    [Senate Hearing 110-394]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 110-394, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 3001

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
        PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                                MILITARY POSTURE
                       POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
                       POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
    UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS
                                    COMMAND
                     POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
       UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
          UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

                                   __________

                  FEBRUARY 6, 26, 28; MARCH 4, 5, 6, 11, 2008

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

    42-629 PDF                 WASHINGTON DC:  2008
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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
    HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                  Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                                Military Posture
                                february 6, 2008

                                                                       Page

    Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Hon.
      Tina W. Jonas, Under Secretary of Defense-Comptroller..........     6
    Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.....    13

                       Posture of the United States Army
                               february 26, 2008

    Geren, Hon. Preston M. ``Pete'', III, Secretary of the Army......   103
    Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, Army.............   115

                       Posture of the United States Navy
                               february 28, 2008

    Winter, Hon. Donald C., Secretary of the Navy....................   180
    Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations...............   196
    Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps......   231

    United States Central Command and the United States Special Operations
                                    Command
                                 march 4, 2008

    Fallon, ADM William J., USN, Commander, United States Central
      Command........................................................   327
    Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, United States Special
      Operations Command.............................................   340

                     Posture of the United States Air Force
                                 march 5, 2008

    Wynne, Hon. Michael W., Secretary of the Air Force...............   400
    Moseley, Gen. T. Michael, USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
      Force..........................................................   419

       United States Southern Command and United States Northern Command
                                 march 6, 2008

    Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, Commander, North American
      Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command............   495
    Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command...   509

          United States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea
                                 march 11, 2008

    Keating, ADM Timothy J., USN, Commander, United States Pacific
      Command........................................................   572
    Bell, GEN Burwell B., III, USA, Commander, United Nations Command
      and Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command;
      Commander, United States Forces Korea..........................   588

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

                                    ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                MILITARY POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner,
    Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and
    Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
    Mary J. Kyle, legislative clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel;
    Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
    member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
    Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
    professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
    Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
    staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member;
    William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional
    staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T.
    Kiley, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
    professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
    member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G.
    Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki,
    professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
    member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L.
    Rubin, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
    Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and
    Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
    Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
    assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
    Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
    assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants
    to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator
    Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
    Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant
    to Senator Cornyn; John L. Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh,
    assistants to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III,
    assistant to Senator Wicker.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to receive testimony from the Secretary of
    Defense, Robert M. Gates, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff (JCS), Admiral Michael J. Mullen. Joining them is
    Comptroller of the Department of Defense (DOD), Tina Jonas. Our
    witnesses are here to present the President's fiscal year 2009
    budget request for DOD, including both the so-called base
    budget and the additional bridge fund requested for operations
    in Iraq and Afghanistan for just the first part of fiscal year
    2009.
        I want to start by welcoming if he is here, but he is not,
    but I will welcome him anyway, a new member of our committee,
    Senator Wicker. We're glad to have him and I will want him to
    know that I have it on unassailable authority from a former
    colleague of his, a member of the House of Representatives who
    I have known for over 70 years, my brother, that he will make a
    fine addition to this committee.
        First some thanks to our witnesses for their service and
    the very positive way that you have worked with this committee.
    We very much appreciate the relationships which have been
    created and which are so important.
        I know our witnesses would agree that our first thanks will
    go to the men and women serving in our military. We are all
    truly grateful for their professionalism and dedication to our
    country and for the sacrifices that they and their families
    make.
        Last year this committee on a bipartisan basis compiled a
    record of accomplishment that we can be very proud of. First,
    we enacted the historic Wounded Warrior Act which will improve
    the health care and benefits of recovering veterans and service
    members and their families. Our law will vastly improve the
    coordination between the DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs
    (VA). It will end the confusing and conflict system of
    disability determinations that have existed for too long
    between the DOD and the VA.
        We also enacted legislation that requires private security
    contractors operating in combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan
    to comply with orders and directives from military commanders
    and with DOD rules relative to the use of force. Our
    legislation established a commission on wartime contracting in
    Iraq and Afghanistan to investigate Federal agency contracting
    for reconstruction, logistics support, and security functions
    in those countries. We established a new Special Inspector
    General (IG) for Afghanistan reconstruction to provide
    oversight and address contracting abuses. We extended the term
    of the Special IG for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).
        We enacted the far-reaching Acquisition Improvement and
    Accountability Act, which tightened the rules for DOD
    acquisition of major weapons systems, subsystems, and
    components, to reduce the risk of contract overpricing, cost
    overruns, and failure to meet contract schedules and
    performance requirements.
        We legislated a defense acquisition workforce development
    fund to ensure that DOD has enough skilled people to
    effectively manage its contracts; and we strengthened statutory
    protections for whistleblowers.
        We established a chief management officer for the DOD and
    each of the military departments to ensure continuous top level
    attention to DOD management problems.
        I'm highlighting what we achieved last year in areas of
    oversight and accountability because we are here today to talk
    about a request for over half a trillion dollars of taxpayer
    funds for the DOD for the next fiscal year, excluding the cost
    of Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibility exceeding $700 billion
    when you include the full cost of those wars next year. We are
    jointly responsible with the President for how those funds are
    spent.
        Last year's actions to strengthen oversight and
    accountability were necessary, but they're not sufficient. The
    DOD faces huge problems in its acquisition system. Over the
    last few years we've seen an alarming lack of acquisition
    planning, the excessive use of time and materials contracts,
    undefinitized contracts, and other open-ended commitments of
    DOD funds. These problems have been particularly acute in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, but they are in no way limited to those
    two countries.
        The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported
    that cost growth on seven of DOD's largest acquisition programs
    ranged from 26 to 188 percent. In a period of just 5 years, the
    GAO told us, the cost of DOD's top five weapons systems
    programs had almost doubled, growing from $290 billion to $550
    billion.
        The reforms that we adopted last year, now signed into law,
    are an important step towards addressing problems in DOD's
    acquisition programs. But it will take years of work by DOD and
    close oversight by Congress to make sure that we get the job
    done.
        Many other challenges lie ahead. We have an Army and a
    Marine Corps which are way overstretched. The stress on our
    forces from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to
    build. The media reports that there is a strong possibility
    that General Petraeus will recommend that force levels in Iraq
    remain at the pre-surge level of approximately 130,000 troops
    for some unspecified period of time once the five surge
    brigades complete their redeployment this summer.
        Meanwhile, our Army troops continue to face multiple tours
    of 15-month duration, with only 12 months or less at home
    between rotations, and Marines also see more time deployed than
    at home. These levels of deployment without adequate rest for
    the troops and repair and replacement of equipment simply
    cannot be sustained.
        Over the past year, 30,000 additional troops have helped
    produce a welcome lessening of violence in Iraq and a lower
    U.S. casualty rate. But the purpose of the surge as stated by
    the President has not been achieved. That purpose, again as
    stated by the President, was to ``provide enough space so that
    the Iraqi Government can meet certain benchmarks or certain
    requirements for a unity government.''
        But the Department of State (DOS) reported to us as
    recently as November 21, 2007, that ``Senior military
    commanders now portray the intransigence of Iraq's Shiite-
    dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort
    in Iraq, rather than al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents, or
    Iranian-backed militias.''
        The military progress on the ground was achieved with huge
    sacrifice and brilliance. We cannot accept that that sacrifice
    will be squandered by Iraqi leadership continuing to fail to
    achieve the key political benchmarks that they set for
    themselves long ago, in particular amending the constitution,
    passing a hydrocarbons law that fairly shares Iraq's oil wealth
    with all citizens, passing a provincial powers act, and
    conducting provincial elections.
        The value of the new de-Baathification law, if it is a law,
    despite the constitution of Iraq saying that it isn't because
    it failed to get the unanimous approval by the presidency
    council required for it to become a law, the value will depend
    upon how it is implemented.
        For years, the Iraqi leaders have failed to seize the
    opportunity our brave troops gave them. It's long past the time
    that the Iraqi leaders hear a clear, simple message: We can't
    save them from themselves. It's in their hands, not ours, to
    create a nation by making the political compromises needed to
    end the conflict. That message is not the language of
    surrender. It's common sense, pragmatism, and the only
    realistic path to success.
        A critical priority for this and future budgets must be the
    war in Afghanistan. Unlike the war in Iraq, the connection
    between Afghanistan and the terrorist threat that manifested
    itself on September 11, and is clear, and American support for
    the Afghanistan mission remains strong. Unfortunately, as a
    number of reports issued recently made clear, the
    administration's strategy in Afghanistan is not yet producing
    the results that we all want.
        A report by the Afghanistan Study Group chaired by retired
    General Jim Jones and Ambassador Thomas Pickering, finds the
    Afghanistan mission is ``faltering.'' The report states that
    ``violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen
    dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its
    international partners falls.''
        Last year was the deadliest year since 2001 for U.S. and
    coalition forces in Afghanistan. A separate report from the
    Atlantic Council states: ``Make no mistake, the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in Afghanistan.''
        The United States has recently announced its decision to
    commit an additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan, despite our
    already overstressed U.S. forces. Unfortunately, some of our
    allies have not demonstrated a similar commitment to providing
    troops and equipment which are needed for the Afghanistan
    mission.
        Finally, I'm disappointed that the budget request does not
    include a request for the full amount of the estimated
    expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan for next year, as required
    by our law. While the monetary cost is not the most important
    part of the debate over Iraq or Afghanistan, it does need to be
    part of that debate and the citizens of our Nation have a right
    to know what those costs are projected to be.
        Again, with thanks to our witnesses, I turn to Senator
    Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you and all
    members of the committee in welcoming our witnesses today.
        Senator Levin and I have had quite a few years in the
    context of these hearings and I think the Gates-Mullen team is
    going to set new high records for cooperation between the
    civilian side and the military side of the DOD. I have watched
    each of you very carefully here in the past month or so and,
    Admiral Mullen, this is your first appearance as Chairman; and
    Mr. Secretary, you have a fine teammate there. You really have
    earned the respect and the admiration and the confidence, of
    not only the Congress of the United States, but indeed the men
    and women of the Armed Forces and their families, which is the
    bottom line why we're here today.
        So I wish you luck.
        I join my colleague in drawing your attention to that law.
    It was the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2007. It was very explicit in requiring the full presentation
    of your expected costs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless,
    I'm sure you have an explanation and we'll receive it.
        We are seeing signs of progress in Iraq, some progress in
    Afghanistan. But I think by any fair standard that level of
    progress to date is falling below the expectations that we had
    hoped here as a Nation. Senator Levin quite appropriately
    observed that the elected officials in Iraq are simply not
    exercising the full responsibility of the reins of sovereignty,
    and that puts our forces in a certain degree of continuing
    peril and risk. I would hope the administration and indeed the
    witnesses before us would do everything we can to expedite and
    get some reconciliation, because time and time again I think
    every single panel that's been up here in all these years, Mr.
    Chairman, has said there is no military solution for that
    problem; it has to be a political one.
        I also would be interested to know if you're beginning to
    lay plans as to how you convey a year hence this Department to
    a new administration and what steps you might take to lay that
    foundation, to have hopefully a seamless transition, Mr.
    Secretary, in your case to the successors who will come in. The
    Admiral hopefully will remain on. But I think we should begin
    to look at that at this time.
        I also join the chairman in recognizing the important work
    done by General Jones, Ambassador Pickering, the Atlantic
    Council, and the National Defense University that presented
    papers here to the Senate in the past week. I stayed throughout
    that hearing and found it extremely beneficial--a clear example
    of how the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are doing
    responsible work and making valuable contributions toward the
    problems that face us today.
        Dwell times, deployment lengths, terms of service in Iraq,
    these are high on our agenda and I do hope both of you give us
    your best views as to what period might we anticipate that the
    15-month tour can be reduced, hopefully to 12 and even beyond
    that if facts justify it. But the young men and women of the
    Armed Forces and their families all over the world are going to
    follow this hearing, and listen to what you have to say on that
    point.
        One of our most important duties each year is procurement
    and I point out that this committee, and indeed Congress,
    passed extensive acquisition reform last year. I urge you to
    bring to the attention of Congress how well that is working or,
    in the case it is not working to your satisfaction, to draw
    that to our attention.
        We also had as a committee chartered a commission to study
    the Reserve and National Guard. There were excellent
    individuals on that committee. They received mixed reviews in
    the press, but I would hope that that report did bring to your
    attention some necessary corrective measures and that you will
    spend some part of the time in your testimony addressing that.
        Ms. Jonas, thank you very much for year after year coming
    up here with all the figures. Now you have a little extra
    money. We're going to watch very carefully how you spend that
    money.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Gates?

       STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
     ACCOMPANIED BY HON. TINA W. JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE-
                              COMPTROLLER

        Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
    members of the committee: It is a pleasure to be here for my
    second and last posture statement. Let me first thank you for
    your continued support for our military these many years. I
    appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the President's
    fiscal year 2009 defense budget request.
        Before getting into the components of the request, I
    thought it might be useful to consider it quickly in light of
    the current strategic landscape, a landscape still being shaped
    by forces unleashed by the end of the Cold War nearly 2 decades
    ago. In recent years, old hatreds and conflicts have combined
    with new threats and forces of instability, challenges made
    more dangerous and prolific by modern technology, among them
    terrorism, extremism, and violent jihadism, ethnic, tribal, and
    sectarian conflict, proliferation of dangerous weapons and
    materials, failed and failing states, nations discontented with
    their role in the international order, and rising and resurgent
    powers whose future paths are uncertain.
        In light of this strategic environment, we must make the
    choices and investments necessary to protect the security,
    prosperity, and freedom of Americans for the next generation.
    The investment in defense spending being presented today is
    $515.4 billion, or about 4 percent of our gross domestic
    product (GDP) when combined with war costs. This compares to
    spending levels of 14 percent of GDP during the Korean War and
    9 percent during Vietnam.
        Our fiscal year 2009 request is a 7.5 percent increase, or
    $35.9 billion, over last year's enacted level. When accounting
    for inflation, this translates into a real increase of about
    5.5 percent. The difference consists of four main categories,
    which are outlined in more detail in my submitted statement.
    Overall, the budget includes $183.8 billion for overall
    strategic modernization, including $104 billion for procurement
    to sustain our Nation's technological advantage over current
    and future adversaries; $158.3 billion for operations,
    readiness, and support to maintain a skilled and agile fighting
    force; $149.4 billion to enhance quality-of-life for our men
    and women in uniform by providing the pay, benefits,
    healthcare, and other services earned by our All-Volunteer
    Force; and $20.5 billion to increase ground capabilities by
    growing the Army and the Marine Corps.
        This budget includes new funding for critical ongoing
    initiatives, such as global training and equipment to build the
    security capacity of partner nations, security and
    stabilization assistance, foreign language capabilities, and
    the new Africa Command (AFRICOM).
        In summary, this request provides the resources needed to
    respond to current threats while preparing for a range of
    conventional and irregular challenges that our Nation may face
    in the years ahead.
        In addition to the $515.4 billion base budget, our request
    includes $70 billion in emergency bridge funding that would
    cover war costs into the next calendar year. A more detailed
    request will be submitted later this year when the Department
    has a better picture of what level of funding will be needed.
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2007, as you have pointed out, requires the DOD to provide an
    estimate of costs for the global war on terror. We would like
    to be responsive to the request. Indeed, I was responsive to a
    similar request last year. Some have alleged that the
    administration has taken this position in order to somehow hide
    the true costs of the war. Nothing could be further from the
    truth. DOD has been very open about what we know about our
    costs as well as what we don't know.
        So the challenge we face is that a realistic or meaningful
    estimate requires answers to questions that we don't yet know,
    such as when and if the DOD will receive the requested $102
    billion balance of the fiscal year 2008 supplemental war
    request and for how much, and what if any adjustments to troop
    levels in Iraq will result from the upcoming recommendations of
    General Petraeus, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the JCS.
        We should also keep in mind that nearly three-quarters of
    the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request will likely be spent
    in the next administration, thus making it even more difficult
    to make an accurate projection.
        I have worked hard during my time in this job to be
    responsive and transparent to this committee and to Congress.
    Nothing has changed. But while I would like to be in a position
    to give you a realistic estimate of what the DOD will need for
    fiscal year 2009 supplemental funds, I simply cannot at this
    point. There are too many significant variables in play.
        I can give you a number. I will give you a number if you
    wish. But I will tell you that the number will inevitably be
    wrong and perhaps significantly so. So I will be giving you
    precision without accuracy.
        As I mentioned earlier, Congress has yet to appropriate the
    remaining balance of the fiscal year 2008 war funding request,
    $102.5 billion. The delay is degrading our ability to operate
    and sustain the force at home and in the theater and is making
    it difficult to manage DOD in a way that is fiscally sound. The
    DOD, as I've said, is like the world's biggest supertanker: It
    cannot turn on a dime and it cannot be steered like a skiff.
        I urge approval of the fiscal year 2008 request as quickly
    as possible.
        Finally, I would like to thank the members of this
    committee for all you have done to support our troops as well
    as their families. I thank you specifically for your attention
    to and support of efforts to improve the treatment of wounded
    warriors over the past year.
        In visits to the combat theaters and military hospitals and
    in bases and posts at home and around the world, I continue to
    be amazed by the decency, resilience, and courage of our
    troops. Through the support of Congress and our Nation, these
    young men and women will prevail in the current conflicts and
    be prepared to confront the threats that they, their children,
    and our Nation may face in the future.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you for your
    continued support of our military these many years. I appreciate the
    opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal year 2009 defense budget
    request.
        Before getting into the components of this request, I thought it
    useful to consider it in light of the current strategic landscape--a
    landscape still being shaped by forces unleashed by the end of the Cold
    War nearly two decades ago. In recent years old hatreds and conflicts
    have combined with new threats and forces of instability--challenges
    made more dangerous and prolific by modern technology. Among them:

             Terrorism, extremism, and violent jihadism;
             Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict;
             Proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials;
             Failed and failing states;
             Nations discontented with their role in the
            international order; and
             Rising and resurgent powers whose future paths are
            uncertain.

        In light of this strategic environment, we must make the choices
    and investments necessary to protect the security, prosperity, and
    freedom of Americans for the next generation.
        The investment in defense spending being presented today is $515.4
    billion, or about 3.4 percent of our Gross Domestic Product. This
    request is a 7.5 percent increase--or $35.9 billion--over last year's
    enacted level. When accounting for inflation, this translates into a
    real increase of about 5\1/2\ percent.
        I also strongly support Secretary Rice's request for the
    international affairs funding. This request is vital to the Department
    of Defense (DOD); in the current strategic landscape, we need civilian
    expertise and robust engagement around the world to build goodwill,
    represent United States values and commitment to our partners,
    complement the contributions of our military, and set the long-term
    conditions for peace, prosperity, and an environment inhospitable to
    extremism.
              strategic modernization--future combat capabilities
        The fiscal year 2009 budget request provides $183.8 billion in
    strategic modernization to meet future threats, a 4.7 percent increase
    over the previously enacted level. This category includes more than
    $104 billon for procurement.
    Joint Combat Capabilities
        The base budget provides $9.2 billion for ground capabilities,
    including more than 5,000 Humvees and 4,000 tactical vehicles. This
    request provides $3.6 billion to continue development of the Future
    Combat System, the Army's major modernization program.
        A total of $16.9 billion is allotted for maritime capabilities,
    with $14.2 billion for shipbuilding, including:

             The DDG-1000, the next generation surface combatant;
             Two littoral combat ships;
             Two joint high speed vessels;
             Two logistics ships; and
             One Virginia-class submarine.

        The ships being built today must provide the capability and
    capacity to maintain the Navy's global presence and influence in the
    future. A fleet sized at 313 ships offers the agility required to meet
    a broadening array of operations and requirements with allies around
    the globe.
        To improve air capabilities, the budget includes $45.6 billion, a
    $4.9 billion increase over last year's enacted levels.
        This includes:

             F/A 18 Hornet and E/A-18G Growler fighters;
             F-35 Joint Strike Fighters;
             F-22 Raptors
             V-22 Ospreys;
             Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; and
             Recapitalization of various missiles and other
            weapons.

        The Air Force's number one acquisition and recapitalization
    priority is the tanker fleet, specifically the KC-135, which is an
    average of 48.5 years old. This aircraft is increasingly expensive to
    maintain and less reliable to fly every day. The Air Force is
    proceeding with a traditional acquisition program for the KC-X, which
    will be able to refuel Air Force, Navy, and allied aircraft.
        Retirement of aging aircraft is a vital component of recapitalizing
    our air assets. I urge Congress to continue to authorize aircraft
    retirements, lifting restrictions from previous years to help the Air
    Force maintain readiness and perform missions more safely.
    Space
        This request provides $10.7 billion to strengthen joint space-based
    capabilities in several categories, including:

             Space-based infrared systems; and
             Communications, environmental, Global Positioning
            System, and Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites.

        The Department's heavy reliance on space capabilities is clear to
    potential adversaries, some of whom are developing anti-satellite
    weapons. Protecting our assets in space is, therefore, a high priority.
    In the past, the Department has been slow to address this
    vulnerability, but we are ramping up to properly address this problem.
    Research and Development
        As changes in this century's threat environment create strategic
    challenges--irregular warfare, weapons of mass destruction, disruptive
    technologies--this request places greater emphasis on basic research,
    which in recent years has not kept pace with other parts of the budget.
        This request for $11.5 billion will sustain ongoing science and
    technology research. Within this category, the fiscal year 2009 budget
    includes $1.7 billion for basic research initiatives. In total, I have
    directed an increase of about $1 billion over the next 5 years for
    fundamental, peer-reviewed basic research--a 2 percent increase in real
    annual growth.
    Missile Defense
        The 2009 base budget provides $10.4 billion to continue developing,
    testing, and fielding a multi-layered system to protect the U.S. and
    its allies from tactical and strategic ballistic missile attack.
        The Missile Defense Agency has successfully fielded elements of the
    ballistic missile defense system since 2004. Today, for the first time
    in history, our Nation has an initial missile defense capability. In
    coming years, the Department seeks to grow this capability by testing
    against more complex and realistic scenarios, and by negotiating with
    like-minded nations. Since becoming the Secretary of Defense, I have
    been personally involved in ongoing discussions with Poland and the
    Czech Republic on hosting U.S. missile defense assets. I will continue
    to press for increased cooperation with our partners.
                       readiness, operations, and support
        The fiscal year 2009 request provides $158.3 billion, a 10.4
    percent increase over last year's enacted level, for operations and
    training, as well as facilities and base support. $68 billion of the
    request will maintain combat readiness, focused on next-to-deploy
    units. The budget invests in readiness measured in terms of tank miles
    driven per month, ship steaming days underway per quarter, and flying
    hours per month. Additionally, this request includes:

             $33.1 billion for logistical, intelligence, and
            service-wide support;
             $32.6 billion for facility and base support;
             $11.8 billion for equipment maintenance to accommodate
            increased requirements, expanded scopes of work for repair and
            refurbishment of equipment, and the transition of systems from
            development to sustainment in the field;
             $10.7 billion for training, recruiting, and retention
            to ensure that the All-Volunteer Force has the right people
            with the right skills; and
             $2.2 billion for sealift efforts and commissary
            support.

        The Department will continue investing in a number of critical
    initiatives that will have long-term implications for the readiness of
    our forces and the Nation's ability to meet future threats.
    Global Train and Equip
        The global train and equip authority provides commanders a means to
    fill longstanding gaps in our ability to build the capacity and
    capabilities of partner nations. It allows the State and Defense
    Departments to act in months, rather than years, to help other
    countries build and sustain capable security forces. The program
    focuses on places where we are not at war, but where there are emerging
    threats and opportunities. It creates the opportunity to reduce stress
    on U.S. forces by decreasing the likelihood that troops will be used in
    the future. Combatant commanders consider this a vital tool in the war
    on terror beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. It has become a model of
    interagency cooperation between State and Defense--both in the field
    and in Washington, DC, Secretary Rice and I both fully support this
    authority. Its benefits will accrue to our successors in future
    administrations. The fiscal year 2009 base budget requests $500
    million, along with a request for $750 million in authority. I urge
    Congress to provide funding and permanent authority to meet enduring
    requirements.
    Security and Stabilization Assistance
        The fiscal year 2009 budget invests $200 million in security and
    stabilization assistance along with a corresponding request to increase
    the authority. This authority will allow the Department to transfer up
    to $200 million to the State Department to facilitate whole-of-
    government responses to stability and security missions--bringing
    civilian expertise to bear alongside our military. This would give
    Secretary Rice additional resources to address security challenges and
    defuse potential crises that might otherwise require the U.S. military
    to intervene.
    Africa Command
        This request includes $389 million, or $246 million above
    previously enacted funds, to launch the new Africa Command, allowing
    the Department to have a more integrated approach than the existing
    arrangement dividing the continent up among three different regional
    commands. This new command will help:

             Strengthen U.S. security cooperation with African
            countries;
             Train and equip our partners;
             Improve health, education, and economic development;
            and
             Promote peace and stability.
    Foreign Languages
        The fiscal year 2009 budget includes $586 million for the Defense
    Language Program, a $52.3 million increase from last year. Thus far,
    our approach to improving language skills is having an impact.
    Proficiency in Arabic has increased 82 percent since September 2001.
    Although the value of foreign languages and cultural proficiency is
    recognized by our Special Forces, these capabilities are essential for
    all forces preparing for irregular warfare, training and advising
    missions, humanitarian efforts, and security and stabilization
    operations.
                                quality of life
        The fiscal year 2009 request includes $149.4 billion in military
    pay, health care, housing, and quality of life for Service personnel
    and their families.
        The request provides for $107.8 billion in pay and benefits an
    increase of 9.8 percent over the fiscal year 2008 enacted level. This
    includes a pay raise of 3.4 percent for the military. Since 2001,
    military pay has increased by an average of 37 percent. For example, in
    fiscal year 2009, the average enlisted E-6 (Army Staff Sergeant) will
    see a pay increase of $1,289. The pay of the average O-3 (Army Captain
    or Navy Lieutenant) increases by $1,943 in fiscal year 2009.
    Family Housing
        The budget request includes $3.2 billion that will construct new
    family housing, improve existing housing, eliminate inadequate housing
    overseas, operate and maintain government-owned housing, and fund the
    privatization of 12,324 additional homes. The Basic Allowance for
    Housing increases by 5.0 percent and the Basic Allowance for
    Subsistence increases by 3.8 percent.
    Wounded Warriors
        We have a moral obligation to see that the superb lifesaving care
    that the wounded receive initially is matched by quality out-patient
    treatment. To provide world-class health care to all who are wounded,
    ill, or injured serving the Nation, the Department is taking action on
    the recommendations made by the President's Commission on Care for
    America's Returning Wounded Warriors. To do so, we have formed a senior
    oversight committee--chaired by the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and
    Veterans Affairs--to examine several key areas:

             Case Management--integrate care management throughout
            the life of the wounded, ill, or injured servicemember to
            ensure they receive, as the President made clear, the ``right
            care and benefits at the right time in the right place from the
            right person'';
             Disability and Compensation Systems--streamline the
            disability evaluation system making it a single, supportive,
            and transparent process;
             DOD and VA Data Sharing--ensure appropriate
            information is accessible and understandable between
            departments; and
             Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)/Psychological Health
            Issues--improve access and quality of care by reducing the
            stigma associated with mental health care and establishing new
            programs, such as a TBI registry.

        The Department has already approved new standards for all
    facilities housing the wounded and we have placed pay management teams
    at numerous sites to better educate troops and their families about
    pay, entitlements, and benefits.
        The budget requests $466 million to support construction of health
    care facilities at Bethesda and Fort Belvoir, as well as establish a
    Warrior Transition Unit at Bethesda. The transition unit will ensure
    the wounded receive optimum care, especially during the outpatient
    convalescent phase of recovery.
    Future Health Care Issues
        In fiscal year 2009, DOD military healthcare costs are projected to
    be $42.8 billion in order to maintain benefits for 9.2 million eligible
    military members and their families, as well as retirees--more than
    double the level in 2001. By 2015, the Department's health care costs
    are projected to reach $64 billion, or 11.3 percent of the budget.
        Because of these concerns, the Department must also seek
    legislation to increase out-of-pocket health care expenses for retirees
    under age 65. The Department continues to believe that modest increases
    to TRICARE out-of-pocket costs for working-age military retirees are
    essential to make military health benefits affordable and sustainable
    for current and future retired servicemembers.
    Global Posture
        The base budget requests $9.5 billion to continue U.S. Base
    Realignment and Closure (BRAC) efforts. For the approved fiscal year
    2005 BRAC recommendations, the budget fully funds 24 major
    realignments, 25 base closures, and 765 lesser actions. The Department
    is continuing to reposition U.S. forces at home and abroad in keeping
    with post-Cold War realities. Consequently, several units stationed
    overseas will be brought home. The Commander of European Command has
    requested that the Army activate two heavy brigade combat teams (BCTs)
    in Germany in 2008 and 2010 to support near-term security needs and
    allow time for construction in the United States.
                             increase ground forces
        Increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps will relieve
    stress on the force and enable the Nation to meet its commitments at
    home and abroad. This growth in end strength is a continuation of
    growth that began last year and is expected to continue through fiscal
    year 2013.
    U.S. Army
        The fiscal year 2009 base budget provides $15.5 billion to increase
    Army active end strength to 532,400, which includes an increase of
    7,000 over the fiscal year 2008 request. The Army request includes the
    cumulative cost of personnel added as part of a temporary increase in
    end strength after September 11, 2001--an increase which had previously
    been paid for in supplemental appropriations.
        The Army plans to grow its active ranks to 547,400 by fiscal year
    2012. In fiscal year 2009, the number of active Army BCTs will increase
    by 2 BCTs, from 40 to 42, with a goal of 48 BCTs by 2012.
        I am concerned that the percentage of new Army recruits with high
    school diplomas has declined in recent years. While still above the
    minimum standard established by Congress, we are watching these numbers
    closely, and are determined to grow the Army in a way that does not
    sacrifice the quality we have come to expect in the All-Volunteer
    Force.
    U.S. Marine Corps
        The base budget seeks $5 billion to grow the Marine Corps' end
    strength to 194,000, an increase of 5,000 over the fiscal year 2008
    request. As with the Army, the Marine Corps' request includes the
    cumulative cost of personnel added after September 11, 2001. The Marine
    Corps' plans to increase end strength to 202,000 by fiscal year 2011,
    in order to achieve three balanced Marine Expeditionary Force units and
    to increase time at home station between deployments. This will enable
    the Corps to continue to be, as it has historically been a ``two-
    fisted'' expeditionary force excelling at conventional warfare and
    counterinsurgency.
                                  war funding
        In addition to the $515.4 billion base budget, our request includes
    $70 billion in emergency bridge funding that would cover war costs into
    the next calendar year. A more detailed request will be submitted later
    this year when the Department has a better picture of what level of
    funding will be needed.
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
    requires the DOD to provide an estimate of costs for the global war on
    terror. We would like to be responsive to this request. The challenge
    facing us is that a realistic estimate requires answers the Department
    does not currently have to several key questions, such as:

             When and if the Department will receive the balance of
            the fiscal year 2008 supplemental war request, and for how
            much; and
             What, if any, adjustments to troop levels in Iraq will
            result from the upcoming recommendations of General Petraeus.

        We should also keep in mind that nearly three quarters of the
    fiscal year 2009 supplemental request will likely be spent in the next
    administration, thus making it even more difficult to make an accurate
    projection.
        In short, while I would like to be in a position to give you a
    realistic estimate of what the Department will need for fiscal year
    2009 supplemental funds, I simply cannot at this point. There are too
    many significant variables in play.
        As I mentioned earlier, Congress has yet to appropriate the
    remaining balance of the fiscal year 2008 war funding request, $102.5
    billion. Delay is degrading our ability to operate and sustain the
    force at home and in theater, and is making it difficult to manage this
    Department in a way that is fiscally sound. The DOD is like the world's
    biggest supertanker. It cannot turn on a dime and cannot be steered
    like a skiff. The consequences of not receiving the balance of this
    request may include:

             Retarding daily efforts in support of Iraqi and Afghan
            national security forces, to include training and equipping
            efforts;
             Halting our ability to pay military personnel and
            continue operations; and
             Limiting reset of equipment lost and damaged by
            ongoing operations.

        I urge approval of the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror
    request as quickly as possible.
                                   conclusion
        At this, my second and also last opportunity to present a budget
    before this committee, I thank the members of this committee for all
    you have done to support our troops as well as their families. In
    visits to the combat theaters, in military hospitals, and in bases and
    posts at home and around the world, I continue to be amazed by their
    decency, resiliency, and courage. Through the support of Congress and
    our Nation, these young men and women will prevail in the current
    conflicts and be prepared to confront the threats that they, their
    children, and our Nation may face in the future.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Mullen?

    STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
                                OF STAFF

        Admiral Mullen. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Senator Warner, distinguished members of this committee. Thanks
    for the opportunity to appear before you today. I'm honored to
    be here alongside Secretary Gates, a man whose leadership and
    insight I greatly respect and admire.
        We are here to discuss with you the President's fiscal year
    2009 budget submission and, more broadly, the state of our
    Armed Forces. Let me speak for a moment about the latter. The
    United States military remains the most powerful, most capable
    military on the face of the Earth. No other nation has or can
    field and put to sea the superb combat capabilities resident in
    our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
        I say this not with false pride or arrogance. I say it with
    conviction, for it is an indisputable fact. This stands as
    testament, of course, to the brave, talented men and women who
    serve, Active-Duty, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian, as
    well as their families. I've been on record as saying that they
    are the finest I have ever seen. I meant it then, I mean it
    now. Each trip to the field, each visit to a base, each bedside
    I stand beside, only reaffirms that for me.
        I know you have also made such visits and can attest to the
    same. So I also believe our enormous strength speaks well of
    the hard work of this committee and Congress as a whole, as it
    does of the American people, who through you, their elected
    representatives, have invested heavily and wisely in their
    national defense.
        We are grateful. We will continue to need that support,
    for, however powerful we may be today, that power is not
    assured tomorrow. That is why the budget we are submitting this
    week includes more than $180 billion for strategic
    modernization, including $3.6 billion for the Army to continue
    to develop the Future Combat System (FCS), and another $3.5
    billion to procure 20 more F-22 fighters, and another $700
    million in research and development.
        That's why it calls for money to continue to build the next
    generation aircraft carrier and guided missile destroyer,
    increased spending on missile defense, as well as funding to
    complete the standup of AFRICOM. It's why we are asking for
    more than $20 billion to increase the size of the Army and the
    Marine Corps.
        Some have argued there isn't much new in this budget, no
    big surprises. Maybe so. Quite frankly, we ought to take a
    little bit of pride in that, because it says to me that we've
    looked pragmatically at all our requirements, that we did our
    homework, and that from a fiscal perspective we have a good
    handle on where we want to go.
        A reporter reminded me just the other day that investment
    budgets are really a type of strategy. If that's so, and I
    believe it is, this budget reveals great balance in our
    strategy for the future, a realization that, while we continue
    to fight and develop counterinsurgency warfare, we must also
    prepare for, build for, and train for a broad spectrum of
    traditional war-fighting missions.
        We are doing well in Iraq, no question. Violence is down,
    business is up, al Qaeda is clearly on the run. Ambassador
    Crocker and General Petraeus deserve a lot of credit. The surge
    of forces we sent them and their innovative application of
    counterinsurgency tactics have markedly improved security on
    the ground. As both men have made clear, this progress is
    tenuous and must be carefully watched. I understand their
    concerns as we keep bringing home the surge brigades.
    Conditions on the ground count.
        But tenuous, too, sir, are the long risks we are taking to
    our security commitments elsewhere in the world if we do not
    address the toll that ongoing combat operations are taking on
    our forces, our gear, our people, and their families. The well
    is deep, but it is not infinite. We must get Army deployments
    down to 12 months as soon as possible. People are tired. We
    must restore our Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities. They
    are dangerously on the wane. We must stay dominant at sea, in
    space, as well as in cyberspace. Others are beginning to pace
    us in the speed of war.
        We must do a better job identifying and treating not only
    the wounded we see, but the wounds we do not see. Too many of
    our returning warriors suffer in silence. I greatly appreciate
    the law that you put into effect last year specifically with
    respect to treating our wounded warriors.
        This budget allocates $41.6 billion to provide world-class
    care and quality-of-life for the entire force. We must honor
    military families by enhancing the government-issued (GI)
    benefits transferability, by broadening Federal hiring
    preferences for military spouses, and by expanding child care
    benefits in appreciation for their many sacrifices.
        We must continue to stay persistently engaged around the
    globe, building partner capacity, improving international and
    interagency cooperation, and fostering both security and
    stability.
        I urge Congress to enact the authorities in the joint DOS
    and DOD Building Global Partnerships Act. I was called to
    testify before the House Armed Services Committee a few weeks
    ago about our progress in Afghanistan. I told them then that we
    are seeing only mixed progress and that Afghanistan was by
    design an economy of force operation. I told them we do what we
    can there. I stand by those comments even as we prepare to send
    more than 3,000 marines over there and even as Secretary Gates
    continues to press our NATO allies for more support.
        The business of war, not unlike governing, is about
    choices. Military leaders must make hard decisions every day,
    choices that affect the outcome of major battles, whole
    nations, and the lives of potentially millions of people. As we
    head into this new year with fresh assessments of our progress
    in Iraq, a new push in Afghanistan, and a continued fight
    against violent extremists, as we consider the depth and
    breadth of traditional capabilities, we must improve. Please
    know that I and the Joint Chiefs remain committed to making
    informed choices, careful choices, and choices which preserve
    at all times and in all ways our ability to defend the American
    people.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
                Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
    committee, I am privileged to appear before you and report to you on
    the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces.
        Let me begin by recognizing and thanking our servicemembers and
    their families. The brave men and women who answer the noble call to
    defend our Nation and the spouses, children, and parents who support
    them are our most valuable national asset.
        Your Armed Forces, and their families, have faced the challenges of
    continuous combat for more than 6 years. Our men and women in uniform
    serve our Nation, accepting unwelcome separation from their loved ones,
    long hard work under difficult circumstances, and in some cases making
    the ultimate sacrifice.
        Military families are equally deserving of our gratitude. They bear
    the brunt of the loneliness, the uncertainty, and the grief that too
    often comes home when our Armed Forces are at war. Acknowledging the
    importance of their support, we must consider new initiatives such as
    transferring GI bill benefits to military spouses and children,
    military spouse employment support, expanded childcare and youth
    programs, and long-term comprehensive support of Wounded Warrior
    families.
        We must provide our servicemembers and their families with the
    leadership, the resources and the support required to defend the
    homeland, win the Long War, promote security, deter conflict, and win
    our Nation's wars.
                                  introduction
        Over the past year, your Armed Forces have done much to improve the
    security environment. Operating globally alongside allies and partners,
    often in concert with the interagency and non-governmental
    organizations, they have successfully protected our Nation's vital
    interests: a homeland secure from catastrophic attack, assured access
    to strategic resources, a strong national and global economy, sustained
    military superiority and strategic endurance, and sustained global
    influence, leadership, and freedom of action.
        A diverse set of perils threaten those interests and demand
    sustained action. Those threats include the proliferation of nuclear
    weapons and technology, transnational terrorism and rising regional
    instability. Today, these challenges manifest themselves most clearly
    in the Middle East.
        We face additional challenges in other areas: a number of state
    actors who appear intent on undermining U.S. interests and regional
    stability, a growing global competition for scarce natural resources,
    the constant threat of natural disasters and pandemics, as well as
    increasing cyber and space threats. Our military is capable of
    responding to all threats to our vital national interests, but is
    significantly stressed while conducting combat operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and other operations worldwide as part of this
    multigenerational conflict against violent extremism. A decline in our
    strength or a gap in readiness will undermine the U.S. Armed Forces
    capability to complete its range of missions from combat overseas to
    providing civil support at home. That is why I believe we must reset,
    reconstitute, and revitalize our Armed Forces while balancing global
    risk.
        We do not--and should not--face these challenges alone. Today, more
    nations are free, peaceful, and prosperous than at almost any point in
    history. While each has its own heritage and interests, most share our
    desire for security and stability. Increasing free trade, regional
    security partnerships, treaties, international institutions, and
    military-to-military engagements and capacity building strengthen the
    bonds between us and other nations. Our engagement with allies and
    friends demonstrates our leadership and resolve to fulfill security
    commitments, and works toward the common good. Most often, it is by
    taking collective action--and not going it alone--that we increase our
    ability to protect our vital interests.
        With this context in mind, and in consultation with the Secretary
    of Defense, I have set three strategic priorities for our military.
    First, we need to increase stability and defend our vital national
    interests in the broader Middle East. Second, we must reset,
    reconstitute, and revitalize our Armed Forces. Third, we need to deter
    conflict and be prepared to defeat foes globally by rebalancing our
    strategic risk. Finally, to achieve our objectives in each of these
    areas we need to place increased emphasis not only on development of
    our own capabilities and the capacity of other agencies (State, U.S.
    Agency for International Development, Agriculture, Treasury, and
    Commerce and so forth), but also on building the capacity of our
    foreign partners to counter threats including terrorism and to promote
    regional stability.
         defend our vital national interests in the broader middle east
        Although our vital national interests are clearly global in nature,
    the broader Middle East is the epicenter of violent extremism. Too many
    countries suffer from burgeoning populations and stagnant economies,
    which have increased radicalization. State and non-state actors alike
    foment instability. Terrorists and insurgents are at war with
    governments in the region. The confrontational posture of Iranian
    leaders with respect to nuclear proliferation, the Israeli-Palestinian
    conflict, Sunni-Shia rivalries, the threat of terrorism, tensions in
    Pakistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, political instability in the Maghreb,
    and the existence of al Qaeda and like-minded groups, all threaten
    regional stability and, ultimately, our vital national interests.
        My near-term focus remains combat operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The surge of U.S. forces to Iraq, a well executed
    counterinsurgency strategy and an Iraqi population increasingly weary
    of violence, and willing to do something about it, have all combined to
    improve security conditions throughout much of the country. Violent
    activities against our forces and against the Iraqi people have
    substantially decreased. These reductions have come about because of
    the hard work of coalition and Iraqi security forces and the decisions
    of the Iraqi people and their leaders. Insurgent activity is down and
    al Qaeda in Iraq is on the run--although both remain dangerous. Much
    hard fighting remains for Iraqi and coalition forces before the job is
    done. Increased security has promoted reconciliation in some key
    provinces and the beginnings of national level reconciliation. We are
    working to secure a long-term security relationship with Iraq that will
    serve the mutual interests of both countries. As we continue to
    progress forward, congressional support of future warfunding will
    remain critical to success. An important component of that funding will
    go to building the capacity of increasingly capable Iraqi security
    forces.
        Security is a necessary condition but is not sufficient for
    achieving our strategic end-state in Iraq. Political, diplomatic and
    economic development together with expanded governance and the rule of
    law form the foundations that will underpin long-term stability and
    security in Iraq. We are making solid progress, but we still have a
    long way to go. I ask that Congress continue its support for increased
    interagency participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),
    stability and reconstruction initiatives, U.S. business investment,
    Department of Defense (DOD) business transformation efforts, and good
    governance initiatives. I encourage your continued emphasis on the
    importance of achieving political and economic goals. Your visits with
    the Iraqi Government and other Iraqi political leaders support the
    efforts of American, coalition, and Iraqi forces.
        In Afghanistan we are seeing a growing insurgency, increasing
    violence, and a burgeoning drug trade fueled by widespread poppy
    cultivation. In response, more U.S. forces will deploy to Afghanistan.
    At the same time, the Afghan National Army and Police have increased in
    numbers and capability. The Afghan PRTs continue to aid the local
    populations, and President Hamid Karzai is reaching out to support the
    provinces. In the U.S. section of RC East, access to basic health care
    has more than doubled and provincial councils have become functioning
    entities active in development. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) forces provide a credible fighting force, but the alliance still
    faces difficulty meeting its force level commitments and some nations'
    forces in theater must be more operationally flexible. These challenges
    emphasize the importance of retaining U.S. freedom of action on a
    global scale. Just as in Iraq, your continued support for funding U.S.
    operations and efforts there, including PRTs, Afghanistan National
    Security Force development, and infrastructure development, is needed.
        In short, a stable Iraq and Afghanistan that are long-term partners
    and share our commitment to peace will be critical to achieving
    regional stability and security. This will require years, not months,
    and will require the support of the American people, our regional
    allies, and concerted action by the Iraqi and Afghan people and their
    leaders.
        I see daily reminders of other challenges in this part of the
    world. Recent irresponsible actions by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
    Guard Corps in the Strait of Hormuz could have led to a crisis between
    our Nations. Restraint in our response does not signal lack of resolve
    or capability to defend ourselves against threats. Much more worrisome
    in the long-term, however, is Iran's hegemonic intent, their continued
    refusal to verifiably suspend uranium enrichment, their continued
    support of terrorism and the resultant instability these actions foster
    throughout the region.
        Al Qaeda safe havens in the under-governed regions of Pakistan,
    combined with the recent assassination of Benazir Bhutto, also
    contribute to regional instability. In my judgment, the most likely
    near term attack on the United States will come from al Qaeda via these
    safe havens. Continued congressional support for the legitimate
    Government of Pakistan braces this bulwark in the long war against
    violent extremism.
        Despite--or maybe because of--these diverse challenges, we are
    fortunate to enjoy the cooperation of many courageous partner nations
    in the region. A recent regional commitment to work toward an Israeli-
    Palestinian peace accord is one example. We should not inadvertently
    signal ingratitude toward any of these nations. Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training
    (IMET) are programs that have the potential to have significant
    strategic repercussions. I therefore seek congressional support to
    ensure the Department of State's FMF and IMET programs remains fully
    funded.
        After three visits to the Middle East since becoming Chairman, I am
    more convinced than ever that we will not achieve regional security and
    stability unless we strengthen all instruments of international
    cooperation, regional partnerships, and national power. We need to
    ensure our plans sustain current gains and chart a course that both
    capitalize on lessons learned while focusing on future demands and
    dynamic conditions on the ground. Our forces must remain in theater as
    long as necessary to secure our vital interests and those of our
    partner nations, and they must operate with the full confidence and
    support of the American people and Congress.
                 reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our forces
        To be successful in defeating our enemies and deterring potential
    foes, U.S. Armed Forces require talented people who are fully trained
    in their specialties and well equipped with warfighting systems. The
    pace of ongoing operations has prevented our forces from fully training
    for the full-spectrum of operations and impacts our ability to be ready
    to counter future threats. This lack of balance is unsustainable in the
    long-term. We must restore the balance and strategic depth required for
    national security. Continued operations without the requisite increase
    in national resources will further degrade our equipment, platforms,
    and people.
        Our Nation's servicemen and women--and their families--are the
    primary focus of my efforts to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our
    forces. Caring for them is a critical consideration in every decision I
    make. Our All-Volunteer Force continues to meet the requirements and
    demands of national security, but with great sacrifice. This is the
    longest time that our All-Volunteer Force has been at war. Our
    servicemembers, in particular our ground forces and their families, are
    under significant strain. However, they remain dedicated, they are
    resilient and combat hardened, and they are taking the fight to our
    enemies. I do not take their service for granted and recognize that
    their resilience has limits. I am extremely concerned about the toll
    the current pace of operations is taking on them and on their families,
    on our equipment, and on our ability to respond to crises and
    contingencies beyond ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        The Secretary of Defense fixed and limited deployment cycles at 15
    months deployed/12 months home for the Army, 7 months deployed/7 months
    home for the Marines, and 1 year mobilization with 5 years back for the
    National Guard and Reserves. I strongly support his decision as it
    stabilized rotations and provided predictability. However, at our
    current force levels, we cannot sustain these cycles. Fifteen month
    deployments are too long. To preserve personal, operational, and family
    readiness, we must shift the Army's deployment cycle to 12 months
    deployed followed by 12 months at home and then as quickly as possible
    to 12 months deployed followed by 24 months at home. We must do the
    same for the Marine Corps by moving to 14 months at home for each 7
    month deployment. Therefore, the most important investment in the
    President's fiscal year 2009 budget is the commitment to expand our
    Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces. This continuation of
    the ``Grow the Force'' initiative is a long-term plan to restore the
    broad range of capabilities necessary to meet future challenges and
    restore a capacity for sustained action. This commitment encompasses
    nearly 33 percent of the total real growth of the DOD budget from
    fiscal year 2008 to 2009.
        Recruiters have a tough job during peacetime and it is made even
    more difficult now given the expansion of both the Army and the Marine
    Corps and the decrease in the propensity of key influencers to
    encourage potential recruits to enlist during this period of war. In
    spite of these challenges, our recruiters are doing exceptional work.
    The military departments met their recruiting goals for fiscal year
    2007 and remain on track for fiscal year 2008. We are also making sure
    we retain the people and the skills we need. The Services are using the
    full range of authorities given to them by Congress in the form of
    retention incentives, and I ask your continued support for these
    programs to sustain our combat-experienced force. Last year, the Army
    and Navy employed the Critical Skills Retention Bonus to retain mid-
    career active duty officers who fill key positions. Likewise, the
    Services have offered bonuses to senior enlisted members of our Special
    Operations Forces. Investment in our people as our most important
    resource is vital. The cost of people continues to grow and we need to
    recognize this as we debate the right level of investment in defense.
        Retention challenges impact more than just our Active-Duty Forces.
    Though they met their recruiting and retention goals this last year,
    the Army Reserve and National Guard have experienced some shortages in
    company grade officers and mid-grade noncommissioned officers who lead
    our troops. We are overcoming these personnel shortfalls through
    enhanced incentives for Reserve and National Guard service, flexibility
    in terms of service requirements, competitive pay, and enhanced
    retirement benefits. These initiatives are important steps towards
    transitioning the Reserve components from a ``strategic Reserve'' role
    to part of the ``operational Reserve,'' creating the depth and staying
    power to respond to multiple global requirements, and maintaining our
    professional Guard and Reserve Force.
        Maintaining our professional Armed Forces, however, takes more than
    talented recruiters, attractive incentives, and competitive pay. We
    must understand our next generation of soldiers, sailors, marines, and
    airmen. Their affinity for technology and collaboration may
    revolutionize the way we fight. The willingness of future generations
    of Americans to serve is directly related to how they, and their role
    models, perceive the veterans of today are treated and appreciated. The
    All-Volunteer Force depends upon the trust and confidence of the
    American people in our institution; it depends on trust and confidence
    in our leaders; and, it depends upon trust and confidence that
    America's sons and daughters will be well-trained, well-equipped, and
    well-cared for in peace and in war.
        While all our servicemembers and their families have done their
    duty with great discipline and honor, one group in particular stands
    out: our returning Wounded Warriors and the parents, spouses and family
    members who care for them when they come home. As a Nation, we have an
    obligation to care for those who have borne the battle and who bear
    both the seen and unseen scars of war. Their sacrifices will not end
    following completion of their initial treatment. We should strive to
    provide only the finest medical and rehabilitative care for them and
    their families for the remainder of their lives.
        As leaders, we must ensure all our Wounded Warriors and their
    families receive the appropriate level of care, training, and financial
    support they need to become as self-sufficient and lead as normal a
    life as possible. Our support can mean the difference not just between
    life and death, but between a life of severe disability and one of
    manageable limitations. To the degree that we fail to care for them and
    their families, and enable their return to as normal a life as
    possible, we undermine the trust and confidence of the American people
    and ultimately put at risk the preservation of our professional All-
    Volunteer Force.
        It is also imperative that we retain the experience of our combat
    hardened leaders. We live in a dangerous and unpredictable world and in
    a time of incredible change. I believe this change will accelerate, not
    slow down. Today's combat veterans are the ones that will take our
    military into the future. Their experience in fighting terrorists and
    insurgents as well as caring for those wounded on the fields of battle
    will enable us to better prepare for the challenges of tomorrow, but we
    cannot afford to lose their hard earned experience today.
        In addition to taking care of our people, we must repair, rebuild,
    and replace the equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed,
    and worn out beyond economic repair after years of combat operations.
    As you are well aware, Service equipment has been used at higher rates
    and in harsher conditions than anticipated. In addition to the wear and
    tear experienced by our ground vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan, our
    airframes and ships are aging beyond their intended service lives.
    Indeed since Operation Desert Storm, 17 years ago, the U.S. Air Force
    and U.S. Navy have flown near continuous combat missions over the
    Middle East and the Balkans. The impact of this usage is illustrated in
    the recent groundings of the oldest F-15 Eagle fighters, our repeated
    request to retire some of our C-130 Hercules and KC-135 Stratotankers,
    and the strains placed on our 29-year-old P-3 Orion reconnaissance
    aircraft.
        Despite usage levels sometimes five to six times above peacetime
    rates, and in the midst of extremely demanding environments, equipment
    readiness in theater remains high, well above the peacetime goals. Your
    support has been helpful in accomplishing this mark. However, this high
    in-theater equipment readiness comes with a price--namely the impact on
    the remainder of the Service equipment. For example, our ground forces
    borrow equipment from non-deploying units in order to equip deploying
    units. While our deploying units are fully resourced to meet the
    challenges of the fight that they are in, we must get ahead of this
    challenge.
        Our forces are relying upon the balance of funds requested in the
    fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request to accomplish equipment
    reset and to address readiness shortfalls. I urge Congress to quickly
    appropriate the remaining global war on terror request for fiscal year
    2008, as it is essential to have continued, predictable, and adequate
    funding for the repair and replacement of both operational and training
    equipment. I also ask for your continued support for our upcoming
    fiscal year 2009 global war on terror funding request.
        Revitalization includes force recapitalization, modernization,
    transformation, re-stationing, and repositioning, along with personnel
    and family support programs. A revitalized force creates a vital
    deterrent effect. Preventing future wars is as important as winning
    wars. Such prevention requires global presence and persistent
    engagement. A revitalized force provides the means to expand
    cooperative relationships with other nations and contribute to a global
    capacity to promote security and stability for the benefit of all. A
    revitalized force will also ensure that we remain prepared to meet our
    global responsibilities.
        Finally, a revitalized force is central to balancing global
    strategic risk. A revitalized force is a balanced total joint force,
    capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict. A balanced force
    possesses the capability and capacity to successfully conduct multiple
    simultaneous missions, in all domains, and at the required levels of
    organization, across the full range of military operations. A
    modernized, balanced total joint force is necessary if we are to
    successfully answer enduring and emerging challenges, and win our
    Nation's wars.
                    properly balanced global strategic risk
        Beyond the Middle East, and in addition to revitalizing our forces,
    we must take a worldwide and long term view of our posture and its
    implications for global strategic risk. We have global security
    responsibilities across the range of military operations. The
    challenges in Asia to the vital interests of the U.S. and our allies
    are an example.
        We must be sized, shaped, and postured globally to leverage the
    opportunities for international cooperation and build the capacity of
    partners for stability, while at the same time, deterring, confronting
    and preparing for profound dangers of the future. I am concerned, as
    are the combatant commanders, that we do not have sufficient resources
    to meet all the needs. By working with other growing powers, and by
    helping emerging powers become constructive actors, we can ensure
    today's dynamic environment does not devolve into a prolonged state of
    conflict and disorder.
        The imbalance between our readiness for future global missions and
    the wars we are fighting today limits our capacity to respond to future
    contingencies, and offers potential adversaries, both state and non-
    state, incentives to act. We must not allow the challenges of today to
    keep us from being prepared for the realities of tomorrow. There is
    risk that we will be unable to rapidly respond to future threats to our
    vital national interests.
        Funding by Congress is critical to restoring balance in the long
    term. But resources alone are not enough. We must think more
    creatively, more deeply, and more systematically about how to best use
    our resources. We have learned a great deal about how to leverage
    modern technology and interagency participation to counter terrorism--
    those lessons can be shared with our partner nations, and applied to
    other security threats such as our Nation's counter narcotics efforts.
    Similarly, our new maritime strategy emphasizes the importance of
    leveraging other nation's capabilities. The growing interdependency of
    the community of nations will continue to offer similar opportunities.
    I support the United States' accession to the United Nations Law of the
    Sea Convention, and I believe that joining the Convention will
    strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations.
        Our enduring alliances and partnerships promote stability and
    security. The 27 nation NATO leads the effort to help extend security
    and stability inside Afghanistan. Australia and Japan have also made
    key contributions to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another key
    ally, the Republic of Korea, has supported Operation Iraqi Freedom for
    the past 3 years--and continues to maintain a robust national
    commitment to security in Northeast Asia. Singapore and the Philippines
    work with us to counter international terrorist threats in Southeast
    Asia. Colombia's highly successful counterinsurgency struggle promotes
    stability in a critical region of South America. Our military to
    military relationships with Mexico and Canada are laying the ground
    work for greater Homeland Security. Enhancing our teamwork with our
    allies and partners is essential if we are to protect our shared
    interests.
        Persistent engagement and capacity building with allies and
    international partners is a key means of properly balancing global
    strategic risk. Persistent engagement consists of those cooperative
    activities that build partner capacity, provide humanitarian
    assistance, counter common threats, and safeguard the global commons.
    As I noted earlier, we need to fully fund our FMF and IMET programs and
    streamline the process for executing these and similar funds. Fostering
    and sustaining cooperative relationships with friends around the world
    contributes significantly to our shared security and global prosperity.
    Relationships take time to grow--and they require investment to stay
    strong.
        In many cases, other countries have significant competencies,
    relationships, and resources that can promote security and stability.
    One way to build relationships with other nations is to help them
    accomplish the goals they cannot achieve alone. Helping other nations
    overcome security problems within their borders by increasing stability
    and eliminating terrorist safe havens bolsters our security as it
    boosts theirs. Our Theater Security Cooperation programs also form a
    foundation for shared and interoperable response to contingencies.
    Regional Combatant Commands--such as U.S. Northern Command, U.S.
    Southern Command, and U.S. Africa Command--are being structured with
    interagency and international relationships in mind to boost our
    security and humanitarian assistance capabilities, and to foster long-
    term U.S. military relationships with regional nations and security
    institutions.
        Legislation that increases the expeditionary capacity of civilian
    U.S. Government agencies is critical to rebalancing global strategic
    risk. Increasing the ability of the U.S. Government, as a whole, to
    deal with crises reduces the strain on our military forces. We need to
    empower the State Department to help other countries prevent and
    recover from conflict. I also fully endorse increased support for our
    intelligence agencies' global activities--upon which our Armed Forces
    depend. We additionally need to look at increasing the capacity of
    other U.S. Government agencies--such as the Justice and Agriculture
    Departments, which are otherwise oriented on domestic missions--to help
    contribute civil expertise that the military lacks in stabilization and
    capacity building missions overseas.
        Rebalancing strategic risk also means addressing capability gaps.
    The technology advantage that we have long enjoyed has eroded, with
    significant ramifications. Interruption of our access to cyberspace
    could substantively damage our national defense and civil society.
    Addressing this threat, the President's budget for fiscal year 2009
    includes funds to reduce our cyber vulnerabilities. Likewise, freedom
    of action in Space is vital to our economic, civil, and military well
    being. We need to increase our capacity to defend our access to that
    domain. We must also address shortfalls identified by our combatant
    commanders in our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
    sensors and processing infrastructure.
        Fighting and winning wars is the main mission, but deterring them
    is always preferable. This is even more the case in deterring nuclear
    threats. We now face the prospect that nuclear weapons will be employed
    against us and our allies by non-state actors and rogue states. To
    defend our Nation and assure our allies, we must enhance our capability
    to rapidly locate and destroy targets globally. We seek to improve
    conventional prompt global strike capability, further develop global
    missile defense systems, and modernize our strategic weapons systems
    and infrastructure, to include developing a Reliable Replacement
    Warhead and a conventional ballistic missile. These components of our
    ``New Triad,'' together with improved intelligence and planning
    systems, will help to ensure credible deterrence across a range of
    threats in the 21st century strategic environment.
                         building partnership capacity
        Building partnership capacity underpins all three of my strategic
    objectives and is an area that requires additional congressional
    support. Unfortunately, there are serious shortfalls in the U.S.
    Government's ability to build the capacity of foreign partners--both
    within and outside DOD. The Departments of State and Defense conducted
    a systematic review of gaps in authority and developed an omnibus bill
    called the Building Global Partnerships Act which was personally
    brokered by the Secretaries of State and Defense. I strongly urge
    Congress to enact all of these authorities.
        Foremost, DOD requires extension and expansion of its Global Train
    and Equip authority. Every single combatant commander cites this as
    DOD's most important authority to counter terrorism and to promote
    regional stability by building the capacity of partner military forces.
    These programs will not get funded or executed properly unless DOD
    funds them and collaborates with State on implementation. Over the past
    3 years, all combatant commanders, the former Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Secretary of
    Defense, and the Secretary of State have requested extension,
    expansion, and funding for these programs. Now is the time to make
    Global Train and Equip authority permanent, to increase the ceiling,
    and to provide annual baseline funding.
        The Commander's Emergency Response Program has been enormously
    successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other combatant commanders have
    requested this same authority to enhance prospects for mission success
    in other regions of the world. Our commanders in the field view this as
    a critical force protection tool that allows them to shape the
    operational environment so force is not required.
        Building the security capacity of our partners is important, but
    partners often need additional assistance to promote stability.
    Stabilization and reconstruction assistance authority allows DOD to
    transfer funds to the Department of State to provide assistance to aid
    foreign police forces, to improve governance, rule of law, economic
    development or essential services, and for humanitarian assistance.
    Stabilization and reconstruction assistance authority recently allowed
    DOD and State to enhance stability in Haiti, Somalia, Nepal, Trans-
    Saharan Africa, Yemen, and Southeast Asia.
        We are in a new national security era that requires building new
    institutional capacity that does not currently exist. Most authorities
    to provide other broader forms of assistance reside at the Department
    of State, where patriotic foreign service officers and development
    professionals are doing everything they can with the force they have.
    But that force is woefully small relative to need. I support Secretary
    Rice's request for the Civilian Response Corps and ask Congress to
    enact quickly legislation authorizing its creation. I also strongly
    support the significant plus-up in people that the State Department and
    U.S. Agency for International Development are seeking in the
    President's 2009 budget as well as its request for increased foreign
    assistance funding. The increases that Secretary Rice is seeking in
    2009 are crucial to supporting our foreign policy goals; underfunding
    these activities undermine our national security. I would also support
    the reconstitution of the U.S. Information Agency or an equivalent
    functional entity to more effectively counter extremist ideology.
    Finally, I appreciate Congress' direction to study the national
    security interagency system, and will strongly support that effort.
                                   conclusion
        The past year saw America's men and women in uniform continue to
    engage in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, while they also provided
    humanitarian assistance, worked with partner nations, and stood guard
    around the globe. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and our
    Nation's coastguardsmen are making a positive difference. They do so
    willingly and unflinchingly. Their valor and dedication are inspiring
    and they serve this Nation superbly. It is an honor to serve alongside
    them and my most solemn responsibility to represent them.
        The American Armed Forces have evolved throughout our Nation's
    history. During the 19th century, while our country was an emerging
    power, the norm for our military included service at either small army
    posts on the Nation's western frontier or single ship patrols off
    whaling stations in the Pacific. Throughout the twentieth century, our
    military fought--and deterred--large scale conflicts against powerful
    competitor nation-states, or their proxies, around the world. Today and
    for the foreseeable future, we are embarked on something new.
        Our military challenge is to protect and preserve the American way
    of life by promoting greater global security, stability, and trust--
    building up the strength of our friends, defeating violent extremists,
    and deterring regional conflicts. Our strategic environment requires
    that we have a force that is ready for operations across the range of
    military missions.
        We have yet to fully institutionalize the lessons learned
    particularly as it applies to building the capacity of partners and
    reforming the interagency. America has undertaken a staggering array of
    tasks in the past 6 years: securing the homeland, fighting global
    terrorism, applying a new counterinsurgency doctrine, expanding
    governance and rebuilding armed forces in shattered countries, and
    increasing our capability and capacity to assist other nations through
    a variety of material aid programs and expeditionary teams. All of
    these efforts have seen successes and setbacks. They have come at
    considerable cost to our Nation's sons and daughters, and to the
    treasure of the American people. We must do more than just document our
    lessons learned. We must accept that the future will likely require
    sustained engagement and continued operations that will focus on
    interagency and international participation. We must go beyond
    pondering and push to embed these lessons into a truly reformed
    interagency. We need continued congressional support to make this
    imperative a reality.
        As for your Armed Forces, we need a total, joint, expeditionary
    force that is suited to irregular warfare against asymmetric threats as
    well as supporting civil authorities at home and abroad. We also need a
    large-scale total force capable of major combat operations against
    traditional nation-state foes. We cannot do it alone; our forces must
    be part of a more encompassing team that includes other Federal
    departments and partner nations. We must also recognize building
    international and interagency capability will take time. In the
    interim, our superb military men and women, and their families, will
    fill the leadership role demanded of them.
        All this takes sustained, robust investment and partnership. With
    your continuing help, our military will be ready for the challenges and
    opportunities ahead. Thank you for your unwavering support in time of
    war.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
        We're going to do our best to get the Secretary and the
    Admiral out as close to noon as we can, so let's try a 7-minute
    first round.
        Mr. Secretary, you've indicated all the reasons why an
    estimate that you give us about war costs for 2009 would not,
    necessarily at least, turn out to be a realistic estimate, but
    that you are still willing to give us that estimate as the law
    requires, if we ask. So I'm asking. What is your estimate?
        Secretary Gates. A straight line projection, Mr. Chairman,
    of our current expenditures would probably put the full year
    cost in a strictly arithmetic approach at about $170 billion.
        Chairman Levin. The bridge funding in the budget is $70
    billion. That's included in the $170 billion.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. So that means that the total if that
    estimate turned out to be accurate, that the total then would
    be the $515 billion base budget plus the $170 billion.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. That would be a total then of $685 billion,
    does that sound right?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. But as I indicated, I have no
    confidence in that figure. Part of the reason I've felt able to
    comply with the law last year was that I felt the assumptions
    that underpinned were fairly reliable and that we could have
    confidence in them. I think you saw the analysis that
    underpinned it and made it possible for us to do that. We just
    don't have that at this point and we will certainly provide it
    just as soon as we have it.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General Petraeus recently said that he thinks ``it would be
    prudent to do some period of assessment before deciding on
    further troop reductions after we get back to the 130,000 pre-
    surge level in July.'' Do you agree with General Petraeus that
    we should have a period of waiting before we make any further
    decisions after we get back to the 130,000 pre-surge level?
        Secretary Gates. I have not discussed this with General
    Petraeus. I have made clear to him that I believed his
    recommendation should be based on his view of the situation on
    the ground in Iraq. I have tried to structure the decision
    process this time around as I did last August and September.
    General Petraeus will give us, the President and I, his
    recommendations based solely on the views he has in the
    situation in Iraq.
        Chairman Levin. So at this time at least, you can't say
    that you agree with what he has said?
        Secretary Gates. That's right, I neither agree nor
    disagree. I intend to be visiting Iraq again in the near future
    and I'm sure we'll have that discussion.
        Chairman Levin. Then the President has said, however, to
    General Petraeus that if he wants to slow down the reduction
    it's up to him. The President has explicitly said that it's up
    to General Petraeus as to whether the drawdown will continue.
    Is that your understanding?
        Secretary Gates. As I started to say, Mr. Chairman, we will
    also receive the evaluation and recommendations of Admiral
    Fallon at CENTCOM and also of the Joint Chiefs. Frankly, I
    expect that I will have my own views, and I would expect that,
    as last fall, the President will take into account all of those
    points of view before making a decision.
        Chairman Levin. You're not telling us, then, what the
    President said, that it's up to Petraeus, is what will in fact
    occur? Your understanding is that it's not ``up to Petraeus,''
    that it's going to be a matter of many recommendations given to
    the President and he will then decide; is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. The President certainly will decide. I
    certainly don't want to put any daylight between myself and his
    comments. It's clear that General Petraeus' view will have a
    very strong impact on this, but I think that the President will
    need to hear other points of view as well.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, any agreement with another
    nation, whether it's called a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
    or something else, has always been submitted to the Senate for
    advice and consent as a treaty if it contains a commitment to
    defend another nation with military force. Now, is it the
    intention as far as you know to submit any agreement which is
    negotiated with the Government of Iraq to the Senate for its
    advice and consent if there is any commitment in such an
    agreement to defend Iraq beyond the term of this
    administration?
        Secretary Gates. I'm certainly no lawyer, but I would say
    that any elements in the agreement, in any agreement that's put
    together that involves the treaty ratification authorities of
    the Senate, would require that it be submitted. At the same
    time, I would tell you that we have somewhere at any given time
    between 80 and 100 SOFAs with other nations, none of which over
    history have been submitted to the Senate. So I think it will
    depend very much on the content of the agreement.
        Chairman Levin. Do you know of any SOFA agreement which has
    committed our forces to the defense of a country?
        Secretary Gates. I'm not that well versed. I'd have to
    check.
        Chairman Levin. Would you let us know, because we don't.
        Secretary Gates. Okay.
        Chairman Levin. It's a major difference. We have all kinds
    of SOFAs with other countries, 80 to 100, whatever the number
    is, but those SOFAs, those agreements, do not contain
    commitments to defend other countries. Those commitments are
    contained in treaties which are submitted to the Senate, and if
    you have any evidence or any information to the contrary would
    you submit that for the record?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        None of the Status of Forces Agreements in force between the United
    States and other countries commits U.S. forces to the defense of the
    other country.

        Secretary Gates. I will just tell you that the subjects
    that I have seen listed that we are interested in in this SOFA
    do not include that kind of a commitment.
        Chairman Levin. Except that there was a declaration of
    principles for a long-term relationship that was signed between
    the President and the Prime Minister of Iraq, and it includes
    the following language: ``Providing security assurances and
    commitments to the Republic of Iraq.'' So those words are in
    there, words which I think should raise real concerns on a
    bipartisan basis. This is not a partisan issue. This has to do
    with the constitution of the United States and the role of the
    Senate.
        So if there's any information you have about those SOFAs
    which make commitments, security commitments to other
    countries, please let us know, would you?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. The security adviser of Iraq, Adviser
    Rubae, recently said that the Iraqi Government is at a
    stalemate. Do you agree with that?
        Secretary Gates. No, sir, but it's pretty slow.
        Chairman Levin. Now, this is Iraq's own security adviser.
    Now, are you concerned by the slowness of the political coming
    together in Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, although I would say that,
    particularly at the national level, and I would say that just
    in recent weeks, there has been some evidence that they are
    beginning to move on some of these pieces of legislation. The
    de-Baathification law, and the accountability and justice law
    has passed and they have become law. According to the Iraqi
    constitution, if the presidency council does not veto it or act
    upon it within 10 days it becomes law, it has to be published
    and then it will become law.
        They are debating the provincial powers law as we speak.
    They are debating a budget. So they are beginning to act on
    some of these pieces of legislation, and of course you have
    been briefed many times on the activities that are taking place
    at the provincial level. So it's clearly important for them to
    continue to move and in my view to move faster on some of the
    legislation they are finally debating.
        Chairman Levin. Just in terms of what the constitution of
    Iraq provides, it specifically provides that legislation
    requires unanimous approval of the presidency council within 10
    days of its delivery in order to become law or it is sent back
    to the council of representatives. I know what's been stated
    about it, but nonetheless that's what the constitution
    provides.
        So we'd appreciate it if you'd have your lawyer take a look
    at the language of the constitution and then tell us, given
    that language, whether or not we have confidence that, despite
    the Iraq constitution's own language, that nonetheless that is
    the law.
        But I think you would agree that, even if it is ``the
    law,'' that how it is implemented is critically important.
    Would you agree with that?
        Secretary Gates. It is critically important the spirit in
    which it is implemented. I would say further that I understand
    that President Talabani and the presidency council may also
    introduce some amendments to the law.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just go back to the chairman's question about the SOFA.
    Have your researchers check 1951, the NATO type of structure.
    That did come to Congress. It was a very important one. I just
    feel that Congress should be made a full partner in the
    decisions with respect to both Afghanistan and Iraq as we go
    forward into the next administration, and that we need the
    support of Congress because therein rests the support of the
    American people. So I do hope that you lay that foundation.
        Returning to the NATO issue, I want to commend you for the
    very strong and pragmatic public statement you've made with
    regard to your concern concerning that situation in Iraq and
    the participation or lack of participation by certain countries
    who've committed forces to that military operation. The problem
    of national caveats has been one that's been before this
    country and Congress for deliberation many times. But it's just
    a question of basic burden-sharing, risk-sharing of the forces
    that are committed to that region. I find it difficult that we
    can ask the U.S. forces, the British, the Canadians, and
    several others who do fully participate in sharing the risks,
    to do the whole thing and the others simply do not participate.
        So I hope that you continue with your strong statements and
    efforts to reconcile that problem. That brings me directly to
    the question of the decision by the President, which I support
    and I think Congress thus far has supported, of sending two
    Marine Corps battalions over there this coming spring.
        Was that decision necessitated by the shortfalls in the
    commitments made by the NATO partners?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I would say that, in reference
    to my public comments, I have achieved a goal I have been
    working for for the last year. I have brought unity to the
    alliance, unfortunately not in the right direction.
        Yes, sir, this is a concern. I think we have to be
    realistic about the political realities that face some of the
    governments in Europe. Many of them are coalition governments.
    Some of them are minority governments, and they are doing what
    they think is at the far end of what is politically acceptable.
        But I worry a great deal about, and will say so in a
    conference in Munich this weekend, the alliance evolving into a
    two-tiered alliance, in which you have some allies willing to
    fight and die to protect people's security and others who are
    not. I think that it puts a cloud over the future of the
    alliance if this is to endure and perhaps even get worse.
        I believe that focus on people meeting their commitments in
    Afghanistan will be an important element of the Bucharest
    summit of NATO in early April. I leave here this afternoon,
    after the House hearing, to go to a NATO defense ministers
    meeting in Vilnius and once again will become a nag on the
    issue, but I think it is important. There are allies that are
    doing their part and are doing well. The Canadians, the
    British, the Australians, the Dutch, and the Danes are really
    out on the line and fighting. But there are a number of others
    that are not.
        Senator Warner. I would not suggest you use the word
    ``nag.'' I think you've been very forthright, clear, and I
    think convincing of the need to rectify this situation. So
    press on, Mr. Secretary, because you owe no less to the men and
    women of our country and the other countries who are taking the
    full measure of the burdens and the risks in that region.
        The most troubling aspect of that region, of course, is
    this each year enhanced drug trade, and the revenues from that
    drug trade in Afghanistan, the poppy crop, are recycled
    directly to the Taliban. The Taliban then invests them in
    weapons and use those weapons against our forces and our other
    allies in that region.
        What should be done in your judgment? We just can't start
    another nine-point plan and a six-point plan. Somebody has to
    say this has to be addressed head-on.
        Secretary Gates. This gets to a larger issue in Afghanistan
    and that is in my view the continuing need, as I suggested
    almost a year ago, for a strong figure empowered by NATO, the
    European Union, and if necessary the United Nations (U.N.), to
    coordinate international efforts in the nonmilitary side of the
    effort in Afghanistan. I very much regret that the appointment
    of Lord Ashdown didn't work, but it goes to the
    counternarcotics problem.
        First of all, I believe that our allies do not take this
    problem as seriously as we do, even though most of that opium
    ends up on the streets of Europe. Afghanistan at this point, I
    think, produces 93 percent of all of the opium, or heroin
    rather, in the world.
        Also, I think we've gotten too caught up in debates about
    specific means of eradication. The United States favors aerial
    spraying because we've seen it work in other places, such as
    Colombia and so on. It's clear that the Afghans themselves, the
    Afghan Government, and most of our allies are opposed to it. So
    my view is let's move on and figure out what kind of a
    comprehensive strategy we should have.
        My view is that if you're going to eradicate a man's crop
    you better be there the day before with money and seeds to let
    him know that he's going to have a livelihood for the next
    year, and you better have roads so that he can take those crops
    to market. So I think we have to do all these things at once.
    You can't do it serially, doing one thing and then do another.
    It seems to me you have to do eradication, you have to do
    interdiction, you have to do alternative development, and so
    on.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Mullen, the tours of our men and women of the Armed
    Forces, the current tour of the Army of some 15 months, what
    can you share with the committee with regard to the future and
    the likelihood that that'll be brought down to a more realistic
    level of one for one, in other words at least a month back home
    for every month over there, and those months over there not to
    exceed 12?
        Admiral Mullen. It is the views of the Joint Chiefs and
    many in leadership that we need to get to one to one as quickly
    as we can, 15-month deployments are too long. General Casey has
    spoken to this very consistently. That said, there's a very
    delicate balance between what we need to do on the ground to
    sustain the gains in Iraq and balance that with the stress on
    the force.
        In fact, there is a review that's ongoing to look at when
    that might occur. We've had discussions about it, and my goal
    would be to support that sooner rather than later, but that
    decision clearly hasn't been made.
        Senator Warner. I conclude with one of your quotes. In
    October 2007, you said: ``The ground forces are not broken, but
    they are breakable.'' I draw your attention to some statistics
    that I reviewed yesterday. Whether it's divorce, absent without
    leave, alcohol, suicide, and I could go on, there are some very
    serious indicators and they could be directly the result of the
    pressures.
        Admiral Mullen. I think they in great part are, and it has
    built up since October. I'm still in the same position. I don't
    think that we are broken, but we clearly can break them. We are
    focused on this very heavily in literally every decision we
    review.
        Chairman Levin. I thank you. I share your view that they're
    not broken, but we must be alert. It's an All-Volunteer Force
    and it's the most valuable asset we've had as a part of our DOD
    for generations.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Following our usual early bird approach, Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Mr. Secretary, one
    item in the defense budget is not often cited, but it's
    important. That is the investment in critical basic research
    for universities, and I commend you for maintaining that in a
    very difficult budget environment.
        Secretary Gates. I was heavily lobbied by some of my former
    colleagues, but, frankly, I felt it was very important to send
    a signal that we were going to again emphasize fundamental
    research, peer-reviewed research. So it's about $300 million
    for 2009 and about $1 billion over the Future Years Defense
    Program.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral Mullen, following on Senator Warner's line of
    questioning, if there is a decision to freeze our force levels
    at 15 brigades in Iraq this summer, would that almost
    automatically require continued use of 15-month deployments for
    the Army and an accelerated callup of Reserve and National
    Guard forces to maintain that force structure?
        Admiral Mullen. In the review of this that I've undertaken
    so far, General Casey has indicated that that may not be the
    case. He's really working his way through that right now, that
    in fact it is possible that we could get to shorter
    deployments. But that again is all tied into General Petraeus
    and Ambassador Crocker coming back with their assessment and
    their recommendation, what the President decides, because
    clearly that's the bulk of the deployed force right now and
    both sustaining what we're doing as well as creating any relief
    is going to be in great part based on that decision.
        Senator Reed. But I think one of the obvious consequences
    is that the real opportunity to reduce the tours to 12 months
    would be seriously compromised if in fact we commit to 15
    brigades indefinitely.
        Admiral Mullen. With some assumptions, we think it's
    actually doable, and in fact then if you end up with a 12-month
    out to a 12-month back, and to sustain at a certain level, say
    if we sustain it at 15 brigades, you just would end up
    deploying sooner.
        Senator Reed. Does that put pressure on Reserve and
    National Guard units?
        Admiral Mullen. It would put pressure on the entire force,
    including the Reserve and National Guard.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, the Army needs approximately
    $260 billion for their grow the force initiative, reset, and
    reequip modernization operations through fiscal year 2011. It
    looks as if there's about $141 billion roughly committed.
    There's a big delta. Are you concerned that we won't be able to
    continue this modernization and force increase for the Army?
        Secretary Gates. I must say, I think that if you look at
    the total cost of the FCS over the entire duration, I think the
    total cost of that program is about $120 billion and, frankly,
    it is hard for me to see how that program can be completed in
    its entirety. One of the things that I think is attractive
    about the way the Army has approached this is that as they are
    developing new technologies they are putting them into the
    field right away, instead of waiting to bring this thing full
    up.
        But I think that, in light of what inevitably are going to
    be pressures on the defense budget in the future, I think that
    is one we will have to look at carefully.
        Senator Reed. Tomorrow or later this week, Mr. Secretary,
    we'll hear from the Commission on the National Guard. One of
    their concerns is a shortage of equipment within the National
    Guard inventories for response to a civilian incident here in
    the United States, and they're estimating that it's about a $47
    billion shortfall which is not being covered at the moment.
        Do we have such a gap? Does it effectively compromise our
    ability to respond to incidents within the United States?
        Secretary Gates. There is a gap. We have in fact $46.8
    billion in the budget between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year
    2013 for the National Guard, and we will push $17.5 billion
    worth of equipment to the National Guard over the next 24
    months--helicopters, 16,000 trucks, communications, and so on.
    But the historic fill rate for equipment for the National Guard
    has been about 70 percent. That fell to about 40 percent in
    2006, was up to 49 percent in 2007. We'll get it to about 65,
    66 percent during the course of 2008, and we hope into the low
    70s by the end of 2009.
        Our goal with what we have budgeted now would put the Army
    at a fill rate of 77 percent in 2013 and the Air Force, the Air
    Guard, at about 90 percent. If you want to try and get them to
    100 percent, which we've never done before, that would require
    an additional amount of money. But one important part about
    this new equipment going to the National Guard, is that it is
    exactly the same equipment that is in the Active Force. That
    will be a first. They have always in the past had either
    equipment that had been used by the Active Force or equipment
    the Active Force was no longer using because it had been
    replaced by more technologically sophisticated stuff. What
    we're going to be sending out to them is the same stuff, the
    same equipment that is provided to the Active Force.
        Senator Reed. I appreciate your efforts and your concern
    about this issue, but it seems we do have an equipment gap here
    with our National Guard Forces, principally attributed to
    deploying equipment in Iraq, leaving it there, and then, as you
    point out, trying to modernize old equipment that's been in the
    inventory too long.
        This raises a very general point and that is, do you agree
    with Admiral McConnell's assessment that al Qaeda in Pakistan
    is growing in its capacity and capability to recruit, train,
    and position operatives within the United States, or conduct an
    attack against the United States? Doesn't it raise some serious
    questions on our overall strategy if we have basically weakened
    our position in the United States in civil response? We have
    committed hundreds of thousands of troops to Iraq. We've put
    billions of dollars--we're debating how many billions will go
    to Iraq. Yet our enemy, which poses an existential threat to
    the United States, according to our intelligence leaders, is
    growing in their capacity as we discuss and debate Iraq.
        Secretary Gates. I think that Admiral McConnell is correct
    in saying that al Qaeda is taking advantage of the safe havens
    on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border to expand and train
    for attacks. Much of what we hear concerns attacks in Europe,
    to be frank about it. But clearly there's no doubt that they
    have the intent of attacking the United States and, frankly, I
    think that's one of the reasons why you're seeing a major push
    for equipment over the next 24 months.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I don't think anyone has done
    a more credible job in my short tenure here as you, and
    unfortunately your short tenure, too. I want to also commend
    Admiral Mullen for his distinguished service. But I think we
    will look back and seriously question some of the strategic
    decisions that have been made in the last several years,
    particularly in reference to our last discussion.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me first of all say to both our witnesses, I really
    believe your opening statements were about the best I've ever
    heard--very direct, and you got into some areas other people
    don't want to get into. Secretary Gates, for the first time I
    ever heard anyone in the last 7 years talk about where we
    should be in our overall defense systems in the future. It's
    been 7 years since that's really been discussed with this
    panel, and you talked about percentages of GDP, where we've
    been in the past, and where we are today.
        I believe I'm accurate when I say that if you go back to
    the 100 years of the 20th century that it averaged 5.7 percent
    of GDP. Then of course, at the end of the drawdowns of the
    1990s it went down to under 3 percent, about 2.7 percent.
    Unfortunately, a war came right after that, so you don't know
    what's going to happen, that's an uncertainty.
        Another uncertainty is what our needs are going to be in
    the future, because when I was serving in the House just in
    1994 we had a witness that said in 10 years we'll no longer
    need ground troops. So I think that you'll be surrounded with
    very brilliant admirals and generals trying to say what our
    needs are going to be in the distant future of say 10 years
    from now and they're going to be wrong.
        So, having said that, where we are today if we include the
    supplemental spending over this last year would be up to 4.7
    percent; without that, 3.7 percent. I know you've probably
    given some thought in looking into the future about where we
    should be. Do you want to share any thoughts with us that
    you've had on that subject?
        Secretary Gates. I used to say during the Cold War that if
    you were to graph the defense budget of the United States over
    a 30- or 40-year period it would look like an electrocardiogram
    of a fibrillating heart, and there would be deep cuts and then
    great increases, and it would go up and down. It is not an
    efficient way to do business.
        One of the advantages that I believe the Soviets had was
    they had fairly steady growth in their military spending over a
    protracted period of time. Four times in the 20th century, we
    made the same mistake. We fought a war, thought the world had
    changed for the better forever, and disarmed ourselves--after
    World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and the Cold War. Every
    time it turned out the world hadn't changed and so we had to
    rearm.
        Now, it seems to me that if we had a steady state and a
    bipartisan agreement of the investment of America's wealth that
    are required over the long-term to protect the Nation and
    everybody agreed and pretty much stuck to that figure, then I
    think we would all be advantaged, and I think, frankly, that
    when we do have to fight again we will save both lives and
    treasure.
        I think that number, if you look at it historically,
    probably ought to be in the 4 percent of GDP range.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much.
        You generally agree with his comments, Admiral?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. One of the reasons that I bring this up is
    because there is an expectation of the American people that our
    kids that are over there have the best of everything, and it's
    just not true, in terms of equipment. I know that Senator
    Warner has left now, but I can recall when he was chairman of
    this committee that I said the best non-line of sight canon or
    artillery piece that we have for close support is a Paladin,
    which is World War II technology, where you actually have to
    swab the breech after every shot. That's something people don't
    understand. There are five countries, including South Africa,
    that make a better one.
        I bring it up at this point because we're making some
    decisions that I think are very significant. When John Jumper
    in 1998 had the courage to stand up and say that now the
    Russians--and he was referring to their Su-27s and Su-30s--are
    making a better strike vehicle than ours. Of course, he was
    referring to the F-15s and F-16s. In many ways they were
    better. During that timeframe China made a very large purchase.
    That was unclassified.
        But I think that's very significant, because until we got
    into the F-22 we were in a position where we didn't have the
    best. Yes, our pilots are better, but the equipment wasn't in
    some ways as good. Some people say we could get by now with
    expanding the F-15s, maybe the E models, but they're not
    stealthy, that wouldn't work.
        Now, we're set up right now, we are flying 112 F-22s, 6 are
    being accepted by the Air Force, 50 to be built, and ultimately
    183, and it's my understanding that that's when it stops and
    that would mean that the line would start deteriorating around
    2009 or 2010. This is something that does concern me and I'd
    like to get your comments as to what--and then of course it
    would be another year before you'd get into the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF) and others.
        Do you agree with this level of procurement in F-22s?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, we are, as you say, we are
    keeping the line open. There is a buy of 20 F-22s in the base
    budget. We will probably ask for several more as part of the
    supplemental. But we do intend to keep the line open. I'm
    persuaded that the 183 is probably the right number, or
    something in that ballpark. I know that the Air Force is up
    here and around talking about 350 or something on that order.
        My concern is that the F-22 is $140 million a copy and the
    JSF will be about half that, about $77 million a copy. My worry
    is that if the F-22 production is expanded that it will come at
    the expense of the JSF. The reality is we are fighting two
    wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the F-22 has not performed a
    single mission in either theater. So it is principally for use
    against a near-peer in a conflict, and I think we all know who
    that is, and looking at what I regard as the level of risk of
    conflict with one of those near-peers over the next 4 or 5
    years until the JSF comes along, I think that something along
    the lines of 183 is a reasonable buy.
        Senator Inhofe. I'd like to ask Secretary Gates and all of
    your people to keep an open mind on this, because this is
    moving. It's not static.
        The last question I would ask would be just a real quick
    response if I could, Admiral Mullen. I've had occasion to spend
    quite a bit of time in both the Middle East and Africa, some 27
    trips. The one thing I consistently hear is that we have to
    enhance our train and equip, our 1206, 1207, 1208, and the
    Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Those are the
    two most popular programs out there. I would like to know if
    you agree with that?
        Admiral Mullen. I do, very strongly. General Petraeus and
    General McNeil in Afghanistan speak literally about CERP money
    as ammo for making good things happen. Clearly the 1206 train
    and equip has tremendous leverage, far beyond the value of the
    money that we're actually spending.
        Senator Inhofe. Making it global?
        Admiral Mullen. Making it global.
        Senator Inhofe. I agree with that.
        I know my time has expired, but just for the record if you
    could give us your thoughts about what's happening with AFRICOM
    now, and particularly as the five African brigades that we have
    been concerned about, but nothing seems to happen there. I
    think of Africa as being a real critical area. So maybe for the
    record you could--thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The African Stand-By Force is intended to be an African
    multidisciplinary contingent force with military and civilian
    components ready for rapid deployment within their respective African
    regions. It is planned that the force will be operational by 2010. The
    African Stand-by Force may be tasked to conduct peace support missions,
    post conflict operations, humanitarian assistance missions and other
    task as mandated by the African Union's Peace and Security Council. The
    African Stand-By Force five Brigades exist in theory and will be
    aligned roughly with Africa's five Regional Economic Communities. U.S.
    African Command (USAFRICOM) is engaging with the African Union's
    Regional Economic Communities in order to promote the professional
    development of the brigades. General Ward, Commander, USAFRICOM, is
    adopting a regional approach to the strategic environment. Our African
    partners have encouraged this viewpoint as it aligns with their
    strategic security concept. USAFRICOM intends to concentrate and
    prioritize its activities in the five African Union designated regions
    to further security across the continent. To achieve reliable
    partnerships while developing security partner capacity at the regional
    level, USAFRICOM will help develop capable professional militaries
    among our partner nations.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, you know my personal appreciation and affection
    for the job that you're both doing. You've brought a candor
    that was desperately needed in DOD. This opinion that I express
    is shared by many of us on this committee and we appreciate it.
        Now, one of the areas with the lack of candor has been
    brought out in the questioning by the chairman today. There's a
    budget request of $515 billion and over and above that is what
    is called a bridge fund of $70 billion for the war, when in
    fact the testimony here, asked by the chairman, it's $170
    billion. So I realize your hands are tied by the White House
    and specifically the budget office of the White House, and I
    agonize for you as you go through this. But this is part of the
    candor that we need. Again, I just reiterate, thank you for the
    candor that you have brought in the relationship between
    Congress and DOD.
        Let me just ask a series of questions, some of which deal
    with the subcommittee that I have the privilege of leading
    here, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. First of all, I want
    to get for the record, do we have any other difference, Admiral
    Mullen, on the question of whether or not we ought to have the
    11 aircraft carriers that we have for projection of our
    defense, or should it be less?
        Admiral Mullen. 11.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Now that that environmental
    impact statement (EIS) has been completed on the question of
    making Mayport nuclear-capable and therefore spreading the
    Atlantic fleet of carriers from just one port to two ports, do
    you think that the DOD will budget for the necessary
    improvements to Mayport in order to make it capable of
    receiving a nuclear carrier?
        Admiral Mullen. I remain where I was when I was the Chief
    of Naval Operations (CNO) and we discussed this, Senator
    Nelson, which is I believe that strategic dispersal is
    important, or that capability is important. It was tied to this
    process, and obviously I would lean on Admiral Roughead and
    Secretary Winter for recommendations to myself and the
    Secretary of Defense, but clearly to have that capability you
    need to invest in it, and we need to continue to do that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. On another subject, you in the
    uniformed military are working up a recommendation to the
    Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense about
    reactivating the Fourth Fleet to give Admiral Stavridis more
    power to project in the Western Hemisphere. Have you made that
    recommendation yet, and if not----
        Admiral Mullen. It has not been made to me. I thought it
    was a great idea when I was the CNO.
        Secretary Gates. One reason I like to come to these
    hearings is I learn so much. [Laughter.]
        Senator Bill Nelson. That's exactly why I brought it up,
    Mr. Secretary, so you would hear it firsthand.
        In the subcommittee that the chairman has given me the
    privilege of heading, we're getting back from some of our
    combatant commanders that they do not have the near-term
    capabilities against the existing short- and medium-range
    missiles that would threaten our forward-deployed forces. We
    even stated this 2 years ago in our National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, to place a priority on
    the near-term effective missile defense capabilities. Yet the
    DOD in its budget is not placing more emphasis and resources on
    these near-term capabilities.
        So I'm wondering, where the disconnect is here?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, I'm a big proponent of missile
    defense and in fact we have fielded capability on a number of
    our ships which give us some of the capability that you're
    talking about, and that capability continues to be fielded.
    It's not out there now as we would have it be in the future and
    I think we need to continue to emphasize that.
        My view is the challenge in the Missile Defense Agency has
    been how to best proportion the investments there for the
    future. In fact, the overall missile defense budget this year
    has been increased. But it's a growing concern, growing threat,
    and it's one I think we need to continue to focus on, not just
    in the near-term but in the far-term.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We're talking about the Aegis, we're
    talking about the Standard Missile----
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson.--interceptor, and we're talking about
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Our concern in our
    subcommittee is that the military analysis shows that you're
    only planning to buy half as many THAAD interceptors and the
    standard missile interceptors as the commanders are asking for.
        Admiral Mullen. We deal with the commanders, the combatant
    commanders, all the time and we work these requirements. The
    combatant commanders are not going to get everything they ask
    for. There's an affordability as well as distribution and risk-
    taking aspect of this, all of which goes into the equation.
        We have, in fact, fielded that capability, as you
    indicated, in some parts of our fleet and it's, as is always
    the case, a balance between meeting the requirement, the timing
    of it, affordability, and where those systems are in
    development.
        Senator Bill Nelson. A final question. I have the privilege
    also of serving on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
    Yesterday in the open session, General Hayden, the Director of
    the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), stated his belief that
    Pakistan, the government, finally has a new appreciation of the
    problem of the uncontrolled tribal areas, and his opinion was
    that the Pakistani Government for the first time sees the
    situation in this area poses a direct threat to the stability
    of the Government of Pakistan.
        Do you agree with this assessment?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I do. I think it's a fairly
    recent development and probably brought home most vividly to
    them by the assassination of Mrs. Bhutto, that this is a
    serious threat. Al Qaeda has been public about threatening the
    leadership of the Pakistani military and the Pakistani civilian
    government. They have declared their desire to overthrow the
    Pakistani Government, plus the insurrectionist activity that's
    going on in the northwestern part of the country has really
    gotten the Pakistani Government's attention.
        Now, the problem that they face in a way is a little bit of
    the problem that the NATO alliance faces. The NATO alliance has
    trained and equipped over the past 50 years, almost 60 years,
    to meet the Soviets coming through the Fulda Gap. Pakistan has
    been focused for all these years on the threat to their east,
    to the Indian conventional military threat. So my view is that
    the Pakistanis, just as they recognize a new kind of threat to
    the stability of the country, are going to have to make some
    changes in terms of the training and equipping of their force.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Of course, that's the next question
    that we have to ask, and part of that has to be off the record.
        Thank you all very much for your service to our country.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service. You have indeed won
    a great deal of respect and credibility on both sides of the
    aisle here in Congress. Your candor and good judgment, I think,
    have been responsible for that and we appreciate it very much.
        Secretary Gates, I think your opening remarks, in which you
    talk about the new strategic threats we face, failed states,
    terrorism, and the like, represent a significant statement. You
    have indicated that we need to confront and be prepared to
    confront those threats for years and years to come. Are you
    confident that what we're doing within DOD now is the right
    balance between a potential peer competitor some time in the
    future, hopefully some years out, and the immediate threat of
    these kind of failed states and terrorist activities?
        Secretary Gates. I think we do have a good balance. I think
    it would be probably unrealistic for me to say with confidence
    that we have it all just right. When you have a budget this big
    and so many programs, you hope to get the balance in the right
    place. I think that what we have to do is figure out how to
    prepare for the diverse kinds of threats we're going to face.
        One of the issues, for example, that I've been discussing
    with the Army and where General Casey, frankly, has been very
    helpful is the fact that the Army is more likely to face
    asymmetric kinds of threats in the years to come, than it is a
    major conventional war, and how do they prepare and equip for
    that over the long term and at the same time be able to retain
    the full spectrum capabilities?
        So it's a matter not of one foot or the other, but the
    amount of weight you put on one or the other foot. So I think
    that another example of this is in the kind of ships that the
    Navy is buying. We've had these problems with these Littoral
    Combat Ships (LCS), but I think that they're exactly the right
    kind of ship for the kind of threat we're going to face in
    places like the Persian Gulf, where they can take on swarms of
    small boats and where they can go in shallower water and so on.
        So I think we have it pretty right, but I would never be in
    a position with a budget this big to say we have it exactly
    right.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Mullen, do you want to comment on
    that?
        Admiral Mullen. I think, to Senator Inhofe's statement
    earlier about projecting, predicting the future, we're in an
    incredibly uncertain time. It's a dangerous time, and to best
    prepare for that I think we have to have a balance. We have to
    have this irregular warfare thing right. We need to continue to
    swing in that direction. But I also think we need to invest
    well for the future with respect to our conventional forces.
        I mentioned space and cyberspace. Those are of great
    concern to me as well. Most importantly, we have to get it
    right for our people, particularly our young people, so that
    they see that we're headed in the right direction, because
    they're the ones that always have to fight the fight.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. I appreciate the Secretary
    mentioning the LCS and I hope, Admiral Mullen, we can break
    through some of the delays that are occurring there and not
    lose momentum on that critically important ship.
        I'm also pleased, Mr. Secretary, in your written remarks
    that you noted the need for the Air Force number one priority,
    the tanker. We'll soon be having a selection on that and it's
    something we're going to need to invest in for a number of
    years. Forty-eight-year-old tankers just cannot continue to
    meet our Nation's need.
        You mentioned cyberspace, Admiral Mullen. I am concerned
    about that. Even our new defense structure commits us even more
    deeply to high tech, satellite, communications, and computer
    systems. Of course the history of warfare has been that enemies
    have figured ways to penetrate communications systems and whole
    wars have turned on intelligence and spying activities. We of
    course have nations like China and others that are highly
    sophisticated in these areas.
        Are you confident that as we commit more to a high tech
    military that we have the defensive capabilities to guarantee
    the security of those systems in the event of a conflict?
        Admiral Mullen. I'm confident that we recognize the
    problem. The threat is exactly as you described it today, as it
    has always been; and that we have taken significant steps to
    invest to get it right for the future. But I would not sit here
    and give you a 100 percent guarantee that we could defend. It's
    a very active domain.
        Senator Sessions. I just have to tell you, the history of
    warfare is that somebody always figures a way to break these
    systems, and we're investing in them so heavily that I hope you
    will invest a lot in security.
        Admiral Mullen. We are.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I might just say that one of my
    concerns is not only that they break them, but that somehow
    they figure out a way to deny them to us. One of the things
    that I've asked for is a study of what kind of, if you will,
    old capabilities we could resurrect as a backup in the event we
    lost some of the high tech capabilities to communicate and so
    on that we have right now.
        This world of cyber war is going to be very unpredictable
    and very dangerous, and it seems to me we ought to look back at
    some old pretty simple technologies so that we're not blind,
    deaf, and dumb if we're denied some of these high tech
    capabilities.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much for that insight. I
    think you need to press that because we absolutely could find
    ourselves in a situation where we're not able to utilize some
    of the technologies we thought we would be able to utilize.
        Missile defense site in Europe. Secretary Gates, you noted
    you personally have met with our Polish and Czech friends, that
    progress is being made there for a radar site at the Czech
    Republic and interceptors in Poland. Could you give us an
    update on that and why you think it's important?
        Secretary Gates. I think that we're continuing to move
    forward. It is my hope that we can reach agreement and break
    ground this fiscal year. I think that the Polish Foreign
    Minister when he made his public remarks after meeting with
    Secretary Rice indicated that the effort would go forward. I
    think the Poles clearly are concerned about whether there is an
    increased threat to their own security as a result of hosting
    these sites. Obviously the Russians are making a lot of
    threats. So we will be discussing that with them. But I think
    it is continuing to go forward.
        Senator Sessions. I would just note, I can't imagine why
    the Russians would object to this system. It poses no real
    threat to their massive capability in missiles. It's just very
    frustrating and another example of bad behavior by the Russians
    that's disappointing.
        Secretary Gates. We would like for them to be our partners
    in this, and we have made a number of forthcoming offers.
    Anybody can understand that this is not capable of being used
    against Russian missiles. The geometry is all wrong, the number
    of interceptors. I told President Putin: If your problem is
    breakout, that you think 10 years from now we'll do something
    different with this site that would make it a threat, we'll
    negotiate that with you so that there are limits. We talked
    about reciprocal presence in the sites.
        So we've really put a lot on the table in the hope that the
    Russians will see we're serious about this partnership. We both
    face the same challenge and that is the growing Iranian
    ballistic missile threat.
        Senator Sessions. You promised when you took this office
    that you would personally analyze conditions in Iraq and that
    you would give us your best judgment about where we should
    deploy, how we should deploy, the number, and so forth. In all
    the discussions that we'll be having, we want that opinion.
        Secretary Gates. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me add my appreciation to your service and particularly
    for the candor that you've been able to express in your
    position, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, as you continue in
    your role. I know you're going to give us your best estimate on
    what we need to do to keep our country safe in the midst of
    growing concerns and different kinds of challenges.
        Mr. Secretary, I dropped a letter your way today about the
    budget. My concern is the concern that was raised initially and
    one that you've responded to. I understand the difference
    between precision and accuracy. I don't know why they have to
    be at odds as far as they are in terms of the numbers.
        My concern is that we continue to bring together our desire
    for precision and getting it right accurately as well, so that
    the distance between the bid and the ask isn't quite so great,
    because it makes it very difficult to have anything back here
    called a budget. I don't know if I coined this word, but we
    came up with it in the office: It looks like a budget is now a
    ``fudge-it.'' There's fudging in it, just because you don't
    know certain things.
        But I think we need to narrow down those differences as
    much as we possibly can. I know you told us that you were going
    to try to do that. The system here is broken and it's not your
    fault, but it is an opportunity for you to try to help us fix
    it so that we don't go through the rest of this decade with a
    broken system, to be inherited by the next administration. It
    just isn't going to enable us to get something that we can deal
    with.
        On high technology, let me say that I really think that,
    whether it's asymmetrical war or whether it's cyber concerns,
    that we have to be not only in a defensive posture--clearly we
    have to be able to defend what we have. If we lose our high
    tech capability, you're right, we better have some low tech
    response capability to be able to deal with that. But I also
    hope that we're at a position where we're not bragging, but
    making the world aware we have the ability to be on the offense
    on this as well.
        If the rest of the world understands that we can take out
    their cyber, assuming we can, we can take out their cyber
    capabilities, perhaps we can ultimately agree to certain things
    and reduce that risk to both sides, so that we don't continue
    to face the uncertainty of what high tech cyber war might look
    like.
        What I'd like to do is go just for a minute on the Pakistan
    military aid funding. I've been watching the media reports, the
    coalition support funds (CSF), and the foreign military
    financing aid that have been provided to the Government of
    Pakistan and it seems, according to the reports, this funding
    seems to have been used for means other than to fight al Qaeda
    and Taliban forces in Waziristan.
        According to a New York Times article on December 24,
    ``Military officials believed that much of the American money
    was not making its way to front-line Pakistani units. Money has
    been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to
    counter India, not al Qaeda or the Taliban, the official
    said.''
        In another article from the L.A. Times on November 1, they
    also talk about the billions of dollars that have been made in
    U.S. military payments over the last 6 years, but raising the
    question as to where those dollars have gone.
        So my first question is, are U.S. funds being used
    effectively and appropriately as well by the Pakistani
    Government in fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban?
        Secretary Gates. Based on the information that's available
    to me, Senator, I think they are. The funds have been used to
    help support I think something like 90 Pakistani army
    operations, to help keep about 100,000 troops in the field in
    the northwest. We have a process where the Pakistanis come to
    the embassy when they have an operation that they're going to
    perform. The embassy has to validate that it is in support of
    U.S. military and security objectives. It is then reviewed by
    CENTCOM, that not only further validates whether it's a
    legitimate military operation, but also whether the cost is
    reasonable. Then it's finally reviewed and approved by Ms.
    Jonas here.
        They have made airfields and seaports available to us. Half
    the material going into Afghanistan goes on Pakistani roads,
    convoys that are protected and so on.
        But as to some of the specifics, maybe I could ask Ms.
    Jonas to respond.
        Ms. Jonas. Senator Nelson, I'd just like you to know that I
    often talk to the IG on this, and when the program was
    initially set up we set it up in conjunction with them. He's
    looking at the program also to see if there are any management
    reviews that we can do or additional things that we can tighten
    up.
        I will tell you that my office in particular spends a lot
    of time testing the reasonableness of the costs. So there are
    plenty of things that we would turn down as well. But we do
    rely on the field to tell us, and to CENTCOM, as to how that is
    supporting the objectives.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Would that involve trying to decide not
    simply whether the use is appropriate, but are we getting
    results from it as well? Because I think that's the concern I
    have. How much do we need to provide to get the results that we
    are hoping for, and that is to avoid having the buildup in
    Waziristan and in the border, the non-border area where you
    have a reconstituting, reconstitution of the Taliban and the
    expansion and redevelopment of al Qaeda?
        So even if the money is being spent appropriately under the
    way in which it's been designated, are we getting the bang for
    the buck that we really ought to be getting? If we're not, is
    it because it's not enough or is it because it's not being
    used, while appropriately, not in the most effective manner
    possible to get the results we're after? Do we ask those kinds
    of questions or do we just go through--I don't mean to be
    pejorative here, and check the boxes to see that it's done
    appropriately, but what about effectively?
        Ms. Jonas. Certainly that would be the responsibility of
    Admiral Fallon and CENTCOM to judge that, along with the field.
        Admiral Mullen. Senator Nelson, if I may.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, Admiral.
        Admiral Mullen. I know Admiral Fallon and I have
    specifically talked about this. I know he has addressed it with
    the leadership. To the Secretary's point, there has been a
    tremendous investment and we think generally it has flown in
    the right direction. Your question about results, output, or
    effects, I think, is a very valid question, particularly at a
    time, as was pointed out earlier, as this threat seems to be
    both expanding as well as turning inward. We know that General
    Kianni, who heads their army now, we all think is a great
    leader and has the right focus. It's going to take him a while
    to get the focus where it needs to go. It's going to take him
    years to get at this as well; and that our continued support is
    really important.
        To the level of detail where these dollars are going, I
    think it is a great question to look at from the standpoint of
    the effects. What we have seen from here, that's the case.
    Admiral Fallon is asking the same questions and I know they are
    in the field. I would hope that we would have detailed answers
    to that down the road that would answer that, that could put
    your concerns at ease.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, maybe we could ask Admiral Fallon
    to do a report for the committee on his view of the
    effectiveness of this investment.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Because if it's an investment and let's
    say it's effective to a certain level, I would like to ask the
    question, if we doubled the money would we get triple the
    results? I think there are certain kinds of questions you ask
    about a program like that, and when we don't seem to be getting
    where we want to be and they're reconstituting themselves and
    they're gaining strength in certain areas we have to ask the
    question. If we always do what we've always done, we'll always
    get what we always got. I think we need to break that and take
    a look at how we move forward to get the results we're after.
    If it's money, then we need to address that. If it's
    commitment, we need to address that. I'm not talking about our
    commitment, but I'm talking about the commitment of the other
    government.
        The other question which I hope to find out is what do our
    friends in Delhi think is being done with this money, because
    there are also reports that they're concerned that a lot of the
    money we're giving that's supposed to be going to Waziristan is
    just simply being used to build up the military strength of the
    Pakistan military on the border of India.
        So there are a lot of issues here and I hope that we could
    get from Admiral Fallon a pretty detailed explanation of that.
    Also, if he had his druthers and an open checkbook and an open
    opportunity, what would he ask for?
        Secretary Gates. I think one of the concerns that we're
    dealing with right now is there's quite a bit of sensitivity in
    Pakistan to the American footprint and presence in Pakistan,
    particularly an American military presence. I have said
    publicly that we are ready, willing, and able to help the
    Pakistani army should they need help in training for the new
    kind of mission and so on.
        They're very proud. They have a long history of being
    representative of the nation. I think, just further to Admiral
    Mullen's point, until General Kianni gets on top of the whole
    situation and what their needs are, I think we're in a standby
    mode at this point, other than this program.
        Senator Ben Nelson. With two wars costing us, what, $12
    billion to $16 billion at a pretty fast clip, one wonders what
    some of that money diverted to a stronger presence to attack
    Waziristan might get us and be cost savings in the long term,
    plus less threat--now my time's run out--to our troops if we're
    able to bring down the pressure there in Afghanistan and in
    Iraq.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Why don't we do this, Secretary Gates. If you would alert
    Admiral Fallon to the line of questions that Senator Nelson has
    raised about the effectiveness of that spending, perhaps by the
    time he comes here, which is March 4, I believe, he could be
    prepared to give us that report. We would appreciate that very
    much.
        Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Secretary Gates, I want to talk to you a bit about two
    reports that were released last week on Afghanistan which
    Chairman Levin has already alluded to. Both of them are pretty
    stark in their warnings about what is at stake in Afghanistan.
    One begins with ``Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in
    Afghanistan. Unless this reality is understood and action taken
    promptly, the future of Afghanistan is bleak, with regional and
    global impact.''
        The other says that ``Afghanistan stands today at a
    crossroads.'' It talks about how the progress of the last 6
    years is threatened by some of the factors that you've already
    discussed. It says that the United States and the international
    community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with
    too few military forces and insufficient economic aid. The
    reports recommend that the ``light footprint in Afghanistan''
    be replaced by the right footprint of U.S. and allied force
    levels.
        My first question to you is, what is your reaction to these
    two reports and the recommendation? Second, I recognize that
    we're sending 3,200 marines this spring to Afghanistan, but is
    that going to be sufficient to put Afghanistan back on course
    if NATO forces aren't joining in an increased commitment?
        Secretary Gates. First, I think that I guess what I would
    say is that I think we are--and it sounds a little familiar--
    being successful in the security and particularly in the
    military arena. General Rodriguez reports that to the eastern
    region of Afghanistan, January was the first month in 2 years
    where the level of violence was actually less than it was 2
    years ago. That's clearly where the United States has the
    biggest presence. It's our area of responsibility, and the
    counterinsurgency is going very well there.
        The Taliban no longer occupy any territory in Afghanistan.
    They were thrown out of Mussaqawa a few weeks ago, before
    Christmas. Now, I think that the Taliban have had some real
    setbacks. Probably 50 of their leaders have been killed or
    captured over the past year and we know that that's had an
    impact on their capability and also on their morale.
        All that said, because they are failing in the conventional
    kinds of attacks on us, they are turning more and more to
    suicide bombers, to terror, and to IEDs. So I would say that,
    while we have been successful militarily, that the other
    aspects of development in Afghanistan have not proceeded as
    well. Clearly, counternarcotics are a problem. Corruption is a
    problem. The ability of the government to get services to the
    countryside is a problem. Effectiveness of government
    ministries in many cases is a problem.
        Then overarching this is a problem that I started trying to
    work on a year ago, which was to bring about greater
    coordination of the civil effort among the NATO allies. There
    are some 40 partner nations active in Afghanistan, not to
    mention hundreds of NGOs. There is no overarching strategy.
    There is no coordinating body that looks at what's working best
    and what's not working and shares those experiences or that
    coordinates and says, you need to focus on electricity, and you
    need to focus on roads and so on, in terms of your commitment,
    rather than everyone doing their own thing all the way around
    the country.
        So the importance of somebody filling the position that
    Lord Ashdown was considered for is critically important, and I
    started proposing that a year ago. I also proposed at Nordvik
    last fall that what NATO needs is a 3- to 5-year strategy that
    looks out beyond the end of 2008, beyond 2009. Where do we want
    to have Afghanistan? Where do we see Afghanistan being in 3 to
    5 years, and what kind of forces will it take, what kind of
    civil commitment will it take, what kind of economic aid and
    development?
        One of the biggest problems with Afghanistan is that it's
    poor. Total government revenues this year will be $675 million.
    That compares with nearly $50 billion budgeted in Iraq, and
    Iraq has 5 million fewer people. So the contrast and the
    importance of the international community helping Afghanistan
    in some respects is even more important than in Iraq because of
    the poverty in Afghanistan.
        But this strategy is necessary, with some milestones on how
    we can tell whether we're making progress in these areas. I
    think that there will be a strategy like this approved at
    Bucharest at the summit, that also will, I hope, serve as an
    educational tool for the people of Europe to better understand
    the threat to them coming out of Afghanistan, which will then
    further empower the political leaders to do more.
        Now, to the second part of your question, I've been working
    this problem pretty steadfastly for many months at this point
    and I would say that I am not particularly optimistic. I think
    there are some additional opportunities and I think there are
    some straws in the wind that suggest some governments may be
    willing to do more and do more in a meaningful way, not just
    symbolic.
        My hope is that in Vilnius and then in Bucharest we'll get
    some better indication of what they're prepared to do. Some
    nations are stepping up. The Poles are sending additional
    people. So I think that there are some who are stepping up to
    do more, after I made the decision on the marines, I sent a
    letter to every defense minister in NATO asking them, basically
    trying to leverage our dispatch of the marines into getting
    them to dig deeper. In several cases I made specific requests
    of specific kinds of units and in some cases named units and
    where they needed to go.
        I haven't gotten any responses yet, but I'm sure I will in
    Vilnius. But we'll see. We just have to keep working it.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Warner has just made an excellent suggestion, as
    always, that you, if you would, send that letter to us so we
    can make it part of the record, if that is a public letter.
        Secretary Gates. It was public after it leaked in Germany.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Why don't you leak it to the record. If you
    could leak it for our record. [Laughter.]
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senators Warner and Levin requested a copy of a letter Secretary of
    Defense Robert Gates sent to every defense minister in NATO on
    enhancing their contributions to activities in Afghanistan, dated
    January 24, 2008. Enclosed is the letter.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I first would like to observe that I really appreciate the
    tone of the relations that we're having out of the DOD now, as
    compared to even a year ago when we were having some of these
    hearings. I think Admiral Mullen, Admiral Fallon, General
    Conway, and others have really demonstrated a willingness to
    rethink where we're going on a lot of these issues. It's
    vitally important that we do this and do it in a timely way.
        I was writing before the invasion of Iraq that my concern
    was we were falling into a double strategic mousetrap. I think
    if you look at this budget that's before us today, you see the
    ramifications of that, a double strategic mousetrap meaning
    first of all we were going to be tieing up our military in one
    spot, burning it out, burning out our people, burning out our
    equipment, at the same time that the enemy that we're facing,
    the true enemy that we're facing, which is global terrorism,
    international terrorism, would retain its mobility.
        I'm looking at the Washington Post this morning, the
    Director of National Intelligence (DNI) identifying what he
    called global hot spots--Iraq obviously, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
    Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China to the extent that it is
    providing missile sales and other weaponry to Iran. They're all
    focusing in that area in a way that we haven't been able to
    control it, in a large sense because of what's happened with
    our commitment in Iraq. To me that argues very strongly for
    getting our people off the streets of Iraq and out of the role
    as occupier.
        The second strategic mousetrap is that we were tieing up so
    much of our national attention and so much of our budget in one
    specific spot, while we were ignoring our strategic interests
    around the world, our larger strategic interests. We're seeing
    that coming home to roost now with the size of this budget. I
    support what we need to be doing, particularly with growing the
    Navy back to where it needs to be, but it's pretty unfortunate,
    from my own perspective that we're having to face these
    problems that were avoidable with a proper strategy.
        My question really is on the GI Bill. I've had meetings,
    I've had discussions with Admiral Mullen about this and others.
    I proposed a GI Bill a year ago that would give the people
    who've been serving since September 11 the same range of
    benefits as those who served during World War II. We took care
    of 8 million people after World War II, paid their tuition,
    bought their books, and gave them a monthly stipend.
        We keep talking about these young men and women as the new
    greatest generation, and yet we're having a very difficult time
    with this administration and, from what I'm hearing, inside the
    DOD, getting an agreement like this is something that these
    people have earned. Senator Clinton is on this bill. Senator
    Obama is on it. Governor Romney has indicated he supports
    something of this nature. We're still waiting for Senator
    McCain, who speaks so strongly about people who serve. We're
    still waiting for people on the other side here.
        But my question for you is this. What I've been hearing
    from the Pentagon is that there are people who believe that
    giving these young men and women this kind of a benefit will
    affect retention. I'm an old manpower guy. I spent 5 years in
    the Pentagon. My view on this is that it will increase the pool
    of people to be recruited, that right now we're burning out
    this one pool we've been going after time and time again with
    all these bonuses, and we've been seeing indicators from the
    Army that categories in terms of mental categories being
    recruited are going down. This would open up a whole new group
    of people potentially.
        I'm wondering if it's true that the position of the DOD is
    that this is somehow going to affect your ability to manage the
    force?
        Secretary Gates. I have not heard that, Senator, and I am
    certainly willing to take a close look at the bill and see what
    the budgetary implications are and so on. Personally, I've been
    trying to do what we can in terms of enhancing the benefits and
    the flexibility of the benefits. For example, the President's
    recommendation in the State of the Union address that a service
    person who does not intend to use his or her Montgomery GI Bill
    education benefits could transfer those to a spouse or to a
    child in their family, I heard that recommendation in one of my
    meetings with military spouses at Fort Hood.
        So I think we are looking for areas in which we can both
    help the families as well as the servicemembers. I'm very happy
    to take a look at this bill.
        Senator Webb. We've been trying to get people in the DOD to
    give us a specific comment on this for more than a year now.
    The Montgomery GI Bill averages out, the average payment on it
    averages out to $6,000 a year. If you were going to go to the
    schools that some of our World War II veterans were able to go
    to--Senator Warner, for instance, was able to go to Washington
    and Lee University--he and I have discussed this--and
    University of Virginia Law School. The Montgomery GI Bill
    wouldn't even cover 14 percent of that today.
        So whatever the benefit is to be transferred--and there are
    questions about transferability. As someone who spent 4 years
    as a committee counsel on the Veterans Affairs Committee 30
    years ago, the benefit itself is not measured to the value of
    the service.
        I'd be interested if the Admiral had any thoughts on this.
        Admiral Mullen. I'm an old manpower guy myself, Senator.
    Listening to you when you talk about this, it's my belief we
    need to take care of these people from the moment we recruit
    them, for as long as the system can support them, depending on
    what they do, whether they stay in and whether they get out.
    That doesn't, obviously, mean we take care of them for the rest
    of their lives, although I do feel strongly we have to have a
    system which supports those who are wounded in that regard.
        Specifically on this, I don't think there is any benefit
    that when I go out and talk to the troops and we meet with
    families--this gets talked about; it's the education benefit
    which they both see, you talk to the young enlisted, who so
    many came in for the education benefits. We know that it will
    lift up the country no matter what they do, whether they stay
    or go.
        I don't immediately sign up to whether this is affecting
    retention at all. I can get a little bit of that. But from the
    beginning to the end, from when they come in to when they
    leave, whether it's a few years or a career, we need to have a
    system which supports that. Education is a ticket to the
    future, whether you're in the Service or not.
        So we need to, I think, take a very careful look at it.
    I've not been made aware of this literally until we've talked
    in the last couple days, and I'm happy to certainly lend my ear
    as well.
        Senator Webb. I would suggest and hope that we can take a
    look at it soon, to try to get something through this year.
    We've been working on it for a year. We've been trying to get
    the other side to understand that this is not a political
    issue, it's an issue of rewarding service. All we're saying is
    try to give the same thing that we gave these people coming out
    of World War II.
        For every dollar that was spent on their education, we have
    $7 back in tax receipts because we increased the value of their
    professional lives. So I would hope we could work in a pretty
    rapid manner on this.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I say, I'm not a manpower guy,
    but the GI Bill did pay for my Ph.D. at Georgetown University.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. In your case it's probably 14 or 15 times
    the investment.
        Senator Webb. So far.
        Chairman Levin. So far, right.
        Senator Warner. Could I just commend my colleague from
    Virginia, and I wish to associate myself with your goals. I
    think we will be able to in this committee eventually put
    forward a bill.
        Senator Webb. I thank the senior Senator for saying that.
        Chairman Levin. I want to thank Senator Webb also for his
    persistence on this.
        But could you, Secretary Gates, get to us within the next
    month or so the position of the Department on this bill that
    Senator Webb and others have introduced?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. We need to know what the Department's view
    is on it. We're entitled to know that, and Senator Webb surely
    has been, I think, not only very clear and right on this issue,
    but he's been patient as well. We're entitled to an answer.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, let me just underscore
    again, as each of our members have said, our thanks for your
    great service to our country and your candor before this
    committee.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Dole, if you would allow an
    interruption.
        Senator Dole. Sure.
        Chairman Levin. Forgive me for doing this, but I'm reminded
    that the question of this bill--this bill has been referred to
    the Veterans Affairs Committee, not to this committee. So that
    any report that you give to us should go also to the Veterans
    Affairs Committee because it is within the jurisdiction of
    Senator Akaka's committee.
        Thank you. I apologize, Senator Dole?
        Senator Dole. That's just fine.
        Admiral Mullen, you've endorsed the proposal to fund the
    annual defense budget at no less than 4 percent of the GDP. A
    review of this budget certainly makes it clear that we need to
    substantially increase the baseline budget. Accordingly, I am
    sponsoring with Trent Franks in the House of Representatives a
    joint resolution that calls for the United States to fund the
    annual defense budget at no less than 4 percent of the GDP.
        But rather than discuss percentages and dollars, would you
    share your view on the implications for our military in terms
    of modernization, the growth of our military, the quality-of-
    life, and the research and development, if indeed we continue
    to inadequately support our armed services?
        Admiral Mullen. Senator, I've been in and out of Washington
    and a lot of time in the budget world since the mid-1990s, and
    I've recently discussed very publicly the need to have 4
    percent as a floor. Not unlike the other discussions, I'm not
    sure that's exactly right, but I think it's an important
    target. Over the last 10 or 12 years for me, as I've watched us
    through budgets which have been lower and budgets which have
    gotten larger, the impact of the growing cost to invest
    correctly for our people--and it's not just the members, but
    their families and the quality-of-life to have them stay in and
    to ensure that they see themselves as valued as we all say they
    are, and without whom we can't do anything--the growing
    challenges that we have across a full spectrum of requirements,
    and there are challenges in the acquisition world and we do
    need to contain those costs. But modern systems have gotten
    more expensive. The growing cost of operations. Those are the
    three big accounts.
        As I look back at a lot of people trying to get this right,
    and there are a lot of really dedicated people, I just worry a
    great deal about, in the world that we're living in right now,
    with the terrorist threat that we have, the weapons of mass
    destruction threat, the uncertainty, the regional instability,
    cyberspace, space, the growing challenges that possibly come
    from a near-peer competitor in the long run, the technology gap
    which is closing and which we're being closed on, that to
    underinvest across the board in a balanced way would be very
    dangerous.
        As I really roll it up and do the math, for me it's about 4
    percent. It isn't exactly that, but I think at a minimum we
    need to do that.
        To Secretary Gates' point earlier, we've made this mistake
    before. We can't do this now. It is a dangerous world, and if
    we do that I think we draw a great risk to ourselves in the
    future.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Secretary Gates, let me speak to you about the need for a
    Goldwater-Nichols II interagency reform initiative. I read with
    great interest your speech to Kansas State University recently.
    You indicated there that, based on your experience serving
    seven presidents, as a former Director of the CIA, and now as
    Secretary of Defense, you said: ``I'm here to make the case for
    strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better
    integrating it with hard power. One of the most important
    lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military
    success is not sufficient to win. Economic development,
    institution-building, the rule of law, promoting international
    reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to
    the people, training and equipping indigenous military and
    police forces, strategic communications, and more, along with
    security are essential ingredients for long-term success.''
        You also mention that ``What we do know is that the threats
    and challenges we will face abroad in the first decades of the
    21st century will extend well beyond the traditional domain of
    any single government agency. These new threats require our
    government to operate in a wholly different manner, to act with
    unity, agility, and creativity.''
        I would like for you to comment on the implications if we
    were not to move in the direction that you've suggested in this
    very impressive Kansas State speech.
        Secretary Gates. In many respects I think some of the
    challenges that we've faced in Iraq in terms of getting the
    development, reconstruction, the civil side of the equation
    right; the deployment, the difficulty that it has posed by
    trying to staff the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as an
    example.
        In a way, this goes back to the question of resources. The
    reality, as I talk about in the speech, is that at the height
    of the Cold War, United States Agency for International
    Development (USAID) had 15,000 employees. It has 3,000 now and
    it's basically a contracting agency. USAID in its heyday was an
    expeditionary agency. It had all of the kinds of agricultural,
    rule of law, civic institution, all those kinds of people who
    knew and wanted to serve overseas and served in many third
    world countries, developing countries, and they knew what their
    role was and they were very good at it. It was an important
    component of America's arsenal in the Cold War, where that was
    as much a war of ideas as it was of military power.
        So we've really hampered ourselves. The freeze on the
    hiring of foreign service officers in the 1990s. One of the
    lines that I used in that speech is, you could take the entire
    foreign service and it would not be enough people to crew one
    single carrier strike group.
        So I think the government is out of balance. Now, the fact
    that I'm up here for a $515 billion budget suggests that I
    don't mean that we correct the balance by lowering the defense
    budget. But I think that there needs to be greater attention
    both in the executive branch and in the legislative branch in
    how do we strengthen some of the civilian side of the
    government that deals with international affairs.
        The second part of the problem is how do you structure it,
    how do you organize it? I would confess to you--and one of the
    few negative comments about that speech was that I didn't put
    forward any ideas on how to fix the problem. What we have done
    in the Pentagon is let a contract to a nonpartisan,
    nongovernmental think tank to try and come up with some ideas
    that could perhaps serve as a basis for legislation or action
    by a new administration in terms of how you structure it.
        The problem with the Goldwater-Nichols analogy is the same
    problem that I had with that analogy in the creation of the
    DNI. It is that the reason Goldwater-Nichols works in the DOD
    is that at the end of the day there is one guy at the top that
    makes all the decisions, and that's not the case in a 16-member
    intelligence community and it's certainly not the case in the
    interagency.
        But clearly the structure--the theme of that speech this
    last year was the 60th anniversary of the National Security
    Act. It created the Air Force, it created the DOD, it created
    the National Security Council, it created the CIA. It was a
    huge piece of legislation, of enormous consequence, and really
    provided the framework for decisionmaking for the entire Cold
    War. My suggestion was, if you are going to write the National
    Security Act of 2007, what would it look like.
        I just think that the legislative branch, because you have
    a lot of research capabilities up here, a lot of historical
    experience, the executive branch, and we're doing our part in
    the DOD, needs to begin to focus on this. Frankly, I think it
    needs to be as a new president looks out at the world, getting
    this right and figuring out how to restructure to use all of
    the elements of national power that we have should be a high
    priority for the new president.
        Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
        My time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses, Secretary Gates and
    Admiral Mullen.
        To Secretary Gates, as a result of the remediation for the
    problems identified at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, DOD
    and VA are currently cooperating and collaborating I would say
    on an unprecedented level. Secretary Gates, do you believe that
    the Department can sustain the current level of cooperation and
    collaboration, and how will this be administered?
        Secretary Gates. I think that one of the things that has
    played a critical role in bringing the Departments together and
    making sure that the various levels of the Departments are
    doing what they're supposed to be doing in terms of both the
    Dole-Shalala recommendations, the legislation that you have
    passed and others, is the fact that the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense, Gordon England, and the Deputy Secretary of Veterans
    Affairs meet every week, and their subordinates are in the room
    and they have a checklist of what they're supposed to do, and
    they are methodically working through it.
        I am confident that this practice will continue certainly
    for as long as Gordon England and I are in our positions.
        I think that when you are sitting up here a year from now
    confirming a new Secretary of Defense, it seems to me that that
    provides a useful opportunity to encourage that Secretary to
    continue this practice, because that's what it takes, frankly.
    It takes top-level attention and it takes short deadlines for
    getting things done, and it has worked and it's really worked
    remarkably well. But it requires continued top-level attention.
        Senator Akaka. I want to thank you for placing that in the
    record. I'm so glad to see that continue to happen.
        Some have suggested, Mr. Secretary, that a permanent joint
    DOD and VA transition office be established. Do you have any
    thoughts about that?
        Secretary Gates. I'm very open to this because when we
    started dealing with this problem I said we need to look at
    this from the standpoint of the soldier, sailor, airman, or the
    marine. Forget all these bureaucracies. Forget all these
    different organizational charts and everything else. I'm a
    soldier, I've been wounded, or even if I haven't been wounded;
    how do we create a structure that makes--this is perhaps a
    contradiction in terms and so idealistic it sounds naive--but
    that in effect makes the bureaucracy the ally of the soldier,
    not the adversary, and a seamless transition, so that the
    bureaucracy smooths the way rather than making it a series of
    obstacles to be overcome.
        I think you can do that, and as we were doing a lot of the
    wounded warrior things, I said, go out and just interview some
    wounded soldiers and tell them: If you had a clean sheet of
    paper, based on your experience so far, how would you design
    this system? What would you make it look like?
        So I'm open to anything that's going to make the
    bureaucracy more user-friendly to those who have served it.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for those responses, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Mr. Secretary, given the increased interaction between DOD
    and VA, disagreements could occur that can't be resolved over
    jurisdiction or responsibility between DOD and VA within either
    the DOD-VA joint executive council or the DOD-VA senior
    oversight committee. In these cases, who do you think is
    responsible for brokering these disagreements between the two
    Departments, and how would the process work?
        Secretary Gates. Happily we haven't had any of those yet. I
    would assume that if there were a really tough problem that
    couldn't be solved by the deputies that it would come to
    Secretary Peake and myself. I find it difficult to imagine that
    we couldn't come to an agreement. But if for some reason we
    couldn't then clearly the next step would be to take the issue
    to the President.
        Senator Akaka. I want to thank you also for mentioning
    ``seamless transition,'' because we have been working on that
    and we have been working here at the Armed Services Committee
    and the Veterans Affairs Committee.
        Many of the programs currently under development, Mr.
    Secretary, at DOD continue to be delayed or are experiencing
    cost overruns. The GAO report just released February 1,
    identified 11 programs that are the result of poor Department
    acquisition practices and reiterates some of the issues brought
    out in the testimony at the end of the last congressional
    session.
        Some failures identified include: overreliance on testing,
    immature technologies, and early entry into signed contracts
    prior to a thorough engineering analysis, both of which
    drastically drive up costs on these programs.
        Secretary Gates, what is the status of ongoing efforts
    within the DOD to improve the efficiency of the acquisition
    process?
        Secretary Gates. I think you could probably fill this room
    with studies of the DOD acquisition process over the past
    number of decades. We have a new Under Secretary for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, John Young. John has
    tried to lay out for his entire group a new approach to
    acquisition that tries to minimize the kinds of problems that
    you've just described. I would invite--and I'm happy to have
    Mr. Young come up and talk to you about it or come up and talk
    to the committee, because I think--one of my real regrets is
    that Mr. Young is only going to have a little over a year in
    office, because I think he's on the right track and I think he
    has it right.
        There's another problem, though, and someone alluded to it
    at the very beginning of the hearing. In the 1990s, for two
    reasons--one, four successive National Defense Authorization
    Acts that required the Department to reduce the number of
    acquisition officers by 95,000 people altogether; and the
    Department's own actions to reduce personnel because of the
    budget--that took the number of acquisition people in the DOD,
    people working acquisition issues, from something like 620,000
    to fewer than 300,000.
        Maybe more importantly, between 1990 and now, the Defense
    Contract Management Agency dropped from 24,000 contract experts
    to just over 9,000. So one of the things we have to do is
    figure out how many is the right number to be involved in
    managing these contracts, because it seems to me, given the
    problems we've had in Iraq and the problems we've had that you
    alluded to, the number where we are now probably isn't right.
        One of the things that the Army has done--there's been a
    lot of criticism and a lot of justifiable criticism about
    contracting problems in Iraq. We had 63 contract managers in
    Iraq until December 2007. We now have over 300 that the Army
    has sent out, the Army alone has sent out there.
        So it's clearly partly a process problem, but it's also a
    resource problem, and I think we're trying to address both of
    those. But I invite the committee and I invite you to sit down
    with Mr. Young, because I think some of the programs he's
    putting in place are quite valuable.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Chambliss arrived on the spur of the moment.
    Senator Chambliss, you are next.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to
    whoever I cut off here.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Martinez was looking expectantly,
    and properly so. But you aced him out. Senator Chambliss?
        Senator Chambliss. Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for
    being here this morning. Thanks for your great service to our
    country.
        Secretary Gates, in addition to requiring a force to defend
    the Homeland and to deter in and from four regions, the
    National Military Strategy requires our military ``to conduct
    two overlapping swift-defeat campaigns. Even when committed to
    a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be
    able to win decisive in one of two campaigns.'' These are
    quotes from that document.
        According to the strategy, it does not represent a specific
    set of scenarios nor reflect temporary conditions. Regarding
    tactical aviation, it is well known that there have been
    several studies regarding how much and what type of tactical
    aviation our National Military Strategy requires. Specifically,
    there have been at least three studies on this issue within the
    last 5 years: one by DOD, one by the Air Force, and one by an
    independent group.
        Each of these studies have come to a different conclusion.
    Only one of them, the DOD study, has concluded that we only
    need 183 F-22s. DOD's joint air dominance study, which was done
    in support of the 2005 QDR, assumes that of the two major
    regional operations that the force is sized against, only one
    of those is a stressing scenario that requires a large number
    of F-22s. I'm very concerned about this assumption. As a
    previous DCI, you know how hard it is to predict the future and
    I think that you would agree that our ability to predict our
    next military opponent over the last 10 to 20 years has been
    very inconsistent, and we've always been wrong.
        The DOD study completely discounts the possibility of a
    resurgent Russia over the next 20 years and uses predictions
    regarding proliferation of surface-to-air missiles and fifth
    generation fighter aircraft that are exceptionally conservative
    and that do not match estimates I received from intelligence
    personnel in the Pentagon just this morning specifically
    related to the double-digit SAM capability that Iran will have
    in 2024, the year the DOD study uses for its scenarios.
        We can't talk specific numbers because this is an
    unclassified hearing, but suffice it to say that the
    information that I received, the Pentagon estimates Iran's
    double-digit SAM capability at two to five times higher than
    the DOD study assumes. This would obviously require a much
    larger fifth generation fighter force to counter and would be a
    much more stressing scenario.
        Second, based on projections that I received from the
    Pentagon, there are at least 17 other nations that will have
    double-digit SAMs by 2024, including many of the Central Asian
    republics, Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Belarus,
    Vietnam, and Venezuela.
        Also, the DOD study makes the assumption, which I frankly
    don't agree with, that the F-22 and the JSF are equally capable
    against surface-to-air missiles, and also assumes that no F-22s
    will be required for homeland defense or to deter the threat
    from four regions, as the National Military Strategy requires.
        Now, given this threat information, the assumptions in the
    DOD study, and the fact that of the three studies only one
    recommends procuring only 183 F-22s, how confident are you that
    we are procuring the right number at 183?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I know that the Air Force's view
    is that they would like to have 350 of these aircraft. I think
    at the end of the day, at least for me, it has ended up being a
    cost-benefit analysis of the F-22, of the growth of the F-22
    program beyond 183 or so aircraft, and the impact on the JSF
    program.
        My concern is that the F-22 is almost twice as expensive as
    the JSF. My worry is that a significant expansion of the
    production of the F-22 in the out-years will encroach on the
    production and the affordability of how many JSFs can be
    purchased.
        My view on this was that we have come to this conclusion in
    this administration in terms of the F-22, but there are 20 F-
    22s in the 2009 budget. As I indicated earlier, we will
    probably ask for four or so more as replacement aircraft in the
    supplemental for 2009. So my objective was to keep the line
    open, quite frankly, so that a new administration as it looks
    at the DOD, at the defense budget and priorities, can make the
    decision. If they choose to expand the F-22 force, then the
    production line will still be open that would enable them to do
    that.
        Senator Chambliss. If you ask for four additional F-22s in
    the supplemental, how long is it your thinking that that will
    keep the line open?
        Secretary Gates. 2010.
        Senator Chambliss. Do you have any concerns about the fact
    that if that is not the case and you don't have money for long-
    lead procurement in this budget, that in effect you're going to
    be shutting down that line because you're not going to have
    subcontractors out there that are going to have the assurances
    that they need from a long-lead standpoint? Is there a concern
    on your part that's real referenced to the shutting down of
    that line?
        Secretary Gates. I am concerned. My objective is to give
    the next administration an option. What I've been told is that
    this will keep the line open, that gives them that opportunity.
        Senator Chambliss. Has the fact that we now have--I'm not
    sure what the exact number is today; I think the last one I saw
    was about--160 F-15s, which the F-22 is replacing--we've had a
    significant issue with the F-15. We have about 160 of them that
    are grounded, I think, as of today. Has that factored into your
    decision or is that late issue that came into the picture not a
    factor?
        Secretary Gates. No, in fact that was an issue that helped
    persuade me to keep the line open.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Chairman Levin. We are not going to be able to quite meet
    our noon promise, but we'll come very, very close. We're not
    going to be able to have a second round of questions, however.
    There have been some requests for that. We'll have to have
    those questions asked for the record, which we will keep open.
    But we are not going to be able to have a second round.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Secretary Gates, for your service. Admiral
    Mullen, thank you very much for what you do for the country.
        I'd like to come back to an item that was talked about in
    the early part of the hearing by the chairman and the ranking
    member. That is the negotiations to sign a permanent long-term
    agreement with the Iraqis on the role of U.S. military in the
    future operations in Iraq. The agreement's expected to be
    concluded by mid-July.
        Obviously, the stakes are extremely high. Congress, I
    believe, must have the opportunity to approve or disapprove any
    security commitment, agreement, or assurance, pledge or
    guarantee, regardless of what it is called, that affects our
    troops and our national security. We're mindful that to date
    the Iraqi foreign minister is describing the agreement as a
    treaty. In a January 15 press conference with Secretary Rice he
    said: ``Our leaders have agreed to set a group of principles
    for the long-term treaty.'' The Iraq parliament is demanding to
    ratify the final agreement and the Iraqi Government has said it
    will submit any United States-Iraq pact to the parliament for
    ratification.
        General Lute, the Assistant to the President for Iraq and
    Afghanistan, said in November that congressional input ``is not
    foreseen. We don't anticipate now these negotiations will lead
    to the status of a formal agreement, which would then bring us
    to formal negotiation or formal input from Congress.''
        Yet, our troops are involved. Our national security is
    involved, and Congress should have the opportunity to approve
    or disapprove such an agreement. Congress even approves a
    security arrangement with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia.
    There's no convincing reason to bypass Congress.
        But let me ask you, before getting into comments about this
    issue. The existing authority under international law for the
    military presence in Iraq was extended in December 2007 through
    the end of 2008. Wouldn't it make more sense to seek a short-
    term extension to enable the next administration to decide what
    form our commitment should take, if any?
        Secretary Gates. Senator Kennedy, the SOFA that is being
    discussed will not contain a commitment to defend Iraq and
    neither will any strategic framework agreement. My
    understanding is--and it's, frankly, a clearer point than I
    made earlier, and we certainly do not consider the declaration
    of principles as a security commitment to the Iraqis.
        My view is that there ought to be a great deal of openness
    and transparency to Congress as we negotiate this SOFA, so that
    you can satisfy yourselves that those kinds of commitments are
    not being made and that there are no surprises in this.
        Senator Kennedy. I appreciate that and appreciate your
    view. We have had other examples of statements that have been
    made where the administration's changed its position. In the
    last 4 years the administration said there would be no
    permanent bases. The President, on April 13, 2004, said: ``As
    proud and independent people, Iraqis do not support indefinite
    occupation. Neither does America.'' Secretary Rumsfeld said:
    ``We do not have plans for permanent facilities in Iraq, no.''
    Ambassador Khalilzad stated on August 15, 2005: ``We do not
    seek permanent military bases.'' Secretary Rice, May 7: ``We do
    not in the process these days of doing permanent military
    bases.''
        Now we have the National Defense Authorization Act this
    year and the President included a signing statement on the
    provision that prohibits funding for the establishment of any
    military installation or base for the purpose of providing for
    permanent stationing of U.S. Armed Forces, saying and
    indicating that he would not apply that language if it impedes
    his constitutional authorities.
        So we've had language from the administration giving the
    assurance to Congress one way and then the administration going
    the other way.
        Why not just simplify it? Why not just get the Iraqis to
    extend the U.N. resolution which has been the basis for this?
    Why not let them do it and then permit the next administration,
    Democrat or Republican, to make that judgment?
        If they are not going to do it, why won't they do it? If
    they won't do it, why shouldn't we take action that says that
    if they're not going to take responsibility in this area why
    should we continue to give effectively a blank check of
    American troops?
        Secretary Gates. We certainly are not going to give anybody
    any blank checks. It was very difficult to negotiate the U.N.
    extension for 2008 and I think that the general feeling from
    the experts, including our ambassador and General Petraeus, is
    that it would be extremely difficult to get the Iraqis to agree
    to even a short extension of this.
        In a way, they have a vote in this, and they don't want
    permanent bases either. They are interested in asserting
    sovereignty and, my personal view--I haven't talked to the
    President about it--but I suspect that that language had more
    to do with the constitutional issues than with the substance of
    whether or not we want permanent bases in Iraq. The fact is, in
    every meeting that I've taken part in, it has been affirmed
    from the President on down that we do not want permanent bases
    in Iraq.
        Senator Kennedy. The language is specific on this
    communique under item 3, the security sphere: ``Providing
    security assurances and commitments.'' That language is signed
    by the President of the United States. That has the President
    of the United States' signature on it. That means something.
    What we are asking here is that, in terms of binding a new
    administration, you've had the authority under the U.N.
    resolution in the past. The Iraqis have the opportunity to say
    that they can extend it for a year or renegotiate it in 6
    months. We're involved in fighting for their country. We don't
    get the reconciliation, the political accommodation. Why can't
    we expect that they would say, all right, you're going to get 6
    months and 12 months and leave the opening to a new
    administration, a new President, Republican or Democrat, to
    work those items out?
        When we have the President of the United States signing
    that document that talks about security, it seems to me that
    the American people are entitled to that kind of voice in its
    decision.
        Secretary Gates. Senator, my view is that there is nothing
    in the SOFA that we are just beginning to negotiate that would
    bind a future administration. It basically, like other SOFAs,
    sets forth the rules by which we continue to operate in Iraq in
    terms of protecting our soldiers, in terms of the legal
    relationship, and so on. I don't think that there's anything
    here that in a substantive way binds any future administration.
        Senator Kennedy. My time is up. Can you give the assurance
    that the Senate will have an opportunity to review it before
    it's implemented?
        Secretary Gates. As I indicated, I think there should be
    full openness as we go through this process.
        Senator Kennedy. I'll assume that that's an affirmative
    answer.
        Secretary Gates. That's a yes.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Martinez.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you both for your patience. I think I may
    be it, so soon you get to leave, and thank you for coming and
    being with us and for your service.
        I wanted to just reiterate, as my colleague from Florida,
    Senator Nelson, indicated, my continuing interest on the issues
    relating to Mayport and thank the chairman. As the CNO, you
    made some great statements on that and I appreciate that, and
    we look forward to the continuation of the EIS and the future
    of Mayport, which is so important to Jacksonville.
        Also, very interested in issues relating to the potential
    for a Fourth Fleet. Admiral Stavridis does a terrific job with
    the Southern Command and, Mr. Secretary, I think as you look
    into these issues that it will be apparent that, given our
    responsibilities as well as the threats in the region, that
    this may be an idea whose time has come.
        I am, too, and I want to just let you know, very concerned
    about the issue of rotations and the 15-month deployment. Mr.
    Chairman, I'm sure that you are equally concerned about it. I
    recently have had occasion to visit with a young man that I've
    known since he was a small baby, and he is back for 2 or 3
    weeks. It does underscore for me personally the difficulty of
    these long deployments. I realize what a difficult circumstance
    you find yourself in, but just count me on the side of needing
    to look for solutions to that issue in the short term.
        My concern--two quick questions. One was on the issue of
    intelligence sharing with Turkey. I was recently there and the
    Secretary and I discussed, I think, the very positive effect
    that our cooperation in terms of the threat presented to Turkey
    by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) has been very well
    received and it's a good thing. My question is twofold. Number
    one, how is this cooperation going?
        Second, I just heard yesterday about a series of aerial
    attacks that had taken place in northern Iraq by the Turkish
    forces. How are we preserving the integrity of Iraq as well as
    maintaining our Iraqi friends in the northern part of Iraq
    sufficiently content with what's taking place?
        Admiral Mullen. Coincidentally, Senator, I actually met
    with General Sigon yesterday. He's been here for about the last
    week or so. He has been the point of contact with the Turkish
    general staff along with General Cartwright, the vice chairman,
    and General Petraeus. We've worked our way over these last few
    months to a level of cooperation that had not been seen.
        Clearly it's a very delicate balance and I think all the
    senior leadership, not just in the military, of both countries
    understand that the balance is there, that this needs to stay
    both in balance and it is very delicate. We speak frequently
    with both General Petraeus and Admiral Fallon about this.
    General Petraeus is very aware each time there's any kind of
    operation which occurs similar to the one that you just read
    about, and it is in that balance that I think the long-term
    success of all the interests, the interests of this sovereign
    country of Iraq, clearly the internal interests that are there
    particularly in the north, as well as the interests of Turkey,
    and that this is focused on exclusively the PKK, which is a
    known terrorist organization.
        So we've made a lot of progress. We also believe that, not
    unlike in many areas that we've talked about, that there isn't
    just a military solution here, that this will, we would hope,
    buy some headroom so that the other aspects of this can be
    addressed for a long-term solution to this very difficult and
    longstanding problem.
        So from my standpoint, the intelligence sharing, the entire
    aspect of this has gone exceptionally well. It's just, like
    many things, a very delicate balance and we have to keep our
    focus on this to make sure that that balance is sustained.
        Senator Martinez. I think Prime Minister Erdogan, who I met
    with when I was in Ankara, was very appreciative of the
    cooperation, but also very cognizant of the fact that it was
    more than just a military solution. I think that General Sagin
    also echoed those comments when he was here. I saw him last
    week as well.
        Shipbuilding. I was concerned in looking at the current
    proposal that we may be seeing a reduction of seven ships from
    the projected schedule that we were on. I know the LCS issue
    and I know how passionately you feel about the importance of
    this. I concur with you, and I know the path we're on to try to
    allow the two current ships to be completed and proceed
    forward. But it does concern me that we are falling drastically
    off schedule from what was projected in our shipbuilding
    program to get us to the 313-ship Navy that I think you and I
    both believe is important.
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. What can you tell me?
        Admiral Mullen. I think the analysis which went into
    underpinning that 313 number is still very solid. I think it's
    important to remember that was the minimum number of aircraft
    carriers, the minimum number of surface combatants, the minimum
    number of submarines, all those things. We had built ourselves
    down to a certain number that we could produce. Certainly we
    hoped the numbers would be up-tied to LCS.
        LCS had a very tough year last year. I thought the
    Department and Secretary Winter in particular put it under a
    microscope to bound the problem both in requirements and costs.
    It is a vital part of the Navy as soon as we can get it out
    there. The Secretary of Defense talked earlier about designing
    the right kind of ships for the kind of swarming tactics which
    we recently saw in the Persian Gulf that the Iranians executed,
    and that in containing it--and I think we can from a cost
    standpoint and we now need to move forward.
        Clearly, we weren't able to execute the third and the
    fourth in the class. We're now just with the first two. I think
    the overall acquisition strategy there is a good one and that
    once we get to the type model series that we want, we then need
    to generate them as quickly as we can and build up to that 55-
    ship requirement.
        I think the submarine aspect of the program is solid.
    Clearly we're moving forward with the new destroyer, which is
    also in this budget. That's a really important transformational
    platform for the Navy for the future and I really believe for
    the Department in many ways. So the investment--I think it's
    somewhere above $14 billion this year, although some of that is
    overhaul money--continues to be there.
        I know I've spoken with Admiral Roughead, that his
    priority--I've heard him say it personally and publicly, that
    his number one priority is ships. You can't have much of a Navy
    without ships.
        Senator Martinez. That makes sense.
        Mr. Chairman, may I have one more question or am I out of
    time?
        Chairman Levin. I don't know if you're out of time or not,
    but why don't you quickly ask a question.
        Senator Martinez. Okay, thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, the one issue that does greatly concern me,
    as I know it does you, is the NATO cooperation in Afghanistan.
    I was chagrined that we had to send 3,500 marines there because
    it appears that our allies didn't understand the seriousness of
    their commitment, or at least didn't understand their
    commitment the same way we did.
        I wonder, in addition to what you said earlier, if there's
    anything you can tell us in terms of how we can bring about the
    kinds of results we need from NATO to undertake their
    responsibilities as it relates to Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. Senator, I leave after the House hearing
    this afternoon for Vilnius for a NATO defense ministers
    meeting, and clearly our role in Afghanistan is a key element.
    I mentioned earlier that I've sent--I'm trying to leverage the
    fact that we're sending these marines to get our allies to
    backfill behind the marines when they come out in winter. I'm
    going to provide a copy of that letter to the committee.
        I think we can--the reality is some of them have very
    difficult political circumstances at home. They're minority
    governments or they're in coalition governments and there's a
    difficult problem. One of the things I'm going to do in
    Vilnius, or actually in Munich at the Wehrkunde conference, is
    there are going to be a number of American legislators there
    and a number of European legislators, and I want to try and
    bring them together at a reception, because I think, frankly,
    one area where Congress can help us is in your interactions
    with European parliamentarians to talk about the importance of
    Afghanistan and success in Afghanistan, not just for their own
    security, but also for the future of the alliance.
        I think that the problem is they need to be more courageous
    in going out and trying to educate their population about why
    Afghanistan matters, and I think you in many respects have more
    credibility with them as elected representatives than people
    like me. So I think whatever you can do, that's one place where
    I think you can be helpful.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
        Senator Warner just wants to make a statement about our new
    Senator.
        Senator Warner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, we have a new
    member, Senator Wicker, who took Senator Lott's seat from
    Mississippi. He has been trapped in this line of tornadoes in
    getting here to the Senate today and therefore he's absent. I
    ask unanimous consent that his statement and questions be
    admitted for the purposes of the record.
        Chairman Levin. Any statement will be made part of the
    record, and of course his questions will be asked for the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Wicker follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Senator Roger F. Wicker
        Chairman Levin and Senator Warner, thank you both for your kind of
    words. I am grateful and humbled to be a member of this prestigious
    committee. The work of the Senate Armed Services Committee makes our
    Nation stronger and the men and women who defend her safer. I look
    forward to contributing in some way to this important honorable cause.
    Thank you for this opportunity.

