[Senate Hearing 110-394]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-394, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3001
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 2
SEAPOWER
----------
MARCH 12 AND APRIL 8, 2008
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009--Part 2 SEAPOWER
42-630 PDF
______
2008
S. Hrg. 110-394 Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3001
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
MARCH 12 AND APRIL 8, 2008
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
42-630 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
JACK REED, Rhode Island JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN CORNYN, Texas
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Strategic Lift Programs
march 12, 2008
Page
Payton, Hon. Sue C., Assistant Secretary for Acquisition,
Department of the Air Force.................................... 4
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Commander, United States
Transportation Command......................................... 8
Navy Force Structure Requirements and Programs to Meet Those
Requirements
april 8, 2008
Stiller, Allison F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Ships, Department of the Navy.................................. 53
McCullough, VADM Bernard J. ``Barry,'' III, USN, Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources,
Department of the Navy......................................... 60
Amos, Lt. Gen. James F., USMC, Commander, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command............................................ 61
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC LIFT PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m. in
Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Kennedy, Martinez, and
Sessions.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; and Sean J. Stackley, professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: Fletcher L. Cork.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator
Webb; Sandra Luff and Samuel Zega, assistants to Senator
Warner; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; and Brian
W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN
Senator Kennedy. The subcommittee will come to order. I
apologize to all of our wonderful witnesses and to our members
here. I was necessarily tied up over on the floor for a few
moments, but I am grateful for their patience.
We would like to welcome Senator Martinez to the committee,
and to our subcommittee. This is a very important subcommittee
of the Armed Services Committee dealing with force projection
with all of its implications, and that is a matter of
extraordinary importance and consequence at any time for our
national security and particularly at this time.
We are very fortunate in this whole area of national
security to have some of the most gifted, wonderful members of
the Armed Forces who are involved in this undertaking and
responsibility. Perhaps not always on the front page in terms
of the news, but front page in terms of all of us who know the
value of their service, extending to making sure that our men
and women are going to get to the right place at the right time
and making sure that those who have served so well and
gallantly and courageously and have been wounded in the course
of battle are going to be brought home with the kind of
attention and respect that they deserve.
There is an extremely broad responsibility with the force
projection in this subcommittee and we take it very seriously,
and we are very grateful for those that serve on it.
So, Senator Martinez, we want to thank you, and we welcome
you to it.
It is always a pleasure to be with my friend, Jeff
Sessions, who is tireless in terms of his interest in the Armed
Services Committee generally and also in terms of the workings
of this subcommittee, and we are glad to have him aboard.
I had a good brief but informed and interesting few minutes
with General Schwartz earlier today.
I have some questions to get to. We talked about a number
of these items earlier. He will have an opportunity to talk
about all of them this afternoon, and we will have a chance to
talk and respond to these questions.
My statement is both a word of welcome and a discussion
about all of the importance of this subcommittee. I will
include it in the record in its entirety to save us some time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
The subcommittee will come to order. I want to extend a welcome to
our witnesses and thank each of you for appearing before the Seapower
Subcommittee today.
The subcommittee will hear today from the Honorable Sue Payton,
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and General
Norton Schwartz, Commander of the Transportation Command. We welcome
both of you and thank you for your service.
First, I always think it's important to note the heroism and
professionalism of the coalition armed forces presently engaged in Iraq
and Afghanistan. While we may have disagreements among policy officials
about the war, let no one mistake that disagreement for a lack of
support for the men and women who are serving their country in the
Middle East right now. Our thoughts and prayers are with them and their
families who are also called by their country to sacrifice in this war
effort.
Now, turning to the subject of this hearing, I would note that
strategic lift is an important and continuing interest of this
subcommittee. Over many years, and with several different individuals
holding the chairmanship of this subcommittee, we have devoted
significant energies to the subject of strategic mobility.
Today's hearing continues the subcommittee's strong bipartisan
interest in the broader strategic lift policy issues facing the Nation
today. I want to take this opportunity to welcome Senator Martinez to
the position of ranking member of the subcommittee. I have had the good
fortune to work with a number of Senators in the leadership of this
subcommittee, including Senators Warner, Cohen, Snowe, Sessions,
Talent, and Thune. I believe that, in each of those cases, we have
worked as a non-partisan team to see to the interests of the men and
women of the Armed Forces whose programs fall within our jurisdiction.
I look forward to continuing this approach with you, Senator Martinez,
as we work toward a new National Defense Authorization Act.
I believe that the Defense Department's recent experience would
indicate to me that the current strategic lift capability may need to
be enhanced, despite what we have seen in the Mobility Capability Study
and the Quadrennial Defense Review. In fact, we adopted direction to
the Department of Defense in the most recent Authorization Act to
complete a new study of strategic mobility requirements. I want to
thank Senator McCaskill for leading the effort to include this new
study language.
We have heard of a number of current issues that the subcommittee
should hear about today. One of those is the stress on our mobility
personnel and their equipment. Another surrounds the best method to
solve our longer-term requirements for strategic airlift. We have the
question of continuing the production line for the C-17 aircraft
program. We also have the C-5 reliability enhancement and re-engining
program (RERP) efforts and the recent Nunn-McCurdy certification that
the RERP upgrades for the C-5 needed to continue to meet national
security requirements.
In the interests of time, I will conclude my comments to leave more
time for questions.
Once again, welcome, Senator Martinez.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Martinez.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. I really
appreciate your welcome.
I am delighted to have an opportunity to serve on this
subcommittee, and I am really looking forward to the work. I
have endeavored to get up to speed, and there is a lot to
learn, and I have learned a lot. I will likewise place my
statement in the record.
I want to thank General Schwartz and Secretary Payton for
their appearance here today and, most of all, for their service
to our country at these critical times.
I appreciate very much your warm words of welcome. I look
forward to working with you and the other members to ensure
that we can do our part to assist a mission that is so critical
at this time in our Nation's history. So thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Martinez follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mel Martinez
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm pleased to join you in welcoming our witnesses for today's
hearing. General Schwartz and Secretary Payton, thank you for your
testimony today, and more importantly, thank you for your leadership
and service to our country every day.
Whether supporting the global war on terror with the air bridge
across the Atlantic, or medically evacuating critically wounded to
receive lifesaving care in the States, or performing humanitarian
relief operations in some distant corner of the globe, or simply
transporting household goods for hundreds of thousands of service men
and their families each year, U.S. Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM)
ability to provide persistent lift of personnel and material anywhere
in the world, virtually ``on demand,'' is vital to our Nation's
security.
We are deeply grateful and proud of the airmen, soldiers, sailors,
and merchant marines who are conducting these lift operations every
hour of every day. They've turned the remarkable into the routine.
I am very interested in hearing your assessment of current
operations and the health of our mobility forces. TRANSCOM has been
central to every phase of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom--from the employment of prepositioning stocks and the first
deployment of troops to the current sustainment of surge forces. It's
important that we understand what you require in order to sustain your
high operational tempo. Equally important, we need to employ the
lessons learned from today's operations as we size and shape the future
strategic lift force.
With that in mind, today's hearing should provide much-needed
clarity regarding the plan for strategic lift aircraft. Last year's
update to the Mobility Capabilities Study confirmed the requirement for
``about 300'' large airlifters, meaning the current program of 190 C-17
and 111 modernized C-5 aircraft. The more recent review of strategic
airlift by the Department, triggered by the C-5 re-engining program
Nunn-McCurdy cost breach, concluded that re-engining the C-5A model
aircraft, 60 in total, would neither be necessary nor cost effective in
meeting airlift requirements. It was also concluded that it was not
affordable to buy additional C-17 aircraft. Your assessment of these
findings will be helpful.
Meanwhile, the award of the KC-45 tanker is an important step
toward recapitalizing the aging tanker fleet--TRANSCOM's top
procurement priority. It is not the intent to review contract award
details here, but it is important to gain your insights regarding how
this tanker's capabilities promise to reshape your mission
effectiveness. In particular, I am interested in understanding the
operational value offered by the tanker's alternate role as an
airlifter, and how this added cargo and passenger capacity would be
employed in your most stressing scenario of supporting two near-
simultaneous major combat operations.
As well, we welcome your insights regarding the role to be
performed by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) in future force
planning. We are interested in your assessment of the health and
viability of your CRAF partners, and your recommendations regarding
initiatives to strengthen the CRAF program to ensure the continued
reliability of this critical lift component.
Finally, while much of our current focus is necessarily on matters
of strategic airlift, we need to be looking ahead to future
requirements to recapitalize our Sealift and Prepositioning Forces. I
know that you are working with the Navy to define requirements for the
Maritime Preposition Force (Future), and it will be valuable to gain
your insights on this emerging program. As well, the age of our Fast
Sealift Ships and the Ready Reserve Force dictate that we commit to a
long-term recapitalization plan as we approach their replacement.
Much to Senator Kennedy's and Senator Warner's credit, this
subcommittee has played a significant role in support of strategic
mobility in the past. I look forward to joining their efforts and
working with you and your staff as we move forward to provide the
resources necessary to support your operations, while also helping to
shape the future TRANSCOM.
Again, I thank you for joining us today, and look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no
statement.
Senator Kennedy. Fine. Secretary Payton, a very special
welcome to you.
Ms. Payton. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kennedy. We are grateful for your presence, and we
look forward to your presentation.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUE C. PAYTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Ms. Payton. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Martinez, and
members of the subcommittee, it is my distinct honor to appear
before you today to testify on the state of several Air Force
mobility programs.
I am further honored to be joined by General Norton
Schwartz, Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM),
and the person I most consider to be our customer in
acquisition for mobility. I look forward to discussing how the
Air Force is committed to modernizing and recapitalizing our
aging aircraft to protect our Nation and support our airmen,
while providing the best value to the American taxpayers.
In the interest of time, I will limit my opening remarks to
the KC-45A, the C-5 modernization program, C-130J production,
and the C-27, also known as our Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA).
The KC-45A is our number-one procurement priority. The KC-
45A tankers will provide greater overall capability than the
current inventory of 500 plus KC-135E and KC-135R tankers,
which will take several decades to replace. While the average
age of the fleet is over 47 years, when the last KC-135R is
retired, it will be more than 80 years old, and it is so
absolutely critical for the Nation to move forward on this
program now.
The Air Force spent an unprecedented amount of time and
effort with the offerers, ensuring we had open communications
and a completely transparent process. I am extremely proud of
the KC-45A acquisition team, and I am certain that the Air
Force selected the best overall value to the warfighter and the
taxpayer based on the competition evaluation criteria.
With regards to our strategic air fleet, the modernization
of the C-5 fleet remains an Air Force priority to meet
combatant commanders' requirements. The last time I testified
before a subcommittee of the Senate with General Schwartz,
Secretary Wynne had just announced the C-5 Reliability
Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP) was in a critical Nunn-
McCurdy breach.
I am very pleased to tell you that on February 14, 2008,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics certified the restructure of the C-5 RERP. The
certified production program consists of modernizing the
remaining 47 C-5Bs and 2 C-5Cs.
A key component of intra-theater airlift modernization
effort is our C-130J. As of February 2008, we have fielded 63
of the 87 funded C-130J aircraft. The current C-130J multi-year
procurement contract ends in fiscal year 2008, and we will be
using suboptimized additional procurements through annual
contracts to procure future aircraft until a new multi-year
procurement contract can be negotiated.
As a joint Army-Air Force program, the JCA is uniquely
qualified to perform time-sensitive, mission-critical resupply.
On February 29, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
sent the required six reports and certification required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. We are
now prepared to move forward with this joint program.
The men and women in Air Force acquisition take great pride
in delivering on our promise to deliver warfighter capabilities
on time and on cost. I am honored to represent them in front of
this subcommittee. I thank you again for the opportunity to be
here. I look forward very much to your questions and comments.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Payton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Sue Payton
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is my distinct
honor to appear before the subcommittee today with General Norton
Schwartz, Commander of U.S. Transportation Command. I look forward to
discussing with you the state of several Air Force mobility programs.
I am proud to represent the finest acquisition workforce in the
Department and I can honestly say we have the smartest and hardest
working airmen developing the most advanced technology required by the
joint warfighter. We are committed to acquiring the most capable weapon
systems for the warfighter while being diligent stewards to the
taxpayer and operating in an open and transparent environment ``without
fear or favor.'' We are living in interesting times as we constantly
balance the near-term need to equip today's warfighter on today's front
lines securing air, space, and cyberspace, while simultaneously
modernizing the force to ensure tomorrow's warfighter is equipped for
success and never surprised by our adversaries.
ACQUISITION LESSONS LEARNED
The Air Force is committed to improving its acquisition process
performance. Success in this endeavor depends on setting achievable
stable requirements, getting appropriate resources, using disciplined
systems engineering, and managing effectively with a skilled workforce.
Our challenge is to quickly and economically convert ideas, experiments
and prototypes into battlefield effects. This entails more than
creating new weapon systems; it means adopting an inherently agile and
responsive acquisition culture. Such institutional agility will allow
us to effectively and efficiently divest our legacy systems while
fielding the capabilities needed to meet new global challenges.
There are several lessons that I have learned as the Air Force
Acquisition Executive over the past 19 months. The first lesson is that
acquisitions of complex, highly integrated, interoperable, survivable
systems are difficult. The challenges for developing complex weapon
systems are not well understood outside of the acquisition community.
The second is that source selection protests are a way of life and they
continue to challenge the Air Force's ability to develop and field
desperately needed systems, on time and on cost. Protests are a
valuable check and balance in the acquisition process, but frivolous
protests only delay desperately needed combat capability to our
warfighter and waste valuable taxpayer dollars. Another valuable lesson
is that the workforce must be empowered to make decisions and we need
to have the right people with the necessary training and expertise. Our
negotiating teams and especially our contracting officers have been
empowered to negotiate and close the deal with industry. Additionally,
under Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century, a new initiative
called Installation Acquisition Transformation (IAT) is underway. An
objective of this new initiative is to strategically realign the
installation contracting organization within the Continental United
States and move away from a tactically focused approach. With today's
fiscally constrained environment, IAT will allow for an agile operating
structure where we can leverage and increase the technical competence
of our workforce while realizing cost savings through proven strategic
sourcing techniques consistent with Office of Management and Budget
guidance. I have also learned that the Nunn-McCurdy process, while
difficult, results in healthier, more executable programs. I inherited
several under funded programs with cost growth challenges, because the
cost, schedule and performance baselines were established well in
advance of when we could reasonably project the technical and schedule
issues that can drive costs out of control. The lessons I have learned
in the first year and a half of my tenure have brought focus to many
daily efforts. However, my commitment to integrity and transparency in
all Air Force acquisitions remains firm and the bedrock of all our
acquisition activities.
FLEET MODERNIZATION AND RECAPITALIZATION
I look forward to discussing with the committee the Air Force's top
acquisition priority, the KC-45A, as well as the status of additional
high-priority acquisition programs such as the C-5 modernization
programs; continued production of the C-130J and introduction of the C-
27 Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) ; as well as our efforts on alternative
fuels certification for our aircraft inventory.
KC-45A
The KC-45A is our highest procurement priority and it is critical
to the entire joint and coalition military team's ability to project
combat power around the world. It gives America and our Allies
unparalleled rapid response to combat and humanitarian relief
operations. KC-45A tankers will provide increased aircraft
availability, more adaptable technology, more flexible employment
options, and greater overall capability than the current inventory of
KC-135E and KC-135R tankers. The KC-45A will be able to refuel
receptacle and probe-equipped aircraft on every mission and itself be
in-flight refuelable. Also, the KC-45A will have an additional role to
carry cargo, aero-medical evacuation and passengers, and be equipped
with defensive systems to enhance its utility to the warfighter.
The current fleet of Eisenhower-era KC-135s average 47 years old.
The KC-45A program is based on a planned purchase of 179 aircraft and
is the first of up to 3 recapitalization programs to replace the entire
legacy fleet. The Air Force has budgeted approximately $3 billion per
year for an annual production rate of 12-18 aircraft. But even with
this level of investment, it will take several decades to replace the
500+ Eisenhower-era KC135s. It's absolutely critical for the Air Force
to move forward now on this program.
As you are aware, the Air Force awarded the KC-X contract to
Northrop Grumman, who met or exceeded the requirements of the Request
for Proposal and provided the best overall value to the warfighter and
the taxpayer based on the competition evaluation factors. The Air Force
spent an unprecedented amount of time and effort with the offerors
ensuring open communications and a completely transparent process. It
is our Air Force goal to move forward with a program of smart, steady
reinvestment to ensure future viability of this unique and vital U.S.
national capability. I am extremely proud of the KC-45A Acquisition
team on the recent award of the KC-45A tanker and the capability it
will bring to the fight.
C-5 MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
Modernization of the C-5 fleet remains an Air Force priority to
meet combatant commanders' requirements for on-time delivery of
oversized and outsized cargo. This effort will bring needed capability
to the warfighter through 2040, getting our troops and equipment to the
fight by increasing the mission availability of C-5s with their
unmatched out sized and oversized, roll-on/roll-off capability.
The C-5 modernization effort is a combination of two programs. The
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) provides modernized avionics and
allows the aircraft to efficiently access international airspace. The
second program is the Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program
(RERP), which builds upon the C-5 AMP modification. C-5 RERP replaces
the propulsion system and improves the reliability of over 70 systems
and components.
On February 14, 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics certified the restructure of C-5
RERP production modernization to 47 C-5Bs and 2 C-5Cs. The C-5A
aircraft are not included in the restructured program. However, they
will undergo AMP modification to enable the aircraft to meet global
Communications/Navigation/Surveillance and Air Traffic Management
standards. We are working closely with Secretary Young and his staff to
produce the best product for the warfighter and the taxpayer.
CONTINUED C-130J PRODUCTION
The C-130J is a key component of the intra-theater airlift
modernization effort. Air Mobility Command identified a need for 127
combat delivery C-130Js to meet intra-theater airlift requirements.
Through defense appropriation and global war on terrorism supplemental
bills, Congress has funded 70 C-130Js, 10 WC-13OJs and 7EC-13OJs and as
of February 2008, we have fielded 63 total C-13OJ aircraft. The current
C-130J Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract ends in fiscal year 2008
and we will be using suboptimized additional procurements through
annual contracts to procure future aircraft until a new MYP contract
can be negotiated. Fiscal year 2009 C-130J procurement is dependent
upon the Air Force Special Operations Command's HC/MC-130
recapitalization program and sales to the United States Marines Corps
and coalition partners.
INTRODUCTION OF THE C-27 JCA
The C-27 is a joint Army and Air Force program to procure a small
cargo aircraft capable of providing responsive, flexible and tailored
airlift for combat, humanitarian and homeland defense missions.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 language
prohibited obligation and expenditure of appropriated funds until the
Secretary of Defense provides specified reports to the Congressional
Defense Committees and certifies the requirement for the aircraft. In
the interest of openness and transparency, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) took the extraordinary step of delivering the draft
Joint Intra-Theater Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis report to the
Congressional Defense Committees before completing the sufficiency
review. On February 29, OSD sent the required six reports and
certification and we are prepared to move forward with this joint
program.
ALTERNATIVE FUELS CERTIFICATION
Following Presidential direction to reduce dependence on foreign
oil, the Air Force is aggressively pursuing a broad range of energy
alternatives. As the Department of Defense's leading consumer of jet
fuel, we are currently engaged in evaluating alternative fuels and
engine technologies leading to greater fuel efficiency. In 2007, we
fully certified the B-52 to fly on a synthetic fuel blend and
demonstrated C-17 operations. In 2008, we expect to certify both the C-
17 and B-1B, demonstrate F-22 operations, and conduct ground testing on
the engines that power the F-16 and F-15. The remainder of the U.S. Air
Force aircraft fleet is expected to be tested and certified by early
2011. Other Air Force technology efforts continue to explore high-
efficiency aerodynamic concepts, advanced gas turbines and variable
cycle engines providing higher performance and greater fuel efficiency.
CONCLUSION
The dynamic and threatening environment in which the U.S. military
operates requires an agile and responsive acquisition enterprise. To
meet the requirements of our joint and coalition warfighters, we must
continue to focus our efforts on modernizing and recapitalizing our
aging weapon systems. The men and women in Air Force Acquisition take
great pride in delivering on our promise and I am honored to represent
them in front of this committee. Thank you again for the opportunity to
be here today and I look forward to your comments and questions.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
General Schwartz?
STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Schwartz. Chairman Kennedy, Senator Martinez, and
Senator Sessions, it is my privilege to be with you today,
representing the more than 155,000 men and women of TRANSCOM.
We are a supporting command, and our number-one mission is to
provide outstanding support to the warfighter and to the Nation
by rapidly delivering combat power and sustainment to the Joint
Force Commander, providing the utmost care in moving our
wounded from the battlefield to world-class medical treatment
facilities, and redeploying our folks home to their families.
As the Department's Distribution Process Owner, TRANSCOM
also leads a collaborative effort within the defense logistics
community to improve the Department of Defense (DOD) supply
chain. We execute our global missions through our component
commands--the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command,
the Navy Military Sealift Command, and the Air Force Air
Mobility Command.
Our effectiveness is the direct result of the hard work and
dedication of these true professionals, and I am grateful to
you, Mr. Chairman, and all of Congress for this needed support
that you provide.
I could not be prouder of the TRANSCOM team or our national
partners. Today, we are supporting the global war on terrorism
and keeping our promises to the warfighters. The delivery of
much-needed Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to
protect our troops continues to be a top priority.
To date, we have delivered more than 3,800 MRAPs to the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater, delivered almost
exclusively by air in the early stages. As production rates
have climbed, we have reached a balance between air and surface
modes of transportation to optimize distribution.
We continue to advance normalized transportation operations
throughout CENTCOM. In 2007, we initiated the first U.S.-
flagged commercial cargo flights into Afghanistan and Iraq
since combat operations began and increased the use of
alternative air and seaport facilities in the region, thus
broadening our capability to provide the best possible support
to our warfighters.
We have also focused on improving quality of life for our
people. Through the Families First program, we are improving
household goods shipments, as this recurring event affects the
lives of our servicemembers and certainly their families. We
now protect household goods shipments with full replacement
value. In addition, the Defense Personal Property Shipping
System, the Web-based software, which will better facilitate
household moves, will be fully integrated into all shipping
offices later this year.
We are also transforming the military deployment and
distribution enterprise by incorporating commercial best
practices where it makes sense. Much like the Fortune 500
companies, which realize savings through transportation
management services, our Defense Transportation Coordination
Initiative (DTCI), in partnership with the Defense Logistics
Agency and the Services, will use a commercial transportation
coordinator to help manage a significant portion of DOD routine
freight movements.
Over the next few weeks, we will implement DTCI at three
continental United States locations, and we are encouraged by
the potential savings and improved support we can provide as
DTCI expands to additional sites throughout the coming year.
It is through a combination of military and commercial
capabilities that TRANSCOM fields a transportation and
distribution system that is unmatched anywhere in the world. As
we look to the future, rapid global mobility will continue to
be a key enabler and ensuring the appropriate mix of lift
assets is vitally important to this mission.
Mr. Chairman, my top airlift priority is recapitalization
of the tanker fleet. I am encouraged that the KC-45 is now
under contract, albeit under protest. The KC-45 with multi-
point refueling, significant cargo and passenger carrying
capability, and appropriate defensive systems will be a game-
changing platform for the future of global mobility.
I am also encouraged by the Department's decision to
certify the C-5 modernization program. The Nation needs the
outsized and oversized lift capability provided by a reliable
C-5 to complement the C-17. We are optimistic that the newly
certified program will deliver the needed reliability and
performance to make the C-5 a more productive platform.
Despite our very substantial military force structure,
TRANSCOM will always depend on a mix of Government and
commercial assets. We should guard against overbuilding the
organic airlift and sealift fleets, which could place our long-
standing commercial partnerships at risk. A critical national
capability for projecting military power and sustaining forces
is a viable Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The continued
success of the CRAF relies upon the strengths of our U.S.-
flagged airlines.
We are beginning to look toward a post-Operation Iraqi
Freedom timeframe, when lift requirements will subside. Given
that eventual reality, we are looking at innovative ways to
encourage continued participation, thus ensuring the long-term
health of the CRAF program.
I am grateful to you, sir, and to the subcommittee for
allowing me to appear before you today to discuss these and
other important issues. I thank you for the essential support
you provide in enabling our capabilities. I look forward, sir,
to your questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF
INTRODUCING THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM) 2008
Mission/Organization
USTRANSCOM, a unified combatant command (COCOM), serves as the
``quarterback'' of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
(JDDE) whose purpose is to project national security capabilities,
provide end-to-end visibility of forces and sustainment in transit, and
rapidly respond to support joint logistics requirements. Through our
component commands, the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Air
Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC) and our national and commercial
partners, we execute military and commercial transportation, terminal
management, aerial refueling and global patient movement through the
Defense Transportation System (DTS). As designated in 2003, re-
designated in 2006, codified in the 2006 Unified Command Plan, and now
institutionalized in Department of Defense (DOD) instructions,
USTRANSCOM is the DOD's Distribution Process Owner (DPO) and is leading
a collaborative effort with JDDE partners across the defense logistics
community to increase the precision, reliability and efficiency of the
DOD supply chain. By increasing collaboration, employing expeditionary
tools and streamlined systems, adapting our business models and
ensuring an appropriate mix of lift assets, we keep our promises to our
warfighters and the Nation, today and tomorrow.
KEEPING PROMISES TO THE NATION IN 2007
Global War on Terrorism Update
In 2007, USTRANSCOM overcame many challenges to meet the
warfighter's requirements for the global war on terrorism, including
Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Noble Eagle
(ONE). AMC, in collaboration with our commercial partners, moved
1,475,427 passengers on deployment, redeployment, sustainment, and rest
and recuperation missions. This indispensable relationship with
commercial industry freed our organic aircraft to airlift 167,396 short
tons of vital cargo into the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater.
Additionally, we airdropped 3,350 short tons of critical supplies for
coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Our aging AMC tankers also delivered 168 million gallons of fuel to
U.S. and coalition aircraft in support of OEF/OIF and helped secure our
skies in support of ONE by flying more than 333 sorties and offloading
2.3 million gallons of fuel to combat air patrol fighters and support
aircraft.
MSC and SDDC's contributions in OIF and OEF were equally
impressive, delivering 916,000 short tons/17,850,000 square feet of
cargo. MSC's point-to-point tankers also delivered over 1.79 billion
gallons of fuel supporting worldwide DOD requirements.
Support to other Combatant Commanders
Operations in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) were our
primary focus this past year. USTRANSCOM rapidly deployed five
additional U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to help stabilize Iraq,
while simultaneously supporting on-time force rotations. Working in
concert with our JDDE partners, we deployed 19 and redeployed 14 BCTs,
and rotated 2 Air Expeditionary Forces and 3 Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces.
Delivering Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles was also
a high priority. We rapidly delivered over 1,657 lifesaving MRAPs both
by air and sea while simultaneously maintaining high levels of force
deployment and redeployment operations. Concurrently, we moved over
25,000 improved armor kits for U.S. High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles, ensuring our warfighters received the latest advances in
vehicle protection.
Turkey is a key ally in the global war on terrorism, and our
operations through Incirlik Air Base are vital to our efficient
intermodal distribution into Iraq. This year we delivered over 66,000
short tons of cargo via aircraft flying out of Incirlik, 10,000 short
tons and 144 cargo aircraft sorties more than in 2006.
We continue to advance and normalize transportation operations
throughout USCENTCOM. In 2007, we initiated the first U.S.-flagged
commercial cargo flights into Afghanistan and Iraq since combat
operations began and increased the use of alternative air and seaport
facilities to augment the redeployment flow of containers that would
otherwise go through Kuwait. These operations broaden our capability to
provide the best possible support to the COCOMs.
The availability of direct commercial cargo capacity presents
opportunities for cost savings and efficiencies. Through our air cargo
tender program, we moved more than 126,000 short tons of intra-theater
cargo via commercial air carriers vice military aircraft or ground
convoys. This capability saved $258 million and freed 14,168 C-130
missions for other requirements. More importantly, the 67,500 pallets
moved by commercial air resulted in fewer ground convoys, mitigating
the risk to U.S. forces. Additionally, we contracted with commercial
shipping companies to deliver increasing amounts of containerized cargo
directly to Iraq, through the port of Umm Qasr, reducing the need for
overland transportation from outlying regional ports. This created new
jobs for Iraqi truckers and port workers, helping to accelerate the
economic revitalization and stabilization process in the region.
Our quick response capability proved vital in supporting Lebanon in
its recent battle against internal insurgents. USTRANSCOM rapidly
airlifted over 480 short tons of ammunition from the U.S., sealifted
over 5,600 coalition-supplied artillery shells and moved 130 vehicles
plus support equipment from Europe to Lebanon. This rapid support was
instrumental in Lebanon's ability to defeat Fatah al-Islam and maintain
its sovereignty.
While operations in USCENTCOM remain a primary focus, we are
mindful of our global commitments. In the U.S. European Command AOR,
USTRANSCOM rotated 7,752 peacekeepers into the Darfur region to support
the African Union Mission in Sudan as it executed its transition of
authority to the United Nations Mission in Sudan.
In U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), USTRANSCOM conducted 10
detainee movement operations from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, repatriating 70
detainees to various points around the globe. We also airlifted over
1,400 passengers and 1,500 short tons of cargo to support Presidential
visits to Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia and Guatemala, strengthening key
regional partnerships.
In the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR, in addition to providing
forces and sustainment for OEF-P (Philippines), we set records in
Operation Deep Freeze, airlifting over 1,900 short tons of cargo and
5,000 passengers, and sealifting 11.9 million gallons of fuel and 12
million pounds of cargo into McMurdo Station, Antarctica, in support of
the National Science Foundation. In a successful proof of concept, a C-
17 conducted the first-ever airdrop at the South Pole, delivering 35.5
short tons of cargo.
At home, USTRANSCOM maintains strong partnerships with U.S.
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and non-DOD organizations such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). We have synchronized plans
to support civil authorities during catastrophic events like hurricanes
and the devastating wildfires that swept across parts of California.
Working closely with these partners, USTRANSCOM moved over 250
passengers and 360 short tons of cargo and provided urgently needed
command and control, aerial firefighting and aero-medical evacuation
elements to reduce the loss of life and property.
We also support the geographic COCOMs through exercises, which
provide critical training and serve as a venue to refine business and
deployment and distribution processes. For example, the Republic of
Korea Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration and Ulchi
Focus Lens exercises in the USPACOM AOR allowed us to integrate new
command and control processes and capabilities to better support the
joint warfighter. USSOUTHCOM's Panamax, the largest 2007 multinational
exercise involving more than 30 ships, 12 aircraft, and 7,500 personnel
from 19 nations, also gave us ample refinement opportunities.
