of the production aircraft included in the fiscal
year 2009 President's budget are being purchased via multi-year
procurement contracts.
Second, the fiscal year 2009 budget request is a balance
between sustaining our fleet of legacy aircraft while also
recapitalizing with newer, more capable, and more reliable
aircraft. Our proposed plan procures 206 aircraft--that's 134
fixed wing, 69 rotary wing, and 3 UAVs--and continues
development of the F-35, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, the P-8A,
the CH-53K, the E-18G, the VH-71, and a number of other
critical recapitalization programs.
Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude by thanking the members of this
subcommittee for your outstanding support. The great efforts of
our men and women in theater today and tomorrow will reflect
the return on your investment in them and the systems they take
to fight.
Once again, thank you and I look forward to your questions,
and I'd be most happy to address any of the naval topics that
you listed in your opening statements.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Balderson and Admiral
Myers follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. William M. Balderson and RADM Allen G.
Myers, USN
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for providing us with this opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2009 tactical aviation
programs.

AVIATION PROGRAMS SUMMARY/OVERVIEW

The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request implements a
recapitalization strategy to obtain new capabilities--and initiatives
to reduce operating costs while sustaining legacy fleet aircraft that
are performing magnificently in current operations. We continue to work
with industry in seeking ways to reduce costs via multi-year
procurement (MYP) contracting strategies on the F/A-18 E/F airframe, H-
60S/R, and the V-22; and we will implement a `prototype' strategy on
the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) to ensure high technology
readiness and reduced risk prior to entering System Development and
Demonstration (SDD). The fiscal year 2009 budget plan ensures that the
Navy and Marine Corps maintain a joint force able to meet the spectrum
of threats. Our proposal continues the development of the F-35, the E-
2D Advanced Hawkeye, EA-18G, the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter
Replacement Aircraft, the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement aircraft,
Unmanned Aviation, and new strike weapons capabilities. In total, Navy/
Marine Corps aviation will procure 134 additional tactical and fixed-
wing aircraft, 69 rotary-wing aircraft, and 3 Vertical Take Off and
Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for a total of 206 aircraft.

I. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT/TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $1.5 billion research,
development, test, and evaluation, Navy (RDT&E,N) for continuation of
F-35 SDD and $1.98 billion Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) for the Low
Rate Initial Production lot 3 (LRIP 3) for 8 Short Take-off and
Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft and the long lead requirements for 14
STOVL and 4 CV aircraft as part of LRIP 4.
A fifth generation aircraft, the F-35 will enhance precision strike
capability with unprecedented stealth, range, sensor fusion, improved
radar performance, combat identification and electronic attack
capabilities compared to legacy platforms. The F-35 carrier variant
(CV) complements the F/A-18 E/F Block II and EA-18G in providing long-
range strike capability and much improved persistence over the
battlefield. The STOVL combines the multi-role versatility of the
legacy F/A-18 and the basing flexibility of the AV-8B. The commonality
designed into the F-35 program will minimize acquisition and operating
costs of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft, and allow enhanced
interoperability with our sister Service and allies.
Impressive technical progress continues across the development
program. The SDD jets are taking longer to build than anticipated but
setting new standards for quality, and manufacturing efficiencies
improve with each jet. In flight testing, the initial Conventional
Take-off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft (AA-1) continues to demonstrate
superb performance and reduce program risk, with 31 sorties flown
through mid-February 2008. In addition, the flying avionics test bed
has flown 91 hours and has accomplished significant risk reduction on
the avionics systems. The first STOVL variant (BF-1) roll-out occurred
on-time in December 2007 and STOVL First Flight is currently projected
for fourth quarter fiscal year 2008. Manufacture and assembly of all
remaining flight test aircraft is well underway. LRIP 1 contract for
two CTOL aircraft awarded in 2007, as was the LRIP II long lead
contract for six CTOLs and six STOVLs. STOVL first flight is a key
event for award later this year of STOVL fiscal year 2008 LRIP 2 full
funding and LRIP 3 long lead funding. The CV Air System Critical Design
Review was successfully completed June 2007 and CV first flight is
scheduled for 2009. The STOVL and CV variants are projected to meet
their respective Key Performance Parameters.
The F135 engine development has completed 9,000+ test hours on 12
engines through mid-February 2008. F135 engine test failures in August
and February occurred in nearly identical operating modes. Both Pratt &
Whitney and the F-35 Program Office understand the causes of these
failures and are actively developing a mitigation plan to minimize the
schedule impacts to the program.
The Department of the Navy (DON) supports the omission of continued
funding for the alternate engine (F136) in the President's budget
request. The DON maintains there are higher priority needs in the
budget and that the risks associated with a single engine supplier
continue to be manageable. The three fiscal year 2007 congressionally-
directed engine studies have been completed. The conclusions, while
supportive of competition in general, reinforced the Department's
initial findings that the projected savings from not doing competition
outweigh the investment and sustainment costs.
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $1.9 billion in APN for 23 F/
A-18 E/F Block II aircraft for the final year of the 5-year MYP
contract (fiscal year 2005 to 2009). The F/A-18 E/F continues to
transition into the fleet, improving the survivability and strike
capability of the carrier air wing. The Super Hornet provides a 40
percent increase in combat radius, 50 percent increase in endurance,
and 25 percent increase in weapons payload over our older legacy
Hornets. Over 410 F/A-18 E/Fs will have been procured through fiscal
year 2008 which is on track to complete procurement of the program of
record of 493 aircraft by 2012. The Super Hornet has used a spiral
development approach to incorporate new technologies, such as the Joint
Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infra-
Red (FLIR), Shared Reconnaissance Pod System, and Multifunctional
Information Distribution System data link. The Active Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radar system in our Block II aircraft has
completed operational testing and the full rate production decision was
approved in June 2007. The first 2 tactical AESA-equipped F/A-18F
squadrons have now received all 12 of their allotted aircraft with full
Integrated Logistics Support support. The FA-18 E/F fiscal year 2009
budget request also includes $129.3 million to implement commonality,
maintain capabilities, and improve reliability and structural safety.
F/A-18 A/B/C/D Legacy Hornet
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $321.6 million for the
continuation of the systems upgrade programs for the F/A-18 platform.
As the F/A-18 program transitions to the F/A-18 E/F, the existing
inventory of over 648 F/A-18 A/B/C/Ds (as of February 2008) will
continue to comprise half of the Carrier Strike Group until 2012.
Included in this request is the continued procurement of recently
fielded systems such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System,
Advanced Targeting FLIR, Multi-Function Information Distribution
System, and a Digital Communications System. The Marine Corps continues
to upgrade 61 Lot 7-9 F/A-18A models to a Lot 21 F/A-18C avionics
aircraft capability with digital communications and a tactical data
link. The Marine Corps anticipates programmed upgrades to enhance the
current capabilities of the F/A-18 C/D with digital communications,
tactical data link and tactical reconnaissance systems. This upgrade
ensures that our F/A-18s remain viable and relevant in support of
Tactical Air Integration and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. The
Marines expect the F/A-18 to remain in the active inventory until 2023.
The Marines are also employing the Litening targeting pod on the F/A-18
A+/C/D aircraft in expeditionary operations, to include Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). When combined with data link hardware, the Litening pod
provides real time video to ground forces engaged with the enemy
through Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver workstations.
Continued analysis of tactical air (TACAIR) inventories will continue
throughout 2007 and beyond to determine the health of the legacy fleet
as the F/A-18 A-D is transitioned to the F-35.
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)/EA-18G
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $128.9 million in RDT&E,N for
continuation of SDD and $1.68 billion in APN for 22 full rate
production EA-18G Lot 3 aircraft. The EA-18G continues its development
as the Navy's replacement for the EA-6B AEA aircraft. The EA-18G will
replace carrier-based Navy EA-6B aircraft by 2012. A total quantity of
27 aircraft will be procured in LRIP. The Navy is using the F/A-18 E/F
MYP contract to buy the Lot 3 aircraft in fiscal year 2009. SDD
continues on schedule with the two development aircraft having first
flown in 2006 and are currently in developmental test at NAWC, Patuxent
River. The program is on track to begin Operational Evaluation in fall
2008, leading to Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2009
and Full Operating Capability (FOC) in fiscal year 2012.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is working to develop adaptable,
modular, and open architecture hardware, firmware, and software for a
next-generation jamming capability that will be hosted by the EA-18G.
In this regard, the Navy is working with the Air Force on jamming
transmitters, and has leveraged previous work completed as part of
their B-52 Standoff Jammer (SOJ). The Navy and Air Force technology
teams continue to meet quarterly to ensure their efforts are
coordinated. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget requests $69.3
million of RDT&E,N under PE 0604270N (EW Development) of which $46.1
million is for Next Generation Jammer technology maturation.
The EA-6B is in near continuous use in Iraq and Afghanistan today
in support of our troops on the ground as DOD's only tactical
electronic attack aircraft performing communications jamming and
information operation missions. Program priorities are current
readiness of EA-6B and ALQ-99 systems, deployment of increased airborne
electronic attack (AEA) capability through products such as ICAP II/III
aircraft upgrades, ICAP III kits, and Low Band Transmitters. In an
effort to achieve those objectives, the fiscal year 2009 budget
requests $33.4 million in APN for procurement of critical AEA products
and continuing EA-6B readiness improvements to increase operational
availability and reduce operating cost of this low density high-demand
aircraft. The EA-6B upgrades include procuring 22 Low Band Transmitters
to provide a new jamming capability and replacement of aging
transmitters to be employed on legacy EA-6B and new EA-18G aircraft.
The budget request also provides for operational safety and cost-wise
readiness improvement initiatives to ensure availability of the aging
EA-6B aircraft.

AV-8B
For the AV-8B, the fiscal year 2009 budget requests $29.9 million
RDT&E,N funding to support development of the Engine Life Management
Plan, Tactical Moving Map Display, Litening pod updates, and aircraft
safety and reliability modifications, to include a Readiness Management
Plan. We also request $54.5 million of procurement funding for engine
production line transition efforts, Open Systems Core Avionics
Requirement installs, engine sustainment efforts, Day Attack Upgrade/
Attrition Recovery efforts, trainer aircraft upgrade efforts, and
Litening pod upgrades.

P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)/P-3C
The future of the Navy's maritime patrol force includes plans for
sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the force. Results
of the P-3 Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) revealed the need for
an aggressive approach to P-3 airframe sustainment. The accumulation of
two decades of heavy demand by the combatant commanders, to include
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, resulted in
advanced fatigue. Our fiscal year 2009 budget request includes $297.9
million to sustain the P-3C until transition to the P-8A Multi-Mission
Maritime aircraft. Over half of this amount ($152.7 million) is for
Special Structural Inspections-Kits (SSI-K), which will allow for
airframe sustainment to support the CNO's P-3 Fleet Response Plan, as
well as supporting EP-3E requirements which are executed within the P-3
SSI-K program. In December 2007, ongoing refinement of the model used
to calculate wing stress indicated that the lower wing surface of the
P-3 aircraft had fatigue beyond standards for acceptable risk resulting
in the grounding of an additional 39 P-3 aircraft. To correct this
issue, additional funding is being sought to mitigate operational
impacts. In addition to fiscal year 2008 requests, fiscal year 2009
funding is being separately requested for P-3C wing panels, supporting
hardware and installation; acceleration of the Fatigue Life Management
Program; and P-8A acceleration. Key elements of the sustainment
approach are strict management of requirements and flight hour use,
special structural inspections to keep the aircraft safely flying, and
increased use of simulators to satisfy training requirements. The
fiscal year 2009 budget request also reflects a systems sustainment and
modernization budget of $145.2 million to continue to address a
multitude of mission essential efforts to replace obsolete components,
integrate open architecture technology, and leverage commonality.
To recapitalize these critical aircraft, the Navy is developing the
P-8A MMA, a 737 commercial-derivative aircraft. This past year, the
program completed both its overall system Critical Design Review and
its Design Readiness Review. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests
$1,132 million in RDT&E,N for continuation of P-8A SDD efforts. Program
objectives for 2009 include executing a contract option for three Stage
II test aircraft, and completing the first flight of the initial Stage
I test aircraft. Our comprehensive and balanced approach has allowed
for re-capitalization of these critical assets.

EP-3 Replacement/Sustainment
The Navy plans to recapitalize its aging EP-3E fleet with a land-
based, manned, airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) platform, called EPX, to meet maritime requirements. The fiscal
year 2009 budget requests $74.6 million in RDTE,N funds for this effort
to support studies focused on capabilities, documentation, and
technology development. Our plan also requests $55.7 million in RDT&E,N
and $72.4 million in APN to address EP-3E signals intelligence sensor
and communications equipment obsolescence issues that are necessary to
keep the EP-3E viable until the replacement platform is fielded, and to
develop follow-on capabilities that can be migrated to the EPX. This
funding supports Operational Test (OT) and procurement for JMOD Common
Configuration (JCC) Spiral 2 data fusion capabilities, and engineering
development for JCC Spiral 3 and Recapitalization Capabilities
Migration (RCM).

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE)
The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye is a critical enabler of transformational
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that provides robust
overland capability against current and future cruise missile-type
targets. The Advanced Hawkeye program modernizes the E-2 platform by
replacing the current radar and other system components to maintain
open ocean capability. The radar for the Advanced Hawkeye will provide
enhanced performance overland and in the littoral environment while
improving performance against clutter, adding transformational
surveillance, and theater air and missile defense capabilities. The
fiscal year 2009 budget requests $484.2 million in RDT&E,N for
continuation of SDD and $589.1 million in APN-1 for three Low-Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) Lot I aircraft. Two SDD aircraft are in
flight test with the first mission system flight completed in December
2007. An `Operational Assessment' is scheduled in fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2008 to support a Milestone-C decision planned for March
2009.

KC-130J
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $153.5 million in APN for 2
KC-130J aircraft. To date, the Marine Corps have taken delivery of 29
KC-130J aircraft, with 7 more aircraft on contract to be delivered
during fiscal years 2008 through 2010. The planned procurement of 2
aircraft in fiscal year 2009 will bring the total number of KC-130J
aircraft to 38. The KC-130J provides major enhancements to the current
fleet of KC-130s, extending its range, payload, and refueling
capabilities while reducing operating costs. Additionally, we have
continued to ensure the tactical capability of our existing KC-130R/T
series aircraft by installing night vision kits and upgraded aircraft
survivability equipment.

T-6B Joint Primary Air Training System (JPATS)
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $289.3 million to procure 44
aircraft under an Air Force MYP contract. The T-6 is the primary flight
training aircraft for Navy and Marine Corps pilots, and naval flight
officers. It replaces the T-34C. The current requirement is for 315
aircraft, of which 98 aircraft have been procured to date.
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM)
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $125.6 million in APN for the
procurement of 73 ALQ-214 on-board Radio Frequency Countermeasure and
$24.7 million in ammunition procurement for 558 ALE-55 Fiber Optic
Towed Decoys, pending a full rate production decision. The IDECM Block
3/ALE-55 Integrated Development Test and Operational Test (IDT/OT)
identified several anomalies which required correction. The corrective
actions have been incorporated, the system has been certified for
Operational Test, and a Full-Rate Production decision is expected in
the first quarter of fiscal year 2009.

Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) Onboard Jammer
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $31.5 million in RDT&E,N for
development of an on-board jammer that will employ state-of-the-art
Digital Radio Frequency Memory devices to replace the ALQ-126B Jammer
that was last produced in 1991. This effort will measurably improve the
survivability of tactical naval aircraft by delaying, denying, and
defeating air-to-air and surface-to-air missile system threats
operating in the radio frequency spectrum. The lead platform for the
DRFM program is the F/A-18 C/D, followed by the AV-8B. An Analysis of
Alternatives has been initiated to investigate alternative solutions,
costs, and schedules. This developmental effort is late-to-need and the
capability is required to pace rapidly proliferating threat systems.

Infrared Countermeasures (IRCM)
The Navy has a multi-faceted approach to providing aircrew
protection against current and next generation IR guided MANPADs. The
fiscal year 2009 budget requests $63.2 million in RDT&E,N for continued
development of the TADIRCM Program to provide improved missile warning
systems for the MV-22 (lead platform) and smaller USN helicopters such
as H-1 & H-60 (follow-on). The fiscal year 2009 budget also requests
$25.8 million of APN-5 and $226.0 million of `APN-5 Supplemental'
funding for procurement of the advanced `Large Aircraft Infrared
Counter-Measure System' (LAIRCM) for USMC CH-53E and CH-46E heavy-lift
rotary aircraft. The DON is also pursuing advanced expendables under
the PANMC appropriation, and plans to complete fielding of an upgraded
AAR-47B(V)2 Missile Warning System to provide improved probability of
detection in clutter environments for those aircraft not getting DIRCM
upgrades with the additional fiscal year 2009 APN-5 supplemental
request.

II. ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT

VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $1,047.8 million in RDT&E,N
for continuation of SDD for the VH-71 program. The VH-71 program is
executing an evolutionary acquisition approach through a two-part
incremental development to deliver a safe, survivable and capable
Presidential Vertical Lift aircraft while providing uninterrupted
communications with all required agencies. The goal of Increment-1 is
to satisfy an urgent need to provide a replacement Presidential
helicopter with capability equivalent to or better than the current
inventory of aircraft. Increment-2 will provide enhanced performance
and state-of-the-art communications capabilities to satisfy long-term
needs. The program is completing Increment-1 integrated test utilizing
three government and two contractor test articles. Additionally, the
government will take delivery of five Increment-1 Pilot Production
aircraft. Increment-2 development will continue as this phase of the
program is restructured, and the program progresses towards a System
Functional Review. It is anticipated that a second quarter Defense
Acquisition Board will approve a new VH-71 program baseline
significantly reducing program concurrency and schedule risk. The
Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program continues to receive
executive level oversight and review in an effort to fully evaluate
program progress while mitigating risks wherever possible.

V-22
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $2.2 billion in APN for
procurement of 30 MV-22s and continued development of follow-on block
upgrades. Fiscal year budget request 2009 is the second year of the MYP
contract. Our MYP strategy supports a continued cost reduction and
affordability trend, provides a stable basis for industry, and best
supports the warfighter. The Advance Acquisition Contract funding
associated with the second year of the MYP and fiscal year 2008
Economic Ordering Quantity and Cost Reduction Investments was awarded
in March 2008.
The DON is developing, testing, evaluating, procuring, and fielding
a tilt rotor, Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft for
Joint Service application. The V-22 Program is designed to provide an
aircraft to meet the amphibious/vertical assault needs of the Marine
Corps, the strike rescue needs of the Navy, and the special operations
needs of the Air Force and Special Operations Command. The MV-22
variant will replace the CH-46E in the Marine Corps. The CV-22 variant
provides a new capability and will augment the MC-130 in the Air Force/
Special Operations Command inventory for special operations
infiltration, extraction, and resupply missions. The existing MH-53
fleet will be drawn down commensurate with the fielding of the CV-22.
V-22 capability is being increased and fielded over time via a block
upgrade acquisition strategy. MV-22 Block A provides a ``Safe and
Operational Test and Training Asset'' configuration that is supporting
developmental flight test, operational flight test and fleet training.
Block B provides for correction of previously identified deficiencies
and suitability improvements. Block C provides mission enhancements,
primarily in the areas of environmental control systems upgrades and
mission systems improvements. CV-22 Block 0/10 is a CV-unique
configuration for Special Operations Capabilities to include radar and
electronic countermeasures upgrades. CV-22 Block 20 provides an
enhanced CV-unique configuration with planned communications and
aircraft system performance upgrades. Both Osprey variants continue
along their prescribed roadmaps for follow-on developmental and
operational test. The CV-22 Program is currently in IOT&E. The MV-22
has successfully completed Operational Evaluation and the first
operational deployment is underway.

AH-1Z/UH-1Y
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $3.8 million in RDT&E,N for
continued product improvements and $474.1 million in APN for 20 AH-1Z/
UH-1Y aircraft. The H-1 Upgrades Program will replace the Marine Corps'
AH-1W and UH-1N helicopters with state-of-the-art AH-1Z and UH-1Y
models. The program is a key modernization effort designed to resolve
existing safety deficiencies, enhance operational effectiveness, and
extend the service life of both aircraft. Additionally, the commonality
gained between the AH-1Z and UH-1Y (84 percent) will significantly
reduce life-cycle costs and logistical footprint, while increasing the
maintainability and deployability of both aircraft. The program will
provide the Marine Corps with 180 AH-1Z helicopters and 100 UH-1Y
models through a combination of remanufacturing and new production.
The first lot of low rate production aircraft has been delivered as
well as several aircraft from the second lot. The final phase of OPEVAL
is ongoing and a full rate production decision is expected later this
year. We are developing the capability to newly fabricate some of the
AH-1Z aircraft to reduce the number of AH-1W aircraft removed from
service for remanufacturing. This will be particularly critical as the
annual production rate increases. The optimum mix of remanufactured and
newly fabricated aircraft is being evaluated with the results to be
reflected in future budget requests.