        Senator Warner. I thank the chair.
        Chairman Levin. We found that out and we're glad you made
    that part of the record.
        We're very grateful to our witnesses, particularly, may I
    say, Secretary Gates, for your statement of a few minutes ago
    giving us the flat-out assurance that any agreement with Iraq
    will not include a security provision. That's what an anonymous
    person from the White House apparently said yesterday, as
    reported in this morning's paper. You have taken the anonymity
    away from that and given us your direct statement, and we now
    have it on authority and that's what we welcome so much. It was
    important, I think, on a bipartisan, an institutional basis, as
    you heard this morning, that any agreement not include security
    commitments to a country since that belongs in a treaty.
        Secretary Gates. That certainly is what I have been
    informed about with the SOFA.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Again, to all of our witnesses, thank you so much for your
    service, and we came reasonably close to keeping our
    commitment.
        Secretary Gates. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Again, our thanks. We will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                             de-baathification law
        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, the Washington Post reported on
    February 4, 2008, that the Iraqi Presidency Council issued a statement
    on Sunday that the de-Baathification law was now ``considered as
    approved'' even though Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the only
    Sunni Member of the Presidency Council, refused to sign it and despite
    the fact that Article 138 of the Iraqi Constitution specifically
    provides that legislation requires unanimous approval by the Presidency
    Council within 10 days of its delivery to the Council to become law, or
    it is sent back to the Council of Representatives. Has the de-
    Baathification law actually been approved?
        Secretary Gates. On February 3, 2008, the Presidency Council
    submitted the Accountability and Justice Law for publication in the
    Official Gazette.
        [Note: Since the February 6, 2008, Senate Armed Services Committee
    hearing, the law was published in the Official Gazette and is now law.]

                      project on national security reform
        2. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, your speeches at Kansas State
    University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies
    called for major national security reforms. Section 1049 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008
    authorized $3 million for a comprehensive study of required reforms in
    the fiscal year 2008 budget. I understand the Department of Defense
    (DOD) has committed to entering into a cooperative agreement with the
    Center for the Study of the Presidency and the Project on National
    Security Reform for this study. Will DOD provide the full $3 million to
    the Project on National Security Reform?
        Secretary Gates. The Department has entered into a Cooperative
    Agreement with the Center for the Study of the Presidency and the
    Project on National Security Reform for this study and will provide the
    $2.4 million appropriated by Congress. These funds will be adequate for
    fiscal year 2008 efforts.

        3. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, what other support will the DOD
    provide to this important effort?
        Secretary Gates. It is too early to know what support may be
    required, but I expect we will be able to provide whatever support is
    requested.

        4. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, I understand that Director of
    National Intelligence McConnell and Secretary of Homeland Security
    Chertoff have promised funding or support to the Project on National
    Security Reform. Have you sought to use the cooperative agreement as
    the mechanism for this assistance as well?
        Secretary Gates. No. Neither agency has requested to do so.
    Additionally, the current cooperative agreement with the Project on
    National Security Reform, and its associated funding, was carried out
    under section 1049 of the NDAA, which limits the amount that may be
    expended to $3.0 million. Using the Cooperative Agreement, which is
    directly tied to the funding prescribed by the NDAA, could limit the
    amounts that other agencies might provide.

        5. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, what steps have you taken or do
    you plan to take to gain assistance from other departments and agencies
    for this effort?
        Secretary Gates. This effort is being carried out at the direction
    of Congress under Section 1049 of the NDAA, with an amount of $2.4
    million appropriated for the project ($3.0 million authorized). This is
    not a DOD initiative nor should it appear to be one if the
    congressional intent of a non-partisan, independent study is to be met.
    The Department thinks it inappropriate to seek additional funding or
    support from other agencies or departments, none of whom were
    authorized nor provided additional funding by Congress to support the
    study. The Project on National Security Reform has been highly
    encouraged to seek assistance from other potential private donors, any
    department or agency of the U.S. Government, as well as from Congress.

        6. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, your policy office has estimated
    that to make national security reform a reality will require $12 to $15
    million. Have you included funding for this effort in your fiscal year
    2009 budget? If not, why not?
        Secretary Gates. I am not aware of an official DOD estimate on the
    costs of national security reform. Given that such reform possibly
    would entail more than just the DOD and likely will extend beyond the
    Executive Branch, any inclusion of government-wide reform in the
    Defense budget would be inappropriate. Currently, at the direction of
    Congress, the Department is funding a study by the Project on National
    Security Reform to examine the dimensions of the problem and possible
    solutions. However, the study is due in the Fall and any discussion of
    its recommendations, and the cost of implementing those
    recommendations, would be premature at this time.

                        strategic arms reduction treaty
        7. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, the Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (START) will expire in December 2009. If that treaty is allowed
    to expire, the DOD will no longer have access to certain Russian data
    and vice versa. In addition, the START verification mechanisms on which
    the Moscow Treaty relies will be lost. Do you believe that the START
    should be extended?
        Secretary Gates. Our goal is to maintain a credible deterrent at
    the lowest possible level, consistent with our national security needs,
    including our obligations to allies. To that end, the Department does
    not want to extend START, a complex, Cold-War era agreement with
    intrusive verification measures unsuited to our current relationship
    with the Russian Federation and the future security environment.
    Instead, we prefer to extend the Moscow Treaty limits of 1,700-2,200
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and apply a set of
    transparency and confidence-building measures, including data
    exchanges, visits, exhibitions, telemetry exchanges, and activity
    notifications, as a means to ensure mutual awareness and predictability
    regarding Russian and U.S. strategic capabilities.

        8. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, what are the alternatives to
    obtain the data and replace the verification mechanisms that would be
    lost if it is not extended?
        Secretary Gates. DOD supports a set of transparency and confidence-
    building measures with Russia including data exchanges, visits,
    exhibitions, telemetry exchanges, and activity notifications.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
                                 iraqi refugees
        9. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, section 1248(c) of the Refugee
    Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007 requires the DOD to provide Congress with
    information to be used to verify employment of Iraqi citizens and
    nationals by the U.S. Government. The law also requires options for the
    development of a unified, classified database of relevant employment
    information that can be used to adjudicate refugee, asylum, special
    immigrant visas, and other immigration claims. A report on employment
    information and a report on a unified database, both dating back to
    2003, are due to Congress by May 28, 2008.
        What procedures have been established to conduct a comprehensive
    review of DOD internal records and databases of Iraqi employees from
    the past 5 years, and how is this same type of employment information
    being gathered from Federal contractors, grantees, and other
    organizations employing Iraqis in support of the United States?
        Secretary Gates. With regard to the two sections, 1248 (c) and (d),
    contained in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, the Department is working
    with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy on an appropriate data
    call and an appropriate lead agency due to the broad nature of this
    task, which requires the ideas and data from multiple Federal agencies.

        10. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, what options are under
    consideration for establishing and managing a unified database on
    Iraqis employed since 2003? How will consultations with the State
    Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, Homeland
    Security Department, and the Treasury Department be coordinated?
        Secretary Gates. Section 1248(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008
    requires the DOD, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
    United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of
    the Treasury, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to review internal
    records and databases for information that can be used to verify Iraqi
    nationals' employment. Part of verifying their employment in Iraq
    involves reviewing internal records and databases to obtain information
    from prime contractors and grantees who have performed work valued over
    $25,000. Likewise, section 1248(d) requires the same Federal agencies
    to submit a report to Congress highlighting the options examined to
    establish such a database. Due to the broad nature of this task, which
    requires data from multiple Federal agencies, the DOD is working with
    the Office of Federal Procurement Policy on an appropriate data call
    and an appropriate lead agency for this requirement.
        The Department considers biometrics as one of many possible venues
    to address this area.

             Consistent with statute and policy governing the use of
            personal identity information for non-U.S. persons, the near
            real-time sharing and screening of identity data on foreign
            persons of interest, to include data on employment, is a
            critical priority for DOD. To that end, DOD has been
            participating in interagency committees and working groups
            designed to improve the interoperability of U.S. Government
            identity data. DOD is evaluating the development of a federated
            data architecture, governed by common standards, in which
            relevant data can be queried and shared both within DOD and
            across the interagency consistent with appropriate privacy and
            legal guidelines. The current arrangement between DOD and the
            Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
            Criminal Justice Information Services Division) allows such
            seamless sharing of identity data between the DOD Automated
            Biometrics Identification System and the FBI Integrated
            Automated Fingerprint Identification System.

        With regard to how consultations with the Department of State,
    USAID, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Treasury
    will be coordinated:

             DOD has been participating in interagency committees and
            working groups designed to improve the interoperability of U.S.
            Government biometric data. Notable among these activities is
            the National Science and Technology Council's Committee on
            Technology, Subcommittee on Identity Management and Biometrics.
            Within its working groups, the executive agencies have
            collaborated to develop government-wide standards agreements
            and interoperability policies. DOD will consult with the other
            executive agencies through this body, to determine the correct
            structure for collaborating on future initiatives and to
            develop options for achieving a unified data architecture that
            will enable the seamless sharing of identity data across the
            interagency.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                 unfunded science and technology opportunities
        11. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, please provide a prioritized
    list of science and technology (S&T) areas in which additional funding
    beyond that requested in this budget request would be supportive of
    defense missions and help address defense technology capability gaps.
        Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget of almost
    $11.5 billion represents a robust investment in S&T, despite difficult
    budgetary demands from the war on terror and anticipated higher energy
    costs. We shifted funding to address capability gaps identified in the
    2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and our increase in Basic
    Research of $270 million, also focused on addressing those gaps, will
    enhance the science and engineering personnel base and develop
    innovative solutions.

                  laboratory personnel demonstration programs
        12. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, how does the DOD plan to utilize
    the new authorities relating to the ongoing and highly successful
    laboratory personnel demonstration programs included in the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2008?
        Secretary Gates. DOD will utilize the new authority provided under
    the act to ensure that the maximum benefit of the extant demonstrations
    is afforded to each location affected by the legislation. We continue
    to work with the Service laboratories to monitor use of new and
    existing authorities.

        13. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, what is the process and schedule
    planned to establish demonstration programs at the Natick Soldier
    Center, Office of Naval Research (ONR), and Edgewood Chemical
    Biological Center?
        Secretary Gates. (from Army) - The previous DOD policy that allowed
    for new laboratory demonstration projects to be approved only if they
    provided for new ``interventions'' different from existing initiatives
    at laboratories has been impacted by the recently passed legislative
    initiatives contained in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, sections 1106
    and 1107. Natick is currently processing all necessary actions to
    establish a laboratory personnel demonstration program with the current
    fiscal year.
        Secretary Gates. (from Navy) - As an alternative to the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) rejected 2001 Lab Demo proposal, the ONR
    has worked with Navy National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and Navy
    Human Resources offices to propose a hybrid NSPS/Lab Demo system.
        Based on a comparative analysis of the proposed 2001 Lab Demo and
    features available under NSPS and other Lab Demos, ONR has modified the
    proposed 2001 Lab Demonstration in the following ways:

             (1) To eliminate features that have been overcome by current
            Federal regulations or are not critical to recruiting and
            retaining employees
             (2) Design career tracks and pay bands to allow transition of
            personnel between NSPS and the ONR Lab Demo program and to
            facilitate an ONR transition to NSPS if that decision is made
            later
             (3) Retain Senior Scientific Technical Manager and
            Contribution-based Compensation Systems
            (4) Identify and implement features not previously considered
            but are now important.

        Examples include:

             Revise Certain NSPS Pay Bands to Reflect Logical Career
            Progression and Breaks
             Change Maximum Pay for Band III to Executive Level IV plus 5
            percent
             Move from two Career Tracks in ONR Demo to six Career Tracks
             Accelerate Developmental Compensation for Developmental
            Positions Modified for all Career Tracks
             Retain Scientific and Engineering Positions as Shortage
            Category for Direct Hire
             Retain Conversion-Out Rules
             External Developmental Assignments

        The Chief of Naval Research is briefing the proposed Lab Demo
    personnel system up the Navy chain, and plans to brief OSD (Dr. David
    Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness) by the end
    of April.

                 international research and technology programs
        14. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, how does the DOD track the
    research and technology capabilities of our global allies and
    competitors?
        Secretary Gates. There are a number of programs within the
    Department that work in concert to track global research and
    technology. Following the 2004 report by the National Academy of
    Sciences, ``Avoiding Surprise in an Era of Global Technology
    Advancement,'' both the Militarily Critical Technologies Program and
    the Department Technical Intelligence Program have been focused to
    systematically increase awareness on global technology. Several
    efforts, including the S&T net assessments and the Military Critical
    Technology List review process, assess comparative research and
    technology capabilities of emerging S&T, commercial technology, and
    military applications between the United States and its allies and
    potential competitors.
        These programs look at technologies from a threat perspective as
    well as assessing the export control perspective. The Department uses a
    team approach that relies upon subject matter experts from the
    Services, Government, industry, and academia in more than 20 technology
    areas. These experts also forecast downstream technologies and capture
    them in a related Defense S&T List that we are currently updating and
    expanding to address the global scope of S&T.
        Additionally, the Services maintain S&T offices abroad in 10
    countries that provide unique ``boots on the ground'' insights into
    regional activities. This global presence of informed military S&T
    experts helps ensure we stay abreast of developments in every corner of
    the world to both avoid technological surprises and to seek out
    opportunities for collaboration with our allies and coalition partners.

        15. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, how is that information used to
    inform DOD investment decisions and the development of cooperative
    research opportunities?
        Secretary Gates. The Department assesses both the technology threat
    and the opportunities from allied technology development for enhancing
    existing and establishing new cooperative research programs. The
    information gained from offices with international liaisons (e.g., ONR,
    Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and Army Research Office) is
    an important component of the defense strategic planning, requirements
    generation, and acquisition processes of the Department. The Services
    maintain technology scouting offices in 10 countries whose job is to
    monitor and assess technology maturity and potential for U.S.
    collaboration in and around the countries the offices are located
    within. Where identified, and advantageous, the Department enters into
    collaborative technology development agreements with our close allies.
    We must use the best technology available worldwide to provide the best
    capability to the Nation and an awareness of international S&T and
    cooperation with our allies are vital parts of providing that
    capability.

        16. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, are there any research or
    technology areas of importance to DOD in which you feel that the United
    States will not have a sufficient technical lead within the next 5 to
    10 years to preserve future military superiority over any adversary?
    Which technical areas? What is being done to address this issue?
        Secretary Gates. The recent National Academy of Sciences report,
    ``Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America
    for a Brighter Economic Future,'' highlighted some strategic national
    challenges with respect to the number of scientists and engineers
    (S&Es) being produced to meet the needs of the Nation. The growth in
    S&Es in other countries compared to the United States results in a
    competitive market place for discovery of new scientific phenomenon and
    engineering. The production of new S&Es is growing faster in some
    nations other than America. This leads to an increased risk of the
    United States falling behind in technology areas of importance to DOD,
    although we are not prepared to state that there are specific
    technology areas that could result in a reduction of our operational
    and technological advantage. However, the DOD does need to remain
    engaged in understanding the technology developments in other nations
    to continue to develop new technologies and capabilities. We also need
    to remain engaged to reduce the possibility of technology surprise. To
    address this challenge within the DOD, we have increased our overall
    budget request in fiscal year 2009 by over 4 percent real growth for
    all of S&T and over 16 percent for basic research compared to the
    fiscal year 2008 budget request. This increased budget request for S&T,
    particularly in early sciences, enhances our insight into emergent
    technology areas. To guard against technology surprise in later
    programs, we are also developing a tighter integration of technology
    intelligence into our S&T planning process. These two actions should
    safeguard the DOD from technology surprise.

                           technology prize authority
        17. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, each of the Services and the
    elements of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and
    Engineering (ODDRE), including the Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency (DARPA), have the authority to award prizes of technological
    achievement, as established in past NDAAs. What are the Services',
    DARPA's, and ODDRE's plans for utilizing this authority for the
    remainder of fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009?
        Secretary Gates. The DARPA held the Urban Challenge on November 3,
    2007, featuring autonomous ground vehicles conducting simulated
    military supply missions in a mock urban area. First, second, and third
    place winners were awarded a total of $3.5 million in cash prizes.
    DARPA has no plans for prize competitions in fiscal year 2008 or fiscal
    year 2009.
        The ODDRE is sponsoring the Wearable Power Prize competition at
    Twentynine Palms, CA, from September 22 through October 4, 2008. The
    Wearable Power Prize competition was announced July 5, 2007, with the
    goal of reducing the weight of power systems warfighters carry to
    operate military equipment. Beginning September 22, 2008, 169
    competitors will gather, test, and demonstrate wearable electric power
    system prototypes that provide on average 20 watts of electric power
    continuously for 96 hours, with peak operation up to 200 watts for
    short periods, attach to a standard vest, and weigh 4 kg or less. First
    place winner is awarded $1 million; second place, $500,000; and third
    place, $250,000. See: http://www.dod.mil/ddre/prize for more details.
        The Services have announced no plans to conduct prize competitions
    in fiscal year 2008 or fiscal year 2009.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                                      iraq
        18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, last February, you testified
    before this committee that the DOD was putting together ``a fairly
    complete checklist or matrix'' that would give us the ability to rate
    the Iraqi military and police forces. Today, with reduced violence
    levels across the country, and Iraqi forces actively participating in
    operations around Mosul, I expect a growing number of these forces have
    met the grade. Yet recently, the decision has been made to put a freeze
    on U.S. troop withdrawals beginning this summer.
        What are some of the obstacles that remain in the training of these
    Iraqi forces that prevents a continual and steady shifting of control
    from U.S. forces to the Iraqis?
        Secretary Gates. There has been no decision to freeze U.S. troop
    withdrawals beginning this summer. After the final surge brigade
    departs in July 2008, there will be a period of consolidation and
    evaluation for a few weeks. After that period, the commanders will
    reconsider the conditions on the ground and make a recommendation on
    force levels accordingly.
        The Iraqi security forces continue to develop its capabilities.
    However, challenges remain. These include the development of logistical
    and combat enablers and the lack of experienced leadership. Coalition
    trainers are working closely with their Iraqi counterparts to address
    these challenges.

        19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you and others have suggested
    that having timelines for troop withdrawals from Iraq is a mistake
    because of the signal it sends to the enemy that they only have to hold
    out so long in order to achieve victory. Yet, our entrance into the war
    was based on the assumption that we would not be there for an
    undetermined extended period.
        If events on the ground dictate that it is necessary to maintain a
    significant military presence in Iraq for the next 10 years, what are
    the biggest operational and structural challenges that will need to be
    overcome?
        Secretary Gates. Our current force projections are based on a
    reasonable estimate of the ground situation in the coming months. We
    are pleased with the security progress that has been made in Iraq, but
    the progress has not attained an irreversible momentum.
        Our planning for future force levels is not based on timelines, but
    on conditions on the ground. Any presence of U.S. forces in Iraq would
    have to be agreed upon by the United States and Iraqi Governments.

                              joint strike fighter
        20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, a lot has been said about
    funding today. It seems to me that we are facing a choice between
    improving our ability to fight ongoing worldwide counterinsurgency
    operations and investing in systems like the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    that improve the long-term ability of the American military to be
    competitive in conventional warfare. Iraq and Afghanistan have shown
    the limitations of technology. Given the increasing costs of
    technology, operations, and personnel, what nature of conflict will the
    U.S. military be best postured to handle in 20 years' time?
        Secretary Gates. The future strategic environment is difficult to
    predict, but will likely tend toward greater disorder and persistent
    conflict. This unpredictability requires that the U.S. military be
    postured to address a range of operations that includes overlapping
    demands in conventional warfare, irregular warfare, disaster
    assistance, and nation building.
        My intent is to ensure the development of a force capability and
    capacity that can deter, and failing that, defeat threats to our
    Nation's security and the security of our vital interests. To
    accomplish this, the Department will require significant resources to
    not only reset and reconstitute our people and platforms due to the
    toll of current operations, but also to revitalize the force to address
    emerging threats.
        I recognize that the resources devoted to the Department represent
    a significant portion of Federal discretionary spending and there is a
    limit to what our Nation can devote to national security. Nevertheless,
    I consider that our future force is affordable and that the Nation
    cannot afford the consequences of being unprepared.

                                joint operations
        21. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, the Air Force is standing up its
    permanent Cyber Command in Louisiana later this year. Concerning roles
    and missions, the Air Force is arguing that operations in cyberspace be
    primarily the function of this branch of the military, given its
    technology heavy assets. The Navy, however, already has a Network
    Warfare Center. As an example of future joint operations, what steps
    are being taken by DOD to ensure unity of effort and interoperability
    among the Services' efforts?
        Admiral Mullen. Every Service brings unique and valuable expertise
    to operations in cyberspace that are critical to joint net-centric
    operations. The Defense Information Systems Agency and U.S. Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM) serve as operational seam managers, interacting with
    the Service organizations to ensure our cyberspace activities achieve
    interoperability, unity of effort, and economies of scale. The National
    Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations Implementation Plan will
    help to ensure we foster continued unity of effort and Service
    interoperability in the Joint Force. This includes developing a joint
    operational concept, exploring appropriate organizational constructs,
    and clarifying command relationships to ultimately shape future
    requirements leveraged and synchronized across all of the military
    Services.

        22. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, what is being done to minimize
    redundancy at all levels of joint operations?
        Admiral Mullen. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is
    responsible for ensuring individual Service program requests support
    the Chairman's guidance and contribute in a holistic manner to an
    increase in overall capabilities. While some redundancy may be built
    into any given capability, the JROC is responsible for ensuring that
    future programs develop weapon systems and other capabilities that
    combine across the warfare and command and control spectrum to enable
    U.S. forces to carry out national tasking across a broad range of
    mission sets.

                                troop readiness
        23. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, I am concerned about the
    operations tempo facing our current forces in meeting the challenges of
    Iraq's reconstruction efforts. It appears that as the situation begins
    to improve on the ground in one area of responsibility (AOR), we must
    shift forces into the other in a perpetual cycle, as we are now seeing
    with the sending of thousands of more troops to Afghanistan. I am
    further concerned, and agree with your testimony, that this seemingly
    endless cycle of operations between the two AORs leaves our military
    thinly stretched and ill-prepared to handle another crisis should it
    become necessary.
        What plan is there to address these resource shortfalls, and how
    will maintaining a large military presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan
    affect our ability to respond to other regions?
        Admiral Mullen. The size, scale, and duration of operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly strained the Army and Marine Corps.
    In order to ensure the highest level of readiness in our deploying
    forces, those recently returned or between deployments have paid a
    price. The impact of giving resourcing priority to the deployed force
    is reflected in the degraded readiness reports of non-deployed units.
    The most significant aspect of this lowered readiness in non-deployed
    units is the increased risk we must assume in the event of an
    unexpected contingency.
        There are sufficient forces and equipment to respond to some
    contingencies abroad but the readiness of those forces may result in
    longer timelines and increased casualties in achieving strategic goals
    and increased risk to mission success. In the case of another major
    theater war, the Army would be unable to source sufficient forces to
    meet all requirements.
        Several initiatives underway help minimize the readiness impact on
    non-deployed forces and maximize contingency readiness. Over the past 3
    years, we have used the Global Force Management process to ensure the
    deployment burden is balanced across the force through global sourcing
    of units and in-lieu-of sourcing. However, this can do only so much in
    managing our shortfalls. The fiscal year 2009 budget fully resources
    our commitment to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps in the
    base budget. This effort is essential in providing the strategic depth
    necessary to improve our force rotation ratio and readiness of non-
    deployed forces.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
         defense experimental program to stimulate competitive research
        24. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Gates, what is the fiscal year
    2009 request and plan for the Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate
    Competitive Research (DEPSCOR)?
        Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2009 request for the DEPSCOR is
    $2.833 million. The Department plans to expend all funds appropriated
    for this program in fiscal year 2009.
        Section 239 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 granted the Department
    more flexibility in the execution of the DEPSCOR program. Section 241
    requires an independent evaluation of it by a defense Federally Funded
    Research and Development Center. This evaluation is underway.

        25. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Gates, what is the status of
    execution of the funds appropriated for the program in fiscal year 2007
    and fiscal year 2008?
        Secretary Gates. Under the DEPSCOR program in fiscal year 2007, the
    DOD awarded $17 million to 13 academic institutions in 9 States to
    perform research in science and engineering. Academic researchers in
    Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
    Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
    Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee,
    U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming were eligible
    to receive awards in this competition.
        In the fiscal year 2008 DEPSCOR cycle, proposals were received from
    the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCOR)
    committees in the 23 eligible states by the closing date of October 26,
    2007. The Services are making final award decisions now (announcement
    expected before March 31, 2008) that will fund these State proposals up
    to the fiscal year 2008 appropriated amount, $17.078 million.

        26. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Gates, how will the two
    provisions relating to the program in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 be
    reflected in the execution of the program's appropriated funds?
        Secretary Gates. Section 239 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008
    granted the Department more flexibility in the execution of the
    DEPSCOR. We have used those authorities to evaluate specific proposals
    in the fiscal year 2008 cycle. Section 241 requires an independent
    evaluation of DEPSCOR by a defense Federally Funded Research and
    Development Center. This evaluation is underway.

        27. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Gates, what is the status and
    plan for DOD to comply with the study requirement in the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2008?
        Secretary Gates. Section 241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008
    requires an independent evaluation of the program by a defense
    Federally Funded Research and Development Center. This evaluation is
    underway.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
                                 future threats
        28. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, as the DOD struggles to balance
    its spending priorities on future threats and current needs, why has
    the DOD not done more to cull less efficient or effective weapons
    systems from its own budget?
        Secretary Gates. The Department is constantly challenged with
    funding weapon system programs to combat conventional and
    unconventional threats in a limited resource environment. As an
    integral part of this exercise, the Department constantly evaluates the
    effectiveness and efficiency of weapon systems currently in
    development, production, and operation. The cancellation of the
    Crusader and RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter programs, the significant
    reduction in funding for Transformational Satellite System (TSAT), and
    the recent restructuring of the Littoral Combat Ship and the C-5 RERP
    programs provide examples of resource decisions necessary to balance
    the Department's investment to meet current and future threats from
    land, sea, air, and space.

                              congressional report
        29. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, in February 2007, you told this
    committee about the positive steps that DOD was taking in assuring a
    strong printed circuit board technology and industrial base as a result
    of the study and issues identified by the National Research Council
    (NRC) Committee on Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Board
    Technology report. This report identified printed circuit board
    technology as critical in nearly every weapons system. You stated that
    a report on this topic, which was mandated by the NDAA for Fiscal Year
    2007, would go into detail on these positive steps. In October 2007,
    your Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics told
    the committee that this report would be coming over to Congress by the
    end of November. To date, we have not received this report. What is the
    status of the report? Why has it been delayed?
        Secretary Gates. The report has been signed by the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness and copies
    were provided to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. The
    report recommends that the Navy be designated the Executive Agent for
    Printed Circuit Board Technology. Preparation of this report required
    the establishment of a Principal Response Team led by the Defense
    Logistics Agency and Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division who
    analyzed, evaluated, and commented on the findings and recommendations
    contained in the NRC study. This evaluation and subsequent
    recommendation took longer than anticipated resulting in the delay of
    submission of the report to Congress.

                              hazardous substances
        30. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, it has come to my attention that
    there are potential reliability issues that may result from the
    European Unions (EU) Restriction on Hazardous Substances (RoHS) on
    lead-free solders utilized in electronic assembly. The science seems to
    indicate that if lead-free components were to enter the commercial
    aircraft industry or U.S. military and our allies' defense systems
    (high reliability electronic systems), severe reliability and potential
    catastrophic failures might occur. What is the military doing to ensure
    that lead-free and/or a mixture of leaded and lead-free components do
    not get incorporated into high reliability, mission-critical electronic
    systems?
        Secretary Gates. The Department has four initiatives to meet these
    challenges posed by RoHS to the Department's mission-critical
    electronic systems.
        1. The Defense Microelectronics Activity Office is participating in
    a joint effort with our industrial partners (Electronic Lead-Free
    Integrated Process Team) to minimize any disruption of the supply or
    reliability of electronics. It focuses on commercial off-the-shelf
    components and sub-assemblies.
        2. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,
    and Technology has also undertaken a study to identify the occurrences
    of lead-free electronics in weapon systems deemed a priority by the
    Army. The National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence is
    involved with both of these initiatives.
        3. DOD's ODDRE and the Aerospace Industries Association of America
    participate in meetings to inform stakeholders of upcoming research
    needs and recommendations with regard to lead-free issues.
        4. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
    Environment is conducting an enterprise-wide assessment to evaluate the
    risks of changing global lead regulations and their potential impacts
    on mission capability.

        31. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, given the unintended
    consequences of the EU's RoHS legislation on lead-free solders and the
    subsequent impact it had on military electronics, what mechanisms are
    in place to deal with another pending EU regulation--Registration,
    Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH)--to influence the
    legislation, to establish policy and guidelines within DOD, and to
    foster implementation should implementation be warranted?
        Secretary Gates. REACH went into effect in July 2007 and is unique
    in that it covers both chemicals and the products that contain
    chemicals. The first date with possible implications for DOD's supply
    chain is the registration deadline of December 1, 2008, as failure to
    register certain materials by that date may result in the refusal or
    the delay of these shipments to the EU.
        The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is compiling a list of chemicals
    with known or potential regulatory consideration within the EU.
    Following DLA's compilation of chemicals transported to/through the EU,
    DLA will conduct a similar search to identify products of concern under
    REACH, also known as `articles.'
        REACH does allow for defense exemptions by member states. The
    Department will have the burden of demonstrating the mission critical
    nature of a material for which no safer alternative is commercially
    available, without a reduction in performance and making its case to
    the member state(s). The Department will continue to address other
    potential effects of this legislation, including costs and potential
    solutions.

                 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
        32. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, in your testimony, you noted
    there is a significant shortfall in intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and processing infrastructure as
    identified by combatant commanders in the field. Would you please
    describe what kind of assets would address that shortfall?
        Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]

        33. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, how will the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff act to ensure that these shortfalls are properly defined and
    described to Congress so that we can work with you in meeting that
    need?
        Admiral Mullen. The Joint Staff has directed U.S. STRATCOM to
    develop a methodology and taxonomy to accurately capture combatant
    command (COCOM) ISR requirements and associated ISR shortfalls. We will
    use standard operational plans for testing scenarios to validate and
    verify U.S. STRATCOM's process. In the meantime,  the  Joint  Staff
    has  worked  with  the  Air  Force  to  produce  and  field  MQ-9
    Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk weapons systems at the maximum possible
    rate, and accelerate the wide area airborne surveillance sensor.
    Additionally, the Joint Staff is fully engaged and actively
    participating in the Secretary of Defense's ISR Task Force.
    Expectations for this task force are high and they are examining anew
    all potential options to address shortfalls. Upon your request, my
    staff stands ready to debrief Congress on results, findings, and
    recommendations to solve pressing ISR shortfalls.

                            unmanned aerial vehicle
        34. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, why is it taking the Joint Chiefs
    so long to develop a comprehensive unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) combat
    air patrol (CAP) requirement?
        Admiral Mullen. To answer the question of how many CAPs we need we
    must first answer the underlying question of what battlefield effects
    we need unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to accomplish and how are we
    going leverage these effects as part of the broader ISR architecture.
    To answer these questions the JROC has initiated two near-term efforts,
    first the development of a comprehensive concept of operations (CONOPs)
    for UAS that integrates the wide variety of UAS platform capabilities
    in a unified approach, and second the development of an ISR force
    sizing construct, based on existing operational plans, to help inform
    future force mix analysis. Both of the efforts are scheduled to
    complete by June 2008 to inform the Department's future UAS force mix
    deliberations in advance of Program Objective Memorandum 2010 and the
    QDR.

        35. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, are the Joint Chiefs any closer
    to establishing intra-service management of medium to high altitude UAV
    procurement and battlespace management?
        Admiral Mullen. In September 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics to establish a task force to coordinate critical UAS
    acquisition issues and to develop a way ahead that will enhance
    operations, enable interdependencies, and streamline acquisition of
    UAS. This task force is achieving results and expects to combine the
    Air Force Predator and Army Sky Warrior programs into a single
    acquisition program in order to achieve common development,
    procurement, sustainment, and training activities. Additionally, the
    JROC will continue to coordinate the development of UAS training
    activities and operational employment by the Services.

        36. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I understand
    that the current JROC validated requirement for Predator UAVs stands at
    21 CAPs. Further, I understand that this addresses only Central Command
    and Special Operations Command priorities. I believe this number is not
    only dated, but insufficient and lacks the true global requirement for
    Predator and other theater-level UAVs to meet the ongoing shortfall in
    ISR assets worldwide. When will this requirement for DOD-wide, theater-
    level UAVs be finalized, and what measures will you take to ensure
    requirements are allocated to make this dire need a reality?
        Secretary Gates. The U.S. Army issues Shadow systems to its
    individual Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as organic equipment. BCTs are
    in one of three phases (deployed, reset, and training). Deployed BCTs
    have their organic Shadows with them, reset BCTs send their Shadows to
    depot maintenance at the end of their deployment, and BCTs in training
    are receiving their Shadows systems from depot maintenance to prepare
    for deployment.
        To send additional Shadow units from the training phase into
    theater would necessitate shortening dwell for these personnel to less
    than 1 year. Reducing dwell below 1 year is an unacceptable option. The
    ISR Task Force, however, has identified three initiatives to increase
    Shadow capacity in theater that do not impact dwell. The first
    initiative sends contractors to theater along with Shadow equipment.
    The contractors will man two orbits in support of BCTs, deploying in
    early 2009.
        The second initiative provides additional contractors in early 2009
    to increase capacity at currently deployed Shadow launch sites.
        The third initiative that the ISR Task Force is examining would
    look to use the remaining Shadow equipment in garrison. The concept,
    known as ``Shadow remote split operations,'' would use a satellite
    relay to control Shadows remotely, just as Predator and Reaper systems
    are controlled. The intent is to conduct an operational demonstration
    of Shadow remote split operations in March 2009, with initial
    operational deployment in December 2009.
        Admiral Mullen. We recognize that a comprehensive review of UAS
    requirements is necessary. To address this concern the JROC has
    initiated two near-term efforts, first the development of a
    comprehensive CONOPs for UAS that integrates the wide variety of UAS
    platform capabilities in a unified approach, and second, the
    development of an ISR force sizing construct, based on existing
    operational plans, to help inform future force mix analysis. Both of
    the efforts are scheduled to complete by June 2008 to inform the
    Department's future UAS force mix deliberations in advance of Program
    Objective Memorandum 2010 and the QDR.
        While I recognize these actions are necessary to define future UAS
    requirements, it is clear that we must act now to address current
    operational deficiencies. As such, I am working to increase production
    of MQ-1C Predator/Sky Warrior, MQ-9 Reaper, and RQ-4 Global Hawk to
    their maximum production capacity at the earliest opportunity. The
    Joint Staff will work closely with the Services to ensure these
    critical enabling capabilities are fully resourced.

        37. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, based on
    ongoing operations, I also understand that the Air Force has committed
    a significant portion, if not all, of its Predator combat capability to
    the AOR, whereas the Army has chosen to only provide 33-45 percent of
    its Shadow UAVs to the AOR. This leads me to believe that the remainder
    is back home in garrison. In our current state of a shortage of full-
    motion video and ISR assets in Iraq and Afghanistan, can you please
    explain the disparity and rationale behind these employment decisions?
    If this is indeed the case, what is being done to manage UAVs so they
    can be more efficiently assigned to support combat missions?
        Secretary Gates. The U.S. Army issues Shadow systems to its
    individual BCTs as organic equipment. BCTs are in one of three phases
    (deployed, reset, and training). Deployed BCTs have their organic
    Shadows with them, reset BCTs send their Shadows to depot maintenance
    at the end of their deployment, and BCTs in training are receiving
    their Shadows systems from depot maintenance to prepare for deployment.
        To send additional Shadow units from the training phase into
    theater would necessitate shortening dwell for these personnel to less
    than 1 year. Reducing dwell below 1 year is an unacceptable option. The
    ISR Task Force, however, has identified three initiatives to increase
    Shadow capacity in theater that do not impact dwell. The first
    initiative sends contractors to theater along with Shadow equipment.
    The contractors will man two orbits in support of BCTs, deploying in
    early 2009. The second initiative provides additional contractors in
    early 2009 to increase capacity at currently deployed Shadow launch
    sites.
        The third initiative that the ISR Task Force is examining would
    look to use the remaining Shadow equipment in garrison. The concept,
    known as ``Shadow remote split operations,'' would use a satellite
    relay to control Shadows remotely, just as Predator and Reaper systems
    are controlled. The intent is to conduct an operational demonstration
    of Shadow remote split operations in March 2009, with initial
    operational deployment in December 2009.
        Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]

                                   leadership
        38. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, in an impressive move, you have
    taken several townhall meetings with mid-level officers and senior
    enlisted servicemembers to better understand why the force has such
    significant holes in some of its most important field leadership
    positions. What are you finding?
        Admiral Mullen. The most important thing I am finding is great
    Americans that are committed and motivated to doing their part to
    preserve the security of our Nation. The mission has been demanding,
    but our All-Volunteer Force has completed every task they have been
    asked to perform.
        I have also heard from them and seen in their faces the wear and
    tear of our current operational tempo. They are stretched and stressed.
    Fifteen-month tours have been particularly arduous, and the recent
    decision to reduce deployment lengths from 15 months to 12 months for
    the Active Army is a very positive step. Additionally, I fully support
    the goal our Secretary has established to work toward a 2-year dwell
    time between deployments, when the mission allows it. This is a theme
    that I have heard repeatedly from spouses and family members. Our
    families right now are very fragile. The more predictability we can put
    into our battle rhythm, the better for our servicemembers and their
    families. The force is amazingly resilient but it has its limits.
    Lastly, young officers express concern for their career paths. They
    want to make sure they hit whatever the important career milestones are
    (like the Captain's Career Course) to ensure they have a viable future.
    These young men and women represent the ``best of the best'' in America
    and in our military. We need to make sure we do all we can to retain
    them and permit a little balance in their lives.

        39. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, in what ways have you tried to
    increase retention for the military's best and brightest?
        Admiral Mullen. The Service Secretaries and Chiefs use the full
    spectrum of authorities given to them to sustain our All-Volunteer
    Force. Whether it is the critical skill retention bonuses the Army used
    for its mid-career force, or the late-career retention bonuses used to
    keep our experienced Special Operations Forces, each Service
    continuously monitors their force and applies these classic retention
    tools. I would like to once again thank the Congress for providing
    these authorities and making the necessary appropriations to give the
    DOD the flexibility to attract and retain our Nation's sons and
    daughters.
        With over half of our servicemembers married, special attention for
    family programs will also have an impact on retention decisions. The
    President acknowledged the service and sacrifice of our families by
    introducing new programs during his 2008 State-of-the-Union Address.
    These initiatives focused on transferring unused education benefits to
    family members, increasing accessibility to quality child care, and
    providing opportunities for spouses of military members to receive
    hiring preference so they can maintain successful careers while
    supporting the mobile lifestyle the military entails. Support from
    Congress will be needed to advance many aspects of these programs.
        Another way we can all help with retention is to keep telling the
    American public of the great performance of our servicemembers.
    Whenever I hear an account of visits to the field, be it by military
    leaders or elected officials, the common thread is they are impressed
    with the courageous men and women wearing the uniform. Their selfless
    dedication should be held up as a true icon of American ideals; and
    along with this recognition will be an even greater boost to morale and
    ultimately retention.
        Finally, reducing deployment lengths from 15 to 12 months for our
    Active-Duty Army, working towards a dwell ratio of 2:1 (2 years at home
    for every 1 year deployed), a robust reenlistment bonus program,
    ensuring we are ``listening'' to their needs, expanding the size of the
    Army and Marine Corps, and success in our missions all contribute to
    improved retention. And our current retention numbers are very good and
    have been such since 2001.

        40. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, how effective are the cash
    bonuses you are now offering?
        Admiral Mullen. The short answer is very effective and very useful.
    The Department's recruiting success and favorable retention rates are a
    testament to the Services executing their bonus programs. It is
    essential that all recruiting and retention incentives remain in place
    and funded. These incentives are vital to attracting and retaining the
    right people with the right skills. As an example, Congress increased
    the accession bonuses for health care professionals in this year's
    authorization so the Department could better compete with attracting
    people in this tough niche market. As the Service Personnel Chiefs
    recently stated in testimony before your Subcommittee on Personnel,
    they are starting to see some positive results from this increased
    authority, but the challenge is far from over. We can never relax our
    efforts when it comes to recruiting and retention because the situation
    continues to change. Thank you for your continued support by giving the
    authority and flexibility to the Services to respond to changing
    dynamics.

        41. Senator Bayh. Admiral Mullen, what, other than money, have you
    considered providing these young men and women who are so integral to
    the future of our Armed Forces?
        Admiral Mullen. Improving the quality of life for all
    servicemembers and their families is a top priority of every leader
    within the DOD. This manifests itself in many ways other than giving
    money directly to our people. Commitments to improving our
    installations in the form of housing, child care, family services, and
    morale/welfare/recreation programs are just a few examples of how we
    want to create a favorable life for military members.
        Another major non-monetary area I have been focusing on is to
    provide stability and predictability in our deployment tempo. Reducing
    the deployment length from 15 months is a very positive change. In
    addition to reducing the length, the Secretary of Defense has also
    stated goals for the amount of dwell time personnel will have between
    deployments. The planned growth of our ground forces will help us
    achieve results. I believe any improvements accomplished in these areas
    will be very well-received by our servicemembers.
        Finally, as the President indicated in his State-of-the-Union
    Address, there are some initiatives being developed that will focus on
    the unsung heroes of our military force, our families. I have
    repeatedly stated our families also serve, and we as a Nation owe them
    a great deal of respect and praise. I support the President's
    initiatives to enhance the opportunities for spouses to pursue their
    own careers by offering them hiring preferences, improving child care
    availability, and allowing Montgomery GI Bill education benefits to be
    transferred to spouses and children.

                                   deployment
        42. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the fiscal
    year 2009 budget notes that the DOD has a goal of significantly
    increasing dwell time for our ground forces. For example, an Army BCT
    can now reasonably assume only a year at their home station for every
    15 months deployed. You both mention goals of 24 months at home for
    every 12 deployed. However, the Army will not have 48 deployable BCT
    until 2012. Given that we only have 42 deployable BCTs today, what
    other assumptions is the DOD making when publicly stating these goals?
        Secretary Gates. First, I should note that with our ``grow the Army
    plan,'' we should achieve 48 deployable Active Army BCTs by fiscal year
    2011, not fiscal year 2012. Second, the operational tempo of our forces
    is largely determined by the situation on the ground. The Department is
    working to increase dwell time. Currently, the United States Central
    Command Commander plans to reduce the number of deployed BCTs to 15 by
    July of this year. This will allow the Army to limit deployments to 1
    year in theater with at least that same amount of time at home. This
    and we currently have 28 Army BCTs in the Reserve component. The
    Reserve component contributes, too.
        Admiral Mullen. I appreciate your question and concern for our
    forces and their families. The Army will have 48 deployable BCTs at the
    end of fiscal year 2011 and currently has 40 deployable BCTs, including
    the brigade forward deployed to the ROK. The Army currently has 43
    BCTs, but three are unavailable; two are transforming and one is
    organized as a transition training unit.
        Secretary Gates and I share your concern and are closely monitoring
    deployment-to-dwell ratios for our forces. We want to reiterate that we
    have a goal of a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for our forces--
    especially our ground forces, committed around the world. This would be
    24 months at home for 12 months deployed for an Army BCT and 14 months
    at home for 7 months deployed for a USMC unit.
        When defining our goals, we include the following force commitments
    which affect our deployment-to-dwell ratio: a forward deployed Army BCT
    in the ROK, forces for global and domestic reaction forces, and Marine
    Expeditionary Units afloat around the world.
        Current demands on ground forces do not allow us to realize our 1:2
    deployment-to-dwell goal. We are working toward this goal and are
    currently reducing force structure in Iraq from 20 to a planned level
    of 15 BCTs. We are currently at 1:1 with the recent decision to reduce
    the length of Active-Duty Army deployments from 15 to 12 months
    starting in August 2008
        1:2 BLUF: Given a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell, we can provide CENTCOM
    with 11 U.S. Army Active component BCTs and 6 Marine Corps Active
    component Infantry Battalions in June 2009 for combat, SECFOR and MEU
    requirements.

             The United States will have 42 deployable BCTs available
            generating 14 BCTs for worldwide commitments. Given the ROK,
            GRF, CCMRF and a RIP/TOA factor, the Army can generate 11 BCTs
            for CENTCOM. The Marine Corps will have 27 deployable infantry
            battalions generating 9 for worldwide rotational commitments.
            Given the two non-CENTCOM MEU requirements and a RIP/TOA
            factor, the Marine Corps can generate six infantry battalions
            for CENTCOM MEU, SECFOR and combat forces in Iraq and
            Afghanistan.
             We can get the force to 1:2 in June 2009 given the following
            assumptions:

                     We continue the drawdown in Iraq to 15 BCT/RCTs as
                    planned.
                     We reduce Iraq to 10 Active component BCTs/RCTs by
                    not replacing 5 BCT/RCTs by June 2009. (4 United States
                    BCTs and 1 RCT)
                     Afghanistan maintains two United States BCTs for
                    combat operations.
                     Marine Corps maintains a 1.0 CENTCOM MEU presence.
                     We continue worldwide commitments: USA-ROK, GRF and
                    CCMRF; Marine Corps - 2 non-CENTCOM MEUs.
                     Note: This COA is devoid of any tactical
                    considerations and assumes conditions on the ground in
                    Iraq would support the COA.

        43. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, when will
    soldiers and their families be able to expect a more predictable and
    tenable operations tempo and what milestones have to be reached in
    order to get there?
        Secretary Gates. The operational tempo of our forces is largely
    determined by the situation on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
    Iraq, the force plus-up has been successful in reducing violence and
    enabling the conditions for a secure and stable Iraqi Government. If
    this situation continues, and we believe it will, the United States
    Central Command Commander plans to reduce the number of BCTs to 15 by
    July of this year. This force drawdown will allow the Army to limit
    deployments to 1 year in theater with at least that same amount of time
    at home. Although this does not yet achieve our goal of 2 years at home
    for every year deployed, the reduced deployment time does ease the
    burden on our servicemembers and their families.
        Admiral Mullen. In Spring 2008, the President announced that in
    August 2008, we would return to 12-month deployments. That is the first
    step to ensuring a more predictable, uniform deployment rotation cycle.
    However, that is also dependent on the requirements of the combatant
    commanders and the assessment of the theater commanders. Given the
    complex variables involved in Iraq, there is simply no way of setting a
    series of benchmarks which would dictate a predictable drawdown in
    ground forces.
        As the situation in Iraq improves, the U.S. military will draw down
    Operation Iraqi Forces as conditions warrant. As forces become
    available, requirements in Afghanistan will be filled. As forces draw
    down even further in Iraq, the U.S. military will reset and
    reconstitute forces at every opportunity in order to improve the health
    of the force and quality of life.
        Services are taking steps to increase the dwell time for our
    forces. The Army will increase by five BCTs over the next 3 years. They
    are also readjusting deployment timelines and in some cases curtailing
    units to more equitably distribute boots-on-the-ground/dwell across the
    force. By first quarter fiscal year 2009, the Marine Corps will
    complete the fielding of the third of three new infantry battalions
    added to the force over the past 18 months. We continue to fund growth
    for specific limited supply and high demand capabilities to include
    Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, and Electronic Warfare
    assets.
        It is our intent that as soon as possible, we will transition to a
    deployment-to-dwell ratio of greater than 1:1, with the eventual goal
    of 1:2 for Active-Duty Forces and mobilization-to-demobilization ratio
    of 1:5 for Reserve component personnel.

                              stability operations
        44. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I understand
    that the DOD now has an officer in place for planning for stability
    operations. He has publicly stated that for cost reasons alone, the
    military cannot design specialized forces to do nothing but stability
    operations. What is that cost?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. DODD 3000.05, Military Support
    for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
    Operations defines stability operations as military and civilian
    activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to
    establish or maintain order in States and regions. NSPD-44 established
    the State Department as lead implementation agency for reconstruction
    and stabilization operations with DOD military organizations supporting
    applicable civilian agencies. As currently configured, our military
    forces are fully capable of supporting SSTR operations without
    designing specialized stability operation forces whose attributes would
    be marginalized across other military activities. There is inherent
    flexibility associated with current General Purpose Force constructs
    that enable units to task organize to provide a broad spectrum of
    support. Because of our force requirements today and what we project
    for in the future require full spectrum capability, we are not costing
    a specialized stability operations force. Rather, we are working with
    the Services and COCOMs, and our State Department counterparts, to
    identify the `full range' of capabilities required to conduct and
    support stability operations and their implications on doctrine,
    organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    and facilities (DOTMLPF).

        45. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is the
    solution the DOD will instead use?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. DOD's solution combines the
    increased end strength of the Army and Marine Corps, greater global
    train and equip authorities, and partnerships with other departments
    such as the State Department in using security and stabilization
    assistance authorities to improve our stability operations effort.
    COCOMs are working to identify the `full range' of requirements
    required for stability operations. In addition, the military
    departments are working to identify capabilities to meet these
    requirements and their implications on DOTMLPF.

        46. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how viable is
    that solution and what are its risks?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. It is viable so long as we
    continue to enhance our interagency and foreign partner capacity and
    capability to conduct stability operations. To that end, it is crucial
    that DOD authorities to conduct train and equip missions, improve the
    commander's access and global utility of critical resources like those
    found in Commander's Emergency Response Program. Continued legislative
    support of authorities such as NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, section 1206,
    and NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1210, is critical to DOD's
    stability operations solution. The associated risk with this solution
    would be realized if the stability operations burden could not be
    distributed across the whole of government and foreign partners and
    rest solely on the uniformed Services.

        47. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what other
    solutions were considered but rejected?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The security demands of today
    and those predicted for our future missions call for a full spectrum
    force, but single force mastery of all global situations comes with too
    many risks and costs. We considered this solution but as operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan are making clear, stabilization and reconstruction
    operations are a civilian-military effort. Success in stability
    operations requires partnerships with both our interagency and foreign
    partners to create the enduring conditions that will prevent a country
    from sliding back to instability. Therefore we have focused on building
    the right force for the full spectrum of missions, while simultaneously
    advocating authorities, relationships, and activities that enhance our
    partner's capacity and capability.

                                wounded warrior
        48. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, you both note
    the importance of caring for America's wounded warriors in your
    testimony. I also believe that after lifetimes of service to your
    Nation, you fully understand the moral imperative of caring for those
    who serve our Nation in uniform. How is DOD proceeding with
    implementing the Dole-Shalala Commission recommendations? As I
    understand, these remain unfunded in this year's budget.
        Secretary Gates. The DOD/Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
    Wounded, Ill, and Injured (WII) Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) meets
    regularly to identify immediate corrective actions, and to review and
    implement recommendations of the external reviews, including the Dole-
    Shalala Commission. We continue to implement recommended changes
    through the use of policy and existing authorities. Specifically, we
    have endeavored to improve the Disability Evaluation System,
    established a Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and
    Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), established the Federal Recovery
    Coordination Program, improved datasharing between the DOD and VA,
    developed medical facility inspection standards, and improved delivery
    of pay and benefits. The core recommendation of the Dole-Shalala
    Commission centers on the concept of taking DOD out of the disability
    rating business so that DOD can focus on the fit or unfit
    determination, streamlining the transition from servicemember to
    veteran. Thus far, Congress has declined to act on that recommendation.
    We believe that the greatest improvement to the long-term care and
    support of America's wounded warriors and veterans will come from
    enactment of the provisions recommended by Dole-Shalala. We have, thus,
    positioned ourselves to implement these provisions and continue our
    progress in providing world-class support to our warriors and veterans
    while allowing our two Departments to focus on our respective core
    missions. Immediate budgetary needs will be met by reprogrammings, or a
    budget amendment, if necessary.
        Admiral Mullen. Implementation of the Dole-Shalala Commission
    recommendations is going well. Thirty-five of the 40 recommendations
    are on track for completion with 16 complete.
        There are five commission recommendations that require changes in
    legislation and advances in medical research to complete. Four require
    additional changes in legislation to substantially restructure the
    disability and compensation system, expand benefits to families, and
    provide lifetime healthcare benefits for combat-injured. Improving
    prevention and care for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and TBI
    will require more medical research along with additional mental health
    professionals, which we are pursuing. The Services and Senior Oversight
    Council (SOC) Overarching Integrated Product Teams (OIPT) are working
    all of these recommendations.
        Most wounded warrior issues are funded between the supplemental and
    the NDAA. Improving data collaboration between DOD/VA is currently
    funded from their budgets. All future programs for the various lines of
    action are not funded except through the supplemental. The DOD and the
    Services are determining future needs and will work to add them to the
    program.

        49. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how is the
    DOD working with the individual Services, such as the Army, to ensure
    that their own plans are well thought out and coordinated with other
    wounded warrior initiatives?
        Secretary Gates. The exchange of information on, and the
    coordination of, plans and programs--particularly those related to the
    care of WII servicemembers and their families, is being conducted
    primarily through the DOD/VA joint SOC, which work closely with the
    military Services.
        For example, the SOC case/care management representatives meet
    weekly with subject matter experts and program representatives from the
    military Services to identify practices and share ``lessons learned''
    in areas such as:

             Care management across medical and non-medical facilities and
            sites
             Preplanning for transitions across medical facilities and
            sites
             Family support
             Joint training and standards for uniform identification,
            notification, and tracking of PTSD and mental health issues
             Workload modeling
             Personnel requirements

        In addition, the SOC conducts joint collaborative exercises with
    the military Services and VA Health Administration and Benefits
    Administration representatives to closely review the process of care,
    management, and transition of WII servicemembers and their families.
        Admiral Mullen. The Services are working exceptionally hard to
    support our wounded, injured, and ill servicemembers. They have made
    significant improvements in their disability evaluation processes, case
    management practices, care for wounded with TBI and PTSD, facilities,
    and benefits. But, there is still more that can be done. The Joint
    Staff works with the Services in several ways to monitor and assist
    with their wounded warrior initiatives. We look at all Services
    activities and try to help identify what works and what needs
    improvement.
        The Joint Staff participates in the Secretary of Defense SOC for
    wounded warriors. The SOC reviews progress reported by the OSD and the
    Services in eight lines of action that consolidate the initiatives for
    improving care and support for our wounded, injured, and ill
    servicemembers.
        As I travel, I hold townhall meetings with combat wounded and their
    families and collect their issues and concerns. I then provide them to
    the Services to address. There are some special concerns that are often
    raised in these sessions:

             1. The Medical Evaluation Board/Physical Evaluation Board
            process is too bureaucratic and too long.
             2. We have too few mental health professionals.
             3. There are too many seams between the DOD and the VA.
             4. There is not enough emphasis on long-term assistance for
            injured personnel and their families.
             5. There is a perception that too often servicemembers'
            injuries are misdiagnosed.

        My Special Assistant for Returning Warriors travels around the
    world assisting me in accurately assessing ground truth for all
    wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers. She marshals Legislative
    Affairs, Legal Assistance, VA, and medical subject matter experts along
    with Veteran Service Organizations and their respective resources to
    enhance my ability to deliver timely and necessary positive solutions
    for our Nation's returning warriors and their families. These efforts
    ultimately lift the morale of servicemembers and ensure a continuing
    legacy of exceptional troop care.
        We must help those who have been injured, and their families, be
    all they can be in the future. We need to have a continuum of care and
    no seams between DOD, the VA, and local communities throughout our
    country so that those who have sacrificed so much can achieve the
    American Dream.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
            congressional oversight of security agreements with iraq
        50. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, when the U.S.-Iraq
    Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation was made
    public in November, Lieutenant General Lute, the President's Deputy
    National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, stated that the
    administration did not anticipate seeking congressional approval or
    even formal congressional input on an agreement that would
    institutionalize our long-term security, political, and economic
    relationship with Iraq. I was astonished, frankly, that the
    administration would complete such a significant agreement, an
    agreement of great long-term importance for American foreign and
    national security policy that could tie the hands of the next President
    with respect to Iraq, without bringing it to Congress for review and
    consent. Do you believe that Congress has an important role to play in
    overseeing any long-term American military commitment to Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. In the Declaration of Principles signed by
    President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in November, the United States
    and Iraq agreed to negotiate bilateral arrangements on the security,
    political, economic, and cultural components of that relationship. Such
    a framework will set the stage for a normalized bilateral relationship
    between the United States and Iraq as two fully sovereign states, and
    would not make any security commitment to Iraq or commit the incoming
    President or any future President to any particular course of action
    with respect to troop levels, military mission, or assistance to Iraq.
        We intend to keep Congress apprised of the negotiation process as
    we proceed. I have instructed my staff to brief Members of Congress and
    their respective committees on these negotiations; these efforts have
    already begun. We will continue to consult with Congress as we proceed
    in these negotiations.

        51. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, one objection I have
    frequently heard to those of us who believe that Congress must have a
    say in this process is that the agreement is likely to be nothing more
    than a standard status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), which we have with
    many other nations around the world and which permits us to station
    American servicemen and women in foreign countries. I believe that any
    agreement with Iraq that commits the United States to help defend Iraq
    against both internal and external threats goes significantly farther
    in terms of our national security than a standard SOFA. Do you agree
    that any long-term security, political, and economic agreement between
    the United States and Iraq should be approved by Congress?
        Secretary Gates. To ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq are provided
    the legal protections and authorities they need absent the U.N.
    Security Council mandate they are presently operating under, the United
    States will seek to negotiate a SOFA with Iraq. The SOFA will be
    similar to other SOFAs the United States has negotiated with countries
    around the world, taking into account the particular circumstances and
    requirements for our forces in Iraq, and will be a part of the overall
    framework of the relationship with Iraq.
        Neither the SOFA nor any other arrangement contemplated with Iraq
    would bind the United States to any security commitments. Such
    documents will not bind the United States to take military action or
    expend funds in support of Iraq.
        Consistent with longstanding U.S. past practice on SOFAs, we expect
    that the SOFA with Iraq would be concluded as an executive agreement.
    We do not anticipate that the terms of this SOFA will require
    congressional assent.

        52. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, do we currently have SOFAs
    with any country with an ongoing civil war?
        Secretary Gates. The DOD does not normally characterize a
    particular conflict, unrest, or violence as a ``civil war.'' However,
    the Department has enduring SOFAs with countries that are experiencing,
    or have experienced, persistent conflict.

            long-term security agreement with iraq - permanent bases
        53. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, when the U.S.-Iraq
    Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation was announced
    in November, I was deeply disappointed to learn that it did not
    explicitly rule out the possibility that the United States would seek
    or maintain permanent bases in Iraq, nor did it make any reference to
    the redeployment of American troops out of Iraq.
        At the time the Declaration of Principles was announced, I wrote to
    the President about the importance of making clear to the Iraqi
    political leadership that we will not be there to referee their civil
    war forever. In my letter I made clear to the President my view that
    the United States should neither seek nor maintain permanent bases in
    Iraq. Unfortunately, what I'm hearing now from the administration is
    not at all clear. On the one hand, the White House spokeswoman has been
    quoted as saying that we won't seek permanent bases in Iraq, and you
    have said that ``we have no interest in permanent bases.'' On the other
    hand, the President last week attempted to circumvent the will of
    Congress by issuing a signing statement to accompany the NDAA,
    effectively saying that he didn't agree with the provision in the
    legislation that would bar funding for the establishment of permanent
    U.S. military bases in Iraq.
        Can you clarify for me, which is it?
        Secretary Gates. In a SOFA with Iraq, the United States would be
    seeking access to facilities in Iraq that support the activities that
    promote our mutual goals and interests. This provision would not be
    different from similar provisions we have negotiated in SOFAs with
    other countries around the world.
        Any agreement with Iraq would not obligate the United States to
    maintain a presence or set U.S. forces levels in Iraq. Rather, the SOFA
    would seek to ensure that the United States has the necessary access to
    Iraqi facilities and areas to conduct its mission in the mutual
    security interests of both Iraq and the United States. Furthermore,
    decisions on U.S. force levels in Iraq are U.S. decisions and are not
    affected by a SOFA. No agreement with Iraq would commit the United
    States to maintaining any specific number of forces.

        54. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, will the administration be
    clear with the American people, with the Iraqi people, and with the
    Iraqi political leadership that we will neither seek nor maintain
    permanent bases in Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. The United States is not seeking to establish or
    maintain permanent bases in Iraq.

       equipping african union/united nations hybrid operation in darfur
                                    mission
        55. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, there has been great concern
    expressed over the capacity of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid
    Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to protect civilians there. As you know,
    the UNAMID mission met its December 31 deadline for assuming command of
    peacekeeping operations in Darfur. As you also are no doubt aware, the
    UNAMID mission had not met expectations in terms of deployed troop
    levels on December 31, and remains understrength at approximately 9,065
    troops, police, and personnel, far below the expected December 31 level
    of 12,000, and less than a third of its full complement of just over
    31,000 troops, police, and personnel. In addition to lacking troops,
    UNAMID also lacks the equipment and resources necessary to succeed,
    such as 18 transport and at least 6 attack helicopters.
        Noting that Congress has provided funding expressly for the purpose
    of increasing the level and tempo of U.S. efforts to bilaterally train
    and equip some of these additional African battalions, what is the
    current status of these U.S. efforts vis-a-vis Africa Contingency
    Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and other programs?
        Secretary Gates. Between June 2005 and March 2008, the ACOTA
    program will have provided $17,365,477 worth of training to AMIS and
    UNAMID-bound peacekeepers. ACOTA-trained units from Rwanda, Nigeria,
    South Africa, and Senegal formed the backbone of the AMIS mission, and
    continue to serve in Darfur now that the mission has transitioned to
    UNAMID. The ACOTA program has trained all of the infantry battalions
    from sub-Saharan Africa that are planning to deploy to UNAMID in 2008,
    including units from Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal,
    and Tanzania.
        Furthermore, the Department of State will provide units deploying
    in 2008 with about $100 million worth of heavy equipment using fiscal
    year 2007 Sudan supplemental funds. This equipment will enhance the
    ACOTA-trained battalions, each consisting of at least 800 peacekeepers,
    and include armored personnel carriers, cargo trucks, maintenance and
    engineering vehicles, generators, field hospitals, and water
    purification systems. The State Department will award a contract in the
    next few weeks to provide this equipment, as well as new equipment
    training and spare parts, to all of the battalions expecting to deploy
    in 2008. The equipment will be shipped directly to each country to be
    transported to Darfur along with the battalion as they are deployed by
    the U.N. This equipment will enable each battalion to meet the U.N.'s
    standards for UNAMID infantry battalions.

        56. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, has the DOD made efforts to
    elicit similar training and equipping commitments from allies who enjoy
    longstanding bilateral military relationships with other committed
    African troop contributors?
        Secretary Gates. The DOD has been working with the State Department
    to elicit training and equipping commitments similar to those the U.S.
    government is making to African troop contributing nations.
    Furthermore, the Department is working with our allies in other areas,
    such as providing pre-deployment planning and strategic transportation
    for deploying or rotating troop contingents. We are also encouraging
    donor countries to maintain their level of support over a longer period
    of time than originally envisioned and reinforcing State Department
    efforts to mobilize donors to satisfy emerging support requirements.
    Finally, DOD has helped the State Department identify countries that
    possess specialized equipment that might meet a critical operational
    need, such as transport and attack helicopters required to support the
    U.N. mission in Darfur.

        57. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, has the DOD made efforts to
    secure the contribution of helicopters from allies for the UNAMID
    mission?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, in concert with the Department of State's
    efforts, the DOD has taken a number of steps to secure the contribution
    of helicopters for the UNAMID.
        For example, the Department has worked closely with the U.N.
    Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to solicit helicopter
    commitments from the international community. The U.N. rejected offers
    from potential contributors based on their pre-established helicopter
    specification criteria. In partnership with the State Department, DOD
    worked with U.N. DPKO to modify current UNAMID helicopter
    specifications to accept helicopters that could fill the transportation
    gap that currently exists in UNAMID.
        We are now encouraging U.N. DPKO to reconsider previous offers from
    Jordan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Egypt. Further, DOD is currently
    conducting an assessment of 72 countries possessing helicopters that
    meet U.N. specifications to determine which nations might be willing to
    contribute. We have recently secured an offer from Ethiopia for four
    attack helicopters, which has been accepted by the U.N. DOD has
    partnered with the State Department to encourage the Government of
    Ukraine to contribute up to nine attack helicopters presently deployed
    to the U.N. Mission in Liberia and to consider leasing options
    involving private Ukrainian companies.

                            africa command and sudan
        58. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, noting that U.S. Africa
    Command (AFRICOM) is scheduled to reach full operational capacity this
    year, and that it will take on additional non-combat responsibilities
    that until now have fallen outside the realm of the DOD, do you foresee
    the U.S. military in general, and AFRICOM in particular, playing a
    larger role in Sudan? If so, how?
        Secretary Gates. AFRICOM is designed to better enable the DOD to
    fulfill its missions in concert with other elements of the U.S.
    Government and African partners. The Department is already supporting
    U.S. initiatives in Sudan, such as the Darfur Peace Agreement and the
    Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As AFRICOM reaches full operational
    capacity, it will better situate DOD to support the State Department's
    lead in advancing peace and stability in Sudan.

        59. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates, more generally, what positive
    and negative reactions has the U.S. military received during
    consultations with African leaders on the role AFRICOM will play on the
    continent?
        Secretary Gates. With very few exceptions, African leaders have
    expressed strong support for DOD's engagement with African militaries.
    Negative depictions of AFRICOM in the international press have, in some
    instances, perpetuated misconceptions about AFRICOM's future presence
    on the continent. We believe, however, that as AFRICOM builds a
    reputation for adding value through improved security cooperation with
    African partners, many of these negative opinions will dissipate. In
    fact, we are already seeing some positive signs in this regard as more
    African leaders become informed about the true nature of the command.
    Many African governments and militaries see AFRICOM as a potential
    advocate for African security priorities within the DOD. They have
    partnered with us on security assistance programs over the years and
    understand the rationale for the command.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
                          base realignment and closure
        60. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, I'm sure you are aware that the
    DOD has the authority to transfer real property to community
    redevelopment organizations at no cost if those communities agree to
    reinvest land sales and leasing revenues back into job creation and
    infrastructure development. It would be my hope that the DOD's disposal
    plans for these closing installations balances both public auctions
    with these no cost and other public benefit transfers. We have many
    financial challenges in executing Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
    projects, but it is important to me that communities are not left
    without resources to cope with the economic recovery they face and some
    of this property should be considered for open space and other
    important public uses. Can you assure me that the DOD will implement a
    balanced approach to property disposal and grant broad deference to
    community reuse plans the way the law intended?
        Secretary Gates. The Department's policy is to work in close
    collaboration with affected communities throughout the closure,
    disposal, and redevelopment process. The Department takes great care to
    ensure Local Redevelopment Authorities (LRAs) have information on
    surplus property for the community's consideration in their formulation
    of a redevelopment plan. The Department has an array of legal
    authorities by which to transfer property on closed or realigned
    installations, ranging from those that may be at no cost or discounted
    consideration to those that yield fair market value to the Department,
    to be responsive to the Department's BRAC and community redevelopment
    needs. The military departments work closely with affected LRAs to
    tailor disposal actions that consider local circumstances. In disposing
    of surplus property, the Department is careful to not preclude any
    disposal method until a redevelopment plan is completed.

        61. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, regarding BRAC, it is my
    understanding that the Army is following the letter of the law and the
    recommendations of the BRAC committee. Are you aware if this is
    occurring or true?
        Secretary Gates. The Army, as well as the other military department
    and defense agencies, are following the BRAC law. The Department
    reviews each recommendation implementation plan twice annually to
    ensure that it is in compliance with the BRAC law. Each of those
    reviews provides an opportunity to direct corrective action as needed.
    Additionally, the OSD Office of the General Counsel has been a key
    player in reviewing these plans to ensure that they are legally
    sufficient and to verify that the Department is meeting its legal
    obligations.

        62. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, what would you do if you found
    out the BRAC recommendations were not being followed?
        Secretary Gates. I would take action to ensure we meet our legal
    obligation. The Department reviews each recommendation implementation
    plan twice annually to ensure that it is in compliance with the BRAC
    law. Each of those reviews provides an opportunity to direct corrective
    action. Additionally, the OSD Office of the General Counsel has been a
    key player in reviewing these plans to ensure that they are legally
    sufficient and to verify that the Department is meeting its legal
    obligations.

                                  procurement
        63. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, the Marine Corps has no
    procurement of the M-18 family of smoke grenades and is utilizing the
    Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) program to modernize the M-18. In
    October 2006 the Marine Corps published a Sources Sought announcement
    in Federal Business Opportunities for the procurement of M-18s and
    plans to issue a Request for Proposal (RfP) at an undetermined time
    this year. The Marine Corps' departure from the procurement of these
    grenades, which are manufactured at the Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) in
    Arkansas, is a great concern to me, especially because the PBA has had
    a long and distinguished tradition of producing quality M-18 smoke
    grenades for the military for the past 65 years.
        The fiscal year 2009 defense budget shows a decrease in spending on
    grenades (all types). Procurement for the Navy and Marine Corps, for
    example, decreased from  $59.6  million  to  $39  million  from  levels
     in  fiscal  year  2008.  Although  the  M-18 smoke grenade is part of
    a family of grenades with the same line number, the decrease in
    procurement coupled with that of the Marine Corps will have a
    significant impact on the industrial base at PBA (10 percent in lost
    revenue). I would consider this a very high risk category when making a
    section 806 determination to the risk on the national technology and
    industrial base.
        Are you aware of the Marine Corps' decision to procure M-18s
    outside of the Arsenal Act and why is the military jeopardizing the
    industrial base at PBA, ignoring the Arsenal Act, and moving away from
    this very important procurement for the warfighter?
        Secretary Gates. It is our intent, utilizing the Foreign
    Comparative Test (FCT) program, to seek alternatives to the current,
    legacy M-18 series smoke grenade. The design of some smoke grenades
    pre-dates the Vietnam conflict, and our modernization effort is one
    that can be expected in any munitions lifecycle, particularly one of
    this age. The smoke grenade modernization effort will: (1) increase
    performance; (2) provide equal or greater smoke duration; and (3)
    provide a safer flame reduced initiation system that will assist in the
    prevention of accidental fires, all at a competitive cost. The intent
    of this new program is to achieve a capability that advances the
    obscurant capabilities of all Services, across DOD. This effort is
    being conducted jointly with the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army.

        64. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, last year Senator McCaskill and
    I introduced legislation to keep the C-27J a joint initiative between
    the Army and the Air Force. $156 million was allocated to the Army to
    begin the procurement of four aircraft in fiscal year 2008. The fiscal
    year 2009 defense budget requests an additional seven aircraft for the
    Army at $264.2 million. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 states that no
    funds will be appropriated for the procurement of the Joint Cargo
    Aircraft (JCA) until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense signs off
    on six reports, one of which being the Joint Intra-theatre Airlift
    Fleet Mix Analysis. Where is this report, is it complete, and when will
    it be signed?
        Secretary Gates. I delivered all six reports to Congress on
    February 27, 2008. Attached is the certification letter from John Young
    validating the requirement for the JCA.

        65. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008
    also requires the Secretary of Defense to certify and validate
    requirements for a capability gap or shortfall with respect to intra-
    theatre airlift. What are your thoughts on this issue? In your opinion,
    does a capability gap or shortfall exist?
        Secretary Gates. My Chief of Acquisition, John Young, recently
    certified and validated requirements for a capability gap or shortfall
    with respect to intra-theatre airlift. The letter stating that is
    attached.

                            unmanned aerial vehicle
        66. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, the JCA and UAV weapons systems
    have created discussions in Congress regarding a roles and missions
    debate and the House of Representatives plans to have hearings on the
    subject. What are your thoughts on an organic, limited operational
    capability within the Services, and what affect will it have on
    restructuring or reorganizing current weapons systems?
        Secretary Gates. While there are some areas where operational
    warfighting concepts and doctrine translate into unique Service level
    requirements and programs, there are far more areas where joint
    solutions can be achieved. The Department must continue to prioritize
    jointness and interoperability imperatives especially in the areas of
    materiel acquisitions. This means reviewing and coordinating new
    research and development programs to integrate Service and Joint
    requirements, development, and testing in order to achieve born joint
    investment programs. It also means continuing to consolidate current
    requirements and programs of record, where possible.
        Only through joint and consolidated acquisition will we realize the
    benefits of these efforts, which include: improved component
    interoperability and reduced duplication; lower development and
    production costs; increased quantities; reduction of logistics
    requirements through standardization; and the ability to meet similar
    multi-service requirements with a common materiel solution.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
                   defense science and technology investment
        67. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, last year, you received a
    memorandum from the Director of ODDRE which characterized current
    investment in defense S&T as ``inadequate'' to keep pace with emerging
    threats and concluded that the country has been ``coasting on the basic
    science investments of the last century.'' Your testimony acknowledges
    a need to increase defense investment in basic research. How are you
    focusing the S&T programs of the DOD to address this challenge?
        Secretary Gates. I asked Congress to approve a $1.70 billion
    investment in Basic Research in the President's budget request for
    fiscal year 2009. The request represents a 2 percent real increase
    above the $1.63 billion that Congress appropriated for fiscal year 2008
    and a 16 percent real growth from the fiscal year 2008 budget request.
    This basic research investment increases each year over the Future
    Years Defense Program to $1.99 billion in fiscal year 2013.
        The additional funds will be applied to peer-reviewed research
    conducted in universities, without specific DOD systems or applications
    in mind, but in areas of long-term interest to the Department.
    Predominantly the funds will support single investigators in the
    Services' Defense Research Sciences and Multi-Disciplinary University
    Research Initiatives, the mainstays of DOD Basic Research. This
    increase will both deepen the DOD investment in traditional Basic
    Research and broaden it to include such areas as: Information
    Assurance; Network Sciences; Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction;
    Science of Autonomy; Information Fusion and Decision Science;
    Biosensors and Bio-inspired Systems; Quantum Information Sciences;
    Energy and Power Management; Counter Directed Energy Weapons; Immersive
    Science for Training and Mission Rehearsal; and Human Sciences.

                          reliable replacement warhead
        68. Senator Warner. Admiral Mullen, in your prepared statement, you
    remark upon the need to modernize our strategic weapons systems and
    infrastructure, including our efforts to explore the feasibility of
    developing a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Although this
    committee, and the full Senate, had supported funding for such a
    feasibility study last year, the omnibus appropriations bill did not
    include funding. The Department of Energy has requested modest funding
    in fiscal year 2009 to continue a feasibility study of a replacement
    warhead. What are your more detailed thoughts and analysis which led
    you to support the continued study of a RRW?
        Admiral Mullen. To help manage geopolitical, operational, and
    technical risks, the United States relies on three inter-related
    aspects of its nuclear posture: 1) the composition of the operationally
    deployed nuclear delivery systems and their capacity to deliver nuclear
    weapons; 2) the size and mix of the nuclear stockpile that supports the
    operational force; and 3) the ability of the supporting infrastructure
    to maintain, produce, and repair nuclear weapon delivery systems and
    warheads.
        The stockpile stewardship program, initiated in the mid-1990s, has
    largely been successful. At present, we believe that the nuclear
    warhead stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. For the near-
    term, we continue to have confidence that warhead life extension
    programs for W76 warheads for Trident II missiles and for B61 gravity
    bombs are needed and are wise investments to sustain existing nuclear
    capabilities. However, the current path for sustaining the warhead
    stockpile-successive refurbishments of existing Cold War warheads
    designed with small margins of error--may in the future be
    unsustainable. Specifically, the directors of the Nation's nuclear
    weapons laboratories have expressed concern about the ability to ensure
    confidence in the reliability of the legacy stockpile over the long-
    term, without nuclear testing.
        Successive efforts at extending the service life of the current
    inventory of warheads will drive the warhead configurations further
    away from the original design baseline that was validated using
    underground nuclear test data. Repeated refurbishments could accrue
    technical changes that, over time, might inadvertently undermine
    reliability and performance. The skills, materials, processes, and
    technologies needed to refurbish and maintain these older warhead
    designs are also increasingly difficult to sustain or acquire. Some of
    the materials employed in these older warheads are extremely hazardous
    as well. Moreover, it is difficult to incorporate modern safety and
    security features into Cold War-era weapon designs.
        In the near-term, we have no choice but to continue to extend the
    life of these legacy warheads. However, the Departments of Defense and
    Energy are pursuing an alternative to this strategy of indefinite life
    extension, namely, the gradual replacement of existing warheads with
    warheads of comparable capability that are less sensitive to
    manufacturing tolerances or to aging of materials. The generic concept
    is referred to as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The RRW
    concept promises other attractive benefits such as improved safety and
    security, less complex production processes, elimination of many
    hazardous materials in existing warheads, and an overall reduction in
    hazardous waste. The directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories
    believe that modern scientific tools developed for the stockpile
    stewardship program, including advanced computer modeling and
    experimental facilities, will enable design and certification of the
    RRW without nuclear testing. In addition, the RRW program will be a key
    enabler for a smaller and more responsive infrastructure, and will help
    grow a new generation of experts capable of sustaining our nuclear
    forces.
        RRW will be key to sustaining long-term confidence in the U.S.
    nuclear stockpile and enable significant reductions in the number of
    reserve warheads--further reducing the size of the overall stockpile.
    Assuring allies and convincing adversaries of the safety, security, and
    reliability of U.S. nuclear forces will in turn contribute to the full
    range of political and military benefits of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
    Finally, allies with continued confidence in U.S. extended deterrence
    will have less motivation to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

                         support for military families
        69. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, in the President's State-of-
    the-Union Address on January 28, 2008, the President said, ``Our
    military families also sacrifice for America. They endure sleepless
    nights and the daily struggle of providing for children while a loved
    one is serving far from home. We have a responsibility to provide for
    them. So I ask you to join me in expanding their access to child care,
    creating new hiring preferences for military spouses across the Federal
    Government, and allowing our troops to transfer their unused education
    benefits to their spouses or children.''
        I join with the President in recognizing the sacrifices of military
    families--and I include parents in that as well. My understanding is
    that these initiatives are not included in the budget request that is
    before us. Is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, that is correct. These initiatives are not
    included in the original budget request, because decisions were made
    after the regular budget process had concluded. We plan to use
    reprogrammings, or a budget amendment, if necessary, to fund the fiscal
    years 2008-2009 costs.

        70. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, what is the magnitude of the
    President's family support initiative and when may we expect to see an
    amended budget and legislative proposals to support these initiatives?
        Secretary Gates. These are the Department's specific proposed
    initiatives to support the President's pledge on family assistance:

              1. Permit Montgomery GI Bill transferability to immediate
            family members, including spouses and children
              2. Establish hiring preferences for spouses of Active-Duty
            military members, wounded or disabled members, and
            servicemembers who died while in Active Service, and a spouse
            internship program
              3. Expand the existing 18-installation demonstration program
            for spousal career advancement accounts to all spouses
              4. Accelerate construction of planned military child care
            centers and public-private ventures for child care
              5. Expand the pilot Yellow Ribbon Joint Family Assistance
            Program and the four additional jurisdictions with National
            Guard establishments

                        funding for military health care
        71. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, for the third year in a row,
    the President's request decrements funding for military health care in
    anticipation of congressional approval of increases in TRICARE fees for
    military retirees, which each year Congress has rejected. Should
    Congress once again decline to increase TRICARE fees for military
    retirees, this budget would then be $1.2 billion short--is that
    correct?
        Secretary Gates. That is correct. The budget currently assumes
    savings of $1.2 billion associated with the adjustments in fees
    consistent with those recommended by the Task Force on the Future of
    Military Health Care, mandated by Congress.

        72. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, one of the DOD health care
    task force's recommendations is to conduct an external audit of DOD's
    health care program and to establish a cost accounting system that
    provides true and accurate accounting for DOD health care costs. Is it
    your intention to follow through on that recommendation as well, so
    that Congress can have a true and accurate picture of DOD health care
    costs in the future?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, we do intend to follow through on the Task
    Force's recommendations. The Defense Health Program (DHP) health care
    costs are currently executed in four separate accounting and finance
    systems, to include Army, Navy, Air Force, and TRlCARE Management
    Activity. Since the accounting and finance systems all have different
    business rules, it is difficult to perform accurate cost accounting for
    health care. Several years ago, the Department developed the Medical
    Expense and Performance Reporting System (MEPRS), which allocates costs
    within the direct care system. While this is a useful managerial cost
    accounting tool, it could be much more accurate if the financial data
    feeding it came from systems using the same financial structure and
    business rules.
        To ensure commonality among DHP related financial systems, the DHP
    is actively participating in the DOD wide development of a Standard
    Financial Information Structure (SFIS). Each Service and Defense-wide
    accounting and finance system (all are currently under development)
    will have to comply with the established SFIS business rules. The DHP
    is actively engaged with the Business Transformation Agency to ensure
    that requirements for medical business processes under SFIS, and thus
    the ability to do medical cost accounting, are accurate. If it appears
    that the Service accounting and finance systems cannot easily
    accommodate the medical business requirements, we may consider adding
    the Army, Navy, and Air Force medical activities into the Defense
    Agency Initiative adopted by TRlCARE Management Activity, which is a
    new accounting and financing system being developed for all Defense
    agencies.
        Regardless of the solution selected, the DHP is committed to
    ensuring that there is accurate accounting of health care costs.
        MEPRS receives three primary types of data from multiple feeder
    source systems--Financial, Workload, and Personnel data. Army, Navy,
    and Air Force all use the same Tri-Service Workload systems, but they
    continue to use Service-unique systems for Financial and Personnel
    data. Challenges arise in trying to report standardized, uniform data
    at the DOD-level, when Financial and Personnel data come in to the
    central data repository as Service-unique data. Attempts are made to
    map these Service-unique data elements to DOD-common data elements.
        SFIS is a comprehensive ``common business language'' that supports
    information and data requirements for budgeting, financial accounting,
    cost/performance management, and external reporting across the DOD
    enterprise. SFIS standardizes financial reporting across DOD, thereby
    reducing the cost of audit. It allows revenues and expenses to be
    reported by programs that align with major goals versus by
    appropriation categories. It enables decisionmakers to efficiently
    compare programs and their associated activities and costs across DOD.
    In addition, it provides a basis for common valuation of DOD programs,
    assets, and liabilities.
        The SFIS initiative may provide a bridge to true and accurate
    picture of DOD health care costs in the future, however, with multiple
    SFIS-compliant financial systems that the Services are migrating toward
    (Army--General Fund Enterprise Business System; Navy--Navy ERP; and Air
    Force--Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System), it will
    still be difficult to report uniform cost accounting information across
    three military department nonsynchronous systems--there will still be
    three separate military department financial systems to overcome.
        Defense Agencies Initiatives (DAI) represents the Department's
    effort to extend its solution set for streamlining financial management
    capabilities, eliminate material weaknesses, and achieve financial
    statement auditability for the agencies and field activities across the
    DOD. The DAI implementation approach is to deploy a standardized system
    solution that effectively addresses the requirements depicted in the
    Federal Financial Management Improvement Act and the Business
    Enterprise Architecture, while leveraging the out-of-the-box
    capabilities of the selected commercial off-the-shelf product.
        With the implementation of DAI, the Department will reduce the
    number of legacy financial systems supporting these entities from nine
    to one, standardize all Enterprise-level integration to a single source
    and streamline Defense Finance and Accounting Service support
    operations into a single solution set that leverages a common set of
    resources across a common set of processes. It is expected that all 25
    agencies and Field Activities will be transitioned to DAI by fiscal
    year 2011.
        Addressing the goal of a true and accurate picture of DOD health
    care costs in the future, DAI might be able to provide one accounting
    system for the DHP appropriation. DAI would then become the Enterprise
    DHP accounting system and allow current legacy systems (i.e., MEPRS) to
    be replaced. One accounting system for the DHP would ensure a
    synchronous and singular accounting management system and the
    opportunity to efficiently integrate cost accounting in routine
    Generally Accepted Accounting Principles compliant accounting
    functions.

                         implementation of dole-shalala
        73. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, with all due respect, Congress
    enacted, and the President has now signed into law, nearly all of the
    recommendations of the Dole-Shalala Commission on Care for America's
    Wounded in the Wounded Warrior Act. These include the items you mention
    in your statement--case management and an emphasis on treatment of
    TBI--in addition to extended benefits for family members who care for
    the wounded and ill under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
        The work that remains is in reform of the disability retirement
    system, which affects the DOD to a lesser degree than the VA. Do you
    agree with that?
        Secretary Gates. A Dole-Shalala revision of the disability
    retirement system codified in chapter 61, title 10, U.S.C., would be
    relatively straightforward for the DOD to implement. There are
    significant DOD costs associated with the implementation of the TRICARE
    health proposal, however, that may require further analysis. The burden
    of implementing Dole-Shalala type transition payments--quality of life
    compensation and earning loss payments--falls on the VA. It is an
    enormous workload and would result in revolutionizing the manner in
    which VA does its business. The VA study on these transition payments
    is due out later this year, and will inform both Departments of the
    magnitude of work and statutory change that will be required.

        74. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, does this committee have your
    commitment that each of the improvements to the care and management of
    wounded and ill soldiers contained in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008,
    Public Law 109-364, will be implemented in a thorough and timely manner
    within the budget that is now before us?
        Secretary Gates. It is the Department's intention to implement all
    the requirements in a thorough and timely manner. The Department's WII
    SOC tracks the implementation of all requirements contained in Title
    16: Wounded Warrior Matters, and Title 17: Veterans Matters of the
    fiscal year 2008 NDAA. The NDAA has 54 sections with 83 mandates that
    address wounded warrior matters. Twenty-five of the 54 sections in the
    NDAA address concerns previously identified by the various commissions
    on wounded warriors and 29 new sections not previously addressed. The
    NDAA requires 30 reports, 35 program or policy initiatives, and 9
    evaluations or studies.

        75. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates, because the needs of men and
    women who become disabled cut across so many agencies of our
    government--the Departments of Defense, VA, Labor and Education,
    Medicare, and the Social Security Administration--has there been
    consideration of a cabinet-level position or task force to oversee
    implementation of these reforms?
        Secretary Gates. As previously stated in testimony, DOD and VA
    formed a joint WII SOC, co-chaired by the two cabinet Departments'
    Deputy Secretaries, supported by a joint OIPT and a full-time joint
    staff office. The purpose of establishing these organizations is to
    coordinate the actions of the cabinet agencies, identify immediate
    corrective actions, and to review and implement recommendations of the
    various commissions and external reviews.
        Specifically, we have endeavored to improve the Disability
    Evaluation System, established a Center of Excellence for Psychological
    Health and TBI, established the Federal Recovery Coordination Program,
    improved datasharing between DOD and VA, developed medical facility
    inspection standards, and improved delivery of pay and benefits.

                                 climate change
        76. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I have been
    profoundly concerned by recent reports that link global climate change
    with exacerbated international security and compromised national
    security. One of these reports, conducted by distinguished retired
    colleagues at the Center for Naval Analyses, concluded that it is
    important that the U.S. military begin planning to address the
    potentially devastating effects of climate change.
        More recently, a study titled ``Uncertain Future'' conducted by the
    Oxford Research Group found that, ``the risks of climate change demand
    a rethink of current approaches to security and the development of
    cooperative and sustainable ways of achieving that security, with an
    emphasis on preventative rather than reactive strategies.'' Can you
    describe how the DOD is preparing to manage the added threat global
    climate change poses on Department activities, facilities, and
    capabilities?
        Secretary Gates. DOD defers to James Connaughton, Chairman of the
    Council on Environmental Quality, for responses addressing global
    climate change.
        Admiral Mullen. The Department is looking ahead to the impact of
    climate change on the future strategic environment as well as taking
    important steps to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases by our
    Armed Forces and improving our energy security posture.
        We anticipate that climate change could have far-reaching impact
    across the globe regarding resources and the access of nations to
    resources. In looking ahead, we are implementing the direction of the
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 that requires our military planners to
    consider the risks associated with climate change regarding current and
    future missions, defense plans, and future required capabilities.
        Additionally, we are working to reduce our own contributions to
    greenhouse gases by focusing on reductions in energy consumption. The
    primary Department-wide organization addressing this concern is the DOD
    Energy Security Task Force chartered in May 2006. Task Force membership
    includes the Joint Staff, Services, COCOMs, OSD, and various other DOD
    agencies. The Task Force has focused on initiatives to reduce energy
    consumption and reduce the overall DOD carbon footprint. The Task Force
    has taken on the development and deployment of energy technologies and
    changes in operational procedures which will decrease DOD-related
    carbon footprint without reducing operational effectiveness.
        Many of the Task Force recommendations consolidate and/or leverage
    existing energy initiatives from the Services for consideration and
    implementation DOD-wide. Examples include single engine aircraft taxi
    procedures and synthetic/alternative aircraft fuels testing (Air
    Force), renewable energy resources and insulation technologies to
    reduce the carbon footprint and fuel reliance of Forward Operating
    Bases (Army), and geothermal power generation facilities at Naval Air
    Weapons Station China Lake (Navy).
        The Joint Staff has initiated efforts to minimize or eliminate
    future climate change risks by reducing the DOD contribution to fuel
    consumption and carbon emissions. These include the incorporation of
    the Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter (KPP) into the Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) in May 2007.
    This will ensure energy efficiency concerns are considered for future
    system acquisitions and associated operational plans. Additionally, we
    are leading a study in conjunction with the Services into the
    feasibility of increased simulator use to decrease in-vehicle training
    (and therefore fuel use and emissions) without sacrificing operational
    readiness.
        We will continue to shape the future strategic environment with an
    eye toward climate change effects and look for opportunities to reduce
    our carbon footprint.

        77. Senator Warner. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how can we
    ensure that we are taking preventative steps rather than reacting to
    situations as they arise?
        Secretary Gates. DOD defers to James Connaughton, Chairman of the
    Council on Environmental Quality for responses addressing global
    climate change.
        Admiral Mullen. The Department is looking ahead to the impact of
    climate change on the future strategic environment as well as taking
    important steps to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases by our
    Armed Forces and improving our energy security posture.
        We anticipate that climate change could have far-reaching impact
    across the globe regarding resources and the access of nations to
    resources. In looking ahead, we are implementing the direction of the
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 that requires our military planners to
    consider the risks associated with climate change regarding current and
    future missions, defense plans, and future required capabilities.
        Additionally, we are working to reduce our own contributions to
    greenhouse gases by focusing on reductions in energy consumption. The
    primary Department-wide organization addressing this concern is the DOD
    Energy Security Task Force chartered in May 2006. Task Force membership
    includes the Joint Staff, Services, COCOMs, OSD, and various other DOD
    agencies. The Task Force has focused on initiatives to reduce energy
    consumption and reduce the overall DOD carbon footprint. The Task Force
    has taken on the development and deployment of energy technologies and
    changes in operational procedures which will decrease DOD-related
    carbon footprint without reducing operational effectiveness.
        Many of the Task Force recommendations consolidate and/or leverage
    existing energy initiatives from the Services for consideration and
    implementation DOD-wide. Examples include single engine aircraft taxi
    procedures and synthetic/alternative aircraft fuels testing (Air
    Force), renewable energy resources and insulation technologies to
    reduce the carbon footprint and fuel reliance of Forward Operating
    Bases (Army), and geothermal power generation facilities at Naval Air
    Weapons Station China Lake (Navy).
        The Joint Staff has initiated efforts to minimize or eliminate
    future climate change risks by reducing the DOD contribution to fuel
    consumption and carbon emissions. These include the incorporation of
    the Energy Efficiency KPP into the JCIDS in May 2007. This will ensure
    energy efficiency concerns are considered for future system
    acquisitions and associated operational plans. Additionally, we are
    leading a study in conjunction with the Services into the feasibility
    of increased simulator use to decrease in-vehicle training (and
    therefore fuel use and emissions) without sacrificing operational
    readiness.
        We will continue to shape the future strategic environment with an
    eye toward climate change effects and look for opportunities to reduce
    our carbon footprint.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
                                troop deployment
        78. Senator Collins. Admiral Mullen, I know how concerned you are
    that the lengthy and repeated deployments have placed enormous strain
    on our troops. As we decrease troop levels in Iraq and also continue to
    increase the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps, which the
    budget continues to fund, this should help to relieve the pressure.
    When do you believe the impact of a larger Army and Marine Corps will
    begin to affect the length and frequency of deployments for our troops,
    both Active-Duty and National Guard?
        Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                                      f-22
        79. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, because Lockheed Martin and
    Boeing are building F-22 Raptors at a rate of two per month, the
    addition of four F-22s via an emergency supplemental budget will
    provide approximately 2 additional months of F-22 production. However,
    long lead suppliers who provide much of the parts essential to
    producing these aircraft would begin shutting down production as early
    as fall 2008. With this in mind, please explain the assertion that
    procuring four F-22s through fiscal year 2009 supplemental funds will
    keep the F-22 line open until the next administration.
        Secretary Gates. The Department is working with the Air Force to
    determine the necessary actions required to keep the F-22A production
    line viable so that the next administration can review the program
    requirements.

        80. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, the administration has
    stated that further F-22 purchases will threaten the production numbers
    and the affordability of the JSF. The Air Force has consistently
    maintained that they would not utilize JSF funds to fund more F-22s
    since they desperately need both aircraft. Given a $515 billion defense
    budget in fiscal year 2009, $3.4 billion of which is allocated for JSF
    production, please describe how an additional Lot of 20-24 F-22s
    threatens the production and affordability of the JSF.
        Secretary Gates. The size of the annual procurement of any single
    program is modest compared to the total budget, but there are always
    unmet needs when we complete the budget process every year. DOD must
    balance across major procurement accounts. Major items in the Air Force
    procurement budget are tactical aircraft, tankers, space systems, and
    ISR assets. Any increase in F-22 funding would have to come out of
    these high priority accounts.
        Some have indicated that F-22 could be funded by finding
    ``efficiencies'' in Operations and Maintenance (O&M), but given the
    pattern of steady growth in the O&M accounts, we don't expect
    efficiencies of $3 billion to $4 billion per year.

        81. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, have you determined how
    much it will cost to shut down the F-22 line, and if deemed necessary,
    re-open the line if a future administration decides to procure
    additional F-22s?
        Secretary Gates. We don't plan to close the F-22 line in fiscal
    year 2009. Prior estimates of shut-down costs were on the order of $500
    million. We have not estimated what it would cost to re-open the F-22
    line once it is closed.

                       national guard and reserve forces
        82. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, I was pleased to see that
    you touched on the important issues of retention and recruiting in your
    written statement. You particularly noted that the National Guard and
    Reserve have experienced some challenges in retaining the company grade
    officers and mid-grade noncommissioned officers who lead our troops,
    but that you are overcoming these shortfalls through enhanced
    incentives for service, flexibility in terms of requirements, and
    enhanced retirement benefits. With the help of many on this committee I
    was proud last year to work on modifying the retirement system for
    National Guard and Reserve members and I hope that this added benefit
    will help retain some of those leaders that we need to retain.
        As you think about transitioning the Reserve components from a
    Strategic Reserve role to part of the Operational Reserve, and
    maintaining our professional National Guard and Reserve Force, what
    kinds of policies and changes come to mind and, in your opinion, how
    can we best transition and shape the National Guard and Reserve into
    being a force that best meets our combatant commanders' and our
    Nation's requirements?
        Admiral Mullen. The Department is currently reviewing the
    Commission on the National Guard and Reserves' 95 recommendations. The
    report identified six topic areas. Our first priority will be to
    implement topic areas I (Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve)
    and IV (Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational
    Reserve). The Joint Staff and COCOMs recognize that we must break the
    Cold War mentality with regards to our Reserve Forces. We intend to
    vigorously pursue these two topic areas.
        We also agree with topic area III (Creating a Continuum of Service:
    Personnel Management for an Integrated Total Force). The Staff is
    carefully evaluating whether any additional statutory changes are
    required and if they will help or hinder our goal to increase the
    Reserve components' integration into the ``Total Force.''
        Topic area V (Supporting Servicemembers, Families, and Employers)
    is one of my main goals as Chairman and Senior Military Leader of the
    ``Total Force.'' I will work with the Services on their support to all
    members of our Armed Forces, their families, and their employers. I
    fully support the Employer Support for Guard and Reserve and will
    continue to champion the cause of our soldier's health, welfare, and
    morale.
        In regards to topic area VI (Reforming the Organizations and
    Institutions that Support an Operational Reserve), I fully support a
    closer alignment of the Services to their support agencies, both
    military and civilian. We need to establish a ``Total Force'' policy
    that eliminates cultural prejudices and produces a better staff
    integration system.
        Topic area II (Enhancing the Defense Department's Role in the
    Homeland) has resulted in some concern on the Joint Staff and within
    the COCOMs. While Reserve component civil support requirements are
    important, they should not be of equal importance to the Department's
    combat responsibilities. We are currently looking at alternate
    approaches to the Homeland recommendations to better support the Nation
    and its citizens.
        The Joint Staff will continue to work closely with the OSD, COCOMs,
    the National Guard and Bureau, and the Services on an implementation
    plan for all 95 recommendations.

                              prompt global strike
        83. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, in your
    statements you discuss the need to address capability gaps, rebalance
    strategic risk, and deter wars. One of the major ways we can do this is
    the ability to strike targets all over the globe promptly--prompt
    global strike. In relation to this, I'm keenly interested in the
    progress of the Air Force's new bomber, as I believe it is critically
    important to our future strategic plan. As you may know, the Air Force
    recently came out with their roadmap for the 21st century, which lists
    several U.S. bases where the next generation bomber may be based. As I
    understand it, there will be an interim bomber that is expected to be
    operational by 2018, with the next generation bomber becoming
    operational in 2035. What progress is DOD is making in developing and
    fielding these new bombers?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Air Force has implemented a
    three-phased approach to meet the Nation's long-range Global Strike
    requirements:

             Phase 1 - Continue with the modernization of the legacy
            bomber inventory to ensure sustainability and increased combat
            effectiveness
             Phase 2 - Leverage near-term technologies with the goal of
            fielding a next generation bomber (NGB) capability in the 2018
            timeframe
             Phase 3 - Pursue a system-of-systems technology push for a
            producible advanced capability bomber with significant
            improvements in speed, range, accuracy, connectivity, and
            survivability in 2035+ timeframe

        The Air Force is leveraging all available technology development
    efforts, including F-35, F-22, B-2, Global Hawk, Reaper, Predator, and
    other S&T investments in order to field a new bomber by 2018. The Air
    Force envisions that the new bomber will be a land-based, highly
    survivable, penetrating, persistent, long-range strike aircraft, likely
    started as a manned platform, with an unmanned option in the future.

                                   readiness
        84. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, you note high readiness
    levels in theater come at the price of declining readiness for
    nondeploying units. How would you assess the general state of readiness
    of units here in the United States--if they had to deploy tomorrow?
    What percentage of units are ready to go?
        Admiral Mullen. [Deleted].

                                wounded warrior
        85. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, I want to thank you for
    your handling of the Walter Reed situation last year, and your
    subsequent efforts to respond to the situation. In your prepared
    statement, you discuss the efforts under way to implement the Dole-
    Shalala Commission's recommendations to ensure our wounded warriors are
    not neglected or forgotten. Beyond what we have already done to
    implement these recommendations in the last NDAA, what help do you
    require from us as a committee to carry out these recommendations?
    Also, I'm particularly interested in hearing what the response has been
    from the veterans community to the proposal to streamline the
    disability evaluation system.
        Secretary Gates. One of the most significant recommendations from
    the task forces and commissions is the shift in the fundamental
    responsibilities of the DOD and the VA. The core recommendation of the
    Dole-Shalala Commission centers on the concept of taking DOD out of the
    disability rating business so that the DOD can focus on the fit or
    unfit determination, streamlining the transition from servicemember to
    veteran. As the President urged in his State-of-the-Union message, we
    seek Congress's action on this recommendation.
        As to acceptance of the streamlined DES, the early responses from
    the Veteran Service Organizations (VSOs) are positive overall. The VSOs
    are pleased that DOD has decreased the time it takes to afford
    servicemembers and veterans their justly deserved benefits. However,
    they are withholding extensive review until the DES pilot program is
    fully expanded.

                                defense spending
        86. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the
    budget you have sent to us represents about 3.4 percent of our gross
    domestic product (GDP). As you know, during other wars, we have spent
    much more of our GDP on defense, such as during the Vietnam war, when
    we were spending about 9 percent of our GDP, or the Korean War, when we
    were spending about 14 percent of our GDP. Admiral Mullen, according to
    an article published a few days ago in the New York Times, you're
    quoted as advocating for a 4 percent floor in defense spending as it
    relates to GDP. In other words, no less than 4 percent of our GDP
    should be spent on defense spending. Secretary Gates, I believe you
    have also been an advocate for this 4 percent floor. Given your
    advocacy for this floor in defense spending, why isn't that reflected
    in the budget you have sent to us?
        Secretary Gates. Before I would formally recommend to the President
    adoption of a defense spending floor of 4 percent of GDP, I would need
    to see promising support for that in Congress and from the American
    people. I do not perceive sufficient support at this time, but I am
    hopeful that my advocacy might advance the idea.
        Admiral Mullen. In order to prevail in the current conflict, defend
    the Nation, and deter future conflicts, the Department requires a
    considerable portion of the Nation's resources. The President's budget
    for 2009 strives to balance spending for the DOD with all of the other
    challenges that I know we face as a country.
        As Chairman, I have focused on advocating for the necessary
    resources to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our people and our
    platforms. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the
    Department's lack of strategic depth and the Department has worked
    effectively to prioritize our resources against our shortfalls. We have
    focused on the growth of our ground forces and that must continue on
    track or at an accelerated pace if achievable. Additionally, I am
    concerned that the growing proportion of our airframes and ships are
    aging beyond their intended service lives and I feel the Nation cannot
    afford to further defer these recapitalization requirements. The
    President and Congress have been tremendously supportive of the needs
    of our Nation's warfighters. The Service Chiefs and I will continue to
    address areas in which we are taking risk in accomplishing the National
    Military Strategy and work with the administration and Congress to
    properly resource our requirements.
        I support a floor of 4 percent of GDP for the DOD base budget. I
    believe that this will generate a thoughtful discussion about what we
    as a Nation need to spend on the DOD. Historically, I believe there is
    a correlation between our defense spending as a percentage of GDP and
    our ability to respond to the Nation's call. I recognize that a
    percentage of GDP may not be the only metric, but it is a metric that
    at least I hope would bring about a thorough, comprehensive debate
    about what we need, particularly as the DOD is one of the very few
    agencies with any discretionary spending.

        87. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, why have
    you presented a budget that represents 3.4 percent of GDP rather than
    the 4 percent of GDP that you advocate?
        Secretary Gates. Before I would formally recommend to the President
    adoption of a defense spending floor of 4 percent of GDP, I would need
    to see promising support for that in Congress and from the American
    people. I do not perceive sufficient support at this time, but I am
    hopeful that my advocacy might advance the idea.
        Admiral Mullen. In order to prevail in the current conflict, defend
    the Nation, and deter future conflicts the Department requires a
    considerable portion of the Nation's resources. The President's budget
    for 2009 strives to balance spending for the DOD with all of the other
    challenges that I know we face as a country.
        As Chairman, I have focused on advocating for the necessary
    resources to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our people and our
    platforms. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the
    Department's lack of strategic depth and the Department has worked
    effectively to prioritize our resources against our shortfalls. We have
    focused on the growth of our ground forces and that must continue on
    track or at an accelerated pace if achievable. Additionally, I am
    concerned that the growing proportion of our airframes and ships are
    aging beyond their intended service lives and I feel the Nation cannot
    afford to further defer these recapitalization requirements. The
    President and Congress have been tremendously supportive of the needs
    of our Nation's warfighters. The Service Chiefs and I will continue to
    address areas in which we are taking risk in accomplishing the National
    Military Strategy and work with the administration and Congress to
    properly resource our requirements.
        I support a floor of 4 percent of GDP for the DOD base budget. I
    believe that this will generate a thoughtful discussion about what we
    as a Nation need to spend on the DOD. Historically, I believe there is
    a correlation between our defense spending as a percentage of GDP and
    our ability to respond to the Nation's call. I recognize that a
    percentage of GDP may not be the only metric, but it is a metric that
    at least I hope would bring about a thorough, comprehensive debate
    about what we need, particularly as the DOD is one of the very few
    agencies with any discretionary spending.

                       north atlantic treaty organization
        88. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, I note in your prepared
    testimony that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in
    Afghanistan ``provide a credible fighting force'' but that ``some
    nations' forces in theater must be more operationally flexible.'' I
    understand that some NATO troops in Afghanistan operate under
    ``caveats'', meaning that they will not fight at night or other
    seemingly unrealistic operational guidelines, which are what I assume
    you're referring to when you say they must be ``more operationally
    flexible.'' Has there been any progress toward doing away with these
    restrictions?
        Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]

        89. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, what other obstacles are you
    facing with the operational flexibility of NATO forces?
        Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]

                                force structure
        90. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, with some of the expansion
    of the Army and Marine Corps being paid for this year, when will we
    feel the positive effects of these new troops?
        Secretary Gates. These strength increases are taking place
    gradually, with the positive effects directly proportional to
    translating new manpower into deployable units.

        91. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, how long do you anticipate
    it taking for them to relieve some of the strain on the current sized
    force?
        Secretary Gates. The benefits already are being realized; by fiscal
    year 2011, we anticipate reaching 48 Active Army BCTs.

        92. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, in your prepared statement,
    you talk about the need to increase interagency involvement. If there
    were more personnel from the other departments, would we be able to
    decrease the military footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan, or, are these
    personnel in addition to all of the military bodies?
        Admiral Mullen. In theory, greater interagency involvement would
    result in a decreased military footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Reality, though, is more complex than that. It is not as simple as a
    one-for-one swap.
        In both countries, we have soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
    performing functions that are not their primary function and for which
    other agencies have greater expertise. The other agencies, though, are
    not absent from the battlefield because of a lack of courage or desire.
    They are simply not manned or resourced to deploy for long periods of
    time like the DOD.
        With proper manning and funding, combined with a fresh
    expeditionary ethos, these agencies could have synergistic effects not
    currently present. It is not enough to create a secure environment
    through military presence and operations, without strong civil support
    providing basic services and creating an environment for economic
    prosperity to take root. It is equally ineffective to attempt to
    provide civil support without proper security. They both support each
    other and without one, the population becomes quickly disgruntled,
    providing a breeding ground for terrorism and insurgency.
        In the long-term, greater interagency involvement will create
    environments where citizens have livelihoods worth protecting with
    their own blood and national treasure. In the meantime, we must set
    those conditions and that can only be done by properly manning and
    resourcing the rest of the interagency.

        93. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, given the expansion of the
    Army and Marine Corps, have we planned and budgeted correctly for all
    the corresponding costs associated with this expansion? In other words,
    do we have enough ships and aircraft to transport them?
        Admiral Mullen. The planned expansion of the Army and Marine Corps
    ground forces is fully funded in the base budget. The primary reasons
    for the Grow the Force initiative are to increase our strategic depth
    and improve force rotation. This is not expected to lead to a larger
    deployed footprint or airlift requirements than what exists today.
        We are carefully reviewing our airlift requirements through the
    conduct of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (section 1046) directed study
    on the size and mix of the airlift force. My assessment so far is that
    the existing air and sealift programs of record are sufficient to
    execute our campaign plans and to support our global presence
    requirements.

        94. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, do we have enough tactical
    fighters and unmanned systems to support them?
        Admiral Mullen. The primary reasons for the Grow the Force
    initiative are to increase our strategic depth and improve force
    rotation. Our tactical fighter and unmanned system requirements are not
    driven by the size of our ground forces, but by our operation and
    contingency plans. My assessment so far is that the existing tactical
    fighter and unmanned system programs of record are sufficient to
    execute our campaign plans and to support our global presence
    requirements.

        95. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, are you comfortable with the
    current division of roles and missions between the Services?
        Admiral Mullen. Our enemy and the nature of warfare are always
    evolving. The Services are constantly evaluating and evolving their
    tactics, techniques, and procedures to adapt to and, where possible, be
    in front of, the enemy. I believe the current division of roles and
    missions is about right. The roles and missions review as directed in
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, will give us a chance to look at this in
    a holistic manner. We will focus on improving the Joint Force's
    effectiveness and efficiency to ensure the enduring security of the
    American people.

        96. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, are there any overlaps that
    we may examine and potentially save money?
        Admiral Mullen. The roles and missions review will address
    traditional core mission areas as well as evolving areas of warfare. It
    is too early in the process to identify specific areas of overlap, but
    throughout the review we will investigate areas of unnecessary
    duplication and capability gaps with the singular goal of optimizing
    the development and employment of our Joint Forces. That said, I do not
    expect there will be overlaps to the point that a great deal of money
    will be available for savings.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                                    seapower
        97. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the
    industrial base required to build and modernize our Navy is relatively
    small compared to our other defense sectors. As the cost of ships has
    increased due to changing requirements and rising material costs, the
    number of ships we have been able to produce each year has slowed. As a
    result of the slow production, labor costs have increased, thus further
    impacting our shipbuilding capability. Conversely, the ability of
    potential adversaries such as China to produce naval ships is much
    greater than ours. How does our current goal of building a 313-ship
    Navy, our long-range shipbuilding strategy, and our budget forecasts
    overlay against potential naval adversaries' ability to grow a naval
    force at a much faster pace?
        Secretary Gates. The Navy faces many challenges in procuring a
    force that will be effective over the broad spectrum of naval missions
    anticipated in the coming decades. At the same time, escalating
    shipbuilding costs demand that the Navy procure only those ships that
    are necessary to accomplish critical missions, with the minimum
    essential capabilities, and in the most efficient and cost effective
    manner possible. As the Navy transforms itself into a 21st century
    fighting force and looks to recapitalize the retiring ship platforms,
    new ship concepts are being introduced. Additionally, as the Navy
    translates lead ships into serial production, cost estimates have been
    adjusted to reflect updated material costs and increased labor costs.
    In the case of fiscal year 2009 President's budget request, many of the
    labor and material rates that were impacted by Hurricane Katrina are
    now reflected in the end-costs of the ships. In addition, the impact of
    the Pension Protection Act has been reflected in higher overhead rates
    throughout the shipbuilding industry. The Navy's 313-ship force
    structure represents the minimum number of ships the Navy should
    maintain in its inventory to provide the global reach; persistent
    presence; and strategic, operational, and tactical effects expected of
    our Navy forces. Currently there are two countries with the indigenous
    shipbuilding capacity and potential budgetary means to grow a modern
    naval force on or ahead of the pace of our long-range shipbuilding
    strategy. China is the third-largest shipbuilder in the world, after
    Japan and South Korea, and is engaged in a naval shipbuilding program
    that is supported by an industrial base of about eight major shipyards
    involved in naval construction. This compares to the U.S. industrial
    base of six major shipyards owned by two corporations and at least two
    smaller shipbuilders engaged in naval construction. China's ability to
    produce modern and effective major ship sub-systems, particularly in
    the propulsion area and in weapon systems for those ships, is just
    recently beginning to show signs of improvement. Although Russia also
    possesses the indigenous shipbuilding capacity and potential budgetary
    means to grow a modern naval force on or ahead of the pace of our long-
    range shipbuilding strategy, it is only now beginning to reestablish a
    naval shipbuilding program. Our ability to maintain a position of
    maritime superiority over the long-term relies on a battle force
    structure consistent with the Navy's 313-ship strategy, and investment
    in the research and development and increased procurement funding for
    ship and weapon systems that will continue to enable the United States
    to maintain its lead over our potential adversaries.
        Admiral Mullen. The Navy faces many challenges in procuring a force
    that will be effective over the broad spectrum of naval missions
    anticipated in the coming decades. At the same time, escalating
    shipbuilding costs demand that the Navy procure only those ships that
    are necessary to accomplish critical missions, with the minimum
    essential capabilities, and in the most efficient and cost effective
    manner possible. The Navy's 313-ship force structure represents the
    minimum number of ships the Navy should maintain in its inventory to
    provide the global reach; persistent presence; and strategic,
    operational, and tactical effects expected of our Navy forces.
    Currently there are two countries with the indigenous shipbuilding
    capacity and potential budgetary means to grow a modern naval force on
    or ahead of the pace of our long-range shipbuilding strategy. Russia is
    only now beginning to reestablish a naval shipbuilding program. China
    on the other hand is engaged in a naval shipbuilding program that is
    supported by an industrial base of about eight major shipyards involved
    in naval construction. This compares to the U.S. industrial base of
    five major shipbuilders and at least two smaller shipbuilders engaged
    in naval construction. While the capacity of China's shipbuilding
    industry is on par with that of the United States, China's ability to
    produce modern and effective major ship sub-systems, particularly in
    the propulsion area and in weapon systems for those ships, is just
    recently beginning to show signs of improvement. Our ability to
    maintain a position of maritime superiority over the long-term relies
    on a battle force structure consistent with the Navy's 313-ship
    strategy, and investment in the research and development of ship and
    weapon systems that will continue to lead our potential adversaries.

        98. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, in
    addition, does our Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
    properly account for our long-term ability to counter these threats?
        Secretary Gates. The new maritime strategy, ``A Cooperative
    Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,'' does properly account for current
    and future threats. I offer that China and other nations throughout the
    world are potential opportunities. Our new strategy recognizes that the
    security and prosperity of the global system will increasingly rely on
    the cooperation and partnership of all maritime powers, including
    China. Our Nation's interests are best served by fostering and
    sustaining a peaceful global system.
        The strategy recognizes that defending our Nation and defeating
    adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of American seapower.
    We will continue to focus on maintaining a robust and effective
    capability to apply regionally concentrated, credible combat power to
    deter potential adversaries, limit regional conflicts, and win our
    Nation's wars. Through forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and
    power projection, we will maintain our ability to secure our Homeland
    and interests around the world.
        Effective implementation of the strategy depends upon our ability
    to execute a stable, affordable shipbuilding plan that delivers a Navy
    of at least 313 ships. A properly balanced Fleet, applied across the
    six core capabilities, will ensure our ability to meet future
    challenges.
        Admiral Mullen. The new maritime strategy, ``A Cooperative Strategy
    for 21st Century Seapower,'' does properly account for the ability of
    potential adversaries to produce naval ships in relatively significant
    numbers. Specifically, with respect to your earlier comments regarding
    China, I would like to offer that I believe China--and other growing
    nations throughout the world--are also potential opportunities. Our new
    strategy recognizes that the security and prosperity of the global
    system--the interdependent networks of commerce, finance, people, law,
    governance, and information--will increasingly rely on the cooperation
    and partnership of all maritime powers, including China. Our Nation's
    interests--all nation's interests--are best served by fostering and
    sustaining a peaceful global system.
        One of the principal tenets of the strategy is that preventing wars
    is as important as winning wars. Regional conflicts and major power
    wars create shocks in the global system that adversely impact people in
    every country around the world, regardless of whether they are involved
    directly in the event. Through the employment of globally distributed,
    mission tailored maritime forces, we are able to partner with nations
    around the world to prevent or contain local disruptions, and
    contribute directly to homeland defense-in-depth. Working in
    cooperation with partners both here and abroad, we exercise maritime
    security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response in order to
    build the capacity to prevent as well as recover from shocks to the
    global system.
        The strategy also recognizes that defending our Nation and
    defeating adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of seapower.
    We will continue to focus on maintaining a robust and effective
    capability to apply regionally concentrated, credible combat power to
    deter potential adversaries, limit regional conflicts, and win our
    Nation's wars. Through forward presence, sea control, and power
    projection we will maintain our ability to secure our Homeland and
    interests around the world.
        Through the selectively balanced application of the core
    capabilities of seapower--in cooperation with joint, interagency,
    nongovernmental, and coalition partners--we believe seapower is a
    unifying force for building a better tomorrow, for our Nation and
    nations around the world who seek the same great opportunities we enjoy
    as Americans.

                          base realignment and closure
        99. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, the Congressional Budget
    Office and the Government Accountability Office estimate that the cost
    to implement the current BRAC round has increased from $21 billion to
    $31 billion. Is this $10 billion cost growth accounted for in the
    President's budget and in the Future Year Defense Program, and what is
    the budget plan to meet the statutory deadline for the 2005 BRAC
    decisions to be completely implemented by September 15, 2011?
        Secretary Gates. As a matter of policy, BRAC requirements which
    ensure meeting the September 15, 2011, deadline must be fully funded.
    As such, all costs to implement BRAC are included in our fiscal year
    2009 budget request (including supplemental requests) and in the Future
    Year Defense Program. It is important to note that this assumes the
    $939 million reduction to the BRAC appropriations is restored in fiscal
    year 2008.

        100. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, in addition, what steps are
    being taken by the DOD to get the BRAC costs under control?
        Secretary Gates. Each implementation plan is reviewed twice
    annually to ensure that the proposed costs are valid and necessary to
    implement BRAC. As necessary, the Department's budget process allocates
    additional resources to ensure the recommendations will be implemented.
    This process adds another level of scrutiny to ensure increases in
    costs are minimized.

                          improvised explosive devices
        101. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, Congress has made a
    tremendous investment in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
    Organization (JIEDDO), since its inception as the Joint IED Defeat Task
    Force in 2004. Fortunately for our soldiers and marines, they have seen
    first-hand some of the success of the JIEDDO efforts, such as the
    highly effective Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Can you
    explain, at an unclassified level, what the JIEDDO priorities are for
    this 2009 budget request?
        Secretary Gates. This budget request provides funding for the
    JIEDDO. To that end, JIEDDO operates along four lines of operation to
    carry out its mission: Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, Train the
    Force, and Staff and Infrastructure.
        Specific JIEDDO priorities for this request focus on three areas:
        Attack the Network ($306.3 million)--this funding allows JIEDDO to
    conduct offensive operations against the complex networks of
    financiers, IED makers, trainers, and their supporting infrastructure
    and enhances our capability to attack and disrupt the enemy's IED
    networks.
        Train the Force ($88.3 million)--this funding supports demanding
    individual and collective training requirements to prepare units prior
    to and during deployment for operations in an intense, fluid IED
    environment. The fiscal year 2009 funding expands counter-IED (C-IED)
    training, completes the resourcing of critical C-IED equipment, and
    exports training capabilities to multiple locations.
        Staff and Infrastructure ($101.7 million)--this funding provides
    for JIEDDO's headquarters support structure necessary to successfully
    coordinate the IED fight. The fiscal year 2009 funding provides for
    civilian personnel, facilities, personnel contracts, professional
    training, communication equipment, travel, and supplies needed for
    minimum day-to-day operations.

        102. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, part of the success of the
    Defeat the Device strategy has been the use of UAVs to provide
    persistent overhead surveillance. How does the budget build on the
    success of the UAVs as part of a C-IED strategy and is there sufficient
    funding to keep the UAV mission at a level that will ensure the
    greatest possible protection of our troops?
        Secretary Gates. The JIEDDO has provided a total of $198 million
    for the delivery and nominal 2-year sustainment of C-IED sensor
    surveillance systems initiatives employed from UASs, requirements
    defined by the combatant commanders. JIEDDO's budget fully supports
    transitioning the C-IED capabilities of sensor systems aboard UASs to
    the Service(s). As new C-IED requirements are identified and validated
    by the combatant commanders and Joint Staff, JIEDDO will apply funding
    to meet the requirement and they are funded to do so during fiscal year
    2008.

        [Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
    Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb,
    McCaskill, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, and
    Thune.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken,
    professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas
    K. McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord,
    professional staff member; Michael J. Noblet, professional
    staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T.
    Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority
    counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana
    G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
    minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Ali Z. Pasha,
    and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: Bethany Bassett and
    Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
    Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to
    Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M.
    Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson,
    assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to
    Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner;
    Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd
    Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter,
    assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
    Senator Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham;
    Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Brian Polley,
    assistant to Senator Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
    Senator Thune; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator
    Wicker.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        Today, Secretary Geren and General Casey testify before the
    Senate Armed Services Committee on plans and programs of the
    U.S. Army in review of the fiscal year 2009 budget request, the
    war supplemental request, and the Future Years Defense Program.
        We last had the Secretary and Chief of Staff update us on
    the state of the Army a little over 3 months ago, in November.
    We welcome you both back. We thank you for your service. As
    always, we ask you to extend our heartfelt gratitude to the men
    and women of the Army and their families, who have given so
    much of themselves in their service to this Nation in a time of
    war.
        Over the 3 months since Secretary Geren and General Casey
    last testified, the Army has begun redeploying the surged
    troops from Iraq, and, according to current plans, will
    complete that redeployment this summer. However, we're now
    hearing that General Petraeus will recommend a pause in further
    redeployments while he assesses the security situation.
    President Bush's public comments indicate he will follow
    General Petraeus's recommendations.
        This also means that we will continue to have an Army which
    is way overstretched. The stress on Army forces from operations
    in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to build. Our Army troops
    continue to face multiple tours of 15-month duration, with only
    12 months or less at home between rotations. According to a
    recent survey, 9 in 10 officers say that the war has stretched
    the military dangerously thin. These levels of deployment
    without adequate rest for the troops and repair and replacement
    of equipment simply cannot be sustained.
        General Casey has said that, ``Today's Army is out of
    balance,'' and that ``the current demand for our forces exceeds
    the sustainable supply.'' Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, has echoed those concerns, saying that the
    ground forces ``remain under tremendous strain.''
        According to press reports, Admiral Mullen, meeting with
    Army captains at Fort Sill last year, found that the most
    prevalent concern was the impact on those soldiers and their
    families of the repeated deployments of 15 months, with 12 or
    fewer months home between rotations. One captain said, ``We
    have soldiers that have spent more time in combat than World
    War II. Is there a point where you can say you've served
    enough?''
        The heaviest burden in this war has fallen on the ground
    forces and on their families. General Casey has said, ``We are
    consuming readiness as fast as we build it.'' Well, one way or
    another, we must find a way to bring the Army back in balance.
        Other evidence of strain on the Army can be seen in
    recruiting and retention patterns. In fiscal year 2007, only 79
    percent of Army recruits were high-school-diploma graduates and
    only 61 percent of new recruits scored above average on the
    Armed Forces qualification test. Fiscal year 2007 represents
    the 4th consecutive year of decline in one or both of those two
    indicators.
        The Army recruited 3,200 category-4 recruits, the lowest
    acceptable measure of aptitude, which is the Department of
    Defense (DOD) maximum of 4 percent in this category. There has
    been an increase in the number of medical and misconduct
    waivers being granted. In fiscal year 2007, nearly one in five
    new recruits required a waiver. More than 50 percent of
    graduates of the U.S. military academy are separating from the
    Army as soon as their obligations expire.
        The impact of the wars has affected the Army in many ways.
    In order to sustain the necessary readiness level in our
    deployed forces, the readiness of our nondeployed forces has
    steadily declined. Equipment and people are worn out. Multiple
    deployments and extended deployments result in higher rates of
    mental health problems for our soldiers, and also takes a toll
    on their families. The number of wounded and injured soldiers
    in our Warrior Transition Units continues to climb. Most
    nondeployed units are not ready to be deployed; consequently,
    getting those units reset and fully equipped and trained for
    their rotation to Iraq or Afghanistan is that much more
    difficult and risky. Getting those units equipped and trained
    for all potential conflicts, including high-intensity combat,
    is virtually impossible, and is not being done.
        This Nation faces substantially increased risks should
    those forces be required to respond to other requirements of
    the national military strategy. The surge of additional forces
    to Iraq last year put even more pressure on an already strained
    readiness situation. Subjecting this Nation to that degree of
    risk is unacceptable.
        As daunting as it is to meet the current readiness
    challenge, we must also modernize our Army to meet our
    readiness requirements and our national security requirements
    into the future, and we must do so intelligently. In so doing,
    we must not fail to capture the lessons learned since the end
    of the Cold War and apply them to building that force of the
    future.
        Although it appeared somewhat fashionable to question the
    relevance of ground forces prior to September 11, that can
    hardly be the case now. The reality of warfare in the 21st
    century demands both the high-intensity force-on-force combat,
    as characterized in the early weeks of the Iraq war, and the
    grinding, all-encompassing stability and support in
    counterinsurgency operations of the last few years. The answer
    is not one mission or the other; the Army must be prepared to
    do both and everything in between.
        The reality right now and for the foreseeable future is
    that soldiers need to be warriors at sometimes, then, at other
    times, need to be acting as builders, city managers,
    humanitarian relief workers, and dispute arbitrators. Given the
    post-surge level of 15 Army brigade combat teams and supporting
    troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army officials have been
    telling Members and staff that the Army will need $260 to $270
    billion a year through fiscal year 2011 in order to meet its
    requirements.
        The 2009 base budget request provides the Army with $140
    billion. DOD requested $70 billion in bridge supplemental
    funding. In an answer to a question at the DOD posture hearing,
    Secretary Gates said that the best guess, at the moment, is
    that the remainder of the 2009 supplemental would be about $100
    billion. That means that the Army will have to receive $120 to
    $130 billion, out of a $170-billion 2009 supplemental total, to
    meet its annual requirement of the $260 to $270 billion. That
    would be somewhat doubtful; in which case, we need to
    understand, fully, the implications for the Army. We need to
    understand what needs to be done to ensure an Army that is
    ready for all its potential missions, both today and in the
    future. The Army and Congress owe nothing less to the soldiers,
    their families, and the American people.
        At this time, I now submit the prepared statement of
    Senator Warner.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
        Mr Chairman, thank you. I join you in welcoming Secretary Geren and
    General Casey here to the committee once again and thank them for their
    long and distinguished service to our Nation.
        Our Nation's Army is the best in the world. It is a battle-hardened
    force whose volunteer soldiers have performed with courage,
    resourcefulness, and resilience in the most arduous conditions.Some
    have suggested that our Army is broken. I do not believe that. However,
    like Admiral Mullen, I do believe the Army is ``breakable.''
        Looking back at the last years of Vietnam and into the 1970s--a
    time when America was last engaged in a protracted and controversial
    war--many of us remember a military that was under great strain. It was
    also a period in our history when popular appreciation for the military
    was not very noticeable.
        However, it is so gratifying today to see how the United States
    civilian population is so united in support of our military.
        We should all remember that the last draftee entered the Army in
    1973. For nearly 35 years now, we have been fortunate to have a
    military composed entirely of volunteers.
        When our country's All-Volunteer Force was born on July 1, 1973, no
    comparable military in the world operated on a fully volunteer basis.
    Since that time, our volunteers have upheld the finest traditions of
    our military Services and our country. Our Nation continues to be
    grateful for the courageous men and women who have demonstrated
    extraordinary patriotism in choosing to defend America.
        We owe these men and women and their families a great deal for
    their service and the sacrifices of their families. For those who have
    made the ultimate sacrifice, the country owes their families every care
    and benefit. To the wounded, we have a responsibility to see that the
    care they receive at all points in the military health care system will
    allow them to transition smoothly to the next phase in their lives. In
    these regards, I am proud of the work that this committee has done, but
    it is an effort that requires constant vigilance and oversight.
        As one who would strongly oppose a return to the draft, I believe
    that we should aggressively seek new ways to express our gratitude to
    these volunteers.
        This morning, the witnesses should be prepared to answer questions
    concerning: state of the All-Volunteer Army; the pace of deployments
    and the strain placed on soldiers and their families; and plans to end
    15-month overseas deployment cycles and attain an interim dwell time
    ratio of 1 to 1 and, ultimately, achieve an objective dwell time ratio
    of 2 to 1.
        In addition the witnesses should expect to be asked to discuss:
    progress being made with the multi-billion dollar investment in the
    Army's Future Combat System; the readiness of Army units when they are
    deployed from home stations to a combat theater, such as Iraq or
    Afghanistan; how the Army is using the dollars it receives to ``reset''
    the force; how the Army will regain and sustain its advantage at
    fighting conventional wars while retaining what it has learned about
    asymmetrical threats and counterinsurgency operations; the readiness of
    Reserve component forces and the recommendations of the Commission on
    the National Guard and Reserves; and the state of outpatient care at
    Army medical facilities.
        Mr Chairman, thank you and I look forward to hearing from our
    witnesses today.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I agree with all of the problems that are there, it wasn't
    as if we didn't see them coming. We are very proud of the Army.
    I remember when Senator Akaka and I were on the House side, we
    were active in the Army Caucus, and there wasn't one over here,
    so we started one here. I think that people are more aware now
    than they ever have been anytime in the history about the
    significance of the Army. With all the problems that the
    chairman mentioned, I can't think of two people that are in a
    better position to handle those problems than General Casey and
    Secretary Geren. So, I appreciate your dedication.
        I can remember, back in the 1990s, when the drawdown was
    taking place, and I was chairman, at that time, of the
    Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee. I remember going
    to the floor several times and talking about the fact that this
    is all fine, assuming that we don't have any real serious
    problems coming up, but guess what happened? We have serious
    problems. All of that couldn't have happened at a worse time.
    We were at our all-time low, after we had drawn down from 18 to
    10 divisions. So, we're demanding more and more, and I look at
    the big picture and think we just have to rebuild, that's all.
    The timing couldn't have been worse. Every time I go over
    there, I'm more and more proud of this All-Volunteer Service. I
    was a product of the draft, and it took me quite a number of
    years to realize that the quality is so good now. These young
    people, men and women, are just doing a great job. I'm also
    real proud that we have 2,600 of the Oklahoma 45th deployed
    over there right now. I recall, on their last deployment, that
    they were active in training the Afghan National Army, in
    Afghanistan, to train their own military.
        So, they're all doing a great job, most of the problems,
    frankly, are on this side of the table. I often say that you're
    doing a great job with the hand you're dealt, but you need to
    be dealt a better hand. Hopefully, we can do that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Let me, before you start, alert everybody, I think we know
    it up here, but for you folks out there, including our
    witnesses, we have five rollcall votes stacked, basically what
    we call back-to-back, starting at about 10:20 or 10:15, we
    believe. We're going to try to continue to go right through
    those votes somehow, but there may be a number of interruptions
    and adjournments that we're going to have to call, at the call
    of the Chair, during the question period.
        Secretary Geren?