Additionally, we tested our Containerized Ammunition Distribution
System (CADS). During Exercise Turbo CADS 2007, we shipped 1,133
container loads of munitions to five ports using an MSC-chartered
commercial container ship, which substantially increased USPACOM's
wartime munitions readiness and prepared commercial ports to augment
typical host nation ports used for ammunition shipments. Finally,
during USNORTHCOM's Ardent Sentry 2007, an exercise centered on
deployment and employment of Homeland Defense Quick Reaction Force and
Joint Task Force--Civil Support elements, we successfully exercised our
new Theater Distribution Management Portable Deployment Kit, a
manportable suite equipped with Radio Frequency Identification,
satellite communication and other technologies to provide in-transit
visibility for unit deployments and cargo movements. The future kit
will provide Global Positioning System-based, passenger manifesting and
cargo accountability capability.
Improving DOD Supply Chain Management
In our role as the DPO, USTRANSCOM declared 2007 the ``Year of
Metrics'' and made great strides to develop the JDDE Performance
Measure Framework. This framework allows us to better evaluate supply
chain performance, reliability and cost, gain insight into system
behavior and identify ways to drive tangible improvements. Using
``Voice of the Warfighter'' surveys, we conducted 200 face-to-face
interviews with logisticians across 4 COCOMs to validate the key
performance indicators that will both measure and drive supply chain
performance to meet COCOM and warfighter expectations. Representative
outcomes include substantial improvement in delivery times and better
alignment of shared business processes across supply, transport, and
end user segments of the DOD supply chain to improve support to the
warfighter.
Another significant improvement in supply chain management will be
the Joint Shipment Manager construct, a collaborative effort between
USTRANSCOM, Defense Logistics Agency and USPACOM operations analysts
and local commercial transportation experts. This construct will place
a distribution hub near Defense Distribution Center Pearl Harbor to
maximize transportation efficiencies between the Oahu ports and the
distribution center. The arrangement will offer customer service and
delivery time improvements across more than 150 transportation lanes
with the potential for a 12 percent net reduction in annual operating
costs.
Supporting the Warfighter
Our support for the warfighter includes improving quality of life.
Through the Families First program we are improving household goods
shipments, as this recurring event directly affects the lives of our
servicemembers and their families. In 2007, SDDC and its partners moved
1.63 billion pounds in household goods. Families First will benefit the
large portion of DOD that moves each year by allowing personnel to rate
transportation service providers online, obtain counseling via the web
and file personal property claims directly with the provider. The
Defense Personnel Property System (DPS), which will provide these web-
based capabilities and help manage the 680,000 annual shipments of
household goods, reached initial operational capability in November
2007 and will be fully integrated into all 136 shipping offices by
September 2008. We also began implementing Full Replacement Value
protection for household goods shipments. This enhancement was made
possible by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 and will be fully implemented for all shipments by
March 1, 2008.
Perhaps the most important of all our missions is the movement of
injured warfighters from the battlefield to world-class medical
treatment facilities. This is a complex, time-sensitive process
requiring close collaboration with doctors, military hospitals and our
aero-medical evacuation crews to move injured personnel at exactly the
correct time to the correct place. In 2007, we transported over 9,900
patients from the USCENTCOM AOR and over 16,000 patients globally. We
continue to improve an already superb process by chartering the Global
Patient Movement Joint Advisory Board to develop a joint critical care
transport capability, standardize the theater Patient Movement
Requirements Centers and implement joint electronic medical records.
Should the worst occur and a warfighter perish in the defense of
our Nation, USTRANSCOM ensures the most dignified transport from the
battlefield to final destination. This year, we transported 837 of our
fallen heroes aboard military or military-contracted aircraft to the
airfield nearest the interment.
leading the joint deployment and distribution enterprise transformation
Process and Systems Transformations
As DOD's DPO, we are leading transformation of the JDDE to meet the
changing environment of current operations and to improve performance
to meet the needs of the future force. A key enabler of this
transformation is our initiative to implement a single transportation
tracking number. Much like commercial industry, this will allow
decisionmakers to more easily track warfighting capability in the DOD
pipeline.
As DOD's functional proponent for Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) and related Automated Identification Technology (AIT), we are
taking a corporate approach to synchronize the myriads of ongoing AIT
efforts with the Services, DLA and other partners. We published a
concept of operations and developed an implementation plan to transform
the current AIT environment and improve asset visibility. We
implemented active RFID technology at our strategic ports to provide
detailed cargo movement information. Through the Alaska RFID
Implementation project and Joint Regional Inventory Material Management
initiative, we have installed passive RFID technology at selected
military installations in Alaska, California, and Hawaii.
Another major initiative, Theater Enterprise Deployment and
Distribution, takes an enterprise view of the JDDE to identify
performance gaps or shortfalls and provides the foundation for
instituting common joint processes, establishing intra-theater
organizational relationships and applying common Information Technology
(IT) support. This effort is yielding positive results.
Our transformation includes moving toward private industry
arrangements geared toward performance and integrated customer-focused
solutions, such as our Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative
(DTCI). DTCI has quickly evolved from a concept to a fully-integrated
and operationally-focused program office. In August 2007 we partnered
with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Services to contract a
commercial transportation services coordinator to help manage DOD
continental United States (CONUS) freight. This partnership will
provide visibility of CONUS freight movements, enabling load
consolidation, increased use of cost effective intermodal solutions and
intelligent scheduling. Today, many Fortune 500 companies using
transportation management services witness cost savings of 7-15
percent. Our comprehensive analysis shows incorporating such commercial
best practices could yield cost savings of up to 15 percent annually
over the 7-year contract.
Managing the portfolio of IT systems is key to meeting the ever
increasing need for information. Historically, IT resources have been
managed and acquired as stand-alone systems rather than integral parts
of a net-centric capability. This often results in duplicative
investment in the same or similar systems, limiting the ability to
share information and fully incorporate doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education factors. As the
Distribution Portfolio Manager, we are aligning IT with warfighter
needs through enterprise level planning, integrated architectures and
warfighter preferred performance measures.
An example of our alignment efforts is the convergence of DLA's
Integrated Data Environment (IDE) logistics system and USTRANSCOM's
Global Transportation Network (GTN). The creation of an IT backbone
through the IDE/GTN Convergence (IGC) allows us to more closely operate
with DLA, provides a common data environment for the DOD supply/
transportation enterprise and facilitates development of new
applications riding on that backbone. For instance, in June 2007 we
fielded a Motor Carrier Compliance capability, which allows us to
determine carriers' compliance with contractual requirements for
electronic status of movement and Government bills of lading. IGC will
also make possible the spring 2008 fielding of World Wide Express/
International Heavyweight Express air carrier shipment status
compliance.
The migration of surface port information from the Worldwide Port
System into the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES) is a
similar effort, providing a single web-based port processing and
manifesting system for DOD. GATES will also link to external systems,
thus enhancing information sharing across DOD and in-transit visibility
for the warfighter. Other transformation initiatives include Common
Operational Picture for Distribution and Deployment, which fuses
information from multiple systems to present one distribution and
deployment picture to the user; and the Single Load Planning concept,
which combines features of the Automated Air Load Planning System and
the Integrated Computerized Deployment System to allow air and surface
load planning on a single web-based application.
Business process reengineering and continuous process improvements
are at the heart of USTRANSCOM's ongoing transformation. Agile
Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21) is an effort to implement
distribution industry best practices using commercial off-the-shelf
tools and then transition to commercial optimization and scheduling
technologies. This transition will improve transportation planning,
improve forecast accuracy and increase on-time delivery of forces and
supplies to combatant commanders at a lower cost to the Services. When
fully operational, AT21 will provide the warfighter full distribution
pipeline visibility and enable throughput management at critical ports
and waypoints around the world.
In collaboration with the Air Force and Defense Finance and
Accounting Service, we are replacing outdated, unreliable billing and
accounting processes and systems. The Defense Enterprise Accounting and
Management System (DEAMS) will transform the financial management of
our $10 billion enterprise. When fully fielded, DEAMS will set a new
standard for effective and efficient stewardship of Defense Working
Capital Fund resources.
AMC is transforming its relationships with the air components of
the COCOMs at the Air Operations Centers. By summer of 2008, AMC will
integrate strategic and theater mobility missions planning and
execution information across coalition, Joint, and Air Force systems.
Globally, AMC will have unprecedented ability to plan and report
aircraft movements into, around, and out of COCOM AORs and provide
USTRANSCOM visibility of in-theater air assets for air refueling,
airlift and air medical evacuation missions.
Finally, in the area of patient movement we are continuing
development of the TRANSCOM Regulating and Command & Control Evacuation
System (TRAC2ES). TRAC2ES will reach full operational capability in
2010 and provide access to information on available transportation
assets, retrospective trend analysis, improved in-transit visibility,
automated data sharing and global web-based user training.
Organizational Realignment/Personnel Issues
Although vital to what we do, the JDDE is more than just processes
and systems. We are focused on initiatives that provide for the needs
of the warfighter. First, we are developing organizational structures,
both in the distribution network and at USTRANSCOM, to enhance JDDE
responsiveness.
Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers (JDDOC), resident
in each geographic AOR, continue to aid COCOMs in improving integration
of strategic and theater distribution. As each COCOM tailors the JDDOC
to best meet theater needs, USTRANSCOM assists with the development of
performance-based metric framework as part of the organization.
A good example of the JDDOC's value is our previously mentioned
support of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). USEUCOM and USCENTCOM's JDDOCs
facilitated movement of donated munitions to the LAF by tapping into
regional expertise, as well as by reaching back to national partners in
the U.S. to maximize intra-theater and inter-theater lift. This unique
mission was possible because of the established collaboration across
our JDDOCs.
Another emerging capability is Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-
PO), an on-call, jointly trained, world-wide deployable team which
enables the rapid opening of ports. JTF-PO was designed with the
command and control capability and in-transit visibility technology to
support geographic COCOMs and sustain domestic first responders. It has
been endorsed by the COCOMs and demonstrated in national level, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and multi-national exercises.
The JTF-PO Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) combines Air Force and
Army units to open an airport and prepare it for logistics operations
in as little as 24 hours. A JTF-PO APOD was fully operational during
Ardent Sentry 07, responding to 23 military and 9 commercial airlift
missions, handling over 1,400 short tons and processing nearly 900
passengers. We are currently fielding the Seaport of Debarkation
capability to open a seaport in a comparable fashion.
The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process has presented a
unique opportunity to establish a modern command and control structure.
Our BRAC initiatives are estimated to save the taxpayer $1.2 billion
over the next 20 years as we realize efficiencies resulting from
consolidation. SDDC's move to Scott Air Force Base in 2007 is the most
visible of our comprehensive consolidation efforts. This organizational
realignment along with the new USTRANSCOM facility housing SDDC and
other critical functions has facilitated consolidation activities.
One such consolidation is our new ``Fusion Center'', which co-
locates SDDC, MSC, and AMC planners with our command staff, allowing
air, surface and sea transportation teams of experts to approach
movement requirements planning from an integrated, intermodal
perspective. This includes combining SDDC, AMC, and USTRANSCOM networks
and moving to joint certification and accreditation by USTRANSCOM of
all transportation working capital fund-resourced systems.
A second consolidation of SDDC, MSC and AMC analysts made our
vision for a Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center (JDPAC) a
reality. While not fully operational until 2010, the JDPAC is primed to
co-lead the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS) with
OSD and already contributes to the Joint Staff Operational Availability
studies and the OSD Analytical Agenda. The JPDAC is also building the
foundation to conduct a bi-annual Future Mobility Assessment. JDPAC
supports the geographic COCOMs through several ongoing or planned
projects to include Guam infrastructure and shared logistics studies
for USPACOM; infrastructure, theater airlift and throughput studies for
USCENTCOM; and airlift and distribution studies for U.S. Africa Command
(USAFRICOM). We expect significant expansion of our analytical
capabilities this year with initial delivery of programmatic and
distribution modeling and simulation tools, and in time, JDPAC will
bring unprecedented distribution modeling and simulation capability,
research techniques and sophisticated engineering tools to bear on
complex distribution problems.
Finally, the Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) combines common
carrier acquisitions and contract functions under one authority. ACE
produces synergies and efficiencies in securing national transportation
and distribution service contracts by centralized procurement of air,
surface and ocean transportation.
In parallel with BRAC transformation, our Joint Intelligence
Operations Center-Transportation (JIOC-TRANS) reached initial
operational capability in 2007. JIOC-TRANS enhances our ability to
anticipate emerging global events and warn transportation and
distribution decisionmakers by collaborating with the National
Intelligence Community and intelligence components of the other COCOMs.
In concert with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, we
established a Billing Center at Scott Air Force Base. Typically, cargo
movement within the DTS requires the billing of segmented
transportation events by mode. When changing transportation modes,
bills may be generated for each mode used. In addition, cargo movement
via ship may generate three separate bills for loading the ship at the
Port of Embarkation, for the actual sealift and for unloading at the
Port of Debarkation. As it matures, the Billing Center will generate a
single consolidated bill for each customer that includes all
transportation modes and billable events.
USTRANSCOM is also examining ways to achieve efficiencies in
container management. Preliminary analyses indicate opportunities to
clarify responsibilities and command relationships by consolidating
authority, strategiC-level planning and funding in a DOD-level
Executive Agent organization.
We are developing military and civilian personnel to manage
deployment and distribution for warfighters in joint, interagency, and
multinational environments. These joint logisticians will ensure the
viability and vitality of the JDDE. We developed a competency model for
Defense deployment and distribution. The Joint Staff has validated and
is planning to use it as a starting point to develop a broader
competency model for joint logistics. We have also teamed with the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces to enhance joint logistician
training in the classroom. In its third year, the Supply Chain
Management program has 43 graduates with 27 enrolled for 2008.
Maintaining Airlift Readiness for Mission Execution
Rapid global mobility is a key enabler to the effectiveness of the
joint force. As response times shrink from weeks to hours, our ability
to rapidly aggregate and move operational capabilities forward depends
on versatile, ready, and effective mobility forces.
However, much of our mobility force structure requires
modernization. My top air mobility priority is the recapitalization of
our aging tankers from a fleet of Eisenhower--era KC-135s and Reagan--
era KC-10s to the more capable KC-45, having multi-point refueling,
significant cargo and passenger carrying and defensive system
capabilities. The KC-45 will fulfill its primary refueling role, and
have the flexibility to contribute to an array of enhanced mobility
solutions, mitigating some short-term risk and/or mission load in other
areas. The Air Force must recapitalize this fleet and retire those
remaining KC-135s that are no longer safe to fly or that are no longer
mission effective.
The KC-10 fleet must also be modified to operate in the global
airspace environment to remain viable through approximately 2040. AMC
is examining ways to modernize the KC-10 to comply with international
airspace requirements, address obsolescence and provide a path for
future avionics upgrades.
Our National Defense Strategy requires a viable fleet of strategic
airlift aircraft. The C-17 is, and will continue to be, a key mobility
asset. We are approaching the end of the procurement program of C-17s,
with the fiscal year 2007 supplemental extending the fleet to 190
aircraft. Should C-5 modernization falter, we will need to sustain C-17
production.
The outsized and oversized, roll-on/roll-off capability provided by
the C-5 is essential to meet global mobility requirements. However,
this year the C-5 had the lowest departure reliability and mission
capable rates among the airlift fleet. Modernizing the C-5s with
avionics upgrades, new engines and other reliability enhancements is
necessary to increase aircraft availability, enable access to
international airspace and foreign airfields, reduce fuel consumption
and extend the useful life of this unique asset through 2040. AMC must
modernize the C-5 fleet while closely managing the costs of the
program, for which Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) certification is pending.
Intra-theater airlift is a key component of our global mobility
force. We currently have grounded three and restricted 24 Air Force C-
130s due to center wing box (CWB) problems, and another 40 aircraft
have been temporarily repaired. The Air Force's C-130 CWB replacement
program for combat delivery C-130H1s is funded thru fiscal year 2013.
Funding stability for CWB is critical to maintaining intratheater
airlift operational effectiveness. Additionally, C-130 variants have
faced challenges of noncompliance with global air traffic requirements,
aircraft avionics equipage and sustainment. The Avionics Modernization
Program will modify 222 combat delivery C-130H2/2.5/3s. USD(AT&L)
directed the Air Force to develop an investment strategy for satisfying
the capability of the remaining 166 C-130 aircraft, which includes 47
C-130H1s and 10 LC-130s.
While the C-130 remains a workhorse for intra-theater lift, the C-
27 will fulfill the joint force need to support dispersed tactical
elements and go the ``last tactical mile''. Acquisition of the C-27,
coupled with the repair and replacement of the CWB on select C-130s,
and additional C-130J procurement will provide the right mix of
aircraft to meet COCOM requirements.
A modern tool in our tactical airlift arsenal is the Joint
Precision Airdrop System (JPADS). JPADS provides precision airdrop from
higher altitudes with a four-fold increase in accuracy over previous
ballistic airdrop systems and the ability to deliver to multiple drop
zones on a single pass. Today, over 250 JPADS systems are supporting
operations in OIF/OEF. An additional advantage of the JPADS technology
is the ability to apply the JPADS Mission Planning System to
conventional airdrop delivery methods. These drops, termed Improved
Container Delivery System (ICDS), produce a refined release point
enhancing ballistic load accuracy by 60 percent while allowing
deployment from higher and less vulnerable operating altitudes. On
average, JPADS/ICDS delivers more than 400,000 pounds of cargo each
month. Since being deployed to OIF/OEF in July 2006, JPADS/ICDS has
eliminated the need for many ground convoy supply missions, thus
removing countless personnel from dangerous roadways.
The ability to rapidly offload cargo with our Tunner and Halvorsen
loaders cannot be overlooked. The Air Force has funded the full
complement of 318 Tunners, but only 392 of 538 Halvorsens. We strongly
support Air Force acquisition of the remaining assets to properly
outfit our global mobility force.
Distinguished Visitor (DV) airlift is a key component of the global
mobility force. Our senior leaders often require immediate and
sometimes simultaneous airlift to carry out diplomatic and other
missions in an ever-changing strategic environment. In partnership with
the Joint Staff and Services, we are facilitating collaborative
scheduling processes, policy and technology initiatives as well as
working to modernize our DV fleet with the Senior Leadership Command,
Control, and Communications System-Airborne (SLC3S-A) package. SLC3S-A
offers our senior government officials communications and information
management capabilities comparable to those available in their
permanent government office environments, while they travel globally
aboard U.S. Government aircraft.
Maintaining Sealift Readiness
On the sealift side, our efforts focus on targeted investments in
readiness, leveraging commercial capabilities and improvements in
maintaining our organic fleet. In previous years, we ``right-sized''
the strategic sealift fleet by transferring older, lower utility ships
out of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The RRF, which is owned and
operated by the Maritime Administration, now consists of 44 ships, down
from 102 in 1994. We used the savings generated from retiring the
vessels to extend the service life of the remaining vessels, fund
efficiency and safety enhancements and leverage our commercial partners
to recapitalize lost capacity.
We are also working with MSC to recapitalize aging tankers and
extend the service life of our Fast Sealift Ships (FSS). International
regulations and commercial refinery standards limit tankers loading and
discharging at most worldwide oil terminals to a maximum age of 25
years. This will place MSC's tankers beyond their useful life in 2010.
As such, MSC contracted for new tankers, which will be built in a U.S.
shipyard. Additionally, MSC completed an Outyear Engineering
Requirements Assessment for the FSSs that determined the FSS platforms
could safely and economically operate through 2033. This extends their
military useful service life to approximately 60 years vice the
originally planned 50 years.
In 2007, MSC conducted a successful test activation of a small T1
size tanker under a unique contingency contract supporting our
strategic capabilities in the Far East. We also replaced our 40-year-
old Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS). This year MSC chartered
a new U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged and U.S.-crewed vessel for this mission.
Replacing our OPDS vessel with a modern technology ship greatly
enhances our capability to support the warfighter with fuel over the
shore when access to prepared ports is denied.
To further shore up our strategic sealift capability, we fully
support the Navy's effort to exercise purchase options on U.S.-
manufactured ships employed in the Maritime Prepositioning Ships
program. Apart from the support they provide for the Marine Corps'
prepositioning requirements, these ships have a dual use of providing
transportation capacity for surge and sustainment missions.
Maintaining Infrastructure Readiness
Infrastructure is the cornerstone of our ability to project
national power. We continue our close coordination with the Department
of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Highway Administration and the
States to balance peacetime and wartime surface movement requirements
on the U.S. highway system. In advance of the reauthorization of
surface transportation legislation, we are updating the Strategic
Highway Network as part of our Highways for National Defense Program,
focusing on congestion, condition and capacity issues along our
intermodal deployment routes. We urge Congress to address national
defense public highway needs in future national highway programs.
With many of our strategic seaports operating at or near capacity,
we are also examining our infrastructure to ensure it is capable of
meeting national security requirements. SDDC has initiated Port Look
2008 to examine ways to optimize the use of U.S. strategic commercial
and military seaports.
We are also looking to expand our reach into regions of increasing
national interest and potential instability, most notably Africa,
Southeast Asia, and South America. USTRANSCOM personnel visited all the
geographic COCOMs to better understand emerging contingency plans and
to champion the need for mobility-capable cooperative security
locations. Additionally, we led Global En-Route Infrastructure Steering
Committee meetings to prioritize joint military construction projects
to expand key global mobility capabilities while ensuring current
mobility infrastructure remains viable.
Protecting our Forces
Protecting our forces is key to accomplishing our global mission.
Our Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP) is fostering information
sharing among DOD, DOT, U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the COCOMs. The CIP mitigates identified risks
to our critical worldwide physical and cyber transportation
infrastructures.
Our components are improving threat protection in their mission
areas. SDDC implemented waterside barriers, improved security equipment
and optimized guard positions at our seaports. AMC continues to field
the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures system to protect mobility
aircraft from advanced manportable missiles. MSC is integrating Navy
Embarked Security Teams to secure our sealift assets. Finally, we are
working with the Joint Staff on individual protective equipment and
technological improvements in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
warfare defense capabilities.
We support all initiatives to authenticate drivers and workers in
the distribution supply chain. This year, we improved interoperability
between the Defense Biometric Identification System and TSA's
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) programs. SDDC
began issuing biometric credentials to our commercial truck drivers
holding security clearances who haul arms, ammunition, explosives and
classified items. We are also seeking TSA's approval to accept DOD
credentials in lieu of TWIC.
Improving supply chain security includes protecting our Military
Ocean Terminals. We must provide a trained and capable security force
at adequate levels to protect critical infrastructure. We continue to
work on improvements using both technical and personnel solutions. In
partnership with the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, we tested
several promising pieces of equipment that would enhance waterway
control. We are also conducting manpower surveys to adequately address
the workload concerns of our anti-terrorism and force protection
personnel.
Fiscal Stewardship
While we are focused on effectiveness in our supporting role, we
are decidedly mindful of costs and constantly look to find efficiencies
due to our stewardship of a significant portion of the Nation's
treasure. Since 2003, we avoided over $1.6 billion in costs. We
achieved the majority of these savings by shifting to less costly
transportation modes attributable to forward stocking initiatives at
Defense Distribution Center, Kuwait. We realized additional savings by
incorporating challenge protocols to validate requests for high-cost
transportation options and negotiating least-cost transportation
solutions. As a large consumer of hydrocarbons, we began using
alternative fuels. Twenty-five percent of our diesel fuel consumption
this year was bio-diesel and 11 of 12 AMC bases are now equipped to
handle and issue bio-diesel fuel. Similarly, 6 percent of our unleaded
fuel was issued as E-85, and 4 of 12 bases are equipped to manage E-85.
Maintaining Partnerships
Mutually supporting relationships are essential to the success of
any enterprise and ours is no different. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) is a critical partner in our Nation's ability to project and
sustain forces. Our legislative initiative is aimed at preserving CRAF
viability by providing a prudent amount of assured business to our
commercial airline partners, thus incentivizing them to maintain
sufficient aircraft availability to meet future DOD needs.
In addition to CRAF, the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and the
Voluntary Sealift Agreement (VISA) U.S.-flag commercial sealift
carriers remain a critical partner in our Nation's ability to project
and sustain forces by providing the Department of Defense with assured
access to commercial U.S.-flag ships as well as U.S. mariners to
support national security requirements during war or national
emergency.
Our commercial sealift partners accessed through the Universal
Services Contract (USC) are also vital to our mission. USC provides
worldwide intermodal transportation services through the DTS, and is a
cost-effective means to transport less than shipload lots of equipment
and supplies by leveraging commercial trade routes and existing
commercial capacity. Although traditionally focused on port-to-port
transportation services, efforts are underway to improve the USC by
asking our commercial sealift partners to expand service to cover the
entire end-to-end distribution process, include provisions for prime
vendor direct booking and improve claims resolution mechanisms.
In an increasingly global environment, we continue to work with our
allies to ensure smooth distribution operations. Strategic airlift
capability is increasing as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom
now have C-17s, and a consortium of NATO and Partnership for Peace
nations is planning to procure C-17 aircraft as well. The imminent
acquisition of new air refueling aircraft by a number of allies and
ongoing discussions with other countries on how to best assist in
providing and acquiring air refueling, airlift and sealift support, on
a reciprocal, reimbursable basis, bodes well for our global
distribution operations. Over the past year we have made excellent use
of international agreements by using the acquisition and cross-
servicing authorities provided by law to offer and obtain reimbursable
logistic support in more than 20 countries.
In addition, we are working to develop closer ties with other
government agencies by making them aware of the unique capabilities and
expertise we can provide through the Joint Interagency Coordination
Group (JIACG). The JIACG, now resident at each COCOM, is reaping
benefits today via close partnering with USAID, FEMA, the Department of
State and others to bring all elements of national power to bear and
incorporate lessons learned from recent events into current planning.
Looking Ahead
As the Services evolve to meet future challenges, we must work in
concert with them, anticipating their need for innovative mobility and
distribution strategies. We are continuously exploring new ways to
support future force requirements. Through our Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise Technology research and development program we
leverage emerging technologies to deliver enhanced joint warfighting
capabilities. Program successes include the JPADS-Mission Planner,
which improved airdrop delivery accuracy to isolated areas; and the
Joint Modular Intermodal Container, which enhanced unit deployment and
theater distribution. Leveraging successful prototype testing, we have
transitioned the Wireless Gate Release System to the Air Force. This
system significantly decreases the cost of airdrop operations by
doubling C-130 JPADS delivery capacity and reducing damage to
airdropped cargo bundles. This year we will provide improved
distribution modeling tools for the JDPAC, deliver a web-based
application to optimize the execution of worldwide Operational Support
Airlift, and begin development of a Lightweight Trauma Module to
improve the already superb en route care of injured personnel. Next
year we will partner with the services to pursue mesh network, tags,
and tracking technologies to enhance asset visibility and develop a
collaborative Single Load Planning Capability. We ask Congress to fully
fund DOD's modest Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Technology
program.
We continue to participate in the capabilities-based assessment of
Sea Basing, spanning the range of military operations in the 2015-2025
timeframe. The success of Sea Basing relies heavily on advances in
cargo handling, ship-to-ship cargo transfers, high-speed connectors and
sea state mitigation through sea state four.
AMC produced the Global Mobility Concept of Operations and the 2008
Air Mobility Master Plan outlining future mobility force operations to
2025. The framework centers on five operational capabilities: airlift,
air refueling, expeditionary air mobility operations, space lift and
Special Operations Forces mobility.
One of our greatest challenges lies in supporting the recently
activated USAFRICOM. With Africa significantly lacking infrastructure
to support air, land and sea transportation, we will undoubtedly
advocate for targeted infrastructure improvements. In doing so, we must
remain flexible to rapidly changing requirements while being sensitive
to the often fragile geopolitical climate that exists in many parts of
Africa.
To make sure we judiciously meet these challenges, we have
initiated a Global Access and Infrastructure Assessment (GAIA) to
examine current global access and infrastructure capabilities on a
region-by-region basis. GAIA will highlight gaps in coverage to ensure
sufficient infrastructure exists to fully support future mobility
operations. GAIA will also provide the infrastructure baseline
assessment for the next MCRS.
All these challenges require a flexible, dynamic Command Corporate
Services environment to improve the precision, reliability, and
efficiency of the entire DOD Supply Chain.
FINAL THOUGHTS
We have been entrusted with the authority to lead and transform the
DOD Distribution System and the awesome responsibility of serving the
geographic combatant commanders as they execute our Nation's most
demanding military missions. Of the future, we know only that major
conflicts will be joint and combined, involving all services and
national and international partners acting in an interdependent manner.
In this environment, we are challenged to be forward-leaning and
forward-thinking and to anticipate and meet the needs of our
warfighters across the globe. I am extremely proud of the USTRANSCOM
team and our national partners. Today, we are supporting the global war
on terrorism while providing consistent precision and velocity to
deliver combat forces and humanitarian relief in support of national
objectives. We are also good stewards of our national resources, and in
our role as the DOD DPO, we will continue to look to the future,
constantly reexamining our capabilities, forces and processes while
implementing enterprise-wide changes ever mindful of cost, value and
efficiency. With all that the Nation has placed in our trust, a promise
given by us will be a promise kept.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Thank you very much for your
testimony and also for your dedication to the service of our
country.
We will do 10-minute rounds, and I ask that the clerk let
me know when I have about a minute and a half left.
Secretary Payton, there has been a lot of interest in
Congress over the Air Force's February 29 decision to award the
tanker to Northrop Grumman. I understand that Boeing filed a
protest of the award yesterday. So, according to the bid
protest rules, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
100 days to issue the decision. That means we might not have a
GAO decision of the protest until sometime in June.
The tanker program does not fall within the jurisdiction of
this subcommittee, but I thought I would offer you an
opportunity to say anything that you are able about the award,
the process leading up to the award, or about the protest. Then
I would ask General Schwartz to do the same.
As I say, it is not directly in the jurisdiction of this
subcommittee, but there is a lot of interest in it. Perhaps you
want to? We had a briefing on this yesterday.
Ms. Payton. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. I think it is an issue that is topical.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for the
opportunity to explain the process that was followed for the
tanker competition. The process that was followed was an effort
to make sure that all the offerers understood every single
detail about the requirements and the capabilities desired by
the Air Force and by our customer, Air Mobility Command (AMC),
who defined the requirements.
The requirements were approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) in November 2006. We had several draft
Requests for Proposals (RFPs) that we coordinated with the
offerers so that we could get a thorough understanding that
they knew what was being requested in the competition. We did
put the final RFP out, after a lot of meetings, on January 30,
2007.
We continuously encouraged questions and answered every
question that came into us. We had well over 500 evaluation
notices that are well-documented because we wanted to make sure
that people really knew what we wanted, and we didn't want a
confusion at a debrief, where someone might stand up and say,
``I had no idea that this was a requirement.'' To put it very
succinctly, we did an awful lot more in this particular source
selection than in any other source selection to be open,
transparent, and fair to the offerers.
We also had a DOD Inspector General investigation in the
middle of source selection, which is very rare. The DOD came in
to make sure that we had traced all those requirements from the
JROC into the system requirements document that was part of the
RFP to make sure we hadn't dropped any requirements or added
any requirements. They did a very thorough review and found
that everything was totally in accordance with good practices.
We had the GAO come in in the middle of source selection to
take a look at our acquisition strategy. As well, they
determined that we were following all the regulations of the
Federal Acquisition Regulations and that we had a solid
process.