MH-60R and MH-60S
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $1,185.8 million in APN and
$70.3 million in RDT&E,N for continued replacement of the Light
Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) MK III SH-60B and carrier-based
SH-60F helicopters with the new configuration designated as the MH-60R.
This program reached full-rate production with the first operational
squadron standing up in 2006. The fiscal year 2009 budget also requests
$549.7 million in APN and $47.3 million in RDT&E,N funds for the MH-
60S, to continue development of the Organic Airborne Mine
Countermeasures (Block II) and the Armed Helo (Block III) missions. The
MH-60S is the Navy's primary combat support helicopter designed to
support Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups. It will replace four
legacy platforms with a newly manufactured H-60 airframe. The Army and
Navy are executing a platform multi-year contract that includes both
the MH-60R and MH-60S, and a second multi-year contract for integration
of mission systems into the MH-60R.

CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement Program
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $570.5 million RDT&E,N to
continue SDD of the CH-53K, which will replace the Marine Corps'
current heavy-lift helicopter, the CH-53E ``Super Stallion.'' The CH-
53K program is on track to conduct a Preliminary Design Review later
this year and the Critical Design Review in late fiscal year 2009.
The legacy CH-53E was built for sustained shipboard operations and
first flown in 1974, the CH-53E continues to demonstrate its value as
an expeditionary heavy-lift platform. This aging but very relevant
helicopter is in high demand, making significant contributions to
missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa; non-combatant
evacuation operations in Lebanon; and disaster relief operations around
the world. Expeditionary heavy-lift capabilities will continue to be
critical to successful sea-based operations in future anti-access,
area-denial environments, enabling sea basing and the joint operating
concepts of force application and focused logistics.
As a design evolution of the CH-53E, the new-build CH-53K will
fulfill sea-based, heavy-lift requirements not resident in any of
today's platforms, and directly contribute to the increased agility,
lethality, and persistent presence of Joint Task Forces and Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces. The CH-53K will include significant enhancements to
extend range and payload performance; expand survivability and force
protection capabilities; improve inter-modal cargo handling and turn-
around; and meet interoperability requirements while reducing heavy-
lift operations and support costs.
The CH-53K will be capable of transporting 27,000 pounds to austere
landing sites at distances of 110 nautical miles under challenging
environmental conditions. Task Force commanders of 2015 and beyond will
then have the option to rapidly insert, to the far sides of the
littorals, a force equipped with armored combat vehicles and heavy
weapons at a rate equivalent to two uparmored High Mobility Multi-
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) per sortie. To sustain that force, the CH-53K
will be the critical air connector to sea-based logistics, transporting
up to three independent loads per sortie, with each load tailored to
individual receiving units. This efficient, reliable, cost-effective,
heavy-lift capability will also address critical challenges in
maintainability, reliability, and affordability found in present-day
operations.

III. WEAPONS

In an era of continuing global uncertainty and shifting threats,
the DON is developing and deploying air-to-air and strike weapons to
enhance our warfighter's capabilities in an evolving and uncertain
security environment. Our fiscal year 2009 budget request for each new
weapon or weapon system modification program is directed towards
deterring potential aggressors, power-projection, sea-control, or other
maritime and expeditionary warfare security objectives. Our budget
request would provide resources for weapon systems that directly
support troops deployed in the field--as well as weapon systems that
will shape our plans to address potential near-peer competitors. The
Navy/Marine Corps weapons programs take into account the lessons-
learned from ongoing combat operations as well as the results of our
research, development, and test efforts. The resulting fiscal year 2009
weapons budget request provides for a portfolio of affordable weapons
programs that is balanced between solutions to address global war on
terrorism threats and development of new military capabilities.

Direct Attack Moving Target Capability
In response to an urgent requirement identified by the combatant
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DON approved a Rapid Deployment
Capability (RDC) in fiscal year 2008 to develop a Direct Attack Moving
Target Capability known as DAMTC. DAMTC improves our ability to attack
and strike moving targets by leveraging off of the highly successful,
congressionally-supported procurement of dual-mode systems. The fiscal
year 2009 budget requests $35.9 million to transition the RDC to a
formal acquisition program, support a competitive acquisition strategy,
and acquire 2,758 additional weapons from potentially multiple sources
at reduced costs.

Joint Air-to-Ground Missile
The DON, in conjunction with our Army partners, received formal
approval from USD(AT&L) to proceed with the development of the JAGM in
January 2008. JAGM will become the next-generation, forward firing
precision-guided munition capable of being launched from Navy/Marine
Corps fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned platforms with both global
war on terrorism and conventional warfare applications. Under USD(AT&L)
direction, the JAGM program implements a technology development
strategy to carry two contractors through Prototyping and Test and the
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) phase of the program. Using a rolling
down-select strategy, the Navy and Army will determine how far beyond
PDR the two contractors should potentially be carried to ensure a high-
level of technical maturity and risk reduction before proceeding into a
formal SDD program. The intent behind this prototyping and technology
development strategy is to improve the probability of overall program
success and reduce program costs through competition. To support this
critical development program, our fiscal year 2009 budget requests
approval of $62.3 million of RDT&E,N to implement this acquisition
strategy.

Hellfire Weapon System
While the DON develops JAGM, we are requesting continued support
for legacy Hellfire weapons. Hellfire continues to be one of the
priority weapons in the global war on terrorism and provides our Navy/
Marine Corps warfighters the ability to attack targets in the caves of
Afghanistan as well as the urban canyons of Baghdad. Our fiscal year
2009 budget request is for $95.4 million for 1,068 weapons with a mix
of thermobaric, blast/fragmentation, and anti-armor warheads to provide
the maximum operational flexibility to our warfighters.

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
The combat proven JSOW family of joint Navy and Air Force air-to-
ground weapons continues on cost and schedule to develop a JSOW-C1
variant. JSOW-C1 adds a `moving target capability' to the highly
successful baseline JSOW-C variant with the addition of a datalink and
guidance software improvements. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests
$22.5 million for continued JSOW-C1 development and $149.1 million for
JSOW-C production totaling 496 all-up-rounds to fill our weapons
magazines that remain below approved Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements.
Production of other JSOW variants remains deferred as we continue to
work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and our sister Service
to resolve unexploded battlefield ordnance issues that are of a concern
to the Department and our Allies.

Tactical Tomahawk BLK IV Cruise Missile
The Tactical Tomahawk budget request supports the continued
procurement of this combat proven, deep-attack weapon in order to meet
ship-fill loadouts and potential combat requirements. The BLK IV
Tactical Tomahawk missile is in a full-rate production status and the
fiscal year 2009 budget request is $281.1 million for an additional 207
BLK IV weapons and associated support.

Harpoon Block III Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
The DON is upgrading our air-launched and surface-launched Harpoon
cruise missiles to provide the all-weather, anti-surface warfare (ASuW)
capability needed to operate with `improved selectivity' in the
cluttered littoral environment. Under the Harpoon BLK III Program, the
Navy is upgrading this very capable system to enhance our standoff ASuW
operations by integration of: network; two-way data-link; and GPS
capability for use under stringent littoral battle-space rules of
engagement. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $68.2 million in
RDT&E,N to continue development of this capability.

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB II)
The DON is partnering with the Air Force on the development of the
Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) program. SDB II provides an adverse
weather, day or night standoff capability against mobile, moving, and
fixed targets--that also allows for target prosecution while minimizing
collateral damage. SDB II is of special interest to the Department as
it will be integrated into the `internal carriage' of Navy/Marine Corps
variants of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). SDB II acquisition consists
of a competitive development, risk reduction phase between two industry
teams with a down-select at Milestone-B that is estimated to occur in
early fiscal year 2010. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $19.6
million of RDT&E,N for the continued development of this joint program.

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)
The AARGM development program transforms the legacy High-Speed
Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) into an affordable, lethal, and flexible
time-sensitive strike weapon system. AARGM adds multi-spectral
targeting capability with supersonic fly-out to destroy sophisticated
enemy air defenses and expand upon the traditional anti-radiation
missile target set. The program has completed all design reviews, began
its formal test program in fiscal year 2007, and is scheduled to be
deployed on the F/A-18 Hornet in 2010. The fiscal year 2009 budget
requests $16.4 million for the development and test program and $42.7
million for low-rate initial production of tactical and training
weapons.

Sidewinder AIM-9X Air-to-Air Missile
The Joint Navy/Air Force (Navy-led) Sidewinder missile is the
newest variant of the Sidewinder family and is the only short-range
infrared air-to-air missile integrated on USN/USAF strike-fighter
aircraft. This fifth generation-9X weapon incorporates high off-bore
sight acquisition capability and thrust vectoring to achieve superior
maneuverability and provides increased sensitivity through an imaging
infrared focal plane array seeker and advanced processing. The fiscal
year 2009 budget requests $6.7 million for research, development, and
test efforts, and $57.5 million for production of 205 all-up-rounds and
associated hardware.

Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) AIM-120
AMRAAM is a Joint Navy/Air Force (Air Force-led) advanced, medium-
range missile that counters existing aircraft and cruise missile
threats with advanced electronic attack capabilities operating at high/
low altitudes from both beyond visual range and within visual range.
AMRAAM provides an air-to-air first look, first shot, first kill
capability working within a networked environment in support of the
Navy's Sea Power-21 Theater Air and Missile Defense Mission Area. The
fiscal year 2009 budget requests $8.6 million for research,
development, test and evaluation efforts and $146.8 million for
production of 147 all-up-rounds and associated hardware.

IV. OTHER

Strike Fighter Shortfall
Our aviation plan balances aviation capabilities through cost-wise
investments in recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization
programs. One of the issues we will be dealing with in the fiscal year
2010 budget development process is the strike fighter shortfall.
F/A-18 A/B/C/D aircraft are reaching life limits and will require
extensions to bridge the gap to JSF. The Service Life Assessment
Program (SLAP) is currently assessing the remaining life on these
airframes. The initial SLAP analytical data necessary to determine
extension to 10,000 flight hours was released in January 2008. Costing
data to support the extension is planned to be released in June 2008,
and the required engineering change proposals to support the extension
will begin to be developed in July 2008.
The best estimate for the most likely magnitude of the strike
fighter shortfall is a projected 125 aircraft shortfall for the entire
Department and 69 for the Navy in 2017, assuming the program of record.
Our air wings will be increasingly more capable as legacy Hornets
are replaced by the modern, more capable JSF aircraft. However, delays
to the JSF program, budget cuts reducing JSF and/or F/A-18 E/F
procurement, or early Hornet retirement will increase the projected
Strike Fighter shortfall. The impact of procurement reduction would
directly impact our ability to provide warfighting effects to the
combatant commanders.

SUMMARY

The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request reflects
considerable effort in identifying affordable solutions for the
Department's aviation programs through a balance between sustaining
fielded capabilities, as they are employed in the global war on
terrorism and continued forward presence worldwide, and a substantive
recapitalization effort that will deliver significantly better
capabilities to the warfighter. The Department's aviation acquisition
team continues to work aggressively to identify efficiencies in the
development, testing, and subsequent procurement of platforms,
components, and weapons systems in order to ensure that investments
made result in quality products and services provided to the fleet.
In closing Mr. Chairman, we thank you for the opportunity to
testify before your subcommittee regarding the DON's aviation programs.

Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Secretary Balderson.
While we're with the Navy, why don't we offer General
Trautman and Admiral Myers the opportunity to testify.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE J. TRAUTMAN III, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

General Trautman. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Cornyn, and distinguished members of the subcommittee: It's a
pleasure for me to be before you today to discuss the 2009
budget submission as it relates to Marine Corps aviation. The
Marine Corps is operating at the highest operational tempo in
decades. We are flying our aircraft hard, deploying our marines
often, and doing our best to take care of families, who are
growing tired under the strain of the operational pace we're
required to maintain. However, the magnificent men and women
who serve our Corps continue to meet every challenge that comes
their way.
As we speak, the aviation combat element of the 24th Marine
Expeditionary Unit is deployed in support of a force of over
3,400 marines in Afghanistan. When combined with the forces
already in Iraq and those that are rotated through the Pacific,
this year will see us reach a new operational peak, with 68
percent of our squadrons either deployed or preparing to
deploy.
The many accomplishments of Marine aviation over the past
year are a direct reflection of the extraordinary dedication to
duty and tireless pursuit of mission accomplishment that is the
hallmark of your Marine Corps. I know that I speak for each and
every one of them when I thank you today for your equally
tireless dedication to those who must serve in harm's way.
Over a decade ago, with exceptional support from
visionaries in Congress, the Marine Corps made a conscious
decision to make the MV-22 Osprey and the F-35B Lighting II the
centerpieces of our future warfighting concepts of operation.
As the first combat deployment of the Osprey in Iraq comes to a
close this week, our abiding belief in the significant benefits
of tilt rotor technology has been validated in the skies over
Iraq.
We are similarly committed to the vitally important fifth
generation warfighting capabilities resident in JSF. The short
take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) JSF enables flexible,
distributed shipboard expeditionary airfield basing; rapid
response to crises; high sortie generation rates; a small
footprint; and vastly improved survivability. The STOVL concept
is predicated on the utility of austere forward basing at a
time when conventional basing and access are projected to be
less and less available, either through risk of enemy attack or
the vagaries of politically imposed operating restrictions.
We see F-35 and V-22, along with the KC-130J, H-1 upgrades,
and the CH-53K, as part of an essential bridge from the aging
legacy platforms we must fly in combat today to the advanced
aviation warfighting capabilities we so desperately need in the
future.
My respect for the accomplishments of the men and women who
comprise Marine aviation past and present is only exceeded by
my confidence that, with your continued support, we are
properly poised to continue the success of our current
endeavors and to meet our future challenges. Your Marine Corps
is operationally engaged and working hard to maintain our
hallmark of 232 years of warfighting excellence.
I would like to close by expressing my gratitude for the
brave warriors of every Service who are committed to defending
this great Nation both at home and abroad.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Trautman follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III, USMC

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, it is a privilege for me to appear before you today
to discuss Marine Corps aviation. The significant accomplishments of
those who serve our Nation are a direct reflection of the tireless
efforts and consistent support of the military by this committee. Thank
you for your dedication and oversight.
Marine Corps aviation continues to add to its rich legacy in the
skies over Iraq and in support of operations with our friends and
allies around the world. We have been fully engaged for the last 6\1/2\
years and we are prepared to continue that same level of operational
tempo as long as it is required. We remain ever mindful of the
historical precedence the Marine Corps has set through a virulent
devotion to operational preparedness, fiscal responsibility and world-
class care of our marines, sailors, and their families. This
methodology has served us well in the past and will continue to do so
in the future.

II. STRESS ON THE FORCE--AVIATION COMMITMENTS

These challenging times have highlighted the ever present need to
expand, modernize and train our forces to cope with an uncertain
future. Within Marine aviation, our sustained contributions to the
current fight have necessitated a concerted effort to re-energize our
commitment to readiness as the foundation of a flexible and adaptable
warfighting force. We seek to maintain capabilities across the full
spectrum of conflict in order to ensure our aging platforms and
equipment seamlessly evolve into a future force that is characterized
by integrated, cooperative, and distributed capabilities and concepts.
Our vision portends a network-enabled and digitally interoperable
expeditionary Aviation Combat Element postured to execute responsive,
persistent, lethal, and adaptive full-spectrum operations. Within that
framework, we have articulated three primary goals that will chart the
course of Marine aviation for years to come. First, we expect to
sustain our wartime operational tempo while improving current readiness
and combat effectiveness through the efficient use of resources.
Second, we will execute our planned type/model/series (T/M/S)
transition strategies from our legacy platforms to the advanced
capabilities associated with next generation platforms: F-35B, MV-22,
UH-1Y, AH-1Z, KC-130J, CH-53K and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).
Finally, we will improve warfighting integration by developing new
transformational concepts of operation (CONOPs) that will significantly
enhance the systems that we are acquiring.
The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request balances
sustainment of legacy aircraft that are performing ably in current
operations with continued recapitalization of more modern capabilities.
The stress on the legacy forces remains considerable as our level of
commitment has been sustained at a surge rate for the past several
years. Before the current conflict, Marine aviation had a recurring
commitment for 21 squadrons deployed with an additional 15 squadrons in
training workups preparing to deploy. With the recent addition of the
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployment to Afghanistan while
our squadrons are still engaged in Iraq, our level of commitment is now
47 squadrons, with 68 percent of Marine aviation currently deployed or
preparing to deploy.
Responding to the pressures of sustaining high operational tempo in
support of current operations, Marine aviation has sought the means to
mitigate the effects of these stressors. First, particularly in the
case of our aging legacy platforms (F/A-18, AV-8, CH-46, UH-1N, AH-1W
and CH-53D), we carefully manage risk and seek to optimize support to
our warriors in combat through the application of sound airframe
service life management initiatives. With exceptional leadership
evident throughout the force, our aviation mishap records in 2006 and
2007 were the second and third lowest in our history. Second, we have
become full partners in the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) in order to
place us on a path to achieve optimized readiness and sustain the
health of our assets into the future. The operational business models,
support plans, and cooperative work exchanges resident within the NAE
construct will lead to improved readiness and prepare our resources for
future growth and transition. Third, we are optimizing the growth of
aviation as the Corps continues on a path to 202,000 marines. This
planned increase in manpower will enable us to train to the full
spectrum of military operations while improving the ability of Marine
aviation to address the future challenges of an uncertain environment.
Our future growth in personnel will reduce operational risk and recover
our ability to respond to the clearly articulated needs of the
combatant commanders.

III. SUSTAINMENT OF LEGACY AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS

The Marine Corps' aging fleet of fixed and rotary wing aircraft is
the oldest in the Department of Defense. Exacerbating the impact of
combat losses and high operational tempo, legacy aircraft production
lines are no longer active. Sustaining these legacy aircraft has become
increasingly more expensive and time consuming for our maintainers. For
each legacy platform, we strive to make prudent investment in systems
upgrades as a mitigating bridge to the future capabilities we
desperately need. The Marine Corps' Tactical Aviation (TACAIR)
platforms, the AV-8B Harrier, the F/A-18 A+/C/D Hornet and the EA-6B
Prowler, are rapidly approaching the end of their planned service
lives. Many of our assault support platforms, including the CH-46 Sea
Knight, the UH-1N Huey, the CH-53D Sea Stallion and the KC-130F/R
Hercules, date back to the Vietnam era yet they continue to deploy at
extremely high turnaround rates in order to meet Marine aviation's
requirements in support of global commitments. Currently flying between
two and five times their programmed utilization rates while in support
of operations in Iraq, these aircraft must remain relevant, not only to
the irregular fight we're in now, but also to the multitude of
contingencies our forces may face in the future.

AV-8B Harrier
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $29.9 million research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds to support development
of the AV-8 Engine Life Management Plan (ELMP)/Engine Monitoring
System, Tactical Moving Map Display, the Readiness Management Plan
(RMP), and moving the Litening targeting pod to the aircraft's
centerline station. This effort will increase the ordnance carriage
capability of the Harrier to better support combat operations. The
fiscal year 2009 budget also requests $54.5 million procurement funding
for the Open Systems Core Avionics Requirement, ELMP upgrades, and the
RMP, which addresses aircraft obsolescence and deficiency issues
associated with sustaining the current AV-8B fleet. Additionally, the
Litening targeting pod will be upgraded to the latest configuration to
better support the warfighter. Finally, the AV-8B program is upgrading
a day attack aircraft to a night attack configuration as part of the
attrition recovery effort to address significant legacy inventory
shortfalls until transition to the F-35B.

F/A-18 A+/C/D Hornet
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $96.4 million (APN-5) for the
continuation of the systems upgrade programs for U.S. Marine Corps
legacy F/A-18 platforms. Included in this request is the continued
procurement of successful programs such as Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing
System, Multi-Function Information Distribution System, and Digital
Communications System. The Marine Corps continues avionics upgrades to
Lot 7 through Lot 9 Hornets, as well as upgrading other F/A-18 aircraft
with digital communications and tactical data link. The ongoing upgrade
to the F/A-18 C/D with digital communications, tactical data link and
tactical reconnaissance systems ensures our F/A-18s remain viable on
the battlefield and relevant partners in the Department of the Navy's
Tactical Air Integration plans. We are experiencing great success
employing the Litening targeting pod on the F/A-18 A+/C/D aircraft in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. When combined with data link hardware and the
ROVER Ground Station, the Litening pod provides real time video to
ground forces engaged with the enemy, adding a new dimension to
precision fires and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR). Our fleet of legacy F/A-18Ds is currently flying at three and
half times their programmed rate. Given this high utilization rate, our
sustainment initiatives are critical to ensuring we have adequate
numbers of F/A-18s to meet our requirements until we transition to the
F-35B.

EA-6B Prowler
The Marine Corps remains fully committed to the EA-6B as we look to
enhance our legacy capabilities and posture to create a future
Electronic Warfare (EW) capability comprised of a networked system-of-
systems (F-35B, UASs, and other relevant air and ground systems). The
Prowler continues to maintain an extremely high deployment tempo
supporting operations against growing and diverse irregular warfare
threats. Ongoing structural improvements and the planned Improved
Capabilities III upgrades have extended the aircraft's service life and
will deliver increased capability through its Program of Record of
2016. The Prowler has the highest utilization rate of any aircraft in
our inventory while operating at an unprecedented five times its peace
time utilization when deployed to Iraq. The fiscal year 2009 budget
requests $33.4 million for the procurement of ALQ-99 pod upgrades to
sustain the capability of this national asset until it is replaced by
the constituent components of a networked array of EW systems.