     STATEMENT OF HON. PRESTON M. ``PETE'' GEREN III, SECRETARY OF
                                THE ARMY

        Secretary Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
    and members of the committee. It's an honor for General Casey
    and me to appear before you today to discuss our Nation's Army,
    an Army that's been built by the partnership between our Army,
    led by our Commander in Chief, and this Congress. It's a
    partnership older than our Constitution, and affirmed by it.
        The President's budget for fiscal year 2009 is before
    Congress; $141 billion for our Army. As is always the case, the
    Army's budget is mostly about people, and operations and
    maintenance (O&M) to support people. The personnel and O&M
    budget makes up two-thirds of our Army budget.
        Creighton Abrams reminded us often, people are not in the
    Army, people are the Army. The Army budget reflects that
    reality.
        Today, we are an Army long at war, in our 7th year in
    Afghanistan; next month, March, will be 5 years in Iraq. This
    is the third-longest war in American history, behind the
    Revolutionary War and the Vietnam War, and it is the longest
    war we've ever fought with an All-Volunteer Force.
        Our Army is stretched by the demands of this long war, but
    it remains an extraordinary Army. It's the best-led, best-
    equipped, and best-trained Army we have ever put in the field,
    with Army families standing with their soldiers as those
    soldiers serve and re-enlist. It's an Army of volunteer
    soldiers and volunteer families.
        We currently have 250,000 soldiers deployed to 80 countries
    around the world, with over 140,000 deployed to Afghanistan and
    Iraq. Our 140,000 soldiers in harm's way are our top priority,
    and we will never take our eye off of that ball. This budget
    and our supplementals ensure that our soldiers have what they
    need when they need it.
        Today and over the last 6 years, our Reserve component,
    Guard and Reserves, have carried a heavy load for our Nation.
    Since September 11, we have activated 184,000 reservists and
    270,000 guardsmen in support of the global war on terror, and
    they've answered the call for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, other
    storms, for forest fires, brush fires, other domestic crises,
    and they are in support of operations on our Nation's border.
        We are one Army. The Active component cannot go to war
    without the Reserve component. The challenge before us, and
    addressed in this budget, is our continuing effort to transform
    the Reserve component into an operational Reserve, match the
    organizing, training, and equipping with the reality of the
    role of today's Guard and Reserves. This budget continues the
    steady investment in new equipment in our Reserve component.
        Although we will not complete the recapitalization of the
    National Guard until 2015, we are not where we need to be, but
    it's important to acknowledge the progress that has been made
    in equipping our Guard.
        Looking at just a few pacer items:
        In 2001, the Guard had 290 Family of Medium Tactical
    Vehicles trucks; today, the Guard has over 9,000. In 2001,
    41,000 Single-Channel Ground-Air Radio System radios; today,
    over 82,000. Night-vision goggles, in 2001, 53,000; today,
    nearly 120,000. This budget includes $5.6 billion for Guard
    equipment and $1.4 billion for the Reserves. Over the next 24
    months, $17 billion worth of equipment will flow to the Guard
    and over 400,000 items over the next 2 years.
        The strength of our Army--Active, Guard, and Reserve--comes
    from the strength of Army families. Our Army families are
    standing with their soldier loved ones, but this long war is
    taking a toll. We owe our families a quality of life that
    equals the quality of their service.
        Over half of our soldiers are married, with over 700,000
    children in Army families. Today, nearly half, 48 percent, of
    all soldiers who go to theater leave behind children aged 2 or
    under. When a married soldier deploys, he or she leaves a
    single-parent household behind, and all the challenges of that
    family dynamic. When a single parent deploys, he or she leaves
    behind a child in the care of others.
        In our 2009 budget, we are doubling funding for family
    programs. We're adding 26 new child development centers to the
    35 that Congress funded for last year. Over the past year, with
    your strong support, we have expanded the availability of
    childcare, and we have reduced the cost. We have asked much of
    the volunteer network of spouses that has carried the burden of
    family support programs since September 11, a burden that grows
    heavier with each successive deployment. But, they need help.
        Our 2008 and this 2009 year budget provides much-needed
    support. We are hiring over 1,000 family readiness support
    assistants and nearly 500 additional Army community service
    staff to provide full-time support to our spouse volunteers and
    to Army families, and we are fielding 35 new Soldier Family
    Assistance Centers at major installations across the country.
    The Yellow Ribbon Program you authorized will provide much-
    needed support for our guardsmen and reservists upon their
    return from deployments.
        In the late 1990s, Congress launched the Privatized Housing
    Initiative, an initiative that has replaced Army housing with
    Army homes, and has built neighborhoods and vibrant communities
    on our Army posts. This budget builds on the great success of
    your initiative. Our budget for Army homes, new and
    refurbished, in this budget is $1.4 billion. For single
    soldiers, we're modernizing existing barracks. Over 2009 to
    2015, with your support, we'll reach our target of 150,000
    soldiers in modernized barracks.
        This budget continues the programs at DOD, the Department
    of Veterans Affairs (VA), Congress, and the Army have made in
    meeting the needs of wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. In
    your authorization bill, you gave us additional authorities to
    hire needed medical personnel, to provide better health care
    for our wounded, and provide more help to family members who
    are supporting their loved ones. You gave us new authorities,
    resources, and the flexibility to allow soldiers and Army
    civilians to build and adapt a new outpatient care system to
    meet the ever-changing challenges of taking care of those who
    have borne the battle.
        This budget continues to advance those initiatives,
    continues to address personnel shortages, improve facilities,
    and work to accomplish the seamless transition from DOD to VA
    for our soldiers returning to civilian life, and we will
    continue to grow our knowledge and improve the care and
    treatment of the invisible wounds of this war--post traumatic
    stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI)--and
    better meet the needs of soldiers who suffer these wounds, and
    better support their families. The generous support of Congress
    last year has provided us resources to make great progress on
    this front, and we have much to do.
        In 2008 and 2009, we will continue to transform Army
    contracting, under the leadership that we've received from the
    Gansler Commission. In this budget, we've looked to the future;
    we never want to send our soldiers into a fair fight. This
    budget continues our investment in the programs of tomorrow,
    our highest modernization priority, the Future Combat System
    (FCS), which will shape the Army of the future. It's spinning
    out technologies into today's fight. The armed reconnaissance
    helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the light utility
    helicopter, and the joint cargo aircraft are all part of that
    future, and we thank you for your support.
        This budget takes a major step forward in ensuring the
    long-term strength and health of our Army by moving the cost of
    43,000 Active Duty soldiers from the supplemental into the base
    budget, and we have accelerated the 64,000-man growth in the
    Active Duty Army from 2012 to 2010, with a commitment that we
    will maintain recruit quality at no lower than the 2006 levels.
        We are a Nation long at war, facing an era of persistent
    conflict. Our soldiers and families are stretched. We are an
    Army out of balance, and we are consuming our readiness as fast
    as we build it. But, our Army remains strong. It's stretched,
    it's out of balance, but it's resilient. Those who seek
    parallels with the hollow Army of the late 1970s will not find
    it. There are 170,000 young men and women who proudly join our
    Army every year, and 120,000 proudly re-enlist every year.
    They're volunteer soldiers, they're volunteer families, they're
    proud of who they are, and they're proud of what they do. We
    all are inspired by their service and humbled by their
    sacrifice.
        Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank you for your
    ongoing support of our soldiers and their families, for the
    resources and authorities that you provide us every year. Thank
    all of you for traveling all over this globe to meet with
    soldiers, and expressing your appreciation to them for the job
    they're doing; that means a great deal to them. Thank you for
    your partnership in building this great American Army.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Geren and
    General Casey follows:]
     Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Pete Geren and GEN George W. Casey,
                                    Jr., USA
        Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army--Active,
    Guard and Reserve--has been a leader in this war and has been fully
    engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. We also have
    provided support, most notably by the Army National Guard and Army
    Reserve, to civil authorities during domestic emergencies. Today, of
    the Nation's nearly 1 million soldiers, almost 600,000 are serving on
    active duty and over 250,000 are deployed to nearly 80 countries
    worldwide.
        We live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies
    threaten our safety and our freedom. As we look to the future, we
    believe the coming decades are likely to be ones of persistent
    conflict--protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and
    individual actors who use violence to achieve their political and
    ideological ends. In this era of persistent conflict, the Army will
    continue to have a central role in implementing our national security
    strategy.
        While the Army remains the best led, best trained, and best
    equipped Army in the world, it is out of balance. The combined effects
    of an operational tempo that provides insufficient recovery time for
    personnel, families, and equipment, a focus on training for
    counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities,
    and Reserve components assigned missions for which they were not
    originally intended nor adequately resourced, result in our readiness
    being consumed as fast as we can build it. Therefore, our top priority
    over the next several years is to restore balance through four
    imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform.
        The Army's strength is its soldiers--and the families and Army
    civilians who support them. The quality of life we provide our soldiers
    and their families must be commensurate with their quality of service.
    We will ensure that our injured and wounded warriors, and their
    families, receive the care and support they need to reintegrate
    effectively into the Army or back into society. We never will forget
    our moral obligation to the families who have lost a soldier in service
    to our Nation.
        We are grateful for the support and resources we have received from
    the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress. To fight the
    wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, transform to meet the evolving challenges
    of the 21st century, and to regain our balance by 2011, the Army will
    require the full level of support requested in this year's base budget
    and global war on terror request.

              ``The U.S. Army today is a battle-hardened force whose
            volunteer soldiers have performed with courage,
            resourcefulness, and resilience in the most grueling
            conditions. They've done so under the unforgiving glare of the
            24-hour news cycle that leaves little room for error, serving
            in an institution largely organized, trained, and equipped in a
            different era for a different kind of conflict. They've done
            all this with a country, a government--and in some cases a
            Defense Department--that has not been placed on a war
            footing.'' Secretary of Defense, Honorable Robert M. Gates,
            October 10, 2007, AUSA Annual Meeting

        The Army--Active, Guard, and Reserve--exists to protect our Nation
    from our enemies, defend our vital national interests and provide
    support to civil authorities in response to domestic emergencies. Our
    mission is to provide ready forces and land force capabilities to the
    combatant commanders in support of the National Security Strategy, the
    National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy.
        While what the Army does for the Nation is enduring, how we do it
    must adapt to meet the changing world security environment. We are in
    an era of persistent conflict which, when combined with our ongoing
    global engagements, requires us to rebalance our capabilities. We do
    this remembering that soldiers, and the families who support them, are
    the strength and centerpiece of the Army. while our Nation has many
    strengths, in time of war, America's Army is the strength of the
    Nation.
                strategic context: an era of persistent conflict
        Persistent conflict and change characterize the strategic
    environment. We have looked at the future and expect a future of
    protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors
    who will use violence to achieve political, religious, and other
    ideological ends. We will confront highly adaptive and intelligent
    adversaries who will exploit technology, information, and cultural
    differences to threaten U.S. interests. Operations in the future will
    be executed in complex environments and will range from peace
    engagement, to counterinsurgency, to major combat operations. This era
    of persistent conflict will result in high demand for Army forces and
    capabilities.
             trends creating the conditions for persistent conflict
        The potential for cascading effects from combinations of events or
    crises arising from the trends described below compounds the risk and
    implications for the United States.
                          globalization and technology
        Increased global connectivity and technological advances will
    continue to drive global prosperity--yet they also will underscore
    disparities, such as in standards of living, and provide the means to
    export terror and extremism around the world. Globalization accelerates
    the redistribution of wealth, prosperity, and power, expanding the have
    and have not conditions that can foster conflict. The scale of this
    problem is evident in the projection that 2.8 billion people are
    expected to be living below the poverty line by 2025. While advances in
    technology are benefiting people all over the world, extremists are
    exploiting that same technology to manipulate perceptions, export
    terror, and recruit the people who feel disenfranchised or threatened
    by its effects.
                                   radicalism
        Extremist ideologies and separatist movements will continue to have
    an anti-western and anti-U.S. orientation. Radical and religious
    extremist groups, separatists, and organizations that support them are
    attractive to those who feel victimized or threatened by the cultural
    and economic impacts of globalization. The threats posed by Sunni
    Salafist extremists, like al Qaeda, as well as Shia extremists with
    Iranian backing, represent a major strategic challenge.
                               population growth
        The likelihood of instability will increase as populations of
    several less-developed countries will almost double in size by 2020--
    most notably in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.
    The youth bulge created by this growth will be vulnerable to anti-
    government and radical ideologies and will threaten government
    stability. This situation will be especially true in urban areas in
    which populations have more than doubled over the last 50 years.
        By 2025, urban areas with concentrations of poverty will contain
    almost 60 percent of the world's population.
                              resource competition
        Competition for water, energy, goods, services, and food to meet
    the needs of growing populations will increase the potential for
    conflict. Demand for water is projected to double every 20 years. By
    2015, 40 percent of the world's population will live in water-stressed
    countries. By 2025, global energy demands are expected to increase by
    40 percent, threatening supplies to poor and developing nations.
                      climate change and natural disasters
        Climate change and other projected trends will compound already
    difficult conditions in many developing countries. These trends will
    increase the likelihood of humanitarian crises, the potential for
    epidemic diseases, and regionally destabilizing population migrations.
    Desertification is occurring at nearly 50,000-70,000 square miles per
    year. Today more than 15 million people are dying annually from
    communicable diseases. The number of people dying each year could grow
    exponentially with increases in population density and natural
    disasters.
                  proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
        The diffusion and increasing availability of technology increases
    the potential of catastrophic nuclear, biological, and chemical
    attacks. Many of the more than 1,100 terrorist groups and organizations
    are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction.
                                  safe havens
        States that are unable or unwilling to exercise control within
    their borders create the potential for global and regional groups to
    organize and export terror. Territories under the control of renegade
    elements or separatist factions will challenge central government
    authority, potentially creating a base from which to launch broader
    security threats. The trends that fuel persistent conflict characterize
    the strategic environment now and into the future and will require
    integration of all elements of our national power (diplomatic,
    informational, economic, and military) to achieve our national
    objectives. The implication for the Army is the need to be modernized,
    expeditionary and campaign capable, and prepared to operate across the
    full spectrum of conflict.
           challenges of providing forces with the right capabilities
        The Army recruits, organizes, trains, and equips soldiers who
    operate as members of joint, interagency, and multinational teams. The
    Army also provides logistics and other support to enable our joint and
    interagency partners to accomplish their missions, as well as support
    civil authorities in times of national emergencies. Responding to the
    strategic environment and the national security strategy that flows
    from it, we are building an expeditionary and campaign quality Army.
    Our expeditionary Army is capable of deploying rapidly into any
    operational environment, conducting operations with modular forces
    anywhere in the world, and sustaining operations as long as necessary
    to accomplish the mission. To fulfill the requirements of today's
    missions, including the defense of the homeland and support to civil
    authorities, approximately 591,000 soldiers are on active duty
    (currently 518,000 Active component, 52,000 Army National Guard, and
    21,000 Army Reserve). Forty-two percent (251,000) of our soldiers are
    deployed or forward-stationed in 80 countries around the world.
    Additionally, more than 237,000 Army civilians are performing a variety
    of missions vital to America's national defense. Of these, more than
    4,500 are forward deployed in support of our soldiers.
        Our current focus is on preparing forces and building readiness for
    counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite this
    current and critical mission, the Army also must be ready to provide
    the combatant commanders with the forces and capabilities they need for
    operations anywhere around the world, ranging from peace-time military
    engagement to major combat operations. Examples of Army capabilities
    and recent or ongoing operations other than combat include the
    following:

             Supporting the defense of South Korea, Japan, and many
            other friends, allies, and partners
             Conducting peacekeeping operations in the Sinai
            Peninsula and the Balkans
             Conducting multi-national exercises that reflect our
            longstanding commitments to alliances
             Continuing engagements with foreign militaries to
            build partnerships and preserve coalitions by training and
            advising their military forces
             Participating, most notably by the Army National
            Guard, in securing our borders and conducting operations to
            counter the flow of illegal drugs
             Supporting civil authorities in responding to domestic
            emergencies, including natural disasters and threats at home
            and abroad
             Supporting interagency and multi-national partnerships
            with technical expertise, providing critical support after
            natural disasters, and promoting regional stability
             Supporting operations to protect against weapons of
            mass destruction and block their proliferation

        It is vital that our Army ensures that units and soldiers have the
    right capabilities to accomplish the wide variety of operations that we
    will conduct in the 21st century. Continuous modernization is the key
    to enhancing our capabilities and maintaining a technological advantage
    over any enemy we face. We never want to send our soldiers into a fair
    fight.
        Future Combat Systems (FCS) are the core of our modernization
    effort and will provide our soldiers an unparalleled understanding of
    their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and
    enhanced survivability. These improved capabilities cannot be achieved
    by upgrading current vehicles and systems. FCS will use a combination
    of new manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, connected by robust
    networks, to allow soldiers to operate more effectively in the complex
    threat environments of the 21st century. Maintaining our technological
    edge over potential adversaries, providing better protection, and
    giving our soldiers significantly improved capabilities to accomplish
    their mission are the reasons for FCS. FCS capabilities currently are
    being tested at Fort Bliss, TX. They are proving themselves valuable in
    the current fight and are being fielded to our soldiers in Iraq. FCS
    and their capabilities will continue to be integrated into the force
    over the next 20 years.
     two critical challenges: restoring balance and funding an army out of
                                    balance
        Today's Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces
    in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our
    ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. While our
    Reserve components are performing magnificently, many Reserve component
    units have found themselves assigned missions for which they were not
    originally intended nor adequately resourced. Current operational
    requirements for forces and insufficient time between deployments
    require a focus on counterinsurgency training and equipping to the
    detriment of preparedness for the full range of military missions.
        We are unable to provide a sustainable tempo of deployments for our
    soldiers and families. Soldiers, families, support systems, and
    equipment are stretched and stressed by the demands of lengthy and
    repeated deployments, with insufficient recovery time. Equipment used
    repeatedly in harsh environments is wearing out more rapidly than
    programmed. Army support systems, designed for the pre-September 11
    peacetime Army, are straining under the accumulation of stress from 6
    years at war. Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we
    build it. If unaddressed, this lack of balance poses a significant risk
    to the All-Volunteer Force and degrades the Army's ability to make a
    timely response to other contingencies.
                               restoring balance
        We are committed to restoring balance to preserve our All-Volunteer
    Force, restore necessary depth and breadth to Army capabilities, and
    build essential capacity for the future. Our plan will mitigate near-
    term risk and restore balance by 2011 through four imperatives:
    Sustain, Prepare, Reset and Transform.
                                    sustain
        To sustain our soldiers, families, and Army civilians in an era of
    persistent conflict we must maintain the quality and viability of the
    All-Volunteer Force and the many capabilities it provides to the
    Nation. Sustain ensures our soldiers and their families have the
    quality of life they deserve and that we recruit and sustain a high
    quality force.
        Goals for Sustain:

             Offer dynamic incentives that attract quality recruits
            to meet our recruiting objectives for 2008 and beyond
             Provide improved quality of life and enhanced
            incentives to meet our retention objectives for 2008 and beyond
             Continue to improve the quality of life for Army
            families by implementing the Army Family Covenant and other
            programs that: standardize services, increase the accessibility
            and quality of health care, improve housing and installation
            facilities, provide excellence in schools and youth services,
            and expand spousal education and employment opportunities
             Continue to improve care for wounded warriors and
            warriors in transition through a patient-centered health care
            system, Soldier and Family Assistance Centers, and improved
            Warrior Transition Unit facilities
             Continue to support families of our fallen with
            sustained assistance that honors the service of their soldiers
                                    prepare
        To prepare our solders, units, and equipment we must maintain a
    high level of readiness for the current operational environments,
    especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Goals for Prepare:

             Continue to adapt and enhance the rigor of
            institutional, individual, and operational training to enable
            soldiers to succeed in complex 21st century security
            environments
             Train soldiers and units to conduct full spectrum
            operations with improved training ranges to operate as part of
            a joint, interagency, or multi-national force
             Provide soldiers the best equipment through the Rapid
            Fielding Initiative, the Rapid Equipping Force, and
            modernization efforts
             Partner with private industry to rapidly develop and
            field equipment needed on today's battlefield
             Continue to improve the Army Force Generation process
            which increases the readiness of the operating force over time
            by generating recurring periods of availability of trained,
            ready, and cohesive units
                                     reset
        To reset our force we must prepare our soldiers, units, and
    equipment for future deployments and other contingencies.
        Goals for Reset:

             Develop an Army-wide reset program that repairs,
            replaces, and recapitalizes equipment that our soldiers need
             Retrain our soldiers to accomplish the full spectrum
            of missions they will be expected to accomplish
             Revitalize our soldiers and families through
            implementation and full resourcing of the Soldier Family Action
            Plan (SFAP) and our warrior care and transition programs
                                   transform
        To transform our force, we must continuously improve our ability to
    meet the needs of the combatant commanders in a changing security
    environment.
        Goals for Transform:

             Help balance our force and increase capacity to
            provide sufficient forces for the full range and duration of
            current operations and future contingencies by growing as
            quickly as possible
             Upgrade and modernize to remain an agile and globally
            responsive force with FCS as the core of our modernization
            effort
             Continue organizational change through modularity and
            rebalancing to become more deployable, tailorable, and
            versatile
             Improve expeditionary contracting and financial and
            management controls
             Continue to adapt institutions and the processes,
            policies, and procedures, including business practices, to more
            effectively and efficiently support an expeditionary Army at
            war
             Complete the transition of the Reserve component to an
            operational Reserve and change the way we train, equip,
            resource, and mobilize Reserve component units
             Integrate Grow the Army initiative, Base Realignment
            and Closure (BRAC), Global Defense Posture Realignment, and the
            operation of installations and facilities to increase
            readiness, improve efficiency, and improve the quality of life
            for our soldiers, families, and Army civilians
             Develop agile and adaptive leaders who can operate
            effectively in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
            multi-national environments
          compelling needs for sustain, prepare, reset, and transform
        To achieve balance through the four imperatives, the Army will
    require sustained, timely, and predictable base budget and global war
    on terror funding. The Army's compelling needs for fiscal year 2009
    are:
                                support and fund
             Recruiting and retention incentives and benefits to
            enable Active and Reserve components to meet end strength
            objectives and achieve Army standards for recruit quality
             Quality of life programs to sustain our soldiers' and
            Army civilians' commitment to serve and the continued support
            of our Army families
             Programs to help our wounded, ill, and injured
            Warriors in Transition to return to duty or to civilian life
             BRAC and military construction to execute the Army's
            global repositioning plan
             Operations and maintenance for air and ground
            operations, depot maintenance, base operations, and space and
            missile defense capabilities
             Leader training and development to make soldiers
            culturally astute and better able to integrate and complement
            the other elements of national power (diplomatic,
            informational, and economic)
             Efforts to develop technical and procedural solutions
            to defeat the threat of improvised explosive devices
             The Rapid Equipping Force
             Equipment repair, replacement, and recapitalization
            programs
             Retraining soldiers to execute their new and future
            missions
             Programs to revitalize our soldiers and families as
            they reintegrate after deployments
             End-strength growth of approximately 74,000 by 2010.
             Army modernization programs including FCS, aviation,
            Patriot PAC-3, LandWarNet, intelligence, logistics automation,
            and other advanced technologies
             Planned modular transformations in 2009--two Brigade
            Combat Teams and 13 support brigades
             Transformation of the Reserve components to an
            operational Reserve

              ``America's ground forces have borne the brunt of
            underfunding in the past and the bulk of the costs--both human
            and material--of the wars of the present. By one count,
            investment in Army equipment and other essentials was
            underfunded by more than $50 billion before we invaded Iraq. By
            another estimate, the Army's share of total defense investments
            between 1990 and 2005 was about 15 percent. So resources are
            needed not only to recoup from the losses of war, but to make
            up for the shortfalls of the past and to invest in the
            capabilities of the future.''--Secretary of the Defense,
            Honorable Robert M. Gates, October 10, 2007, AUSA Annual
            Meeting
                               funding challenges
        Recruiting and retaining the most combat-experienced Army in our
    Nation's history require predictable and sustained funding. Sustaining
    this high-quality and professional All-Volunteer Force will not be
    possible without investing in and supporting our quality of life
    efforts and providing competitive pay and benefits. As a manpower-
    intensive organization, we will continue to spend the bulk of our funds
    to sustain people and maintain vital infrastructure, but we also must
    maintain investment in equipment and technology required for future
    readiness.
        To support our soldiers, the centerpiece of the Army, we must
    rebuild and recapitalize our equipment including vehicles and weapons
    systems, maintain readiness for current operational demands, and build
    readiness for future challenges. It takes years beyond the end of
    hostilities to complete rebuilding and recapitalizing equipment. The
    fact that the number of vehicles and weapon systems currently in Army
    depots are sufficient to equip five Brigade Combat Teams and one Combat
    Aviation Brigade demonstrates the importance of timely recapitalization
    and reconditioning.
                    the fiscal year 2009 president's budget
        The fiscal year 2009 President's budget requests $140.7 billion for
    the Army. This request and the amounts in the global war on terror
    request are necessary to support current operations, fight the wars in
    Iraq and Afghanistan, sustain the All-Volunteer Force, and prepare for
    future threats to the Nation. This year the President approved
    accelerating the end strength of the Army's Active component to 547,000
    and the Army National Guard to 358,200 by 2010.
        The Army Reserve will increase in size to 206,000 by 2013. This
    most significant increase in the fiscal year 2009 budget is the result
    of permanent end strength increases of 44,300 soldiers in two
    components: 43,000 in the Active component and over 1,300 in the Army
    National Guard. The Army's fiscal year 2009 budget includes $15.1
    billion for all the costs associated with Grow the Army, which is an
    increase of $7.4 billion over the costs of this initiative in fiscal
    year 2008. This growth will enhance combat capabilities, help meet
    global force demand, and reduce stress on deployable personnel. Amounts
    requested by major appropriation category in the fiscal year 2009
    President's budget as well as the change from the amounts enacted in
    fiscal year 2008 are:
                               military personnel
        The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $51.8 billion, a $5.5 billion
    increase from fiscal year 2008. This includes $4 billion for Grow the
    Army, an increase of $3.4 billion over fiscal year 2008. This amount
    also funds pay, benefits, and associated personnel costs for 1,090,000
    soldiers: 532,400 Active, 352,600 Army National Guard, and 205,000 Army
    Reserve. The global war on terror request will fund special pays and
    incentives and the mobilization of Reserve component soldiers.
                           operation and maintenance
        The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $40.2 billion, a $3.6 billion
    increase from fiscal year 2008. This includes $2.6 billion for Grow the
    Army, an increase of $1.9 billion from fiscal year 2008. The increase
    funds training and sustainment of Army forces and includes the
    maintenance of equipment and facilities. The global war on terror
    request will fund the day-to-day cost of the war, training to prepare
    units for deployment, and the reset of forces returning from
    deployment.
                                  procurement
        The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $24.6 billion, a $2 billion
    increase from fiscal year 2008. This includes $4.2 billion for Grow the
    Army, an increase of $100 Million from fiscal year 2008. This increase
    continues procurement of weapons systems for the Army to include the
    Non-Line of Sight Cannon, an FCS-designed system. The global war on
    terror Request will fund procurement of weapon systems to improve force
    readiness and replace battle losses and the reset of forces returning
    from deployment.
                  research, development, test, and evaluation
        The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $10.5 billion, approximately
    the same amount requested last year, but a $1.5 billion decrease in the
    amount appropriated in fiscal year 2008. The fiscal year 2009 request
    reflects a $100 million decrease to the FCS research, development,
    test, and evaluation as the programs transition to procurement.
      construction, base realignment and closure, and army family housing
        The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $11.4 billion, a $1.8 billion
    increase from fiscal year 2008. This includes $4.3 billion for Grow the
    Army, an increase of $1.9 billion from fiscal year 2008. The increase
    funds the construction of facilities to support the growth and
    restationing of Army Forces. The global war on terror request will fund
    construction in and around the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of
    operation.
                                 other accounts
        The Army executes the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction
    Program. Funding for this account is stable at $1.6 billion in fiscal
    year 2008 and fiscal year 2009. The Army also has fiscal responsibility
    for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Afghanistan Security Forces
    Fund (ASFF), and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
    (JIEDDO) appropriations. The Army budgets for recurring sustainment
    costs of JIEDDO with fiscal year 2009 at $500 million, an increase of
    $400 million from fiscal year 2008. The global war on terror request
    will fund JIEDDO initiatives. The ISFF and ASFF are funded entirely
    through the global war on terror request.
                            restoring fiscal balance
        Timely and full funding of the Army's fiscal year 2009 request of
    $140.7 billion will ensure the Army is ready to meet the needs of the
    Nation and continue the process of putting us back in balance. However,
    it is important to note that over the last 6 years, the Army has
    received increasing proportions of its funding through supplemental and
    global war on terror appropriations. This recurring reliance on global
    war on terror funds and a natural overlap between base and global war
    on terror programs means that the Army's base budget does not fully
    cover the cost of both current and future readiness requirements.
    Because the global war on terror planning horizon is compressed and the
    timing and amount of funding is unpredictable, some base programs would
    be at risk if supplemental funding is precipitously reduced or delayed.
    An orderly restoration of the balance between base and global war on
    terror requirements is essential to maintain Army capabilities for
    future contingencies.
        Our goals are to be good stewards of the resources we are provided
    by Congress and to free human and financial resources for higher
    priority operational needs. Through the use of innovations such as Lean
    Six Sigma we are improving support to our people while reducing waste
    and inefficiencies. Integral to achieving our goals is the development
    of an Army-wide cost-management culture in which leaders better
    understand the full cost of the capabilities they use and provide and
    incorporate cost considerations into their planning and decisionmaking.
    This approach will enable us to achieve readiness and performance
    objectives more efficiently. Concurrently, we are strengthening our
    financial and management controls to improve contracting in
    expeditionary operations and ensure full compliance with the law and
    regulations.
        Our goal to improve long-term sustainability will be achieved
    through effective stewardship of human, financial, and natural
    resources. Some examples of our ongoing initiatives include:

             Adjusting our national and global footprint to improve
            efficiency and sustainability
             Transforming installations, depots, arsenals, and the
            information network that connects them to become more
            effective, energy efficient, and environmentally conscious
             Transforming the Army's training, structure, systems,
            and processes to better sustain and prepare the force
             Adapting our activities to protect the environment
             Our accomplishments over the past year further
            illustrate our commitment to improving efficiency and
            effectiveness throughout the Army.
                              army accomplishments
             Initiated the Army Medical Action Plan to improve
            medical care for our wounded warriors
             Initiated the SFAP bringing to life the Army Family
            Covenant
             Initiated Soldier Family Assistance Centers throughout
            the Army to provide a single point of entry for families and
            wounded warriors for health care and related issues
             Recognized with the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige
            Award; the Army Armament, Research and Development Engineering
            Center is the only organization in the Federal Government to
            have received this honor
             Recognized for world-class excellence in
            manufacturing, the Army Materiel Command's depots and arsenals
            earned 12 Shingo public sector awards
             Formed the Army Contracting Task Force to review
            current contracting operations and then immediately began
            implementing improvements
             Converted approximately 10,000 military positions to
            civilian positions through the end of fiscal year 2007
             Privatized more than 4,000 homes, bringing the total
            to over 75,000 homes that are privately managed
             Reduced energy consumption on our installations
            through fiscal year 2007, achieving levels down 8.4 percent
            since 2003 and 28.9 percent since 1985
             Reset 123,000 pieces of equipment, including 1,700
            tracked vehicles, 15,000 wheeled vehicles, 550 aircraft, and
            7,400 generators
             Improved property accountability by providing Army
            wide visibility of 3.4 billion items valued in excess of $230
            billion
             Destroyed over 15,000 tons of chemical agent contained
            in 1.8 million chemical munitions and containers
             Moved 10 million square feet of unit cargo in support
            of the global war on terror and humanitarian aid missions
             Merged the Joint Network Node program into the
            Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, resulting in better
            integration and cost savings
             Began fielding Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
            vehicles to units in Iraq
             Established the Army Evaluation Task Force and fielded
            first `spin-outs' from FCS
             Developed the Automated Reset Management Tool to
            provide a collaborative integrated tool for equipment reset
            planning and execution of the Army Force Generation process
             Increased the rigor in training new soldiers by
            requiring graduates of basic training to be Combat Lifesaver
            certified
             Fielded Human Terrain Teams to assist commanders in
            gaining objective knowledge of a population's social groups,
            interests, and beliefs
             Employed National Guard soldiers worldwide who aided
            in seizing nearly 4,000 vehicles, approximately a million
            pounds of marijuana, and roughly 600,000 pounds of cocaine

        While we are proud of these accomplishments, we continue to
    identify and pursue additional ways to improve our stewardship,
    efficiency, and effectiveness throughout the Army.
                     preserving the strength of the nation
        The Army has been at war for over 6 years. Our soldiers have
    demonstrated valor, endured countless hardships, and made great
    sacrifices. Over 3,000 soldiers have died and many more have been
    wounded. The awards our soldiers have earned reflect their
    accomplishments and bravery on the battlefield. Our Army families have
    stood shoulder-to-shoulder with their soldiers throughout these
    challenging times.
        Our examination of the current and future security environments
    confirms the need to restore balance and build readiness across all
    components of the Army as quickly as possible. Four imperatives--
    Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform--frame how the Army will restore
    balance by 2011 and begin to build readiness for the future. To
    accomplish our plan, we will continue to require timely and predictable
    resources and support.
        The Army will remain central to successfully achieving U.S.
    national security objectives, particularly in an era in which
    operations will be waged increasingly among people in urban
    environments. As the decisive ground component of the joint and
    interagency teams, the Army operates across the full spectrum of
    conflict to protect our national interests and affirm our Nation's
    commitment to friends, allies, and partners worldwide. Our goal is a
    more agile, responsive, campaign-quality and expeditionary Army with
    modern networks, surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms
    that are lighter, less logistics dependent, and less manpower
    intensive.
        As we restore balance and build readiness for the future, we
    continue to invest in our centerpiece--soldiers--and the families that
    support them. Of the million soldiers in uniform, over half of them are
    married, with more than 700,000 children. The Army Family Covenant, the
    SFAP, and the Army Medical Action Plan are examples of our commitment
    to caring for our soldiers, families, and Army civilians in these
    challenging times. With the continued support from the Secretary of
    Defense, the President, and Congress for our legislative and financial
    needs, the Army will restore balance, build the readiness necessary in
    an era of persistent conflict, and remain the strength of the Nation.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Geren.
        General Casey?

      STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
                                  ARMY

        General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
    members of the committee.
        The chairman mentioned the fact that the Secretary and I
    were here in November, and, really, with the exception of some
    of the returning surge forces, not much has changed in the last
    90 days. That said, I'd like to re-emphasize some of the themes
    that the Secretary and I highlighted, but do it in the context
    of the fiscal year 2009 budget that we're presenting today.
        As has been said, our country is in our 7th year of war,
    and our Army remains fully engaged on all fronts, both abroad
    and at home. I testified, in November, that I believed the next
    decade would be one of persistent conflict, a period that I
    described as a period of protracted confrontation among state,
    nonstate, and individual actors who are increasingly willing to
    use violence to achieve their political and ideological
    objectives.
        I also described to you some of the global trends that I
    think will exacerbate and prolong this period: the double-edged
    swords of globalization and technology, doubling populations in
    developing countries, competition for resources, proliferation
    of weapons of mass destruction and safe havens in ungoverned
    spaces. I said that our Army must be versatile enough to adapt
    rapidly to the unexpected circumstances that will result, and
    that we are building an agile, campaign-capable, expeditionary
    force that we need for this uncertain future.
        I also said that the cumulative effects of the last 6-plus
    years at war have left our Army out of balance, consumed by the
    current fight, and unable to do the things we know we need to
    do to properly sustain our All-Volunteer Force and restore our
    flexibility for an uncertain future.
        Now, Mr. Chairman, I wrestled hard to find the right words
    to describe the state of the Army, because, as the Secretary
    said, it remains a hugely resilient, professional, and combat-
    seasoned force, but I think we all acknowledge that we are not
    where we need to be.
        I said that we have a plan that will, with your help,
    restore balance to our force, and that we've identified four
    imperatives that we must accomplish to put ourselves back in
    balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. Let me just
    say a few words about each.
        First and foremost, we must sustain our soldiers, families,
    and Army civilians. They are the heart and soul of this Army,
    and they must be sustained in a way that recognizes their
    quality of service. The Secretary mentioned some of the
    initiatives we've taken. They will continue with your support.
        Second, prepare. We need to continue to prepare our forces
    for success in the current conflicts. We cannot flinch from our
    commitment to provide them the training, the equipment, and the
    resources to give them a decisive advantage over any enemy that
    they face.
        Third, reset. The harsh environments that we're operating
    in, and the frequent deployments, are taking their toll on our
    soldiers and their equipment. Reset is about returning our
    soldiers and our equipment to appropriate levels of readiness
    for future deployments and contingencies. In fiscal year 2007,
    you provided us the resources to begin properly resetting the
    force, and, as a result, we've made significant strides in
    restoring systems and capabilities to the force. In my mind,
    resources for reset are the difference between a hollow force
    and a versatile force for the future.
        Lastly, transform. Even as we work to put ourselves back in
    balance, we must continue to transform our Army into the agile
    campaign-capable expeditionary force that can meet the security
    needs of the Nation in the 21st century. For us, transformation
    is a holistic effort to adapt how we train, modernize, develop
    leaders, station forces, and support our soldiers, families,
    and civilians.
        To guide our transformation, we are releasing, this week, a
    new version of our capstone doctrine, field manual 3.0. This is
    the first revision of our capstone doctrine since 2001. It
    describes how we see the future security environment and
    provides a framework for Army forces to operate and succeed in
    that environment. It has five significant elements.
        First, it describes the complex and multidimensional
    operational environment of the 21st century, where we believe
    we will increasingly operate and fight among the people.
        Second, the manual elevates stability operations to the
    level of offense and defense, and describes an operational
    concept for full-spectrum operations, where Army forces
    simultaneously apply offense, defense, and stability operations
    to seize the initiative and to achieve decisive results.
        Third, it emphasizes the commander's role in battle command
    and describes an intellectual process of developing solutions
    to complex challenges our forces will face.
        Fourth, it emphasizes the importance of information
    superiority in achieving success in modern conflict.
        Fifth, it recognizes that our soldiers remain the
    centerpiece of our formations and our ultimate asymmetric
    advantage.
        Mr. Chairman, we believe that this doctrine will provide us
    a great start point from which to build on the experience of
    the past 7 years and to shape our Army for the future.
        So, that's our plan: sustain, prepare, reset, and
    transform. The last 2 years, you've given us the funding to
    begin the process of putting the Army back in balance. This
    budget before you, the war on terror supplemental that will
    accompany it, and the balance of the fiscal year 2008 war on
    terror supplemental, will allow this process to continue. We
    appreciate your support, and I'd like to give you a few
    examples about how we've worked hard to put the resources
    you've given us to good use.
        First, we've made great strides in the Army Medical Action
    Plan to provide better care for our wounded soldiers.
        Second, we've initiated an Army Soldier Family Action Plan
    to bring life to our Army Family Covenant to improve the
    quality of life for soldiers and families.
        Next, we are over 60 percent complete with the modular
    conversion of our units. This is the largest organizational
    transformation of the Army since World War II. We're also over
    60 percent complete with our conversion of our 120,000 soldiers
    from skills that were needed in the Cold War to ones we need
    for the 21st century. We've reset over 120,000 pieces of
    equipment. We've privatized more than 4,000 homes, bringing the
    total of privately managed homes to over 80,000. The depots in
    our Army Materiel Command had been recognized by commercial
    industry for efficiency 12 times. There's a Shingo Award that
    industry gives for efficiency, and our depots have won 12 of
    those in the last year. So, as you can see, with your help
    we're not sitting still, and we're moving out to give the
    Nation the Army it needs for the 21st century.
        Now, let me just close with some thoughts on quality.
        I was in Alaska right before Christmas, and I was asked to
    present a Distinguished Service Cross to Sergeant Greg
    Williams. Sergeant Williams was on a Stryker patrol in Baghdad
    in October 2006. His patrol came under attack from three
    directions and with an explosively formed penetrator array.
    Those are those very lethal armor-penetrating improvised
    explosive devices. He was knocked out. He awoke to find his
    Stryker on fire, to find his legs on fire, and his eardrum
    burst. He put out his flames, and his first reaction was to
    grab the aid bag and start treating his fellow soldiers, under
    fire. He realized that the lieutenant was still in the burning
    vehicle. He went back in the burning vehicle and dragged the
    lieutenant to safety. Continuing to fire at the enemy, he
    realized that no one was manning the .50 caliber machine gun on
    top of the Stryker. He returned to the burning vehicle a second
    time, a vehicle that still contained over 30 pounds of
    explosives and detonating cord. He got on the .50 caliber,
    brought the weapon to bear on the enemy, broke the ambush, and
    the squad was extracted.
        That's the kind of men and women that we have in your Armed
    Forces today, and you can be extremely proud of the job that
    they're doing all around the world.
        That said, it will require more than the courage and valor
    of our soldiers to ensure that our Army can continue to protect
    this country in an era of persistent conflict. It will require
    recognition by national leaders, like yourselves, of the
    threats and challenges that America faces in the years ahead.
    It will also require full, timely, and predictable funding to
    ensure that our Armed Forces are prepared to defeat those
    threats and to preserve our way of life.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
        Let's try a 5-minute round of questions. It's very short,
    but we have five votes coming up, and I'm afraid it's necessary
    to hop, skip, and jump a bit. So, let's have a first round of 5
    minutes.
        According to the current model for planning the rotations
    of units into and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army's
    assertion is that it can reduce the time deployed, from the
    current 15 months, as was necessary to support the surge at the
    beginning of last year, back to the pre-surge 12 months per
    rotation. Let me ask you, Secretary or General, either one,
    when are you going to return to the 12-months deployment? What
    assumptions, relative to drawdown, do you make in the answer
    which you give to that question?
        Secretary Geren. Let me begin, but then I'd like to ask
    General Casey. We've been working on this together, and I think
    that he could provide more details on the analysis.
        We can't say, with certainty. It is a top priority for our
    Army. We know 15-month deployments are too long, and we know
    that we cannot continue to sustain the readiness that we need
    to build in this Army if we aren't able to extend the dwell
    time. Everyone in the Army understands this challenge, the
    importance of it, and we're working to shorten the deployment
    times and lengthen the dwell times.
        Chairman Levin. What is your goal? Do you have a goal for
    when you're going to reach 12 months, in terms of deployment,
    and what you need to do, in terms of drawdown of deployments,
    in order to achieve that goal? You must have a goal.
        Secretary Geren. We have a goal, but so much depends upon
    the demand from theater, and we don't control that, obviously.
        Chairman Levin. Is there a timetable for it?
        Secretary Geren. This summer, we'd like to see us be able
    to put ourselves on track to get our deployments and our dwell
    time in a one-to-one ratio.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, now what would have to come from the
    theater, in terms of drawdown, in order for you to reach 12
    months; by when? Put it in shorthand for us. You have to draw
    down to what level in order to get to 12-month deployment.
        General Casey. In shorthand, Senator, if General Petraeus
    is able to execute the announced plan of getting to 15 brigades
    by July, it would be our goal, at that point, to return to 12-
    month versus 15-month deployments.
        Chairman Levin. All right. If that pause that he says he
    favors continues, say, for 6 months, would you be able to
    continue that 12-month deployment?
        General Casey. You asked what assumptions we make.
        Chairman Levin. Yes.
        General Casey. If the brigade levels stay at 15 brigade
    combat teams, we believe it will still be possible, even with a
    pause, to go from 15 brigades to 12 brigades. That's our goal.
        Chairman Levin. Fifteen months.
        General Casey. I'm sorry, yes.
        Chairman Levin. Yes, 15 months.
        General Casey. Fifteen months to 12 months. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. That's regardless of the length of the
    pause.
        General Casey. Yes. As long as we get to 15 brigades.
        Chairman Levin. Even if we stay at 15 brigades.
        General Casey. Even if we stay.
        Chairman Levin. All right.
        I want to talk about stop loss. How many soldiers do you
    expect that the Army's going to retain under stop-loss
    authority at the end of fiscal year 2008?
        Secretary Geren. We currently have a little less than 8,000
    on stop loss today. Our goal is to get rid of stop loss as a
    force management tool. That also will depend upon what happens
    in theater. If we get down to 15 brigades, for every brigade
    that is reduced, we're able to reduce stop loss further. DOD,
    the Department of State, and the leadership of the Army all
    committed to utilizing stop loss as seldom as possible. Right
    now, it's less than 8,000. Without some remarkable change,
    it'll probably be around that at the end of the fiscal year.
        Chairman Levin. If we stay at 15 brigades?
        Secretary Geren. It might get as low as 7,000, but we don't
    expect it to go much lower than that over the course of this
    fiscal year.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Last October, General, the Army
    requested $123 million to build Warrior Transition Unit and
    Soldier Family Assistance Center facilities. Our authorization
    conference fully funded that request. Now, the Army has
    identified requirements for a substantial increase in the
    number of, and the funding required for such facilities for
    fiscal year 2009, but there's no funding in the budget request
    for those facilities, and there's no request for assistance for
    wounded warriors or families on the unfunded requirements
    letter that you've provided to us. I'm wondering why that is
    true. General?
        General Casey. We have made great use of the funds that
    you've provided there, in building 35 Warrior Transition Units
    around the country. I visited one in Alaska last week, and am
    very impressed with the quality of what we're doing.
        As for the additional funding in the 2009 base program, I
    was under the impression that we did have money in there for
    Warrior Transition Units. The exact number escapes me right
    now.
        Chairman Levin. My understanding is, there isn't. If there
    isn't, should there be?
        Secretary Geren. We have used the supplementals to respond
    to many of the wounded warrior needs, Senator, and that is
    among the areas that we're looking to move into the base
    budget, ultimately; but, right now, since they are wounds of
    war and they are a response to the casualties of war, we are
    funding much of that in the supplementals. When we look at
    programs that we're going to need to move from the supplemental
    to the base, that is one of them.
        Chairman Levin. So, we can expect that's going to be part
    of the supplemental request if it's not in the budget?
        Secretary Geren. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Over the last year and with Congress' support, we have rapidly
    improved care for our wounded warriors. We requested much of this
    funding in global war on terror supplemental because of our need to
    respond immediately. With Congress' assistance, we are operating and
    building facilities to support 35 Warrior Transition Units. Our fiscal
    year 2008 global war on terror supplemental request includes $300
    million for this purpose. Once Congress completes its budget
    deliberations, we will be able to proceed with the construction portion
    ($138 million) of these important projects and finalize our remaining
    requirements for the fiscal year 2009 global war on terror
    supplemental. In the long-term, timely and predictable funding is
    critical to ensure quality care for our wounded warriors. Starting with
    fiscal year 2010, we plan to include Army Medical Action Plan
    requirements in our budget request.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Geren, you and I were both serving together in
    the House in 1994, and you've heard me make this statement
    before about the witness that appeared before the House Armed
    Services Committee and projected that, in 10 years, we'd no
    longer need ground troops. That was 1994; I think what that
    does is emphasize that, no matter how smart we are and how many
    smart generals we have around us, if you try to project out 10
    years, you're going to be wrong. Right now, we're negotiating a
    war and you're fighting it, having started after we reduced the
    number of divisions and resources that we had. It looks like
    what you're saying in your testimony this morning is that this
    budget is going to allow us to do that. Is that your feeling
    now, that you can hold on with this budget and also address the
    four things that you mentioned, General Casey, the sustain,
    prepare, reset, and transform?
        Secretary Geren. I think we would agree, today, that we cut
    the Army way too much. This Army is about 40 percent the size
    that it was 35 years ago. In this budget and over the program
    objective memorandum, we're not only growing the Army, we're
    growing the Army faster than we planned. Our plan is to add
    74,000 soldiers to the Active Army and 65,000 to the Guard and
    Reserve. With this budget, we're moving the growth of the
    Active component up from 2012 to 2010, so we'll have completed
    that growth by then. So, we're going to have more soldiers. As
    the chief mentioned, it's not just a question of more soldiers,
    it's moving soldiers from low-demand, high-density military
    occupational specialties (MOSs) to high-demand, low-density. We
    are in the process of moving 120 soldiers out of their old MOSs
    into new MOSs. For example, the Reserves are getting 1,000 new
    soldiers under this Grow-the-Reserves plan, but they're going
    to, at the end of their transformation, have 17,000 more
    soldiers that are going to be available to the operational
    Army. So, it's growing the Army, but it's also transforming the
    Army, making sure that we have soldiers that can do what the
    demands of the future require.
        Senator Inhofe. General Casey, when you used your, for
    example, sustain, repair, reset, and transform, you weigh them
    all about the same, don't you? Equal emphasis?
        General Casey. Senator, I would weight ``sustain,'' taking
    of and retaining our soldiers, as a little heavier than I would
    the others but the others are equally important.
        Senator Inhofe. I guess what I'm getting at is, the problem
    normally is whatever is bleeding the most is going to get the
    most attention. That usually leaves transformation out, or
    moves it back. I'm very proud that you've been able to keep
    that where it is. I'd like to have you both comment on the
    current status of the FCS and how optimistic you are that
    you're going to be able to stay on schedule with that system.
        Secretary Geren. The cuts that we have taken in the program
    over the last 3 years will result in a delay. We're estimating
    now that it'll delay the program 7 months. We had expected to
    build eight of the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) cannons this year,
    we're going to build five this year, three the next. So, the
    changes in the FCS budget have affected the calendar, but we do
    believe that we're going to be able to stay on track and bring
    this program into the service of our soldiers.
        There's been a lot of questions about its affordability,
    but if you look at the $160 billion over the life of the FCS
    program, at no point does it get to be more than a third of
    research and development (R&D) and acquisition budget. So, our
    R&D budget is a fourth of our Army budget. At no point does it
    get more than a 12th of our Army budget. We believe it's
    affordable, and we believe it's an investment that we have to
    make.
        Senator Inhofe. General Casey?
        General Casey. If I could, thank you.
        You mentioned in your opening comments about some decisions
    that were made in the 1990s that resulted in the force that we
    had on September 11. If we think back to the 1990s, we were
    looking at what we thought was going to be a very peaceful
    future.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I remember the peace dividend, yes.
        General Casey. The lesson that I take from that is, you
    have to continue to look for the future. We believe that the
    FCS is exactly the full-spectrum system that we need for our
    future. In fact, when you look at this manual, you'll see that
    the things, like precision intelligence-collection abilities
    and precision effects that are required in full-spectrum
    operations in the 21st century, are exactly the kind of systems
    that the FCS will bring to us.
        This year is the year that you will be able to see some of
    the things that, up to now, you've only seen on slides. Last
    week, I visited Fort Bliss, TX, where we have an Army brigade
    that is actually testing some of the initial components of the
    FCS. There will be a limited user test this summer. You will
    also see the first prototype of the man-ground vehicle in June.
    So, this is going to go from the slides to reality, here, and I
    think you will be able to see them, and see the power of what
    we're trying to create.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. My time has expired, but
    I have this very strong feeling, as I talk to people around the
    country, that there are expectations that if our kids are going
    to go to war, they ought to have the best there is out there,
    and currently, they don't. We are deficient in some areas. You
    mentioned the NLOS cannon. That's one area where, it's my
    understanding, there are actually five countries, including
    South Africa, that make a better NLOS cannon than we have.
    That's something we want to correct, as difficult as it is
    while we're negotiating war, and I applaud you for your being
    steadfast in that area.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        The votes have begun. Senator Reed is next, and then I
    would ask Senator Reed, when he's done, whoever's here, to
    identify them, if you would. Senator Lieberman, if you'll take
    this overall charge.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
        Last Sunday, I think many people woke up and read a very
    intriguing article in the New York Times magazine about a
    battle that a company of the 173rd Airborne Brigade had in
    Afghanistan. One of the things that struck me is a passage
    which I'll read, ``One full-moon night, I was sitting outside a
    sandbag-reinforced hut with Kearney,'' Captain Dan Kearney, a
    great young company commander, airborne, ``when a young
    sergeant stepped out, hauling the garbage. He looked around in
    the illuminated mountains and dust and rocks, the garbage bins.
    The monkeys were screaming. `I hate this country,' he shouted,
    then he smiled and walked back into the hut. `He's on
    medication,' Kearney said quietly to me. Then another soldier
    walked by and shouted, `Hey, I'm with you, sir.' Kearney said
    to me, `Prozac, serious PTSD from the last tour.' Another one
    popped out of the headquarters, cursing and muttering.
    `Medicated,' Kearney said. `Last tour, if you didn't give
    information, he'd burn down your house. He killed so many
    people, he's checked out.' ''
        I find it disturbing that we have soldiers that are
    suffering, and again, this is a snapshot of one unit in one
    very difficult situation, but soldiers appear to have serious
    psychological problems, that are taking antidepressants and are
    in combat operations on a daily basis. Does that undercut a lot
    of this rhetoric about how we're doing great, the Army's fine,
    we just need a little more resources?
        General Casey. Senator, I don't think either the Secretary
    or I said that everything's great and the Army's fine. I think,
    just to the contrary, we said that we are stretched. I think
    what you're seeing is the impact of repeated tours in a brutal
    combat environment. We all understand the impact and the toll
    that takes on our soldiers and on our leaders.
        Now, I trust our junior leaders, supported by their medical
    health professionals, to make individual judgments about the
    soldiers in their units. Clearly what you read there is
    troubling.
        Senator Reed. I can recall, we were both in command of
    companies, and I, in a benign environment, was not faced with
    those types of leadership challenges, as portrayed here, of
    significant and multiple situations of young soldiers who have
    serious mental health problems. It seems to be that this is not
    a reaction to their first exposure to combat. As you point out,
    General, this is because they're being repeatedly cycled
    through combat. I think, in other circumstances, these young
    men would have been evacuated, or certainly not sent back into
    the zone. That, I think, underscores what you've said is not
    only overstretched, but, in fact, stretched, in some cases,
    beyond the capacity of individual soldiers.
        General Casey. Yes, Senator, I don't know the specifics of
    this particular unit, but I think you know that we have
    started, last summer, a very concerted effort to reduce the
    stigma that people attach to seeking assistance for PTSD and
    other mental health problems, and to inform our subordinate
    leaders so that they can help in diagnosis. We have trained
    over 800,000 of our soldiers in that, and we're starting to see
    a reduction in the stigma and people willing to come forward
    and get treatment, because, as our research has shown us, the
    sooner we get soldiers into the system, the more likely they
    are to make a full recovery.
        Senator Reed. There's another quote I think is important in
    this article by Sergeant Erick Gallardo of the unit, ``we don't
    get supplies, assets. We scrounge for everything and live a lot
    more rugged, but we know the war is here, we have unfinished
    business,'' which I think speaks to the ethic of these young
    soldiers to carry on, but also raises a question of, do they
    have everything they need? We're not just talking about the
    new, fancy FCS, we're talking about the basic equipment to
    carry out the job they're doing now. I think I would be
    disturbed; are you disturbed? When young soldiers and
    noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are talking about, ``we don't
    have everything we need.''
        General Casey. Senator, I go out to the theater, just like
    you do, and I ask everybody I talk to, ``Do you have what you
    need?'' I called both General Rodriguez, who's the commander in
    Afghanistan, and General Austin, who's the commander in Iraq,
    yesterday, and I asked them, ``Do you have supply problems? Do
    you have shortages?'' Their answer was, ``There's no systemic
    shortages, and they're at their stockage levels.'' Now, at the
    platoon level, can there be spare-part shortages? Sure. But I
    know that the logistical systems between Afghanistan and Iraq
    are well-established, and we can usually take care of shortages
    in a relatively short period of time.
        Senator Reed. My time is expired. I want to recognize
    Senator Chambliss. But, just a question for the record or for
    contemplation. When Secretary Gates was here just a few weeks
    ago, and I asked him about the status of FCS, he said, rather
    candidly, ``I don't see how the Army could ever fund this
    system going forward.'' He's someone that I think we all
    respect, and he happens to be your boss. So, I think you have a
    problem, if the Secretary candidly and honestly feels that he
    can't fund FCS, and you're talking about this all coming to
    balance in 2011. I'll try to come back for a response, but I
    want that on the record, at least.
        General Casey. I can give you a short one here, that I've
    talked to Secretary Gates after he made that statement, and he
    indicated he has no basic problems with the program. As he
    said, he supports the spinout part of the program. But, as with
    anyone faced with, as the case you posed, the inevitability of
    reductions in resources, you have to look at a $162 billion
    program.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Gentlemen, first of all, as always, thanks for your great
    service to our country. We appreciate both of you.
        I was pleased to see both of you focus on the issue of
    wounded warriors in your opening statement, and also pleased to
    see the accomplishments and progress the Army has made in
    treating wounded warriors, caring for the families, and
    ensuring that the deployment reintegration process is as
    seamless as possible.
        Secretary Geren, you were here a couple of weeks ago, when
    we had the hearing on wounded warriors, and I asked about the
    ongoing cooperation between Fort Gordon, the Augusta VA, and
    the Medical College of Georgia in relation to caring for
    wounded warriors, and I appreciate Lieutenant General
    Schoomaker's comments about the success of that collaboration.
    He deserves an awful lot of credit, and I probably didn't say
    enough about him that day, but he really did a great job when
    he was at Eisenhower relative to this issue, and he, frankly,
    gave a lot of credit to the farsighted vision of the people of
    the Augusta community for seeing a need for that partnership
    and making it work.
        Now, as we go forward regarding how the Army treats its
    wounded warriors and works to rehabilitate them either back
    into the Army or successfully into civilian life, how can the
    private sector participate with you in this regard? How can we
    help you? What kind of expertise, training, or resources might
    you be able to use from the private sector that would assist
    you in ensuring your wounded warriors receive the best
    treatment possible?
        Secretary Geren. Thank you and I'll pass along your kind
    words about General Schoomaker. He certainly did an outstanding
    job there, and he's doing an outstanding job as the Surgeon
    General for the Army today in a very challenging time. That
    collaboration between VA and the DOD at Fort Gordon and
    Eisenhower is outstanding, and it's one of the models that we
    look to, to emulate around the force. The community down there
    does an outstanding job supporting the military and VA, and we
    appreciate, very much, all they do.
        There are many areas that we have to look to the private
    sector to address challenges that come with meeting the needs
    of wounded, ill, and injured warriors. Last year, Congress gave
    us $900 million in the area of TBI and PTSD work. Much of those
    funds will be invested with outside research efforts in order
    to increase our knowledge in those areas, so we will look to
    the outside community for research. Our health care system
    today depends on TRICARE, and TRICARE depends on the private
    sector, and that is one of the great challenges we have across
    the system. Many of our Army installations are in rural areas,
    they have certain medical specialties that are underserved in
    those areas, and we have a challenge in many of these rural
    communities, particularly in the area of mental health care,
    and we need to look long and hard at the TRICARE system and our
    system of supporting mental health needs within the Army to
    figure out a good way ahead that meets this need of our
    soldiers and their families.
        Certainly, research is an area that the private sector will
    be a full partner. We have shortages throughout our system in
    the areas of mental health; we have shortages in nursing; we
    have shortages in dental care, and dental professionals as
    well. So, with the authorities you have given us, we are
    working with the private sector to try to meet these shortages.
    But, for us to be successful in meeting the healthcare needs of
    our soldiers, it will require a full partnership with the
    private sector.
        Senator Chambliss. I applaud you for taking giant steps and
    trying to make sure that these brave young men and women are
    getting the treatment they need when they come back, and we
    look forward to continuing to work with you in that respect.
        I think I'm going to have to go vote. I guess we'll be in
    recess, subject to the call of the Chair.
        Secretary Geren. All right. Thank you. [Recess.]
        Senator Collins [presiding]. The committee will be in
    order.
        At the suggestion of the chairman, we're rotating back and
    forth between the votes, and so, I'm going to proceed quickly
    with my question at this time. If someone else comes back, I'll
    turn over the gavel. It's nice to temporarily have the gavel.
        General Casey, the inadequate size of our Army has caused
    repeated and extended deployments for our troops, and this is a
    matter of great concern to all of us. You've talked this
    morning about the tremendous strain on our troops and their
    families. Another consequence of the inadequate size of our
    Army has been an unprecedented reliance on private security
    contractors in a war zone. Do you think that we have become
    over-reliant on private security contractors to perform tasks,
    in a hostile environment, that traditionally have been
    performed by our troops?
        General Casey. I would not say, Senator, that we are overly
    reliant, as you suggest. In the 1990s, as we discussed earlier,
    some decisions were made to reduce the size of the Army from
    780,000 down to around 482,000. As a result of that, we
    recognized that we would have to rely on contractors, primarily
    for logistics, but also for security.
        My recollection is that DOD is relying on about 7,000
    security contractors in theater right now. To me, that does not
    seem to be an inappropriate number, and the tasks they are
    performing, usually of providing individual or close-in
    security, are something that probably they could do better than
    our soldiers, and our soldiers can best be put to
    counterinsurgency-type operations.
        Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, the same question for
    you. Are you satisfied with the balance between having military
    personnel, versus private security contractors, in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, or do you believe that we've become too dependent
    on private security contractors, who are, for the first time,
    performing tasks that traditionally have been performed by our
    men and women in uniform?
        Secretary Geren. We have to allocate our soldiers and our
    contract resources according to the priorities of where each
    could serve best. It's not just private security contractors,
    but we've seen a tremendous growth in the number of private
    contractors that support a deployed Army. In Iraq and
    Afghanistan, we have close to 200,000 contractors. I think
    that's just a reality of the kind of Army we are today. When we
    deploy today, we will be roughly half in uniform and half out.
    As we've shrunk the size of the Army, we've had to look to
    contractors to provide many of the support functions that have
    traditionally been handled by soldiers. But, if the choice is
    between putting a soldier in one of those contract functions or
    putting a soldier out, fighting the counterinsurgency war, I
    think we're making the better choice.
        Senator Collins. The reason that I'm focusing particularly
    on the private security contractors is, unlike contract
    employees who are engaged in logistics, they are far more
    likely to be involved in a hostile incident; and, indeed, there
    have been several controversial cases in Iraq where private
    security contractors have been involved in firefights, and in
    some cases, have killed Iraqi civilians. Whether unprovoked or
    not is being investigated, even as we speak.
        Let me ask you a different question, then, General Casey.
    Are you confident that we have a clear legal authority to deal
    with private security contractors who may have killed Iraqi
    civilians without justification?
        General Casey. Senator, I cannot say that I am confident. I
    don't know the specifics of the agreement that was worked out
    between General Petraeus and the Ambassador. I know that they
    were working very hard to ensure that we could exercise
    appropriate jurisdiction over any contractor that committed,
    really, any offense that was punishable under the Uniform Code
    of Military Justice (UCMJ).
        Senator Collins. Doesn't the fact that that agreement did
    not previously exist suggest that the framework for dealing
    with such cases was legally tenuous or ambiguous?
        General Casey. Again, I can't speak to that. I think, as
    you suggest, the increasing reliance on contractors has caused
    us to expand what we needed to do to deal with them, and it was
    a learning experience, and I think we have continued to grow in
    our knowledge of what it takes to effectively exercise control
    over contractors.
        Senator Collins. General Casey, I am going to have to go
    return to the floor, but, in fact, there was not such a
    framework worked out while you were the commanding officer in
    Iraq, was there?
        General Casey. That's true. That's true. I had jurisdiction
    over the DOD contractors; the State Department had jurisdiction
    over theirs.
        Senator Collins. According to an investigation that the
    Homeland Security Committee has done, in some cases the only
    penalty for a contract employee was to be just given an airline
    ticket home. Does that trouble you?
        General Casey. I don't know that that is the case in every
    situation. I know that there were some contractors under our
    authority who were, in fact, punished. I certainly cannot say
    whether that was the case for all contractors operating in
    Iraq.
        Senator Collins. My time has expired, but I would just
    suggest that another consequence of having too small a military
    force, in addition to the one that concerns us most, which is
    the tremendous strain that repeated deployments and extended
    deployments imposes on our troops, our families, and in the
    case of the National Guard, the employers, as well. Another
    consequence has been a need to rely on private security
    contractors who are not under the UCMJ, necessarily, or who are
    not subject to the kinds of legal constraints and chain of
    command that military personnel are under. I think that's been
    a real issue.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
    Collins.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Casey, Secretary Geren, thanks for being here.
    Thanks for the extraordinary service you and over a million
    Americans who serve under you give our country. We're placing
    enormous demands on you, and, in my experience and review, the
    Army is meeting those demands with excellence, with honor, and
    with a lot of bravery, and, as a result, we're succeeding in
    places where it's not easy to succeed. So, I thank you for
    that.
        As you well know, in the nature of the process we go
    through on the budget, the administration presents the budget,
    and then we have a responsibility to independently evaluate,
    consider the threats and demands that we face, and then
    authorize to a level that we think meets those threats and
    demands. I want to focus on Army personnel, because, obviously,
    all the concern you've heard expressed here and elsewhere,
    about the 15-month tours of duty, is a result of the fact that
    we have fewer people in the Army than we should have, in my
    opinion. This fiscal year 2009 budget funds positions up to
    what number, Mr. Secretary? In the Active Army, that's what I
    want to focus on.
        Secretary Geren. In this budget, we add 43,000 soldiers,
    which had been in the supplemental, into the base budget.
    Today, we have 523,000 soldiers on Active Duty. At the end of
    the fiscal year, we'll have 534,000 on Active Duty.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. So, let me ask you this question,
    just to enable us to go through the process that we have a
    responsibility to go through. I want to ask both of you to
    answer this. Knowing what you know about the demands we face
    today, what your ideals would be, and what other demands and
    threats we may face around the world, leaving aside the very
    relevant, but I want to ask you to leave it aside, question of
    resources and budgeting, how large do you think the Army should
    be?
        General?
        General Casey. That's hard to leave the budget out of that
    discussion.
        Senator Lieberman. I know, but I want to give both the
    committee and, frankly, the American people, some sense, though
    the budget is high, that----
        General Casey. What I have said in the past, Senator, is,
    we have a plan to increase the size of the Active Force by
    65,000.
        Senator Lieberman. So, that would bring us to 547,000.
        General Casey. That's the 547,000 that we're building to
    now.
        Senator Lieberman. You've accelerated, and I appreciate it,
    the pace at which we're going to do that, and we're doing it.
        General Casey. That's correct.
        Senator Lieberman. In other words, the original was over 5
    years.
        General Casey. It was going to go out through 2012 and, as
    the Secretary said, we accelerated the growth until 2010.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Casey. The purpose of that was to, again, take and
    reduce some of the stress on the force.
        Senator Lieberman. Sure. So, that's 547,000 by 2010.
        General Casey. That's correct.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay.
        General Casey. Now, the question really then goes to: for
    what? What size Army do you need for what? The next question, I
    think, for the Active Army, particularly is: what is the access
    to the Guard and to the Reserve?
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Casey. We feel that to sustain the Guard and
    Reserve, a deployment ratio of about 1 to 5, 1 year out, 5
    years back, is sustainable. They're operating at about 1 to
    3\1/2\ right now.
        Senator Lieberman. One to 3\1/2\. Right.
        General Casey. So, my strategy has been, let's get to
    547,000.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Casey. Let's build that quality force, and let's
    continue what we're doing to increase the size of the Guard and
    Reserve, and then let's reassess, and let's have a discussion
    and a debate about how big the Army should, in fact, be.
        Senator Lieberman. So, you're not prepared to give a number
    about what your goal would be now.
        General Casey. No, I don't think so, Senator. If you're
    looking for broad parameters with the folks that are mobilized,
    there's around 600,000 people on Active Duty today.
        Senator Lieberman. So perhaps the goal there would be to
    have 600,000 on Active Duty.
        General Casey. I don't necessarily think so, because you go
    back to the question you don't want to discuss. The worst thing
    I believe we could do, Senator, is to build a force that
    wouldn't be the quality of this force. I came into a hollow
    Army, and I really don't want to go out of a hollow Army.
        Senator Lieberman. No, absolutely. That's exactly the
    point. I've been reading the things that others have said,
    including your predecessor, General Gordon Sullivan, he did a
    slightly larger universe, but he said the Army and Marines and
    Special Operations Forces ought to hit a total of 750,000. Let
    me put it a different way. The 750,000 is the current goal.
    General Sullivan talked about possibly hitting a million. I
    take your answers, and I'm not going to push you any further to
    say to me, and I'll say what I believe, myself, that the
    current goal of 547,000 is not enough, and we're going to have
    to come back, as we go on to meet the threats that we need to
    meet, and to do it with people who are capable to defend our
    security.
        Secretary Geren, my time is up, but I don't know if you
    want to add anything to what General Casey has said on this
    subject.
        Secretary Geren. When we consider the size of the Army, a
    big part of our effectiveness in the future is going to depend
    upon how good a job we do in operationalizing the Guard and
    Reserve. Our Army Active Duty is only about half of the total
    end strength of our military today.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Secretary Geren. You have the same number of people in the
    Guard and Reserve as you do in the Active Duty. Our Reserves,
    over the course of this growth, are going to add 1,000
    soldiers, but through transformation, they're going to be able
    to move 17,000 more soldiers into their operating force. So,
    there are a lot of variables as we look to what the right mix
    should be and what the right size should be. I think our most
    prudent course of action is to achieve the growth that we have
    on the books now, continue to work the transformation, move
    folks into MOSs that are in high demand, look at how
    effectively we can operationalize the Guard and Reserve, and
    then assess where we are, and then make a decision on whether
    or not it's an Army that meets the needs of the future.
        Senator Lieberman. The dialogue will continue. Thanks very
    much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        I want to pick up, first, on a question that Senator
    Collins asked about under what law State Department contractors
    in Iraq are operating. I think it's important that we have a
    clear answer for the record. I understand that there's an
    effort now to negotiate an agreement with the Iraqi Government.
    That's not what I'm referring to. I don't think that's what
    Senator Collins was referring to either because she was talking
    about until now, what is the law that governs contractors hired
    by the State Department who allegedly have committed crimes? We
    need to know that for the record.
        Secretary Geren. Let us get back to you for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Geren. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
    Act (MEJA) law gives our Justice Department the authority to
    criminally prosecute Americans who commit crimes in foreign
    countries, so that is a backstop, but, as you well know, it's
    not used very often; it's been used very few times.
        Chairman Levin. Do you know why it's not used?
        Secretary Geren. I do not.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. Can you give us, for the record, a
    clear answer to what law applies? If Iraqi law doesn't, because
    of some agreement reached with the Iraqis, what American law
    applies? If it's a law that's not used frequently, why is it
    not used frequently? We need to know that, clearly, for the
    record.
        Secretary Geren. I'll get back to you for the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. If you could do that promptly,
    because this issue is coming up in other committees, and there
    should be an answer from the DOD on this.
        On the deployment issues that I went over with you before,
    assume for the moment that there are two additional brigade
    combat teams that are needed in Afghanistan, and the other
    countries that are involved don't provide them, and the
    decision is made by our commander there that they are needed.
    Could those two U.S. combat teams be provided under your
    scenario, General? In other words, could you continue your 12-
    month deployment? Would that answer still be effective after
    July, if we get down to 15 combat teams in Iraq, and stay
    there, if two additional brigade combat teams of the United
    States are required in Afghanistan, or would that change your
    answer?
        General Casey. Senator, when you asked that question
    earlier, about what the assumption is, my assumption is 15
    deployed Active component brigades, which, for the Army, is 13
    in Iraq and 2 in Afghanistan.
        So at 15 brigades, either in Iraq and/or Afghanistan,
    that's where we can stay at 12 months.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. So, the 15 includes 2 in Afghanistan.
        General Casey. There are two Marine regiments in there in
    Iraq.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. I just want a real clear answer. Now,
    there's 3,200 marines that are being sent, or have been sent,
    additionally, to Afghanistan. That's separate, correct?
        General Casey. Correct.
        Chairman Levin. The 15 brigades that you referred to, in
    Iraq in July, are the 15 that General Petraeus has talked
    about.
        General Casey. That's correct. That would be 13 Army and 2
    Marine.
        Chairman Levin. Two Marine. My question is: if two
    additional brigades are needed in Afghanistan, to the number of
    troops we already have there, would that change your answer?
        General Casey. As I said, my assumption on getting to 15
    months is that we will stay at 15 Army Active component
    brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Chairman Levin. What is General Petraeus's statement about
    getting to 15 brigades in July and then pausing? Are those the
    same 15 you've just described?
        General Casey. He is describing the 15 brigades in Iraq
    only. Those 15 brigades consist of 13 Army and 2 Marine.
        Chairman Levin. The 15 he's talking about are 13 Army, 2
    Marine.
        General Casey. Right.
        Chairman Levin. Now, if, in addition to what he's talking
    about is needed in Iraq, two additional brigades are needed in
    Afghanistan, on top of the troops we have there now, then, I
    take it, your answer is, we could not get to 12-months
    deployed. Is that correct?
        General Casey. Then I would have to go back and relook at
    that impact. I have not looked at supporting 17 brigades.
        Chairman Levin. I thought you did look. You said that the
    maximum in both Iraq and Afghanistan was 15. Now you're saying
    you need to relook it?
        General Casey. You asked me what my assumption was to get
    from 15 months to 12 months. I said it was 15 deployed Active
    component brigades between Iraq and Afghanistan. Army brigades.
        Chairman Levin. So, you're saying it's possible that you
    could add two additional brigades to Afghanistan and still have
    the same answer of 12-months deployment?
        General Casey. I have not looked at that specific case,
    Senator, and as I said, I'm very comfortable with the 15
    number. I have not looked specifically at 17.
        Chairman Levin. All right. My time's up. Would you get that
    back, then, for the record, to us?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Deployment lengths and dwell times are a function of available
    supply and global combatant commander demands. Currently, U.S. Central
    Command demands over half of the available Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
    in the Army inventory. As demand for Army BCTs decreases, deployment
    lengths decrease.
        The Army is planning to reduce deployment lengths for soldiers from
    15 to 12 months later this year as the number of BCTs in Iraq is
    reduced. Twelve-month deployments are sustainable only if the global
    demand for BCTs remains at or below pre-surge levels. In other words,
    the number of available BCTs is fixed. If the two BCTs were provided to
    Afghanistan without a similar reduction elsewhere, the Army could not
    achieve 12-month deployment lengths.

        Chairman Levin. We have 3 minutes left, plus the 5 minutes
    add-on. So, Senator Lieberman, we'll turn it to you. If no one
    is here when you are done, would you recess us for 15 minutes?
    I'm going to come back and make sure there's no other Senators.
    Thank you.
        Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Honored to do that. Thank
    you.
        I just have a few questions, then I'm going to go over and
    vote.
        I wanted to focus in on another element of Army personnel.
    In my opinion, and, I presume, yours, the All-Volunteer Army
    has been a great success. I'm often asked when I'm out in
    Connecticut or elsewhere, ``Is there a need to go back to the
    draft?'' I said, ``No. The military, particularly, doesn't want
    to do that, because we have a good All-Volunteer Force.''
        Studies that I've looked at say that the quality of that
    All-Volunteer Force is dependent very much on two primary
    determinants, and that is the scores of the recruits on the
    Services Aptitude Test, and if the recruit had received a high
    school diploma. Obviously, there are individuals who may not
    score the highest on the aptitude test or may not have a high
    school diploma who turn out to be extraordinary soldiers. But
    my reading of these studies says that, on the average, we do
    better if we have people who score better on the test and have
    a high school diploma. Reports now indicate that we're falling
    down from the previous high levels in recruitment, that is, the
    test scores and the presence of a high school diploma, among
    people coming into the Army now. I want to ask you to comment
    on that, but also I want to ask this question in an affirmative
    spirit, which is: what can we do to help the Army, if this is a
    problem, recruit to a level that assures that this All-
    Volunteer Force of ours will continue to maintain the standards
    of excellence and success that it has achieved thus far?
        Secretary Geren. Many issues bear on that question. Let me,
    first, say that many intangibles go into deciding whether or
    not somebody makes a good soldier or not.
        Senator Lieberman. Sure.
        Secretary Geren. One of the most important intangibles in
    assessing our recruiting classes these days is their
    willingness to stand up and raise their right hand and join the
    Army in the middle of a war.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Secretary Geren. That tells you a lot about that young man
    or that young woman.
        Senator Lieberman. Motivation.
        Secretary Geren. They join the Army knowing they likely
    will be going into combat. So, I think, as a threshold
    question, that helps sort out folks. It brings the type of
    people into the Army that we want, the people that are willing
    to make selfless sacrifices.
        But you're right, when you look at our quality indicators
    over the last 3 years, they have gone down. Our high school
    diploma grads were at 79 percent last year. Our goal was to
    keep that above 80 percent. The Office of the Secretary of
    Defense goals are 90 percent, and we strive for that, and we
    are working to get to those levels.
        We have a challenge with our recruiting population. Only
    about 3 out of 10 young men in the 17- to 24-age range have the
    physical, moral, mental, and educational qualifications to join
    the Army. So we're aiming at the same people that the job
    market is aiming at. We want people that are dependable,
    healthy, moral, and have demonstrated a commitment to finish
    what they started, finish high school. As a country, we need to
    expand that pool, we need to get more young people to finish
    high school.
        A looming issue on the horizon is obesity. We're seeing
    that, as we look 10 years down the road we're going to see more
    and more young people disqualified for joining the Army because
    of obesity. We have to do a better job, as a country, producing
    17- to 24-year-olds that have the standards that qualify them
    to join our Army. So, I think that's a national effort.
        Senator Lieberman. So, short answer, and I apologize,
    because I have to go over and vote, can you think of anything
    specific that we can do for you, by way of funding or programs,
    that will enable you to get back to those higher percentages on
    the high school diploma, for instance?
        Secretary Geren. In this budget, we do have a couple of new
    programs that we started last year continuing this year. One is
    our Army Advantage Fund, which is offering opportunities for
    homeownership and also the opportunity to start a small
    business as an incentive. I think one of our most promising
    initiatives is a partnership between the Active component and
    the Guard to recruit together and have a young man or woman
    join the Active component and then transition to the Guard for
    the rest of their obligated service. So we are funding those
    initiatives and we continue to work to figure out ways to do
    what we do, and do it better, just recruit better. But, long-
    term, we need, as a country, to do a better job of producing
    young people that are educated and meet the requirements of the
    Army. Support from leaders such as yourself, at the national
    level and the State level, and encouraging young people to join
    the Army, is a very valuable part of our effort.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Secretary.
        General, I apologize for not having the time here, but this
    obviously is a long-range problem, and you and I will have many
    opportunities to discuss it.
        Thank you.
        General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.
        General Casey. Thank you for your interest.
        Senator Lieberman. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Let me mention something. Senator Akaka, have you gone,
    have you had a series of questions yet?
        Senator Akaka. No.
        Senator Inhofe. Oh. Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka [presiding]. Thank you very much.
        Secretary, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and
    Management Support, I am especially concerned about the amount
    of time our soldiers are getting at home in between
    deployments, both to take care of themselves and their
    families, but also to receive the necessary training. This
    really is about resetting, as is being mentioned. Even with the
    increase in Army end strength, I'm concerned that operations
    tempo facing our soldiers will impact their ability to be
    trained and prepared for missions across the spectrum of
    conflict.
        My question to you, Secretary: what are the biggest
    obstacles for the Army to overcome if another crisis erupts
    that demands U.S. military intervention on the ground?
        Secretary Geren. Our goal is full-spectrum readiness, have
    our soldiers ready for the full range of threats that are out
    there. As you note in your question, with the length of time
    that we have at home today, 12 months between deployments, we
    do not have time to train for full-spectrum readiness in that
    period of time. We have funding that is allowing us to reset
    the equipment, so that equipment is ready for when soldiers
    redeploy, but, until we get to a deployment-to-dwell ratio that
    gives us adequate time at home, we are going to fall short of
    our goal of full-spectrum readiness.
        Senator Akaka. General Casey?
        General Casey. There's a perception that conventional
    training is not happening in the Army, and it's not happening
    much. But, I recently visited both Japan and Korea, and in
    Japan I witnessed an Army corps participating in a conventional
    scenario partnered with a Japanese corps. Then, in Korea, the
    U.S. forces under General Bell are also doing conventional
    training. So, not much, but it's not nonexistent.
        Senator Akaka. If current operations, Mr. Secretary, in
    Iraq and Afghanistan continue to require the same approximate
    number of forces for the next 2 or 3 years, what impact will
    this have on readiness, do you think?
        Secretary Geren. We are consuming readiness now as quickly
    as we build it, and if we are unable to extend the dwell time,
    if the number of brigades doesn't get down to a demand of 15
    brigades for our Army, we are going to have a difficult time
    having sufficient dwell time to accomplish all the missions
    that we hope to accomplish when a soldier is home. Our soldiers
    are training for the mission which they are asked to do today,
    counterinsurgency mission, and the soldiers that we send into
    combat are well-prepared for what we're asking them to do, but
    the demand to get them prepared for what we are asking them to
    do now understandably limits their ability to prepare for other
    missions.
        General Casey. Senator, if I could.
        Senator Akaka. General Casey?
        General Casey. Based on your question about what will
    happen the next few years, and if you hold the demand steady at
    those 15 Active component brigades, what you see is, with our
    growth, that the amount of dwell time at home gradually
    increases to the point where every year, starting in 2009, we
    get a progressively larger number of forces trained for the
    full spectrum of operations, in addition to the forces that
    we're deploying. So, the growth helps.
        Secretary Geren. When we reach our goal of 76 brigade
    combat teams across all three components, we'll be able to
    sustain up to 19 brigades deployed, at that point. So as we
    grow and reorganize towards that, we will be able to sustain a
    higher level of overseas deployments.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        General Casey, much has been said of the limited value of
    mechanized warfare and the impact technology can have in
    conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations, which
    tend to rely much more on cultural awareness and interpersonal
    relationships to be effective. In essence, the enemy is not a
    willing participant in the information network, and detection
    in urban environments may be beyond the capabilities of any
    known technology. My question is: what are the specific
    advantages that a FCS VCT could bring to the counterinsurgency
    fight that justify its cost in the near term?
        General Casey. Thank you, Senator. A couple of points here.
    First of all, the FCS is an effective system across the
    spectrum of conflict, and I see it as very good at conventional
    war in the 21st century, which is going to be different than
    the wars we plan to fight on the plains of Europe. But, I see
    it as very helpful in terms of irregular warfare. As I
    mentioned in my opening remarks, in irregular warfare, your
    intelligence requirements require much more precision than they
    do in conventional warfare. It's a heck of a lot easier to find
    the second echelon of the 8th Guard's Tank Army than it is to
    find, as you suggested, an individual on the sixth floor of a
    high-rise apartment building in a sprawling city. What we're
    working on with the FCS, and what is being tested and evaluated
    today out at Fort Bliss, are unmanned and unattended ground
    sensors, UAVs, all linked by the network, that will allow us to
    locate, precisely, the targets of our military operations, and
    then to apply precision effects. There's a NLOS weapon system,
    that is part of this first test that you'll see, that can put a
    missile on a target from 40 kilometers away. So its precision
    intelligence-collections ability and its precision attack
    capabilities will make it, in my view, just as useful in
    irregular warfare as it is in conventional warfare.
        Lastly, the network will enable our soldiers to have a much
    better situational understanding of what will inherently be a
    very, very complex environment, and they will be augmented in
    that, in their cultural understanding and their cultural
    training, which would still be part of it. But, as I said, I am
    quite comfortable with the FCS capabilities in both an
    irregular and in a conventional environment.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Geren and General Casey, thank you for your
    service and your outstanding leadership to our country. Welcome
    to the committee.
        I have to say that the last 6 years have made me extremely
    proud of the work that our Army does. These amazing men and
    women have performed incredible feats in the toughest of
    environments without complaint, and their families, of course,
    have shouldered an incredible burden, as well, with many of the
    soldiers serving multiple tours in harsh environments overseas.
        What I'd like to do is pick up on some of the questioning.
    I serve as the ranking Republican on the Readiness
    Subcommittee, with Senator Akaka. Last November, when you both
    appeared before the committee, I asked about the unwillingness
    of Congress to deliver adequate and predictable funding to you,
    and what kind of effect this was having. General Casey, you
    answered, ``We will beggar the home front to make sure that our
    soldiers that are in the theater have everything that they
    need, and it will put a terrible burden on soldiers, on
    families, on the institutional Army, our ability to train.''
    Despite that testimony, Congress decided to provide only a
    portion of the emergency supplemental funds required by the
    President last year, and, in your prepared statement today, you
    emphasized that today's Army is out of balance, that, overall,
    our readiness is being consumed as fast as we build it. These
    statements are obviously cause for deep concern, and I guess my
    question is: is the problem of our readiness being consumed as
    fast as it is built related to the problems that you face in
    receiving timely and complete funding from Congress? Is the
    lack of full funding inhibiting our ability to grow the force
    with the capabilities that we need for future operations?
        Either one of you, if you want to react to that, or answer.
        Secretary Geren. You have to look at the funding in all the
    many categories that we rely on it. We use the term in the
    trade, the color of money, but there's money that can be used
    for certain purposes and can't be used for other purposes.
    Predictable and timely funding is key for us to be able to
    operate an organization that is the size of the United States
    Army. A million men and women in uniform, and over 200,000
    civilians, and over 200,000 contractors. When funding is
    unpredictable, it makes it very hard to plan, long-term.
        One area of great concern for us right now is Base
    Realignment and Closure (BRAC) funding. Last year, you all did
    not fund the entire BRAC bill, and, for the Army, we're $560
    million short, going into this year, in BRAC funding. It's
    going to make it very difficult for us to meet what the law
    requires, finishing BRAC by September 2011. We need that
    funding. We need it sooner, rather than later.
        The military construction funding also is very critical to
    maintaining support for our families. We're moving tens of
    thousands of soldiers around, we're building housing and other
    support structures across the country and around the world, and
    the delays that we've experienced in receiving the military
    construction funding also complicated our ability to being able
    to build what we need, when we need it, and maintain the type
    of synchronization that's necessary in order to manage the
    personnel of a huge organization such as the Army's.
        We are going to run out of the money in personnel in June
    in the supplemental funding, and we will run out of our O&M
    funds in July. As we anticipate that, we'll have to start
    making adjustments in order to accommodate for the ripple
    effect of that situation. So, it makes it very difficult, it
    makes things cost more, and it makes things take longer. Last
    December, we got awfully close to a point where we were going
    to have to start laying off people, or at least giving them
    notice of layoffs, and I'm hopeful that we don't find ourselves
    in that situation this spring. We really need the supplemental
    funding by Memorial Day.
        General Casey. The only thing I'd add to that, Senator, is
    that what you don't necessarily see are the second- and third-
    order effects of the delays. For example, I mentioned in my
    opening statement that in fiscal year 2007 we got the money for
    the reset, right up front, and we were able to not only commit
    all of that, but also to buy the spares in advance that we
    needed, the long-lead items. Every time you delay long-lead
    items, you delay the completion of the reset and the vehicle.
    So, there are always second- and third-order effects that
    aren't visible that impact us over the long haul.
        Secretary Geren. Let me mention one other thing, if I
    could, on military construction. When we're operating under a
    continuing resolution, we don't have the authorities for new
    starts, either. That greatly complicates our ability to build
    the infrastructure to meet the needs of our soldiers and their
    families. Over the last several years, we have found ourselves
    having to operate without the new-start authority, or at least
    not having it in a timely manner. That complicates it as well.
    So, it's not just a question of the money, it's also a question
    of the authority which comes from authorizers. That makes it
    challenging to be able to build our infrastructure on the
    timeline that we need in order to meet the needs of our
    soldiers and families.
        Senator Thune. I have some other questions, Mr. Chairman,
    but I see my time is expired. That was the main issue I wanted
    to get out, so perhaps I'll submit some of those for the
    record.
        Thank you.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. I know our men and
    women in Army green are indebted to you for your commitment,
    and we appreciate your giving us your candid appraisal of where
    we are, at the moment, with readiness and a number of other
    extremely important issues.
        One of them has come to my attention; last week, the
    Washington Post published an article outlining the Army's
    policy on maternity leave and deferments from war-zone areas
    for new mothers that are serving in the military. According to
    the story, new mothers are facing a continuing difficult
    decision between motherhood and their service for their
    country. New mothers who have the critical skills to support
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have to seek a deferment
    which would allow them to spend more time with their newborn
    before having to return to their job within the military.
        In 2007, the Navy extended their deferment time for new
    mothers to 12 months. But the Army's policy only allows, at the
    present time, for 4 months before facing deployment. Some of my
    colleagues and I have written a letter to Secretary Gates to
    review the current policies that are in place, but I wonder,
    Secretary Geren, in light of our need to keep skilled
    personnel, many of whom are women, maybe as much as 15 percent
    of our force, what are your thoughts about the Army's policy
    versus the Navy policy, or at least in looking at the policy to
    see if this is a reasonable period of time or whether it should
    be extended?
        Secretary Geren. The chief and I have had numerous
    discussions about that, and we have tasked the Army staff to
    examine that policy and examine the impact of a change in that
    policy. I don't want to prejudge the outcome at this point, but
    we have asked them to explain to us why we should not be able
    to increase the maternity leave at least up to the level where
    the marines have been, which is 6 months.
        Senator Ben Nelson. With the force strength that we have,
    and the number of deployments and extended deployments, and
    trying to cut all that down, it only adds another variable to
    your already difficult task. But, if we're going to think about
    both recruitment and retention, I think clearly that has to be
    reviewed because it has to have some impact on people deciding
    whether to get in or stay in, if they have to get an extended
    deferment in order to have a family.
        Secretary Geren. I understand and share your concerns, and
    we should be able to get back with you pretty soon with an
    answer.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Current Army policy requires a 4-month Postpartum Operational
    Deferment period for a female soldier after the birth of a child. The
    Army Postpartum Operational Deferment policy matches designated
    guidelines established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
        The Army recognizes the merit in lengthening the Postpartum
    Operational Deferment period, and intends to lengthen that period to 6
    months once Active Army units return to a 12-month deployment rotation
    policy from the 15-month deployment rotation policy that is currently
    in place.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
        I think it was June 2007 that the Center for New American
    Security Publication titled ``Institutionalizing Adaptation
    Report'' stated, ``The most important military component of the
    long war will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well
    we enable and empower our allies to fight with us.'' We're
    faced with requiring heavy numbers with a very well-armed and
    well-staffed Army to do what we would call, I guess, the
    essential combat of the past that an Army does. But, we're now
    faced with new requirements around the world. I guess we're no
    longer talking about nation-building, that's passe. At least in
    trying to help other countries develop their own military, are
    we at a point where we need to have a standing Army Advisory
    Corps, General Casey, as well as the typical operating mix of
    conventional forces and Special Operations Forces?
        General Casey. That's something that we are looking at very
    closely, and not only internally, but also with the Commander
    of Special Operations Command, Admiral Olson, and with the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps. In fact, we're getting
    together, here, in the next couple of weeks to discuss that.
        Clearly, one of the elements of any former battlefield, we
    believe, will be our ability to interact and work with
    indigenous forces.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Without knowing the answer to this,
    it's impossible to even give much of a guess, but on a 50-50
    basis, do you think that 50 percent of the future will require
    conventional forces, or will it be 60 percent or 40 percent?
    What mix do you envision between an asymmetrical combat force
    capability and conventional force capability?
        General Casey. Senator, as we look to the future, we
    believe that we will be best served by multipurpose forces that
    can operate across the full spectrum of conflict, from
    conventional war to peacetime engagement. That's the doctrine
    that I spoke about here. Those are the forces that we are
    trying to build. I would also tell you a bit more about your
    initial question. Cleary, there's an increasing role for
    special forces in training other armies, and we are increasing
    the number of special forces battalions by five, and that will
    give us great capability. We are, as you suggest, examining
    whether we should put an assistance group in each of the
    regional combatant commanders. We're working with them to see
    if that would be useful to them.
        But, working with indigenous forces is clearly an element
    of any future battlefield.
        Senator Ben Nelson. My time's up, but I'm going to follow
    up with a letter to the Secretary of Defense, in light of the
    concern that we have about the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization's (NATO) capabilities of providing military
    support, where necessary, at the required levels of support
    necessary. Should we be looking, perhaps, for a two-tiered
    approach by NATO to not only have the capabilities of combat
    forces, as in the case of Afghanistan, but for more assistance
    in this area of an advisory role for part of their commitment?
    It seems to me that it's one thing for us to hit them over the
    head because they don't send enough troops, they don't have
    enough troops, they don't keep enough troops, and I'm not
    talking about all those that are already doing it, but those
    who can't. There may be another role that they could play.
    Rather than have us hit them over the head for what they're not
    doing, maybe we ought to start thinking about what they could
    do, and how they could support that kind of a growth in the
    Army.
        General Casey. The NATO allies, especially Italy, did a
    great job in Iraq training police. The Carbinieri were very
    effective in the south.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen.
        Senator Reed. Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator.
        I missed the discussion between Senators Levin, Collins,
    and, I think, yourselves, about what law governs contractor
    behavior. The sooner we could get an answer to that situation,
    I think, the better the country would be.
        I've just gotten back from a fairly extended visit to Iraq,
    and one of the big issues facing our country is that we're
    going to war now with, I think, over 100,000 contractors.
    They're patriotic Americans who are doing a great job,
    generally speaking, for our country, but we've never had a war
    quite like this. The idea of that many people being in Iraq,
    some of them with guns, requires us to address this problem and
    find out what law does regulate their behavior; because, Mr.
    Secretary, General Casey, I think it's a very demoralizing
    event for an E-4 or E-5 to be sitting across the table from a
    civilian contractor who makes four times what they make, and
    the contractor breaks the rules in an obvious way, and nothing
    happens, other than maybe getting fired. So, I would just add
    my voice to the idea that we need, as a country, to come up
    with a solution to this problem.
        General Casey, when it comes to force reductions in Iraq,
    the goal is to try to get to 15 brigades, I think, by July. Is
    that correct?
        General Casey. Correct, sir.
        Senator Graham. Could you explain to me, very briefly, the
    collaborative process that's going on, in determining when the
    troops come home, between you, General Petraeus, and others?
        General Casey. General Petraeus will come back in April and
    give his assessment of what needs to happen after July. He will
    interact with the Joint Chiefs in the process of forming his
    recommendations. But, there will also be independent action by
    the Joint Chiefs, so that we can present the President with our
    independent views on what the situation requires.
        Senator Graham. I understand that, and my two cents worth
    here is that it's been a very hard fight to turn things around
    in Iraq. I think we are turning things around politically,
    economically, and militarily. Every one wants the troops back
    home, and you can add me to that list. But, more than anything
    else, I want to make sure we don't lose the gains we've
    achieved by going down too fast. I'm sure you're sensitive to
    that. Is that correct, General Casey?
        General Casey. I am sensitive to that, sir.
        Senator Graham. I know the troops want to come home, but
    they're very proud of what they've achieved, and I want to make
    sure that we don't bring people home for anything other than
    success. I think they're going to come home with success.
        General Casey. Senator, if I could add to what you say.
        Senator Graham. Please. Yes, sir.
        General Casey. As I talk to the soldiers, it's exactly what
    you suggest. The most important thing to them is winning, not
    necessarily coming home.
        Senator Graham. Generally speaking, General Casey, how is
    morale for folks in the Army, particularly in Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        General Casey. Senator, everything I have personally
    observed during my visits in December, and that I continue to
    hear, is that morale, both in Iraq, Afghanistan, and among the
    returning forces, is very positive. They believe in what
    they're doing. They see themselves making a difference in a
    very difficult environment. So I believe morale is very good.
        Now, as we said before you arrived, the force is stretched
    and there is no question about that. I just visited a brigade
    in Alaska that had been back about 90 days. My assessment is,
    they felt pretty good about what they did, but they were tired.
        Senator Graham. Sure, and that's why we're trying to build
    up the Army, right?
        General Casey. Right.
        Senator Graham. Is that correct? Okay.
        There was a comment made at, I think, the last Democratic
    debate by Senator Obama. Mr. Secretary, I don't know if you are
    familiar with what he said, but basically, during the debate,
    he indicated that a captain who was in charge of a rifle
    platoon in Afghanistan had come up to him and said that the
    amount of troops in that platoon were basically reduced in
    half, and the other half went to Iraq, and that the people left
    over went to Afghanistan, and they didn't have bullets, and
    they had to use Taliban weapons. It was easier to use Taliban
    weapons than it was to get the equipment they needed from the
    Army. Has Senator Obama talked to you or anyone in the
    Department about this?
        Secretary Geren. No. I have not discussed it with Senator
    Obama. General Casey, though, has looked into this issue, and
    I'd like to give him the opportunity to respond, with your
    permission.
        Senator Graham. Please.
        General Casey. Senator, as we looked into this, the best we
    could tell is, this incident occurred back in 2003 and 2004,
    and it was in a brigade of the 10th Mountain Division. We have
    talked to the brigade commander, and we've looked at their
    readiness reports. The brigade was manned over 100 percent, and
    stayed over 100 percent manned the whole time they were there.
    Now, it's certainly possible that platoons within that brigade
    might not have been filled to the same level as the rest of the
    brigade.
        You'll recall that was a difficult time, as we were all
    working very hard to get uparmored Humvees in to the troops.
    There were no uparmored Humvees available for him in training,
    which is one of the points that he made; there were only, at
    that time, a little over 50 in all of Afghanistan.
        There may have been some spot shortages of spare parts and
    ammunition, but the commander said that there was never a
    shortage of ammunition that impacted on the unit's ability to
    accomplish its mission.
        Senator Graham. But, you were never contacted by Senator
    Obama in 2003 or 2004, or any other time?
        General Casey. No, I have not been.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Since we had a McCain moment, I think I need to have an
    Obama moment, out of fairness. It wasn't what I intended to ask
    about, but Secretary Geren and General Casey, I think you both
    are certainly aware that this captain has been contacted and
    has independently verified to independent sources the
    frustration he had with getting everything they needed, to do
    what they needed to do in Afghanistan. Is that your
    understanding, that this captain who has served valiantly and
    heroically, has independently verified that, certainly, there
    was a frustration over getting what they needed to do the job
    in Afghanistan at that point in time?
        General Casey. Senator, I don't think there's any doubt
    about that. We have purposefully not tried to seek out the
    captain, individually.
        Senator McCaskill. Which I respect.
        General Casey. I've seen the same reports that you've seen.
    Again, I have no reason to doubt what it is the captain says.
    But, this was 2003-2004, almost 4\1/2\ years ago. We
    acknowledge, and we all worked together to correct,
    deficiencies with equipment that we saw during that period, not
    only in Afghanistan, but in Iraq. It was a period that we have
    worked our way through.
        Senator McCaskill. I admire the acknowledgment that has
    occurred in this hearing room, by command, DOD, Secretary
    Gates, and by you and all of your colleagues, at the
    shortcomings, in terms of getting the equipment and we all know
    the shortages we have in Afghanistan right now, in terms of
    boots-on-the-ground. I mean, that is a critical, critical
    problem for us right now, in terms of us having success with
    NATO, getting the number of other countries involved, like we
    should have and haven't been able to, because of their
    unwillingness. So to act as if this Army captain is speaking
    about something that we all haven't acknowledged, I think,
    frankly, is misleading.
        Now I'll get to my questions.
        First of all, I want to congratulate Senator Nelson for
    speaking about maternity leave. I'm glad that he showed his
    softer side today and acknowledged that this is a career issue
    for the Army.
        I also want to talk, in passing, before I get to officer
    retention, about paternity leave. I think that it's time for
    the Army, frankly, and for the Secretary of Defense to look at,
    overall, a uniformity of policy between the various branches as
    it relates to both maternity leave and acknowledgment of some
    recognition of paternity leave. I know this was being
    discussed. I know that there was a pullback that occurred by
    one of the Under Secretaries of Defense about paternity leave.
    But, I just wanted to say that I'm hopeful that you all
    continue to look at that issue, because it dovetails nicely
    with what I want to ask you about this morning, which is our
    ability to retain officers.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Defense is reviewing a legislative proposal that
    will amend section 701 of title 10, U.S.C., to include a new
    authorization to allow up to 21 days of permissive temporary duty for
    servicemembers in conjunction with the birth of a new child. The
    legislative proposal is consistent with a recent congressional change
    to section 701 of title 10 (section 593), which authorized up to 21
    days of administrative leave for a servicemember adopting a child. As
    with all leave, paternity leave would be granted on an individual basis
    dependent on the unit's mission and operational circumstances.

        Senator McCaskill. I would like both of you to speak to
    what I think the Government Accountability Office (GAO) pointed
    out, which is, we need to consolidate the command over West
    Point and Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), in terms of
    officer retention and it worries me that we are promoting 98
    percent of our captains and majors right now. That's an
    extraordinarily high number. It also worried me that we are
    doing the officer ascension program directly through Officer
    Candidate School, as opposed to West Point and ROTC. Looking
    from the outside, it appears to me that we may have a little
    turf war going on here between the command of West Point and
    the command of ROTC. Clearly, if I have young people that have
    applied to go to West Point, and they don't make it, we need to
    make sure we're grabbing those folks and getting them in the
    ROTC program. I'm very worried about this lack of coordination,
    especially when you realize that this is a huge hole that we
    can't patch. We have to integrate a solution and I'd love both
    of you to speak to that.
        Secretary Geren. Thank you for raising that. I appreciated
    the letter you sent on that. I've studied the GAO report and
    agree with many of those concerns.
        We have tasked a retired general to look at this issue and
    make some recommendations on how we could do a better job of
    coordinating the overall officer accessions. We are already
    working to do a better job of taking those outstanding young
    men and women who are not accepted into West Point, and trying
    to make them aware and recruit them into ROTC programs. But,
    overall, we have to do a better job of taking what, right now,
    are, by and large, three stovepipes--the military Academy,
    ROTC, and OCS--and bring those together and break down the
    walls between them. Over the course of this spring, we'll be
    back to you with a proposal to address those very important
    concerns. We are in agreement about the challenge, and we'll be
    getting back with you soon on a recommended way ahead.
        Senator McCaskill. I'm happy. I know that the stovepiping
    is resisted by the commands, and if some pointed letters to any
    of those commands, General, would help, I'm more than happy to
    let my pen fly.
        General Casey. Thank you for the offer, Senator. I find
    they respond pretty well to my direction.
        Senator McCaskill. I think that you can handle it, but I
    just want you to know there are several of us that have your
    back on this one. I think it's really important.
        General Casey. Thank you.
        Secretary Geren. Thank you.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. General Casey, one of the things that you
    promised to do when you returned as our commander in Iraq was,
    as Chief of Staff, to check on the status of families, those
    who've served, how they're doing. Your wife has been active in
    that. You've visited with a lot of people. First, are you
    continuing to do that? What are your observations, in general,
    and concerns about the state of the Army family health?
        General Casey. Senator, as I took over here, and we--my
    wife and I--traveled around the Army, it was clear to us, and
    this is late last summer, that the families were the most
    brittle part of the force, that we were asking more of Army
    families than I, frankly, thought that we should have been. We
    weren't doing enough for them. I've been a member of an Army
    family for 60 years, so I have some experience in this.
        In October, the Secretary and I issued an Army Family
    Covenant where we restated the commitment of the Army to
    families. We focused that covenant on five key areas, and they
    were the five key areas that families gave to my wife and I,
    that they were most concerned about.
        They wanted standardized services. They said, ``We don't
    need a bunch of fancy new programs. What we need is you to fund
    what you have, standardize them across the installations.''
        They want better access to quality health care. Quality is
    not usually the problem; it's accessing, getting into the
    system. So we're working with the Defense Health Services on
    that one.
        They want quality housing, they want better education and
    childcare opportunities for their children, and they want
    better education opportunities and employment opportunities for
    themselves.
        So we have focused $1.4 billion last year, and $1.2 billion
    this year, in this budget, on improving family programs. That's
    about double what we've done in the past. I believe it is
    absolutely essential to continue on that track, to retain the
    quality force that we have today.
        Mr. Secretary, anything you want to add to that?
        Secretary Geren. I'd like to add something quickly. We
    signed the Family Covenant, our leaders at each command signed
    it, all across the world--we had 120 Family Covenant signings--
    to make sure that families understood our commitment to them.
        Senator Sessions. Were the families participating in these
    signing ceremonies?
        Secretary Geren. Yes, they did. We had large family groups
    at every signing. The Chief mentioned some of the funding and
    some of these new initiatives that have been undertaken, but
    some of the most important initiatives that help the families
    are going to come from those commanders on the ground, those
    garrison commanders and those command sergeant majors, as they
    identify ways to just make the Army work better for families.
        General Caldwell, out at Leavenworth, he took over the
    command there, and saw that we had a start time for the classes
    at Leavenworth that conflicted with the start time for
    children's classes in the area schools. So General Caldwell
    moved the start time of his classes back 30 minutes, so the
    parents, who had the responsibility of taking care of those
    children, could take the kids to school, and could eat
    breakfast with them. I think it's little things like that, in
    addition to some of these major budget initiatives, that are
    going to make the Army work better for families. So, we are
    going to see a lot of creativity coming out of leaders, up and
    down, NCOs and officers, as we try to make the Army work better
    for families.
        I'd like to briefly mention, we did the Covenant with
    Families last fall, this spring, we're going to do a covenant
    between the communities and families. Every installation in
    America has some wonderful programs in which the local
    communities stand up and support families; Adopt a Platoon, the
    Hugs program that helps families through difficult times. Every
    one of the installations all over the country has some, or
    many, innovative programs to help families.
        We're going across the whole force in trying to identify
    those, catalog them, identify the best practices, and, over the
    course of this spring and through the summer, we're going to be
    going to all the major installations across our country to
    invite our community leaders to join us in this Covenant with
    Families, and give them some ideas on things they can do to
    help families better; take good ideas from Alabama and take
    them to Texas, or take them to Oklahoma. So, it's our second
    step in this.
        We are, the Chief used the term, brittle. The families no
    doubt are stretched. They have shown extraordinary resilience.
    But, we can do more as an Army, we can do more as a government,
    and our communities can do more. So we're inviting them to join
    hands with us and help better support those families during
    these challenging times.
        Senator Sessions. I think you're wise to spend time on
    that. I think it's the right thing to do. We are asking a great
    deal of men and women in uniform, and, as a result, we want
    them to be supported in every feasible way.
        My time is up, but I do believe we're making some progress
    on improving housing. Some very good housing programs are out
    there that have accelerated our ability to produce housing much
    faster than we've done in the past. But, I hope that the Army,
    in particular, will emphasize, because we don't mean that our
    Army personnel, who oftentimes are away while their family's at
    home, are in anything but the best housing we can give them.
        So, thank you, General Casey, for your commitment to that
    issue. I believe you'll fulfill the commitments you made when
    you were confirmed and I asked you about that.
        Secretary Geren, I appreciate your report. I think that's a
    step in the right direction, because we are all worried that
    our personnel are supported adequately in a whole host of
    different areas.
        Secretary Geren. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your getting
    personally involved in this case of the World War II veteran
    who was inaccurately imprisoned and given a dishonorable
    discharge. The Army, a half a century later, recognized its
    mistake and gave him an honorable discharge; but then, to
    compensate him for the year that he spent in prison, sent him
    his pay of $720. I want to thank you for personally getting
    into it, with the VA, to try to figure out some appropriate
    compensation, given the fact that 50 years has passed. So,
    thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, the chairman has already asked you to
    release the full classified version of the RAND report, which
    was on the planning for post-war Iraq, which was prepared for
    the Army by the RAND Corporation, and also to prepare an
    unclassified summary. I'd like to, additionally, suggest that
    the RAND study be sent to the Intelligence Committee. I have
    the privilege, as does the chairman, of sitting on both
    committees, and, if you will do that, we would appreciate it
    very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Chief of Legislative Liaison, Major General Galen Jackman,
    responded to your request on March 20, 2008. A copy of the letter from
    General Jackman is attached.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, what I want to suggest to you
    here is that, it has come to my attention, from women in my
    State, the rapes that have occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. I
    have been after this to try to get information, but what we'd
    like is to know the number of sexual assaults. Now, this is not
    military people, these are contractors. If you had this in the
    military, you have the UCMJ. Now, the chairman has already
    asked you, earlier today, what law applies if a civilian
    contractor commits a crime, and you said you would get back to
    the chairman on that. What we're finding is incomplete
    information and also this Never-Never Land of not knowing what
    to do and what laws to apply, and who's going to enforce it.
    You would think, if it's a contractor to DOD, DOD would enforce
    the prosecution of these crimes. Same for a contractor with the
    State Department, and so forth. So, for the record, let me just
    lay out a number of questions that I'd like you to address.
    We're not going to have time, obviously, in this setting here.
        The Inspector General (IG) has given us what they thought
    were the sexual assaults in 2005, 2006, and 2007, but we need
    to know, going back to the beginning of October 2001 in
    Afghanistan, and then, likewise, March 2003 in Iraq, what's the
    disposition of each of those sexual assault cases? What are the
    Service components or government agencies involved in each
    investigation? What is the status of the persons involved in
    each case? In other words, are they Active Duty military? Are
    they U.S. Government civilian employee, contract employee, or
    Iraqi national? Who has the jurisdiction or investigative
    authority for these sexual assault allegations in both
    Afghanistan and Iraq? This committee should have a clear
    explanation of the rules, regulations, policies, and processes
    under which these sexual assaults are investigated and
    prosecuted.
        It's obviously in our oversight responsibility to ask these
    questions. We would be most appreciative if you could help us
    get this information, because we've gotten very limited
    information, thus far, as a result of the IG referring us to
    the Army Criminal Investigative Command.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I come to the table with this,
    because, indeed, there is a Tampa lady that was part of a
    contractor that had contracted to the DOD. I've already talked
    to the chairman. In my capacity as chairman of a subcommittee
    in Foreign Relations, I'm going to have a hearing on this, as
    it involves the contractors to the Department of State. But, we
    need this information with regard to the DOD.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        This information would be more appropriately addressed by the
    General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Let me
    just, first of all, commend you for your pursuit of this issue.
    We will ask our witnesses whether or not they will be able to
    promptly provide that information.
        Secretary Geren?
        Secretary Geren. We'll certainly work to provide everything
    we can acquire. Now, it's possible that some of this
    information will come from other departments of government, but
    we'd be glad to cooperate with them and do everything we can to
    get you the information you request.
        Chairman Levin. That's great. Thank you so much.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just to follow up briefly on what the Senator from Florida
    just asked you. General Casey could tell us what law applied to
    contractors when you were commanding troops over there.
        General Casey. We did this earlier, Senator, and the UCMJ
    applied to the folks that were working for the DOD.
        Senator Webb. Applied to civilians?
        General Casey. The contractors.
        Senator Webb. Civilian contractors were under the UCMJ?
        General Casey. That worked for DOD. Not all of them.
        Senator Webb. That worked for DOD. How many are you talking
    about?
        General Casey. It varied over the time I was there,
    Senator. I want to say around 20,000.
        Senator Webb. You had 20,000 civilian contractors subject
    to the UCMJ?
        General Casey. I'm sorry not----
        Senator Webb. How many were subject to the UCMJ when you
    there?
        General Casey. Senator, I do not recall the number right
    now.
        Senator Webb. Approximately. You were commanding the
    troops. How many were subject to the UCMJ?
        General Casey. Senator, we worked very hard over time to
    get an accurate number on contractors, and I want to say the
    number that was subject to UCMJ was around 7,000 to 8,000, but
    I am not sure of that number.
        Senator Webb. When you were commanding, 7,000 to 8,000
    civilians were subject to the UCMJ?
        General Casey. That's my recollection, yes, Senator.
        Senator Webb. Do you know if any of them were ever charged
    under the UCMJ?
        General Casey. Senator, I have vague recollections of a
    couple of cases, but I can't say for certain.
        Senator Webb. As someone who has spent some time in
    military law, and sat on courts-martial and been involved in
    the appeal of cases out of the UCMJ, I'm not even sure how you
    could have a proper court for a civilian under UCMJ, or how you
    could charge them. The most recent news I've heard about this
    was that this was a proposal last year, when I arrived on this
    committee. You're saying that you actually had civilians in
    Iraq subject to the UCMJ, who were subject to proceedings under
    the UCMJ?
        General Casey. Senator, my recollection is that we had UCMJ
    authority over some number of DOD civilians that were
    contracted by DOD. I am not 100 percent certain of that.
        Senator Webb. I'd like to know. I would think, quite
    frankly, if you were commanding people over there, you'd know
    that.
        General Casey. At one time, I did Senator, and it's been a
    while.
        Senator Webb. It's been a while since you knew that? I can
    remember when I was commanding troops in 1969.
        General Casey. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Webb. It's not a difficult concept, whether people
    are subject to the UCMJ. This isn't something I was going to
    ask about, but I find it very curious.
        Senator Bill Nelson. May I say to the Senator that I have
    been told that the UCMJ does not apply, and that's the reason
    why we have to get some clarity about what law does apply to
    protect these Americans that are serving their country in a
    civilian capacity abroad. Thank you.
        Senator Webb. I would agree. I would say to the Senator
    from Florida that this was an issue that came up in the
    Personnel Subcommittee last year as a proposal.
        I'm not aware of anyone, Mr. Chairman, who as a civilian,
    has been subjected to UCMJ.
        Chairman Levin. We've asked the question so that we can get
    very clear answers for the record. We've not gotten them
    clearly this morning. I believe that my chief of staff has just
    told me that, in the last couple of years, we've taken some
    steps relative to contingency operations, and people who are
    contracted for, relative to those operations, to be covered.
    But, that's within the last couple of years, and I'm not sure I
    even heard my own chief of staff, because he was whispering in
    my ear as you were asking the question.
        In any event, Secretary Geren has also, this morning,
    indicated a backup form of prosecution, and used an acronym,
    which I'm not personally familiar with.
        Perhaps, Secretary Geren, you could repeat for us what you
    made reference to earlier this morning, in terms of possible
    prosecution by the Department of Justice.
        Secretary Geren. It's a law that was passed in the early
    1990s, and it goes by the acronym of MEJA. It gives our Justice
    Department the authority to prosecute crimes by American
    citizens abroad, and it came out of a case in which an American
    citizen, I believe in Saudi Arabia, committed a crime and led
    to this initiative. It has not been used much. As I understand
    it, it's been used 12 to 18 times.
        Chairman Levin. In Iraq? In Afghanistan?
        Secretary Geren. No. I think just overall, as I understand
    it. It's a Justice Department authority, it's not a DOD
    authority. I believe it's been used twice in Iraq. One was a
    CACI contractor, having to do with one of the detainee
    investigations. It was a CACI contractor that was accused of
    detainee abuse, and I believe he was prosecuted under MEJA.
    There was one other case, and I don't remember the details of
    that one. But, it's been used very sparingly. At one point, I
    heard the Justice Department discuss some of the challenges
    associated with applying that as a prosecution tool. There's
    problems with witnesses and gathering evidence. They could,
    obviously, provide you more insights than I could.
        As I understand it, in 2007, Senator Graham offered an
    amendment that expanded the application of the UCMJ for use
    against civilians, and broadened that authority, and clarified
    that authority. Some of our commanders are waiting for some
    implementing instructions to figure out exactly how you do it.
    As Senator Webb noted, there are some obvious complications
    using the UCMJ as broadly as it's now allowed under Senator
    Graham's amendment.
        Chairman Levin. Yes, that is the reference which my chief
    of staff made, was to that 2007 amendment by Senator Graham,
    which became law.
        Secretary Geren. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Yes.
        Okay, we ought to give you some additional time, Senator.
        Senator Webb. I would just say to the chairman, I would
    appreciate if we could really stay on top of this a little bit,
    because I think that Congress has been rolled on this issue for
    quite some time. We now have in excess of 150,000 contractors
    in Iraq, from the count that I've seen; it's probably higher
    than that. I'm not aware of any case, there may be a case, but
    I'm not aware of any case where serious crimes have been
    brought to justice. We know serious crimes have been committed.
        Chairman Levin. We did ask before for a very prompt
    assessment, because other committees are also interested in
    this subject, and there's been an IG report on this subject so
    that Secretary Geren committed to a very prompt overview of the
    law in this area.
        Senator Webb. I thank the chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I was told by Senator Warner, who's not here
    today, that, in a meeting with him, you expressed, I'm not sure
    whether they were your personal views or the views of the
    Department of the Army, that you were in support of the concept
    of a GI bill that would take care of these people who have been
    serving since September 11 in the same way that those who
    served in World War II were taken care of.
        Secretary Geren. We talked, in general, about expanding the
    benefits of the GI bill, and talked, most specifically, about
    expanding the eligibility of benefits so that a soldier could
    transfer his or her GI bill benefits to spouses and children.
    That was really the focus of our conversation that day.
    Congress had passed legislation several years ago that allowed
    us, for critical skills, to offer an expansion of the use of GI
    bill benefits allowed to be transferred to children, and
    talked, that day, about how we might expand that benefit and
    make it more broadly available.
        Senator Webb. Right. That's a totally separate concept than
    the issue of S.22, the GI bill that's before the Senate right
    now. That's taking the Montgomery GI bill and moving it
    laterally rather than measurably increasing the benefits
    themselves.
        Secretary Geren. That was our discussion.
        Senator Webb. Does the Department of the Army have a
    position on the expansion of GI bill benefits other than the
    Montgomery GI bill?
        Secretary Geren. No, Senator, we have not had an
    opportunity to reach a final recommendation on it. The
    Secretary of Defense, Dr. Gates, has taken ownership of that
    initiative, for want of a better word. The Services are working
    with his Under Secretary in analyzing the bill. We have not had
    an opportunity to work through all the provisions of it. In the
    President's State of the Union, he noted the GI bill is one of
    the areas that he wants to see our Department expand its
    benefits.
        Senator Webb. I am told that the administration opposes
    this and so I'm trying to get some clarification. I mentioned
    that to Secretary Gates when he was testifying, and in concept,
    I think he agreed with what we were saying here. I would note
    that you have a pilot program, I just got something on this
    about a week ago, that as a recruitment incentive will pay
    enlistees who sign up for 5 years, as it reads here in this
    article, $40,000 toward purchasing a home when they leave the
    Army.
        Secretary Geren. Yes.
        Senator Webb. I don't know what the cost of that program
    is, but the argument against S. 22 is that it would affect
    retention at the end. What you're seeing here is clearly an
    incentive for someone to get out and cash in their $40,000 to
    buy a home at the end of an enlistment. As someone who spent a
    lot of my life working manpower issues, I would respectfully
    say that probably the best recruitment incentive you can give
    people if you want to broaden your recruiting pool is good
    educational benefits. You seem to be pounding on one potential
    pool of enlistees over and over again, when you have this whole
    group over here of people who are struggling to get through
    college, who might have some incentive to serve, that aren't
    being fit into the formula.
        Secretary Geren. Unquestionably, educational benefits are
    one of the most appealing benefits for service in the United
    States military. It's a big part of our recruiting, it's a big
    part of our retention. The Secretary of Defense, again, has
    taken ownership of evaluating that. The Services are providing
    input, and to my knowledge, the administration has not taken a
    position on the bill. I'm not aware of it, if the
    administration has.
        Senator Webb. We've had a number of articles in the Service
    Times where the administration has opposed the bill. The VA
    opposed it in hearings last year. I'm on the Committee on
    Veterans' Affairs as well. Like the General, I've been around
    the military since the day I was born. I feel very strongly
    about the people who are serving. I think that the military,
    right now, has been doing a very good job, in terms of managing
    its career force. We have some disagreements on the dwell-time
    issues and that sort of thing. But, there are so many people
    who come into the military because of family tradition, love of
    country, with no intention of really staying. Those are the
    people who are getting lost in the system. That is a pool that
    actually would expand with the right sort of educational
    benefits, and they'd have something when they walked back into
    the community. The number one recruiting tool, at least from
    the time that I was doing this, back in the community, is a
    veteran who is proud of their service and believes strongly
    that the military took care of them. So, this is kind of a no-
    brainer to me. I can't see why we can't get it done.
        Secretary Geren. It's being actively evaluated right now,
    and the Department will take a position on it, I expect, soon.
    I checked, just as of yesterday, and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense was still accepting input from the
    Services, and evaluating it, and looking at the financial
    implications. As soon as a decision is made, sir, we'll get
    back with you, Senator.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        When you present the analysis of the law which applies to
    contractors as to whether they can be prosecuted either in a
    military court or in an American court, include in that any
    understandings or agreements which have been reached between
    the American authorities and the Iraqi authorities relative to
    the prosecution of these folks in Iraqi courts.
        Secretary Geren. We will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The information you requested was provided in a March 31, 2008,
    letter from the Honorable Benedict S. Cohen, General Counsel of the
    Department of the Army. I have enclosed that letter for your records.

        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        Secretary Geren. Just to expand, earlier you asked us to
    address the State Department.
        Chairman Levin. That is correct.
        Secretary Geren. We'll try to pull together a picture of
    the entire governmental position.
        Chairman Levin. We appreciate that.
        Senator Kennedy, thank you for your patience.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, General.
        I'd like to talk with you a little this morning about the
    kinds of pressures that are upon those that have served, and
    also those that are serving in the military, in order to
    understand the state of our Army.
        First of all, in this area of Army suicide in 2007, the
    Army suicide rate was the highest it's ever been. In 2006, Army
    suicides rose to 17 percent. That number increased to 20
    percent in 2007, when 121 soldiers committed suicide, more than
    double the numbers reported in 2001, before we sent troops into
    Iraq.
        The Army strives to ensure that 90 percent of its enlistees
    have high school diplomas. Last year, only 79 percent of the
    enlistees achieved that goal. The Army conduct waivers have
    more than doubled since 2003. The felony conviction waivers
    have increased 24 percent. Serious misdemeanor waivers have
    increased by 168 percent. These obviously highlight the strain
    we placed on the Armed Forces. The Army is currently facing a
    shortage of 3,000 officers or more, and the shortage is
    overwhelming in the mid-grades, the senior captains and majors.
    The Army recently announced that it failed to meet its goal of
    retaining 14,184 captains, and retained only 11,933, despite an
    aggressive campaign that offered cash bonuses, as much as
    $35,000, plus ability to choose next assignment or attend
    military-funded graduate school in exchange for continued
    service. All told, 67 percent of those eligible for the program
    agreed to serve an additional 1 to 3 years. The goal was 80
    percent. The attitude of the very young, in terms of how they
    view joining of the Service, has been dramatically altered or
    changed in the last several years.
        Several weeks ago, Senator McCaskill and I and others wrote
    to you about some of these challenges that you're having, in
    terms of the expansion of West Point and Officers Candidate
    Schools. We've reached sort of a level on this. It seems that
    we're reaching a perfect storm here, both in terms of attitude
    of young people going in, and in terms of the key personnel
    that are in there, remaining and staying. For those that do
    remain and stay, and that have been called on to go to Iraq and
    Afghanistan, it's an explosion in terms of domestic problems
    and challenges that are happening.
        What's your take of this? How should we view all of this?
    Is this the perfect storm, what's happening in terms of the
    military? How much should we be concerned about it? Is it just
    enough to change the tempo of service from 15 to 12 months? If
    you look at all of these kinds of indicators together, and take
    them, it certainly poses a very serious kind of challenge for
    the military. How are we going to deal with this?
        General Casey. Senator, you're right, and you are seeing
    the signs of a force that is stretched and under stress. The
    Secretary and I monitor these and other trends on a very
    regular basis, and it is something that we are all very
    concerned about and watch very closely.
        That said, there are some other positive indicators that we
    also watch. For example, retention: NCO retention in all three
    of our components is well above 100 percent. That's a very
    strong signal. We believe that even though the force is
    stretched, they are still a very dedicated and committed group.
        The second thing I'd say is that all of these indicators
    that you've mentioned, we are looking at and addressing. You
    mentioned suicides; that is something that concerns us all. We
    have a four-point program that we've been implementing for some
    time to reduce the stigma, to raise awareness, increase access
    to behavioral health care, and provide feedback to commanders.
        So, it's a combination of, one, recognizing that, yes, the
    force is stretched and stressed, and then, two, taking
    aggressive action to provide as much support and mitigation to
    the soldiers and the families as we can.
        Senator Kennedy. You had a task force that was focused on
    suicide, and then that became, as I understand, generally
    underfunded until very recently. I don't know what the take is
    on that. It seems to me, the re-enlistment rate is certainly
    something to be watched, but if you're looking across the board
    on this, in terms of the youths' attitude about whether to join
    the Service, all the steps that's been necessary to try and
    bring people into the Service, the challenge that people have
    in remaining in the Service, who are the high-quality figures
    in their mid-career, the majors and the captains, particularly
    those who have been involved in combat arms, it's certainly a
    pattern of enormous kinds of dangers. I'm just interested in
    what we're looking at. Do you take each of these components and
    try and deal with them individually? Do you look at this
    globally? How are you trying to come to grips with this in a
    meaningful way?
        Secretary Geren. Senator, we're in our 7th year of combat
    operations, and next month will have been 5 years in Iraq. I
    don't think it's surprising to see some of these personal
    indicators that you've noted start to show the stress on the
    force, both on the soldiers and on the families. On a macro
    level, one of the most important things we can do is get the
    deployment lengths down from 15 months to 12 months, and get
    the dwell time greater than the deployment length. That will go
    a long way towards reducing a lot of this stress on the force.
        But the symptoms of the stress, and you've done an
    excellent job of detailing them, we are approaching every one
    of those individually, as well. The suicides we've seen; we've
    watched the divorce rates; we've seen an increase in the number
    of divorces among females; we have family programs, chaplain
    programs, and other support programs to try to address that. We
    have an increase in the number of soldiers that have sought
    treatment for mental health. We're trying to staff up and do a
    better job of meeting those needs.
        So on a macro level, we're trying to grow the Army, and
    we're trying to reduce the stress on individual soldiers. But
    then, in detail, we're going after every one of those symptoms.
    We have an aggressive program to try to attack every single one
    of those and help soldiers, and help families deal with this
    stress.
        Senator Kennedy. Let me just say, finally, in December I
    mentioned I sent a letter to you with Senators Biden, Bayh, and
    McCaskill urging you to develop a plan to efficiently and
    effectively manage your accession pipeline. In developing a
    plan, we suggested that you conduct a thorough review of the
    Army's professional military education and career progression
    and selection programs. Your response, Mr. Secretary, to our
    letter detailed some long-term solutions to these problems,
    such as precommissioning retention programs and increasing West
    Point and ROTC production. For many of us, though, our concern
    is more immediate, and I'd hope you'd take a look again at the
    letter that we sent.
        Secretary Geren. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
        Secretary Geren. We have taken immediate steps to respond
    to the concerns raised in your letter, and I share your
    concerns. The GAO report that you noted in your letter made
    some very important observations about our officer accessions,
    and we are taking immediate steps, and we have a task force
    that is going to be reporting back to the chief and me within a
    couple months. Then we're going to take some additional steps.
    But, you've raised some very important points in that letter
    about the need to do a better job of coordinating officer
    accessions, and we are acting on that.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
        Just one more question about the FCS program. It's, as you
    point out, a critically important program for Army
    modernization, and you've given us some of the funding
    assumptions in the future, and are confident that the program
    will be completed.
        Secretary Gates said, and perhaps you were asked this and I
    missed it, that it's hard for him to see how that program can
    be completed in its entirety.
        General Casey. We discussed that with Senator Reed.
        Chairman Levin. Is there not a disconnect there?
        General Casey. I've talked directly to the Secretary about
    it. He has no problems with the program. As he said, he
    particularly likes the spinout program to help the current
    force. My sense is that, the question was formed, ``Faced with
    the inevitability of a downturn in resources, would you have to
    relook the program?'' It's a $162 billion program, and I think
    that's where he framed his answer.
        Chairman Levin. I don't understand then what your answer
    is. Did he say that it is his expectation that the program will
    not be completed in its entirety?
        General Casey. Senator, my recollection of the exchange
    was, it was about, ``Faced with a drawdown in resources, could
    we afford a $162 billion program?''
        Chairman Levin. It was on the assumption that there would
    be a reduction in overall resources, that he gave that answer?
        General Casey. I think, as the Secretary said earlier, even
    at the high point of the funding, it's less than a third of our
    procurement accounts, which are about a quarter of our overall
    budget. So, we believe that it is affordable.
        Chairman Levin. I just want to be clear that you're saying
    that Secretary Gates' comment, that it's hard for him to see
    how the program can be completed in its entirety, that was left
    out in that quote was that, ``if there is a reduction in
    overall resources for the Army,'' that then it would be hard
    for him to see it? Is that what you're saying?
        General Casey. That's my recollection. There was something
    in there about the inevitability of a decrease in resources.
        Chairman Levin. He said it was inevitable there will be a
    reduction in resources?
        General Casey. Senator, my recollection is that's the way
    the question was posed.
        Secretary Geren. He has expressed his strong support for
    the program. I also have discussed his comment with him since
    that hearing. He was expressing concern over long-term, when
    you have a program that depends on funding over many years,
    about the challenges associated with maintaining support over
    those years in the face of budget challenges. But, he assured
    me in our conversations of his strong support for FCS, and
    nothing to do with the quality of the program or the importance
    of the program. But, he was being candid about what he sees as
    the challenges, long-term, in maintaining a program such as
    that over many years.
        Chairman Levin. We thank you both. It's been a morning
    which, happily, had only three interruptions instead of five,
    so as it was, it was a bit hectic, but we very much appreciate
    your testimony and your service. Again, please, always
    represent to our troops and their families the support of this
    Senate.
        Secretary Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                             future combat systems
        1. Senator Akaka. General Casey, with regard to the Army's Future
    Combat Systems (FCS), cost estimates continue to rise, and the most
    recent analyses by the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) predict
    that the total cost for the program will be between $230 and $300
    billion. This program has come under scrutiny lately both due to its
    price and its immediate relevance in fighting the global war on
    terrorism. Given the level of immature technologies that are being
    integrated into FCS, and recent concerns over available networking
    bandwidth, what is the Army doing to control costs of this system over
    the coming years?
        General Casey. The Army's FCS cost estimate has not continued to
    rise. With the exception of the one-time program restructure initiated
    in 2004 (restoration of four deferred systems, introduction of current
    force Spin-Outs, added experimentation, and a 4-year program extension
    to reduce concurrency), FCS costs have been stable. The Army is aware
    of other independent cost estimates that are higher than the Army
    estimate, but much of the difference between the Army's estimate and
    the independent estimates is driven by potential risks that to date
    have not manifested themselves in negative cost performance. The Army
    has acknowledged these risks and has implemented program metrics and
    risk mitigation strategies to minimize the likelihood of the risks that
    may lead to cost growth. At this point, it would not be prudent to plan
    and budget the program to a set of potential risks.
        FCS program costs are managed through an integrated life-cycle cost
    containment strategy. The safeguards reflected in this strategy include
    state-of-the-art processes, systems, and incentives. The independent
    estimates have been reviewed by the Army and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense.

                         cultural training of soldiers
        2. Senator Akaka. General Casey, there has been a lot of emphasis
    within the DOD lately about increasing the cultural awareness of our
    soldiers so that they may better perform counterinsurgency and
    stability operations. Training soldiers to effective levels in language
    and culture differences comes at a price, however, in reduced resources
    and time to train them in more traditional conventional areas of
    warfare. From a soldier's perspective, what do you make of these calls
    to create an Army of culture warriors, and do you think there will be
    an impact on the capabilities of the Army to perform large force
    traditional combat operations as more resources are invested in
    cultural training?
        General Casey. Training soldiers to effective levels of culture and
    foreign language capabilities is a daunting task and does indeed come
    with a price. However, the benefits to the conduct of current and
    future operations are worth the investment of both time and funding.
        Within the scope of counterinsurgency and stability operations, a
    basic level of cultural awareness is vital to plan operations and
    interact with the local populace, to include building trust and
    cooperation. Culturally aware and foreign language-enabled soldiers are
    much more adept and responsive to situations that may arise during
    these operations. Moreover, culturally aware and foreign language-
    enabled soldiers and leaders contribute to the successful planning and
    execution of all types of operations, not just counterinsurgency and
    stability operations.
        The Army has several initiatives underway that build on existing
    capabilities for the total force. Cross-cultural competence training is
    embedded throughout Army professional military education. Our Training
    and Doctrine Command is developing an Army Culture and Foreign Language
    Strategy that expands training in cultural and foreign language
    competencies throughout a soldier's career. This strategy allows for
    additional focused training for units during their pre-deployment
    preparations. The Secretary of the Army has initiated a program that
    will encourage future officers to begin foreign language study during
    their participation in the Reserve Officer Training Corps.
        Cultural awareness and foreign language capabilities are combat
    multipliers that we can ill afford to neglect in the training and
    preparation of America's soldiers. Our challenge is to develop these
    skills while maintaining our basic warrior skills.

                                   retention
        3. Senator Akaka. General Casey, America is now engaged in the most
    enduring conflict since establishment of the all-volunteer professional
    military, and retention has emerged as a significant challenge for the
    Army. Recently, it was reported that almost 60 percent of the 2002
    graduating class from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point left the
    Army as soon as their service commitment was fulfilled. This compares
    with only 20 percent of the class of 1998 leaving when they had
    fulfilled their commitments. Given the high taxpayer cost of training a
    cadet at West Point, what sort of programs is the U.S. Army
    implementing to try to do a better job of retaining Academy graduates
    when they complete their initial service requirements, since as
    captains they fulfill such a critical role in combat leadership
    positions in both Iraq and Afghanistan?
        General Casey. The average United States Military Academy (USMA)
    graduate loss rate for year groups 1991-2002 at 60 months of service (5
    years) is 29 percent, and it increases to 41 percent at 66 months of
    service (5.5 years). Attrition rates for year groups 2000-2002 are
    approximately 5 percent higher than the average at 60 months and 2
    percent higher than at 66 months of service. Overall, there is no
    statistical significance in the loss rate differences from USMA year
    groups 1991-2002.
        The increased loss rates, regardless of statistical significance,
    are still of concern to the Army. We have, therefore, begun a thorough
    review of officer accession and retention policies, and are assessing
    the overall health of the officer corps. We have instituted two
    initiatives to boost officer retention. First, we provide the highest-
    performing cadet officers from West Point and our ROTC scholarship
    programs the opportunity to select either their branch of choice,
    initial post of choice, or a fully-funded graduate degree program. This
    incentive has garnered over 9,000 additional man-years of obligated
    service among year groups 2006 and 2007 officers. We expect this
    incentive will raise the number of high-performance officers electing
    to serve 8 years by more than a third. Second, our unprecedented
    captain retention program offers a number of incentives, including
    graduate school or a cash bonus, to encourage our best and brightest
    officers to remain on Active Duty. Analysis of the results of our first
    several months of this program indicate a slight reduction in the loss
    rates of captains in the 2000 and 2001 year groups graduating from West
    Point.

                                    waivers
        4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Casey, the number of
    waivers granted by the Army to recruits with prior criminal offenses
    and/or illegal drug usage has risen markedly since the beginning of the
    Iraq conflict. Are the commanders in the field experiencing any
    noticeable detriment to the quality of the force as a result of this
    increase in waivers?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. The number of enlistment waivers
    has increased over the last few years, in an era of persistent conflict
    and growth of the Army. Army mechanisms for screening these individuals
    are designed to mitigate risk and have proven very effective. A recent
    study comparing trends of waivered soldiers to non-waivered soldiers
    who entered the Army from fiscal years 2003-2006 indicates that the
    soldiers who received enlistment waivers performed comparable to their
    non-waivered peers in most areas. We continue to monitor these trends
    closely.

        5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Casey, with the
    understanding that basic training standards have not been adjusted, has
    there been any change in discipline-related failures to complete
    training as a result of this policy?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. Overall, there has been no
    discernable adverse change in the discharge rate for discipline-related
    failures in Initial Entry Training as a result of waiver policy. A
    review of attrition rates for entry level performance and conduct
    demonstrated a decline in attrition for this category from 2003 to
    present. A recent analysis by the Human Resources Research Organization
    showed that attrition rates among individuals with approved conduct
    waivers were not significantly different from the rates among
    individuals without conduct waivers. The use of these waivers does not
    currently appear to be causing any marked overall decrease in soldier
    quality, proficiency, or abilities or increase in related attrition in
    the training base.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
       sexual assault allegations and prosecution in afghanistan and iraq
        6. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, how many sexual assault
    allegations and prosecutions have there been since October 2001 in
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Geren. There have been 76 unrestricted sexual assault
    allegations in Afghanistan since October 2001. Of the 76
    investigations, four remain in open investigative status. There were at
    least nine military courts martial, one trial by Italian authorities
    for an allegation against one of their soldiers, and one trial by
    Egyptian authorities for an allegation against one of their soldiers.
        In addition to the 76 unrestricted reports of sexual assault
    investigated by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC),
    there have been five restricted reports of sexual assault recorded by
    soldiers in Afghanistan since DOD instituted the restricted reporting
    option in June 2005. Restricted reports are not reported to the chain
    of command or USACIDC, and are, therefore, not investigated or
    prosecuted.

        7. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, how many sexual assault
    cases have been reported since March 2003 in Iraq?
        Secretary Geren. There have been 454 unrestricted sexual assault
    cases in Iraq since March 2003. In addition to the 454 unrestricted
    reports of sexual assault investigated by USACIDC, there have been 15
    restricted reports of sexual assault recorded by soldiers in Iraq since
    DOD instituted the restricted reporting option in June 2005. Restricted
    reports are not reported to the chain of command or USACIDC, and are,
    therefore, not investigated or prosecuted.

        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, what is the disposition of
    each of these cases?
        Secretary Geren. The disposition of the 454 sexual assault
    investigations in Iraq:\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Some cases had more than one suspect, so dispositions will not
    equal investigations.

    80........................................  Courts Martial
    72........................................  Non-judicial punishment
                                                 (Article 15, Uniform Code
                                                 of Military Justice)
    1.........................................  U.S. Federal District Court
                                                 prosecution under provision
                                                 of MEJA
    2.........................................  Referred to the U.S. Navy
                                                 for action as subjects were
                                                 Navy personnel
    64........................................  Adverse personnel actions
    21........................................  Referred to local
                                                 authorities
    15........................................  No action taken by
                                                 responsible authorities
    25........................................  Remain unsolved
    160.......................................  Either not substantiated or
                                                 unable to develop
                                                 sufficient evidence to
                                                 support any type of
                                                 judicial or adverse action
    29........................................  Still pending action by
                                                 commanders in the field
    39........................................  Still open and active
                                                 investigations

        9. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, what are the Service
    components or government agencies involved in each investigation?
        Secretary Geren. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the USACIDC is the
    agency responsible for investigating all unrestricted sexual assault
    allegations that occur and either involves U.S. Army soldiers as
    subjects or victims or both, no matter the location, or occurs on Army
    installations and involves anyone, regardless of status. Depending on
    the availability of other military and Federal criminal investigative
    organizations such as the Navy, Air Force, or FBI, the location of the
    alleged offense and persons involved and the status of the alleged
    offender joint investigations between USACIDC and these other agencies
    may occur. For the cases mentioned in the preceding question, USACIDC
    was the primary investigative agency. Recent changes provide Uniform
    Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority over civilians and USACIDC
    investigative authority has expanded to include all civilians accused
    of criminal acts who are accompanying the Army, or working on Army
    contracts, no matter where the crime occurs. For civilian offenders,
    prosecution would be with local judicial authorities (especially for
    local and third country nationals), U.S. Federal prosecutors under the
    provisions of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA),
    or, as of October 2007, with military authorities under the UCMJ.

        10. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, what is the status of the
    persons involved in each case, i.e. Active military, U.S. government
    civilian employee, contract employee, or Iraqi national?
        Secretary Geren. Of the 76 investigations in Afghanistan, 49
    suspects were U.S. Army soldiers, 14 suspects were local or third
    country nationals, two suspects were U.S. civilians, one was a member
    of the U.S. Air Force, three suspects were from foreign militaries, and
    nine were unknown. In those same 76 investigations in Afghanistan,
    there were 78 U.S. Army soldier victims, 3 local or third country
    national victims, 5 U.S. civilian victims; 3 were in the U.S. Air
    Force, 1 in the U.S. Navy, and 1 in the U.S. Marine Corps. Some of
    these investigations remain active investigations and the number and
    type of persons involved may change in the future.
        For the 454 investigations in Iraq, there were 375 U.S. Army
    soldier suspects, 62 local or third country national suspects, 16 U.S.
    civilian suspects, 3 U.S. Navy suspects, 2 U.S. Air Force suspects, 2
    U.S. Marine Corps suspects, 5 suspects from foreign militaries, and 28
    unknown suspects. In those same 454 investigations in Iraq, there were
    467 U.S. Army soldier victims, 14 local or third country national
    victims, 22 U.S. civilian victims, 4 U.S. Navy victims, and 6 U.S. Air
    Force victims. Some of these investigations remain active
    investigations and the number and type of persons involved may change
    in the future.