We had OSD send in an independent review team that
thoroughly looked at everything that was going on. Were the
people in the source selection evaluation team, as they
debriefed the people in the source selection advisory council,
were all of those factors flowing into the advisory council?
Were all of the factors that the advisory council were aware of
flowing into the SSA?
They looked at were the offerers being treated fairly as
well, and were we following all the rules and regulations and
documenting all of the findings that we had? They, too, said
that this was probably the best, most unprecedented
coordination that has ever been done, to their knowledge. The
group included the director of all defense procurement----
Senator Kennedy. This is enormously important, and I just
limited myself to 10 minutes at the start of it. So maybe you
could wrap up a little bit here?
Ms. Payton. I was just about to conclude. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Then I think I will come back to the topic
because I have some technical questions on the subject matter
which we are going to get into. But this is very interesting
and very valuable, so I don't want to suggest that it isn't.
Ms. Payton. Yes, and that was the last thing, yes, sir,
that happened. We had the DOD team that included an Army
expert, an acquisition and Navy expert, lawyers, and the person
that is the director of the defense procurement group within
OSD.
We feel very confident that sound processes were followed,
that our motives were pure throughout the entire process, and
that we had no fear and no favor from anyone in this process.
We did what was right for providing best value to our
warfighter and the taxpayer. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. Good. Let me go on, General Schwartz, to
some of the important matters that I think we hopefully will be
able to address. One, last November, you responded to a letter
from Chairman Levin asking your personal and professional
opinion about how many C-17 aircraft to buy, if any, beyond the
190 aircraft that were planned.
If I can paraphrase your response, you said that given the
uncertainty about the C-5A modernization program, you couldn't
recommend terminating the C-17 production at this time. You
went on to say that you thought 205 C-17 and 111 C-5s is the
correct fleet mix for the future.
Without objection, the two letters will be made part of the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Kennedy. So, General Schwartz, now the Under
Secretary has certified the C-5 RERP to continue, at
least for the C-5B. Does the mix now of 205 C-17s and 111 C-
5As still represent your personal and professional view of the
fleet needed to meet your requirements?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, it does.
Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, Secretary Young's Nunn-
McCurdy certification of the C-5 RERP upgrade indicated several
actions that were planned, including providing the Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) upgrading for all 111 C-5s and
requiring the Air Force institute performance-based logistics
and lean Six Sigma process improvements to the maintenance
activity for all 111 C-5 aircraft be improved capability and
lower operating cost.
Is there funding in the budget and the Future Years Defense
Program to complete the AMP and improve logistics for the C-5s?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, I understand that is the
case. Ms. Payton can confirm that. But of course, it is
important to perform the avionics modernization on the
airplanes that do not receive the full-up reliability
improvement in order to assure that the aircraft can access
controlled airspace of the future. That is essential and is
also required for safety of flight reasons.
But as I understand it, sir, both programs now are properly
funded.
Senator Kennedy. How will the AMC respond to these
directions for improving logistic support for the C-5?
General Schwartz. Sir, there is an effort underway in the
AMC. It is consistent with a larger Air Force program called
AFSO21, which is essentially lean in the Air Force. It is clear
that there is a place for improvement, probably in maintenance
of all of our airplanes, but certainly true in the C-5 and in
the spare parts inventory and so on.
But I remain convinced, Mr. Chairman, that the C-5
reliability improvement program will make a very substantial
difference, in the reliability of the airplane--for example, we
currently schedule two airplanes to make one. That is just the
reality. That will be less the case in the future. Importantly,
the improved airplane will also perform much better, carry
more, fly higher, use less gas, exactly the kinds of things
operators treasure.
Senator Kennedy. I am going to include John Young's letter
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Kennedy. On page 2 of that, he goes into talking
about the importance of retention and operation, C-5A are
required, the AMPs, and the next paragraph, the logistical
aspects, which you have referred to.
Secretary Payton, the DOD-approved cost estimate of the C-5
RERP has shown that there was, indeed, a breach of the Nunn-
McCurdy threshold for the C-5 RERP modernization. The Cost
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), which produced that approved
estimate derived a constant-dollar cost estimate of
acquisition, unit cost of $92 million, $92.4 million versus
$60.5 million originally estimated.
While this increase was unfortunate, the estimate only
reflects half the increase that the Air Force derived, as the
service cost position reporting the Nunn-McCurdy violation in
the first place. Can you explain why the Air Force estimate was
so much higher than the CAIG?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. In trying to get affordability and
cost growth under control and inheriting many programs that
were costed at a 50 or 40 or 30 percent confidence level to
begin with, I have set the stage so that the person who
inherits the job after me will get programs that are costed at
a higher level of confidence.
If 10 things can go wrong on a program and you only have
enough money to fix 4 of them, i.e., you would be at a 40
percent confidence level in your amount of money allocated,
that puts our acquisition workforce in a terrible situation. So
I have indicated that an 80 percent to 90 percent confidence
level should be the funding level for our program, so that our
acquisition people do have enough money in order to pay for
things when things go wrong that you weren't counting on.
So the reason our Air Force cost estimate was higher is
because they calculated it at an 80 percent confidence level,
having a few more engineers, having a little bit more time in
the schedule in case things go wrong, rather than at a 50
percent confidence level, which is what the OSD CAIG calculates
cost at.
Senator Kennedy. That is an interesting concept and one
which I can see has value if it is constantly used. Of course,
there was at least an argument made that the estimate by the
Air Force was so prohibitively high that it is sure to
terminate the whole program. Therefore, when they came back in
at the lower cost, which is the real cost, they found that it
made sense in terms of the value of the program.
So I think we want to find out it is important in terms of
accounting, but also what the impact is going to be, just as we
want to make sure that we are going to have truth in accounting
in terms of it and consistency in the accounting. When I heard
those figures that are going out and said that is the end of
the program, and most other people thought it was the end of
the program, and then we heard there were some in the Air Force
who wanted the end of the program, this is a pretty easy way to
end it.
Then we found out that the costs were not really related,
were double what were the real costs on it. So it raised some
serious questions, and I think you have given us an
explanation.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. I have had other programs that have
come before me, and I have insisted on an 80 percent confidence
level so that acquisition doesn't get cost overruns. We
estimate them so low, and all of a sudden, they are 30 percent
overrun when, in fact, they were not funded properly to begin
with.
So I am trying to set the stage for my successors for all
programs.
Senator Kennedy. This is for all programs, right?
Ms. Payton. For all programs, sir. For all programs I have
a memo and guidance out that we will no longer lowball these
programs. They must be funded properly so our acquisition
workforce has a fighting chance to maintain its integrity and
to deliver on time and on cost.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up, but I would be interested
what the results are. At 80 percent, do you have a consistent
fact that you are missing the target because you are using at
80 percent versus if you had used, what, the 50 percent? I am
not an accountant, and I don't know.
Ms. Payton. I would be glad to follow up with you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Of the 35 acquisition category 1, non-space programs, 9 are funded
in the 80-90 percent confidence level. The remaining programs either do
not have a specific confidence level assigned to the cost estimate, are
funded at the 50 percent confidence level per the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group, or were baselined
before the SAF/AQ guidance.
Senator Kennedy. But with that, there is going to be some
issues in terms of the merits of a particular kind of system.
It would be interesting for us to know, using the higher
figure, the accuracy of that.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. The C-5 program, to begin with, was
under estimated. We baselined it way, way too early before we
had any data. We do this in a very poor manner, and so we came
up with a number, ``I think it will be about this.'' We
breached Nunn-McCurdy because I think we baselined it way too
low to begin with.
So I am trying to put some discipline in the process. We
have great cost estimators, but we always pick the low number.
We should start picking a higher number so that we can give our
acquisition people a fighting chance to be successful.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You spoke eloquently, I think, about the process on the KC-
45A, and I had the benefit of also, Secretary Payton, hearing
you yesterday. I want to just commend you for the very even-
handed way that you have made your presentation in both
instances.
Ms. Payton. Thank you.
Senator Martinez. As someone who does not have a direct
stake in the outcome, I must say that it sounds like a process
that, well, obviously, the protest is undergoing. So I
shouldn't comment on it. But it just does seem like you are
providing the kind of information that is helpful to us.
General Schwartz, on that same subject, if I could ask,
could you describe for us, you had determined this to be the
top priority of your command, the tanker fleet. They currently
fly out of MacDill Air Force Base in my backyard in Tampa. I
was just wondering if you could speak to us about the
importance of the KC-45's passenger and cargo capability and
what it will do for your airlift mission? Also, does this
capability add to your ability to operate at greater capacity
and greater efficiency?
General Schwartz. Certainly, sir. I think it is important
to recognize that while other countries have modest
capabilities in this area now--France, Italy, Japan, the U.K.,
so on--we have a unique capability to project American military
power that the tankers give us.
It allows us to establish the air bridge through which we
move airlift aircraft, pack passengers, and cargo. It allows us
to put fighter aircraft and bomber aircraft into an area of
responsibility (AOR) to perform missions as required. Likewise,
it supports the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capability of the Armed Forces with air-breathing sensors. It
is a fundamental and almost a uniquely American capability.
The dilemma is, is that 500 of our 550 or so airplanes are
aging. They were manufactured not long after I was born. While
we have modified and improved the KC-135 over the years, we
need a successor platform. We made the case, which was
validated by the JROC, that in today's environment what we
needed was an airplane that certainly could do the refueling
mission, but needed to offer more versatility than just to do
refueling.
Throughout the Armed Forces, sir, single-point platforms,
single-mission platforms, are not necessarily the best
solution. You want to have versatility. Doors, floors, and
defensive systems in a tanker-type airplane provide that type
of versatility so that you can carry passengers. You can carry
cargo. You can air refuel on the same sortie, and you can
position the airplane in threat airspace that at the moment we
very carefully manage with regard to the KC-135 and the KC-10.
The bottom line is, sir, we need an airplane of the 2000s,
not of the 1950s. That is exactly, it appears to me, what the
Air Force has selected.
Senator Martinez. Tell me, General Schwartz, about this
very sensitive mission that you spoke of, which is transferring
of injured service men and women from the theater to critical
care facilities, which I know you place a great deal of
importance on that. Can you tell us and give us an update
regarding your continued efforts to improve this vital mission,
and let us know also of any further support that Congress might
provide you in this vital area?
General Schwartz. This is a mission which is a moral
imperative. We have a contract, Senator, with our kids, and
that is if they get banged up on the battlefield that we will
leave no stone unturned to return them to the best medical care
on the planet.
I honestly believe that we and part of what we do
underwrites the All-Volunteer Force because if the kids stop
believing that, they will stop volunteering. So, our capacity
to do this has just multiplied because of modern aircraft.
In the old days, when we had C-141s and KC-135s and so on,
these were adequate. But they were not designed with good
power, good lighting, or good environmentals--temperature
control, pressurization, and so on. Modern airplanes do that,
like the C-17, to a T. So if we put a superb medical crew in
the back, they actually have an intensive care unit that is as
good as anything on terra firma. We have fortunately in the
last 2\1/2\ years only lost one troop that passed away while
returning from the CENTCOM AOR, returning to the United States.
It is a tribute, sir, to both the aircrews in the
airplanes, the equipment on the birds, and, most importantly,
the medical teams that provide that care. That capability is
embedded in the KC-45 requirement. There is no doubt in my mind
that we will use that airplane to perform that function, and it
will do it exceedingly well. Profoundly important mission.
Senator Martinez. Let me ask both of you if you could
comment on the working relationship with our commercial
transportation partners and supporting labor organizations that
allows you to do your mission and to supplement your mission. I
am speaking of CRAF specifically.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir. If I may, Madam Secretary?
Ms. Payton. Please.
General Schwartz. The United States Government, sir, can
never own all of the assets it would need in a major surge. Our
secret weapon, frankly, at the TRANSCOM is this capacity to
blend both organic U.S. Government-owned resources and
commercial resources to best effect. This happens both in the
airlift and the sealift communities.
Let me start with the sealift first. It is important to
recognize, sir, that all of our sealift assets, even those that
are owned by the Navy and those that are owned by the Maritime
Administration, are operated by U.S. Merchant Mariners,
civilian U.S. Merchant Mariners. In my opinion, that is the
fifth Service. They are dedicated, patriotic Americans, and
they do a terrific job.
The same thing is true on the airlift side, where roughly
95 percent of the passengers that we move--and we move a lot--
we have moved 5 million passengers since September 11--moves on
commercial platforms. Roughly 40 percent of the cargo that we
move moves on commercial platforms, and so that is very
important. The way we get access to these platforms is through
the CRAF. Once again, those are crewed by American civilian
aviators.
So, it is vitally important, sir, preserving those two
capabilities and structuring the incentives that allow American
industry to support the Government when we need to surge is
something that I think is very important for the future.
I just would close, sir, by commenting that one of the
things that you hold me accountable for is maintaining the
balance between the organic fleet and the commercial
capability. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I caution
about overbuilding the organic fleet because if that occurs, it
competes in peacetime with that preference cargo, the
incentives that we offer our commercial partners. So that is
one of the reasons that I believe 205 is the right number of C-
17s.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Martinez. While you are on that subject, would you
also comment on the recapitalization needs that you might be
seeing in terms of our seagoing lift assets?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir. We are in a period at the
moment where there is not a need to initiate a new sealift
program. You may recall, sir, that both in the immediate
aftermath to the first Gulf War, there was a considerable
investment made by Congress in sealift capability. Those
platforms will remain viable through about 2020.
So we won't have to seriously consider successor platforms
until program year 2012, the 2012 program. We are a couple of
years out from that. But at that point, 2 years from now, it
will be time for us to think about the recapitalization of the
fast sealift ships.
You may recall those were the old SEALAND ships, the high-
speed SL-7s that DOD bought and converted, and they will go out
to about 60 years. At that point, it will be time to replace
them.
Senator Martinez. My time has expired. Thank you both very
much.
General Schwartz. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Navy recently awarded contracts for the joint high-
speed vessel. What role do you expect them to play, when will a
lead contractor be decided, when do you expect them to enter
into the fleet, and how many?
General Schwartz. Sir, I will have to do this for the
record in terms of when they will be delivered. I don't have
that off the top of my head. However, the last program summary
I saw was that there were going to be three Navy and five Army
platforms. This is an important capability, and the reason is,
is because not everything has to fly.
If you can move units, coherent units on a surface
platform, which is what the high-speed vessel will allow us to
do is to move a Marine company, for example, very effectively
over, say, distances from in the western Pacific from Okinawa
to Korea, or similar arrangements in the Gulf. These are
excellent platforms, again, for moving coherent units where you
have port capability.
It is an important initiative. It is one which the regional
commanders who I support certainly endorse--U.S. Pacific
Command and CENTCOM, in particular. The first increment of
that, I am quite certain, will be eight platforms. I will give
you the delivery schedule for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Sessions. All right. Secretary Payton, with regard
to the tanker and the procedures that were utilized, there were
lease arrangements which fell apart and much embarrassment over
that. Congress, as part of our response and mandate to DOD,
required that this contract be bid, did it not?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. When Congress required that, issues such
as components, labor requirements, or other issues in existence
at the time that Congress had originally passed, were the
standards that you had to follow when you executed the
contract.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. So some Members of Congress that are
complaining to you about how you conducted the process forget
we set up the process of how bids should be conducted, and then
we directed the Air Force to bid this contract, and do you feel
like you followed those requirements?
Ms. Payton. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. Are you satisfied that the aircraft
chosen will be a superior product for the military personnel
who will use them?
Ms. Payton. No doubt. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Schwartz, would you comment on
that?
General Schwartz. Sir, I am content with the selection
process.
Senator Sessions. Will the aircraft today, General
Schwartz, the aircraft that has been selected, how does it
compare to the existing aircraft? Do you get savings and
benefits from having this more modern aircraft in addition to
just eliminating a fleet that is getting more and more costly?
General Schwartz. Senator Sessions, I think the short
answer is this: the 707 was a magnificent machine in its day,
and it was designed to fly once every 3 days. Airplanes today,
particularly commercial variants, are designed to fly three
times a day. That kind of utility, that kind of productivity,
will change the way we do business.
That is really the thing that is exciting. The versatility
that is inherent in the airframe to both refuel and to lift and
to do it with a modicum of self-protection is a game changer,
in my view.
Senator Sessions. With regard to your comments about lift
and the commercial sector, the Army Reserve unit I used to be a
member of for 10 years--I was a part of the Military Sealift
Command, and we contemplated and had leases with ships, and in
a crisis, we didn't expect that we would have enough military
ships to lift everything that we needed, but we had a priority
lease with regard to those shipping companies that they would
immediately bring their ships to the service of the country for
whatever needs we might have, along with their crews.
First of all, is that essentially what you are doing with
the Air Force, and is that a big cost saver?
General Schwartz. That is essentially the process that we
have both on the airlift and the sealift side. Clearly, if the
U.S. Government owned the assets and the networks that we take
the commercial networks out there that we take advantage of,
some have estimated that the cost of it would be $50 billion.
Senator Sessions. In extra cost if you tried to maintain
that as a force?
General Schwartz. Exactly. Exactly. The truth, this is a
particularly advantageous arrangement where, for a relatively
modest incentive, we are assured that both our airline partners
and our sealift partners will present their vessels or their
aircraft typically within 48 hours, a little bit longer for the
sealift folks depending on where their ships are, and support
America's business.
Senator Sessions. I think striking that right balance,
people might disagree where it is. But I absolutely agree it is
just not feasible for us to maintain all these ships sitting
with no real mission, and then for a certain number of months,
they might all be used. It makes more sense to have the kind of
contracts in place that allows you to call up commercial
aircraft that are well-maintained and can be utilized
immediately.
With regard to I think you mentioned, there is considerably
more cargo and considerably more personnel lift capability in
these new tanker aircraft. Mr. Chairman, the fuel--you probably
know, but I didn't until some time ago--is just in the wings.
The main cargo area is open for personnel and any cargo. So you
get a considerably amount more of cargo and personnel lift
capability with this?
General Schwartz. We certainly do, and that is not a
trivial matter.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Payton, do you know the details
of the numbers on that offhand?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir, I do. I think relative to the
winner--the successful offer and the unsuccessful offer, I
can't really give those particular numbers out at this time.
This was a tanker first. It has incredible offload capacity
at 1,000 nautical miles and 2,000 nautical miles. So from a
tanker perspective, it will take many less tankers to refuel
many more receivers and to stay in the air for a much longer
time.
Relative to passengers, hundreds of more passengers can be
carried. Aeromedical evacuation as well is hugely improved with
either one of these tankers. So it is a great multi-mission
aircraft, but tanking is job one.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, and I know it remains the Air
Force's number-one priority for recapitalization. You mentioned
multi-point refueling. What does that mean, Secretary Payton or
General Schwartz?
Ms. Payton. Do you want to take that?
General Schwartz. I would be happy to. In other words, this
airplane will be able to refuel both from the boom for those
typically Air Force aircraft that have a boom and receptacle
sort of refueling arrangement. Or at the same time, there will
be wing pods, which allow refueling what we call probe and
basket. Typically, the United States Navy uses that. So the
baskets come back out of the pods and the Navy aircraft can
refuel.
So you can refuel both off the pods and the boom
simultaneously.
Ms. Payton. As well with our coalition partners who
typically use the drogue or the basket side of it, yes.
General Schwartz. Right.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. I have just a final
couple of questions.
Secretary Payton, what is the status of those negotiations
for buying any C-17 beyond the 180 aircraft in the original Air
Force program?
Ms. Payton. From an acquisition point of view, we have no
requirements to procure any additional C-17s. I do understand
that some have been put in the supplemental. So a request went
in in the supplemental.
The requirement side of the world is handled by the uniform
service relative to operations and readiness, and once those
requirements are approved and funded, then the acquisition
workforce kicks into work. But at this point, relative to
acquisition, I have no new requirements to procure any more C-
17s.
Senator Kennedy. If there are, are you including
negotiation of options for buying some number of C-17 with the
final appropriations in 2008?
Ms. Payton. No.
Senator Kennedy. If not, would you be conducting all new
negotiations for any 2008 aircraft?
Ms. Payton. No, sir. We don't have any negotiations in work
for C-17s. As a matter of fact, a primary concern right now is
that factory and the amount of money it costs to close it down.
So if we are not going to buy more, then we need to figure out
how to fund the closedown of it. If we are, then we won't know
that until the supplemental is approved later this year, I
understand.
Senator Kennedy. The point I am getting to is whether you
consider any of these options in terms of negotiating for
expansion of C-17s?
Ms. Payton. I believe we have been provided unsolicited
proposals. But at this time, we are not looking at those
because we have no money, and it would violate the law to try
to do something without any money.
Senator Kennedy. Let me ask you, General Schwartz, just to
conceptually and just briefly with the looking down the road in
terms of national security and defense and where we are, where
we are going to be, how do you see the expansion of the
Services, which are being looked at, all the different types
and changes, how do you consider those potential changes as you
are planning now in terms of the future?
General Schwartz. There are a number of matters out there
that do need to be factored into what is the right fleet size
and mix. Some of those factors include, at the moment, changes
related to the size in the ground forces, both the Marine Corps
and the Army. Some of that relates to the equipment, which
needs to be transported. This tends to grow over time. It
rarely gets smaller.
Likewise, the plans that the combatant commanders have to
employ the force influence how quickly one must close the
force. Every several years, we do what we call a mobility
study, sometimes called a capability study, sometimes called a
requirements study. This time, upcoming, sir, it will be both.
The so-called mobility, capability, and requirement study
(MCRS) 2008 will look at all of these factors to offer the best
assessment on what is the right size of the force and what is
the best fleet mix. Now, there is another study underway as
well, directed by Congress, known at least in our lingo as
McCaskill-Tauscher, which is due in January 2009. The Institute
for Defense Analyses is going to do that one.
The DOD study, which we are a full partner in, MCRS, will
be due later in 2009. We are working hard to synchronize those
two efforts so that they don't get disconnected.
One final comment, sir. You asked me earlier about 205
C17s. A key factor in 205 is this question about the growth in
the ground forces. I believe that the growth in the ground
forces is not to provide the country with a capability to surge
more brigades in a short period of time. In other words, say,
for the sake of argument, our current plan is 20 brigades, that
the additional brigade equivalents that will come onboard are
not there to take it to 25, but rather to reduce the tempo on
the ground forces that, in some cases, are pulling 15-month
tours now or longer, or 7 months for the Marine Corps or maybe
a little longer--to reduce that tempo.
I think that is the case. The studies will reconfirm that
is, in fact, what the Department intends. But that is certainly
my understanding of where we are at and is why I remain
confident that 205 is the right number.
Senator Kennedy. I want to thank you very much. We might
have some questions for the record from the other members who
weren't here.
General Schwartz. Understood, sir.
Senator Kennedy. We're very grateful, and we appreciate and
we applaud you. We weren't always in this kind of circumstance
in terms of airlift in recent years.
General Schwartz. Right.
Senator Kennedy. So you deserve very considerable credit to
get us up to the shape that we are in, and we are very
impressed with it. Thank you very much.
General Schwartz. To you, sir, and Congress, who enabled us
to do it.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. The subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
C-5A AIRCRAFT READINESS
1. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, Secretary Young's Nunn-
McCurdy certification of the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-
engining Program (RERP) upgrade indicated several actions that were
planned, including providing the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP),
upgrade to all 111 C-5s, and requiring that the Air Force institute
performance-based logistics and Lean Six Sigma process improvements to
the maintenance activities for all 111 C-5 aircraft to improve
capability and lower operating costs. Is there funding in the budget
and the Future Years Defense Program to complete the AMP and improve
logistics support for the C-5 fleet?
General Schwartz. The current budget funds the AMP modification for
the remaining fleet. Additionally, reliability will be improved through
the RERP effort on the B models and through a change in the logistics
philosophy used on the entire fleet. The C-5 is moving from a ``fly-to-
fail'' system to a scheduled inspection and maintenance program,
similar to the commercial world. These programs are also funded in the
current budget.
2. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, how will the Air Mobility
Command respond to these directions for improving logistics support for
the C-5 fleet?
General Schwartz. The Air Mobility Command efforts to improve
logistics support for the C-5 fleet include Aircraft Availability
Improvement Programs such as Maintenance Steering Group (MSG-3) and the
C-5 Regionalized Isochronal Inspection program (C-5 RISO). MSG-3 is an
inspection philosophy that alters the traditional fly-to-fail approach
to maintenance. At the same time, it moves the C-5 community to a more
proactive condition-based approach to aircraft maintenance. The RISO
reduces the number of inspection facilities across the country and the
subsequent manpower associated with these facilities. Additionally, it
minimizes simultaneous inspections and maximizes inspection
proficiency. Together, these programs will improve overall reliability
and make additional aircraft available to the warfighter.
STATUS OF THE C-17A PRODUCTION
3. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Payton, Congress added 10 aircraft to
the budget request in fiscal year 2007 and has authorized 8 aircraft in
fiscal year 2008. Congress has not yet acted on the final Department of
Defense (DOD) supplemental appropriations for 2008. What is the status
of the negotiations for buying any C-17 aircraft with the fiscal year
2007 funds?
Ms. Payton. An Undefinitized Contractual Action was issued December
18, 2006, for the 10 additional aircraft so the contractor could begin
work. The first aircraft is scheduled to deliver in November 2008 and
the last will deliver in July 2009. The Air Force is in preliminary
stages of negotiations, with contract definitization anticipated in
July 2008.
4. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Payton, are you including negotiation
of options for buying some number of C-17 aircraft with the final
appropriations for 2008? If not, would you be conducting all new
negotiations for any 2008 aircraft?
Ms. Payton. We have not included any options for C-17 aircraft
identified in the fiscal year 2008 appropriations. Boeing would be
required to submit a new certified proposal for 2008 aircraft.
C-5 RERP COST ESTIMATING
5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Payton, the DOD-approved cost
estimate of the C-5 RERP showed that there was indeed a breach of the
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds for the C-5 RERP modernization. The Cost
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), which produced that approved
estimate, derived a constant dollar cost estimate of acquisition unit
cost of $92.4 million, versus the $60.5 million originally estimated.
While this increase was unfortunate, this estimate only reflects half
the increase that the Air Force derived as the service cost position in
reporting the Nunn-McCurdy violation in the first place. During the
hearing, you said that the primary reason for this was that you were
funding the program to the 80-90 percent confidence level, and that
this is now standard practice for major Air Force acquisition programs.
Could you provide the committee a list of all Air Force major
acquisition programs and identify the confidence level assumed in
building the cost estimates for the current program?
Ms. Payton. Of the 33 acquisition category 1, non-space programs, 9
are funded in the 80-90 percent confidence level. The remaining
programs either do not have a specific confidence level assigned to the
cost estimate, are funded at the 50 percent confidence level per the
Office of the Secretary of Defense CAIG, or were baselined before the
SAF/AQ guidance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
ONGOING MOBILITY OPERATIONS
6. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) has been central to virtually every major U.S. global
operation, providing persistent support to the regional commanders.
Mission requirements have been highly varied--supporting forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan, providing humanitarian relief, moving patients
worldwide to provide critical care; all while supporting steady state
global operations. How would you assess the current readiness of the
mobility fleet of aircraft and ships, and that of the men and women
operating this fleet, given the operational tempo of these ongoing
operations?
General Schwartz. [Deleted.]
7. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, how does your strategic
airlift requirement address and account for the stand-up of U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) and the Grow the Force initiative?
General Schwartz. The strategic airlift requirement is based upon
comprehensive analysis of all the major airlift missions required to
support the National Military Strategy. The 2005 Mobility Capability
Study provides the most recent analysis but did not include the recent
stand-up of the U.S. AFRICOM and the Grow the Force initiative. The
congressionally-directed Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis and the Department
of Defense Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study, to be
completed in January and May 2009 respectively, will consider a number
of emerging operational issues, to include future AFRICOM needs and the
Grow the Force initiative requirements.
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND PROGRAM PRIORITIES
8. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, there are a number of major
programs--ongoing and future--which comprise TRANSCOM's end-to-end lift
capability. C-17 production, C-5 modernization, tanker fleet
recapitalization, C-130 modernization, and Joint Cargo Aircraft are
primary examples. To some extent, the capabilities provided by these
programs overlap. Strategic lift aircraft, for example, are performing
tactical lift. Likewise, the future Joint Cargo Aircraft may take
pressure off of tactical airlift requirements. Meanwhile, you've
expressed the importance that the future tanker be capable of cargo and
passenger lift. While this reflects smart management of limited
resources, these programs are also competing with each other for
procurement funding. Could you please outline your program priorities
as they pertain to ensuring balanced capability across the full
spectrum of lift requirements?
General Schwartz. Rapid global mobility is essential to the
effectiveness of the future force and I am comfortable that the current
funding levels in the President's budget adequately address these
mobility priorities with manageable risk.
With that in mind, my top mobility priority of recapitalization of
our aging tanker fleet is funded at the Program of Record. Continued
funding support and minimizing delays in the KC-X program is critical
to the TRANSCOM mission. Additionally, legacy mobility platforms must
remain funded at the requested levels in the President's budget. Any
reductions in programmed funding for the C-5 AMP and RERP or C-130 AMP
and center wing box translate into additional risk. While I support the
programmed fleet of 190 C-17s, in conjunction with the modernization of
a portion of the C-5 fleet, I would favor a modest increase in the C-17
programmed fleet from 190 to 205 aircraft. Finally, LAIRCM installation
on the C-37/C-40 fleet must remain fully funded as requested in the
President's budget. LAIRCM equipped C-37/C-40s will free up C-130s and
C-17s currently tied to missions requiring defensive systems.
9. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, recognizing that we are
always bound by fiscal constraints, are you satisfied that this year's
budget request adequately addresses these priorities?
General Schwartz. Rapid global mobility is essential to the
effectiveness of the future force and I am comfortable that the current
funding levels in the President's budget adequately address these
mobility priorities with manageable risk.
With that in mind, my top mobility priority of recapitalization of
our aging tanker fleet is funded at the Program of Record. Continued
funding support and minimizing delays in the KC-X program is critical
to the TRANSCOM mission. Additionally, legacy mobility platforms must
remain funded at the requested levels in the President's budget. Any
reductions in programmed funding for the C-5 AMP and RERP or C-130 AMP
and center wing box translate into additional risk. While I support the
programmed fleet of 190 C-17s, in conjunction with the modernization of
a portion of the C-5 fleet, I would favor a modest increase in the C-17
programmed fleet from 190 to 205 aircraft. Finally, LAIRCM installation
on the C-37/C-40 fleet must remain fully funded as requested in the
President's budget. LAIRCM equipped C-37/C-40s will free up C-130s and
C-17s currently tied to missions requiring defensive systems.
C-5 RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT RE-ENGINING PROGRAM
10. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton and General Schwartz, the
Under Secretary of Defense recently completed his review of the C-5
RERP in conjunction with the program's Nunn-McCurdy cost breach; and he
certified that the most cost-effective way to meet your strategic
airlift requirements is to re-engine the 51 C-5B and C-5C
aircraft, only. He also reviewed options for procuring
additional C-17 aircraft and rejected those options as not meeting
requirements and more costly to the taxpayer; ultimately concluding
that procurement of additional C-17 aircraft was not affordable. Do you
agree with the course the Under Secretary has set for strategic airlift
programs, particularly in view of the priority placed on the tanker
program within the TRANSCOM portfolio?