CH-53D/E Sea Stallion/Super Stallion
The CH-53D/E Sea Stallion/Super Stallion provides unparalleled
combat heavy lift to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). While
these aircraft are achieving unprecedented operational milestones, they
are reaching the end of their service life (the CH-53D has been
operational for over 38 years and CH-53E is approaching 30 years) and
will be incapable of supporting the Marine Corps' future warfighting
concepts. To keep these platforms viable until the CH-53K is procured,
the fiscal year 2009 budget requests $56.4 million targeted at a
variety of near-term enhancements including the Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Blue Force Tracker, ballistic armor
kits, T-64 Engine Reliability Improvement Program kits and improvements
to engine operation at increased Power Inlet Temperature (T5) operating
limits for increased power margin at higher operating altitudes.

CH-46E Sea Knight
The venerable CH-46E continues to perform well and is poised to
maintain operational relevancy through its projected retirement in
2018. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $34.6 million targeted at
improvements and enhancements in dynamic components, avionics, and
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) that will sustain the health of
the airframe as we progress through the transition to the MV-22. Only
the Marine Corps could maintain a fleet of helicopters that will be
over 50 years old when they retire and yet still remain relevant and
engaged in the protection of the Nation. This is a true testament to
the men and women of the CH-46 community who work so hard to keep these
aircraft in the fight.

AH-1W Cobra/UH-1N Huey
Sustaining and improving our aged utility and attack helicopter
fleet is an imperative necessary to support our deployed forces while
we continue our efforts to upgrade the UH-1N and AH-1W to the Yankee
and Zulu variants, respectively. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests
$6.4 million for the AH-1W and $8.9 million for the UH-1N. Current
upgrade efforts to the legacy AH-1W include 20MM cannon reliability
enhancements and completion of the turned exhaust modification. UH-1N
funding is requested to procure BRITE Star Block II night vision
systems that will forward fit into the UH-1Y. These essential
enhancements will ensure that both the UH-1N and the AH-1W are
reliable, survivable, and lethal until the transition to the Yankee and
Zulu is complete.

VH-3D/VH-60N
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests an investment of $40.2 million
that will be used to extend the operational life and improve the
capabilities of our legacy Presidential Support Aircraft (VH-3D and VH-
60N). The improvements to our executive transport fleet focus on key
component upgrades combined with a Service Life Assessment/Extension
Program. The key component upgrades for the VH-3D will be the addition
of Carson Blades as part of the Lift Improvement Program and several
survivability improvements. VH-60N upgrades will focus on technology
insertion in a cockpit upgrade. The investment in both aircraft will
include a Service Life Assessment/Extension Program which will ensure
continued safe and reliable executive transport until integration of
the VH-71 occurs.

Aircraft Survivability Equipment
In order to provide increased protection for our critical assets we
have developed and procured improved ASE for assault support aircraft.
We continue to mitigate threats to rotary wing aviation through a
combination of tactics, centralized command and upgrades to existing
equipment. To prevent current technology lagging behind the threat,
increased science and technology (S&T) focused on developing the next
generation helicopter survivability equipment is required. For fiscal
year 2009 the Department of the Navy has requested $38.9 million for
continued Directed Infrared Countermeasures RDT&E, and hardware
procurement (APN-1/5/6). This state-of-the-art ASE will enable Marine
aviation to pace the threat of advanced anti-aircraft systems
proliferation. Funds obligated to date have been used for development
and first year procurement which will begin delivery of 72 systems in
October 2008. The remaining unfunded portion is for an additional 70
systems equating to 1 year production capacity in 2009. Continued
support of this critical need for our fleet of aircraft is greatly
appreciated as we ensure our pilots and aircrew have the most current
survivability technology available to them.

Aviation Weapons Programs
Over the past year Marine aviation flew over 115,000 combat hours,
delivered over 2,700 precision-guided munitions, and dropped over 4,000
bombs. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests includes funding for
precision-guided munitions (PGM) programs that will directly support
combat operations.

a. Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM). The Marine Corps has
expended over 1,500 Hellfire and 1,000 TOW air-to-ground
missiles in support of ground forces engaged in combat since
2003. A low collateral damage PGM for moving targets, like
JAGM, is critical for Marine aviation as a replacement for our
aging stockpiles of TOW, Hellfire and Laser Maverick family of
weapons. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $183.7 million.
b. Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). The past
year has witnessed the successful test firing of the laser
guided 2.75'' rocket. This initiative seeks to provide a
precision capability to a once unguided rocket fired from
attack helicopters. The $6 million provided by Congress in
fiscal year 2008 ensured continued development of this
capability and the fiscal year 2009 budget request of $13.1
million will complete development in anticipation of
procurement beginning in 2010.

IV. RESETTING THE FORCE

Resetting Marine aviation means getting more capable and reliable
aircraft into the operational deployment cycle sooner; not merely
repairing and replacing damaged or destroyed aircraft. The operational
demands and harsh environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of
Africa highlight the limitations of our aging fleet. While deployed,
our aircraft are flying at two to five times their designed utilization
rates (Figure 1).

Maintaining the readiness of our aviation assets, while preparing
aircrews for their next combat rotation is, and will continue to be, an
enormous effort and constant challenge for our marines. To maintain
sufficient numbers of aircraft in deployed units, our non-deployed
squadrons have taken significant reductions in aircraft and parts, thus
resulting in a 30 percent decrease in the number of non-deployed units
that are ``deployment capable'' over the last 5 years.
Reset programs have helped us mitigate degradation of our aircraft
materiel readiness through aircraft modifications, proactive
inspections and additional maintenance actions. The reset funding
provided by Congress has been absolutely essential to our ability to
maintain and sustain our legacy force during this stressful period.
Moreover, it has enabled us to create avenues to build the long-term
health of Marine aviation and served as a catalyst to establish
reliability-centered processes and practices with proactive and
forward-looking metrics. Continued funding support is critically needed
as we are simply running short of aircraft on our flight lines due to
age, attrition and wartime losses.
Our Current Readiness (CR) aviation logistics improvement strategy
is now a mature pillar within the NAE. We have developed a clear set of
readiness improvement goals and implemented business rules that provide
top-down performance alignment from the Marine Force (MARFOR)
Commanders and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation down to individual
squadrons. The Marine Aviation Executive Readiness Board (MAERB),
comprised of the four Wing Commanders and Deputy MARFOR Commanders,
provides recurring oversight to the process which is enabled by T/M/S
teams, each led by a subject matter expert Marine Aircraft Group
Commander. The T/M/S teams define their standards and readiness goals
and provide focus of effort and alignment to AIRSpeed concepts (the
integrated application of theory of constraints, Lean and Six Sigma).
This process not only enables efficiencies in the current maintenance
and supply environment, but also postures our logistics effort for
future success as we neck-down our airframes in concert with the Marine
Aviation Plan.
Improved aviation logistics readiness processes and dedicated reset
programs have helped us mitigate degradation of aircraft materiel
readiness through the wise application of aircraft modifications,
proactive inspections and additional maintenance actions. These efforts
have successfully bolstered aircraft reliability, sustainability and
survivability even in the face of high utilization rates. Nevertheless,
additional requirements for depot-level maintenance on airframes,
engines, weapons, and support equipment will continue well beyond the
conclusion of current hostilities.

V. MODERNIZING MARINE AVIATION

The Marine Aviation Plan (AvPlan) provides the way ahead for Marine
aviation over the next 15 years as we transition 39 of 69 squadrons
from 13 legacy aircraft models to 6 new ones. The AvPlan also
incorporates individual program changes and synchronizes aviation
equities in support of our end strength growth to 202,000 marines.

F-35B Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)
The December 2007 rollout of the first production F-35B Short Take-
Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft marked the beginning of the
transition from production to testing of the technologically superior
fifth generation platform that is destined to become the centerpiece of
Marine TACAIR. Over a decade ago, with exceptional support from
visionaries in Congress, the Marine Corps made a conscious decision to
make the MV-22 Osprey and the F-35B Lightning II the center pieces of
our future warfighting CONOPs. As the first combat deployment of Osprey
comes to a close this week, our abiding belief in the significant
benefits of tilt-rotor technology has been validated in the skies over
Iraq. We are similarly committed to the vitally important enhanced
fifth generation warfighting capabilities resident in the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF). STOVL JSF enables flexible distributed shipboard and
expeditionary airfield basing, rapid response to crises, high sortie
generation rates, a small footprint and vastly improved survivability.
STOVL is predicated on the utility of a forward basing concept at a
time when conventional basing and access are projected to be less and
less available--either through risk of enemy attack or the vagaries of
politically imposed operating restrictions. Along with the MV-22, the
F-35B will be the cornerstone of Marine aviation and a critical enabler
of the future MAGTF for many decades to come.
In the next year, we expect to see issues resolved and expectations
achieved that will ensure our planned F-35B Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) in 2012. F-35B development is on track with the first
flight of BF-1 (the JSF STOVL variant) scheduled for the summer of
2008. The System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program for the F-
35 Pratt & Whitney engine has also progressed steadily, leveraging
heavily on the investment made in the Pratt & Whitney F-119 engine for
the F-22. Ultimately, the Lightning II will replace our aging F/A-18
and AV-8 legacy fleet with state-of-the-art aircraft that will be fully
network enabled and digitally interoperable in support the MAGTF across
the full spectrum of combat operations.
As we manage the bridge to F-35B, we will continue to take prudent
measures to mitigate our legacy TACAIR shortfall. A declining AV-8B
inventory has already required a reduction in AV-8B Primary Assigned
Aircraft (PAA) and has increased the operational tempo of our seven
deployable Harrier squadrons. We have accepted additional near term
risk by placing four F/A-18 squadrons in cadre status. We plan to
recoup the AV-8B PAA adjustments and return the four F/A-18 squadrons
to active status as JSF is delivered. If our TACAIR shortfall
unexpectedly accelerates or the bridge to F-35B lengthens, we will take
whatever steps are necessary to further mitigate the impact.
Adequate investment in legacy sustainment, combined with prudent
management of airframe life expenditure and a properly funded F-35
program, will be the key factors in ensuring the Marine Corps' TACAIR
transition from legacy to fifth generation occurs seamlessly. There are
numerous variables to the TACAIR shortfall and all are closely
monitored to ensure that a balanced set of choices are always
available. A 2012 IOC best supports the Marine Corps' transition
strategy and any delay would increase risk to the Marine Corps in the
short term by exacerbating the TACAIR shortfall. While we have time to
execute other options should conditions change, at this point in time
the Marine Corps' confidence in F-35B has never been stronger. The
fiscal year 2009 budget requests eight aircraft for delivery in fiscal
year 2010. These aircraft will support pilot transition training and
are essential to preserving our IOC of fiscal year 2012. This budget
provides a fiscally responsible approach to a TACAIR inventory that
confirms our strongly held belief that the F-35B is the right aircraft
for the future of our Corps.

Future of Electronic Warfare
Beyond the Prowler, the future of EW within the Marine Corps will
be comprised of a networked system-of-systems. The constituent
components of this network include the F-35B JSF, with its impressive
array of embedded EW capabilities; UAS capable of carrying scalable and
specifically tailored EW payloads; ISR pods and payloads; Next
Generation Jammers (NGJs) operating from multiple platforms; and ground
systems already fielded or under development. This system will possess
both offensive and defensive capabilities. A key tenet of our future
vision is the array of EW capabilities accessible throughout the battle
space, not just those that reside on dedicated EW platforms, with the
individual pieces of hardware used as tentacles of the distributed EW
network. This is a critical and important distinction that promises to
make USMC EW capabilities more readily available and applicable to
MAGTF and Joint Force Commanders of the future in ways that are only
now beginning to be well understood and exploited.

MV-22 Osprey
The transformational tilt-rotor MV-22 is now in Full Rate
Production (FRP). The 360 MV-22 aircraft planned for procurement by the
Marine Corps will bring revolutionary assault support capability to our
forces in harm's way. The MV-22 is replacing the CH-46E aircraft which
is over 40 years old and has limited lift and mission capabilities to
support the MAGTF.
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $2.2 billion in APN for
procurement of 30 MV-22s and the continued development of follow-on
block upgrades. Like the F-35, the MV-22 has implemented a block
improvement strategy. Block ``A'' aircraft are training aircraft, Block
``B'' are operational aircraft, and Block ``C'' aircraft are
operational aircraft with mission enhancements that will be procured in
fiscal year 2010 and delivered in fiscal year 2012.
The current inventory of 57 operational MV-22 aircraft are home
based at Marine Corps Air Station New River, NC. Our AvPlan projects
the transition of two CH-46 HMM squadrons to VMM squadrons each year by
leveraging the procurement of 30 aircraft per year in concert with the
Multi-Year Procurement plan that was approved in fiscal year 2008. At
the current rate of production, the transition to MV-22 will be
complete in 2018.
With Initial Operational Capability (IOC) declared last June, the
MV-22 program met another important milestone when VMM-263 deployed to
Al Asad Air Base, Iraq in October 2007. Supporting our marines in
combat, the MV-22 has performed beyond expectations. Flying at almost
twice the designed utilization rates, the squadron has averaged 7 out
of 10 mission ready (70 percent MR) aircraft per day for the 5 months
of this initial combat deployment. As an example of the Osprey's
operational utility, a flight of just two MV-22s can accomplish its
assigned missions in half the time it takes four CH-46s to carry out
the same tasks. Additionally, the aircraft's operational reach spans
the entire range of the area of operations assigned to Multi-National
Force-West in Iraq while flying a majority of its mission profile
outside the typical assault support threat envelope. The fleet needed
an aircraft that could take us farther, faster, and safer--and now
thanks to the foresight and support of Congress, it is here.

KC-130J Hercules
KC-130J Hercules aircraft are continuously deployed in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom providing multi-mission, tactical aerial
refueling, and fixed-wing assault support. Its theater logistical
support reduces the requirement for resupply via ground, limiting the
exposure of our convoys to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
other surface-borne attacks. The recent introduction of the aerial
refuelable MV-22, combined with the retirement of the legacy KC-130F/R
aircraft due to fatigue life and parts obsolescence, requires
accelerated procurement of the KC-130J.
The Marine Corps is programmed to procure a total of 46 aircraft by
the end of fiscal year 2013. To date, 29 new aircraft have been
delivered, 7 more are on contract, and 2 aircraft are requested in the
fiscal year 2009 budget for a total of 38. This is still 13 aircraft
short of our inventory objective of 51 KC-130Js for the Active Force.
Ultimately, the Marine Corps will also seek to replace our 28 Reserve
component KC-130T aircraft with KC-130Js, thus necking down our aerial
refueling force to a single T/M/S.

AH-1Z Viper/UH-1Y Venom (H-1 Upgrades)
The H-1 Upgrade Program, comprised of AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom
aircraft, will significantly enhance the tactical capability,
operational effectiveness and sustainability of our attack and utility
helicopter fleet. Our Vietnam-era UH-1Ns are reaching the end of their
useful life, thus rapidly fielding the UH-1Y remains a top priority.
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $3.8 million in RDT&E and $474.1
million in APN for 20 AH-1Z/UH-1Y aircraft.
IOC for the UH-1Y will occur in 2008. The first operational
deployment of UH-1Y is anticipated in the spring of 2009. IOC for the
AH-1Z is fiscal year 2011. Eleven production aircraft have been
delivered to date and Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) Phase II, which
commenced in February 2008, is ongoing. A full rate production decision
is expected in late fiscal year 2008.
The current AH-1Z program of record is utilizing a remanufacturing
strategy which requires an AH-1W be removed from operational status for
a period of 2 years. To mitigate this shortfall we are adopting a
``build new'' strategy that will allow the AH-1Ws to remain in
operational squadrons while we manufacture AH-1Zs. The intent is to
revert back to a remanufacturing strategy once the operational
shortfall has been mitigated. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental
provided $50 million for non-recurring engineering to pursue ``build
new'' at a minimum of 50 AH-1Z aircraft.

CH-53K
In operation since 1981, the CH-53E is becoming increasingly
expensive to operate. Its replacement, the CH-53K, will more than
double existing lift capacity and range, while dramatically improving
maintainability, reliability, and survivability, decreasing operating
costs, and radically improving aircraft efficiency and operational
effectiveness. The program passed Milestone B in December 2005 with a
subsequent contract awarded to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in April
2006. IOC is scheduled for fiscal year 2015. The program is proceeding
through the developmental stages and will begin to procure airframes in
the fiscal year 2013. The fiscal year 2009 budget request is $570.5
million RDT&E to continue development through the Preliminary Design
Review later this year and the Critical Design Review in fiscal year
2009.

Unmanned Aerial Systems
The Marine Corps is taking proactive steps to modernize and improve
organic UAS capabilities. Our UAS are organized into three echelons,
each tailored to the mission and requirements of the supported command.
Tier III UAS serve at the Marine Expeditionary Force level; Tier II UAS
support Regimental Combat Team and MEU operations; and Tier I UAS
support battalion and below operations. At the Tier III level, we have
simultaneously transitioned Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMU) to
the RQ-7B Shadow and initiated a reorganization of the squadrons' force
structure to better task-organize for mission requirements. The
transition to the Shadow provides a temporary Tier III solution as a
bridge from Pioneer to our expected Tier III IOC in 2015. As an interim
solution, Shadow has been invaluable because it has enabled us to
provide MAGTF Commanders with a far more responsive and reliable UAS
than its predecessor, Pioneer. We have also begun the stand up of a
third active component VMU squadron. The addition of a third VMU
squadron is critical to sustaining current operations and will help in
decreasing the operational tempo from our current deployment-to-dwell
ratio of less than 1:1--to a more sustainable 1:2 ratio. This rapid
transition and reorganization, initiated in January 2007, will be
complete by the fourth quarter fiscal year 2009.
To best support our deployed forces, we have instituted an ISR
services contract to provide Scan Eagle systems to fill the Tier II
void until future fielding of the Tier II/Small Tactical UAS which will
occur in 2011. At the Tier I level, the Marine Corps is transitioning
from the Dragon Eye to the joint Raven-B program, which is also common
with the U.S. Army. When fully fielded, our UAS family of systems will
be networked through a robust and interoperable command and control
system that provides commanders a significantly enhanced warfighting
capability.

Aviation Command and Control Family of Systems (AC2FoS)
The Marine Aviation Command and Control System (MACCS) continues to
contribute to the success of Marine aviation operations by planning and
executing tactical air support while ensuring proper integration of
aviation into the MAGTF scheme of maneuver. The future of Aviation
Command and Control (AC2) is defined by a Family of Systems (FoS)
designed to fuse real and near real-time data from sensors, weapons and
C2 systems into a single integrated display. This fused data will be
networked and distributed MAGTF-wide, increasing battle space awareness
at all levels, from operators to commanders.
The centerpiece of the AC2FoS will be the Common Aviation Command
and Control System (CAC2S) which replaces dissimilar legacy C2
equipment with a common, scalable suite. CAC2S will fuse the sensor
inputs from expeditionary radars, as well as data from the F-35B and
UAS assets, vastly improving full spectrum surveillance and awareness.
Our continued focus will ensure emerging systems are fully
interoperable and designed to enhance our capabilities, while
leveraging these systems to facilitate effective command functionality.
Armed with fully networked systems, the MACCS will improve the ability
to affect command, integrate resources, and employ Marine aviation most
efficiently in support of MAGTF and Joint Force Commanders in the
future.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Marine Corps has a heritage of fighting battles and winning
wars on the ground, at sea, and in the air. Since 2001, we have done so
while supporting extremely high operational tempo, conducting combat
operations, growing the force and introducing new aircraft and systems.
My respect for the accomplishments of the men and women who comprise
Marine aviation, past and present, is only exceeded by my confidence
that we are poised to meet our future challenges. As we move forward we
will execute the Marine Aviation Plan with a careful eye to maximizing
efficiency gained early in each T/M/S transition. The resources
Congress provides will continue to be used wisely in direct support of
our most precious and important asset--the United States marine. Thank
you for your consideration.

Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, General. I just did
want to enter for the record that you're the Deputy Commandant
for Aviation.
Admiral Myers, glad to have you here, the Director of Air
Warfare for the Navy.