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, who has jurisdiction or
    investigative authority for sexual assault allegations in both
    Afghanistan and Iraq?
        Secretary Geren. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the USACIDC is the
    agency responsible for investigating all unrestricted sexual assault
    allegations that occur and either involves U.S. Army soldiers as
    subjects or victims or both, no matter the location; or occurs on Army
    installations and involves anyone, regardless of status. Depending on
    the availability of other military and Federal criminal investigative
    organizations such as the Navy, Air Force, or FBI, the location of the
    alleged offense and persons involved, and the status of the alleged
    offender, joint investigations between USACIDC and these other agencies
    may occur. For the cases mentioned in the preceding question, USACIDC
    was the primary investigative agency. Recent changes provide UCMJ
    authority over civilians and USACIDC investigative authority has
    expanded to include all civilians accused of criminal acts who are
    accompanying the Army, or working on Army contracts, no matter where
    the crime occurs. For civilian offenders, prosecution would be with
    local judicial authorities (especially for local and third country
    nationals), U.S. Federal prosecutors under the provisions of the MEJA,
    or, as of October 2007, with military authorities under the UCMJ.

        12. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, could you provide a clear
    explanation of the rules, regulations, policies, and processes under
    which sexual assaults are investigated and prosecuted?
        Secretary Geren. Allegations of sexual assault involving soldiers
    as either suspects or victims, regardless of location, or allegations
    of sexual assault that occur on Army installations, regardless of the
    status of the participants, are investigated by the USACIDC.
    Allegations of crimes involving soldiers that occur on other Service
    controlled bases (e.g. U.S. Marine Corps) are investigated by that
    Service's criminal investigative organization. Prosecution of soldiers
    is a command function pursuant to the UCMJ, and the Manual for Courts-
    Martial (MCM). The MCM provides general guidance to commanders on the
    disposition of any offense. However, pursuant to Army policy, authority
    to dispose of cases that resulted from allegations of sexual assault is
    withheld to the Battalion commander level and above, and that commander
    may do so only after receiving the advice of a judge advocate.
    Prosecution of civilians accused of criminal offenses may be
    accomplished either through local law enforcement/judicial authorities
    (especially for local nationals) or through the Department of Justice
    (DOJ) under the MEJA of 2000, if the acts occurred overseas. Under
    MEJA, the USACIDC provides its investigative report concerning a
    civilian suspect to either the Combatant Commander, or his Staff Judge
    Advocate, who may refer the case and the investigative report to the
    DOD General Counsel's office for coordination with the DOJ. Article
    2(a)(10), UCMJ, also provides for UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians
    serving with or accompanying the force in the field during contingency
    operations.

        13. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, have any civilians been
    prosecuted during the entirety of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and
    Iraq under the UCMJ?
        Secretary Geren. No. Jurisdiction over civilians was expanded on
    October 17, 2006 when the John Warner National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2007 amended Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ. The expansion
    provided for UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians serving with or
    accompanying the force in the field during contingency operations.
    Prior to the effective date of the act, there were no prosecutions,
    because UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians was limited to periods in
    which there is a formal declaration of war. There have been no
    prosecutions of civilians since the statutory amendment became
    effective.

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, have any civilians been
    prosecuted during the entirety of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and
    Iraq under any other U.S. or international law? If so, what
    international laws?
        Secretary Geren. Yes. I am aware that one former soldier,
    Specialist Steven Green, is being prosecuted under the MEJA of 2000 in
    Federal District Court in Kentucky, after being accused of murder and
    rape of Iraqi nationals in Iraq. Additionally, one U.S. civilian, who
    indecently assaulted a soldier in Iraq in 2005, was prosecuted and
    convicted in Federal District Court in Georgia. Issues relating to the
    prosecution of civilians serving with or accompanying our forces
    overseas under U.S. laws and international law are under the purview of
    the DOD Office of General Counsel (OGC). DOD OGC coordinates directly
    with the DOJ in its exercise of jurisdiction under MEJA, and maintains
    records and information on these cases or their disposition. Given
    DOD's and DOJ's responsibility and control over this process, they
    would be better positioned to provide specifics regarding the number of
    cases and their disposition. I am not aware of any American civilian or
    soldier being prosecuted in international tribunals. However, DOD OGC
    is the best source of data for this question.

        15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, what are the
    circumstances of all cases that have been prosecuted under the UCMJ or
    U.S. or international law?
        Secretary Geren. For Army activity under the UCMJ, there have been
    96 summary, special and general courts-martial of soldiers for sexual
    assaults in Iraq and Afghanistan. The alleged offenses include rape,
    forcible sodomy, sodomy with a child, and indecent assault. There have
    been an additional 92 adverse administrative and non-judicial actions
    for soldiers accused of sexual assaults. Under MEJA, one former
    soldier, Specialist Steven Green, is being prosecuted in Federal
    District Court in Kentucky, after being accused of murder and rape of
    Iraqi nationals in Iraq; and one U.S. civilian who indecently assaulted
    a soldier in Iraq in 2005 was prosecuted and convicted in Federal
    District Court in Georgia. Given DOD's and DOJ's responsibility and
    control over the application of MEJA, they would be better positioned
    to provide specifics regarding the number of cases and their
    disposition. I do not know of any cases where U.S. soldiers have been
    prosecuted for sexual assault under international law, at international
    tribunals, or in foreign domestic courts arising from allegations of
    misconduct in Iraq or Afghanistan. I would again encourage consultation
    with DOD OGC concerning this matter.

        16. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, what is the law that
    governs civilian contractors (DOD, State, or any other U.S. Government
    agency) who are alleged to have committed crimes?
        Secretary Geren. Civilian contractors are subject to prosecution
    under the MEJA of 2000, and as of October 17, 2006, the UCMJ, Article
    2(a)(10). If a civilian in Afghanistan or Iraq commits a criminal
    offense that violates U.S. Federal criminal law, the MEJA allows the
    military to investigate the incident and coordinate with the DOJ
    concerning prosecution of the case. Under MEJA, civilian contractors
    are subject to prosecution under U.S. Federal criminal law if they
    commit a criminal act that would have been a felony-level Federal
    offense if committed within the United States. MEJA also requires that
    the contractor be employed by or contracted to the DOD, or that their
    employment or contractual work for another agency supports the mission
    of DOD. Since October 17, 2006, UCMJ jurisdiction extends to civilian
    contractors serving with or accompanying the force in the field during
    contingency operations. Therefore, civilian contractors who fall within
    this category are subject to prosecution for UCMJ offenses at courts-
    martial. If jurisdiction exists under both MEJA and the UCMJ, by DOD
    policy, Federal prosecution takes precedence over UCMJ prosecution.

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, what role, if any, does
    the MEJA of 2000 play in the prosecution of civilian contractors who
    allegedly commit crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Secretary Geren. If a civilian in Afghanistan or Iraq commits a
    criminal offense that violates U.S. Federal criminal law, the MEJA of
    2000 allows the military to investigate the incident and coordinate
    with the DOJ to determine a United States Attorney's Office to
    prosecute the case. Under MEJA, civilian contractors are subject to
    prosecution under U.S. Federal criminal law, if they commit a criminal
    act that would have been a felony Federal offense if committed within
    the United States. MEJA also requires that the contractor be employed
    by or contracted to the DOD, or that their employment or contractual
    work for another agency supports the mission of DOD. Prosecution in
    MEJA cases is conducted by a United States Attorney's Office in a
    Federal District Court within the United States. If jurisdiction exists
    under both MEJA and the UCMJ, by DOD policy, Federal prosecution takes
    precedence over UCMJ prosecution of civilians.

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, how many prosecutorial
    investigations have been initiated under MEJA?
        Secretary Geren. Issues relating to the prosecutions of civilians
    under U.S. laws and international law are under the purview of the DOD
    OGC. DOD OGC coordinates directly with the DOJ in its exercise of
    jurisdiction under the MEJA of 2000. According to the DOD OGC, eight
    investigations of alleged sexual assault have been referred to the DOJ
    under the MEJA. Thus far, DOJ has proceeded with prosecution in two of
    these cases. Former soldier, Specialist Steven Green, is being
    prosecuted under MEJA in Federal District Court in Kentucky, after
    being accused of murder and rape of Iraqi nationals in Iraq; and one
    U.S. civilian who indecently assaulted a soldier in Iraq in 2005 was
    prosecuted and convicted in Federal District Court in Georgia. Both
    cases were investigated by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation
    Command. Three cases have been declined for MEJA prosecution because
    there was insufficient evidence. The remaining three cases are listed
    as ``pending.''

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, what is the earliest date
    that you can provide to the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence
    Committees the classified and unclassified RAND report and all
    summaries titled ``Rebuilding Iraq''?
        Secretary Geren. The Chief of Legislative Liaison, Major General
    Galen Jackman, responded to your request on March 20, 2008. A copy of
    the letter from General Jackman is attached.

                     missile defense transition to the army
        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Geren, the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA) has indicated that it is in discussions with the Army
    about its proposal for how and when to transition and transfer certain
    missile defense capabilities, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) system. Can you describe your view of the proposed
    transition plan, and any concerns you have about it?
        Secretary Geren. The Army and MDA have been working plans to
    transition and transfer those Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
    elements for which the Army is the lead Service. There are currently
    three BMDS elements designated to be transferred to the Army: the
    ground-based interceptors and ground-based midcourse defense fire
    control and communications; the THAAD system; and the AN/TPY-2 Forward
    Based Mode Radar. A fourth BMDS element, the PAC-3, has already been
    transferred to the Army. For the past 2 years, we have collaborated on
    the transition and transfer plans and have participated on integrated
    product teams for each element in order to work the specific details
    associated with transition and transfer. Transition and transfer was
    the main topic of a recent Army/MDA board of directors meeting where it
    was decided to develop and sign an overarching memorandum of agreement
    with individual, event-driven element annexes to further guide the
    transition and transfer process. Our only concern with the transition
    and transfer of BMDS elements to the Army is long-term affordability.
    Element transitions must only occur when full funding is secured, as
    procurement and operations and support costs anticipated at transfer
    are beyond the Army's ability to program and fund without a total
    obligation authority increase.

                              thaad system delays
        21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Casey, the MDA budget request for
    fiscal year 2009 would delay the delivery of THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4
    by 1 year. These are near-term capabilities that we understand the
    regional combatant commanders want delivered as soon as possible to
    defend their forward-deployed forces against existing missile threats.
    If it is possible to eliminate this delay and deliver these fire units
    on time to the combatant commanders, would you support doing so?
        General Casey. Yes, and the MDA has recently taken steps to realign
    internal funding to restore planned procurement and delivery of these
    two fire units and interceptors as originally planned and scheduled.
    THAAD represents a cutting edge ballistic missile defense capability
    that we need to field as early as possible.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Casey, the Joint Capabilities Mix
    study of missile defense systems indicates that we will need about
    twice the number of THAAD interceptors as the 96 we are currently
    planning to buy. Do you agree that we will need more than 4 THAAD Fire
    Units and 96 THAAD interceptors to provide adequate capability for our
    forward-deployed forces?
        General Casey. The Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) II+ Sensitivity
    Analysis was completed in early January 2008. To date, the results of
    the study have been briefed at the Force Protection Functional
    Capabilities Board (FP FCB) and went to the Joint Capabilities Board in
    mid-February 2008. Results are scheduled to be briefed to the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). JCM II+ results support the
    findings of the Upper Tier interceptor inventory requirements for U.S.
    forces in 2015 that were detailed in the JCM II. These studies clearly
    show that current inventory levels are not sufficient to operate in
    multiple theaters in near-simultaneous combat operations.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
                                 mental health
        23. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, as I understand, the reality is
    that our Nation and the military's medical system face significant
    shortages of mental health professionals. In fact, the Army is trying
    to hire 272 new mental health professionals this year. Unfortunately,
    the Army has estimated that it will have only 150 by March. As a
    result, our system today is hard-pressed and strained, at best, to
    provide the essential care that so many of our soldiers who suffer from
    traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
    need. With that in mind, should we instead be focusing our efforts on
    taking the needed steps to increase access to quality, community-based
    and private care for our wounded soldiers?
        Secretary Geren. To provide optimal care for our soldiers, we must
    make full use of the Military Health System (MHS), the Department of
    Veterans Affairs (VA), and private sector care. Currently, the MHS
    makes extensive use of private sector care through the TRICARE Network.
    The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
    (HA) recently issued a new policy to ensure beneficiaries have
    appropriate access to mental health services by aligning mental health
    access standards with existing primary care access standards. This
    policy directs two new business practices. First, military mental
    health clinics must provide more self-referral capabilities, much like
    a primary care clinic. Mental health clinics traditionally operated as
    specialty referral clinics, with soldiers only having limited self-
    referral capabilities. Second, the policy establishes a 7-day routine
    standard for receiving mental health treatment for a new onset, non-
    urgent behavioral health condition or the exacerbation of a previously
    diagnosed condition. Military treatment facilities closely track access
    standards for our wounded soldiers. If access to care standards cannot
    be met at a military facility, the soldier is referred to the private
    sector for care. In addition, we are partnering with civilian health
    care providers to ensure that civilian providers have the education and
    training to care for our soldiers and veterans.
        DOD has focused its efforts on increasing access to community based
    care through a health care program called Military OneSource. The DOD
    provides Military OneSource at no cost to servicemembers and their
    families, and it is accessible 24/7. The health care system provides
    access to community counseling services by phone and in person. These
    counseling sessions are private and focus on issues ranging from
    reactions to deployment, to grief and loss, to stress related problems,
    to relationship problems. The servicemember or family member receives
    up to six free sessions per issue. Servicemembers can call 1-800-342-
    9647 toll free, or they can access services through the website at
    www.militaryonesource.com.

        24. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, are you pursuing a comprehensive
    examination of TBI sufficient to provide protection for our future
    soldiers? That is, are the engineering and scientific communities being
    joined with the medical community to develop a deep understanding of
    the issues of blast waves and their interaction with the human body?
        Secretary Geren. Yes. The Army's core medical research program is
    currently supporting multiple parallel efforts to examine the medical
    effects of blast waves on the human body, and specifically on the
    brain. These efforts include evaluating the attenuating effects of
    protective equipment, as well as assessing design considerations that
    will improve the protective effect of the soldier's equipment. The
    medical research community is actively working with the engineering
    research community, multiple academic institutions, and private
    industrial labs to advance our understanding of primary and secondary
    blast effects on the human body, and to develop effective
    countermeasures to prevent injury to our warriors in the future.

        25. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, what are your plans to develop a
    broad body of investigators with new approaches, as opposed to a small
    number of research organizations, to research TBI and its remediation?
        Secretary Geren. There are already a myriad of research projects
    under way across a vast multidisciplinary research community, which
    includes academia, private organizations, and governmental
    organizations. The results of these multidisciplinary research
    initiatives being pursued by the best scientists in the field will
    advance our understanding of how to prevent, detect, diagnose, and
    treat TBI. Some examples of these research initiatives include
    neuroprotection and repair strategies, rehabilitation and reintegration
    strategies, and the physics of blast injury relative to brain injury.
        DOD PTSD/TBI Research Program supports basic and clinically
    oriented research that will: (1) result in substantial improvements
    over today's approaches to the treatment and clinical management of
    TBI; (2) facilitate the development of novel preventive measures; and
    (3) enhance the quality of life of persons with TBI. Congress mandated
    that the program be administered according to the highly effective U.S.
    Army Medical Research and Materiel Command's two-tiered review process
    that includes both an external scientific (peer) review conducted by an
    external panel of expert scientists, and a programmatic review. After
    the scientific peer review has been completed for each proposal, a
    programmatic review is conducted by a Joint Program Integration Panel
    (JPIP), which consists of representatives from DOD, VA, and Department
    of Health and Human Services. The JPIP identified several gaps in TBI
    research, including (1) treatment and clinical management; (2)
    neuroprotection and repair strategies; (3) rehabilitation/reintegration
    strategies; (4) field epidemiology; and (5) physics of blast. Research
    proposals that address these gaps will have the highest priority for
    funding.
        The DOD's investment strategy for the $150 million appropriation
    included multiple intramural (DOD and VA) and extramural award
    mechanisms focused primarily on pre-clinical TBI research. The funding
    mechanisms include the Concept Award, which supports the exploration of
    a new idea or innovative concept that could give rise to a testable
    hypothesis; the Investigator-Initiated Research Award which supports
    basic and clinically oriented research; the Advanced Technology-
    Therapeutic Development Award, which supports studies designed to
    demonstrate the effectiveness of pharmaceuticals (drugs, biologics, and
    vaccines) and medical devices in preclinical systems and/or the testing
    of therapeutics and devices in clinical studies; the New Investigator
    Award, which supports bringing new researchers into the field of TBI;
    and the Multidisciplinary Research Consortium Award which supports
    optimizing research and accelerating the solution of a major
    overarching problem in TBI research within an integrated consortium of
    the most highly-qualified investigators.
        The DOD PTSD/TBI Research Program is offering competitive funding
    for a Clinical Consortium, which will combine the efforts of the
    Nation's leading investigators to bring to market novel treatments or
    interventions that will ultimately decrease the impact of military-
    relevant PTSD and TBI within the DOD and the VA. Further, the Clinical
    Consortium is required to integrate with the DOD Center of Excellence
    (DCoE) and is intended to support the DCoE's efforts to expedite the
    fielding of PTSD and TBI treatments and interventions. Several other
    award mechanisms offered by the PTSD/TBI Research Program will also
    support preclinical and clinical trials for more effective treatments
    for TBI.
        The opportunities for funding research in TBI through these award
    mechanisms is open to all investigators worldwide, including military,
    academic, pharmaceutical, biotechnology and other industry partners.
    The competition is open, but rigorous, and the process ensures that the
    best research and brightest people are funded to provide solutions to
    the problem of TBI.

        26. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, how have the responders to your
    solicitations for TBI research shown investments that compliment and
    accelerate the programs of research?
        Secretary Geren. The DOD PTSD/TBI Research Program solicited
    proposals under intramural and extramural funding opportunities.
    Intramural funding mechanisms were dedicated to supporting research
    aimed only at accelerating ongoing TBI-oriented DOD and VA research
    projects or programs. Intramural proposals were solicited under two
    TBI-focused funding mechanisms, the Investigator-Initiated Research
    Award, which supports basic and clinically oriented research, and the
    Advanced Technology-Therapeutic Development Award, which supports
    studies designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of pharmaceuticals
    (drugs, biologics, and vaccines) and medical devices in preclinical
    systems and/or the testing of therapeutics and devices in clinical
    studies. Approximately $35.3 million of the $150 million TBI
    appropriation has been approved for funding ongoing DOD and VA research
    projects or programs. It is anticipated that other ongoing DOD and VA
    research will be supported indirectly through the extramural funding
    process.
        Congress mandated that the program be administered according to the
    highly effective U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command's two-
    tiered review process that includes both an external scientific (peer)
    review conducted by an external panel of expert scientists, and a
    programmatic review. After the scientific peer review has been
    completed for each proposal, a programmatic review is conducted by a
    JPIP which consists of representatives from the DOD, VA, and Health and
    Human Services. The members of the JPIP represent the major funding
    organizations for TBI and, as such, are able to recommend funding
    research that is complimentary to ongoing efforts.

                            unmanned aerial vehicles
        27. Senator Bayh. General Casey, as I understand, the Air Force and
    Army utilize different models for their unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
    crews. The Air Force's model, as it has been explained to me, is called
    Remote Split Operations. This places crews (pilots, sensors, analysts)
    in installations across the United States to allow for their constant
    usage. In turn, this means that the crew footprint in theater is
    relatively small and limited to only the launch and recovery elements.
    However, I understand that the Army is deploying the units forward
    allowing for only the use of those deployed assets (1/3 deployed, 1/3
    in train up, 1/3 in reconstitution). Does this not allow for 100
    percent utilization of Air Force crews instead of the Army's
    approximately 33 percent utilization rate?
        General Casey. The Army uses a modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
    centric model to generate forces for deployment. Our BCT structure
    incluces a Shadow UAS platoon of 22 soldiers. This small platoon
    conducts all launch, recovery, and flight operations. The UAS operators
    are fully integrated into the BCT mission planning and fully understand
    the commander's intent. If an unanticipated high priority mission
    occurs while a Shadow UAS is flying, the BCT can direct the operator to
    change the planned mission to provide immediate support. The Army
    currently has 20 Shadow UAS platoons, 2 Hunter UAS companies, 1 I-Gnat
    UAS detachment, and 4 Warrior-A UAS platoons deployed in OIF; and 2
    Shadow UAS platoons and 1 Warrior-A UAS platoon deployed in OEF. All
    BCTs scheduled to enter theater on the next rotation train with their
    Shadow UAS platoon to ensure the commander and staff understand how to
    employ this critical asset.

        28. Senator Bayh. General Casey, commanders abroad continue to note
    their growing UAV requirements for operations abroad. As I understand,
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is currently
    reevaluating the UAV requirement for the entire DOD. Given what appears
    to be a modest explosion in need for the kind of persistent
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) that UAVs provide,
    why is the Army not following the Remote Split Operations model the Air
    Force uses?
        General Casey. The Army focuses on tactical Reconnaissance,
    Surveillance, and Target Acquisition with its UAS assets. The
    integration of the UAS operator into mission briefings allows for
    greater understanding and facilitates dynamic retasking, effective
    manned/unmanned teaming, full use of on-board communications relay
    capabilities, and dynamic flexibility to meet emerging, time sensitive
    high risk threats. Of the 22 soldiers in the Shadow Platoon only two
    are operators not involved in launch and recover operations. If the
    Army placed those soldiers in the States they would not attend mission
    briefings, would not understand the commander's intent, and would not
    be readily available for dynamic retasking. The Army would have to add
    satellite technicians at each BCT and in the locations in the States.
    This would likely increase the footprint in theater, require the
    recruitment and training of large numbers of satellite technicians, and
    sever the critical link between the BCT commander and his UAS
    operators.

        29. Senator Bayh. General Casey, the Army currently supports an
    equivalent of 12 combat air patrols (CAPs) with its UAV fleet. The Air
    Force is anticipating that they will be able to support an estimated 24
    CAPs by June of this year thanks to a surge in their usage of personnel
    and assets. What are the Army's current UAV or ISR needs in Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        General Casey. As of February 19, 2008, the Army has flown over
    429,000 UAS hours in theater. That includes 99,000 Raven Small UAS
    hours. Over the past 3 months, approximately two thirds of the major
    subordinate commands' full motion video requests were satisfied. The
    Army will provide a Sky Warrior Quick Reaction Capability and six more
    Shadow platoons to meet stated MNC-I shortfalls. We are awaiting
    feedback from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on our
    recommended courses of action to support the ISR surge.

        30. Senator Bayh. General Casey, has the Army considered an
    approach similar to the Air Force's to try and meet that current need?
        General Casey. The Army has provided the Secretary of Defense with
    options for increasing the number of Army UASs in theater. One option
    would be to accelerate the deployment of the Sky Warrior Block 0 and
    Shadow UAS into theater. Other options include mobilizing additional
    Reserve component units and adding Government Owned/Contractor Operated
    systems into theater. With all the options the Army balances the
    current need for UAS systems in theater with the scheduled rotations
    and to meet the Secretary of Defense's dwell time and boots-on-the-
    ground requirements.

                              iraq and afghanistan
        31. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General Casey, can you please
    delve into your plans to ensure that the force is appropriately
    balanced for future counterinsurgency or nation-building contingencies?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army continuously assesses
    capabilities to ensure the right mix of force structure to meet current
    and future strategic demands. The Army's ongoing analysis will directly
    result in the rebalancing of more than 142,000 spaces of capability,
    including the growth of 74,200 spaces of structure in the Grow the Army
    plan, by the end of fiscal year 2013. The focus of the Army's
    rebalancing and growth is to provide more special operations forces,
    infantry, military intelligence, military police, engineers, civil
    affairs, psychological operations, and critical combat service support
    enablers. These capabilities have allowed the Army to shift its weight
    to meet increasing requirements for counterinsurgency and nation
    building capabilities. The combined impact of rebalancing and growth
    will build strategic and operational depth across all three Army
    components to meet combatant commander requirements; mitigate high-
    demand/low-density persistent shortfalls; and ensure the capability to
    generate, train, and sustain the force in an era of persistent
    conflict.

        32. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General Casey, how is the
    Army training soldiers for both the situations today in Iraq and
    Afghanistan while also balancing the potential requirements of
    tomorrow?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. Army training has aggressively
    adapted to fully prepare deploying forces. However, we face challenges
    to maintain balance for full spectrum conflict and future force
    modernization. The Army continues to deploy highly trained forces
    prepared for their projected mission in Iraq or Afghanistan. Units are
    alerted of their expected deployment as early as possible, identify
    mission essential tasks associated with their assigned mission, and
    focus pre-deployment training on achieving proficiency in those tasks.
    The Army has improved the capability of training venues at units' home
    stations and Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to realistically portray
    the ever changing operational environments--terrain, social, language,
    and culture--in which our soldiers are fighting. Every deploying unit
    conducts a mission rehearsal/readiness exercise or capstone event which
    features nongovernmental organizations, contractors, media, coalition
    role players, and hundreds of civilians on the battlefield.
        Given the predominance of operational deployments to Iraq and
    Afghanistan and the high demand for forces there, the Army is sensitive
    to likely atrophy of expertise for other kinds of operations. To
    counter any such trend and regain more suitable balance, the Army
    requires units to retain training focus as long as possible on the core
    tasked for which they were designed, before shifting to the tasks and
    operational conditions associated with their projected deployment.
    Doing so enables a unit to build skill on the fundamental tasks
    required of full spectrum operations--offense, defense, and stability
    operations--which are executed during any kind of operation whether
    counterinsurgency or major combat operations. As the dwell time before
    units must deploy increases over time, units will be able to train more
    on their as-designed, core tasks. Additionally, to ensure leaders
    develop in a balanced way over their extended careers, the Army
    requires professional military education courses for commissioned
    officers and noncommissioned officers to retain a broad focus on the
    entire range of military operations.
        Sustained demand of current operations has stressed the Army's
    training capability. For example, replicating current operational
    conditions at unit home stations and Army CTCs is accomplished by using
    a combination of base and supplemental funding at the expense of
    modernization. Overtime the training capability of the Army generating
    force has slipped out of balance with requirements of operating force
    because we have taken risk in manning, equipping, and resourcing the
    training base. The Army seeks to achieve balanced training capability,
    in part, by:

             Investing in training modernization for a fully integrated
            live, virtual, and constructive training environment.
             Transferring training tasks from post-mobilization to pre-
            mobilization for Reserve component units.

        33. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General Casey, can you please
    explain how long you believe the Army will be able to handle the
    current operations tempo?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. The cumulative effects of the
    last 6-plus years at war have left our Army out of balance. The impacts
    on soldiers and units of increasing time deployed and decreasing time
    between deployments are visible in several different areas such as
    training and readiness. Additionally, there is a backlog of soldiers
    who have not attended professional military education schools
    commensurate with their rank. Units are only able to train to execute
    counterinsurgency operations rather than full-spectrum operations.
    Other potential indicators are worrisome: the competitive recruitment
    environment with a declining number of qualified potential recruits,
    the increase in the number of soldiers with post traumatic stress
    disorder, and an increasing number of suicides. However, we predict
    that we will continue to recruit and retain enough soldiers to meet our
    end strength requirements.
        The Army has identified four imperatives that we must accomplish to
    put ourselves back in balance: Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform.
    The Army has accelerated its planned growth of soldiers and units and
    we expect to complete our growth by the end of 2011. In this era of
    persistent conflict, the Nation needs to field fully prepared and
    resourced forces wherever required.

        34. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General Casey, you both
    mention that the force is strained; can you please contrast and compare
    your definitions of a strained force and a broken force?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. Today's Army is out of balance,
    it is strained but not broken. Indications that the force is strained
    and out of balance include demand exceeds supply, counterinsurgency-
    focused, rather than a full-spectrum trained force, accelerated
    equipment wear out, and stress on soldiers and families. Nevertheless,
    today's Army is able to meet the national strategy. The Army sends only
    properly manned, trained, and equipped units to Iraq and Afghanistan. A
    broken force lacks the capability to man, train, and equip itself to
    meet the national strategy.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
                              joint cargo aircraft
        35. Senator Pryor. General Casey, the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 states that no funds will
    be appropriated for the procurement of the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)
    until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense signs off on six reports,
    one of which being the Joint Intra-theatre Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis.
    Having been completed in December 2007, this report is long overdue to
    Congress. Where is this Fleet Mix Analysis and when will it be signed?
        General Casey. The Fleet Mix Analysis is a United States Air Force
    report; therefore, you will receive it from the Chief of Staff, Air
    Force.

        36. Senator Pryor. General Casey, how will a delay in this report
    affect the procurement and development of the JCA program for the Army?
        General Casey. The authorization delay will not effect the
    procurement of four aircraft in fiscal year 2008. The delay does impact
    JCA testing and the Business Case Analysis to support the Joint Program
    Strategy for Full Rate Production. Additionally, delayed funding will
    have a direct impact on establishing the first bed down site in
    Georgia, the maintenance contract, purchase of ground support equipment
    and special maintenance tools, and training for pilots and crew
    members. Today, we are in a day-for-day slip with regard to the first
    unit equipped in fiscal year 2010.

        37. Senator Pryor. General Casey, can you elaborate on the
    importance of the JCA for the Army and the strategic differences in
    intra-theater airlift and the last tactical mile?
        General Casey. The importance of the JCA Program to the Army cannot
    be understated. The JCA enables the Army to meet its inherent core
    logistics functions as described by Joint Publication 3-17 and Joint
    Publication 4-0. The primary mission of the Army JCA is to transport
    Army time-sensitive mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and personnel to
    forward deployed units, often in remote and austere locations, commonly
    referred to as the last tactical mile. Because of the critical nature
    of this cargo to the success of the tactical ground commander's mission
    and the short notice of its need (usually less than 24 hours), lift
    assets must be in a direct support relationship to provide the
    necessary responsiveness.
        For sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation performs those
    missions which lie between the strategic and intra-theater missions
    performed by the U.S. Air Force and the tactical maneuver and movement
    performed by Army rotary wing or ground assets. The JCA will provide
    point-to-point distribution where effectiveness vice efficiency is
    critical to meeting the ground tactical mission needs. Simultaneously,
    the JCA will continue to push the majority of supplies forward,
    maintaining the potential synergistic effect between efficiency and
    effectiveness. JCA for both the Army and Air Force is meant to be a
    complimentary asset.

        38. Senator Pryor. General Casey, on January 23, 2008, you met with
    General Moseley at Bolling Air Force Base for Warfighter Talks in an
    effort to strengthen joint partnerships between the Army and the Air
    Force and to discuss issues about interdependence and interoperability
    of operations. Specifically, what conclusions were drawn regarding the
    joint nature of the JCA?
        General Casey. The Army and Air Force have agreed to examine Intra-
    theater Air Lift Roles and Missions as part of the Quadrennial Defense
    Review. In the most recent Air Force-Army Warfighter Talks, we
    recommitted our Services to the success of the C-27 program in its
    current format, on the current fielding timeline, and in accordance
    with the current beddown plan. Together, both Services will work any
    roles and missions issues that may arise.

                        finance and accounting officers
        39. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what steps is the Army taking
    to increase the number of finance and accounting officers both within
    the Army and the combatant commands for current and future areas of
    concern?
        Secretary Geren. The Army's financial management community has
    proactively embraced transformation and modularity. Initiatives such as
    the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource Management System and
    the General Fund Enterprise Business System leverage technology to
    better use the talents of the officers within the financial management
    community. Our financial management community is also combining the
    functions of financial operations and resource management within the
    tactical structures to provide a full scope financial management asset
    for deployed commanders, while conforming to modularity for enhanced
    scale efficiencies. All these efforts maximize the capabilities of our
    current financial management officer population as the Army attempts to
    meet an increasing number of mission requirements.
        Despite these efficiencies, the experiences of OIF/OEF revealed the
    increased need for both financial management and contracting officers
    in deployed environments. The Gansler Report prescribed an increase to
    the expeditionary nature of contracting culminating with the
    establishment of the U.S. Army Contracting Command and a higher
    percentage of Army officers comprising the acquisition profession.
    Parallel efforts within the Army's financial management community
    recognized that battlefield procurement far exceeded previously
    anticipated volumes and recommended doubling the size of both corps and
    division level resource management cells. The analysis prescribed an
    increase from 4 to 8 soldiers at each echelon of these forward deployed
    money management cells--a total of 88 commissioned and noncommissioned
    officer positions across the Army. The next step toward achieving this
    increase in financial management personnel occurs in April when the
    Army's corps structure review revalidates the need and determines a
    sourcing solution.

        40. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what are the incentives for a
    soldier to go into this critical field and has the Army instituted a
    general officer career path?
        Secretary Geren The Army has a well-established financial
    management career path for enlisted soldiers and officers through the
    ranks of sergeant major and colonel. However, the extraordinary
    financial circumstances of the past few years; the missions in
    Afghanistan and Iraq; the Gansler report; and expectations for a
    different budgetary landscape in the future indicate that the Army
    should increase the number of general officers from the financial
    management field.
        The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial
    Management and Comptroller) recently identified 16 positions across the
    Army and Joint Staff for which our skilled financial managers would be
    ideal fits. Both the Army and the Joint Staff would benefit from the
    assignment of soldiers from the financial management field to these
    jobs.
        To support growth in the number of general officers from the
    financial management community, I have agreed to the chief of staff's
    recommendation to increase the number of financial management personnel
    selected for brigadier general this fiscal year, and to select at least
    one every year thereafter. For fiscal year 2009, we are contemplating
    selecting two financial management personnel in order to accelerate by
    1 year the plan to put more financial management general officers into
    key Army and Joint Staff positions.
        The Army has not experienced any difficulties in recruiting or
    retaining uniformed financial-management personnel. Soldiers appreciate
    the inherent challenge of the job and being part of a community in high
    demand with enormous responsibility. Financial management offers the
    opportunity to make a tangible difference from the micro to the macro
    level--from helping to improve the quality of life and the service
    environment for individual soldiers and their families, to obtaining
    and shepherding the operational resources that enable the Army to
    execute its mission and build for the future.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
                         national guard aviation units
        41. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren and General Casey, the Maine
    Army National Guard's Air Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Company of the
    1st Battalion of the 126th Aviation Regiment is currently training at
    Fort Sill, OK, and will soon be deployed to Iraq. This will be their
    second deployment to Iraq since 2003, in addition to a deployment to
    Kosovo in 2000. The proposed DOD budget has $5.01 billion for Army
    aviation aircraft procurement. Some Army National Guard aviation units
    will be trading in their older UH-60 A model Blackhawk helicopters for
    newer model UH-60 M models. I also understand that there is a plan for
    some National Guard units to get their UH-60 A model Blackhawks
    modified to the UH-60 L configuration. While I am pleased to see that
    the Army is making great efforts to get the latest and very best
    equipment to our men and women in the National Guard, I am concerned
    that the Maine Army National Guard is not included in any of these
    plans despite the fact that they have deployed more often and more
    frequently than other National Guard Army aviation units. Can you tell
    me what the plan is to ensure that all of the Army Aviation National
    Guard units receive the most modern aircraft in order to perform all of
    their missions, both here at home, as well as when deployed overseas?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army is completely committed
    to providing the best equipment available to all aviation units,
    regardless of component. To this end, there is a deliberate review of
    the capabilities of each unit prior to its being sourced for a
    deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan. If, during that review, it is
    determined that additional capability beyond what it currently
    possesses is either needed or appropriate for that unit to be able to
    accomplish its mission, the mechanisms to accomplish that are put into
    motion. This is the process that was used to upgrade the UH-60A MEDEVAC
    aircraft in Maine's 1-126th Aviation with the newest engines
    available--the T701D. These are the best engines in the Army and give
    that unit the added aircraft performance that is needed for the
    missions that it will perform. While the end result will be to have all
    UH-60 aviation units upgraded to UH-60Ms or UH-60Ls, fielding nearly
    2,000 Blackhawks in just these 2 configurations will take over 15
    years. This fleet will be a mix of Active and Reserve component units
    and will be fielded in a holistic manner. In the meantime, the Army
    will ensure that each unit has the proper capability. To this end, the
    needs of individual National Guard units are initially assessed by the
    National Guard Bureau, which makes an informed decision about the order
    in which these units need to receive new aircraft.

        42. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren and General Casey, despite the
    fact that the Maine Army National Guard's Air MEDEVAC Company of the
    1st Battalion of the 126th Aviation Regiment has deployed more than any
    other National Guard Air Ambulance company since 2000, it is troubling
    to see that they are not on the list to receive newer equipment. Can
    you describe the process and criteria used in determining which units
    will receive the newest aircraft?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army is completely committed
    to providing the best equipment available to all aviation units,
    regardless of component. To this end, there is a deliberate review of
    the capabilities of each unit prior to its being sourced for a
    deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan. If, during that review, it is
    determined that additional capability beyond what it currently
    possesses is either needed or appropriate for that unit to be able to
    accomplish its mission, the mechanisms to accomplish that are put into
    motion. This is the process that was used to upgrade the UH-60A MEDEVAC
    aircraft in Maine's 1-126th Aviation with the newest engines
    available--the T701D. These are the best engines in the Army and give
    that unit the added aircraft performance that is needed for the
    missions that it will perform. While the end result will be to have all
    UH-60 aviation units upgraded to UH-60Ms or UH-60Ls, fielding nearly
    2,000 Blackhawks in just these 2 configurations will take over 15
    years. This fleet will be a mix of Active and Reserve component units
    and will be fielded in a holistic manner. In the meantime, the Army
    will ensure that each unit has the proper capability when it is needed
    most. To this end, the needs of individual National Guard units are
    initially assessed by the National Guard Bureau, which makes an
    informed decision as to the order in which these units need to receive
    new aircraft.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                         community growth around bases
        43. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Geren and General Casey, as you
    are well aware, both Fort Stewart and Fort Benning in the State of
    Georgia are in the process of growing as a result of the Grow the Army
    plan and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, and we
    welcome that growth and look forward to having more Army soldiers and
    their families residing in the State of Georgia. This growth does bring
    challenges, and one specific challenge that I've been aware of and
    working to address for several years now is the growth in the number of
    students at local school districts resulting from an influx of
    military-connected children. No school district is going to turn away
    additional students, and I know that the folks in Muscogee County,
    Chattahoochee County, and Liberty County are eager to accommodate new
    Army families and their children into their school districts--and they
    will do so. I have had a very difficult time getting accurate estimates
    from the Army regarding how many soldiers and, consequently, how many
    school-aged children will be relocating to Georgia bases. The estimates
    have varied widely and have made it very difficult for local school
    districts to predict and plan how to accommodate this growth. However,
    everyone agrees that, at least at Fort Benning, they will experience a
    growth of several thousand students. But this is not just a Georgia
    issue. Bases and communities in Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and
    Kansas will be affected as well. As you can well understand, any
    additional facilities and teachers required to accommodate additional
    students will need to be funded in advance of the students arriving.
    Local communities are challenged to pay for these expenses, especially
    when the tax base for doing so does not exist, or will likely be made
    up of non-residents who may not be paying income and property tax. Can
    you tell me what the Army is doing to partner with communities around
    bases experiencing this growth?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. Installation commanders maintain
    dialogue with local education activities about timing and level of
    projected growth, as well as associated challenges. In December 2007, a
    Growth Summit was held in St. Louis, Missouri, where participants
    shared their communities' experiences, including techniques or services
    that would help others respond better to their anticipated growth.
        Impact Aid, a function and responsibility of the Department of
    Education, is a tool local communities use to meet the challenges they
    face in funding additional facilities and teachers to accommodate
    increased student loads. The aid is specifically designed to assist
    local school districts that have lost property tax revenue due to the
    presence of tax-exempt Federal property, or experience increased
    expenditures due to enrollment of federally connected children. The
    Army, in coordination with the DOD Office of Economic Adjustment and
    Department of Education, conducted a series of installation visits to
    provide Impact Aid stakeholders with on-the-ground knowledge of issues
    surrounding mission growth, to improve communications among all
    partners, and to identify gaps/lags in capacities.
        The accompanying table reflects school-aged dependent growth at
    Georgia installations.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Projected school-aged
               Georgia installations            dependent growth from fiscal
                                                       years 2007-2011
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fort Benning..............................  3,983
    Fort Gillem...............................  -838
    Fort Gordon...............................  518
    Hunter Army Airfield......................  13
    Fort McPherson............................  -2,251
    Fort Stewart..............................  1,963
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        44. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Geren and General Casey, how are
    you working to ensure that the children of Army families will have
    schools to attend when they arrive at a new station?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army, in coordination with
    the Department of Education's Offices of Elementary and Secondary
    Education and Management, and DOD Office of Economic Adjustment and DOD
    Military Community and Family Policy, conducted site visits to a
    representative sample (Fort Benning, Fort Bliss, Fort Drum, and Fort
    Riley) of locations to provide program stakeholders (Federal, State,
    and local) with on-the-ground knowledge of issues surrounding mission
    growth, improve communications among all partners, identify gaps/lags
    in capacities, and to more extensively document the specific requests
    for Federal action to assist communities and States responding to
    student migration.

        45. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Geren and General Casey, can you
    give me your assurances that making sure this transition is seamless
    and doing everything you can to help local communities prepare for this
    growth will remain a priority for the Army?
        Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army is partnering with
    local communities to deal with community needs, such as schools,
    housing, and community activities, associated with Army stationing and
    growth. Garrison commanders and staff regularly engage with community
    leaders and have school liaison officers who facilitate communication
    with local education agencies to help communities deal with stationing
    and growth.
        The Army is committed to providing soldiers and families with a
    quality, supportive environment commensurate with their voluntary
    service and daily sacrifices. The Army Family Covenant lays out the
    Army's commitment to soldiers and families, and the fiscal year 2009
    budget includes $1.5 billion to make the covenant a reality. The Army
    Family Covenant is in direct response to concerns from Army families
    who expressed concern about support for family programs, physical and
    mental health care, housing, education, childcare, and employment
    opportunities for spouses.
        The Installation Management Command works extensively with
    garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and
    programming requirements. Our BRAC plan addresses the needs of families
    as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans
    include maintaining support to our soldiers and families throughout the
    process. At our installations impacted by growth, we have programmed
    new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness facilities
    and increased staffing, as needed. The Army will closely monitor these
    efforts to ensure that our families' needs are met as the Army
    undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment, and
    deployment.

        [Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
    Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Warner,
    Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Thune, and Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
    professional staff member; Mark R. Jacobson, professional staff
    member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell,
    professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and
    William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
    professional staff member; David G. Collins, research
    assistant; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
    Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
    professional staff member; Sean J. Stackley, professional staff
    member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard
    F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
    Cronin, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Bethany Bassett and
    Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Charles Kieffer,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Bonni Berge and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka;
    Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
    Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
    assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to
    Senator Webb; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions;
    Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor
    IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
    Senator Dole; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian
    W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells
    III, assistant to Senator Wicker.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. First, the
    committee welcomes Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and
    General James T. Conway, USMC, back to the committee this
    morning. In addition, we'd like to welcome Admiral Gary
    Roughead, USN, to his first posture hearing. You are well known
    to this committee. You served as Chief of Legislative Affairs
    not too many years ago, a fairly short time, I think. Do you
    remember what years you were here as legislative affairs chief,
    if you want to admit this?
        Admiral Roughead. I wouldn't want to admit that. I think it
    was in the 2000, 2001 timeframe.
        Chairman Levin. It's great to have you back.
        Admiral Roughead. It's great to be back, sir. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. We're grateful to each of you for your
    service, and to the valorous and truly professional men and
    women that you command and to their families, that we always
    remember when we extend our greetings and our gratitude to the
    men and women in uniform. We always remember to include their
    families, for reasons which you gentlemen are very well aware
    of.
        You're faced with a number of critical issues that confront
    the Department of the Navy in balancing modernization needs
    against the costs of supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. In one notable case, the Nation is calling on the
    Marine Corps to surge additional forces to Afghanistan because
    of a refusal among our allies to support operations there.
        General Conway's prepared statement highlights that at
    least 3,200 marines will soon deploy to Afghanistan, without
    relaxing commitments elsewhere in the United States Central
    Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations. When I talked to
    General Conway the other day in my office, I asked him whether
    that failure on the part of our allies to do their committed
    part had any impact at all on the morale of our marines. His
    answer was a very firm, stout, and immediate ``No,'' and we
    recognize that. If we can be doubly grateful to our marines for
    that kind of a response, we are.
        The Navy's been contributing directly to the war effort in
    CENTCOM as well. In addition to the normal deployments of ships
    and aircraft in support of these operations, according to the
    Admiral's prepared statement the Navy has trained and deployed
    more than 17,000 individual augmentees (IAs) to support these
    missions on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, not
    their usual duty, but there are no complaints, and we're
    tremendously grateful for that response.
        As we visit these men and women we talk to them about that
    issue, and they are doing their duty, period.
        General Conway. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. These activities further stress our troops
    and represent challenges to our servicemembers and their
    families. Again, let me express the thanks of every member of
    this committee and I'm sure every member of the Senate and
    every American for just how well and ably the men and women of
    the Department of the Navy and their families are responding to
    these challenges.
        A number of challenges facing the Department of the Navy
    center on acquisition programs. We have concerns about cost
    problems in the shipbuilding arena, most notably with the
    Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. When we met here last year,
    the Navy had cancelled the contract for the second ship with
    the first of the two LCS contractors. Since that time the
    second LCS contractor has run into much the same cost and
    schedule problems that plagued the first LCS contractor and the
    Navy cancelled that contractor's second ship as well.
        Changing requirements, poor cost estimates, inexperienced
    program managers, and poor supervision of the contractors'
    performance were among the causes of the overrun. Long ago, a
    famous study concluded: Don't monkey with requirements after
    signing a contract, because that leads to cost and schedule
    problems. I've heard through the decades that the Navy has
    learned that lesson, but it apparently still has not.
        In Marine Corps programs, we saw significant cost growth on
    the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program last year.
    More recently, we've seen reports of significant problems in
    affording the VH-71 helicopter that will replace the current
    Marine Corps helicopters that support the President. We will
    need to understand what has caused those cost growth overruns
    and problems and what steps are being taken to correct them.
        In the case of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
    vehicle program, Congress intervened to accelerate this program
    enough so that the Marine Corps will complete filling its
    requirement for the MRAP vehicles in fiscal year 2008.
        Another concern surrounds future force levels. We're facing
    the prospect that the current Navy program will lead to
    potentially large gaps between the forces that the Chief of
    Naval Operations (CNO) has said that he needs and the forces
    that will be available to his successors. In one case, the CNO
    has said that the Navy needs to have 48 attack submarines to
    meet combatant commanders' requirements, but we are faced with
    the risk of falling well short of that goal for more than 10
    years starting during the next decade.
        Under current plans for tactical aircraft acquisition, the
    Navy is facing a shortfall of as many as 200 tactical fighters
    needed to outfit our aircraft carrier air wings. With
    shortfalls that large, we could be faced with drastically
    reducing the number of aircraft available on short notice to
    the combatant commanders, either because we've deployed
    understrength air wings or because we did not deploy the
    carrier at all because of those aircraft shortages.
        The Navy has predicted that the reduction in carrier force
    levels to 10 will not prevent them from maintaining the current
    capability to surge carriers under the Fleet Response Plan, the
    so-called 6+1 capability. If the Navy were not to have enough
    aircraft to outfit 4 of its 10 carrier air wings, this would be
    a moot point in any event.
        We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses this
    morning. We're very grateful again for their presence, for
    their commitment to this Nation, and to their fine work.
        Senator Warner, I think this may be your last Navy posture
    hearing, unless we sneak in another one before the end of the
    year.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. I've enjoyed 30 years of being with you,
    Senator, at these posture hearings, and then 5 years prior
    thereto when I sat at that table. So it's been a very wonderful
    opportunity for this humble person to have had that experience.
        I join you, Mr. Chairman, in the respect and homage we pay
    to the men and women of the Armed Forces, and today it's the
    Navy-Marine Corps team and their families for their service to
    country.
        Mr. Secretary, I was pleased when we visited the other day
    you told me about the centennial celebration for the Great
    White Fleet launched by Teddy Roosevelt 100 years ago, and how
    his aides said to him: Mr. President, we only have money to
    really get them halfway around the world. The President said:
    That's fine by me; we'll get them there and we'll park the
    ships until Congress appropriates the money to bring them home.
        So here we are. But I think those moments of history are
    important to remember. We should reflect also upon the
    Constitution, which says that this Nation shall maintain a Navy
    and raise an Army as we see fit in the appropriate time.
        Today, a third of our Fleet is underway at any one time,
    from the Western Pacific to the Arabian Gulf, sailing with the
    flag of freedom and hope, not only for our country, but for so
    many countries. We also see the trends in naval construction of
    other countries, notably China and now a rejuvenated Russian
    interest in their Navy, and that brings to mind the essential
    requirement of this country and we must remember, in effect,
    we're an island nation, and we're dependent on a maritime
    strategy for our overall security interests.
        Meanwhile, 25,000 marines are conducting our Nation's most
    pressing business in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more are on the
    way. So we salute you, General, and your forces. Today's
    hearing should ensure that we are doing all in our power so
    that they can meet that motto, the most ready at all times.
        For the Navy and the Marine Corps, this comes down to ships
    and aircraft, ordnance and armor, and a trained force of
    sailors and marines equally ready for sea and ready for war.
        The chairman covered several points that are also of
    interest to me and I'll just put that in the record as a part
    of my statement. But I'd like to say to the Commandant, I was
    impressed. I watched a piece last night, I believe it was on
    the Lehrer show, about your concern of the current armor and
    the weight of that armor and how that weight, not only of the
    individual's armor, but the armor that we put on vehicles,
    requires you to do some consideration about the future. I
    commend you for that. Certainly the uparmored Humvee has been a
    successful operation, and now the MRAP. But with that armor
    goes some loss of tactical mobility of those vehicles as well
    as the tactical mobility of the individual marine. Perhaps in
    your testimony you will touch on that decision that you've been
    making.
        We also are interested in the recruiting and training. The
    chairman and I will bring those issues into focus here.
        As the CNO, we're encouraged by the Navy's continued focus
    on the Fleet Response Plan, on stabilizing your steaming days
    and flying hours. I join the chairman with regard to the
    shipbuilding budget and, Mr. Secretary, we hope it is accurate
    and we're hopeful that we can maintain the goals that you've
    established for this coming fiscal year and in the outyears.
    That's the essential part of our responsibility here, providing
    for an adequate force.
        The 313-ship total, Admiral, is still the goal, as it
    should be, of our Fleet. We are also faced, as the chairman
    said, with shortfalls in aircraft as we try to fill the gap
    with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and we'll cover that.
        But a ``well done'' to each of you gentlemen and those that
    you're privileged to have the responsibility to care for, both
    in uniform and the families, and a very significant civilian
    corps, Mr. Secretary, that you know well. I looked at your
    overall figures. It's 900,000 individuals in the Department of
    the Navy that you're responsible for, uniformed and civilian.
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement by Senator Warner follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
        Thank you, Chairman Levin.
        General Conway, Admiral Roughead, Secretary Winter, thank you for
    your testimony today. I commend each of you for your outstanding
    leadership to our Nation, our service men and women, and theirfamilies.
        Mr. Secretary, I was pleased to note your recent centennial
    commemoration of President Theodore Roosevelt launching the great white
    fleet. President Roosevelt had a clear vision for American Seapower,
    and in the century since, our Nation's security has been underpinned by
    our preeminent position as a maritime power.
        Today, you report that a third of the fleet is deployed from the
    western Pacific to the Arabian Gulf, sailing with a freedom truly
    unmatched in history. Yet, today we also see trends in naval
    construction by foreign navies which alert us that this freedom, this
    `command of the seas' will surely be challenged ahead, and it is our
    responsibility to be prepared to meet such challenge.
        Meanwhile, 25,000 marines are conducting our Nation's most pressing
    business in Iraq and Afghanistan, to be joined soon by an additional
    Marine task force deploying to Afghanistan--another demonstration of
    the Corps' commitment, to be `most ready.'
        Today's hearing should ensure that we are doing all in our power so
    they can meet this commitment.
        For the Navy and Marine Corps, this comes down to ships and
    aircraft, ordnance and armor, and a trained force of sailors and
    marines equally ready for sea and ready for war.
        Commandant, you've stated that you're operating at ``surge-plus''
    with marines experiencing a one-to-one ratio of time deployed to time
    back home, and that equipment usage rates are seven times greater than
    peacetime rates. I am most interested in your assessment of the Marine
    Corps' ability to sustain this operational tempo, your readiness to
    surge the additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan next month, and how
    you will transition the experience you've gained in the Al Anbar
    province to achieve equal success in Afghanistan.
        It is important to hear from you on trends in recruiting,
    retaining, and equipping the force as you increase the Corps to an end
    strength of 202,000 marines. While we are focused today on Iraq and
    Afghanistan, it's important to understand your challenges in
    maintaining the Corps' excellence in Expeditionary Warfare.
        As well, Chief of Naval Operations, I'm encouraged by the Navy's
    continued focus on the Fleet Response Plan, on stabilizing steaming
    days and flying hours, and on increasing force readiness. Similarly,
    the Navy has been successful at managing end strength while offsetting
    increasing personnel costs--this done, while supporting ground forces
    with 10,000 sailors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        However, the Navy's force readiness--current and future--will
    ultimately rely on ships and aircraft at sea, and I remain concerned by
    the continued downward trends in recapitalizing our fleet and naval air
    force.
        You have rightfully stated that the Navy's program to build a fleet
    of 313 ships is ``the floor'' required to meet the future threat. Yet
    today, with a force of 279 ships and just 7 ships in this budget
    request, we are simply not building at the rate we need.
        Compounding this problem, we are on the front end of a long gap to
    strike fighter aircraft. Shortfalls of at least 2, perhaps 4 air wings,
    threaten to extend beyond the next decade.
        In considering this budget request, the debate should not center on
    how we will make due with shortfalls in carriers, strike fighters,
    submarines, and amphibious lift; but rather, how we can best close
    these gaps. At the very core of this debate we must address spiraling
    cost growth, or the 313 ship fleet under the cover of 10 carrier air
    wings will remain beyond our reach. I know you all share this concern.
        Secretary Winter, I greatly appreciate your efforts to strengthen
    the business of building our Navy. Programs like the Littoral Combat
    Ship and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle received much attention this
    past year, but the greater concern is that these programs' troubles are
    symptomatic of systems, processes and an industrial base that are
    struggling with today's demand for highly complex systems in low-rate
    production.
        I'm interested in your views on how we strike a course in
    acquisition that brings the Navy's affordability imperative in line
    with its mission requirements.
        As always, we rely on you to advise this committee on the adequacy
    of this budget request to fully support these objectives and to
    identify any challenges you face that warrant the attention of this
    committee. Again, I thank you gentlemen for joining us today and look
    forward to your testimony.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Winter?

       STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

        Secretary Winter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and members of the committee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
    here to present the Department of the Navy's plan to support
    our sailors and marines in their mission to defend our Nation
    against current and future challenges.
        The President's fiscal year 2009 budget will assist the
    Navy and Marine Corps in accomplishing their complementary and
    reinforcing missions while building capabilities necessary to
    meet future threats. One of the primary responsibilities of our
    Government is to provide for the Nation's defense. Those
    responsibilities include the critical requirements to organize,
    train, and equip the naval forces. For the vast majority of
    citizens, the only cost imposed on us is financial. America is
    able to provide for the national defense with such a minimal
    impact on the citizenry because we are blessed to have among us
    a generation of people, patriots all, who volunteer to serve.
    They are the ones who bear many hardships, accept many risks,
    and go in harm's way.
        The pay and benefit funding levels in our 2009 budget
    request reflect the compensation levels necessary to continue
    to attract and retain quality personnel in the Navy and the
    Marine Corps. Furthermore, although we are doing well in our
    overall recruiting and retention numbers, I emphasize the need
    for special pays and bonuses to meet critical sub-specialty
    needs such as our requirements for nurses, physicians, and
    explosive ordnance disposal personnel.
        It is because of the hard work of our sailors and marines
    that we are making progress, fostering maritime security,
    defeating terrorist networks, progressing towards a stable
    Iraq, supporting the Afghan government, countering piracy and
    the proliferation of deadly technology, rendering humanitarian
    assistance, and strengthening partnerships around the world.
    Our sailors and marines have responded when called and superbly
    performed their many missions in our Nation's defense. It is
    truly an honor and privilege to work with them and support them
    as their Secretary.
        The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2009 budget meets
    the challenge of resourcing the Navy and Marine Corps team
    across a range of missions, from partnership building to combat
    operations. It invests in our ability to operate, sustain, and
    develop forces that are engaged in the global war on terrorism
    while preparing the force for the challenges and threats of the
    future.
        We are requesting a total of $149 billion, a 7 percent
    increase over the fiscal year 2008 baseline. This increase is
    driven by factors such as rising oil costs and the critical
    comprehensive growth of the Marine Corps. Our fiscal year 2009
    budget reflects three key priorities, which are consistent with
    those of previous years. They are: first of all, prevail in the
    global war on terror; second, take care of our sailors,
    marines, and their families, and particularly our wounded; and
    lastly, prepare for future challenges across the whole spectrum
    of operations.
        To help meet our first priority, prevail in the global war
    on terror, we are adapting our force for current and future
    missions, to include growing the Marine Corps, shaping the
    force by recruiting and retaining the right people, and
    addressing critical readiness needs. Among the most critical
    readiness needs is the ability to train our sailors and marines
    for the threats that they may encounter. Unfortunately, our
    Navy has encountered increasing encroachments in our ability to
    conduct critical training. We recognize that there are on
    occasion impacts on the citizenry at large associated with such
    training. But these are necessary costs that are critical to
    the defense of the Nation. We take extensive precautions to
    minimize the impact of our training. We owe it to the American
    people and we owe it to those who serve to acknowledge that, as
    in all things in life, there are competing interests and
    tradeoffs and that we treat the risks of sonar operation at sea
    or the impact of jet noise the way we treat all public policy
    issues, balancing risks and costs against legitimate national
    security interests.
        I greatly appreciate the support this committee provided us
    last year with respect to Miramar Air Station, thereby ensuring
    that our naval aviators can continue to receive vital training.
    I commit to you today that I will continue to keep you apprised
    of legal challenges and their implications for readiness that
    we face over the course of the coming year.
        Mr. Chairman, if in the future we are unable to properly
    train our sailors and marines we will have failed to do our
    duty to them and to the American people.
        Another critical issue I would like to highlight concerns
    doing right by those who go in harm's way. As Secretary of
    Defense Robert M. Gates has stated, apart from the war itself
    we have no higher priority than to take care of our wounded.
    Our wounded warriors and their families deserve the highest
    priority care, respect, and treatment for their sacrifices. Our
    2009 budget honors our commitment to ensure that our sailors
    and marines receive the appropriate care, training, and
    financial support that they need.
        Finally, to meet the challenges of the future, the 2009
    budget provides for a balanced fleet of ships, aircraft, and
    expeditionary capabilities with the fighting power and
    versatility to carry out blue, green, and brown water missions
    wherever called upon.
        Furthermore, I would like to note that, consistent with our
    commitment to assure affordability and timely delivery of
    capabilities, we have launched an acquisition improvement
    initiative to provide better integration of requirements and
    acquisition decision processes, improve governance and insight
    into the development, establishment, and execution of
    acquisition programs, and formalize a framework to engage
    senior naval leadership.
        Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the strong support this
    committee and Congress at large have given our Navy and Marine
    Corps team. I want to thank you on their behalf. Our Navy and
    Marine Corps are a strong, capable, and dedicated team. I
    appreciate the opportunity to represent them today and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Winter follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald C. Winter

     The Navy and Marine Corps Team . . . fighting today and preparing for
                               future challenges

                                i. introduction
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is
    an honor to appear again before you representing the men and women of
    the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps--Active,
    Reserve, and civilian--a force of over 800,000 strong.
        I am here to present the Department of the Navy's (DON) plan to
    support our sailors and marines in their mission to defend our Nation
    against current and future challenges as they conduct operations
    spanning the spectrum, from major combat to humanitarian assistance.
    The President's fiscal year 2009 budget will assist the Navy and Marine
    Corps in accomplishing their complimentary and reinforcing missions,
    while building capabilities necessary to meet future threats. The
    fiscal year 2009 budget balances capabilities to support both
    traditional and irregular warfare demands. It also continues to expand
    the Marine Corps' capacity and furthers the transformation from a blue
    water navy into one that can fight and win in the blue, green, and
    brown waters.
        As I reflect upon my time as Secretary of the Navy, nothing is more
    sobering than the experience of seeing--every single day--the
    dedication, professionalism, and willingness to sacrifice shown by our
    sailors, marines, civilian employees, and their families. I will attest
    to you their unwavering commitment to duty. These patriots put
    themselves in harm's way to protect our Nation. From those who have
    given the ultimate sacrifice, such as Medal of Honor recipients
    Lieutenant Michael Murphy and Corporal Jason Dunham, to those who daily
    take the pledge to support and defend our Nation, our Navy and Marine
    Corps Team is second to none. It is because of their efforts that we
    are making progress fostering maritime security, defeating terrorist
    networks, progressing towards a stable Iraq, supporting the Afghan
    government, countering piracy and the proliferation of deadly
    technology, giving humanitarian assistance to people in need after
    tsunamis and earthquakes, and strengthening partnerships around the
    world. The men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps have responded
    when called upon. It is an honor and privilege to work with them and
    support them as their Secretary.
        Today our Nation is faced with a myriad of challenges and
    uncertainties across the globe. There have been several unexpected, and
    sometimes sudden, changes in the security environment over the past few
    years. Yet many of the strategic imperatives of the United States--
    particularly with respect to the maritime environment--remain
    unchanged. It is clear the United States must have the capacity to act
    in such a fluid and unpredictable environment, and that naval forces
    offer unique flexibility to respond swiftly and decisively anywhere in
    the world. Providing this flexibility requires that the DON invest
    wisely across a wide range of capabilities, and that we take care to
    deliver a balanced portfolio of capabilities to the joint force.
    Worldwide presence, credible deterrence and dissuasion, projection of
    power from naval platforms anywhere on the globe, and the ability to
    prevail at sea are the critical, most fundamental elements of the Navy
    and Marine Corps strategic posture; these are our indispensable
    contributions to the joint warfighting capability of the Nation.
        The United States is a maritime power, bounded by sea to the east
    and west. The health of our national economy depends on assuring safe
    transit through the seas--and the maritime dimension of international
    commerce is ever increasing. Consider that 70 percent of the earth is
    covered by water, 80 percent of the world's population lives in close
    proximity to the coast, and 90 percent of the world's international
    commerce is transported via the sea. Given our national interests, and
    the role we play in the world, it is unsurprising that our sailors and
    marines are constantly called upon to react to a wide range of
    challenges. I suggest that the strength of a nation's naval force
    remains an essential measure of that nation's status and role in the
    world. I also submit that maritime dominance by the United States
    remains vital to our national security, to our position in the world,
    and to our ability to defend and promote our interests.
        Last fall, the DON, in collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard,
    reaffirmed its emphasis on the traditional capabilities of forward
    presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection in its new
    Maritime Strategy: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.
    However, the Maritime Strategy also makes clear that we consider our
    core capabilities to include maritime security and the provision of
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief--areas of growing
    importance. The strategy emphasizes the use of soft power, and
    highlights the criticality of our foreign friends and allies, while
    reminding us that the underlying credibility for partnerships and peace
    is the United States' ability to swiftly defeat a threat with
    overwhelming and decisive combat power.
        The unique nature of our Department is such that the Navy and
    Marine Corps team is a constantly deployed force, both in peacetime and
    in war, with the further ability to surge assets worldwide, anytime
    required. As we consider the current and projected strategic
    environment, we must anticipate a steadily growing reliance on our
    unique expeditionary character. This is becoming ever more apparent.
    The challenge of resourcing our two services across such a large range
    of steadily growing global missions, from partnership building to
    combat operations, is one that we have met with the President's fiscal
    year 2009 budget.
        Reflected in the budget submittal is the fact that today's Navy and
    Marine Corps are operating in blue, green and brown waters, in the air
    and on the shore--and sometimes deep inland--facing a wide variety of
    threats. On any given day, approximately 40 percent of the fleet is
    deployed at sea or involved in pre-deployment training. Forward
    deployed carrier and expeditionary strike groups operate on the high
    seas, unencumbered by constraints facing land-based forces. They are
    providing our combatant commanders with many important and powerful
    combinations of capability: tactical aviation, land attack systems,
    SEAL and Marine Special Operations Forces (SOF), intelligence and
    surveillance platforms, amphibious assault and forcible entry capacity,
    over-the-horizon force projection, and flexible seabasing and at sea
    logistical support. Our full spectrum of capabilities also includes
    ship-based ballistic missile defense--providing a shield that not only
    protects our maritime freedom of movement and access, but which also
    contributes to the defense of our allies and our homeland against
    missile threats. In other words, we are presenting a budget which
    supports a force in high demand across the globe.
        The President's budget does more than just fulfill our
    responsibilities in today's complex environment; it continues to evolve
    our portfolio of capabilities. This is essential to our ability to
    defend against future threats which could range from the asymmetric--
    from terrorists to proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass
    destruction--to the more traditional challenges posed by nation-states
    and possible future ``near peer'' competitors.
        Evolving our portfolio of capabilities can be challenging, since
    the Navy and Marine Corps have an operational construct that emphasizes
    forward deployment and presence. Historically, while the bulk of U.S.
    forces return home after cessation of a conflict or crisis, our
    maritime forces often do not. They are continuously present in forward
    regions, and through their forward engagement they maintain familiarity
    with the environment and the characteristics of regional actors; they
    also foster and sustain trust and cooperation with friends and allies.
    Thus when a threat to our national security emerges overseas, it may
    well be encountered first by the Navy and Marine Corps. Meeting that
    threat, whether on land, in the air, on the high seas, or under the
    sea, will require our forces to be in peak fighting condition. They
    must be ready to fight and win at any time, and to do so at great
    strategic distance. We have developed a budgetary plan which addresses
    these requirements.
        We have developed the budget in the face of a demanding and rapidly
    changing security environment, and there are worrisome trends that bear
    watching. Nations are developing weapons and systems which seem
    deliberately intended to threaten our naval assets, deny access, and
    restrict our freedom of maneuver. The proliferation of anti-access
    weapons technology to unfriendly nations is a significant concern.
    Furthermore, the DON, like other parts of the Department of Defense
    (DOD), has been a target of aggressive foreign intelligence and data-
    collection activities. As such, we need to invest in the capabilities
    necessary to preserve our technological advantage. Additionally, aside
    from growing costs and schedule delays in some acquisition programs, we
    also struggle with regulatory encroachment and legal challenges that
    threaten to undercut our ability to effectively train and maintain
    readiness. We must address these challenges; doing so is fundamental to
    maintaining our naval readiness and our capability to defend our
    Nation.
        In summary, the DON's fiscal year 2009 budget invests in the Navy
    and Marine Corps to operate, sustain and develop forces that will
    remain engaged in the global war on terrorism, while at the same time
    preparing the force for the challenges and threats of the future. The
    fiscal year 2009 budget requests $149.3 billion for these purposes.
    This is a 7-percent increase over the fiscal year 2008 baseline and is
    driven by factors such as rising oil costs and the critical,
    comprehensive growth of the United States Marine Corps.
    Priorities for the Department of the Navy
        The DON is committed to finding solutions that allow the Navy and
    Marine Corps to balance our current requirements and operational
    realities with the likely needs of the future. We strive to maintain an
    agile and flexible force that can not only contribute to winning our
    Nation's wars but also can assist in preventing future conflict to the
    extent possible--whether by dissuasion, deterrence, humanitarian
    action, or disaster relief. As such, our priorities remain consistent
    with those in previous years. They are to:

             Prevail in the global war on terrorism;
             Take care of our sailors, marines, their families and
            particularly our wounded; and
             Prepare for future challenges across the full spectrum
            of operations.

        As in the past, for the sake of brevity, some of the key programs
    are highlighted and can be found in greater detail in the Highlights of
    the DON fiscal year 2009 budget.\1\ This statement is designed to
    reinforce, and build upon, initiatives articulated in previous
    testimony and budget material.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Highlights of the DON fiscal year 2009 budget, February 2008.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   ii. prevail in the global war on terrorism
        The Department's top priority remains the global war on terrorism.
    Today, approximately 29,300 marines and 11,300 sailors (including
    individual augmentees) operate ashore, along with 12,000 sailors at
    sea. They are conducting and supporting operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, and throughout the U.S. Central Command region, and their
    contributions are central to the progress being made.
        Naval forces provide a major part of the national worldwide
    rotational presence and an increasing portion of the required support
    for ground units in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation
    Iraqi Freedom (OIF). They operate across the spectrum--from low
    intensity conflict, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to
    high intensity conflict involving airborne strike and Marine Corps
    forces in coordinated joint and coalition ground operations. To
    illustrate the wide range of activities undertaken, it is noteworthy
    that, in 2007, five Carrier Strike Groups and five Expeditionary Strike
    Groups deployed in support of OEF and OIF. Throughout 2007 the Marine
    Corps provided three embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) forward
    positioned in all geographic commands. Two of these MEUs were employed
    ashore in support of Multinational Force-West and participated in
    sustained combat operations. Naval aviation, afloat and ashore, in
    concert with U.S. Air Force and coalition aviation forces, has provided
    critical strike, overland surveillance, logistical and electronic
    warfare support to the joint land forces deployed in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The Navy has also deployed riverine forces for the first
    time since Vietnam, operating on Lake Thar Thar and the Euphrates
    River. The Marine Corps also achieved a milestone with successful
    deployment of the first MV-22 Osprey squadron in OIF operations. Naval
    Special Warfare (NSW) forces continue to be actively engaged in
    combating terrorism. The Navy SEALs and the Marine Special Operations
    Command have done outstanding work in OIF/OEF and have made critical
    progress in countering the threat of international terrorism. We will
    continue to prioritize investment and retention of our highly-skilled
    Special Operations Forces.
        In addition to traditional types of maritime activities, the Navy
    continues to support the global war on terrorism in a variety of non--
    traditional areas. For example, Navy sailors are leading a number of
    Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan today. Significant
    numbers of naval combat support and combat service support personnel
    are relieving the Army and Marine Corps in select mission areas. In
    U.S. Central Command, Navy personnel are providing base and port
    operations support, medical, explosive ordinance disposal, construction
    battalions, civil affairs, electronic warfare, mobile security forces,
    detainee operations, intelligence, and headquarters staff support. The
    Navy also continues command of the detainee mission in Guantanamo Bay,
    Cuba and at Camp Bucca, a high security prison in Iraq. Executive agent
    responsibilities are discharged by the Navy for the global war on
    terrorism-related Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA)
    in Djibouti. CJTF HOA has transformed from its initial seafaring force,
    aimed at blocking terrorists fleeing Afghanistan (and preventing them
    from establishing new safe havens), into a task force that also
    conducts military-to-military training and humanitarian assistance over
    a large geographic expanse of eight countries.
        With respect to the Marine Corps, the II Marine Expeditionary Force
    Forward, augmented by marines from around the Corps, conducted
    counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and led the Multinational Force-
    West in Al Anbar Province, supported by Army, Air Force, and Navy
    personnel. The achievements of the marines in Al Anbar have been widely
    noted, and their success in creating a permissive environment for local
    governance and economic development--making significant inroads in
    security, training, and transfer of responsibility to their Iraqi
    counterparts--has been crucial. More broadly across the country, Marine
    Corps Transition Teams have conducted training for Iraqi military,
    police, and border teams. The Marine Corps provided over 800 personnel
    across more than 50 types of Iraqi transition teams in 2007. Building
    upon these successes in Iraq, recently the President approved the
    deployment of 2,200 marines to Afghanistan in support of the NATO-led
    International Security Assistance Force mission, and 1,000 marines to
    assist in the training and development of the Afghan National Security
    Forces. In preparation for these overseas missions, the Marine Corps
    continues to implement comprehensive training programs at home, such as
    Mojave Viper and Desert Talon.
        At sea, the effective conduct of Maritime Security Operations is a
    critical element of the fight against terrorism. In the Northern
    Arabian Gulf, our sailors and marines are working with coalition and
    Iraqi forces in a Coalition Task Group to defend the Al Basra Oil
    Terminal and the Khawr al Amaya Oil Terminal. The security of these
    platforms is provided through waterborne patrols in rigid hull
    inflatable boats, platform security personnel, and helicopter
    surveillance. Working with our NATO allies, the Navy continues to
    provide support for Operation Active Endeavor, which is an ongoing
    maritime interdiction effort in the Mediterranean. Similarly, the
    conduct of operations to dissuade and counter piracy off the West
    African coast and the actions of the guided missile destroyers U.S.S.
    Porter, U.S.S. Arleigh Burke and U.S.S. James E. Williams off the coast
    of Somalia this past October are examples of how the Navy is working to
    provide a secure maritime environment.
        Fostering enduring foreign partnerships and friendships is yet
    another key contributor to the global war on terrorism, as we bolster
    the capacity of nations to work with us, and to conduct
    counterterrorism efforts of their own. The Navy is continuing to
    develop the concept of Global Fleet Station (GFS), envisioned to be a
    highly visible, positively engaged, reassuring, and persistent sea base
    from which to interact with the global maritime community of nations.
    The Department demonstrated the concept through the GFS pilot in
    October, using the HSV-2 SWIFT in the Caribbean, and again with the
    African Partnership Station in the Gulf of Guinea, using the U.S.S.
    Fort McHenry and HSV-2 SWIFT. In addition to targeted outreach
    activities, the Navy and Marine Corps team extends America's diplomatic
    reach through the conduct of multinational exercises and port visits.
    Throughout 2007, the naval force participated in over 230 bilateral and
    multinational exercises with partners around the globe.\2\ The Marine
    Corps also participated in over 60 Theater Security Cooperation events,
    which ranged from deployment of small Mobile Training Teams in Central
    America to MEU exercises in Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific.
    Additionally, several overseas training events were held with foreign
    special operations forces to improve interoperability with Navy and
    Marine SOF, and the Department provided support to the stand-up of
    NATO's new SOF Coordination Center. The cumulative effect of these
    exercises and events is to foster trust and sustain cooperative
    relationships with our international partners. This is critical to U.S.
    national security.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Illustrative of our global security cooperation are exercises
    involving the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and the Indian Navy
    during TRILAX 07 in the Northern Pacific; PHOENIX EXPRESS 07 with
    Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian forces west of the Gibraltar Strait;
    BALTOPS 07 in the Baltic Sea with Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden,
    Poland, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, and NATO; AMAN
    07 with Pakistan, Great Britain, China, France, Italy, Malaysia,
    Turkey, and Bangladesh; UNITAS off of South America's Pacific coast
    with Chile, Colombia, and Peru; and MALABAR with forces from India.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Outreach to foreign populations is also an important part of the
    Nation's efforts to stem the spread of terrorism. This is an important
    mission for the Navy and the Marine Corps and is a tangible way that we
    can demonstrate the compassion and values of the American people. Last
    year, the Navy and Marine Corps together were at the forefront of
    numerous humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
    Sailors and marines in the Pacific provided desperately-needed
    humanitarian support to Bangladesh in the aftermath of Cyclone Sidr.
    The Marine Corps engaged in civil-military and humanitarian assistance
    operations such as ``New Horizons'' in Nicaragua and land mine removal
    training in Azerbaijan. The joint and combined crew aboard the U.S.N.S.
    Comfort gave humanitarian aid during a 4-month tour in Latin America
    and the Caribbean. During Pacific Partnership 2007, the joint and
    interagency crew of the U.S.S. Peleliu gave similar aid to the
    Philippines and other Pacific island nations. We hope that the support
    given during these missions, whether it was the Seabees' reconstruction
    of homes and schools devastated by a tsunami, or inoculation and
    treatment of children and the elderly by Navy and Marine medical
    professionals, helped convey a positive image of the United States with
    local populations.
        Finally, within the United States, the Department continues its
    emphasis on providing increased force protection to our sailors and
    marines, particularly in the area of counter-improvised explosive
    devices (IED). As lead service for the joint Mine Resistant Ambush
    Protected (MRAP) vehicle program, the Department accelerated production
    for MRAP vehicles to rapidly field this capability in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Through the use of Lean Six Sigma activities and projects,
    the Department synchronized an effort to build and transport MRAP
    vehicles to the theater, rapidly identifying and mitigating
    deficiencies in the MRAP vehicle pipeline. Over 2,000 MRAP vehicles
    have been fielded to support the Department's joint urgent requirement,
    over 900 of which are in the hands of marines and more than 150 fielded
    to the Navy. Also as part of the broader counter-IED effort, the
    Department is procuring Biometric Tools, the Family of Imaging Systems,
    counter-IED robotics, and Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic
    Warfare systems.
    Adapting the Naval Force for Global War on Terrorism and Future
            Missions
        The Marine Corps and Navy are being called upon today to conduct
    surge operations, conduct Iraq unit rotations, provide additional
    forces to Afghanistan, and prepare for other challenges. The Department
    has not only addressed these commitments, but is contributing low
    density, high demand forces (e.g., Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
    units) to support the other Services and coalition efforts. Of our
    deployed EOD teams, over 50 percent operate in support of other
    services. Additionally, over the course of 2007, the Navy provided
    12,985 Active component augmentees and 9,527 mobilized reservists in
    support of OEF and OIF globally, and filled approximately 8,000
    individual augmentee and 4,500 ``in-lieu-of'' requirements. The Navy
    has increased several low density, high demand specialties and units,
    such as Construction Battalions and EOD teams. In October 2007, the
    Navy commissioned its newest Construction Battalion and Construction
    Regiment, bringing them to a total of nine Active Duty battalions and
    three Active Duty regiments. Further, in order to relieve stress on
    marines and their families, and to address future contingencies, the
    Marine Corps is growing the force, exceeding its 2007 target of 184,000
    marines; the Marine Corps is on track to meet the goal of 202,000 by
    fiscal year 2011.
        Reshaping of the force is an important and evolutionary process. To
    do this, the Department is focused on three fronts: recruiting the
    right people, retaining the right people, and achieving targeted
    attrition. Recruiting objectives are focused on increasing the quality
    of the Total Force and seeking qualified sailors to include special
    emphasis on filling the ranks of SEAL, NSW, Navy Special Operations,
    Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen, EOD, Divers, Hospital
    Corpsmen, and Women in Non-traditional Ratings (Master-at-Arms and
    Seabees). Recruiters are also focused on creating a smooth flow of
    recruits into boot camp by maintaining and mentoring a healthy pool of
    young men and women in the Delayed Entry Program.
        The Department has also implemented initiatives to increase
    visibility and incentives for medical recruitment. While we have seen
    improvement in some medical programs, such as in the Nurse Corps with
    direct accessions, numerous challenges remain in recruiting and
    retaining medical personnel. Retention challenges exist in critical
    specialties that require 3-7 years of training beyond medical school.
    In the Dental Corps, we face challenges in retaining junior officers
    between 4-7 years, and we also are experiencing high attrition rates
    for junior officer ranks in the Nurse Corps. To combat the recruiting
    challenges and continue supporting the increased demand for the OIF/
    OEF, we implemented increased accession bonuses for the Nurse Corps and
    Dental Corps; funded a critical skills accession bonus for medical and
    dental school Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP)
    participants; increased the stipend for HPSP students, as well as
    Financial Assistance Program participants; expanded the critical skills
    wartime specialty pay for Reserve component medical designators;
    recently implemented a Critical Wartime Skills Accession bonus for
    Medical and Dental Corps; and implemented a Critical Skills Retention
    bonus for clinical psychologists.
        We note that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
    Fiscal Year 2008 restricts military-to-civilian conversions for the
    medical community through September 30, 2012. Due to the date of
    enactment of this legislation, it is not reflected in the fiscal year
    2009 President's budget request, but the plan is now being readdressed.
    Resolution will require careful planning, and we are working closely
    with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on this matter.
        Incentive programs were a key component of our enlisted recruiting
    success in 2007. The enlistment bonus continues to be our most popular
    and effective incentive for shaping our accessions. The authority to
    pay a bonus up to $40,000 made a significant contribution to our Navy
    Special Warfare and Navy Special Operations recruiting efforts.
    Likewise, our Reserve component success would not have been possible
    without the availability of enlistment bonuses. Extended incentive
    authorities towards some of our more specialized skill fields,
    including nuclear and aviation, will help to recruit and retain these
    critical skill sets, while renewal of accession bonuses will help to
    expand the force to newly mandated levels. The continued support of
    Congress in the creation of flexible compensation authorities affords
    the Department the tools that will help shape the force for the 21st
    century.
        The Grow the Force mandate by the President is a long-term plan to
    restore the broad range of capabilities necessary to meet future
    challenges and mitigate global risk to national security of the United
    States. The Marine Corps will grow the force by 27,000 (from 175,000 to
    202,000) marines over 5 years. This additional capacity and capability
    will enable full spectrum military operations in support of allies and
    partners as well as against potential enemies. In 2007, the Marine
    Corps added two infantry battalions, capacity to the combat engineer
    battalions and air naval gunfire liaison companies, and planned the
    training and infrastructure pieces necessary to build a balanced
    warfighting capability. The Marine Corps has achieved success in
    recruiting and maintaining quality standards. This is a remarkable
    achievement for an All-Volunteer Force during a sustained war. The
    Marine Corps anticipates continued success in meeting recruiting and
    retention goals to achieve this planned force level. This end strength
    increase addresses more than current operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. It ensures that the Marine Corps will be able to deal with
    the challenges of the Long War and will reduce combat stress on marines
    and their families by moving towards a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio.
    Currently many marines are on a 1:1 or less deployment to dwell ratio.
        Navy and Marine Corps Reserves continue to be vital to successfully
    fighting the global war on terrorism and in accomplishing routine
    military operations. The Marine Corps and Navy activated, respectively,
    5,505 and 5,007 reservists to fulfill critical billets in OIF and other
    gaps in headquarters and operational units. At the close of fiscal year
    2007, the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves end strength was 69,933 and
    38,557 respectively.
    Readiness
        The Department's budget reflects a commitment to properly price and
    fund readiness to meet the demands of the Combatant Commands. For
    fiscal year 2009, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) is funded to achieve
    ``6+1''--the ability to support deployment of six carrier strike groups
    within 30 days and one additional group within 90 days. Additionally,
    the fiscal year 2009 budget funds 45 underway steaming days per quarter
    for deployed forces and 22 underway days per quarter for nondeployed
    forces. For the Marine Corps, equipment readiness accounts are focused
    on supporting the operational and equipment readiness of units engaged
    in operations in OIF. The Marine Corps has made tradeoffs in this area
    by cross-leveling equipment from units not in the fight, and while the
    force made great strides in its overall readiness to conduct
    counterinsurgency operations, this has been achieved at the expense of
    other traditional training, such as amphibious assault and jungle
    warfare.
        Carrier Waiver
        The Navy is committed to maintaining an aircraft carrier force of
    11. However, during the 33-month period between the planned 2012
    decommissioning of U.S.S. Enterprise and the 2015 delivery of the
    U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford, legislative relief is requested to temporarily
    reduce the carrier force to 10. Extending Enterprise to 2015 would
    involve significant technical risk, challenge our manpower and
    industrial bases, and require significant resource expenditure; with
    only minor gain for the warfighter in carrier operational availability
    and significant opportunity costs in force structure and readiness. The
    Navy is adjusting carrier maintenance schedules to meet the FRP and
    ensure a responsive carrier force for the Nation during this proposed
    ten carrier period.
        Law of the Sea Convention
        It is critically important to the United States and our friends and
    allies that the seas of the world remain safe and open for all nations.
    Accordingly, the DON supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
    Convention. The Treaty codifies important principles of customary
    international law, such as Freedom of Navigation and rights of passage.
    Joining the Convention, with the declarations and understandings
    reflected in Senate Report 110-9 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee),
    will assist the United States to exercise its leadership role in the
    future development of open oceans law and policy. As a non-party, the
    United States does not have full access to the Convention's formal
    processes (through which over 150 nations participate in influencing
    future law of the sea developments). By providing legal certainty and
    stability for the world's largest maneuver space, the Convention
    furthers a core goal of our National Security Strategy to promote the
    rule of law around the world.
        Suppression of Unlawful Acts
        The Department supports expeditious U.S. ratification of the 2005
    Protocol of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA)
    against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the 2005 Protocol to the
    1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
    of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (``SUA
    Amendments''), adopted by the International Maritime Organization on
    October 14, 2005, and signed by the United States on February 17, 2006.
    The SUA Amendments significantly strengthen the legal regime to
    criminalize terrorist acts and combat weapons of mass destruction
    proliferation in the maritime domain making them an important component
    in the international campaign to prevent and punish such acts.
        Encroachment
        A critical readiness issue is our ability to be prepared to meet
    the full spectrum of operations that may arise globally. This requires
    that we have the ability to properly train our sons and daughters in a
    manner that effectively prepares them for the threats they may
    encounter. In order for naval forces to be able to meet our operational
    commitments we need installations and ranges, the ability to continue
    to use them for their intended purposes, and the ability to augment
    them when necessary to respond to changing national defense
    requirements and circumstances.
        We appreciate the action taken by Congress to recognize the
    importance of protecting naval installations from encroachment
    pressures by enacting section 2863 of the John Warner National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 that establishes prohibitions
    against making certain military airfields or facilities, including
    Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, available for use by civil aircraft.
    We seek your continued support to move forward with plans for the
    Outlying Landing Field (OLF) that is critically needed to support
    training requirements for Carrier Air Wing aircraft based at Naval Air
    Station Oceana and Naval Station Norfolk. The OLF will directly support
    the Department's ability to meet its national defense commitments under
    the FRP and provide naval aviators critical training in conditions most
    comparable to the at-sea operating environment they will face. In
    response to public comments regarding the previous site alternatives,
    the Navy has terminated the draft Supplemental Environmental Impact
    Statement (EIS) and will initiate a new EIS that examines five new site
    alternatives, three in Virginia and two in North Carolina, based upon
    new information provided by officials in those states. I ask for your
    continued support as we work with Congress and the States of Virginia
    and North Carolina to preserve and improve the installation and range
    capabilities needed to properly train our young men and women before we
    send them into harms way.
        Marine Mammals and Active Sonar
        The most critical readiness issue relates to the Navy's ability to
    train using active sonar while minimizing the effect on marine mammals.
    One of the most challenging threats that our naval forces face is
    modern, quiet diesel-electric submarines. These submarines employ
    state-of-the-art silencing technologies and other advances, such as
    special hull treatments, that make them almost undetectable with
    passive sonar and also reduce their vulnerability to detection with
    active sonar. A diesel-electric submarine so equipped can covertly
    operate in coastal and open ocean areas, blocking Navy access to combat
    zones and increasing United States vessels' vulnerability to torpedo
    and anti-ship missile attacks. Currently, over 40 countries operate
    more than 300 diesel-electric submarines worldwide, including potential
    adversaries in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East areas. Naval strike
    groups are continuously deployed to these high-threat areas. Training
    with the use of mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar is a vital component
    of pre-deployment training. The tactical use of MFA sonar is the best
    means of detecting potentially hostile, quiet, diesel-electric
    submarines. The inability to train effectively with active sonar
    literally puts the lives of thousands of Americans at risk.
        In January 2008, a Federal district court issued an injunction
    precluding the Navy's ability to train effectively with MFA in critical
    exercises scheduled to occur in the Southern California Operating Area
    through January 2009, creating an unacceptable risk that strike groups
    may not be certified for deployment in support of world-wide
    operational and combat activities. Because the Composite Unit Training
    Exercises and the Joint Task Force Exercises off Southern California
    are critical to the ability to deploy strike groups ready for combat,
    the President concluded that continuing to train with MFA in these
    exercises is in the paramount interest of the United States and granted
    a temporary exemption from the requirements of the Coastal Zone
    Management Act for use of MFA sonar in these exercises through January
    2009. Additionally, due to the emergency circumstances created by an
    injunction that would prevent the Navy from reliably training and
    certifying strike groups ready for deployment, the Council on
    Environmental Quality (CEQ) authorized, and the Navy accepted,
    alternative arrangements for compliance with the National Environmental
    Policy Act. Despite these developments, the trial court refused to set
    aside the injunction. As a result the Navy has appealed the court's
    refusal to give effect to the President's and CEQ's actions by
    dissolving the injunction and correcting the court's failure to
    properly tailor the injunction in the first place to allow the Navy to
    train effectively. The appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit for
    expedited review.
        The Department continues to be a good steward of the environment,
    while providing the necessary training that is essential to national
    security and ensures the safety of our people. The Department is
    engaged in a comprehensive effort to ensure compliance with the
    National Environmental Policy Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act,
    Endangered Species Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, National Marine
    Sanctuaries Act, and Executive Order 12114. Twelve EISs are in
    development with associated Records of Decision (ROD) scheduled for
    issuance by the end of calendar year 2009. The Navy implements 29
    protective measures developed in conjunction with the National Marine
    Fisheries Service, the Federal regulator responsible for oversight and
    implementation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. These measures
    afford significant protection to marine mammals while maintaining
    training fidelity. The Navy has steadily increased funding for marine
    mammal research from $12 million in fiscal year 2006 to $18 million in
    fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009. The Navy's financial commitment
    constitutes more that half of the world-wide funding for research on
    the effects of anthropogenic sound on marine mammals. Over the past
    several years, tremendous progress has been made in expanding the
    scientific base of knowledge, especially concerning the species
    identified as the most sensitive to MFA sonar, deep diving beaked
    whales. The Navy, working with the National Marine Fisheries Service,
    is engaged in a 3-year controlled exposure study of sound on whales at
    the Navy's Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center in the Bahamas.
    This study, along with other research, development, test and evaluation
    efforts, will provide further information needed to understand and
    effectively mitigate the effects of active sonar on marine mammals.
                          iii. take care of our people
        In 2007 the Department implemented a Human Capital Strategy that
    focuses on our most valuable asset, the Department's people. In the
    strategy, the Department addresses the changes in warfare, workforce,
    technologies, and processes and lays out the strategic objective to
    produce and employ the right people with the right skills to support or
    accomplish 21st century naval missions. The development and retention
    of quality people is vital to our continued success. The DON is
    committed to sustaining quality of service and quality of life
    programs, including training, compensation, promotion opportunities,
    health care, housing, and reasonable operational and personnel tempo.
    The cost of manpower is the single greatest component in the fiscal
    year 2009 budget. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $41.6 billion
    for military personnel and includes a 3.4 percent military personnel
    pay raise. This investment is critical to ensuring a naval force with
    the highest levels of ability and character.
        Comprehensive Care
        As Secretary of Defense Gates has stated, ``Apart from the war
    itself, we have no higher priority (than to take care of our Wounded,
    Ill, and Injured).'' Over the sustained combat operations in the global
    war on terrorism, the Department has endured the loss of over 830
    marines and 75 sailors killed in action, and over 8,500 marines and 600
    sailors wounded in action. These marines and sailors and their
    survivors deserve the highest priority care, respect and treatment for
    their sacrifices. We must ensure our wounded warriors and families
    receive the appropriate care, training and financial support they need.
    Failing them will undermine the trust and confidence of the American
    people. Consequently, the DON initiated a Comprehensive Casualty Care
    effort in March 2007 to ensure visibility of the full range of needs of
    servicemembers and their family members and the coordination and
    expedient delivery of clinical and nonclinical services throughout the
    continuum of care. Among the initiatives pursued under this effort was
    a Lean Six Sigma mapping of the casualty care process to identify areas
    of patient transitions, gaps in service, and unmet needs across key
    functional service areas to include: Medical, Pay, and Personnel,
    Family Support, Case Management, Information Technology, and the
    Disability Evaluation System. The following sections provide some
    specific examples of the Department's actions and plans for improving
    care for our people.
        Combat Casualty Care
        Navy Medicine provides combat casualty care to Navy and Marine
    Corps units, on Expeditionary Medical Facilities, aboard casualty
    receiving/treatment ships and hospital ships, and in military
    hospitals. Recent advances in force protection, battlefield medicine,
    combat/operational stress control, and medical evaluation have led to
    improved survival rates for wounded (approximately 97 percent) and
    enhanced combat effectiveness. In September 2007 Naval Medical Center
    San Diego stood-up a Comprehensive Combat Casualty Care Center
    providing inpatient and outpatient services to all levels of combat
    casualties, including rehabilitative, mental health and prosthetic
    care. The unit is the military's first and only center for amputee care
    on the west coast. This year the Marine Corps is reorganizing Medical
    Battalions and fielding the Family of Field Medical Equipment,
    modernizing 34 different medical systems such as the Traumatic Brain
    Injury (TBI) scanner and the Airframe First Aid Kit.
        Wounded Warrior and Safe Harbor
        In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps expanded its existing
    programs by establishing the Wounded Warrior Regiment with a Wounded
    Warrior Battalion on each coast to provide better continuity of care
    for wounded warriors. Specifically, these organizations provide wounded
    warriors a location to recuperate and transition in proximity to family
    and parent units. The Navy has a number of programs ensuring care for
    all wounded, ill, and injured sailors and their families. Those
    severely wounded, ill, and injured sailors and their families receive
    non-medical case management and advocacy from the Navy's Safe Harbor
    Program. Safe Harbor provides assistance in dealing with personal
    challenges from the time of injury through return to duty or transition
    to civilian life.
        Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
        Specific improvements for post-traumatic stress disorder include
    both preventive and post-deployment care. The Marine Corps is employing
    Operational Stress Control and Readiness teams to provide early
    intervention, outreach, and prevention at the unit level in close
    proximity to operational missions, reducing stigma associated with
    conventional mental health care. The Navy is enhancing the Operational
    Stress Control Program and is completing phase two of the in-theater
    Behavioral Health Needs Assessment Survey to identify mental health
    needs, guide development of appropriate prevention and treatment
    programs, and ensure adequate in-theater mental health support. To date
    in fiscal year 2008, Navy Medicine expanded the Deployment Health
    Clinic (DHC) concept to a total of 17 centers. These DHCs logged over
    30,000 visits encompassing the entire range of post-deployment health
    care symptoms. These clinics are designed to be easily accessible, non-
    stigmatizing portals for effective assessment and treatment of
    deployment-related mental health issues. Three additional DHCs are
    planned for 2008. Specialized training is also being provided to the
    Chaplain Corps and non-mental health medical personnel to include mind,
    body, and spiritual practices. Augmenting the ability to deliver the
    highest quality of psychological health care available, Navy Medicine
    committed $7 million to stand-up a Naval Center for the Study of Combat
    Stress that will support all of the varied and diverse mental health
    needs.
        Traumatic Brain Injury
        The Department is engaged in activities to address TBI and remains
    committed to the further expansion of TBI research and availability of
    services for our service members. Navy Medical Research Command uses
    new techniques to identify transmissibility of blast wave energy into
    the brain, focusing on the nexus between the blast wave energy
    transmission and the resulting brain pathology. Navy researchers serve
    on the Health Affairs Senior Executive Advisory Committee on TBI sensor
    development and coordinate closely with the U.S. Army Program Executive
    Office in the development of helmet-mounted monitors. The National
    Naval Medical Center's Traumatic Stress and Brain Injury Program serves
    blast-exposed or head-injured casualties aero-medically evacuated out
    of theater. Over 1,082 blast-exposed service members have been
    evaluated for psychological health and TBI. In May 2007, Naval Medical
    Center San Diego stood up a Traumatic Stress and Brain Injury Program,
    and in September 2007, Camp Lejeune stood up a similar program.
        Physical and Medical Evaluation Boards
        The Department refined the physical and medical evaluation board
    process to ensure timely, comprehensive and transparent actions
    balancing the rights of the individual and the needs of the service.
    Actions include upgrading the Council of Review Board website to
    provide transition services and links to government agencies with post-
    service benefits. Additional upgrades are underway to provide a portal
    for members to monitor case processing. The Department is also
    participating in the joint DOD-VA Disability Evaluation Pilot in the
    National Capital Region that is designed to further streamline the
    process and ensure a smooth transition to civilian life for service
    members leaving active duty.
        Family Readiness
        The Department remains committed to the readiness and resilience of
    Navy and Marine Corps families, including the spouses, children,
    parents, and other extended family members committed to caring for
    sailors and marines. To that end, the Department operationalized family
    support programs to better empower sailors and marines to effectively
    meet the challenges of today's military lifestyle. The Marine Corps is
    redesigning and enhancing family readiness programs that most directly
    prepare marines and their families, including: Unit Family Readiness
    Program, Marine Corps Family Team Building Program, Exceptional Family
    Member Program, School Liaison Program, and Children, Youth, and Teen
    Program. As a companion effort, the Marine Corps will address quality
    of life deficiencies at remote and isolated installations, expand
    communication connections between separated marines and their families,
    and make needed improvements to quality of life facilities and
    equipment throughout the Marine Corps. The Navy increased emphasis on
    prevention, education, and counseling to Navy families undergoing
    frequent and often short notice deployments. It has created school
    liaison positions to work with school districts and Navy families to
    ensure teachers and other school officials understand the pressures and
    issues facing military children. The Navy provides brief, solution-
    focused clinical counseling services to more family members, as well as
    increasing home visitation services to new parents who have been
    identified as requiring parenting support. To better reach Individual
    Augmentee families who do not live near a military installation but who
    have access to a computer, the Navy has begun virtual Individual
    Augmentee Family Discussion Groups to ensure outreach information,
    referral and ongoing support.
        The Department has developed an aggressive child care expansion
    plan, adding over 4,000 new child care spaces within the next 18
    months. This expansion includes construction of new Child Development
    Centers (including facilities open 24/7), commercial contracts, and
    expanding military certified home care. Combined, these initiatives
    will reduce the waiting time for child care from 6-18 months to less
    than 3 months. To assist parents and children with the challenges of
    frequent deployments, an additional 100,000 hours of respite child care
    will be provided for families of deployed servicemembers. In efforts to
    combat youth obesity, the Navy has implemented a new world-wide youth
    fitness initiative called ``FitFactor'' to increase youth interest and
    awareness in the importance of healthy choices in life.
        National Security Personnel System
        The DON has successfully converted 30,000 employees into National
    Security Personnel System (NSPS), with an additional 30,000 scheduled
    to convert by 30 October 2008. The DON is already seeing a return on
    investment: an unprecedented training effort focused on performance
    management, greater communication between employees and supervisors,
    people talking about results and mission alignment, and increased
    flexibility in rewarding exceptional performance. While mindful of new
    legislative restraints, maintaining key human resource elements of
    NSPS, including pay-for-performance, is vital to the system's success
    and the Department's ability to respond to ever-changing national
    security threats.
        Safety
        Fundamental to taking care of sailors, marines, and DON civilian
    employees is establishing a culture and environment where safety is an
    intrinsic component of all decisionmaking, both on- and off-duty.
    Safety and risk management are integrated into on- and off-duty
    evolutions to maximize mission readiness and to establish DON as a
    world class safety organization where no mishap is accepted as the cost
    of doing business.
        The Secretary of Defense established a goal to achieve a 75 percent
    reduction in baseline fiscal year 2002 mishap rates across DOD by the
    end of fiscal year 2008. In fiscal year 2007 the DON recorded our
    lowest number of serious operational mishaps and the lowest rate of
    serious aviation mishaps in our history.
        One particular challenge that we continue to face is loss of
    sailors and marines to fatal accidents on our Nation's highways--111 in
    fiscal year 2007. While our rates are actually better than U.S.
    national statistics, and fiscal year 2007 was one of our best years
    ever, we find these losses untenable--we can and must do better. In
    particular, the growing popularity of sport bikes, or high-powered
    racing motorcycles, represents our biggest challenge. We are
    restructuring our motorcycle training, and in partnership with the
    Motorcycle Safety Foundation, we have developed a new hands-on Sport
    Bike Rider Safety Course. We are also implementing methods and
    technology to more rapidly assess our personnel to accurately identify
    those individuals at high risk for private motor vehicle mishaps. They
    will be targeted for intervention in an effort to further reduce
    mishaps and our DON risk profile.
                       iv. prepare for future challenges
    Building a Balanced Fleet
        Today's Navy and Marine Corps must confront threats in the maritime
    domain ranging from near-peer competitors, to non-state and
    transnational actors, to rogue nations and pirates. To meet the
    challenge the fiscal year 2009 budget provides for a balanced fleet of
    ships, aircraft and expeditionary capabilities with the fighting power
    and versatility to carry out blue, green, and brown water missions on a
    global basis.
        To ensure affordability and timely delivery of capabilities will
    require improvements in the acquisition process--ensuring stable
    requirements and clarity in design criteria, better program management
    expertise, and new measures to incentivize contractors to complete
    programs on cost and within schedule, while delivering a quality
    product for military use. Military use also includes other factors such
    as habitability conditions that support quality of life, reduced
    variability of part types, and supportable logistics and sustainment.
    In addition, independent cost, schedule, and risk assessments are
    conducted and used to establish the foundation of program plans.
        The Department has launched an acquisition improvement initiative,
    planning for which has included the Secretary, Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and which
    will enforce discipline across the Department without altering existing
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff-level
    processes. Actions comprising the acquisition improvement initiative
    include the following:
    Acquisition Governance
        Led by CNO/CMC, the requirements phase comprises three
    ``requirements gates:'' (1) Approval of Initial Capabilities Document;
    (2) Approval of Analysis of Alternatives; and (3) Approval of
    Capabilities Development Document and Concept of Operations. During
    this phase the focus is on what we buy and the process ensures
    completeness and unanimity of requirements, agreed upon by top
    leadership early in the acquisition process.
        The acquisition phase, led by the Component Acquisition Executive,
    consists of three ``acquisition gates:'' (1) Approval of the System
    Design Specification; (2) Approval to release the System Development
    and Demonstration Request for Proposals; and (3) A Sufficiency Review
    of the entire program. During this phase the focus is on ``how we
    buy,'' emphasizing clear system design specifications, leveraging
    commonality within parts and systems, and the use of open architecture.
    During this phase CNO and CMC remain in support of the acquisition
    force to ensure stability in the requirements.
        Each ``gate review'' includes a comprehensive assessment using
    detailed metrics to determine the health of the program and ensures
    that the program is ready to proceed through the next phase of the
    acquisition process. The key benefits are: (1) better integration of
    requirements and acquisition decision processes; (2) improvement of
    governance and insight into the development, establishment, and
    execution of acquisition programs; and (3) formalization of a framework
    to engage senior naval leadership throughout the review process.
    Acquisition Workforce
        To reinvigorate the acquisition workforce the Department has
    aggressively pursued investment in several key areas. Using a model of
    our total workforce, we've identified certain imbalances and
    redundancies which Systems Commands and Program Executive Officers will
    initiate corrective action for in fiscal year 2008. Further, the
    Department will create a common business model across Systems Commands
    to allow maximum flexibility of workforce utilization while sharpening
    the skill sets of our acquisition professionals. Further, we are
    creating common templates for acquisition program leadership that will
    ensure adequate staffing of programs throughout their life cycle.
    Notably we have adjusted the programmatic leadership structure of the
    DDG-1000 and Littoral Combat ships to benefit from these common
    templates.
        Finally, to bolster our acquisition leadership, we have selected a
    Vice Admiral to serve as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
    Research Development and Acquisition.
    Fiscal Year 2009 Acquisition Programs
        Shipbuilding
        The fiscal year 2009 shipbuilding budget provides for seven new
    ships: one Virginia-Class (SSN-774) nuclear-powered attack submarine,
    one DDG-1000 Destroyer, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), two Dry Cargo
    Ammunition (T-AKE) ships, and one Joint High Speed Vehicle (JHSV). The
    Navy also will procure an additional JHSV for the Army in fiscal year
    2009. The budget also includes the next increment of funding for CVN-
    78; research and development funds for CG(X), the future cruiser; the
    first increment of funding for the Refueling Complex Overhaul for the
    U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71); funding for an engineered refueling
    overhaul for an SSBN; and continued modernization for guided missile
    cruisers, guided missile destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers.
        Naval Aviation
        The DON requires a robust aviation capacity including attack,
    utility, and lift capabilities. The Department is in the midst of an
    extensive, long-term consolidation and recapitalization of aircraft in
    the naval inventory to achieve a more efficient and effective
    warfighting force. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests funding for 206
    aircraft. The fiscal year 2009 budget supports the acquisition of the
    F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the EA-18G Growler, the MV-22B, the KC-130J,
    the E-2D; the MH-60, the UH-1Y and AH-1Z helicopters; and the continued
    development of the P-8A Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, the CH-53K and
    VH-71 programs.
        The Department will continue to recapitalize our aging inventory
    with upgrades or new variants of existing aircraft where suitable and
    cost effective. For example, the Navy helicopter community is replacing
    six different aircraft with the MH-60R and MH-60S, while the Marine
    Corps is buying the UH-1Y, AH-1Z, and CH-53K to replace older variants
    of those aircraft.
        Command, Control, Communications, Computers
        Effective command, control, communications, computers (C\4\)
    capabilities are key to ensuring that our forces have accurate
    situational understanding to enable decision superiority. The Navy and
    Marine Corps have planned several programs to deliver agile and
    interoperable network-centric capabilities to ensure success for naval,
    joint, and coalition forces, including naval contributions to the
    National Security Space. The Department is planning the replacement for
    the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet with the Next Generation Enterprise
    Network. The Marine Corps is developing the Command and Control
    Harmonization Strategy. Capitalizing on emerging capabilities such as
    the Tactical Communications Modernization Program and the Very Small
    Aperture Terminal, the Marine Corps intends to deliver an end-to-end
    integrated, cross-functional capability across the force.
        Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
        The Navy and Marine Corps are in the process of reviewing current
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and
    formulating a long-term ISR strategy. This strategy, when completed,
    will ensure the Department's current and future ISR capabilities are
    used to the fullest extent possible and will maximize the use of other
    services' and national capabilities to enhance the Department's variety
    of missions. The Marine Corps' use of Department of Army's unmanned
    aircraft system, Shadow, is an example of leveraging another service's
    capability. Shadow meets the Marine Corps requirements for a
    transportable ISR asset capable of providing tactical commanders with
    day and night, battlefield and maritime reconnaissance. The Navy, with
    unique maritime domain ISR requirements, is integrating manned and
    unmanned capabilities with the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
    Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and the P-8A program. The BAMS UAS will
    provide a persistent, multi-sensor, maritime ISR capability with
    worldwide access. Additionally, the Department of Navy is working
    closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of the Defense for
    Intelligence to ensure the current Distributed Common Ground System--
    Navy and Marine Corp family of systems meet DOD standards, share
    technology and minimize duplication.
        Maritime Domain Awareness
        The responsibility for Global Maritime Security lies with many
    departments, agencies, and organizations across the spectrum of our
    government, international partners, and industry. Each of these
    stakeholders bring a part of the solution, and taking the lead in
    establishing a global capability from those parts is one of the single
    most important new steps of the DON. Protection of the global maritime
    domain is fundamental to our national security, and requires an
    integrated approach across the naval forces, with our Federal maritime
    partners, with certain State and local authorities, and indeed with the
    entire global maritime community. We have embarked on the
    organizational behavior changes necessary to bring those disparate
    stakeholders together, and are investing in creation of an enduring
    operational capability for the Nation.
    Infrastructure Investment
        Facilities
        The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $3.2 billion for military
    construction projects at Active and Reserve Navy and Marine Corps
    bases, a substantial increase over the enacted $2.3 billion in fiscal
    year 2008. Much of the funding growth is to build training and housing
    facilities to support the Marine Corps growth in end strength over the
    next 5 years. Both Navy and Marine Corps will sustain existing
    facilities at 90 percent of the DOD model requirement.
        Base Realignment and Closure
        The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $871.5 million to continue
    implementation of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
    Commission recommendations. This request invests in construction
    (including planning and design) and operational movements at key
    closure and realignment locations. Fiscal year 2009 plans may require
    some adjustment to ensure consistency with the approved fiscal year
    2008 budget.
        Walter Reed National Medical Center Bethesda
        BRAC action 169 called for closure of Walter Reed Army Medical
    Center, realignment of tertiary and complex care missions to National
    Naval Medical Center Bethesda, and establishment of Walter Reed
    National Military Medical Center Bethesda. The DOD approved an expanded
    scope and acceleration of the original program. The Naval Facilities
    Engineering Command is managing the EIS for Bethesda and a ROD is
    scheduled for May 2008.
        Family and Bachelor Housing
        Privatization for housing in the continental United States is on
    its way towards completion. The privatization of unaccompanied housing
    is proceeding smoothly at our first pilot project in San Diego. The
    construction of new apartments is well underway with completion of the
    first building scheduled for December 2008. Moreover, the project won
    an industry customer service award in its first year of operation in
    recognition of the dramatic improvement in resident satisfaction in
    existing housing that was privatized. We have broken ground on our
    second pilot project in Hampton Roads in our effort to bring the
    benefits of bachelor housing privatization to sailors on the east
    coast. This year's budget reflects the continuation of the Marine
    Corps' quality-of-life initiative to construct additional housing to
    address the substantial, longstanding shortfall of adequate housing for
    single marines. The objective is to provide quality bachelor housing
    for all sergeants and below for our `pre-grow the force' end strength
    by fiscal year 2012 and to support 202,000 marines by fiscal year 2014.
    Our fiscal year 2009 budget request also includes a military
    construction project to replace bachelor housing at Naval Station San
    Clemente, completing elimination of inadequate bachelor housing in the
    Department.
        Wounded Warrior Housing
        The DON completed inspections of all housing for wounded, ill, and
    injured to ensure quality and accessible living quarters. Annual
    inspections will ensure continued oversight by Department of Navy
    leadership. In addition, Wounded Warrior Barracks are under
    construction at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. Both barracks will
    provide 100 two-person American with Disabilities Act-compliant rooms
    allowing for surge capability.
        Marine Corps Relocation to Guam
        The fiscal year 2009 budget continues detailed studies, plans, and
    environmental analyses for the U.S./Government of Japan Defense Policy
    Review Initiative to relocate about 8,000 marines and their dependents
    from Okinawa, Japan to Guam by 2014. The facilities, housing, logistics
    and environmental requirements are being developed from the ground up
    to support mission requirements as well as business-case prudence. The
    measured investment in fiscal year 2009 is crucial to the 5-year $10.27
    billion ($4.18 billion from the U.S. and $6.09 billion from the
    Government of Japan) construction program scheduled to commence in
    fiscal year 2010.
        Naval Station Mayport
        The Navy is preparing an EIS that examines several alternatives for
    best utilizing the facilities and capabilities of Naval Station Mayport
    after the retirement of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV 67). The options
    being evaluated include:

             Cruiser/Destroyer homeporting
             Amphibious Assault Ship homeporting
             Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier (CVN) capable
             CVN homeporting
             Amphibious Ready Group homeporting

        Preparation of the Mayport EIS is on schedule. The draft EIS is
    scheduled for release in March 2008, with the final EIS expected in
    December 2008 and the ROD in January 2009.
    Environmental Stewardship
        Energy Initiatives
        Energy efficiency is key to reducing life-cycle costs and
    increasing the sustainability of installations and facilities. The
    Department has led the way in supporting the Energy Policy Act of 2005
    (EPAct05) by adopting the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
    (LEED) Silver standard as a primary consideration for all DON military
    construction projects. Using the LEED Silver standard, new energy-
    efficient projects have been completed on several installations,
    including Recruit Training Center Great Lakes and Naval Amphibious Base
    Little Creek. DON also has a comprehensive energy program responding to
    the requirements of EPAct05 and Presidential Executive Order 13423,
    evidenced by an 8.85 percent reduction in fiscal year 2007 energy
    consumption and an extensive renewable energy program.
        Minimizing the overall environmental effects
        The recently-announced Low-Impact Development (LID) policy is an
    example of how the Department is emphasizing reduction of impact to the
    environment. The goal of the policy is ``no net increase'' in the
    amount of nutrients, sediment, and storm water escaping into the
    watersheds surrounding facilities and installations. The use of cost-
    effective LID Best Management Practices such as rainwater collection
    systems in construction and renovation projects is central to achieving
    this goal.
        Alternative Fuels
        The Department has been a leader in the use of alternative fuels.
    The Navy and Marine Corps both reduced petroleum consumption in their
    vehicle fleets by more than 25 percent from 1999 to 2006, and together
    used almost 2 million gallons of biodiesel in 2006. Further gains in
    alternative fuel implementation will be supported by the Department's
    new Petroleum Reduction and Alternative Fuel Vehicle Strategy, which
    challenges the Navy and Marine Corps to build on already substantial
    progress to meet and exceed the established Federal goals contained in
    Executive Order 13423 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of
    2007. We are also expanding our use of alternative fuels in our
    tactical fleet, to include ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles. In
    fiscal year 2009 we will lay the groundwork for a testing and
    certification program for alternative fuel use. The Navy is also
    actively pursuing energy conservation initiatives, through energy
    conserving alterations in propulsion plants and conservation practices
    in operations.
                       v. management process improvement
        Complementary action to our acquisition improvement initiatives is
    our commitment to enhance process improvement across the DON to
    increase efficiency and effectiveness and responsible use of resources.
    The Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) program, planned for
    implementation throughout the Department, began initial implementation
    at Naval Air Systems Command in October 2007. It is an integrated
    business management system that modernizes and standardizes business
    operations and provides management visibility across the enterprise.
    The Department continues to champion the use of Lean Six Sigma as the
    primary toolset as a means toward increasing readiness and utilizing
    resources efficiently. Over 4,420 leaders have completed Lean Six Sigma
    training, and there are over 2,000 projects underway. The Department's
    Financial Improvement Program leverages ERP and strengthens control of
    financial reporting. The Marine Corps expects to be the first military
    service to achieve audit readiness.
        A major process improvement initiative to ensure that the
    Department applies fundamental business precepts to its management is
    the Secretary of the Navy's Monthly Review (SMR). The SMR is a senior
    leadership forum, involving CNO, CMC, and Assistant Secretaries,
    designed to afford greater transparency across the Department and set
    into motion actions that garner maximum effectiveness and efficiency
    for the Department. The SMR reviews a portfolio of the bulk of
    Department activities and programs involving manpower, readiness,
    acquisition, infrastructure, etc. Using Lean Six Sigma tools and other
    business tools, this forum reviews the most urgent issues and discusses
    and implements appropriate solutions. Ultimately, this monthly
    interaction serves as a means to synchronize the Department's actions
    to comprehensively address complex problems, accomplish strategic
    objectives, and better position for challenges in the future.
        The Department will incorporate the Chief Management Officer (CMO)
    into the Secretariat in fiscal year 2008. The CMO will have
    responsibility for improving Department business operations to carry
    out objectives. These initiatives are all steps to make process
    improvement a way of thinking in carrying out daily business throughout
    the organization.
                                 vi. conclusion
        Thank you for this opportunity to report to you on the DON. I
    provide the fiscal year 2009 budget to you and ask for your support for
    this plan that will enable the Department to prevail in global war on
    terrorism, take care of our people and prepare for future challenges.
    The uniformed men and women of the DON, and our civilian workforce,
    depend on our collective support and leadership. I appreciate the
    opportunity to set forth the President's fiscal year 2009 budget and
    look forward to working with you in furtherance of our maritime
    capabilities and our national security.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Secretary.
        Admiral Roughead, you're next.

     STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin,
    Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the committee: On
    behalf of our 600,000 sailors, Navy civilians, and families,
    thank you for your support and the opportunity to appear before
    you today. Together with Secretary Winter and General Conway,
    I'm privileged to be part of this leadership team, committed to
    our Nation's safety, security, and prosperity.
        Today your Navy stands ready with the agility, the
    flexibility, and the competence to do what no other Navy in the
    world can do. Last week we successfully temporarily converted
    our sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability to
    engage a failing satellite. Sea-based BMD is here, it is real,
    and it works.
        But that is only part of what your Navy delivers to the
    Nation. We recently deployed the first converted strategic
    submarine for sea-air-land (SEAL) delivery. 2,800 sailors set
    sail to patrol in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and the
    three ships of our Africa Partnership Station conducted four
    port calls in West Africa.
        What you saw last week was just a small part of what your
    Navy does in executing the maritime strategy, a strategy that
    is more than just a glossy brochure. Four carriers last year
    anchored our presence in the Arabain Gulf. SSBNs patrolled as
    silent deterrence. Three carrier strike groups massed in an
    array of joint power, exercising sea control in the western
    Pacific in Exercise Valiant Shield. F/A-18 Hornets increased
    projected power ashore in Operation Enduring Freedom when the
    Air Force F-15s were grounded. Ships patrolled the Horn of
    Africa, enhancing maritime security against piracy. U.S.N.S.
    Comfort and U.S.S. Pelelly provided proactive humanitarian
    assistance to tens of thousands in South America and Southeast
    Asia. The U.S.S. Keasage Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)
    rushed to provide disaster relief to Bangladesh in the
    aftermath of a cyclone.
        We are out and about, doing essential missions for the
    Nation. But as you so well know, our operations come at a cost
    to our people, our current readiness, and the future Fleet,
    those are my three areas of focus. Our people, our sailors, our
    marines, our Navy civilians, and their families know they have
    your support. We must continue to invest in their futures and
    in the young men and women of America who will follow in their
    wake. As a Nation at war, our utmost responsibility is to our
    wounded warriors. I am proud of and committed to the Safe
    Harbor program, which has dedicated staffs and teams
    individually tracking and meeting the needs of those heroic
    sailors and their families.
        In the context of this generational war, however, investing
    in the health of our force must go further. The health care we
    provide, especially for traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) and
    post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as the
    President's support for child care, hiring preferences for
    spouses, and family education benefits, will bring welcome
    relief to the military families and assist us in a very
    challenging recruiting and retention environment.
        Likewise, increasing the throughput of the U.S. Naval
    Academy is an important investment in our future leadership,
    especially as Marine Corps end strength grows.
        But supporting our future force cannot be done without
    readiness to fight today. To this end, quality shore
    installations, responsive depot-level maintenance centers, and
    unfettered ability to train responsibly are necessities. Where
    area access and short support are denied, the Commandant and I
    have been moving forward with a sea basing alternative. These
    elements are essential to support our Fleet Response Plan,
    which has enabled us to meet requirements, and will sustain us
    through a requested temporary carrier force level adjustment.
        Of my three focus areas, building tomorrow's Navy to be a
    balanced, appropriately sized force is the most immediate
    imperative and challenge. Fiscal realities, operational strain
    on our ships and aircraft, and necessary decommissionings are
    contributing to the risk we assume. Achieving the 313-ship
    floor at current funding levels will require us to improve
    processes, collaborate with industry, and make difficult
    decisions in the near term.
        I am pleased that the first two DDG-1000 contracts have
    been awarded. The technology embedded in that ship will advance
    our surface combatants of the future. I remain strongly
    committed to funding those programs that provide critical
    capabilities to our forces. There is no substitute for the LCS
    in closing a littoral capability gap. Current F/A-18 Hornets
    are needed to assuage a 2016 strike fighter shortfall. Surface
    combatant superiority will be maintained through DDG-51
    modernization. Multi-mission maritime aircraft will
    recapitalize our maritime patrol antisubmarine warfare
    capabilities, and space BMD will ensure future theater and
    national defense and enable access.
        These critical programs for our future Fleet require
    appropriate disciplined investment now. The 2009 budget and its
    associated force structure plans will meet our current
    challenges with a moderate degree of risk. Clearly we have many
    challenges, of which building tomorrow's Fleet is the greatest.
    But with these challenges, it is our opportunity to have a
    Fleet which will defend the Nation and assure our prosperity
    for generations to come.
        On behalf of our sailors, Navy civilians, and our families,
    thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today,
    and thank you for your support for what we do today and what we
    will do tomorrow.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by ADM Gary Roughead, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is
    an honor to appear before you today representing the nearly 600,000 men
    and women, sailors and civilians of our Navy. In 2007, the Navy
    answered all bells. Surge and rotational expeditionary forces performed
    brilliantly and we responded to global contingencies and requirements.
    The fiscal year 2009 budget and its associated force structure plans
    represent the capabilities needed to meet current challenges with a
    moderate degree of risk. I appreciate your continued support as our
    Navy defends our Nation and our vital national interests.
        In 2007, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard released the
    Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. The strategy represents
    unprecedented collaboration among the three Services. It also
    incorporates input from American citizens obtained through a series of
    ``Conversations with the Country'' that included the maritime Services,
    business and academic leaders, and the general public.
        The maritime strategy is aligned with the President's National
    Strategy for Maritime Security and the objectives articulated in the
    National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
    National Military Strategy. It recognizes that the maritime domain is
    vital to national security and prosperity. Nearly three-quarters of the
    Earth's surface is water; 80 percent of the world's population lives on
    or near coastlines; and 90 percent of the world's trade, including two-
    thirds of the world's petroleum, moves on the oceans to market. The
    oceans connect us to populations around the world and our Navy's
    presence and active engagement is vital to our collective security.
        In addition to the Navy's engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    international military, political, and economic events beyond those
    borders have direct and indirect implications for the Navy. Examples
    include China's rapid build up of a blue water navy and their
    development of cyber and space warfighting capabilities. Russia's first
    Mediterranean deployment in 15 years and increased defense spending
    demonstrate their desire to emerge as a global naval power. North
    Korea's long-range ballistic missile program and their missile
    proliferation history reinforce the need for a credible, forward-
    deployed ballistic missile defense capability. Militaries in Central
    and South American seek aircraft and submarines to back their regional
    and international objectives. Iran's confrontational activities at sea
    this past January, when the U.S.S. Port Royal, U.S.S. Hopper, and
    U.S.S. Ingraham encountered five small Iranian boats operating
    provocatively in the Strait of Hormuz, heightened tensions. Conflict is
    likely to continue into the future and the Navy's global commitments
    are likely to increase. As U.S. ground forces reset, reconstitute, and
    revitalize, the Navy will remain on station to respond to threats and
    crises.
        The new maritime strategy recognizes the many existing and
    potential challenges to national security and prosperity. To address
    these challenges, the strategy articulates six core capabilities our
    maritime Services provide: forward presence, deterrence, sea control,
    power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and
    disaster response (HA/DR). The first four capabilities are paramount
    because they enable the defense of our Nation and its interests.
    Forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection must
    remain the cornerstones of what makes our Navy a dominant global force.
        The Navy will continue to enhance cooperation with existing and
    emerging partners and build bridges of trust among the international
    community. Proactive global involvement is a strategic imperative for
    the Navy and our Nation, since trust cannot be surged in times of
    crisis.
        Execution of the maritime strategy is already underway in current
    operations. As we plan and resource for the future, the maritime
    strategy will guide our efforts. The execution of our current readiness
    and force structure plans faces many challenges, but affordability is
    the most pressing. I refuse to cede our technological advantage to
    competitors; however current readiness, manpower, and escalating
    procurement costs make pacing the threat exceptionally difficult. We
    will continue to improve processes, work with industry, and maximize
    cost saving initiatives. Stable procurement plans must be affordable
    and realistic to deliver the balanced future Fleet. While I am
    satisfied that the force structure plans deliver required capabilities,
    the balance among capability, affordability, and executability in these
    plans is not optimal. This imbalance has the potential to increase
    significantly warfighting, personnel, and force structure risk in the
    future.
        Our operations, people, and equipment continue to serve our Nation
    well, but it comes at a significant cost. It is my duty as CNO to
    ensure our Navy is always ready to answer our Nation's call anytime,
    anywhere, now and in the future. This duty shapes my priorities and
    will influence the decisions and recommendations I will make regarding
    the future of our Navy.
                        priorities for fiscal year 2009
        My vision for the Navy is that we remain the preeminent maritime
    power, providing our country a naval expeditionary force committed to
    global security and prosperity. We will defend our homeland and our
    Nation's vital interests around the world. We will prevent war,
    dominate any threat, and decisively defeat any adversary. The Navy will
    remain a powerful component of joint warfare by exploiting cutting edge
    technology and cooperating closely with the other Services, the
    interagency community, allies, and international partners. We will
    remain a superbly trained and led team of diverse sailors and
    civilians, who are grounded in our warfighting ethos, core values, and
    commitment to mission readiness and accomplishment.
        To achieve this vision, the Navy must address existing and emerging
    challenges and create new opportunities. My priorities are to:

             Build tomorrow's Navy
             Remain ready to fight today
             Develop and support our sailors and Navy civilians.

        I will demand that we accurately articulate requirements and remain
    disciplined in our processes. Achieving the right balance within and
    across these focus areas will provide dominant seapower for our Nation,
    today and tomorrow.
    Building Tomorrow's Navy
        Our Fleet must have the right balance of capability and the
    capacity. Three hundred thirteen ships represent the minimum force
    necessary to provide the global reach, persistent presence, and
    strategic, operational, and tactical effects. Our fiscal year 2009
    budget requests 7 new ships: 2 LCS, 1 DDG-1000, 1 SSN, 2 T-AKE, and 1
    JHSV, and 47 new ships over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
    (fiscal years 2009-2013). I support a stable shipbuilding plan that
    provides an affordable, balanced force and preserves our Nation's
    industrial base. I intend to develop further our Navy's relationship
    with industry to reinforce our commitment to a stable shipbuilding
    plan.
        As we pursue operational capability at reduced cost, we take into
    account several industrial factors. Level loading of ship and aircraft
    procurements help sustain appropriate employment levels, retain skills,
    and promote a healthy U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. Common hull
    forms, common components, and repeat builds of ships and aircraft that
    permit longer production runs also reduce construction costs. Our
    Navy's shipbuilding plans incorporate open architecture for hardware
    and software systems and they increase the use of system modularity.
    These initiatives reduce the cost of maintenance and system upgrades,
    and keep the Navy's Fleet in service longer.
        I seek your support for the following initiatives and programs:
        Aircraft Carrier Force Structure
        The Navy is committed fully to maintaining an aircraft carrier
    force of 11. During the 33-month period between the planned 2012
    decommissioning of U.S.S. Enterprise and the 2015 delivery of U.S.S.
    Gerald Ford, however, legislative relief is requested to temporarily
    reduce the carrier force to 10. Extending Enterprise to 2015 involves
    significant technical risk, challenges manpower and industrial bases,
    and requires expenditures in excess of $2 billion. Extending Enterprise
    would result in only a minor gain in carrier operational availability
    and adversely impact carrier maintenance periods and operational
    availability in future years. We are adjusting carrier maintenance
    schedules to support the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and ensure a
    responsive carrier force for the Nation during this proposed 10-carrier
    period. I urge your support for this legislative proposal.
        Littoral Combat Ship
        Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fills critical warfighting requirements.
    It offers speed, draft, and modularity that no other ship offers.
    U.S.S. Freedom (LCS-1) and U.S.S. Independence (LCS-2) enter service
    soon and their performance at sea will enable us to decide on the
    appropriate acquisition strategy for the class. Controlling and
    reducing LCS costs are key to an affordable shipbuilding plan and we
    have already improved management oversight, implemented stricter cost
    controls, and incorporated selective contract restructuring to ensure
    delivery on a realistic schedule. Although recent changes to the LCS
    program resulted in the reduction of 13 ships across the FYDP, I remain
    committed to procuring 55 LCS by fiscal year 2023. I appreciate your
    continued support for this important ship class, including our fiscal
    year 2009 request for $1.47 billion for procurement of two additional
    ships and associated modules and continued research and development
    (R&D).
        Joint Strike Fighter
        The increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of our legacy aircraft is
    consuming service life at an accelerated rate. The recent groundings of
    high demand P-3 aircraft highlight the need to bring the next
    generation of aircraft in service and retire our aging aircraft. The
    Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) provides expanded capability that will meet
    the needs of our Navy, Joint Forces, and international partners.
    Because of the high OPTEMPO of the current strike aircraft fleet, and
    despite JSF's initial operational capability (IOC) and delivery in
    2015, we anticipate a shortfall of strike aircraft from 2016-2025.
    Further delays in JSF will exacerbate this strike fighter gap. Navy's
    fiscal year 2009 investment of $3.4 billion includes procurement of
    eight aircraft and continued R&D for aircraft and engine development.
        CG(X)
        The next generation Guided Missile Cruiser CG(X) will be a highly
    capable major surface combatant tailored for Air and Missile Defense.
    CG(X) will provide maritime dominance, independent command and control,
    and forward presence. It will operate as an integral unit of Joint and
    Combined Forces. The CG(X) design and development program will feature
    revolutionary acquisition and spiral development practices that
    incorporate advanced technologies and next generation engineering
    systems. By replacing the Ticonderoga (CG 47) class of ships at the end
    of its 35-year service life, CG(X) capitalizes on the developments made
    through DDG Modernization and DDG-1000. We are conducting a rigorous
    analysis to examine alternatives for CG(X) consistent with the National
    Defense Authorization Act requirement for nuclear power. Our fiscal
    year 2009 R&D request for $370 million will support CG(X) and
    associated radar development.
        DDG-1000
        Congressional approval of split funding for the dual lead DDG-1000
    ships supports an acquisition approach that motivates cooperative
    completion of detail design. Collaboration between Northrop Grumman
    Ship Systems and Bath Iron Works during the detail design process has
    enabled these shipyards to produce the two lead ships simultaneously.
    Consequently, the DDG-1000 detail design will be more mature prior to
    start of construction than any previous shipbuilding program. Our
    budget request in fiscal year 2009 will procure the third ship of the
    class.
        Ballistic Missile Defense
        The increasing development and proliferation of ballistic missiles
    can threaten the homeland and our friends and allies. Ballistic
    missiles can also impede our military operations. Maritime ballistic
    missile defense (BMD) provides protection for forward-deployed joint
    forces and regional allies while contributing to the larger defense of
    the United States through the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
    Maritime ballistic missile defense directly contributes to the Navy's
    core capability of deterrence, and enables our core capabilities of
    power projection and sea control. The Aegis BMD directorate of the
    Missile Defense Agency has developed the Navy's BMD capability which is
    installed on 17 ships including 3 cruisers and 14 guided missile
    destroyers with installations continuing in 2008. These Navy surface
    ships support the BMDS by cueing ground-based sensors and intercepting
    Short to Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles with ship-based
    interceptors (SM-3 missiles). The Near-Term Sea-Based Terminal Program
    provides the ability to engage a limited set of Short Range Ballistic
    Missiles (SRBMs) with modified SM-2 Block IV missiles. The Navy will
    continue to work closely with the Missile Defense Agency to deliver
    improved capability and capacity to defend against this proliferating
    threat. While development and procurement funding is covered under the
    Missile Defense Agency budget, Navy has committed $16.5 million in
    fiscal year 2009 for operations and sustainment of Aegis BMD systems.
        Navy Networks
        Afloat and ashore networks enable warfighting command and control
    capability. Data, hardware, and applications must be arranged in a way
    that enables rapid upgrades to accommodate exponential increases in
    demand. Incorporation of open architecture and common computing
    environment in our networks will require us to redesign network
    architecture to free us from proprietary control. Open architecture
    will drive us to commonality and standardization, introduce
    efficiencies, promote better data protection, and network security. It
    will also allow our future war fighters to fight collaboratively and
    more effectively.
        The first step in achieving this new network architecture is
    putting it to sea. The Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise
    Services (CANES) system achieves an open, agile, flexible and
    affordable network architecture that will move us forward. CANES
    embraces cross-domain solutions that enable enhanced movement of data.
    It is a revolutionary change in our information technology
    infrastructure and it is absolutely vital for us to excel in 21st
    century warfare. $21.6 million is aligned to CANES in the fiscal year
    2009 budget request, all of which is redirected from existing budget
    lines.
        Research and Development
        Science and technology (S&T) give the Navy warfighting advantage.
    Last year the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps, and my predecessor completed and published a combined Naval S&T
    strategy that ensures our investments accomplish the vision and goals
    of the Navy and Marine Corps. Selecting research for future naval force
    capabilities must be balanced with fiscal realities. The S&T strategy
    identifies 13 research focus areas and sets high-level objectives that
    guide investment decisions. S&T investments present a balance between
    applied science, focused on near-term challenges, and basic research
    that advances the frontiers of science. We aggressively focus on
    transitioning S&T into programs of record and push these programs of
    record out to the Fleet through our Future Naval Capabilities program
    at the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The fiscal year 2009 budget
    requests $1.8 billion for Navy's S&T programs, an increase of 6 percent
    over the requested fiscal year 2008 level.
    Ready to Fight Today
        Maintaining warfighting readiness demands a Navy that is agile,
    capable, and ready. As operational demands and Joint Force posture in
    the Middle East subside, I expect the Navy's posture, positioning, and
    OPTEMPO to increase, not decrease. OPTEMPO, as expressed in terms of
    steaming days, reflects the underway time of our conventionally powered
    ships. OEF/OIF and additional global commitments have caused a
    significant difference between budgeted and actual steaming days. The
    Navy has funded this difference with war supplemental funding. Trends
    indicate that anticipated operational requirements will continue to
    exceed peacetime levels in fiscal year 2009. Additionally, increased
    OPTEMPO drives accelerated force structure replacement and higher
    maintenance and manpower costs that must be funded.
        As the Nation's Strategic Reserve, the Navy must be ready to
    generate persistent seapower anywhere in the world. The Navy must also
    establish and evolve international relationships to increase security
    and achieve common interests in the maritime domain.
        We generate forces for the current fight and employ our Navy much
    differently than in years past. We simultaneously provide ready naval
    forces and personnel for Joint Force Commanders, sustain forward
    presence, fulfill commitments to allies, and respond to increasing
    demands in regions where we have not routinely operated, specifically
    in South America and Africa.
        The FRP has enhanced our ability to meet COCOM requests for forces
    for the last 6 years. FRP provides naval forces that are well-
    maintained, properly manned, and appropriately trained to deploy for
    forward presence and surge missions. FRP increases operational
    availability and generates more forward presence and surge capability
    on short notice than was possible in the past. The unscheduled
    deployment of a second carrier to the Middle East in January 2007 is an
    example of how FRP provides the Nation with options to defend its vital
    interests. FRP also allows the Navy to respond to global events more
    robustly while maintaining a structured, deliberate process that
    ensures continuous availability of trained, ready Navy forces.
        Balancing capacity and capability across the spectrum of warfare is
    essential. The challenge will be maintaining dominance in traditional
    roles while meeting existing and emerging threats in asymmetric and
    irregular warfare. My goal is to influence the entire range of military
    operations from large scale conflict to maritime security and HA/DR.
    Areas of particular interest to us are:
        Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): Sonar-The Key ASW Enabler
        Submarines remain an immediate threat and their roles and lethality
    are increasing. More countries are buying submarines; some are building
    anti-access strategies around them. Maintaining the ability to detect,
    locate, track, and destroy submarines is essential and our active sonar
    systems, particularly medium frequency active (MFA) sonar, are the key
    enablers.
        The Navy's use of sonar is being challenged in Federal court by
    various lawsuits which seek to prohibit or severely limit it during
    vital combat certification exercises, such as those conducted in our
    southern California operating areas. In more than 40 years of sonar use
    in southern California waters, not a single injury to marine mammals
    has been linked to sonar. The Navy has worked closely with the National
    Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to establish effective, science-based
    mitigation measures. By implementing these measures NMFS does not
    expect adverse population level effects for any marine mammal
    populations during Fleet training exercises scheduled in southern
    California in 2008. MFA sonar provides a robust and absolutely vital
    capability to detect submarine threats. Limiting our ability to train
    and exercise with MFA sonar will degrade operational readiness and
    place our forces at risk.
        Our measures provide an appropriate balance between good
    stewardship of the environment and preparing our forces for deployment
    and combat operations. Our sailors must be trained to the best of their
    abilities with all of the technological tools available to fight and
    win. It is vital that our Navy be allowed to train and exercise with
    MFA sonar.
        Intelligence
        Our Navy provides a vital intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance capability around the globe. These capabilities produce
    warning and awareness in support of the planning and execution of
    maritime and joint operations. We are expanding our intelligence
    capability through development of trained human intelligence (HUMINT)
    personnel, investment in operational intelligence at our Maritime
    Operation Centers, and expanded synchronization with theater, joint,
    and national intelligence capabilities.
        Maritime Domain Awareness
        Maritime security supports the free flow of commerce for all
    nations. Maritime Domain Awareness is knowing what is moving below, on,
    and above the sea. Without a high level of Maritime Domain Awareness
    the free flow of commerce is jeopardized. The goal of Maritime Domain
    Awareness is to establish a level of security regarding vessels
    approaching our coastlines, while not infringing upon each nation's
    sovereignty or sharing inappropriate information.
        In partnership with the Coast Guard we established the Office of
    Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA). GMSA works with the
    Office of Global Maritime Intelligence Integration in developing the
    national maritime picture. The first spiral of Maritime Domain
    Awareness capability arrives in the Central Command and Pacific Command
    in August 2008 with later spirals in the Atlantic and Caribbean.
        Seabasing
        Seabasing represents a critical warfighting capability. It will
    assure access to areas where U.S. military forces are denied basing or
    support facilities. In the near term, our amphibious and prepositioned
    ships (including MPF(F)) are the key ships in the seabase. They provide
    the required lift for the Marine Corps across the range of military
    operations. These ships and marines, and the defensive and strike
    capabilities of our surface combatants and aircraft, provide
    operational maneuver and assured access for the force while
    significantly reducing our footprint ashore.
        The Navy is exploring innovative operational concepts combining
    seabasing with adaptive force packaging that will further support
    national security policy and the combatant commanders' objectives
    worldwide. Our 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan provides for seabasing that
    covers the spectrum of warfare from Joint Forcible Entry to persistent
    and cooperative Theater Security Cooperation.
        Future Joint Sea Basing requirements are still being defined but
    will be significantly greater than today's Navy and Marine Corps
    warfighting capabilities. The next generation long-range, heavy lift
    aircraft, joint logistics support system, intra-theater lift and sea
    connectors will provide these future capabilities.
        Shore Installations
        Our shore installations are extensions of our warfighting
    capabilities and among our most complex systems. Our installations must
    be ready to deliver scalable, agile, and adaptive capabilities to meet
    the requirements of our fleet, sailors, and families. We must reverse
    our historical trend of underinvestment in our shore establishment. I
    will leverage and expand upon the successes of our Navy Ashore Vision
    2030 and enhance the linkage between our installations, our
    warfighters, mission accomplishment, and quality of service.
        In the past, we accepted significant risk in our shore
    establishment to adequately fund Fleet readiness. As a result, the
    condition, capability, and current and future readiness of our shore
    installations degraded to an unacceptable level by industry standards.
    I directed the implementation of a systematic and consistent approach
    to assess the material condition of our shore establishments and
    develop a comprehensive investment strategy to arrest and reverse the
    decline of our shore establishment.
        We will take advantage of every opportunity to leverage the joint
    capabilities we share with other Services and the capabilities of the
    supporting communities where we work and live. The power of this
    leverage is highlighted in our new Public-Private Venture Bachelor
    Quarters at San Diego and Norfolk. With the authorities granted by
    Congress and very progressive private partners, we provide our sailors
    the best housing I have seen during my naval career. These quarters
    will have a dramatic impact on sailors' decisions to reenlist.
        We owe our sailors, their families, and our civilian workforce, who
    selflessly serve our Nation, world-class facilities and services to
    enhance their productivity and effectiveness and to motivate them to
    remain in the Navy. The decline in the shore infrastructure must be
    reversed by a prudent review of current capacity and a forward leaning
    investment strategy that defines our shore footprint for the
    foreseeable future. The shore establishment is a critical system for
    the Navy and provides the foundation for our training, manning, and
    equipping. It is imperative we invest and sustain our shore
    establishment at the right level to ensure a ready, mobile, and capable
    Navy.
        Depot Level Maintenance
        The increased OPTEMPO of our ships and aircraft in combat
    operations elevates the importance of performing timely depot level
    maintenance. Depot level maintenance ensures continued readiness and
    the safety of our men and women operating our ships and aircraft.
    Adequate funding for depot level maintenance ensures we do not incur
    unnecessary risk by extending our ships and aircraft well past their
    periodicity of maintenance. In addition to the challenges of
    maintaining our ships and aircraft, the capacity of the industrial base
    remains challenging. Consistent, long-term agreements for the efficient
    use of shipyards are necessary to keep our ships and aircraft in the
    highest states of readiness.
        United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
        The Law of the Sea Convention codifies navigation and overflight
    rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global
    mobility of our Armed Forces. It directly supports our National
    Security Strategy. I believe strongly that the Convention furthers our
    national security interests. Our maritime security efforts necessitate
    that we become a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, the bedrock
    legal instrument in the maritime domain, to which 154 nations are
    party. Our current non-party status constrains our efforts to develop
    enduring maritime partnerships. It inhibits our efforts to expand the
    Proliferation Security Initiative and elevates the level of risk for
    our sailors as they undertake operations to preserve navigation rights
    and freedoms, particularly in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz and
    Arabian Gulf, and the East and South China Seas. Accession to the Law
    of the Sea Convention is a priority for our Navy.
    Developing and Supporting Our Sailors and Navy Civilians
        Our talented and dedicated sailors and Navy civilians are
    absolutely essential to our maritime dominance. Attracting, recruiting,
    and retaining in a competitive workplace is increasingly more
    expensive. We must devote adequate resources and shape our policies to
    ensure our people are personally and professionally fulfilled in their
    service to our Nation. We have identified a steady-state force level of
    322,000 Active component/68,000 Reserve component end strength as the
    optimum target for our projected force structure. It is critical that
    future funding sustains this level.
        Recruiting, developing, and retaining diverse and highly capable
    men and women are imperatives. The Navy must address the changing
    national demographic to remain competitive in today's employment
    market. Only 3 out of 10 high school graduates meet the minimum
    criteria for military service. The propensity to serve is declining
    among youth and more often influencers of these youth, such as parents
    and teachers, are advising against military service.
        ``Millennials'' are the generation of youth currently entering the
    workplace and they comprise 43 percent of our Navy. Born into a
    globalized world saturated with information and technology, Millennials
    are more accomplished for their age than previous generations. They are
    a technology-savvy and cyber-connected group who may find the
    military's hierarchical command and control structure contradictory to
    the flat social networks they are used to navigating. The different
    paradigm under which this generation views the world and the workplace
    has implications for how the Navy attracts, recruits, and retains top
    talent. Additionally, to better meet the needs of the U.S. Marine
    Corps, we must increase the through-put at the U.S. Naval Academy. I
    urge your support of our legislative proposal to increase the number of
    Midshipmen at the Naval Academy.
        The Strategy for Our People ensures we have the best and brightest
    on our team. The strategy outlines six goals for achieving a total Navy
    force of sailors and civilians that is the right size and possesses the
    right skills to best meet the needs of the Navy. These goals are:
    capability-driven manpower, a competency-based workforce, effective
    total force, diversity, being competitive in the marketplace, and being
    agile, effective, and cost-efficient. Many of the efforts currently
    underway in support of the strategy are discussed in further detail
    below.
        Recruiting Initiatives
        The Navy Recruiting Command is relentless in its pursuit of
    attracting the best young men and women in America to serve in our
    Navy. Recruiting priorities are currently focused on attracting
    personnel for the Naval Special Warfare/Naval Special Operations,
    nuclear power, medical, and chaplain communities. Recruiting Command is
    constantly searching for new ways to recruit America's talent. For
    example, the Medical Leads Assistance Program employs Navy officers as
    ambassadors for generating interest in Navy Medicine. In the NSW and
    Naval Special Operations communities, we provide mentors for recruits
    before enlistment and during training with the two-fold goal of
    improving recruiting results and ensuring applicant success at Recruit
    Training Center and Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training.
        To recruit nuclear-trained officers and chaplains, we encourage our
    personnel to share their story with the American public. Through visits
    to college campuses and career fairs, nuclear-trained officers share
    their experiences of operating nuclear reactors on board carriers and
    submarines. These visits have improved short-term Nuclear Propulsion
    Officer Candidate recruiting and our officers will continue to
    cultivate personal relationships with faculty and university
    representatives to ensure long-term program health. Through the Reserve
    Officer Goals Enhance Recruitment program, Reserve chaplains use their
    network of ministerial relationships to share their experiences as Navy
    chaplains and provide information on how to become Active or Reserve
    chaplain candidates.
        Over the past 5 years, Navy Reserve Junior Officer recruitment has
    declined. To encourage young officers to stay Navy, we authorized a
    mobilization deferment policy for officers who affiliate with the Navy
    Reserve within the first year after leaving active duty. Combined with
    a $10,000 affiliation bonus, we have had some success in improving the
    recruitment of Reserve officers, but this market remains a challenge.
    We established a Reserve Retention and Recruiting Working Group to
    identify near-term and long-term solutions that will achieve
    sustainable success.
        Development Initiatives
        Our people deserve personally and professionally fulfilling careers
    that provide continuous opportunities for development. We offer
    multiple programs and we partner with outside organizations so that
    sailors and Navy civilians can pursue job-relevant training, continuing
    education, and personal enrichment. One such program is a pilot called
    ``Accelerate to Excellence.'' This program provides enlisted recruits
    in specific ratings the opportunity to earn an Associate's Degree at a
    community college while undergoing specialized training after boot
    camp.
        The Navy also provides developmental opportunities for officers and
    enlisted personnel through Professional Military Education (PME). PME
    is designed to prepare leaders for challenges at the tactical,
    operational, and strategic levels of war. The PME continuum integrates
    advanced education, Navy-specific PME, Joint PME (JPME) and leadership
    development in a holistic manner. The competencies, professional
    knowledge, and critical thinking skills sailors obtain from PME prepare
    them for leadership and the effective execution of naval missions. PME
    graduates are 21st century leaders who possess the capacity to think
    through uncertainty; develop innovative concepts, capabilities, and
    strategies; fully exploit advanced technologies, systems, and
    platforms; understand cultural/regional issues; and conduct operations
    as part of the Joint force.
        Enrollment in JPME courses is up: JPME Phase I in-residence
    enrollment is up 5 percent; JPME Phase I non-residence enrollment is up
    15 percent; JPME Phase II enrollment is up 50 percent. Congressional
    support to allow Phase II JPME to be taught in a non-residency status
    would enable sailors to pursue professional development while
    continuing their current assignments.
        In addition to JPME courses, the Navy supports Joint training
    through the Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE). NCTE is a
    distributed and simulated Joint and coalition training environment that
    replicates real-life operations. NCTE integrates into the Joint
    National Training Capability (JNTC) training architecture and satisfies
    COCOM requirements at the operational and tactical level.
        Retention Initiatives
        As the Navy approaches a steady-state force level of 322,000 Active
    component/68,000 Reserve component end strength, attracting and
    retaining sailors with the right skills is critical. In fiscal year
    2008, the goal is to shift our focus beyond numbers to ensure we have
    the right skill sets in the right billets at the right time. This
    approach increases opportunities for advancement and promotion by
    assigning personnel to positions that utilize and enhance their
    talents, and emphasizes continued professional growth and development
    in stages that align to career milestones.
        The Navy is also addressing retention through Active component to
    Reserve component transition. This program is changing the existing
    paradigm under which a sailor leaves the Navy at the end of their
    obligated service and is instead promoting service in the Reserve
    component as an alternative to complete detachment. The Perform to
    Serve (PTS) program screens Zone A sailors, who are at the end of a 4-
    to 6-year enlistment for reenlistment within their rating or for rating
    conversion. The manpower, personnel, training, and education enterprise
    is adding Reserve component affiliation to sailors' PTS options at the
    end of Zone A enlistment. Additionally, Reserve component affiliation
    will become increasingly seamless as we shift responsibility from Navy
    Recruiting Command to Navy Personnel Command.
        Taking Care of Families
        When a sailor or civilian joins the Navy team our commitment
    extends to their family. Mission success depends upon the individual
    readiness of our people and on the preparedness of their families.
    Supporting Navy families is critical to mission success.
        Keeping families ready and prepared alleviates some of the stress
    associated with deployments. Our continued commitment to programs and
    resources that maximize family readiness remains high. We continue to
    improve and expand child care programs and centers. Crisis management
    and response procedures coupled with enhanced ombudsman programs
    demonstrate our commitment to give deployed sailors confidence that
    their families are in good hands.
        In 2007, Navy programs cared for 45,780 children ages 6 months to
    12 years and served over 70,000 youth, ages 13 to 18, in 124 child
    development centers, 103 youth centers, and 3,115 on and off-base
    licensed child development homes. In response to the needs of Navy
    families, we have launched an aggressive child care expansion plan that
    adds 4,000 child care spaces within the next 18 months and reduces
    waiting lists in most places below the current 6-month average.
        At the end of fiscal year 2007, we successfully privatized 95
    percent of the continental U.S. (CONUS) and Hawaii family housing. We
    aggressively monitor the ratification of Navy housing residents and our
    Public Private Venture efforts are clearly resulting in continuous
    improvement in the housing and services provided to our sailors and
    their families. The ability of the private partner to renovate and
    replace family housing units at a much quicker pace than military
    construction (MILCON) has positively impacted the quality of Navy
    housing.
        Taking care of our families includes proactively reducing financial
    stresses placed on sailors and families. We are focused on family
    counseling in response to increased OPTEMPO as a result of OEF/OIF. We
    provided one-on-one job search coaching services to 21,730 Navy family
    members and made 10,830 military spouse employment ready referrals to
    employers. Fleet and Family Support Center (FFSC) financial educators
    provided more than 186,000 sailors and family members seminars/
    workshops focusing on financial fitness, increased our financial
    counseling services to military spouses by more than 50 percent, and
    launched a robust campaign to encourage wealth building and debt
    reduction.
        Health Care
        We have some of the best medical professionals in the world serving
    in the Navy. Health care options the Navy offers its people are
    valuable recruitment and retention incentives. Still, health care costs
    are rising faster than inflation. Operations in OEF and OIF increased
    the demand for medical services in combat and casualty care. Part of
    this demand is straight forward: our wounded need traditional medical
    care and rehabilitation services. The other part of this demand is more
    complex and addresses the increased occurrences of mental health
    disorders resulting from combat operations. Medical professionals are
    rapidly learning more about assessing and treating the effects of
    mental health issues associated with war such as post-traumatic stress
    disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury. We are implementing these
    lessons to more effectively treat these sailors.
        Wounded Warrior/Safe Harbor Program
        Care for combat wounded does not end at the Military Treatment
    Facility (MTF). The Navy has established the Safe Harbor Program to
    ensure seamless transition for the seriously wounded from arrival at a
    CONUS MTF to subsequent rehabilitation and recovery through DOD or the
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Since its inception, 162 sailors
    including 143 Active and 19 Reserve members have joined the program and
    are being actively tracked and monitored, including 126 personnel
    severely injured in OEF/OIF. Senior medical staffs personally visit and
    assist seriously injured sailors and their families to ensure their
    needs are being met.
                                   conclusion
        We are truly a ready, agile, and global Navy. To ensure that we
    maintain our naval dominance, we must achieve the optimal balance of
    building the Navy of tomorrow as we remain engaged and ready to fight
    today while fully supporting our people.
        I will continue to work closely with the Secretary of the Navy, the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps, Congress, and industry to build the
    levels of trust and collaboration necessary to resource, acquire, and
    effectively manage a Fleet of the right size and balance for our
    Nation.
        Despite the challenges, I am very optimistic about our future and
    the many opportunities ahead. The dedication of our sailors and Navy
    civilians is inspiring. They are truly making a difference and it is an
    honor to serve alongside them. I thank you for your continued support
    and commitment to our Navy and for all you do to make the United States
    Navy a force for good today and in the future.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
        General Conway?

      STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Conway. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and
    distinguished members of the committee: I have pledged to
    always provide you with forthright and honest assessments of
    your Marine Corps and I bear that in mind today as I report to
    you on the posture of our Service.
        In the written statement I provided you a list of
    priorities that would enable your Corps to best serve our
    Nation's security interests, both today and in the uncertain
    future. But in brief, our young warriors in combat are my
    number one priority. Those magnificent patriots have been
    extremely effective in disrupting insurgents and the al-Qaeda
    in the al-Anbar Province. In the spirit of jointness, I must
    note that it hasn't been just marines, rather marines, sailors,
    and soldiers, a composite effort over time, that has brought
    success to the al-Anbar.
        Quiet in their duty and determined in their approach, your
    marines are telling us loud and clear that wherever there's a
    job to be done they'll shoulder that mission with enthusiasm.
    They're tough and they'll do what it takes to win.
        We are still supporting the surge in Iraq and have already
    shifted from population protection to transitioning security
    responsibilities to Iraqi security forces. They are actively
    stepping up to the task. Though it may not be our core
    competency, marines have addressed the Nation-building aspect
    of our duties with enthusiasm and determination.
        As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in answer to the most
    recent call from the Secretary of Defense, we are also
    deploying more than 3,400 marines to Afghanistan. Your marines
    will assist the joint force in either gaining or maintaining
    momentum there. We fall in on our expeditionary ethos of living
    hard and fighting well as part of the air-ground team.
        I've just returned from a visit to Iraq and Afghanistan
    and, ladies and gentlemen, I'm pleased to report to you that
    your marines are demonstrating amazing resiliency in the face
    of multiple deployments to dangerous lands. In spite of a one-
    to-one deployment-to-dwell regimen that has virtually no chance
    of getting better until fall, the factors that we track monthly
    to determine health of the force, that include desertion and UA
    rates, suicide, divorce, child or spousal abuse, and not in the
    least, reenlistment rates, are all as good or better than they
    were in 2001.
        We do have a significant issue with our families. Simply
    put, they are proud of their contributions to this war, but
    they're tired. We owe it to those families to put our family
    service programs onto a wartime footing. For too long our
    programs have been borne on the backs of our volunteers--
    perhaps acceptable during peacetime, but untenable during a
    protracted conflict. Congress has been exceptionally supportive
    in enabling us to make good on the promise to do more.
        Of course, we look beyond today and our obligation to the
    Nation, and we have learned lessons in trying to build the
    force as we fight. In response to a clear need, we are growing
    the Corps to 202,000 marines. We do this without lowering our
    standards and we are ahead of our goals. During the last fiscal
    year, we needed to bring aboard 5,000 additional recruits. We
    actually grew 7,000 additional marines, 96.2 percent of them
    high school graduates.
        But more than just manpower, the growth requires training,
    infrastructure, and equipment to meet the needs of our Nation.
    You've helped us meet those requirements with steady support
    and encouragement, and for that we thank you.
        Though our capacity is currently stretched, the Marine
    Corps retains the mission to provide a multi-capable force for
    our Nation, a two-fisted fighter, if you will, able to destroy
    enemy formations with our air-ground team in a major
    contingency, but equally able to fall back on our hard-earned
    irregular warfare skills honed over decades of conflict.
        By far the most complex of our congressionally mandated
    missions, amphibious operations, requires deliberate training
    and long-term resourcing to achieve a high level of
    proficiency. The operational expertise, the special equipment
    sets, and the amphibious lift are not capabilities that we can
    rapidly create in the face of a threat.
        Finally, on behalf of your marines, I extend great
    appreciation for your support thus far, and I thank you in
    advance for your efforts on behalf of our brave service men and
    women in harm's way. I assure you that the Marine Corps
    appreciates the increasing competition for the Nation's
    discretionary resources and will continue to provide a tangible
    return for every dollar spent.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to
    speak.
        [The prepared statement of General Conway follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Gen. James T. Conway, USMC
                               executive summary
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
    committee; I have pledged to always provide you forthright and honest
    assessments of your Corps. I bear that in mind today as I report to you
    on the posture of your Corps.
        Your Marine Corps is fully engaged in what we believe is a
    generational struggle against fanatical extremists; the challenges we
    face are of global scale and scope. This Long War is multi-faceted and
    will not be won in one battle, in one country, or by one method. Your
    marines are a tough breed and will do what it takes to win--not only in
    these opening battles of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in the
    subsequent conflicts which we endeavor to prepare for today.
        In the face of great hardship, your marines have made a positive
    and selfless decision to stay resolved. More than 332,000 marines have
    either enlisted or re-enlisted since September 11, 2001; more than
    208,000 have deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan--a telling number for a
    force of less than 200,000 marines. Make no mistake, they joined or
    decided to re-enlist knowing they would go into harm's way.
        They have answered the Nation's call and are fully engaged in this
    fight--serving with distinction as the professionals they are. It falls
    on us, then, to fully support them--we owe them the full resources
    required to complete the tasks ahead. Now more than ever, they need the
    sustained support of the American people and Congress to provide them
    the help they need to fight today's conflict, prepare for tomorrow's,
    and fulfill our commitment to our marine families.
        Without question, marines in combat are our number one priority.
    Taken as a whole, combat operations are indeed stressing our forces and
    families. That said, the Marine Corps will not fail her country when
    called. In fact, in answer to the most recent call to provide ready
    forces to serve our Nation, the Marine Corps is deploying more than
    3,200 marines to Afghanistan in addition to supporting ongoing surge
    operations in Iraq and other force requirements worldwide.
        It is with these great men and women in mind that the Marine Corps
    has shaped its priorities--which are enduring and serve not only the
    conflict of today, but also the inevitable crises that will arise in
    our Nation's future. Through this budget request, we seek to:
    Right-Size the Marine Corps for today's conflict and tomorrow's
            uncertainty
        To fulfill our obligations to the Nation, the Marine Corps will
    grow its personnel end strength to 202,000 Active component marines by
    the end of fiscal year 2011. This increase will enable your Corps to
    train to the full spectrum of military operations and improve the
    ability of the Marine Corps to address future challenges of an
    uncertain environment. Our growth will enable us to recover our ability
    to respond in accordance with timelines outlined in combatant commander
    war plans--thereby, reducing operational risk. More than just manpower,
    this growth will require training, infrastructure, and equipment to
    meet the needs of our Nation.
    Reset the force and prepare for the next contingency
        To meet the demands of this war, we must reset the force so that we
    can simultaneously fight, train, and sustain our Corps. The Long War is
    taking a considerable toll on our equipment, and we continue to make
    tough choices on how best to apply the resources we are provided.
    Congress has responded rapidly and generously to our requests for
    equipment and increased protection for our marines and sailors. We are
    committed to fulfilling our responsibility to manage these resources
    prudently as we modernize our force.
    Modernize for tomorrow to be ``the most ready when the Nation is least
            ready''
        Congressionally-mandated to be ``the most ready when the Nation is
    least ready,'' your multi-capable Corps is committed to fulfilling this
    responsibility. We remain focused and steadfast in our responsibility
    to be the Nation's premiere expeditionary Force-in-Readiness. To do so,
    we continue to adapt our organization and equipment to provide our
    country the best Marine Corps in the world.
    Provide our Nation a naval force that is fully prepared for employment
            as a Marine Air Ground Task Force across the spectrum of
            conflict
        The newly published Maritime Strategy reaffirms our naval character
    and reemphasized our enduring relationship with the Navy and, now,
    Coast Guard. Current operations limit our ability to aggressively
    commit forces to strategy implementation at this time. However, as we
    increase our end strength to 202,000 marines and as security conditions
    continue to improve in Iraq, the Marine Corps will transition our
    forces to other battles in the Long War. The most complex mission in
    the Maritime Strategy is the congressionally-mandated mission of
    amphibious forcible entry. Such an operation requires a high level of
    proficiency and long-term resourcing and is not a capability that we
    can create on short notice.
    Take care of our marines and their families
        Our most precious asset is the individual marine. Our marines and
    families have been steadfast and faithful in their service to our
    country, and we have an equally enduring obligation to them. As such,
    we are committed to putting our family programs on a wartime footing--
    our marines and families deserve no less.
    Posture the Marine Corps for the future beyond the horizon
        The United States faces a complex mix of states who sponsor
    terrorism, regional and rising peer competitors, failing states that
    undermine regional stability, and a variety of violent non-state
    actors--all serving to destabilize legitimate governments and undermine
    security and stability of the greater global community. We see this
    global security context as a persistent condition for the foreseeable
    future.
        The Marine Corps continues to create a multi-capable force for our
    Nation--not only for the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    but also for subsequent campaigns of the Long War. We are committed to
    ensuring we remain where our country needs us, when she needs us, and
    to prevail over whatever challenges we face.
        On behalf of your marines, I extend great appreciation for your
    support thus far and thank you in advance for your ongoing efforts to
    support our brave service men and women in harm's way. I promise you
    that the Corps understands the value of each dollar provided and will
    continue to provide maximum return for every dollar spent.
          i. marines and sailors in combat are our number one priority
        Marines in the operating forces have been pushed hard by the tempo
    and frequency of operational deployments; yet, their morale has never
    been higher--because they believe they are making a difference. Thanks
    to Congress, your marines know that the people of the United States and
    their Government are behind them. Your support has been exceptional--
    from the rapid fielding of life-saving equipment to the increase of
    Marine Corps end strength. With your continued support, your marines
    will continue to make progress in their mission.
    USMC Commitments in the Long War
        Over the past year, your marines deployed to all corners of the
    globe in support of our Nation. With more than 24,000 marines deployed
    throughout the U.S. Central Command's Area of Responsibility,
    Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) remain our
    largest commitment. The Marine Corps continues to support surge
    operations in Iraq in the form of two additional infantry battalions
    and the enabling forces that accompany them. As part of the Marine Air
    Ground Task Force in Iraq, these forces have proven extremely effective
    in the disruption of insurgent activities in the Al Anbar province.
        As part of these forces, Marine Corps provides more than 250
    personnel to OEF-Afghanistan. Approximately 100 of these marines are
    members of a Marine Special Operations Company that routinely engages
    in combat operations with partnered Afghan and U.S. Special Forces
    units. The remaining Marine complement to Afghanistan forms the nucleus
    of seven Embedded Training Teams (ETTs); these detachments provide
    strong mentorship to Afghan National Army units in the continuing fight
    against the Taliban.
        Taken as a whole, these recurring commitments of Marine forces in
    support of combat operations is indeed a stressing challenge on our
    forces and families. That said, the Marine Corps is fully cognizant of
    the regional and global effects of progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    the Middle East. In fact, in answer to the most recent call to provide
    ready forces to serve our Nation, the Marine Corps is deploying a
    Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)-sized Marine Air Ground Task Force and
    an additional Battalion to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan.
    These 3,200 marines are in addition to surge operations in Iraq and
    other force requirements worldwide.
        The Marine Corps also deployed forces to participate in over sixty
    Theater Security Cooperation events, which ranged from small Mobile
    Training Teams in Central America to MEU exercises in Africa, the
    Middle East, and the Pacific. The Marine Corps also took part in civil-
    military and humanitarian assistance operations such as New Horizons
    events in Nicaragua, land mine removal training in Azerbaijan, and
    disaster relief in Bangladesh after a devastating cyclone.
      ii. right-size the marine corps for today's conflict and tomorrow's
                                  uncertainty
        To meet the demands of the Long War, as well as the unforeseen
    crises that will inevitably arise, our Corps must be sufficiently
    manned, well-trained, and properly equipped. Like the Cold War, the
    Long War is a long-term struggle that will not be measured by the
    number of near-term deployments or rotations; it is this long-term view
    that informs our priorities and plan for growth.
        To fulfill our obligations to the Nation, the Marine Corps will
    grow its personnel end strength to 202,000 Active component marines.
    This increase will enable your Corps to train to the full spectrum of
    military operations and improve the ability of the Marine Corps to
    address future challenges of an uncertain environment. Our growth will
    enable us to recover our ability to respond in accordance with
    timelines outlined in combatant commander war plans--thereby, reducing
    operational risk.
        Current wartime deployment rates dictate an almost singular focus
    to prepare units for their next rotation and counterinsurgency
    operations. This focus and the deployment rate of many units threaten
    to erode the skills needed for Marine Corps missions such as combined-
    arms maneuver, mountain warfare, and amphibious operations. Our
    deployment cycles must not only support training for irregular warfare,
    but also provide sufficient time for recovery and maintenance as well
    as training for other contingency missions. By increasing dwell time
    for our units, we can accomplish the more comprehensive training needed
    for the sophisticated skill sets that have enabled Marine Air Ground
    Task Forces to consistently achieve success in all types of operations.
        Just as importantly, this growth will relieve strain on those
    superb Americans who have volunteered to fight the Nation's battles. We
    must ensure that our personnel policies, organizational construct, and
    training enable our marines to operate at the ``sustained rate of
    fire.'' This means that we must have sufficient dwell time, equipment
    for training, and resources for our marines and their families to
    sustain their efforts over time. Our recently begun growth to 202,000
    marines will significantly enhance our ability to operate at the
    ``sustained rate of fire.''
        Our goal, during the Long War, is to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-
    dwell ratio for all of our Active Forces; for every 7 months a marine
    is deployed, he or she will be back at home station for 14 months.
    Right now, many of our forces are at a 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratio or
    less--which cannot be sustained in the long-term. We also aim to
    implement a 1:5 deployment to dwell ratio for our Reserve Forces and,
    eventually, achieve a peacetime deployment-to-dwell ratio goal is 1:3
    for our Active Forces.
        As we grow, we will develop all the elements of our Marine Air
    Ground Task Force in a balanced manner to meet the diverse challenges
    of an uncertain future. This growth includes:

             An increase in our end strength to 202,000 marines;
             Adequate expansions of our infrastructure to provide
            for our marines, their families, and their equipment; and
             The right mix of equipment for the current and future
            fight.

        This additional end strength will result in three Marine
    Expeditionary Forces--balanced in capacity and capability. The
    development of Marine Corps force structure has been the result of a
    thorough and ongoing process that supports the combatant commanders and
    accomplishes our Title 10 responsibilities. The process addresses all
    pillars of combat development (Doctrine, Organization, Training,
    Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) and
    identifies our required capabilities and the issues associated with
    fielding them. The most recent assessment revealed a requirement to
    front-load structure for recruiters and trainers to support our
    personnel growth and a phased introduction of units balanced across the
    Marine Air Ground Task Force.
        In fiscal year 2007, we stood up two infantry battalions: 1st
    Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. We also added
    capacity to our combat engineer battalions and air naval gunfire
    liaison companies. Our plan will gradually improve the deployment-to-
    dwell ratio of some of our other habitually high operational tempo
    units--such as military police, unmanned aerial vehicle, helicopter,
    air command and control, combat service support, and explosive ordnance
    disposal units.
        Growing the Marine Corps as we simultaneously fight the Long War is
    a challenge, but we are committed to being the best stewards of the
    Nation's resources and working with Congress to achieve these important
    goals.
    Growing to 202,000 Marines
        The Marine Corps surpassed its fiscal year 2007 authorized end
    strength goal of 184,000 and is on track to meet the goal of 189,000
    marines for fiscal year 2008 as well as our target end strength of
    202,000 marines by fiscal year 2011.
        Recruiting
        A vital factor in sustaining our force and meeting end strength
    goals is continuing to recruit qualified young men and women with the
    right character, commitment, and drive to become marines. With over 70
    percent of our end strength increase comprised of marines on their
    first enlistment, our recruiting efforts are a critical part of our
    overall growth.
        While exceeding Department of Defense quality standards, we
    continue to recruit the best of America into our ranks. In fiscal year
    2007, the Marine Corps achieved over 100 percent of the Active
    component accession goal necessary to grow the force as well as 100
    percent of our Reserve recruiting goals. We reached this goal without
    compromising the high quality standards the American people expect of
    their marines.
        We forecast that both Active and Reserve recruiting will remain
    challenging in fiscal year 2008, particularly given the increased
    accession missions needed to meet our end strength growth. We will need
    the continued indispensable support of Congress to sustain our existing
    programs and other incentives essential to achieving our recruiting
    mission.
        Retention
        Retention is the other important part of building and sustaining
    the Marine Corps. As a strong indicator of our force's morale, the
    Marine Corps has achieved unprecedented numbers of reenlistments in
    both the First Term and Career Force. The expanded reenlistment goal,
    in which we sought to reenlist over 3,700 additional marines, resulted
    in the reenlistment of 31 percent of our eligible First Term force and
    70 percent of our eligible Career Force--compared to the 22 percent
    first term and 65 percent career force reenlistments in fiscal year
    2006. This achievement was key to reaching the first milestone in our
    end strength increase--184,000 marines by the end of fiscal year 2007--
    without sacrificing our high quality standards. In fact, a recent
    Center for Naval Analyses study concluded that the quality of our first
    term force who reenlist has improved steadily since fiscal year 2000.
        For fiscal year 2008, our retention goals are even more aggressive,
    but we fully expect to meet them. Our continuing success will be
    largely attributable to several important enduring themes. First,
    marines are motivated to ``stay marine'' because they are doing what
    they signed up to do--fighting for and protecting our Nation. Second,
    they understand our culture is one that rewards proven performance; our
    Selective Reenlistment Bonuses are designed to retain top quality
    marines with the most relevant skill sets.
        There is no doubt that your marines' leadership and technical
    skills have rendered them extremely marketable to lucrative civilian
    employment opportunities. To retain the most qualified marines, we must
    maintain Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) funding. In fiscal year
    2007, the Marine Corps spent approximately $460 million in SRB and
    Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) to help achieve our end strength goal.
    With a reenlistment mission of 17,631 in fiscal year 2008--compared to
    an historical average of 12,000--the Marine Corps expects to spend
    approximately $500 million in reenlistment incentives during fiscal
    year 2008.
        This aggressive SRB plan will allow us to retain the right grade
    and skill sets for our growing force--particularly among key military
    occupational specialties. The continued support of Congress will ensure
    we have the necessary combat-trained marines for the Long War and other
    contingency operations.
        Reserve Component End Strength
        Our fights thus far in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a Total Force
    effort--our Reserve Forces continue to perform with grit and
    determination. Our goal is to obtain a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio
    within our Reserve component. As our Active Force increases in size,
    our reliance on our Reserve Forces should decrease--helping us achieve
    the desired deployment-to-dwell ratio. We believe our current
    authorized end strength of 39,600 Selected Marine Corps Reserves is
    appropriate. As with every organization within the Marine Corps, we
    continue to review the make-up and structure of our Reserve in order to
    ensure the right capabilities reside within the Marine Forces Reserve
    units and our Individual Mobilization Augmentee program.
        Military-to-Civilian Conversions
        Military-to-civilian conversions replace marines in nonmilitary-
    specific billets with qualified civilians, enabling the Corps to return
    those marines to the operating forces. Since 2004, the Marine Corps has
    returned 3,096 marines to the operating force through military-to-
    civilian conversions. We will continue to pursue sensible conversions
    as this will aid in our deployment-to-dwell ratio goals for the force.
    Growing to 202,000: Infrastructure
        Military construction is one of our keys to success in increasing
    the Marine Corps to 202,000 marines by 2011. We have determined the
    optimal permanent locations for these new units and have generated
    estimates for the types and sizes of facilities needed to support these
    forces. Because our end strength will increase before final
    construction is complete, we are providing interim support facilities
    that will include lease, rental, and purchase of temporary facilities.
    Our plan will ensure adequate facilities are available to support the
    phase-in and Final Operating Capability of a 202,000 Marine Corps while
    meeting our environmental stewardship responsibilities.
    Military Construction--Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Initiative.
        Housing for our single marines continues to be our top military
    construction focus. Barracks are a significant quality of life element
    in taking care of our single marines. We have put ourselves in extremis
    with regards to new barracks as we have degraded their priority for
    decades in lieu of operational requirements. We are now committed to
    providing adequate billeting for all of our existing unmarried junior
    enlisted marines and noncommissioned officers by 2012--and for our
    increased end strength by 2014. To do that, we doubled the amount of
    our bachelor housing funding request from fiscal year 2007 to 2008; we
    will more than triple the 2008 amount in fiscal year 2009. We are also
    committed to funding replacement of barracks' furnishings on a 7-year
    cycle and prioritizing barracks repair projects to preempt a backlog of
    repairs.
        Public Private Venture (PPV) Housing
        Our efforts to improve housing for marines and their families
    continue. The housing privatization authorities are integral to our
    efforts to accommodate both current housing requirements and those
    resulting from our planned force increases. Thanks to congressional
    support, the Marine Corps had business agreements in place at the end
    of fiscal year 2007 to eliminate all of our inadequate family housing.
    However, we need to continue our PPV efforts to address the current
    insufficient number of adequate housing units as well as the deficit
    being created by the increase in end strength to 202,000 marines.
        Training Capacity
        Marine Corps Training and Education Command is increasing its
    training capacity and reinvigorating our pre-deployment training
    program to provide support to all elements of the Marine Air Ground
    Task Force (MAGTF) across the full spectrum of potential missions. In
    accordance with the Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation
    guidance, we are developing and coordinating training and education
    programs to build the capacity of allied and partner nations. We are
    also developing the capability to conduct large-scale MAGTF exercises
    within a joint, coalition, and interagency context to maintain
    proficiency in core warfighting functions such as combined arms
    maneuver, amphibious operations, and maritime prepositioning
    operations. Finally, we are ensuring our training and education
    programs and training ranges accommodate the 27,000 Marine Corps end
    strength increase.
    Growing to 202,00: Equipment
        Our assessment of the materiel requirements for our growth has been
    significantly enhanced through cooperation between the Marine Corps and
    industry partners. Through this effort, the units we created in fiscal
    year 2007 were provided the equipment necessary to enter their pre-
    deployment training cycle. By prioritizing marines in combat and
    redistribution of some of our strategic stocks, these new units were
    able to meet training and deployment requirements for combat. With
    Congress' continued support, the numerous equipment contracts required
    to support our growth were met during fiscal year 2007 and will be met
    through fiscal year 2008 and beyond.
        iii. resetting the force and preparing for the next contingency
        To meet the demands of this war, we must reset the force so that we
    can simultaneously fight, train, and sustain our Corps. The Long War is
    taking a considerable toll on our equipment, and we continue to make
    tough choices on how best to apply the resources we are provided--
    either to replace our rapidly aging equipment with similar platforms or
    to modernize with next generation equipment. Additionally, we have
    routinely drawn additional equipment from strategic stocks, which need
    to be replenished in order for us to remain responsive to emerging
    threats. Congress has responded rapidly and generously to our requests
    for equipment and increased protection for our marines and sailors. We
    are committed to fulfilling our responsibility to manage these
    resources prudently as we modernize our force.
    Costs of Resetting the Force
        Reset funds replenish the equipment necessary to keep the Marine
    Corps responsive to emerging threats. Costs categorized as ``reset''
    meet one of the following criteria: maintenance and supply activities
    to restore and enhance combat capability to unit and prepositioned
    equipment; replace or repair equipment destroyed, damaged, stressed, or
    worn out beyond economic repair; and enhance capabilities, where
    applicable, with the most up-to-date technology.
        Our current reset estimate is $15.6 billion. To date, Congress has
    appropriated a total of $10.9 billion for Marine Corps global war on
    terrorism reset costs. As the nature of the Long War evolves, ``reset
    the force'' cost estimates evolve as well. We not only need to
    ``Reset'' the force to support current readiness, but we also need to
    ``Reconstitute and Revitalize'' the force in preparation for future
    challenges. We are coordinating with other Services and the Joint Staff
    to refine estimates, and we are aggressively executing funding to
    ensure the marines in the fight have the proper equipment in a timely
    manner.
    Equipment Readiness
        While the vast majority of our equipment has passed the test of
    sustained combat operations, it has been subjected to more than a
    lifetime's worth of wear stemming from increased vehicle mileage and
    operating hours as well as harsh environmental conditions--resulting in
    an escalated maintenance effort. This maintenance requirement is a
    consequence of not only operational tempo and operating environments,
    but also the sheer amount of equipment employed in operations.
    Approximately 26 percent of all Marine Corps ground equipment is
    currently engaged overseas. Most of this equipment is not rotating out
    of theater at the conclusion of each force rotation; it remains in
    combat, used on a near-continuous basis at a pace that far exceeds
    normal peacetime usage.
        For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, crews are driving Light
    Armored Vehicles in excess of 8,700 miles per year--3.5 times more than
    the programmed annual usage rates of 2,480 miles per year. Our tactical
    vehicle fleet is experiencing some of the most dramatic effects of
    excessive wear, operating at five to six times the programmed rates.
    Many weapon systems have been modified during this conflict; some of
    these modifications have led to further wear and tear due to additional
    weight--for example, armor plating has been added for protection
    against improvised explosive devices. These factors, coupled with the
    operational requirement to keep equipment in theater without
    significant depot repair, has tremendously decreased the projected
    lifespan of this equipment. As a result, we can expect higher than
    anticipated reset costs and more replacements than repair of equipment.
    The depot level maintenance requirements for the equipment that is
    repairable will continue beyond the conclusion of hostilities in Iraq
    and Afghanistan.
        Our priority for equipment is to support marines serving in harm's
    way. Therefore, we have drawn additional equipment from the Maritime
    Prepositioning Ships and prepositioned stores in Norway; we have also
    retained equipment in theater from units that are rotating back to the
    United States. The operational results of these efforts have been
    outstanding--the average mission capable rates of our deployed forces'
    ground equipment remain above 90 percent--but there is a price.
        The cost of this success is a decrease in non-deployed unit
    readiness as well as an increase in the maintenance required per hour
    of operating time. Equipment across the Marine Corps is continuously
    cross-leveled to ensure that units preparing to deploy have sufficient
    equipment to conduct our rigorous pre-deployment training programs.
    Because the stateside priority of equipment distribution and readiness
    is to units preparing to deploy, there has been a trade-off in unit
    training for other types of contingencies. The timely delivery of
    replacement equipment is crucial to sustaining the high readiness rates
    for the marines in theater, as well as improving the rates for the
    forces here at home. While additional equipment has been purchased,
    long lead times and production rates mean that, although funded, much
    of this equipment is still many months from delivery.
    Aviation Equipment and Readiness
        The operationally demanding and harsh environments of Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa have highlighted the limitations of
    our aging fleet of aircraft. In order to support our marines, sister
    Services, and coalition partners successfully, our aircraft have been
    flying at two to three times their designed utilization rates.
        Despite this unprecedented use, our maintenance and support
    personnel have sustained a 79 percent aviation mission-capable rate for
    deployed marine aircraft over the past 12 months. Maintaining the
    readiness of our aviation assets while preparing our aircrew for their
    next deployment is and will continue to be an enormous effort and
    constant challenge for our marines. To maintain sufficient numbers of
    aircraft in deployed squadrons, our nondeployed squadrons have taken
    significant cuts in available aircraft and parts as they prepare for
    deployment--resulting in a 30 percent decrease in the number of
    nondeployed units reporting ``deployment capable'' over the last 5
    years. Reset funding has partially alleviated this strain, but
    continued funding is needed as we are simply running short of aircraft
    on our flight lines due to age, attrition, and wartime losses.
        Reset programs have helped us mitigate degradation of our aircraft
    materiel readiness through aircraft modifications, proactive
    inspections, and additional maintenance actions. These efforts have
    successfully bolstered aircraft reliability, sustainability, and
    survivability; nevertheless, additional requirements for depot level
    maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment will
    continue well beyond the conclusion of hostilities.
    Prepositioning Programs
        Comprised of three Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRON)
    and other Strategic Reserves, the Marine Corps' prepositioning programs
    are a critical part of our ability to respond to current and future
    contingency operations and mitigate risk for the Nation. Targeted
    withdrawal of equipment from our strategic stocks has been a key
    element in supporting combat operations, growth of the Marine Corps,
    and other operational priorities; these withdrawals provided necessary
    equipment from the existing inventory while industry catches up to our
    new requirements in the long-term. Generous support from Congress has
    enabled the long-term solution, and as a result, shortfalls within our
    strategic programs will be reset as equipment becomes available from
    the manufacturer.
        Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons
        Our MPSRONs will be reset with the most capable equipment possible,
    and we have begun loading them with capabilities that support lower
    spectrum operations while still maintaining the ability to generate
    Marine Expeditionary Brigades capable of conducting major combat
    operations. Since 2007's report, all three squadrons have completed the
    Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Maintenance Cycle-8 (MMC-8).
    MPSRONs 1 and 3 were reconstituted to 91 percent and 100 percent
    respectively. The near-term reduction of MPSRON-1 was required to
    outfit new units standing up in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008
    as part of our end strength increase. MPSRON-1 will complete MPF
    Maintenance Cycle-9 (MMC-9) in June 2008, and we anticipate it will be
    loaded with roughly 80 percent of its full equipment set as a result of
    our requirement to support end strength increase to 202,000 marines.
    MPSRON-2 was loaded to 54 percent of its equipment requirements; much
    of MPSRON-2's equipment remains committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
    With projected deliveries from industry, our intent is to fully reset
    and modernize MPSRON-2 and MPSRON-3 when they return for maintenance
    beginning in May 2008 and April 2009 respectively.
        We are actively working with the Navy and Transportation Command to
    incorporate newer, more flexible ship platforms from the existing
    Military Sealift Command fleet into our aging legacy Maritime
    Prepositioning Force program. As we reset MPF, these changes are
    necessary to ensure we incorporate hard fought lessons from recent
    combat operations. Two decades of equipment growth and recent armor
    initiatives have strained the capability and capacity of our present
    fleet--that was designed to lift a naval force developed in the early
    1980s.
        We plan to incorporate three of Military Sealift Command's 19
    large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSR) as replacements for
    5 of our older leased platforms. The LMSR significantly expands MPF
    flexibility and will allow us to reset and optimize MPF to meet current
    and emerging requirements.
        Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway
        The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program--Norway (MCPP-N) was also
    used in support of current operations, growth of the Marine Corps, and
    resetting other Marine Corps shortfalls with a higher operational
    priority. The Marine Corps continues to reset MCPP-N in concert with
    our operational priorities while also exploring other locations for
    geographic prepositioning that will enable combat and theater security
    cooperation operations for forward deployed naval forces.
    Depot Maintenance
        The Marine Corps has aggressively worked to stabilize the
    conditions that affect our depot maintenance. These conditions include:
    the uncertainty of the timing of reset, asset availability, timing of
    funding, equipment condition, and evolving skill requirements. One area
    we focus on is the in-theater identification of equipment and scope of
    work to be performed; this effort enables better planning for parts,
    manpower resources, funding requirements, and depot capacity. Triage
    assessments made in theater and relayed back to the sources of repair
    have helped to ensure efficient repair preparation time. These efforts
    reduce the repair cycle time, returning the mission capable equipment
    to the warfighter as soon as possible--improving materiel readiness.
        Depot capacity is elastic; productivity is not constrained by money
    or capacity; the limiting factor is asset (carcass) availability. We
    increase capacity to support surge requirements through a variety of
    means--overtime, additional shifts, and additional personnel.
    Performing work on over 260 product lines, our depot workforce
    currently has multiple trade skills ranging from laborers to engineers.
    Much of the equipment in theater today includes items not previously
    repaired by any depot facility--organic or non-organic. As a result,
    the existing work force may require additional training. New personnel
    and continued supplementation through contractor support may also be
    required. We continue to leverage state and local institutions, such as
    the technical colleges and universities, which can provide valuable
    assistance in training our workforce in skills such as welding,
    environmental science, and engineering.
        Future challenges to meeting the increasing workload requirements
    include leveraging depot capacity, lessening the impact on our labor
    force, and ensuring parts are available. Continuing to partner with
    other Services and industry, we will enhance execution of reset using
    organic and non-organic sources of repair. We will continue to work
    with Congress to anticipate the evolving depot maintenance funding
    requirements.
    Equipment Retrograde Operations from Central Command Area of Operations
        During 2006, in a continued effort to support the Commander, United
    States Marine Forces, Central Command, Marine Corps Logistics Command
    took the lead as the Service Executive Agent for the retrograde of
    equipment in theater determined to be excess. In addition to receiving,
    preparing, and shipping excess equipment within theater, Marine Corps
    Logistics Command (Forward) coordinates strategic lift requirements and
    manages the redistribution of principle end items in accordance with
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps' sourcing priorities. Since June
    2006, over 15,731 principle end items have been processed at the
    retrograde lot in Al Taqaddum and approximately 11,799 items have been
    shipped back to Blount Island Command for disposition. Once disposition
    is received, assets are sent to Marine Corps Logistics Command for
    induction into the Master Work schedule, placed In-Stores, used to fill
    requisitions, or sent to the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office if
    deemed uneconomical to repair. The repair and return of items to In-
    Stores will enable us to better address the many demands for equipment.
    This, in turn, will keep us moving forward towards our goal of
    continued readiness improvement.
        Operation Iraqi Freedom has led to a conceptual change in the way
    we provide operational-level logistics to the warfighter. Due to
    changing operational and mission requirements, Marine Corps Logistics
    Command is implementing capabilities extending beyond traditional
    boundaries, creating a more mobile and agile organization. The Marine
    Corps Logistics Command (Forward) was established to satisfy
    operational logistics requirements using competitive, comprehensive,
    and integrated solutions obtained from ``the best'' strategic
    Department of Defense and commercial providers. While continuing to
    execute its strategic-level responsibilities, Marine Corps Logistics
    Command has transformed from a garrison-centric organization to one
    capable of deploying operational-level logistics solutions to augment
    the sustainment requirements of Marine Forces in combat.
     iv. modernize for tomorrow to be ``the most ready when the nation is
                                 least ready''
        We know we have tough choices ahead of us to meet equipment demands
    across the Corps. As we reset, we are making prudent assessments on
    when it is more effective to replace aging and worn out equipment with
    similar equipment or to buy new equipment. We remain focused and
    steadfast on our responsibility to be the Nation's premiere
    expeditionary Force-in-Readiness.
    Experimentation
        Our Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory conducts experiments to
    support operating force requirements and combat development. We
    continually seek to improve the capabilities of the operating forces by
    focusing on the needs of our lower-level ground combat and ground
    combat support units engaged in current and potential near-term
    contingencies. Some examples of current projects include:
        ``Combat Hunter,'' a project aimed at enhancing observation and
    hunting skills of individual marines operating in a combat environment;

             Company Level Intelligence Cell experiment, designed
            to provide us with a ``best practices'' model and to
            standardize infantry battalion intelligence processes;
             Squad Fires experiment, enhancing close air support to
            squad-level units;
             Combat Conditioning project, examining advances in
            physical fitness training to best prepare marines for the
            demands of combat; and
             Lighten the Load initiative, an effort to decrease the
            amount of weight carried by marines in the field.
    Enhancing Individual Survivability
        The Marine Corps continues to pursue technological advancements in
    personal protective equipment--our marines in combat deserve nothing
    less. Fully recognizing the limiting factors associated with weight,
    fatigue, and movement restriction, we are providing marines the latest
    in personal protective equipment--such as the Modular Tactical Vest,
    QuadGard, Lightweight Helmet, and Flame Resistant Organizational Gear.
        Body Armor
        Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need
    to evolve our personal protective vest system. In February 2007, we
    began transitioning to a newly-designed Modular Tactical Vest (MTV).
    This vest is close to the same weight as its predecessor, the Outer
    Tactical Vest, but it integrates more easily with our other personal
    protection systems. It provides greater comfort through incorporation
    of state-of-the-art load carriage techniques, which better distributes
    a combat load over the torso and onto the hips of the marine. The MTV
    also incorporates our combat-proven Enhanced Small Arms Protective
    Inserts (E-SAPI) and Side SAPI plates. These plates are provided to
    every marine in the Central Command theater of operations. The E-SAPI
    provides the best protection available against a wide variety of small
    arms threats--to include protection against 7.62mm ammunition. The
    initial acquisition objective for the MTV was 60,000 systems, with
    deliveries completed in October 2007. We are procuring additional MTVs
    during this fiscal year to ensure our marines continue to deploy with
    the best body armor system available.
        QuadGard
        The QuadGard system is designed to provide ballistic protection for
    a marine's arms and legs when serving as a turret gunner on convoy
    duty. This system, which integrates with other personal ballistic
    protection equipment, such as the MTV ESAPI and Lightweight Helmet
    (LWH), provides additional protection against ballistic threats--
    particularly improvised explosive device fragmentation.
        Lightweight Helmet
        We are committed to providing the best head protection available to
    our warfighters. The LWH weighs less than its predecessor and provides
    a high level of protection against fragmentation threats and 9mm
    bullets. We now require use of a pad system inside the helmet as
    multiple independent studies and tests demonstrated that it provides
    greater protection against non-ballistic blunt trauma than the sling
    suspension system. We are retrofitting more than 150,000 helmets with
    the pad system and have already fielded enough helmet pads for every
    deployed marine. Since January 2007, all LWHs produced by the
    manufacturer are delivered with the approved pad system installed. In
    October 2007, we began fielding the Nape Protection Pad (NAPP), which
    provides additional ballistic protection to the occipital region of the
    head--where critical nervous system components, such as the cerebellum,
    brain stem, occipital lobe, and spinal cord are located. The NAPP is
    attached to the back of the LWH or the Modular Integrated
    Communications Helmet (MICH), which is worn by our reconnaissance
    marines. Final delivery of the initial 69,300 NAPPs is scheduled for
    April 2008. That said, we continue to challenge industry to build a
    lightweight helmet that will stop the 7.62 mm round fired from an AK-
    47.
        Flame Resistant Organizational Gear
        In February 2007, we began fielding Flame Resistant Organizational
    Gear (FROG) to all deployed and deploying marines. This lifesaving
    ensemble of flame resistant clothing items--gloves, balaclava, long-
    sleeved under shirt, combat shirt, and combat trouser--is designed to
    mitigate potential injuries to our marines from flame exposure. These
    clothing items provide protection that is comparable to that of the
    NOMEX combat vehicle crewman suit/flight suit, while adding durability,
    comfort, and functionality. We have recently begun fielding flame
    resistant fleece pullovers to our marines for use in cooler conditions,
    and we are developing flame resistant varieties of cool/cold weather
    outer garments and expect to begin fielding these to marines in late
    fiscal year 2008. With the mix of body armor, undergarments, and
    outerwear, operational commanders can determine what equipment their
    marines will employ based on mission requirements and environmental
    conditions. Through ongoing development and partnerships with other
    Services, we continue to seek the best available flame resistant
    protection for our marines.
        Sustained funding for the development and procurement of individual
    protective equipment has had a direct impact on our ability to reduce
    or mitigate combat injuries. Continued congressional support is needed
    to ensure that our marines and sailors receive the best equipment
    available in the coming years.
        Counterimprovised Explosive Devices
        Responding to urgent warfighter needs, we are providing the most
    capable force protection systems available. We are upgrading our
    Counter Remote-controlled IED Electronic Warfare Chameleon systems to
    meet rapidly evolving threats while remaining engaged with the Joint
    Program Board to develop a joint solution. We are enhancing our ability
    to combat the effects of weapons of mass destruction as well as
    protecting our marines worldwide by fielding 18 consequence management
    sets using the best available commercial off-the-shelf technologies.
    These sets complement the capabilities of our Family of Incident
    Response Systems and the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force.
    Our Family of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Equipment has undergone
    significant modernization through enhancement of technician tool kits
    and greater counter IED robotics capability and availability.
    Marine Aviation Plan
        Resetting Marine Aviation means getting more capable and reliable
    aircraft into the operational deployment cycle sooner--not merely
    repairing and replacing damaged or destroyed aircraft. Daily, your
    marines rely on these aircraft to execute a wide array of missions
    including casualty evacuation for our wounded and timely close air
    support for troops in contact with the enemy. Legacy aircraft
    production lines are no longer active--exacerbating the impact of
    combat losses and increasing the urgency for the Marine Aviation Plan
    to remain fully funded and on schedule.
        The 2007 Marine Aviation Plan (AvPlan) provides the way ahead for
    Marine Aviation over the next 10 years as it transitions 39 of 71
    squadrons from 13 legacy aircraft to 6 new aircraft; it incorporates
    individual program changes and synchronizes support of our end strength
    growth to 202,000 marines.
        Joint Strike Fighter
        F-35B Lightning II development is on track with the first flight of
    BF-1 Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant scheduled for
    2008. The F-35B STOVL variant is a fifth generation aircraft that will
    provide a quantum leap in capability, basing flexibility, and mission
    execution across the full spectrum of warfare. The JSF will act as an
    integrated combat system in support of ground forces and will be the
    centerpiece of Marine Aviation. The manufacture of the first nineteen
    test aircraft is well underway, with assembly times better than planned
    and exceptional quality demonstrated in fabrication and assembly. The
    first Conventional Take-Off/Landing (CTOL) aircraft flew in December
    2006 and accumulated 19 flights prior to a planned technical refresh.
    The JSF acquisition strategy, including software development, reflects
    a block approach. The Marine Corps remains committed to an all-STOVL
    tactical aircraft force--which will enable future MAGTFs to best
    fulfill its expeditionary warfighting responsibilities in support of
    the Nation and combatant commanders.
        MV-22 Osprey
        The MV-22 brings revolutionary assault support capability to our
    forces in harm's way; they deserve the best assault support aircraft in
    the world--without question, the MV-22 is that aircraft. The MV-22 is
    replacing the CH-46E aircraft. The CH46E is over 40 years old, with
    limited lift and mission capabilities to support the MAGTF. In
    September 2005, the V-22 Defense Acquisition Board approved Full Rate
    Production. Twenty-nine Block A and 24 Block B aircraft have been
    delivered and are based at Marine Corps Air Station New River, NC;
    Patuxent River, MD; and Al Asad Air Base, Iraq.
        Much like the F-35, the MV-22 program uses a block strategy in its
    procurement. Block A aircraft are training aircraft, Block B are
    operational aircraft, and Block C aircraft are operational aircraft
    with mission enhancements that will be procured in fiscal year 2010 and
    delivered in fiscal year 2012. One V-22 Fleet Replacement Training
    Squadron, one test squadron, and three tactical VMM squadrons have
    stood up. MV-22 Initial Operational Capability was declared on 1 June
    2007 with a planned transition of two CH-46E squadrons per year
    thereafter.
        VMM-263 is deployed to Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, and the significant
    capabilities of the Osprey have already been proven in combat. A brief
    examination of the daily tasking of the MV-22 squadron in Iraq tells a
    compelling story: a flight of MV-22s are doing in 6 hours what would
    have taken 12 hours in CH-46s. In addition, the aircraft easily ranges
    the entire area of operations and flies a majority of the time at
    altitudes beyond the range of our enemy's weapons. The Marine Corps
    asked for an aircraft that could take us farther, faster, and safer;
    and Congress answered.
        KC-130J
        KC-130Js have been continuously deployed in support of Operation
    Iraqi Freedom since February 2005--providing state-of-the-art, multi-
    mission, tactical aerial refueling, and fixed-wing assault support. The
    KC-130J is the workhorse of the MAGTF; its theater logistical support
    reduces the requirement for resupply via ground, limiting the exposure
    of our convoys to IEDs and other attacks.
        The introduction of the aerial refuelable MV-22 combined with the
    forced retirement of the legacy KC-130F/R aircraft due to corrosion,
    fatigue life, and parts obsolescence requires an accelerated
    procurement of the KC-130J. In addition, the Marine Corps will replace
    its 28 Reserve component KC-130T aircraft with KC-130Js, simplifying
    the force to 1 type/model/series. The Marine Corps is contracted to
    procure a total of 46 aircraft by the end of fiscal year 2013; 29 new
    aircraft have been delivered and 4 KC-130J aircraft requested in the
    fiscal year 2008 budget.
        H-1 Upgrade
        The H-1 Upgrade Program (UH-1Y/AH-1Z) resolves existing operational
    UH-1N power margin and AH-1W aircrew workload issues--while
    significantly enhancing the tactical capability, operational
    effectiveness, and sustainability of our attack and utility helicopter
    fleet. The Corps' Vietnam-era UH-1N Hueys are reaching the end of their
    useful life. Due to airframe and engine fatigue, Hueys routinely take
    off at their maximum gross weight with no margin for error. Rapidly
    fielding the UH-1Y remains a Marine Corps aviation priority, with the
    first deployment of UH-1Ys to Operation Iraqi Freedom scheduled for the
    spring 2009.
        Due to significant operational demands and aircraft attrition in
    the existing attack and utility helicopter fleet, the Marine Corps
    adopted a ``build new'' strategy for the UH-1Y in fiscal year 2006.
    Similarly, the Marine Corps began investing in Non-Recurring
    Engineering (NRE) in fiscal year 2007 for the production of a limited
    number of AH-1Z ``build new'' aircraft; these AH-1Zs will augment those
    existing AH-1Ws that will be remanufactured. This combined ``build
    new'' and remanufacture strategy will enable the Marine Corps to
    rapidly increase the number of AH-1s available, support the Marine
    Corps' growth to 202,000 marines, and alleviate inventory shortfalls
    caused by aircraft attrition. Ten production aircraft have been
    delivered. Operation and Evaluation (OPEVAL) Phase II commenced in
    February 2008, and as expected, showcased the strengths of the upgraded
    aircraft. Full rate production of the H-1 Upgrade (and the contract
    award of Lot 5 aircraft) is scheduled to take place during the fourth
    quarter fiscal year 2008.
        CH-53K
        In operation since 1981, the CH-53E is becoming increasingly
    expensive to operate and faces reliability and obsolescence issues. Its
    replacement, the CH-53K, will be capable of externally transporting
    27,000 lbs to a range of 110 nautical miles, more than doubling the
    current CH-53E lift capability. Maintainability and reliability
    enhancements of the CH-53K will significantly decrease recurring
    operating costs and will radically improve aircraft efficiency and
    operational effectiveness over the current CH-53E. The program passed
    Milestone B (System Development and Demonstration (SDD) initiation) in
    December 2005. The SDD Contract was awarded to Sikorsky Aircraft
    Corporation in April 2006. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is
    scheduled for fiscal year 2015, and is defined as a detachment of four
    aircraft, ready to deploy.
    Unmanned Aerial Systems
        The Marine Corps is taking aggressive action to modernize and
    improve organic UAS capabilities. The Marine Corps' UAS are organized
    into three echelons, appropriate to the level of commander they
    support. Tier III UAS serve at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
    level. Tier II UAS support Regimental Combat Team and Marine
    Expeditionary Unit operations, and Tier I UAS support battalion and
    below operations. At the Tier III level, we have simultaneously
    transitioned Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMU) to the RQ-7B
    Shadow; started reorganizing the squadrons' force structure to support
    detachment-based flexibility (operating three systems versus one for
    each squadron); and initiated the stand up of a third Active component
    VMU squadron.
        With the significant support of the Army, the Marine Corps has
    completed the transition to the RQ-7B Shadow in less than 9 months. The
    transition to the Shadow provides a mature and modern--yet basic and
    readily available--Tier III platform upon which to baseline Marine VMU
    reorganization. A detachment-based concept of operations for the VMU
    will give Marine Expeditionary Force commanders flexibility to task-
    organize based on mission requirements. The addition of a third VMU
    squadron is critical to sustaining current operations by decreasing our
    current operational deployment-todwell ratio--currently at 1:1--to a
    sustainable 1:2 ratio. This rapid transition and reorganization, begun
    in January 2007, will be complete by the fourth quarter fiscal year
    2009, significantly improving organic Marine Corps UAS capability while
    increasing joint interoperability and commonality.
        The Marine Corps is using an ISR Services contract to provide Scan
    Eagle systems to Multinational Forces-West, Iraq to fill the Tier II
    void until future fielding of the Tier II/Small Tactical UAS (STUAS), a
    combined Marine Corps and Navy program beginning in fiscal year 2008
    with planned fielding in 2011. At the Tier I level, the Marine Corps is
    transitioning from the Dragon Eye to the joint Raven-B program, also
    common with the U.S. Army.
        When fully fielded, the Corps' Unmanned Aerial Systems will be
    networked through a robust and interoperable command and control system
    that provides commanders an enhanced capability applicable across the
    spectrum of military operations.
    Ground Mobility
        The Army and Marine Corps are leading the Services in developing
    tactical wheeled vehicle requirements for the joint force. Our efforts
    will provide the joint force an appropriate balance of survivability,
    mobility, payload, networking, transportability, and sustainability.
    The Army/Marine Corps Board has proven a valuable forum for
    coordination of development and fielding strategies; production of
    armoring kits and uparmored HMMWVs; and response to requests for Mine
    Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The Ground Mobility Suite
    includes:
        Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
        The Marine Corps provides the Nation's joint forces with a unique
    and flexible forcible entry capability from the sea. The Expeditionary
    Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is specifically suited to maneuver operations
    conducted from the sea and sustained operations in the world's littoral
    regions. Its inherent capabilities provide utility across the spectrum
    of conflict. As the Corps' largest ground combat system acquisition
    program, the EFV is the sole sea-based, surface-oriented vehicle that
    enables projection of combat power from a seabase to an objective. It
    will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle--in service since
    1972. Complementary to our modernized fleet of tactical vehicles, the
    EFV's amphibious mobility, day and night lethality, enhanced force
    protection capabilities, and robust communications will substantially
    improve joint force capabilities. Its over-the-horizon capability will
    enable amphibious ships to increase their standoff distance from the
    shore--protecting them from enemy anti-access weapons.
        The Marine Corps recently conducted a demanding operational
    assessment of the EFV. It successfully demonstrated the most critical
    performance requirements, but the design complexities are still
    providing challenges to system reliability. To that end, we conducted a
    comprehensive requirements review to ensure delivery of the required
    capability while reducing complexity where possible. For example, the
    human stresses encountered during operations in some high sea states
    required us to reevaluate the operational necessity of exposing marines
    to those conditions. Based upon this assessment, along with subsequent
    engineering design review, we will tailor final requirements and system
    design to support forcible entry concepts while ensuring the EFV is a
    safe, reliable, and effective combat vehicle.
        Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
        The Army/Marine Corps Board has been the focal point for
    development of joint requirements for a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    (JLTV)--which will provide protected, sustained, networked, and
    expeditionary mobility in the light tactical vehicle weight class.
    Throughout 2007, Army and Marine Corps combat and materiel developers
    coordinated with the Joint Staff, defining requirements and acquisition
    planning for the replacement for the uparmored HMMWV. In December, the
    Defense Acquisition Board approved JLTV entry into the acquisition
    process at Milestone A, designating the Army as lead Service and
    initiating competitive prototyping during the technology development
    phase. Prototypes will be evaluated to demonstrate industry's ability
    to balance survivability, mobility, payload, network enabling,
    transportability, and sustainability. The program is on track for a
    Milestone B in early 2010.
        Marine Personnel Carrier
        The Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) is an expeditionary armored
    personnel carrier--ideal for irregular warfare--yet effective across
    the full range of military operations. Increasing armor-protected
    mobility for infantry battalion task forces, the MPC program balances
    vehicle performance, protection, and payload attributes. Through 2007,
    we completed both joint staffing of an Initial Capabilities Document
    and, a draft concept of employment. Additionally, the Analysis of
    Alternatives final report was published in December 2007. The program
    is on track for a Milestone B decision in the second quarter of fiscal
    year 2010 and an Initial Operational Capability in the 2015 timeframe.
        Internally Transported Vehicle
        The Internally Transported Vehicle (ITV) is a family of vehicles
    that will provide deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces with ground
    vehicles that are transportable inside the MV-22 and CV-22 tilt-rotor
    aircraft, as well as CH-53 and MH-47 aircraft. There are three variants
    of the ITV, the Light Strike, the Prime Mover-Weapon, and the Prime
    Mover-Trailer. Both prime mover variants are components of the
    Expeditionary Fire Support System designed to support the M327 120mm
    mortar. In conjunction with testing of our Expeditionary Fire Support
    System, we conducted an operational assessment of the ITV Light Strike
    variant during which it met all key performance parameters. We expect
    to begin fielding this variant the Light Strike Variant of the ITV in
    June 2008.
    Vehicle Armoring
        Our goal is to provide the best level of available protection to
    100 percent of in-theater vehicles that go ``outside the wire.'' Our
    tactical wheeled vehicle strategy pursues this goal through the
    coordination of product improvement, technology insertion, and new
    procurement in partnership with industry. The Marine Corps, working
    with the other Services, is fielding armored vehicles such as: the MRAP
    vehicle, the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement Armor System, the
    Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) Marine Armor Kit, and the Uparmored
    HMMWV.
        Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Armor System (MAS)
        MAS provides an integrated, armor enclosed, climate-controlled cab
    compartment and an armored troop carrier for our MTVR variants. These
    vehicles are also being upgraded with an improved blast protection
    package consisting of blast attenuating seats, five-point restraint
    harnesses, and improved belly and fender-well blast deflectors. Basic
    MAS has been installed in all of the Marine Corps' MTVRs in the Central
    Command's theater of operation. Additionally, we are installing blast
    upgrade, fuel tank fire protection kits, and 300 AMP alternators;
    target completion for in-theater vehicles is fourth quarter fiscal year
    2008.
        Logistics Vehicle System Marine Armor Kit II
        The LVS Marine Armor Kit (MAK) II provides blast, improvised
    explosive device, and small arms protection. It has a completely
    redesigned cab assembly that consists of a new frame with armor
    attachment points and integrated 360-degree protection. The new cab
    will also have an air conditioning system that cools from 134 degrees
    Fahrenheit to 89 degrees Fahrenheit in 20 minutes. Additional
    protection includes overhead and underbody armor using high, hard
    steel, rolled homogenous armor, and 2.75" ballistic windows. The
    suspension system has been upgraded to accommodate the extra weight of
    the vehicle. We estimate the LVS MAK II armoring effort will complete
    fielding by February 2009.
        M1114 Highly-Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)-Upgrade--
            Fragmentation Kit 2 and Kit 5
        Fragmentation Kit 2 enhances ballistic protection in the front
    driver and assistant driver wheel-well of HMMWVs. Fragmentation Kit 5
    reduces injuries from improvised explosive devices as well as armor
    debris and fragmentation. Installation of both fragmentation kits was
    completed in fiscal year 2007. We are continuing to evaluate the U.S.
    Army's objective kit development and work with the Army and Office of
    Naval Research to assess new protection-level capabilities and share
    information. The Marine Corps has adopted a strategy of a 60 percent
    fully uparmored HMMWV fleet. All new Expanded Capacity Vehicles will
    have the Integrated Armor Package. Of those, 60 percent will be fully
    uparmored to include the appropriate ``B'' kit and Fragmentation kits
    during production. The Marine Corps will continue to work with the Army
    to pursue the development of true bolt-on/bolt-off ``B'' kits and
    fragmentation kits to apply as needed to post-production vehicles.
        Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
        MRAP vehicles have a V-shaped armored hull and protect against the
    three primary kill mechanisms of mines and improvised explosive devices
    (IED)--fragmentation, blast overpressure, and acceleration. These
    vehicles provide the best currently-available protection against IEDs.
    Experience in theater shows that a marine is four to five times less
    likely to be killed or injured in a MRAP vehicle than in an uparmored
    HMMWV--which is why Secretary Gates made the MRAP program the number
    one acquisition priority for the Defense Department. MRAP vehicles come
    in three categories: Category I designed for use in urban environments
    and carries by up to six personnel; Category II for convoy escort,
    troop transport, and ambulance evacuation, which transports up to ten
    personnel; and Category III for route clearance/explosive ordnance
    disposal vehicles.
        The total Department of Defense requirement for MRAP vehicles is
    15,374--of which 3,700 are allocated for the Marine Corps. However, the
    Marine Corps requirement has been revalidated to 2,225, pending Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council approval. The Navy is the Executive
    Agent for the program and the Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command
    is the Joint Program Executive Officer. As an example of our adaptation
    to evolving threats, the Joint MRAP Vehicle Program Office has recently
    selected qualified producers of a new MRAP II vehicle for the Marine
    Corps and other forces. Vehicles procured through this second
    solicitation will meet enhanced survivability and performance
    capability required by field commanders.
        The Marine Corps is very pleased with the overwhelming support of
    Congress on the MRAP program, both financially and programmatically. We
    ask that Congress continue their support for these lifesaving vehicles
    and support us as we transition to the sustainment of these vehicles in
    future years.
    Marine Air Ground Task Force Fires
        In 2007, we initiated a study titled ``The Major Combat Operations
    Analysis for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2024.'' This study scrutinized the
    current organic fire support of the MAGTF to determine the adequacy,
    integration, and modernization requirements for ground, aviation, and
    naval surface fires. The study concluded that the MAGTF/Amphibious Task
    Force was unable to adequately address moving and armored targets 24/7
    and in all weather conditions. This deficiency is especially acute
    during the Joint Forcible Entry Operation phase of combat operations.
    The study also reinforced the critical importance of both the Joint
    Strike Fighter and AH1Z in minimizing the fires gap. With this
    information, we then developed a set of alternatives for filling these
    gaps--using either MAGTF reinforcing or joint fires. We also performed
    a supplemental historical study using Operation Iraqi Freedom data to
    examine MAGTF Fires in the full spectrum of warfare. These studies
    reconfirmed the requirement for a mix of air, naval surface, and
    ground-based fires as well as the development of the Triad of Ground
    Indirect Fires.
        Our Triad of Ground Indirect Fires provides for complementary,
    discriminating, and nondiscriminating fires that facilitate maneuver
    during combat operations. The Triad requires a medium-caliber cannon
    artillery capability; an extended range, ground-based rocket
    capability; and a mortar capability with greater lethality than current
    models and greater tactical mobility than current artillery systems.
    The concept validates the capabilities provided by the M777 lightweight
    155mm towed howitzer, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and
    the Expeditionary Fire Support System, a 120mm rifled towed mortar.
        M777 Lightweight Howitzer
        The new M777 lightweight howitzer replaces our M198 howitzers. It
    can be lifted by the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter and is
    paired with the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement truck for improved
    cross-country mobility. Through design innovation, navigation,
    positioning aides, and digital fire control, the M777 offers
    significant improvements in lethality, survivability, mobility, and
    durability over the M198 howitzer. The Marine Corps began fielding the
    first of 511 new howitzers to the operating forces in April 2005 and
    expects to complete fielding in fiscal year 2011.
        High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
        High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) fills a critical
    range and volume gap in Marine Corps fire support assets by providing
    24 hour, all weather, ground-based, indirect precision and volume fires
    throughout all phases of combat operations ashore. We will field 46
    HIMARS--18 to the Active component, 18 to the Reserve component, 4 to
    the supporting establishment, and 6 to the War Reserve Material
    Readiness--Forward. When paired with Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
    System rockets, HIMARS will provide a highly responsive, precision fire
    capability to our forces. We will reach Initial Operational Capability
    this August and expect to be at Full Operational Capability by fiscal
    year 2010.
        Expeditionary Fire Support System
        The Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS), a towed 120mm mortar,
    will be the principal indirect fire support system for heli- and
    tiltrotor-borne forces executing ship to objective maneuver as part of
    a Marine Air Ground Task Force. When paired with an Internally
    Transportable Vehicle, EFSS can be transported aboard MV-22 and CH-53E
    aircraft. EFSS-equipped units will have immediately responsive, organic
    indirect fires at ranges beyond current infantry battalion mortars.
    Initial operational capability is planned during fiscal year 2008, and
    full operational capability is planned for fiscal year 2010.
    Infantry Weapons
        Based on combat experience and numerous studies, we are developing
    infantry weapons systems with the following goals: increased
    effectiveness, lighter weight, improved modularity, and integration
    with other infantry equipment. The Marine Corps and Army are co-leading
    joint service capabilities analysis for future developments.
        Individual Weapons
        The M16A4 is our current service rifle and makes up the majority of
    our assigned individual weapons. It is supplemented by the M4 Carbine,
    which is assigned to marines based on billet and mission requirements.
    We are participating in several Army tests which will evaluate the
    capabilities and limitations of our small arms inventory. In
    conjunction with the Army and Air Force, we will use these results to
    determine priorities for a future service rifle with focus on
    modularity, ergonomics, balance, and lethality. We also have executed a
    two-pronged strategy for a larger caliber pistol: supporting the Air
    Force's effort to analyze and develop joint capabilities documents for
    a new pistol and examining the Army's recent consideration of personal
    defense weapons.
        Multi-Purpose Weapons
        The Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon (SMAW) is an
    aging, heavy weapon that is nearing the end of its service life. We are
    seeking ways to reduce weight, increase reliability, and improve target
    identification as well as develop a ``fire from enclosure'' capability
    that will enable marines to fire the weapon from within an enclosed
    space.
        Scout Sniper Capability
        We are conducting a holistic assessment of our Scout Sniper
    capability to identify shortfalls and develop recommended solutions--
    concurrently integrating the doctrine, training, weapons, equipment,
    and identified tasks with a marine sniper's professional development
    and career.
        Non-lethal Weapons Technology
        The complexities of the modern battlespace often place our service
    men and women in challenging situations where sometimes, lethal force
    is not the preferred response. In these environments, our warfighters
    need options for a graduated escalation of force. As the Executive
    Agent for the Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program, we see
    the need for long-range, directed-energy systems. Marines and soldiers
    in Iraq are already using non-lethal directed energy weapons; green
    laser warning devices have reduced the requirement to use lethal force
    at checkpoints against wayward, but otherwise innocent, Iraqi
    civilians. We continue to pursue joint research and development of
    promising non-lethal weapon technologies, such as the millimeter wave
    Active Denial System. We thank the committee for its support of these
    vital capabilities for modern warfare.
        Counter-Sniper Technology
        We are leveraging the work of the Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency, our sister Services, the Marine Corps Intelligence
    Activity, and the National Ground Intelligence Center in an effort to
    increase our ability to counter enemy snipers. We are examining
    different obscurant technologies as well as various infrared detection/
    location sense and warn capabilities. We are experimenting with
    advanced equipment and improved tactics, techniques, and procedures.
    The ability to detect enemy optics will provide our marines warning of
    impending sniper or improvised explosive device attacks and the ability
    to avoid or engage the sniper before he can fire. Ongoing joint and
    interagency cooperation, coupled with industry collaboration, will
    shape our future experiments.
        Infantry Battalion Enhancement Period Program (IBEPP)
        We are fielding additional equipment to infantry battalions to
    better enable marines to fight and win on the distributed and non-
    linear battlefield. This equipment encompasses communications, optics,
    weapons, and vehicles, at a cost of approximately $19 million per
    battalion. Key elements of the IBEPP include a formal squad leader
    course for every rifle battalion squad leader, a tactical small unit
    leaders' course for prospective fire team leaders, and a ``Train the
    Trainer'' mobile training team to teach junior tactical leaders the
    skills required to more effectively train their own marines.
    Command and Control (C2) Harmonization
        The Marine Corps' Command and Control Harmonization Strategy
    articulates our goal of delivering an end-to-end, fully-integrated,
    cross-functional capability to include forward-deployed and reach-back
    functions. We envision seamless support to marines in garrison and in
    combat--taking the best of emerging capabilities to build a single
    solution that includes the Common Aviation Command and Control System
    (CAC2S), Tactical Communications Modernization (TCM) program, Very
    Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), and training.
        The CAC2S fuses data from sensors, weapon systems, and command and
    control systems into an integrated display, assisting commanders in
    controlling organic, joint, and coalition efforts while operating as a
    joint task force. Delivered in a common, modular, and scalable design,
    CAC2S reduces the current systems into one hardware solution. The TCM
    and VSAT programs fuse data on enemy forces into the Common Operating
    Picture and increase our ability to track friendly forces. Lastly, our
    C2 Harmonization Strategy increases capability to train our staffs
    through Marine Air Ground Task Force Integrated System Training
    Centers.
    Information Operations
        The ability to influence an adversary through information
    operations has been a critical capability our current operations and
    will be of even more importance as we continue to engage in security
    cooperation efforts around the globe. To better support our Information
    Operations (IO), we are standing up the Marine Corps Information
    Operations Center at Quantico, VA--our primary organization to
    integrate and deliver IO effects throughout the Marine Corps.
    Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise
        We are increasing the quality of our Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities through the use of an enterprise
    approach known as the Marine Corps ISR Enterprise (MCISR-E)--resulting
    in a fully-integrated architecture compliant with joint standards for
    data interoperability. MCISR-E will provide networked combat
    information and intelligence down to the squad level across the range
    of military operations. To ensure marines have access to these new
    capabilities, our MAGTF Command and Control systems feed combat
    operation centers with information from wide field of view persistent
    surveillance systems such as Angel Fire, traditional ISR systems such
    as our family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and non-traditional
    collection assets such as Ground Based Operational Surveillance System
    (GBOSS). Intelligence sections down to the company level are equipped
    with ISR fusion systems as well as applications such as MarineLink that
    enable rapid discovery, data mining, analysis, and most importantly
    incorporation of Intelligence into tactical planning for operations and
    intelligence reporting down to squad level and up to higher
    headquarters.
    Marine Corps Operational Logistics
        Operating Force Sustainment Initiatives
        We have aggressively moved forward on several forward-deployed
    initiatives that have improved our support to our marines in combat.
    Our Marine Corps Logistics Command is working with our Marine
    Expeditionary Forces on extending heavy intermediate maintenance
    support within the continental United States. Maintenance Center
    contact teams at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton are extending the
    service life of equipment through corrosion control and maintenance
    programs that enhance predeployment readiness.
        Improving Combat Readiness Through Innovation
        To assure optimum use of the resources provided by Congress and the
    American taxpayers, we are making innovations in how we equip, sustain,
    house, and move our warfighters. We are aggressively applying the
    principles of continuous process improvement to these enabling business
    processes across the Corps. In just the past year, we have cut costs
    and repair cycle time at both aviation and ground maintenance depots,
    revamped and speeded up the urgent universal needs statements process,
    and instituted regional contracting for materiel and services that is
    proving more cost effective. Such improvements are expected to increase
    as training and experience proliferate.
    Urgent Universal Needs Statement Process
        The Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) process enables
    deployed commanders to request equipment based on their recent
    experience. Designed to procure equipment more expediently than if
    submitted in the regular budgeting process, the Marine Corps' UUNS
    process uses a secure, Web-based system that provides full stakeholder
    visibility from submission through resolution. Through continuous
    process improvement, we have reduced our average processing time by
    58.8 days. Our goal is responsive support to commanders in the field by
    providing a rational, disciplined, and time-sensitive process that
    fulfills their validated urgent requirements in the fastest, most
    logical way. We continue to review the system for opportunities to
    increase efficiency and timeliness. For example, as a result of a
    February 2006 Lean Six Sigma review, several improvements were
    implemented including standardization, on-line tracking, and
    streamlined approval. Typically, UUNS are funded by reprogramming funds
    from approved programs or through congressional supplemental funding.
    They are funded with regard for current law, their effects on
    established programs of record, or other initiatives in the combat
    capability development process.
    Information Technology Enablers/Global Combat Support System--Marine
            Corps
        Global Combat Support System--Marine Corps continues to make
    strides toward delivering a modernized information technology system
    that will enhance logistics support to the warfighter. As the primary
    information technology enabler for the Marine Corps' Logistics
    Modernization efforts, the system's primary design focus is to enable
    the warfighter to operate while deployed and provide reach back
    capability from the battlefield. At the core is modern, commercial off-
    the-shelf enterprise resource planning software that will replace our
    aging legacy systems. The Global Combat Support System--Marine Corps
    Block 1 focuses on providing the operating forces with an integrated
    supply/maintenance capability and enhanced logistics-chain-management
    planning tools. Field User Evaluations and Initial Operational Test and
    Evaluations are scheduled for 1st quarter fiscal year 2009, followed by
    fielding of the system and Initial Operating Capability during fiscal
    year 2009. Future blocks will focus on enhancing capabilities in the
    areas of warehousing, distribution, logistics planning, decision
    support, depot maintenance, and integration with emerging technologies
    to improve asset visibility.
    Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network
        The Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) is our
    primary warfighting command and control network. The asymmetric nature
    of current attacks combined with future threats to our networks demand
    a greater reliance on the SIPRNET to ensure the security of Marine
    Corps warfighting and business operations. The Marine Corps is
    aggressively upgrading our existing SIPRNET capabilities and an
    expansion of our SIPRNET in the future will be necessary to meet
    operational demands. The resources required for this expansion will
    enable wider use of the SIPRNET across the Marine Corps as we
    transition more warfighting and business operations into a highly
    secure and trusted network.
    Infrastructure Energy Considerations
        The purchase of electricity, natural gas, petroleum fuels, and
    potable water to operate our facilities is a significant expense.
    Through proactive Facilities Energy and Water Management and
    Transportation Programs to reduce consumption, we are achieving
    substantial cost avoidance and environmental benefits including
    reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants. Our program
    provides the direction, actions, and metrics necessary for commands to:

             Reduce rate of energy use in existing facilities;
             Improve facility energy efficiency of new construction
            and renovations;
             Expand use of renewable resources;
             Reduce water usage rates on our installations;
             Improve security and reliability of energy and water
            systems; and
             Decrease petroleum use through increased efficiency
            and alternative fuel use.

        Marine Corps conservation efforts have been substantial, but
    installation energy and water requirements continue to increase as we
    increase our end strength and adjust to rising energy prices.
    v. provide our nation a naval force fully prepared for employment as a
                     magtf across the spectrum of conflict
        The enduring value of naval expeditionary forces in protecting our
    homeland, preventing crises, and winning our Nation's wars is a key
    theme of the recently signed maritime strategy entitled ``A Cooperative
    Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,'' the Naval Operations Concept, and
    the Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security
    Environment. These documents acknowledge the uncertainty of the
    strategic environment and that winning the battle for influence--and
    thus preventing wars--is as important as our Nation winning wars.
    Influenced by a variety of geographic, diplomatic, and geographic
    factors, our country's access to strategic basing is in decline. Our
    strategies address the requirement to maintain a robust forcible entry
    capability: the ability to maneuver from the sea, gain and maintain
    access anywhere in the littorals as well as transition to operations
    ashore and sustain the force from the seabase. They provide a template
    for Maritime Service capability and capacity and underscore our Marine
    Corps-Navy warfighting interdependence.
        These concepts and strategies also incorporate hard-fought lessons
    from our current battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Combat casualties
    have in a very real sense become a center of gravity for America--no
    matter what the cause or conflict. Therefore, ``increased risk'' and
    ``slower response times'' must always be calculated in terms of their
    real costs--loss of life and materiel on the battlefield and then,
    potentially, the loss of support of the American people.
        Seapower is a distinct asymmetric advantage of the United States.
    For marines, that asymmetric advantage includes Joint Seabasing, which
    allows us to maximize forward presence and engagement while ``stepping
    lightly'' on local sensitivities, avoiding the unintended political,
    social, and economic disruptions that often result from a large
    American presence ashore. It allows us to conduct a broad range of
    operations in areas where access is challenged, without operational
    commanders being forced to immediately secure ports and airfields.
    Given diplomatic, geographic, and infrastructure constraints, Seabasing
    is absolutely critical to overcoming area denial and anti-access
    weapons in uncertain or openly hostile situations. The combination of
    capabilities that allows us to influence events ashore from over the
    horizon--amphibious warfare ships, innovative Maritime Prepositioning
    Force (Future) ships, Joint High Speed Vessels, surface connectors, MV-
    22s, and EFVs--play a key role in surmounting access challenges.
        Seabasing is not exclusive to the Navy and Marine Corps--it will be
    a national capability. In fact, we view Joint Seabasing as a national
    strategic imperative. Just as the amphibious innovations championed by
    the Navy-Marine Corps team during the 1920s and 1930s were employed by
    all U.S. and Allied forces in every theater during World War II, we
    believe that the Seabasing initiatives currently underway will expand
    to become joint and interagency capabilities. Our control of the sea
    allows us to use it as a vast maneuver space--365 days a year.
    Seabasing allows us to project influence and expeditionary power in the
    face of access challenges, a distinct asymmetric advantage. These
    capabilities allow maritime forces to support our partners and to deter
    and defeat adversaries in a complex and uncertain future. Today,
    another generation of Naval planners continues to envision how our
    amphibious capabilities can evolve into more fully sea-based operations
    and better meet the Combatant Commanders' varied and competing
    requirements.
    Amphibious Ship Requirements
        The maritime strategy advocates credible combat power as a
    deterrent to future conflict. The Marine Corps supports this capability
    through the flexibility and combat power of the Marine Air Ground Task
    Force embarked on amphibious warfare ships. By far the most complex of
    our congressionally-mandated missions, amphibious forcible entry
    requires long-term resourcing and a high-level of proficiency. It is
    not a capability that we can create in the wake of a threat.
        The characteristics of amphibious ships (their command and control
    suites, flight decks, well decks, air and surface connectors, medical
    facilities, messing and berthing capacity, and survivability) merged
    with the general-purpose nature of embarked marines, make them multi-
    mission platforms--unbeatable in operations ranging from humanitarian
    assistance to amphibious assault. These forces have brought hope and
    assistance to peoples ravaged by tsunamis, earthquakes, and cyclones--
    even hurricanes in our own country. They have provided a powerful
    combat force from the sea as evidenced by the opening days of Operation
    Enduring Freedom when marines provided the first conventional forces
    ashore in Afghanistan. An equally powerful force assaulted from
    amphibious ships up the Al Faw peninsula in early weeks of Operation
    Iraqi Freedom. In spite of the proliferation of anti-access
    technologies among state and non-state actors, Navy-Marine Corps
    amphibious capabilities have answered our Nation's ``911 call'' over 85
    times since the end of the Cold War. Many international navies have
    recognized the value of amphibious warfare ships--as evidenced by the
    global renaissance in amphibious ship construction.
        Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years we have
    accepted risk in our Nation's forcible entry capacity and reduced
    amphibious lift from 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault
    echelons to 2.0 MEB assault echelons. In the budgetary arena, the value
    of amphibious ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of
    forcible entry--discounting their demonstrated usefulness across the
    range of operations and the clear imperative for marines embarked
    aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to
    transition between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to
    every mission-tasking in between, will rely on a strong Navy-Marine
    Corps Team and the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and
    Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum number of
    amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation's needs--and look
    forward to working with the committee to support the Chief of Naval
    Operation's shipbuilding plans.
        The Marine Corps' contribution to the Nation's forcible entry
    requirement is a single, simultaneously-employed two Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault capability--as part of a seabased
    Marine Expeditionary Force. Although not a part of the Marine
    Expeditionary Force Assault Echelon, a third reinforcing MEB is
    required and will be provided via Maritime Prepositioning Force
    (Future) capabilities. Each MEB assault echelon requires seventeen
    amphibious warfare ships--resulting in an overall ship requirement for
    34 amphibious warfare ships. However, given current fiscal constraints,
    the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume greater operational
    risk by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using only 15 ships
    per MEB--in other words, a Battle Force that provides 30 operationally
    available amphibious warfare ships. In that 30-ship Battle Force, 10
    aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA/LHD/LHA(R)) and 10 LPD-17 class
    ships are required to accommodate the MEB's aviation combat element.
        In order to meet a 30-ship availability rate--based on a Chief of
    Naval Operations-approved maintenance factor of 10 percent--a minimum
    of 11 ships of each of the current types of amphibious ships are
    required--for a total of 33 ships. The Navy has concurred with this
    requirement for 33 amphibious warfare ships, which provide the
    ``backbone'' of our maritime capability--giving us the ability to meet
    the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum of conflict.
        Amphibious Assault Ship (Replacement) (LHA(R))
        The legacy Tarawa class amphibious assault ships reach the end of
    their service life during 2011-2015. The eighth Wasp-class LHD (multi-
    purpose amphibious assault ship) is under construction and will replace
    one Tarawa-class ship during fiscal year 2008. To meet future
    warfighting requirements and fully capitalize on the capabilities of
    the MV-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, two LHA(R)-class ships with
    enhanced aviation capabilities will replace the remaining LHA class
    ships. These ships will provide enhanced hangar and maintenance spaces
    to support aviation maintenance and increased jet fuel storage and
    aviation ordnance magazines. We are investigating the feasibility of
    incorporating the reduced island concept and well-deck capabilities in
    future, general-purpose assault ship construction.
        Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
        The LPD-17 San Antonio class of amphibious warfare ships represents
    the Department of the Navy's commitment to a modern expeditionary power
    projection fleet that will enable our naval force to operate across the
    spectrum of warfare. It is imperative that 11 of these ships be built
    to meet the minimum of 10 necessary for the 2.0 MEB assault echelon
    amphibious lift requirement.
        The Navy took delivery of the first LPD-17 in the summer of 2005
    and operational evaluation is scheduled for spring 2008. The LPD-17
    class replaces four classes of older ships--LKA, LST, LSD-36, LPD-4--
    and will have a 40-year expected service life. LPD-17 class ships will
    play a key role in supporting the ongoing Long War by forward deploying
    marines and their equipment to better respond to crises abroad. Its
    unique design will facilitate expanded force coverage and decreased
    reaction times of forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units. In
    forcible entry operations, the LPD-17 will help maintain a robust
    surface assault and rapid off-load capability for the Marine Air Ground
    Task Force and the Nation.
    The Maritime Prepositioning Force
        Capable of supporting the rapid deployment of three Marine
    Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), the Maritime Prepositioning Force is an
    important element of our expeditionary warfighting capability. MPF is a
    proven capability and has been used as a force deployment option in
    selected contingencies, to close forces on accelerated timelines for
    major combat operation, and in combination with amphibious forces to
    rapidly and simultaneously react to crises in more than one theater.
        The next and necessary evolution of this program is incorporation
    of the Maritime Prepositioning Force-Future (MPF(F)) Squadron into the
    existing MPF Program. MPF(F) is a key enabler for Seabasing and will
    build on the success of the legacy Maritime Prepositioning Force
    program. MPF(F) will provide support to a wide range of military
    operations with improved capabilities such as at-sea arrival and
    assembly, selective offload of specific mission sets, and long-term,
    sea-based sustainment. From the sea base, the squadron will be capable
    of prepositioning a single MEB's critical equipment and sustainment for
    delivery--without the need for established infrastructure ashore.
        While the MPF(F) is not suitable for forcible entry operations, it
    is critical for the rapid build up and sustainment of additional combat
    forces once our entry has been achieved by our assault echelon--
    launched from amphibious assault ships. The MPF(F), along with two
    legacy MPF squadrons, will give the Marine Corps the capacity to
    quickly generate three MEBs in support of multiple combatant
    commanders. The MPF(F) squadron composition decision was made in May
    2005. That squadron is designed to consist of three aviation-capable
    big-deck ships, three large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, three
    T-AKE supply ships, three Mobile Landing Platforms, and two dense-
    packed container ships. All of these will be crewed by civilian
    mariners and, as stated earlier, are not designed to conduct forcible
    entry operations. The program is currently in the technology
    development phase of acquisition, with a Milestone B decision planned
    in fiscal year 2008.
        Mobile Landing Platform
        The Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is perhaps the most flexible
    platform in the MPF(F) squadron. Designed to be the ``pier in the
    ocean,'' the MLP is an interface platform for other surface lift ships
    and vessels. Instead of ships and lighters going to a terminal on
    shore, they could transfer vehicles and equipment to and from the MLP.
    The ship is being designed to interface with MPF(F) Large Medium-Speed
    Roll-on/Roll-off ships through sea state four and accommodate Landing
    Craft Air Cushion operations in sea state three at a minimum.
    Additionally other service platforms could leverage the ship as an
    interface. In concert with the Navy, the MLP capabilities development
    document was delivered to the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel in
    January 2007.
        Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
        The T-AKE is a selectively off-loadable, afloat warehouse ship,
    which is designed to carry dry, frozen, and chilled cargo; ammunition;
    and limited cargo fuel. Key holds are reconfigurable for additional
    flexibility. It has a day/night capable flight deck. These ships can
    support the dry cargo and compatible ammo requirements of joint forces
    and are the same ship class as the Combat Logistics Force T-AKE ships.
        Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) Ship
        The LMSRs were designed to accommodate the Department of Defense's
    largest vehicles--such as the Abrams Tanks, Rough Terrain Cargo
    Handler, and tractor trailers; this capacity is being leveraged to
    support Marine Corps vehicles and equipment. These ships, modified for
    MPF(F), will be very large, afloat equipment staging areas with
    additional capabilities including vehicle maintenance areas, berthing,
    ammunition breakout areas, two aviation operating spots, underway
    replenishment equipment, MLP interface, and a 113-ton crane capable of
    lifting vehicles or shipping containers. Importantly, they will also
    reduce strategic airlift requirements associated with our fly-in
    echelon.
    Ship-to-Shore Mobility
        Historically, Marine Corps amphibious power projection has included
    a deliberate buildup of combat power ashore; only after establishment
    of a beachhead could the Marine Air Ground Task Force begin to focus
    its combat power on the joint force's operational objective. Advances
    in mobility, fires, and sustainment capabilities will greatly enhance
    operations from over the horizon--by both air and surface means--with
    forces moving rapidly to operational objectives deep inland without
    stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones.
    The ability to project power inland from a mobile sea base has utility
    across the spectrum of conflict--from humanitarian assistance to major
    combat operations. The EFV, MV-22 Osprey, and CH-53K heavy lift
    helicopter are critical to achieving necessary capabilities for future
    expeditionary operations.
        High-Speed Connectors
        High-speed connectors will facilitate sustained seabased operations
    by expediting force closure and allowing the necessary sustainment for
    success in the littorals. Coupled with strategic airlift and sealift
    assets, the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint Maritime Assault
    Connector provide an intra-theater capability, which enables rapid
    closure of Marine forces and sustainment ashore. These platforms will
    link bases and stations around the world to the sea base and other
    advanced bases, as well as provide linkages between the sea base and
    forces operating ashore.
                vi. taking care of our marines and our families
        Our most precious asset is the individual marine. Our marines and
    families have been steadfast and faithful in their service to our
    country, and we have an equally enduring obligation to them. As such,
    we are committed to putting our family programs on a wartime footing--
    our marines and families deserve no less.
    Putting Family Readiness Programs on a Wartime Footing
        Last year, we directed a rigorous assessment of our family programs
    and have aggressively moved forward to improve them at every level. We
    continue our assessments--targeting younger marines and their families
    to ensure that we are fully addressing their needs. We request that
    Congress continue to support these initiatives so that we can advance
    these reforms to meet the evolving requirements of our warfighters and
    their families.
        Our Marine Corps Family Team Building Program and unit Family
    Readiness Programs, the centerpiece to our family support capability,
    was based on a peacetime model and 18-month deployment cycles. It was
    also largely supported on the backs of our dedicated volunteers; our
    volunteers have been performing magnificently while shouldering the
    lion's share of this program--but it is time to dedicate sufficient
    resources in light of the demands of our wartime operations.
        We have recently initiated a sustained funding increase to
    implement Marine Corps family readiness reforms in fiscal year 2008.
    These reforms include:

             Formalizing the role and relationship of process
            owners to ensure accountability for family readiness;
             Expanding programs to support the extended family of a
            Marine (spouse, child, and parents);
             Establishing primary duty billets for Family Readiness
            Officers at regiment, group, battalion, and squadron levels;
             Improving the quality of life at remote and isolated
            installations;
             Increasing Marine Corps Family Team Building
            installation personnel;
             Refocusing and applying technological improvements to
            our communication network between commanders and families;
             Dedicating appropriate baseline funding to command
            level Family Readiness Programs; and
             Developing a standardized, high-quality volunteer
            management and recognition program.

        The Marine Corps continues its proud heritage of ``taking care of
    its own'' and ensuring family programs sustain our families and our
    marines for the Long War.
    Casualty Assistance
        Your marines proudly assume the dangerous, but necessary, work of
    serving our Nation. Some marines have paid the ultimate price, and we
    continue to honor them as heroes for their immense contributions to our
    country. Our casualty assistance program continues to evolve to ensure
    the families of our fallen marines are always treated with the utmost
    compassion, dignity, and honor.
        Our trained Casualty Assistance Calls Officers provide the families
    of our fallen marines assistance to facilitate their transition through
    the stages of grief. Last year, congressional hearings and inquiries
    into casualty next-of-kin notification processes revealed deficiencies
    in three key and interrelated casualty processes: command casualty
    reporting, command casualty inquiry and investigation, and next-of-kin
    notification. These process failures were unacceptable. Instantaneous
    with discovery of the process failures, we ordered an investigation by
    the Inspector General of the Marine Corps and directed remedial action
    to include issuing new guidance to commanders--reemphasizing
    investigation and reporting requirements and the importance of tight
    links between these two systems to properly serve marines and their
    families. We will continue to monitor our processes, making every
    effort to preclude any future errors and to ensure marines and families
    receive timely and accurate information relating to their marine's
    death or injury.
    Wounded Warrior Regiment
        In April 2007, the Wounded Warrior Regiment was activated to
    achieve unity of command and effort in order to develop a comprehensive
    and integrated approach to Wounded Warrior care. The establishment of
    the Regiment reflects our deep commitment to the welfare of our
    wounded, ill, and injured. The mission of the Regiment is to provide
    and facilitate assistance to wounded, ill, and injured marines, sailors
    attached to or in support of Marine units, and their family members,
    throughout all phases of recovery. The Regiment provides non-medical
    case management, benefit information and assistance, and transition
    support. We use ``a single process'' that supports Active Duty,
    Reserve, and separated personnel and is all inclusive for resources,
    referrals, and information.
        There are two Wounded Warrior Battalions headquartered at Camp
    Lejeune, NC, and Camp Pendleton, CA. The Battalions include liaison
    teams at major military medical treatment facilities, Department of
    Veterans Affairs Polytrauma Rehabilitation Centers and Marine Corps
    Base Naval Hospitals. The Battalions work closely with our warfighting
    units to ensure our wounded, ill and injured are cared for and continue
    to maintain the proud tradition that ``Marines take care of their
    own.''
        The Regiment is constantly assessing how to improve the services it
    provides to our wounded, ill, and injured. Major initiatives of the
    Regiment include a Job Transition Cell manned by marines and
    representatives of the Departments of Labor and Veteran Affairs. The
    Regiment has also established a Wounded Warrior Call Center for 24/7
    support. The Call Center both receives incoming calls from marines and
    family members who have questions, and makes outreach calls to the
    almost 9,000 wounded marines who have left active service. A Charitable
    Organization Cell was created to facilitate linking additional wounded
    warrior needs with charitable organizations that can provide the needed
    support. Additionally, The Regiment has also strengthened its liaison
    presence at the Department of Veterans Affairs Central Office. These
    are just some of the initiatives that reflect your Corps' enduring
    commitment to the well-being of our marines and sailors suffering the
    physical and emotional effects of their sacrifices for our great
    Nation.
        We are at the beginning of a sustained commitment to care and
    support our wounded, ill, and injured. As our Wounded Warrior Program
    matures, additional requirements will become evident. Your continued
    support of new legislation is essential to ensure our Wounded Warriors
    have the resources and opportunities for full and independent lives.
        Thank you for your personal and legislative support on behalf of
    our wounded warriors. Your personal visits to them in the hospital
    wards where they recover and the bases where they live are sincerely
    appreciated by them and their families. Your new Wounded Warrior Hiring
    Initiative to employ wounded warriors in the House and Senate
    demonstrates your commitment and support of their future well-being. We
    are grateful to this Congress for the many wounded warrior initiatives
    in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. This
    landmark legislation will significantly improve the quality of their
    lives and demonstrates the enduring gratitude of this Nation for their
    personal sacrifices. I am hopeful that future initiatives will continue
    to build upon your great efforts and further benefit the brave men and
    women, along with their families, who bear the burden of defending this
    great country.
    Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
        With the frequent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
    improved protective measures that reduce mortality rates, more marines
    are exposed to possible traumatic brain injuries. As with other poorly
    understood injuries, there is sometimes a reluctance by individual
    marines to seek medical attention at the time of the injury. Education
    is the best way to reduce this stigma, and it is to be the most
    effective treatment for those suffering a mild injury. TBI awareness
    and education is part of pre-deployment and routine training. All
    marines are being screened for TBI exposure during the post-deployment
    phase and those identified as injured receive comprehensive evaluation
    and treatment. A pilot program for baseline neurocognitive testing is
    being implemented to improve identification of TBI and maintain
    individual and unit readiness in the field. The Marine Corps continues
    to work closely with DOD's Center of Excellence for Psychological
    Health and Traumatic Brain Injury to continue to advance our
    understanding of TBI and improve the care of all marines.
    Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
        The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps Training
    and Education Command, Naval Health Research Center, and others are
    studying ways to identify risk and protective factors for Post-
    Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and to increase our resilience to
    stress. By improving the awareness of both individuals and our leaders,
    we can provide early identification and psychological first aid for
    those who are stress-injured. Better screening and referral of at-risk
    marines are underway via pre- and post-deployment standard health
    assessments that specifically screen for mental health problems. The
    Department of Veterans Affairs has established comprehensive guidelines
    for managing post-traumatic stress, which are available to all
    Services.
        The Marine Corps is grateful for the effort Congress has put into
    making TBI, PTSD, and other-combat-related mental illness issues a top
    priority. We will continue to do the same so that we can further
    improve our knowledge and treatment of these disorders.
    Combat and Operational Stress Control (COSC)
        Marine Corps commanders are fully engaged in promoting the
    psychological health of our marines, sailors, and family members. Our
    commanders bear responsibility for leading and training tough,
    resilient marines and sailors, and for maintaining strong, cohesive
    units. Unit commanders have the greatest potential for detecting stress
    occurrences and assessing impact on warfighters and family members. Our
    leaders establish an environment where it is okay to ask for help and
    that combat stress is as deserving of the same respect and care as any
    physical wound of war. With the Navy's medical community, we are
    expanding our program of embedding mental health professionals in
    operational units--the Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR)
    program--to directly support all elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force. We also continue our collaboration with sister Services, the
    Department of Veterans Affairs' National Center for Post-traumatic
    Stress Disorder, and external agencies to determine best practices to
    better support marines and their families.
    Family Member Pervasive Developmental Disorders
        The effectiveness of marines and sailors during deployment is
    dependent upon the adequacy of support provided to family members at
    home. Children of servicemembers with special needs, to include
    pervasive developmental disorders, have additional medical,
    educational, and social needs that are challenging to meet even when
    both parents are available. The TRICARE Enhanced Care Health Option has
    not been able to provide sufficient support. To address this issue, the
    Marine Corps is working with the Department of Defense Office of Family
    Policy Work Group on examining options to expand its Educational and
    Developmental Intervention Services (EDIS), a program that delivers
    Early Intervention Services to eligible infants and toddlers in
    domestic and overseas areas as well as through Medically Related
    Service programs in Department of Defense schools overseas.
    Exceptional Family Member Program (Respite Care)
        Parental stress can be heightened for families that are not only
    impacted by the current operational tempo but are also caring for a
    child with special needs. To focus on this need, we offer our active
    duty families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program up to
    40 hours of free respite care per month for each exceptional family
    member. We seek to provide a ``continuum of care'' for our exceptional
    family members. In this capacity, we are using our assignment process,
    working with TRICARE and the Department of the Navy Bureau of Medicine
    and Surgery to expand access and availability to care, and providing
    family support programs to ease relocations and ensure quality care
    transitions.
    Water Contamination at Camp Lejeune
        Past water contamination at Camp Lejeune has been and continues to
    be a very important issue for the Marine Corps. Our goal is, using good
    science, determine whether exposure to the contaminated water at Camp
    Lejeune resulted in any adverse health effects for our marines, their
    families, and our civilian workers.
        The Marine Corps continues to support the Agency for Toxic
    Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) in their health study, which is
    estimated to be completed during 2009. With the help of Congress, the
    highly respected National Academy of Sciences is now helping us develop
    a way ahead on this difficult issue.
        The Marine Corps continues to make progress notifying former
    residents and workers. We have established a call center and
    notification registry where the public can provide contact information
    so that we can keep them apprised of the completion of these health
    studies.
       vii. beyond the horizon--posturing the marine corps for the future
        History has proven that we cannot narrowly define the conditions
    for which our military must be ready. With little warning, our Nation
    has repeatedly called its Corps front and center. In the southern
    Pacific after Pearl Harbor, in Korea after the communist invasion in
    1950, in the mountains of Afghanistan after September 11, and southern
    Asia in the wake of the catastrophic tsunami of 2004--to name a few.
    These strategic surprises demonstrate the broad range of possibilities
    for which the Marine Corps must be prepared.
        The United States faces a complex mix of states who sponsor
    terrorism, regional and rising peer competitors, failing states that
    undermine regional stability, and a variety of violent non-state
    actors--religious extremists, insurgents, paramilitary forces, pirates,
    and other criminals--all serving to destabilize legitimate governments
    and undermine security and stability of the greater global community.
    We see this global security context as a persistent condition for the
    foreseeable future.
        Our Nation and its international partners are engaged in a global
    struggle for influence at the same time our access to many areas is
    acutely challenged--diplomatically, militarily, and geographically. In
    the past, the United States has maintained large forces on a
    significant number of permanent bases beyond our shores. Today,
    however, we have far fewer installations overseas. When conflict is
    imminent or crises occur, which may require land-based forces, we must
    conduct extensive diplomatic negotiations to acquire basing rights.
    Because of local and regional political, social, or economic pressures,
    even countries friendly to the United States decline to host or place
    conditional restrictions on basing U.S. forces. Furthermore,
    proliferation of anti-access technology among state and non-state
    actors further diminishes access opportunities.
        Our national interests increasingly require us to operate in
    remote, developing regions of the world where infrastructure is either
    insufficient or rendered useless by natural disasters. The growing
    trend of violent, transnational extremism is especially prevalent in
    many of these remote areas. In addition to ethnic and religious
    intolerance, many developing regions are troubled with economic
    challenges and infectious diseases. These problems are especially
    severe in the densely populated urban centers common to the world's
    littorals, resulting in discontented populations ripe for exploitation
    by extremist ideologues and terrorist networks. We estimate that by the
    2035 timeframe, more than 75 percent of the world's population will
    live within just 120 miles of the ocean; alternative energy sources
    will not be mature, so industrial and, increasingly, developing nations
    will depend on the free flow of oil and natural gas. Fresh water will
    be as equally important as petroleum products; during the 20th century,
    while the global population increased 300 percent, the demand for water
    increased 600 percent. Demographics and the aging of the population in
    industrial countries, accompanied by a youth bulge in developing
    countries, will literally change the face of the world as we know it.
    The U.S. technological advantage, economic power, and military might
    still exceed that of other nations, but will not be nearly as dominant.
        Given these strategic conditions, the requirement for maritime
    forces to project U.S. power and influence has increased--and will
    continue to increase. With its inherent advantages as a seabased and
    expeditionary force, the Marine Corps can quickly reach key areas of
    the globe in spite of challenges to U.S. access. The Marine Corps and
    its naval partners will expand the application of seapower across an
    even wider range of operations to promote greater global security,
    stability, and trust--key objectives for winning the Long War. Our
    seabased posture will allow us to continue to conduct ``Phase 0''
    operations with a variety of allies and partners around the world to
    ease sources of discontent and deter conflict. We must increase our
    capacity for these operations without forfeiting our warfighting
    prowess in the event of a major regional conflict. As a forward-
    deployed force, we are able to achieve familiarity with various
    environments, as well as behavioral patterns of regional actors--
    contributing to our significant advantage in speed and flexibility.
        Recently combat-tested in the Middle East and historically engaged
    in the Pacific, the Marine Corps will seek to further enhance its
    operational capabilities in the Pacific theater. Some areas like Africa
    offer unique challenges and opportunities for significant U.S.
    engagement. The shear breadth and depth of that great continent present
    their own challenges, but given the operational flexibility afforded by
    Seabasing and the extended reach of the MV-22 and KC-130J, the future
    bodes well for the ability of dispersed units of marines--with
    interagency partners--to extend our partnerships within the continent
    of Africa.
    Security Cooperation MAGTF
        The linchpin of future marine efforts to support the engagement
    requirements of combatant commanders to build partnership capacity will
    be the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force. Similar to a
    Marine Expeditionary Unit but regionally-focused and task organized for
    security cooperation, Security Cooperation MAGTFs will provide training
    and assistance to partner nations--shaping the environment and
    deterring irregular adversaries.
        The units comprising the Security Cooperation MAGTF are general
    purpose forces, which will maintain a foundation of excellence in
    combined arms and the full range of military operations. Additional
    training in culture, language, and foreign internal defense will
    further prepare these units for the unique tasks needed to train
    foreign militaries. Able to aggregate and disaggregate based on mission
    requirements, elements of the Security Cooperation MAGTFs will be
    capable of operating for sustained periods and will help prepare the
    militaries of partner nations to disrupt irregular adversaries and
    reduce the requirement for U.S. forces to be committed to these
    regions.
    Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)/Guam
        Our recent force posture agreement reached under the auspices of
    the Defense Policy Review Initiative with Japan is facilitating an
    opportunity to more effectively employ Marine Corps forces while
    mitigating the effects of encroachment around United States facilities
    in Japan. The most significant DPRI action is completion of the Futenma
    Replacement Facility on Okinawa. Its completion is a prerequisite for
    realignment of Marine units north of Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa,
    shifting KC-130s from Futenma to Iwakuni, Japan, and movement of
    approximately 8,000 marines and their family members from Okinawa,
    Japan, to Guam. The Government of Japan is prepared to bear much of the
    cost associated with the planned changes, but there are still
    significant remaining military construction and other infrastructure
    needs that require United States financial support. For the past 2
    years, the Marine Corps has worked with numerous stakeholders to shape
    the eventual basing of forces onto Guam. The Department of Navy-led
    Joint Guam Program Office is leading the detailed facility-level
    planning effort to support the force buildup on Guam. The Marine Corps
    is working with Joint Guam Program Office, the Secretary of the Navy,
    and Commander, United States Pacific Command to ensure plans meet
    operational requirements.
    Law of the Sea Convention
        To be able to maneuver from the seas in a timely and reliable
    manner, and in concert with the U.S. Navy, we support joining the Law
    of the Sea Convention. Joining the Convention will best preserve the
    navigation and overflight rights that we need to reliably maneuver and
    project power from the sea.
    The Future of Training and Education
        With Marine forces so heavily engaged in counterinsurgency
    operations, we will have to take extraordinary steps to retain the
    ability to serve as the Nation's shock troops in major combat
    operations. Continued congressional support of our training and
    education programs will enable us to remain faithful to our enduring
    mission: To be where the country needs us, when she needs us, and to
    prevail over whatever challenges we face.
        The Long War requires a multi-dimensional force that is well
    trained and educated for employment in all forms of warfare.
    Historically, our Corps has produced respected leaders who have
    demonstrated intellectual agility in warfighting. Our current
    deployment tempo increasingly places our Professional Military
    Education (PME) programs at risk. No level of risk is acceptable if it
    threatens the steady flow of thinkers, planners, and aggressive
    commanders who can execute effectively across the entire spectrum of
    operations.
        Marine Corps University (MCU)
        We have made substantial improvements in our Officer and Enlisted
    Professional Military Education (PME) programs and have significant
    improvements planned for the future. Marine Corps War College was the
    first senior Service college to be certified as Joint PME II and will
    soon undergo accreditation as part of the process for joint education
    accreditation by the Joint Staff. The Command and Staff resident and
    non-resident programs are scheduled for Joint PME I reaccreditation in
    September 2008. We have integrated irregular warfare instruction
    throughout all levels of PME; at the same time, balance between
    irregular and conventional warfare has been maintained so as not to
    lose sight of our essential core competencies, including amphibious
    operations. Additionally, MCU has led the way for integration of
    culture and language by continually refining their curricula to provide
    proper balance among PME, culture, and language.
        Last year we conducted a comprehensive assessment of the health of
    PME. The assessment examined six areas: students, curriculum,
    educational programs, staff, infrastructure, and policy. We are working
    diligently to improve our information technology and infrastructure by
    developing a facility master plan to accommodate needed growth. We must
    develop an aggressive plan and commit resources for additional faculty,
    facilities, and resources. The assessment was informative--we have
    world-class students, curricula, and faculty as evidenced by marines'
    performance on today's battlefields. With continued Congressional
    support, we can build our information technology and facility structure
    to match.
        Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
        Our Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned applies lessons from
    operational experiences as well as those of the Joint Staff, other
    Services, and Joint Forces Command to guide efforts for ``fine tuning''
    and transforming our force. This rapid, continuous process ensures the
    latest enemy and friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures are used
    in training and are part of the decisionmaking for institutional
    changes. In 2007, as result of these lessons learned, the Marine Corps
    implemented changes in predeployment training in such areas as
    detention operations; transition teams; interagency coordination of
    stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations;
    irregular warfare; and the role of forensics in counterinsurgency
    operations.
        Center for Irregular Warfare
        In 2007, we established the Center for Irregular Warfare as the
    primary Marine Corps agency for identifying, coordinating, and
    implementing irregular warfare capability initiatives. The Center
    reaches out through the Center for Advanced Operational Culture
    Learning (CAOCL) and Security Cooperation Education and Training Center
    (SCETC) to other military and civilian agencies. Last year, the CAOCL
    expanded beyond pre-deployment unit training by offering operational
    culture, regional studies, and limited language courses for officer
    professional military education programs. Thus far, approximately 2,100
    new lieutenants have been assigned regions for career long-term study
    through the regional learning concept, which will be expanded this year
    to include sergeants, staff sergeants, and captains. Both officer and
    enlisted marines will receive operational culture education throughout
    their careers. We plan to have Language Learning Resource Centers at
    the eight largest Marine Corps bases and stations to provide local, on-
    call, operational language training. Congressional support, to include
    recent supplemental funding, has been invaluable.
        Since early 2006, our SCETC formalized our military advisor
    training process and trained over thirty transition teams fiscal year
    2007. In fiscal year 2008, the SCETC is scheduled to train over 100
    teams (over 2,000 marine advisors) as well as stand up a Marine Corps
    Training Advisory Group to manage the global sourcing of future
    transition and security cooperation teams.
        Foreign Area Officers
        The Marine Corps has begun an expansion of its Foreign Area Officer
    (FAO) program in response to the wide-spread demand for language and
    cultural expertise for worldwide service with the Defense Attache
    System and combined, joint, and Service headquarters. As a result, the
    training of Marine FAOs will more than double in the near term. In
    addition to our traditional emphasis on Arabic, Russian, and Chinese,
    FAOs selected this year will learn more than a dozen different foreign
    languages, including Pashto, Hindi, Thai, French, and Indonesian.
    Training Marine Air Ground Task Forces
        Operations in support of the Long War have significantly increased
    our training requirements. To meet deployment requirements and remain
    skilled in the full spectrum of operations, marines must now train to a
    broader range of skills. However, due to high operational tempo, we
    face ever-decreasing timetables for marines to achieve mastery of these
    skills. Our first major initiative to maximize effective use of limited
    time for training was the establishment of a standardized and well-
    defined Predeployment Training Program. Subsequently, we have
    instituted two additional training efforts: the Marine Combat
    Operations Training Group and the Infantry Battalion Enhancement Period
    Program.
        Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG)
        We recently established the MCTOG to provide standardized training
    and instructor qualifications for ground combat elements, similar to
    our exceptionally successful Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics
    Instructor Course in Yuma, AZ. The MCTOG is developing and implementing
    a Ground Combat Element Operations and Tactics Training Program to
    provide advanced training in MAGTF operations, combined arms training,
    and unit training management and readiness at the battalion and
    regimental levels. We will improve unit preparation and performance by:

             Providing focused, advanced instruction for key
            battalion and regimental staff personnel, and
             By assisting with the identification and vetting
            training requirements and deficiencies for our ground combat
            elements.

        Located at Twentynine Palms MAGTF Training Center, the MCTOG will
    reach an Initial Operating Capability by spring 2008 and a Full
    Operating Capability by spring 2009.
        Marine Aviation Training Systems Program (ATS)
        Marine Aviation, through Aviation Training Systems (ATS), is
    pursuing the development of fully integrated training systems at the
    post-accession aviation officer and enlisted level, to greatly enhance
    operational readiness, improved safety through greater standardization,
    and to significantly reduce the life-cycle cost of maintaining and
    sustaining aircraft. ATS will plan, execute, and manage Marine Aviation
    training to achieve individual and unit combat readiness through
    standardized training across all aviation core competencies.
        Twentynine Palms Land Expansion
        The Marine Corps currently lacks a comprehensive training
    capability to exercise all elements of a MAGTF in an environment that
    replicates operational conditions with our current equipment--as our
    new weapons systems have greatly increased ranges over legacy systems.
    As a result, we are conducting planning studies for expansion of our
    range complex at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in
    Twentynine Palms, CA. Implementing this action will involve acquiring
    land and seeking assignment of airspace by the Federal Aviation
    Administration in support of large-scale MAGTF live fire and maneuver
    training. This will give us the maneuver space to simultaneously train
    three to four battalions in the range complex and train with our
    current equipment. Our proposed complex will further facilitate the use
    of the Western Range Training Complex and lead to the capability for
    future large-scale MAGTF, Coalition, and Joint National Training Center
    training.
        Modernization of Training Ranges
        In 2001, we activated a Range and Training Area Management
    Division, and in 2004, we began a comprehensive investment program to
    sustain, upgrade, and modernize our training infrastructure. This
    modernization effort provides tools for better planning and execution
    of live training. The four principles of our program are:

             Preserve and enhance our live-fire combined arms
            training ranges. The full development of our doctrine and the
            integrated employment of air and ground weapons will continue
            to require access to the volume of land and air space available
            at these larger installations.
             Recapture the unit-training capabilities of the
            Nation's two premier littoral training areas, Camp Lejeune and
            Camp Pendleton. The transition of expeditionary combat power
            from sea to shore remains among the most challenging of
            military tasks, and we must reorient and update our training
            capabilities.
             Provide timely and objective feedback to marines who
            are training. Proficiency with individual weapons and in
            combined-arms requires that we provide venues that have the air
            and land space to allow realistic employment and the
            instrumentation and targetry to provide objective, actionable
            feedback.
             Ensure our complexes are capable of supporting joint
            forces. Common range infrastructure and systems architecture to
            support the joint national training capability are requirements
            of our modernization program.
             The range modernization program is a program of record
            and has successfully programmed the resources to continue
            operating and maintaining the many investments made with
            supplemental and congressional-add funds.
    Core Values and Ethics Training
        As part of our ethos, we continually seek ways to improve ethical
    decisionmaking at all levels. In 2007, we implemented the following
    initiatives to strengthen our Core Values training:

             Tripled the amount of time Drill Instructor and
            recruits conduct ``foot locker talks'' on values;
             Institutionalizing habits of thought for all marines
            operating in counterinsurgencies, the message of the importance
            of ethical conduct in battle, and how to be an ethical warrior
            is being strengthened and re-emphasized at all levels of the
            Marine Corps;
             Published pocket-sized Law of War, Rules of
            Engagement, and Escalation of Force guides;
             Increased instruction at our Commander's Course on
            command climate and the commander's role in cultivating
            battlefield ethics, accountability, and responsibility; and
             Educated junior marines on the ``strategic corporal''
            and the positive or negative influence they can have; and
             Reinvigorated the values component of our Marine Corps
            Martial Arts Program, which teaches Core Values and presents
            ethical scenarios pertaining to restraint and proper escalation
            of force as the foundation of its curriculum.

        We imbue our marines with the mindset that ``wherever we go,
    everyone is safer because a U.S. marine is there.''
                                viii. conclusion
        The Marine Corps continues to create a multi-capable force for our
    Nation--not only for the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    but also for subsequent campaigns of the Long War. We are committed to
    ensuring we remain where our country needs us, when she needs us, and
    to prevail over whatever challenges we face. Your continued support has
    been critical to our readiness for today and adaptation for tomorrow. I
    promise you that the Corps understands the value of each dollar
    provided and will continue to provide maximum return for every dollar
    spent.
        Perhaps most importantly to keep in mind as we develop our force
    for the future, everything we read about the future indicates that
    well-trained, well-led human beings with a capacity to absorb
    information and rapidly react to their environment have a tremendous
    asymmetric advantage over an adversary. Ladies and gentlemen, that
    advantage goes to us. Our young marines are courageous, willing to make
    sacrifices and, as evidenced by our progress in Al-Anbar, capable of
    operating in complex environments. Quiet in their duty yet determined
    in their approach, they are telling us loud and clear that wherever
    there is a job to be done, they will shoulder that mission with
    enthusiasm. On behalf of your marines, I extend great appreciation for
    your support thus far and thank you in advance for your ongoing efforts
    to support our brave service men and women in harm's way.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
        Let's try an 8-minute round.
        Secretary, I made reference to these huge cost overruns
    that have dogged our acquisition programs. Are you making
    systemic changes to try to overcome those?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Two specific areas
    that I would highlight, one of which has to do with the overall
    processes that we go through within the Department to establish
    a program, and in particular to ensure that all the
    requirements are properly defined and completed prior to the
    initiation of advanced development activities.
        We're also going through a very significant activity to
    assure that we have the right work force to be able to both
    manage and oversee the acquisition activities themselves. This
    includes everything from the numbers to the appropriate
    training of the individuals that are put into the specific
    roles.
        Chairman Levin. Is there ever any accountability for the
    failure to meet these cost estimates?
        Secretary Winter. The accountability is imposed both within
    the Navy team itself as well as with the contractor community.
    One of the things that we try on the contractor side is to
    provide appropriate incentives that give the contractor
    financial inputs should they fail to meet the appropriate
    financial and schedule targets.
        Similarly, on the military side, in terms of the
    acquisition community, this is a major factor that we use in
    the evaluation of people relative to their future assignments
    and future careers.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, I made reference to your Navy
    personnel who are serving not in their regular billets.
    Instead, they're being used as IAs. Do we have some way of
    assessing the impact of that on readiness or in other areas?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, Senator, we do. We have been
    assigning our sailors and IAs for a couple of years now and, as
    someone who in a previous assignment was responsible for the
    direct management of that, we have created a structure and
    oversight to properly pair the individual with the mission to
    be accomplished when they go forward, and at the same time as
    we're doing that we look at what effect that individual will
    have on the readiness of the sourcing command.
        What I have found is that the process that we have in
    place, the way that we identify, allows us to put the
    appropriate capability forward while not diminishing the
    readiness of our Fleet.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, you made reference to the recent
    use of a modified missile defense interceptor, Standard Missile
    3, along with a modified version of the Aegis BMD system, to
    shoot down that failed satellite. Can you confirm that the
    modifications that were made to the interceptor missile and the
    Aegis weapons system were unique, one-time modifications
    exclusively for this one mission, and that the Aegis BMD system
    could not perform its required missile defense mission with
    those one-time modifications?
        Admiral Roughead. Those were one-time modifications,
    Senator, that were done on a finite number of missiles. The
    missiles that were not used in this mission will be
    reconfigured back to the anti-ballistic missile configuration.
        Chairman Levin. In terms of the Aegis BMD system, can you
    confirm that that system which was deployed does not have the
    capability to shoot down satellites, with the one exception of
    that unique mission?
        Admiral Roughead. I can confirm that, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary and Admiral, in your written
    statements you made reference to the importance of United
    States approval and accession to the Law of the Sea Convention
    in order to carry out our maritime strategy. We've held a
    hearing on that convention. The Foreign Relations Committee has
    voted it out of committee. It's on the calendar.
        Can you just briefly indicate here publicly that you do
    support that convention?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I'm supportive of
    that. I think it's important that we have a seat at the table
    as part of that convention and have an opportunity to engage
    with the other members, signatories to that convention, as the
    convention evolves over the years to come.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, do you join that?
        Admiral Roughead. I do, sir. I can attest from my command
    positions in the Atlantic and Pacific that by not being a party
    to that treaty, it actually inhibited the activities that we
    could pursue with other navies.
        Chairman Levin. Is the administration committed at the
    highest levels to pursuing Senate approval of the ratification
    of the Law of the Sea Convention in this session of Congress?
    Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, do you know?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. General, let me ask you about the issue
    which was referred to at some length in this morning's
    Washington Post, which has had other references as well, and
    that's the question of Anbar Province, its success in turning
    against the extremists which you made reference to, and for
    which everybody is obviously pleased and grateful.
        The movement, which is called in various places and times
    the Sunni Awakening, or Concerned Local Citizens, or Sons of
    Iraq, is, according to a number of reports, including this
    morning's paper, fraying somewhat and could collapse because
    too few of their members are being offered positions in the
    Iraqi security forces, there are limited opportunities for
    other jobs, they are being targeted by al Qaeda, they are
    distrusted by too much of the Shia-dominated government, and
    they have been complaining of insufficient support by the
    United States.
        In the mean time, that provincial powers law which calls
    for provincial elections to be held by October 1 and was seen
    by the Sunni Arab community as a way to gain political power,
    has been vetoed by the Shia member of the presidency council,
    as we read yesterday or the day before. I just would like to
    ask you this question because you and your troops have played
    such a key role in Anbar and the success that has taken place
    there.
        Are you concerned that those Sunni Arabs may once again
    take up arms against the coalition, become insurgents again,
    which of course would then threaten to unravel many of the
    gains which have been achieved during the surge?
        General Conway. Sir, I'm not concerned that that could
    happen in the near term, but we are concerned about some of the
    things you cite and about some of the things which you read in
    the article this morning. There have been significant security
    gains and there are, even as we speak, the tribal frictions now
    as they elbow for power at the provincial level, but also as
    they endeavor to plug in at the national level.
        We're conscious of those things. We have people dedicated
    to working those things with the central government in Baghdad,
    to try to ensure that they understand the value of
    incorporating Sunnis into the government if we are to see one
    Iraq stay together in the future.
        So we monitor those things. We try to mitigate those things
    through discussion. We talk of the value of synergy, of all of
    the tribes and all of the political parties coming together as
    they plug into Baghdad. But we're not concerned that there is
    any near-term danger of a return to the levels of violence that
    we have seen.
        Chairman Levin. Is it fair to say that unless those
    problems are addressed that there could be a significant
    problem in the longer term?
        General Conway. Sir, I think that's fair. We have always
    talked about the three legs of the stool: the security, the
    economics, and the political. We can, in our current role of
    providing security and doing some nation-building in the
    province, help most with the security and the economics. We are
    less able to be involved in the political aspect of things,
    although we engage where we can.
        We certainly are pushing to keep the provincial elections
    October 1, because we think that will be a significant
    advancement on behalf of the Sunni tribes out west and an
    opportunity for them to again further engage with the central
    government.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner?
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, let's return to the shipbuilding budget, the
    out-year objective of 313 ships. Clearly, in your position you
    have first drawn on an extensive background prior to coming to
    the Navy Secretariat of managing major programs for the very
    top levels of our defense structure, TRW and Northrop and
    others. How confident are you that in the out-years you can
    reach, or perhaps I should say a successor to you could reach,
    the 313 level? What steps are you putting in place to ensure
    that that takes place in the out-years?
        Secretary Winter. Senator, I think that as we take a look
    out in time our understanding obviously is much better in the
    current years, in the near years. I'm confident that we have a
    viable program for 2009 and for the immediate years around
    that. As we go out further in time there are a number of
    uncertainties associated with everything from the cost of
    production to the overall requirements that have yet to be
    defined for many of the future systems, programs like the Ohio-
    class replacement, programs like CG(X), which is still in the
    process of going through its early definition phases.
        I am hopeful that we will still be able to obtain a 313-
    ship target in a timely manner, but that is going to require a
    significant effort on the part both of the Navy and industry to
    work together, to make significant changes to the acquisition
    process, including in particular stabilizing requirements, and
    having, if you will, a limit on our appetite for those
    requirements as we go through program definition.
        Furthermore, significant effort is going to be required, I
    believe, to modernize our facilities for the construction of
    ships and the combat systems that go on them. That investment
    is going to require, I believe, a concerted effort on the part
    of both the Navy and industry.
        Senator Warner. You're going to put in place a series of
    benchmarks that have to be made by you and your successors, and
    in what year do you hope to obtain, what fiscal year, the level
    of 313 ships?
        Secretary Winter. We've laid out the program right now into
    the 2020----
        Admiral Roughead. 2019 is when they cross.
        Senator Warner. 2019 is the year?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Is that predicated on some significant top
    line readjustment in the allocation of resources by the
    Secretary of Defense between the Navy, the Army, and the Air
    Force?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, that has a number of assumptions in
    it. It does assume an average expenditure of about $15.8
    billion a year in 2007 dollars to be able to accomplish that.
    That is more than what we're spending right now, but hopefully
    it is an amount that is achievable within the current
    allocation process.
        There are aspects that I would like to note are not
    included in that estimate. It does not include the costs
    associated with nuclear power for future surface combatants and
    it does not include the cost estimates associated with Ohio-
    class replacement.
        Senator Warner. It's a challenge, but I think it's
    imperative that we meet that challenge in view of the fact that
    other nations now recognize the importance of having
    significant maritime capabilities in their military forces.
        General, I'm going to follow onto the line of questions by
    the chairman with regard to Afghanistan. I suppose that theater
    concerns this Senator the most of all the challenges that face
    us today. The marines are heading in in significant numbers,
    the thought being perhaps the success that the marines had in
    al-Anbar can be used as a blueprint to try and achieve greater
    success in Afghanistan.
        Would you address that concept and your own professional
    judgment as to whether or not there is a transferability of
    that strategy in al-Anbar which has been successful, for what
    in my judgment is a continuing serious, in some ways
    deteriorating, situation in Afghanistan, with the ever
    strengthening resurgence of the Taliban?
        General Conway. Sir, I don't think there's a direct
    transfer because the missions will be slightly different. That
    those marines will take in lessons that come right from our
    Small Wars Manual and the decades of dealing with Third World
    countries, if you will, I think will be extremely valuable. But
    whereas in al-Anbar we owned ground and had responsibility for
    all of the villages and all of the cities, neither the
    battalion that's going in nor the Marine Expeditionary Unit
    (MEU) will be assigned primary responsibility for ground. The
    MEU we believe will be used as a response task force,
    immediately commanded by the Commander of International
    Security Assistance Force, valuable we think particularly
    during a spring offensive if we see one, valuable if we decide
    to launch our own spring offensive against Taliban locations.
        The battalion coming off the West Coast will be primarily
    involved with training police and the army, and their utility
    will be at the various police stations throughout their region
    of assignment, in terms of securing the area to a degree that
    these people can operate with the populace.
        Senator Warner. So the first battalion would be in the
    nature of a September 11 force, to go anywhere within
    Afghanistan to confront high level insurgents?
        General Conway. I think that's fair, sir.
        Senator Warner. That's interesting. The second primarily
    for the training of the Afghan forces?
        General Conway. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Warner. Now, I mentioned the very interesting piece
    that I saw last night. You're readjusting your order for the
    new MRAP, is that correct?
        General Conway. No, sir. If you're talking about the
    protective vest, the individual armor----
        Senator Warner. Let's go vest and vehicle.
        General Conway. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Whichever one you want first.
        General Conway. Sir, we did adjust our requirement for
    MRAP. We initially asked for 3,700 vehicles and the thought
    process was a one-for-one replacement of our uparmored Humvees
    with the MRAPs. The uparmored Humvees were simply not standing
    up to underbody explosions to the degree that we had hoped
    would be the case, and the MRAP had proven itself over time
    with the ability to do that.
        What we have discovered as those MRAPs have started to
    arrive in theater in large numbers is that, particularly out
    west, they are not able to cross some of the bridges that
    aren't that well built.
        Senator Warner. Because of the weight?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, exactly. They are heavy vehicles,
    48,000 pounds with the heaviest of the lot.
        They also don't maneuver as well off road. So what we've
    found is that those patrols need to be a combination of MRAPs
    and uparmored Humvees in order to be most successful and to
    accomplish the mission. So we have reduced our buy to something
    more on the order of about 2,300 vehicles, and saving we think
    in the process about $1.7 billion for the Government.
        Senator Warner. Now, what about the utility of that vehicle
    with your forces in Afghanistan?
        General Conway. Sir, we think there will be some utility.
    When I was there, I looked at, in fact, the arrival of the
    first 36 vehicles. We think there will be a total of about 38,
    something less than 40. It is not as applicable in large
    portions of the Afghan terrain even as it is in Iraq, because
    of the mountainous nature. But there are roadways there, there
    are some desert plains there, where we do think it will have
    value, and we fully intend to use it with our engineers, our
    route clearance people, and our Explosive Ordinance Disposal
    personnel clearing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
        Senator Warner. Let's conclude my time with the vest
    situation. That's been a very controversial subject here in
    Congress and certainly in the minds of the public. Where are we
    in your judgment on the amount of protective armor for the
    average marine, and are you going to make an adjustment once
    again in the type of vest that you think is best suited for the
    combat situations?
        General Conway. Sir, as a former marine I think you know
    that there is always a tradeoff between weight and protection
    and the mobility of the individual marine, and we continue with
    that dynamic even today. We think that the vests that we have
    protect our people exceedingly well.
        What we are hearing now from the marines in the Fleet and
    the marines in Iraq and Afghanistan is they don't like this
    most recent vest because it is three or four pounds heavier
    than the vest that it replaced. It takes, depending on how you
    put it on, two people to put on the vest. It has a quick
    release element that the old vest did not have, but when a
    marine straps in his rifle that quick release capacity is
    diminished or disappears.
        I wore it myself on my visit to the theater over
    Thanksgiving last year and, frankly, I have a big head and big
    ears and it's painful putting it on and taking it off, and many
    marines have experienced that same thing.
        Senator Warner. Then where do we go from here? Are we going
    to go back to the previous vest and produce more of that?
        General Conway. Sir, what I have done is told my commander
    at Quantico who handles such things to simply stop purchase on
    the remaining 24,000 vests. We need to go back and investigate.
    There were over 100 marines who field tested the vests for us
    back in 2006 and declared it ``good to go,'' if you will. But
    we're not getting that same report from the marines in theater
    who now wear it on a daily basis in combat.
        So I think we need to reassess at this point. I assure you,
    sir, there is no loss of protection either way, with either the
    old vest or the new vest. It's just a question whether or not
    we have made an advancement in this.
        Senator Warner. Are you working with the Army? Are you
    sharing that experience?
        General Conway. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Are they experiencing the same problem with
    this vest?
        General Conway. Sir, I don't know that. I'm just back from
    the theater and my guys at Quantico are reinvigorating the
    discussion.
        Senator Warner. It seems to me that answer is important to
    achieve. There should be some parallelism between because the
    missions are comparable.
        General Conway. It's my belief, sir, that the Army has not
    invested in what we call the OTV, which is this latest variant,
    that they're still wearing the vest that we were stepping away
    from. We thought that this new vest that ostensibly carried the
    weight better on the hips and gave us slightly more protection
    was again a step up. I am not absolutely certain of that today.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning again. General Conway, according to the recent
    press reports an internal Marine Corps study found that the
    general in command of our Marine Forces in western Iraq sent an
    urgent request 3 years ago this month for over 1,000 MRAPs, but
    the urgent request was apparently lost in the bureaucracy and
    never made it to the senior levels of the Marine Corps. As we
    know, it took the Secretary of Defense's intervention in 2007
    to fix the broken bureaucracy and get a sufficient number of
    the MRAPs to our forces in Iraq.
        Secretary Gates said last June: ``The way I put it to
    everyone is that you have to look outside the normal
    bureaucratic way of doing things and so does industry, because
    lives are at stake. For every month we delay, scores of young
    Americans are going to die.''
        The recent Marine Corps study itself states that: ``If mass
    procurement and fielding of MRAPs had begun in 2005 in response
    to the known threats, as the Marine Corps is doing today,
    hundreds of deaths and injuries could have been prevented.''
        The Marine Corps now has questioned the press report,
    saying that that study was not an official Marine Corps study
    and that its conclusions are the investigators' own. Recently,
    General Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps,
    stated: ``I don't think the study stands up to the facts about
    what we did, about what the industry was capable of doing, and
    why we did what we did. I just don't think it's accurate.''
        A Naval Audit Service report last September, however,
    supported the Marine Corps study and its accusations of
    inefficiency when it concluded that the Marine Corps had not
    established adequate oversight for the urgent needs of its
    forces.
        Two days ago, the Marine Corps finally began to acknowledge
    the seriousness of the study's conclusion and asked the
    Pentagon's Inspector General (IG) to investigate the
    allegations. It seems, however, that the Marine Corps is still
    focused on downplaying the issue of getting the MRAPs to Iraq
    and missing the bigger issue, which is the Marine Corps
    bureaucracy.
        The Naval Audit stated: ``As the study concluded, MRAP is
    just one current example of how a loss of time had direct and
    measurable consequences on the battlefield. Marine Corps combat
    development organizations are not optimized to provide
    responsive, flexible, relevant solutions to commanders in the
    field.''
        The Naval Audit report last September agreed, stating that
    ``the Marine Corps bureaucracy was broken and the ability to
    accomplish the mission could be undermined and the delivery of
    the equipment delayed.''
        So could you tell us about how you explain the differences
    between the Marine Corps statements that dismiss the MRAP
    study's conclusion and the Naval Audit report that the Marine
    Corps bureaucracy is broken?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, I'd be happy to. Sir, first of
    all, I would not characterize the series of events just as you
    describe. First of all, we asked the marine, former marine, now
    a GS-15, who works for us to write a letter to his boss to
    explain his concerns that we had read about in the media or had
    been advised about from Senators on the Hill.
        Senator Kennedy. This was done when?
        General Conway. It's been done recently, sir. I think
    within the past several weeks.
        But going back to the issue of the MRAP request, sir, in
    February 2005, if were Major General Dennis Hejlik sitting in
    this chair, who was the officer who signed off on the request,
    he would tell you that he was asking for uparmored Humvees, M-
    1114s. We had a few at that time, but we had very few. He felt
    like that was the armor of choice and the vehicle that we
    needed for all of our marines when he signed off on the
    request. He had little knowledge of what an MRAP was at that
    point.
        That's the second point I would make to you, sir, is that
    at that point there were probably half a dozen of the actual
    MRAP vehicles, the Cougars with the V-shaped bottom, in the
    theater. We were having maintenance issues with some of those
    vehicles.
        At that point, sir--and this is the third point--only about
    10 percent of the attacks that we were seeing, and in most
    months less than that, were underbody explosions. What General
    Hejlik was concerned about were the side of the road explosions
    that were destroying our vehicles and killing marines.
        So to say that we knew at that time that a vehicle that had
    far from proven itself, against a threat that was by no means
    the major threat, was what we needed to buy is, I think in some
    regards, some excellent 20-20 hindsight.
        Senator Kennedy. The point that is made is the fact that
    the Naval Audit Report Number One recommends that by April 30
    you promulgate a Marine Corps order defining the roles,
    responsibilities, and desired outcomes of urgent need process.
    So obviously they made a finding and a judgment that the
    process and procedure at the current time was not working well,
    at least according to this naval report.
        Now, where do you stand with promulgating that, this order?
        General Conway. Sir, we have put something out on that in
    the wake of that report, and I will be the first to acknowledge
    that no bureaucratic process is without means of improvement.
    The Secretary works hard with us, with Lean Six Sigma----
        Senator Kennedy. I don't understand. You put something out?
    Explain that to me. I don't understand what's putting something
    out? This says promulgate. Their recommendation is by the 30th
    you promulgate a Marine Corps order defining the roles,
    responsibilities, desired outcome for the process, which is the
    urgent need process.
        General Conway. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. Has that been done yet?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, it has been done.
        Senator Kennedy. It has been done?
        General Conway. I would add further, sir, that we have
    asked for, in the wake of this issue coming to light once
    again, we have asked for a Department of Defense (DOD) IG
    investigation, because we think when the facts are fully known
    that they will----
        Senator Kennedy. When was that done?
        General Conway. Within the last 10 days, while I was on the
    trip to Iraq.
        So that all the facts can be brought to bear, and we think
    that the conclusion will be that well-intended men, very much
    concerned about the welfare of the marines, made prudent
    decisions at the time to bring forward the best capability we
    could to protect our people in combat.
        Senator Kennedy. If you look at the whole process, it
    appears that it took the Secretary of Defense's intervention in
    2007 to get the order. This is what Secretary Gates himself
    said: ``The way I put it to everyone is you have to look
    outside the bureaucratic way of doing things, and so does
    industry. Lives are at stake.''
        The audit makes that recommendation for the marines to
    date. I understand what you've said now is that you issued the
    response to the Naval Audit Report Number One.
        General Conway. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. That has been done.
        General Conway. Sir, if I could, with all due respect to
    Secretary Gates, when I became the Commandant in November 2006,
    at that point our commanders were advocating that we replace
    our uparmored Humvees with the MRAP vehicle. That became my
    theme then for purchase of those vehicles.
        If I could offer another quote, it was when I had said that
    by that point in time that we had had 300 underbody attacks
    against the MRAP and had not lost a single marine or sailor,
    the Secretary was impressed with that quality of the vehicle
    and then made it his number one priority in the DOD.
        Senator Kennedy. My time is up. I'm interested in the
    process of the request that was made and how the Marine Corps
    bureaucracy responded to that urgent request. I think you've
    answered the question with regards to the desirability of that
    particular system and alternative systems. But that doesn't get
    away from the underlying point about whether the system is
    functioning and working when these urgent requests come up
    which are necessary.
        I'll look forward to looking through the report.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Admiral Roughead, there's been a lot of discussion about
    the cost of the DDG-1000 and some House Members are quoted in
    Defense Daily today as going so far as to suggest the diversion
    of funds from the budget in order to buy other kinds of ships.
    What is often overlooked in the discussion of the DDG-1000 are
    three factors: first, that the requirements are actually for 8
    to 12 DDG-1000s rather than the 7 that are in the long-term
    plan; second, the technological advancements that have been
    incorporated into the ship, that will give the Navy much-needed
    capabilities; and third, the cost savings that will result when
    you look at the life-cycle cost from the much smaller crew size
    for the DDG-1000. If memory serves me correctly, I believe that
    the DDG-51 requires 338 sailors and we're looking at a crew
    size of only 142 sailors for the DDG-1000.
        Could you comment, please, on the capabilities issue, the
    requirements, and the cost?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator, I will. The DDG-1000
    introduces more new technology that will inform our future Navy
    combatants than any other ship class that we've ever fielded.
    The new technologies that we have put into that, the most
    significant one I believe is what you mentioned, reducing the
    crew size. Our ships of the future must have smaller crews.
        With respect to some of the press reporting that I have
    read about using the DDG-1000 to perhaps be used, the resources
    for that to be used for other ship classes, I'm very concerned
    that we do not disrupt our combatant lines. Right now we are
    developing a new Fleet of ships. If you look across it from
    submarines to combatants to amphibious ships, we are
    introducing all new classes. The Virginia-class is coming on
    line. It's a great submarine. The prices are coming down. We're
    doing the right thing there.
        The Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)-17. Even though we had
    some growing pains when that ship came out, we're now in the
    process of getting into the flow of that ship, and in fact on
    Saturday I'm going down to participate in the christening of
    New York, our most recent LPD-17. The T-AKEs, that line is
    moving well.
        The areas where I am most concerned about are in our
    combatant lines: the DDG-1000, our new destroyer, and where we
    will take that ship to bridge to the new cruiser that we're
    beginning to work on now, but also the LCS.
        I believe with the stability that we have in submarines,
    amphibious ships, and auxiliary ships, we really need to allow
    our combatant build programs to take root, grow, stabilize, and
    move us into the future. So I very much want to do as much as
    we can to get the stability in our combatant lines for the
    future.
        Senator Collins. That's also very important in terms of the
    transition from the DDG-51 line to the DDG-1000. We do need to
    make sure that that is managed very appropriately in order to
    avoid a gap in the work at the yards, which could cause the
    loss of skilled workers. Once you lose that capability, it's
    gone forever; and I know that you and Secretary Winter share my
    concern in that regard.
        I want to associate myself also with the concerns expressed
    by Senator Warner about the need to stay on course for the 313-
    ship fleet, which you have appropriately described as the
    floor, the minimum that we need. Part of the strategy for
    achieving that goal is modernizing in order to extend the life
    of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class of destroyers.
        First of all, how important is that modernization plan to
    achieving the 313-ship fleet?
        Admiral Roughead. That is very important to our 313-ship
    fleet, and it's also very important to the relevant
    capabilities that we're going to need in the future. DDGs are
    great ships. I speak from experience, having put one in
    commission myself as a commanding officer. But also, it was a
    DDG that was the backup ship for the Lake Erie when they shot
    down the satellite, again attesting to the versatility of the
    ship and the capability of that ship.
        It will be important for us to conduct that modernization,
    to upgrade the capability and extend the life of those ships,
    so that we don't have to take them out before they're due.
        Senator Collins. I want to encourage you to examine both
    the cost and schedule advantages of doing that modernization at
    the building yard rather than the home port. I think there's
    significant evidence that suggests there would be considerable
    cost savings to the Navy as well as efficiencies in doing that,
    and I look forward to working further with you and Secretary
    Winter.
        Finally, let me just thank you, Admiral Roughead, for
    coming to Maine to visit Bath Iron Works and to visit the
    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME. I know you were
    impressed with what you saw and I very much appreciated your
    including Maine as you've been getting out across the country
    to visit naval installations and yards.
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for
    taking time from your schedule to be with me during that visit.
    It really was good to get out and see the quality of work
    that's being done, the commitment not just of the leadership in
    the yards, but, as in all cases, it's the individual on the
    line that's actually doing the hard work that makes a
    difference, and that was apparent during my time up there.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, gentlemen, for your testimony and for your service.
        General Conway, I think that the two exchanges that you had
    with Senator Warner and Senator Kennedy over the MRAP and the
    uparmored Humvee were very important. Perhaps we in Congress
    have something to learn from them. I think we have been so
    concerned not only about the vest that you talked about with
    Senator Warner, but about the exposure of our personnel to the
    impact of the IEDs, the bombs, that we rushed with a lot of
    good intentions to authorize and appropriate at a very high
    level for the provision of the MRAPs. I'm hearing you say
    something really very, in some ways, tough, but very practical
    and reasonable, which is that in the experience of the marines
    the MRAPs are not right for all the missions we're asking you
    to perform and, in fact, may not protect against some of the
    other kinds of vulnerabilities. I think 10 percent was what you
    said was the percentage of attacks from underneath, and
    obviously the uparmored Humvees also protect from attack from
    the side.
        So I admire you for cutting back on your initial request
    for the MRAPs because it may be as I hear you that really we
    may have overdone it in real and practical terms, not only in
    terms of your performance of the mission, but protecting the
    safety of our personnel, and that what's needed ideally is a
    mix of vehicles, the MRAP, the uparmored Humvee, and maybe
    something else. I don't know the extent to which the Joint
    Light Tactical Vehicle that is being worked on now may fill a
    role there.
        So I just wanted to thank you for what you've said and what
    you've done, and I think maybe there's a lesson in it for all
    of us.
        I don't know whether you want to respond to that briefly.
        General Conway. Sir, I would only say that I look on the
    evolution of the MRAP creation and testing and purchase as one
    of the real success stories that has come out of what's
    happened. It took Congress, it took the DOD, it took the
    industry to provide the vehicles in the rapid state that they
    did. Sir, we have still yet to lose a marine in an MRAP to an
    underbody. It is an amazing vehicle against that niche kind of
    capability, and I think I can speak on behalf of my Army
    brothers and say that they're equally satisfied.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Conway. But you are exactly correct in that it's
    not a vehicle for all places and all times. Sir, as I look at
    the particular culture of our Corps, we're light, we're
    expeditionary, we're fast-moving and hard-hitting. Although an
    MRAP still may be in our future in another battlefield, it
    doesn't transport well.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, it doesn't transport well if it's
    too heavy; I agree with you. I'm certainly not questioning the
    MRAP program. I think it's had great utility, and I appreciate
    your saying that we turned it around quickly.
        But your point is well taken. If it doesn't travel well, if
    it's too heavy to go over some bridges, if it doesn't operate
    well off road, and if it doesn't protect against some of the
    other threats to our troops, then I think what we're looking
    for is a mix of vehicles to allow you and the Army to carry out
    the missions we've asked you to carry out with maximum
    protection of our troops.
        General Conway. I think that's exactly right, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that very much, and I think
    it's something we have to take into consideration.
        I want to go back to the size of the Fleet, the goal of 313
    ships total. What are we at right now, just as a matter of
    record? How large is the Fleet?
        Admiral Roughead. 279 today, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. So in the most direct sense, does
    that mean, since we're at 279 and our goal has been to be at
    313 ships in our Navy, that we are vulnerable, we're in some
    danger? Are you unable to carry out some of the missions,
    Admiral, that the country is asking you to carry out?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, I would put it into two
    different categories. One is that in combat operations I would
    say that the size of the Fleet today puts us at moderate risk,
    and by ``moderate risk,'' there would be likely success, but it
    may require longer time, it may require more resources, and it
    could require some changes in the plans that we would normally
    use to go after a particular problem.
        But I also believe that in the world that we live in today
    and the strategy that I believe that we as a Navy and a Marine
    Corps and even a Coast Guard must pursue, that we have to be
    out and about. The types of operations, the importance of
    maritime security on our prosperity and the way that the goods
    and resources flow around the world, that numbers become a
    capability in themselves, and we have to be there to assure the
    sea lanes that supply our country and that allow us to export
    our goods; and also to be able to have the types of ships and
    the balance in our Fleet for the various missions that we
    perform.
        The one area that I am most concerned about today is the
    area close to shore, the littoral areas, the green water.
    That's what the LCS is about. The other ship classes that we
    have are complementing current capabilities and are upgrading
    those current capabilities. The LCS is about an area that we
    are, quite frankly, deficient in.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate the directness of the
    answer. Moderate risk is, I think, ideally more risk than any
    of us should want you and our country to face, so that it does
    make the point, though that the absolute dollars in the
    requested DOD budget are large, in my opinion they're not
    enough and we remain at a percentage of the Gross Domestic
    Product, that is spending on defense, which is historically
    low, considering that we are at war, an active war, and we're
    facing the rise of other great powers--Russia, China--who we
    obviously hope we'd never get into hostilities with, but are
    putting a lot of money into military acquisitions, including
    ships for their fleet.
        Let me ask you about the LCS, just to remind us what the
    numbers are. Of the 313 goal, how many are intended to be in
    the LCS category?
        Admiral Roughead. Our objective, Senator, is 55.
        Senator Lieberman. So that's a pretty significant number.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Just for the record, you've cut back
    because of the problems in acquisition and development on what
    you're going to ask for this year, right, for the LCS?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, that's correct.
        Senator Lieberman. Just remind us again of what the
    reduction there is?
        Admiral Roughead. We reduced our intention this year by
    four LCSs and that is the adjustment in this year's current
    budget proposal.
        Senator Lieberman. So do you worry that the increasing cost
    of the ship will make it impossible for us to attain the 55
    number goal for the LCS that is part of that 313?
        Admiral Roughead. Getting control of the cost and indeed
    bringing the cost of the ship down is a very high priority, and
    that's what we're working on with the Secretary's leadership,
    and the decisiveness in cancelling the LCSs three and four was
    not an easy decision, but I believe it was in the best
    interests of the program.
        I look forward to being able to take the 2008 ship and the
    two LCSs that we have in 2009 and being able to put together an
    acquisition strategy that allows us to move forward, that
    allows us to acquire those ships, so that we can get them out,
    get them operating, because I do believe they are going to be
    workhorses of the future for us.
        Senator Lieberman. I agree. So at this moment you would
    hold to the 55 LCS goal that's part of the 313?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, my objective remains 55 LCSs.
        Senator Lieberman. The 313 remains not only your goal, but
    a goal that you think will meet our defense needs, our national
    security needs?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, and I would say that it is the
    minimum number of ships that we will need for the future.
        Senator Lieberman. It's very important to say that, right.
        Thank you. My time is up. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, welcome. I'm always
    impressed at the tremendous ability and resilience of our men
    and women in uniform, and the Navy and Marine Corps certainly
    are great examples of that. Although in South Dakota we don't
    have a lot of shoreline, coastline, or beaches, I still have a
    great interest in making sure that our sailors and marines are
    well-equipped and well-trained.
        Secretary Winter, in your prepared testimony you discuss
    the recent readiness and training challenges that the Navy
    faces with a Ninth Circuit Court decision regarding the Navy's
    use of active sonar off the coast of California to train strike
    groups before deploying. From what I understand from your
    prepared statement, the Navy is still subject to an injunction
    on the use of this sonar issued by the court, despite the
    President granting an emergency exemption.
        As the ranking member of the Readiness and Management
    Support Subcommittee, I'm concerned about the effect that this
    injunction may be having on predeployment training. What effect
    is this injunction having on your current ability to conduct
    predeployment training, particularly as it relates to
    countering these modern super-quiet diesel electric submarines?
        Secretary Winter. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    Right now the orders that we've received from the court impose
    several additional conditions on our use of sonar for training
    and exercise activities in the southern California operating
    area which we believe would have a significant deleterious
    effect on the efficacy of those training activities. They
    basically increase the requirement for shutdown of the sonar
    when a marine mammal is seen from what has been our practice of
    200 yards to a 2,000-meter requirement, which is over a factor
    of 10 increase in the area that we have to shut down under such
    circumstances.
        Similarly, there are certain water column conditions,
    what's known as surface ducting conditions, under which we
    would be required to reduce the sonar power by 75 percent
    whether or not a marine mammal was present.
        Those types of constraints we believe would significantly
    affect our ability to conduct the type of training activities
    that are crucial to preparing our Fleet prior to deployment.
        Senator Thune. Admiral Roughead, I have a question in
    relation to the encounter by the Navy with five Iranian
    speedboats that occurred last month in the Strait of Hormuz.
    According to a January 12, 2008, article in the New York Times,
    a 2002 war game indicated that small, agile speedboats could
    swarm a naval convoy and inflict devastating damage on our
    warships.
        To the extent that you can discuss this in an open setting,
    what is the Navy doing to prepare to meet this type of threat?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, as you would understand, I won't
    get into the particular procedures that our ships and crews
    use. But first off, I'd like to just mention the competence and
    the training of our crews and the commanding officers are what
    I believe kept that situation under control.
        As part of our training for our crews as they prepare to
    deploy, we present them with scenarios that are very similar to
    that which would be encountered around the Straits of Hormuz
    and other littoral areas such as that. We employ simulators as
    well, again to just be able to take them through a variety of
    responses. But as we operate in environments like that we
    employ all dimensions of our naval power, not just the
    capabilities that we have on our ships, but also our airplanes,
    those that are embarked on the destroyers and other combatants,
    but also the aircraft of our air wing. So it's a total
    capability that we bring in. Our awareness, our situational
    awareness, adds to our understanding of what is developing.
        But again, I come back to the fact that it really is the
    training, the competence, and the discipline of the young men
    and women who are operating our ships at sea that make all the
    difference.
        Senator Thune. I absolutely would agree with that with
    regard to the incident in January. I guess the question is with
    regard to the simulation and how that played out when you gamed
    it out, do you have a concern about our flexibility and ability
    to react to that type of a threat, which seems to be where our
    adversaries in that region are headed?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, I have confidence in our sailors
    and our commanding officers, but I am concerned about the type
    of behavior that is allowed to be taking place. When the
    leadership of Iran lauds the crew that captured the Royal Navy
    sailors, I think that that just engenders an attitude in the
    Revolutionary Guard units that has the potential to escalate,
    elevate, and perhaps make behavior like this more routine.
        Senator Thune. Secretary Winter, the Navy recently rolled
    out a new maritime strategy. Could you highlight the major
    points of that strategy and where you think we have the big
    gaps in our ability to execute it?
        Secretary Winter. I think the new maritime strategy really
    represents a long-term commitment on the part of the Navy to
    partnership building, to maritime security as a common
    objective of all maritime nations, and also recognizes the
    importance of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as
    mechanisms to assist our ability to develop the relationships
    with other nations, other navies, and be able to represent our
    country around the world.
        It also continues, if you will, all the current aspects of
    dissuasion, deterrence, and supremacy at sea that have been a
    hallmark of our Navy ever since.
        Senator Thune. Admiral Roughead, there has been a lot
    written about the development of the Chinese and Indian navies,
    as well as other emerging threats. How would you characterize
    the submarine threat that other countries pose and how ready is
    the United States to deal with it?
        Admiral Roughead. The proliferation of submarines globally
    is occurring at a very, very rapid pace, and it's more than
    just numbers. The sophistication and the technical advancements
    that are being made in quieting submarines, making them harder
    to find, creating air-independent propulsion systems that allow
    submarines to remain under water for very long periods of time,
    add to the challenges of anti-submarine warfare and get to the
    point that the Secretary was making about the need to be able
    to train against those types of threats.
        In the days of the Soviet Navy, we looked for their
    submarines by listening passively and we could detect where
    they were and get a position on them. In the case of these very
    sophisticated, smaller, advanced diesel submarines, active
    sonar is how we find them, active sonar is how we localize
    them, and active sonar is enabling how we will kill them. We
    must be able to train realistically.
        We can do that while being good stewards of the
    environment. In fact, the United States Navy has invested in
    marine mammal research, more than any other organization in the
    world. We can do both and our record speaks to that.
        Senator Thune. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indication of
    if and when that injunction by the court might be lifted with
    regard to the training exercises?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, we had oral arguments yesterday in
    California. We expect to get a ruling by the Ninth Circuit
    Court some time next week, and we'll have to go from there. I
    do expect, however, to see continuing challenges on a wide
    variety of fronts associated with our use of sonar techniques.
        Senator Thune. I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen, and thank you for your public
    service to our country. I get to visit with you, Mr. Secretary
    and Admiral, probably more than you would want me to visit with
    you, and I thank you for the continuing saga with regard to
    making Mayport nuclear, and we're awaiting the Environment
    Impact Statement (EIS) so thank you very much.
        In a couple of minutes I'm going to be visiting with our
    Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and, as I have
    discussed with both of you, the recommendations that are coming
    up to you, Mr. Secretary, from the Admiral about the
    reactivation of the Fourth Fleet. You may want to share your
    thoughts with the committee about that, and then specifically
    I'd like to ask if you will make the request for the
    appropriate funding in order to make the necessary improvements
    at Mayport for the Fourth Fleet that would support Admiral
    James E. Starvidis, USN, as we project our American presence
    throughout the Western Hemisphere.
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, I've been out in the fleet for
    the last few years, and as I've looked at the world we're going
    to operate in and I look at the strategy that I believe is
    right for our time, it became apparent to me that we had to
    make some adjustments in our command and control structure, and
    from that came the Fourth Fleet recommendation that I've made.
        It will better align Admiral Stavridis's naval activities
    and operations with the way that we're doing them in other
    parts of the world, very similar to Fifth Fleet and Sixth
    Fleet. So I believe the time has come to reactivate that and it
    will provide for much more effective operations and more
    cooperative activity, particularly in the SOUTHCOM area of
    operations.
        I would say, however, that the Fourth Fleet is a command
    structure and, similar to the Sixth Fleet in Europe and the
    Fifth Fleet in the Middle East, they will be receiving forces
    from other naval commands and operating them in the SOUTHCOM
    area of operations. So with regard to any improvements in
    Mayport, those are more driven by the EIS that I'm pleased
    we're going to have out here soon for public comment and
    decision in January 2009, and also the outcome of what I've
    asked my staff to do, and that is to look at what is the right
    strategic laydown and where should we have our Navy forces
    positioned in the United States.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So that EIS is not only going to be
    for nuclear-capable, but it's also going to be for whatever
    additional activities you would have with the Fourth Fleet?
        Admiral Roughead. What the EIS is looking at are a range of
    force package options for Mayport. There are 13 options that
    we're going to look at and range everywhere from combatants to
    carriers, and that will be a very informative document for us.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, what's this in the
    chain of command? Is it coming from the Admiral up to you and
    then it goes to Secretary Gates? Is that what happens?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir. I've taken a preliminary brief
    on it. I've asked a number of questions, particularly with
    regard to exactly how we will evolve this structure. As the CNO
    commented, this is principally a command and control element.
    This is a staff group that we're talking about. Most of that
    staff currently resides at Mayport. Is that the right place in
    the long term to support the SOUTHCOM down in Miami? How do we
    want to work all of that? All has to be determined yet.
        Once we go through that process, then we will go and take
    it forward to the Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is that interrelated with the EIS or
    is that a command decision about where you locate the support
    group?
        Secretary Winter. I do not view this as having any material
    impact on the EIS or vice versa.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I see. Well then, I must have been
    mistaken. I thought that the recommendation coming up was that
    the Fourth Fleet would be headquartered at Mayport.
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, the Fourth Fleet is a
    headquarters, much like our Sixth Fleet is in Europe and our
    Fifth Fleet is in Bahrain. It is a headquarters organization
    that in the case of Fourth Fleet will be the merging of Naval
    Forces South and the Fourth Fleet into the headquarters
    element.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I thought that recommendation that was
    going up was to be at Mayport. Is that the recommendation that
    has to go up through the civilian leadership?
        Admiral Roughead. The recommendation, sir, is to take the
    Navy Southern Command (NAVSOUTH) staff and redesignate them as
    NAVSOUTH and Fourth Fleet, and that they currently reside in
    Mayport. My recommendation is that that redesignation occur,
    but that as we look at force laydown, where command and control
    structure will be in the future, I believe we should be looking
    at what is the best way for us to position and operate our
    Navy, and that will all be part of the look that I'm doing.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So long term, that's a decision still
    to be made in your recommendation?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I think that we should be
    taking a good look at the overall force posture and positioning
    and where is the best place to put our forces.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Admiral, let me ask you
    about the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), which was going
    on the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The first version
    of the RRW was something of a rebuild of the existing W-76
    nuclear warhead. But now the question is, is there a slow-up on
    the RRW? So what's the impact on the rebuild of the W-76?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, if I could take that question
    for the record, I'd like to do that and get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The current halt in the Reliable Replacement Weapon program
    resulting from the removal of Department of Energy funding in the
    fiscal year 2008 Appropriations process does not affect the Navy's
    program to refurbish existing W-76 warheads. The Navy's plan to extend
    the service life of W-76 warheads will ensure their safety and
    reliability through calendar year 2042.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We have that issue in front of
    our Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which we're going to have to
    answer that.
        I would also want to ask you if you would take for the
    record the question of the Standard Missile 3 inventory, as
    well as the Standard Missile 3 Block 1B over the Block 1A.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The current inventory of SM-3 Missiles is 25; 9 SM-3 Block I
    variants and 16 SM-3 Block IA variants. A total of 75 SM-3 Block IA
    variants will be produced in the program of record. In fiscal year
    2010, production of the SM-3 Block IB variant will begin, with the
    first Flight Test Mission in fiscal year 2011. There are a total of 72
    SM-3 Block IB variants in the program of record through fiscal year
    2013.