Ms. Payton. I support the Department's decision as outlined in the
C-5 Nunn-McCurdy certification.
General Schwartz. Based on current analysis, the Under Secretary is
pursuing a prudent acquisition approach in accordance with the
President's budget. As always, we must reassess our strategy if and
when future studies indicate a need for change.
11. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, in response to
questions regarding C-17 aircraft on the Unfunded Priority List, the
Air Force has indicated that the C-17 acquisition objective has been
increased to 248 aircraft--an increase of 58 above current program and
43 above your sweet spot. What impact would this increase to your C-17
fleet have on your ability to manage a balanced airlift force,
including your Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) partners, in a cost
effective manner?
General Schwartz. A fleet of 248 C-17s assumes the retirement of
all 59 C-5As and one-for-one replacement by C-17s to the C-5A units.
All C-5A units are assigned to the Guard or Reserve. The C-17s would
fly the same number of hours as the C-5s they replace. As a result,
expanding the C-17 fleet to 248 and retiring the C-5As would have no
effect on our CRAF partners.
12. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton, I understand that
three re-engined C-5 aircraft are currently conducting flight testing.
Could you provide your assessment of the performance of these re-
engined aircraft in meeting their reliability objectives?
Ms. Payton. As of April 7, 2008, the three SDD aircraft have
successfully completed a total of 276 flights while accumulating
approximately 840 hours flight time. Overall, the flight test program
has executed over 76 percent of ground and flight specification test
points. Both Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company and Air Force
Developmental Test Organization reliability performance tracking
efforts indicate the three modified C-5M aircraft are meeting
reliability requirements and are, in fact, exceeding requirements in
several areas. Our assessment of the most recent data, as reported by
the Air Force Developmental Test Organization, indicates that
reliability and maintainability specifications will be met. The C-5M
propulsion system, the cornerstone of C-5 RERP accounting for 54
percent of the expected Mission Capable Rate (MCR) improvement, is
exhibiting exceptional reliability performance during flight testing as
shown on the attached chart.
13. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton, if the three re-engined C-5
aircraft that are currently undergoing flight testing are not meeting
their objectives, what would you attribute the cause for this shortfall
and what actions are underway to correct it?
Ms. Payton. Our assessment of the most recent data, as reported by
the Air Force Developmental Test Organization, indicates that
reliability and maintainability requirements will be met.
14. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton, the prime contractor for
the C-5 aircraft proposed to mitigate cost growth through long-term
purchase agreements with his vendors and not-to-exceed (NTE) pricing
with the Air Force. Could you provide an update on your current
acquisition strategy for this program, and your progress in completing
negotiations for the contract?
Ms. Payton. Our contract now establishes NTE prices for the 49
aircraft to be modified to the RERP configuration over 7 lots. We have
negotiated fixed prices for Lots 1 through 3 and expect to be on
contract by 30 April with these prices. The prices will be subject to
economic price adjustment for unusual economic impacts on only the
propulsion system and the pylons.
Prices for Lots 4 through 7 will be negotiated as fixed prices
prior to funding of each option. We continue to pursue cost-reduction
initiatives for all lots.
The fixed prices and the NTE prices are based on a buy profile of 1
in fiscal year 2008, 3 in fiscal year 2009, 5 in fiscal year 2010, 7 in
fiscal year 2011, 11 in fiscal year 2012, 11 in fiscal year 2013, and
11 in fiscal year 2014. The Air Force is committed to funding for this
buy profile.
15. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton, what structure and
incentives are you incorporating to improve upon the C-5 aircraft
program cost estimates?
Ms. Payton. Fixed prices, subject to adjustment for unusual
economic fluctuation, have been negotiated for Lots 1 through 3. Fixed-
price arrangements provide maximum incentive on a contractor to reduce
costs in order to maximize profit within the negotiated price.
Our contract also establishes NTE prices for Lots 4 through 7.
These prices will be negotiated prior to award/funding of the options
for each lot. The contractor is encouraged within this NTE structure to
reduce costs; future profit negotiations will consider whether the Air
Force significantly benefits from the contractor's efforts to reduce
cost or improve schedule or performance.
We will work with the contractor and with the Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA) to closely track actual costs during
production. For example, we are requiring Earned Value Management
reporting. We are also working with DCMA and the contractor to improve
the company's estimating system. All of this information will
facilitate negotiation of fair and reasonable prices for Lots 4 through
7.
16. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton, understanding that a
significant percentage of the C-5 aircraft program's cost growth is
associated with government costs, what specific measures are you taking
to curb this cost growth on the program, and how would you judge the
likely effectiveness of these measures?
Ms. Payton. Two factors caused C-5 RERP production cost growth
associated with Other Government Costs (OGC): (1) underestimation at
Milestone B of required Government Furnished Equipment (GFE); and (2)
growth in Engineering Change Orders (ECO) and Mission Support costs,
which were calculated by applying a factor to the increased total
contract cost.
Completion of the C-5 RERP modification on the three SDD aircraft
enabled a more complete understanding of the GFE required for
Production, both in terms or actual items required and cost. Using this
actual data, which was lacking at Milestone B, is a more effective way
to develop program cost.
KC-45 TANKER AIR LIFT CAPABILITY
17. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, a discriminating
requirement for the KC-45 tanker is the ability of the aircraft to be
alternatively employed as an airlifter for passenger and cargo
transport. The KC-45 lift capability was not included in the analysis
for the Mobility Capabilities Study. However, this capability should
significantly reduce your risk in meeting requirements in support of
major combat operations. Are you able to quantify the magnitude of this
lift contribution in terms of either million ton miles per day or C-17
equivalents?
General Schwartz. During the first weeks of wartime surge
operations (periods of peak demand for both airlift and aerial
refueling), the KC-45 is dedicated for use in its primary role as a
tanker supporting deployment and employment operations. Million Ton-
Miles per Day (MTM/D) is a wartime surge metric. The AMC does not plan
to credit any MTM/D contributions from the KC-45 to the wartime surge
equation; a policy consistent with the way we evaluate KC-10
performance today. However, AMC will use the KC-45s to meet airlift
demands for CRAF transload of passengers and bulk cargo when the CRAF
cannot operate in threatened environments. During periods of reduced
aerial refueling demand, the KC-45 can also contribute effectively to
organic delivery of passengers and cargo to locations and environments
not served by commercial industry. The KC-45 lift capacity was not
included in analysis for the MCS nor will it be included in our current
MCRS analysis since those studies are in the 2012 to 2017 timeframe and
the KC-45 will not reach FOC. Finally, it is inappropriate to equate
KC-45 with C-17 capability. The KC-45 is not designed to carry the
oversize and outsize equipment delivered by C-17s or access the austere
environments visited by C-17s.
CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
18. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton and General Schwartz, the
DOD has submitted a legislative proposal to guarantee that a proper
amount of assured business for CRAF partners will be available in the
future. Would you please explain the importance of having U.S.-flagged
commercial airline capability to carry outsize cargo within the CRAF
program, and then, the importance of your proposed assured business
model to the health of the CRAF program?
Ms. Payton. I defer this question to General Schwartz because U.S.
TRANSCOM manages the CRAF contract with commercial air carriers.
General Schwartz. A U.S-flag commercial airline outsize cargo
capability is not something we currently require in the CRAF as this
need is met by our C-5 and C-17 fleet.
We believe the assured business proposal is an integral part of the
strategy to ensure the continuing viability of the CRAF program when
DOD movement requirements return to pre-September 11 levels. The
Department has a study underway to determine what other incentives or
alternative organizing principles are needed to assure the CRAF program
remains attractive to U.S. air carriers. I do, however, believe that
the assured business concept will be a key part of the Department's
business relationships with our CRAF partners.
19. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton and General Schwartz, has
there been a trend away from medium-sized air cargo carriers that would
jeopardize these partners' participation in CRAF?
Ms. Payton. I defer this question to General Schwartz because U.S.
TRANSCOM manages the CRAF contract with commercial air carriers.
General Schwartz. There is no trend by the TRANSCOM to move away
from medium-sized air cargo carriers. Both large- and medium-sized
cargo carriers make essential contributions to the Defense
Transportation System (DTS).
20. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton and General Schwartz, as the
global defense landscape changes and we bring units back from overseas
to the United States, how does that affect the business relationship
with our CRAF partners?
Ms. Payton. I defer this question to General Schwartz because U.S.
TRANSCOM manages the CRAF contract with commercial air carriers.
General Schwartz. Current Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation
Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) requirements sustain Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) carriers with wartime airlift business that will be greatly
reduced post OIF/OEF. Current CRAF business is approximately $2.5
billion a year. Historically, the total pre-September 11 annual CRAF
business was approximately $500-600 million per year. The tenuous state
of the airline industry raises additional and significant concerns over
CRAF viability post OIF/OEF-especially for the smaller CRAF charter
carriers, both cargo and passenger. Careful consideration of
legislative proposals, such as the CRAF Assured Business proposal
currently before Congress, together with other possible incentives will
be required to help assure a viable CRAF with adequate participation/
capability in the future. As directed by Congress, DOD has contracted
with Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Federally Funded Research
and Development Center, to study the future of CRAF to include
potential impacts of a drawdown on our industry partners. That report
is scheduled to be provided by the Secretary to Congress no later than
September 30, 2008.
21. Senator Martinez. Secretary Payton and General Schwartz, to
what extent are your maritime partners, through the Maritime Security
Program and Voluntary Intermodal Security Agreement Program, similarly
affected by DOD business volatility?
Ms. Payton. I defer this question to General Schwartz because U.S.
TRANSCOM manages the CRAF contract with commercial air carriers.
General Schwartz. Each of our strategic sealift partners enrolled
in the Maritime Security Program and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement will be affected differently depending on the percentage of
their business model that is predicated on DOD business. In the global
war on terrorism, DOD business for some carriers may be as little as 1
percent while others could be as much as 60-70 percent. One of the
TRANSCOM's highest priority initiatives for 2008 is to assess the
expansion of the DTS business base in order to bring other Federal
departments and agencies ship movements under the DOD distribution
umbrella, increasing the amount of DOD cargo and lessening the effect
of the loss of DOD specific cargo.
MILITARY SEALIFT
22. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, the Navy is formulating a
program to procure Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))
ships, which, in addition to providing prepositioning of equipment for
operational forces, would be available for routine tasking by the
combatant commanders. How does the Navy's employment plan for this
future MPF capability integrate with your vision for meeting
prepositioning mission requirements?
General Schwartz. The Navy's MPF(F) will constitute a component of
our Nation's Global Prepositioning Materiel Capabilities and support a
wide spectrum of Joint forces operations. MPF(F) will significantly
improve the way we project cargo into an objective area; decreasing
reliance on access to secure ports and airfields, and speeding the
closure time of critical materiel.
Doctrine to integrate MPF(F) with other naval forces and ensure it
complements the DTS is still being developed. TRANSCOM will remain
engaged in this process and duly consider the future capabilities of
MPF(F) vessels in the development of overall strategic sealift
requirements.
23. Senator Martinez. General Schwartz, Operation Iraqi Freedom
placed heavy demands on prepositioned equipment. How would you assess
progress to restore the readiness of the preposition force for future
contingencies?
General Schwartz. Each of the Services has a sound strategy for
reconstituting and revitalizing their preposition force. It will take a
few years to reach the intended end-state but the reconstituted force,
by incorporating a combination of recent lessons learned and
modernization initiatives, will be better suited to support the
combatant commanders future contingencies. Current operations influence
timelines in the case of both the Army and Marine Corps. One of the
Army's Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) vessels is in full
operating status and reconstituted with prepositioned stock; five more
LMSRs will reset with Army Prepositioned Stock-3 cargo between 2010 and
2013 in accordance with Army Prepositioning Strategy 2015. Full
reconstitution of the Marines' MPF is expected by 2012. Two former Army
LMSRs are scheduled for transfer to the MPF (one in April 2008 and one
in April 2009). Additional acquisitions and alternatives to accommodate
MPF growth are being considered.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS TO MEET THOSE
REQUIREMENTS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Kennedy, Sessions,
Collins, and Martinez.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; and Sean J. Stackley, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Benjamin
L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to
Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Todd
Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter,
assistant to Senator Collins; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to
Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN
Senator Kennedy. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to
order. We welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Ships, Allison Stiller. We want to thank you for a long period
of service for the Navy, and not without its challenges.
We thank you very much for your dedication.
Ms. Stiller. Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy. We also welcome Barry McCullough, who's
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of
Capabilities and Resources. We thank you very much for being
here, Admiral. General Amos, Commander, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, we thank you very much. We know you've had
recent service over in Iraq and we thank you. We thank all of
our panel for their important public service and service to our
country.
We are faced, all of us and the Services, with a number of
critical issues that confront the Department of the Navy in
balancing modernization needs against the costs of supporting
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within that general
area there are several specific concerns for the subcommittee
today.
One of these is in the prospects for meeting future force
structure requirements. We're facing the prospect that the
current Department of the Navy program will lead to potentially
large gaps between the forces that the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have
said they need and the forces that will be available to their
successors.
In one case, the CNO has said that the Navy needs to have
48 attack submarines to meet the combat commanders'
requirements. We're faced with the risk of falling well short
of that goal for more than 10 years starting during the next
decade.
In another case, the Navy now predicts the Navy and Marine
Corps tactical aircraft forces are facing a shortfall of at
least 125 tactical fighters needed to outfit our active air
wings, 10 aircraft carrier air wings, and 3 Marine Corps air
wings. With shortfalls that large, we could be faced with
drastically reducing the number of aircraft available on short
notice to the combatant commanders, either because we have
deployed understrength air wings or because we did not deploy
the carrier at all because of these aircraft shortages.
I mention the aviation situation not because we will deal
with it in detail this afternoon, but to illustrate that we
will not be able to look to Navy aviation to be a bill-player
for the problems of the shipbuilding portfolio.
Other challenges face the Navy centering on acquisition
programs. We have had special concern about the Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS). This was intended to be a ship that the Navy could
acquire relatively inexpensively and relatively quickly. As it
turns out, the LCS program will be neither. Once again, we are
presented with a program with significant cost growth, which at
least in part was driven by the Service changing requirements
after the design and construction was signed and making poor
original cost estimates.
The LCS situation raises significant questions about
acquisition management within the Navy. For example, why
weren't the Navy and contract teams better able to see the
problems sooner? At the time we marked up the National Defense
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2008, the subcommittee
believed that the second LCS team, led by General Dynamics, was
likely to experience the very same difficulty as the Lockheed
Martin team. You'll recall the Navy had terminated the contract
on the second Lockheed Martin LCS, the LCS-3, earlier last
year.
During the middle of the markup, the committee heard from
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, who both claimed that
things were not as bad with General Dynamics' part of the
program as they had proven to be on the Lockheed Martin ships.
They made these assertions despite the Navy's own internal
estimates to the contrary.
Late in 2007, the Navy finally realized it was facing the
same situation with General Dynamics as it faced with Lockheed
Martin and tried to get General Dynamics to sign up to a fixed-
price contract for the two ships or face outright cancellation
on the second ship, just as the Navy had done with Lockheed
Martin. The Navy and General Dynamics could not reach an
agreement, so the Navy terminated the contract for the second
vessel, the LCS-4, for the convenience of the government.
In summary, the Navy was still viewing the LCS program too
optimistically as late as May last year, again just months away
from having to terminate the contract for LCS-4. I would be
interested in hearing from Secretary Stiller about what actions
the Department has taken to strengthen the acquisition
oversight and restore confidence in the Navy's ability to
manage major acquisition programs.
We have also been waiting too long for better definitions
of requirements in a couple of areas. First, the Navy was
supposed to already have reached some better definition of
requirements for the next generation cruiser, called the CG(X).
The longer these definitions wait, the less likely it is the
Navy will be able to maintain the intended schedule of awarding
the first ship of that class in 2011.
We also are waiting for indications from the Navy about
whether they will comply with the requirements that this new
ship be nuclear powered or whether they will be seeking a
waiver from that requirement from the Secretary of Defense. If
that ship is to be nuclear powered, work would have to begin
immediately on the design of such a ship to have a chance of
starting construction any time before the middle of the next
decade.
Another area where the Navy has had trouble defining the
requirements that has been a problem is the Maritime
Prepositioning Force-Future (MPF-F) program. While the
subcommittee has heard for several years about the
contributions that such a force could make to Marine Corps and
Navy operations, we have seen that the procurement of certain
ships within that objective has been delayed each year as
resolution of questions about the requirements and capabilities
keep being deferred.
There are other concerns, but in the interest of time I'll
conclude with the following note. The subject of Navy force
structure and acquisition is not a new one for the
subcommittee. Over many years and with several different
individuals holding the chairmanship of this subcommittee, we
have devoted significant energies to these subjects. Today's
hearing continues the subcommittee's strong bipartisan interest
in the broader naval force structure issues facing the Nation
today. It is in that bipartisan spirit that I again welcome
Senator Martinez to the Seapower Subcommittee for the first
year as serving as the ranking member of the subcommittee. I
look forward to all of your testimony this afternoon and other
issues facing the Department of the Navy, and we'll ask Senator
Martinez for any comments he'd like to make.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
The subcommittee will come to order. I want to welcome Secretary
Stiller, Admiral McCullough, and General Amos to the subcommittee this
afternoon. We are grateful to you for your service to the Nation and to
the valorous and truly professional men and women in the whole Navy and
Marine Corps team.
You are faced with a number of critical issues that confront the
Department of the Navy in balancing your modernization needs against
the costs of supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Within that general area, there are also several specific concerns
for the subcommittee today. One of these is in the prospects for
meeting future force structure requirements. We are facing the prospect
that the current Navy program will lead to potentially large gaps
between the forces that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps have said they need and the forces that
will be available to their successors.
In one case, the CNO has said that the Navy needs to have 48 attack
submarines to meet combatant commander requirements, but we are faced
with the risk of falling well short of that goal for more than 10 years
starting during the next decade.
In another case, the Navy now predicts that Navy and Marine Corps
tactical aircraft forces are facing a shortfall of at least 138
tactical fighters needed to outfit our active air wings, 10 aircraft
carrier air wings, and 3 Marine Corps air wings. With shortfalls that
large, we could be faced with drastically reducing the number of
aircraft available on short notice to the combatant commanders, either
because we have deployed under-strength air wings, or because we did
not deploy the carrier at all because of these aircraft shortages. I
mention the aviation situation, not because we will deal with it in
detail this afternoon, but to illustrate that we will not be able to
look to naval aviation to be ``bill-payer'' for problems in the
shipbuilding portfolio.
Other challenges face the Navy, centering on acquisition programs.
We have had special concerns about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
program. This was intended to be a ship that the Navy could acquire
relatively inexpensively and relatively quickly. As it turns out, the
LCS program will be neither. Once again we are presented with a program
with significant cost growth which, at least in part, was driven by the
Service changing requirements after the design and construction
contract was signed and making poor original cost estimates.
The LCS situation raises significant questions about acquisition
management within the Navy. For example, why weren't the Navy and
contractor teams better able to see the problems sooner? At the time we
marked up the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2008,
the subcommittee believed that the second LCS team, led by General
Dynamics, was likely to experience the very same difficulties as the
Lockheed Martin team. We all recall that the Navy had terminated the
contract on the second Lockheed Martin LCS, LCS-3, earlier last year.
During the middle of markup, the Committee heard from Secretary
Winter and Admiral Mullen (then CNO) who both claimed that things were
not as bad with the General Dynamics part of the program as they had
proven to be on the Lockheed Martin ships. They made these assertions
despite the Navy's own internal estimates to the contrary.
Late in 2007, the Navy finally realized that it was facing the same
situation with General Dynamics as it had faced with Lockheed Martin,
and tried to get General Dynamics to sign up to a fixed-price contract
on the two ships or face outright cancellation on the second ship (just
as the Navy had done with Lockheed Martin).
The Navy and General Dynamics could not reach and agreement, so the
Navy terminated the contract for the second vessel (LCS-4) for the
convenience of the government.
In summary, the Navy was still viewing the LCS program too
optimistically as late as May last year, again just months away from
having to terminate the contract for LCS-4.
I would be interested in hearing from Secretary Stiller about what
actions the Department is taking to strengthen acquisition oversight
and restore confidence in the Navy's ability to manage major
acquisition programs.
We have also been waiting too long for better definitions of
requirements in a couple of areas: first, the Navy was supposed to have
already reached some better definition of requirements for the next
generation cruiser, called CG(X). The longer these definitions wait,
the less likely it is that the Navy will be able to maintain the
intended schedule of awarding the first ship of that new class in 2011.
We also are waiting for indications from the Navy about whether they
will comply with the requirement that this new ship be nuclear powered,
or whether they will be seeking a waiver from that requirement from the
Secretary of Defense. If this ship is to be nuclear powered, work would
have to begin immediately on the design of such a ship to have any
chance of starting construction anytime before the middle of the next
decade.
Another area where the Navy has had trouble defining the
requirements has been a problem is the Maritime Prepositioning Force-
Future program. While the subcommittee has heard for several years
about the contribution that such a force could make to Marine Corps and
Navy operations, we have seen the procurement of certain ships within
that objective being delayed each year as the resolution of questions
about the requirements and capabilities keeps being deferred.
There are other concerns, but in the interest of time I will
conclude with the following note: the subject of Navy force structure
and acquisition is not a new one for the subcommittee. Over many years,
and with several different individuals holding the chairmanship of this
subcommittee, we have devoted significant energies to these subjects.
Today's hearing continues the subcommittee's strong bipartisan
interest in the broader naval force structure issues facing the Nation
today. It is in that bipartisan spirit that I again welcome Senator
Martinez to the Seapower Subcommittee for his first year of serving as
ranking member on the subcommittee.
I look forward hearing your testimony this afternoon on these and
other issues facing the Department of the Navy.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate your kind words of welcome and I look forward to
continuing to work in the bipartisan fashion that this
subcommittee needs to have in order to accomplish our common
goals.
I also am pleased to welcome the witnesses, Secretary
Stiller, Admiral McCullough, and General Amos. We thank you for
your service to our Nation and thank you for joining us today.
This morning the Armed Services Committee received
testimony on operations in Iraq and I know the more than 24,000
marines assigned to the Multi-National Force have performed
remarkably, particularly in Al Anbar Province. Likewise, the
Navy has made vital contributions in the theater. Over 10,000
sailors are augmenting ground forces in a variety of roles.
Without question, marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen in
combat are our number one priority. However, while the
committee focuses on meeting the demands of these current
operations, we must also take a longer view to ensure the
readiness of our fleet and fleet marine force for future
conflict.
The Navy reports as much as half of our ships are under way
on any given day supporting the global war on terror and
performing vigilance, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief
missions around the world. We're accustomed to and indeed our
National Security Strategy is built upon freedom of the seas, a
freedom that is made possible only through global presence and
naval superiority. Absent a credible challenge at sea over the
past 2 decades, however, the fleet has drawn down to 280 ships
and it's in jeopardy of slipping further.
I share the strong concern raised by the subcommittee these
past several years regarding this decline in the size of our
fleet. Particularly today as we witness rapid expansion by
competitor navies, most notably that of China, we must guard
against shortfalls to our numbers of aircraft carriers,
submarines, amphibious ships, and surface combatants.
The CNO has presented Congress with a shipbuilding plan to
reverse this trend and build the Navy back to 313 ships. Even
this plan, however, which strives to balance capability with
affordability, must cope with shortfalls in key warfighting
areas while confronting significant cost risk. The cost
estimate for building this future Navy exceeds the investments
of the past 15 years by greater than 50 percent. Arguably, this
is a bill that has come due as a result of the long lapse in
ship construction following the end of the Cold War.
In the 2009 budget request, however, it falls four ships
and $1.5 billion short of the shipbuilding plan presented to
this subcommittee just 1 year ago. This is a disturbing leading
indicator of challenges ahead. It is important today to gain
your candid assessment of these challenges, to hear from you
regarding progress on new ship programs and regarding the
health and welfare of the industrial base.
As well, I look forward to your practical assessment of the
Navy's ability to finance a shipbuilding plan in the face of
ever-increasing budget pressures and competing priorities. In
the end, we need to arrive at a common understanding of the
Navy and Marine Corps's priorities and risks and the prudent
actions available to the administration and Congress that would
mitigate these risks.
I also join the chairman in my concern over the LCS
program. I want to make sure that we have this on track and are
moving forward adequately, because without that component of
the new shipbuilding program I don't think we can meet that
goal of a 313-ship Navy.
I thank you again for joining us. I thank you for your
tremendous service, and I look forward to your testimony here
before us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Martinez follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mel Martinez
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm also pleased to welcome our witnesses. Secretary Stiller,
Admiral McCullough, and General Amos, thank you for joining us.
Earlier today, the committee received testimony on operations in
Iraq, where the 24,000 marines assigned to the Multi-National Force
have performed remarkably in the Al Anbar Province. Likewise, the Navy
has made vital contributions in-theater with over 10,000 sailors
augmenting ground forces.
Without question, marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen in combat
are our number one priority. However, while the committee focuses on
meeting the demands of these current operations, we must also take `the
longer view' to ensure the readiness of our Fleet and Fleet Marine
Force for future conflict.
By the Navy's reports, as many as half of our ships are underway on
any given day supporting the global war on terror, and performing
vigilance, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief missions around the
world. We are accustomed to, and indeed our National Security Strategy
is built upon freedom of the seas--a freedom that is made possible only
through global presence and naval superiority.
Absent a credible challenge at sea over the past two decades,
however, the Fleet has drawn down to 280 ships and is in jeopardy of
slipping further. I share the strong concerns raised by the committee
these past several years regarding this decline in the size of our
fleet. Particularly today, as we witness rapid expansion by competitor
navies, most notably China, we must guard against shortfalls to our
numbers of aircraft carriers, submarines, amphibious ships, and surface
combatants.
The CNO has presented to Congress a shipbuilding plan to reverse
the trend and build the Navy back to 313 ships. Even this plan,
however, which strives to balance capability with affordability, must
cope with shortfalls in key warfighting areas while confronting
significant cost risk.
The cost estimate for building this future Navy exceeds investments
of the past 15 years by greater than 50 percent. Arguably, this is a
bill that has come due as a result of the long lapse in ship
construction following the end of the Cold War.
The 2009 budget request, however, falls four ships and $1.5 billion
short of the shipbuilding plan presented to this subcommittee just 1
year ago. This is a disturbing `leading indicator' of challenges ahead.
It is important today to gain your candid assessment of these
challenges; to hear from you regarding progress on new ship programs,
and regarding the health and welfare of the industrial base. As well, I
look for your practical assessment of the Navy's ability to finance the
shipbuilding plan in the face of ever-increasing budget pressures and
competing priorities. In the end, we need to arrive at a common
understanding of the Navy's and Marine Corps' priorities and risks, and
the prudent actions available to the administration and to Congress
that would mitigate these risks.
Again, thank you for joining us. I thank you for your tremendous
service to our country, and I look forward to your testimony.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Secretary Stiller, we'd be delighted if you'd lead off,
please.
STATEMENT OF ALLISON F. STILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR SHIPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Ms. Stiller. Mr. Chairman, Senator Martinez, Senator
Collins: It's a privilege for Lieutenant General Amos, Vice
Admiral McCullough, and me to appear before you today to
discuss Navy shipbuilding. I request that Vice Admiral
McCullough's and my written statement be entered into the
record.
Senator Kennedy. Without objection.
Ms. Stiller. The Department is committed to build an
affordable fleet at or above 313 ships, tailored to support the
National Defense Strategy, the recently signed Maritime
Strategy, and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). For
the first time in a long while, the Navy's budget does not
include funding for any lead ships. This year a total of seven
ships are included in the fiscal year 2009 President's budget:
one Virginia-class submarine, one DDG-1000-class ship, two
LCSs, two T-AKEs, and one Navy Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV).
In addition, although not part of the Navy's 313-ship force
structure, the Navy will procure 1 JHSV for the Army in fiscal
year 2009.
I'll now elaborate on the specifics of the request. The
Navy is requesting $2.1 billion of full funding for one
Virginia-class submarine in fiscal year 2009 and advanced
procurement for the fiscal year 2010 boat, and advanced
procurement for two boats in fiscal year 2011. The Virginia-
class construction program is continuing to make progress
toward realizing CNO's goal of buying two Virginia-class
submarines for $4 billion as measured in fiscal year 2005
dollars, starting in fiscal year 2012.
Because of your support with the addition of advanced
procurement funding last year, the Navy has accelerated the
production of two Virginia-class submarines per year from
fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2011. Two months ago, the Navy
awarded contracts for the construction of the dual DDG-1000
lead ships to General Dynamics-Bath Iron Works and to Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget
request of $2.55 billion provides full funding for the third
ship of the DDG-1000-class and advanced procurement for the
fourth ship. With recent approval from the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) for the follow ship acquisition strategy, the
Navy intends to utilize fixed-price incentive fee contracts
through a competition for quantity.
The Navy remains committed to the LCS program and LCS
remains a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy. The
fiscal year 2009 President's budget request includes $920
million for two additional LCS sea frames. The Navy also
intends to execute the fiscal year 2008 appropriation for one
sea frame, utilizing the remaining funding and material from
the terminated ships. Under an acquisition strategy approved in
January 2008 by the DAE, the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 awards
will be for fixed-price incentive fee contracts based on a
limited competition between the current LCS sea frame prime
contractors.
The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request also
provides for procurements of two T-AKEs in the National Defense
Sealift Fund.
The JHSV program is currently in the technology development
phase. Lead ship award is anticipated in late fiscal year 2008,
with delivery of the first vessel in 2011. The fiscal year 2009
President's budget request includes $187 million for the
construction of the first Navy-funded JHSV and $173 million for
the second Army-funded vessel. We worked diligently to
stabilize our shipbuilding plan and move into serial
production.
The Navy remains committed to ensure fiscal responsibility
in shipbuilding acquisition programs, as evidenced by the
cancellation of LCS-3 and LCS-4 last year.
Mr. Chairman, we'd like to thank you for this opportunity
to discuss the Navy's shipbuilding budget request for fiscal
year 2009. Vice Admiral McCullough would like to remark briefly
on a day in the Navy. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Stiller and Admiral
McCullough follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Allison F. Stiller and VADM Barry
McCullough, USN
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address Navy
shipbuilding. The Department is committed to the effort to build an
affordable 313-ship fleet by 2020 tailored to support the National
Defense Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review. This year a total of seven ships are included in the
fiscal year 2009 President's budget, one Virginia-class SSN, one DDG-
1000, two littoral combat ships (LCSs), two T-AKE, and one Navy Joint
High Speed Vessel (JHSV). In addition, although not part of the Navy's
313-ship force structure, the Navy will procure 1 JHSV for the Army in
fiscal year 2009.