STATEMENT OF RADM ALLEN G. MYERS, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE
DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Myers. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Cornyn,
distinguished members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's Fiscal Year 2009 Aviation Programs. I appreciate the
opportunity to share time with my colleagues here from the
Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force to
convey the critical needs of naval aviation in our Armed
Forces.
The Navy has been fully engaged in OEF and OIF for the last
6\1/2\ years and we're prepared to continue that same level of
operational tempo as long as it's required. The remarkable
performance of our sailors and marines could not have been
possible without this subcommittee's tireless devotion and
significant contributions, not only to our Navy but to our
Nation as a whole.
Naval aviation continues to play a major role in providing
tailored effects in support of OEF and OIF, as well as the
broader global war on terrorism. The ability of naval aviation
to shape strategic, operational, and tactical environments is
reflective of the substantive return on your investment in our
people, our combat readiness, and our refined spectrum of
critical warfighting capabilities.
Also, these investments in surveillance, command and
control, and persistent strike, among others, ensure our
tactical aircraft can operate effectively from aircraft
carriers that can exploit the vast maneuver space provided by
the sea.
Our aviation plan balances aviation capabilities through
cost-wise investments in recapitalization, sustainment, and
modernization programs. One of the challenges that we will be
dealing with in future programming processes is the Strike
Fighter shortfall. The best estimate for the most likely
magnitude of the Strike Fighter shortfall is projected to be
125 aircraft for the entire Department and 69 for the U.S. Navy
portion of the Department, peaking in the 2017 timeframe, and
that assumes the program of record.
Now, our F/A-18 A through D, our legacy Hornets--these
aircraft are reaching their life limits and will require
extensions to bridge the gap to reach the JSF. The Department
of the Navy has made significant investments in a thorough
Service Life Assessment Program and is currently assessing the
remaining life of these legacy platforms.
The preliminary Service Life Assessment Program analytical
data necessary to determine whether or not we can extend these
aircraft to the 10,000-hour mark. Originally, they came to us
from the factory with a 6,000-hour life. We think that we can
extend them with the preliminary data that we received in the
January timeframe, but the final costing data to support the
extension is planned to be released around the June timeframe.
With that final data, we will start to put together the
engineering change proposals to support the extensions
beginning at the end of the summer.
Now, the Navy's strategic vision for tactical air (TACAIR)
is based on a mix of capabilities of both the JSF and
the Block 2 F/A-18 E and F. Our air wings will be
increasingly more capable as the older legacy Hornets are
replaced by the modern more capable JSF. However, delays in the
JSF program, budget cuts that reduce either the JSF or the F/A-
18 E and F procurements, or early legacy Hornet retirements all
could increase our projected JSF shortfall and will directly
impact our ability to provide warfighting effects to our
combatant commanders.
These Navy aviation programs, comprised of both platforms
and weapons, directly underpin our Navy's strategic plan and
directly support our new maritime strategy. The fiscal year
2009 President's budget maintains the trends of balancing
conventional and irregular warfare aviation capabilities. It
reduces excess capacity and achieves technological superiority
through cost-wise investments in recapitalization, sustainment,
and modernization programs.
The adjustments reflected in the budget maintain sufficient
capacity to meet global presence and warfighting requirements,
manage the overlap with joint capabilities, and preserve
warfighting relevance through the 2024 timeframe.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today and thank you for your support of naval aviation and our
Fleet, which defends our great Nation today and tomorrow. I
look forward to your questions.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Admiral. I know we'll
have some questions for you about some of the items you touched
on.
We'll go now to the Air Force. Lieutenant General Daniel
Darnell is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and
Information Operations, Plans and Requirements. General
Darnell, thanks for being here.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR AIR, SPACE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

General Darnell. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Chairman,
Senator Cornyn, distinguished subcommittee members: Thank you
for the opportunity to speak before you today.
Your Air Force is the most battle-tested in history, as
Senator Cornyn pointed out earlier, and every day your airmen
find innovative ways to accomplish their mission more
effectively and more efficiently. Our first priority is to win
today's fight. In the global war on terror, we continue to
fulfill our roles as airmen for the joint team, working with
our sister Services to provide the desired effects to the
combatant commanders.
Every day your Air Force flies over 300 sorties in Iraq and
Afghanistan, directly integrated with and enhancing ground
operations. Since September 11, America's airmen have flown
over 394,000 mobility sorties, moving equipment and troops to
and from the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The Air Force has
flown over 80 percent of the coalition's combat sorties in
support of OIF and OEF. Since 2001 we've flown over 50,000
missions protecting the Homeland for Operation Noble Eagle.
Air Force engagement in the global war on terror is only
the tip of the iceberg. Over 40 percent of the total force and
53 percent of the Active-Duty Force are directly engaged in and
supporting combatant commanders' operations every day. On any
given day, the Air Force has approximately 206,000 airmen
fulfilling worldwide combatant commander needs. This includes
approximately 127,000 airmen conducting activities such as
operating and controlling satellites, standing alert in our
intercontinental ballistic missile facilities, operating UAVs,
launching airlift and tanker sorties, providing intelligence
assessments, and many other functions critical to each of the
combatant commanders.
Airmen fulfilling combatant commander tasks today are fully
ready to perform their missions, but future dominance is at
risk. America faces a dangerous and uncertain future. Our
enemies do not sit idly by. Adversaries both declared and
potential continue to develop and field new and better means to
threaten our Nation, our interests, and worldwide stability. At
the same time, the average age of our air and spacecraft
continue to rise and our ability to overcome future threats
diminishes. We must be capable of setting the conditions for
America's success and we're doing all we can to become even
more efficient and effective and to defray these rising costs.
We thank you for your continued support. Once again, I
appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Darnell and
General Hoffman follows:]

Joint Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Donald J. Hoffman, USAF, and Lt.
Gen. Daniel J. Darnell, USAF

I. INTRODUCTION

Senator Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss Air Force Tactical Aviation and other matters that are
important to our Air Force and the Nation.
Your Air Force is actively fighting terrorism and insurgents around
the world in the global war on terror, and we appreciate the Senate
Armed Services Committee's continued support of our Nation's air,
space, and cyberspace forces. Since the global war on terror began,
congressional supplemental funding each year, including the $5.5
billion provided for fiscal year 2008, ensured that your airmen
deployed in combat overseas are trained, equipped, and ready day-to-day
to perform their mission. As we prepare for the next year of global
operations, the Air Force is grateful for the subcommittee's support
provided through the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, and as
always, we appreciate the great lengths to which the subcommittee has
gone to support airmen, their pay, and their quality of life.
In the global war on terror, we continue to fulfill our roles as
airmen for the joint team working with our sister Services to provide
the desired effects to the combatant commanders. Simultaneously, we
stand prepared for rapid response and conflict across the globe as our
Nation's sword and shield. For over 17 years, the United States Air
Force has been engaged in continuous combat operations providing our
Nation unparalleled advantage in three warfighting domains: Air, space,
and cyberspace. Your airmen have maintained constant watch, deployed
continuously, engaged America's adversaries directly, responded to
human crises around the world, and provided the Global Vigilance,
Global Reach, and Global Power to secure our Nation.
Your Air Force is the most battle-tested in Air Force history, and
every day your airmen find innovative ways to accomplish their mission
more efficiently and effectively. Your airmen are dedicated to the
defense of this Nation and have committed themselves to go to the ends
of the Earth, to the most dangerous or austere locations, in our
Nation's hour of need or in the world's moment of despair. If tonight,
tomorrow, or in 20 years America calls; we will go, because it is our
sacred oath to provide America and its joint team, wherever it might be
engaged, the full might of air, space, and cyberspace power.
To ensure success, your Air Force is organizing, training, and
equipping our airmen for both the current and future fights, building
in the flexibility to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict.
It is no accident that America's Air Force has unprecedented Global
Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power. We learned our lessons from
our own history and others', and we invested resources and effort to
establish and maintain dominance in our three warfighting domains: air,
space, and cyberspace. Even after the victory in Operation Desert
Storm, the Air Force upgraded, modernized, and completely changed its
training mindset and programs. The result was a flexible, responsive,
and lethal force that contributed greatly to the joint successes in
Operations Allied Force (OAF), Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). Even with these advances, airmen continue to find ways
to improve the combat power provided to the joint team. Your forces
engaged in combat today are fully ready to perform their missions, but
future dominance is at risk.
America faces a dangerous and uncertain future and our enemies do
not sit idly by. Instead, adversaries--both declared and potential--are
developing and fielding new and better means to threaten our Nation,
our interests, and stability around the world. At the same time, the
average age of our air and space craft continues to rise, and our
ability to overcome future threats is diminishing. We also face
increased operations, maintenance, and personnel costs that cut into
our ability to finance future dominant capabilities. We are doing all
we can to become even more efficient and effective and to defray these
costs. Despite our best efforts, we face declining readiness and
soaring recapitalization rates. Therefore, we have taken significant
steps to self-finance a vital recapitalization and modernization effort
for our aging air and space force. The Air Force must be capable of
setting the conditions for America's success against emerging threats
in the uncertain years that lie ahead.

II. WIN TODAY'S FIGHT

Our first priority is to win today's fight. Air Force global war on
terror missions are only the latest in a string of over 17 continuous
years of combat since Operation Desert Storm began. Throughout this
period, our strategic forces have remained on constant alert. In fact,
the United States Air Force has underwritten the national strategy for
over 60 years by providing a credible deterrent force, and we continue
to serve as the Nation's force of first and last resort, reassuring
allies, dissuading competitors, and deterring adversaries by
maintaining an always-ready nuclear arm.
Today, Air Force operations are ongoing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Horn of Africa. Every day, your Air Force flies over 300 sorties in
Iraq and Afghanistan directly integrated with and enhancing ground
operations. Since global war on terror operations began, your Air Force
has flown over 80 percent of the coalition's combat sorties in support
of OIF and OEF. These missions provide the joint and coalition team
airlift, aero-medical evacuation, air-refueling, command and control,
close air support to ground operations, strike, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and electronic warfare. We have
flown over 394,000 mobility sorties moving equipment and troops to and
from the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Our intra-theater
airlift missions shift convoys to the air eliminating the need to place
troops and vehicles in harm's way. Aero-medical evacuation missions
move wounded soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen to higher levels of
medical care at hospitals as far away as the continental United States.
In 2007, America's airmen conducted nearly 1,600 precision strikes in
Iraq and Afghanistan, many under the control of Joint Tactical Air
Controllers. In Iraq, strikes increased by 171 percent over the
previous year. Added to those numbers, your Air Force has flown over
50,000 sorties protecting the homeland for Operation Noble Eagle.
Air Force engagement in CENTCOM is only the tip of the iceberg.
Airmen operate around-the-clock and around-the-globe to provide all
combatant commanders (COCOMs) with critical capabilities. Over 40
percent of the total force and 53 percent of the Active-Duty Force are
directly engaged in or supporting COCOM operations everyday. On any
given day, the Air Force has approximately 206,000 airmen (175,000
active duty plus an additional 31,000 Guard and Reserve) fulfilling
COCOM tasks. This includes approximately 127,000 airmen conducting
activities such as operating and controlling satellites, standing alert
in our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile facilities, operating
unmanned aerial vehicles, launching airlift and tanker sorties,
providing intelligence assessments, and many other functions critical
to each of the COCOMs. There are a further 57,000 airmen stationed
outside the continental United States in direct support of the Pacific
Command and European Command missions. Finally, a portion of the above
forces plus an additional 22,000 airman from the current AEF rotation
are made available for deployments in support of other COCOM
requirements.

III. STATUS OF THE FLEET

As requested by the subcommittee, the following information
provides updates on U.S. Air Force Tactical Aviation:

Legacy Fleet
The Air Force fighter force is the oldest it has ever been, at an
average age of more than 19 years, it is generally able to accomplish
today's missions. However, all our legacy aircraft are showing signs of
age. In addition, global war on terror duration and operations tempo
have accelerated service life consumption for numerous platforms, and
the cost of keeping them in the air in terms of dollars and manpower is
increasing. This sustained high operations tempo has contributed to
lower readiness levels, which does not allow us to take much risk in
operations and maintenance. We must sustain readiness and be able to
fight today. global war on terror is forcing the Air Force to maintain
some legacy systems to meet the current threat.
The Air Force continues to improve fighter aircraft capability to
conduct precision targeting in close coordination with our soldiers on
the ground by fielding the Sniper and Litening Advanced Targeting Pods
(ATPs) with video downlink (VDL) capability. VDL-equipped pods are able
to transmit streaming sensor video directly to ground forces equipped
with the Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver terminal, greatly
speeding target acquisition and providing a revolutionary improvement
in support to ground forces both in the traditional Close Air Support
(CAS) and emerging nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (NTISR) missions. There are currently 155 Sniper and 225
Litening ATPs in the Combat Air Forces. Of those, 33 Sniper and 111
Litening are VDL equipped, and 53 of the 77 ATPs in theater have VDL.

A-10
The A-10 provides the Joint Force Commander lethal, precise,
persistent, and responsive firepower for Close Air Support and Combat
Search and Rescue. It has performed superbly in Operation Desert Storm,
OAF, OEF, and OIF. However, the age of the A-10 and high operations
tempo have taken their toll on the fleet. In the Fall of 2006, the Air
Force Fleet Viability Board (FVB) recommended that the Air Force
upgrade 242 thin-skin center wing A-10 aircraft with thick-skinned
center wing replacements. Additionally, A-10 landing gear failures have
resulted in a program for replacing failure prone parts. In the near
term, a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and overhaul programs
will allow us to continue flying these venerable aircraft. The Air
Force is upgrading all 357 A-10s to the ``C'' configuration through the
Precision Engagement modification. This integrates digital data links
and advanced targeting pods, adds color displays, pilot throttle and
stick controls, and increases precision-guided weapons carriage
capability. Additionally, we have integrated beyond-line-of-sight
radios into the A-10 for faster communication with ground units,
forward controllers, and command and control centers.

F-15 A-D
The average age of the F-15A-D fleet is over 25 years old. However,
analysis suggests that Air Combat Command can manage the fleet through
scheduled field/depot inspections under an Individual Aircraft Tracking
Program.
The F-15A-D fleet has returned to flying status after engineering
analysis confirmed they are safe for flight. Of the 429 aircraft in the
inventory, only 9 remain grounded due to the longeron crack. The
Commander of Air Combat Command has proposed that five will be repaired
and four will be retired due to their proximity to planned retirement.
We anticipate that most of these aircraft will be repaired this year at
a cost of approximately $235,000 each using organic materials and labor
at the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center.
On the recommendation of Boeing and depot engineers, the Air Force
has instituted recurring inspections of F-15 longerons every 400 flight
hours to detect cracks before they become catastrophic. Analysis
confirms that this interval is very conservative and will avoid a
mishap such as the one that occurred on 2 November 2007. Additionally,
the Air Force will conduct a full-scale fatigue test, aircraft
teardown, and improved structural monitoring to help establish the
maximum F-15 service life and more effectively manage structural health
of the fleet. We expect these efforts to successfully enable the 177 F-
15C/D ``Golden Eagles'' to operate safely and effectively through 2025.

F-15E
The F-15E fleet, which was not affected by the longeron crack, has
an average age of over 16 years and continues to provide support for
ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like the A-10, the F-15E
performed superbly in Operation Desert Storm, OAF, OEF, and OIF. The
Air Force has been working hard to improve the F-15E's ability to
rapidly engage and destroy time sensitive targets by adding secure
radios and data links for faster communications with ground units and
forward controllers; by integrating the latest precision weapons that
not only accurately hit a target but are designed to reduce collateral
damage; by adding a helmet mounted cueing system that will reduce the
F-15E's time to engage a target by up to 80 percent; and by adding a
state-of-the-art radar system that not only addresses sustainment
issues with the current system but will give the F-15E advanced
capabilities to identify and engage targets, share real-time
information with other aircraft, and protect itself from enemy threats.
The Air Force plans for the F-15E to be an integral part of the
Nation's force through at least 2035.

F-16
Our F-16s, the bulk of the fighter fleet, are undergoing a
structural upgrade program to replace known life-limited structural
components. This upgrade program is required to achieve an airframe
life of 8,000 flight hours. Wing pylon rib corrosion, a known problem
with the F-16 aircraft, is an issue we monitor closely. This corrosion
can prevent the F-16s from carrying pylon-mounted external fuel tanks,
which limits their effective combat range. While we currently have
three F-16 aircraft grounded and 13 flight restricted from carrying
external tanks due to wing pylon rib corrosion, the corrosion problem
is somewhat common across the fleet. For example, within the past 24
months, we identified 27 aircraft at Aviano Air Base, Italy with some
degree of corrosion in this area. We currently inspect F-16 aircraft
every 800 hours to monitor for this problem.
In other inspections, approximately 16 percent (63 of 399) of our
Block 40/42 F-16 aircraft have been found to have bulkhead cracks. As
of March 31, 2008, 18 Block 40/42 F-16 aircraft were in non-flying
status awaiting bulkhead repair or replacement. An additional 42
aircraft continue to fly with increased inspection requirements to
measure crack growth. We will continue to monitor this situation
closely.
The Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) is the top
F-16 priority and will enable the maintenance of a single operational
flight program configuration on both the Block-40 F-16s and Block-50 F-
16s. The Block-50 modification is complete and the Block-40
modification will be complete in fiscal year 2010. It combines several
modifications including a new mission computer, color displays, air-to-
air interrogator (Block 50/52 only), Link-16, and Joint Helmet Mounted
Cueing System.

Future Fighter Shortfalls and Plans to Mitigate Shortfalls
The Air Force has been at war for 17 continuous years with
operations in Southwest Asia, the Balkans, global war on terror, and
defending the Homeland. This extremely high operations tempo has
accelerated the service life consumption for nearly all of Air Force
platforms and especially the fighter force. This sustained high
operations tempo has contributed to lowered readiness levels, with
increasing risks to operations and maintenance.
Your Air Force aircraft are the oldest they have ever been,
averaging over 24 years of age. While your Air Force remains able to
carry out the missions of today, it is becoming clear that the aging of
the fleet is having negative effects that are difficult to forecast.
The Air Force faces a recapitalization challenge unlike anything
before. Airmen must ensure that adequate forces and the right balance
of aircraft types are available to meet both the near-term and future
needs of our Nation. Today's airman must ensure that future airmen
inherit an Air Force that is relevant, capable, and sustainable.
Capitalization of our fifth generation fighter force is essential
to meet our commitment of securing the national defense. F-35s will not
achieve full production rates until 2015 yet we are already retiring F-
15s and F-16s, and will continue to do so well into the out-years.
During this period of retiring aircraft before F-35 full rate
production, F-22 production is capped, effectively interrupting our
ability for fifth generation recapitalization until the middle of the
next decade. By 2025, most of our legacy air frames will be retired.
The Air Force position remains that a 2,250 combat aircraft inventory
is the required force. However, airmen realize this will be a difficult
challenge based on likely budget availability.

Fifth Generation Fighters
Fifth generation fighters like the F-22A and the F-35 are key
elements to our Nation's defense and deterrence. As long as hostile
nations recognize the ability of U.S. airpower to strike their vital
centers with impunity, all other U.S. Government efforts are enhanced,
which reduces the need for military confrontation. This is the timeless
paradox of deterrence; the best way to avoid war is to demonstrate to
your enemies, and potential enemies, that you have the ability, the
will, and the resolve to defeat them.
Both the F-22A and the F-35 represent our latest generation of
fighter aircraft. We need both aircraft to maintain the margin of
superiority we have come to depend upon, the margin that has granted
our forces in the air and on the ground, freedom to maneuver and to
attack. The F-22A and F-35 each possess unique complementary and
essential capabilities that together provide the synergistic effects
required to maintain that margin of superiority across the spectrum of
conflict. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-led 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review Joint Air Dominance study underscored that
our Nation has a critical requirement to recapitalize tactical aircraft
forces. Legacy fourth generation aircraft simply cannot survive to
operate and achieve the effects necessary to win in an integrated,
anti-access environment.

F-22A Procurement Plans
We're proud to tell you the F-22A program has established a world-
class production program. The F-22A production program is currently
delivering Lot 6 aircraft ahead of scheduled contract delivery dates at
a rate of about two per month. Additionally, construction has started
on Lot 7 Raptors, the first lot of the 3-year multiyear procurement
contract we awarded last summer. When the plant delivers the last
aircraft of Lot 9 in December 2011, we will have completed the program
of record of 183 Raptors. The Air Force supports the President's budget
and greatly appreciates the SECDEF commitment to keep the F-22A
production line open through a supplemental request. Because of our
economic order quantity buy under the multiyear contract, some vendors
early in the build process will complete deliveries and begin shutdown
in November this year. As such, we are on track to release a shutdown
request for proposal later this summer, and we anticipate fiscal year
2009 shutdown costs to be $40 million.
On the current unfunded requirements list, we requested an
additional $600 million to buy four more aircraft to replace global war
on terror losses of legacy aircraft. These aircraft would be dovetailed
in at the end of Lot 9 and will only keep the production line open for
an additional 2 months. If we want to keep the line open and deliver an
additional F-22A Lot, then the Air Force would require $595.6 million
in fiscal year 2009 for Advance Procurement of 24 aircraft. In either
case, we are at a critical crossroad: we must make a decision by
November to avoid increased costs and a break in the production line
before our suppliers begin to exit the market.