        Senator Bill Nelson. It's going to have a considerable
    improvement and we need your advice as we get into this.
    Speaking of the Standard Missile, congratulations to you.
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You hit the bull's eye and you did a
    service, and I think it's appropriate for somebody like me to
    say that, even though people jump to conclusions, the fact is
    you had a schoolbus-sized defense satellite that was tumbling
    out of control, along with a 1,000-pound tank of hydrazine that
    could survive reentry, and the fact that you hit it and busted
    it into all thousands of pieces will cause--number one, the
    orbit to degrade a lot quicker; number two, much more
    manageable and therefore less likely that pieces survive the
    searing heat of reentry; and number three, you busted open the
    tank, so the likelihood of a tank filled with hydrazine--which
    did happen, by the way. The small hydrazine tank survived the
    reentry in the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia all
    the way to the Earth's surface. So for that third reason, you
    are to be congratulated in improving the safety of the
    conditions. Thank you.
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Roughead. I couldn't be more proud of our sailors
    and our civilian engineers that put all that together. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Nelson's
    comments and congratulations I'm sure reflects the feelings of
    all of us.
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Martinez, an uninterrupted turn
    from the chairman today.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We can work as a
    team when need be. I thank you.
        I want to add my word of congratulations. I really think it
    was a remarkable thing. From time to time there are things that
    happen that completely capture our imagination and that one is
    an amazing feat. So, well done!
        Admiral Roughead, we have talked about the expanding Navy
    and the need for a 313-ship Navy, which as you know I fully
    support. One of the things that has been mentioned along those
    lines is the possibility that the Navy should be an all-nuclear
    surface fleet, and I wonder if you can articulate for us your
    thoughts on that issue.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Nuclear power offers
    advantages. Nuclear power is also a more expensive initial cost
    as we build ships that have nuclear propulsion. I believe that
    as we look at the ships of the future we should look at varying
    types of ways to propel and to power those ships, and nuclear
    power is one of those things that we should look at.
        That said, for all ships to be nuclear my great concern is
    that it would become a question of affordability, and we have
    to look at that. We have to look at more than just the fuel
    cost. We have to look at how much it will cost us to maintain
    those ships, how much it will cost us to manage those ships,
    because I believe that as nuclear power has a resurgence in the
    civilian commercial applications that many of those companies
    know where the best operators and where the best engineers are,
    and that's in the United States Navy.
        Senator Martinez. So your concern is cost, which when
    compared to the cost of fuel alone does not tell you the whole
    cost, which has to do with the increased maintenance, and also
    you think that you could have simply a manpower issue in terms
    of competing with the private sector for increased demand for
    nuclear?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We have to look at the whole
    dimension of it and then make the best decisions that we
    possibly can.
        Senator Martinez. So you want the flexibility, in other
    words to increase our Navy with whatever power station you
    think is the most suitable at a given point in time?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. Mr. Secretary, good to see you again.
        Secretary Winter. Good to see you, sir.
        Senator Martinez. We've talked about the LCS and how
    important it is. I really would like to get an update from you
    on that program. Where are we, what steps have you taken to
    correct the deficiencies? The Admiral and I have discussed the
    need for us to get this one right as we look to getting that
    313-ship Navy. So bring us up to speed on where we are on the
    procurement, on the ship models, and that kind of thing?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir. At this point in time we are
    focusing on really two aspects, one of which is the two ship
    hulls that are being constructed right now, one in Marinette
    under the Lockheed prime contract and the other down in Alabama
    under the General Dynamics contract. Both of those ships are
    coming along. We are right now conducting somewhat limited
    power train tests up at Marinette with the LCS-1. We're
    somewhat limited because of the ice buildup at this time of
    year in the lake there, and we are fully expecting to be able
    to initiate the full range of sea trials once we get past the
    ice season there, most likely in the April time period.
        With the LCS-2, which is down in Alabama, we're in the
    process of completing the construction there to the point that
    we can get it into the water later this spring. That is still
    our current forecast there and we fully expect to be able to
    conduct at least the initial range of sea trials with her later
    this year.
        Senator Martinez. What timeframe of the year? This summer,
    perhaps?
        Secretary Winter. Probably in the summertime, yes, sir.
        At the same time, we have proceeded very well on the
    mission modules. We've already taken delivery of the first of
    the mine warfare modules. That has been delivered. We also are
    fully expecting to have the first of the surface warfare and
    the anti-submarine warfare modules delivered this year. All of
    that gives us a good basis for conducting the full range of
    mission tests that we'd like to be able to do with both of
    these vessels.
        At the same time, we're preparing to start a round of
    acquisition which would enable us to acquire three additional
    vessels under a fixed price incentive type contract. Those
    three vessels would include the one that was previously
    approved for fiscal year 2008 and the two that we're requesting
    in the year of current interest, fiscal year 2009.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
        General Conway, we've discussed this morning here the
    increased presence in Afghanistan with 3,200 marines. I'm not
    sure if it was asked, but if not I'd like to be sure that I'm
    clear. My concern is that from reports that I hear of an
    increasingly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan from the
    security standpoint, that this type of force increase may not
    be sufficient and that perhaps additional forces may be needed
    in Afghanistan in the near future.
        Aside from the great concern that I have about the lack of
    participation in real fighting from our North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) partners, can you tell us where you see the
    Afghanistan force needs going in the near term and the far
    term?
        General Conway. Sir, I think your analysis is probably
    correct. When we visit there, people are generally pretty
    satisfied with what they see happening in Regional Command
    East, which is up against the Pakistani border and is in the
    northeastern portion of Afghanistan. They are less comfortable
    with conditions in the south. The drug fields still operate
    relatively freely there. There are what they call rat lines in
    from what some would consider safe haven across an
    international border. Taliban actually control some ground and
    some would say it's the heart of the Taliban. You have families
    there who have sons fighting as a part of the Taliban.
        So I think Regional Command South is still very much an
    unclear picture at this point, and whether or not enough troops
    have now been committed, both coalition force troops, who in
    some cases are doing very good work, and now marines in
    addition to the soldiers that have been there, will be
    sufficient I think is uncertain at this point, sir.
        Senator Martinez. I know the Secretary of Defense has been
    traveling a lot recently and has made his case to our NATO
    partners. But can you tell us anything about the level of
    cooperation that you might anticipate in what is a NATO mission
    from other NATO countries in terms of participating in the
    actual difficult work that is necessary there?
        General Conway. Sir, I cannot talk about any increased
    participation. What we do know is that the Canadians publicly
    are asking for additional troops. They think that there is a
    need for additional troops, especially if our marines pull out
    in October, which is planned at this point. The British we see
    are there. They have a replacement scheduled, a rotation that
    will replace the people that are there now with a parachute
    brigade, for all intents and purposes.
        So we think that the resolve is still readily evident on
    the coalition forces that are there now for at least the rest
    of this calendar year. Again, sir, I would not want to
    presuppose beyond that.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, General.
        My time is up, but let me associate myself with Senator
    Nelson's comments as they relate to the situation in Mayport
    and our great desire to continue to see a very vibrant naval
    presence there going into the future. We've discussed it ad
    nauseam. I'm sure you know my points on that, but I did want to
    associate myself with the Senator's comments. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen. Admiral Roughead, the Navy has the
    requirement to start detailed design for the next class of
    ballistic missile submarine. In fact, we have to start doing
    that pretty soon since I think 2019 is the target date to begin
    construction. When are you going to start that research and
    development (R&D) design program in the budget, this year's
    budget?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We have to start looking at
    that, and we are beginning to move forward with initiatives to
    work a design process, as well as work cooperatively with the
    U.K. Government, which has a more urgent need than we do. So we
    are moving forward in that regard.
        Senator Reed. One of the problems I think is not in terms
    of just the delivery of the submarine in the future; it's the
    maintenance of the R&D force, which is fragile. If we don't
    keep investing, these are skilled individuals who will leave
    and go off by necessity. That is, I presume, a concern that you
    have and that will motivate your actions.
        Admiral Roughead. Very much so, yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, can you describe the
    acquisition strategy for the rest of the ships in the DDG-1000
    program?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir. At this point in time we have
    not definitized the acquisition strategy for the rest of the
    ships. We will be developing that this year and going through
    the normal approval process on that.
        Senator Reed. When do you anticipate informing Congress
    about the results of the analysis of alternatives and design
    decisions for the CG(X?)
        Secretary Winter. Sir, we're still in the process of going
    through that right now. I will say that, based on the
    preliminary reviews I've had, we still have a ways to go on
    that, and I will be hard-pressed to give you a definitive date
    at this point in time.
        Senator Reed. Is it your intention to leverage the
    investment in existing hulls by re-using DDG-1000 hulls in your
    planning? Is that one option at least? I know you can't reach a
    definitive judgment. Is that an option?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, one of our principal objectives, is
    to maximize reuse of everything from hull forms to individual
    componentry on all of our ships, and to the extent that we can
    use improvements and new technology that is being developed in
    other programs, we will endeavor to do so.
        It is at this point in time, sir, though, just one of a
    series of options.
        Senator Reed. Yes. With respect to the DDG-1000 hull and
    the construction of the CG(X), can you do that with nuclear
    propulsion, as required by the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2008?
        Secretary Winter. That is one aspect that we're looking at.
    We do believe that we can accommodate a reactor plant in that
    particular hull form, but that is something that still needs to
    be fully developed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Conway and Admiral Roughead, in general do you
    think we are putting enough money into the R&D to support both
    shipboard operations and expeditionary forces? Commandant, you
    first, and then the Admiral.
        General Conway. Yes, sir, I do. We have a very active
    warfighting lab that works with the Navy research labs. We
    reach out to commercial and educational institutions with our
    research. So I think that we are, sir.
        Admiral Roughead. I agree with that, Senator. Just
    coincidentally, this week I directed the president of our Naval
    War College to reinstitute the Title 10 war game so that we
    can, at an operational level, begin to look at some of the
    concepts that are important to General Conway and me,
    particularly in the area of sea basing, because I really value
    the intellectual capital that we have in Newport.
        Senator Reed. Rhode Island?
        Admiral Roughead. In Newport, RI, absolutely, yes, sir.
    That adds to not just the R&D, but really the operational
    perspectives that must be brought to bear.
        Senator Reed. Let me raise a final question. That is, I
    understand that the Navy is essentially allocating 50
    accessions from their Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or
    Naval Academy programs to the Marine Corps this year. Is there
    any plan going forward or contemporaneously to make up for
    that?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, one of the things that we are
    requesting this year is to grow the size of the Naval Academy
    by 100 midshipmen. It will be done over a period of 4 years.
    That really is in support of the Marine Corps requirement and
    I'd seek your favorable consideration.
        Senator Reed. As long as they're coming out for the archery
    team that's fine. [Laughter.]
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Let's see. Senator Wicker, I believe, is
    next.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you very much. I
    appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let's talk about LPDs. Mr. Secretary, the
    purpose of the LPD is to load, transport, and unload marines,
    as well as their assault equipment, such as helicopters and
    other vehicles, for amphibious warfare missions. I notice,
    Admiral Roughead, that the LPD is number two on the Navy's
    unfunded priority list and, General Conway, it's the Marines'
    number one unfunded priority. I'd like to see that moved up,
    moved up a little.
        I know that we have competition between the needs and our
    ability to finance them. But I am concerned about our ability
    to provide continuous global posture, as outlined in the naval
    strategy, without additional investments in these large-deck
    platforms.
        If you couple the fact that the fiscal year 2009 budget
    outlines a 5-year shipbuilding plan and relies heavily on three
    new platforms, which brings a large degree of risk to an
    already complicated production strategy, with the growing
    Marine Corps, which I support and which most people support, it
    seems to me that additional LPDs are going to be necessary.
        As I understand it, there are nine of these ships that have
    been authorized and appropriated in last year's act. $50
    million in advance procurement was appropriated for the tenth
    ship, but it is not funded in the budget request. I'll ask each
    of you to comment on this. How many ESGs does the Marine Corps
    have a validated requirement for? As a matter of fact, somebody
    tell us for the record, what comprises an ESG?
        Admiral Roughead. The ESG, Senator, is comprised of----
        Senator Wicker. One strike group.
        Admiral Roughead. One strike group. One strike group will
    have a large-deck amphibious ship. It will have surface
    combatants capable of firing Tomahawk missiles, and on occasion
    we will couple a submarine with that strike group.
        Senator Wicker. But an LPD is an integral part of this ESG,
    is that correct?
        Admiral Roughead. That is correct.
        Senator Wicker. So isn't it a fact that we have a
    requirement, a validated requirement, for 11 of these strike
    groups?
        Admiral Roughead. General Conway's requirement is for 11
    LPDs as part of an 11-11-11 mix. I concur with the requirement
    that he has set forth. With regard to the prioritization with
    the LPD on my unfunded priority list, it is number two. Number
    one on my list are the P-3 airplanes that we have experienced
    cracking in the wings, and I've had to ground 39 of them in the
    last couple of months. The P-3s are our premier anti-submarine
    warfare airplane, so they're important to us in that mission.
    They're also being used very extensively in Iraq because of
    their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability
    that they have, and for that reason I have put the P-3s as my
    number one priority.
        Senator Wicker. Number one unfunded priority.
        Admiral Roughead. Unfunded priority.
        Senator Wicker. How are we going to meet these requirements
    without the number one and number two requirement, and for you,
    General Conway, for your number one unfunded priority? How are
    we going to meet the requirement of 11 strike groups without
    those?
        General Conway. Sir, first of all, we are short. But let me
    couch perhaps the same conversation just a shade differently.
    We see that a minimum two brigade across-the-shore requirement
    is how we arrive at the numbers of ships that we need. You're
    certainly correct in that the ESGs are afloat, they serve a
    very valuable purpose, but 9 or 11 ESGs do not make an
    amphibious assault force.
        So we have analyzed what our two brigades look like, the
    amount and the numbers of ships that it would need to carry
    those brigades, and at this point we are a little short. Now,
    as Admiral Roughead mentioned, we've had some tremendous
    discussions with the Navy. We have come to agreement on the
    numbers of ships, 33 to make 30 operational ships, in order to
    give our Nation that very necessary capability. The Navy has
    looked at a way to extend some older ships that gives us that
    30 number for some period on through the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP), the 5-year defense plan.
        Our only concern with it, however, is that we have already,
    through previous agreement, previous CNOs and previous
    Commandants, agreed on the 30 ships. That still represents
    about a 20 percent shortfall that those brigade footprints
    would require. If we go with the old ships instead of newer
    ships, that shortfall becomes about 29 percent, and we think
    there's a risk inherent with that that just concerns us greatly
    with the ability to provide that kind of capability to the
    Nation. Ergo, it being our number one unfunded priority.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I would suggest you
    have the gist of my question. We put the $50 million in for
    advanced procurement for the 10th ship last year and I would
    just hope that this Government somehow could find the ways and
    means to go ahead with the 10th ship in short order.
        Now, General Conway, let me shift in the time I have
    remaining and follow up on Senator Martinez's question about
    Afghanistan. Regional Command South is troubling, as I
    understand your testimony to be. This is what I understand also
    from some of my colleagues who recently returned from
    Afghanistan.
        I think it's important that we paint a correct picture
    about what's going on there in Afghanistan. I think the
    testimony was that the Canadians are asking for additional
    troops. I suppose you mean they're asking our NATO allies for
    additional troops?
        General Conway. I think that's a fair statement, sir. They
    are saying that there is a need for 1,000 additional troops and
    6 additional helicopters.
        Senator Wicker. That's what the Canadians are saying. Do
    you agree with that? Is there a need for more than that 1,000
    to get the job done?
        General Conway. Sir, I think it remains to be seen. We're
    in a period at this point of lesser amounts of activity. Those
    3,400 marines are not on deck yet. I do think that a battalion
    of marines----
        Senator Wicker. I'm sorry. We're in a period of lesser
    activity?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, because it's winter there and
    there are heavy snows. The Taliban are historically less active
    during these months.
        But I think springtime will be another story. I was going
    to say, sir, that a battalion of marines in Afghanistan we feel
    as the Joint Staff is probably going to have more effect than a
    battalion in Iraq because of the nature of the threat and the
    numbers that we face. Sir, we don't know yet what the outcome
    of those 3,400 marines are going to be in the south. But the
    Canadians, who command RC South, would like to see a
    continuation of that kind of force structure on through beyond
    this calendar year and that's what they're asking for, to
    whatever nation that can help them to carry on the fight.
        Senator Wicker. Those would be NATO nations.
        The staff has just handed me a nice little card and I know
    that my time is drawing to a close. But I would just observe,
    this is a crucial moment for NATO and I would say this publicly
    to anyone that's listening to the sound of my voice. Our entry
    into Afghanistan was not controversial, as Iraq was later on.
    It followed September 11. The world was with us, and NATO all
    agreed to hold hands and do this together.
        I would simply suggest that there are a lot of people
    observing the situation that are wondering if everyone in NATO
    understands what the agreement was and what the alliance is
    about.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, would you allow me to commend
    my colleague? I agree with your comment with regard to NATO. We
    should not forget that background.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. I think there's probably a consensus on
    this committee as to what you just said, Senator Wicker. We've
    spoken out on that issue, as has the Secretary of Defense, and
    your comments, I think, are right on target about the
    obligations of NATO that have not been met.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me say, Secretary Winter, Admiral Roughead, and General
    Conway, aloha and welcome to this hearing on the Navy's
    National Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2009.
    Also I want to thank all of you for your service to our
    country, and also thank all of those you command for their
    service to our country. We really appreciate all of that.
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, my question has to
    do with Guam. Decisions have been made already to send 8,000
    marines to Guam by 2014. This move coincides with the overall
    buildup of U.S. military facilities on Guam as it becomes a key
    strategic location in the Pacific. Your 2009 budget request
    includes $34 million to continue planning and development for
    the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities, which
    requires an EIS.
        I understand that DOD is making steady progress with their
    EISs. Other agencies such as the Department of the Interior do
    not have the funding necessary to complete their own EIS
    requirements for Guam. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead,
    if these other agencies are unable to find the funding
    necessary to complete their EIS requirements, my question is
    what impact will this have on the proposed time line?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, first of all, thank you for the
    question. I would note that we have gone a long way over the
    last several months in terms of developing the interagency
    coordination necessary to bring in the other Departments. In
    particular, Secretary Dirk Kempthorne has been a major player
    in terms of bringing the Department of the Interior into this
    act as part of their responsibilities for insular affairs and
    having explicit responsibility for Guam.
        I believe that the ongoing activities that are needed to
    support both the overall EIS development and the master plan
    development have all been identified. We are hopeful that they
    will be funded in a timely manner. I know that there's been a
    lot of effort going towards that direction. I cannot give you
    an explicit statement of what would occur if any specific
    component were unable to support the activity, but I can give
    you the assurance that we are working with all the other
    agencies in a very direct manner, and should any specific issue
    come up of that nature we would be more than pleased to inform
    you of that.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, there's nothing I can add to the
    Secretary's statement.
        Senator Akaka. I would then say that should other agencies
    not provide this information there may be a reconsideration of
    the time line.
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead, the Pacific is likely to
    increase in relevance for U.S. national security and for the
    U.S. Navy. As China becomes a greater economic and military
    power and as operations against radical extremism continue in
    places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, this certainly is a huge
    concern. Personally, I just want to say I would tell you that
    Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN, has made some great moves and
    has been able at least to converse with the Chinese
    authorities.
        Given the importance of the U.S. Navy power projection in
    the Pacific and the shifting of 8,000 marines to Guam from the
    Third Marine Expeditionary Force, is there consideration,
    Admiral, for basing the new U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford at Pearl
    Harbor, given its strategic geographical advantages?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, in recent years we've realigned
    our carrier force, put most of it in the Pacific. The same with
    our submarines. As we look to the future and the delivery of
    the Gerald Ford, which will be an aircraft carrier of great
    capability, we will factor that capability into the force
    structure and basing plans for the future.
        Senator Akaka. General Conway, in your statement you
    mention the importance of maintaining proficiency in the most
    enduring and traditional of Marine Corps missions, and that's
    the amphibious forcible entry. I'm concerned about the current
    operational stretch on the Corps and their readiness to conduct
    these types of operations that are so different from the
    missions our marines perform with such courage today, and many
    of course on the ground.
        Given the increased Taliban activity in Afghanistan and the
    U.S. response to send an additional 3,200 marines to that
    country, what is the biggest challenge facing the Marine Corps'
    ability to prepare for high intensity amphibious operations
    over the next years, so that we don't find ourselves in a
    situation where we've underresourced you or neglected the core
    competency of the marines?
        General Conway. Sir, our biggest challenge is to be able to
    create sufficient dwell time for our marines and sailors so
    that we can get back to some of those training venues that give
    us such a multi-capable capacity to do the Nation's work. When
    we're home now, we're home for 7 months and, quite frankly,
    some of that is used in leave time at the front and at the
    beginning, but the rest of it is devoted towards
    counterinsurgency training. As a result of that, we are not
    doing amphibious training or exercises. We are not doing
    combined arms live fire maneuver, which would be the extension
    of an amphibious operation once you're ashore. We are not doing
    mountain or jungle training except by exception.
        So your concern is my concern, sir. We traditionally have
    had a cadre of very experienced officers and senior staff NCOs
    who understood amphibious operations. I'm afraid we're losing
    that capacity and we've been away from it now for 5, maybe 6
    years. I don't know that you get it back in 5 or 6 years. I
    think there is an additional time requirement out there to
    develop and provide experience levels to those kinds of
    marines.
        Senator Akaka. Let me ask my final question to the
    Secretary. The strategic importance of Guam in the Pacific has
    led to increased investment in Navy and Air Force base
    facilities and equipment as more U.S. military capabilities are
    being transferred there. In an effort to make the best use of
    limited resources, part of the Base Realignment and Closure
    2005 recommendation was to realign Anderson Air Force Base by
    relocating the installation management functions into a joint
    basing effort led by the Navy. How is this realignment
    proceeding and what are your recommendations for the
    development of future military capability on Guam?
        Secretary Winter. Senator, I would observe that the
    cooperation that I have seen on Guam between both Navy and Air
    Force senior personnel is probably as good as anyplace else in
    the Services. I think that they are evolving that concept very
    well. We are doing an integrated planning activity as we
    develop the master plan, which incorporates not only Navy and
    Air Force activities, but also Marine Corps requirements
    associated with Anderson and the related areas.
        I think that as we evolve over the next several years there
    is all the possibility of making this perhaps one of the best
    cases for integrated joint basing.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you. I thank you all for your
    responses.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Winter, you and Admiral Roughead, I think, have
    been very articulate and firm in your affirmation of the Navy's
    plan to make sure we have 55 LCSs as a part of the 313-ship
    Navy, and it's just a critical component of our defense
    capability. It's a new high-speed ship that would utilize less
    sailors and have more capability and be able to go into areas
    that we've never been before effectively and could have
    multiple capabilities, and maybe even as years go by we see
    even greater capabilities for that ship and we might even need
    more.
        But I was really taken aback last year when the
    subcommittee zeroed out funding for that. I can't complain. I
    believe persons in your position have to stand up and make sure
    costs come in on line. But we've now cancelled ships from both
    competitors. I guess I'm asking you and Admiral Roughead if you
    realize that it's going to take perhaps some extra effort to
    make sure that our members of the Senate and House are aware
    that, even though you're being vigorous and aggressive on costs
    and have delayed production and done some things, that you
    remain committed to this program.
        Would you share your thoughts, Secretary Winter?
        Secretary Winter. Thank you very much, Senator. I would
    like to underscore your comment there relative to the critical
    importance of LCS. I would note that, as opposed to many other
    of our shipbuilding activities, where we are modernizing and
    replacing older vessels of similar types, that this represents
    truly a new capability and a capability that we have no
    alternative mechanism of providing at this point in time.
        It is not just a matter of the speed, as you pointed out,
    but also the flexibility of the mission, the shallow draft and
    the appropriateness specifically for an evolving and
    increasingly important domain that we have to be prepared to
    fight in, the littoral.
        With regard to the specifics of the acquisition program
    that we've been engaged in, one of my objectives has been to
    ensure that we're able to acquire these vessels in a cost-
    effective manner and a timely manner. One of the things that
    became fairly evident last year was that we were proceeding at
    a rate which was in advance, if you will, of our knowledge and
    understanding of the vessels. The specific actions that I took
    were with the objective of being able to put the program into a
    more studied and appropriate development process.
        I think we now have very good focus on both the individual
    vessels as well as the mission modules. We are proceeding at a
    good pace into the development and trials of both of those, and
    I fully expect that we will come out of this with an
    exceptionally good product and a capability that will provide
    excellent service for our Navy for many years to come.
        Senator Sessions. Your strong action that you took does not
    reflect any doubt of the ultimate ability of the ships being
    considered to meet the goals and requirements of the Navy?
        Secretary Winter. No, sir. If anything, I think we're going
    to wind up with two very good alternatives here, and exactly
    how we sort through that perhaps abundance of riches and
    options is something that we will have to deal with in the
    future. But I'm very comfortable that we have two very good,
    viable designs, either one of which has good prospects for
    fully meeting our objectives in the littoral.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Roughead, would you likewise
    affirm that, even though the Navy has put its foot down on some
    cost and other issues, that that in no way reflects a lack of
    confidence in the capability of these vessels and the need that
    the Navy has for it to be a part of the Fleet?
        Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, Senator. I believe that we
    have had to fill this gap that we have and the LCS does that
    for quite some time. I have visited both variants on two
    occasions in the last 8 months. My visits to that ship only
    increased my commitment to the program, and I believe that the
    decision that was made with regard to LCS-3 and LCS-4 reflects
    a commitment to the program and the need to get the costs under
    control so that we could have the program.
        Senator Sessions. We know part of the cost problem was Navy
    additional requirements, and that all is not the contractor's
    fault when the buyer wants to add more and more capabilities. I
    think in the future, would you not agree that we could do
    better in making sure Congress has a fair picture of the actual
    costs of a product when you recommend it?
        Secretary Winter. Most definitely, sir. One of the changes
    that we put in place over this past year is a formal set of
    gate reviews that mandate that explicit discussion, so that we
    have a definitive set of requirements, not just the top level,
    but a complete set of requirements, in a timely manner and are
    willing to commit to stability in those requirements during the
    course of acquisition.
        Senator Sessions. I would just note, I know the Navy since
    I guess the beginning has favored the Law of the Sea Treaty,
    the LOST Treaty we call it. I'm not here to argue all of that,
    but I would just say to you I have a broader responsibility.
    This is an organization that gives us, I think for the most
    part, just one vote out of 100-and-something nations. It
    creates the possibility of an international taxing body on
    American corporations and businesses. It deals with many things
    that affect the seas. We even had lawsuits over nuclear power
    plants, trying to block plants on land because somebody argues
    that it might be a part of the sea. It creates international
    courts that we are bound to follow. We have perhaps enough
    courts already in our country.
        Someone could argue that this or that action might impact
    the environment of the sea, and we could have an international
    body blocking something that our environmental agency has
    approved in the United States.
        Also I would suggest that a hostile group over some
    political, international, military issue who was unhappy with
    the United States could at times generate enough votes to
    create rules that might block the military from doing things
    that we've historically been able to do.
        So I just want to say that I have some doubts about the
    treaty and I think we need to look at it carefully. That's why
    probably it hasn't been passed yet. It also has sovereignty
    issues that are not minor. We need to think those through.
        General Conway, I was honored to visit you and interact. I
    don't know whether you've had the opportunity to talk about it,
    but I remember the briefing we had in, I believe, 2006--
    Senators Warner and Levin were there--that was so troubling, by
    the Marines about some of the difficult things in al-Anbar with
    the al Qaeda group. Within months, it seems, Major General
    Walter E. Gaskin, Sr., USMC, and his team had begun to
    negotiate with very local leaders, not regional leaders, not
    Baghdad leaders, but local leaders, tribal leaders, city
    mayors, and agreements were reached, and all of a sudden
    persons who had been helping the al Qaeda were now helping us.
    It really has been the model of this dramatic reduction in
    violence by 60 to 70 percent, we've seen in Iraq.
        Would you agree with that, that that was a key part of the
    change that's happened in Iraq? Would you say to us that
    legislation that would direct that you could only use force
    against al Qaeda would be impractical in the battlefield, as
    has been proposed? I don't think we're going to vote on that
    now. Maybe it's pulled down. But we had legislation up in the
    last few days that would have said you have to identify one
    group or another and you can only attack this group and not
    another.
        Any comments you would have?
        General Conway. Sir, the last question first: I would not
    want to put restrictions on the battlefield commanders or, more
    importantly, those NCOs that have to make split of the moment
    decisions that result in lives being lost or saved.
        With regard to your earlier observation, I think that's
    right. I would say that General Gaskin and his folks, the
    marines and soldiers and sailors there, did a wonderful job
    during that rotation. But they had the same theme during that
    period as we had from 2004. So I credit all those rotations
    that were through those cities and that surrounding countryside
    with maintaining the presence, maintaining their patience,
    their discipline, and trying to work with the Sunni sheiks to
    show that that we were not their worst enemy, but the al Qaeda
    was.
        I think when the al Qaeda finally overplayed their hand
    through the murder and the intimidation, wanting to intermarry
    and so forth, the sheiks finally decided collectively they had
    had it up to here. When they came to us to say, ``We will turn
    on them and slaughter them with your assistance'' we were only
    too happy to say, ``We think that's the right thing to do.''
    That's when you saw the Province turn. It was a west to east
    movement, but it has continued east on now to Baghdad and
    places north and south of Baghdad, and I see that as very
    positive.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First I would like to say--it was mentioned earlier--this
    is Senator Warner's last Department of the Navy posture
    hearing, at least as a sitting Senator, and I want to express
    all of the appreciation I can muster for the years of service
    that the senior Senator from Virginia has given our country,
    first as a marine, then in the Defense Department, and finally
    here in the Senate.
        Mr. Chairman, I was a 25-year-old marine my last year in
    the Marine Corps on then Under Secretary and Secretary of the
    Navy Warner's staff, and am pleased to have an association with
    him since that time. I think it can fairly be said that there
    is no one wearing the uniform of the United States military
    today whose military life and well-being has not been affected
    by the dedication of the senior Senator from Virginia. So we
    will look forward to working with you in many other capacities.
        Senator Warner. I deeply am humbled by the comments that
    you make, my good friend. I thank you.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb, also. I tried in a
    very inadequate way to express those sentiments earlier today,
    and I appreciate your comments.
        Senator Webb. I certainly wouldn't want to take away from
    what the chairman said.
        Admiral Roughead, I have said many different times, you're
    familiar that I not only support the growth of the Navy to 313
    ships; I think we need to work really hard to figure out what
    the best number can be. It may be higher than that. I
    personally believe it should be higher than that. We have major
    strategic concerns around the world that I think have been in
    some ways atrophied because of the focus that this country has
    had to have in recent years on the situations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, and there is no substitute for a tangible presence
    of the United States Navy in times of crisis when we have
    strategic concerns around the world.
        You hear how the members feel about that. Everybody seems
    to want ships homeported and everybody seems to want to build
    ships, so let's see what we can do to work together to get
    efficient shipbuilding programs and to streamline the process
    so that we can have the best strategic defense of our country.
        General, I would like to follow on a bit from what Senator
    Akaka began talking about this shift in our assets in the
    Pacific, the situation particularly from Okinawa to Guam. But I
    would like to hear more of your perspectives on that. I've been
    involved in it at one level or another for a very long time.
        One question that came up that I hope you can give us some
    further light on for the committee here is this aviation
    facility on Okinawa that was scheduled to be built offshore on
    the far northern part of the island. I can recall when I was
    visiting Okinawa a few years ago as a journalist there was a
    good bit of support, at least from what I could tell, for
    moving it. Then there was something about a lawsuit that
    originated in the United States that would interrupt the
    construction of this facility. Can you help us out on that?
        General Conway. Sir, if I can, I will talk briefly about
    the facility and then ask the Secretary if he'd like to
    comment, because it is very legal and he and his lawyers have
    been discussing it in detail.
        The facility is called the Futenma Replacement Facility. It
    would be built offshore, you're correct, sir, off Camp Schwab
    in a coral area there, to replace the one we have at Futenma,
    move it from a less populated area to an area offshore. We're
    asking for a similar type of facility that would take aboard
    both our helicopters and our C-130s for intertheater lift.
        It has been seeing recent problems with the finding of the
    Ninth Circuit, and I'd ask the Secretary to take over from
    here.
        Secretary Winter. Yes, sir. Senator, I appreciate the
    question. What has transpired here is that a group of
    individuals, principally from Japan but with a small group of
    plaintiffs from the United States as well, have argued that the
    National Historical Preservation Act applies in this
    circumstance, that, notwithstanding the fact that the
    Government of Japan is responsible for the actual construction
    activity and that the Government of Japan is undergoing their
    equivalent of a NEPA process with their style of EISs, that it
    is incumbent upon us to deal with the dugong, which is a
    manatee type of animal which has been designated by the
    Government of Japan as a cultural treasure, and it is therefore
    argued that the Okinawan dugong is subject to protective
    measures under the National Historic Preservation Act, which is
    one of the few acts which does constrain activities outside the
    United States.
        Senator Webb. Would you say this is going to interrupt the
    construction of the facility?
        Secretary Winter. It has the potential, sir, of disrupting
    the activities. It constrains our ability to provide the final
    approvals on the process, and I am concerned about in
    particular the schedule impact. Notwithstanding what we believe
    is a good likelihood of success in the final adjudication of
    this, the time period that it's going to take is going to be
    significant.
        We are currently evaluating our options to be able to
    continue in parallel, at risk if you will, in particular given
    the fact that the government of Japan has the principal
    responsibilities here.
        Senator Webb. Thank you. We'll look forward to working with
    you to help resolve that, I hope.
        The final disposition, General, of the assets, what would
    that look like, between Guam and Okinawa, Japan?
        Admiral Roughead. Sir, what we'd like to see is about
    10,000 on Okinawa, about 8,000 on Guam. We're proposing that as
    a part of the initial agreement that we also be able to
    distribute some of our forces to Hawaii. In the end what we
    would like to do is effect a brigading, if you will, of those
    locations in the Pacific, with the primary headquarters on
    Guam, but with the air wing and CSS headquarters located
    elsewhere, so as to be able to respond to some need in the
    future by the combatant commander.
        Senator Webb. It's absolutely essential for us to keep
    forces in that region, not only for that region, but for
    maneuverability throughout that part of the world.
        General Conway. I wholeheartedly agree, sir.
        Senator Webb. Have you looked at Babelthaup?
        General Conway. Sir, not as a basing.
        Senator Webb. Great training area.
        General Conway. But our commander in the Pacific is
    developing what he optimistically calls a ``Twentynine Palms of
    the Pacific,'' and he is looking at the Palaus, the Marshalls,
    opportunities to train and perhaps even put a station, if you
    will, on some other nations, where we would visit and bring the
    camp to life and then put it in a cooldown status when we
    leave.
        We think that there are going to have to be additional
    training opportunities because Guam is simply not that large
    and probably the best you're going to be able to do on-island
    is company size.
        Chairman Levin. Would you help us with ``Babelthaup,''
    please?
        Senator Webb. Mr. Chairman, we ought to have a discussion
    about this. The first book that I wrote when I was 27 years old
    postulated that we should realign our military bases in the
    Pacific with a very heavy axis on Guam and Tinian. During those
    discussions actually General Lou Walt had gone out into the
    areas where the Marine Corps had operated in World War II. In
    the Palau Island group there's an island called Babelthaup,
    which is very difficult to spell. But he had recommended that
    as a training area.
        Chairman Levin. The reason I ask was to help our reporter.
    I also must confess ignorance. I had never heard the term
    before.
        Senator Webb. We'll get back to you for the record on that.
    I think there's a t-h-a-u-p on the end of it.
        Chairman Levin. That will give us another reason to go back
    and read your book, though. [Laughter.]
        Senator Webb. I can summarize it for you very quickly.
    [Laughter.]
        Admiral, you mentioned something here about the Naval
    Academy increasing in size in order to resource the growth in
    the Marine Corps? Am I hearing you correctly?
        Admiral Roughead. That's right, Senator. We would like to
    take the Naval Academy brigade strength from 4,300 to 4,400,
    because of the increased number of officers that are being
    commissioned into the Marine Corps in support of the growth.
        Senator Webb. What percentage of the Naval Academy now goes
    into the Marine Corps?
        Admiral Roughead. We're not set on a percentage. I think if
    you were to run the percents it's almost 30-plus percent a year
    that are now going into the Marine Corps.
        Senator Webb. That's incredible. When I look back, when we
    had a 4,100 Midshipman Brigade and the Marine Corps was 190,000
    going into Vietnam, I think they had about a 6\3/4\ percent
    were going into the Marine Corps. Then the Marine Corps went
    from 190,000 to 304,000 during Vietnam and they went up to 10
    percent. When it was at 200,000 when I was in the Pentagon, I
    don't think it was much higher than 10 percent.
        Admiral Roughead. It was about 16 percent when I was the
    Commandant there.
        Senator Webb. What you're really seeing is the impact of a
    reduction in the size of the Navy, I think, with those
    percentages going over.
        These people don't go through regular Marine Corps Officer
    Candidate School (OCS), do they General?
        General Conway. They do not, sir, any longer. They do go to
    Quantico if interested in a Marine Corps option for a 3-week
    period after their third year.
        Senator Webb. Mr. Secretary, when it grew above 10 percent
    when I was Secretary of the Navy, I mandated that those Naval
    Academy midshipmen who wanted to go in the Marine Corps should
    go through the bulldog program the same as the ROTC midshipmen,
    and I think at the time it was done because we were looking at
    the class standing of Naval Academy midshipmen in basic school
    and it had gone way down.
        We don't ever worry about the people at the top. They're
    always going to do well, the people who are really motivated.
    But when you have that high a percentage, I would be curious as
    to see what the spread looks like. You want to make sure that
    everybody's motivated. The Marine Corps has a different
    perspective than a lot of different areas.
        General Conway. I can talk to that myself, sir, if you
    would like. When I was commanding officer at the basic school I
    did a like study and, as you might imagine, our Marine Enlisted
    Commissioning Program was absolutely producing the best
    students, Naval ROTC and Platoon Leader Class a distant second.
    At that point Academy was about the same as OCS, and that was
    troubling to us.
        We started a series of engagements, and I can tell you,
    sir, it's quantum better today. Their performance today is akin
    to their intelligence levels and the 4 years of experience
    they've gained at the Academy.
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, I'd say it turned around when I
    was the Commandant at the Naval Academy. [Laughter.]
        Admiral Roughead. But I would also say that, in addition to
    supporting the Marine Corps growth, the Naval Academy remains
    one of the primary institutions where we get our technical base
    from. So that's why the growth is important. It can't be zero
    sum and that's why we need the growth.
        Senator Webb. Having had an engineering degree shoved down
    my throat during 4 years at the Naval Academy, I know what you
    mean about technical requirements. But I'd kind of be curious
    to see those numbers, actually.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to say that no one has been more of a gentleman
    and more of a class act in terms of a Senator since I arrived
    here than Senator Warner. It's a wonderful time when we can get
    past all that party label stuff and acknowledge this. It's what
    makes this place good for our democracy. So I certainly echo
    the warm sentiments that Senator Webb had.
        Senator Warner. I thank my colleague.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        I note in your testimony, Admiral, that you're concerned
    about the tactical aircraft inventory shortfall. The older F-
    18s are being used, as you well know, far beyond their original
    design. I know your inventory is really challenged by the
    delays in the JSF, and we're talking about now, depending on
    who you talk to and depending on whether we want to be very
    optimistic or whether we want to be overly realistic, somewhere
    between 2-, 3-, and 6-year delays.
        The Carrier Air Wing 7, it's my understanding, is missing
    all of its tactical aircraft at this point and is playing kind
    of a shell game to cover its mission responsibilities. I think
    your inventory models predict at best a 70-aircraft shortfall
    during this transition to JSF.
        My question is, would you comment on your plans in fiscal
    year 2009 and beyond to fix the shortfall? Do we need to
    strongly consider a new multi-year procurement of F-18s to fill
    in the gap in terms of these carrier deck shortfalls,
    particularly in light of our mission in that regard and the
    national security concerns?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, thank you very much for the
    question. The JSF is going to be a capability that will add
    greatly to our Navy capability in the future. That said, as I
    look at how we are using our strike fighter aircraft, we're
    using them at quite a rate. In fact, we have a study underway
    currently to see if we can stretch out the life of the Hornets
    that are in service today.
        As I look at our future air wing--and your number is very
    close to ours. We're saying it's 69. We believe in the 2016
    timeframe that we will have a dip. We have to look at what are
    the mitigators for that. I do not believe we can stretch the
    Hornets any more than we're seeking to do right now.
        But as we go into preparation of our fiscal year 2010
    budget this is something that is foremost in my mind, because
    our ability to project power around the world is a function of
    our carriers and a function of our air wings, and we have to
    make sure that we have the capabilities that we need.
        Senator McCaskill. I'm encouraged that you're looking at
    that, and I certainly--obviously, I think we have a lot to be
    proud of in the F-18. It's under budget and on time and it has
    been a great aircraft for its purpose. Frankly, having a few
    more of them around during this transition period of time I
    think is not something that we should shy away from,
    particularly realizing the gap that's coming.
        Admiral Roughead. It's a great airplane and I'm pleased
    we've been able to transition it into an electronic attack
    variant that I think will be very valuable to us as well.
        Senator McCaskill. It's terrific.
        Also, the only other question I had today for you--and
    frankly, any of you can speak to this. I know that Senator
    Kennedy talked about the MRAP problems in terms of the
    availability. I'm concerned about the whistleblower, Franz
    Gayl. I would like some reassurance from you that Mr. Gayl is
    not going to face any adverse employment decisions or actions
    because of his whistleblowing in regard to the study that was
    done, that has now come out in part of the public discourse.
        General Conway. Ma'am, he works for the Marine Corps. I
    have purposely stayed at arm's length from that discussion. I
    have never met Mr. Gayl or Major Gayl.
        There is, I will say, I guess, an investigation underway to
    determine whether or not he has complied with the guidance that
    was given to him by his boss. We are making every overture to
    ensure that we don't violate any aspects of his whistleblower
    status. But if it's determined that Mr. Gayl has done something
    other than what his leadership and his bosses have instructed
    him to do, then that outcome will have to be determined, as to
    what happens to Mr. Gayl.
        Senator McCaskill. I know that General Magnus recently
    referred this to the DOD IG, which I think is an appropriate
    move. I know how hard it is internally to be careful in this
    regard, and I know that there are some whistleblowers who have
    not followed direct instructions and who have gotten out in
    ways that maybe they shouldn't have.
        But the impact that dealing negatively with whistleblowers
    has on the entire operation is something that we really need to
    avoid. Whistleblowers are so important to accountability,
    regardless of whether we're talking about a bureaucratic agency
    that's dealing with the taxpayers or whether we're talking
    about the military. I just want to make sure that I didn't
    leave this hearing without expressing to you how strongly I
    feel and how closely I'll be watching to make sure that any
    whistleblower, and this whistleblower in particular, is treated
    with respect and deference and under the letter of the law in
    terms of any potential adverse consequences because of what he
    did.
        I just think it's tremendously important and I just didn't
    want to leave the hearing without expressing that in very
    strong terms.
        General Conway. I do appreciate that and I can assure you
    from my leadership position he will be treated in accordance
    with the law.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill.
        Admiral, I think you made reference to the number of P-3s
    that are grounded.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. As 39?
        Admiral Roughead. 39 is what we've grounded.
        Chairman Levin. What's the total number of P-3s we have? Is
    that a third? What percentage of the total is that?
        Admiral Roughead. That's about a third of what we have
    operational.
        Chairman Levin. You can get us the precise number for the
    record, just to get some idea of that.
        Admiral Roughead. I will get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        There are currently 157 P-3C aircraft in the inventory. The 39 Red
    Striped aircraft comprise approximately 25 percent of the total force.

        Chairman Levin. By the way, we'll just have a brief second
    round for those who want to ask some additional questions.
        On the MRAPs, General, your decision on the MRAPs, which is
    totally understandable, you explained it very well as to the
    various missions and what vehicles you need for which missions.
    When you purchase less or fewer MRAPs than expected, does the
    Army need the ones that you did not buy, do you know, and does
    that speed up delivery to the Army of their requirement because
    you're not going to be using all of the ones you originally
    planned on? Does that have any impact positively on the Army?
        General Conway. Sir, potentially, in that there would have
    been a distribution over time of those that were built that was
    depending upon the needs of the units in theater. Frankly, a
    part of our determination to recommend reduction of our buy was
    that we were not seeing the contacts in the west that the Army
    was still having, Baghdad, Diyalah, and up towards Mosul.
        So the answer I think is probably yes. That said, when we
    considered the reduction we looked at the impact that it would
    have on industry. We didn't want them to have bought up steel
    and transmissions and tires for a vehicle that we would
    suddenly say that we didn't need. There was no impact there.
        Chairman Levin. That would be a second question. But as far
    as the Army, you're not sure whether or not that brings them
    quicker to their requirement?
        General Conway. I think it's fair to say that it will, sir,
    because all those built on this last buy, which I think was
    December of this last year, will be Army. There will be no
    Marine vehicles in there.
        Chairman Levin. I'd like to talk to you about your troop
    levels. General, as I understand it in CENTCOM now, in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, you now have eight battalions; is that correct?
        General Conway. Sir, today as we speak we have eight
    battalions, that is correct.
        Chairman Levin. It's your intention to increase that to 10
    by March or in March? Is that your general plan?
        General Conway. Sir, it gets complicated, but our committed
    battalions will be 10 in March, because you will have the eight
    in Iraq and two more battalions, of course with the MEU
    headquarters and the support elements, going into Afghanistan.
    So from March through May the commitment will be 10 battalions.
        Chairman Levin. Then in May you're going to be bringing
    back two battalions as I understand it?
        General Conway. That is correct, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Then you'll be staying with eight through
    October?
        General Conway. That is correct, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Now, is it your plan to draw down below
    eight in October? Is that your current plan?
        General Conway. Sir, the conditions under which the
    Secretary of Defense approved the request for forces was such
    that the deployments to Afghanistan represent 7-month
    deployments, which is our norm, for both the MEU and the
    battalion. So ostensibly those forces will be coming out in
    October of this year.
        Chairman Levin. Is it fair to say then that is what the
    current plan is, but it could be changed?
        General Conway. Mr. Chairman, that's exactly right.
        Chairman Levin. Now, on that Law of the Sea Convention that
    we made reference to--and I'm delighted to hear the
    administration is going to strongly support the ratification of
    that convention. It's my understanding that the Foreign
    Relations Committee voted that out again this Congress, and I'm
    wondering whether any of you or either of you may have
    testified before the committee, or was that your predecessors?
        Admiral Roughead. I did not testify. I believe Admiral
    Mullen testified, and I know Admiral Vernon E. Clark, USN
    (Ret.) did as well.
        Chairman Levin. He testified, okay.
        Senator Warner. Very strongly, if I might say, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. That's great.
        I'm urging again that this convention be brought to the
    floor. I just think it's long overdue. It has great value in
    terms of the Navy, the way in which we can have orderly
    processes at sea working with other nations. My dear colleague,
    Senator Warner, was the person who actually signed the treaty,
    I believe on behalf of the country.
        Senator Warner. When I was Secretary of the Navy, I was the
    delegate for the Secretary of Defense to the Law of the Sea
    Conference in Geneva. It was about 36 years ago that I
    performed that service. It was someone different than the
    Incidents at Sea.
        But I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing up this
    question of this treaty. It's important for the United States
    of America if we're going to continue to lead as the major
    maritime power, and we now have before us today the current
    team that's in charge of the Navy and they give unqualified
    support to this treaty. So thank you for bringing it up.
        Chairman Levin. I thank you. There's a wonderful picture of
    Senator Warner, if you have a chance to see it, when he was
    just a couple years younger, when he was, on behalf of the
    United States of America, initialing or signing fully that
    agreement. It's a wonderful bit of naval history, an important
    part to security, stability on the seas. It's a great history
    and I hope that we're able to confirm this while Senator
    Warner's still in the United States Senate.
        But a number of the benefits of the Law of the Sea
    Convention which have been cited were: the right of unimpeded
    transit passage through straits that are used for international
    navigation; a framework for challenging excessive claims of
    other states over coastal waters; and the right to conduct
    military activities in exclusive economic zones.
        Admiral, I believe you have said that the convention
    provides a stable, predictable, and recognized legal regime
    that we need to conduct our operations today and in the future.
        Admiral Roughead. Absolutely.
        Chairman Levin. So I wanted to get all that in the record
    because I will be asking the Majority Leader to bring that
    convention to the floor.
        The only other question I think I have is about the EFV.
    General, let me just ask you about the funding for that
    vehicle. This is really the missing piece in your over-the-
    horizon assault goal. It's been in development, this vehicle,
    since the early 1990s. There was a cost breach of the Nunn-
    McCurdy which occurred last year. That resulted in a delay. But
    there's a funding shortfall, as I understand it; is that
    correct, or is that not a funding issue at the moment?
        General Conway. Sir, I think at this point it's a
    developmental issue more than it is a funding issue. We have
    reduced our requirements by half in order to have just those
    vehicles that we sense that we have to need. We accept fully
    the reason why the Navy would not want to close closer than 25
    miles to an unfriendly shore. So you're precisely right, we
    have to find some way to bridge that distance and do it
    quickly.
        I'd ask the Secretary, sir, if he would have any comments
    about the funding or the development.
        Chairman Levin. Maybe you could comment on it. Mr.
    Secretary, is there a funding issue or is that a different
    problem?
        Secretary Winter. No, sir, I believe the issue here that
    you're referring to is a developmental one, where we went
    through the test and evaluation activities last year. While the
    vehicle was able to perform the vast majority of its
    objectives, the reliability was far from what we were looking
    for. So we went and took the program and said we needed to do a
    design for reliability and maintainability, with the hopes of
    being able to come up with a configuration that would reflect
    those types of improvements, give us the ability to maintain
    this critical asset on board ship, and have the availability
    and reliability that we expect out of a vehicle of this type,
    and make all of those changes before we went into production.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General Conway. Sir, if I could add one thing. We've talked
    some about the growth of other navies. I am going to China the
    end of next month. I'm invited to go out and ride aboard one of
    their new amphibious ships and then to be taken ashore in their
    equivalent of the EFV, that will ride well above the wave
    height at something exceeding 25 miles an hour.
        Chairman Levin. That's great. I think, by the way, these
    military-to-military contacts are valuable for all kinds of
    reasons, and that's a perfect example of it.
        General Conway. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
    every now and then we should acknowledge the support that we
    get from our staffs. I wanted to thank a member of your staff,
    Fletcher Cork, for recognizing when the hearing started the
    temperature in this room was 64 degrees, and we have now got it
    up to 70.
        Chairman Levin. The conversation has not been heated at
    all. [Laughter.]
        Senator Warner. It's just the foresight of a very able
    staff member.
        Chairman Levin. New technology in operation here.
        Senator Warner. It's your staff.
        Chairman Levin. We want to thank you for recognizing my
    staff.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. They've done some other important things as
    well. Not recently. [Laughter.]
        Senator Warner. Notice all the laughter emanated on your
    side. [Laughter.]
        I want to talk a little bit about the family structure,
    which is so important to each and every one of those
    servicemembers, be it male or female, that's proud to wear the
    uniform. Admiral, I understand that you recently requested the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to hold a tank session of the
    senior military leadership to address military health care
    costs and DOD medical issues. I hope that that will come to
    pass.
        We're fortunate in DOD to have the services of a man by the
    name of Dr. Alfred S. Casales, M.D. You're familiar with him?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I know him.
        Senator Warner. Extraordinary achievement in the private
    sector as a cardiac surgeon, and he's heading up the team. He
    will undoubtedly be integral to this study.
        But tell us what you hope to achieve from bringing this up
    with your fellow members in the tank. Then, General, I'd like
    to invite you to address the same question. Because we have
    tried to improve health care. This committee has taken the
    leadership over many years. We did TRICARE for Life
    legislation. We had the very serious problem of, I just call it
    the Walter Reed syndrome, which awakened all of us to the need
    for further study. Now I think you're carrying it to another
    level.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. My motivation in recommending
    to the Chairman that the Chiefs talk about health care really
    stems from a couple of things. One is that as we look at what
    our people value, what our sailors and their families value,
    the surveys always point that health care is at the very top of
    the list.
        It is also true that the costs of health care are
    significant and that they are squeezing and putting pressure on
    budgets in ways that were not envisioned years ago.
        But most importantly, when you combine these things, and as
    we make adjustments in how we deliver care, whether it's
    privatized or direct care, I believe that the Chiefs must have
    a discussion as to what the nature of our operational health
    care will be, and in the case of the Navy and the Marine Corps
    we're an expeditionary force, we're a deployed force. So as we
    make changes to health care systems and how we budget for that,
    what effect does that have on the operational dimension?
        I believe that it's the Chiefs that must have that
    discussion. We can talk about the business plans and other
    things in other fora. But we collectively as Services, and as
    we become more joint in the providing of health care, I think
    it's time that we have this discussion. It's not aimed at any
    particular area.
        Senator Warner. I strongly commend you for that initiative.
        Would you like to add your perspective?
        General Conway. Sir, there's two or three points I'd like
    to offer. One, we with Navy medicine, I think, are doing a very
    good job with our wounded warriors. That includes PTSD and TBI,
    although we continue to, I think, do some discovery learning in
    terms of techniques. There is no lack of effort to provide the
    best possible medical care.
        The Navy has a forward-deployed footprint. The Admiral
    mentioned that they're expeditionary. They are. They're forward
    with us with teams sorting out these things really now in both
    theaters, and that's as it should be. What happens as an
    indirect result of that, and I'm attempting to manage it
    through discussions with the families and so forth, is that
    there is a shortfall in some of the hospitals and clinics. Our
    people wait a little longer, but they still get great treatment
    when they get in, and we're helping our families to understand
    that.
        One area that I find, though, that I think we need to place
    increasing attention and increasing concern are for those
    Exceptional Family Member Programs. We have stories out there
    of a first sergeant living in his mother-in-law's home, with
    his wife and two children, one of whom is an exceptional child.
    He is paying $80,000 a year for that treatment to that child
    and that's where all his income is going. He's a devoted
    parent.
        But the care that's being offered for some of our
    exceptional family members through the TRICARE system that we
    have now I think needs to take a closer look at those specific
    concerns and help these families, because they're having tough
    times otherwise.
        Senator Warner. They look to you as the uniformed boss. But
    I would like to invite Secretary Winter to follow on to the
    General's observation. I commend you for your recognition of
    the Navy-Marine Corps family as they've endured these high
    operational tempos, the initiatives you have outlined, adding
    4,000 child care spaces, authorizing 100,000 hours of respite
    care for families of deployed servicemembers, enhanced programs
    for children and youth, indeed at a price. Tell us a little bit
    about those initiatives?
        Secretary Winter. Sir, as has been said many times, we
    recruit sailors and marines; we retain their families. Ensuring
    that we're able to provide for an appropriate lifestyle and an
    appropriate environment for our families there is of absolute
    importance. Doing that at our Fleet concentration areas has
    been a major objective here. It has been somewhat easier, if
    you will, in those areas than it has been at some of the more
    farflung places that we operate, and in particular a little bit
    more challenging, obviously, for those families associated with
    our IAs and reservists that have been called up for Active
    Duty.
        What we're trying to do right now is to develop a whole
    range of programs and processes that can address the full
    spectrum of those families. The child development center
    investments that you referred to are a major part of that. That
    happens to be one of the highest priority items any time we go
    out and conduct surveys of families as to what is really
    important for them. Similarly, being able to provide the full
    range of support from the fleet and family service centers is
    increasingly important.
        What we've been doing of late, in addition to those
    activities, is affording mechanisms for families that are not
    co-located, that are not in those Fleet concentration areas, to
    participate in the call centers, the Internet Web sites, the
    other mechanisms that we've been able to identify, to be able
    to make sure that our families are taken care of and know how
    to get the resources that they need, no matter where they live.
        Senator Warner. I want to thank you for that initiative.
        Gentlemen, it's interesting, this July will mark 35 years
    of the All-Volunteer Force. Too much has been said about me
    here today, but I was privileged to be in the DOD in your
    position in July 1973 when the draft ended. We took a deep
    breath. I say ``we''; the whole of the United States, and
    particularly the military leaders, civilian and uniformed,
    decided to try an experiment that no other nation had ever
    tried. It has worked magnificently.
        As a matter of fact, I think it has worked better than any
    of us at that time had the vision to foresee. We have to
    protect it. I'd just like to wind up this session by hopefully
    receiving your assurances that in your collective professional
    judgment, if all three will respond to the question, that the
    All-Volunteer Force is very much alive and well and even
    strengthening.
        Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Winter. Yes, Senator. I would argue it is not
    only necessary, but it is clearly possible. We just need to
    take care of our servicemembers and their families, and I think
    this Nation will continue to support us.
        Senator Warner. Admiral?
        Admiral Roughead. Senator, in June 1973 you spoke at my
    graduation.
        Senator Warner. At Annapolis.
        Admiral Roughead. You headed me fair, as we say in the
    Navy, and I'm honored that you're here at my first posture
    statement.
        The reason I bring that up is because of your leadership
    and your concern for the men and women of our Navy. That today
    I serve in the best Navy I have ever served in, and it's a
    function of the All-Volunteer Force, the care that you and this
    committee, the attention and the thought that goes into truly
    creating an environment where our young men and women can come
    and be fulfilled personally and professionally, has made our
    Navy what it is today. I thank you and I thank the committee
    for everything that you do.
        Senator Warner. General?
        General Conway. Sir, I joined the Marine Corps in 1971 in
    the operating forces. That was before the All-Volunteer
    military. There is no comparison between today's military and
    the people we had in our ranks at that point, absolutely no
    comparison.
        I would offer that a small All-Volunteer military is really
    put to the test in a protracted conflict such as we see here
    now. But use of our Reserves, I think, across all Services has
    helped to mitigate that, and we're managing that, I think
    effectively, in many instances.
        I would end, sir, by saying, however, that we're now a
    country of over 300 million people. Less than 1 percent of our
    numbers wear the uniform at any point in time. That is our
    warrior class. That's our insurance against all those things
    out there that could in some way do damage to our country. I
    would only ask that you continue to support and sustain those
    people to the best of your ability, because we owe them a great
    deal.
        Senator Warner. I want to thank you for those comments. As
    a matter of fact, I leave here to go to the floor at 2 o'clock
    to join Senator Webb, who's really been a leader in so many
    initiatives in the short time he's been in the Senate, to put
    forth legislation to strengthen and broaden the GI Bill.
        When I reflect on my modest career, it would not have been
    achievable had I not received a GI Bill education for modest
    service in World War II and a law degree for again modest
    Active Duty in the Marine Corps, this time during the Korean
    Conflict. I think this generation is entitled to the same
    benefits as my generation had. That educational program was
    probably the best investment that the American taxpayers ever
    made. It started in 1944.
        I mention that only because in my judgment the initiatives
    of Senator Webb and others who joined on this field are going
    to strengthen and solidify the foundation on which the All-
    Volunteer Force exists. I think it's an important step. Sleep
    with one eye open. We cannot ever revert back to the draft in
    my judgment, absent some extraordinary unforeseeable situation.
        You remember, General--and I think probably, Admiral, you
    saw the vestiges of the draft--the problem that we had, the
    disciplinary problems, because there were just individuals who
    were there, not because they raised their hands and
    volunteered, as does every single person in uniform today. They
    are there because they had the courage and the willingness to
    raise their hand and said ``I volunteer.''
        So sleep with one eye open and guard it.
        I thank you again, Senator, for your comments.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. A lot's been
    said about you today.
        Senator Warner. Too much.
        Chairman Levin. Well, no, not enough. A lot more is going
    to be said about you in the months ahead. But most importantly,
    it's not just what you've contributed to the security of this
    country, representing your beloved Commonwealth, but we're
    going to look forward to many, many, many, many more years of
    your contribution to the security of this country after you
    leave this particular place early next year.
        Senator Warner and I have exchanged this gavel many times
    as chairman. I think we've each been chairman three times now.
    I'm just wondering, Senator, since this is going to be, I
    think, your last posture hearing, unless we can slip in an
    additional one just for old time's sake before you leave, if
    you would gavel this hearing to a close.
        Senator Warner [presiding]. This is an unexpected pleasure.
    Thank you. A third of a century of my life has been with the
    Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and with our military, and I
    wouldn't be here today but for what they did for me, and I
    don't think I've done in return that much for them. But I thank
    you for this honor.
        Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                increases in navy science and technology funding
        1. Senator Reed. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, the Navy
    mission has undergone significant change where the threats, theaters of
    operations, and increasingly joint context of operations have shifted
    significantly. One would expect a `bump' in science and technology
    (S&T) funding associated with technology enablers for new mission
    capabilities. This can be observed in the Army funding the S&T efforts
    to support the Future Combat System (FCS) when it was evident that a
    transformation to a faster, leaner, more connected ground force was
    needed. The Army got their S&T bump starting in 2005 and is now coming
    back down. Many of the technologies will not necessarily be tied to a
    platform, but are part of the overall theater combat network. We are at
    a point in time in the Navy where the force structure is changing and
    several new ship and air platform types are in the works. Typically,
    there is an increase in S&T before new platform types are introduced
    into the fleet as new systems technologies are developed for the
    platform. We are at that point in the Navy where a bump should be
    expected. The Navy budget for S&T has essentially flat-lined since 2004
    including the budget presented this year. Are we falling behind the
    curve in funding research and development (R&D) to support both
    shipboard and expeditionary force advanced capability?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. We are not falling behind.
    The Navy has renewed its commitment to a strong S&T leadership role as
    reflected in the 6 percent increase in S&T investment in the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2009. We continue focusing
    our S&T investments on greater integration of capabilities and on
    aggressively tapping into the opportunities provided by the global
    movement of ideas, technology, and innovation.
        Our S&T investments present a well-reasoned balance between applied
    science, focused on near-term challenges, and basic research to make
    longer-term investments to advance the frontiers of science. Our
    investment in basic and early applied research will build the
    scientific foundation for future technologies, emphasize key ``game
    changing'' initiatives that can provide disruptive technologies to our
    sailors and marines, and focus on the transition of critical S&T
    programs to the acquisition community and the fleet.
        The naval S&T strategy provides this balance by directing minimum
    investments as follows:

             At least 40 percent in discovery and invention (basic
            research and early applied research)
             At least 30 percent in acquisition enablers, primarily the
            Future Naval Capabilities (applied and advanced research)
             At least 10 percent in leap ahead innovations such as
            Electromagnetic Railgun (applied and advanced research)
             At least 10 percent in quick reaction S&T (advanced research)

        2. Senator Reed. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, if the Navy
    is falling behind in funding on R&D to support shipboard and
    expeditionary force advanced capability, how much is needed to supply
    an adequate `bump' in Navy S&T funding?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The Navy is not falling
    behind on R&D funding. We value S&T to give us a warfighting advantage
    and enable new innovative naval operating concepts. We have increased
    our investment in S&T by 6 percent in the President's budget request
    for fiscal year 2009 and 1.5 percent across the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP).
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
                            unmanned aerial systems
        3. Senator Bayh. General Conway, the MQ-9 Reaper, an Unmanned
    Aerial System (UAS), continues to distinguish itself during challenging
    combat operations in Southwest Asia supporting U.S. and coalition
    forces in combat abroad. U.S. and allied military commanders engaged in
    these operations have identified the MQ-9 Reaper as consistently key to
    mission success. The capabilities of the MQ-9 Reaper equipped with the
    DB-110 Reconnaissance Pod meet U.S. Marine Corps combat requirements in
    Iraq and Afghanistan, providing persistent endurance, superior wide-
    area/day-night surveillance, precision strike, and beyond-line-of-sight
    operations, while also providing a 3,000 pound external payload
    capacity to meet future Marine Corps combat needs. However, the Marine
    Corps currently lacks these UAS capabilities and their dedicated
    employment. What are the combat benefits the Marine Corps could derive
    from the MQ-9 Reaper's immediate strike capability assuming the MQ-9
    Reaper were dedicated to and under direct control of Marine Corps
    fighting forces?
        General Conway. The MQ-9 Reaper is a large, multi-function UAS with
    a myriad of capabilities for providing day/night ISR and weapons
    employment. The Marine Corps could certainly benefit from dedicated MQ-
    9 Reaper support. However, UAS support is a zero sum equation and the
    Marine Corps is currently meeting its commitments with the RQ-7B
    Shadow.
        Operational control (Direct Support vice General Support to the
    Joint Force) of an RQ-9 system by the Marine Corps would be in conflict
    to the Joint Force Commander's employment plan and would be achieved at
    the cost of support to another joint or coalition unit. Beyond
    operational support, the Marine Corps could not support the MQ-9 system
    with regard to logistics or manpower. The MQ-9 Reaper is three times
    longer, five and a half times wider, and an order or magnitude heavier
    than the currently fielded RQ-7B Shadow. The size and weight of the MQ-
    9 limit its ability to be incorporated into the expeditionary
    warfighting methodology used by the Marine Corps.
        The future Tier II capability desired by the Marine Corps will
    retain its expeditionary capability with a requirement that it be
    transportable by a CH-53 aircraft. The MQ-9 does not meet this
    requirement.
        If given the opportunity to operationally control an MQ-9 system
    for direct support to the MAGTF, the USMC would certainly derive a
    short-term benefit. The cost to the Joint Force Commander could be
    considered detrimental given the limited availability of MQ-9 assets.
    It is a matter of debate as to the priority for MQ-9 support.

        4. Senator Bayh. General Conway, could the MQ-9 Reaper's and the
    DB-110 Reconnaissance Pod's capabilities complement Marine aviation
    functions, to include: Offensive Air Support, Aerial Reconnaissance,
    Assault Support, Electronic Warfare, Command and Control of Aircraft
    and Missiles, and Anti-Air Warfare?
        General Conway. Yes. Direct support to the MAGTF provided by the
    MQ-9 Reaper would complement the six functions of Marine aviation. The
    difference between the benefit provided and the associated cost of
    ownership is the deciding factor regarding the MQ-9 Reaper. If the
    Marine Corps were directed to support the MQ-9, the other aviation
    functions would suffer due to the logistical and manpower requirements
    to operate and control the system (e.g. maintainers, aviators, command
    and control officers, etc).

        5. Senator Bayh. General Conway, could the Marine Corps benefit
    from an extended Marine Corps MQ-9 Reaper/DB-110 Reconnaissance Pod
    combat evaluation in Southwest Asia, while operating under direct and
    dedicated Marine Corps control?
        General Conway. Yes, the Marine Corps could stand to benefit from
    MQ-9 Reaper support. Two key assumptions are critical to a successful
    evaluation. First, if all system support was provided by the owning
    agency (e.g. operators, maintenance, and controllers). Second, if the
    tempo from that agency matched our battle-rhythm. The rate at which
    tasks were turned into reconnaissance and actionable intelligence would
    have to be responsive and timely to meet the Marine Corps concept of
    operations. Given both assumptions, the Marine Corps would benefit from
    a combat evaluation of the MQ-9 Reaper.

                  nuclear and fossil-fuel navy power analysis
        6. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, the Navy
    has been studying variants of the next cruiser, CG(X), including
    nuclear power, in an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), which was to be
    completed in 2007. I am extraordinarily pleased the Navy is undertaking
    this effort, and compliment the Navy's leadership and vision in
    pursuing such an in-depth study so critical to our Nation's security
    for the next half century. Is this analysis a true apples-to-apples
    comparison of nuclear and fossil-fueled ships, taking into account:

             the fact that procurement costs for nuclear ships
            include the cost of fuel for the ship's lifetime, while
            procurement costs for fossil-fuel ships do not include a
            lifetime of fuel;
             the cost of the fuel supply infrastructure for fossil-
            fueled ships, including costs to protect supply ships as
            capital ships (including the potential growth of fuel and
            infrastructure costs over the life of the ship);
             the value of energy independence, increased mobility,
            and reduced carbon emissions from nuclear ships;
             the value of more space for weapons, unmanned
            vehicles, and aircraft fuel in nuclear ships due to space saved
            by not storing fuel for power;
             long-term savings on submarines and aircraft carriers
            due to increased nuclear production; and
             the value of nuclear power's ability to accommodate
            the high energy demands of future weapon systems?

        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The Maritime Air and Missile
    Defense of Joint Forces AOA, which includes consideration of CG(X)
    platform alternatives, examined and compared the Life-Cycle Costs
    (LCCs) for nuclear and fossil-fueled ship concepts on an equal basis.
    The LCCs include costs for development, procurement, operations and
    support (including fossil fuel usage), and disposal. This cost
    comparison includes the cost of nuclear reactor cores supporting ship
    life in the upfront acquisition cost comparisons. For the operating and
    support costs, a delivered fully burdened cost of fuel is used in
    accordance with Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance and the
    Defense Energy Support Center price which includes direct costs (fuel
    price, refinement, transportation, facilities/operations) as well as
    proportionate indirect costs (Navy storage and handling, oiler
    acquisition and operating costs, and environmental related costs).
        The cost of protecting supply ships or growth in fuel supply
    infrastructure was not evaluated in the AoA. As CG(X) is envisioned to
    operate with Strike Groups and/or Surface Action Groups, accordingly no
    major impact to the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) structure is
    anticipated with either a new nuclear cruiser or a new efficient, high
    endurance, fossil fueled cruiser because CG(X)/CGN(X) is not the
    limiting ship class for re-supply. Should the Navy consider platform
    alternatives or operating concepts that affect these assumptions, the
    Navy will consider the impact to the CLF in the decision process.
    Regarding the value of increased mobility:
        While any financial benefits that would accrue from operational
    advantages were not included in the cost comparison, studies of
    operational sufficiency conducted in support of the AoA suggest that
    nuclear power allows higher transit speeds in surge-to-theater missions
    without underway replenishment. Nuclear power offers increased time
    between replenishment resulting in longer time on station during
    warfighting operations.
        The value of energy independence beyond the operational benefits to
    a nuclear-powered CG(X) was not evaluated in the AoA. Quantification of
    the impacts of nuclear power on strategic energy independence is
    difficult in a cost comparison.
    Regarding the value of reduced carbon emissions from nuclear ships:
        The value of reduced carbon emissions was not evaluated during the
    AoA. Design and operation of a future CG(X) platform will comply with
    applicable Federal, State, and local statutes.
    Regarding the value of more space for weapons, unmanned vehicles, and
            aircraft fuel in nuclear ships due to space saved by not
            storing fuel for power:
        Development of ship design concepts to support the assessed
    operational requirements (including weapons, unmanned vehicles, and
    aircraft fuel) in the AoA included examination of the design impacts of
    alternative propulsion systems such as machinery space and fuel tank
    requirements.
    Regarding long-term savings on submarines and aircraft carriers due to
            increased nuclear production:
        The AoA considers but did not specifically include the long-term
    savings (5-9 percent) on submarines and aircraft carriers due to
    increased nuclear production.
    Regarding the value of nuclear power's ability to accommodate the high
            energy demands of future weapon systems:
        The ability to accommodate higher electric energy demands
    associated with future weapon and sensor systems is a function of
    electrical generation and distribution capacity, and is independent of
    fuel type (nuclear vs. fossil fuel). Flexibility in accommodating
    increased electric loads can be introduced into either nuclear or
    fossil fuel propulsion plant designs, although fossil fuel endurance is
    degraded with electric load growth.

        7. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, when will
    the results of the AoAs be complete and made available to Congress?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The results of the Maritime
    Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces AoA, more commonly referred to
    as the CG(X) AoA, were delivered to the Navy Staff in January 2008. The
    Navy Staff is reviewing this comprehensive and lengthy report. The
    report is over 600 pages of information and reflects 18 months of work.
    The Navy is conducting a series of internal reviews prior to making
    final decisions in several critical areas. I have been updated on the
    progress of the internal Navy AoA reviews. Once complete, the AoA
    Report will be forwarded from the Navy Staff via the Secretary of the
    Navy's Office to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for final
    approval. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will have the final
    determination on when the AoA will be made available to Congress.

        8. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, if the cost
    of fuel, as well as the costs of operating and protecting supply ships,
    were added to the upfront costs of fossil-fueled ships, what would the
    difference in upfront costs be for nuclear and fossil-fuel cruisers?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The Maritime Air and Missile
    Defense of Joint Forces AoA, which evaluated CG(X) platform
    alternatives, examines and compares the LCCs for the nuclear and fossil
    fueled ship concepts on an equal basis based on the fully burdened cost
    of fuel to include the operations of the supply ship. The AoA did not
    evaluate the cost of protecting supply ships. As CG(X) is envisioned to
    operate with Strike Groups and/or Surface Action Groups, no major
    impact to the CLF structure is anticipated with either a new nuclear
    cruiser or a new efficient, high endurance, fossil fueled cruiser
    because CG(X)/CGN(X) is not the limiting ship class for resupply.
    Should the Navy consider platform alternatives or operating concepts
    that affect these assumptions, the Navy will consider the impact to the
    CLF in the decision process.

        9. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, has the
    Navy considered alternative funding methods for nuclear fuel--for
    instance, funding nuclear fuel with the same appropriations fund that
    is used for fossil fuels--to reduce the difference in procurement costs
    in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) fund? If not, why not?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. No, the Navy has not
    considered alternative funding methods for reactor cores for new
    construction ships. These funds are required to support construction.
    Changing the appropriations to procure these reactor cores represents
    no advantage to the Navy.

        10. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, absent the
    current budget approach for nuclear fuel in SCN and fossil fuel in
    Operation and Maintenance, Navy, which power plant--nuclear-powered or
    fossil-fueled--will provide operationally superior capabilities for a
    cruiser able to meet the Navy's drastically increasing operational
    tempo and support Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and other future high
    energy weapons systems?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The budget approach has no
    impact on operational capability. However, studies conducted in support
    of the Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces AoAs, which
    included consideration of CG(X) platform alternatives; assess that
    nuclear power offers increased time between replenishment resulting in
    longer time on station during warfighting operations and higher transit
    speeds in a surge-to-theater scenario.
        Cruisers currently deploy with other fossil fuel ships including
    CLF assets that can provide refueling at sea capability in the existing
    air defense concept of operations. The operational impact of reduced
    operational presence due to replenishment at sea is minimized if
    operating distances between CLF assets and the CG(X) remain small.
        The ability to accommodate higher electric energy demands
    associated with future weapon and sensor systems is a function of
    electrical generation capacity, and is independent of fuel type
    (nuclear vs. fossil fuel). Flexibility in accommodating increased
    electric loads can be introduced into either nuclear or fossil fuel
    propulsion plant designs, although fossil fuel endurance is degraded
    with electric load growth.

        11. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, several
    years ago, the Nation's various shipyards were consolidated under two
    shipbuilding companies, to achieve greater efficiency and reduced
    costs. Have those predicted results been realized in savings in
    shipbuilding costs?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The consolidation of the
    shipyards under two shipbuilding companies allows those shipbuilders
    more flexibility to take a sector view in balancing their resources and
    facilities as they determine the most efficient approach in the
    production process. The Navy is encouraged by General Dynamics' and
    Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding's recent attempts to explore corporate-
    wide efficiencies across their shipyards. The innovative design and
    build practices being implemented by General Dynamics Electric Boat and
    Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Newport News in the Virginia-class
    Submarine Program serves as a model for other programs. Cost reduction
    goals are being realized and as a result the Navy will begin procuring
    two submarines per year in fiscal year 2011, 1 year earlier than
    previously planned. General Dynamics has also used Electric Boat's
    designers on the DDG-1000 design contract and Northrop Grumman Newport
    News resources have been used to support production of ships at
    Northrop Grumman Ship Systems. The Navy believes greater efficiencies
    and cost savings are possible as industry further examines the
    potential for corporate-wide savings.

        12. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, both of
    the Nation's shipbuilders own nuclear and non-nuclear shipyards. Would
    shifting contracts to the shipbuilders vice individual shipyards better
    facilitate construction of future classes of nuclear-powered ships, by
    requiring the shipbuilders to most efficiently allocate their resources
    and distribute their work throughout the individual shipyards?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. Awarding a nuclear
    shipbuilding contract to the ``parent'' corporation will not
    significantly change the allocation of ship components or systems
    within the corporation. The Navy awards contracts to the legal entity
    capable of performing the work. In most cases, the legal entity that
    possesses the qualifications, certifications, facilities, and resources
    to construct and deliver nuclear-powered ships is the individual
    shipyard, not the parent company. There is currently no contractual
    prohibition against sharing work across sectors of the same
    corporation, and shipyards do that. The Navy, in collaboration with
    industry partners, determines the most efficient manner to build ships,
    subject to the requisite technical approvals and competencies of the
    specific shipyards.

                              modular construction
        13. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, modular
    construction has been very successful for the Virginia-class submarine
    program. How will the Navy apply this successful method of modular
    construction to other programs, particularly the nuclear cruiser
    program?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. Modular construction has
    been a standard practice for more than 2 decades (e.g., DDG-51, LPD-17,
    T-AKE, and DDG-1000). The Navy seeks increased use of modular
    construction to maximize pre-outfitting and testing. Such efficient
    construction methods are planned for incorporation into any cruiser
    alternative. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News and General
    Dynamics Electric Boat are the Nation's two authorized and experienced
    nuclear qualified construction shipyards. Non-nuclear sections of
    future nuclear-powered ships could be built by other shipyards
    experienced in Naval Surface Combatant construction (General Dynamics
    Bath Iron Works and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Gulf Coast). The
    method and location of construction of potential additional nuclear-
    powered ship classes have not yet been determined. Lessons learned for
    efficient modular construction in the Virginia- and Ford-class programs
    will be applied to any new nuclear ship construction plan.

                      number of navy ships and submarines
        14. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, given the
    fact that the number of Navy submarines will dip significantly below
    the Navy's stated minimum requirement of 48 submarines in about 20
    years, are there ways to rearrange the Navy's shipbuilding budget to
    facilitate more submarines sooner?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The shipbuilding plan
    detailed in the Navy's Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for
    Construction on Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2009 reduces the number
    of years that SSN force structure is below 48 from 14 years (per fiscal
    year 2008 plan) to 12 years. The 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan is the best
    balance of anticipated resources to the Navy's force structure
    requirements. Having less than 48 attack submarines (from 2022 through
    2033) is not ideal, but the long-term risk incurred is manageable as
    part of a stable shipbuilding plan that is properly balanced within
    anticipated resources. A two submarine per year build rate is good for
    Navy (cost and operational requirement) and for industry (stable
    market).
        The Navy is pursuing a three-part strategy to mitigate the risk
    incurred by the SSN shortfall by reducing the construction time of
    Virginia-class submarines from 72 to 60 months, extending the service
    life for 16 SSNs (ranging from 3 to 24 months in length), and extending
    the length of selected SSN deployments from 6 to 7 months. This
    strategy will reduce the impact of the projected dip in submarine force
    structure in the 2020-2033 time period and provide for all current and
    projected Combatant Commander critical forward presence requirements.

        15. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, absent
    budget restraints, what is an achievable procurement schedule that
    minimizes national security risks and accelerates the timeline to get
    to a 313-ship Navy?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The budget submitted
    represents the best balance of resources to warfighting requirements.
    However, the Navy continues to evaluate the threat and evolving
    security environment to determine what, if any, adjustments to the
    force structure may be required. The Navy shipbuilding plan contains a
    313-ship force to meet the need in the 2020 time period.
        The Navy has examined the feasibility of increased shipbuilding in
    fiscal year 2009. Most of the ships in the Navy's construction
    inventory cannot be accelerated due to programmatic risk or production
    limitations. For other ships in production, such as DDG-51 class ships,
    in order to award and construct additional ships, numerous Government
    Furnished Equipment and Contractor Furnished Equipment vendor base
    issues would need to be resolved.
        LPD-17 class Amphibious Assault Ship and T-AKE Dry Cargo Carrier
    could accelerate the shipbuilding plan, but doing so would imbalance
    competing priorities to meet warfighting capability requirements across
    all warfare areas within the limits of Navy Total Obligating Authority.
        Given current industrial base capacity, the Navy's plan to achieve
    the required 313-ship force by the fiscal year 2020 time period, and
    other competing Navy requirements that must be met, the Navy's current
    procurement schedule represents the appropriate approach to achieve the
    required warfighting capability.

        16. Senator Bayh. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, should SCN
    funding be increased or budgeting methods for ship procurement--
    including submarines and nuclear ships--be revised to facilitate
    achieving the 313-ship Navy?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The Navy examined the
    feasibility of increased shipbuilding investment in fiscal year 2009.
    Given the current industrial base capacity and other competing Navy
    requirements, the fiscal year 2009 budget request of $12.4 billion is
    sufficient. The Navy plans to increase shipbuilding investments from
    $12.4 billion in fiscal year 2009 to over $17.9 billion in fiscal year
    2013. Stability in the shipbuilding program will be key in cost
    control.
        The current budgeting methods for ship procurement are sufficient.
    It is the Navy's policy to fully fund the cost of shipbuilding programs
    in the year of contract award, with the exception of incremental
    funding for aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships. While we
    have no plans for expanding incremental funding, we will continue to
    assess methods that responsibly optimize ship procurement.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
                competition in navy surface ship combat systems
        17. Senator Warner. Admiral Roughead, the Navy's first Quarterly
    Report to Congress on Naval Open Architecture, submitted this month,
    states: ``The Submarine Domain's Acoustic Rapid Commercial Off-the-
    Shelf Insertion (ARCI) program is widely recognized as the Navy's most
    mature Open Architecture program. Based on studies in 2006, the
    development and production costs for the ARCI model process were
    roughly 1/6th of those for previous systems acquired under the
    traditional ``Mil Standard'' model. Consequent operating and support
    costs were approximately 1/8th of those for predecessor systems.''
    That's an 83 percent reduction in acquisition costs and an 88 percent
    reduction in annual operating costs for the Navy's entire submarine
    fleet for the equipment acquired under this program. The key to
    achieving this unprecedented result was use of Open Architecture
    approaches and open business models involving continuous competition
    among businesses.
        Last year the committee required the Navy to report quarterly to
    Congress on how it plans to achieve similar results for surface ships.
    The Navy's report shows that there is a lot of Open Architecture
    activity going on in the Navy. Absent is any meaningful activity to
    open up competition--i.e. the business model--for the combat systems on
    Aegis destroyers and cruisers, which are by far the most numerous ships
    in the fleet. This is especially important since the contract for Aegis
    combat systems on Navy surface ships has not been competed since 1969.
    The Navy has already approved two sole-source justifications to spend a
    total of $2.5 billion with the incumbent Aegis combat system contractor
    over the last 10 years on a cost-plus basis, and is working on a new
    sole-source waiver to competition. Could you please explain your plan,
    using Open Architecture business models, for improving capability and
    lowering costs for computers and software on Navy surface ships?
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy has recently implemented an open
    business model for the procurement of displays and processors.
    Additional components for competition will include display services,
    electronic warfare/softkill integration, track management (including
    integrated architecture behavior model integration), training, anti-
    submarine warfare capability improvement, and support systems.
        The Navy continues to focus on removing barriers to competition as
    we move forward with Open Architecture. Our ability to accelerate the
    reconfiguration of our ships to open architecture is limited by two
    factors. First, the fleet must maintain adequate numbers of operational
    ships to meet its worldwide commitments. Second, we must take into
    consideration the industrial capacity of our shipyards when we schedule
    the work necessary to configure our in-service fleet in the Open
    Architecture model. The cruiser and destroyer modernization programs
    address both of these factors and the budget required.
        Our intent is to move ahead as quickly as possible, while
    fulfilling our primary mission of providing a combat capable, reliable,
    and ready fleet.

        18. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, is the
    incumbent Aegis combat system contractor working with the Navy to open
    up competition for the DDG-51 combat system modernization?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The Navy is focused on
    removing barriers to competition as we move forward with Open
    Architecture. We are transitioning from the current platform-based
    development to a capability-based development. To this end, we are
    directing the Aegis combat system contractor to adhere to a government-
    controlled objective architecture with government-defined and
    authenticated interfaces. We are providing incentives to broaden the
    vendor base, including the use of third-party components. These efforts
    will support competition for Aegis modernization components, including
    competitively awarded display contracts (fiscal year 2008) and the
    recently announced competition for the common processing system.
    Additional components being considered for competition include display
    services, electronic warfare integration, training, anti-submarine
    warfare capability improvement, and support systems.

        19. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, why is
    the Navy's surface ship community so far behind the submarine community
    in adopting Open Architecture?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The submarine community's
    success in adopting Open Architecture results from their open business
    methods of collaboration and competition combined with a vigorous Peer
    Review process. These methods are being emulated by the surface
    community. This year we are delivering Open Architecture-based combat
    systems in U.S.S. Bunker Hill (CG-52) and U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68).
        Our Aegis cruisers and destroyers have a tightly coupled radar
    sensor-to-weapon control loop, which requires significant work to parse
    the functional relationships between components such as radar, weapons,
    and display. Some of this effort has been done with the separation of
    Display and Common Processing functions. The next step is to facilitate
    competition at the component level.
        The Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) MK2, fielded in our large
    amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, has migrated to Open
    Architecture. The software and hardware are separated and can more
    readily accommodate legacy and new interfaces. The software
    applications are maintained in a common software library and are
    compiled for ship-specific installations. The SSDS commercial hardware
    is now upgraded via pre-planned product improvement kits to address
    commercial component parts obsolescence.

        20. Senator Warner. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, what
    percentage of all the software that has been developed by the DDG-51
    contractor over the last 40 years is in the Navy's re-use library?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The DDG-51 Aegis Baseline
    7.1 software is included in the Software, Hardware Asset Re-use
    Enterprise (SHARE) library. This accounts for approximately 14 percent
    of all currently operational Aegis software baselines. Other components
    developed from the broad vendor base for Aegis and other combat systems
    that satisfy our Open Architecture needs will also be included in the
    SHARE library.
        Operational software delivered prior to Baseline 7 is not included
    in the SHARE library because it is written in older programming
    languages and is not transferable to newer Open Architecture systems.
    Additionally, non-operational software developed and fielded since
    program inception will not be included in the SHARE library due to
    software obsolescence.

                            navy strike fighter gap
        21. Senator Warner. Admiral Roughead, the Navy is facing a strike
    fighter shortfall estimated to range from 80 to 200 tactical aircraft--
    roughly 2 to 4 air wings--and extending through the next decade. The
    exact shortfall will depend on the Navy's ability to extend the service
    life of F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and the ability to procure 50 Joint
    Strike Fighters (JSFs) per year beginning in 2014. The Navy's plan to
    extend legacy Hornets from 6,000 to 10,000 hours appears highly
    optimistic. Similarly, the plan to buy 50 JSFs per year during the
    period that you plan to double the shipbuilding budget raises true
    concerns. What is your best estimate for the most likely magnitude of
    the strike fighter shortfall?
        Admiral Roughead. The current estimate of the strike fighter
    shortfall is a projected 125 aircraft in 2017 (69 Navy and 56 Marine
    Corps). F/A-18 A/B/C/D aircraft are reaching life limits and will
    require extensions to bridge the gap to the JSF. The Service Life
    Assessment Program (SLAP) is assessing the remaining life on these
    airframes. The initial SLAP analytical data necessary to determine
    extension to 10,000 flight hours was released in January 2008. Costing
    data to support the extension is planned to be released in June 2008,
    and the required engineering change proposals to support the extension
    will begin development in July 2008. Initial Naval Air Systems Command
    and Boeing indications are encouraging on reaching 10,000 flight hours
    for the F/A-18 A/B/C/D aircraft.

        22. Senator Warner. Admiral Roughead, how does the strike fighter
    shortfall affect the Navy's ability to meet its commitment to maintain
    three deployed carriers, and be able to respond to crises by deploying
    three additional carriers within 30 days, and a 7th carrier within 90
    days?
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy will experience an estimated 69 aircraft
    strike/fighter shortfall by 2017. This shortfall would be exacerbated
    by delays in JSF, reduction in F/A-18E/F or JSF procurement, or early
    F/A-18 retirement. Without mitigation, Carrier Strike Group operations
    will be sub-optimized due to insufficient numbers of aircraft available
    to provide full complements of strike-fighters at the appropriate level
    of readiness to meet projected combatant commander demands.

        23. Senator Warner. Admiral Roughead, what steps are being taken--
    or otherwise necessary--to reduce the strike fighter shortfall, and
    also mitigate risk in the F/A-18 service life extension and JSF
    procurement plans?
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy is developing a stable aviation plan
    that balances aviation capabilities through investments in
    recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization programs. An ongoing
    effort to reduce the strike fighter shortfall includes the F/A-18 SLAP
    to assess the feasibility of extending the F/A-18 A/B/C/D aircraft to
    10,000 hours. Initial indications are encouraging. Additional
    mitigation efforts will be addressed in Program Objective Memorandum
    (POM)-10.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
                        naval ballistic missile defense
        24. Senator Collins. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, let me
    first congratulate you for the successful downing of the dead satellite
    last week. I was proud to see that the ship that made the successful
    shot, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70), was a Bath Iron Works-built ship. This
    is a tremendous accomplishment that the whole Navy team should be proud
    of. The demonstration of capability and flexibility of the Aegis
    Cruiser and Destroyer fleet was a result of many factors and it
    highlighted the tremendous capability our complex surface combatant
    force brings to the important mission of naval BMD from the sea. What
    do you see as the future role of front-line surface combatants in
    defending our forces and our homeland from potential threats posed by
    ballistic missiles?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The threat to our forces
    afloat and ashore, to our friends and allies, and to our homeland is
    real and becoming more complex. We are building capability and capacity
    to conduct the regional BMD mission afloat in stride with our forward-
    deployed and rotational-deployed forces. Additionally, these forces are
    being integrated into the Ballistic Missile Defense System as Long-
    Range Surveillance and Track assets, contributing to the Homeland
    Defense Mission by providing early detection and cueing to support
    ground-based interceptors.
        The Navy has 12 engagement-capable BMD ships in the fleet today,
    and will have 18 by the end of calendar year 2008. Beginning in fiscal
    year 2012, our DDG modernization program will add this capability to
    our entire fleet of Aegis destroyers. While our current fleet has no
    capability against the longer range intermediate and ICBM threats,
    future Aegis baselines and Standard Missile Interceptors (SM-3) deliver
    this capability within the next 10 years.

        25. Senator Collins. Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, would
    not the naval BMD capability argue for a larger fleet of surface
    combatants going forward, in light of the growing threat we face?
        Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead. The Navy is committed to
    delivering BMD capability through the DDG modernization program and
    through new classes of surface combatants, such as CG(X).
        Today the Navy has 12 Aegis BMD Engagement ships and five Aegis BMD
    Long-Range Surveillance and Track ships that have been upgraded with
    BMD capability. Eighteen Aegis BMD Engagement ships will be available
    by the end of calendar year 2008. Additionally, the Navy will begin
    outfitting the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with BMD capability as
    part of the DDG modernization program in fiscal year 2012, expanding
    the number of BMD capable surface ships to 62. The Navy is also
    examining opportunities to include BMD capability in the CG
    modernization program.

                         naval shipyard infrastructure
        26. Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, let me first thank you again
    for taking time from your schedule to come to Maine to visit both Bath
    Iron Works and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard last month. As I am sure you
    saw, the dedication and quality of the workforce at both of those
    historic Maine yards is second to none. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has a
    number of buildings and facilities that are quite old. While the ``can
    do'' attitude and Yankee ingenuity have allowed the shipyard to be one
    of the most efficient public shipyards that the Navy has, the
    infrastructure of the yard has presented the workforce with a number of
    different challenges.
        While we were there, you and your staff were provided with a brief
    that detailed the different military construction projects that the
    shipyard requires in order to help it to remain as efficient as it
    currently is. During the past, many of the military construction
    projects have been provided through congressional plus-ups instead of
    being included in the annual Navy budget that is submitted to Congress.
    In fact, I have been told that since 1971 all but four military
    construction projects that have occurred on the shipyard have been
    funded with congressional adds.
        As you saw in the brief provided to you, Portsmouth has done a
    significant amount of planning and prioritization in laying out its
    military construction projects. I am concerned, however, that these
    projects may not be funded in a timely manner. As the Navy begins the
    transition from the Los Angeles-class to the Virginia-class submarine,
    what steps is the Navy taking to ensure that Portsmouth will have the
    facilities it requires to continue its outstanding record of
    performance?
        Admiral Roughead. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has an approximate $160
    million MILCON reinvestment plan. This includes $67 million in MILCON
    programming in the fiscal year 2009 FYDP to improve the condition and
    operational efficiency of the shipyard. Specific projects include:

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Fiscal Year                                         Amount
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2011................................  P-266; Structural Shops       23.8
                                           Consolidation.
    2012................................  P-268; DD#3 Waterfront        16.8
                                           Support Facility.
    2013................................  P-280; Gate 2 Security         4.1
                                           Improvements.
    2013................................  P-282; Consolidate            12.2
                                           Global Sub Complex
                                           Facility.
    2013................................  P-285; CBQ Building 373        9.7
                                           Addition Phase 1.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Navy will continue to target investments throughout future
    programming processes. This plan will ensure Portsmouth has the
    facilities it requires to continue its outstanding record of
    performance. Portsmouth does not require any MILCON projects in the
    FYDP to service Virginia-class submarines, as its facilities are
    already capable.

                 sealift capability and increased end strength
        27. Senator Collins. General Conway, last year the President
    announced that he wanted to increase the end strength of the Marine
    Corps by 22,000 marines. This process began last year and, according to
    the Department of the Navy's ``Budget Highlights,'' the Marine Corps
    end strength will continue to grow in fiscal year 2009. An important
    component of this increased capability is the ability to get the Marine
    Corps to where they need to go. Do you believe that there is sufficient
    sealift capability to accommodate the Marine Corps, especially
    considering the increase in Marine Corps end strength?
        General Conway. The end strength increase does not impact in itself
    Navy and Marine Corps amphibious lift requirements. These requirements
    are derived from Major Contingency Operation plans and Combatant
    Commander presence demands. The current amphibious lift requirement is
    34 operationally available assault ships. This is sufficient to support
    a simultaneous amphibious assault by two Marine Expeditionary Brigades.
    Because of fiscal constraints, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
    the Chief of Naval Operations have agreed to accept risk by reducing
    the amphibious lift requirement to 30 operationally available ships as
    the minimum. However, this 30-ship assault echelon fleet must include
    at least 10 ``big deck'' aviation capable assault ships (LHA/LHD/
    LHA(R)), at least 10 LPDs, and 10 LSD-41/49s.
        Moreover, we must fully fund the Maritime Prepositioning Force
    (Future) program so as to provide a Marine Expeditionary Brigades'
    worth of reinforcing capability to fully enable a seabased Marine
    Expeditionary Force to fight a Major Contingency Operation.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
                shipbuilding and the national maritime strategy
        28. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, this committee has strongly
    supported the Navy's 313-ship plan. Likewise, we have supported the
    recently developed Maritime Strategy, which provides a framework for
    the Navy's role in meeting national security requirements. However, we
    remain concerned that Navy shipbuilding continues to fall short in
    numbers of ships procured and dollars invested. When coupled with cost
    growth on new ship programs, the 313-ship Navy--and with it, the
    Maritime Strategy--appear beyond the reach of the Navy's budget. How do
    we drive the necessary changes to our requirements and budget and
    procurement processes that are needed to improve the affordability of
    the shipbuilding plan?
        Admiral Roughead. The October release of our new Maritime Strategy
    will inform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process
    for POM-10. We have tailored our budget and defined our future Navy to
    enhance and support the speed, flexibility, agility, and scalability
    that our forces bring to the maritime realm.
        During the Navy's POM-10 programming, the Maritime Strategy will
    guide our decisions to ensure that the Navy is properly sustained, has
    the capacity to satisfy mission requirements, and is relevant for
    future operations. We are evaluating our current programs and
    reconciling our portfolio with fiscal realities. The result of this
    process will be a balanced program which will allow us to meet the
    imperatives outlined in our Maritime Strategy. The Navy recognizes that
    building the required force structure will largely depend on
    controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat systems) within an
    affordable range and the need for aggressive requirements and cost
    control measures. This can only be achieved by working closely with
    industry, utilizing realistic assumptions, instilling discipline in
    shipbuilding requirements, and driving more industry and government
    investments to reduce cost. Given the importance of requirements-
    containment and cost-reduction to the viability of the shipbuilding
    plan, the Navy continues to evaluate each ship class and identify cost
    reduction opportunities while balancing warfighting requirements,
    costs, and industrial base realities.
        The Navy is emphasizing repeat builds of ships within the same
    class to reduce new construction costs, provided required warfighting
    capabilities can be fielded. This permits longer production runs and
    resultant cost reductions associated with production improvements and
    economies of scale. The Navy's shipbuilding plans include incorporation
    of Open Architecture for hardware and software systems and increased
    use of systems modularity. In addition, the Navy is aggressively
    pursuing opportunities to incorporate standardized components to reduce
    logistics support costs. These initiatives will reduce the cost of
    maintenance and system upgrades, and they will facilitate keeping Navy
    ships in service longer.

        29. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, if we agree with the Navy's
    determination that the 313-ship fleet represents ``the floor'', why
    aren't we seeing the funding in the shipbuilding budget request
    necessary to get up to that floor?
        Admiral Roughead. The current President's budget 2009 represents
    the best overall balance between procurements to meet operational
    requirements and affordability. The Navy has examined the feasibility
    of increased shipbuilding investment in fiscal year 2009. Given current
    industrial base capacity, the Navy's plan to achieve the 313-ship mix
    required by the fiscal year 2020 timeframe, and other competing Navy
    requirements that must be met, $12.4 billion in the fiscal year 2009
    budget request is sufficient and represents the necessary resources to
    achieve the required warfighting capability on time. In addition, the
    Navy's plan increases shipbuilding investments from $12.4 billion in
    fiscal year 2009 to over $17.9 billion in fiscal year 2013.
        It is a significant challenge to get the number of ships we need
    with the right capabilities within the Navy's overall funding level;
    however, the Navy is committed to achieving a force structure of at
    least 313 ships, with the necessary warfighting capability that the
    Navy will need by fiscal year 2020.

                     carbon fiber composite hull technology
        30. Senator Martinez. Secretary Winter, I am concerned that we
    aren't seeing as much development within the Navy of composites and
    carbon fiber hull technology for ships. This is something that other
    countries, including China, seem to be pursuing, yet our research
    efforts with this technology seem minimal at best. Please provide an
    update of what programs you're planning on implementing with regard to
    composite hull technologies.
        Secretary Winter. The Navy has a robust program in the development
    and material performance evaluation of composites and carbon fiber
    technology for use in naval vessels.
        Our basic and applied research efforts supporting carbon fiber and
    composite hull technologies, including steel-composite hybrid hull
    technology, are targeted at understanding and mitigating those
    degradation mechanisms that are unique to naval hulls; specifically,
    the dynamic effects of seaway loading, extreme loading from weapons,
    fire, and the marine environment itself.
        The Navy has dedicated composite hull technology efforts in the
    following areas:

             An agreement with the Japanese to develop technology for a
            hybrid composite-steel ship hull for a Navy surface combatant.
            Under the agreement, large composite and hybrid test articles
            are exchanged and tested by both countries (deck house and hull
            sections) for signature, underwater, and air explosion.
             Currently prototyping a large scale carbon composite high
            speed vessel bow for feasibility and cost evaluation using a
            vacuum assisted resin transfer molding method.
             Mk V.1 Special Operations Craft Replacement is an 82 foot,
            carbon/epoxy hulled boat that was delivered March 2008 for
            performance evaluation. The outcome of these trials will assist
            in determining value of carbon composite hulls in future
            combatant craft.
             Navy Transformable Craft Innovative Naval Prototype program
            includes a composite hull craft from one of the competitors.

        Additionally, the Navy has the following ongoing efforts to develop
    and demonstrate the use of composites in the construction of ships and
    submarines in an effort to reduce procurement costs:

             DDG-1000. The composite Deckhouse and Hangar program
            represents the largest use of composite structures to date
            within the surface Navy. This ship class will also be the first
            to use composite rather than steel rudders, specially contoured
            to reduce cavitation and meet performance requirements.
            Additionally, a project is in planning to demonstrate a low
            cost method for fabricating composite exhaust stacks for the
            ship's turbine engines, which would replace the current design
            requiring expensive, heavy nickel-base alloy that is difficult
            to manufacture.
             Virginia-class Submarine (VCS). The Navy is converting the
            VCS Sail Cusp, a hull-to-sail fairing, from steel to a much
            more affordable and easier-to-manufacture composite structure.
            The VCS steel main ballast tank flood grates were recently
            converted to fiberglass composites. Additionally, the VCS
            program is considering converting the expensive steel bow
            planes and nickel-aluminum-bronze tail cone to composite
            structures.
             CVN-21. A light-weight, composite superstructure,
            incorporating thermal, acoustic, and fire insulation, as well
            as ballistic protection, is in final validation testing.

        31. Senator Martinez. Secretary Winter, what can Congress do to
    further our research efforts on the carbon fiber composite hull
    technology front?
        Secretary Winter. The Navy currently has a robust research program
    in carbon fiber composite hull technology. Congressional support of the
    R&D program request in the President's fiscal year 2009 budget
    submission will enable this research program to continue.

                             law of the sea treaty
        32. Senator Martinez. Secretary Winter, I am aware of the Navy's
    and the administration's strong support for Senate ratification of the
    Law of the Sea Treaty. This treaty has been in the works and debated,
    on and off, since the Carter administration. I have some concerns that
    the United States would be routinely outvoted on issues of national
    interest were they to come up in the International Tribunal that the
    treaty establishes or with the International Seabed Authority. It seems
    to me that freedom of the seas and the rights of free passage are long
    established. Are you concerned that other nations may try to sue the
    United States or the Navy if the Senate were to ratify this treaty? For
    instance, for the use of sonar or for some other perceived
    environmental threat.
        Secretary Winter. No, I am not concerned that ratification of the
    Convention will open the Navy to lawsuits. Specifically, the compulsory
    dispute resolution procedures will permit the United States to
    completely exempt its military activities from dispute resolution and
    prevent any opposing state, court, or tribunal from reviewing our
    determination that an activity is an exempted military activity. When
    the Convention was being drafted, military officers serving as members
    on the United States delegation negotiated this exemption; it is
    ironclad. The Convention they helped craft permits a maritime nation,
    like the United States, to use compulsory dispute resolution as a sword
    against foreign coastal state encroachment while simultaneously
    shielding military activities from review. It is important to note that
    all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (except
    the United States) and numerous other countries have taken the military
    activities exemption. For this reason, I am not at all concerned that
    accession to the treaty would make the United States more susceptible
    to lawsuits.

        33. Senator Martinez. Secretary Winter, it is certainly in the best
    interest of much of the world to be a party to this treaty because
    other nations stand to benefit from the fees collected by the Seabed
    Authority for deep sea mining that would then be distributed to them
    under the ``Benefit of Mankind'' provision (Article 140). The vast
    majority of what the Navy is seeking under this treaty is
    unobjectionable. However, it is also only a small fraction of the total
    treaty. Has the Navy taken into consideration the non-military
    provisions in this treaty?
        Secretary Winter. The Navy, in considering its support of the Law
    of the Sea Convention, has taken all aspects of the treaty into
    account. The benefits are considerable, which accounts for the treaty's
    broad and long-standing support from the President and the Departments
    of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, and Interior. The
    treaty also has broad support from industry. Every major ocean
    industry, including shipping, fishing, oil, natural gas, drilling
    contractors, shipbuilders, and telecommunications companies that use
    underwater cables support United States' accession.
        Specific questions relating to the non-military provisions of this
    treaty might better be answered by others. However, in regards to
    Article 140, the Convention does not set forth any ``royalty''
    requirements for seabed production. If the United States became a party
    to the Convention, we would need to agree to the establishment of any
    ``royalty'' requirement and, as in the case of the extended continental
    shelf, no payments would go to the United Nations; they would be
    distributed to states parties in accordance with a formula which would
    require concurrence by the United States before it could be
    implemented.

                       next generation enterprise network
        34. Senator Martinez. Secretary Winter, as part of last year's
    National Defense Authorization bill, the committee included report
    language on the status of the Next Generation Enterprise Network
    (NGEN). What is the current status of the NGEN?
        Secretary Winter. The NGEN program is concluding the requirements
    definition phase. When the resulting requirements document is signed by
    the Service Chiefs, it will be forwarded officially to the acquisition
    agent.
        Following approval of the requirements document, detailed costing
    and engineering analysis will be conducted by the NGEN Program Office.
    Both an Acquisition Strategy and Acquisition Plan are currently being
    developed. Subsequently, the Service Specification will define the
    required system functions, performance parameters, and all other
    requirements and constraints. Upon completion, Department of the Navy
    leadership will conduct a review of the Service Baseline in order to
    confirm that the recommended solutions adequately address the approved
    requirements within cost, schedule, performance, and risk parameters.
        An NGEN Oversight Team, under the leadership of the Department of
    Defense Chief Information Officer, has been established to ensure
    coordination, effective test and evaluation planning, comprehensive
    architectural compliance, and continued responsive oversight of the
    program. The Oversight Team includes representation from the Under
    Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense (Network Integration and Information),
    the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Joint Staff, the
    Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the Defense Information
    Systems Agency, and Department of the Navy leadership.
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (S.
    Rept. 110-77) requested the Secretary of the Navy submit a report
    jointly with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
    Information Integration; the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Director, Operational
    Test and Evaluation on the plans for the NGEN acquisition. The
    information requested has been compiled and the report is currently
    within the Department's staffing process. Department of the Navy
    intends to submit the report to the defense committees by April 1,
    2008.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                              cooperative strategy
        35. Senator Wicker. Secretary Winter, the Navy, Marine Corps, and
    Coast Guard recently published its revised Naval Strategy called ``A
    Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.'' This Strategy
    represents the first time that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard
    have all collaborated on a single, common strategy for defending the
    U.S. Homeland and protecting U.S. interests overseas. I applaud our
    three maritime forces for coming together to form a unified naval
    strategy. This strategy seems to rightly coincide with the Navy's
    decision to increase the fleet by 33 commissioned ships--from 280 to a
    floor of 313 ships. However, given the current rate of production, I am
    concerned with our ability to meet the future needs of our maritime
    forces and meet the minimum of 313 ships. How will the President's
    budget meet the ``Cooperative Strategy'' objectives and is the proposed
    mix of naval ships that combine to form the 313-ship Navy sufficient to
    provide a ``credible combat power to be continuously postured in the
    Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean,'' as outlined in the
    strategy?
        Secretary Winter. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request
    and current procurement schedule both meet the Cooperative Strategy
    objectives by representing the necessary resources and warfighting
    capabilities to achieve the 313-ship fleet. This fleet will have the
    agility to meet a broad array of challenges and requirements to include
    operations with allies and friends around the globe. The increased
    emphasis of naval forces in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/
    Indian Ocean reflects the combined demands of planned steady-state
    operations and response times for potential projected contingencies.
    The current mix of the 313-ship Navy described in the Long-Range Plan
    for Construction of Naval Vessels for 2009 includes large deck nuclear-
    powered aircraft carriers, conventionally-powered amphibious ships and
    other associated surface combatants, submarines, maritime preposition
    ships, combat logistic ships, and support ships that establish our
    combat credibility not only in these regions, but worldwide.

        36. Senator Wicker. Secretary Winter, does the current mix of big
    deck ships outlined in the 30-year shipbuilding plan meet the challenge
    of creating a ``credible combat power to be continuously postured in
    the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean,'' as outlined in the
    strategy?
        Secretary Winter. The increased emphasis of naval forces in the
    Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean reflects the combined
    demands of planned steady-state operations and response times for
    potential projected contingencies. The current mix of the 313-ship Navy
    described in the Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
    2009 includes large deck nuclear-powered aircraft carriers,
    conventionally-powered amphibious ships and the other associated
    surface combatants, submarines, maritime preposition ships, combat
    logistics ships, command-control ships, and support ships that
    establish our combat credibility not only in these regions, but
    worldwide.

        [Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

    UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS
                                    COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Warner,
    Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Cornyn, Thune, and
    Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
    member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general
    counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member;
    Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; Michael J.
    Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; and
    David M. Morriss, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Jessica L.
    Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator
    Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
    Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to
    Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd
    Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter,
    assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
    Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
    and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today we welcome
    Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander of the United States
    Central Command (CENTCOM); and Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander
    of United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
        Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson command virtually all of
    the U.S. forces who are currently participating in combat. We
    ask you to convey to the men and women under your command our
    heartfelt gratitude for the many sacrifices that they and their
    families are making on our behalf. Of course, our thanks also
    go to you personally and to your families for the contribution
    which you and they are making.
        Admiral Fallon's command is responsible for U.S. security
    interests in 25 nations that stretch from the Horn of Africa
    (HOA) through the Arabian Gulf region into Central Asia. He
    commands the bulk of U.S. troops in combat today and is
    responsible for an area with a host of security challenges. In
    that position, Admiral Fallon also uses diplomatic skills to
    help us deter and prevent conflict almost as much as his
    military skills when a military response is appropriate. Today
    we will be seeking his views on a host of troubling issues in
    his area of responsibility (AOR), predominantly, but not
    entirely, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Admiral Olson represents the over 50,000 military and
    civilian personnel working for SOCOM, who are fulfilling
    critical direct and indirect long-term and short-term missions
    all over the globe. Special operations personnel have been
    heavily concentrated in the CENTCOM AOR since 2003, so it is
    fitting that we have the two commanders here together today.
        Our Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces are
    overstretched and increasingly stressed. General David Petraeus
    has advocated ``a period of consolidation, perhaps some force
    adjustments and evaluation before continuing with further
    reductions'' in troop levels in Iraq once the five surge
    brigades complete their redeployment this summer.
        Although General Petraeus also said that there's ``every
    intent,'' in his words, to further reduce forces. President
    Bush has already indicated he would support a recommendation
    for a pause in redeployments. In other words, there is a strong
    possibility that force levels in Iraq will remain at pre-surge
    levels of approximately 130,000 and that troop levels in Iraq
    will be about the same when President Bush leaves office as
    they were in December 2006, before the surge.
        At the same time, Iraqi leaders continue to squander the
    opportunity our troops and our taxpayers have given them. Our
    soldiers risk their lives while Iraqi politicians refuse to
    take political risks. We cannot have the lives of American
    servicemembers held hostage to Iraqi political bickering. The
    State Department said last November that the ``Shiite-led
    government is a larger threat than al Qaeda.'' The report went
    on to say that ``senior military commanders now portray the
    intransigence of Iraq's Shiite-dominated government as the key
    threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al Qaeda
    terrorists, Sunni insurgents, or Iranian-backed militias.''
        In Afghanistan, we're now increasing American troop levels,
    with over 3,000 additional marines slated to deploy in the
    coming months, and more may well be needed. Meanwhile, our Army
    troops continue to face multiple tours of 15-month duration,
    with only 12 months or less at home between rotations, and
    marines also see more time deployed than at home, although for
    shorter, more frequent periods.
        These levels of deployment without adequate rest for the
    troops and repair and replacement of equipment cannot be
    sustained. General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff, has
    said that the ``Army is out of balance'' and that ``the current
    demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply.''
        For too long, United States military operations in
    Afghanistan have taken a back seat to the war in Iraq. The
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen,
    acknowledged as much in December when he said, ``It is simply a
    matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan we do what we
    can. In Iraq we do what we must.'' That's not acceptable.
        While the President paints a rosy picture of the situation
    in Afghanistan, just last week the Director of National
    Intelligence, Michael McConnell, told this committee that ``The
    Taliban-dominated insurgency has expanded'' to previously
    peaceful areas west and around Kabul. He testified that the
    Taliban controls about 10 percent of the country, while the
    Afghanistan government is capable of controlling about 30
    percent, which leaves about 60 percent of the country outside
    of either's control.
        Defense Intelligence Agency Director General Michael Maples
    stated that al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is ``increasing
    to levels unseen since 2001 and 2002'' and that the number of
    attacks, suicide bombings, and improvised explosive devices
    (IEDs) continues to rise.
        As has been reported, Admiral Fallon is conducting an
    assessment of the Afghanistan mission, one of a number that the
    administration and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    are undertaking. The Atlantic Council report, which by the way
    says that ``NATO is not winning in Afghanistan and that,
    despite efforts of the Afghan Government and the international
    community, Afghanistan remains a failing state and could become
    a failed state,'' that Atlantic Council report also says that
    the assessments that Admiral Fallon is making, will hopefully
    be completed in a matter of weeks, not months, and we'll be
    interested in Admiral Fallon's recommendations for
    strengthening the U.S., NATO, and international community's
    efforts in Afghanistan.
        Another major challenge in the CENTCOM AOR is addressing
    the safe havens that the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other violent
    extremists have found in the tribal areas along Pakistan's
    border with Afghanistan. As Director McConnell recently
    testified, the tribal areas are serving not only as a staging
    area for attacks into Afghanistan, but also as a terrorist
    training location for attacks in Pakistan, Middle East, Africa,
    Europe, and the United States.
        Director McConnell and Secretary Gates have testified
    recently that they believe that Pakistan's political leaders
    now perceive that the lawlessness prevailing in the border
    tribal areas represents a potentially mortal threat to
    Pakistan. We'll be interested in Admiral Fallon's views on what
    opportunities exist to encourage Pakistan to confront extremist
    elements on its territory and eliminate the sanctuary for the
    Taliban and al Qaeda along the Afghanistan border.
        Over 80 percent of SOCOM's operators are deployed in the
    CENTCOM area of operation. However, SOCOM's responsibilities
    are global and the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are
    affecting the command's ability to maintain critical language
    and cultural skills and relationships in other parts of the
    world. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended
    increase in the size of SOCOM will help address that problem. I
    hope Admiral Olson will comment on whether that increase is
    sufficient.
        In addition, while the Department included funding in
    SOCOM's budget for some personnel growth, the fiscal year 2009
    budget request is $300 million less than their budget for this
    fiscal year. This comes in a year when the overall DOD funding
    request is 7.5 percent above this year's level and when the
    Services have increased funding requests ranging from 7 to 9.6
    percent above the fiscal year 2008 base budget.
        Some of the decrease in SOCOM funding is due to one-time
    military construction costs. But since SOCOM's end strength
    continues to increase, it's unclear why the procurement
    account, for example, has decreased by 17 percent.
        The $300 million decrease in SOCOM funding from fiscal year
    2008 to 2009 is all the more perplexing given the fact that
    SOCOM also gave the committee: one, a list of 31 additional
    procurement and research and development programs that they
    would like funding for, totaling $413 million; and two, have
    given us a list of 12 unfunded military construction projects
    totaling $186 million.
        On top of this, Admiral Olson, I understand that in
    response to an inquiry from Senator Bayh, that you recently
    identified a $300 million unfunded requirement for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which is
    a critical asset in the hunt for terrorists in the CENTCOM area
    of operation, and that $300 million itself falls short of the
    additional $900 million which Admiral Fallon has indicated in a
    CENTCOM joint needs statement is necessary for counter-
    terrorism in his area of operations.
        So we have many issues to explore today. We are very
    appreciative of our witnesses' appearance here today and of
    their service to this Nation, and I call upon Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I followed your
    statement very carefully and much of the statement that I will
    ask to have put into the record today reflects views in many
    respects parallel to yours.
        I want to, of course, join in thanking our two witnesses
    and their families for their service, and each and every one of
    the many in uniform that you have in your command, and the
    important component of the civilians who work dedicated in your
    commands.
        Mr. Chairman, in the past few weeks I've had an opportunity
    to go over and visit with Admiral McConnell, the Director of
    National Intelligence and I expressed to him a need that we
    here in the Senate Armed Services Committee, and indeed the
    entire Senate, would value greatly updates in the intelligence
    area on Afghanistan and Iraq. I've included and ask unanimous
    consent to put in today's record here his response to me. He
    said he would publish a paper in March updating the National
    Intelligence Estimate (NIE) threat on the homeland here in the
    United States, publish an NIE on Afghanistan by late summer,
    early fall, but the Iraq piece will be ready in March.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Warner. I recall, Mr. Chairman, a trip with you and
    our colleague Senator Sessions in 2006 to Iraq, and I remember
    coming back and I expressed my own views that the situation is
    just drifting sideways. I'm pleased this morning to acknowledge
    that I feel that the surge operations initiated by President
    Bush in January 2007 have moved forward in Iraq and turned a
    situation from one that was unpredictable going down to some
    definite signs of improvement in that area.
        The President said that this was to clear and secure
    neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, to
    help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of
    providing the security that Baghdad needs. He further added
    that when this happens daily life will improve, Iraqis will
    gain confidence in their leaders, hopefully, and the government
    will have the breathing space.
        Certainly the military operations under the leadership of
    these two fine witnesses this morning has shown that it has
    resulted in that security situation. They are approaching, I
    think--Admiral Fallon will give us greater details--a time when
    we'll take a brief breathing space ourself to determine the
    true levels. But I hope the Admiral can assure us that the
    commitments the President made to bring home the forces by
    July, the surge forces, can be met and that that interregnum
    between further reductions, which I hope will be achievable,
    will not be a lengthy one.
        I also said at the time when the President spoke that more
    responsibility should be given to the Iraqi forces. I'm anxious
    to hear your views this morning, Admiral. In my judgment the
    Iraqi forces have shown a significant increase in their
    professional ability to work and carry out the responsibilities
    of protecting the sovereign nation of Iraq.
        Nevertheless, the violence there, while it has fallen off
    considerably, it remains, as is al Qaeda remains, a threat. I
    think, Admiral Olson, particularly your forces in Special
    Operations under General McCrystal--and I do hope that he can
    soon return to the United States and take on new
    responsibilities with the Joint Staff--you told me yesterday
    that General McCrystal has 120 days of accrued leave. He hasn't
    hardly been home to see his family in this long, extensive, and
    distinguished tour he's had over there.
        But nevertheless, a substantial degradation of al Qaeda has
    taken place, but it still remains a threat.
        The factions, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in Iraq are
    disappointing--Shia factionalism, criminal activities,
    corruption remains at a higher than acceptable level; and
    sectarian distrust prevails at a level far unacceptable
    throughout Iraq.
        I acknowledge that the Iraqi Council of Representatives
    (COR) passed a long-awaited de-Baathification law, a provincial
    powers law, an amnesty law for detainees, and a budget for
    2008. Credit is owing for those achievements. But I regret that
    the political situation remains far short of demonstrating the
    decisive leadership needed to preserve and grow a new sovereign
    nation.
        For example, the Provincial Powers Act was passed by the
    legislature and rejected by a member of the Presidency Council.
    This is another example of moving ahead two steps and then one
    backwards. Let us hope that that can be readily cured and that
    legislation can go forward, because the Iraq people have
    tremendous potential for developing a nation which could become
    the envy of all the countries in the Middle East. There is
    untapped natural resources in that nation, principally oil,
    that can restore the economy to a strong, vibrant economy and
    match any of the increases that we've seen by different
    countries in the Middle East.
        But your soldiers, your sailors, your airmen, and your
    marines have made it possible for the increases that have taken
    place thus far in political reconciliation.
        In the coming months the United States Government and Iraq
    will negotiate a strategic framework agreement and a status of
    forces agreement (SOFA) that will chart our long-term mutual
    relationship. Our colleague Senator Webb has taken the lead on
    that. I was privileged to join him yesterday for a special
    briefing and I judge that hopefully he'll join us this morning
    and address that important issue.
        But Admiral, I think it's important that you likewise
    address those agreements and give us your best estimate of the
    timing and particularly the necessity. The underlying necessity
    for such agreements is to protect the individual serviceperson
    wearing the United States uniform and carrying out missions in
    that AOR.
        Turning to Afghanistan, the chairman quite properly recited
    the number of attacks by the Taliban insurgency exceeded that
    of the previous year. The poppy situation is absolutely abysmal
    in my judgment, and it is really the responsibility of the
    Department of State and NATO as a whole to come to grips with
    this situation. I find it totally unacceptable that our forces
    are facing an enemy using ammunition and arms and other things
    purchased as a consequence of the recycling of the poppy
    culture profits into armaments. I think I just find that just
    totally unacceptable and I hope that this year some much
    stronger initiatives can be undertaken to bring about a
    cessation of that poppy crop, which today is the most
    significant drug dissemination source in the whole world.
        I'd like to commend our Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates,
    for his tireless efforts over the past few weeks to impress
    upon NATO allies the importance of NATO's mission in
    Afghanistan. In testimony before this committee last month,
    Secretary Gates expressed concern and said the alliance
    evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which some are willing
    to fight, some are not. The people's security is at stake.
        The debate on the importance of the mission in Afghanistan
    is the most complicated mission that the NATO allies have faced
    since the alliance was formed. Failure there by NATO could
    bring about the demise of NATO.
        The committee will want to know your views on the role of
    NATO and what they should do to prepare themselves for a
    stronger retaliation against the Taliban and for the need for
    each of the NATO participants to live up to their commitments
    with regard to the manpower levels.
        The chairman made reference to the three reports on
    Afghanistan that were brought before this committee. I share
    with him the views in those reports and I'm sure you have seen
    them, Admiral Fallon.
        Another area of concern is Pakistan. Working with the
    Pakistan armed forces and with their government, is an
    essential relationship to our mission in Afghanistan. So much
    of our supplies, so much of the particularly petroleum and so
    forth, has to transit Pakistan. The tribal areas are certainly
    moving in a direction which is antithetical to a strong central
    government in Pakistan, and I hope that we can work in
    partnership to alleviate that threat to Pakistan.
        I would like to close, Mr. Chairman, with a note on Iran.
    It appears to be enhancing its ability to project its military
    power, primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power. Iran
    continues to provide support for violent terrorist groups in
    Lebanon and Syria and seeks to deepen its influence in Iraq and
    western Afghanistan.
        I want to close in recognition of America's Gold Star
    Mothers, Mr. Chairman. I was visited by them recently. This is
    an organization of mothers who have lost a son or a daughter in
    the war. It was founded shortly after World War I. These women
    who have suffered a parent's loss continue to provide support
    for mothers and families of servicemembers of today's
    generation.
        The Gold Star Mothers across the country, our Nation owes
    you a debt. I would expressly ask in a question: I wonder what
    the reaction of a Gold Star Mother who lost a son or a daughter
    in Iraq as a consequence of the illegally imported weaponry
    that Iran is sending into Iraq. I wonder what their reaction is
    to the visit by Ahmedinejad from Iran to Iraq this week? I'd
    like to have your comments on that eventually, Admiral.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral Fallon?

      STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                         STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        Admiral Fallon. Senator Levin, Senator Warner,
    distinguished members of the committee: It's a great honor to
    be back in front of you again this morning, and particularly to
    appear with my distinguished colleague Admiral Olson. Tampa is
    in an unusual state now with all this maritime leadership not
    seen before. Not that we spend much time there. We're focused
    out in the region, where we certainly have lots of challenges,
    as both Senator Levin and Senator Warner have highlighted here
    today, and many issues. I'd be pleased to get into these issues
    as I get into the testimony.
        I would like to begin by picking up on both Senator Levin
    and Senator Warner's comments about the hard work and sacrifice
    of our men and women in uniform and those civilians that
    support them. Every day that I get the chance to visit and work
    with our people, I am more proud, if that's possible, of the
    great work that they do in our behalf, under conditions that
    are certainly challenging in many respects. But they and their
    families, who have shouldered this burden of our engagement in
    troubled areas for several years consecutively now, I can't say
    enough about them and certainly join you in saluting them.
        I have to tell you that going to Iraq I am very encouraged.
    From the time that I sat here about 10 months ago, the
    situation has improved substantially in the security arena, and
    I believe that there are many other aspects of the situation
    that are coming together, that have contributed to this
    improvement, and I see this on an upward vector, and I'll be
    pleased to get into the details of your questions in talking
    about Iraq.
        In Afghanistan, I'm encouraged. I know that there are a lot
    of reports, a lot of commentaries that are rather negative. But
    I'm encouraged for a couple of reasons with what I see in
    Afghanistan. First of all, the Government of Afghanistan still
    enjoys broad support from the people. We're working very
    closely with the Afghan security forces, particularly the army.
    I'm really encouraged by the leadership, determination, and the
    willingness to go out and engage; and at the end of the day
    these are the people that are really going to provide stability
    and security that are going to enable this country to stand on
    its own two feet.
        There are certainly lots of other issues--Pakistan,
    Lebanon, Somalia, lots of places in which stability and
    security are fragile, if at all existent. But with each of
    these places, there are also opportunities for us to engage, to
    help people to help themselves, to try to make this a better
    region.
        So in Pakistan, for example, they're suffering turmoil
    politically, under attack internally from an insurgent threat,
    just completed an election as the world watched, and they are
    in the process of forming a government, which we certainly
    encourage and will certainly do our utmost to support. Again,
    opportunities for us to not only help them to help themselves,
    but to help some of our interests, and particularly the recent
    use of these ungoverned areas or previously ungoverned areas
    along the Afghan border.
        I see other signs of hope. The recent agreement that was
    brokered by United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General Kofi Annan
    in Kenya to try to bring to a halt the strife and bloodshedding
    that's been going on there in recent days. We engage throughout
    the region to try to provide stability and security, to do what
    we can to lend our experience, our resources, through the
    generosity of certainly this committee and your colleagues in
    Congress, to lend the opportunity for our people, our best
    ambassadors, to work with these people, to show by their
    example how things could be done differently and better, to
    provide opportunities.
        So as I get around and spend most of my time out in the
    region, I'm encouraged. I wish we had more hours in the day to
    both engage to a greater degree in each of these countries--and
    I have to tell you in summing up here that I couldn't be any
    more proud of the work that our men and women do every day
    throughout this region.
        Thank you for the support that you provide to them and to
    their families. I am grateful to be here again and I'll look
    forward to your questions. Thank you very much, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon follows:]
                Prepared Statement by ADM William J. Fallon, USN
                                i. introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee:
        On behalf of the men and women of the United States Central Command
    (CENTCOM), I thank you for this opportunity to testify about the state
    of the command and to provide an assessment of security and stability
    in my Area of Responsibility (AOR), as well as our military strategy
    and operational requirements.
        I would begin by highlighting the selfless service and sacrifice of
    our servicemembers and their families. This dedicated work on behalf of
    our Nation merits recognition and credit for the substantial progress
    that has been achieved in security and stability during these past 12
    months.
        The CENTCOM AOR is large and diverse. It spans 6.5 million square
    miles and 27 countries stretching from the Horn of Africa, through the
    Middle East to the Central and South Asian States. These countries
    possess vast human and natural resource potential, have rich histories,
    and sit at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe. The region is
    home to nearly 700 million people, who speak more than 80 languages,
    identify with 50 or more ethnic groups, and are adherents of more than
    a dozen religions. Despite differences in language, culture, and
    history, we share basic aspirations with the peoples of the Middle
    East, East Africa, and Central and South Asia. They desire security and
    prosperity for their families, opportunities to make choices, and
    governments that respect their rights and respond to their basic needs.
        This is the 7th consecutive year of combat operations in the
    CENTCOM AOR. I am pleased to report significant progress in security in
    Iraq. Our forces there, in concert with coalition partners and the
    increasingly competent Iraqi security forces (ISF), have expanded areas
    of stability and brought a return to more normal life for the citizens
    of Iraq. Likewise, in Afghanistan, large areas of the country are
    generally stable, millions of children are in schools and the Afghan
    National Army (ANA) is growing in size and demonstrated performance.
    But challenges remain in both these countries and in other areas of the
    region. Violent extremism, weak governance, political crisis and
    lagging economic development are key inhibitors to long-term stability.
    Given the complexities of the region, two certainties stand out; there
    are no simple answers to the challenges, and enduring solutions require
    predominately non-military initiatives.
        To advance U.S. security interests and regional stability, CENTCOM
    works with interagency and international partners to promote
    development and cooperation among nations, responds to crises, deters
    and, if necessary, defeats aggression. Success will require patience,
    thoughtful application of resources and commitment.
        The strategy in support of this mission has focused efforts in five
    main areas: setting conditions for stability in Iraq; expanding
    governance and security in Afghanistan; degrading violent extremist
    networks and operations; strengthening relationships and influencing
    states and organizations to contribute to regional stability and the
    free flow of commerce; and posturing forces to build and sustain joint
    and combined warfighting capabilities and readiness.
                  ii. setting conditions for stability in iraq
        United States and Coalition forces have operated continuously in
    the region since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and will soon
    enter the 6th year of combat operations in Iraq. Our objective is a
    unified, democratic and Federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and
    sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. We are pursuing
    this objective along political, security, economic, and diplomatic
    lines of operation. I can say with confidence that we are closer to our
    objective today than when I last testified.
        The most significant development in Iraq over the last year has
    been a dramatic decrease in violence. By almost every measure, the
    security situation has improved significantly. This turnabout is the
    result of many complex and interrelated factors. The application of the
    ``surge'' deployment implemented last February, which increased troop
    levels and shifted our strategy to the priority task of protecting the
    population, has enhanced local security. The proximity of our troops to
    the populace and their shared experience in day-to-day life throughout
    the country has reversed the widespread anti-coalition attitude to a
    general acceptance and appreciation for our presence. This situation
    has been facilitated by the larger and more capable ISF, which have
    expanded the scale and effectiveness of operations against al Qaeda in
    Iraq and criminal Shia militias. The population has welcomed the
    widespread deployment of the Iraqi Army and is growing more comfortable
    with the Iraqi Police. Both of these forces are becoming more capable
    and competent as they assume an increasing share of security duties and
    boost reconciliation.
        Equally important have been the growing rejection of al Qaeda by
    the Iraqi people and the genesis of the ``awakening'' movement, which
    has altered the local balance of power between extremists and security
    forces. More than 90,000 Iraqi men have volunteered to assume grass
    root security functions as Concerned Local Citizens, also known now as
    Sons of Iraq. These men are key partners who supplement uniformed
    security forces in their communities and provide invaluable
    intelligence about the violent extremists. Although at this point,
    these groups are comprised primarily of Sunni Muslims, some Shia
    communities have started similar initiatives as Jaysh al-Mahdi
    extremists wear out their welcome.
        While security in Iraq has improved dramatically and sectarian
    violence has greatly diminished, these gains are not irreversible.
    Multiple strains of violent extremism remain a threat to the government
    and populace, and some of these groups benefit from external support.
    From the East, Iran pursues a destabilizing political and ideological
    agenda and is a key source of finance, weapons and training support to
    lawless militia groups. In the West, foreign fighters continue to enter
    Iraq from Syria.
        To sustain and build on improvements in security, Multinational
    Force-Iraq conducts security operations with the ISF while
    transitioning, where conditions allow, to Iraqi led and conducted
    operations. More than 530,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers now
    secure their country with notable improvement in capability and
    battlefield performance. With the ISF proving themselves in battle, the
    next steps in building the ISF will focus on enhancing capabilities in
    command and control, logistics, combat support functions, and other
    operational enablers. I believe our efforts to improve Iraq's Army and
    Police will help set the conditions for sustained security and enable
    future U.S. troop redeployments.
        Meanwhile, the previously announced reduction of Brigade Combat
    Teams from 20 to 15 is underway, along with several Marine Corps
    battalions and some enabling forces. General Petraeus is preparing a
    response to a Planning Order from me to consider scenarios for the
    post-July 2008 period in Iraq and to provide recommendations on the
    pace and scope of a further reduction of forces from Iraq. His
    recommendations will be considered by the Chain of Command and our
    inputs, along with his, will be forwarded to the President for his
    consideration. Recommendations will consider the existing security
    situation, progress of the ISF and their readiness to assume
    responsibility for security. The conditions on the ground will be a
    major determinant of future moves.
        Progress in governance lags behind security, but there are signs of
    improvement. To sustain the security gains, a general improvement in
    government effectiveness and the enactment of legislative guarantees
    are required. Iraqi political leaders have begun demonstrating the will
    and skills to move this process forward. The recent passage of the 2008
    National Budget, Provincial Powers, Amnesty, and de-Baathification laws
    are significant accomplishments. The Presidency Council returned the
    Provincial Powers Law to the Council of Representatives but with the
    assurance that preparations for provincial elections this fall should
    continue. Meanwhile, the Government of Iraq continues to work toward
    other important legislation including Hydrocarbon and Election laws and
    the referendum on Kirkuk.
        Economic development is a key component of sustained growth and
    reconciliation. The Government of Iraq has improved budget execution
    and increased allocations to provinces and ministries. Iraqi and
    coalition initiatives to secure critical infrastructure and a
    substantial investment in repair and refurbishment have resulted in
    greater oil production and revenue from oil sales. The international
    community is playing an increasing and welcome role in Iraq. The
    Neighbors Conference Ministerial meetings have contributed to
    stabilization efforts. France is actively reaching out to Iraq while
    Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are considering the
    re-opening of diplomatic offices in Baghdad. The U.N. designated a new
    Special Representative to Iraq, who has demonstrated strong initiative
    and a keen understanding of the situation. The U.N. also dramatically
    increased its assistance mission, while the Security Council passed a
    new Chapter 7 mandate for the Coalition to operate in Iraq until 31
    December 2008.
        Looking to the future and as U.S. forces are withdrawn, we are
    planning to normalize long-term bilateral relations through a framework
    agreement that reflects our shared political, economic, cultural and
    security interests, as well as a Status of Forces Agreement. These
    agreements will establish authorities and jurisdictions for U.S. and
    coalition forces operating in Iraq beyond 2008. The documents will
    allow us maximum flexibility to assist the Government of Iraq in the
    fight against al Qaeda, develop its security forces and combat harmful
    influences inside Iraq while, at the same time, protecting our own
    forces. As Iraq increasingly asserts its sovereignty, we want to
    continue to assist in developing the Iraqi capacity to secure and
    defend their country.
               iii. expand governance and security in afghanistan
        U.S. and coalition forces support international efforts to assist
    the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to provide security, improve
    stability, and enhance development and governance. Within Afghanistan,
    the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commands the
    security mission while CENTCOM leads the military capacity building and
    counterterror efforts. These command structures require close
    coordination between CENTCOM and NATO.
        Despite increased violence in 2007, most visibly in the form of
    suicide attacks, Afghan and coalition forces have degraded the ability
    of the Taliban and other insurgents to execute coordinated and
    effective attacks. The coalition has maintained relentless pressure on
    the insurgents, and as a result, the enemy has shifted most of its
    effort to targeting police and civilians. The recent increase in
    suicide attacks is a concern and may give the perception that the
    insurgents have grown stronger. In reality, most of their successful
    attacks are confined to about 10 percent of total districts, while the
    vast majority of Afghans deny support to the violent extremists.
        The successes in Khowst Province are one example. Long considered
    ungovernable and one of the most dangerous provinces in Afghanistan,
    Khowst has been turned around by Afghan and coalition counterinsurgency
    operations. Tangible improvement in governance, reconstruction,
    development and security have been noted and are good examples for
    application elsewhere in the country.
        The increase in U.S. forces planned for this spring will reinforce
    our momentum while enabling accelerated growth of Afghan National
    Security Forces (ANSF). CENTCOM recently concurred with an initiative
    to expand the authorized end strength of the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000
    soldiers. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
    is scheduled to complete the fielding of 80,000 ANA personnel by the
    end of 2010. Meanwhile a Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground
    Task Force will deploy this spring and bolster the ISAF maneuver forces
    in Regional Command-South.
        The ANA has taken the lead in more than 30 significant operations
    to date and has demonstrated increasing competence, effectiveness and
    professionalism. Operation Maiwand executed last summer in the Andar
    District of Ghazni Province is an example of recent progress. Planned,
    rehearsed, and executed under the direction of the Afghan 203rd Corps
    Commander, a combined ANA and NATO ISAF task force cleared the entire
    district and removed a Taliban shadow governor. This well-integrated
    security operation was quickly exploited with the synchronized
    application of governance and development efforts consisting of medical
    treatment for 2,300 citizens, 10 new schools, the delivery of 260 tons
    of humanitarian aid, and $1 million committed toward additional
    development. This operation resulted in significant disruption to enemy
    forces in Ghazni Province and is a manifestation of the growth and
    maturation of ANSF as well as the spread of governance and development.
        The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) are improving, although at a
    slower pace than the ANA. While police competence has progressed in
    many areas, corruption, poor leadership, pay issues and equipment
    shortfalls challenge this organization. A new initiative, led by CSTC-
    A, called the Focused District Development plan and implemented late
    last year, shows great promise. This initiative withdraws local police
    from selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained
    and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police. The local police then
    receive 2 months of immersion in a concentrated program of instruction
    by carefully selected mentors to upgrade their professional
    performance, equipment and confidence. Local police units then return
    to their districts as much more capable forces and better able to serve
    their communities.
        Recruiting for both the Army and Police has shown a positive trend.
    Despite increased targeting of ANSF personnel and high casualty rates,
    Afghans continue to enlist in large numbers. This demonstrates
    confidence in the government and their future (as well as a strong need
    for employment opportunities). Proper training of these dedicated
    volunteers will take time, and additional U.S. personnel will be needed
    to fill key shortfalls in training capacity. A battalion of U.S.
    marines will deploy to support and mentor the ANP this spring in an
    effort to boost ANP capability.
        Setting the conditions necessary for economic growth is essential
    to long-term security and stability. Afghanistan has come a long way in
    7 years. Since 2001, Gross Domestic Product, per capita income and
    Foreign Direct Investment are all up. There has been considerable
    growth in Afghanistan's domestic revenues as well as international
    reserves, which have nearly doubled since 2004. However, Afghanistan
    still faces formidable economic challenge. The Afghan Government
    remains overly dependent on foreign aid, with official revenues
    covering only 20 percent of recurrent costs. Inflation, particularly
    for food and fuel, is rising. Access to credit is limited, and few
    Afghans are able to borrow.
        Four strategic economic priorities support the counterinsurgency
    effort. These include embracing free market economic policy, enhancing
    government resources, addressing inflation and implementing structural
    reforms. Staying the free market course means resisting costly new
    subsidies, which serve to reduce resources for other more constructive
    expenditures in areas like infrastructure, education and health care.
    U.S. and international community efforts are assisting the Afghan
    Government move toward a sustainable fiscal policy to generate revenue,
    manage resources and operate without massive foreign financial support.
    The international community is also trying to boost economic growth by
    modernizing the infrastructure, particularly in the areas of electrical
    power, road construction, water management and agricultural
    development. Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams are key elements in
    these endeavors, and they have brought real improvement directly to the
    populace. Finally, trade is benefiting, albeit slowly, from growing
    regional integration. On March 3, Afghanistan is scheduled to join the
    South Asian Free Trade Area, bringing greater access to and integration
    with six other regional countries.
        Narcotics remain a significant challenge for Afghanistan and the
    international community. Opium production in Afghanistan increased
    substantially in 2007. The narcotics trade dissuades work and
    investment in legitimate activities, provides the insurgents with a
    lucrative source of funding and contributes heavily to heroin addiction
    in Central Asia, Europe, and increasingly in East Africa. We will
    continue to work with the interagency and international partners to
    reverse this negative trend. Of note, the ANA is standing up a new
    counternarcotics battalion for the single purpose of poppy eradication.
    This unit is in training and is expected to deploy this spring to
    destroy (by plowing under) poppy plants in fields when found.
        Our commitment to the Afghan Government and people seeks to shape a
    future of a moderate and stable Afghanistan as a key regional partner.
    There is a general sense of optimism and determination among the Afghan
    leaders and people. They regularly voice their appreciation for our
    assistance. Enduring success will require additional, well coordinated
    Coalition resources and support.
            iv. degrading violent extremist networks and operations
        Whether sponsored by Iran, enabled by Syrian acquiescence or
    motivated by networks such as al Qaeda and its associated movements,
    violent extremism is a serious danger to regional and global security.
    We must identify, mobilize against, and confront this menace as its
    anachronistic worldview and murderous tactics threaten people and
    stability worldwide. While our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
    continue, we will use all available methods to build regional and
    international momentum for moderate behavior while eroding support for
    violent extremist ideology.
        The highest priority in our counterterror efforts is to defeat al
    Qaeda. Part of this effort, but not an end to itself, is the removal of
    senior al Qaeda leaders. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, we and
    our partners have captured or killed terrorists, diminished safe
    havens, driven leaders underground, and restricted their operating
    space. Despite these efforts, challenges continue as our enemies work
    to reconstitute their networks. Critical to countering these violent
    extremists is the denial of the sanctuaries, nation-state support and
    lines of communication that sustain them. These militant Islamist
    terrorists attract recruits from a large, worldwide pool of disaffected
    young people. Unfortunately, their tactics and radical ideology remain
    almost unchallenged by voices of moderation. In response, we will
    enhance our intelligence capabilities, develop partner nation
    capacities, strengthen information sharing, disrupt illicit lines of
    communication, and work to prevent terrorist organizations from
    acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. All of these actions
    will require interagency and international coordination and
    cooperation.
        Equally important to defeating al Qaeda and other extremist groups
    is delegitimizing the underlying social and political movements that
    support them. To diminish the radical social movements from which our
    enemies derive their strength, we must maintain operational pressure on
    their networks while building capacity in governance and security that
    help at-risk societies address problems that foster internal and local
    grievances. This work requires empowering credible experts to expose
    the flaws and internal contradictions of the enemy's ideology; provide
    viable, competing alternative worldviews; and contest the intellectual
    ``safe harbors'' where extremist ideas incubate.
        Defeating extremists and their ideology would be easier if they did
    not have state sponsors. Iran and Syria have not cooperated with
    efforts to combat terrorism and promote reconciliation. Their policies
    and actions threaten the internal security of their neighbors and the
    collective stability of the region. The Iranian regime provides Shia
    militia groups in Iraq with training, funding and weapons including
    lethal Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), a particularly deadly
    form of Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Iran continues to employ
    surrogates in Lebanon and Gaza, providing money and weapons to
    Hezbollah and Hamas, threatening the stability of Lebanon and
    undercutting the future of Palestinians, as well as engaging in
    confrontational activity in the Gulf.
        Iran's most destabilizing activity has been the pursuit of nuclear
    weapons technology in defiance of the international community,
    International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations Security Council.
    A nuclear-armed Iran would further threaten regional stability,
    potentially trigger an arms race and increase the potential for
    extremists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
        The Syrian Government continues to meddle in Lebanon. Its support
    for Hezbollah is destabilizing the country, and it stonewalls the
    investigation into the Rafik Hariri assassination.
        Over the past 5 years, terrorists, suicide bombers, and foreign
    fighters have traveled through Syria to attack Iraqi and coalition
    forces. The government in Damascus has tolerated the presence and
    operations of Iraqi Sunni extremists who have fueled the fighting in
    Baghdad and elsewhere in the country.
        In Lebanon, the government is confronted by opposition groups and
    violent protests, but the Lebanese Armed Forces are maintaining a
    fragile order. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have stood up publicly
    against assassination and terror, and for their elected government and
    a peaceful, prosperous future. The international community continues to
    support the popularly elected government in Beirut and its legitimately
    constituted and disciplined security forces.
     v. strengthening relationships and influence states and organizations
       to contribute to regional stability and the free flow of commerce
        To increase prospects for long-term stability and security in the
    region, we are working to strengthen relationships between and among
    these nations and the United States. We are also trying to influence
    states and organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to
    contribute to regional stability and work to ensure the free flow of
    commerce and positive economic growth.
        During the course of my numerous trips to the region, I have
    developed relationships with most of my military counterparts and many
    of their political leaders. The foundation of these partnership
    building efforts is our Theater Security Cooperation program, which
    helps develop the security capabilities of current and prospective
    coalition partners, builds and supports effective regional security
    arrangements and interoperability, and synchronizes efforts with other
    U.S. Government agencies. More importantly, these programs forge
    personal relationships between the U.S. and partners in the region,
    enhancing mutual trust and confidence and facilitating the effective
    operations of our commands.
        The CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation program is built on a
    foundation of enduring relationships. The synchronized efforts of all
    the elements of U.S. and international power are key to success. We are
    fortunate to have a number of close, reliable partner nations. Five of
    these countries, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain and Pakistan, are major
    non-NATO Allies, and of those, Jordan and Bahrain are Free Trade
    Agreement partners. Our Theater Security Cooperation Strategy enables
    regional stability and advances security efforts that protect vital
    U.S. national interests and helps partners build capacities to combat
    terror and become self-reliant.
        Department of State programs such as Foreign Military Funding (FMF)
    and International Military Education and Training (IMET) are vital to
    build enduring security relationships. Attendance at U.S. institutions
    and courses of instruction by foreign military personnel offers
    exposure to our ideas, principles, standards and most importantly, our
    people. The resulting personal relationships have proven invaluable in
    building long-term trust and access. In my experience, withholding IMET
    funds inhibits the ability to influence the positive transformation of
    regional military forces. Additionally, authorities for building global
    partnership capacity proposed in title 13 of the draft National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 will give me the tools I need to
    support our partners in the war on terror more effectively and
    efficiently than current authorities. Passage of this legislation will
    allow CENTCOM to use existing authorities to train and equip partner
    nations' non-military security services in addition to national
    military forces, and to engage in a wider range of combined exercises,
    training, and personnel and information exchanges. It will also give
    more field commanders the authority to spend Commander's Emergency
    Response Program funds, give rewards for valuable information and
    integrate a wider range of Department of State capabilities with our
    military ones. However, it will still require advance notification to
    Congress, thereby maintaining appropriate levels of transparency and
    oversight.
        In order to facilitate multi-lateral engagement between our
    partners, I hosted the inaugural CENTCOM Chiefs of Defense Conferences
    in Tampa, bringing together senior military officers from 19 of the 27
    nations in our region. These conferences were very well received and
    bolstered the stature and acceptance of the Iraqi and Afghan Defense
    Chiefs. Additionally, the unprecedented engagement between participants
    reduced suspicion and enhanced trust while cementing personal
    relationships.
        Military exercises enable our troops to operate with partner forces
    and improve interoperability as well as demonstrate capabilities. Our
    forces have participated in 49 combined exercises throughout the AOR,
    including multi-lateral exercises in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates
    (UAE), Egypt, and Kazakhstan. Qatar hosted an exercise focused on air
    defense and consequence management called Eagle Resolve for the third
    consecutive year. This event has strengthened defense cooperation among
    many of our regional partners. The UAE hosted three air exercises, two
    of them at the Gulf Air Warfare Center, which focused on multi-lateral
    cooperation and interoperability among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
    members. Egypt hosted CENTCOM's longest standing cooperative exercise,
    Bright Star, for 13 partner nations. After 25 years, this exercise
    continues to be relevant and has grown to emphasize strategic level
    engagement. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan hosted exercise Regional
    Cooperation, which enhanced interoperability and integration between
    the various disaster preparedness and consequence management ministries
    of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. By
    bringing together units from various nations to cooperate in response
    to realistic and challenging scenarios, these exercises hone the skills
    of U.S. and partner military forces while enhancing regional stability
    and security.
        Following are highlights of the development of key relationships in
    the region:
    Egypt
        Egypt is a key ally, strongly supporting the Middle East Peace
    Process and U.S. regional initiatives. Our close relations greatly aid
    our efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on terror by providing
    expedited Suez Canal transits for U.S. warships, over flights and
    access to basing. Egypt has maintained a field hospital and medical
    staff in Afghanistan since 2003 that continues to provide medical care
    and training. Egypt has signaled its intent to help combat smuggling
    into the Gaza strip through the purchase of technical equipment that
    could assist Egyptian security forces detect and exploit tunnels, a
    requirement that has assumed even greater importance in light of recent
    events. Egypt is one of the largest contributors to the United Nations-
    African Union Mission in Darfur with some 1,200 Egyptian soldiers and
    police officers. FMF significantly contributes to the modernization and
    interoperability of the Egyptian Armed Forces, which helps provide
    stability in the Suez Canal area and the Levant.
        The prospects for positive change in Egyptian governance are
    enhanced by our close interaction on regional security matters. These
    relations also ensure continued Egyptian support for our regional
    presence and operations and demonstrate that when we make a commitment,
    we keep it. For these reasons, I urge Congress to continue its support
    for Egyptian FMF levels.
    Horn of Africa and Yemen
        The nations in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti,
    Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and the Seychelles) face border and ethnic
    tensions, insurgencies, corruption, terrorist infiltrations and
    poverty. CENTCOM's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
    conducts operations, training, and humanitarian missions in the Horn of
    Africa and Yemen to build partner nation military capability, improve
    quality of life, expand governance, strengthen bilateral relationships,
    and build partner nations' military capability. Cooperation of these
    nations with us contributes to building their own capacity to combat
    terrorism and prepare for other challenges, including natural
    disasters. CENTCOM is working closely with U.S. Africa Command to
    ensure our relations continue to strengthen as the new geographic
    command prepares to assume its responsibilities.
    Ethiopia
        Ethiopia is a key regional strategic ally and close partner in the
    war on terror. This strong bilateral relationship was readily evident
    in the wake of Ethiopia's initial military operations in Somalia to
    support the Transitional Federal Government against radical insurgents.
    Ethiopia has also demonstrated strategic importance by its considerable
    contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions, such as the U.N.
    Mission in Liberia and its pledge of 5,000 peacekeepers for the U.N.
    African Union Mission in Darfur. Our support for the efforts of the
    Ethiopian military to modernize and professionalize will be critical to
    the government's ability to address security threats effectively and in
    conformity with international norms.
        Ethiopia has, however, refused to evacuate disputed territory on
    its border with Eritrea, despite the fact the United Nations Ethiopia-
    Eritrea Border Commission made its final ruling in favor of Eritrea's
    claim. Eritrea has denied supplies to the United Nations mission there
    in order to force it to depart. President Isaias Afwerki's government
    also sponsors violent extremists in Somalia, and there is evidence it
    does the same in Ethiopia. Eritrea's treatment of its own people is no
    better, as Isaias has jailed all political opponents and devastated
    what had been a relatively healthy economy. As long as Eritrea is
    aggressive toward its neighbors and repressive against its own people,
    the amount of assistance CENTCOM can provide will be severely limited.
    Kenya
        The just signed power-sharing agreement between President Kibaki
    and Orange Democratic Movement leader Raila Odinga is encouraging.
    While we should remain vigilant for signs of a return to political
    crisis and ethnic violence, I believe Kenya's strong institutional
    foundations can be a basis for long-term stability. Kenya provides a
    traditional locale for the U.S. and the international community to
    conduct relief and rescue operations in regional trouble spots and is a
    key contributor to regional conflict resolution and counterterrorism
    efforts. Historically, Kenya has been one of our closest and staunchest
    partners against terrorism. America's interests are to assist Kenya in
    countering the terrorist threat, support the processes of political and
    economic reform, help raise the standard of living, combat health
    crises, and protect Kenya's resource base.
    Djibouti
        This small, peaceful, and tolerant Muslim country is an island of
    stability in a region characterized by tension and violence. Djibouti
    is a key security partner as it hosts CJTF-HOA and provides refueling
    facilities for coalition naval vessels. Djibouti is also the warehouse
    location for prepositioned emergency food relief used by the Office of
    Foreign Disaster Assistance in times of crisis. As this country
    undergoes potentially rapid change while developing a new port complex,
    the continued support for CJTF-HOA in cooperation with other elements
    of the interagency will be critical to ensure the benefits of growth
    are distributed in a way that promotes stability and democratic
    development.
    Sudan
        In 2007, tension between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP)
    and the southern Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) increased
    due to the slow implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
    (CPA). These tensions culminated in the SPLM temporarily withdrawing
    from the Government of National Unity in Khartoum. We anticipate
    additional tension in 2008 due to expected delays in the CPA-mandated
    national census. In Darfur, the deployment of the U.N.-African Union
    Mission in Darfur will remain behind schedule due to NCP
    obstructionism. Multiple attempts to unite the Darfur rebels failed to
    bring about a cohesive group prior to renewed peace talks, exacerbating
    insecurity and the humanitarian crisis.
    Somalia
        Military, humanitarian, and political conditions deteriorated
    significantly in Somalia during 2007 and could further deteriorate in
    2008. Initially fractured in early 2007, the al Qaeda associated Somali
    resistance, supported politically by Eritrea, have regained control of
    much of southern and central Somalia. We will work closely with our
    regional partners to prevent harm to our broader interests, mitigate
    the humanitarian challenges and support efforts to achieve a political
    settlement.
    Seychelles
        Our relationship with the stable, democratic Government of
    Seychelles focuses on countering coastal security threats and improving
    disaster preparedness. Through joint exercises with the Seychelles
    Coast Guard we are working to build their capacity to plan and conduct
    operations to counter transnational threats.
    Lebanon
        Since November 2007, Lebanon's already tenuous political situation
    has worsened. The government and opposition see the stalled
    Presidential election process and the subsequent cabinet formation as
    crucial to their interests. The country remains politically stymied as
    the Hezbollah-led opposition, with its Syrian and Iranian allies,
    attempt to use the vacuum in the presidency as leverage to control
    future decisionmaking in the country. Syria will continue to pressure
    its allies to refuse any compromise knowing that the election of a
    Western leaning government will likely lead to the rapid implementation
    of the Special Tribunal to charge the assassins of former Prime
    Minister Rafiq Hariri. Damascus fears this will implicate high-ranking
    Syrian officials and their Lebanese allies. These political battles
    have grown violent as evidenced by assassinations of political and
    security leaders. In addition, bombs have targeted high-ranking members
    of the security establishment as well as U.S. Embassy employees.
        A well-armed and well-trained Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a
    potential unifying force. The multi-confessional LAF, with its members
    drawn from all of the country's communities, enjoys broad support from
    the Lebanese people. The LAF demonstrated resolve and courage during
    its 102 day fight in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp last year--a
    victory that would have been far more costly were it not for the
    support of the United States and key allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
    and Egypt. CENTCOM Special Operations Forces enhanced LAF effectiveness
    by providing training during the months preceding operations at Nahr
    al-Barid. While addressing the short-term needs of the LAF, we are
    focusing on its long-term development. The $220 million FMF
    supplemental approved by Congress in 2007 is contributing significantly
    to this effort, but we must continue the process and strengthen our
    bilateral military relationship to resist efforts by Syria, Iran, and
    their Hezbollah surrogates to undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon.
    Jordan
        Jordan is a regional leader in security and counterterror training
    and one of our strongest partners. In 2007, Jordan hosted a large
    multinational special operations exercise as well as six other military
    exercises. It also hosts the Peace Operations Training Center, the
    International Police Training Center, the Cooperative Management
    Center, and the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center.
    Additionally, Jordanian doctors and nurses operate and provide training
    in much needed hospitals in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Consistently supportive of our role and presence in the region,
    Jordan has played a major role in promoting stability and
    reconciliation in Western Iraq, supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces
    and training Palestinian Authority Security Forces. Currently, more
    than 1,000 Palestinian authority security personnel are receiving
    essential police training in Jordan.
        Although it placed enormous stress on public services, Jordanian
    leaders opened their country to hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing
    the violence in their own country. Jordanian efforts to improve border
    security are exemplary and set the standard for the region. U.S.
    military and economic assistance to Jordan are wise investments for a
    peaceful, secure and prosperous region.
    Arabian Gulf States
        We have improved participation and cooperation with the GCC states
    of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Of note,
    Iraq has participated in GCC multi-lateral discussions and as an
    observer during exercises. Developing these relationships will
    eventually lead to greater security and economic opportunity for the
    entire region. Each of these nations has been a valuable contributor to
    our mutual security efforts providing essential base and port access,
    overflight rights and additional force protection for U.S. units in the
    region.
        Our strong partnership with Kuwait is vital to the CENTCOM mission.
    Kuwait hosts the Combined Forces Land Component Command and provides a
    staging area for Coalition forces entering and departing Iraq. Military
    operations in Iraq would not be possible without critical support
    provided by Kuwait in the form of fuel, electricity, water, meals,
    waived customs fees, and many other allowances totaling about $1
    billion per year. The military-to-military relationship with Kuwait
    grows stronger through a robust military sales program and an extensive
    program of combined exercises.
    The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
        The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has achieved significant success with
    an initiative to cut off funding to terrorists and restrain violence.
    Saudi leaders have enacted tough antiterrorism laws, established a
    Financial Intelligence Unit to combat illegal ``charities'' that
    ultimately fund al Qaeda and have built indigenous special operations
    and counterterror forces capacity. They have also made efforts to
    reform their educational system and have promoted the ideals of
    tolerance and moderation in their leading mosques and promote
    rehabilitation programs for security prisoners. Saudi Arabia has been
    helpful in our efforts to support the stability and independence of the
    legitimate Government of Lebanon. Our military relationship is based on
    extensive interaction between armed forces and a robust military sales
    program that we expect to grow in coming years. It is enhanced by a
    U.S. advisory presence in the Kingdom and by our training of Saudi
    military personnel.
        Bahrain and the U.S. have enjoyed a close military relationship for
    more than a half a century. Today, Manama hosts U.S. Naval Forces
    Central Command. In addition, a Bahraini officer currently commands
    Coalition Task Force 152 with responsibility for Maritime Security in
    the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain hosted an Iraq Coalition conference this past
    October and is a strong supporter in the struggle against terror. In
    the past year, I attended the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, and the Forum
    on U.S.-Islamic Relations in Qatar. These two widely respected fora are
    strongly supported by the host nations and allow leaders the
    opportunity to benefit from extensive engagement on substantive
    regional issues.
        We are grateful to Qatar for hosting the CENTCOM forward
    headquarters at Camp As Saliyah and our Combined Air Operations Center
    at al-Udeid Air Base. The excellent military-to-military relationship
    with the Qatar Armed Forces is robust and mutually beneficial. Access
    to the airbase at al-Udeid facilitates air operations in the AOR. Doha
    also provides substantial in-kind support to U.S. forces, significantly
    offsetting the cost of our operations from there. Additionally, they
    have participated in the Gulf Security Dialogue meetings with the
    Departments of State and Defense in order to build infrastructure and
    systems necessary to improve deterrence.
        The UAE has emerged as a staunch coalition partner, contributing to
    the continued security and stability of the Gulf and the Strait of
    Hormuz. In addition to access for air assets at the Al Dhafra Airbase,
    the Emirates provide nearly continuous access for Navy ships in the
    port of Jebel Ali. It is a leading partner in the campaign against
    terror, providing assistance in military, diplomatic and financial
    areas. Our military-to-military relationship ties are a key element of
    our excellent bi-lateral relations. We expect these relations to
    strengthen as the UAE serves as a regional example of the benefits of
    private sector growth and broadened opportunity for individual choice.
    The Emiratis are leading the Shared Early Warning initiative in the
    Gulf and have a robust Foreign Military Sales Missile Defense request
    pending.
        Oman is a stable, secure, and cooperative partner. The Sultanate
    allows the storage of important war reserve material, and its proximity
    to the Strait of Hormuz is a uniquely vital strategic position. We have
    had an enduring relationship with Oman since the early part of the 19th
    century, and they have provided strong support for Operations Enduring
    Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Our cooperation with Oman in areas such as
    education and economic development support Oman's own measured path to
    economic growth and more participatory governance.
    Pakistan
        The recent election in Pakistan was encouraging and offers the
    potential for a peaceful return to democracy and much needed
    stabilization for this populous country. It is important to note that
    the Pakistani Armed Forces did not arbitrate these elections, but they
    did provide the essential security that enabled a generally peaceful
    process. Senior Pakistani leaders understand the threat of violent
    extremism to their country and are taking steps to transform their
    security institutions to be more effective in combating these
    challenges. The military aid we have provided in all forms has been
    critical in the fight against extremists inside Pakistan, particularly
    along the western frontier adjacent to Afghanistan. Pakistan has
    successfully deployed more than 100,000 troops to the western frontier,
    directly engaged al Qaeda, the Taliban, and foreign fighters.
        Pakistani security forces have captured and killed significant
    numbers of violent extremists, to include high-ranking leaders of al
    Qaeda and the Taliban. They have also suffered extensive casualties.
    Our long-term partnership with Pakistan is central to defeating
    extremist groups in the region, and it is difficult to imagine success
    in that struggle without its support and cooperation. We are working
    together to reduce the tensions stemming from the radical and violent
    extremist presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Ongoing
    initiatives include regular meetings with Pakistan's military leaders,
    enhanced liaison and communications among our units operating along the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border and a Security Development Plan, which
    includes initiatives to establish a Frontier Corps Training Center,
    assist the Frontier Corps (FC) in establishing new Wings (battalion
    equivalent) and improve indigenous intelligence operation capabilities.
    Advisors will share lessons learned in counterterrorism and
    counterinsurgency mission sets, and FC personnel will be provided with
    modern equipment. Also, Sector Headquarters and Border Coordination
    Centers will be established to improve shared situational awareness and
    deconflict border operations with coalition forces in Afghanistan.
        Pakistan remains a strong partner of the United States, and our
    support for its counterterror efforts will continue with a variety of
    focused programs. Our security cooperation funding and bilateral
    exercise programs help the Pakistani Government conduct counterterror
    operations, develop its counterinsurgency capacity and enhance its
    internal stability. In this critical time of democratic change it is
    vital that Pakistan view the U.S. as a long term trusted partner,
    particularly in our efforts to defeat common enemies.
    Middle East Peace Process
        Any discussion of security and stability in the region must include
    the Middle East Peace Process. Recent efforts to revive this effort are
    positive. A peaceful two-State solution that offers justice and
    security to Palestinians and Israel would negate the widespread
    perception of inequity in the Arab world.
    Central Asian States--Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
            and Uzbekistan
        These five nations in Central Asia, are strategically important to
    the U.S., welcome greater interaction with us and play an increasing
    role in the global energy market. They reject violent extremists and
    all, save Uzbekistan with whom we have just reestablished a military
    dialogue, cooperate with the U.S. in a variety of security initiatives.
        Kazakhstan is a valued partner in Iraq and offers the potential to
    serve as a regional leader for economic growth and prosperity.
    Kazakhstan is a key player in east-west trade and the potential
    northern nexus of a trade route that could stretch south to Pakistan,
    linking the less developed nations in the region with access to
    international markets in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. With regard
    to its security needs, we have been assisting Kazakhstan in refining
    its defense strategy, modernizing its armed forces, and development of
    its peacekeeping forces.
        Kyrgyzstan is rebuilding political stability after the turmoil of
    the past few years and hosts a U.S. presence at Manas Air Base, a key
    logistics node that facilitates operations in Afghanistan. We are
    seeking new and innovative ways to help develop the capabilities and
    capacity of Kyrgyz security forces to meet internal requirements and to
    contribute to regional stability.
        Economic woes, an energy deficit and narcotics trafficking
    challenge Tajikistan, one of the poorest nations in the region.
    Tajikistan has made progress in building national unity, but much work
    remains. I am encouraged by Tajikistan's willingness to participate in
    international peacekeeping efforts, and our security cooperation
    programs are focused on helping Dushanbe build its capacity and secure
    it borders.
        Turkmenistan is slowly but steadily emerging from the self-
    isolation of former President Niyazov. President Berdimuhamedov has
    loosened up internal controls, reached out to neighbors in need and
    demonstrated a stiff spine by halting gas exports to Iran for non-
    payment of agreed fees. Turkmenistan has expanded cooperation with us
    on a range of military-to-military activities and recently approved
    funding for a U.N. Drug Control program office in Turkmenistan. They
    have actively assisted our efforts in support Afghanistan operations.
        We have reinstituted a security relationship with Uzbekistan after
    a hiatus of about 3 years following the expulsion of our forces from
    Karshi-Khanabad airbase, in the wake of the Uzbek Government's response
    to an attempted extremist takeover of the town of Andijan in 2005. I
    met with President Karimov in January, and we welcome the opportunity
    to reverse the deterioration in relations between the U.S. and
    Uzbekistan, encourage better regional cooperation and reopen a dialogue
    to address issues of reform and human rights.
        Throughout Central Asia, there is an opportunity to positively
    influence the future development of these countries. We are encouraging
    greater economic, political, and security cooperation among these five
    states. Greater sustained diplomatic engagement, military aid and
    economic assistance would further mutual interests.
        vi. posturing the force to build and sustain joint and combined
                     warfighting capabilities and readiness
    Joint and Coalition Operations
        Joint and combined warfighting capability and readiness are
    fundamental to our ability to prosecute ongoing military operations,
    maintain a credible presence to deter aggression and respond
    effectively to contingencies. Because we execute nearly all of our
    activities jointly and in concert with allies, we must cultivate
    effective interservice and multinational ways of doing business.
    Existing examples of such integration include the Multinational
    Headquarters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Because our
    region is filled with uncertainty, we must maintain a full spectrum of
    responsive capabilities through an effective forward deployed force
    structure, thorough planning and realistic combined training exercises.
    Other critical capabilities include the following:
    A Strong Coalition
        Currently there are 41 partner nations with troops in Afghanistan
    and 31 with personnel in Iraq. They bring important mission
    capabilities but also significant integration challenges. Blending
    capabilities of these countries into effective action requires, among
    other factors, a command and control infrastructure that accounts for
    remote locations, multiple languages, cultural differences and
    challenging force protection issues. Our coalition must share
    classified and sensitive information when appropriate and have the
    networks and infrastructure to facilitate such exchanges.
    Interagency Coordination
        Establishment of security and stability in our region requires the
    application of all elements of national power: military, diplomatic,
    economic, and information. The military instruments can set conditions
    for security but other agencies foster lasting change.
        We are fortunate to have several U.S. Government entities engaged
    in the CENTCOM AOR. The Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and
    Homeland Security, as well as subordinate agencies including the U.S.
    Agency for International Development, Diplomatic Security Service,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and
    U.S. Coast Guard, are actively engaged in our theater. Their efforts
    are helping to protect critical infrastructure, prevent terrorist
    attacks on our homeland, train fledgling law enforcement organizations
    and rebuild damaged or aging infrastructure. There is clearly a need
    for better integration and more comprehensive application of all the
    elements of national power.
    Flexible Logistics
        Strategic airlift, rapid sealift, prepositioned inventories, and
    access to bases with critical infrastructure are the key logistics
    components which support operational flexibility. Our primary focus in
    this area remains the timely deployment, equipping, and sustainment of
    units engaged in combat operations. As an example, the rapid fielding
    of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to our troops would
    not have been possible without the highly flexible contingency air and
    sealift capabilities. We will leverage commercial air and surface
    distribution across the theater and pursue initiatives to improve
    theater-wide logistics cost savings and work force reductions. We will
    continue working with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, the Department of State, and partner nations to ensure access
    to the infrastructure we need to support ongoing and future operations.
    Adaptable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
            Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) Capabilities
        Interoperable, high-volume communications systems are essential to
    conducting operations across a dispersed command space. Our systems
    operate near full capacity daily with little surge capability. Because
    many of our needs must be satisfied by commercial providers, access to
    them is critical. The largest challenge we face is integration of
    disparate systems into interoperable and reliable networks. We must
    embrace policies that enable successful integration and technologies
    that result in effective interoperability and efficient information-
    sharing.
        Ultimately, our ability to target violent extremists depends on
    precise and actionable intelligence. We continue to evolve our
    techniques and procedures to optimize efforts to ``find, fix, finish,
    and exploit'' targets. Our adversaries have been agile in adapting to
    our operations. We continue to improve battle space awareness, seeking
    greater specificity, detail, and timeliness of intelligence whenever
    possible. We are aggressively seeking ways to manage shortfalls or
    capability gaps in imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor
    integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered
    Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) architecture,
    biometrics, counterintelligence, and human collectors. Your support of
    our intelligence needs is much appreciated, and I solicit your
    continued funding of these critical items.
    Responsive Counter Improvised Explosive Device Program
        Insurgents' weapon of choice will likely continue to be the IED, or
    road-side bomb. They are cheap, effective, and anonymous and have been
    adapted to include toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine. While
    some are crude, our adversaries increasingly use sophisticated
    technology, including EFPs from Iran. These weapons have killed or
    wounded thousands of military and civilian personnel in Iraq, and IEDs
    are becoming increasingly prevalent in Afghanistan.
        To counter this threat, and working with the interagency and our
    coalition partners, we are fielding jammers, specialized route
    clearance vehicles and equipment and improved vehicle and personnel
    protective armor. The most effective counter to the IED is targeting
    the human networks which supply, train, and employ the devices. We have
    pressed this approach through a comprehensive application of ISR. These
    initiatives have reduced IED effectiveness. We must continue to develop
    new technologies, tactics, techniques and procedures. Of particular
    importance to CENTCOM is continued fielding of MRAP vehicles, and
    further research and development to improve the detection of mines,
    IEDs and unexploded ordnance.
    Personnel
        Sustained operations in the CENTCOM AOR depend on personnel who
    have foreign language proficiency and cultural awareness competency in
    addition to military skills. Retention is a critical issue, and we
    depend heavily on quality of life enhancements such as Combat Zone Tax
    Relief, Imminent Danger Pay, and Special Leave Accrual. The Rest and
    Recuperation program continues to be a success, serving more than
    590,000 troops to date. Over the past year, we have conducted a
    comprehensive review of the manning of our headquarters, which, after 6
    years of war, is still highly reliant on temporary individual
    augmentation personnel. My subordinate warfighting headquarters are
    also heavily manned with individual augmentees. I am committed to
    working with the Services and the Joint Staff to properly size and
    resource all of these headquarters.
        CENTCOM is also working to address requirements for low density
    skills. Our present inventory of language and intelligence specialists
    (especially human intelligence) and counterintelligence agents does not
    support current requirements. Language expertise is crucial in
    counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and counterintelligence operations
    and will continue to be in high demand. Contracting language expertise
    provides interim capability, but in the long run, we need
    servicemembers and career civilians with the requisite language and
    cultural skills.
        We recognize the importance of co-locating our servicemembers with
    their families whenever prudent. We further recognize the value is
    compounded when done so overseas as our families interact with the host
    nation and strengthen the ties between our peoples. We have initiated
    the process to authorize our military families to return to areas as
    reduced threats permit. Before such actions, we will take every
    precaution to ensure protection and security measures are in place to
    safeguard our personnel and their families.
                                 vi. conclusion
        During this past year the men and women assigned to CENTCOM have
    fought valiantly in Iraq and Afghanistan, provided humanitarian and
    reconstruction assistance, and engaged with partners and allies in
    deterring aggression. They have worked tirelessly on behalf of the
    American people to provide essential security and stability for
    millions of others. They have trained and exercised alongside men and
    women from many other nations, providing experience, advice, mentoring,
    and example in an effort to increase the capabilities of others to
    defend and secure their people. The engagement of our service personnel
    with foreign counterparts is key to gaining the trust of these people
    and facilitating our ability to influence outcomes in support of U.S.
    policy objectives. We stand ready to assist those who would work with
    us to bring lasting peace to this troubled region of the world.
        The American people and Congress have provided staunch and steady
    support for our efforts, and we greatly appreciate your advocacy and
    assistance. I am proud and honored to represent the men, women and
    supporting families of CENTCOM. On their behalf, thank you for your
    support and for this opportunity to testify before you.

        Chairman Levin. Admiral Fallon, thank you.
        Admiral Olson?

     STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and
    distinguished members of the committee: Thank you as well for
    this opportunity to appear before you to report on the Special
    Operations Forces. I'm very honored to represent the 54,000
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and government civilians
    of SOCOM. With your permission, I submit my written posture
    statement for the record and will limit my opening remarks.
        The strong and steady interest of Congress and this
    committee has helped Special Operations Forces attain global
    capability and effectiveness. Since your creation of United
    States SOCOM, now almost 21 years ago, our joint force has
    proven itself in many well-known and lesser known operations,
    and it's been a steady presence with our friends and allies.
        Throughout the command, its strength has been its
    extraordinary people, enabled by unique authorities and a
    dedicated budget. United States SOCOM is charged by legislation
    to prepare and provide fully capable Special Operations Forces
    to conduct operations worldwide. These activities include
    counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction, direct action, special reconnaissance,
    unconventional warfare, training with foreign forces, civil
    affairs, psychological operations, and information operations
    as they relate to special operations.
        By direction of the President, United States SOCOM is also
    the lead combatant command for synchronizing Department of
    Defense (DOD) planning for the global campaign against
    terrorism.
        So in aggregate, these doctrinal terms define a complex set
    of tasks that are best accomplished by a specially selected,
    trained, and equipped joint force with proven skill,
    discipline, courage, and wisdom. It's a force that must operate
    with equal confidence and equal effectiveness across the
    spectrum of conflict from pre-crisis through intense conflict
    and to stabilization and reconstruction. Such a joint force
    must be carefully managed to optimize its readiness.
        When deployed outside the United States, Special Operations
    Forces are almost always in support of geographic combatant
    commanders. They're present in 58 countries today, mostly in
    small numbers, often with low visibility, low profile presence.
    Over 80 percent, as you said, sir, of our deployed forces today
    are in the CENTCOM AOR working for Admiral Fallon, focused on a
    careful balance of direct and indirect actions to defeat
    terrorists and violent insurgents and contribute to local
    stability.
        Operational commanders have learned that no other force can
    accomplish such a broad scope of missions in such diverse
    operational environments, and so global demand for this force
    does exceed supply, and I anticipate no decrease in demand even
    as some United States forces eventually draw down from Iraq. In
    fact, I expect an increase in demand for Special Operations
    Forces as local environments transition from a larger
    conventional force presence to a smaller train and assist kind
    of activity presence, especially considering the continuing
    deficit of Special Operations Forces in the other geographic
    combatant commanders' regions.
        To answer this, as a result of program decisions of the
    last few years, including the QDR in the last Program Objective
    Memorandum cycle, we are expanding as fast as we reasonably
    can, as fast as we can reasonably absorb the growth. In the
    long-term, I estimate that 3 to 5 percent growth per year is
    about right for Special Operations Forces manpower. If we must
    expand organic enablers like aviation, like cordon and search
    forces, like interrogator forces, intelligence analysts,
    airfield control and the like in order to become more self-
    sufficient, though, those numbers would increase.
        Many of the mobility platforms and much of the equipment
    used by Special Operations Forces are initially procured by the
    Services and then modified for Special Operations-peculiar
    mission requirements. So must of SOCOM acquisition programs
    must be carefully synchronized with the Services.
    Recapitalizing our fixed wing transport fleet and our
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capability in terms
    of systems, not just platforms, are our most critical needs.
        For these and other programs that deliver Special
    Operations-peculiar items, speed of process is essential and
    I'm committed to exploring the scope of my authorities in order
    to make that system more responsive.
        In any case, I'm convinced that Special Operations will be
    required to at least sustain and perhaps grow its levels of
    both operational effort and funding for the foreseeable future.
        I remain humbled to command such a force, such a capable
    and versatile group of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
    civilians, at this important time, and I also remain in awe of
    the courage and dedication demonstrated by this force every
    day.
        I thank you for your continued support and I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, it is an
    honor to report on the state of United States Special Operations
    Command (SOCOM).
        SOCOM's mission is to provide fully capable Special Operations
    Forces (SOF) to defend the United States and its interests; and to plan
    and synchronize Department of Defense (DOD) operations against
    terrorist networks.
        America's Special Operations Forces (SOF) are organized, equipped
    and trained, and then deployed by SOCOM to meet the high demands of
    Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) around the world. The range of
    special operations is wide, the geographic dispersion is great, the
    quality is exceptional and the results are impressive.
        Although most SOF deployed from the United States since the attacks
    of September 11 have served in and around Iraq and Afghanistan, we
    clearly understand the enduring value of a global presence. We are
    proud to be serving in about 60 countries today.
        The core capabilities of SOF are in the people who choose to do,
    qualify for and remain committed to this type of work. Finding,
    training, and sustaining them requires steady focus. Ensuring they have
    the equipment, sensors, weapons, and mobility platforms of the kind and
    quality demanded by their peculiar missions requires willingness to
    invest in the rapid fielding of both existing solutions and cutting
    edge technologies even when the relatively small purchase quantities do
    not optimize production costs.
        SOF must be manned, trained and equipped to operate globally with
    unmatched speed, precision and discipline within a culture that
    promotes innovation, initiative and tactical level diplomacy. While
    this Nation appreciates the tremendous impact of SOF's day-to-day
    engagement with global friends, allies and partners, and the powerful
    impact of SOF on the battlefield is legend, America also expects SOF to
    be able to appear in places they are not expected to be, with
    capabilities they are not expected to have.
        To accomplish our missions, we are focused on three priorities,
    each containing nested objectives.
        First, we must deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats to our
    Nation. We do this by planning and conducting special operations,
    emphasizing culturally-attuned international engagement and fostering
    interagency cooperation. The Command's synchronization of the plans and
    planning to deter, disrupt, and defeat our enemies has great influence
    on allocation of the Department's resources.
        Second, we must develop and support our people and their families.
    Our great people are the foundation of mission success, and they are
    national assets. We must maintain our quality, train and educate our
    force as joint warrior-diplomats, and always care for them and their
    families.
        Third, we must sustain and modernize the force by equipping the
    operator, upgrading our mobility platforms and further developing
    persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors
    and systems.
        These priorities support SOCOM's ongoing efforts to ensure SOF are
    highly trained, properly equipped and deployed to the right places at
    the right times for the right missions. Our personnel must be capable
    of planning and leading a wide range of lethal and non-lethal special
    operations missions in complex, ambiguous environments. This specific
    requirement underpins expectations that SOF will continue a military
    culture of initiative and innovation at every level. SOCOM will
    continue to work closely with the Services to ensure that the
    conventional force enablers upon which we depend remain a part of our
    future operations.
                  deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats
        The enemy threat is complex and patient. SOCOM anticipates no
    relief from our deployed commitments even when U.S. force levels in
    Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced. SOF's ability to grow relationships
    and build partner nation capacity is a fundamental part of the
    Department's campaign plan against terrorist threats.
        We pursue two essential, mutually supporting and often intertwined
    approaches--direct and indirect. These two approaches integrate the
    requirement to immediately disrupt violent extremist organizations
    while positively impacting the environment in which they operate.
        The direct approach addresses the immediate requirement to pursue
    terrorists, their infrastructure and their resources. Despite the
    positive trends in Iraq, operations to capture or kill terrorists and
    disrupt their networks remain both urgent and necessary. In the dynamic
    and ambiguous environments that constitute today's battlefields, the
    ability to rapidly analyze and exploit information is key to fast
    sequential targeting. This requires unique skills, specialized
    technologies and flexible mobility. We understand the necessity of
    prosecuting targets with speed, precision and discipline.
        The indirect approach addresses the underlying causes of terrorism
    and the environments in which terrorism activities occur. The indirect
    approach requires more time than the direct approach to achieve
    effects, but ultimately will be the decisive effort.
        In a world characterized by protracted struggles, emerging
    Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine calls for a suite of capabilities to
    prevail against those who threaten us. IW is a logical, long-term
    framework that assists in both analyzing and applying many elements of
    national and international power to achieve mutual security objectives.
        IW often employs indirect operations to gain asymmetric advantage
    over adversaries. IW is not a new mission area for SOF. Unconventional
    warfare, counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency, civil-military
    operations, Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and
    Foreign Internal Defense (FID) are all traditional IW activities and
    core tasks for SOF. With IW's emergence as a focus area for broader
    participation across the Department, it increasingly describes
    activities that both SOF and general purpose forces will employ in
    their operational approaches.
    Theater SOF Efforts--By, With, and Through
        Deployed SOF are normally under the command of Theater Special
    Operations Commanders who work directly for the GCCs. The Theater SOCs
    have the regional focus that contributes to a good understanding of the
    people, the cultures, and the issues of their areas of interest.
        It is under the Theater Special Operations Commands that
    permanently deployed and rotational SOF work in other countries to
    enhance combat skills; establish relationships with counterparts;
    advise, assist or manage a variety of civil and military projects;
    contribute to the achievement of U.S. Ambassadors' objectives; or gain
    the experience that will contribute to future successes.
        For example, at the direction of SOCOM-Pacific, SOF assist
    Philippine forces' efforts to identify and defeat indigenous and
    transnational terrorist organizations in the southern islands. Building
    on the model that was effective on Basilan Island in 2002, a Combined
    Joint Special Operations Task Force works closely with Philippine Army,
    Marine and Navy units and the U.S. Agency for International Development
    to provide both humanitarian assistance and military training. SOF also
    manage information and public affairs plans in coordination with the
    U.S. country team. The combined effect of these efforts has made
    central and southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago a much more
    challenging environment for terrorist activity.
        Under SOCOM-Europe, Army Special Forces conducted an exercise
    during the summer of 2007 involving several Trans-Saharan (Pan-Sahel)
    nations and our European partners. SOF provided training in regional
    synchronization, intelligence sharing, planning and coordination for CT
    related operations. Last year, SOF also participated in Joint Combined
    Exchange Training exercises in this region. These exchanges enhance SOF
    skills while building person-to-person and unit-to-unit relationships.
        Under SOCOM-Central Command, SOF have continued programs that are
    building competent and capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces . Iraqi
    SOF are generally touted as some of the most effective military units
    in the region.
        Under SOCOM-South, SOF personnel train, advise, and assist in
    Colombia's campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
    (FARC) narco-terrorists.
    Foreign Internal Defense
        SOF employs its unique abilities to assess, train, advise, and
    assist host nation militaries to build military capability. In so doing
    we improve our partner nations' confidence and abilities to detect and
    defeat violent extremist organizations. In 2007, SOF conducted hundreds
    of FID missions around the world.
    Civil Affairs
        CA projects deter support for violent extremist organizations by
    legitimizing existing governments and fostering a more favorable
    opinion of U.S. efforts. Simultaneously, programs that address
    government corruption, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and basic
    human needs build confidence in fledgling governments. While CA units
    are key to success in Afghanistan and Iraq, they remain equally vital
    to the conduct of myriad other SOF operations throughout the world.
        Working closely with Colombian government and military officials,
    SOF CA personnel carried out more than two dozen medical humanitarian
    civic action events. These events treated thousands of Columbian
    patients in remote areas of the country and solidified that
    government's legitimacy in undergoverned spaces.
        The Civil Military Engagement Program employs Civil Military
    Support Elements which are scalable, modular SOF teams that plan,
    coordinate, facilitate, manage and lead programs and projects that
    support U.S. and host nation objectives. Combatant commanders are
    increasingly requesting this CA augmentation to enhance their indirect
    operations.
    Psychological Operations
        One of the most important components in defeating terrorism
    includes countering violent extremist propaganda. These efforts are
    global in scale and are locally implemented by the geographic Combatant
    Commands. PSYOP forces disseminate truthful information to shape
    behavior and erode the attraction of extremist ideologies among foreign
    audiences.
        SOCOM's Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) includes
    functional, cultural and geographic experts who bring a combined
    approach to tackling what has become a tough, entrenched war of ideas.
    JMISC currently orchestrates a 24/7 multi-media campaign formatted to
    the cultures and languages of relevant audiences. This provides a
    factual message as an alternative to the extremist ideology for global
    audiences.
        A most important tool in our ability to build the capacity of
    partner nations to conduct CT or stability operations is our continued
    authority to train and equip foreign military forces under language
    included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2008. Sections 1202 (previously known as 1208) and 1206, which expires
    this year, are authorities that have made a big difference in
    developing carefully selected counterpart forces. As an authority
    specific to Special Operations, section 1202 is especially germane.
    Synchronization and Planning
        In 2005, SOCOM was directed by the Unified Command Plan to plan,
    synchronize and, as directed, conduct global operations against
    terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.
    While this was widely perceived as granting SOCOM the authority to
    direct a wide range of operational activities in areas already assigned
    to the GCCs, we have realized in execution that our greatest value is
    in synchronizing global war on terror campaign plans and planning. The
    operations themselves are in almost every case conducted by the GCC
    responsible for that region, with SOCOM in support. Every day at
    headquarters SOCOM, and at numerous outstations and agencies around the
    world, SOCOM personnel are collaborating, coordinating, and planning
    with other agencies to achieve desired global effects.
        The most comprehensive element of SOCOM's synchronization effort is
    the global collaborative planning process. This effort draws on other
    Combatant Command capabilities and expertise to develop DOD's global
    war on terror campaign plan. This plan, coupled with the Geographic
    Combatant Commands' regional war on terror campaign plans that support
    it, are dynamic and under continuous review. SOCOM and the DOD Global
    Synchronization Community have developed structured processes to
    evaluate and prioritize the many capabilities, operations, activities,
    resources and forces required for DOD's efforts to deter, disrupt, and
    defeat terrorism. SOCOM provides real and virtual venues for regular
    meetings, briefings, and conferences with each of the GCCs, interagency
    partners, and friendly and allied nations. The primary forum is the
    semi-annual Global Synchronization Conference. Because collaboration
    with our partner nations is so important, several other programs such
    as the foreign attache-based Sovereign Challenge and our upcoming
    International SOF Week improve global cooperation.
        SOCOM's Interagency Task Force is a catalyst to rapidly facilitate
    CT collaboration within the U.S. Government against trans-regional,
    functional, and strategic level problem sets and opportunities.
        SOCOM's International Engagement Program identifies requirements
    and helps coordinate actions within selected foreign countries to
    assist, resolve and enhance their CT capabilities and increase overall
    information sharing.
    Future Concepts
        The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified several
    initiatives to give the Department greater capability and agility in
    dealing with the most common and enduring threats of the 21st century.
    The development of IR capabilities was prominent. SOCOM plays a lead
    role in developing IW doctrine.
        The IW Joint Operating Concept, developed by SOCOM in partnership
    the Marine Corps, was approved and signed by the Secretary of Defense
    in September 2007. It is the first step in the promulgation of IW
    doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and
    education, personnel, and facilities.
        In order to maintain the momentum in IW planning and policy, SOCOM
    established an IW Directorate (J10) in 2007. The J10 provides
    continuous focus on IW related issues that cut across operational and
    programmatic lines.
               develop and support our people and their families
        The Commander of SOCOM is responsible for ensuring the combat
    readiness of assigned forces. With this requirement comes the need for
    better defined personnel management authorities and readiness reporting
    frameworks.
    Recruiting and Retention
        The ability to identify and recruit the best SOF candidates is a
    challenge requiring innovation and commitment of resources. Diversity
    across the force is an operational necessity posing additional
    challenges to recruiting. Attributes sought by the SOF community
    include culturally-attuned individuals proficient in foreign languages
    who physically blend into the operational environment.
        Ongoing personnel sustainment and programmed growth efforts
    directed by the QDR require intense cooperation and support between
    SOCOM, the Services, and DOD. This concentrated effort has paid
    dividends--89 percent of the fiscal year 2007 QDR growth was achieved.
    With support from the Services, the SOF community leveraged a
    combination of innovative accession programs, revamped training
    programs, and implemented retention incentives.
        SOF personnel have deployed often and suffered many casualties.
    SOCOM puts great emphasis on sustainment programs that assist families
    as well as the uniformed member. The SOF Care Coalition project,
    implemented by my predecessor, has been extremely successful through
    patient and family advocacy that extends beyond recovery,
    rehabilitation and any subsequent transition to civilian life. No issue
    is too large or too small. Care Coalition successes range from
    minimizing medical and physical evaluation board bureaucracy, ensuring
    Traumatic Serviceman Group Life Insurance compensation is appropriate,
    coordinating home repairs for a family whose father was deployed,
    making certain a SOF warrior's young daughter received the best TRICARE
    could provide, and providing personalized support for all families
    caring for their hospitalized wounded warrior.
        Although SOCOM is specifically responsible for the special
    operations force defined by Major Force Program (MFP) 11
    authorizations, one of the greatest emergent challenges is the health
    of our service-provided SOF enablers.
    Training and Education
        The component assessment and selection programs identify candidates
    with the potential for entry into the SOF community. The initial SOF
    qualification training that follows assessment and selection takes up
    to 2 years to complete, but skills training is continuous thoughout
    one's career in SOF.
        Professional military education remains an essential element to the
    development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF. One initiative
    scheduled to begin in 2008 will expand the SOF Interagency Fellow's
    program to provide post-graduate courses, full degree programs, and
    independent research opportunities for SOF strategists and long-range
    planners.
    Language and Culture
        Language skills and cultural knowledge continue to be key to
    establishing effective relations with the foreign forces,
    organizations, and individuals with which SOF will interact. The 1st
    Special Forces Group language training program was recognized by the
    Army and DOD as the best of its kind in 2007 but, although we have
    enhanced all of our language training programs in recent years, we
    remain underqualified in many key languages and dialects. We will
    continue to expand our programs in 2008, stressing the need for a few
    individuals to be thoroughly steeped in select languages and cultures.
    Our initiatives will include exploration of innovative options to
    permit such specialization without sacrificing promotion opportunity.
    Joint Special Operations University
        The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is responding to the
    increased need for strategic and operational level education for our
    SOF personnel, enablers, and international partners. JSOU will continue
    to offer a range of academic options that address strategic and
    operational subject areas. Programs will include traditional courses
    and seminars; tailored academic electives at the Service professional
    military education institutions; joint mobile education teams; symposia
    and academic workshops; individual performance support; and similar
    activities aimed at the needs of our student base.
                        sustain and modernize the force
    Budget
        The budget and acquisition authorities provided in the original
    language that created SOCOM have proven invaluable in enabling SOF to
    be properly trained and equipped.
        The fiscal year 2009 President's budget request of $5.727 billion
    for Major Force Program 11 will permit continued development of
    capabilities peculiar to special operations. This request will continue
    our investment in capabilities to improve SOF warrior systems, promote
    specialized and institutional training, explore and exploit new
    technologies and refine force structure. Over half of the budget
    request--$3.7 billion--is for operations and maintenance to sustain SOF
    operational readiness, to maintain equipment, and to provide for fuel,
    consumable supplies, civilian salaries, spare parts, and repair of
    weapons and equipment.
        Of the remainder, $1.5 billion is for procurement, and will be used
    to fund vital SOF-unique modernization and recapitalization efforts in
    force protection, mobility, weapons, munitions, communications, and
    intelligence equipment. An additional $361 million is requested for
    research, development, test, and evaluation to develop SOF-peculiar
    equipment, to provide technological advances, and to modernize SOF
    weapons. Finally, $255 million is requested for Military Construction
    to fund 13 projects in 7 States and 1 project at an overseas location.
        We expect our tempo of operations will remain high even when
    conventional forces downsize in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the
    funding we have received in supplementals will still be required to
    support our efforts. In order to sustain our operations long term, we
    are working with DOD to pursue a shift of essential supplemental
    funding to the base budget.
    Force Structure
        Last year, SOF added 6,443 military and civilian positions. These
    positions provided needed enhancements to both headquarters and
    operational force structure.
        In fiscal year 2009, SOCOM will add another 1,536 military and
    civilian billets across the component commands in order to improve
    readiness and add capacity and capabilities. We will grow to 55,890
    civilian and military personnel by the conclusion of fiscal year 2009,
    of which 43,745 will be Active-Duty military members, 6,870 will be in
    Reserve components (4,310 Guard and 2,560 Reserve) and 5,275 will be
    government civilians.
    Acquisition Efforts
        SOCOM's acquisition organization is a very important factor in
    resourcing SOF-peculiar requirements. While Federal Acquisition
    Regulations uniformly apply to the Department, we strive to take
    advantage of flexibilities that are inherent in these guidelines to
    quickly provide materiel solutions for the SOF operator. Because our
    budget authority is limited to SOF-peculiar equipment and
    modifications, SOCOM must work closely with the three military
    departments (MILDEPs), because the MILDEPs fund, develop, acquire and
    provide the basic Service-common vehicles, aircraft, boats, weapons,
    ammunition and other equipment to SOCOM, which we then modify to SOF-
    specific platforms, systems and/or equipment.
        When a SOF requirement cannot be met using a Service-common
    solution, SOCOM uses its authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar
    equipment or modify the Service-common equipment to meet SOF needs.
    SOCOM's acquisition culture stresses assertive risk management, and
    process efficiencies to steward a system that is often more tailorable,
    responsive, and agile than elsewhere in DOD.
        SOCOM's Urgent Deployment Acquisition process continues to provide
    a rapid acquisition and logistics response to combat mission needs
    statements submitted by deployed SOF. Most capabilities developed under
    this program are delivered to the forces within 6 months to a year
    after the requirement is validated.
        Our total requirements, funding and acquisition sub-processes are
    still slower and more restrictive than we believe is optimal for this
    specialized force. During the coming year we intend to explore whether
    we are using the full extent of our legislated authorities as Congress
    and President intended when SOCOM was established.
    Science and Technology
        SOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) strategy is to selectively
    invest and leverage available resources with the MILDEPs and other
    agency laboratories, academia, and industry for the purpose of
    maximizing SOF capabilities. S&T programs identify and assess emerging
    technologies for potential insertion into current and future SOF
    concepts, requirements, and acquisition programs of record. As the
    strategic, tactical, and geopolitical environments in which SOF
    operates evolve, so too does the S&T investment focus and support.
        The SOCOM Special Operations Technology Development (SOTD), Special
    Operations Advanced Technology Development (SOST) and Small Business
    Innovation Research programs work together to synergistically develop,
    evaluate, and eventually transition key technologies. The SOCOM
    Locating, Tagging and Tracking efforts are being staffed through the
    SOTD and SOST programs in collaboration with our program executive
    officers, the Defense Research and Engineering Directorate, the MILDEPs
    and interagency partners. Our involvement in several Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstrations and Joint Capability Technology
    Demonstrations allows SOCOM to leverage the resources of other
    organizations to create robust opportunities for evaluating and
    transforming mature technologies in a way that SOCOM could not
    otherwise afford on our limited S&T budget.
    Equipping the SOF Warrior
        The new combat assault rifles, the MK16 and MK17 and their
    associated enhanced grenade launcher module, completed development and
    began limited fielding in 2007. We expect these weapons to be fully
    deployed by the end of 2009. SOCOM will continue the development of
    next-generation ammunitions as well as fused-image-capable, clip-on
    optics for our weapons.
        In 2007, SOCOM fielded more than 11,000 supplemental body armor
    kits, saving lives and reducing injuries by increasing the area of
    ballistic protection beyond that of previously issued SOF body armor.
    More than 4,500 sets of the new protective combat uniform were fielded
    to provide extreme cold weather protection for SOF operators. The
    Command implemented a product improvement effort to reduce the weight
    and/or increase the ballistic performance of the modular integrated
    communications helmet.
        The worldwide proliferation of night vision devices has somewhat
    diminished the technological advantage that the U.S. military possessed
    during the conduct of night operations. Although the technology gap has
    narrowed, SOCOM continues to identify, test and field many new night
    vision and visual augmentation systems. In 2007, SOCOM continued to
    field advancements in thermal imaging and camera technology by putting
    into service visual augmentation systems that were smaller and lighter
    with increased capabilities.
    SOF Munitions
        Special purpose munitions, such as demolition, breaching,
    diversionary, and shoulder-fired munitions, are required to accomplish
    SOF missions. Future developments will upgrade the SOF shoulder-fired
    systems with the capability to fire within and from enclosed spaces for
    use in urban environments. We will continue to procure foreign weapons
    and ammunition to train SOF operators so they will be better prepared
    to train the forces of our partner nations.
        Once munitions are developed and fielded, our logistics personnel
    assume responsibility for procurement of replenishment munitions to
    sustain the force. All SOF munitions are intensively managed in order
    to minimize stock levels while simultaneously providing time-sensitive
    capabilities required by the Theater Special Operations Commands.
    SOF Communications
        SOCOM continues to transform its respective capabilities in the
    areas of communications, information technology, automation of
    intelligence data and collaboration tools into a single, integrated SOF
    information environment. Such an information environment enhances
    operations by permitting robust command and control capabilities at the
    strategic, operational, and tactical levels and by extending
    information services to the individual SOF warrior.
        As a result, available satellite communications bandwidth is at a
    premium.
    SOF Mobility
        SOCOM continues to sustain and modernize the venerable SOF C-130
    fleet. We have engaged with the Department of the Air Force to develop
    strategies for replacing and modernizing the aging MC-130E Combat Talon
    I and MC-130P Combat Shadow fleets. As an interim solution, 4 of 12
    planned MC-130W air refueling tankers were delivered to date, with 4
    more scheduled for delivery in 2008. The eight aircraft will help to
    partially offset those MC-130Es and MC-130Ps. Four CV-22 trainer
    aircraft and the first three operational CV-22 Ospreys were delivered
    in 2006 and 2007. Three additional aircraft will to be delivered in
    2008, with Initial Operational Capability projected for February 2009.
        SOCOM rotary wing programs, in partnership with the U.S. Army, are
    providing the latest technologies and sustainability upgrades to the
    current SOF rotary wing fleet. Taken together, these programs for the
    MH-47s, MH-60s, and the MH-6Ms will improve current capabilities and
    prepare for future modernization while consolidating the fleet into
    three common standardized airframes. The MH-47G variant has been
    deployed since February 2007. The MH-60M program was accelerated and
    will begin deliveries in 2008. The MH-6M Little Bird is nearing
    completion of its first block modification upgrade. Meanwhile, the MH-
    53M fleet is being drawn down for total retirement later this year.
        The fielding and deployment of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System
    (ASDS) in June 2007 moved SOCOM Undersea Mobility capabilities
    significantly forward. ASDS #1 is now available for deployment as a
    reliable combat capability based on successful testing, exercises and
    improvements in reliability. This vehicle enables SOF to perform myriad
    missions in water space that was previously unreachable. Our other
    Undersea Mobility efforts such as the wet submersible Swimmer Delivery
    Vehicle and Dry Deck Shelter will continue to provide capabilities that
    enable SOF to perform a wide range of specialized tasks. There are on
    going studies to better define future undersea mobility joint efforts
    in this area.
        SOCOM recently enhanced its surface maritime mobility systems by
    fielding the advanced forward looking infrared systems for installation
    throughout its combatant craft fleet. As a result of combat lessons
    learned, SOCOM has also fielded other improvements on the special
    operations craft-riverine. As the current models of rigid-hull
    inflatable boats and the SEAL Delivery Vehicles age, SOCOM will begin
    developing the next generation of these surface and undersea maritime
    platforms.
        This year, two new classes of vehicles were introduced for SOF
    ground mobility: the RG-31 medium mine protected vehicle and the RG-33
    mine resistant ambush protected vehicle. These vehicles enable SOF to
    deploy forces across the theater of operations with a level of
    protection previously unavailable. In 2008, SOCOM will begin fielding a
    suspension upgrade for our primary ground mobility vehicle (HMMWV
    variants) in order to return payload and mobility to the platform that
    was lost with the addition of heavy armor packages. Additionally, the
    light mobility vehicle, delivering in 2008, will carry 3-5 personnel
    over all types of terrain and is deployable from multiple aircraft
    platforms, including the CV-22.
    SOF Sensor Systems
        Sensor systems that provide persistent ISR are essential elements
    of SOCOM's operations and force protection. SOCOM has been swiftly
    fielding persistent ISR capabilities within budgetary constraints and
    respective Service training program limitations. We have modified
    existing SOF equipment where available, procured additional manned and
    unmanned ISR platforms, and partnered with the MILDEPs, Defense
    Research and Engineering Directorate and the Joint IED Defeat
    Organization to cooperatively field additional sensors.
        SOF Locating, Tagging, and Tracking capabilities are currently
    providing valuable information regarding hostile force location,
    movement, and intent while minimizing risk to U.S. personnel. SOCOM, in
    conjunction with other government partners, will continue to invest in
    leading-edge technologies for sensors and data infiltration and
    exfiltration.
        Improved laser range finders and designators, hand-held thermal
    imagers, infrared pointers and marking and illuminating devices are a
    few of the capabilities delivered over the past year. Eye-safe laser
    range finders and binoculars provided a marked improvement in the
    determination of enemy target locations. Improved target geo-location
    accuracy was demonstrated in 2007, providing SOCOM with the world's
    most accurate self-contained laser targeting geo-locater.
        Additionally, SOCOM acquired and utilizes a combination of several
    manned and unmanned airborne ISR assets to provide the necessary
    flexibility for supporting the dynamic SOF mission set. Unmanned aerial
    systems continue to be powerful force multipliers for SOF activities
    and a key component of almost every operation. The micro unmanned
    aerial systems, the long-endurance Predator class systems, and the
    potential ultra-long-endurance unmanned aerial systems, such as the
    Global Observer JCTD, are platforms that provide force protection to
    small SOF units and aid in the identification and tracking of
    individual targets and items of interest. SOCOM also continues to grow
    our manned airborne ISR capability to complement the unmanned ISR
    systems. In fiscal year 2007, additional airborne ISR aircraft were
    procured with supplemental funds, and SOCOM partnered with the National
    Guard Bureau to rapidly modify and employ Air National Guard aircraft
    and air crews to augment SOCOM's organic ISR capability.
                                   conclusion
        We continue to improve our capability and capacity to conduct all
    of our assigned missions, carefully balancing the demands of both
    preceding and responding to the sound of guns. Over the course of
    SOCOM's 21 year history, Congress has consistently demonstrated strong
    interest in the command and its people. The joint SOF you see around
    the globe today is a direct product of your vision, your trust, and
    your commitment to build the world's premier Special Operations
    capability. We will prevail against those who threaten us and assist
    those who don't. The men and women of the SOF will meet your highest
    expectations. Thank you for your continued support.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Fallon, what further reductions in U.S. troop
    levels do you see for the rest of this year, assuming the
    current level of violence continues?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'm eagerly awaiting General
    Petraeus' response to some planning guidance that I provided to
    him recently for his assessment of courses of action. I think
    there should be little doubt that our desire is to continue to
    bring our force levels down in Iraq as the Iraqis demonstrate
    their ability to stand up and take responsibility for security
    in the country. Those trends are certainly encouraging and
    moving in the right direction.
        But it's critical that, of course, we not lose the ground
    that's been so hard fought this year in providing the overall
    stability and security. I don't want to give you a number until
    I see General Petraeus' input, but I think that we are clearly
    in agreement in the direction we want to go.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, as Senator Warner said, the surge
    has helped produce a reduction in violence. I think that's
    clear. Its primary purpose, however, was to give the political
    leaders the chance to work out political differences. There was
    recently a statement ballyhooing the decision of the assembly
    over there to adopt some legislation which would have
    represented progress. There was a bundle of three bills. One of
    them was then vetoed by a member of the Presidency Council.
        What is the status of the other two bills that were in that
    bundle? Are they interrelated?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, they were interrelated in the
    political discussions that enabled the COR to vote and move
    those forward. But the other two bills, my understanding is
    that they are still in play and we have every expectation that
    they're going to go forward. They were linked politically for
    the purpose of getting approval through the COR, but now that
    they're agreed they're independent.
        Chairman Levin. Are they law?
        Admiral Fallon. They should become law once the waiting
    period expires on those.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner asked a question which I
    think is a very pertinent one and I want to comment on it and
    then ask you to answer it. That has to do with the visit of
    President Ahmedinejad to Iraq. We've shed a lot of blood and
    our taxpayers have spent a lot of money to give Iraq an
    opportunity to be independent. Next door is a threat to them.
    It's called Iran, who is seeking weapons of mass destruction,
    nuclear weapons, against the wishes of the United States, and
    providing weaponry which is killing our men and women still.
        Then we see their leader, a virulent leader, a vituperative
    leader, their president, who comes to visit Iraq. I think it's
    offensive. The Iraqi leaders have every right to invite whoever
    they want. They're sovereign. But we have a right to express an
    opinion about it. Have we expressed an opinion about this to
    the leadership of Iraq?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'll address a couple of aspects
    of that if I could. Certainly, as you indicated, Iraq's a
    sovereign country. They have the right to do what they choose.
    The reality is that Iran is a neighbor that shares a long
    border with them. As with many things in life, there are mixed
    blessings. It's not all one way.
        I would highlight a comment that's alleged to have been
    made by Minister Bulani, the Minister of Interior, I think
    yesterday in Iran, in which he was asked what he thought about
    it, the visit, and as I understand it highlighted the fact that
    there are many things that are perceived as good coming from
    Iran, and he highlighted food and other things that are helping
    make life better for some Iraqis. On the other hand, the point
    you made: There are lethal weapons, training, support coming
    over, that are being used against not only our people, but
    moderate Iraqis. So it's a mixed bag.
        From my perspective, we are not going to be able to help to
    solve the problems inside that country without assistance from
    outside. In the past year it's been encouraging to note the
    many countries who have come to begin to assist Iraq in very
    positive ways. Iran has not been one of those to the best of my
    insight and observation.
        There may be an opportunity here. My understanding from
    speaking to General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker on this
    subject is that we certainly have expectations that the Iraqi
    leadership in their engagement with President Ahmedinejad would
    convey to him the necessity of stopping this lethal flow of
    equipment and beginning to show positive signs that they are
    willing to work with the Iraqi Government and with us. We've
    had a series of engagements, the first in many decades, with
    Iran. We have had one scheduled engagement that keeps being
    postponed. I think this is a venue in which we might be able to
    move some kind of a dialogue forward to get them to be more
    cooperative and helpful in this area.
        I have to tell you that it's a difficult picture to
    absolutely determine where we are. The levels of lethal
    assistance into Iraq, difficult for us to pinpoint, but there's
    certainly been a diminution of activity in the last several
    months, particularly regarding these IEDs, explosively formed
    penetrators, the particular version of those, that are
    obviously coming from, at least our vision, obviously coming
    from Iran. How much of this is directly a result of decisions
    made in Teheran and how much of it is due to our own people and
    their good work in the field, I don't know. But this kind of
    trend is something that we want to see accelerated and moved
    on.
        Chairman Levin. I'm not raising the question of having some
    kind of contacts with Iran and expressing positions to Iran.
    I'm talking about inviting that particular president, a
    vituperative extremist, to Iraq, and I don't think it's a mixed
    bag at all. That invitation, I don't think it's a mixed
    blessing. I think it's an unmixed mistake. Not the opening to
    Iran, not the conversations, not the discussions, but that
    particular invitation to that particular president it seems to
    me sends exactly the wrong message to Iran and to the world.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I join you on that issue of
    the visit by President Ahmedinejad.
        I'm glad that you gave I think a fairly comprehensive
    answer to the chairman's question, and I would hope that others
    in the administration would express their indignation about
    this visit and the comments made by that president, because
    they go to the very heart of the enormity of the sacrifices of
    life and limb that we have suffered in trying to provide Iraq
    the ability to become a strong sovereign nation and a working
    partner for all the Nations in that region. You, I think, are
    the only one that I know of that has expressed any opinion thus
    far. A White House spokesman sort of touched on the question
    here recently, but I cannot find where anyone else spoke out on
    it.
        Let's turn to NATO. We are sending over two battalions of
    marines, one to provide a training mission for the Afghani
    forces, the second to--and I asked this of the Commandant and I
    think he acknowledged it--is to sort of be a September 11 type
    force, to be utilized in Afghanistan wherever the situation is
    tough. These marines are up to that tough fight. You know that.
        But I believe those two battalions were needed because of
    the shortfalls in the commitments made by other nations in
    forming the alliance that went in under the command of NATO,
    into Afghanistan. Do you share that view?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, if you'll permit me to double
    back, lest there be any doubt. My view of Iranian behavior
    regarding Iraq and their activities is they've been absolutely
    unhelpful, very damaging; and I absolutely don't condone any of
    their activities. I have yet to see anything since I've been in
    this job in the way of a public action by Iran that's been at
    all helpful in this region, and particularly in Iraq, rather.
        To Afghanistan and the marines: As we looked at the
    situation there and, as Senator Levin indicated, we've been
    doing some assessment of where we are and what we might be able
    to do in the future, it seemed to me that we could benefit from
    an injection of forces there if we could pull them together, to
    capitalize on the situation we find ourselves in at the end of
    winter, as we approach the end of the winter here.
        I believe that General McNeal ought to be able to take
    advantage of this significantly capable maneuver force, special
    purpose Marine air ground task force, that's moving into the
    country, to give him the flexibility to deal with the Taliban
    and their al Qaeda allies, to really move us up into security
    and stability.
        We all know that there's been a longstanding requirement
    from General McNeal for additional maneuver forces from NATO
    writ large. It's clear that that requirement is not being met,
    and it seemed to me that from my view we ought to do anything
    we can to try to help General McNeal and give him the assets
    that he needs.
        At the same time, the other battalion I believe is going to
    be of great value to us in helping to grow the Afghan security
    forces in a way that will be helpful to us. This is another
    shortfall that we've had for some time, that we have not been
    able to come up with enough people. I think this is going to be
    very useful and helpful to us, and so I'm anxious to get these
    folks over there and put them to work.
        Senator Warner. Let's turn to this question of the emerging
    of the major narco-state as it relates to the poppy production.
    This has been the football that's been passed around to several
    countries to deal with, and it has each year increased in size
    and the flow of funds from this are directly in large measure
    going into the Taliban to enable them to do the combat missions
    against NATO and the U.S. forces.
        Now, when are we going to see a turnaround in this
    situation, and what actions? I ask these to you in a very
    forceful way for your views on this, but it is largely the
    responsibility I think of the Department of State and the
    Afghan Government under President Karzai. Therein rests the
    primary responsibility. But we cannot tolerate this.
        It's interesting to note in history that when the Taliban
    were in control of Afghanistan the poppy production was but a
    mere fraction of what it is today. So it's literally grown in
    size as a consequence of the situation to try and liberate
    Afghanistan so that it can join the Nations of the world as a
    democracy. In that area we have failed.
        What steps are likely to be taken in the future or what
    steps are you in your position asking of our Government and
    other governments to end this exponential growth in the poppy
    production?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, this scourge of poppy production
    afflicts not only the Afghan people, but, as you indicated,
    many parts of the world. Why the increase? I think several
    factors are at play here. Last year the weather conditions they
    tell me were pretty much ideal for the production of this
    stuff. The fact that the Taliban are using poppy production as
    a means to fund their activities is pretty widely accepted.
        If we're going to get it fixed, we collectively, ourselves,
    the Afghan Government, the rest of the world that's trying to
    assist this government, are going to have to get their act
    together, I believe, and focus on getting the job done. From
    what I know and information, there are a couple of initiatives
    within the Afghan Government to do this. There's a drug
    eradication operation with people and materials and funding
    within the Government of Afghanistan. There's a new initiative.
    We've been in discussion with the Afghan military and they have
    decided to dedicate a new battalion, or kandak, as they call
    it, whose specific and only task will be to work on this drug
    eradication. They're in training right now. They're getting the
    materials and the tools to do this, and we expect to be able to
    put them in the field here in a couple months and actually have
    them going after those poppy fields that are under cultivation.
        As I get around Afghanistan and look at different areas,
    it's really a mixed bag. Those areas which have been
    historically most productive here in growing these poppies, are
    those that are typically the most unstable, the most insecure.
        A couple months ago I went around and met some of the
    governors and made an interesting observation. Those provinces
    that were particularly well led, strong governors, the poppy
    production is either nonexistent or minimized. I met with a
    couple of them who had a problem of significance last year.
    They've assured me that they've taken steps in the fall, and
    that's when the initial actions had to be done to prevent the
    planting of this crop. They've taken actions. I'll be anxious
    to see what really transpires.
        President Karzai and his government for their part have to
    step up and recognize this is a problem. I realize it's
    complex, that it's a traditional activity in the country, but
    it has to stop, and my sense is that progress----
        Senator Warner. I hope they could take a lead on it. My
    time has expired, but we ought to send a message to President
    Karzai. I know he's up for reelection in about a year, but he
    can't sit on his hands and tolerate this situation. He has to
    move out assertively.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you for your
    extraordinary service.
        I want to say just briefly, about the Ahmedinejad visit to
    Iraq, that I share my colleagues' sense of outrage about it. I
    also want to thank you for, both in your prepared statement and
    your testimony here this morning, making very clear that
    there's no doubt in the mind of the American military that the
    Iranians continue to provide lethal training and equipment to
    the Iraqis, even though--and this is why I say this--
    Ahmadinejad when he was in Iraq denied any such behavior by
    Iran, which is simply a lie.
        Admiral Fallon. The facts prove otherwise.
        Senator Lieberman. The facts prove otherwise, and I thank
    you for saying that.
        A few questions about Iraq. Again, it means a lot to hear
    from you, looking back to last year--and I'm quoting you--that,
    regarding Iraq, you're very encouraged that we're on an upward
    vector. I appreciate that. I know, as you said, we fought hard
    to achieve that, so did the Iraqis, and we're fortunate for
    that.
        We're now in the process of pulling down the additional
    troops, moving out the additional troops that were sent as part
    of the surge. That withdrawal will be completed in July. Then
    there'll be the pause.
        I wanted to ask you this, and I quote from you again. You
    said: ``It's critical that we not lose the ground that we
    fought so hard to attain in Iraq.'' There's been some concern,
    acknowledging the reality of the stress on our forces as a
    result of Iraq and Afghanistan, that there'd be pressure to
    pull more forces down after the pause, based more on the stress
    on the forces than on conditions on the ground. I wanted to ask
    you personally, in your role at CENTCOM. My belief, based on
    what I've heard you say today and before, is that the primary
    consideration in responding to General Petraeus' recommendation
    will be that we not lose the ground that we have fought so hard
    to obtain and win in Iraq thus far. Am I right?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, Senator. I think there may be too
    much focus on the word ``pause'' and what that means, what it
    might mean or might not mean. The reality is that as we go
    forward to the midyear point this year there is a plan that's
    been well vetted and very complex, that will continue to draw
    down those surge brigades as their 15 months in country comes
    to an end. That in itself is a recognition of this other
    reality that there's great stress on our force.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Admiral Fallon. It's not only that these units are going to
    be withdrawn. We have every expectation that that's going to
    continue apace. But there are also some other brigade combat
    teams that are in the process of rotating so that their
    numerical reliefs will be coming in at the same time. This is
    an awful lot of activity in a short period of time.
        I expect General Petraeus is going to come in and recommend
    to me and to the chain of command is that it's prudent to make
    an assessment of where we are. It's not just pulling troops
    out, but he has a really significantly difficult task, in that
    as we withdraw these many thousands of troops he has to reset
    the lines of command and control within the country. It's
    significantly different now than it was a year ago, because
    there are many more Iraqi security forces that are now in the
    field and coming in. They did their own surge this past year,
    increasing their numbers.
        So General Petraeus has this major task of resetting the
    battlefield here, and that's the focus, to keep the momentum
    going, to keep the stability and security. It is truly
    remarkable today to look at the statistical evidence and, as
    many of you know because you were in there to see it, to
    actually see the difference on the ground.
        Senator Lieberman. It is remarkable, and it didn't happen
    as an accident. There was tremendous effort by our forces under
    your leadership and others, and some excellent work by the
    Iraqis as well.
        Let me ask you one final question. Over the last weekend
    there's been some confusion about a pause ending automatically
    after 45 days. In other words, there was a story in some of the
    press based on communication with an unnamed national security
    official which led some to believe that there would be a 45-day
    pause and then automatically the troops would begin to come
    out.
        President Bush said that was not his intention, that there
    would be a review and troops would come out based on conditions
    on the ground and of course based on recommendations from
    General Petraeus, yourself, and up the chain of command.
        So what was the confusion about the 45 days?
        Admiral Fallon. I think the confusion is because this is
    all speculation. The facts are General Petraeus has yet to come
    back to me formally with his recommendations and of course I'm
    going to wait until I see what he says before we decide.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Admiral Fallon. The reality is that we'll look at the whole
    situation. I'll be eager to hear what he has to say and to have
    his input into that. I think nothing is written in stone.
    Assuming decisions are made, that people are going to be smart
    enough to recognize that we'll take actions based on the
    conditions we find. If those conditions change, I expect that
    there'll be every consideration.
        But all of this is speculation. The facts are that he has
    not come in with his recommendations. I think we ought to just
    wait a few weeks and see what he has to say, and then we'll be
    happy to take that and go forward.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that, and I find it
    reassuring, one in that General Petraeus is the key original
    source of recommendation from the field; two, that conditions
    on the ground will determine the pace of the reduction in our
    forces, which all of us want. We spent a lot of time arguing in
    the Senate about the troops coming home. Everybody wants the
    troops to come home. The question is are we going to order them
    out from here or are they going to be brought out by the
    military and the Commander in Chief based on what's happening
    on the ground, and I hear you say, of course, the latter.
        The one of the three new laws that did not make it because
    of a veto on that council presumably will be passed before--and
    that's the provincial election law, which will provide for
    elections, or at least in its original form, no later than
    October 1. Very important from everybody I've talked to.
        I just want to get a reassurance that one of the factors
    that you'll consider as you consider the pace of withdrawal of
    troops is that we wouldn't want to take on any additional risk
    or vulnerability at a time of the elections when we presume the
    terrorists would be looking to create maximum disruption.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, the provincial powers legislation
    in Iraq is a political document. You are much more aware of how
    this works than I. My understanding is that the process that
    has been codified by the Iraqi people in their legislation to
    date affords an opportunity for that legislation to go back and
    be reviewed and hopefully move forward.
        It's complex. There are aspects of this that we're
    cheering. I personally would like to see elections as soon as
    practical in as many areas as we can. We deal with risk every
    day. I think that's the job that has been entrusted to me and
    I'll certainly seriously consider every aspect of that risk in
    making my recommendations and decisions.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, let me associate myself with the remarks of
    Senator Warner in terms of the progress of the surge, and also
    in your printed statement--I'm not sure you got to it in your
    verbal statement--talking about the quality of the training in
    Afghanistan. I'm very proud that--I was over there 3 or 4 years
    ago, and we turned over the training of the Afghan National
    Army to the Afghans, and that happened to be the Oklahoma 45th
    that was over there. So I think that we've been following their
    progress and they've been very successful.
        My three favorite programs that I want to get your opinions
    on. You did cover them somewhat in your opening and in your
    written statement. First of all, the train and equip, 1206,
    1207, 1208 authorizations, they expire this year. We tried to
    get reauthorization last time and expanding the authority that
    goes with those train and equip programs, but were unable to do
    it, not because there was opposition, but we just ran out of
    time.
        I'd like to have both of you on the train and equip
    programs give us your candid opinion.
        Admiral Fallon. Eric, do you want to step up to the mike?
        Admiral Olson. It's hard to overstate the importance of
    those authorities, particularly 1206 and 1208, in the world in
    which I operate. 1208 is an authority peculiar to Special
    Operations. It is an authorization, not an appropriation. It
    authorizes $25 million to be spent around the globe on Special
    Operations train and equip activities. We have grown into 1208
    very well and in fact we are approaching the $25 million limit.
        Senator Inhofe. I understand that's actually the smallest
    of the three programs. But you're the one to address that.
        Admiral Olson. It is by a long shot, yes, sir. The
    realization has struck me that once in it's hard to back out,
    and so this will have to be an increase in authority over time.
        Senator Inhofe. Do you agree, Admiral Fallon, with his
    comments on the significance of the program?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I certainly do, and if I could
    offer an endorsement to an Office of the Secretary of Defense
    proposal, the building partnership capacity, global partnership
    capacity initiative, which would propose pulling together the
    1206, 1207, and the Commander's Emergency Response Program
    (CERP) together.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, the other thing I was going to ask you
    about is the CERP. It's been my opinion is so significant to
    the commanders out there, and money well spent.
        Admiral Fallon. As I look at the progress that's been made
    in Iraq and progress in Afghanistan, and particularly in the
    eastern region where U.S. forces are operating in Afghanistan,
    this is one of the most important and crucial factors in
    progress in both areas, is this ability to actually use a
    relatively small amount of funds compared to some other
    expenditures to directly affect capacity-building with our
    partners on the ground, to give our commanders the opportunity
    to actually fix things right on the spot.
        It's so different to watch our people in Afghanistan, for
    example, and their ability to deal with challenges and watch
    the way other countries do it. I strongly encourage the
    support.
        Senator Inhofe. I see Admiral Olson nodding in agreement.
    Of course that's the program that needs to be globalized, and I
    think you would agree with that. Anyway, that expires also this
    year, so we need to address that.
        Then the third one and the last one is the International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) program. There was a
    time when we treated that program as if we were doing countries
    a favor by bringing their people over and training them and
    actually requiring Article 98 cooperation before allowing them
    to do it. I think we recognized in the last authorization bill
    that it's doing us the bigger favor, so we eliminated that
    requirement.
        Do you see that as a high priority program, the two of you?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, as part of my responsibilities for
    synchronizing planning in the global war on terrorism we
    develop and recommend the list of priority countries, 1 through
    204 in terms of their importance. As I go through the top
    countries on that list, I'm struck by how underfunded IMET is
    in most of those countries. In the places we go and the people
    with whom we work, having trained in the United States is a
    badge of honor that is proudly worn, almost a self-selection
    criteria. It's clear early who has trained in the United States
    and who hasn't. The power of IMET to bring people to this
    country, to train them in skills and knowledge at schools and
    universities, is truly powerful. I think you said it very well
    when you said we used to think of it as doing something for
    them, but it truly is doing something very important for us.
        Senator Inhofe. It builds an allegiance that stays there.
    I've noticed this in a lot of the African countries, so I do
    appreciate it. We need to do that.
        Speaking of Africa, with the Africa Command (AFRICOM)
    coming on I've had extensive conversations with General Ward.
    Do you think the transition's coming along all right? Just a
    short answer.
        Admiral Fallon. Thanks, Senator. If I could double back, I
    have to say something about IMET. Of all the programs that are
    funded by this institution, there are none that I think offer
    us the potential on leverage to do good for ourselves and
    people around the world than this program. It's really painful
    for me to watch the down side of the use of this program in a
    way to either punish or to try to get the attention of other
    countries. I understand the rationale behind it, but I have to
    tell you the damage it does is significant.
        Let's take one country, Pakistan. For almost a decade, for
    reasons that we well understand and appreciate, we had a
    situation in which we were not permitted to have this kind of
    engagement with this country. We are paying price for that
    right now, because we have a large block of the leadership of
    their military services that, frankly, are dubious of trust
    with us. As we try to help them face the challenges they
    undergo today, it's really a challenge.
        So I can't say enough for IMET. It's not only the
    opportunity to train people and make the associations, but when
    they go back and spread this word it's very helpful.
        To AFRICOM, my intention is to take that part of Africa in
    which we are engaged right now, in the Horn, which is grouped
    under a command, Joint Task Force-HOA, and to try to take that
    organization and structure as it exists, to transfer it to
    AFRICOM, to continue the same kind of good work that they're
    doing. Every single one of our ambassadors, every single one of
    the leaders of those countries in that region, tell me they're
    grateful, appreciate, and they want it to continue in just that
    manner.
        Senator Inhofe. I think you have the right guy running that
    over there. He's doing a very good job.
        My time has expired, so the last two questions I'll ask for
    the record if you don't mind. One is your feelings about the
    African brigades. It's been going very slowly. The East African
    Brigade in Ethiopia and the West in Ghana with the Economic
    Community of West African States are doing pretty well, but the
    other three are not. So I just would like to get for the record
    something as to what you feel the status is and the
    significance is.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) is part of an African
    Union (AU) initiative to establish five regional standby brigades
    (north, south, east, west, and central) that can deploy as quick
    reaction forces in support of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
    operations throughout Africa. Britain, France, Canada, and the U.S. are
    partners in supporting the concept of EASBRIG. Combined Joint Task
    Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is the implementing agency for U.S.
    Department of Defense involvement. A truly capable EASBRIG is important
    to U.S. interests because it would provide a regional peacekeeping and
    peace support operations capability and would contribute to the
    creation of an overaching regional security architecture.
        EASBRIG currently consists of a limited HQ staff in Addis Ababa,
    Ethiopia, a Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and a Planning Element
    in Nairobi, Kenya. CENTCOM, thru CJTF-HOA, has worked with the AU staff
    to assist in the development of a training and structural needs
    assessment of EASBRIG, as well as exploring options, within CJTF-HOA
    resources, to support EASBRIG capacity building leading to a
    Headquarter Command Post Exercise.

        Senator Inhofe. Admiral Fallon, you and I fought and lost a
    3-year battle called the battle of Vieques, and we did the best
    we could. It was not a partisan thing. It wasn't Democrats or
    Republicans. But we lost. It's interesting now that the very
    opposition in Puerto Rico that was there is now coming back
    saying: We've changed our minds. Well, we were right and they
    were wrong.
        But for the record, I'd like to have you inform us as to
    the quality of the integrated training that was there before
    and after and how we're progressing in making up for that
    vacuum that I think is sorely missed.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The loss of the Vieques training facility has had no operational
    impact for units currently operating within the Central Command area of
    responsibility. Since the closure of Vieques in May 2003, units are and
    have been arriving in theater with all training requirements complete.
    Over the last 4\1/2\ years, the Navy and Marine Corps have adapted
    their training by utilizing combinations of alternate training
    facilities in order to provide the same training opportunities that
    were afforded by the Vieques training facility.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Fallon, I know my colleagues have commented on the
    visit of President Ahmadinejad, but I think his visit and,
    frankly, the warm response he received in Baghdad, raises a
    fundamental question about our strategy. Iran now seems to me
    more powerful than it was 5 years ago, both politically and one
    might argue also militarily, working not directly but
    indirectly through surrogates in Iraq itself, in Lebanon, and
    elsewhere.
        From a strategic point of view, doesn't this question what
    we've been doing the last 5 years?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'm not sure. What we've been
    doing in regard to what?
        Senator Reed. To Iran. We've seen them grow. We have
    invested trillions of dollars in our efforts in the region.
    Iran, I argued back in 2003, was a much more serious threat to
    stability in the region and to our interests in the region than
    Iraq was. Now we've seen them, frankly, become more robust,
    more politically accepted, and I think it underscores a
    fundamental strategic fault or flaw that this administration
    has pursued for the last several years.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, Iran is a complex issue. I would
    give you maybe a little different view of Iran and their
    influence and their stature, if you would, in the region. As I
    talk to countries throughout the region and all of Iran's
    immediate neighbors, what I come away with is a lot of
    skepticism, a lot of distrust, a lot of anxiety about them. In
    my opinion their stature has not grown. To the contrary,
    countries are taking a very dim view of their engagement.
        They know the game. They know that Ahmadinejad gets out,
    gets a lot of face time. We see other people in other parts of
    the world that act in a similar manner. But at the core of
    things, people are concerned, and they are engaging with us--
    these are the neighbors--to ascertain our intentions, to be
    able to stand tall, to not knuckle under to any Iranian
    intimidation or pressure. They're anxious to have us support
    them.
        Nobody's looking for another conflict, but they are
    certainly looking for support from us in our approach. It seems
    to me that that's what we ought to be trying to do, and that's
    certainly what I do in my engagement with these countries.
        Senator Reed. So how would you assess the influence of Iran
    in Iraq today versus 5 years ago?
        Admiral Fallon. I think the situation is so different in
    Iraq today than 5 years ago that it's pretty difficult to say,
    because you'd have to set up the conditions and the conditions
    are very different.
        Senator Reed. Would President Ahmadinejad have made a trip
    to Baghdad 5 years ago?
        Admiral Fallon. Speculation: probably not. I suspect the
    pollsters are out hard at work today asking this same question,
    what do you think about this, of the Iraqi people. Even in the
    south, where the Iranians have been working overtime to try to
    maximize their influence, there's increasing skepticism from
    every report that I see from our engagement with the people
    there. They're dubious of Iran's real intentions.
        I mean, frankly, practically, most everybody in Iraq has
    been happy to take their money, and they've been spreading a
    lot of it around by every account. But they're now realizing
    that there may be other intentions here, and I'm beginning to
    sense a significant pushback. Again, I don't know all the
    factors that are at play, particularly in the south, but I do
    know that things have kind of gone the other way now, and I
    think that as people--first of all, as the Iraqis get more
    confident in their own ability, my sense is that there's going
    to be a little bit of--I'm out in front of my headlights here,
    but every indication I have is that people are realizing that
    there's no free lunch here. Yes, they like the tomatoes and the
    potatoes and the mattresses and the other things that are
    helping, and I've been to the borders. I've watched this
    incredible amount of traffic coming across.
        The Iraqi people welcome the average Iranian pilgrim who
    wants to come and visit the shrines, and there's a tremendous
    traffic there and that's an economic benefit, of course, to the
    people. You can see the interaction with them. But the people
    are not stupid. They recognize that this is a potential double-
    edged sword, and it's in our interest to continue to work with
    the Iraqi people. It's pretty obvious to me, if you look at
    just the data of responses to questions in the last 6 months,
    as security and stability have expanded in this country, people
    have come to realize that the reason that's expanded is because
    of our engagement with them and not the Iranians. They have not
    been particularly helpful.
        So I think it's in our best interest to continue to engage,
    to continue to try to build security and stability, and I think
    the Iraqi people are going to be smart enough to realize what's
    going on here.
        Senator Reed. So you aren't troubled by the presence of the
    Iranians politically or tactically on the ground?
        Admiral Fallon. Of course I am. We want to do everything we
    can, and from the military standpoint we are working overtime
    with our commanders to try to cut off this Iranian influence in
    all of its aspects inside of Iraq.
        Senator Reed. There is about 60,000 Sunni militia in the
    Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) that have not been integrated
    into the formal structure of the security forces there. The
    Government in Afghanistan, heavily dominated by Shia and Kurds,
    seem reluctant to do that. What's your estimate of this taking
    place? Because I think there are many that are concerned that
    if it doesn't take place in the next few months these forces
    will become less supportive and cooperative with us. In fact,
    there was a ``strike'' in Diyalah a few days ago by CLC forces.
        Admiral Fallon. A complex question. Very few free lunches
    or one-way streets certainly in this country. We have clearly
    welcomed the initiative of the people to step up and be willing
    to put themselves and their lives on the line. I think it's
    impractical to expect that all of these folks are going to be
    able to be integrated into the Iraqi security forces. In
    recognition of that, General Petraeus and our team in Iraq have
    been working to try to have other opportunities available.
    There are a number of initiatives that are beginning to be
    under way in and around Iraq to try to provide other
    opportunities, vocational training and--it's jobs, that's the
    bottom line. At the end of the day, this is probably the most
    important thing, the number one issue with the majority of
    people in the country: Give me some meaningful work and give me
    a future and we'll think things are getting better.
        There are issues to work through. This issue in Diyalah
    that you mentioned has been resolved, at least for now, by a
    step by the Iraqi central government to make an adjustment to
    the leadership in the security forces in Diyalah that it turned
    out was acceptable to those CLCs, now called Sons of Iraq,
    they've seen fit to now go back on the job.
        As I was out the week before last in Anbar, went all
    through the province looking and watching at what's going on, I
    saw enthusiasm among the people, those CLCs that are so
    effective. You go to a city like Fallujah now or Ramadi and you
    walk around in the city, very few American troops are seen,
    marines in this case. A few more Iraqi soldiers, but many more
    police and Sons of Iraq. It was interesting to me as I was out
    and about on this last trip. I started off with a large
    contingent of marines to look out for my safety, and we got
    into the city and as we got deeper into the city and just all
    of a sudden, turned around and the marines kind of faded back
    and the fellows that were escorting me and pointing things out
    and providing security were almost all Iraqis, and they were
    proud of it.
        The requests that I got were: Can you please help us to get
    jobs? We want a future and this is the answer.
        I'm sorry, that was a long answer to your question. But I
    don't believe it's practical to put them all back in the army
    or the police, and we have to work hard to make sure we have
    other opportunities.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think it's interesting that those who want the United
    States to talk with anybody in the world now feign the greatest
    concern that Iraq would talk with its neighbor, which is--and
    having some sort of relationship with Iran is important for
    their long-term success; wouldn't you agree, Admiral Fallon?
        Admiral Fallon. Of course. It's their neighbor. They have
    to figure out how to deal with them.
        Senator Sessions. How many miles of border is that? Do you
    happen to know?
        Admiral Fallon. I'd be guessing at the number. It's a long
    border.
        Senator Sessions. A long border. At least they have a good
    bit of contact. So I don't know how to handle this. We tell the
    Iraqis they have to step up and act like a real country and to
    solve political problems, and then they try to meet with a
    country that could destabilize them or could be some sort of
    halfway decent partner in the future and we jump on Maliki. I
    am somewhat taken aback by this line of questioning.
        Admiral Olson and Admiral Fallon--well, first, Admiral
    Fallon, let me ask you this. At the 30,000 foot level there's
    been a good bit of discussion off and on about what kind of
    military commitment works best in this region. I saw an article
    I think in the Washington Times quoting I believe Colonel
    Nagel, who favors a more intensive training of regular army, I
    believe, in things that relate to nation-building. General
    Casey says he hopes we don't have another one of these happen
    again, and certainly we all hope that's true.
        But I'm not convinced we won't have a continual demand on
    the part of the United States as a government to provide
    leadership to states that could fall into the failed state
    category and be a danger to the neighbors and us. So I think
    that is a continual thing.
        Frankly, I find that the military performs better than the
    State Department and other agencies who've been very weak in my
    view in providing leadership.
        I guess what I want to ask you first, and I'll ask you,
    Admiral Olson, are we configured correctly? Are we thinking
    further, hard enough in the years to come about what kind of
    capabilities our military needs in these grey areas between war
    and peace and reconstruction and stability in the areas that
    may be very important to us?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, we need a multifaceted approach to
    this, it seems to me. Many of the skill sets and capabilities
    that I believe are and will continue to be very effective in
    this engagement are skills that our people are learning in
    significant efforts now inside of Iraq, that will be
    transferable to other places.
        The key thing is to be engaged. We need to be there. We
    need to be visible. We need to gain the trust and confidence of
    people in each of these countries. My number one objective, big
    picture, would be to build capacity in each of these nations so
    that they can look after their own security as the primary
    instrument of stability in their countries. The extent to which
    we can do that is of course a factor of their willingness to
    have us, and that means you have to have engagement to be able
    to build trust, to be invited to help--because it's their
    country; they have to invite us in--having the tools available.
    You've been very generous in providing----
        Senator Sessions. Let me just ask it a little bit
    different. My question is a little bit different. Are you
    satisfied that our budget and plans within the United States
    military are sufficiently focused on preparing ourselves for
    situations like Iraq in the future? Have we thought that
    through sufficiently, and do you have any observations?
        Admiral Fallon. I have one observation to start with: that
    as we look to the future the one thing that's certain is the
    future will never be exactly as the events we've just engaged
    in. So we have ourselves in a position now where we've honed
    and refined the skill set that's very effective in Iraq, that
    has been demonstrated, and trying to figure out which of these
    applications really suits Afghanistan. So I think we're in very
    good shape now for that.
        We also have to be mindful that there are other
    capabilities that might be required in other situations, and I
    think the challenges for the Services in particular are to try
    to balance those requirements. Sometimes they appear to be in
    competition, but what I find is the number one thing is people.
    If we can train our people to be agile of mind and to be
    broadbased in their skill sets, so they're very adaptable, they
    can handle these situations.
        So of all the things you could do, the emphasis on people
    and trying to get and retain the best people, have their skill
    sets as broad as possible, would be the number one thing. I
    think we're generally okay, but I got to tell you that from my
    perspective I'm focused on the execution right now. What I see
    I like. There are not many things except maybe more of them or
    a little more flexibility in the application of the things that
    you've given us, but generally I'm satisfied that we're in
    pretty good shape right now.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson?
        Admiral Olson. Senator, all of the Services are working to
    build a train and assist capability into their forces. It's
    access and how you apply it, is what I think is important.
    Certainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we're focused on
    building an army from scratch, the big Services have a capacity
    to do that that's very important.
        In most of the countries of the world, there is in fact, a
    limited appetite for that, and where we earn access through a
    lower profile presence and an enduring engagement, and those
    are the areas that I am more particularly focused on, where
    some sort of cultural awareness that builds up over a
    regionalization over time, a linguistic skill, a maturity of
    experience, and the personal relationships that then do
    contribute significantly to building these partner capacities
    for the purpose of either disengaging from that country as they
    grow their own sovereign capabilities or because we're going to
    fight alongside them in some special circumstances at some
    point in the future.
        We're contributing from Special Operations Forces a great
    number of operational detachments, Alpha, Special Operations A
    Teams, and a few Navy SEAL platoons, to Admiral Fallon to do
    that in specialized units across Iraq and Afghanistan. It works
    well there the way we are doing it in partnership with the big
    Services the way that they are doing it. The issue is how do
    you break down big Service units to do this kind of training
    and will the future structure support sort of taking from the
    big organizations the specific capabilities that you need to
    train to specific skills once we get beyond simply building an
    army.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just note that I do think
    we need to not only think about how to replicate Iraq in the
    future better, a situation like that, but the other kind of
    situations we might have and some sort of cadre and training
    program for a number of persons that could help us be more
    effective from day one I think might be helpful.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Fallon, many of us are so concerned about the
    strain that extended and repeated deployments in Iraq and
    Afghanistan has had on our troops. Last week General Casey
    testified that we would be able to return to the 12-month
    deployment, once the number of Army brigades was drawn down to
    15. But in reviewing his testimony, it's not clear to me
    whether he's talking about 15 combat brigades in both
    Afghanistan and Iraq or just in Iraq. Could you clarify that
    issue for the committee?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I can give you my opinion, but I'm
    not sure. I think you probably need to talk to General Casey to
    be sure. My understanding is that it's 15 in Iraq, but I defer
    to General Casey because he's the one that's doing the detailed
    look at his force structure.
        Senator Collins. We have had two recent reports, one from
    the Atlantic Council of the United States, the other from the
    Afghanistan Study Group, that both warned that we have
    insufficient military forces in Afghanistan to accomplish the
    goals, as well as an effort on the economic and diplomatic side
    that is not robust enough. In effect, both of these reports
    warn that Afghanistan is on the brink, that we're at a tipping
    point, and both of them are an urgent call for action.
        We are sending 3,200 additional marines into Afghanistan to
    try to deal with this problem. My concern is that if NATO
    troops do not step up to the challenge that's outlined in this
    report and if our NATO allies continue to operate under
    constraints that make them less effective in dealing with the
    resurgence of the Taliban, that in fact we're going to end up
    with another enormous effort, imposing still more strain on our
    troops, and that it will be impossible for us to go back to a
    normal deployment length of 12 months and to stop repeatedly
    sending back the same troops after insufficient rest periods.
        Based on your assessment, what do you see as the demands
    for additional American troops in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'll start by saying that I'm not
    as pessimistic as some of these reports and studies seem to
    indicate the situation is in Afghanistan. Regarding the use of
    U.S. forces, we've taken steps and the President's approved the
    deployment of two marine units, one to address the need for
    maneuver forces under the NATO command, under International
    Security Assistance Force. There's been a longstanding request
    to have two more brigade-size forces for General McNeal.
        Now, there's been another request to have more trainers
    working for General Cohn, who works for me, to provide for the
    training of the Afghan security forces. We're sending units to
    address both of these issues, not in the full numbers that have
    been desired, but I think that they're going to be very helpful
    this year.
        The challenges that General McNeal faces in the ability to
    use the existing forces in Afghanistan are well known. The
    caveats and conditions under which these forces are used in my
    opinion provide some significant tactical limitations. They are
    what they are and, there are many efforts being made to address
    that issue with the other countries of NATO, to try to get more
    responsiveness and more flexibility in the use of those troops.
        I expect that this year this influx of troops ought to have
    some significant results. I don't think that the situation in
    Afghanistan is going to be in the long term solved by a huge
    influx of additional forces. I think that we need to get people
    focused on executing the specific tasks in Afghanistan that are
    going to be helpful to returning this country. It's different
    than Iraq, very different, in many ways. Our forces have been
    very successful, particularly in the past year, working in the
    eastern regions where we have primacy and basically
    responsibility. What I see is the kinds of engagement with the
    local populations--we learn a lot of lessons from Iraq in this
    regard--that basically provide stability and security, but
    encourage them through the instruments like CERP that you've
    made available and through other means, and the engagement with
    the international community, to help build their future--
    schools, development, water, power, management, all these
    things that are essential to daily life. This combination of
    factors in a focused, flexible manner has been what's given us
    the results in the east and we have every expectation we'll be
    able to build on that this year.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        I want to turn briefly to Pakistan. Obviously, the recent
    violence in population, the increase in car bombings, the
    assassination of the former prime minister, combined with the
    election changes in which a strong ally of our country,
    President Musharraf, and his party was resoundingly rejected,
    call into question what the impact will be on cooperation with
    the United States in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and for
    Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, particularly in the Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.
        How do you see these recent events affecting the
    cooperation that the United States desperately needs from the
    Pakistan Government?
        Admiral Fallon. My first comment would be that I find it
    impossible to separate Afghanistan from Pakistan. There's a
    border out there between the countries, but the reality is that
    you have a significant Pashtun tribal ethnic reality that
    spreads into significant parts of both countries. The Pak
    leadership now understands that, I believe, the principal
    threat to their long-term security and stability are the same
    folks that are operating out of the FATA, that are a problem
    for us in Afghanistan. So we have a lot of common ground here.
        Certainly there is a lot of swirl and change in Pakistan. I
    think it remains to be seen how this is going to work out. The
    good news is there's a process, there's a democratic process
    that has provided an election, and there is maneuvering going
    on and the political actions now to try to form a new
    government, which we certainly hope will be supportive of
    stability in that country, which will be helpful to us and the
    region in the long run, and also that they'll continue to
    support us in our endeavors to address the terror threat and
    the leadership of those networks that we believe emanate in the
    FATA.
        We have had, I believe, significant engagement of a
    positive manner with the Pak military. General Qiani, the new
    army chief, whom I've had the pleasure to meet, I think is very
    aware of the responsibilities he has to not only help, as the
    army is the dominant institution in that country to provide
    internal security, but he very well recognizes the threat
    that's posed by these extremists, and the same kind of
    behaviors that we see in Afghanistan now spreading into other
    areas of Pakistan. They're going to have to deal with it.
        From my perspective, we want to stay engaged. We want to
    encourage them to work with us as they have in the past and to
    a greater extent, so that we can leverage our relationship to
    help them help themselves and to help us in the process. I
    think it remains to be seen. It's certainly a critical time for
    this country of Pakistan and certainly for us. For our part, it
    seems to me the priorities for us are to encourage them to work
    toward solutions that are going to be politically acceptable
    and that are going to give their people the best chance for
    security for the future.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Admiral Fallon. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to focus in for a minute on the money being spent,
    and I want to particularly focus in on the money being spent in
    Pakistan. I think that there have been a number of reports, as
    we've had with the moneys in Iraq also, of fraud, waste, and
    abuse in terms of military aid to Pakistan. I know that we are
    spending $80 million a month on the combat support operations,
    the coalition support funds program, which supposedly
    reimburses Pakistan for conducting military operations to fight
    terrorism on the Afghan border.
        My concern is as I look at all the materials on this, I
    know that the U.S. embassy is supposed to verify that Pakistan
    has in fact incurred these expenses in support of combat
    activity on the Afghan border, and that I know the expenditures
    are sent to CENTCOM, where they are supposedly evaluated and
    the claims are looked at and then reimbursement is forwarded on
    to the Pentagon, the Office of Management and Budget, and to
    Congress.
        But the Pakistan military provides no receipts and many
    officials now believe that these invoices are being inflated. I
    think another concern obviously is that a senior military
    official has said that this aid, this $80 million a month, a
    total of $5.7 billion which we have provided, is really being
    used on a weapons system to potentially be involved with India;
    that Pakistan is focusing these moneys on something other than
    the goal that we want them to be working on, which is obviously
    the tribal unrest and terrorism that is obviously in play along
    the Afghan border.
        I would certainly like your take on this and what
    procedures can you put in place or your staff put in place to
    get a handle on these reimbursements, to make sure that they
    are going onto fighting terrorism in these tribal areas, as
    opposed to some long-term strategic goal that the Pakistani
    Government has in terms of the threat they feel from India?
        Admiral Fallon. Ma'am, I'll take this one to start with.
    The first comment I would make is these coalition support funds
    which are made available by Congress are intended to reimburse
    partner nations for their logistic and military activities in
    support of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Operation
    Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom specifically.
        I can tell you what I've done in the 10 months or so that
    I've been in charge of CENTCOM. I can't tell you what went on
    in the past, but I can tell you we're paying a lot of attention
    to it now--and trying to make sure that these moneys are being
    used for the purposes for which they were intended. This is
    very complex and the support that the Paks provide to us is
    extensive. I can tell you, frankly, that we would be very hard-
    pressed to be able to conduct our operations in Afghanistan
    today anywhere near the scope that we conduct them without this
    significant assistance from Pakistan.
        The Paks I believe understand that the challenge--I don't
    know what it was like in the past, but they certainly
    understand now that the threat that they face is really the
    same threat that we're facing in Afghanistan. It's the same
    people and I think many of the same intentions.
        The process by which we look at these expenditures and try
    to validate the purpose for which they are being spent is one
    in which there's no rubber stamp. We are looking very carefully
    at these things and as I look at the way things appear to have
    gone in the past and how they go now, we have in many ways
    slowed down the process. This has created some friction with
    the Paks because they submit these vouchers, if you would,
    outlining what they say they have spent the money on and we're
    scrutinizing them very carefully.
        In the past year, my folks tell me we've only approved
    about 80 percent of those requests that have come in, as we try
    to drill into them and find out what's really being done.
        That said, I think it's only fair to recognize that the
    Paks are heavily engaged. They have lost several thousand
    people killed and wounded to these insurgents that are up along
    the border there. They have been engaged certainly in the past
    year that I've been watching them to a much greater degree than
    they were in the past. They have moved a significant number of
    forces. Somewhere well over 100,000 troops have now been moved
    from the east, where traditionally they have been focused on a
    perception of an Indian problem, and they are increasingly
    engaging in the west.
        In operations in the Swat Valley, for example, where they
    were I think surprised to see insurgents and terrorists take
    over that area, they have fought to push them back out of that
    valley. It's been painful to watch and painful for them to
    endure, but they've been successful.
        So I see a lot of activity. North Waziristan, South
    Waziristan, they're actually moving. I think that in the big
    scheme of things there's little doubt that in the past they
    were focused on India as the big threat to the country. I think
    they see things differently now. They've taken steps. It is
    different now than it was 6 months ago and certainly a year
    ago, and they're working in this area.
        People make all kinds of accusations. For example: No money
    should be spent for F-16s because that's a big weapon system.
    In fact, they have a significant need for close air support to
    help their troops that are engaged on the ground. They don't
    have the capabilities we do. So they are trying to use every
    one of their means to try to address this issue.
        The fact of the matter is their capabilities need a lot of
    work. That's part of our engagement here, is to help make them
    more productive, make them more effective in their engagement.
        So we're looking very hard at this money. I understand it's
    a large amount of money and we would like to have it spent in
    the right way. But they do a lot of things every day. Every
    single aircraft that flies into Afghanistan from the south and
    east, and that's the vast majority of them, have to overfly
    Pakistan. They have to have support, they have to be
    deconflicted and so forth. So there are lots of things on these
    lists of charges and requests for reimbursement that the Paks
    submit that I think have a basis. How much exactly is stuff
    that we have to go through. But we're working on this process.
    We're working very hard with our own people in Islamabad to
    make them more aware of the need to be very careful in
    scrutinizing this. We're working on it.
        Senator McCaskill. Is it your sense then, Admiral, that
    since you have taken over that you're comfortable that we are
    in fact drilling down and getting receipts and actually getting
    documentation for what they are requesting in terms of this $80
    million that we're spending on a monthly basis, which is a lot
    of money for the American taxpayers?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, it certainly is. I'm not going to say
    that I'm comfortable with any of this. I'll tell you that we're
    certainly giving it good close attention. The idea that you
    have a receipt for every flight hour that's expended or the
    repair costs of the helicopters or whatever I think is a little
    difficult to do. But we are certainly engaged with the Paks in
    this and I think we're in a lot better shape than we were in
    the past, and we're going to keep at it.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Martinez.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson for being
    here today. I thank you both for your service, and the troops
    that serve under you. Again I want to tell you how proud I am
    that both of your commands are headquartered at Tampa, FL, in
    the great Sunshine State. We're proud to have you there.
        Admiral Fallon, earlier you answered some questions about
    Iranian influence in the region and I was intrigued by your
    comments because it did appear to me that you suggest that
    their influence vis-a-vis the area of influence that they could
    possibly project, their neighborhood, you indicated they were
    viewed with skepticism, distrust, with a dim view, and their
    influence was not increased, but in fact there was great
    concern about them.
        My question is then, it appears that their neighbors and
    the neighbors of Iraq--you suggested that those neighbors were
    concerned also about our commitment, and that you were asked
    repeatedly by these neighbors about our commitment. I guess my
    question to you is, given the fact that things have
    dramatically improved on the ground from a year ago, that in
    fact levels of violence are greatly decreased in Iraq, would it
    be fair then to say that our continued presence in Iraq has
    added stability to the region, and that in fact these neighbors
    feel better about the fact that we continue to be committed
    than they would feel if we in fact had not maintained that
    commitment, but had in fact withdrawn precipitously?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, as with most of these issues,
    there's more than one side to the story. I think it would be
    fair to say that many of the countries in the region were not
    particularly pleased with us, directly related to the level of
    violence in Iraq in the past years, directly related to the
    continuing instability and the concerns about where this all
    was going. Now that the forces in Iraq have made substantial
    progress, they like it a lot better and now they're concerned
    the other way. Probably the majority of that concern is in the
    other direction, that they don't want us to pull out and have
    this thing drift back into a more chaotic state again.
        So it's the battle of perceptions. I think it really
    highlights how important it is to have consistent messaging,
    based on behavior on our part. There is concern about our
    commitment and as many of these countries look at the way we
    have engaged periodically and then seemingly gone into periods
    where we have not seemed to have focused on their region and
    their countries, they begin to doubt us.
        It's like anybody else. They want to be loved, they want to
    be engaged. They want to feel that we are going to be with them
    all the time.
        Now, we have requirements from our side, too. We want to be
    with them, but we want them to behave in a manner that's going
    to be helpful to their own people and to us in the region. So
    as with most things, you have to look at the entire thing from
    all the angles. But today there's pleasure, increased
    confidence that the situation in Iraq is improving. I believe
    that countries would like to see us engaged, to remain engaged
    in the region. Certainly the concern about Iran demonstrates
    that. They want us to do it in constructive ways. So I think
    it's in our interest to continue to stay there in some number,
    in some form, and stay engaged.
        Senator Martinez. In terms of continuing the low level of
    violence, I don't think there's any question that it was very
    important that the Mahdi Army and Moqtada al-Sadr made a
    commitment to continue their ceasefire. Can you tell me how we
    deal with an individual that is as volatile as this individual,
    who has such deep hatred of the United States, and yet seems to
    be in such an influential position as it relates to the level
    of violence in Iraq, and how we will move to a more permanent
    level of stability?
        Admiral Fallon. The short answer is, because we don't have
    direct engagement with this individual, Moqtada al-Sadr, we
    rely on those Iraqis that deal with him, not just the
    Government of Iraq and those clerics with whom he deals, and
    that's how we try to convey our messages, which are it's in the
    interest of not only his group but the rest of the people of
    Iraq to continue this so-called freeze, to continue to focus
    their energy in non-kinetic ways, in ways that are not going to
    incite levels of violence.
        I believe that as the Iraqi people see the benefits of
    people not resorting to force of arms they are liking things a
    lot better and that becomes a pressure in itself. So it's the
    Iraqi people working with the Iraqis and these leaders of these
    groups to influence them to act in reasonable and appropriate
    ways.
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Admiral.
        Admiral Olson, recently, in fact Saturday, the Colombian
    Government struck a great success in their continuing fight
    against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Coloumbia (FARC), a
    terrorist group that has been responsible for now over 3 years,
    I guess, the kidnapping of 3 Americans, in addition to over
    their history over 100 Americans who have been kidnapped by
    this group over time. I know that your Special Operations
    Forces have been engaged in training in Colombia as well as
    other missions, including humanitarian missions, as you
    mentioned. Could you speak to us about your work in Colombia?
    It looks to me like your training has taken hold because this
    operation on Saturday seems to have been a pretty neat deal.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. We do have a longstanding
    engagement with the Colombians, as you're well aware. Our
    presence in Colombia has ranged from 200 to 500 people as it's
    ebbed and surged over the last several years. Under the rules
    of the engagement, we are in a train and assist role. We do not
    conduct operations with the Colombians, but we do train and
    advise and assist, and we say goodbye to them as they go off on
    their operations and then we welcome them back as they return.
        This has been a successful engagement. It is conducted
    largely by Army Special Forces, but we have had marines and
    Navy SEALS down there conducting that engagement because so
    much of their transportation is dependent on the riverine
    system within Colombia. So it's been a good partnership.
        I second your thought that this operation that was
    successful this past weekend against the number two FARC leader
    was at least in large part a manifestation of that
    relationship. In fact, one of the Colombian soldiers I'm told
    who was killed in that operation is one on whom one of our
    Special Operations leaders down there had pinned a U.S. medal
    not too many years ago because of the value of the relationship
    that we had built with that particular Colombian soldier.
        So this is a continuing effort for us. I think that we
    should be encouraged by the level of Colombian activity against
    the FARC in particular. They had gone many years without having
    this kind of success. Now they've had several successes over
    the last couple of years.
        Senator Martinez. I would conclude by just following on
    that comment. The fact is that the Colombian Government is a
    democratically elected government. President Uribe was elected
    with an overwhelmingly positive vote by their people and it is
    distressing to see that neighboring governments seem to be
    intent upon destabilizing the Colombian Government and
    situation by providing assistance to the FARC.
        It's interesting that in this operation apparently some
    very direct and clear evidence of this destabilizing influence
    of neighboring governments came to light, which I think many of
    us have suspected for a long time, but it's pretty clear that
    that in fact took place.
        I'm proud of your people standing on the side of a
    democratically elected government against those who through
    violence would seek to destabilize.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service
    to our country, and its especially a privilege that we have
    your two headquarters located in our State.
        Admiral Olson, you need two modified C-27s as a gunship and
    you also need some more Ospreys to do your role. You want to
    tell the committee about that?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, two separate issues. I'll address them
    separately. The C-27 we're discussing as a prototype for what
    we call Gunship Light. The AC-130 gunship has proven very
    powerful and in high demand in Afghanistan and Iraq with its
    surgical strike capability from an orbital flight. We are soon
    to experience a degradation of that fleet due to the center
    wingbox issue that has struck the entire C-130 inventory. The
    Air Force solution for the next generation gunship is several
    years away, at least fiscal year 2015, 2016, perhaps 2017.
        So we're looking at a lighter version of the C-130. If you
    take a C-130 and put it on a copy machine and push the 50
    percent button, you  get  a  C-27. It's  a  twin  engine. It
    looks  a  lot  like  the  C-130. This is an integration effort
    to determine the art of the reasonable with respect to mounting
    guns on a C-27, flying it in an orbital pattern to provide
    quick response, primarily to troops in contact or where troops
    may be expected to be in contact, with the surgical precision
    that we've come to expect from the AC-130.
        I've talked to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force about
    this. It would be an exaggeration to say that we are moving
    forward together on this, although we are supportive of the
    goals of the effort, and he has spoken about that as well. But
    with the acquisition authorities that I am granted as the
    Commander of SOCOM, we are striving  to  move  forward  with  a
     prototype  development  of  that  C-27.
        The V-22 Osprey is our next generation rotary wing lift, at
    least for the Air Force component of Special Operations. We
    have come to depend on the MH-53 Pave Low fleet, the last one
    of which will be retired in October of this year. We have an
    inventory of 31. We're building towards an inventory of 50 CV-
    22s, largely to replace that capability. It's a Special
    Operations-modified version of the V-22. We pay about one-
    quarter of the cost, the Air Force pays about three-quarters of
    the cost, as we make the SOF-peculiar modifications to it.
        In my view that airplane is being delivered to us at too
    slow a rate. There are opportunities in the production line to
    accelerate that and so we are seeking some funding in order to
    do that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Fallon, you may have gone over
    this while I had to go and just give a speech, but let me quote
    from your comments: ``Looking to the future and as U.S. forces
    are withdrawn, we are planning to normalize long-term bilateral
    relations through a framework agreement that reflects our
    shared political, economic, cultural, and security interests,
    as well as a status of forces agreement.''
        Then you go on to say: ``As Iraq increasingly asserts its
    sovereignty, we want to continue to assist in developing Iraqi
    capacities to secure and defend their country.'' That's what
    the military does and it does it very well, our military.
        Every presidential candidate has some version of a
    withdrawal that they have laid out on the table for the
    American people to consider. Will political reconciliation
    occur in your opinion, and do you see any evidence that it's
    occurring other than what you've stated in your testimony here,
    the 2008 national budget, the provincial powers, amnesty, the
    de-Baathification law, provincial powers laws, and so forth?
    Look over the horizon for us.
        Admiral Fallon. We certainly have every expectation they're
    going to continue down this path to stability and enable us to
    do what I believe the vast majority of our people would like,
    and that is to be able to withdraw the bulk of our combat
    forces and let the Iraqi security folks take over in their own
    country.
        This will be enabled by continued political development in
    the country. It's painful to watch sometimes. But I see things
    that go on almost on a daily basis. When I got here last year,
    I went out and tried to make a point to meet the leaders
    throughout Iraq, particularly those in the central government,
    and, frankly, came back with mixed opinions of folks. My
    opinion at that time, after meeting them for the initial go-
    around, was that most were very narrowly focused based on their
    backgrounds from political parties. Recognition that the people
    in many of the key positions were there precisely because they
    weren't really powerful, because those were the deals that were
    brokered.
        It's been encouraging to watch the development of these
    people from Prime Minister Maliki on down, to see them take
    responsibility, and increasingly we're seeing the results of
    that. It's not a straight line and I don't think it's going to
    be. There are things that are frustrating. This is a different
    culture than ours and, frankly, it's a different political
    process and philosophy in this country. But it's coming along.
        I'll give you one example. There was an impasse in this
    legislation and there were a number of items teed up: the
    budget, the Provincial Powers Act that Senator Levin already
    talked about, the amnesty legislation. They all appeared to be
    stymied and as we watched they'd take one after the other and
    weren't making progress. They got innovative. They bundled
    them, put them all on the table together, and in the process
    found ways to make the political accommodations that got them
    all passed, amazingly, in one day. It was kind of astounding.
    All of a sudden it was, how'd they do this?
        So I think we have to continue to engage them, continue to
    point out to them the cost of this in terms of blood, sweat,
    and tears on the part of our people, which is very substantial,
    the resources that we've devoted to this country.
        They're working on it. They're taking responsibility in my
    view, whether it's in the political process, whether it's in
    the recognition--it seems to me they are more aggressive now in
    going out and addressing issues away from the capital, and this
    is essential to me. If they can't figure out how to get people
    in the provinces the basics that they need, we're not going to
    be successful, nor they. But increasingly I see them paying
    attention to it.
        I give you another couple of examples. I was out in Anbar 2
    weeks ago and it was pointed out to me by the marines out there
    that they had a problem on the border, one of the border
    crossing points with Syria. The issue was that the Iraqis out
    there, Sunnis most of them, all of them actually in this area,
    had been attending to business and they were having to do it
    out of their own resources, and the central government had not
    seen fit, or at least that was the story, to pay these guys and
    to provide them the other resources they needed. It was gnawing
    at them. Just this weekend, got a report. They actually sent a
    delegation out, addressed the issues, paid the arrears, and
    people were moving forward.
        I mentioned this thing in Diyalah the other day with the
    Concerned Local Citizens/Sons of Iraq. It was gnawing at them
    and it was starting to cause the compromise to come apart. They
    took appropriate steps to fix it in the budget.
        They are increasingly taking responsibility financially for
    themselves. The lines have crossed. They are spending this year
    three times more on their security than we will spend. Where 3
    years ago we were spending the bulk of the money, they are now
    spending the vast majority of it, and the trends are in the
    right direction.
        They were particularly not effective in using their own
    resources for their own people. That's increased I think 55
    percent or so is the data this year. It's still got a long way
    to go. But they are getting better at their own budget
    execution.
        Anyway, day after day, slowly but surely, it's generally
    moving in the right direction. It has to continue. Part of the
    role of our folks that are engaged out there is to keep beating
    the drums to ensure that they don't lose sight of the fact that
    they have to continue to make progress.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. On the question of the Iraqi resources, you
    say now being spent more and more to support their own troops.
    The Iraqi oil ministry goal for 2008 is to produce 2.2 million
    barrels of oil a day. Now, the exports that we know of have
    revenues that are estimated $41 billion in 2007 and according
    to the current rate in 2008, extrapolating that rate would give
    us an estimate of $56 billion of oil exports for 2008.
        How much of that oil revenue is Iraq spending for its own
    security and economic development?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, this year the number's about $9
    billion in security. The number for us is about $3 billion. In
    total development, I don't have it off the top of my head, but
    I know that when we were out there the week before last that
    their intention was to bump a surge amount, if you would, of
    $10 billion additional into development.
        The trends are increasingly for them to increase and take
    over responsibility. In the big scheme of things, this year the
    lines crossed in development resources. As I recall, the number
    now is total that they've invested is about $51 billion versus
    $48 billion for us since 2002. So they're working on it. They
    have a long way to go.
        Chairman Levin. Since 2002, that's about 6 years or 5
    years, and that's about maybe $7, $8 billion a year. But I'm
    talking $40 billion in oil money, oil revenues from exports
    last year, and perhaps $56 billion this year. How much of that
    is just being stashed away in foreign banks, do you know?
        Admiral Fallon. A lot of it's in our banks, the vast
    majority.
        Chairman Levin. Why should that money not be spent in Iraq,
    on Iraqi projects?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, it should be. The facts are that
    their ability to institutionalize and effectively distribute
    those funds is lacking. It's increasing. It's getting better.
    As I indicated, it's double this year, the expenditure rate,
    than the year before. This is not going to happen overnight. We
    have to continue to engage with them.
        I think it illustrates a real important fact here. While we
    couldn't be where we are without security and stability
    provided through the military, the major issues in their long-
    term viability are not military. It's government and
    development of those institutional processes within the country
    that are going to enable them to actually be effective in this
    business.
        Chairman Levin. I can't accept the answer that they're not
    capable of administering their own revenues. They have a budget
    which is approximately this amount, and it's totally
    unacceptable to me that we are spending tens of billions of
    dollars on rebuilding Iraq while they are putting tens of
    billions of dollars in banks around the world from oil
    revenues. It doesn't compute as far as I'm concerned and I
    think that we ought to get an accounting from our either
    Inspector General or our Government Accountability Office of
    those oil revenues, and we'll be sending a letter to one or the
    other to do just that. I take it you wouldn't have any
    objection to that?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'm with you on this one. I think
    it's not just sitting in the banks trying to get somebody rich
    on interest income. It's because they're in a holding position
    now until they can figure out how to effectively disburse this
    money.
        There's another dimension to this that I find pretty
    fascinating. Because of the tradition in this country with
    Saddam and his henchman and the way they took all resources and
    used them for private funds, the Iraqi leaders at every level
    appear to be highly sensitive to the image of corruption, not
    that there isn't that that goes on, but to the perception that
    they might somehow misuse these funds, the National funds.
        So we find what I consider are very extraordinary actions
    on their part, risk avoidance, if you would, in taking what
    seem to me to be appropriate, prudent decisions to go ahead and
    get with the program. It's the checks and balances kind of
    thing.
        But clearly we'd like to see them take a more active role,
    spending more of their money, and so we end up spending less of
    ours, no doubt about it.
        Chairman Levin. If they can't figure out how to spend their
    own money and if the fear of being perceived as being corrupt
    is the reason, they sure can transfer those resources to us.
    We'll administer them the way we administer our own funds, for
    their reconstruction. I mean, we're putting a lot more money
    into reconstruction up to now than they have.
        Admiral Fallon. But that's changed. They are putting more
    in now.
        Chairman Levin. It's changing, but that money, which is
    sitting somewhere in banks, can be applied to reconstruction,
    if necessary through our administration. Some of us voted when
    this war began to have the future delivery of Iraqi oil to fund
    the cost of this war. We had a vote on that issue. In fact, it
    was represented by some people that the Iraqis would pay for
    the cost of this war.
        The least they can do, instead of stashing that money in
    banks, is have that money go to current reconstruction
    projects. So we're going to press that issue in the way that I
    indicated, and there may be other ways to do it as well.
        Admiral Olson, let me get to some of the questions that I
    had in my opening statement that I'd like to address. Kind of
    working backwards, do your special operators have sufficient
    Predators and other assets to conduct aggressive search and
    seizure missions against al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in and
    around Afghanistan and in Iraq? Do you have enough of those
    type of assets?
        Admiral Olson. I'd like to give you a yes or no answer, Mr.
    Chairman. It's a balance of what Special Operations should
    provide and what should be provided by the rest of the theater.
    There are now 50-something orbits, is the term, flown over
    Iraq, most of which are provided by CENTCOM, some of which are
    provided by SOCOM. We're providing on the order of 11 or 12 of
    those.
        In total, that's not sufficient. If the question is are
    there sufficient Predators, there aren't. But I'm not convinced
    that a dollar for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
    capability is best spent on Predators at this point. It's a
    very complex system, with bottlenecks in training the
    operators, training the intelligence analysts, developing the
    hangars and the ramp space and the bandwidth and developing the
    full motion video sensors. That is all part of the ISR system.
        So the short answer is we have insufficient capability for
    ISR in total.
        Chairman Levin. What is your shortfall? On ISR what is your
    shortfall?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, the most severe shortfall is manpower
    now. It's trained operators of the systems and trained
    intelligence analysts to evaluate and distribute the
    information that is gathered through the surveillance.
        Chairman Levin. Do you have a dollar shortfall? You've
    given us a list of dollar shortfalls.
        Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Could you total them up for us?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, the shortfall that I've presented is on
    the order of about $300 million in short-term funds, and that's
    balanced across leasing capability, buying capability,
    investing in training capability. There are air space
    management challenges. There's a lot that goes into this. But
    with $300 million I believe that I can reasonably enhance the
    Special Operations capability as our share of the much larger
    development of the total military capability.
        Chairman Levin. Have you requested that money in the
    budget?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, we're in discussion with your staff.
        Chairman Levin. No, no. I mean in the administration's
    budget.
        Admiral Olson. No, sir, we did not.
        Chairman Levin. Why was that?
        Admiral Olson. Because we were depending on Service
    capability to provide for that shortfall. We have long
    supported a stated requirement for 30 continuous orbits in
    Iraq. That's a CENTCOM requirement, supported by U.S. SOCOM. We
    internally have grown at a rate that we believe we reasonably
    could, in order to support our share of that total shortfall.
    But I did not submit in my budget request the funds to make up
    for the entire military shortfall.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, I apologize for having had
    to step out of here. As so often happens up here, we have two
    very important hearings going on at the same time, and I'm at
    the bottom of the food chain here, so I had to wait longer than
    I thought I would at the other one before I could ask my
    questions.
        I also wanted to make sure that I reviewed the questions
    that had been asked of you so I wouldn't be redundant here.
        I have two areas that I would like to get some
    clarification on. The first is, how would you describe the
    center of mass of al Qaeda activity in your region, Admiral
    Fallon? Where would you put that?
        Admiral Fallon. The first word would be ``distributed.''
    These guys are pretty clever. They've figured it out. They
    leverage the technology today and they recognize the inherent
    danger of pulling all the folks in one spot.
        We have a working assumption that the most senior
    leadership resides somewhere in the Afghan-Pak border area,
    probably in the FATA. But we have lots of evidence that
    indicates that they have established nodes, if you would, in
    lots of other places in the region. It seems that the CENTCOM
    region, for better or for worse, mostly for worse, I think,
    seems to be attractive to them. That's not surprising because
    we have more poorly governed or lawless places, I suspect, than
    most in the world. So they tend to come to these areas and take
    refuge there and try to operate, and using the technology to
    communicate back and forth.
        Senator Webb. Recognizing that they are mobile, would you
    say that the center of mass of their activities is Pakistan?
        Admiral Fallon. Again, I don't have a body count. I think
    there are a couple of things that are pertinent here. One is
    they have lots of allies and allied groups, and these
    affiliated organizations sometimes maybe present the appearance
    of mass, but I suspect that there are fractures and fissures
    and different views among these folks.
        I think this offers us an opportunity in some respects. The
    fact that they are distributed in different countries means
    that they have to communicate somehow, some way. When they talk
    one way or another or move, it gives us an opportunity to use
    regional assets, not just U.S. but the countries in the region,
    to help us in identifying and hopefully capturing these people.
        Senator Webb. Just to say editorially, one of the problems
    I've had since day 1 with what we did in Iraq is that we took
    probably the greatest maneuver force in the world and locked it
    down in a strategic mousetrap, occupying these different
    cities, while the people we ostensibly were going after
    remained mobile. So we have a situation here where a huge
    portion of our military is essentially in a classic holding
    action for political reasons while this mobility is occurring
    over us.
        The question I want to get to because I'm running out of
    time is a little different. It's something that Senator Warner
    and I have discussed at some length. There are two agreements
    now that are being negotiated at the executive branch level
    between our Government and the Iraqi Government pertaining to
    the future relationships, long-term future relationships that
    we are going to have in Iraq. There is some great concern,
    particularly on this side of the aisle, that we are going to be
    placed in a position as the Government changes one way or the
    other after November, where because of the reliance of the
    Iraqi Government on some of these terms that are being
    negotiated and because of sort of a lack of clarity with us
    here in the congressional branch about what is being done,
    where we will be kind of ineluctably drawn into a long-term
    relationship while it hasn't been properly debated.
        Are you familiar with the differences between these two
    agreements that are being negotiated? I'd like your thoughts on
    that.
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, I think I'm pretty tuned in to
    this, and I'm very, very focused on it because it's essential.
    The reality is that we have to have in place the appropriate
    protections for our troops, and not just for their personal
    protection, which is essential, but to enable them to be
    effective in operating in Iraq. Come December 31 of this year
    when that U.N. Security Council resolution expires, we're going
    to be in a different ballgame.
        We have a critical task in front of us to figure out. The
    two, from my view, they're different, but they're very
    complementary and essential, and you have to have both. What
    we're trying to do here in what's called the strategic
    framework agreement is to frame expectations with the
    Government of Iraq about our mutual vision of the future. What
    is it we expect to have in the way of a relationship between
    the countries? Certainly a lot different than the one that's
    been in place for the last couple of years.
        So that's the key aspect of the SOFA. Certainly we have to
    for our part, I believe, affirm for the Iraqis their
    sovereignty. This is their country and they want to have a
    future, and they want to be able to make decisions about their
    security. At the same time, we want to ensure that our
    interests are protected, and most importantly those interests
    are our people, that they can actually continue to do what they
    do.
        We would like to be able to continue to work against this
    extremist threat, the terrorist threat, the al Qaeda network
    that remains in Iraq. We want to be able to deal with the
    challenges that we face.
        At the same time, there's another aspect of this and that's
    the detail of just the physical presence of people in another
    country, as you're well aware. We have SOFAs, for example, with
    dozens and dozens of countries around the world. They're
    individually negotiated and they cover the interests and
    specifics of various nations.
        It's essential that we have a replacement for the U.N.
    Security Council Resolution. We have a process to do these
    things that is well tested. I don't believe that we have any
    intention of putting ourselves in a position where we are
    making an international agreement such that it would
    necessitate Senate review of this or anything along those
    lines. These are essential agreements that should be made at
    the executive level and I think that's clearly our intention
    from my view of what we're trying to do in this duality
    approach, if you would.
        Senator Webb. We may have some disagreement on that with
    respect to the umbrella agreement. We had a meeting yesterday
    with some people from the administration on this. When I say
    ``we,'' I'm saying among this body. There are people who are
    concerned that that first agreement is not a security
    agreement. When you talk about long-term relations with a
    country, it's essentially a national agreement. It's committing
    the country and that sounds an awful lot like a treaty.
        We have always operated under some sort of umbrella,
    particularly when we're putting people into harm's way, whether
    it's international compacts like NATO or bilateral security
    agreements like the Philippines, Japan, et cetera. So we, those
    of us who are concerned, may want some further clarification on
    this.
        Recognizing that the clock is ticking, that actually is one
    of the reasons that the concern level up here and that the
    level of sincerity perhaps from the administration both have
    come into question.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, from my perspective I can pledge
    to you that we'll be as open as we possibly can. There's every
    intention to keep you informed. I think from my discussions
    with the folks that were up briefing you yesterday that's
    certainly their intention as well, to keep you well informed
    and to keep your confidence.
        Senator Webb. I hope we can shed some more light on this. I
    have great respect for the job that you've been doing and
    hopefully we can get this into the open air. If we don't, it's
    going to become a campaign issue; I can promise you that.
        Admiral Fallon. We have highlighted a couple of agreements
    with countries around the world. We have many agreements. In my
    previous assignment out in the Pacific, we've reached agreement
    with countries on similar things. One that comes to mind, very
    important for us, was a SOFA-equivalent with Singapore. It was
    an executive agreement to codify expectations with that
    country.
        But back to the key point here, the intention is to be very
    open, very forthcoming, to alleviate any concerns in this
    regard.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to commend my colleague, Senator Webb, for taking
    this initiative. I feel just as strongly as he about these
    agreements.
        Now, the SOFA follows the pattern of military agreements
    we've had with many nations, and that's to protect our
    individual soldiers, airmen, marines, and sailors for their
    personal activities in carrying out the missions assigned by
    the President. Second, we would not want the strategic
    framework agreement in any way to tie the hands of the next
    president, whoever that may be, as he or she directs the future
    missions of our country on behalf of not only Iraq, but indeed
    Afghanistan, too, because this is a pattern.
        Lastly, I don't know whether this rises to the level of
    advise and consent. Senator Webb said a treaty. I'll leave that
    to perhaps our colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee.
    But I do think it's important, Mr. Chairman, that Senator Webb
    and I recommend to you that we have a hearing on this at the
    appropriate time, and that there be the maximum amount of
    transparency. Now, any negotiation requires a certain amount of
    confidentiality between the negotiators, but at the present
    time get it all out, so that there's no hidden agenda in the
    minds of the American people or in the minds of the Iraqi
    people about where the two nations want to go.
        So I urge you also that we move out on this thing, because
    I would think it would be helpful to have it wrapped up in the
    next 90 or 120 days and therefore not become drawn into good
    old-fashioned politics of America as we elect our next
    president and it become or could be distorted or whatever.
        I want to turn to this problem of the rest of the United
    States Government. Throughout the years this committee has
    pushed for the administration to get more of the departments
    and agencies of this Government involved in Iraq. I think
    that's slowly come to pass. But do we have a similar situation
    in Afghanistan, Admiral Fallon? Now, there there's some
    question about the security, personal security of people of
    other agencies and departments coming over to perform their
    functions. But it is essential. You stressed the need for jobs
    in Iraq. I stress the need for jobs in Afghanistan if we're
    going to have a strong and stable sovereign country.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I couldn't agree more. In fact, as
    I look at Afghanistan the priorities for that emerging country
    are in other than military things--electrical power, roads,
    water management, agricultural development. These are the
    things that are really going to turn this into an ongoing
    concern.
        There's a fact of life in this business of the interagency
    and their personnel. DOD and our military forces are by nature
    expeditionary. We are used to deploying, used to going out in
    the world and engaging. Our rotational forces are out there all
    the time. The other institutions of this Government are focused
    historically domestically, with the exception of the Department
    of State. Secretary Rice has had an initiative to substantially
    ramp up the number of people in the Department of State. It's
    going to take a while to do that.
        I am anxious to get more people to engage in these things
    because not too many of them are there.
        Senator Warner. Good. I mentioned also the Department of
    Agriculture. If we're going to come to grips with this
    insidious, frightful problem of the growing poppies and the
    increased revenue there--from flowing into military operations
    to support the Taliban, we have to help that agricultural base
    develop alternatives. Let's hope that that can really be on the
    top of everybody's list.
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Admiral, I noted with a great deal of
    pleasure that the U.S.S. Cole deployed into your region. One of
    your 24 countries is Lebanon. We all remember the events of the
    1980s, to include the tragic bombing of the marine barracks
    that killed 241 marines. I remember Senator Tower and I went
    out there within 48 hours, I believe, of that tragic incident
    to make our assessment.
        What's the intent of the deployment of the U.S.S. Cole and
    what's the likelihood that that deployment structure will stay
    in place for a while?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, the deployment is really sent as a
    signal. In my opinion, it's designed to let folks know that we
    are certainly very interested in this part of the world and
    particularly in activities within Lebanon. It's been
    frustrating to me to watch. I visited Lebanon back in September
    for the first time in several decades, in fact since I was back
    there in 1983, the last time. There had not been a senior
    military officer visit.
        I was well received by the government, the leadership
    there, the defense minister. It's clear that they want to
    engage with us. But meanwhile we've watched now this political
    impasse drag on and on where--the inability to get a president.
    It's very clear that outside actors are influencing this in
    Lebanon. The message here is that we are watching with keen
    interest, that we are not actively putting our fingers into
    this thing, we're not trying to destabilize anything, but we
    want to demonstrate through our presence that we are committed
    to helping Lebanon to move forward and hopefully resolve their
    crisis.
        I'm very anxious to get our people engaged in helping the
    Lebanese armed forces to be more confident and more able to
    provide security and stability. As they demonstrated in the
    refugee camp activities this last summer, they have a lot of
    challenges. We want to be more engaged.
        Senator Warner. I think sending the U.S.S. Cole is quite a
    symbol. As we all remember, that ship and its crew suffered a
    tragic incident when a terrorist rammed it and exploded. We
    repaired that ship and she's back on the line.
        Are there other ships accompanying it in this force or is
    it a single ship?
        Admiral Fallon. I believe that there will be other ships
    that are going to operate in the area, sir.
        Senator Warner. I would hope that would be the case.
        My last question, Mr. Chairman. There's been the assertion
    that the Afghan situation should be separated from the Iraq
    situation. They are coupled in that it's a common effort to
    enable two nations to achieve strong sovereignty, but I think
    Secretary Gates again very wisely said the Europeans have a
    problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to
    Afghanistan, and do not understand the different kind of
    threat.
        I assume you associate yourself with that analysis by the
    Secretary of Defense, and I thought you'd share with us your
    own views here.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, both Iraq and Afghanistan are
    stability challenges in my region. Each is unique; many
    circumstances that are different. I can't explain all the
    thought processes within the heads of the people in the various
    countries that are involved here, but I can tell you that we
    need help in Afghanistan. There are lots of folks who have
    raised their hands and said, we aim to be of assistance here.
    It seems to me we have to figure out a better way to get people
    to be committed to working together in a really complementary
    and effective manner if we're going to be successful.
        Senator Warner. There's no reason why they can't supply
    some of the non-military aspects of the recovery in
    Afghanistan.
        Admiral Fallon. I think we're a little cautious to say,
    look, here's how it works and how it's effective. Our example
    in the east bringing to bear those other instruments that
    you've made available to us in the way of moneys and ability to
    operate to help people in their daily lives, it seems to me
    these are very obvious examples of how things could be more
    effective than they are now. Removing caveats and allowing
    troops to really have their value on the ground is critical. I
    just don't understand what people are thinking about in this
    except for the risk aversity of things.
        It's very different in Afghanistan. For example, the
    drumbeat today is things are really going to heck in a
    handbasket and there's no doubt about that the IEDs, the
    suicide bombings, are up significantly from a year or 2 ago,
    but the scale of violence in Afghanistan is a fraction of what
    it is in Iraq. I'm not trying to sugar-coat this at all, but it
    needs effective engagement.
        There are lots of folks there. If we could get everybody to
    put in a solid effort without all these caveats, I think we'd
    be a heck of a lot further down the road.
        Senator Warner. Is Iran trying to project along its border,
    particularly in that segment of Afghanistan, it's own influence
    and destabilizing some of the efforts that we and NATO are
    trying to achieve?
        Admiral Fallon. No doubt that the Iranians are influencing
    Afghanistan. In many ways it's positive. I've had this
    conversation with President Karzai. They have provided a lot of
    assistance to Afghanistan.
        Senator Warner. ``They'' being----
        Admiral Fallon. The Iranians.
        Senator Warner. Recently have provided economic assistance?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir. In the west, in Herat and that
    area, there's substantial Iranian investment and activity. The
    cost of that----
        Senator Warner. Do you view that as positive?
        Admiral Fallon. That's positive. What I don't like is the
    flip side of it, that we found several instances last year in
    which it was pretty apparent that they were trying to provide
    lethal assistance of a similar kind----
        Senator Warner. The IED type?
        Admiral Fallon. Haven't seen much evidence of that, but
    we've seen other things. Now, it's not on a scale of what's
    going on on the other border, but it's still unhelpful. Now,
    what else we don't know remains to be seen. It could be a very
    positive influence. In some ways it is. The flip side of it is
    as you know.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think our witnesses have
    shared very superb professional perspectives on your
    responsibilities in that AOR. I compliment you and your troops
    under you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is my understanding--and please correct me if I'm
    wrong--that we have approximately 85,000 Sunnis on the payroll
    on a monthly basis in Iraq?
        Admiral Fallon. Closer to--this is the former Concerned
    Local Citizens, called ``Sons of Iraq'' now?
        Senator McCaskill. I'm just curious how many Sunnis we have
    on the payroll. I don't know what we call them or what they're
    doing. I just want to figure out what is the number of Sunnis
    that we are paying every month with American tax dollars.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think you're focused on those
    volunteers that have helped us with local security. The answer
    is about 90,000 total and I'm told that about 80 percent of
    those are Sunnis, about 20 percent Shia. So the number is
    probably closer to 70-75,000.
        Senator McCaskill. They're receiving somewhere between $200
    and $400 a month from us?
        Admiral Fallon. I don't know exactly what General Petraeus
    and his folks are paying them, but they're certainly receiving
    a salary.
        Senator McCaskill. Is it the sense that this is making a
    big difference in terms of stability?
        Admiral Fallon. Huge difference, a very positive
    difference.
        Senator McCaskill. Have we thought about paying 90,000
    Afghans a month? How about 90,000 Pakistanis a month?
        Admiral Fallon. The situations are different in both
    countries. I don't think you can take this--we have looked at
    this. A lot of people have said, well, this thing worked over
    here, let's get it going in Afghanistan. It's very different in
    many respects.
        The lesson's not lost on us. We're trying to figure out how
    to work with the indigenous people, with the tribes. I would
    tell you that right off the bat my experience and knowledge
    here in Afghanistan tells me that it's much more complex. Many
    more tribal affinities, local tribal affinities. Many of them
    don't particularly get along with the folks over in the next
    valley. So we've benefited immensely in Iraq in places where
    there's large tribal influences that cover big swaths of
    territory, folks have cooperated with one another. We think
    this is going to be a significant challenge in Afghanistan.
        I'm open to any suggestion that would help us move forward,
    but I don't think that we can just take this template and plop
    it down over top of either of these countries.
        Senator McCaskill. How are we going to get out from
    underneath this payroll? It's so frustrating. I think the
    amount of money--and by the way, I was kind of facetious when I
    talked about Afghanistan, but the Atlantic Council has said
    only 10 cents of every dollar we're spending there is getting
    to the Afghans.
        I'm curious also for your take on what kind of measures do
    we have in place to make sure these taxpayer dollars that we're
    spending in Afghanistan in fact is getting any kind of efficacy
    in terms of our goals in Afghanistan, and what's the long term?
    If we're doing this, whether it's 75,000 or 85,000 Sunnis that
    we're paying every month with American money, when do we stop
    paying them?
        I know some have characterized that payroll as--I know our
    military has performed there very well under General Petraeus
    as it relates to security. But clearly this amount of people on
    the payroll has also greatly contributed to what has occurred
    in terms of more security, and I don't know how we get out from
    under that.
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, we are very grateful for the
    willingness of these folks to step up and assume responsibility
    at the local level. It's been extraordinarily helpful in
    achieving the stability gains that we've made. We recognize
    that this is not a long-term solution, that we will have to
    have a way to transition these folks to some future employment,
    and that's what it's really about. It's about jobs and that's
    what they want.
        Some of these folks have been already and the plan is to
    continue to try to transition them into the Iraqi security
    forces, the army and the police. Many will not be able to do
    this, for a lot of reasons. So we're looking at other
    alternatives. Some of them are already under way. There are
    several trials that are involving a couple thousand of these
    people now to get them retrained through vocational schools,
    through other economic opportunities.
        The answer here in my opinion is as the economic activity
    levels increase in Iraq this is really the solution. General
    Petraeus and his commanders are certainly aware of this. They
    know that we have to have long-term solutions. Again, these are
    not all military. We have to have help from the development
    agencies and others.
        I'm encouraged by the beginnings of investment from outside
    private money into Iraq and the future of this country, and
    that's the real answer, giving them alternatives. So we know we
    have to transition them. We're working to try to effect those
    transitions as best we can.
        Senator McCaskill. But we have the same challenge in
    Afghanistan in terms of alternatives to poppy.
        Admiral Fallon. Of course.
        Senator McCaskill. I understand the tribal differences and
    I understand it's not quite as static as Sunni, Shiite, Kurd as
    in Iraq, that it is more complex in Afghanistan. But if what
    we're doing in terms of spending money in Afghanistan has not
    been successful--and 10 cents on the dollar is certainly not
    successful--it seems to me that we need to roll out the full
    employment plan in Afghanistan.
        Admiral Fallon. I can't vouch for 10 cents on the dollar,
    but I can tell you that there are certainly a lot of people
    that are intensely focused on trying to make Afghanistan a
    success. I would look at their security forces. We are actively
    and very positively, I believe, engaged in trying to make this
    force--not only allow it to grow, but to grow in a manner that
    they're really going to be capable of providing security.
    That's coming along.
        The real answer is in economic development. But this
    country is very different than Iraq. For starters is the
    literacy rate. It's in the 30 to 35 percent range. That means
    you have limited options when you start talking about economic
    opportunities. You have to start somewhere. The good news is
    there are millions of youngsters that are in schools now and
    that's a really positive sign.
        So there's no easy answer to this, this business in
    Afghanistan. At the end of the day it's a very different
    culture than ours, too, and they're going to have to come up
    with Afghan solutions to many of these challenges. We can
    advise them, we can be there to help provide security and
    stability, which we certainly are, and to encourage them. I get
    citizens around the country sending me, almost on a weekly
    basis, ideas about things that we might be able to try in
    Afghanistan, and I'm anxious to listen to them. Some of them I
    think are actually pretty worthwhile. We do what we can to give
    these over to our development folks and say, what can you do to
    help us?
        We're working the problem. We have to have stability and
    security as an underpinning, but we know that the real future
    in Afghanistan is economic development and we're committed to
    try to help.
        Senator McCaskill. I worry that the economic development is
    going to take so long, and that sometimes what we try to do
    militarily is so expensive. Believe me, it's weird that I would
    be sitting here pitching for lining up folks and putting them
    on the payroll paid for by the American taxpayer. But if in
    fact the problem with the poppy and the problem with all the
    tribal fighting in Afghanistan and the resurgence of a lot of
    the terrorist elements in that country and the Taliban is
    because of dire poverty--it took years for us to figure out how
    to begin to stabilize in Iraq, and the formula seems to be not
    only a good strategy, obviously, by the military, but the fact
    that we are now signing up people and giving them money every
    month. It seems to me that it's time for an analysis as to how
    the employment plan may cost out in terms of a cost-benefit
    analysis in terms of the money that we're spending.
        Clearly it doesn't appear that we're getting NATO to step
    up to do what they need to do to help us. If it's just a matter
    of us stretching even more thinly our boots on the ground in
    the Middle East, it's weird that I think that this might be a
    good idea, because if somebody would have told me I would be
    pitching this idea I'd say this is not what I would normally be
    doing.
        But I would certainly ask that you take a look at that in
    terms of just lining people up and paying them like we are the
    Sunnis in Iraq.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Do we have any idea how much it would cost us to pay
    farmers in Afghanistan--these are the poorest folks--not to
    grow poppy? Do we have any idea? I'm not talking about the drug
    lords and the places, the heroin labs and the precursor folks.
    I'm talking about just those farmers. Do we have any idea, to
    pay them 100 bucks a month, what it would cost us?
        Admiral Fallon. No, I don't, Senator. But it seems to me
    that just paying them money is not the answer. The answer is to
    give them a future, give them some viable----
        Chairman Levin. I agree. We give them seeds and give them
    something else to grow. But do we know how much it would cost?
        Admiral Fallon. No. We're working on it. What I'm sensing
    is these people have been there for a long time. They're hardy,
    they're tough. They've managed to eke out an existence and
    thrive to an extent. There are more people in Afghanistan than
    Iraq. But they've been in a box. They've been destabilized,
    they've been oppressed by the Taliban, other challenges.
        We're working on it. Educate them, give them an
    opportunity.
        Chairman Levin. Let me tell you what I sense after talking
    to a whole lot of folks about this issue. The people who are
    making the money in Afghanistan are not those farmers. They're
    making a little more than they'd make growing other crops. The
    people who are making the money are drug lords, drug czars,
    people running chemical labs. But we don't go after the drug
    lords.
        Now, why don't we go after the drug lords? As I understand
    it, the order that our forces are operating under is that they
    seize narcotics and destroy labs that they come across in the
    course of their normal operations, but they do not have an
    order to seek and seize and destroy those narcotics labs, which
    if you could do that you address the problem.
        Why do we not have an interdiction mission in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think it's not we don't have a
    mission. We're trying to focus on stability and security for
    the people of this country, and in the process of course, if
    they have an opportunity to engage the drug trade, they're
    going to do that. But I've seen an increase in the last several
    months of, as we become more effective in engaging in this
    country, of starting to get at these what I consider the more
    lucrative targets, not working at the farmer and his field end
    of the thing, but into the area where they get the refined
    drugs.
        One of the things I spend time doing as the regional
    commander is engaging the other countries, and particularly
    those to the north to try to come up with arrangements with
    them to be more effective in interdicting this supply. They
    have some of the same questions and challenges. This stuff's
    coming out of Afghanistan; why can't you guys be more effective
    in this?
        I think we'll work on it. It's not that our people are
    turning a blind eye to this. You know they're working on it.
    We'll just have to look and see if we can be more effective.
        One of the problems is the corruption issue. It's
    traditional here in this country and as we engage with
    President Karzai and the leadership we make every effort to try
    to influence the right decisions, to get rid of those people
    that are identified as corrupt and that are supporting this
    drug trade and get them replaced. I think there's no straight
    line, but in Helmand Province, the most problematic, certainly
    by most measures the most prolific drug producing province, the
    governor has just been replaced. President Karzai has put in a
    new man. He's been effective in two other provinces, and
    hopefully this is the kind of move that's going to provide the
    kind of backbone to knocking this stuff off.
        Again, my experience as I get around the country, in those
    provinces where the governor and the leadership have taken a
    strong stand against it then the results follow. So we'll
    continue to encourage this kind of activity.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Boucher told this committee in a
    recent hearing that the U.S., our Government, preferred to have
    Afghan forces seize the drug lords and the heroin labs and the
    precursor materials. Then he also acknowledged that Afghan
    forces have only had some success with small and medium
    traffickers and not a lot of success at the bigger levels.
        Then we had a meeting with the British chief of defense,
    Sir Jock Stirrup who asserted that the coalition should set a
    goal of having two to three high-value drug lords locked up by
    the end of the year.
        What about it? Why not adopt that? We basically know who
    they are. Some of them are pretty high up in the political
    support of the Government of Afghanistan. Why do we not just
    tell the Afghan Government basically, these drug funds are
    being used to support the Taliban, which are out after our men
    and women, they're killing us, they're killing your troops? Why
    not have an interdiction mission flat-out going after these
    laboratories?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I would be very pleased to take on
    the drug labs. I think this is where we're probably going to
    have much better payoff, again, than working down the food
    chain. I'm happy to take that on. I'll be happy to talk to our
    commanders and look at it.
        I also acknowledge that there's another reality in this
    country, and that is that it's very complex. Governance,
    effective governance, relies on the allegiance of many, many
    tribal entities, and I think finding someone who is completely
    lily-white pure in this area and still being effective in
    trying to get the allegiances required to move forward is a
    challenge. I think President Karzai is acutely aware of it.
    Again, they make decisions every day. I see more of them that
    are in the right direction than the wrong direction. So we'll
    keep at it.
        Chairman Levin. Will you get back to us on that issue when
    you talk to your commanders, when you take on that mission of
    going after the laboratories? Will you, after you have those
    discussions, let us know what the outcome is?
        Admiral Fallon. Sure.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        There's a terrorist target that was reportedly attacked in
    southern Somalia the other day. Do you know what the outcome of
    that strike was?
        Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'd prefer to do that in a closed
    session. We'll be happy to share what I have on it.
        Chairman Levin. That's fine.
        There's a program in Afghanistan which I briefly talked to
    you about yesterday called, in my office, called the National
    Solidarity Program. Assistant Secretary of State Boucher again
    endorsed a program, this program, the National Solidarity
    Program. It's within the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural
    Rehabilitation and Development. It provides block grants
    directly to locally elected community development councils.
    They identify the development projects in their own communities
    at very small cost in each community, and there's 16,000
    community development councils in Afghanistan. Apparently
    there's been like $400 million in payments to those community
    development councils, which have financed more than 30,000 sub-
    projects in these communities which have improved
    infrastructure, markets, services.
        Would you take a look at those and tell us from your
    perspective whether or not they've been a success? We think
    they've been a very important place where some progress at a
    local level, much freer of corruption, the progress has taken
    place. But I'd like your take on it after you've had a chance
    to review that.
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I believe the National Solidarity Program (NSP) to be a valuable
    initiative, and I support its intent. The Islamic Republic of
    Afghanistan established the NSP in 2003 to empower the grassroots of
    Afghan society. It does this by facilitating local governance via
    Community Development Councils (CDCs) in more than 20,000 villages
    across all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces. CDCs identify and prioritize
    community projects and take ownership over each program by contributing
    a minimum of 10 percent of cost for each project. The NSP has supported
    approximately 34,000 community projects with most oriented on improving
    infrastructure such as irrigation and roads. Other projects have
    improved access to electricity, safe drinking water, clinics, and
    better sanitation. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
    implemented the program, which has received approximately $410 million
    from an international consortium of donors. The World Bank is the
    largest financier. This has been sufficient to run the program, without
    direct support from U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