The Department has updated the Long-Range Strategic Shipbuilding
Plan with an eye on further stabilizing workload and funding
requirements. A stable plan will enable the shipbuilding industry to
maintain critical skills and to make business decisions that increase
efficiency and productivity in order to meet the Navy's projected
shipbuilding requirements. In addition to a stable shipbuilding plan,
the Department has been exploring alternatives with the shipbuilding
industry to mitigate workload fluctuations among shipyards to maintain
a stable and skilled workforce across the industry sectors. The
Department requests consideration of a general cost cap exception to
allow the Department to work with industry to better level load work
across the industrial base.
We still face challenges. In response to cost increases in the lead
ships of the LCS class, the Navy has slowed the initial rate of
production to reduce risk; however, the Navy remains committed to the
program to fill critical warfighting gaps that exist today. In an area
of success, the innovative design and build practices being implemented
by Virginia-class are already showing promise and can serve as a model
for other programs. Bringing the cost of the Virginia-class fast attack
submarine down to $2 billion (fiscal year 2005 $) per hull by fiscal
year 2012 remains a challenge and is currently within $50 million of
target.
The Gulf Coast shipyards have struggled since Hurricane Katrina.
Over the last year the Navy and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems have
worked at a ship portfolio level to reset the schedule baselines and
have adjusted the associated contracts accordingly. Additionally, six
Gulf Coast shipbuilders were awarded contracts in 2007 under Section
2203 of Public Law 109-234, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Defense, The Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery 2006. The
purpose of these contracts is to expedite recovery of shipbuilding
capability in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina by repairing and/or
replacing shipbuilding facilities, to make lasting improvement in
shipyard facilities that would result in measurable cost reductions in
current and future Navy shipbuilding contracts, and to improve the
ability of shipbuilding facilities on the Gulf Coast to withstand
damage from potential hurricanes or other natural disasters.
Lastly, we are actively working with our Allies to exchange best
practices and lessons learned on shipbuilding efforts. A Shipbuilding
Quadrilateral forum has been established which includes the U.S.,
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia to discuss systematic trends that
are emerging in shipbuilding programs. The forum serves to discuss,
compare and contrast acquisition matters such as contracting practice
and industry trends. In addition, the Navy is partnering with the
United Kingdom to support the new missile compartment design for their
Vanguard-class replacement.
As noted earlier, the Department proposes procurement of seven new
construction ships as part of the 2009 President's budget request. Each
of these ships as well as other significant Navy shipbuilding programs
are discussed below.
VIRGINIA-CLASS
Currently, four Virginia-class submarines have been delivered to
the Fleet and six more are under construction. In the past year, the
Navy commissioned U.S.S. Hawaii (SSN-776), the third boat of the
Virginia-class, christened the fourth submarine of the class, North
Carolina (SSN-777), and laid the keel for the fifth submarine, New
Hampshire (SSN-778). In 2008 we will deliver and commission two
submarines. North Carolina (SSN-777), the fourth submarine, just
delivered last week and will commission in May. New Hampshire (SSN-
778), the fifth submarine is scheduled to deliver in October, 6 months
ahead of the April 2009 contract delivery date. In January 2008, the
seventh, eighth, and ninth hulls were named Missouri (SSN-780),
California (SSN-781) and Mississippi (SSN-782), respectively.
The Virginia-class construction program is continuing to make
progress toward realizing the Chief of Naval Operation's goal of buying
two Virginia SSNs for $4 billion as measured in fiscal year 2005
dollars, starting in fiscal year 2012. General Dynamics Electric Boat
and Northrop Grumman Newport News (NGNN), will continue to jointly
produce these submarines and are working to reduce the construction
time and cost of these ships in concert with the program office. In
this budget, the production of two Virginia-class submarines per year
has accelerated to start in fiscal year 2011 vice fiscal year 2012. The
fiscal year 2008 congressional plus-up for advanced procurement was
instrumental to this effort. Negotiations for an eight-ship multi-year
procurement contract will begin soon, and we anticipate signing that
contract in late 2008. The Navy requests approval for the next multi-
year contract.
DDG-1000 DESTROYER
This multi-mission surface combatant, tailored for land attack and
littoral dominance, will provide independent forward presence and
deterrence and operate as an integral part of joint and combined
expeditionary forces. DDG-1000 will capitalize on reduced signatures
and enhanced survivability to maintain persistent presence in the
littoral in future scenarios. The program provides the baseline for
spiral development to support future surface ships. DDG-1000 with the
Advanced Gun System and associated Long-Range Land Attack Projectile
will provide volume and precision fires in support of joint forces
ashore. The dual band radar represents a significant increase in air
defense capability in the cluttered littoral environment. Investment in
open architecture and reduced manning will provide the Navy life cycle
cost savings and technology options that can be retrofit to legacy
ships thus allowing adaptability for an uncertain future. The program
continues to execute on cost and schedule.
This month, the Navy awarded contracts for construction of the dual
lead ships to General Dynamics Bath Iron Works and to Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding. Ship detail design and the design of the mission system
equipment are on track to support the start of production. The fiscal
year 2009 President's budget request of $2.55 billion provides full
funding for the third ship of the class, and advanced procurement for
the fourth ship. With recent approval from the Defense Acquisition
Executive for the follow ship acquisition strategy, the Navy intends to
utilize fixed-price incentive fee contracts for the follow ships
awarded through a competition for quantity.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
LCS will be a fast, agile, and networked surface combatant with
capabilities optimized to assure naval and joint force access into
contested littoral regions. LCS will operate with focused-mission
packages that deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute a variety
of missions, including anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and
mine countermeasures. LCS will also possess inherent capabilities to
support homeland defense, Maritime Interception Operations, and Special
Operation Forces.
The Navy remains committed to the LCS program, and LCS remains a
critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in
the littorals and strategic choke points around the world. However, the
Navy identified significant cost increases on the order of 100 percent
for the lead ships in the LCS class, due to unrealistic contractor
proposals, development difficulties and changes from a commercial
baseline. The Navy believes that active oversight and strict cost
controls are needed to deliver these ships to the fleet over the long
term. The Navy demonstrated strong oversight when it terminated the
contracts for LCS-3 and LCS-4 in 2007.
It is vital that the Navy continue through first-of-class
construction challenges to complete LCS-1 and LCS-2. When these ships
are delivered, the Department will be able to better evaluate their
costs and capabilities. LCS-1 and LCS-2 are currently scheduled to
deliver to the Navy in 2008. The Navy will seek congressional support
to complete the reprogramming of fiscal year 2007 LCS shipbuilding
funds to complete LCS-1 and LCS-2.
The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request includes $920
million for two additional LCS seaframes. The Navy also intends to
execute the fiscal year 2008 appropriation for one seaframe, utilizing
the remaining funding and material from the terminated ships. The Navy
will also seek congressional support for the reprogramming of these
funds for the fiscal year 2008 procurement. Under an acquisition
strategy approved in January 2008 by the Defense Acquisition Executive,
the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 awards will be for fixed-price incentive
fee contracts, based on a limited competition between the current LCS
seaframe prime contractors. These ships will be designated as Flight 0+
and will include all existing approved engineering changes developed
from lessons learned, along with any current improvements to
construction or fabrication procedures. The Navy will incorporate
further lessons learned from LCS-1 and LCS-2 sea trials into these
ships prior to production. Any such changes will be minimized to those
essential for safety and/or operability. Acquisition strategies for
fiscal year 2010 and follow ships are under Navy review.
LEWIS AND CLARK CLASS DRY CARGO/AMMUNITION SHIP (T-AKE)
T-AKE was designed to replace the Navy's aging combat stores (T-
AFS) and ammunition (T-AE) shuttle ships. Working in concert with an
oiler (T-AO), the team can perform a ``substitute'' station ship
mission which will provide necessary depth in combat logistics. The
fiscal year 2009 President's budget request provides for procurement of
two T-AKEs in the National Defense Sealift Fund. Fourteen T-AKE hulls
are covered under a fixed-price incentive contract with General
Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company. Three of the T-AKEs
are to support MPF-F program requirements. Major accomplishments for
the year include the christening of T-AKE-4 (Richard E. Byrd) in May
2007 and the delivery of T-AKE-3 (Alan Shepard) in June 2007 and T-AKE-
4 in November 2007. T-AKE-5 (Robert E. Peary) launched in October 2007.
Progress continues on the follow on ships including the keel laying for
T-AKE-6 (Amelia Earhart) in June 2007 and T-AKE-7 in November 2007. T-
AKE-8 commenced construction in October 2007. The construction contract
option for the T-AKE-10 and long lead time material for the T-AKE-11
were exercised in January 2008. The fiscal year 2009 funding is to
complete funding for two ships (T-AKE-11 and T-AKE-12).
JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL
High speed connectors will facilitate the conduct of sustained sea-
based operations by expediting force closure and allowing the
persistence necessary for success in the littorals. Connectors are
grouped into three categories: inter-theater, the Joint High Speed
Sealift, which provides strategic force closure for the continental
United States-based forces; intra-theater, the JHSV that enables rapid
closure and sustainment of Marine forces; and the Joint Maritime
Assault Connector, to move troops and resources from the sea base to
shore. These platforms will link bases and stations around the world to
the sea base and other advanced bases, as well as provide linkages
between the sea base and forces operating ashore. JHSV is currently in
the Technology Development Phase. The Capabilities Development Document
was Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-approved in January
2007. Milestone B is anticipated in fiscal year 2008 with delivery of
the first vessel in 2011. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget
request including research and development (R&D) is $186.8 million for
the construction of the first Navy-funded JHSV and $173.0 million for
the second Army-funded vessel.
The Navy also continues with important new construction and
modernization programs. These programs are outlined below.
CVN-21
CVN-78, the lead ship of the CVN-21 program will replace U.S.S.
Enterprise (CVN-65). CVN-21 warfighting capability improvements
include: 25 percent increase in sortie generation rate, ship's force
reduction approaching 800 billets with an additional 400 billets
reduction including airwing and embarked staff, nearly three-fold
increase in electrical generating capacity, restoration of Service Life
Allowances, and enhanced Integrated Warfare System to pace future
threats. These capability improvements will ensure that the CVN, the
centerpiece of the Navy's Carrier Strike Group, continue to pace
projected threats. The major critical technologies and capabilities
planned for integration into the lead ship include: Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System, Advanced Arresting Gear, Joint Precision
Aircraft Landing System, Improved Survivability, Enhanced Flight Deck
and Improved Weapon and Material Handling.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
authorized the Navy to enter into construction contracts for the first
three ships of the CVN-78 class and provided for 4-year funding of the
first three ships beginning with construction of the Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78) in fiscal year 2008. Non-recurring investment in the class
design is $5.7 billion and the cost of the lead ship (excluding all
nonrecurring costs) is $8.1 billion ($TY), nearly $300 million less
than the projected cost to buy a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in the
same timeframe. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2009
included $2.7 billion as the second of the four funding increments
planned for CVN-78. The Navy released the Request for Proposal for
Detail Design and Construction of the lead ship in July 2007 and NGNN
responded with their contract proposal on October 31, 2007. Contract
negotiations are ongoing.
CVN-68 CLASS
George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), is the 10th and final Nimitz-class
nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The construction of CVN-77 has
proceeded rapidly following the launch in October 2006. The aircraft
catapults began testing in January of this year by `launching' dead-
loads. Sea trials will commence this fall. The George H.W. Bush is
expected to deliver near the end of this calendar year. The
commissioning date has been set for January 10, 2009. The President's
budget for fiscal year 2009 requests $20.5 million for the completion
of government responsible mission critical and safety system
installations reflecting operational needs to deploy the George H.W.
Bush at a readiness condition appropriate for the defense of America's
freedom. The program remains within the congressionally enacted $6,057
million cost limitation.
CVN-68 CLASS REFUELING COMPLEX OVERHAUL
The CVN-68 Class Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) program spans
40+ years across the Nimitz-class. During each RCOH, 35 percent of a
carrier's total Service Life Maintenance plan is performed, as well as
depot level mid-life recapitalization that extends the service life of
Nimitz-class carriers out to approximately 50 years. Refueling of the
ships' nuclear reactors, warfighting modernization, and repair of ship
systems and infrastructure are also completed to meet future missions.
These combined upgrades support a reduction in operating costs, achieve
expected service life, and allow the Nimitz-class to deter projected
threats well into the 21st century. This program is critical for the
class to achieve its service life and retain combat relevance. The
President's budget for fiscal year 2009 requests $124.5 million in
fiscal year 2009 to facilitate the acceleration of the execution start
date for U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) to September 2009, and
$21.4 million advanced procurement for U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
RCOH. This acceleration provides additional 2 months of operational
availability to the carrier fleet during the critical 2012-2015 period
before the commissioning of the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and adds
approximately 1 million manhours to NGNN's fiscal year 2009 workload
keeping 300 NGNN skilled workers employed.
WASP (LHD-1)-CLASS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP
The Wasp (LHD-1)-class comprises multi-purpose amphibious assault
ships whose primary mission is to provide embarked commanders with
command and control capabilities for sea-based maneuver/assault
operations as well as employing elements of a landing force through a
combination of helicopters and amphibious vehicles. Seven LHDs have
been delivered to the fleet. The last of the LHD-1-class, U.S.S. Makin
Island (LHD-8), is scheduled to be delivered in November 2008. Although
a modified repeat of the previous seven ships, this ship introduced gas
turbine propulsion system with all electric auxiliary systems and
eliminated the steam plant and steam systems.
LHA(R) GENERAL PURPOSE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP (REPLACEMENT)
The LHA(R) Assault Echelon ships will provide the Nation with
forcible entry capability and forward deployed contingency response
forces. These ships will provide enhanced hangar and maintenance spaces
to support aviation maintenance and increased jet fuel storage and
aviation ordnance magazines. The LHA(R) Assault Echelon ship is the
functional replacement for the aging LHA-1-class ships that reach the
end of their extended service life in 2011-2015. The Detail Design and
Construction contract for the lead ship, LHA-6, was awarded on June 1,
2007, with a contract delivery date of August 31, 2012.
LPD-17 CLASS AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIP
The LPD-17 San Antonio-class of amphibious warfare ships represents
the Department of the Navy's commitment to a modern expeditionary power
projection fleet that will enable our naval force to operate across the
spectrum of warfare. The Navy took delivery of the first LPD-17 in the
summer of 2005, and operational evaluation began in the spring of 2007.
LPD-18 (U.S.S. New Orleans) and LPD-19 (U.S.S. Mesa Verde) were
commissioned in March 2007 and December 2007, respectively. LPD-19 will
undergo shock trials this summer. There are five ships currently under
construction. LPD-20 (Green Bay) is expected to deliver this year, and
LPD-21 (New York) has been launched and will be christened in March
2008. LPDs-22-24 are in various stages of the construction phase, and
the option for construction of LPD-25 was exercised on December 21,
2007. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request includes funding
for outfitting/post delivery efforts on LPDs 20-24 and program closeout
efforts required following delivery of the final LPD-17-class ship. The
San Antonio-class ship replaces four classes of older ships--the LKA,
LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4--and will have a 40-year expected service
life. San Antonio class ships will play a key role in supporting the
ongoing global war on terrorism by forward deploying marines and their
equipment to respond to crises abroad.
MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (FUTURE) (MPF-F)
MPF-F provides a scalable, joint, sea-based capability for the
closure, arrival, assembly and employment of up to a MEB-sized force.
It will also support the sustainment and reconstitution of forces when
required. MPF-F is envisioned for frequent utility in Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Theater
Security Cooperation, and other Littoral Combat Operations as well as
major combat operations. When coupled with an Expeditionary Strike
Group or Carrier Strike Group, MPF-F will provide the Nation with a
highly flexible operational and logistics support capability that
enables rapid reinforcement of the Assault Echelon of an Amphibious
Force in anti-access or denial environments. In March 2006, the Defense
Acquisition Board approved program entry into the Technology
Development Phase. An R&D plan is currently being executed and the
program is progressing on track. The fiscal year 2009 President's
budget request includes $41.8 million R&D for ongoing risk reduction
and technology development, and advance procurement for the fiscal year
2010 MPF Aviation Ship.
DDG MODERNIZATION
The DDG-51 modernization program is a comprehensive 62-ship program
designed to modernize the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) and
Combat Systems. These combined upgrades support a reduction in manpower
and operating costs, achieve expected service life, and allow the class
to pace the projected threat well into the 21st century. This program
is critical for the class to achieve its service life and retain combat
relevance.
The first DDG to be modernized will be DDG-51 with an HM&E
availability in fiscal year 2010. Congress provided additional funds to
this program with $50 million SCN in fiscal year 2005, $50 million in
SCN in fiscal year 2006, and $30 million in OPN in fiscal year 2007.
The HM&E alterations are being developed in SCN new construction in
order to minimize development costs and mitigate technical and schedule
risk. The President's budget for fiscal year 2008 included the addition
of robust warfighting upgrades. The President's budget request for
fiscal year 2009 includes $316 million which supports the Flight I and
II ship modernizations starting in fiscal year 2010.
CRUISER MODERNIZATION
Twenty-two cruisers remain in service and are planned for
modernization. A comprehensive Mission Life Extension is critical to
achieving the ship's expected service life and includes the All
Electric Modification, Smartship, Hull Mechanical & Electrical system
upgrades and a series of alterations designed to restore displacement
and stability margins, correct hull and deck house cracking and improve
quality of life and service onboard. Cruiser Modernization bridges the
gap to future surface combatants and will facilitate a more rapid and
affordable capability insertion process. The first full modernization
is CG-52 commencing in February 2008. The President's budget request
for fiscal year 2009 includes $413 million which will modernize two
cruisers.
CG(X)
CG(X) is envisioned to be a highly capable surface combatant
tailored for Joint Air and Missile Defense and Joint Air Control
Operations. CG(X) will provide airspace dominance and Sea Shield
protection to Joint forces. The Maritime Air and Missile Defense of
Joint Forces Initial Capabilities Document was validated by the JROC in
May 2006. Under the Navy's current program of record, the program
procures its first ship in fiscal year 2011 with follow-on construction
in fiscal year 2013.
The results of the Navy's Analysis of Alternatives for the Maritime
Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces capability are currently within
the Navy staffing process. Resulting requirements definition and
acquisition plans, including schedule options and associated risks, are
being evaluated in preparation for CG(X) Milestone A, planned to occur
in fiscal year 2008. This process includes recognition of the
requirement of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, that all major combatant vessels of the United States Navy strike
forces be constructed with an integrated nuclear power plant, unless
the Secretary of Defense determines this not to be in the best interest
of the United States.
Regardless of the Navy's selection of a particular preferred
alternative, vital R&D efforts must continue in fiscal year 2009. These
engineering development and integration efforts include systems
engineering, analysis, computer program development, interface design,
Engineering Development Models, technical documentation and system
testing to ensure a fully functional CG(X) system design. The fiscal
year 2009 President's budget request will continue maturation of the
CG(X) design based on the preferred alternative selected.
OHIO-CLASS SSGN CONVERSION
The Ohio-class SSGN Conversion Program continues to be a successful
transformational program. All four ships, U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN-726),
U.S.S. Florida (SSGN-728), U.S.S. Michigan (SSGN-727), and U.S.S.
Georgia (SSGN-729), have been delivered to the Fleet. The SSGNs
completed their Operational Evaluation and had its Initial Operational
Capability declared on November 1, 2007. Additionally, U.S.S. Michigan
will complete testing with the Advanced SEAL Delivery System in March
2008. U.S.S. Ohio, the first SSGN to complete conversion, is now
deployed in the Pacific Ocean and has already conducted its first crew
exchange in Guam.
SSBN ENGINEERED REFUELING OVERHAULS
The Ohio-class SSBN Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) Program
will continue with the fiscal year 2009 authorization for the start of
the industrial period for the fifth submarine, U.S.S. Tennessee (SSBN-
734). In addition, fiscal year 2009 includes advance procurement
funding for U.S.S. Pennsylvania (SSBN-735) and U.S.S. West Virginia
(SSBN-736) which will start in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011,
respectively. These EROs are the one-time depot maintenance period near
the mid-point of the SSBN service life, where the nuclear reactor is
refueled, major equipment is refurbished, class alterations are
installed, and SUBSAFE unrestricted operations maintenance is
accomplished.
SHIP INACTIVATIONS
The Navy remains committed to reducing and eliminating any
environmental risks posed by its inactive ships by reducing the size of
the inactive ship inventory. This inventory has been reduced from a
high of 195 ships in 1997 to 62 ships today. The Navy plans to
decommission 29 ships between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2013, of
which 23 will be designated for disposal upon decommissioning and 6
will be retained for future mobilization purposes.
The Navy utilizes six disposal methods to reduce the inventory of
non-nuclear inactive ships, including Foreign Military Sales transfers;
interagency transfers to the Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast Guard,
or other agencies; donations for memorial/museum use; domestic
dismantling; experimental use/fleet training sink exercises; and ship
reefing. While fleet training sink exercises are not a disposal method,
since the primary purpose is weapons effectiveness testing or fleet
training, it does contribute to inventory reduction.
SUMMARY
The Navy is committed to ensure fiscal responsibility in
shipbuilding acquisition and modernization programs.
STATEMENT OF VADM BERNARD J. ``BARRY'' McCULLOUGH III, USN,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF
CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral McCullough. Chairman Kennedy, Senator Martinez, and
Senator Collins: I'm honored to appear before you today with
Ms. Stiller and General Amos to discuss Navy force structure
requirements and the fiscal year 2009 budget request.
Before we begin, I'd like to share with you what your Navy
accomplished on March 19. The fleet is 280 ships strong, with
140 ships, or 50 percent, underway. There are over 332,000
Active Duty, 70,000 Reserve, and 178,000 civilians serving in
the Navy; 6,300 sailors are deployed around the world in
support of the global war on terror.
Beginning in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, Hawaii, our
newest Virginia-class submarine, along with Cromlin, Simpson,
Steven W. Groves, and Navy P-3s, are conducting
counternarcotics operations in support of U.S. and
participating nations' drug control programs.
In the European theater, Dallas is in the Mediterranean
participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
operations, monitoring maritime activity to detect, deter, and
respond to terrorism and other transnational threats. Nassau,
Nashville, and San Jacinto are conducting maritime and theater
security operations. Fort McHenry and Swift arrive in Monrovia,
Liberia, as part of the Africa Partnership Station, supporting
an exercise delivering humanitarian assistance and medical
goods in conjunction with U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Project
Hope.
In the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations,
supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF), Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group is
underway, while the Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group conducts
port visits in the Arabian Gulf. Riverine forces are conducting
a variety of missions in country, while in the air, Navy
airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets
are providing critical intelligence to Navy and Special
Operations Forces. EA-6B Prowlers are supporting efforts on the
land.
Carney, Hopper, and Winston Churchill are conducting
maritime security operations, while off the west coast of
Africa, Oscar Austin is supporting counter-piracy operations
with coalition forces.
In the Pacific theater, Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is
underway in the western Pacific providing presence, while Kitty
Hawk completes her first day of at-sea training since
completing a maintenance period. Essex Expeditionary Strike
Group is en route to Yokosuka, Japan, for a port visit after
completing exercises with Republic of Philippines forces, while
Ohio is in Guam after participating in the binational exercise
Key Resolve/Foal Eagle.
In Indonesia, Harpers Ferry and marines from the 31st
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) participate in field exercises
and provide medical and dental civic action programs. In the
eastern Pacific, Peleliu and elements of the 15th MEU are
underway, preparing for a summer deployment, while Carrier
Airwing Two completes embarkation on Abraham Lincoln and is in
the progress of performing carrier qualifications at the start
of a 7-month deployment in support of OIF and OEF.
Finally, in the mid-Pacific Lake Erie, which last month
launched a modified SM-3 missile and successfully intercepted
and destroyed an inoperable satellite containing a toxic
hazard, was in Pearl Harbor finishing her last day of material
inspection with the Board of Inspection and Survey.
These are everyday examples of the balanced capability set
the 2009 fiscal year shipbuilding program will provide to meet
the challenge the Nation faces with a reasonable degree of
risk. The Navy's 313-ship force structure represents the
minimum number of ships the Navy requires, the minimum
capacity, if you will, to provide global reach, persistent
presence, and warfighting effects expected of Navy forces as
outlined in the National Defense Strategy, the 2006 QDR, and
the recently signed Maritime Strategy.
I thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Navy
shipbuilding program with you and look forward to answering
your questions.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
General Amos?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDER, MARINE
CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
General Amos. Thank you, Chairman Kennedy, Senator
Martinez, and Senator Collins: Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today and talk to you about your Marine
Corps.
As we meet here this afternoon, we have a little over 2,000
marines that have landed in the southeastern part of
Afghanistan--I know you're aware of that--from the 24th MEU.
It's not completely on the ground yet, but they'll be flowed in
within the next couple of weeks. Early elements of the lead
elements of the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines Reinforced,
from Twentynine Palms, are on the ground as well.
When it's all said and done, there'll be 3,500 marines and
sailors down in the Helmand Province, arguably probably the
most dangerous part of all of Afghanistan. So on behalf of
those 3,500 marines and sailors and the 24,000-plus that we
have in the Al Anbar Province in Iraq, I want to thank you for
your strong support for the last 5 years of heavy combat for
the marines.
Senator Kennedy. General, where is more dangerous, do you
think, to those 3,200 that have arrived down there in southern
Afghanistan, or to the marines in----
General Amos. I think the area where the marines are going
to be in the Helmand Province, down with the Canadians and the
Brits, Mr. Chairman, is probably the most dangerous area and
the most unstable area of Afghanistan right now.
Senator Kennedy. Is that more dangerous, less dangerous
than Iraq?
General Amos. For us it's more dangerous. The western part
of Iraq, the Al Anbar Province, was the early part that saw the
awakening from the sheiks. So there's always danger there. I
don't want to misrepresent it. But that area has turned around
for us, for the marines.
I also carry a message from the families, the wives, the
children, the parents of our marines and sailors, the husbands.
I want to thank you again for your strong support for the last
5 years.
I come to you today with really just two comments. The
first one is, by nature the Marine Corps is a light and
expeditionary force. Arguably, we have been on land now for the
last 5 years. But we're going to return to our roots, which is
our naval heritage. But we need to be able to return as a light
force, light enough to be able to get someplace quickly, with
enough punch to complete the mission.
That mission can be something as benign as working the
tsunami relief. It can be something not as benign, but
important, as removing 17,000 civilians from Lebanon 2 years
ago when that crisis took place. It can also come right to our
home, our home ports and our countrymen, with the Hurricane
Katrina operations. So everything from what we call phase zero
operations all the way to the right of the spectrum, where it's
major combat operations, your Marine Corps needs to be light
and expeditionary.
So as you see our programs come before you--you'll see
efforts, for instance the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, you'll
see an effort for us to try to keep the weight of that vehicle
down so that we can get it off the ships and get it across
beaches, carry it underneath helicopters, and that kind of
thing.
So everything we do, from the way we recruit young men and
women and promise them, really, hardship, to the equipment we
buy and the way we train, are all focused through the filter of
expeditionary operations.
My second point, Mr. Chairman, is that we're a maritime
force. As I said earlier, we've been on land now for the last 5
years, but our CNO and our Commandant understand that our
synergy and our greatest strength is when we come together as a
naval force who go aboard ships. So as we grow the force to
202,000, thank you for your support for that, but as we do
that, as we back out of Iraq, somewhere down the road we'll be
able to get back aboard ships, and that's exactly where the
Commandant of the Marine Corps wants to take us.
We will come from the sea more than likely for future naval
operations, and when we do we'll come from amphibs and we'll
come through sea bases and we'll come through MPF-F. So I'd ask
for your support as we take a look at the amphibious
requirements, we take a look specifically for the 10th LPD-17.
We need that ship, and I ask for your continued support for the
14 ships, the program of record, for the MPF-F.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that you take my statement for the
record and I'm prepared to answer any questions that you have.
Senator Kennedy. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. James F. Amos, USMC
I. INTRODUCTION
Chairman Kennedy, Senator Martinez, and distinguished members of
the Seapower Subcommittee; it is my privilege to report to you on
Marine Corps shipbuilding and force structure requirements.
We know these next few years will be challenging--not only in the
immediate conflict in Iraq, but in subsequent campaigns in the long war
on terror. This is a multi-faceted, generational struggle that will not
be won in one battle, in one country, or by one method. Many of the
underlying causes of the current conflict will persist in the coming
decades and may be exacerbated by States and transnational actors who
are unwilling or unable to integrate into the global community. In this
environment, the Marine Corps must be able to rapidly adapt to broad
strategic conditions and wide-ranging threats. We remain faithful to
our enduring mission--to be wherever, whenever our country needs us and
to prevail over whatever challenges we face. We have done this and will
continue to do so by recruiting and retaining the best of our Nation's
sons and daughters, training them in tough, realistic scenarios and
providing them the best equipment available. We are confident that with
your continued support, your Corps will remain the Nation's force in
readiness and continue to fulfill its congressionally-mandated mission
of being the most ready when the Nation is least ready.
II. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Strategic Vision Group
To improve our capacity to anticipate, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps established a Strategic Vision Group (SVG) in June 2007. This
group is designed to assist the Commandant in determining how best to
posture the Marine Corps for successful service to the Nation in the
years to come. The Group studies the future state of the world,
considers the most likely world conditions and threats, and then
conducts assessments of our military, political, and economic power to
derive implications for the country, the Department, and the Marine
Corps from now through 2025. For example, the SVG characterizes the
most likely future conflicts as a blurred mix of irregular and
conventional warfare in which terrorists, extremists, and criminals may
become the most lethal and dominant enemy. Additionally, the SVG
discerned that enemy states may adopt similar asymmetric tactics and
techniques that will make access to operating areas ashore and
subsequent operations, including combat, more challenging. Armed with
these critical assessments, the SVG will translate them into tangible
products addressing implications to national security and Marine Corps'
continued readiness and relevance.
The SVG has made significant progress in synthesizing inputs from
United States and allied strategic assessments, and has established
relationships with a wide community of subject matter experts and
related sister Service efforts. The Group has briefed our senior
leadership on assessments of the 2025 security environment, the key
patterns and trends that can be foreseen impacting the strategic
context, and future operational environments. Most significantly,
recent assessments prompted development of the Commandant's overarching
Marine Corps Vision and Strategy. This document will provide a
comprehensive, actionable, and compelling narrative that describes how
the Marine Corps will continue to serve as the Nation's ``force in
readiness'' for the 21st century and will be published in June 2008.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
By always keeping an eye to the future, advances in science and
technology (S&T) provide an immediate, measurable advantage to our
warfighters and provide for development and implementation of concepts
only dreamed of 20 years ago. In light of this importance, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the
Commandant recently completed and published a combined Naval S&T
Strategic Plan that establishes objectives and provides direction to
ensure our investments are focused on accomplishment of Navy and Marine
Corps visions and goals. This plan identifies, as objectives, our five
most critically needed technology enhancements:
lightening the load of our dismounted marines and
sailors through new materials and technologies that are both
lighter and that provide enhanced protection;
the application of robotics to ground logistics
delivery and a cargo unmanned aerial vehicle to rapidly move
logistics on a distributed battlefield;
high-fidelity immersion simulation in support of small
unit ground tactical training;
improved vehicle survivability for our future family
of tactical vehicles through application of new construction
materials such as synthetic armor;
persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance technologies aimed specifically at providing
tactically relevant intelligence in all phases of a broad
spectrum of operations.