F-22A Future Capabilities and Modifications
The F-22A Raptor is the Air Force's primary air superiority
fighter, providing unmatched capabilities for operational access,
homeland defense, cruise missile defense, and force protection for the
Joint Team. The multi-role F-22A's combination of speed, stealth,
maneuverability and integrated avionics gives this remarkable aircraft
the ability to gain access and survive in high threat environments. Its
unparalleled ability to find, fix, track, and target enemy air and
surface-based threats ensures air dominance and freedom of maneuver for
all Joint Forces.
The Air Force has accepted 116 F-22A aircraft to date, out of a
programmed delivery of 183. Most of these aircraft include the
Increment-2 upgrade, which provides the ability to employ supersonic
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and enhances the intra-flight data-
link to provide connectivity with additional F-22As. The F-22A fleet
will be upgraded under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
approved Increment-3 upgrade designed to enhance both air-to-air and
precision ground attack capability. Raptors off the production line
today are wired to accept the Increment-3.1 upgrade, which when
equipped, upgrades the APG-77 Active Electronically Scanned Array
(AESA) radar to enable synthetic aperture radar ground mapping
capability, provides the ability to self-target JDAMs using on-board
sensors, and allows F-22As to carry and employ eight small diameter
bombs (SDB). Increment-3.1 is funded and begins to field in fiscal year
2010. Future F-22As will include the Increment-3.2 upgrade, which is
funded and features the next generation data-link, improved SDB
employment capability, improved targeting using multi-ship geo-
location, automatic ground collision avoidance system (Auto GCAS), and
the capability to employ our enhanced air-to-air weapons, the AIM-120D
and AIM-9X. Increment-3.2 should begin to field in fiscal year 2013.
The Increment-3.3 upgrade is currently unfunded. It plans to include
Mode 5/S, which is the next generation Identification Friend or Foe and
advanced air-traffic control transponder, radar auto search/auto
detect, which gives automated target cueing using a fourth generation
AESA radar, and a ground-moving-target-indicator-and-tracking
capability.

F-35
The F-35 program will develop and deploy a family of highly common,
affordable, fifth generation strike fighter aircraft meeting
operational needs of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allies. The
F-35 will provide our Nation with a highly capable and affordable
strike aircraft in sufficient quantities to destroy a wide array of
targets in a protracted conflict. Air Force and OSD studies, such as
the Sustaining Air Dominance and Joint Air Dominance studies, have
demonstrated the requirement for both the air-to-surface payload and
survivability of the F-35 in the face of advanced surface-to-air
missile threats. Legacy fourth generation aircraft simply cannot
survive to operate and achieve the effects necessary to win in an
integrated, anti-access environment. Failure to recapitalize the
fighter force with the F-35 will result in significantly increased risk
to both our air and ground forces.
The F-35 is meeting all Key Performance Parameters, and as of March
31, 2008, the first Conventional Take-off and Landing (CTOL) test
aircraft, AA-1, has completed 39 test flights. Recently it completed
its first two in-flight refueling missions, and the Cooperative
Avionics Test Bed continues to provide unprecedented risk reduction at
this stage in a major weapon system not seen in any legacy program.
Most recently, the F-35 program has received approval to award the
second Low Rate Initial Production lot which consists of six CTOL
aircraft, which will be awarded this spring, and six short take-off and
vertical landing aircraft, which will be awarded this summer.

Joint Strike Fighter Alternative Engine Program
The Department continues to believe the risks associated with a
single source engine supplier are manageable and do not outweigh the
investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine. However,
the Air Force and Navy are executing the $480 million appropriated by
Congress in the 2008 budget to continue development. We completed the
Critical Design Review for the alternate engine in February 2008, and
we have completed over 300 hours of engine testing for the CTOL
aircraft.
The cost to complete remaining F136 engine development is estimated
at $1.4 billion in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation through
2013. Starting in 2009, the F136 program would require approximately
$31 million for long lead items in preparation for production and $1.7
billion across the Future Years Defense Program beginning in fiscal
year 2010 for the production of the F136 engine.

IV. CLOSING

We are building a 21st century Air Force prepared to succeed--
strategically, operationally, and tactically. Our highly capable and
lethal aviation programs provide Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and
Global Power. These capabilities are critical today and for the future
Joint Force.
The United States of America depends on air, space, and cyberspace
power to an extent unprecedented in history. We are ready and engaged
today, and looking toward securing the future. We cannot rest on the
laurels of our current capability. Our Nation must invest today to
ensure tomorrow's air, space, and cyberspace dominance.

Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General.
Finally, we'll have Lieutenant General Donald J. Hoffman of
the Air Force, the Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition. Good to see you again,
General.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD J. HOFFMAN, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

General Hoffman. Mr. Chairman, thank you. We may have the
most battle-tested Air Force that we've ever had, but we also
have the oldest equipment we've ever had, as General Darnell
mentioned. We're now over 24 years average age. Our Chief and
Secretary have testified we need around $20 billion a year to
arrest that. That won't reverse it, but that will at least
arrest the aging. As my role as the Military Deputy for
Acquisition, I'd be glad to answer any questions you may have
on our recapitalization efforts to do that to meet our future
threats.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
How much is in the budget for you this year? Are you
anywhere near that number in the next year, during the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM)?
General Hoffman. That's over and above what's in the
budget, is what we think we need to arrest it.
Senator Lieberman. At some point it's a larger question.
Senator Cornyn and I have talked about somehow, maybe at the
beginning of the next administration, we need to do that, is to
try to formulate hopefully a bipartisan public education
campaign about the extent to which we're not funding critical
DOD programs because we don't have the money.
Let me go on to some questions, and I'll begin with General
Darnell. I wanted to talk about the F-22. Let's do 7-minute
rounds and we'll just keep moving, and you'll let me know when
I come to the end of the 7 minutes.
I understand, General, that one part of the difference of
opinion between the Air Force and the DOD about the F-22s and
how many to buy centers on whether the currently planned 183
aircraft would be sufficient to meet wartime requirements. I
know that in this public forum we cannot discuss the specific
differences, but I want to say in that context it appears that
the Air Force, to me, that the Air Force and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense are using different estimates of the
threat.
My understanding is that the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) is responsible for publishing coordinated threat
estimates against which the whole Department fields
capabilities. So I want to ask this question, and I understand
your answer will be within the context of this public forum. Is
the Air Force using the DIA-approved threat estimates in
arriving at its conclusion that you need more F-22s?
General Darnell. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that
we are using the DIA threat estimates.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Then this question is either to you, General Darnell or
General Hoffman. On page 11 of your prepared testimony today
you make a statement regarding the timing of the decision to
obligate the funds for advanced procurement for F-22 to keep
the line operating past the current end of production with
fiscal year 2009 procurement of 20 aircraft. I'm going to quote
here. You say: ``We must make a decision by November to avoid
increased costs and a break in the production line before our
suppliers begin to exit the market.''
At the full Senate Armed Services Committee posture hearing
in February, Secretary Gates, regarding this F-22 production
issue said, ``My objective is to give the next administration
an option.'' Air Force officials, including Secretary Wynne,
have told us that they're in agreement with the position of the
Secretary of Defense.
So what I want to ask is, how would these positions be in
agreement, in other words, signing advanced procurement
contracts, as you said today, in November 2008 and giving the
next administration an option, when obviously the next
administration won't take office until January 20?
General Hoffman. Mr. Chairman, I think if you recall back
on the B-1 story: we cancelled the B-1, we restarted the B-1.
So all subsequent administrations have the option. I think it's
a matter of at what cost do you exercise that option. To do
that in a most efficient manner, which is where I come from in
an acquisition standpoint, and that is to have the right
advanced notice, to do Economic Order Quantity, multi-year or
even single lot advanced procurement in a quantity that makes
sense for effective production.
If we go past November, we'll start seeing shutdown of sub-
vendor tiers and all that, and then to go back and recapture
them will become more expensive. Every month after that the
costs will go up of what it takes to go back and recapture
them, without a path forward, without a commitment for
additional procurement.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, I appreciate that answer. I
assumed that's what you had in mind. I'm curious whether you've
calculated at all what the dollar and schedule effect would be
of waiting actually until January or some time thereafter to
make a decision.
General Hoffman. It takes about 3 years to build an F-22.
From when we go on contract, it's 35 months until it rolls out
the door. So that's at an efficient rate. If you're at a less
than efficient rate, that number can vary. So December 2011 is
when the last F-22 goes out the door right now. So you can back
that up to find out when you're in that 35-month window and
then it's a month for month delay to that. Costs go up, and
depending on how many months that will be will determine what
the cost is.
There's no per-month cost because it's an increasing amount
every month as additional sub-vendors close their doors.
Senator Lieberman. But you can say with some certainty that
waiting until 2009 to make the advanced procurement decision
would cost more money?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. November of this year will be
fiscal year 2009, but if you're talking about calendar year
2009 to make the decision we're already into the fiscal year
and we do not have the authorizations there to keep those sub-
vendors still alive.
Senator Lieberman. So what you're saying is that there's
time and money to be saved by doing the advanced procurement in
November of this year, and that your understanding of Secretary
Gates' position about giving the next administration an option
is basically meaning that they can stop the process if they
choose?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir, depending on when the next
administration would form as a team to build or get that
decision through Congress as well.
Senator Lieberman. In calendar year 2009, okay.
Admiral Myers, let me ask you a question regarding force
structure. We talked about the shortfall in aircraft. I want to
understand whether you're saying that the combination of the
JSF and upgrading existing planes will actually fill the gap,
which we have at least 69 aircraft short of the number required
to support the 10 aircraft carrier wings? So is that
combination that you talked about in your opening testimony
adequate to fill the gap?
Admiral Myers. Chairman Lieberman, we will have a 69
tactical fighter aircraft gap that peaks in the 2017 timeframe
if we continue to follow the current program of record and
there are no delays in the JSF. So that assumes that we receive
the program of record for the JSF as it's identified in the
President's 2009 budget, and that also assumes that we don't
have any other early retirements of our legacy Hornets that
we're completing the analysis on the Service Life Extension
Program.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you about how much risk, on
that last point, you think we're exposing ourselves and
obviously our pilots to by assuming that the F-18, which was
designed for 8,000 hours, will be able to fly operationally
until it reaches 9,000 hours?
Admiral Myers. Mr. Chairman, that's a great question. We
have over the last few years spent quite a bit of time doing
the analysis to try to get what came to us from the factory as
a 6,000-hour aircraft--6,000 hours with 8,300 landings and
2,000 cats and traps--and we have already taken those aircraft,
the legacy F-18 A through Ds, out to 8,000 hours and extended
their landings to 14,500 and 2,700 cats and traps.
So this is the next phase, to try to get the hours from
8,000 to 10,000. We're not going to increase the cats and traps
or the landings. Our analysis to date shows that we think we're
going to get to the number of aircraft that we need. We have
about 640 legacy F/A-18s and if we get half of those to a point
where we can extend them, meaning we've looked at each
aircraft. We understand the 159 hot spots that are associated
with high fatigue and corrosion areas for every aircraft. Of
those 159 hot spots, 100 are going to require some kind of
engineering change or augment to extend it if it shows wear.
So what we're doing right now is we're completing the
analysis to identify which aircraft will fall into that
category that we can extend, and then we'll start with the
engineering change proposals at the end of the summer. So it's
a little bit early to say that we're going to get there with
all of the aircraft that we need for the 10,000-hour extension,
but we're confident that we are on the right track and we'll
know more here in the next few months.
That's our challenge in POM 10--to make sure that those
engineering changes are funded and that we have all the
aircraft that we need programmed to try to do what we can to
mitigate that shortfall.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up, but just to ask a quick
question: I presume you're imposing a high standard of
acceptable risk here as you extend the hours of service life
for individual planes?
Admiral Myers. Sir, this is what I would term as the
highest standard of acceptable risk. We would not put our
tactical aviators in a position in which we weren't confident
that we could safely extend the aircraft.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Darnell and General Hoffman, we're all aware of the
controversy surrounding the KC-45 tanker program and I'm not
going to get into the merits of that. But I would like to ask a
few basic questions about this top priority program for the Air
Force.
First of all, General Darnell, how urgent is the
requirement for a next generation of aerial refueling tanker?
General Darnell. Senator Cornyn, we consider it so urgent
that we've made it our number one acquisition priority. Our
average fleet age for our KC-135Es is 48 years, and our
maintenance man-hour costs per flying hour for the KC-135 have
gone up dramatically and exponentially. So we again consider it
that important to make it our number one acquisition priority.
Senator Cornyn. General Hoffman, compared to other programs
that you've witnessed over your career, would you compare how
fair, open, and transparent the bid and award process was for
the KC-45 tanker compared to those other programs you've
witnessed over your career?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. I would say that this is
unprecedented in the amount of effort that's gone into being
open to all partners in this, both between the DOD and with
Congress on what the game plan is. It's been unprecedented in
the amount of exchanges we've had with the vendors of what our
intentions are and getting feedback from them before we locked
in the requirements, that we made sure we had executable
requirements for our industrial partners.
I can think of no program that's gone through the volume of
effort that this program has.
Senator Cornyn. General Darnell, General Trautman, and
Admiral Myers, I want to ask about the second engine on the F-
35, because, frankly, I'm perplexed. Congress acted to restore
funding for the development of the second engine production
source for the JSF and actually passed legislation requiring a
second source, and the Department has, it looks like has
ignored that.
Can you please describe the Department's rationale for
doing so, if in fact you agree that's happened? I'd like to
know whether the Navy and the Air Force support the
Department's decision, and why or why not. General Darnell, you
could start, please, or General Hoffman if you think it's more
appropriate.
General Hoffman. We do support the President's budget and
the Department's position on this. In a fiscally constrained
environment, the balance of risk versus the benefit of
competition is balanced, and we think we have a track record in
other aircraft that have a single engine provider to give us
confidence that we'll have a successful program.
Senator Cornyn. General Trautman, would you care to
respond?
General Trautman. Senator, the issue for the Marine Corps
is how do we stretch the limited resources that we have across
a wide range of needs. It is incredibly important that we keep
the F-35 on track for a 2012 initial operational capability
(IOC) for all the reasons that Admiral Myers so clearly
articulated. So it just becomes a matter of that as a
decisionmaker for us.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral Myers, do you have anything you'd
like to add?
Admiral Myers. Yes, sir, just that the Navy and the
Department continue to believe that the risks associated with a
single engine supplier are manageable and do not outweigh the
investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine.
Senator Cornyn. I know this has been the subject of a lot
of discussion and hearing, over time. I'm one of those who if
you tell me the military needs something I'm willing to open up
the Treasury to pay for it. But it's a little perplexing why,
given the discussion and the conscious decisionmaking process
by Congress, that this budget ignores that judgment. So I guess
we'll have to go through it again this time.
Let me ask Mr. Balderson and General Hoffman. GAO recently
released a report critical of the F-35 and I alluded to that in
my opening statement. They took exception to the program's
current risk reduction program, schedule, and cost estimates.
I'd like to give you an opportunity, if you will, both of you,
to respond to that.
Mr. Balderson. Senator, I'll start if I can. Actually,
there have been two reports. I'd be happy to respond to both of
them. The report that you refer to I think basically had two
findings. First, it was critical of the midcourse risk
reduction plan; and then, second, there were a series of
recommendations that addressed the need for an independent cost
estimate and schedule risk assessment.
With respect to the midcourse correction recovery plan, we
believe that this was a strategy that was carefully considered
over a very long period of time. There are really two elements
to the risk reduction plan. The first element is a very modest
reduction of engineering staffing at Lockheed Martin, during
the end of the development phase. When I say modest, there was
already, of course, a reduction plan for people at the end of a
development program. Our risk reduction plan reduces those
people about 5 percent faster.
The second piece of that reduction plan was to reduce two
test vehicles. What we have to keep in mind is that when we
entered the System Development and Demonstration phase of this
program about 6 years ago, we had a test plan at that point and
made certain assumptions about the number of test hours we
would need and the test vehicles that we would need. Four years
into the program, when we decided that we did need to recoup
some management reserve and we began to look for opportunities
to do that, the Lockheed Martin-government team all unanimously
believed that what we had learned during that first 4 years
made it clear that there were two vehicles in that test plan
that we didn't need.
We didn't go looking for areas to cut and pick test
vehicles. It became clear to us from information that we had
gleaned over the first 4 years that we could do without those
vehicles.
We believe we have a mitigation strategy for both of those
areas should we prove to be wrong. First of all, we're going to
watch this very carefully over the next couple of years. With
respect to the people, very simply, if we're not ready to
remove those people we won't remove them. They won't come off
the program before the time. We just believe that we will be
able to get rid of them at this pace.
Second, we have a fallback position with respect to the two
test vehicles. We don't believe we will need those vehicles for
the test program, but if we do we're prepared to substitute
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) vehicles to complete the op-
eval, and we know that we can do that.
Just very briefly, the other piece of the recommendation
with respect to independent cost estimate and schedule risk
assessment, we completely agree with that. In fact, prior to
this particular GAO report coming out, the Department had
chartered what we call a joint independent review, where the
Navy and the Air Force independent cost teams, teaming with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Cost Analysis
Improvement Group, conducted a comprehensive cost and risk
assessment that will inform POM 10 and will inform a decision
to proceed on with the subsequent LRIPs.
General Hoffman. Senator, I would just add, the GAO made a
bunch of observations. They took some data points. But we don't
necessarily agree with how they connected the dots in
projecting forward into the future. I think the program office
is the source for the truth on that. We've been tasked in both
Services and the OSD staff by Mr. Young to come to closure on
what we think the expected completion cost is, and that process
is going on throughout the summer.
The select acquisition report for 2007 shows really no
change from 2006 in that regard. But we do admit there is cost
and schedule pressure in this program. We're trying to define
that here in the next couple of months so we can inform POM 10
building so that we can deliver a quality product to you next
year with confidence in the way ahead in this program.
I will say that this program has learned a lot from the F-
22 program. We have a very robust test fleet and additional
test assets, like the cooperative avionics test bed and so
forth, to wring the risk out of the program in a timely manner
so that we can make informed decisions as we go through our
LRIP lots into full rate production.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. My time has expired.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Hoffman, going back to Senator Lieberman's comments
relative to the F-22, I notice in your statement where you talk
about the line being shut down or a line being kept open.
Obviously, as you said, under the current procurement situation
the line will start shutting down in November. Suppliers will
begin backing off. If we're truly going to keep that line open,
as you state on page 11, it will require $595.6 million in the
fiscal year 2009 advanced procurement budget, is that correct,
for 24 additional aircraft?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. We need $595 million for
advanced procurement. Some of that money can come from money we
have set aside right now for the tail-up expenses. If there is
a lot 10, that tail-up gets deferred, so the amount of money--
$125 million--that's in there for lot 10 can be applied toward
that advanced procurement.
Senator Chambliss. What about the satisfaction of the Air
Force as a customer as to what's being done with respect to the
F-22 production now? Is it moving the way you want it to move?
General Hoffman. Absolutely. You may recall 4 or 5 years
ago that we were struggling to get on schedule and stay on
schedule. We have more than recovered schedule-wise. Their
average delivery is 2 months earlier now and we're actually
getting jets that are being delivered with zero writeups on
them.
Senator Chambliss. There is conversation about four more F-
22s being added to the supplemental. What does that add to the
timeframe from the standpoint of the production line being kept
open?
General Hoffman. Sir, that adds four aircraft to the fleet.
It adds very little to the debate about keeping vendors open.
At the current production rate, if we blended it in at the same
production rate, that would be less than 2 months of
production.
Senator Chambliss. Based upon where we are with respect to
the F-35, which is a great airplane and obviously I think we
all agree we have to continue down the road with that weapons
system, but given the current procurement plan, will the Air
Force have a gap in your fighter inventory line?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir, but I'll let General Darnell
talk to that from the requirements standpoint.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
General Darnell. Senator, yes, we will. Based on the
program of record, beginning in 2017 we will start incurring a
gap, out to the 2024 time period. Based on a delivery of 48 F-
35s a year and 183 F-22s, we would anticipate a shortage of
over 800 aircraft in 2024.
Senator Chambliss. In your opinion is there any need to do
an additional study to determine what the right mix is of
legacy as well as fifth generation aircraft?
General Darnell. Senator, right now, in light of that,
we're--as Admiral Myers already talked about--starting to
review what that mix of legacy might have to be if we're unable
to increase production.
Senator Chambliss. I note from your written statement that,
regarding repairing the F-15 A through Ds, that the Commander
of Air Combat Command has proposed that of the nine aircraft
still grounded due to the longeron cracks, five will be
repaired, at a cost of approximately $235,000 per plane or a
total of $1.2 million. Is that correct?
General Darnell. That's correct, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Is that the extent you think the expense
of those grounded aircraft is going to come to?
General Darnell. Those are our best estimates at this time,
yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Do you recommend purchasing any new F-
15s?
General Darnell. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Chambliss. You discuss the F-22A future
capabilities and modifications in your written statement. You
talk a little bit about the criticality of this program to
upgrading our current F-22s. As we know, GAO recently issued a
report that was critical of the F-22 modernization program. Do
you agree with the GAO's assessment?
General Darnell. Sir, I probably ought to let General
Hoffman talk to that. As an operator, quite frankly, I did not.
But he may have a little more insight than I.
Senator Chambliss. General Hoffman?
General Hoffman. Sir, I think it's a matter of when you put
your probe into the program and all that. They had comments in
there about the maturity of some of the technologies. We are
well on our way on the early increments of those modernization
programs. 3.2 is fully funded. Like all modernization
increments, there's continuous debate as technology matures at
a certain rate or as funding is available at a certain rate,
what crosses the boundary between that increment and the one
preceding it or the one following it.
That's the whole beauty of increments, is it gives you that
flexibility as you approach that timeframe to make those
decisions on content in order to hold schedule and cost.
Senator Chambliss. What's going to happen in that gap
period out there? If we're going to be 800 airplanes short,
what's the plan?
General Darnell. Senator, that is one thing we're going to
have to figure out, is exactly what we're going to do with our
legacy fleet, specifically F-15s. We have 177 programmed to go
out to the 2024 time period or timeframe. We're going to do a
tear-down analysis this year. We're going to do a fleet
viability study; the results are to be out in the May-June
timeframe. We're going to do a complete review of the program
to see where we need to go.
We've extended the life of the F-15s now to 8,000 hours.
Senator Chambliss. What's the oldest of those F-15s we have
in those legacy aircraft now?
General Darnell. Calendar-age, we have aircraft that are
25-years-old.
Senator Chambliss. General Trautman, you note in your
written statement that the KC-130J aircraft are continuously
deployed in support of OIF and providing multi-mission tactical
air refueling and fixed wing assault support, and that these
aircraft reduce the requirement for resupply via ground and
limit the exposure of convoys to IEDs. You also note that the
introduction of the aerial refuelable MV-22, combined with the
retirement of the legacy KC-130, requires accelerated
procurement of the KC-130J.
I note that the Marine Corps unfunded program list includes
a request for $150 million for two KC-130Js. Can you please
articulate how procuring these additional aircraft in fiscal
year 2009 would support your requirements for refueling and in-
theater logistics support and how you might be better able to
support deployed marines and marine assets if you had
additional aircraft sooner?
General Trautman. Thank you, Senator. Yes, sir. Our program
of record is for 51 KC-130Js in the Active-Duty Force. We've
had 36 aircraft delivered or on contract. We've kept these
airplanes very busy in the support to deployed forces. In fact,
we're flying them at about 250 percent of our planned rate.
That means that beginning about September of this year
we'll start the process of taking airplanes off the flight line
to put them into required depot-level maintenance. So the
stress on the force as we continue this transition will
continue and will actually exacerbate itself slightly in the
fall. So any additional airplanes that we can put in the hands
of our operators will be put to good use.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your leadership on these issues; very important.
If I may, Mr. Balderson, let me start with you. I want to
ask about helicopters. Of course, you have the MH-60, which has
been the workhorse of the Fleet. As I understand it, back in
previous budget years there was a decision to consolidate some
of our helicopters and have more MH-60s and fewer other type of
helicopters. Does that decision that was made a few years ago
still make sense, and can you give the committee a better
understanding of what Fleet Forces Command's study is trying to
address?
Mr. Balderson. Senator, if I could I'd like to refer that
question to Admiral Myers. It has more of an operational than a
budget flavor. I'd be happy to address the acquisition aspects
of the program.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Admiral Myers?
Admiral Myers. Thank you, Senator. The reduction from
seven-type model series of helicopters to two started back in
the late 1990s with our helicopter master plan, and that's been
refined and updated since 2001 to make sure that we're on the
right path. We're essentially going down to two-type model
series--the MH-60 Sierra, which will be an anti-surface and a
mine warfare platform, as well as a logistics platform and then
the Romeo, which will be our anti-submarine warfare helicopter.
Of recent, the last few years, we've taken a look to make
sure that we're on the right path. Knowing that our MH-53s are
going to retire starting in the 2016 timeframe and be retired
out about the 2019 timeframe, that will mean that our heavy-
lift/vertical-lift capability goes out with that helicopter. So
Fleet Forces Command was requested to do a vertical heavy lift
requirements study to make sure that we had a good idea of what
the operational environment was going to be starting in that
timeframe; what the requirement was going to be in that
timeframe; and that we had contingencies or a way of operating
that would accommodate the things for which we're currently
using an MH-53 heavy lift helicopter.
We thought that heavy lift concepts of operation (CONOPs)
was going to be completed last fall. It's been rescrubbed and
we don't anticipate that it's going to be available for us from
Fleet Forces Command until some time early next fall. But that
will help set us on the right programmatic path in the future
and assure us that we're on the right glide slope with the
reduction from the seven-type model series to two.
Senator Pryor. General Hoffman, let me ask you, if I may,
about the C-130J program. As I understand it, there is no
request for C-130Js in the fiscal year 2009 budget. Given the
aging C-130E fleet and some of the problems we've had there,
why have we not requested any more C-130Js?
General Hoffman. Senator, I think it's a combination of us
completing the multi-year buy that we're presently on, plus the
amounts that are in the global war on terror account right now.
Then you'll see it pick up again in the 2010 request and on,
where we have a steady state level of effort for the C-130J
recapitalization.
Senator Pryor. So will the C-130Js still be manufactured
during the fiscal year 2009 cycle?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. In fact, there are some in
there. Even though the numbers may be zero in the production
there as far as the request, there is more of a steady flow
through the factory during that timeframe there because of the
Marine Corps buy and because of foreign buys and all that.
There's activity throughout that time period.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask about the CV-22, if I may.
General Hoffman, can you give me a good understanding of the
acquisition status of that and any kind of problems that you
see with the CV-22?
General Hoffman. We're completing the initial operational
test and evaluation for the Air Force variant of the V-22.
We're completing that this summer. We'll get the test report on
that. So I'll hold fire until the testers give their
professional opinion on what they think is going on.
But I've heard nothing at my level that causes any concern
on the acquisition and continued production of that aircraft.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. Balderson, there's one theme that we get tired of
hearing here in the Senate oftentimes, and that is that, when
it comes to military acquisitions, there are two things that
happen. They get behind schedule and they get over budget. I
know that you have several items right now in your mix that
you're overseeing that are behind schedule and over budget, and
it's like what Senator Chambliss asked a few minutes ago. When
you start to get into that situation, you still have the needs
that are still there.
But let me start with one of those and that is the
presidential transport, the VH-71. As I understand it, it's
behind schedule and they may cost more than we thought they
would. What's the status of that?
Mr. Balderson. Let me speak to the VH-71 in two increments,
Senator. Increment-1--which is the initial capability, five
aircraft--that program is proceeding I would say reasonably
well. There are three increment-1 test vehicles flying at
Patuxent River currently. All five of the increment-1
production vehicles are in various stages of production in
Yeovil, England. They will all be delivered by the end of this
year to begin testing, and we're projecting an IOC of September
2010. That's about 11 months later than the original
projection, which is why I say the program is going reasonably
well. We lost some time and progress when we initiated that
program. We couldn't recover all of that. But we feel confident
that program is going well and we'll introduce that initial
operational capability of increment-1 in the September 2010
timeframe.
Increment-2 has been a different challenge. Increment-2 is
a considerable leap in terms of capability, range,
communications, survivability, et cetera. It was always
anticipated to be a much more capable aircraft. We recognized
at the end of calendar year 2006 that we were not going to be
able to execute increment-2 on cost or on schedule and frankly
since the end of 2006 we have been evaluating any number of
options to proceed forward and deliver that capability.
In fact, toward the end of last year, because of funding
shortages for increment-2 and because we were in the process of
restructuring, we issued a stop work order and currently there
is no work. We have increment-2 on hold.
Recently, having evaluated a large number of options to
proceed with increment-2 or other alternatives and working
closely with the White House, we've made the determination that
the increment-2 capability and the program of record that we
have on hold now is really the only way and the only means of
meeting the requirement for this capability. So what we have
ongoing at the current time is we are now working very closely
with Lockheed Martin to get a proposal that would lead to a
negotiated restructure of that contract by the end of this
year.
We're preparing to go to a Defense Acquisition Board in the
fall, which would give us the authority to proceed. As we do
that, we're developing and refining our cost estimate for the
program. It does look like at this point, depending on how
negotiations go and what sort of trades we might be able to
make, like we're talking about a cost growth in the
neighborhood of $4 billion and probably roughly 5 years in
delivering that IOC.
I would add that the only way we can restart increment-2 in
the fall is with the 2009 authorization and appropriation. We
don't have funding in 2008 to continue with increment-2 for a
number of reasons, which I can go into. There are about $300
million in the 2009 budget request that would continue
increment-2, and we will need that to get the program
restarted.
Senator Pryor. That's not great news, because it sounds
like, if I understand it, that program is going to be, what did
you say, $4 billion over budget and 5 years late?
Mr. Balderson. The increment-2, that would be a pretty
close estimate, yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, that's tough news.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. We'll pursue that further.
Thank you, Senator Pryor. We'll start a second round of
questions.
I want to come back to the questions about the aircraft
shortage projected. General Trautman, I know one of the
projections for a shortfall for the Marine Corps was a minimum
of 56 aircraft short of the required to support the three
Marine air wings. Since the Marine Corps, going back to my
conversation with Admiral Myers about the F-18, also is flying
F-18s and is contributing squadrons to certain carrier air
wings, how is that potential gap of at least 56 aircraft going
to affect the Marine Corps' ability to meet its commitments?
General Trautman. It puts us in a different position,
Senator. It does hit us about the 2017 timeframe. This gap
needs to be managed aggressively and I think the Department of
the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Navy, are working together
to mitigate the gap through things like the service life
assessment program and the service life management programs
that we have in place, so that we can make sure we get every
single legitimate safe flight hour out of the existing force.
From our perspective, anything that puts pressure and that
delays the arrival of F-35B increases our concern about our
ability to provide the kind of aviation service to our Marine
air-ground task forces that the joint forces commanders expect
from the Corps.
Senator Lieberman. This comes back again to the critical
importance of the JSF program and doing everything we can to
make sure that there are not delays in delivering it, right?
General Trautman. It's absolutely essential from the Corps'
perspective. We made a conscious decision over a decade ago to
forego the F-18 E and F.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Trautman. It was a wise decision, I think, when you
look at the relative capability sets between this fifth
generation strike fighter, the F-35, and the F-18. But as that
bridge gets longer and longer, it puts our force under
considerable stress and increases the concern that the
Commandant and I and others have about our ability to make that
bridge.
Senator Lieberman. Absolutely.
In that regard, Secretary Balderson, there have been
reports of engine testing failure that certain engines have had
when operating--I'm talking about the F-35--in the more highly
demanding mode for the Marine Corps STOVL aircraft. Can you
give us a status report on the F-35 engine, particularly as
regarding the STOVL operating demands?
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir. What occurred on two occasions in
the last few months is an engine on a test stand that was
undergoing testing, and it was in the lift mode, the highest
stress lift mode for the STOVL variant, and the two engines
failed. The first one failed at a point where the engine was
under the highest stress. It broke a blade in the third stage
of the engine.
The company, Pratt & Whitney, believed they understood the
root cause fairly quickly. They began ongoing testing on
another engine, and put it in exactly the same mode. The intent
actually had been to get it up to a mode where they were able
to determine that the engine was about ready to fail, but to
cut it off before it failed. They got it into that mode, but
didn't get it shut off quickly enough, and at exactly that same
mode they had an identical failure. In fact, if you look at the
pictures you can see the blade broke in the same place and
almost in the same shape.
The company feels pretty confident, based on the fact that
they had already been working a fix and this testing was to
validate the fact that they understood the root cause; they're
pretty comfortable that they understand the root cause, and
they're doing additional testing as we speak to verify that.
That testing should be completed by the end of April.
Concurrent with that, they are developing a design fix
that, assuming the root cause that they've determined proves
out at the end of this month, they'll implement the design fix.
At this point, obviously, we view any sort of test failures
like this with caution and with great seriousness. We do
believe Pratt & Whitney and the government team have a handle
on this, and the plan now is to proceed. We're going to delay
first flight of STOVL a little bit just to make sure we have
the root cause and the fix established. But the plan now is to
delay first flight no more than a month, because the first
flight of STOVL is going to be in the conventional mode anyway,
and one of the things that Pratt & Whitney through their
testing is confident of now is that this sort of problem
doesn't exist in the conventional mode. It's only in the lift
mode for the STOVL.
Senator Lieberman. So at this point your hope is that that
engine test failure will result in only a minimal delay in the
ultimate availability of the STOVL variant of the JSF?
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir. The current plan is to delay the
first flight of the STOVL 1 month in the conventional mode, and
I believe I have these dates correct. The first flight in the
STOVL mode was supposed to have been in October of this year.
We're looking to probably delay that a couple of months.
Now, prior to flying in the STOVL mode, which is projected
now for the December timeframe, Secretary Young and Secretary
Winter have asked to get together and hold a review of the test
data and the technical data to make absolutely sure that we're
confident that we have the fix and that they're confident that
we can fly safely.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Obviously, these are very
sophisticated, complicated aircraft. But we want to do
everything we can, for just the reasons General Trautman said,
and I know you agree with this, to get the Marine Corps this
plane on time, even beyond that if possible.
General Hoffman, let me change the subject to UAVs. The
Army is planning to buy a large number of Warrior UAVs in
upcoming years and intends to buy its own fleet of medium
endurance UAVs because it does not believe that the Air Force
will adequately support the ground forces with Air Force
assets.
Last year we heard that the Air Force could end up buying
the Army version of the UAV. Is that still the case?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. In fact, we're buying two of
them and we are running through the test program. There are
many attributes of the Warrior that we like, like automatic
take-off and land, heavy fuel-use engine, more ruggedized
landing gear, and so forth.
There are some things on the early Warriors that would not
serve our CONOPs, if you will, using the reachback methodology
that we use right now of actually launching them forward, and
flying them from the States. But as Warrior progresses those
attributes will be in Warrior as well.
So we're not afraid of the C at all. In fact, we're
embracing it, and as soon as it proves itself in tests we'll
probably just transition our production from the B to the C.
Senator Lieberman. So you intend--right now you're on a
path to become--essentially to join the Army program on this
one?
General Hoffman. Yes, sir. I would, just to qualify one
comment you made earlier, I don't view any of our assets as Air
Force assets. I view them all as joint assets. Wherever the
theater commander wants them, that's where they go. We do not
have Air Force ISR targets that we service for our own needs.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that answer.
My time is up. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Let me return for a minute to the F-35 for
one or two more questions. Mr. Balderson and General Hoffman,
the GAO released a report last month that said the JSF costs
had increased by more than $23 billion over the last year
because of a 7-year program extension, future price increases,
and increases in the price of materials. However, according to
the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) released this past month
by the DOD, the F-35's program costs decreased slightly over
the final months of 2007 and the effort did not experience a
significant cost breach during that time requiring
congressional involvement.
The report says JSF program costs decreased by $981
million, from $299.8 billion to $298.8 billion, over the 3-
month period.
In your view, which report more accurately reflects the
reality, the GAO report or the SAR?
General Hoffman. Senator, I think it's apples and oranges
here. If you knew that you were going to die in 10 years and
then you found out you were going to die in 17 years, you're
going to live 7 years longer and that's going to cost more
money than dying in 10 years.
Primarily what GAO is talking about is life cycle costs.
Because of the production rates, we're going to be making these
things 7 years longer than we originally planned. So if you
make them 7 years later, they live 7 years later. Those are
operating costs primarily in the out years.
The SAR reflects our development and production of the
aircraft. As we both talked about before, I think we'll have
more fidelity on that cost through the summer here as we work
to build the 2010 POM.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Balderson, do you have anything you'd
like to add on that?
Mr. Balderson. I agree with that completely. Secretary
Young testified recently, and I mention this because I think
this is what I anticipate also, that we anticipate that when
this joint independent cost estimate is done this fall, we
probably will have to put modest amounts of funding in the F-35
program to keep it stable. I think that's accurate, and that
you will in no way see the kinds of costs GAO is talking about
in the development of the production.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Lieberman asked a little bit about
UAVs. I'd like to follow up on that subject. In 2001 Congress
established as a goal that by 2010 one-third of the aircraft in
the operational deep strike force should be unmanned. However,
the unmanned systems road map just delivered to Congress does
not describe how it plans to achieve this goal, nor does it
include striking targets as a key UAV role or mission in the
future.
I'd like to know--this will be for General Darnell, General
Trautman, or Admiral Myers--how is your Service doing toward
meeting the goal set in 2001 for an operational deep strike by
UAVs, and do you see striking targets as a potential mission
for UAVs in the future, and if so why, or why not?
General Darnell. Sir, we can tell you that in the
President's fiscal year 2009 budget, we have 92 aircraft that
we plan to buy. Of those 92, 54 are UAVs. So we feel like we're
making a significant statement in where we want to go. Our next
generation bomber that we've also specified can be either
manned or unmanned. Over the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), approximately 35 percent of the vehicles that we will
purchase will be UAVs.
Senator Cornyn. I think the question really related to the
operational deep strike capability. Would you address that
issue?
General Darnell. Senator, we look at deep strike in several
different ways. With a Predator UAV, you can still accomplish
deep strike. Are you talking about a bomber type aircraft?
Senator Cornyn. The last UAV road map provided kinetic
effects as a prime mission area, although the latest UAV road
map, written in December 2007, no longer included kinetic
effects as a major UAV goal or operational mission area. I'm
just trying to get a grasp on what you think these UAVs are
going to be used for.
General Darnell. I can tell you, Senator, as far as the Air
Force is concerned, we're going to be doing a combination of
reconnaissance and kinetic effects. Like I said, I'm not
familiar with that report. I can tell you that our plan is to
transition, frankly, to MQ9, which is our Reaper aircraft, a
much larger aircraft with much more kinetic capability.
Senator Cornyn. General Trautman, would you agree that
kinetic effects, striking targets, is going to continue to be
an important role for UAVs?
General Trautman. Senator, absolutely. It's a growth
industry. It's inevitable, and the pace at which it comes is
just a function of technology development and finding the
resources to apply to the new CONOPs.
With regard to the Marine Corps's role here, we typically
don't own assets that do the classic deep strike. Clearly, our
UAS approach in the near term has been the tactical level UASs,
Raven B, Shadow, and Scan Eagle. We have a plan for a program
of record with an IOC in the mid-teens, around 2015, in which
we're doing an analysis of alternatives now, and one of the
attributes of that system is the desire to do the kind of
precision strike that you're talking about. But it's still a
little ways out there for the Corps.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral Myers, would you care to add
anything?
Admiral Myers. Yes, sir, and thank you for the question.
The Navy's approach to UAVs is divide them into four areas:
First is a fighter or F/A-XX, and we have currently the Navy
Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (Navy UCAS) demonstration
program that's underway, and that will go out to a carrier. We
have two vehicles, X-47, which go out to the carrier in the
2011 timeframe.
Let me just give you a broad brush and then I'll deep dive
into each one. In the high end, deep penetrating strike and
persistent realm is the F/A-XX, or Navy UCAS. The next level
below that is Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS). The next
level below that is our VTOL Tactical UAV (VT UAV), which is
currently in testing. That will be deployed on our Littoral
Combat Ships. Then below that is, at the extreme tactical
level, the Scan Eagle or Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft
System, which is essentially an extended sensor for the
deploying unit that's using it.
I'll start with F/A-XX. Right now, our overall road map
plan for naval aviation has us recapitalizing a strike fighter
type about every 10 years. So if every 10 years we're
recapitalizing half of our strike fighter fleet, then that
means at this point we're transitioning in the teens into the
JSF, IOC in 2015 for the C variant for the U.S. Navy. Ten years
later in the 2024-2025 timeframe, when the F/A-18 E and F Block
2 aircraft start to retire, that's when we want to recapitalize
with the F/A-XX.
So that's our challenge in POM 2010: to make sure that the
program gets moving in the right direction starting with
analysis of alternatives and moving forward. In order to
deliver that in the 2024 timeframe, we need to move out right
about now. We think that it's about a 12-year process to
deliver that kind of capability.
One level below that is our BAMS, which we just recently
attended a Defense Acquisition Board and will announce more
specifically the direction we're heading here in another week.
BAMS is an ISR and communication relay, broad area surveillance
platform that will augment our maritime aircraft, our P-8s. It
is intended to deliver starting in the 2014 timeframe, and it
will take about 30 to 33 percent of the workload of ISR off our
P-8s. So, therefore, it has a direct corollary to reducing the
inventory.
One step below that is VT UAV, and that's currently in
testing. That's to augment our Littoral Combat Ships in both
the MH-60 Sierra and the MH-60 Romeo variety. So what that'll
do is take again about 30 to 33 percent of the flights off the
Romeo and Sierra for the Littoral Combat Ships and perform EO
and IR, electro-optical and IR type of work, and also a
communications relay to enhance the capability for the Littoral
Combat Ship to do all three missions--the mine warfare, anti-
submarine warfare, and ASUW, anti-surface warfare.
At the tactical level, we're currently enjoying the use of
Scan Eagle, but it's time to recapitalize and look at the next
generation of capabilities, again at the tactical level, to be
used on our surface combatants.
So right now, those are a broad brush of our programs. Our
challenges coming into this upcoming POM cycle are to make sure
that all of those programs are either funded to the level that
we require or are started in a manner that they'll deliver on
time.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
My time has expired.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Gentlemen, that's pretty exciting, to
think about where we're headed with the future of TACAIR and
unmanned aircraft. It's just an entirely new generation we're
thinking about. I see all four of you are proudly displaying
wings on your uniforms. Are we going to replace that with a
joystick or something for these guys that'll be flying those?
That's truly exciting.
I don't have a dog in this tanker situation from the
standpoint of a parochial issue, but I am, as we all are, very
concerned about where we're going here, because I think every
branch has expressed a real need for this tanker issue to move
forward, that we're hitting a critical time.
Now, I realize the Air Force contract is currently being
reviewed by GAO and I certainly look forward to hearing what
their opinion is on the issue of this particular contract. One
issue that I hope you look at closely is to what extent the Air
Force accepted or did not accept as compliant the commercial
pricing data that the bidders and the partners provided and
whether or not this data was dismissed during the Air Force's
evaluation of the proposals.
Obviously, if the data was faulty it should not be
accepted. But if the data submitted was accurate and did comply
with what the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires, it seems
to me it should be accepted as such.
General Hoffman, I wouldn't ask you to necessarily comment
on that because I think this is something that I just want to
get in the record. But it is an issue that we have to be very
clear on as we move forward on this.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Chambliss.
I don't know if Senator Cornyn has more questions. Okay,
I'll delay a little bit. I don't have any more questions,
although I thought while I had you all here I would repeat
something and just throw a jump ball out there and see if
anybody wants to respond.
This was a comment from a colleague recently--it's very
different from anything that we've talked about today; it
probably reflects a lot of thinking from people who are just
watching our military situation. The comment was this: The Army
and Marine Corps are so deeply involved in Iraq and Afghanistan
that, as this colleague said, if we get into another crisis
we're really going to have to totally rely on the Navy and the
Air Force.
You may want to contend with the first part, the first
premise there. But I'm curious. This is the lay person's
conventional wisdom out there, and I wonder if any of you have
a response to it?
General Darnell. Mr. Chairman, I would have to probably
agree with that, if we're talking about another major
conventional operation, at least at the outset.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. In other words, that we wouldn't
have the available Army and Marine Corps capabilities to go
into another major conventional operation.
General Darnell. I testified about a month ago to the
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee and my biggest
concern in that discussion with the subcommittee was the fact
that we are looking at some troubling readiness indicators now
and today, and my concern was we're mortgaging our capabilities
for tomorrow, for the very scenario that you bring up.
Senator Lieberman. Anyone else? Admiral?
Admiral Myers. Sir, some of your comments, I think, are
appropriate if you would look at our new maritime strategy and
the six tenets, where it ranges from our ability to provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to partnerships at
sea and sea control. The items that you just mentioned fall in
the area of deep strike or deterrence. What you're essentially
saying from your colleague is that you're relying on a couple
of Services to provide the deterrence or the ability to strike
and control overseas, and that's what your U.S. Navy is all
about, is giving you and our Nation's leaders that strategic
deterrence reassurance, as well as being able to partnership at
sea, control, and offer the security that we need worldwide,
and then all the way down to the low end of humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, which I think our new maritime
strategy adequately explains.
Senator Lieberman. I agree, absolutely.
General, did you want to, because you have one foot in each
side here of that question.
General Trautman. Exactly, Senator, and that's where the
Marine Corps typically sits, one foot in each side.
I think that it would be foolhardy to think that just the
Air Force or just the Navy could take on something larger than
the opening stages of something like a major combat operation,
and that's not what your colleague meant to say.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Trautman. But America has to realize that we have
to be prepared to respond across the full range of potential
adversarial actions that our President may deem necessary. So
it's vitally important that we keep not just the Air Force and
the Navy ready and relevant, but also Marine aviation so we can
make our contribution as well. So that's why we're here before
you today and that's why we appreciate your interest in the
kinds of things that we're talking about.
Senator Lieberman. Well done.
General Hoffman. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add. I've
heard that same comment and my response to that is there is no
fight out there that's just waiting for any one Service to go
solve. All our challenges and conflicts in the world are joint
responses.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. That's something that
I've certainly been involved in for quite a number of years on
this committee, including setting up, being involved in the
original creation with then Secretary Cohen and General Shelton
of what is now the Joint Forces Command. So I appreciate that
answer. That was part of my answer to my colleague.
I don't have any more questions. Senator Cornyn?
Senator Cornyn. I have two.
Senator Lieberman. Please. Go right ahead.
Senator Cornyn. One last question about UAVs. In March
2007, General Moseley spelled out the case for the Air Force to
become the executive agent for all medium- and high-altitude
UAVs. It seems like with the proliferation of UAVs, whether
it's for the Future Combat Systems by the Army, the different
ways that the military Services use UAVs, this new capability,
I'm a little concerned or at least would like your response to
the question, are we continuing to operate and develop these
capabilities with UAVs in a way that provides for their
jointness?
I'm a little concerned that the various military Services
are developing the UAVs they think they need for what they do.
But I appreciate General Hoffman's reminder that no Service
fights a fight alone, that this is going to be a joint fight.
I'd like a little bit of reassurance, I guess, that we
haven't abandoned jointness when it comes to development of the
UAVs needed by the various branches of our military Services.
Mr. Balderson. Senator, if I could. First, I think some of
the tools of the trade that all Services use are optimized for
their unique environment that they operate in. Where we came on
board with that discussion on executive agency was for theater-
wide assets that can quickly flex across the battlefield and
theater. If you have weather in one-half of your theater, those
assets can go to where the weather is good and contribute, not
just wait for the unit, if they're tied to a unit. That was our
logic behind theater-wide assets and why we thought there were
efficiencies to be gained in centralized command and control,
if you will, of those theater assets.
Senator Cornyn. Anybody else care to comment?
General Trautman. Senator, if I could add. OSD AT&L
presently has a UAV task force that we and the other Services
are contributing to and members of. We're working very closely
with the United States Army in light of our latest warfighter
talks to come up with a joint concept of operations which does
optimize these aircraft. Both Training and Doctrine Command and
Air Combat Command are working through that, and they're making
good progress.
Senator Cornyn. I know Secretary Chertoff of the Department
of Homeland Security is acquiring UAVs, so they're
proliferating, it seems like, across the United States
Government. I appreciate your answer.
The last thing I would like to ask about has to do with
synthetic fuels. Since last fall the Air Force has been testing
whether Air Force aircraft can fly on liquid fuels made from
natural gas or coal. According to the Air Force, barring any
unforeseen glitches the Air Force expects to certify the
synthetic fuel for use in B-52 bombers this summer. Given the
interest and publicity with which the Air Force has surrounded
their synthetic fuels research program and given the energy
crisis that our country faces generally speaking, how much
funding is in the fiscal year 2008 budget request for this, and
what level of capability does the Air Force's program provide
for FYDP?
General Hoffman. Senator, I'll take that for the record on
the amount that's in our program. But what we're doing is
qualifying our equipment to operate. There's a larger issue
here and that is where is the infrastructure that's going to
produce that fuel, what are the environmental consequences of
producing that fuel, and what are the permission sets that
allow us to buy fuel at--right now it's above market rate.
[The information referred to follows:]