III. PROVIDE OUR NATION A NAVAL FORCE THAT IS FULLY PREPARED FOR
EMPLOYMENT AS A MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) ACROSS THE
SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
Long War Concept
The Marine Corps' concept of force employment to meet the need for
counterinsurgency and building partnership capacity is outlined in our
February 2008 concept of employment ``The Long War: Send in the
Marines.'' This employment concept further explains how the Marine
Corps will support the National Defense Strategy and multi-national
efforts in the global war on terrorism/Long War. This publication is
nested within our major concepts and strategies: the Maritime Strategy,
the Naval Operations Concept, and Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a
Changing Security Environment. The focus of this new Long War concept
is to increase the Marine Corps' global, persistent forward presence,
tailored to build partnership capacity for security, while adapting
existing forces and creating new capabilities for an uncertain future.
Through these efforts, we will better enable multi-national
partnerships to address existing regional challenges, while mitigating
the conditions that allow irregular threats to proliferate.
Although we will continue to develop our full spectrum
capabilities, this war will place demands on our marines that differ
significantly from those of the recent past. Paramount among these
demands will be the requirement for marines to train and mentor the
security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their
governments to secure their own countries. This long war strategy helps
posture our Corps to serve as the Nation's expeditionary force-in-
readiness--able to answer the call when needed.
Maritime Strategy
The October 2007 Maritime Strategy reaffirms our naval character
and reemphasizes our enduring relationship with the Navy, and now, the
Coast Guard. Current combat operations limit our ability to
aggressively commit forces to strategy implementation at this time.
However, as we increase our end strength to 202,000 marines and as
security conditions continue to improve in Iraq, the Marine Corps will
transition our forces to forward presence in other priority areas and
other battles in the Long War. The Maritime Strategy notes that, ``Our
ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain
power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility.'' Our means of
projecting power is the congressionally-mandated mission of amphibious
forcible entry. The same flexible, expeditionary capabilities that
enable forcible entry also have great utility in enabling the wide
range of missions needed to counter the growth of extremist movements
and terrorism. Such expeditionary capability and readiness require a
high level of proficiency and long-term resourcing and is not a
capability we can create on short notice.
Today, information moves almost instantaneously around the world
via cyberspace, and while people may quickly travel great distances by
air, the preponderance of materiel still moves the way it has for
millennia--by sea. Whenever the United States has responded to conflict
around the globe, the vast majority of United States Joint Forces,
their equipment, and supplies have been transported by sea. In the
first half of the 20th century, demonstrating considerable foresight
and innovation, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leaders developed the
capabilities necessary to establish sea control and project power
ashore where and when desired. In the latter half of the same century
the importance of these capabilities waned, as the United States
enjoyed the luxury of extensive basing rights overseas, to include
secure ports and airfields.
In recent years, this network of overseas bases has been
dramatically reduced, even as we are confronted by a variety of
strategic challenges and are locked in a global struggle for influence.
The ability to overcome political, geographic, and military challenges
to access has re-emerged as a critical necessity for protecting vital
interests overseas. Fortunately, the United States possesses an
asymmetric advantage in that endeavor: seapower. Our ability to cross
wide expanses of ocean and to remain persistently offshore at a time
and place of our choosing is a significant national capability. This
means that the Navy-Marine Team can use the sea as both maneuver space
and as a secure operating area to overcome impediments to access.
Seabasing
The approach for overcoming these impediments is called Seabasing.
The Joint Seabasing concept--particularly when using aircraft carriers
and amphibious ships with embarked marines--mitigates reliance on ports
and airfields in the area of operations. It is the ideal method for
projecting influence and power ashore in a selectively discrete or
overt manner--from conducting security cooperation activities, to
providing humanitarian assistance, to deterring and, when necessary,
supporting major combat operations.
The seabasing capability currently employed by the Navy-Marine
Corps team, however, is limited in its ability to support large joint
operations. The sealift transporting the preponderance of the joint
force's materiel is still dependent upon secure ports and airfields.
Recognizing the importance of seabasing to 21st century needs, the Navy
and Marine Corps evolved a robust body of conceptual work and, with
other joint partners, produced a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept.
This concept defines Joint Seabasing as ``the rapid deployment,
assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of
joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support,
sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces
without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area. These
capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate
assured access and entry from the sea.''
Just as the amphibious innovations championed by the Navy-Marine
Corps during the 1920s and 1930s benefited the entire joint and allied
force in World War II, the Navy-Marine Corps seabasing initiatives
currently underway are expanding into more comprehensive joint and
interagency endeavors. The ability to conduct at-sea transfer of
resources, for both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore purposes, has
emerged as a key enabler for deploying, employing, and sustaining joint
forces from the sea. Building upon the cornerstones provided by
amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, initiatives include developing
high-speed intra-theater connectors, surface connectors, and Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF-F). These initiatives--as well as
others--will be employed in combination to achieve an increasingly
robust capability to reduce the joint force's reliance on ports and
airfields in the objective area.
Together, the Navy and Marine Corps provide the Nation with its
capability to rapidly project and sustain combat power ashore in the
face of armed opposition. When access is denied or in jeopardy,
forward-postured and rapidly deployable Marine forces are trained and
ready to create and exploit seams in an enemy's defenses by leveraging
available joint and naval capabilities, projecting sustainable combat
power ashore, and securing entry for follow-on forces. The Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the Nation's premier forcible entry force.
Two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) provide the assault echelon
that fights from amphibious ships. These forces launch from over the
horizon to strike inland objectives and fracture the enemy's defenses.
They are reinforced by a brigade of marines employed through MPF-F.
Collectively, these capabilities provide an ability to respond to
crisis across the spectrum of operations without reliance on
infrastructure or basing ashore.
In recent years our amphibious and prepositioned capabilities have
been in high demand across the spectrum of operations. These
capabilities have enabled over 85 commitments, such as the recent
Lebanon noncombatant evacuation and tsunami and Hurricane Katrina
relief operations, since the end of the Cold War--doubling the rate at
which they were employed during that superpower stand-off. Considering
this demonstrated utility, the modest investment of 34 amphibious ships
and MPF-F is not too much of an investment to secure the United States'
ability to conduct forcible entry operations; ensure strategic access
and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging
alliances and partnerships; and establish favorable security
conditions.
IV. SHIPBUILDING REQUIREMENTS
Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years the Navy and
Marine Corps have accepted risk in our Nation's forcible entry
capacity, and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0 MEB assault echelon (AE)
to 2.0 MEB AE. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious ships is
too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry--discounting
their demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the
clear imperative for marines embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet
Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those two strategic
goalposts, and to respond to every mission-tasking in between, will
rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that
facilitate our bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently
to determine the minimum number of amphibious ships necessary to
satisfy the Nation's needs.
The Marine Corps' contribution to the Nation's forcible entry
requirement is a single, simultaneously-employed two MEB assault
capability--as part of a seabased MEF. Although not a part of the MEF
AE, a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be provided through
MPF-F shipping. Each MEB AE requires 17 amphibious warfare ships--
resulting in an overall ship requirement for 34 amphibious warfare
ships. However, given current fiscal constraints, the Navy and Marine
Corps have agreed to assume a degree of operational risk by limiting
the AE of each MEB by using only 15 ships per MEB--in other words, a
Battle Force that provides 30 ``operationally available'' amphibious
warfare ships.
Amphibious Ships
In that 30-ship Battle Force, 10 aviation-capable big deck ships
(LHA/LHD/LHA(R)), 10 LPD-17-class ships, and 10 LSD class ships are
required to accommodate the MAGTF capabilities. In order to meet a 30-
ship availability rate--based on a CNO-approved maintenance factor of
10 percent--a minimum of 11 ships of each of the current types of
amphibious ships are required--for a total of 33 ships. The CNO has
concurred with this requirement for 33 amphibious warfare ships, which
provide the ``backbone'' of our maritime capability--giving us the
ability to meet the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum
of conflict.
The LPD-17 San Antonio-class of amphibious warfare ships represents
the Department of the Navy's commitment to a modern expeditionary power
projection fleet enabling our naval force to operate across the
spectrum of warfare. The LPD-17 class replaces four classes of older
ships--LKA, LST, LSD-36, LPD-4--and will have a 40-year expected
service life. It is imperative that 11 of these ships be built to meet
the minimum of 10 necessary for the 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift
requirement. Procurement of the 10th and 11th LPDs remains a priority.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
Capable of supporting the rapid deployment of three MEBs, the
legacy Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) is a proven capability used
as a force deployment option in selected contingencies to close forces
on accelerated timelines for major combat operations and, in
combination with amphibious forces, to rapidly and simultaneously react
to crises in more than one theater. The next and necessary evolution of
this program is fielding of the MPF-F Squadron. MPF-F is a key enabler
of Seabasing and will build on the success of the legacy MPF program.
It will provide support to a wide range of military operations with
improved capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, selective
offload of specific mission sets, and long-term, sea-based sustainment.
From the sea base, the squadron will be capable of prepositioning a
single MEB's critical equipment and sustainment for delivery offshore--
essentially creating a port and airfield at sea. While the MPF-F is not
suitable for independent forcible entry operations, it is critical for
the rapid build up and sustainment of additional combat forces once
entry has been achieved by our AE. The MPF-F, along with two legacy MPF
squadrons, will give our Nation the capacity to quickly generate three
MEBs in support of multiple combatant commanders. The MPF-F squadron
composition decision was made in May 2005 and is designed to consist of
three aviation-capable big-deck ships, three large medium-speed roll-
on/roll-off ships, three T-AKE supply ships, three Mobile Landing
Platforms, and two dense-packed container ships. Many of these will be
crewed by civilian mariners and, as stated earlier, are not designed to
conduct forcible entry operations.
Ship Modernization
Amphibious and maritime prepositioning ship modernization is vital
to maintaining our Nation's maritime forward presence and expeditionary
capabilities. Two decades of equipment growth and recent armor
initiatives have impacted the capability and capacity of our present
amphibious and maritime prepositioning ship fleets that were designed
to lift an early 1980s naval force. We are monitoring the Navy's
progress in upgrading and extending the service lives of our big-deck
amphibious assault support ships to ensure those vessels are uniformly
outfitted with up-to-date sea-based communications and network
capabilities, and will be able to compensate for increased weight and
density of Marine Corps assets as a result of armoring initiatives. We
must ensure that the dock landing ship fleet is recapitalized to
accommodate 21st century Marine Corps forces. Moreover, we are actively
working with the Navy to incorporate newer, more flexible ship
platforms from the existing Military Sealift Command fleet into our
aging Maritime Prepositioning Ships program. As we reset these ships,
changes are necessary to ensure future afloat prepositioning platforms
can accommodate our updated tables of equipment and sustainment support
requirements.
V. RIGHT-SIZING OUR MARINE CORPS
To meet the demands of the Long War, and prepare for other
contingencies for which the MAGTF is uniquely capable, our Corps must
be sufficiently manned, well trained, and properly equipped. To fulfill
our obligations to the Nation, and with the approval of the President
and Congress, we are growing our end strength to 202,000 Active
component marines. Our decision to grow to 202,000 marines was based on
national strategic guidance combined with increasing operational
forward presence requirements, and was guided by the Department of
Defense's 1:2 unit deployment-to-dwell ratio policy. The additional end
strength will result in three balanced MEFs--balanced in both capacity
and capability--and will ensure the Marine Corps can meet increasing
combatant commander demands for expeditionary forces.
The development of Marine Corps force structure has been the result
of a thorough and ongoing process that supports the combatant
commanders and accomplishes our title 10 responsibilities. The process
addresses each pillar of combat development--Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and
Facilities--and identifies our required capabilities and the issues
associated with fielding them. We have front-loaded structure for
recruiters and trainers to support this growth and have phased the
introduction of units balanced across the MAGTF. The increase in
capacity will be gradual, as we stand up new units and add end strength
through fiscal year 2011, while we simultaneously grow mid-grade
enlisted and officer leadership--a vital part of our growth that cannot
be developed overnight. In addition to personnel, this growth includes
expansions of our infrastructure to provide suitable housing and
support facilities, and the right mix of equipment for the current and
future fight.
Our engagements thus far in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a Total
Force effort--our Reserve Forces continue to perform impressively. As
our Active Force increases in size, our reliance on our Reserve Forces
should decrease--helping us achieve the 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio.
We believe our current authorized end strength of 39,600 Selected
Marine Corps Reserves is the right level. As with every organization
within the Marine Corps, we continue to review the make-up and
structure of our Reserve to ensure the right capabilities reside within
Marine Forces Reserve units and our Individual Mobilization Augmentee
program.
Building Educational and Training Structure
As part of our holistic growth plan, we are increasing training
capacity and reinvigorating our pre-deployment training program to
provide support to all elements of our MAGTFs. In accordance with the
Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation guidance, we are developing
training and education programs to build the capacity of allied and
partner nations. We are also developing the capability to conduct
large-scale MAGTF exercises within a joint, coalition, and interagency
context to maintain proficiency in core warfighting functions such as
combined arms maneuver, amphibious operations, and maritime
prepositioning operations. Finally, our budget request supports our
training and education programs and training ranges to accommodate the
202,000 Grow the Force effort.
World-Class Marine Corps University (MCU)
Our success in the Long War hinges on a multi-dimensional force
well trained for the current fight, but educated for the next.
Historically, our Corps has produced respected leaders who have
demonstrated intellectual agility in warfighting; however our current
deployment tempo places our Professional Military Education (PME)
programs at risk. We must maintain the steady flow of thinkers,
planners, and aggressive commanders who can execute effectively across
the entire spectrum of operations. Last year we conducted a
comprehensive `health of PME' assessment which identified six areas
necessary for the creation of a world-class MCU: students, curriculum,
educational programs, staff, policy, and infrastructure. We have world-
class students and faculty as evidenced by Marines' performance on
today's battlefields. We have made substantial improvements in our
curricula by integrating irregular warfare instruction while
maintaining a balance with conventional and amphibious warfare. Seeking
to ensure readiness for the next challenge, this year we added Iran and
China faculty chairs. We must however, correct significant
infrastructure and information technology deficiencies. It is crucial
that resources to support our MCU master plan be committed and approved
to support this critical effort. With proper investment and your
support, the MCU will become a world-class educational institution to
match its world-class students.
Center for Irregular Warfare
In 2007, we established the Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) as
our primary agency for identifying, coordinating, and implementing
Marine Corps irregular warfare capability initiatives. The CIW reaches
out through the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning
(CAOCL) and Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC)
to other military and civilian agencies. Last year, the CAOCL expanded
beyond pre-deployment unit training by offering operational culture,
regional studies, and limited language courses for officer PME
programs. Thus far, approximately 2,100 new lieutenants have been
assigned regions for career long-term study through the regional
learning concept, which are being expanded this year to include
sergeants, staff sergeants, and captains. Both officer and enlisted
marines will receive operational culture education throughout their
careers.
Since early 2006, the SCETC has formalized our military advisor
training curricula, and in fiscal year 2007 trained over 30 transition
teams. In fiscal year 2008, the SCETC is scheduled to train over 100
teams (over 2,000 marine advisors) and we will stand up a Training
Advisory Group to manage global sourcing of future transition and
security cooperation teams.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our Nation rightfully has high expectations of her Corps--as she
should. Your marines are answering the call around the globe,
performing with distinction in the face of great hardships. As they
continue to serve in harm's way, our moral imperative is to fully
support them--we owe them the full resources required to complete the
tasks we have given them. Now more than ever, they need the sustained
support of the American people and Congress to simultaneously maintain
our readiness, reset the force during an extended war, and to modernize
to face the challenges of the future. Again, we thank you for the
opportunity to report to you on their behalf.
Senator Kennedy. First of all, Admiral McCullough, the Navy
is projecting a shortfall, as I mentioned, of the F-18 aircraft
during the next decade. According to Navy testimony, that
shortfall could be as large as 125 aircraft short of the number
required to support the 10 aircraft carrier wings and 3 Marine
Corps. In my opening statement I asserted that anyone looking
to solve the shipbuilding problems could not look to naval
aviation to be a bill-payer. Do you agree with that assessment?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. The way I look at this is
particularly from the Navy. The 125 shortfall is for the
Department. The Navy shortfall commencing in 2017 is
approximately 69 strike fighter aircraft. There are several
ways we've worked at that. We're looking at life extensions
from a fatigue life standpoint on the F/A-18 A through
Ds to 10,000 hours, on the F/A-18 E and Fs to 9,000 hours, to
try to mitigate the effects of that strike fighter shortfall.
Senator Kennedy. We'd appreciate your keeping us abreast of
your assessment, both of the life expectancy of the planes,
what's necessary to get it, and also how that fills the gap.
Secretary Stiller, one of the big decisions in shipbuilding
is to fund the third DDG Land Attack Destroyer in fiscal year
2009 or whether to delay it a year and perhaps even truncate it
at a total of two ships, as some have suggested. Such
discussions usually included buying some form of DDG-51 Aegis
destroyers, either in the 1-year delay or continuing until the
Navy's ready to buy the CG(X), the next generation cruiser.
The Navy had intended to sign the contracts for two lead
ships in 2007, but recently completed negotiations and signed
the contracts almost a year later than planned. In part, the
Navy delayed the award while they switched the shipyard
responsible for building the first ship. The Navy plan for the
fiscal year 2009 ship is to award a fixed-price contract for
that ship.
Since it's taken so long to sign the lead ships contracts,
which are cost plus contracts, and since very little actual
ship construction information will be available at the time the
contractors have to submit their bids for fiscal year 2009
ship, why would the Navy believe that you'll be able to sign
these contracts in a timely fashion in 2009?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. One is that we took several steps as
we took a pause on DDG-1000. We didn't stop the activity on the
detailed design. So the detailed design has been continuing
right along, as well as procurement of long lead items as
authorized by the DAE.
While we didn't sign the actual construction contract until
about a month ago, we were proceeding incrementally, in fact,
there are a couple things that make us feel very confident that
we could sign fixed-price deals in 2009. That's because part of
what we've authorized the shipbuilders to do is to build a
complex machinery block to prove out the translation of the
design from the product model into the production floor, so to
speak.
That's ongoing. That will wrap up at Bath Iron Works this
summer and at Northrop Grumman a little later in the year. But
that will inform their bids.
Senator Kennedy. So you don't feel that you lost the time?
Ms. Stiller. No, sir. From the original when we thought we
would start on the lead ship, there was about a 5-month slip.
But we still feel that we were doing the prudent things to
continue the program and that the 2009----
Senator Kennedy. That's manageable, you think?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Why would the Navy believe that the
contractors would be willing to take a larger portion of the
risk to build the ship for roughly $2.5 billion in a fixed-
price contract, when the first ship cost more than $3 billion
and the shipyards will have very few actuals upon which to base
their bids?
Ms. Stiller. There are a couple of reasons. First of all,
they will be significantly far along in design when they start
production. They'll be about 85 percent. For example, LCS was
less than 25 percent along. So they should be getting the
return data right away.
Also, what I talked about, what we've carved out for both
of them to do is a complex machinery block, and that work will
be done before the bids are due, so they will have that return
data, and we feel comfortable that that will prove to them and
the Navy that they understand the design and what these ships
truly cost.
Also, the other element is the material that's under
procurement. A good portion, I'd say 98 percent, of the long
lead material and some of the other commodities are already
under fixed-price contracts for the lead ship. They understand
the material portion of the ship.
Senator Kennedy. So you're on track on those and feel
confident about it?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. General Amos, I mentioned the MPF in my
opening statement, where defining the requirements has been a
problem. I know that it's been prudent to take sufficient time
upfront to define the requirements for any major program. But
the MPF program appears to be taking longer than anyone had
originally estimated.
While the subcommittee has heard for several years about
the contribution such a force would make to the Marine Corps
and Navy, we have seen the procurement of certain ships
designed to support the MPF program, such as the Mobile Landing
Platform (MLP), being delayed each year as the resolution of
questions about requirements and capabilities has been
deferred.
What clarification can you give us about when requirements
will be defined for these new ships, and when will we see the
plans for building these new ships stabilize?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, we just completed about 3 weeks
ago the Commandant's Title 10 war game on sea basing, and it
was joint and combined. Eleven nations participated, over 300
folks from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the
interagency. The whole idea was sea basing. Buried in there, in
the middle of all of that, was MPF-F. It's an important part of
the whole sea basing concept.
But MPF-F is not sea basing, but it is certainly the key
enabler, and it is the heart and soul of our Nation's ability
to do sea basing in the future, vice the kind of sea basing we
do right now, where you pull up with a single ship and you
can't offload necessarily in stream, it's difficult to offload
at high sea states. So MPF-F will provide us that capability.
The good news is that in the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) there are three of these MLPs. We're actually going to
start cutting steel on the MLP within the next couple of years
and we'll see that. I predict when that ship pulls alongside a
large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ship and lowers a
ramp onto the MLP and the first 70-ton tank comes off of that,
when you have landing craft, air cushions up there to take it
ashore, it's going to revolutionize sea basing and our whole
perspective on that in the future.
So, Mr. Chairman, I think we have the requirements
identified. I think what we've done is we've just done a poor
job of being able to pass that message across to both Congress
and OSD and the American people.
Senator Kennedy. Conceptually it certainly makes a good
deal of sense. But there have been the questions about the
implementation.
Let me ask you about the urgent needs process, General.
According to recent reports, the Marine general in command of
the forces in western Iraq sent the urgent request on February
17, 2005, for 1,169 mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP)
vehicles, and the urgent request was apparently lost in the
bureaucracy of Marine Corps combat development and never made
it up to the senior levels of the Marine Corps. As we all know,
it took the Secretary of Defense personally getting involved in
2007 to fix a broken bureaucracy and a get sufficient number of
MRAP vehicles to forces in Iraq.
Last June, Secretary Gates stated: ``The way I put it to
everyone is that you have to look outside the normal
bureaucratic way of doing things, and so does industry, because
lives are at stake. For every month we delay, scores of young
Americans are going to die.''
In this morning's Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
General Petraeus thanked the committee for their support in
delivering the MRAP vehicles to Iraq, calling them lifesavers.
If proper MRAP procurement had begun in 2005 in response to
the known threats, hundreds of deaths and injuries could have
been prevented. The Marine Corps questioned the press reports
about the issue, but a Naval Audit Service report last
September said the Marine Corps had not established adequate
oversight of the urgent needs requirement process. This process
at the time of our audit was ineffective.
The Marine Corps has asked the Pentagon's Inspector General
(IG) to examine the allegations. The real question is whether
the Marine Corps today is adaptive enough to meet urgent needs.
There are many success stories with rapidly fielding urgent
needs in the last few years, including small unmanned ground
and aerial vehicles, hand-held electronic translators, and
Quick Clot, a granular mineral material that speeds the natural
clotting process and limits blood loss.
But many of these successes have involved the Army's urgent
needs system. The Army's rapid equipping force has been in
place for years. It seems to be a more responsive system for
addressing urgent needs, including the practice of deploying
many of its members to forward teams throughout Iraq and
Afghanistan to identify needs and then assess how well rapidly
fielded equipment works.
So I'm concerned, General Amos, that the changes the Marine
Corps seems to be making to the system are only bandaid
solutions, more importantly, that not enough of the changes are
long term. If too much of the system is being fixed in informal
meetings or by personal intervention of senior leaders, that
doesn't fix the bureaucracy for the future.
So what actions are you specifically taking to make changes
to the urgent needs process and to codify these changes so that
the entire culture with respect to urgent needs is fixed in the
Marine Corps?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, I truly appreciate your concern
in this area. There are probably a number of urgent needs in
2003, 2004, and 2005 that have my personal signature on them
from Iraq. So I'm very sensitive to this and I do appreciate
exactly what you said.
As I look back on 2005--and I was there, had come up from
Camp Lejeune and was part of the meeting when the decision was
made to buy the M-1114s. I know you've been briefed on that, as
your staff has. But honestly, at the time we thought--the
Commandant did and the senior leadership did--we were doing
exactly the best thing for the Marines as a result of our IG
that had just come back and said the Marines want the up-
armored Humvee.
I look back now, like you, I regret that we didn't have the
foresight to buy the MRAPs in 2005. They have saved lives and
they are a critical enabler. But what we've done since the
Naval Audit report has come in--and they talked about three
major things. They said you need to have some type of
overarching order that defines roles and responsibilities; you
need to have a tracking system that allows visibility up and
down the chain; and you need to establish controls and provide
oversight, in other words metrics. We've done that.
In 2006 we've had a Lean 6 Sigma effort that's come in,
that came in before I went there and took command. The results
of that are right now an electronic system in cyberworld where
when a requirement comes in from the fleet--and it has to come
in from our warfighters; it can't be just somebody that's in
WestPac that's not affiliated with warfighting necessarily. But
when that urgent need comes in, we see it, I see it
automatically right here as well as my other generals, my
colonels, and the folks that process this thing.
We see it. It comes in, it flows. We've reduced the amount
of time. We have visibility. We've done everything, I think,
that we ought to be doing as responsible stewards of the lives
and requirements of our young men and women. So I think we're
there.
I'd like to give you two examples of what just took place
within the last about 2 weeks to talk about the value of this
cyber system, this virtual network where everybody gets to see
it. The 24th MEU that's on the ground in Afghanistan right now,
the commander about 2 weeks before he deployed, so just about a
month ago, said: I need tier two unmanned aerial vehicles. We
don't have any with the MEU. That's not an integral part of a
MEU. That came in signed by the three-star. I saw it. It came
into the process. I looked at it and I said: We need to get
moving on this right away because this MEU is going to deploy
immediately.
While this thing was grinding its way--and I say
``grinding'' not in the slow term, but I mean working its
process--it went right to the head of Marine Aviation, went
over to the Naval Air Systems Command, and we already have it
under contract, and the Scan Eagles will be in theater here
within the next probably 2 weeks.
The second thing they asked for is a counter-mortar radar.
We don't have that. That's not part of a battalion's normal
fix. That thing popped up. I saw it about 2 weeks ago and said:
Let's buy it; it's in the system; it's commercial off-the-
shelf; other forces have it.
So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what you're saying. I think
we understand and we have the system in place.
Senator Kennedy. I thank you. My time is up, and I think
it's impressive, what you've said and what you've done. We want
to make sure that it's going to be a system that's going to
remain in place.
General Amos. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Perhaps I'll be a little bit more specific
and ask if you'd give me a note on this about how you're
working on this.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Kennedy. Just finally, Admiral McCullough, I'm
interested always in mine warfare. General Amos talks about how
we're coming in from the sea and returning to the sea, and this
mine warfare has been an area which we've been interested in
for some period of time. I'm going to submit some questions
just on that.
The last question, if I could ask, Admiral, I understand,
since the time that the U.S.S. Cole was in Aden and they had
that tragedy there, that naval ships don't go back into Aden. I
was in preparation for the Petraeus hearing and someone
mentioned to me that this has some significance, because
they're trying to make the point that al Qaeda is making is
that once the United States leaves it doesn't come back, and
they were using the fact that there had been the attack on the
Cole and we haven't had a Navy ship that's come back into Aden.
They used other examples, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia;
once Americans have left places they don't come back, and if
they leave in Iraq they're not going back.
It was just an interesting point. I see you down here at
the other end of the table. I don't know whether you want to
make a quick comment on this or whether there's a reason that
they don't come. I know it was rare that they went there, but
if you want to submit something later; it's a sort of an off-
the-wall question.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. I'll have to check on whether
we've put anybody back into Aden. I'm not sure that that's
totally correct, but I'll get that answer.
Senator Kennedy. Yes, that would be fine.
Admiral McCullough. We've used Aden as a refuel point for
ships that were independently deploying to Fifth Fleet to
execute maritime security operations, both going in and coming
out, and that's what we used Aden for. We didn't use it a lot,
but that's what we used it for.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. If you could just let me know I'd
appreciate it. Thanks very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
No U.S. ships have pulled into Aden, Yemen, in any capacity, since
U.S.S. Cole's terrorist attack in October 2000. This includes port
visits or servicing stops.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral McCullough, one of the things we've been discussing
is the need for there to be a floor of a 313-ship Navy. From
your perspective, what is the optimal number of ships that we
should have in our Navy, obviously 313 being the goal?
Admiral McCullough. Senator, we look at the 313 number as a
capability-based force structure based on a 2020 threat. As we
speak to our component commanders globally, specifically in
Pacific Command with Pacific Fleet and in CENTCOM with
Commander, United States Navy Central Command, there's always a
higher demand for presence than we have in theater.
Specifically, Admiral Willard would like to get at the
southwestern Pacific.
I don't have a specific number to give you, but I'll tell
you that in a lot of ways capacity becomes a capability of its
own. So I'll get back to you on a higher number, but CNO has
specifically said we believe we can do the Nation's bidding in
accordance with the Maritime Strategy with moderate risk with a
313 capability-based force structure.
Senator Martinez. I know there are some challenges in
funding this and in the budget and so forth for this, and I was
just wondering. The CNO has emphasized that he will control the
costs by controlling requirements.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. But in spite of this, the Congressional
Budget Office believes that the Navy has underestimated
shipbuilding costs by $3 to $4 billion per year, suggesting
further cuts are necessary to meet the overarching requirement
for the 313-ship Navy. So, Admiral, my question is, how has the
CNO's direction to control requirements translated into policy
and practice? It would be good to know exactly examples where
we've done that in the reduction of shipbuilding costs.
[The information referred to follows:]
A full force structure assessment occurs as a part of the
Department of Defense's (DOD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In
2005, the Navy conducted a comprehensive, capability-based Force
Structure Assessment to support POM-08. The Navy's ship force structure
requirement of 313 ships is based on detailed campaign and mission
analysis of 4 warfighting scenarios (3 major contingency operations
(MCO), plus global war on terror), using ship types projected to be in
the fleet in 2020 through 2024 and the current DOD planning guidance to
wage two nearly-simultaneous conventional campaigns. Subsequent
campaign analysis for MCO and in-depth global war on terror analysis
validated capability and capacity requirements of the 313-ship force
structure. The analytic baseline supporting the 313-ship plan, although
significantly updated with new warfare analysis since 2005, continues
to support the quantities of ships by class in the original baseline.
The next QDR will provide an opportunity to readdress the basis of the
current planning guidance, which if changed, will affect the inputs
into Navy's next comprehensive, capability-based Force Structure
Assessment and produce an updated requirement.
The current President's budget 2009 represents the best overall
balance between procurements to meet operational requirements and
affordability. The Navy has examined the feasibility of increased
shipbuilding investment in fiscal year 2009. Given current industrial
base capacity, the Navy's plan to achieve the 313-ship mix required by
the fiscal year 2020 timeframe, and other competing Navy requirements
that must be met, $12.4 billion in the fiscal year 2009 budget request
is sufficient and represents the necessary resources to achieve the
required warfighting capability on time. In addition, the Navy's plan
increases shipbuilding investments from $12.4 billion in fiscal year
2009 to over $17.9 billion in fiscal year 2013.
It is a significant challenge to get the number of ships we need
with the right capabilities within the Navy's overall funding level;
however, the Navy is committed to achieving a force structure of at
least 313 ships, with the necessary warfighting capability that the
Navy will need by fiscal year 2020.
Admiral McCullough. Sir, when we submitted the 2009
shipbuilding plan to Congress we looked at what we had said: in
fiscal year 2005 dollars to execute the plan, that we needed
about $13.4 billion a year. Our review prior to submitting the
2009 plan, because of the escalation in material and some labor
requirements in the various yards, said that we should probably
have funded that to about $14.6 billion a year, which in 2007
dollars is about $15.7 billion a year. So right now we believe
the plan's based on $15.7 billion a year and escalated out
through 2020.
Additionally, the CNO asked us to look at a different way
to couch a shipbuilding plan, because we think we understand
relatively well the costs in the near years and through the
FYDP and probably to some degree out through what we call the
near term, to 2020. Beyond 2020, the ships in the shipbuilding
plan are replacements for ships that were built in the late
1970s and 1980s and are just our best estimate on what they'd
be in a per-unit replacement.
Requirements generation, we've worked with the Marine Corps
and the secretariat to develop an acquisition governance
process which gets senior Navy leadership much more involved in
major acquisition decisions at an earlier point. We call it the
six gate review process. The CNO or the Commandant are
responsible for the first three gates, which involve
development of the initial capabilities document, the guidance
to work through the analysis of alternatives, and approval of
which alternative is selected, and then development of the
capabilities development document that goes into the joint
capabilities integration and development system process.
At that point, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition, starts to chair the
gate reviews. We have developed a process called a system
design specification (SDS) that goes into the overarching
requirements, technical requirements that exist currently in
the Navy, to better specify what requirements we put in the
Request for Proposals (RFPs) with the contractor.
Once we agree on the SDSs and the capabilities development
document is approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) process, we come together and develop the RFP.
This goes through another gate review that's approved by the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition.
The way I liken this to is when we used to develop key
performance parameters (KPPs) in the capabilities development
document. They're high level requirements, like a ship will go
so many knots for X number of miles, or it'll have so many
weapons tubes in it, and it'll have threshold and objectives in
those requirements. We then gave that to the acquisition
community and expected them to develop detailed requirements to
pass to industry. We didn't always do that very well.
So the SDS will provide adequate detail to industry, so
that if I had asked for a CTS Cadillac that the specifications
I give to industry tell them I want a CTS Cadillac and can't be
interpreted to mean I want a Ford F-150 pickup truck.
So I think through that process we better control our
requirements, because throughout the process we review the
health of the program, the budget, and the cost estimates. This
process has been recently implemented and I think that's
probably what the CNO was referring to.
Senator Martinez. Ms. Stiller, if you could focus on the
requirements discipline that is necessary, but not enough to
reduce costs, and what is the acquisition organization doing to
improve cost estimates and to elevate cost control in the
shipbuilding contracts?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. Just to echo what Admiral McCullough
said, I have one tangible example that came out right after we
went through the LCS review. We were in the process of getting
ready to issue the RFP for the JHSV, and we took a pause and
worked with the requirements community and what I call the
technical community that's writing the building codes to say,
do we really want these features to be designed to Coast Guard
specs, naval vessel rules, or military specs.
We came up with a detailed matrix, which is part of what a
SDS will do, that will tell you what specifications you want to
build that ship. So we delayed the RFP release until we knew we
had it right and we had agreement across the board. That's one
example.
But what we're doing on the acquisition side to improve the
independent cost estimates is, we're using realistic indices.
We've seen escalation on certain materials, like nickel for
example rose 700 percent in 1 year. Instead of using just
standard OSD inflation indices, we're looking at the indices
that are specific to shipbuilding--copper, steel, aluminum.
Whatever goes into a ship, we're watching those and factoring
those into our cost estimates.
We look at cost estimating relationships as it relates to
ships we've built in the past and what that means to future
ships. As we get through a bunch of these lead ships and we
start to get into serial production--that's why I commented I'm
very happy we don't have lead ships in this budget--it helps us
to inform our cost estimates for the future ships, and we're
using those as well.
We look at obsolescence and we work with the shipyards to
understand where we might have obsolescence issues in the
vendor base, so that we can factor that in as well.
Another tool that we've given to all the program managers
is restrictions on the type of changes that they can approve.
Changes for safety items or test and trial deficiencies, for
example, they have the ability to make the change. If the
change is I want more or somebody else tells me I want more,
they have to come and ask approval through the process. That
will greatly reduce the number of changes that are introduced
during the design and construction of a vessel.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
My time's about to expire, but let me ask one last
question. Admiral, regarding the situation at Mayport, the
Environmental Impact Statement has now been completed and I was
wondering what your plans were for future funding of Mayport,
particularly to complete any of the improvements that need to
be made. Are you at all familiar with what I'm talking about?
We need some dredging, wharf upgrades, and things of that
nature.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with that and
I've dealt with it on the periphery. I'd like to take that
question for the record and have the right folks get you the
correct answer.
Senator Martinez. I'd like to know when is completion of
the strategic laydown study so that we may know when a decision
may be made on that.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Only the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) has been
completed. The Final EIS will not be completed until November 2008. A
Record of Decision (ROD) on a preferred alternative for the Mayport EIS
will follow in December 2008. The Navy will fully consider operational,
financial, and environmental factors before making decisions regarding
the homeporting alternatives being evaluated in the EIS. If the Navy's
preferred alternative requires military construction (MILCON), these
requirements will be balanced with the Navy's other programming
priorities.
The plan for future funding of Mayport depends upon the alternative
chosen in the ROD. Should the ROD select an alternative to move any
ships to Mayport, funding will be requested in order to meet the
desired date of initial operating capability (IOC). For example, in
order to make a 2014 IOC date for CVN homeporting at Mayport, several
supporting MILCON projects would need to be programmed beginning in the
fiscal year 2010 budget.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Ms. Stiller, I want to take up where the chairman left off
on the DDG-1000. Some House members have proposed terminating
the DDG-1000 after building just the two lead ships and instead
building more DDG-51s, which the Navy has not asked for.
So first let me get you on record: Does the Navy oppose
that plan?
Ms. Stiller. Right now, ma'am, the program of record is
seven DDG-1000s. That was signed out in the 30-year
shipbuilding plan.
Senator Collins. So that's a yes, right?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. In addition to the many capabilities that
would be sacrificed if we went back to the DDG-51 instead of
proceeding to the DDG-1000, there are also some important cost
considerations. The DDG-51 is coming to the end of that class
of ships. Has the Navy done an estimate of how much it would
cost to restart the DDG-51 line?
Ms. Stiller. Ma'am, we've looked at it in a couple of ways
because that information has been requested from the House.
Some estimates indicate if you built one ship it would be $2.1
billion and if you built two it would be $3.3 billion if you go
back to DDG-51. However, I expressed concern when I testified
before the House Armed Services Committee that I don't
necessarily understand all the subvendor implications, because
the last multi-year was signed in 2002 and we did an economic
order quantity.
I have agreed to work with the shipbuilders to try to
understand the subvendor implications, and I don't have that
data yet. They're going to come see me in a couple of weeks.
But there may be some subvendor implications that we were not
aware of when we cost this. But right now those were the
estimates, yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. If there are those implications, that
presumably would increase the cost still further, correct?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. In addition, has the Navy looked at the
total life cycle cost, the total operational costs of the DDG-
1000 versus the DDG-51?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am. As part of all program
documentation that we take forward to the DAE, we have to look
at the total ownership cost of those vessels. I don't have the
comparison between DDG-1000 and DDG-51. I'll have to take that
for the record. But I'll be happy to provide that for you.
Senator Collins. As luck would have it, I do have that
information. It's my understanding that the Navy has estimated
that the DDG-1000, when you look at the total life cycle costs,
that it actually costs less to operate the DDG-1000 over 35
years than the DDG-51. In fact, the estimate that I have from
the Navy is that it's $4.5 billion less to operate 10 ships
over 35 years.
Setting aside that issue for just a moment, isn't there a
considerable cost savings that results from the far smaller
crew size that is needed to operate the DDG-1000 compared to
the DDG-51?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am. Certainly manpower reductions will
save you over the life of the class. There are additional
maintenance costs, though, when you do that. When you take
sailors off, there's going to be more shoreside maintenance
that will have to be done. But overall I do believe there is a
net savings. I hear your numbers. I'll make sure that I go back
and verify those.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Navy has not stated that it would cost roughly the same amount
of money to procure and maintain one DDG-51 ship as it would a DDG-1000
ship. The unit costs for the final ships of the DDG-51 class (procured
in fiscal year 2005) are lower than the projected unit costs for the
follow ships of the DDG-1000 class. However, the Navy does expect that
a DDG-1000-class ship will have a lower annual total operating and
support (O&S) cost per ship than a DDG-51 class ship. This comparison
is based on the Navy service cost estimate for DDG-1000 O&S costs
compared to a composite across all ships of the DDG-51 class based on
reported O&S cost data. The overall lower DDG-1000 per ship annual O&S
cost is primarily due to the decreased ship manning for DDG-1000 as
compared to DDG-51. This decreased manning affects both direct mission
personnel costs and indirect support costs (such as installation and
personnel support costs). The Navy is currently updating the O&S cost
estimate for DDG-1000 based on the current design and life cycle
support strategy.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
It's my understanding that the crew size for the DDG-1000
is projected to be only 148 sailors. Admiral, if I'm wrong on
that feel free to jump in.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, ma'am. The core crew on the DDG-
1000 is 114 crew members. The aviation detachment 28, so the
total for the ship is about 142.
Senator Collins. 142, and that compares very favorably with
the DDG-51. The crew size for that I believe is something in
the neighborhood of 346 or so; is that correct?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, ma'am, depending on what variant
of the ship and what we've done to take efficiencies in Smart
Ship and drive the crew size down. But it's in excess of 300
folks, yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. So we're talking about a ship that is more
capable and yet can be operated with about half the crew size;
is that accurate?
Admiral McCullough. It's much more capable in the littoral,
given the radar suite that we put on it, the signature
reductions that we've put into the ship, and yes, ma'am, it has
less than half the crew size on it.
Senator Collins. Admiral, could you speak to some of the
other capabilities that the DDG-1000 would give the Navy that
it does not currently have with the DDG-51, fine ship though
that is?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, ma'am, DDG-51's a great ship.
DDG-1000 has 10 technological advancements on it, and I'll
do the best I can without a cheat sheet in front of me. It has
an integrated electric drive fight-through power system that's
a 78 megawatt power plant, and it is electric drive. It has a
significantly reduced acoustic signature that rivals the
signature of some of our attack submarines. It has a thermal
suppression system that reduces the infrared signature of the
ship.
The hull form is specifically designed to reduce the wake,
which is a significant portion of the radar cross-section of
the ship. So the ship has a very, very small radar cross-
signature compared to a DDG-51.
Senator Collins. So it's stealthier?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, ma'am.
We put two advanced gun systems on it that are unmanned 155
millimeter tubes, that are designed to shoot a long-range land
attack projectile that has a nominal range in excess of 60
miles with a very small circular error probability. So it's
very accurate. It's GPS-guided. The system is designed so it
can have multiple rounds simultaneously impact the target at
that range.
The gun system is totally unmanned. I would tell you from
the work that we've done from computer simulation and actually
shot the gun at Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, if you looked
at the computer simulation of the gun and compared it to the
real gun firing, you can't tell which one's which until the
breach block opens on the gun.
We have fired the long-range land attack projectile from a
155 tube. I believe it was at Point Mugu. We fired it at a
barge approximately 60 miles at sea. We put a video camera on
the barge. The barge owner was not as convinced as we were what
the accuracy of the projectile would be. They made us insure
the barge. You can see the projectile splash off the barge
where it was supposed to.
The SPY-3 radar, the X-band radar on that ship, provides
the ship with periscope detection as well as very high fidelity
in the littoral. So it reduces the clutter of the radar and
enables it to see targets over land much better than what a
SPY-1 can do.
The last one's the fire suppression system, which enables
us to reduce the crew size.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Admiral. I think it's clear
that it is an extraordinarily capable ship which will be able
to be operated with half the crew size, which has life cycle
costs that are extremely favorable, and that we should proceed
with it.
If I could just ask one more quick question of Ms. Stiller.
Ms. Stiller, how important is the DDG-51 modernization program
to achieving the goal of a 313-ship Navy?
Ms. Stiller. DDG modernization is an important component.
But I'll defer to Admiral McCullough for the requirements.
Admiral McCullough. Modernization of our current fleet is
the heart of the 313 force structure plan. If you look at 2020
and look at the battle force inventory, the majority of the
ships that make up the battle force inventory are sitting at
the pier today.
We historically don't do a good job with ships if we don't
modernize the combat systems. If you look at the 993-class
DDGs, we decommissioned them at about 17 years, which was half
their engineered service life. The Baseline 1 cruisers we
decommissioned at about 20 years. That was about half of their
expected service lives. The Spruance-class destroyers we
decommissioned at an average age of 22 years, which was half of
their estimated service life roughly.
If you don't modernize the combat system and you can't pace
the current threat, the ships have a tendency to become
irrelevant. So the combat systems and hull, mechanical, and
electrical modernization program that we've put in for the 47
cruisers in the DDG-51s is a key cornerstone of the 313 plan,
and Bunker Hill is in her modernization right now.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
I would just conclude my questioning by saying to the
chairman that the most efficient way to undertake that
modernization of the DDG-51s, a modernization that we just
heard is critical to achieving the goal of a 313-ship fleet, is
to return those ships to the building yards, which have the
expertise to do the retrofits in a most efficient manner.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. I never thought of that before. That's a
real interesting observation.
Senator Collins. I know the chairman wants to save money at
all times and the best way is to bring them back.
Senator Kennedy. Bring them home, bring them home.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I'm not surprised that Senator
Collins had all that information when she asked that question.
She's not trained as a lawyer, but she usually knows the answer
before she asks.
Let me ask a few questions about the LCS. I'm a little
worried about that. But first let me compliment the Navy on a
decade of work that is designed to transform the Navy into an
effective fighting force that can utilize less personnel, more
firepower, and more capabilities. I hope we continue to do
that, but we don't need to weaken the Navy in the process. So I
hope you'll keep us advised.
As I understand it, I think it's clear that the Navy has
placed, Secretary Stiller, the LCS at the center of its
procurement and at the center of its 313-ship Navy. How many of
those LCS ships are planned to be part of the 313-ship Navy?
Ms. Stiller. The plan is still for 55 LCS as part of the
313 plan.
Senator Sessions. At one point it was as high as 82, I
believe, in one of the plans.
The LCS vessel has outstanding capabilities in areas, for
example, like the Persian Gulf, would it not?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. I'm going to defer to Admiral
McCullough.
Senator Sessions. Admiral McCullough, I guess I'll ask you.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. The ship's designed as a
focused mission ship. It has very good capability in mine
warfare and in the anti-surface warfare area that we looked
extensively at scenarios in the Arabian Gulf, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. It's not exactly a replacement of any
other ship. It's more of a new capability for the Navy; is that
correct, Admiral?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Sessions. What are some of the new capabilities
that you expect to achieve from that ship?
Admiral McCullough. It has significant enhancements in the
mine warfare area, specifically with a remote mine-hunting
vehicle that tows an SQS-20 sonar, which is a very accurate
sonar, to find mines.
Senator Sessions. Let me mention that Senator Kennedy I
think for years has rightly been concerned about mines and the
threats of mines to major vessels. One mine can neutralize
hundreds of millions of dollars of ship capability.
The LCS clearly is an advancement in our anti-mine
capability?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Would that be one of its top
capabilities? It's the first one you mentioned.
Admiral McCullough. We've delivered the first mine mission
package. It came out just last fall. It had the remote mine-
hunting vehicle, the SQS-20A sonar. We're working on an
Airborne Mine Neutralization System. It also included an
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System and the support equipment
that goes with that.
We're working on some additional capability which involves
putting a 30-millimeter gun on the ship to neutralize mines.
The system's called the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System.
We're also working on a program where it can detect mines over
the beach. So this will have a significant mine warfare
capability to enable us to maintain access against people that
would use mines as an anti-access strategy.
Senator Sessions. Compared to capabilities, this ship also
has personnel demands?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. The core crew on the ship is
40 folks. There are 15 folks that go with the mission packages
and about 20 or 22 that go with the aviation detachment on a
ship.
Senator Sessions. So 60 or so even with the packages and
capabilities.
Admiral McCullough. 75, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Fuel mileage? It depends on how fast it
goes, right?
Admiral McCullough. It depends. Yes, sir, it depends on how
fast it's traveling. The threshold KPP for the ship is 40
knots. Both of the ships use large gas turbine engines as well
as diesel engines to propel them. So even with the advanced
hull-form and General Dynamics variant, they still burn a lot
of fuel when they go fast, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. But just to ask you, Admiral McCullough,
the Navy remains committed to this ship to being 55 of the 313
ships we envision in the Navy?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Sessions. We have one today.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Now, Secretary Stiller, I have been
concerned. I can't complain too much. I have to admire
Secretary Winter for saying we're going to challenge the costs,
we're going to keep costs down. Basically, you've put a hold on
both versions now of the ship. Explain to me in simple English
where we are in terms of bringing this ship up to the 55 we're
supposed to have. Are we going to be behind? Does this
represent any lack of commitment on behalf of the Navy to the
ship, or do you remain committed to it as a critical part of
the future navy combat system?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir, we are committed to the LCS program.
Right now LCS-1 is about 82 percent along in her construction.
She'll go to builder's trials here in May. LCS-2 is about 68
percent along and she'll launch in late April.
We have one ship in 2008 and two in 2009 that we are in the
process of running a limited competition between the two primes
for the total of three. Ideally, one would have one and the
other would have two. That RFP was just released and so the
contractors are in the process of working up their proposals.
The Navy's hope is to award toward the latter part of the
summertime the 2008 ship as well as the options for the 2009
ships.
As for getting to 55, I believe in the 313 plan we still
get there before 2020. It's in 2019. So we've laid out a ramp-
up of quantities that will get us there by 2019.
Senator Sessions. I can't criticize you if you need to
examine the expense, examine the capabilities, and make a good
decision. But I do think that you have to be aware that in the
environment we operate under that if we delay something too
long and we can't make up our minds it can allow Congress to
take money and spend it on other things.
If it's a critical part of your shipbuilding capability,
Admiral, and your needs for the warfighter, we don't need to
dawdle around here. We need to work out the problems, challenge
the contractors if need be, and get this thing moving.
Do you understand the dangers that we can have with
uncertainty in the procurement process?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir, absolutely. That's why we are moving
forward as quickly as we can on the 2008 and 2009 procurements,
which will also be in a fixed-price environment, recognizing
the cost cap imposed by Congress as well.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Martinez [presiding]. Thank you.
I want to focus on the LCS, but I want to make sure that we
talk a little bit about the amphibious lift requirements,
General Amos. My understanding is that the Marine Corps has
long had a requirement for three amphibious brigades to conduct
amphibious assault, but fiscal constraints reshaped this
requirement for operationally available amphibious lift to two
brigade assault echelons.
So how does this requirement for two brigade assault
echelons translate into numbers and types of amphibious ships,
and what are the assumptions and related risks in sizing this
amphibious force?
General Amos. Senator Martinez, you're absolutely correct.
There has been risk that has been taken already as we went from
three Marine Expeditionary Brigades worth of assault echelon,
which equates to forcible entry, our Nation's ability to
project forces from the sea ashore in an environment or a
nation that doesn't want us to be there. So we went from 3 to
2.5 and we're down to 2.0 right now.
That number of marines and that requirement requires just a
little bit over 17 ships to hold that many marines, 17 ships
per Marine Expeditionary Brigade. A decision was made 2 years
ago by the Commandant and the CNO to accept the level of risk,
further level of risk, and allow those total numbers to get
down to 15 per Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
So that's a total of 30 ships. Now, just like anything
else, like airplanes and whatever, everything's not up 100
percent of the time. Things are in maintenance, things are in
overhaul. So if you just take the historic average of
maintenance and availability, you need about 34 ships. You need
a little bit more than 34, but 34 ships to bring those two
brigades worth of marines ashore.
Now, it's important to note that the mix inside that is
important, and that's why in my opening statement I talked
about the 10th LPD and I talked about the importance of that
ship and the capabilities it brings. It's a 25,000-ton ship. It
is an enormous ship and it's very, very capable.
So we're looking at a proper mix inside those 15 ships: 5
big-deck what we call LHA-LHD ships, 5 LPD-17 ships, and 5 LSD-
41, or 49 ships to bring up the total of 15 to put in there. So
that's how we got to the total requirement agreed to by the CNO
and the Commandant of 34 ships. It's really about 33: 11 big
decks, 11 LPD-17s, and 11 LSDs.
Senator Martinez. We need to fix the problem. My question
to you would be, what would be your priorities in terms of
fixing the capabilities and the shortfalls? From your
perspective, how would you like to see this proceed?
General Amos. I know the Commandant's number one unfunded
priority for this year is the 10th LPD. Right now there is the
LPD-17 line scheduled to be closed in fiscal year 2009. There
is money applied to that, $103 million, and what the Navy and
the Marine Corps--I'll just speak for the Marine Corps--what
the Marine Corps would like to see happen is to have that 10th
LPD fully funded with global war on terror funds and get that
thing underway and under contract.
Senator Martinez. Ms. Stiller, if that was not to take
place what would then happen to the industrial base for the
shipbuilding of that particular class of ship?
Ms. Stiller. If you look at the industrial base and where
we are in the LPD production, I would say that you could wait
until fiscal year 2010 to buy that ship with a little bit more
risk, but beyond that you would definitely end up with a cold
production line.
Senator Martinez. One last question, General Amos. As you
indicated in your opening remarks, the role of the marines in
Iraq and Afghanistan has been a land-based role, not the
traditional role of the Marine Corps in expeditionary warfare.
Is there a need for you, for the Marine Corps, to rebuild this
fundamental expertise through the ranks of the Corps in order
to retain the full skills and capabilities required to project
power ashore from the sea?
General Amos. Sir, there is. The Commandant talked to his
leadership about that. We have really a couple of generations
of young company-grade officers now that have never even been
aboard a ship, because we've been focused solely, narrowly on
the set of operations that we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So we understand that.
One of the driving factors behind growing the Marine Corps
to 202,000 was to give us a little bit of elasticity in the
deploying units. Right now--and I know you know this, Senator--
there's a large percentage of our front-line combat units that
are on about a one-to-one dwell to rotation. They're gone for 7
months, they're home for 7 months. It's a bit of a ruse because
they're home really for probably 6 to 5 months because they
spend 30 days at Twentynine Palms away from their family, then
they're going to rotate early so that they can go over there
and relieve the unit that they're going to take their spot. So
somewhere between 5 to 7 months is the time they're home.
So if we grow the force we get a little bit more dwell,
hopefully two-to-one, which is our goal. Then when we do that,
that now allows us, the senior leadership, to be able to say:
Okay, you're going to go a year from now or 14 months from now,
you're going to go back into Iraq, you're going to go into
Afghanistan, instead of saying 5 months from now and we have to
start training immediately.
So that allows us the opportunity to do some full-scale
operations and training. We're building that capability right
now with the growth of the force and with the training plans
that come underneath my command down at Quantico. So we
recognize it. We need to be able to do it. Quite honestly, it's
a Title 10 responsibility that Congress has given us and we're
not doing that right now.
Senator Martinez. Thank you all very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
1. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller and Admiral McCullough, you
are having particular problems with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) that
are very much in the news. Admiral Clark said he wanted this relatively
inexpensive ship in a hurry to meet the projected threat in the
littorals. Now we find that we will not get these ships in a hurry, nor
will they be as inexpensive as we were led to believe. What is the Navy
doing to meet this urgent threat that the LCS was intended to address
with the LCS program delayed as it has been?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. The Navy is accepting greater
risk by addressing littoral threats with current force structure of
mine countermeasures ships and multi-mission ships. However, there will
be capability gaps until LCS delivers in capacity.
2. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller and Admiral McCullough, have
you investigated deploying mission modules on other Navy combatant
vessels?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. The Navy is examining options
to deploy selected LCS mission modules on other combatant vessels. In
February 2008, Secretary Young (USD, AT&L) directed the Secretary of
the Navy to conduct an analysis of alternative (AoA) platforms and
develop a concept of operations (CONOPs) for mine countermeasures (MCM)
capability fielding with and without LCS. The analysis and CONOPs will
be submitted with the fiscal year 2010 MCM Master Plan and should also
include forward staging and system sparing considerations.
3. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller and Admiral McCullough, if
you are just accepting greater risk for the interim, why didn't the
Navy just plan from the beginning to accept that greater risk for some
period of time and get the LCS program right in the first place?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. The LCS program was designed to
address warfighting gaps in MCMs, surface warfare, and anti-submarine
warfare. Because of the compelling and urgent warfighting need, the LCS
program attempted to meet a faster schedule than typical Navy programs.
With a constrained price, tight schedule, two different designs at two
different shipyards, and demanding performance requirements, LCS took
on much higher risk than other programs. The rapid schedule also forced
a large degree of concurrency between design and construction.
In order to reduce program risk to acceptable levels, the Navy has
restructured the program to accommodate known cost and schedule
estimates. LCS remains a program of maximum importance to the Navy, and
the Navy continues to monitor it closely. Warfighting requirements to
fill the capability gaps remain compelling and consistent; therefore,
the requirement for LCS remains unchanged.
ACQUISITION REFORMS
4. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller, it seems that the LCS should
provide plenty of educational opportunities for how not to manage a
major acquisition program. Unfortunately, it appears that many of the
lessons learned from the LCS program were actually lessons ignored. We
were in such hurry we ignored almost all of the lessons we learned
painfully in previous years about how not to buy major weapons systems.
For example, we picked the ship platform without having conducted any
analysis to see whether there were other, more capable or less
expensive solutions to the problem we faced. We changed requirements
after we signed the contract. We did not have an adequate number of
people with the right acquisition experience to oversee the shipyards.
What steps have you taken or are you planning to take to improve the
Navy's ability to acquire major systems on time and on cost?
Ms. Stiller. On February 26, 2008, we issued SECNAVNOTE 5000, which
instituted an Acquisition Governance Improvement Six-Gate reporting,
reviewing, and oversight process that provides specific criteria for
areas such as requirements, funding, and technical performance
including a Probability of Program Success tool. This new process
ensures that the various stakeholders from the resources, requirements,
and acquisition communities address and revisit at defined intervals
issues associated with technical maturity, affordability, and program
health. We are currently developing new guidance addressing system
design methods; the use of independently-chaired engineering technical
review boards; and responsibility for Configuration Steering Boards to
monitor requirements changes as well as consider cost and funding
availability. It is important to note that the success of all these
initiatives is heavily dependent on personnel with the correct training
and experience commensurate with responsibilities assigned. While we
are working to ensure we have the personnel with the requisite skill
sets, this is an area where there is a shortage in both government and
industry.
5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller, I know that previous
uniformed Navy leaders, including Admiral Mullen, have complained about
a lack of transparency between the officers responsible for setting
requirements and the acquisition system trying to meet those
requirements. What steps should be or have been taken to break down
these barriers?
Ms. Stiller. On February 26, 2008, we issued SECNAVNOTE 5000, which
instituted an Acquisition Governance Improvement Six-Gate reporting,
reviewing, and oversight process. Its purpose is to ensure early and
frequent involvement and collaboration among the leadership of the
requirements, resources, and acquisition communities. New changes to
both DOD Instruction 5000.2 and SECNAVINST 5000.2 include additional
emphasis on requirements discipline. Configuration Steering Boards will
oversee any changes to the requirements baseline. In addition, the
Department of the Navy will implement a Systems Design Specification
which will provide more clarity to the Capability Development Document
(CDD)/CPD development process and convert and interpret operational
specifications into affordable design requirements.
AIRCRAFT CARRIER FORCE STRUCTURE
6. Senator Kennedy. Admiral McCullough, Congress argued at length
over the past several years about letting the aircraft carrier force
structure fall below 12. That was contentious enough. Again this year,
the Navy is proposing legislation that would permit a temporary
reduction in the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 10 in the
middle of the next decade. Assuming that Congress were to agree to
allow this temporary reduction, what steps is the Navy proposing to
take between now and then to mitigate this drop in force structure that
impinges on the ability of future Chiefs of Naval Operations to meet
requirements of the combatant commanders?
Admiral McCullough. The Navy remains fully committed to an 11-
carrier force; however, it is fiscally imprudent to operate 11 carriers
between CVN-65 inactivation and CVN-78 commissioning. For the duration
of this force structure gap, Navy can meet projected operational
requirements with moderate risk by mitigating the operational impacts
through the selective rescheduling of carrier maintenance
availabilities and the inherent flexibility provided by the Fleet
Response Plan (FRP). Ongoing process improvement events focus on
reducing the time between the end of construction/maintenance
availabilities to ship Initial Operational Capability/Major Combat
Operations (MCO) Surge Readiness. Additionally, the maturity of FRP,
increased experience with the Refueling Complex Overhaul program, and
refinement of the Continuous Maintenance concept allows Navy to improve
carrier operational availability. Navy will have the force structure to
maintain six carriers deployed or available within 30 days plus an
additional carrier available within 90 days. Accordingly, Navy will
continue to work with the combatant commanders through the Joint Staff
to best mitigate operational risk during this timeframe.
COST CONTROL
7. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller, we all know that the Navy
will have difficulty affording the shipbuilding procurement programs
that will meet our requirements and maintain the 313-ship that Admiral
Mullen and Admiral Roughead have identified as the requirement. What
steps are you taking or proposing to help constrain the rising costs in
the shipbuilding account?
Ms. Stiller. The Navy's shipbuilding plan recognizes the need for
careful management of requirements and aggressive cost control
measures. This can only be achieved in partnership with industry by
utilizing realistic assumptions, instilling discipline in shipbuilding
requirements, and driving more industry and government investments to
reduce cost. Given the importance of requirements-containment and cost-
reduction to the viability of the shipbuilding plan, the Navy continues
to evaluate each ship class and identify cost reduction opportunities
while balancing warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial base
realities.
The Navy plans to make greater use of other contract incentives,
such as multi-year procurements, fixed-price contracts (when and where
appropriate), and increased use of competition. These efforts are
expected to contribute to real cost containment in future shipbuilding
plans. The Navy's shipbuilding plan requires a balance among
operational requirements and risk, affordability, and industrial base
utilization. Additionally, use of gates in oversight of shipbuilding
programs to better integrate the requirements and the acquisition
community in order to further stabilize the programs have been
implemented. The Navy's long-range vision reduces the types and models
of ships, maximizes the reuse of ship designs and components, and
implements open architecture for software and hardware systems.