Fiscal year 2008 Alternative Fuels program funding included $12.5
million of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) for
alternative fuels laboratory research efforts. The following provides
the fiscal year 2009 President's budget Alternative Fuels laboratory
research funding for the future years defense plans:

Additionally, fiscal year 2008 Alternative Fuels program funding
included $11.8 million of RDT&E and 0.8 million of operation and
maintenance (O&M) for the aircraft and ground vehicle fleet alternative
fuels certification effort. The following provides the fiscal year 2009
President's budget Alternative Fuels aircraft and ground vehicle fleet
certification funding for the future years defense plans:

[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
------------------------------------------------------
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDT&E.................................................... 28.5 47.2 15.1 9.6 3.2
O&M...................................................... 27.9 21.5 12.8 6.4 2.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................. 56.4 68.7 27.9 16.0 6.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This effort will provide Air Force aircraft and ground vehicles
with the capability to operate using a 50/50 blend of standard jet fuel
and a synthetic fuel derived from natural gas or coal. Certification of
Air Force aircraft and ground vehicles is a necessary step toward the
long-term goal of satisfying 50 percent of continental U.S. based
aviation fuel requirements by purchasing synthetic fuel derived from
domestic sources (gas or coal) and produced in the United States by
2016.

General Hoffman. The Secretary has a passion for this and
it's not about the economy or the type of fuel we're using or
the industrial base issues. It's about fuel assuredness,
because he's not thinking 1 year or 2 years or 5 years or 10
years. He's thinking down the stream: Will this Nation be able
to assure itself that it has enough fuel for its military
purposes? So it takes years to go through the qualification
process. It takes years to develop the infrastructure that will
produce that type of fuel.
So as the largest consumer of aviation in the DOD, and DOD
is one of the largest users of energy in the government, he's
trying to take the lead and the initiative there to show that
we can be good consumers of that fuel, and if we can certify
our equipment, if you build it they will come. He thinks
industry will respond. We do need some help with the permission
sets that allow us to get this jump-started to where it does
become an economical at least break point with standard-based
petroleum.
Senator Cornyn. As gasoline approaches $4 a gallon and with
the price of oil way above $100 a barrel, it strikes me this is
a great and wise program and one that could have benefits
across the economy, not only our military Services. So I'd be
interested in what you're doing and would offer to work with
you and try to figure ways we can facilitate it and enhance the
program, because I think it's exactly headed in the right
direction.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn.
I thank the witnesses. It's been, I think, a very good
hearing. Your answers to our questions have been responsive and
thoughtful, certainly helpful to the subcommittee. The general
impression--there's always good news and bad news. The good
news is that we have a great Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps,
and the aviation components of each of those are just serving
our country with extraordinary devotion and excellence.
Technology is allowing you to sustain the lives of the aircraft
more than had been previously so.
But each of the Services is facing now a daunting--I don't
know whether you call it longer-term or mid-term--shortage in
aircraft that we have to deal with. In Washington, we have a
problem. Hopefully we can figure out a way to deal with it.
Part of it obviously is, Mr. Secretary, that any time a program
comes in over budget and late it just makes everything we're
trying to do harder and harder.
So, bottom line, I assure you that Senator Cornyn and I and
our subcommittee will do everything we can to try to stretch
our resources as far as we can, to give you the support that
you need and deserve in carrying out the responsibilities that
you do every day on behalf of our country. So I thank you for
that.
Senator Cornyn, do you want to add anything?
Senator Cornyn. I concur, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
witnesses for your testimony. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
We'll leave the record of the hearing open for 10 days in
case members of the subcommittee have questions they want to
submit to you in writing or you want to add to any of the
testimony that you've offered today.
With that, I thank you for your service and your testimony.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

ENGINE COMPETITION

1. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Balderson and Lieutenant General
Hoffman, if Congress requires that the Department of Defense (DOD)
develop and buy the GE/Rolls Royce F136 alternate engine for the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), what will the Navy and Air Force
Departments do to improve the quality and performance of the Pratt &
Whitney F135 engine so that the competition is based more on cost or
price, not on levels of technology?
Mr. Balderson and General Hoffman. The performance requirements in
today's engine specifications are identical, and the intent is to
enable engine interchangeability (F135 with F136) with no noticeable
effect on aircraft performance. The program acquisition strategy
envisioned a propulsion competition to address production and
sustainment, based on factors related to affordability, supportability,
and safety, to enable selection of ``best value'' production-
sustainment combination offers.

ADVANCED CONCEPT EJECTION SEAT

2. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Hoffman, the Air Force has
invested funding in incremental improvements to the Advanced Concept
Ejection Seat (ACES), the common ejection seat on almost all Air Force
combat aircraft. Can you describe whether there would be cost savings,
maintenance benefits, and any other advantages of using a modular ACES
ejection seat in the B-2?
General Hoffman. The Air Force typically performs Programmed Depot
Maintenance (PDM) and Intermediate Maintenance on three B-2 aircraft
per year. The ACES modular seat design reduces this required
maintenance time, which directly correlates to cost and operational
efficiencies. The projected PDM savings is $263,000/year and a
reduction of 3,000 hours; as hatch removal/replacement is not required
to perform ejection seat maintenance. In addition, the projected
Intermediate Maintenance savings is estimated at $177,000/year and an
increase of 18 days of aircraft availability, gained at squadron level.
Furthermore, modular seat design affords maintenance personnel the
opportunity to accomplish foreign object damage inspections and time-
change component replacement without removing the ejection seat while
at home-station or at deployed locations.

3. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Darnell, I understand that
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) includes funding in fiscal year
2011 to retrofit the ACES modular ejection seat into the B-2. However,
I understand that the Air Force has not programmed the funds to qualify
and test the seat. Would having a modular ejection seat in the B-2
aircraft improve the operational readiness and operational availability
of the fleet due by reducing maintenance downtimes?
General Darnell. Currently, there is no funding in the FYDP to
retrofit the ACES modular ejection seat into the B-2. The Air Force is
currently evaluating funding priorities for the fiscal year 2010
Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Having a qualified modular ejection
seat would improve B-2 aircraft's operational availability for mission
tasking. A modular seat design will enhance maintainability by
substantially reducing hours required for PDM and local intermediate
inspections, while increasing man-hour availability for other tasks. It
allows personnel to perform on-equipment maintenance more safely,
quickly, and effectively without the use of a mechanical lift or
removal of any canopy, hatch or overhead enclosure, and eliminates
canopy and seat rail damage. The result is improved aircraft
availability and reliability.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER PROGRAM

4. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Hoffman, the Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR-X) helicopter program is designed to replace the aging HH-
60G helicopter fleet with improved force protection, greater range, and
increased payload capacity for specialized equipment and injured
personnel. The CSAR-X contract, originally awarded to Boeing in
November 2006 for its HH-47 variant, has been subject to two bid
protests from the losing competitors, Sikorsky and Lockheed, which were
sustained by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). These protests
have delayed the CSAR-X program 2 years from what was originally
planned. Last year Congress had to appropriate an additional $99
million for modifications (upgrades) to the HH-60 in order to safety
and effectively support search and rescue missions throughout the
world. The CSAR-X has yet to become operational and taxpayers have had
to subsidize this cost. Where is the Air Force in the source selection
process?
General Hoffman. Amendment 6 to the CSAR-X request for proposal was
released on April 22, 2008. Offeror submissions are due by May 27,
2008. The Air Force intends to complete the source selection activities
and begin execution of a CSAR-X System Development and Demonstration
contract in the fall of 2008.

5. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Hoffman, what is the new
timeline?
General Hoffman. The Air Force plans to conclude CSAR-X source
selection activities and begin execution of a System Development and
Demonstration contract in the fall of 2008.

6. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Hoffman, will the American
taxpayer have to once again pay the additional cost in the fiscal year
2009 budget to keep the HH-60 flying?
General Hoffman. The Air Force has programmed $16.7 million for the
sustainment of the HH-60Gs in fiscal year 2009. The Service continues
to monitor the health of the HH-60G fleet and will plan for the
required resources needed to sustain this critical weapon system until
it is replaced by CSAR-X.

7. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Hoffman, will we have to spend
on the KC-135 to keep them operational while we wait for the protest on
the KC-45 tanker?
General Hoffman. Regardless of the KC-45 tanker contract protest,
the Air Force's tanker recapitalization plan will require decades to
replace all of the KC-135 aircraft. For that reason, the Air Force has
planned for modification programs designed to keep the aircraft
operational until at least 2040. The fiscal year 2009 President's
budget request contains $134.2 million in Procurement and $7.133
million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funds for these
planned modifications.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

8. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Darnell, for fiscal year 2008,
all four congressional defense committees recommended an increase of
$480 million to the President's budget request to provide for the
continued development of a competitive JSF engine. Despite this
legislation, the DOD did not include funding for the development of a
competitive JSF engine, and would instead prefer to rely only on the
F135 engine being developed by Pratt & Whitney. $495 million is
required in fiscal year 2009 for F136 development (General Electric/
Rolls Royce competitive second engine) and $31 million would be needed
for advance procurement of long-lead parts, for a total of $526
million. To date, the Air Force has spent $2.1 billion on the F136
second engine initiative and needs an additional $1.3 billion to
complete the program. The GAO has recently concluded that the cost of
buying and operating the JSF for the U.S. military is nearing $1
trillion, having found the program to be dogged by delays,
manufacturing inefficiencies, and price increases. Given this
conclusion, do you believe the Air Force can afford a competitive
second engine program? What is your cost analysis and why?
General Darnell. DOD decided to eliminate the alternate engine
program during the fiscal year 2007 program and budget review. Like all
requirements prioritized during DOD's planning, programming, budgeting,
and execution system, the JSF alternate engine program was weighed
against all other funding priorities. The Department decided the
benefits of an alternate engine program were not commensurate with the
increased cost. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) led an analysis to support this
decision. The Deputy Secretary of Defense provided this documentation
to the committee February 2006.

9. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Darnell, can you give me the
Air Force perspective on the proposed termination of the JSF
competitive engine program, including how such termination may affect
procurement and life-cycle costs for the JSF?
General Darnell. The Air Force agrees with the Department's
position to not pursue a competitive engine for the F-35 JSF. The
conclusions of all three 2007 congressionally-directed engine studies,
while supportive of competition in general, support the Department's
initial findings that the expected savings from competition do not
outweigh the investment costs. Funding two engines vice one would
increase F-35 total development cost. Splitting the production buys
between two sources may actually increase total production costs due to
learning curve effects, and maintaining two engines would increase
sustainment costs.

10. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Darnell, will the benefits of
the competitive engine program outweigh the costs?
General Darnell. No, the conclusions of all three 2007
congressionally-directed engine studies, while supportive of
competition in general, support the Department's initial findings that
the expected savings from competition do not outweigh the investment
costs.

11. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Darnell, how many other Air
Force aircraft procurement programs have had a second engine
competition as part of its development, past or present?
General Darnell. Competition between Pratt & Whitney and General
Electric to supply engines for the F-16 occurred in the mid-1980s;
however, this was after the development of the F-16, which began in
1975. There was also an engine competition between Pratt & Whitney and
General Electric to obtain improved engine durability and operability
for the F-15; however, this occurred in 1984 after development of the
F-15, which began in 1969. In the original purchase of the C-5A (1965),
the Air Force issued contracts to both General Electric and Pratt &
Whitney for design studies of new turbofan engines. General Electric
Aircraft Engines (GEAE) won the competition, and a contract was awarded
for its TF39 engines. Other than those listed, no other Air Force
aircraft procurement programs have had a second engine competition as
part of the development phase.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

12. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, during the Air
Force's lengthy efforts to develop and procure advanced fifth
generation tactical fighter aircraft (F-22s and F-35s) to replace its
aging Cold-War era fighters, many believe the Air Force has under-
invested in maintaining the readiness of its F-15 and F-16 fighter
aircraft. Further, some theorize that the rapid aging of the F-15 and
F-16 fleet is accentuated by a lack of investment in both aircraft's
maintenance and readiness. The age and readiness levels of the F-15 and
F-16 are among the core justification points utilized by the Air Force
for needing to procure more F-22 and F-35 aircraft than the DOD budget
currently permits. Many believe the Air Force is putting its overall
readiness at risk by allocating too many resources needed for
maintaining the readiness of the F-15 and F-16 fleet to F-22 and F-35
development and procurement. Please explain and justify the Air Force's
decision not to execute a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for our
F-15 fleet.
General Darnell. There has not been a rapid decrease in F-15 and F-
16 readiness. In fact, aircraft readiness slowly decreased across all
weapon systems due to an environment of austere funding through the
1990s. The Air Force responded by investing heavily in aircraft spares
and Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21)
initiatives at the depot facilities and field units. As a result,
aircraft readiness rebounded in 2001, especially for the F-15 and F-16,
and has been holding the line ever since.

13. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, has the lack of
a SLEP for the F-15 contributed to recent maintenance problems in the
F-15 fleet? If not, why?
General Darnell. No. The recent longeron issue on the F-15 is the
result of a problem with a single lifetime-designed component outlier,
not of the broader structural system. Engineers at the Air Force's
Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) have determined that a service life
extension to 12,000 hours and higher is possible without having to
perform Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) modifications.

14. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, can you assure
me that the Air Force did not undertake a strategic effort to permit
the rapid degrading of F-15 and F-16 readiness in order to facilitate a
stronger argument for the procurement of F-22 and F-35 aircraft? Please
explain.
General Darnell. I can assure you the Air Force did not undertake
an effort to degrade F-15 and F-16 readiness to facilitate a stronger
argument for procurement of the F-22 and F-35. There has not been a
rapid decrease in F-15 and F-16 readiness. In fact, aircraft readiness
slowly decreased across all weapon systems due to an environment of
austere funding through the 1990s. The Air Force responded by investing
heavily in aircraft spares and Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st
Century (AFSO21) initiatives at the depot facilities and field units.
As a result, aircraft readiness rebounded in 2001, especially for the
F-15 and F-16, and has been holding the line ever since.

15. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, General Corley,
Commander of Air Combat Command, recently publicly stated that even if
the Air Force were given a blank check to replace its F-15s with new F-
22s, the F-22 production line would not be able to deliver the required
number in the given time needed. Nonetheless, he did not believe the
Air Force wanted to go back to buying more F-15s to address tactical
fighter shortfalls that may result from a reduction in the F-22 buy as
well as delays in both F-22 and F-35 production. Given budget
constraints, which will lead to smaller than planned/desired purchases
of F-22 and F-35 aircraft, as well as delays in F-22 and F-35
production, shouldn't the Air Force be re-examining the option of
procuring additional F-15s in order to bridge the gap created by delays
in production as well as the gap created by a reduction in the overall
number of fifth generation aircraft expected to be procured?
General Darnell. The Air Force is committed to purchasing a
complementary mix of fifth generation fighters to recapitalize its
fighter fleet. Fifth generation fighters are required to achieve air
dominance against current and emerging threats and to maintain the U.S.
technological edge given recent foreign developments. Fourth generation
legacy aircraft, such as the F-15 and F-16, cannot be modified to match
the capabilities of fifth generation fighters.

16. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, we all want our
airmen to have the best equipment to get the job done. Is there a place
for F-15Es as a complement to F22s and F-35s in future tactical
aircraft operations?
General Darnell. The F-15E will complement the F-22 and F-35 in all
U.S. joint combat operations for the next 20+ years. Although the F-15E
is not a stealth platform, and may not be employed in direct attack
operations during the first stages of a high threat major operation, it
is an essential component of our fighter force structure and is well-
suited to numerous lesser threat scenarios from medium intensity combat
operations to counter-insurgency and global war on terrorism
operations. The Air Force is prioritizing modernization and sustainment
investments to ensure the F-15E remains a highly capable and viable
platform by upgrading its systems to include data links, secure beyond
line-of-sight communications, and a modernized, active electronically
scanned array (AESA) radar. These, and other, upgrades will ensure that
the F-15E remains a key part of the Air Force inventory out into the
2020s.

17. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, do we need all
fifth generation fighters or can we have a mix of fighter aircraft to
get the job done and maintain military readiness? For example, is there
not a place for F-22 and F-35 aircraft in early combat operations,
where the stealth of the aircraft will be crucial, while much cheaper
but still highly capable F-15 aircraft could execute numerous tactical
aircraft missions once air superiority is established?
General Darnell. Fifth generation fighters are required to achieve
air dominance against current and emerging threats and to maintain the
U.S. technological edge given recent foreign developments. Fourth
generation legacy aircraft, such as the F-15 and F-16, cannot be
modified to match the capabilities of fifth generation fighters. Legacy
aircraft (fifth generation) use is being constrained by rapid advances
of enemy capabilities in fighters and integrated air defenses which
require fifth generation capability to counter. Our use of legacy
aircraft in a campaign is constrained until air-to-air and surface-to-
air defenses have been neutralized and access assured. Thus, the mix of
assets must be carefully managed. Over-reliance on legacy fighters both
today and in the future puts all operations of war--land, sea, and
air--at risk against capable threats.

18. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, do we really
need all fifth generation fighters to execute every phase of air combat
operations, especially in light of the costs required to procure such a
capability and the lack of resources currently available to enable such
a strategy?
General Darnell. No, we do not require F-22s and F-35s in every
phase of combat operations. However, the fifth generation capabilities
of these two platforms are absolutely critical to the initial phases of
any major combat operation and to follow-on operations in contested
airspace. Fifth generation aircraft provide the unique capability to
operate in heavily defended airspace allowing them to detect and
destroy key air and ground targets and share vital information they
collect with other friendly legacy systems. These capabilities are
essential to gaining and maintaining air superiority, and enable all
follow-on joint air, land, and sea operations to be executed with
acceptable risk.

19. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, I believe we can
all agree the F-15 production line has been one of the most productive
lines for the Air Force producing a top rate aircraft that is still
considered one of the most formidable fighter aircraft in the world. In
addition, the F-15 line has been vital in foreign military sales of
U.S. fighters to our closest allies. However, like all good things,
soon the line faces its end. Do you think it is smart to allow the F-15
line to close with our current state of influx in trying to fill the
shortfall in fighter aircraft?
General Darnell. The F-15 production line is open until mid-2012
producing aircraft for foreign customers. Boeing is actively seeking
additional foreign customers which could further extend the production
line. The F-15 and other fourth generation fighters cannot be modified
to equal the capabilities of the fifth generation aircraft. Fifth
generation fighters are required to engage/destroy advanced enemy
fighter and surface-to-air threats.

20. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, do you think it
wise to cut off a main production line of a fighter in this class
that's heavily utilized by our allies?
General Darnell. The F-15 production line is open until mid-2012
producing aircraft for foreign customers. Boeing is actively seeking
additional foreign customers which could further extend the production
line. The F-15 and other fourth generation fighters cannot be modified
to equal the capabilities of the fifth generation aircraft. Fifth
generation fighters are required to engage/destroy advanced enemy
fighter and surface-to-air threats.

21. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, what can the Air
Force do to extend the F-15 line?
General Darnell. The F-15 production line is open until mid-2012
producing aircraft for foreign customers. Boeing is actively seeking
additional foreign customers which could further extend the production
line. If directed to extend the production line, the Air Force could
procure new F-15Es at a rate of one per quarter, or four per year. The
current Air Force estimated fly-away cost for four F-15Es is $448
million in fiscal year 2008 dollars, or $112 million per aircraft. The
length of the line extension depends on the quantity of aircraft
ordered.

22. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, the Air Force
maintains that 2,250 fighter aircraft are required to meet National
Military Strategy requirements. In your written testimony you state
that 2,250 remains the required number. However, at the same you time
you acknowledge the challenges that may prevent the Air Force from
reaching 2,250 fighter aircraft. What alternatives are you looking at
to address this shortfall in fighter aircraft?
General Darnell. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
established the requirement for the Air Force to maintain 86 Combat
Wings in order for it to meet the requirements in the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS). For tactical
aircraft (TACAIR), that equates to 2,250 aircraft.
Today's force (fiscal year 2008) meets this requirement (2,347
total fighters). However, this force consists mostly of fourth
generation fighters: A-10, F-15, F-15E, and F-16 aircraft. These
aircraft were developed in the 1960s/1970s and are now reaching the end
of their design lives. The average age of the U.S. Air Force TACAIR
inventory is currently 20 years with some aircraft as old as 29 years.
That average age is projected to climb to 25 years by 2015.
New aircraft, the F-22 and F-35, will replace our current inventory
at a rate less than one for one under current fiscal constraints. Based
on the current acquisition programs for the F-22 and F-35 and the
service life retirements of our current fleet, the Air Force will drop
below the required 2,250 total aircraft beginning in 2013 and continue
to do so every year thereafter.
For this reason, the Air Force has sought to accelerate the rate at
which F-35s enter the force by increasing production to 110 aircraft
per year.

23. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, is the Air Force
fully considering the merit of extending the life of the newest F-15s
in the fleet and purchasing new F-15s in order to address the tactical
aircraft gap in the short run?
General Darnell. The Air Force will continue to improve the F-15 to
enable it to execute the evolving fourth generation mission. The F-15
and other fourth generation fighters cannot be modified to equal the
capabilities of the fifth generation aircraft. The Air Force is taking
the appropriate investment and risk mitigation steps to keep some of
our aging F-15s flying until 2025.

24. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, can you discuss
the cost gap between the F-15 and F-22 and F-35, even acknowledging the
capability gap?
General Darnell. The cost gap, if measured by Unit Flyaway Cost
(UFC), is highly dependent on the quantity of aircraft procured. The
capability gap between fourth and fifth generation aircraft is a
critical factor--fifth generation fighters maintain air dominance in
anti-access environments whereas fourth generation fighters are less
survivable against those advanced threats.
Under the current F-22 Multiyear Procurement (MYP) contract for
Lots 7-9, the average UFC for 60 F-22s is $142.6 million in then-year
dollars. Accounting for inflation and loss of MYP savings, UFC for an
additional Lot 10 of 20 aircraft would increase to $154 million
(BY09$). The Air Force has analyzed three options for additional F-22
procurement (including tail-up costs, support equipment, initial
spares, etc.). Those options are a single lot of 20 aircraft totaling
$4.3 billion, a single lot of 24 aircraft totaling $4.8 billion, or a
4-year MYP of 24 aircraft per year totaling $4.0 billion per year
(savings realized via Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) parts buy). These
options assume uninterrupted production after Lot 9 which requires a
decision for Lot 10 production and funding for Advanced Procurement by
November 2008. The additional F-22s would begin to roll off the
production line in fiscal year 2012 after final Lot 9 aircraft
delivery.
The unit flyaway cost for the F-35A conventional take-off and
landing (CTOL) aircraft is $62.3 million (BY09$) based on 1,763
aircraft buy for the Air Force. Previous drills were run regarding the
procurement of an additional 20 aircraft in fiscal year 2011 and we
found that 20 additional CTOLs would cost $1.988 billion total
procurement. Those 20 additional aircraft brings Air Force total in
fiscal year 2011 to 44 aircraft (24 programmed plus 20 additional
aircraft). The Unit Recurring Flyaway (URF) cost for 44 aircraft is
$100.1 million (BY09$). The Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) for 44
aircraft is $133 million (BY09$). To purchase an additional 20 F-35As,
advanced procurement (long lead) is required in fiscal year 2010 and
full funding is required in fiscal year 2011. Aircraft deliveries would
begin in fiscal year 2013. The F-35 is early in production, with the
LRIP Lot 2 contract awarded in May 2008, as well as advanced
procurement for LRIP3. The LRIP Lot 1 aircraft are scheduled for
delivery in January 2010.
The Boeing F-15 production line currently produces variants for
direct commercial sales. The last Air Force variant was procured in
2001 as an attrition reserve purchase. A new F-15E procurement estimate
is based on the Korean F-15K variant and would require approximately
$30 million to retool the production line to the U.S. configuration and
approximately an additional $50 million to qualify the new
configuration (BY08$). Assuming long lead funding is provided in fiscal
year 2009 and a fully funded contract is awarded in fiscal year 2010,
deliveries would begin no earlier than fiscal year 2012. The cost to
procure six F-15Es would be approximately $670 million, or
approximately $112 million UFC. Procuring more than six additional
aircraft requires development and qualification of an electronic
warfare suite due to limited government furnished equipment. The cost
to procure 20 F-15Es would be approximately $1,760 million, or
approximately $88 million UFC.

25. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, how much risk do
we assume by placing new F-15s on air base ramps where the Air Force
wanted F-22s and F-35s? I believe it is limited if the right mix is
sought, whereas the risk of having too few aircraft, regardless of them
all being fifth generation fighters, is quite high. Please comment.
General Darnell. The F-15 and other fourth generation fighters
cannot be modified to equal the capabilities of the fourth generation
aircraft. Fifth generation fighters are required to engage/destroy
advanced enemy fighter and surface-to-air threats. Once enemy
capability is significantly degraded, fourth generation fighters, such
as the F-15, provide additional capabilities.
There are multiple risks associated with operating any aircraft for
40+ years, and we have never operated a fighter for that length of time
before. Consistent recapitalization of our fleet is critical to
maintain combat capability and avoid ballooning support cost and
operational risks for aging system.

26. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, in previous
hearings, General Moseley indicated that the Air Force's long-term
requirement for F-22s was 381, yet today the Air Force is aligned with
DOD's procurement number of 183. The Joint Requirement Oversight
Council believes the Air Force structure needs to include 240 assigned
aircraft and 141 for testing, training, and back-up for a total of 381.
The discrepancy between the two figures is very confusing. Is DOD's
assigned procurement number of 183 enough to ensure the Air Force can
answer the National Military Strategy requirements?
General Darnell. While General Moseley was asked for his personal
opinion, the Air Force supports the program of record and is very
grateful the production line continues to remain open. We look forward
to continued discussions regarding the requirement to achieve air
dominance at acceptable risk levels.

27. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Darnell, how are you
planning to make up the difference between your original number of 381
and 183 F-22s?
General Darnell. OSD rendered a decision of adding four more F-22s
into the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request. The Air Force welcomes
and is committed to further discussions regarding the requirement to
achieve air dominance at acceptable risk levels.

NAVY TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

28. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson and Rear Admiral Myers, during
the Senate Armed Services Committee posture hearing on the fiscal year
2009 Navy budget, I spoke with Admiral Roughead, Chief of Naval
Operations, about my concerns with the Navy's tactical aircraft
inventory shortfall. The Admiral agreed there was a strong possibility
of a fighter shortfall around 70 aircraft. He believed the shortfall
was something that needed to be addressed in order for the Navy to
project power around the world using its carriers and air wings.
Although the Navy tactical aircraft inventory models may only predict a
70 aircraft shortfall, I have also heard from other commentators that a
shortfall in excess of 170 aircraft is more realistic. In my view, what
we are talking about here is the possibility of multiple nuclear
aircraft carriers being left without airpower. We already have the
Carrier Air Wing 7 that is missing all of its tactical aircraft and is
playing a shell game to cover responsibilities. Can you comment on the
latest information you have on the shortfall and for your plans in
fiscal year 2009 and beyond to address this shortfall?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Myers. Peak Department of the Navy Strike
Fighter shortfall is projected at 125 aircraft in 2017 for the Navy and
Marine Corps. The Navy shortfall predicted by the F/A-18 inventory
model is 69 aircraft in 2017. Our air wings will be increasingly more
capable as legacy Hornets are being replaced by the modern more capable
JSF aircraft. However, delays in the JSF program, budget cuts reducing
JSF and/or F/A-18E/F procurement, or early Hornet retirement will
increase the projected Strike Fighter shortfall. The impact of
procurement reduction would directly impact our ability to provide
warfighting effects to the combatant commanders.

29. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson and Rear Admiral Myers, GAO
just released a report on the status of the F-35 JSF program. It states
that the F-35 is over cost and behind schedule and is projected to
increase in price by as much as $38 billion. Based on the number of
projected purchases of all three versions of the F-35, this is 45
percent above the original program estimate. It is apparent that the
Navy's version, the F-35C, that will be last to be developed, will be
delayed even further than previous estimates had indicated. Will the F-
35C be operating in the Navy's fleet by the currently projected Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) of 2015? If not, how does the Navy plan to
fix the shortfall caused by the delay?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Myers. The Department of the Navy fully
expects the F-35C to IOC in 2015. If the F-35C is delayed, the Navy
will look at all possible alternatives to mitigate the increased
shortfall. The Navy's strategic vision for tactical air is based on a
mix of capabilities of both the JSF and the Block 2 F/A-18 E and F. Our
air wings will be increasingly more capable as the older legacy Hornets
are replaced by the modern, more capable JSF.

30. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson, in regards to GAO's assessed
shortfall in the tactical aviation force structure and the F/A-18
production line coming to an end in fiscal year 2012, with suppliers
beginning to shut down long lead items in the fall of 2010, do you
think it is wise to shut down the F/A-18 hot production line 3 years
before the planned IOC of the Navy's version of the JSF?
Mr. Balderson. 2009 is the final procurement year for the second
Super Hornet multi-year. Single year procurement in 2010, 2011, and
2012 are currently planned. If additional F/A-18 purchases were added,
it would be cost effective to pursue a third multi-year. Multi-Year
Procurement is an acquisition strategy that has resulted in substantial
savings in the F/A-18 E/F program. Should additional F/A-18 E/F
aircraft be procured in POM-10, Multi-Year Procurement will be
considered by the Navy.

31. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson, based on the cost, schedule,
and performance challenges of the JSF program as outlined by the
current GAO report, does it make sense and do you accept the national
strategic risk of having a 3-year gap in Navy fighter production
capability?
Mr. Balderson. The Department of the Navy fully expects the F-35C
to IOC in 2015. If the F-35C is delayed, the Navy will look at all
alternatives to mitigate the increased shortfall.

32. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson and Rear Admiral Myers, with
production delays in the F-35C and associated cost overruns, there is
little dispute that the Navy will experience a tactical aircraft
shortfall in the near term, as discussed above. It is my understanding
that the Navy is very happy with the performance of the F/A-18 as well
as with the value they have received from Boeing, who makes the
aircraft, in F/A-18 production. It is also my understanding that the
Navy, and thereby the American taxpayer, has benefited from significant
cost savings associated with entering into Multi-Year Procurement (MYP)
contracts with Boeing for F/A-18 production in the past. With the
shortfall in tactical aircraft currently facing the Navy and MYP-II
coming to an end, it seems to me that the Navy needs to be rapidly
considering and moving to enter into a new MYP for F/A-18s. To what
extent have you conducted analyses of a potential third MYP contract of
F/A-18 E/F/G Super Hornets to address the fighter gap that the Navy
will experience during the transition to the JSF?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Myers. 2009 is the final procurement year
for the second Super Hornet multi-year. Single year procurement in
2010, 2011, and 2012 are currently planned. If additional F/A-18
purchases were added, it would be cost effective to pursue a third
multi-year. Multi-Year Procurement is an acquisition strategy that has
resulted in substantial savings in the F/A-18 E/F program. Should
additional F/A-18 E/F aircraft be procured in POM-10, Multi-Year
Procurement will be considered by the Navy.

33. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson and Rear Admiral Myers, what
conditions would you require or wish to see met in order to create the
proper business case for a third MYP?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Myers. The F/A-18 inventory model
estimates a U.S. Navy Strike Fighter shortfall of 69 aircraft in 2017.
Mitigation plans, including inventory optimization and possible
additional aircraft procurement, are being addressed in POM-10.
Reduction of F/A-18 E/F or JSF buy rates and/or shorter F/A-18 A-D
service life will significantly increase the Strike Fighter shortfall.
Multi-Year Procurement is an acquisition strategy that has resulted in
substantial savings in the F/A-18 E/F program. Should additional F/A-18
E/F aircraft be procured in POM-10, resulting in a sufficient quantity
to develop a business case, Multi-Year Procurement will be considered
by the Navy.

34. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson and Rear Admiral Myers, what
are your overall views on a possible MYP III?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Myers. 2009 is the final procurement year
for the second Super Hornet multi-year contract. Single year
procurements in 2010, 2011, and 2012 are currently planned. Multi-Year
Procurement is an acquisition strategy that has resulted in substantial
savings in the F/A-18 E/F program. Should additional F/A-18 E/F
aircraft be procured in POM-10, resulting in a sufficient quantity to
develop a business case, Multi-Year Procurement will be considered by
the Navy.

35. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Balderson, in regards to GAO's assessed
shortfall in the tactical aviation force structure and the F/A-18
production line coming to an end in fiscal year 2012, with suppliers
beginning to shutdown long lead items in the fall of 2010, do you think
it is wise to shut down the F/A-18 hot production line 3 years before
the planned IOC of the Navy's version of the JSF?
Mr. Balderson. 2009 is the final procurement year for the second
Super Hornet multi-year. Single year procurement in 2010, 2011 and 2012
are currently planned. If additional F/A-18 purchases were added, it
would be cost effective to pursue a third multi-year. Multi-Year
Procurement is an acquisition strategy that has resulted in substantial
savings in the F/A-18 E/F program. Should additional F/A-18 E/F
aircraft be procured in POM-10, Multi-Year Procurement will be
considered by the Navy.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

F-35 ALTERNATIVE ENGINE

36. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Lieutenant General Hoffman,
in your personal opinion, are you concerned that with a sole engine
supplier, the lack of competition could hinder both innovation and
efforts to decrease the cost of F-35 engine development?
Mr. Balderson. The conclusions of all three 2007 congressionally-
directed engine studies are supportive of competition in general, but
do not obviate the Department's initial findings that the expected
savings from competition do not outweigh the investment costs. Funding
two engines vice one would increase F-35 total development cost.
Affordability is one of the cornerstones of the F-35 program, and prime
contractors will be incentivized to become more efficient and decrease
their costs where possible.
General Hoffman. The conclusions of all three 2007 congressionally-
directed engine studies, while supportive of competition in general,
support the Department's initial findings that the expected savings
from competition do not outweigh the investment costs. Funding two
engines vice one would increase F-35 total development cost. Splitting
the production buys between two sources may actually increase total
production costs due to learning curve effects, and maintaining two
engines would increase sustainment costs. Affordability is one of the
cornerstones of the F-35 program, and prime contractors will be
incentivized to become more efficient and decrease their costs where
possible.

37. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Lieutenant General Hoffman,
what level of funding would be necessary to continue development the F-
35 alternate engine program for fiscal year 2009?
Mr. Balderson. To maintain schedule, F136 alternate engine
development would require $495 million ($247 million per Service) in
fiscal year 2009. In addition, $31 million ($15.5 million per Service)
of advance procurement funding for the F136 would be required in fiscal
year 2009.
General Hoffman. The F136 alternate engine development would
require $495 million ($247.5 from the Departments of the Air Force and
Navy) in fiscal year 2009. In addition, $31 million ($15.5 million from
the Departments of the Air Force and Navy) of advance procurement
funding for the F136 would be required in fiscal year 2009.

38. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Lieutenant General Hoffman,
why has DOD not requested additional funding for the F-35 alternate
engine when Congress expressly directed DOD to do so in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008?
Mr. Balderson. The conclusions of all three 2007 congressionally-
directed engine studies are supportive of competition in general, but
do not obviate the Department's initial findings that the expected
savings from competition do not outweigh the investment costs. The
Department assessed all aspects of the F-35 program in preparation for
this years' budget submission and the Department continues to believe
the risks associated with a single source engine program are manageable
and do not outweigh the investment required to fund a competitive
alternate engine.
General Hoffman. The conclusions of all three 2007 congressionally-
directed engine studies, while supportive of competition in general,
support the Department's initial findings that the expected savings
from competition do not outweigh the investment costs. The Department
assessed all aspects of the F-35 program in preparation for this year's
budget submission, and the Department continues to believe the risks
associated with a single source engine program are manageable and do
not outweigh the investment required to fund a competitive alternate
engine.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]