The Navy continues to work with shipbuilders to strive for level
loading of production facilities. Workload peaks and valleys are
mitigated through work share opportunities and regional outsourcing.
8. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller, given this cost concern, why
has the Navy chosen again this year to not provide any funding for the
National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP), the one program where
the Navy was providing matching funding for industry to help make
itself more efficient?
Ms. Stiller. Although NSRP was put in place with the major goal of
reducing the cost of shipbuilding and repair, there was a lack of
direct focus on specific shipbuilding programs. The focus was on cross-
shipyard collaboration to implement initiatives that were applicable
industry-wide. Navy and industry collaboratively have decided to
transform NSRP from its previous structure to a mechanism that will
address ship-specific initiatives. This new construct will align with
corporate Navy philosophy to reduce the cost of our shipbuilding
programs. While it is no longer a dedicated line item in the budget,
Navy is still committed to NSRP.
CG(X) RADAR
9. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Stiller and Admiral McCullough, the
cost of pursuing ballistic missile defense has been very high. I am
very concerned about ensuring that we spend no more than is necessary
to achieve that capability in order to hold down those costs. We know
that the DDG-1000 program is developing new radars as part of the
ship's combat system. One of those radars is the Volume Search Radar
(VSR). Some have asserted that the Navy and the contractors could
modify the VSR to make it larger for comparatively little cost, and by
doing so could avoid the very high cost of developing totally new
radars for the Navy's next generation cruiser, the CG(X) class. I know
that you have not published the CG(X) AoA, but I will ask this question
anyway. Would it be possible to upgrade the VSR radars from the DDG-
1000 to do more than serve as the primary sensor on the CG(X)? If so,
would that course be substantially cheaper than developing totally new
radars for CG(X)?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. No, it is not technically
feasible to upgrade VSR to meet integrated air and missile defense
requirements for CG(X). VSR, as designed, does not contain the critical
technologies required to provide the minimum capabilities required to
satisfy the integrated air and missile defense requirements set.
Incorporating these capabilities into the VSR is not technically
achievable.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
STRATEGY
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, what
is the status of the strategic laydown study? Has it been completed? If
not, when will it be delivered to Congress?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. Conducted yearly as part of an
internal review, the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal study is currently
still ongoing and is not yet complete. The Strategic Laydown and
Dispersal was developed as part of a working process used to inform
Navy decisions on the potential future alignment of fleet capabilities
and operations. As part of an ongoing Navy process, the Strategic
Laydown and Dispersal was not developed with the intent to produce a
public document.
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires the
Navy to maintain 11 operational carriers. Does the Navy plan to deviate
from this law?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. The Navy continues to work with
Congress through established legislative processes to identify a
position that is both fiscally and operationally responsible. The Navy
is committed long-term to a minimum of 11 operational carriers.
12. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, please
detail the Navy's plan to address Navy leadership's goal of strategic
dispersion.
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. The Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO)-directed Strategic Laydown and Dispersal plan was designed to
inform Navy decisions on where ships of the 313-ship Navy could be
homeported based on steady state security postures and potential
contingency operations in the 2020 time frame. The Strategic Laydown
and Dispersal takes into account response times, analysis of
requirements for regional presence and deployment locations, as well as
infrastructure capabilities and capacities.
The Strategic Laydown and Dispersal is just one aspect of a more
comprehensive and complex analysis of our Naval Forces. There are
multiple ongoing efforts that also contribute to developing the force
structure, personnel, and infrastructure needed to execute the New
Maritime Strategy and support the future fleet.
13. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, how
will the Navy carry out this goal with respect to dispersing its
Atlantic Fleet aircraft carriers among more than one port?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. A decision with respect to
Atlantic Fleet carrier dispersal has not yet been made. There are
multiple ongoing efforts that inform this decision. The Navy will fully
consider operational, financial, and environmental factors before
making decisions regarding the homeporting alternatives being evaluated
for its Atlantic Fleet aircraft carrier force.
The Mayport Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was
released to the public on 28 March 2008. This DEIS reviews and assesses
several potential action alternatives for comparison. Upon completion
of the public comment period, efforts will begin to incorporate public
and agency comments and develop the Final EIS. Originally planned to
close on 12 May, the public comment period is being extended to 27 May
2008. This limited extension of the public comment period recognizes
the importance of public review and comment on the DEIS while allowing
Navy decision-making to proceed on a reasonable timeline.
While not exclusively concerned with a single class or ship
location, the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal study is part of a larger
Navy process to inform future decisions on the potential alignment of
fleet assets, capabilities, and operations. This effort is exploring
several disposition alternatives without presupposing the results of
the Mayport DEIS.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
14. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, the
Navy recently released a DEIS on Mayport Naval Station to look at home
porting options for additional ships. In addition, the Navy also
released a DEIS on Naval Air Station Jacksonville. According to the
Congressional Research Service and the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, it is unusual for a DEIS to omit a preferred
alternative. The Navy included a preferred alternative in the NAS
Jacksonville DEIS. Why did the Navy omit a preferred alternative in the
Mayport DEIS?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. The Navy did not identify a
preferred alternative in the DEIS released on 28 March 2008 because the
Navy has not selected one. Not stating a preferred alternative in the
DEIS is authorized under NEPA and CEQ regulations. While the DEIS does
thoroughly examine environmental factors, the selection of a preferred
alternative will also consider force laydown implications, total costs,
and other relevant factors. Analysis of these other factors is not yet
complete. The Navy will identify a preferred alternative based on all
these factors in the final EIS scheduled for release in November 2008.
15. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, when
will the Navy provide a preferred alternative in the Mayport DEIS?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. The Navy did not identify a
preferred alternative in the DEIS released on 28 March 2008, because
the Navy has not selected one. While the DEIS does thoroughly examine
environmental factors, the selection of a preferred alternative will
also consider force laydown implications, total costs, and other
relevant factors. Analysis of these other factors is not yet complete.
The Navy will identify a preferred alternative based on all these
factors in the final EIS scheduled for release in November 2008.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
VALVES AND PUMPS
16. Senator Martinez. Ms. Stiller, recent reports indicate that a
group of important Navy suppliers, valve and pump manufacturers, may be
in jeopardy of going out of business or filing for bankruptcy due to
numerous asbestos lawsuits. Are you aware of this issue?
Ms. Stiller. Yes. The Valve and Pump Coalition (VPC) met with me on
April 1, 2008, to inform the Navy of the wave of asbestos litigation
being brought against their industry, and the risk the VPC foresees for
the pump and valve industrial base as a result of this litigation. The
VPC consists of Buffalo Pumps and Leslie Controls. As a result of this
meeting, the Navy has been assessing the potential impacts to national
defense and the domestic industrial base if pump and valve vendors go
out of business due to asbestos litigation.
17. Senator Martinez. Ms. Stiller, these lawsuits have the
potential to disrupt the supply of certain valves and pumps for our
ships. If this disruption were to occur, would it pose a significant
problem for our ships and operations?
Ms. Stiller. The disruption of our valve and pump supply could
potentially have an impact to our shipbuilding programs. The severity
of the impact would depend on which and how many vendors had supply
disruptions, and the suddenness, duration, or finality of the
disruption. If any vendor went out of business, it is reasonable to
expect that its product line could be purchased by the remaining
vendors; there would likely be a gap in engineering continuity; and
there would likely be some impact to ship design, construction, and in-
service support. While it is possible to transition the data required
to produce another vendor's product to a new vendor, it is expected to
cause cost increases and time delays for the Navy's programs.
18. Senator Martinez. Ms. Stiller, how do you plan to solve this
problem?
Ms. Stiller. While the loss of any pump and valve supplier to our
shipbuilders will have an impact on Navy programs, it is possible that
the Navy could qualify other vendors to supply pumps or valves for Navy
programs. Development costs and time would be required for this option.
However, the Navy could procure a stockpile of equipment and spare
parts as a means of minimizing schedule and service delays.
SONAR DOMES
19. Senator Martinez. Ms. Stiller, is the Navy satisfied with the
performance of the surface ship and submarine sonar domes currently
supplied to the fleet?
Ms. Stiller. The Navy is satisfied with the performance of the
surface ship sonar domes currently supplied to the fleet by B.F.
Goodrich, Jacksonville, FL. The rubber and composite domes for the FFG
class have performed well, as have the sonar dome rubber windows for
both the CG and DDG classes.
The Navy is also satisfied with the performance of sonar domes and
sonar dome boots being procured for Virginia-class submarines.
20. Senator Martinez. Admiral McCullough, does the Navy have a
requirement or a plan to seek a second source for sonar dome
production?
Admiral McCullough. Sonar domes and boots are procured for surface
ships and submarines from the only presently-qualified vendor, B.F.
Goodrich, Jacksonville, FL. There is no current plan to seek a second
source; however, the Navy is conducting a Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) effort to explore alternative solutions.
MAYPORT
21. Senator Martinez. Admiral McCullough, now that the EIS has been
completed, what are your plans for future funding for Mayport?
Admiral McCullough. Only the DEIS has been completed. The Final EIS
will not be completed until November 2008. A Record of Decision (ROD)
on a preferred alternative for the Mayport EIS will follow in December
2008. The Navy will fully consider operational, financial, and
environmental factors before making decisions regarding the homeporting
alternatives being evaluated in the EIS. If the Navy's preferred
alternative requires MILCON, these requirements will be balanced with
the Navy's other programming priorities.
The plan for future funding of Mayport depends upon the alternative
chosen in the ROD. Should the ROD select an alternative to move any
ships to Mayport, funding will be requested in order to meet the
desired date of initial operating capability (IOC). For example, in
order to make a 2014 IOC date for CVN homeporting at Mayport, several
supporting MILCON projects would need to be programmed beginning in the
fiscal year 2010 budget.
22. Senator Martinez. Admiral McCullough, we have been told that
the final decision may hinge on the completion of a strategic lay-down
study. When do you expect this strategic lay-down study to be
completed?
Admiral McCullough. Conducted yearly as part of an internal review,
the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal study is currently still ongoing
and is not yet complete. The Strategic Laydown and Dispersal was
developed as part of a working process used to inform Navy decisions on
the potential future alignment of fleet capabilities and operations. As
part of an ongoing Navy process, the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal
was not developed with the intent to produce a public document.
23. Senator Martinez. Admiral McCullough, how much money does the
Navy plan on including in the fiscal year 2010 budget for Mayport wharf
upgrades and dredging?
Admiral McCullough. In addition to the fiscal year 2009 P-999 Alpha
Wharf project ($14.9 million), the 2009 President's budget (PB-09)
request includes MILCON restoration projects for Bravo Wharf (P-888;
$30.0 million) in fiscal year 2010 and Charlie Wharf (P-777; $20.8
million) in fiscal year 2011. The PB-09 request also includes O&MN
funds for maintenance dredging: fiscal year 2010 ($5 million), fiscal
year 2012 ($6 million), and fiscal year 2014 ($6 million). The fiscal
year 2010 President's budget request is still under development. The
investments currently programmed for fiscal year 2010 and beyond will
be given full consideration and prioritized against all Navy
requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
HAWAII SUPERFERRY
24. Senator Sessions. Ms. Stiller, an important part of having a
capable Navy is having available substantial lift capabilities for both
inter-theater and intra-theater lift. Combatant commanders identified
both a near-term and a long-term requirement for high-speed intra-
theater surface lift and there is now in the budget a plan to procure a
substantial number of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) to meet that
requirement. However, with the current building schedule we won't see
the first of those ships until 2012 or 2013 and it will be a decade or
more before we see a significant JHSV capability on the water, which
means that we will have a substantial shortfall in intra-theater lift
capabilities for many years to come. I understand that the Navy has
been considering for the last few months a plan to install national
defense features (NDF) on one or more of the Hawaii Superferry ships
that have been built or are being built in the United States and will
be in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program. Are
you aware of this issue?
Ms. Stiller. The Navy is reviewing the operational requirements
that could be met by the Hawaiian Superferry company's unsolicited
proposal which identified specific changes to be funded under the NDF
program. The bridge to the JHSV program is currently being met by the
Military Sealift Command (MSC)-leased vessels M/V Westpac Express and
HSV-2 Swift. Although the NDF program is a cost-effective means to
provide for surge sealift or resupply capability by providing active,
crewed ships with proven mechanical reliability and desirable
performance capabilities, it is not meant to support continuous
operations and the ships are only used in times of national
emergencies.
25. Senator Sessions. Ms. Stiller, would it be fair to say that the
Navy and the Marine Corps would benefit from having available on call a
high speed ferry like the Hawaii Superferry with substantial NDF
already installed?
Ms. Stiller. The Navy and Marine Corps are currently reviewing what
requirements the Hawaiian Superferry, with the proposed NDF features
installed, could provide in meeting wartime surge operations.
26. Senator Sessions. Ms. Stiller, wouldn't this give the combatant
commanders some much needed near-term capability?
Ms. Stiller. The NDF program is designed to ensure that the
Department of Defense can obtain militarily-useful commercial cargo
ships in times of national emergencies. The NDF program funds
installation of militarily-useful features on U.S.-built vessels during
construction or conversion. NDF funding also pays for any increased
costs during commercial operations that are directly attributable to
the NDF. The NDF program is a cost-effective means to provide for surge
sealift or resupply capability by providing active, crewed ships with
proven mechanical reliability and desirable performance capabilities.
The NDF program is not meant to support continuous operations and the
ships are only used in times of national emergencies. Each proposal
submitted for NDF must be addressed on its own merit, and consideration
of the business case for the Navy must be taken into account.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
DDG
27. Senator Collins. Ms. Stiller, given the focus and concern on
cost of Navy shipbuilding in general and the DDG-1000 specifically,
please tell me what the impact would be on cost of the first two ships,
as well as the impact on the stability of the program's industrial base
if the program were terminated after first two ships.
Ms. Stiller. If the fiscal year 2009 President's budget request for
DDG-1000 is not funded, it will impact warfighting capability gaps,
cost, and the shipbuilding industrial base. The cost of the first two
ships, now under contract to General Dynamics Bath Iron Works and
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, will significantly increase due to the
lack of the shipbuilders' ability to spread shipyard overhead cost
among multiple ships. Additionally, the cost of the mission systems
equipment for the lead ships will increase for similar overhead cost
increases. The loss of this workload would also likely impact costs on
other Navy contracts at these shipbuilders. Finally, the lack of a
fiscal year 2009 ship will likely impact the shipbuilding industrial
base including workforce stability and may endanger the future
viability of the Nation's major shipyards.
Each shipbuilder's lead-ship cost proposal was based on a seven-
ship program of record DDG-1000 workload. The cancellation of the
program would affect vendors that are currently under contract and
building class-specific systems and components that would not be
incorporated in large numbers or at all on future ships, including
systems such as the Dual Band Radar (Raytheon/Lockheed Martin),
Advanced Gun System (BAE Systems), Integrated Power System (Converteam/
DRS Technologies), Advanced Vertical Launch System (Raytheon/BAE
Systems), and Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure
(Raytheon). Hundreds of system and component vendors employing
thousands of people in 49 States would also be impacted. To date, total
of $13.2 billion has been invested in the program: $6.3 billion spent
on research and development (R&D) and $6.9 appropriated for lead ships
construction and advance procurement for the third ship. Terminating
the program would provide little return on this investment and a
decades' worth of development effort.
The Navy continues to stress that a stable plan will enable the
shipbuilding industry to maintain critical skills and to make business
decisions that increase efficiency and productivity in order to meet
the Navy's projected shipbuilding requirements. Terminating the program
would produce the opposite effect. Most importantly, the cancellation
of future ships would deny the Fleet critical capabilities and limit
the introduction of next-generation capabilities to deal with known and
anticipated threats.
28. Senator Collins. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, the
current Navy shipbuilding request of $14.1 billion in the fiscal year
2009 budget does not meet the $15.8 billion the Navy has estimated it
needs to meet its own 30 shipbuilding plan, and the CNO has stated that
the cost of a nuclear-powered cruiser would be $600 to $700 million
more per ship. Do you see any way that the Navy can afford to build
nuclear-powered surface combatants?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. There is always a balance that
must be achieved in the shipbuilding accounts. Our first priority is to
get the capabilities we need on the schedule we need them. However,
these priorities are always tempered by affordability and the impact of
any single program on the resources available to support other programs
within that sector of the Navy's accounts. Clearly accommodating the
upfront cost for a nuclear-powered cruiser would be difficult and will
pose a challenge with respect to the limited resources we have within
the shipbuilding sector. This may result in a need to request
additional funding from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or
Congress to meet the direction provided in last year's National Defense
Authorization Act.
The greatest concern regarding affordability of nuclear cruisers
would not be whether we can afford to build the ships but rather what
the impact is on the remaining resource demands the Navy faces after
funding these nuclear cruisers to the appropriate resource level. As
the Navy prepares for Milestone A and selection of a preferred design
alternative, including consideration of ships with a nuclear-power
option, the Navy will continue to assess the potential impacts on the
remaining shipbuilding program.
29. Senator Collins. Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough, aside from
the dramatically increased costs, is it even practical to replace the
current power plant in the DDG-51 or DDG-1000 with a nuclear power
plant?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral McCullough. No, it is not practical to
replace the current power plant in the DDG-51 or DDG-1000 with a
nuclear power plant.
The specific capability needs as well as unique ship integration
constraints of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 compared to existing nuclear-
powered ships would necessitate a wholly new nuclear propulsion plant
design and/or significant hull redesign for these applications. Given
the extensive redesign of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 to incorporate
nuclear propulsion, this effort would take many years and several
billion dollars to complete and therefore is impractical.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
UNFUNDED REQUIREMENT FOR 10TH LPD-17 CLASS SHIP
30. Senator McCain. Ms. Stiller, the Navy and Marine Corps have
included a 10th LPD-17 class ship as a top priority on the unfunded
requirements list again this year. With the ninth and currently last
ship of the class starting construction, what would be the impact to
the shipbuilding industrial base and to the Navy's ability to procure a
future LPD-17 if funding is not provided in 2009 for this ship?
Ms. Stiller. There are currently five LPD-17 class ships under
construction. As LPD-25, the 9th LPD-17-class ship, is not expected to
deliver until February 2012, there is currently a backlog of LPD work.
To avoid a production break impact, the 10th ship would need to be
appropriated no later than fiscal year 2010. The Navy is revisiting the
10th LPD-17 as part of fiscal year 2010 budget deliberation.
FUTURE CRUISER, CG(X)
31. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, the Navy's program includes
about $3 billion in R&D towards a future missile defense cruiser,
CG(X), in 2011. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act requires
that CG(X) be nuclear-powered unless the Secretary of Defense
determines that it is not in the national interest. What is the status
of the Navy's AoA for the CG(X), and when will Congress have sufficient
insight to the program to be able to support this year's budget
request?
Admiral McCullough. The results of the Maritime Air and Missile
Defense of Joint Forces (MAMDJF) AoA, more commonly referred to as the
CG(X) AoA, were delivered to the Staff of the CNO in January 2008. The
CNO Staff is reviewing the comprehensive and lengthy report. A series
of internal Navy reviews have been conducted, and will continue, until
decisions in several critical areas are made. The Navy will select a
service-preferred alternative for CG(X) and then provide a
recommendation to OSD at a Milestone A Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
anticipated in fiscal year 2008. Once complete, the AoA Report will be
forwarded from CNO via SECNAV's OSD. Following approval of the AoA, the
Navy will seek Milestone A approval for the CG(X) program from the
Defense Acquisition Executive. The Navy will be able to provide further
detail on the AoA results and the Navy's selection of a preferred
alternative to Congress upon Milestone A approval.
Regardless of the selected alternative, the President's fiscal year
2009 budget request for the CG(X) budget funds vital efforts in
requirements analysis, technology development, and ship design activity
that need to continue.
32. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, the press has reported that
the Navy has determined that if it is to be nuclear-powered, CG(X)
would use a scaled version of the CVN-21 reactor plant. Has the Navy
determined whether this reactor plant could be installed in the DDG-
1000 hullform?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, the Navy has determined that the CVN-78
reactor plant cannot be installed in the DDG-1000 hull form. The
nuclear-powered CG(X) option will have a hull form which will be
designed to accommodate the CVN-78 reactor plant.
33. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, what is the Navy's range of
cost estimates for building a nuclear-powered CG(X)?
Admiral McCullough. The MAMDTF AoA includes cost analysis for the
potential use of nuclear propulsion for CG(X).
Navy leadership is reviewing the AoA results. The Navy will select
a service preferred alternative for CG(X) and then provide a
recommendation to OSD at a Milestone A DAB anticipated in fiscal year
2008.
The Navy's fiscal year 2006 Report to Congress on Alternative
Propulsion Methods for Surface Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships
indicated an upfront nuclear acquisition cost premium of $600-$700
million in fiscal year 2007 dollars per ship for a medium surface
combatant. This premium is over and above the acquisition cost of a
fossil fueled ship. While the nuclear-power variant includes a higher
upfront acquisition cost than the fossil fuel variant, it will be
offset over the life cycle by lower operations and support costs
completely or to some degree depending on ships OPTEMPO, energy
demands, and fuel prices.
34. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, what is the Navy's plan for
certifying the two surface combatant shipbuilders, Bath Iron Works and
Ingalls Shipbuilding, for nuclear ship construction?
Admiral McCullough. The Navy currently has no plans to certify
General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding-Gulf Coast (NGSB-GC) for nuclear-powered ship
construction. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News and General
Dynamics Electric Boat are the Nation's two authorized and experienced
nuclear qualified construction shipyards. However, non-nuclear sections
of future nuclear-powered ships could be built by other shipyards
currently experienced in naval surface combatant construction (BIW and
NGSB-GC). The method and location of construction of potential nuclear-
powered surface combatants have not yet been determined.
NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER
35. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, the National Security
Cutter (NSC), constructed for the Coast Guard Deepwater program, would
appear to provide a low cost alternative for certain naval missions.
Has the Navy reviewed the capabilities offered by the NSC, and if so,
could you provide your assessment regarding the suitability of this
ship to meet low-mix missions envisioned by the Maritime Strategy?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, the Navy has reviewed the capabilities of
the Coast Guard's NSC. The NSC cannot fulfill key requirements within
the naval warfare mission that the Navy's LCS is designed to achieve,
including survivability, crew size, sprint speed, draft, and the
ability to embark and employ focused mission packages. The CONOPs and
design specifications for the two ships are not compatible.
LCS is built to Naval Vessel Rules to provide Level 1
survivability. NSC is built to commercial standards and was not
designed to operate in the same threat environment.
LCS has a crew size requirement of 75, including core crew,
mission package detachment and aviation detachment. NSC's crew
size is 143.
The LCS has a sprint speed of 40+ knots. NSC's sprint speed
is 28 knots.
LCS draft is approximately 13 feet. The NSC's draft is 21
feet. This fundamentally limits the areas where the ship can
effectively operate.
LCS has been designed and purpose-built to carry and operate
focused naval warfare mission packages that address Joint
Staff-approved capability gaps in MCMs, surface warfare, and
anti-submarine warfare. The NSC does not have the shipboard
interface nor the footprint availability required to receive
and operate these mission packages, nor does it have the
organic capability to execute the specific LCS gap filler
capability and therefore cannot fulfill the role of LCS.
The Navy and LCS Program Office have partnered with the Coast Guard
Deepwater program to share useful information, identify risk
mitigations to new technology, and to ensure commonality where it is
practicable and cost effective (e.g., common 57mm gun, common air
search radar, and associated crew training programs).
OHIO-CLASS BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE REPLACEMENT
36. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, funding for development of
the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine replacement is included in
the Future Years Defense Program, with procurement of long lead
material within the decade. However, the Navy's long-range shipbuilding
plan does not include procurement funding required to replace the Ohio-
class ballistic missile submarines. What are the projected procurement
costs for this strategic program, and how does the Navy propose that it
be funded?
Admiral McCullough. The Navy is working to define the initial
capabilities for the Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent, which will describe
the attributes required for strategic deterrence influence for the
follow-on capability to the Ohio-class SSBN. This capability analysis
will support an AoA planned to commence in fiscal year 2009. The
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) estimated cost will be
developed at the conclusion of the AoA in the fall of 2009.
The Navy anticipates commencing R&D efforts for the follow-on to
the Ohio-class SSBN in fiscal year 2010. However, since the Ohio-class
SSBN replacement has neither been designed, nor the program developed,
any cost estimate for SCN at this time would be premature.
SEA BASING AND THE MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (FUTURE)
37. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, how does the Navy intend to
man and equip the large deck amphibious ships included in the Maritime
Prepositioning Force Future, and what warfighting role is planned for
these ships in amphibious assault operations?
Admiral McCullough. The CDD for the MPF-F large deck amphibious
ships has not yet been finalized. One option being considered calls for
the MPF-F large deck aviation ships to be manned and operated by a MSC
civilian crew while in a prepositioned status. MSC crews would be
augmented by Active Duty Navy/Marine Corps and civilian contractor
personnel who are charged with maintaining the prepositioned equipment
and certain ship systems.
Once operationalized, the MSC crew will be augmented by Navy and
Marine Corps personnel to fully man required functions to employ forces
ashore, such as the air department, ordnance department, combat
information center, and ship's company. MSC crews would continue to
provide non-warfighting support in propulsion, ship auxiliaries, and
housekeeping.
Excluding the self defense systems except crew served weapons the
MPF-F LHA(R)s will be identical (with fact of life changes) to the
legacy design.
The MPF-F big decks, as part of the MPF-F, will deliver the
Vertical Assault element of a reinforcing Third Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB) to complement the two MEBs delivered by Assault Echelon
shipping in an MCO. MPF-F's big decks will also provide a substantial
contribution to the sustainment of forces operating ashore by creating
an air base at sea to generate ample sorties for air delivery of
supplies and support of aircraft maintenance.
38. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, has the Navy established
capstone requirements to provide for defense of the sea-base ships,
which by themselves lack the self-defense and damage control
capabilities of amphibious warships?
Admiral McCullough. A Capstone System Threat Assessment (ONI-CTA-
003-06) was completed in May 2006. Additionally, on 15 January 2008 the
Joint Staff for Intelligence (J-2) and Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) certified concurrence with the assessed threat as laid out in the
MPF-F Capability Development Document's threat section. The assessments
identify potential, projected, and technologically feasible threats to
MPF-F and will be used as the basis for threat delineation. It is
anticipated that the primary threats shall be from aircraft, ships,
submarines, coastal defense units armed with anti-ship cruise missiles,
theater ballistic anti-ship surface-to-surface missiles, and air-,
ship-, and submarine-launched mines. Secondary, but significant,
threats also come from submarine-launched torpedoes; tactical air-to-
surface missiles; other ordnance carried by sea- and land-based
aircraft (fixed and rotary-wing); chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons; and in the future, directed energy weapons. When operating in
the littoral environment, additional threats may be encountered from
coastal artillery, multiple rocket launchers, small boats, and atypical
sources such as torpedoes from coastal defense sites. A tertiary threat
will include preemptive attacks or covert action from Special
Operations Forces, combat divers and terrorists. Command, control, and
communications (C3) electronic attack and electronic support systems
may support the weapons threats.
An MPF-F program-sponsored Sea Shield analysis was conducted for an
approved MCO scenario. The scenario used an approved Multi-Service
Force Deployment (MSFD) document for 2012 with friendly and threat
capabilities extrapolated out to 2024. MPF-F was included in the force
laydown operating from a sea base and delivering a MEB ashore from over
the horizon. The Navy's Seabasing and Sea Shield pillars, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command's Seabasing Integration Division, Naval Sea
Systems Command, elements of the Joint Staff, and OSD's Program
Analysis and Evaluation Branch participated in the development of the
analysis. While operating in a threat environment, MPF-F will be
protected by other Naval Sea Shield and/or other Joint or Combined
forces commensurate with the threat. The analysis showed that an
appropriate level of Sea Shield was attained to protect the MPF-F.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
39. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, the two versions of the LCS
are very different, yet reportedly both meet Navy requirements. The
Navy has previously stated the intent to gain efficiencies in
construction and lifecycle by conducting a downselect once these ships'
capabilities have been fully tested. What is the current Navy's plan
for downselecting to a single design and opening up competition for
construction?
Admiral McCullough. The acquisition strategy for fiscal year 2010
and out-year ships is under Navy review. OSD will conduct a Milestone B
prior to fiscal year 2010 procurement. The Navy and OSD will consider
the questions of down-selecting seaframes and the transition to full
and open competition as part of the fiscal year 2010 acquisition
strategy deliberations.
40. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, what is the Navy's current
estimate for follow ship costs on the program, and how is the Navy
leveraging its plan to build a large number (55) of these ships to
drive these costs down?
Admiral McCullough. The statutory cost cap for LCS is $460 million
per ship. However, execution within that cost cap will be a challenge
as this estimate was based on its applicability to the fifth and sixth
ships of the class and on two ships being appropriated in fiscal year
2008. This procurement plan would have allowed increased sharing of
some program costs between seaframes.
The Navy believes that additional design maturity, production
progress on LCS-1 and 2, and a competitive contract award between
incumbent suppliers will enable the use of fixed-price incentive terms
for the fiscal year 2008 ship appropriated by Congress and the two
fiscal year 2009 ships that the Navy is requesting.
When these first two ships are delivered, the Navy will be able to
better evaluate their costs and capabilities, and to make decisions
regarding the best manner to procure the remainder of the class. The
acquisition strategy for fiscal year 2010 and outyear ships has not yet
been formulated. OSD will conduct a Milestone B prior to fiscal year
2010 procurement. The Navy and OSD will consider the questions of
single seaframe assessment and the transition to full and open
competition.
DDG-1000 DESTROYER PROGRAM
41. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, the committee has strongly
supported the DDG-1000 Destroyer, and views it as a critical capability
for the future Navy. When considering that greater than $5 billion has
been invested in new technologies for this ship, it's difficult to
understand how the Navy has determined that a seven-ship program is the
right size for the dollars invested and the missions envisioned for the
class. How many DDG-1000 Destroyers are needed to meet the Marine Corps
requirement for naval gunfire support in support of MCOs?
Admiral McCullough. The Navy requires seven multi-mission DDG-1000s
to support MCOs and to maintain presence in forward operating areas to
support the warfighting needs of the combatant commanders, including
meeting Marine Corps naval gunfire support. U.S. Marine Corps fire
support requirements are specifically addressed with DDG-1000 Advanced
Gun System and its Long-Range Land Attack Projectile which will meet 90
percent of the Marine Corps' call for fires requirement within 5
minutes.
42. Senator McCain. Admiral McCullough, what are the accompanying
assumptions regarding the availability of DDG-1000 ships to meet this
mission, when accounting for depot maintenance and other employment
factors?
Admiral McCullough. The requirement for seven DDG-1000 ships in the
Navy's Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
fiscal year 2009 was based on analysis that included the following
assumptions: intermediate and depot level maintenance periods and
availability timelines, DDG-1000 employment across the globe, potential
warfighting requirements, affordability in filling the Naval Fires
warfighting gap, and acceptable risks.
[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]