        Chairman Levin. The question has been raised about these
    two negotiating tracks which we're on, and this will be my
    final question. Do you know who are negotiating those two
    agreements with the Iraqis? Is the military involved in those
    negotiations?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir. Ambassador Crocker has the lead
    for the entire effort in Baghdad. Ambassador Loftus from the
    Department of State is specifically the SOFA negotiating agent.
    Of course we're involved in them. I've met Ambassador Crocker
    all the time. I met with Ambassador Loftus and had a good chat.
    I have somebody from my headquarters plugged into his staff. I
    understand he's either downrange in Iraq now or headed down
    there. So it seems to me that there's a very close relationship
    here between the interested parties.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Gates told us that there will be
    no security commitment made to Iraq in those agreements. Is
    that your understanding?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, I know we're not allotted any
    time in this, but if I can ask for 1 minute to fully address
    the question you asked on Predators and ISR.
        Chairman Levin. Absolutely.
        Admiral Olson.--because I'm uneasy that I left a sense that
    we're not being as aggressive as we can be and that we didn't
    put it in the President's budget, which we did. We are pressing
    ahead with the purchase----
        Chairman Levin. I'm sorry. I'm confused. You said that the
    money which you had not asked for, that you in fact did ask
    for; is that what you're----
        Admiral Olson. No, sir. There is $300 million on top of
    what we asked for in the President's budget, and I think that's
    where the confusion factor was. We did include in the
    President's budget a significant amount of money for purchase
    and lease of total capability. I meant to say that we are
    beholden to the Services for recruiting and providing people,
    bandwidth, all of that. We've also become dependent to a large
    degree on the global war on terror supplemental for funding the
    day-to-day costs of operating our Predators, on top of what's
    included in the President's budget as well, to continue the
    pace of operations and in fact grow it, as we already have in
    our budget. It will require a sustainment of that level of
    effort.
        But the $300 million specifically was after we submitted
    the President's budget we were asked specifically: If there was
    more available could you spend it? We did a further analysis
    and determined that there is some burden that we could take on
    from the services for an additional $300 million of MFP-11
    money.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. So it's not that you relied on a
    supplemental for that $300 million?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, we have ISR funding in the
    supplemental, we have ISR funding in our President's budget.
    This would be in addition to the supplemental.
        Chairman Levin. So there was no signal to you from the
    administration that you should not include that request to
    them?
        Admiral Olson. Sir, these are new items that was based on
    additional analysis after we submitted the supplemental.
        Chairman Levin. So the answer is there was no signal then
    from the administration?
        Admiral Olson. That's correct, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Again our thanks to both of you. It's been
    a long hearing, and we appreciate your work and your commitment
    to your missions; and to all the support that you get, we're
    grateful to them and to your families. We'll stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                               levels of violence
        1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, I am pleased and encouraged about
    the falling levels of violence across Iraq, and the prospects of a
    better future for the Iraqi people. However, I am concerned about other
    factors that may be contributing to the reduced number of attacks other
    than what can be attributable to the U.S. surge in forces last year. To
    what degree do you figure that the nation-wide ceasefire order from
    Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr has played in reducing violence
    throughout the country, and especially around Baghdad?
        Admiral Fallon. Muqtada Al-Sadr's 29 August 2007 ``freeze'' order,
    which he renewed for 6 months on 22 February 2008, has certainly
    contributed to reduced violence levels, particularly the intra-Shia
    violence in the southern provinces. However, it is important to note
    elements of the Jaysh al Mahdi, especially the Iranian-backed Special
    Groups, continue to conduct attacks against the coalition in violation
    of the ``freeze'' order. Sadr's ``freeze'' added to other factors--most
    notably the U.S. surge, the disruption of al Qaeda in Iraq, more
    effective Iraqi security forces, and the success of local Sunni
    security initiatives--to create a synergistic effect that has reduced
    violence levels in Baghdad and the surrounding areas. Thus, Sadr's
    ``freeze'' order has been one factor among many with contributed to
    lowering levels of violence.

                                  troop levels
        2. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, assuming the number of attacks
    remains manageable enough, and that increasing numbers and capabilities
    of the Iraqi security forces will allow the United States to continue
    the withdrawal of military forces after the summer ``pause'', what
    prospects do you give for long-term stability between Sunni and Shia
    factions within Iraq at the reduced troop levels?
        Admiral Fallon. We are optimistic, despite the uncertainty in Iraq,
    that the positive trends we have observed will continue in the next
    year and that the prospects for long-term stability between Sunni and
    Shia are excellent. The reduction in civil sectarian violence in Iraq
    during the past year has been significant, and has allowed Iraq's Sunni
    and Shia to focus on a shared adversary, foreign-inspired terrorist-
    extremists. The increasing, albeit slow progress on Iraq's political
    front demonstrates Sunni/Shia cooperation in a manner that fosters
    stability and non-violent resolution of political competition in Iraq.
    The growth of localized Sunni security institutions, particularly
    tribal security organizations, has encouraged Sunni cooperation and
    reconciliation with the Government of Iraq. By giving Sunnis a greater
    stake and greater control in the self-governance of their own
    communities, the Sunni security initiatives are creating greater long-
    term stability between Sunni and Shia factions in Iraq.

                                opium production
        3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Fallon, recent reports before this
    committee have highlighted the importance of addressing the opium
    production problem in Afghanistan as a prerequisite to coalition
    success. What is being done to compensate Afghani farmers for giving up
    their poppy crop growing, both financially and in terms of protecting
    them and their families from retribution by the Taliban insurgent
    forces, for cooperating with coalition objectives?
        Admiral Fallon. The State Department's Bureau for International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs serves as the lead implementing
    agency on narcotics issues in Afghanistan. Their partner for
    Alternative Development in Afghanistan is the United States Agency for
    International Development.
        The military role in this effort is clear; development activities
    can not occur where there is not sufficient security. The NATO led
    International Security Assistance Force has integrated counternarcotics
    into the broader security strategy and routinely incorporates
    development activities as follow-on to security operations.
        The challenges of implementing the Alternative Development program
    are daunting. Economic growth in Afghanistan is hampered by massive
    infrastructure deficits, a shortage of skilled human capital,
    insecurity, corruption, weak legal and regulatory regimes, and poor
    access to seaports, among other factors. Despite the significant
    progress made, given Afghanistan's incredibly low starting point, years
    of work remain in order to build a modern and regionally competitive
    Afghan economy.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                                      iran
        4. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Fallon, is the President of Iran's
    claim that, ``Iran now rivaled the United States in terms of influence
    in Iraq'' realistic?
        Admiral Fallon. Instead of attempting to quantify President
    Ahmadinejad's claim, I think the focus should be Iraq is a sovereign
    nation. As such, they have the right to diplomatically engage with
    their neighbors; including Iran. The reality is that some Iraqi
    politicians have characterized President Ahmadinejad's recent visit to
    be a positive step in developing good relations with a neighboring
    Muslim state.
        In the bigger picture, Iranian activity throughout the area of the
    Arabian Gulf is not helpful. Iranian support for terrorism and the
    export of sectarian violence beyond its borders is a destabilizing and
    troubling influence. Iran is emboldened in their recent behavior and
    actively seeks to play a more assertive role within Iraq, such as in
    their support for Shia extremists. As a direct result of the visit,
    Ambassador Crocker expressed hope that Iran would now deal in a more
    positive, constructive manner with Iraq's Government and people, and
    stop assisting groups that damage Iraq's stability and security. In
    addition, he also hopes Iran's visit would send a clear message to
    Iraq's Arab neighbors that they need to engage more with Iraq because
    they too have vested interests that may be in danger if they continue
    their current diplomatic inertia. The U.S. Mission in Iraq will
    continue pressing these key Arab neighbors to open embassies and send
    ambassadors to Baghdad.

              equipment needs--aircraft full motion video cameras
        5. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson, is there
    another Service organization besides Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    that could acquire and maintain the aircraft you require to fulfill
    Central Command (CENTCOM)'s operational requirement for aircraft with
    full motion video cameras?
        Admiral Fallon. All Service components and the Joint Improvised
    Explosive Device Defeat Organization are capable of, and are actively
    acquiring and fielding, manned and/or unmanned platforms for the
    purpose of intelligence collection using full motion video (FMV). As
    stated, in testimony by Admiral Olson, the immediate Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) shortfall, in regards to
    processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED); is manning and
    intelligence exploitation. It is critical that ISR systems be developed
    and fielded with consideration to the entire system, end-to-end, to
    include theater bandwidth and communications architecture integration.
        Admiral Olson. The Services have large airborne ISR FMV programs
    that can provide the detailed information needed by Special Operations
    Forces (SOF). However, Service platforms were designed for different
    target sets. SOF unique target sets require far more persistence and a
    different degree of stand-off than that needed by the target sets the
    Service common ISR platforms were designed for. Additionally, Service
    common ISR FMV programs are currently insufficient to cover the service
    common demand in the CENTCOM, leaving very little to cover any other
    Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) theater demands.
        Navy programs include P-3/EP-3 and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
    (BAMS). The P-3 fleet is aging and replacement does not begin until
    2012 for P-3 (P-8) and 2018 for EP-3. BAMS is still in the research and
    development (R&D) stage.
        Army programs include the Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP)
    Unmanned Aircraft System (Warrior) and Guardrail. The Guardrail is also
    aging. The Warrior is FMV capable but has a limited ability to
    disseminate its data and is not yet available in sufficient numbers.
        Air Force programs include Predator, Global Hawk, U-2, RC-135,
    Senior Scout, Scathe View, and E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
    Radar System (JSTARS). Only the Predator and Scathe View are FMV
    capable; the current planned Predator and Scathe View inventory is
    insufficient. The Air Force is reportedly making plans to substantially
    increase the size of the Predator fleet. SOCOM encourages this
    development as it brings needed capability to the current Operation
    Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) fight and to the
    post OIF/OEF environment.
        Airborne FMV ISR must be thought of as a whole system (pilots,
    sensor operators, exploiters, architecture, etc.). Airborne FMV ISR
    sensors collect data; PED and then converts that data into
    intelligence. Service common PED is designed to convert collected data
    into intelligence to support conventional force needs. Operational
    experience has demonstrated that Service common PED does not meet SOF
    needs.
        Based on lessons-learned, SOF has developed its own PED capability/
    capacity with SOF unique tactics, techniques, and procedures.
    Experience consistently shows that SOF ISR, or Service ISR supporting
    SOF combined with SOF unique PED, leads to dramatic increases in
    actionable intelligence. Conversely, experience shows that lack of SOF
    unique PED support makes ISR dramatically less effective. Current SOF
    unique PED capacity is insufficient.
        Distributed Command Ground Systems (DCGS) is the current
    exploitation program for the Services; in addition, some of the
    Services heavily leverage combat support agency (CSA) exploitation
    capabilities. There are substantial differences between the DCGS
    programs. The Air Force DCGS combines manpower, systems, equipment, and
    facilities to provide a PED capability and capacity for ISR assets. The
    other Service DCGS programs are mostly equipment-centric. The current
    Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) led DCGS efforts are
    focusing on improving interoperability and data sharing among the DCGS
    programs. Discussions about improvements in interoperability have not
    been accompanied by discussions on growing PED capacity. Similarly,
    discussions on Service common ISR growth are not being matched by
    discussions on Service common PED growth. It is important to note that
    SOF unique PED does rely heavily on intelligence generated by Service
    common ISR and PED. Furthermore, SOF units in the field often receive
    time-sensitive direct support from conventional ISR and PED. SOCOM
    needs conventional force ISR and PED support to remain in place; they
    are a critical enabling capability for SOF. SOCOM encourages the
    Services and the combat support agencies to increase their Service
    common PED capacities and align them with the projected Service common
    ISR growth.
        Due to its unique target set and insufficient Service common ISR
    and PED, SOCOM has grown and is growing its SOF unique ISR and PED
    capability and capacity to meet SOF needs. The global war on terror
    requires far more ISR and PED than was ever envisioned. Based on sheer
    volume alone, SOCOM will not be able to grow all the SOF unique ISR and
    PED necessary to meet the SOF demand. SOCOM will grow its fair share
    and make SOF-peculiar modifications to Service capabilities as
    required, but it continues to look to the Services and CSAs to expand
    their ISR and PED support for the global war on terror.

        6. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson, are you
    looking into this?
        Admiral Fallon. CENTCOM through the Joint Force Management and
    Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) processes has consistently
    documented operational needs (including theater SOF requirements) for
    Aircraft (both manned and unmanned platforms) with FMV capability.
    Currently there are eight open JUONs that have FMV as a critical
    component. The acquisition of additional platforms with FMV
    capabilities along with requisite PED capabilities will greatly enhance
    the warfighter's ability to track and target enemy activities. The
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is currently investigating
    FMV solutions, as persistent ISR is CENTCOM's number two issue on the
    Integrated Priority Listing (IPL).
        Admiral Olson. The Services have large airborne ISR FMV programs
    that can provide the detailed information needed by SOF. However,
    Service platforms were designed for different target sets. SOF unique
    target sets require far more persistence and a different degree of
    stand-off than that needed by the target sets the Service common ISR
    platforms were designed for. Additionally, Service common ISR FMV
    programs are currently insufficient to cover the Service common demand
    in the CENTCOM, leaving very little to cover any other Geographic
    Combatant Command (GCC) theater demands.
        Navy programs include P-3/EP-3 and BAMS. The P-3 fleet is aging and
    replacement does not begin until 2012 for P-3 (P-8) and 2018 for EP-3.
    BAMS is still in the R&D stage.
        Army programs include the ERMP Unmanned Aircraft System (Warrior)
    and Guardrail. The Guardrail is also aging. The Warrior is FMV capable
    but has a limited ability to disseminate its data and is not yet
    available in sufficient numbers.
        Air Force programs include Predator, Global Hawk, U-2, RC-135,
    Senior Scout, Scathe View, and E-8 JSTARS. Only the Predator and Scathe
    View are FMV capable; the current planned Predator and Scathe View
    inventory is insufficient. The Air Force is reportedly making plans to
    substantially increase the size of the Predator fleet. SOCOM encourages
    this development as it brings needed capability to the current OIF/OEF
    fight and to the post OIF/OEF environment.
        Airborne FMV ISR must be thought of as a whole system (pilots,
    sensor operators, exploiters, architecture, etc.). Airborne FMV ISR
    sensors collect data; PED and then converts that data into
    intelligence. Service common PED is designed to convert collected data
    into intelligence to support conventional force needs. Operational
    experience has demonstrated that Service common PED does not meet SOF
    needs. Based on lessons-learned, SOF has developed its own PED
    capability/capacity with SOF unique tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. Experience consistently shows that SOF ISR, or Service ISR
    supporting SOF combined with SOF unique PED, leads to dramatic
    increases in actionable intelligence. Conversely, experience shows that
    lack of SOF unique PED support makes ISR dramatically less effective.
    Current SOF unique PED capacity is insufficient.
        DCGS is the current exploitation program for the Services; in
    addition, some of the Services heavily leverage CSA exploitation
    capabilities. There are substantial differences between the DCGS
    programs. The Air Force DCGS combines manpower, systems, equipment, and
    facilities to provide a PED capability and capacity for ISR assets. The
    other Service DCGS programs are mostly equipment-centric. The current
    USDI led DCGS efforts are focusing on improving interoperability and
    data sharing among the DCGS programs. Discussions about improvements in
    interoperability have not been accompanied by discussions on growing
    PED capacity. Similarly, discussions on Service common ISR growth are
    not being matched by discussions on Service common PED growth. It is
    important to note that SOF unique PED does rely heavily on intelligence
    generated by Service common ISR and PED. Furthermore, SOF units in the
    field often receive time-sensitive direct support from conventional ISR
    and PED. SOCOM needs conventional force ISR and PED support to remain
    in place; they are a critical enabling capability for SOF. SOCOM
    encourages the Services and the combat support agencies to increase
    their Service common PED capacities and align them with the projected
    Service common ISR growth.
        Due to its unique target set and insufficient Service common ISR
    and PED, SOCOM has grown and is growing its SOF unique ISR and PED
    capability and capacity to meet SOF needs. The global war on terror
    requires far more ISR and PED than was ever envisioned. Based on sheer
    volume alone, SOCOM will not be able to grow all the SOF unique ISR and
    PED necessary to meet the SOF demand. SOCOM will grow its fair share
    and make SOF-peculiar modifications to Service capabilities as
    required, but it continues to look to the Services and CSAs to expand
    their ISR and PED support for the global war on terror.

        7. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson, do you
    believe that Congress should fund this requirement on the supplemental?
        Admiral Fallon. Yes. The acquisition of full motion video has been
    validated as an urgent need at various levels throughout the Department
    of Defense (DOD). Currently there are eight open Joint Urgent
    Operational Needs that involve full motion video capability. The
    acquisition of additional full motion video capabilities will greatly
    enhance the warfighter's ability to track enemy activities, resulting
    in successful operations while significantly reducing American and
    Coalition loss of life.
        Admiral Olson. The Services have large airborne ISR FMV programs
    that can provide the detailed information needed by SOF. However,
    Service platforms were designed for different target sets. SOF unique
    target sets require far more persistence and a different degree of
    stand-off than that needed by the target sets the Service common ISR
    platforms were designed for. Additionally, Service common ISR FMV
    programs are currently insufficient to cover the Service common demand
    in the CENTCOM, leaving very little to cover any other Geographic
    Combatant Command theater demands.
        Navy programs include P-3/EP-3 and BAMS. The P-3 fleet is aging and
    replacement does not begin until 2012 for P-3 (P-8) and 2018 for EP-3.
    BAMS is still in the R&D stage.
        Army programs include the ERMP Unmanned Aircraft System (Warrior)
    and Guardrail. The Guardrail is also aging. The Warrior is FMV capable
    but has a limited ability to disseminate its data and is not yet
    available in sufficient numbers.
        Air Force programs include Predator, Global Hawk, U-2, RC-135,
    Senior Scout, Scathe View, and E-8 JSTARS. Only the Predator and Scathe
    View are FMV capable; the current planned Predator and Scathe View
    inventory is insufficient. The Air Force is reportedly making plans to
    substantially increase the size of the Predator fleet. SOCOM encourages
    this development as it brings needed capability to the current OIF/OEF
    fight and to the post OIF/OEF environment.
        Airborne FMV ISR must be thought of as a whole system (pilots,
    sensor operators, exploiters, architecture, etc.). Airborne FMV ISR
    sensors collect data; PED and then converts that data into
    intelligence. Service common PED is designed to convert collected data
    into intelligence to support conventional force needs.
        Operational experience has demonstrated that Service common PED
    does not meet SOF needs. Based on lessons-learned, SOF has developed
    its own PED capability/capacity with SOF unique tactics, techniques,
    and procedures. Experience consistently shows that SOF ISR, or Service
    ISR supporting SOF combined with SOF unique PED, leads to dramatic
    increases in actionable intelligence. Conversely, experience shows that
    lack of SOF unique PED support makes ISR dramatically less effective.
    Current SOF unique PED capacity is insufficient.
        DCGS is the current exploitation program for the Services; in
    addition, some of the Services heavily leverage CSA exploitation
    capabilities. There are substantial differences between the DCGS
    programs. The Air Force DCGS combines manpower, systems, equipment, and
    facilities to provide a PED capability and capacity for ISR assets. The
    other Service DCGS programs are mostly equipment-centric. The current
    USDI led DCGS efforts are focusing on improving interoperability and
    data sharing among the DCGS programs. Discussions about improvements in
    interoperability have not been accompanied by discussions on growing
    PED capacity. Similarly, discussions on Service common ISR growth are
    not being matched by discussions on Service common PED growth. It is
    important to note that SOF unique PED does rely heavily on intelligence
    generated by Service common ISR and PED. Furthermore, SOF units in the
    field often receive time-sensitive direct support from conventional ISR
    and PED. SOCOM needs conventional force ISR and PED support to remain
    in place; they are a critical enabling capability for SOF. SOCOM
    encourages the Services and the combat support agencies to increase
    their Service common PED capacities and align them with the projected
    Service common ISR growth.
        Due to its unique target set and insufficient Service common ISR
    and PED, SOCOM has grown and is growing its SOF unique ISR and PED
    capability and capacity to meet SOF needs. The global war on terror
    requires far more ISR and PED than was ever envisioned. Based on sheer
    volume alone, SOCOM will not be able to grow all the SOF unique ISR and
    PED necessary to meet the SOF demand. SOCOM will grow its fair share
    and make SOF-peculiar modifications to Service capabilities as
    required, but it continues to look to the Services and CSAs to expand
    their ISR and PED support for the global war on terror.

                           pakistani training mission
        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Olson, do you have plans for SOCOM
    to provide trainers to the Pakistanis in order to better develop their
    capabilities for irregular warfare operations in the tribal regions?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Olson, are the Pakistanis willing
    to accept the level of help that is really needed to meet the
    challenges they face?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Olson, are the local recruits that
    Pakistan plans to use for this new mission likely to be reliable?
        Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]

                    assessment of indirect military actions
        11. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of
    our Government's performance in meeting the challenge of those indirect
    military actions required to defeat the terrorist threat throughout
    your area of responsibility?
        Admiral Olson. At this juncture, we have not yet sufficiently met
    the challenge of effectively and efficiently implementing the indirect
    military actions required to defeat the global terrorist threat.
        This correlates with our analysis that highlights the need for an
    increased emphasis on the indirect approach at this time. Within this
    indirect approach, DOD should increase endeavors to enable our Partner
    Nations (PNs) to help us further reshape the environment around our
    enemies to reduce their capacity and popular support. In addition, DOD
    needs to bolster its participation and contributions to the whole-of-
    government effort, specifically with regard to a reinvigorated
    strategic communication campaign.
        From a strategic perspective, we need to prevent the emergence of
    new violent extremist threats, particularly those that pose strategic
    threats to the U.S. and our PNs. To date, we have demonstrated success
    in this endeavor. Yet, existing extremist groups continue gaining
    support and now seek to align themselves with better known ``brand
    names,'' in an effort to increase their legitimacy among their current
    and likely constituency. The creation of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al
    Qaeda in Magreb (AQIM) are prime examples of this trend. Increasing our
    ability to support the development of capable governments in countries
    with at risk populations, and the development of a PN-focused network
    capable of delivering culturally effective messages that deter the
    emergence of new generations of extremist organizations, is vital to
    long term success in this venue.
        Meanwhile we have had mixed results in isolating threats to the
    regional or local levels, as many VEOs remain as strategic threats. The
    outcome of the global effort to deprive terrorist organizations of the
    assets and resources needed to wage war over the long-term has been
    limited. Unfortunately, DOD support to United States Government and PN
    actions has neither denied a sufficient number of extremists their
    access to funds nor their freedom to acquire resources and to recruit
    adherents and operatives in the global market place.
        On the other hand, DOD has been effective in defeating threats once
    they are isolated, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. VEOs, such as
    al Qaeda, have felt the effects of DOD action manifested in significant
    losses and in precipitating their retreat to sanctuaries as opposed to
    openly operating among the populace. Yet as fast as we eliminate or
    capture enemy leaders and fighters, sufficient numbers of recruits and
    support flow into these organizations. This reality demonstrates the
    limitation of the direct approach--eliminating enemy combat elements
    which can be replaced is not enough to achieve long term victory. We
    must employ additional indirect actions to nullify the extremist
    networks' strategic capability and capacity to generate and project
    power.
        Likewise, we must prevent the reconstitution of VEOs, such as the
    Taliban in Afghanistan. Success depends on the establishment of a PN
    network that refuses to support extremist organizations or to permit
    their populations to support terrorism. Many nations continue to
    develop counterterrorism (CT) capabilities. DOD, however, has been
    limited in its progress to enable PN CT programs.
        While DOD deems enabling PNs to combat VEOs as the decisive
    military effort in the ongoing struggle, a comprehensive and integrated
    strategic communication campaign is also critical to countering the
    appeal of the extremist ideology. DOD must continue working with the
    U.S. Government lead, the Department of State, to help develop and
    implement this program. Still, this effort is complicated by the
    likelihood that almost any publically revealed strategic communication
    effort linked to DOD will lack legitimacy in the eyes of many targeted
    populations. As such, DOD and the U.S. Government must also work with
    PNs to spread the anti-VEO message by amplifying moderate voices that
    speak out against terrorism.
        Finally, to sufficiently meet the global challenge of implementing
    those indirect military actions required to defeat the terrorist
    threat, DOD will most likely need to realign resources. Operations
    designed to remove our enemies' freedom to act and move within
    vulnerable populations may require a more persistent application over
    several years. Due to the less tangible nature, the longer approach and
    the increased challenge of measuring success in these types of
    operations, patience will be required to reap success.

        [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                     POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill,
    Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Thune,
    Martinez, and Wicker.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
    staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
    Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
    member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
    professional staff member; Sean J. Stackley, professional staff
    member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard
    F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
    Cronin, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka;
    Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
    Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
    assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
    Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
    assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions;
    Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey
    Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
    Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez;
    and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        This morning, we welcome Secretary Wynne and General
    Moseley back to the committee. As we do on these occasions, let
    us ask both of you to extend, on behalf of the committee, our
    gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force, and their
    families, for the many sacrifices that they have made, and will
    continue to make on behalf of our Nation. Thanks to both of you
    for your careers of leadership and service.
        A number of critical issues confront the Air Force.
    Although not at the same operating tempo as the Army and the
    Marine Corps, the Air Force faces the difficult challenge in
    balancing its modernization needs against the costs of
    supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We
    understand that you, General Moseley, have said that you
    require something like an additional $20 billion per year,
    beyond the budget request, to maintain and modernize the Air
    Force. We also know that each of the other Services are facing
    their own modernization and readiness challenges. So, we'd like
    to hear from both of you this morning about the risks that
    will, in your opinion, face future Secretaries and Chiefs of
    Staff if additional resources are not provided, but also
    whether you requested additional funds from the administration
    when discussing your budget with them.
        We know that the Air Force is providing forces to the
    Central Command (CENTCOM) war efforts in a number of
    traditional roles, but it is also providing airmen in support
    of land-component tasks and the so-called in-lieu-of (ILO)
    missions. According to the witnesses' prepared statements,
    there are more than 6,200 airmen currently performing that
    mission in the theater now. I think we should hear from the
    witnesses about what systems are in place to cushion the impact
    of these ILOs being where they're at on the organizations who
    are giving up these airmen for those ILO deployments.
        On the acquisition front, one of the challenges facing the
    Air Force is in space systems. All of the Air Force space
    satellite systems are in the process of modernization and
    replacement, and all have seen substantial cost growth and
    schedule delays. In many instances the initial cost and
    schedule predictions were unrealistic, and in others the
    technical risk was greater than thought or not well understood,
    and others suffered from poor management or execution. Some of
    these programs are showing improvement, but most are not out of
    the woods yet. As a result, space program costs have increased
    substantially overall.
        Another challenge facing the Department is the potential
    closure of several production lines and what effects those
    closings might have on meeting warfighting requirements. The
    production program that has had the most prominent discussion
    of the past several years is that of the C-17. Two years ago,
    Congress added 10 C-17 aircraft to the fiscal year 2007
    supplemental request. Then, last year, the Air Force budget for
    fiscal year 2008 did not include any funding to keep the C-17
    production line open. Congress authorized procurement of eight
    additional C-17s in fiscal year 2008, but no funds have yet
    been appropriated for those aircraft.
        General Moseley has been quoted as saying that he would
    like to retire C-5A aircraft and buy more C-17 aircraft. In
    fact, you've requested 15 more C-17s on your unfunded priority
    list, at a cost of approximately $3.9 billion.
        At one point, the Air Force had been discussing a so-called
    30-30 option, wherein 30 C-5As would be replaced by 30 new C-
    17s. The analysis supporting the Reliability Enhancement and
    Re-engining Program (RERP) certification of the Under Secretary
    of Defense reviewed that very option, but rejected it because
    it would not meet requirements.
        So we should hear from you this morning, General Moseley,
    about whether your unfunded priority list for buying more C-17s
    is part of a plan to retire C-5As or whether they would be
    added to the airlift force, and whether you made your case for
    the C-17s to the Department of Defense (DOD) for inclusion in
    the fiscal year 2009 budget request.
        On the C-5 modernization program, the Air Force's RERP has
    recently been granted a waiver under the Nunn-McCurdy process.
    It was invoked when that effort ran into cost problems. The
    program has now been scaled back to a total program of
    performing that re-engining on the 49 C-5Bs and 2 C-5C aircraft
    in the fleet, and dropping the C-5A aircraft from the program.
    Does dropping the C-5As from that program result in having
    insufficient strategic airlift capability?
        So, in summary, we need to hear about the Air Force's plans
    for airlift modernization and sustainment.
        Another program facing production shutdown is the F-22. The
    fiscal year 2009 budget for F-22 includes neither funds for
    advanced procurement of additional aircraft in 2010, nor money
    to pay for line shutdown charges. We think the Air Force's view
    is clear on this. General Moseley's unfunded priority list for
    fiscal year 2009 includes almost $500 million for advanced
    procurement for 24 aircraft that would be produced in a later
    fiscal year. However, others within the DOD hold the view that
    the currently approved program of 183 F-22 aircraft is enough
    to meet the needs of the warfighters. So, the committee needs
    to hear more about those differing views this morning.
        On the tanker issue, the Air Force has not provided, yet,
    any details describing the basis under which the winner of the
    competition was selected. We appreciate that the Air Force
    leadership took special measures to ensure transparency with
    Congress in the tanker acquisition process leading up to the
    selection of the winning contractor team. I believe that the
    Air Force is following appropriate procedures in waiting to
    provide details of the decision to Congress until the Air Force
    has briefed the participating contractors, and we would welcome
    any comments or clarification, as appropriate, this morning.
        Underlying all of these major acquisition concerns is an
    acquisition management issue. Secretary Wynne, when you came
    into this job, you recognized that you would have to take
    significant steps to build up the acquisition workforce and to
    restore confidence in the Air Force acquisition system after
    the abuses and poor decisions, that were previously documented,
    on the tanker lease program. We talked last year about that
    effort. But, again this year, we'd like to hear from you of any
    progress on that front.
        In the operational arena, the Air Force has been challenged
    to review the procedures under which it manages and protects
    access to nuclear weapons. We all know about the incident of
    the B-52 carrying nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base
    (AFB) to Barksdale AFB, when standard nuclear weapons handling
    procedures were violated. It would be useful to hear what the
    Air Force has done, both in making corrective actions and in
    holding accountable those responsible for the failures involved
    in that incident.
        So, we look forward to hearing your testimony this morning
    on these and other issues that face the Air Force. Again, we're
    grateful for your service and for your presence here this
    morning.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, it's interesting, the Air Force celebrated
    its 60th birthday in September, and I judge that you and I have
    sat here for 30 years, half the life of the Air Force, working
    on these budgets. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Well, we don't look that old. The Air Force
    sure looks that old, but we don't look that old. [Laughter.]
        Senator Warner. This budget poses a challenge. The chairman
    pointed that out. But, I certainly want to recognize the
    tremendous contribution that the men and women in uniform, and
    your large civilian component, are performing on behalf of this
    Nation all over the world. You should take great pride in it.
        I checked, the other day. You've been in the CENTCOM area
    for 17 years taking an active role from the first Gulf war to
    enforcement of Iraq no-fly zones all during that interregnum
    period with the Navy, and now Operations Enduring Freedom and
    Iraqi Freedom. Those deployments, in addition to operations in
    Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere throughout the world in support
    of humanitarian efforts, have made the maximum use of the Air
    Force air expeditionary concept. I don't think there's a
    Senator around this table that hasn't ridden in the aircraft
    operated by the Air Force, particularly the old C-130s, the Air
    Guard, a magnificent part of your organization. All of us
    remember the flights, every hour on the hour, into Bosnia and
    Sarajevo, back in that stressful period of time. In our visits
    to Iraq and Afghanistan, it's usually the old workhorse, the C-
    130, that takes us around.
        It's interesting, this morning I was reading, with great
    interest, the acceleration of China's budget. I stopped to
    think; the role of the Air Force in balancing the interests of
    the United States in China and that region is really critical.
        You have a few problems in here, and the chairman touched
    on them, but I'd like to add a few of my own views.
        We're back again with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    Program, and we simply have the funding for the single engine.
    This committee has taken the lead, I think I have been in the
    forefront of that, to provide for the competition and the
    reliability, which history points out is essential to a program
    of this magnitude, and particularly where we have, now, a
    number of foreign partners in it, and that could even grow.
        Consequently, I think we have an obligation to this
    contract and the foreign participation to make sure we have
    that two-engine. I don't think there's any contract that I can
    think of in the history that I've been affiliated with the
    Pentagon, which is quite a few years, with that large a
    participation by other nations in buying in and sharing in that
    program.
        So, that's a challenge that the committee will have, and I
    feel pretty confident the committee can work that out, as it
    has in years past.
        Now, the chairman very carefully pointed out about the
    conflicting messages with your C-17s and the C-5s and he went
    all through the C-17 production line. I've been on this
    committee with all of us working it out. But, the plain fact of
    the matter is, the C-17 is one of the finest aircraft that
    we've ever produced, and we have to continue, somehow, to make
    this aircraft available.
        Similarly, with the F-22, this conflict between ``it's not
    in the budget, but there's no shutdown,'' leaves us up just to
    work with you to figure out how we're going to go through that.
        I'm going to read this carefully: ``Continuing on the theme
    of the budget being incomplete, the Air Force has submitted an
    unfunded priorities list of items that did not make it into the
    final budget request, that totals $18.7 million.'' Despite the
    fact the Air Force budget has grown by nearly 35 percent in
    constant dollars since 2001, the Air Force's unfunded list this
    year is 4 times the size of the Navy list, 5 times as large as
    the Army, and 10 times the Marine Corps.
        I guess if you don't ask, you don't get, but we're going to
    have to work our way through that in an equitable manner as it
    relates to the other components, that is, the Army, the Navy,
    and the Marine Corps.
        So, we will carefully follow your testimony today. The
    chairman mentioned our concern about the nuclear weapons
    handling incident.
        As we increase the end strength of the Army and the Marine
    Corps, how do you intend to adjust your end strength?
        The new cyber command is of great interest to me, and, I'm
    sure, others.
        The interesting thing that you told me, Mr. Secretary, is
    about the use of alternative fuels to help alleviate the energy
    crisis. I hope you have an opportunity to discuss that.
        So, we're looking at this budget like the old song, ``We're
    coming in on a wing and a prayer,'' and it's going to take a
    lot of praying to work these things out for your folks.
        I also want to add my thoughts about this tanker contract.
    If you'll recall, there's a reprogramming action that worked
    its way through Congress, and the two committees in the House
    approved it. The Appropriations Committee in the Senate
    approved it, and then myself and others, I was chairman at that
    time on this committee, we felt that that contract wasn't
    correct. The rest is history. We've lost a lot of time. I join
    the chairman in saying that we will work in reviewing with you
    how you performed the steps under the law to reach your
    conclusion, but I want you to know, I feel very strongly that
    Congress should not get into the business of trying to rewrite
    a contract, particularly one of this magnitude and complexity,
    as it might suit other members. So, I intend to support the
    contract; nevertheless, we'll look at it carefully. But, I'm
    confident, once we've finished that exam, we can go forward
    with this contract.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Wynne.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

        Secretary Wynne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
    members of this committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
    testify on behalf of America's Air Force.
        Thank you, as well, for your support on our improved
    readiness, via retirement and recapitalization. We're working
    hard to see this through. Today, we urge you to quickly pass
    the pending supplemental, as it will help.
        Across the total force of Active, Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian, we are America's strategic shield in air, space, and
    cyberspace. We are contributing to today's fight with
    increasing ordnance drops, and we stand watch at the missile
    fields; we stand ready in the nuclear field; and we are an
    effective air superiority and strike force to both deter and
    dissuade any opponent who may consider our forces to be
    stretched in the global war on terror.
        We're gratified to hear that role reaffirmed by the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a deliberate message
    to those who might seek to dissuade or deter us from our own
    options in the future. This is why we seek to move forward, and
    not backward, into fifth-generation fighters, into new
    expeditionary tankers, and into new long-range strike assets. I
    can report to you that we did complete the award for the new
    KC-45 air refueling tanker. This tanker decision is a major
    step in the Air Force's critical recapitalization and
    modernization effort. It is why we seek to modernize space
    assets, as the executive agent for space, and not see further
    fragmentation of the management of this now vulnerable area. It
    is why we have established the cyberspace command and see this
    as a warfighting domain in which we need to dominate to remain
    a net-centric force for the future.
        Clearly, beyond the global war on terror, we must not lose
    America's asymmetric advantage in strategic forces. Your Air
    Force has been in the fight for 17 years, as you acknowledge,
    and yet has, over the same 17 years, seen underfunded
    modernization. We thank you for initiatives to restore fleet
    management to the United States Air Force, a responsibility we
    don't take lightly. When General Moseley and I came to our
    posts, we set about a strategy to restructure our Air Force, to
    truly develop a lean and efficient Air Force in order to
    husband the resources for investment. We worry about the
    industrial base and the need to look after any open line. I am
    pleased to report to you that the Department and the Air Force
    have indicated a desire to essentially not close the F-22 line,
    and to develop a long-range threat asset. It is to these that
    we would like to apply the saved resources over the near term
    while the F-35 proves itself through rigorous tests and is
    effectively capped on production. We ask that you agree with an
    approach for the F-22 aircraft, while we work to restore our
    readiness with younger aircraft.
        The F-35 and the F-22 are complementary. The F-22 is
    bigger, faster, planned to fly higher, and can carry more air-
    to-air weapons internally. Also, with less than 20 penetrating
    bombers in our current fleet, it is time to develop an
    alternative, as well. We have talked about being underfunded,
    but, here, have worked to offer a balanced budget, prioritized
    to best defend America, and we will continue to do that over
    the Future Years Defense Program.
        The Air Force research laboratories are well engaged in
    technology development, expanding the opportunities for energy
    alternatives, while reducing our demand in our fleet and at our
    bases, also on unmanned flight, in propulsion, in material
    science, as well as in human effectiveness.
        As regards space, at Kirtland AFB, a branch of the Air
    Force research laboratory is creating inherently defensive
    space assets. In cyberspace, career development, including the
    Air Force Institute of Technology, and also warfighting schools
    are keys. Combat commanders and agencies partner with us in
    this increasingly contested domain.
        I have worked in space for almost two decades, and have
    worked in commercial and classified space as a supplier and a
    customer. We need consolidated leadership to maintain our
    current strategic advantage. Congress asked for a relook at
    responses to the Space Commission, and we should really
    consider what's in the report. The Air Force is undergoing
    back-to-basics, as well as back-to-blue, complementary efforts
    to restore a steady demand and a knowledge base to execute on
    that demand. I recommend we keep the executive agency exactly
    where it is, which is in the Air Force shop.
        I have engaged airmen in both theaters of operation, and
    they have asked about the continuation of our presence and the
    continuation of the ground-force tasking, referred to as ILO
    tasking. My answer is, they performed so well that our Army
    colleagues don't want to give them up. They do perform well,
    many winning Bronze and Silver Stars. Your Air Force is
    currently protecting the sovereignty of these fledgling
    nations, and, until their air forces can do that, I would not
    be surprised to see our Air Force requested to remain. This is
    why we are reexamining our force structure, though we have
    prioritized, right now, recapitalization in the President's
    budget.
        I again thank you for the privilege of leading the best Air
    Force in the world. Every day, our airmen earn the respect of
    our friends and enemies. We worry about their quality of life
    as we seek efficiencies and as we implement joint basing, but
    we never worry about the sense of mission they bring to the
    task.
        I will not have the privilege to represent them in this
    setting for the force posture again, and I hope I have
    reflected their pride in service, as I have felt, myself.
        I'm ready to take your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Wynne and
    General Moseley follows:]
     Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael W. Wynne and Gen. T. Michael
                                 Moseley, USAF
                             1.0 executive summary
        The United States Air Force provides the Nation with a powerful
    deterrent force in times of peace, and it sets the conditions for joint
    and coalition victory in times of war. For over 17 years, since
    Operation Desert Shield, the United States Air Force has been engaged
    in continuous combat operations. Our airmen have maintained constant
    watch, deployed continuously, engaged America's adversaries directly,
    responded to human crises around the world, and provided the Global
    Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power to secure our Nation.
    Global Vigilance
        The ability to gain and maintain awareness--to keep an unblinking
    eye on any entity--anywhere in the world; to provide warning and to
    determine intent, opportunity, capability, or vulnerability; then to
    fuse this information with data received from other Services or
    agencies and use and share relevant information with the Joint Force
    Commander.
    Global Reach
        The ability to project military capability responsively--with
    unrivaled velocity and precision--to any point on or above the earth,
    and provide mobility to rapidly supply, position, or reposition Joint
    Forces.
    Global Power
        The ability to hold at risk or strike any target anywhere in the
    world, assert national sovereignty, safeguard joint freedom of action,
    and achieve swift, decisive, precise effects.
        Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power constitute
    America's edge--America's asymmetric advantage that shapes the global
    security environment. Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power
    are vital to our National Security Strategy, as conveyed through the
    decision superiority they allow, the military options they provide, and
    the influence they command. However, in a world of increasing
    uncertainty, volatility, and accelerating technology, America's edge
    will become a fleeting advantage if we fail to maintain and hone it.
        The United States Air Force executes its missions globally. Its
    warfighting domains cover the entire planet, offering a unique
    perspective. Every day, America's airmen demonstrate a non-negotiable
    commitment to offer and deliver sovereign options for the United States
    in, through and from air, space, and cyberspace.
        Our Air Force strategic imperatives articulate why these sovereign
    options are necessary to maintain and strengthen our National security
    and global stability. The Air Force is redefining air, space, and cyber
    power through cross-domain dominance--our effort to integrate all of
    our capabilities to exploit the natural synergies across these
    warfighting domains.
        This statement articulates the major elements of our Air Force
    Posture--our strategy for fulfilling our role in defending the Nation
    and its interests; our contributions to winning the global war on
    terrorism; our most critical efforts and concerns; and our top priority
    programs. We will continue to pursue specific programs and initiatives
    to safeguard and strengthen America's military advantages and to
    address major concerns and risks.
        Three overarching Service priorities serve as the organizing
    principles for all of our efforts: Winning Today's Fight; Taking Care
    of Our People; and Preparing for Tomorrow's Challenges. The Air Force's
    top acquisition priorities specifically begin to address our critical
    recapitalization and modernization needs--the new Tanker (KC-X); the
    new Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter (CSAR-X); modern space systems
    to provide capabilities vital to our joint warfighters; the F-35A
    Lightning II; and a new Bomber we intend to field by 2018.
        We will continue our efforts to modernize and protect America's
    vital air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. We strongly recommend
    extending the existing C-130J production line. We are also concerned
    with preserving America's aerospace industrial base. Additionally, we
    seek relief from restrictions on the retirement of aging, worn-out
    aircraft which are increasingly unsafe, unreliable, and obsolete. The
    Air Force is highly engaged in national efforts to assure sustainable
    energy, and we will continue to push the performance envelope on fuel
    efficiency and renewable energy technologies. We are committed to the
    Joint Basing initiative and want to work through the transfer of total
    obligation authority and real property control without impacting
    command authorities, reducing installation service support, or
    negatively affecting quality of life. Finally, we will continue our
    practice of recruiting and retaining the world's highest quality
    airmen. We will build upon our successes in achieving Total Force
    Integration (TFI) of our regular, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen.
        America looks to its airmen to provide dominance that spans the
    air, space, and cyberspace warfighting domains. They need your support
    today to defend the Homeland and to prepare for tomorrow's threats and
    challenges. Full funding and support for America's airmen will ensure
    America's continued freedom of action; reassure our allies; strengthen
    our partnerships; reinforce our sovereign Homeland defenses; dissuade
    and deter adversaries; and set conditions for joint and coalition
    success across the entire spectrum of conflict and crisis.

              We guard the Nation--providing the Global Vigilance, Global
            Reach, and Global Power that underwrite the security and
            sovereignty of our Nation.
                            2.0 strategic imperative
              The mission of the United States Air Force is to deliver
            sovereign options for the defense of the United States of
            America and its global interests--to fly and fight in air,
            space, and cyberspace.

        Today the United States stands at a strategic crossroads. This
    junction is characterized by a global economy accompanied by a
    diffusion of technology, new and increasingly complex economic and
    international relationships, competition for resources and influence,
    and the changing conduct of warfare. From the early days of the 20th
    century, the United States has played a leading role in preserving and
    protecting international stability, particularly as the number of
    democratic nations grew. This leadership led in large part to the
    current world order and provided the backdrop against which countries
    like Japan, India, and China initiated their unprecedented economic
    growth. We cannot abdicate our position of political and military
    leadership without grave consequences.
    2.1 Challenges
        Today's confluence of global trends already foreshadows significant
    challenges to our organization, systems, concepts, and doctrine. We are
    at an historic turning point demanding an equally comprehensive
    redefinition of American air power. The future strategic environment
    will be shaped by the interaction of globalization, economic
    disparities, and competition for resources; diffusion of technology and
    information networks whose very nature allows unprecedented ability to
    harm and, potentially, paralyze advanced nations; and systemic
    upheavals impacting state and non-state actors and, thereby,
    international institutions and the world order. The following are
    salient features of this increasingly complex, dynamic, lethal, and
    uncertain environment:

             Violent extremism and ethnic strife--a global,
            generational, ideological struggle
             Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
            empowering technologies
             Predatory and unpredictable regional actors
             Increasing lethality and risk of intrusion by
            terrorist and criminal organizations
             Systemic instability in key regions (political,
            economic, social, ideological)
             Unprecedented velocity of technological change and
            military adaptation
             Availability of advanced weapons in a burgeoning
            global marketplace
             Exponential growth in volume, exchange, and access to
            information
             Surging globalization, interconnectivity, and
            competition for scarce resources
             Dislocating climate, environmental, and demographic
            trends

        The consequences of not being adequately prepared for a conflict
    should a military peer arise would be severe and potentially
    catastrophic. We must maintain our focus on deterring potential peer
    adversaries from using military threats to narrow our diplomatic
    options, or from embarking on militarily risky courses of action. The
    rapid development and proliferation of high-technology weapons,
    combined with innovative operational concepts, is likely to make these
    global and regional engagements particularly challenging, since power
    balances will be dynamic and the risks of miscalculation and
    misperception high. Therefore, maintaining deterrence will require a
    sophisticated, competitive strategy that assures we maintain required
    military capabilities for today and make sustainable, affordable
    investments for tomorrow.
        Even if we continue to successfully dissuade and deter major
    competitors, their advanced equipment is proliferating worldwide. We
    are bound to confront these weapons systems wherever America engages to
    promote and defend its interests. We must also vigilantly monitor
    adversary breakthroughs and maintain leading edge research and
    capabilities in fields such as cybernetics, nanotechnology,
    biotechnology, electromagnetism, robotics, energy conversion
    technology, and advanced propulsion. We cannot assume the next military
    revolution will originate in the West. Indeed, the hub of innovation in
    science and engineering education has shifted eastward. Therefore, we
    must anticipate innovative combinations of traditional and new
    concepts, doctrines, weapons systems, and disruptive technologies.

              Given this spectrum of threats, the United States must field
            an Air Force capable of assuring our allies, dissuading and
            deterring potential adversaries, and, if necessary, defeating
            those who choose to become our enemies.
    2.2 The Role of the U.S. Military
        It is always better to deter hostile intent or win without having
    to fight. Today, the U.S. military does this by shaping the
    international environment with the potent tools of assurance,
    dissuasion, and deterrence. The principal role of the U.S. military is
    to defend our Nation and our National interests. Rooted in overwhelming
    capabilities and plainly linked to the National will, two powerful
    tools we exercise in this role are our assurance to allies that they
    need not bow to violent threats and our deterrence of potential
    adversaries. Our armed services accomplish this role by providing a
    solid foundation of military strength to complement the tools of
    peaceful diplomacy. None of these tools alone can sustain our position
    of international political and economic influence. However, we must be
    prepared to provide our leaders with critical elements of U.S. military
    power to use in proper combination and in an integrated manner to
    address potential threats to our Nation and our interests.
    2.3 Sovereign Options
        In response to current and emerging threats, the Air Force has
    implemented a strategy based on providing policy makers with sovereign
    options for our defense, covering the spectrum of choices that air,
    space, and cyberspace capabilities offer for solving problems. We use
    this strategy for sovereign options to guide how we organize, train,
    and equip our forces. In peacetime, these options include such
    expedients as: supporting the containment of aggressive states or
    usurping elements of their sovereignty as a means short of war to
    compel positive behavior; signaling opponents of our commitment by
    moving forces into contested regions; and providing humanitarian aid--
    to both our allies and potentially hostile populations--to assure them
    of friendly U.S. intentions. In war, Air Force capabilities provide
    decisionmakers with a range of options, from supporting Joint and
    Coalition actions in conjunction with allied land and sea forces to
    direct strikes against enemy centers of gravity to accomplish strategic
    and tactical objectives. These options provide the country with
    credible and scalable counters to the full range of potential enemy
    actions and support our goals of assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence.
    These sovereign options are enabled by the asymmetric advantage the
    U.S. possesses in air and space technology and the way our preeminence
    in air, space, and cyberspace increases the power of all U.S. and
    coalition forces.
        Through aggressive development of technology and operational
    concepts, the U.S. enjoys leadership in space, and in recent decades
    has achieved the ability to gain air supremacy against enemy air forces
    and air defense systems. The history of warfare, however, shows such
    advantages to be fleeting and fragile. Air and space preeminence is the
    key to the ability to accurately strike targets within enemy states or
    enable friendly ground or maritime forces to rapidly dominate their
    respective domains. While U.S. air and space preeminence has
    transformed the way the U.S. fights, allowing joint and coalition
    forces unprecedented freedom of action in all domains, the Nation
    cannot rest on its laurels. Future preeminence is not guaranteed;
    instead, it must be planned, paid for, developed, and fielded.
        More than the ability to win wars, sovereign options increase the
    Nation's strategic flexibility in determining when, how, and where to
    engage an enemy. War is not a matter of convenience. When war is thrust
    upon us, we must have the strategic depth to shape the conditions of
    conflict. From 1991 to 2003, the use of no-fly zones allowed the U.S.
    to contain the aggressive actions of Saddam Hussein. When his
    aggressive acts drew us into open conflict, the determined use of air
    power as part of a joint force crushed Iraq's conventional armies. A
    similar fate met the forces of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. When the
    Taliban were removed from power in 2001 by a combination of air power
    working with Special Forces and indigenous Northern Alliance troops, we
    disrupted Osama bin Laden's plan to operate his global terrorist
    network from the relative sanctuary of the Afghan frontier. In the
    insurgencies that followed these operations, air, space, and cyberspace
    power continued to prevent insurgents from massing into guerrilla
    armies, thus diminishing their power and providing friendly forces time
    and territory to establish stability.
        The Air Force's ability to be simultaneously dominant in air,
    space, and cyberspace, has formed the foundation from which we provide
    sovereign options to policy makers. Our ability to operate across these
    domains and defeat our adversaries in each allows the Air Force the
    ability to multiply the power of Joint and Coalition forces or to act
    alone to achieve national objectives. Our Air Force combines
    capabilities in the domains of air, space, and cyberspace to deliver
    Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power to the Joint force.
    2.4 Cross-Domain Dominance
        No future war will be won without air, space, and cyberspace
    superiority. Accordingly, the Air Force must be better postured to
    contend with both today's and tomorrow's challenges. To promote and
    defend America's interests through Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and
    Global Power, the Air Force must attain cross-domain dominance.
        Airmen appreciate the interdependence of the air, space, and
    cyberspace domains--actions in one domain can lead to decisive effects
    in any and all domains. Cross-domain dominance is the ability to
    maintain freedom of action in and through the air, space, and
    cyberspace despite adversary actions. It permits rapid and simultaneous
    application of lethal and non-lethal capabilities in these three
    domains to attain strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in
    all warfighting domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.
        Through cross-domain dominance, the Air Force contributes to joint
    freedom of maneuver in all warfighting domains. This, in turn, allows
    the Joint Force Commander to achieve desired outcomes across the full
    range of military operations, from humanitarian relief to preventing
    war via dissuasion and deterrence to inflicting strategic paralysis on
    implacable opponents. Without the Air Force's ability to present this
    spectrum of capabilities to the Joint Team in peace, crisis, and war,
    U.S. national security would be at risk.
    2.5 Implementing the Strategy
        The Air Force currently provides joint and coalition forces with an
    air bridge to the rest of the world and dominance on the battlefield.
    This hard-won capability to dominate air and space will only persist in
    coming decades if carefully nurtured.
        The technology race continues. Today, opponents are studying our
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and are rapidly developing counters
    to aging U.S. air and space superiority technology. These adaptive
    competitors are translating lessons from recent conflicts into new
    warfighting concepts, capabilities, and doctrines specifically designed
    to counter U.S. strengths and exploit vulnerabilities. They are
    advancing in all domains. For example:

             ``Generation 4-plus'' fighter aircraft that challenge
            America's existing ``4th Generation'' inventory--and, thus, air
            superiority--with overwhelming numbers and advanced weaponry;
            sophisticated integration of electronic attack and advanced
            avionics; emerging low-observable technologies; and
            progressive, realistic, networked training.
             Increasingly lethal integrated air defense systems
            that threaten both our airmen and aircraft, and could negate
            weapons used to suppress or destroy these systems.
             Proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles with
            growing range, precision, mobility, and maneuverability that
            are capable of delivering both conventional and non-
            conventional warheads.
             Proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capable
            of conducting low observable, persistent, intrusive missions in
            both lethal and non-lethal modes.
             Resurgence of offensive counterspace capabilities,
            including anti-satellite weapons, jamming, and blinding.
             Increasing ability of even marginal actors to surveil
            the disposition of U.S. and allied assets through widely-
            accessible, commercially-available means.

        In the coming years our advantage will significantly diminish if we
    do not keep pace by fielding new 5th Generation fighters, modern
    bombers, and modern satellites in sufficient numbers to counter the
    development of advanced anti-air and anti-space technologies and the
    inevitable export of those capabilities to potentially hostile states
    and non-state actors. We must provide our airmen with the most
    exceptional tools for battle in order to sustain a durable and credible
    deterrent against our adversaries.
        Equally worrisome is the rapidly shrinking aerospace industrial
    base. Historically, America's strength and ability to capitalize on
    advances in air and space technologies hinged largely on its vibrant
    and diverse aerospace industry. This advantage has deteriorated over
    the last decade.
        Beyond advantages in technology and operational concepts, America's
    commitments abroad require an expeditionary Air Force that can engage
    forward in peacetime and fight forward in wartime. While long-range
    bombers and missiles are the ultimate guarantor of U.S. security and
    power, expeditionary presence reflects U.S. power and is the
    indispensable source of local and regional assurance, dissuasion,
    deterrence, and, ultimately, sovereign options. Engaging forward in
    times of peace and fighting forward in times of war are hallmarks of
    U.S. national security strategy. Therefore, the Air Force must have
    sufficient resources and capability to continue to maintain a
    sustainable, rotational base. We must retain sufficient manpower and
    force structure to project influence.
        The mechanism to accomplish this is the Air and Space Expeditionary
    Force (AEF) that provides Joint Force Commanders with a trained and
    ready air, space, and cyberspace force to execute their plans. U.S.
    influence flows from permanent and expeditionary basing and serves to
    assure allies of U.S. commitment while deterring our adversaries from
    threatening U.S. national interests. The Air Force works with combatant
    commanders and partner air forces to secure basing and counter
    potential anti-access strategies. We continue to develop new ways of
    projecting power without exposing vulnerabilities, and we design
    systems that facilitate reach-back, thus maximizing forward capability
    while minimizing forward footprint.
        The Air Force can provide Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and
    Global Power only so long as it possesses robust capabilities in such
    areas as air dominance; global strike; space superiority; intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); missile defense; special
    operations; air mobility, and cyberspace superiority. Today, electronic
    communications constitute and connect all joint and coalition
    capabilities. In an information age, this network allows us to find our
    opponents, process the information, route it to where it is needed, and
    guide our munitions to their targets. Cyberspace vastly increases our
    capabilities but also presents a potential vulnerability our
    adversaries could exploit. Our enemies also increasingly use and depend
    on cyberspace systems. Safeguarding our own capabilities while engaging
    and disrupting the use and purpose of our opponents' capabilities is
    thus increasingly critical to modern warfare.
        If the Air Force is to fulfill its crucial role, we must develop
    and maintain technological leads in the areas of air-superiority, anti-
    access penetration, and long-range reconnaissance and strike
    capabilities to hold at risk targets around the world. We must also
    field sufficient strike and full-spectrum mobility assets to assure
    dominance for the Joint Team. We must continue treating space as an
    operational domain by creating architectures and systems that allow us
    to provide the appropriate situational awareness and communications
    capability, giving strategic and tactical advantage to leadership at
    all levels. We must design and develop a force structure to operate in
    cyberspace to our benefit while holding adversaries at risk. While
    doing so, we will continue our series of cross-Service initiatives to
    enhance interoperability and avoid unnecessary duplication of
    acquisition, manning, and operations.
                             3.0 win today's fight
        We remain committed, first and foremost, to fighting and winning
    the long global war on terror, sustaining our current operations, and
    providing strategic defense of our Nation. We also continue to adapt
    our ability to deter adversary activities, detect enemy locations, and
    defeat them through direct or indirect actions when required--anywhere
    and at any time.
        America's airmen are key to joint success and have proven their
    capabilities applicable and adaptable across the entire spectrum of
    conflict. They are the most battle-tested force in our history. Today's
    global war on terror missions are only the latest in a succession of
    over 17 years of continuous combat and expeditionary operations,
    beginning with our initial Operation Desert Shield deployments in
    August 1990; continuing with years of persistent conflict in Southwest
    Asia, Somalia, the Balkans, and Haiti; and through ongoing operations
    in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. The past 17 years have
    clearly demonstrated success at any point along the spectrum of
    conflict requires air, space, and cyberspace superiority.
    3.1 Maintain Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for
            America
        We are the Nation's premier multi-dimensional maneuver force, with
    the agility, reach, speed, stealth, payload, firepower, precision, and
    persistence to achieve global effects. Dominance of air, space, and
    cyberspace provides the essential bedrock for effective Joint
    operations.
        Today's Air Force provides the Joint Force Commander a range of
    capabilities that set conditions for success. Our airmen currently fly
    an average of over 300 sorties daily as part of Operations Iraqi
    Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF). These sorties include
    Intertheater and Intratheater Airlift; Aeromedical Evacuation (AE);
    Aerial Refueling; Command and Control (C2); ISR; Close Air Support; and
    pre-planned strike.
        Our airmen operate on a global scale every day; Air Force
    engagement in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility
    (AOR) is only the ``tip of the iceberg.'' The complete picture of Air
    Force engagement includes airmen deployed to contingencies outside of
    the Continental United States (OCONUS), forward deployed in Europe and
    the Pacific, and employed from their home stations as they execute
    global missions.
        Furthermore, the Air Force is the only Service flying Operation
    Noble Eagle (ONE) missions, which have been continuous since September
    2001. America's airmen fly fighters, tankers, and Airborne Warning and
    Control aircraft during daily Air Sovereignty Alert operations.
    America's airmen also command and control these aircraft, maintaining
    vigilance and protection of America's air corridors and maritime
    approaches in defense of our Homeland.
        Since 2001, the Active Duty Air Force has reduced its end strength
    by almost 6 percent, but our deployments have increased over 30
    percent--primarily in support of global war on terror. Approximately
    26,000 airmen are deployed to over 100 locations around the world to
    fight in the global war on terror at any given moment--fighting our
    enemies in their own backyard so they cannot come to ours. In addition,
    approximately 208,000 airmen--178,000 regular Air Force airmen plus
    30,000 Guard and Reserve airmen--fulfill additional combatant commander
    (CCDR) requirements, missions, and tasks 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
    In other words, approximately 41 percent of our Total Force airmen--
    including 54 percent of the regular force--are globally contributing to
    winning today's fight and are directly fulfilling CCDR requirements
    everyday.
        Whether controlling satellites, flying unmanned aerial vehicles
    (UAVs), standing strategic missile alert, or analyzing intelligence
    information, airmen directly engage America's adversaries and affect
    events worldwide every day.
        3.1.1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        ISR is the foundation of Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global
    Power. It cuts across all domains and affects almost every mission
    area. Today, ISR efforts make up the majority of the operations
    required to achieve our security objectives. These operations range
    from finding the enemy, to deconstructing its network and intentions,
    to making it possible to deliver weapons or other effects on target, to
    subsequently assessing the results of those efforts.
        ISR is the linchpin of our Effects-Based Approach to Operations
    (EBAO). It is impossible to accurately predict the effect of operations
    on an enemy system without good intelligence; nor can one assess the
    outcome of delivered effects without detailed surveillance and
    reconnaissance. Intelligence requirements for an EBAO and effects-based
    assessment (EBA) are much more demanding than the old attrition-based
    model. The increased intelligence detail necessary for EBAO/EBA makes
    focused reconnaissance and persistent surveillance operations ever-more
    crucial.
        The Air Force has demonstrated its commitment to the importance of
    ISR by establishing a 3-star Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR, the Air
    Force ISR Agency, and formed a global organization for the processing
    of ISR data from a variety of sources. These initiatives demonstrate
    the Air Force has shifted the way it manages ISR capabilities from a
    Cold-War platform perspective to a 21st century holistic capability-
    based approach.
        3.1.2 Strike
        In addition to our ONE missions over the Homeland, America's airmen
    fly daily OIF and OEF missions, keeping a watchful eye on America's
    adversaries and providing lethal combat capabilities that take the
    fight to our enemies. In 2007, America's airmen conducted nearly 1,600
    strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq alone, Air Force strikes
    increased by 171 percent over the previous year, while in Afghanistan
    strikes increased by 22 percent. These increases clearly demonstrate
    the applicability, flexibility, and prevalence of Air Force combat
    options in ongoing OIF and OEF counterinsurgency operations.
        Engaging directly is only a small portion of what the Air Force
    provides. To meet current and future challenges, we must maintain a
    credible deterrent that convinces potential adversaries of our
    unwavering commitment to defend our Nation, its allies and friends. One
    prominent example is our ICBM force--the U.S. nuclear arsenal continues
    to serve as the ultimate backstop of our security, dissuading opponents
    and reassuring allies through extended deterrence. Besides continuing
    the recapitalization of our fighter force, we must also modernize our
    bomber and ICBM forces.
        3.1.3 Space
        Space superiority, like air superiority, has become a fundamental
    predicate to joint warfighting. Indeed, America's space superiority has
    completely transformed the way America fights. America's airmen
    currently operate 67 satellites and provide command and control
    infrastructure for over 140 satellites in total, providing the Nation
    persistent global communications; weather coverage; strategic early
    warning; global Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT); signals and
    ISR capabilities--all vital to joint success.
        Space superiority relies on assured access to space, and Air Force
    launch programs continue to provide this capability. In 2007, we
    extended our record to 56 straight launch successes, including
    deployment of two new Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. Also
    in 2007, we successfully launched the first operational Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle heavy lift rocket. This rocket deployed the
    final satellite in the Defense Support Program constellation of
    ballistic missile warning satellites.
        3.1.4 Airlift
        Airlift is an Air Force core competency, and our airmen prove it
    everyday. Air Force airlifters--both Intertheater and Intratheater--
    have become absolutely indispensable to Joint Forces in Iraq and
    Afghanistan as well as to crisis response planners and responders in
    the wake of natural disasters both at home and abroad. The Air Force
    gives America an air bridge--a strategic asset providing operational
    reach--making possible the deployment and employment of joint combat
    power and humanitarian relief.
        Airmen provide the Nation's ground forces with the tactical,
    operational, strategic, and logistical reach to rapidly deploy,
    deliver, supply, resupply, egress, and evacuate via air anywhere in the
    world. In Iraq, Air Force airlift delivers approximately 3,500
    equivalent truckloads of cargo in an average month, taking more than
    8,600 people off dangerous roads and providing the Army and Marine
    Corps the flexibility to reassign those vehicles and associated support
    troops to alternate missions and safer routes.
        3.1.5 Aeromedical Evacuation
        Air Force Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) is a Total Force, combat-
    proven system contributing a unique, vital capability to the joint
    fight. AE and enroute care are built on teamwork, synergy, and Joint
    execution, providing soldiers, sailors, marines, coast guardsmen, and
    airmen the highest casualty survival rates in the history of warfare.
    Casualties treated in our deployed and joint theater hospitals have an
    incredible 97 percent survival rate.
        Since late 2001, we have transported more than 48,500 patients from
    the CENTCOM AOR to higher levels of care. We continue to refine this
    remarkable capability and the enroute care system built upon our
    expeditionary medical system.
        3.1.6 Joint Force Land Component Tasks
        Of the approximately 26,000 airmen currently deployed in the
    CENTCOM AOR, over 6,200 are performing tasks and missions normally
    assigned to the land component--also known as ``In Lieu Of'' (ILO)
    tasks. Airmen currently fill other Services' billets in some of their
    stressed skill areas and are taking on tasks outside Air Force core
    competencies. Since 2004 we have deployed approximately 24,000 airmen
    in support of such ILO tasks, and we expect a steady increase in that
    total.
        In addition to the 6,200 airmen currently deployed supporting ILO
    taskings, over 1,000 airmen are ``in the pipeline'' for ILO Task
    training at any given time. Within the Joint Team, airmen provide the
    Joint Force Commander distinctive skills. While complementary, these
    skills are not interchangeable amongst the team, thus airmen require
    ground-centric combat training to accomplish ILO taskings. This
    training increases personnel tempo for our airmen, but, more
    importantly, ILO tasks and training consumes critical training time,
    resources, manpower, and in some cases reduces overall proficiency in
    Air Force core mission areas. In many cases, Air Force career fields
    already at critical manning levels are further affected by unit
    deployment rates of as high as 40 percent, primarily filling ILO
    taskings. Such high deployment rates from units cannot be absorbed
    without putting at risk the critical missions and capabilities the Air
    Force provides our Nation. This situation creates additional risk to
    the critical missions the Air Force performs and capabilities the Air
    Force provides our Nation.
    3.2 Strengthen Global Partnerships
        Fighting and winning the global war on terror requires commitment,
    capability, and cooperation from our allies and partners around the
    world. We depend on them to secure their territory, support regional
    stability, provide base access and overflight rights, and contribute a
    host of air, space, and cyber power capabilities as interoperable
    coalition partners.
        So America's strategic partnerships are more important than ever.
    Our Air Force will strengthen and broaden international relationships,
    capitalizing on the global community of like-minded airmen while
    attending to interoperability between allies and partners. Building
    these relationships not only expands, extends, and strengthens Global
    Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power, but also leverages the Air
    Force's value as an engine of progress and, thus, as a potent
    instrument of America's diplomacy in an increasingly interconnected
    world.
        The Air Force strives to develop synergistic, interoperable air
    forces utilizing a capabilities-based approach. Foreign Military Sales
    and Direct Commercial Sales allow our partners to operate common
    systems with the Air Force while providing a vehicle to expand
    relationships with our international partners. Some recent examples of
    mutually beneficial agreements include Australian, Canadian, and
    British selection of C-17 Globemaster III airlifters; international
    participation in the F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    program and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
    communications program; British Royal Air Force procurement of MQ-9
    Reaper UAVs; and Australian participation in the Wideband Global SATCOM
    (WGS) system. Future opportunities for partnerships--with platforms
    such as UAVs, C-17s, C-130Js, and the new C-27--can open doors for
    greater interoperability, personnel exchanges, common doctrine, and
    training.
        In addition to integrating international partners into the most
    robust combat training scenarios, we maintain our commitment to the
    pursuit of partnerships for greater global cooperation, security, and
    stability. We recently held the 3rd Global Air Chiefs Conference in
    Washington, DC, which gave over 90 international air chiefs the
    opportunity to learn, understand, and share concerns and issues with
    fellow airmen from around the world. We are also making strides to
    improve language expertise and cultural understanding through
    deliberate development of airmen in the International Affairs
    Specialist program, expanding Military Personnel Exchange Program, and
    cultivating skilled and knowledgeable attaches.
        The Air Force's approach to operations, interoperability, and
    training exemplify our global, international, and expeditionary
    perspective--built on the shared traditions of airmanship that
    transcend geographic boundaries.
                          4.0 take care of our people
        Any organizational renaissance begins with people. We must prepare
    our airmen for a future fraught with challenges, fostering their
    intellectual curiosity and ability to learn, anticipate, and adapt.
    Because our expeditionary airmen must be prepared to deploy and ready
    to fight, we are revitalizing the world's most advanced training system
    and expanding their educational opportunities. While we enrich our
    airmen's culture, leadership, training, education, and heritage, we
    will also continue to care for their families and provide for their
    future.
        Our airmen are our most precious resource. They must be well-
    trained and ready for expeditionary warfighting responsibilities.
    Fiscal constraints dictate that we continue to carefully shape the
    force. Additionally, within the context of rising costs, we remain
    committed to providing the highest possible quality of life standards
    and charting out a career full of education and training for each
    airman. We will continue our emphasis on recruiting and retaining the
    world's highest quality airmen. Additional Air Force high priority
    efforts serve to reinforce a warrior ethos throughout our Service,
    provide proactive force health protection, and encourage Air Reserve
    Component (ARC) volunteerism.
        Spanning six decades of Air Force history, particularly over the
    past 17 years, our airmen have proven themselves as the global first
    responders in times of crisis--taking action anytime, anywhere. The
    foundations for this well-deserved reputation are the quality and
    frequency of the training and education we provide and our commitment
    to the highest possible safety and quality of life standards.
    4.1 Shape the Force
        Ultimately, we must produce a Total Force that is sized and shaped
    to consistently meet current and future requirements--balanced against
    the compelling need to maintain high quality of life standards--to meet
    the global challenges of today and tomorrow.
        During the 1990s, while engaged in continuous combat, the Air Force
    suffered a 7 year ``procurement holiday.'' Today, fiscal constraints
    have tightened as energy and health care costs have continued to
    increase dramatically.
        In late 2005, the Air Force reduced its end strength by 40,000
    Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian Full-time Equivalents (FTEs)
    in order to self-finance the vital re-capitalization and modernization
    of our aircraft, space, and missile inventories. End strength reduction
    by 40,000 FTEs over a 3-year period was our only viable alternative to
    preserve the required investment capital.
        Our Force Shaping efforts have placed us on a path to meet our end
    strength targets. However, personnel changes of this magnitude come
    with a degree of uncertainty and difficulty for our airmen and their
    families. We are making every effort to use voluntary measures to shape
    the force with the right skills mix, increase manning in stressed
    career fields, leverage new technologies, and refine our internal
    processes to reduce workload and reduce or eliminate unnecessary work
    through Air Force Smart Operations 21.
        We have reduced our Air Force end strength using a methodology that
    has preserved a strong expeditionary capability. Our AEF construct
    provides an enterprise view of Service risk that synchronizes our
    resources and assets to support our global requirements. However,
    reducing Air Force end strength further, coupled with ILO taskings for
    the foreseeable future, carries considerable risks of ``burning out''
    our airmen in several critical expeditionary career fields as well as
    limiting our future national options to meet global mission
    requirements in an increasingly volatile world.
    4.2 Ensure Highest Quality of Life Standards
        Our ``People'' priority demands we ensure the quality of life we
    offer our airmen meets the highest possible standards. Because the
    nature of our Air Force mission demands a highly educated, trained, and
    experienced force, we recognize the direct linkages between quality of
    life issues and their impact on our recruiting, retention, and,
    ultimately, our mission capability.
        4.2.1 Housing and Military Construction
        Air Force investments in housing underscore our emphasis on
    developing and caring for airmen. Through Military Construction
    (MILCON) and housing privatization, we are providing higher quality
    homes faster than ever. With the fiscal year 2009 funding, we will
    revitalize more than 2,100 homes through improvement or replacement. We
    are on track to meet our fiscal year 2009 goal of eliminating
    inadequate housing at overseas locations.
        MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due
    to fiscal constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk
    in facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to
    recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment. However,
    our new construction projects are state-of-the-art, incorporating
    energy efficient features and sustainable designs. We have prioritized
    the most critical requirements to support the Air Force and the
    Department of Defense (DOD) requirements. Our MILCON plan supports
    these priorities by focusing on new mission beddowns, training, and
    depot transformation, as well as dormitory and child care center
    upgrades.
        4.2.2 Joint Basing
        The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward
    common goals in a Joint environment without compromising Air Force
    principles and the well-being of our people. Joint Basing initiatives
    are no exception. To guarantee success, each Joint Base should be
    required to provide a suitable setting to all of its assigned
    personnel, their families, and other customers within the local
    communities our bases support.
        To accomplish this, we advocate establishment of a common Joint
    Base quality of life standard. Our airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines,
    DOD civilians, and their families will benefit from efficient,
    consistent installation support services. Such standards will ensure
    the Air Force and our sister Services continue to provide all personnel
    with the level of installation support services they deserve. As we
    work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and our sister
    Services, we will ensure all Joint Basing initiatives contribute to the
    DOD's ability to perform its mission. We will also safeguard against
    potential negative impacts to the Joint and Air Force approach to
    mission performance.
        To do this, we will have to work through the transfer of TOA and
    real property without eroding the local installation commander's
    prerogatives relative to satisfying mission and training requirements,
    optimizing installation resources, tailoring installation services to
    local needs, and prioritizing MILCON funding. We will also have to work
    through the transfer without reducing the combat capability our bases
    generate, installation service support standards, or the quality of
    life for servicemembers, their families, and other customers of these
    Services.
        We look forward to establishing a base realignment and closure-
    envisioned executive agency agreement involving local leaders and the
    local unit commander. Such an agency, combined with elimination of
    duplicate offices and administration of centrally agreed standards,
    would improve efficiency while safeguarding mission requirements and
    quality of life for families and servicemembers. We believe the
    natural, direct feedback and tension between a service provider and a
    paying customer is the best model to drive efficiency and cost savings.
        The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, joint
    or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their missions and
    meet our quality-of-life standards. We want joint bases to be so
    efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a
    highlight for every servicemember.
    4.3 Recruit, Train, and Retain Highest Quality Airmen
        The Air Force is the ``Retention Service''--we recruit, train,
    develop, and retain the best America has to offer. Our emphasis on
    retention stems from the high technical and operational expertise
    required of our personnel. The high morale, cohesiveness, and
    capability of the Air Force are due to our efforts to retain a highly
    experienced, educated, and skilled force.
        The Air Force has never lowered its recruiting standards. We
    continue to recruit and choose the best America has to offer from our
    diverse population. Our recruiting and retention figures remain
    impressive, clearly indicating our success to date and the
    effectiveness of the Air Force's holistic approach to quality of life,
    recruiting, and retention. This success reaffirms our commitment to
    long-term family support efforts, education, and training.
        While we recruit airmen, we retain families. We believe our airmen
    should never have to choose between serving their country and providing
    for their families. Quality of life and family support are critical
    elements of our overall effort to retain high quality airmen. As part
    of our efforts to maintain high quality of life standards, we are
    concerned with the hardships facing our Air Force families resulting
    from the frequent moves our airmen and other servicemembers make
    throughout their careers. We applaud ongoing congressional and
    interstate efforts addressing such issues as transfer of educational
    credits for military members and dependents, professional
    certifications for military spouses, and economic support for military
    families coping with spousal income disadvantages.
        Additionally, Air Force training initiatives continue to evolve,
    improving our ability to develop and retain the world's best air,
    space, and cyberspace warriors. We are concentrating our efforts to
    reprioritize Air Force professional education opportunities to reflect
    a balance between winning today's fight and preparing for tomorrow's
    challenges.
        Tuition assistance continues to be a strong incentive that helps
    ensure we meet our recruiting and retention goals. We believe voluntary
    education, facilitated with tuition assistance, not only aids in
    recruiting and retention, but further reinforces national strength and
    richness by producing more effective professional airmen and more
    productive American citizens for the Nation, both during their
    enlistment and their eventual return to civilian life.
        Within the last 2 years we have taken several initiatives to
    ``intellectually and professionally recapitalize'' our airmen. We are
    developing leaders with the management acumen, cultural sophistication,
    international expertise, and language skills to successfully lead a
    diverse, globally engaged force. Air Education and Training Command and
    Air University are leading our efforts to reinvigorate the world's most
    advanced educational system for airmen by expanding our full-spectrum
    educational opportunities.
        Finally, we optimized and expanded our training regimes to take
    advantage of more modern methods and broader scope in our live
    exercises. Red Flag exercises now offer two venues, Nevada and Alaska,
    with varied environments; take advantage of Distributed Mission
    Operations technologies; include Total Force airmen from the Regular
    and Reserve Components; and offer the full range of integrated
    operations, offering realistic training for warriors from across the
    Services, Components, and our international partners.
                     5.0 prepare for tomorrow's challenges
        In addition to taking care of our airmen and training them for the
    full-spectrum challenges we expect this century, it is also our
    responsibility to ensure our airmen have the weapons and equipment
    necessary to provide for our Nation's defense.
        The U.S. cannot take advantages in air, space, and cyberspace for
    granted. Today, we are already being challenged in every warfighting
    domain. The Air Force is actively formulating innovative operational
    concepts to anticipate, adapt to, and overcome future challenges. We
    are transforming our thinking from considering the space and cyber
    domains as mere enablers of air operations to a holistic approach that
    recognizes their interdependence and leverages their unique
    characteristics. We will continue to push this conceptual envelope and
    expand the boundaries of existing tactics, techniques, and procedures
    to fully exploit the synergies of cross-domain dominance.
        But we cannot hone America's edge without modernizing the Air
    Force's air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. We are therefore
    pursuing the biggest, most complex, and most important recapitalization
    and modernization effort in Air Force history. These programs will gain
    and maintain militarily important advantages for our Nation for the
    coming decades.
    5.1 Top Acquisition Priorities
        The Air Force's top acquisition priorities begin to address our
    critical recapitalization and modernization needs--the new Tanker (KC-
    X); the new CSAR-X; modern space systems to provide capabilities vital
    to our joint warfighters; the F-35A JSF; and a new bomber we plan to
    field by 2018.
        Additional high-priority acquisition programs include F-22 5th
    Generation fighter production; C-17 production; continued production of
    the C-130J and introduction of the C-27 intratheater airlifter; and
    expansion of the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV
    inventories.
        5.1.1 New Tanker (KC-X)
        The KC-X is our highest procurement priority. It is critical to the
    entire joint and coalition military team's ability to project combat
    power around the world, and gives America and our allies' unparalleled
    rapid response to combat and humanitarian relief operations alike. KC-X
    tankers will provide increased aircraft availability, more adaptable
    technology, more flexible employment options, and greater overall
    capability than the current inventory of KC-135E and KC-135R tankers
    they will replace. It is imperative we begin a program of smart, steady
    reinvestment in a new tanker--coupled with measured, timely retirements
    of the oldest, least capable KC-135E tankers--to ensure future
    viability of this unique and vital U.S. national capability.
        5.1.2 New Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter
        The Air Force organizes, trains, and equips dedicated forces for
    the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission. The Air Force must
    recapitalize our CSAR forces to maintain this indispensable capability
    for the Nation and the Joint Team. Purchasing the entire complement of
    programmed CSAR-X aircraft will relieve the high-tempo operational
    strain placed on the current inventory of aging HH-60G Pave Hawk
    helicopters.
        The CSAR mission is a moral and ethical imperative. Airmen are
    responsible for safely securing and returning our airmen and members of
    the joint and coalition team. The CSAR-X helicopter will provide a more
    reliable, more responsive capability for rapid recovery of downed,
    injured, or isolated personnel in day or night, all weather and adverse
    conditions, as well as support non-combatant evacuation and disaster
    relief operations.
        5.1.3 Space Systems
        Air Force communications, ISR, and geo-positioning satellites are
    the bedrock of the Joint Team's ability to find, fix, target, assess,
    communicate, and navigate. While many of our satellites have outlived
    their designed endurance, they are generally less durable than other
    platforms and sensors. Over the next 10 years we must recapitalize all
    of these systems, replacing them with new ones that enhance our
    capabilities and provide mission continuity, maintaining the asymmetric
    advantages our space forces provide our Nation.
        The WGS system, AEHF, and the Transformational Satellite
    Communications program will assure a more robust and reliable
    communications capability designed to counter emerging threats and meet
    expanding joint communications requirements.
        The GPS II-F and III programs will add a more robust PNT capability
    to America's established GPS constellation. GPS III will utilize a
    block approach to acquisition and will deliver enhanced civil and
    military PNT capabilities to worldwide users.
        The Space Based Infrared System will enhance the Air Force's early
    warning missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
    awareness capabilities through improved infrared sensing, missile
    warning, and data processing.
        The Air Force will continue to develop space situation awareness
    (SSA) capabilities to help protect space assets from future threats. We
    are also pursuing more robust space protection measures to warn of
    attacks, provide redundant command and control, harden electronics, and
    defend against direct attacks. The Space Based Space Surveillance
    system will be the first orbital sensor with a primary mission of SSA.
    This system, along with other developments such as the Rapid Attack
    Identification Detection and Reporting System will improve our ability
    to characterize the space environment--the friends and foes operating
    in it, and the objects traversing it.
        5.1.4 F-35A Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)
        The F-35A Lightning II will be the mainstay of America's future
    fighter force, providing an affordable, multi-role complement to the F-
    22 Raptor. In addition to fielding advanced combat capabilities, the
    Lightning II will also strengthen integration of our Total Force and
    will enhance interoperability with global partners.
        The F-35A Lightning II boasts 5th Generation, precision engagement,
    low-observable (stealth), and attack capabilities that will benefit not
    only the Air Force, but also the Navy, Marines, and our international
    partners involved in the program. The F-35A is the Conventional Take-
    off and Landing variant, and it will replace, recapitalize, and extend
    Air Force F-117, F-16, and A-10 combat capabilities. The F-35A also
    serves as the recapitalization program for our international partners'
    aging F-16s, F-18s, and other 4th Generation fighter aircraft.
        Complete dominance of the air and freedom of maneuver for the
    entire joint force demand the complementary capabilities of the F-22
    and F-35A 5th Generation of fighters. Together, they promise the
    ability to sweep the skies, take down the enemy's air defenses, and
    provide persistent, lethal air cover of the battlefield. The leading
    edge capabilities of the F-35A, in development and low rate production
    now, will provide an affordable, Joint Service, international
    complement to the F-22.
        5.1.5 New Bomber
        Range and payload are the soul of an Air Force. These capabilities,
    along with precision, lethality, survivability, and responsiveness are
    fundamental to modern strategic military deterrence, and apply across
    the full range of military operations--from tactical to strategic,
    kinetic to non-kinetic. Yet our Nation has just 21 bombers currently
    capable of penetrating modern air defenses. Even these B-2 Spirit
    stealth bombers have limitations and will become relatively less
    capable and less survivable against advanced anti-access technologies
    being developed and fielded around the world. Furthermore, our current
    bomber inventory is becoming more costly to operate and maintain.
    Indeed, some suppliers for spare parts no longer exist.
        The Air Force is therefore pursuing acquisition of a new bomber by
    2018 and in accordance with Quadrennial Defense Review goals for long
    range strike capability. This next generation bomber will feature
    stealth, payload, and improved avionics/sensors suites, and will
    incorporate highly advanced technologies. It will also bring America's
    bomber forces up to the same high standard we are setting with our F-22
    and F-35A 5th Generation fighters, and ensure our bomber force's
    ability to fulfill our Nation's and the CCDRs' global requirements.
    5.2 Improve our Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power
        Because Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power constitute
    America's edge, we must continually hone our ability to provide them.
    Our acquisition programs aim to broaden Global Vigilance, extend Global
    Reach, and strengthen Global Power advantages for America.
        5.2.1 Broaden Global Vigilance
        The Air Force provides the global eyes and ears of the Joint Team
    and our Nation. Using a vast array of terrestrial, airborne, and
    spaceborne sensors, we monitor and characterize the earth's sea, air,
    space, land, and cyberspace domains around the clock and around the
    world. The information collected through surveillance and
    reconnaissance, and converted into intelligence by exploitation and
    analysis, is used to formulate strategy, policy, and military plans; to
    develop and conduct campaigns; guide acquisition of future
    capabilities; and to protect, prevent, and prevail against threats and
    aggression aimed at the U.S. and its interests. It is relied upon at
    levels ranging from the President and senior decisionmakers to
    commanders in air operations centers to ground units engaged with the
    enemy to pilots dropping precision-guided munitions.
        The future vision of all the U.S. military Services is information-
    driven. Success will hinge on America's integrated air, space, and
    cyberspace advantages. Air Force assets like the E-8C Joint
    Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, E-3 Airborne Warning and
    Control System, RC-135 Rivet Joint, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator,
    and our constellations of satellites contribute vital ISR capabilities
    and networking services that are integral to every aspect of every
    joint operation. Our recapitalization and modernization plan aims to
    dramatically increase the quantity and quality of ISR capabilities,
    products, and services available to the Joint Team and the Nation. Our
    recapitalization efforts are focused on extending the lifespans and
    capability sets of our workhorse platforms, such as the RC-135 Rivet
    Joint and several space-based assets. We are also working to find and
    leverage previously untapped ISR capabilities such as those on fighters
    carrying targeting pods. Finally, we have made a concerted effort to
    ensure the viability of Air Force space communications, PNT, early
    warning missions, and SSA capabilities to provide uninterrupted mission
    continuity for America and our allies.
        5.2.2 Extend Global Reach
        America's airmen provide the long legs and lift for joint
    warfighters' rapid global mobility as well as the long arms for global
    strike and high endurance for global persistence and presence. On a
    daily basis, Air Force intertheater and intratheater airlift and
    mobility forces support all DOD branches as well as other government
    agency operations all over the world. Yet the increased demand for
    their capabilities and their decreased availability underscore the
    critical need for tanker recapitalization and investment to ensure the
    long-term viability of this vital national capability.
        5.2.3 Strengthen Global Power
        The U.S. Air Force provides the ability to achieve precise,
    tailored effects whenever, wherever, and however needed--kinetic and
    nonkinetic, lethal and nonlethal, at the speed of sound and soon at the
    speed of light. It is an integrated cross-domain capability that rests
    on our ability to dominate the air, space, and cyberspace domains.
        The Global Power advantages the Air Force provides the Joint Team
    ensure freedom of maneuver, freedom from attack, and freedom to attack
    for the Joint Team. However, failure to invest in sufficient quantities
    of modern capabilities seriously jeopardizes these advantages and risks
    the lives of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
    5.3 Retire Aging, Worn-Out Aircraft
        The Air Force has been in continuous combat since 1990--17 years
    and counting--taking a toll on our people and rapidly aging equipment.
    While we remain globally engaged, we recognize the imperative of
    investing in the future through recapitalization and modernization.
    Beyond fielding new aircraft, we must also retire significant portions
    of our oldest, most obsolete aircraft if we are to build a modern, 21st
    century Air Force. Our aircraft inventories are the oldest in our
    history, and are more difficult and expensive to maintain than ever.
    They require a larger footprint when deployed, and are significantly
    less combat-capable in today's increasingly advanced and lethal
    environment. In the years ahead they will be less and less capable of
    responding to or surviving the threats and crises that may emerge.
        Since 2005, we have attempted to divest significant numbers of old,
    worn out aircraft. However, legislative restrictions on aircraft
    retirements remain an obstacle to efficient divestiture of our oldest,
    least capable, and most costly to maintain aircraft. Lifting these
    restrictions will alleviate considerable pressure on our already
    constrained resources that continue to erode our overall capabilities.
    5.4 Preserve America's Aerospace Industrial Base
        America's public and private aerospace industrial base, workforce,
    and capabilities are vital to the Air Force and national defense. The
    aerospace industry produced the brainpower, innovations, technology,
    and vehicles that propelled the U.S. to global leadership in the 20th
    century. The aerospace sector gave birth to the technologies and minds
    that have made the information age a reality. This key industrial
    sector continues to lead and produce the technologies and capabilities
    America needs to safeguard our future.
        Yet this vital industry has deteriorated over the last decade. We
    have witnessed an industry consolidation and contraction--from more
    than 10 domestic U.S. aircraft manufacturers in the early 1990s to only
    3 prime domestic aircraft manufacturers today. Without funding, in the
    coming decade production lines will irreversibly close, skilled
    workforces will age or retire, and companies will shut their doors. The
    U.S. aerospace industry is rapidly approaching a point of no return. As
    Air Force assets wear out, the U.S. is losing the ability to build new
    ones. We must reverse this erosion through increased investment.
        We must find ways to maintain and preserve our aerospace industrial
    capabilities. We must maintain national options for keeping production
    lines open. Complex 21st century weapons systems cannot be produced
    without long lead development and procurement actions. Additionally, we
    must continue our investment in a modern, industrial sustainment base.
    Air Force depots and private sector maintenance centers have played
    vital roles in sustaining our capabilities and have become models of
    modern industrial transformation. We are fully committed to sustaining
    a healthy, modern depot level maintenance and repair capability.
        Furthermore, we must recognize that these industry capabilities
    represent our National ability to research, innovate, develop, produce,
    and sustain the advanced technologies and systems we will continue to
    need in the future. This vital industrial sector represents a center of
    gravity and single point vulnerability for our National defense.
    5.5 Extend C-130J Production Line
        Acquisition programs set the stage to field future capabilities. So
    we must make prudent decisions to maintain current production of
    advanced systems in order to reach required force structure goals and
    provide a hedge against future uncertainty. We must maintain and extend
    the existing production lines for C-130J intratheater airlifters. This
    aircraft represent America's best technology and capability.
        We strongly recommend taking action to ensure these vital
    production lines remain open. Maintaining current production lines will
    be critical to revitalizing our force structure, setting conditions for
    future success, and providing America with the option--should
    conditions dictate--to produce additional modern, advanced technology
    aircraft without having to start from square one.
    5.6 Strengthen Total Force Integration
        The Air Force is dedicated to ensuring our States and Nation get
    the most combat effective, most efficient force possible to accomplish
    our mission faster and with greater capacity, around the world and at
    home. We believe integrating our Total Force is the best way to do
    that.
        America's airmen set the DOD standard for Reserve component
    integration. The ARC--comprised of the Air National Guard and the Air
    Force Reserve Command--is an operational Reserve and an essential
    element of the U.S. Air Force. We are developing concepts, strategies,
    force management policies and practices, and legal authorities to
    access sufficient ARC forces without the need for involuntary
    mobilization. Though the Air Force is already the model for melding its
    Guard, Reserve, and civilians with its Regular Air Force elements, we
    can and will push this synergy to new levels.
        A distinguishing hallmark of the Air Force is the ease with which
    Total Force airmen work seamlessly together at home and abroad. From
    the first Reserve Associate unit in 1968 to the full integration of
    Guard and Reserve units into the AEF in the 1990s, the Air Force has a
    well-established history of employing airmen from all components in
    innovative and effective ways.
        TFI represents a long-term Air Force commitment to transformation.
    TFI maximizes the Air Force's overall joint combat capability, forming
    a more cohesive force and capitalizing on the strengths inherent within
    Regular, Guard, and Reserve elements. Including the ARC in emerging
    mission areas increases the Air Force's ability to retain critical
    skills should airmen decide to transition from the Regular Air Force to
    the ARC. We will continue to review policies and practices--through our
    Continuum of Service initiative--to optimize sustainment support to the
    warfighting force and further integrate personnel management across the
    Total Force. TFI will be critical to meeting the challenges of
    competing resource demands, an aging aircraft inventory, and
    organizing, training, and equipping for emerging missions.
        We are leveraging our Total Force to the greatest extent ever. We
    expect the Total Force to produce the vanguard elements we will need as
    we expand our leading role in cyberspace and explore new cyber
    technologies. Many of our most experienced cyber warriors, having
    attained the high level of expertise required to excel in this domain,
    are found in our Guard, Reserve, and civilian ranks.
        5.6.1 Total Force Roadmap
        As an integral element of our procurement efforts, we have built a
    global Total Force Roadmap for acquiring and basing new aircraft and
    equipment. Just as our AEF construct seamlessly draws upon all of the
    Total Force components, the beddown of future Air Force aircraft and
    equipment integrates Regular, Guard, and Reserve airmen beginning with
    the first phases of production and basing through Full Operational
    Capability.
        The Roadmap represents a more efficient and flexible force
    structure. Although the Air Force will have a smaller total aircraft
    inventory compared to our current inventory of aircraft, overall Air
    Force capabilities will increase with each next-generation weapons
    system. In numerous instances, the potential locations will capitalize
    on TFI efforts, creating innovative organizational arrangements among
    Regular, Guard, and Reserve components. This effort takes advantage of
    the inherent strengths of each component.
        The Air Force Roadmap provides a planning construct for the future
    which, if adequately resourced, will result in the required force
    structure that will give our Nation the best capability for Global
    Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power across the globe; to reassure
    allies, to dissuade, deter, and defeat adversaries; and to protect the
    Homeland.
    5.7 Secure the Future
        To maximize the potential advantages of our programs in the future,
    the Air Force is engaging in multiple initiatives to better organize,
    train, and equip our forces. Whether harnessing the complementary
    capabilities of the F-22 and F-35A programs to provide Air Dominance
    for the Joint Team; strengthening our National Security Space
    Enterprise; leading efforts to acquire interoperable UAS; developing
    Cyber Warriors; or pursuing alternative energy solutions with
    environmentally safe production processes, the Air Force continues to
    investigate and embrace opportunities to secure Global Vigilance,
    Global Reach, and Global Power for our Nation's future.
        5.7.1 Strengthen Joint Air Dominance
        America's airmen are understandably proud of their contributions to
    the joint fight. Airmen have prevented enemy aircraft from inflicting
    any U.S. ground force casualties for over 50 years, and our Nation must
    maintain the required capability advantages to continue this record in
    the future. With advancing technology and proliferating threats, the
    Nation also needs the right equipment for the Homeland Defense mission
    to protect civilians on American soil.
        The F-22 Raptor and the F-35A Lightning II JSF are leading-edge,
    modern, 5th Generation fighters. They are not modernized versions of
    old designs. These aircraft reap the benefits of decades of advanced
    research, technology development, open architecture design, and
    operational experience. These fighters are furthermore designed to be
    complementary--the F-22 being superior in speed and maneuverability,
    and the F-35A being optimized for ground attack and multi-role
    capabilities. These fighters will provide the advanced warfighting
    capabilities, aircraft system synergies, and the flexibility and
    versatility required in future environments and engagements.
        Currently in production and fully operational with Total Force
    units in Virginia and Alaska, and with units planned for New Mexico and
    Hawaii, the F-22 is the newest member of the Air, Space, and Cyber
    Expeditionary Force. Airmen are putting the Raptor through its paces--
    flying and deploying the world's first and only operational 5th
    Generation fighter. Its attributes of speed, stealth, maneuverability,
    internal weapons carriage, advanced sensors, and adaptable, integrated
    avionics will meet our Nation's enduring national security requirements
    to gain and maintain joint air dominance in anti-access environments;
    provide powerful sensing capabilities and battlespace situational
    awareness; and precisely engage a broad range of surface targets.
        It is vital to our National interests that 5th Generation fighter
    production capability be preserved. This year the F-35A will continue
    development and begin its ramp-up to full rate production in 2014.
    Continuing production ensures the aerospace industry keeps its
    technical edge, maintains an able workforce to respond to
    uncertainties, and preserves critical skills and production suppliers.
    Uninterrupted production in sufficient numbers of 5th Generation
    fighters remains the lowest risk strategy and best future guarantee for
    homeland air sovereignty and Joint air dominance.
        5.7.2 Lead Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Operational Development
        The Air Force is the world leader for successful, innovative, and
    effective development, acquisition, and operation of Unmanned Aircraft
    (UA) and the UAS that incorporate UAs and the C2 networks and equipment
    to employ them. Future successful Joint UAS acquisitions and operations
    hinge upon execution of three critical elements, which align cohesively
    with joint doctrine:
        Develop Joint UA Concept of Operations (CONOPs). UA operators serve
    the global Joint mission through interoperability and interdependence.
    Globally and jointly integrated UAS operations and capabilities--from
    strategic to tactical--are necessary for joint success. CONOPs
    development must focus on accomplishing the joint mission as opposed to
    serving functional components.
        Standardize and Streamline UAS Acquisitions. We must develop an
    affordable joint acquisition strategy for future UAS development,
    organization, and employment. Air Force acquirers and operators
    pioneered UAS development and application in joint warfare, and have
    established best practices for organizing, training, standardizing, and
    equipping the world's most effective UAS operations squadrons.
        Ensure Airspace Control and Awareness. Presentation of UA forces
    and capabilities must meet Joint Commander requirements and objectives.
    ``Organic ownership'' of UAS capabilities is irrelevant in the context
    of the Joint fight and the Joint Forces Air Component Commander's
    authority and responsibility to control Joint airspace. Homeland
    operations are also becoming increasingly important. We are working
    with all the Services and the Department of Transportation to establish
    Federal Aviation Administration Certifications for UA operations within
    approved civil airspace.
        5.7.3 Lead the National Security Space Enterprise
        Our Nation depends on its space capabilities as an integral part of
    its military strength, industrial capability, and economic vitality. As
    DOD Executive Agency for Space, the Air Force will continue to ensure
    mission continuity in critical areas of communications, PNT, early
    warning, SSA, and ISR. We will also continue efforts to strengthen
    National Space integration and collaboration across DOD, with the
    Intelligence Community, our interagency partners and our international
    partners.
        Of particular note are our efforts to strengthen America's space
    professionals and science and engineering workforce. These
    professionals will form the fundamental corps who will lead our space
    efforts to success in the future by integrating enterprise level
    architectures; designing, developing, acquiring, and fielding new
    systems; and operating in a dynamic and potentially contested
    environment.
        Additionally, the Air Force is developing capabilities to quickly
    respond to the urgent needs of CCDRs. Operationally Responsive Space is
    a tiered capability consisting of spacecraft, launch vehicles, and
    terrestrial infrastructure employed in concert to deliver a range of
    space capabilities to responsively meet CCDR requirements in times of
    war, conflict, or crisis.
        Finally, the Air Force is committed to improving its space
    acquisitions, focusing on flexibility and affordability. Success in
    this endeavor depends on achievable requirements, appropriate
    resources, disciplined systems engineering, and effective program
    management. We focus all of these efforts through a disciplined block
    delivery approach tying together basic science and technology (S&T),
    technology development, systems development, and system production
    efforts so concepts first evaluated in S&T will enable a systematic
    transition from development to operations.
        5.7.4 Lead Cyberspace Operational Development
        Current and potential adversaries already operate in cyberspace,
    exploiting the low entry costs and minimal technological investment
    needed to inflict serious harm in and through cyberspace. State and
    non-state actors are already operating within cyberspace to gain
    asymmetric advantage.
        In April 2007, Estonia was the victim of a barrage of cyber attacks
    which brought its technologically sophisticated government to a virtual
    standstill. Insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere exploit
    electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to kill and maim through
    improvised explosive devices and propagate their message of hate to the
    world. Thus, the ability to inflict damage and cause strategic
    dislocation no longer requires significant capital investment, superior
    motivation and training, or technological prowess.
        We seek to deny our adversaries sanctuary in cyberspace while
    assuring our access to and freedom to operate in this domain. Our
    Nation's ability to achieve effects in air, in space, on land, and at
    sea depends on control of and freedom of maneuver in the cyber domain.
        As part of a larger effort to address this need, the Air Force
    stood up a Provisional Air Force Cyberspace Command (AFCYBER) on 18
    September 2007. Our current plan is to activate the AFCYBER MAJCOM on 1
    October 2008. The newly designated AFCYBER will consolidate and
    integrate Air Force cyber capabilities to prepare them to function
    across the spectrum of conflict. These capabilities will include, but
    are not limited to: electronic warfare; network warfare; global C2
    integration, and ISR enhancement.
        We will continue to develop and implement plans for maturing cyber
    operations as an Air Force core competency. Our objective is to provide
    flexible options to national decisionmakers to deter, deny,
    disrupt, deceive, dissuade, and defeat adversaries through destructive
    and non-destructive, lethal and non-lethal means.
        5.7.5 Assure Sustainable Energy
        We are pursuing an aggressive energy strategy and are committed to
    meeting and surpassing the energy goals mandated by the Energy Policy
    Act of 2005 (EPAct 05) and other national policies. We continue to
    pursue a variety of programs aimed at reducing our use of fossil fuels
    and controlling cost growth. Our vision emphasizes a culture in which
    all airmen make energy-conscious decisions. We aim to implement our
    vision with solutions that include alternate sources of domestic energy
    as well as an aggressive drive for greater efficiency in our
    facilities, vehicles, and aircraft.
        Following Presidential direction to reduce dependence on foreign
    oil, the Air Force is aggressively pursuing a broad range of energy
    alternatives. As the DOD's leading consumer of jet fuel, we are
    currently engaged in evaluating alternative fuels and engine
    technologies leading to greater fuel efficiency. We have certified the
    B-52 to fly on a synthetic fuel blend, and are on track to certify the
    C-17 and B-1 in 2008, the F-22 in 2009, and the remainder of all of our
    aircraft expected to be certified by early 2011. In fact, on December
    17, 2007--the 104th anniversary of the Wright Brothers' first flight at
    Kitty Hawk, NC--a McChord AFB, Washington-based C-17 flew the first
    transcontinental flight on synthetic fuel (a 50/50 blend). The Air
    Force goal is to acquire 50 percent of its continental United States
    aviation fuel via a synthetic fuel blend utilizing domestic sources.
    Our intent is to require synthetic fuel purchases be sourced from
    environmentally-friendly suppliers with manufacturing facilities that
    engage in carbon dioxide capture and effective reuse. In addition, the
    Air Force is testing renewable fuel resources that will lower CO2
    emissions significantly compared to petroleum. Other Air Force
    technology efforts continue to explore high-efficiency aerodynamic
    concepts, advanced gas turbines, and variable cycle engines providing
    higher performance and greater fuel efficiency.
        The Air Force is the renewable energy leader, and we seek to expand
    our portfolio through innovative public-private partnerships and
    evaluations of a wide range of energy proposals at several bases. Last
    year, the Air Force received the Presidential Award for Leadership in
    Federal Energy Management. The Air Force also continued to lead the
    Federal Government in green power purchases, with 37 bases meeting some
    portion of their base-wide electrical requirements from commercial
    sources of wind, solar, geothermal, or biomass. We reached full
    operating capacity--14.5 megawatts--of the largest solar photovoltaic
    array in the Americas at Nellis AFB, NV. At Edwards AFB, CA; Kirtland
    AFB, NM; and Luke AFB, AZ; we are exploring additional commercial-scale
    opportunities for solar power. On under-utilized land at Malstrom AFB,
    MT, we are exploring the potential for a privately financed and
    operated coal-to-liquid plant. Finally, as a result of congressional
    interest, we have begun considering the potential for small-scale
    nuclear power production on Air Force property. As energy leaders, the
    Air Force is engaging with allied and coalition air force partners to
    share best practices, identify common issues and concerns, and ensure
    future, sustainable energy interoperability.
        5.7.6 Maintain Science and Technology Leadership
        True to our heritage over the past century of powered flight, the
    Air Force continues to maintain the most complex, diverse, and
    ambitious S&T portfolio of all the Services. History clearly
    demonstrates the broad benefits to America of our S&T efforts, in terms
    of military power, industrial capability, economic growth, educational
    richness, cultural wealth, and national prestige. Examples of these
    efforts include aerospace technology and propulsion, materials science,
    advanced computing and communications, atmospheric science, remote
    sensing, medicine, precision timing, weather forecasting, and satellite
    navigation. What has been good for the Air Force has been great for
    America. We are committed to building upon this heritage.
        The Air Force S&T program develops, demonstrates, and tests
    technologies and advanced warfighting capabilities against the spectrum
    of 21st century threats. As we continue to adapt to a volatile and
    uncertain world, today's focused investment in our S&T program will
    produce the future warfighting capabilities needed to ensure America's
    continued technological preeminence and military flexibility. Major Air
    Force S&T efforts include hypersonics, composites, propulsion,
    nanotechnology, small satellite technology, directed energy, and
    cybertechnology.
        Additionally, Air Force S&T organizations work closely with the
    other Services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
    Intelligence Community, and other Federal agencies, such as the
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as well as partner
    nations. Through these partnerships we leverage efforts, share
    information, and advance state-of-the-art technologies.
        The Air Force S&T Program provides the necessary leadership and
    foundation for future joint warfighting capabilities, focusing on
    dominance of the air, space, and cyberspace warfighting domains.
    Continued Air Force S&T leadership will be critical to maintaining the
    asymmetric military advantages and broad national benefits our Joint
    Team and the Nation have come to expect and enjoy.
                              6.0 america's airmen
        U.S. security and prosperity are best assured when all the
    instruments of national power are orchestrated to work with other
    states to promote a stable and prosperous international system. The Air
    Force directly contributes to U.S. security by providing a unique array
    of sovereign options for decisionmakers. These options maximize our
    ability to assure friends and to dissuade and deter threats, large and
    small, across the spectrum of conflict. When opponents cannot be
    deterred, these options magnify the combat capability of joint and
    coalition forces and provide a variety of alternatives for our
    political leaders to choose from in pursuit of national objectives. We
    provide the Nation with its most lethal and proven force for defeating
    enemies across the broad range of threats we face.
        By exploiting the synergies of air, space, and cyberspace, the Air
    Force provides our Nation with the capability to dominate across
    domains and expand the options available for our sister Services to
    dominate their respective domains. Implementing our strategy requires
    fielding a force of highly trained airmen with a commanding edge in
    technology and a force structure with sufficient capacity to provide
    the assurance of U.S. presence. So long as airmen maintain a global
    presence and hold significant advantages over potential opponents, we
    will continue to provide our Nation with the means to lead the fight
    for global stability and prosperity.
        Our emphasis on assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence reflects our
    conviction that it is far better to convince potential adversaries to
    refrain from the use of military force than to have to defeat them in
    battle. Our success will be measured by conflicts averted as well as
    conflicts fought and won. But we must never forget that our ability to
    assure and deter ultimately flows directly from our unambiguous ability
    to overwhelm swiftly and decisively any adversary who elects to test
    us.
        We are today honing America's edge. Our airmen have sworn an oath
    to serve their country, and they are meeting and exceeding their
    wartime commitments. We remain focused on our Air Force priorities of
    winning today's fight, caring for our people, and preparing for
    tomorrow's challenges. We are assessing threats in an uncertain world,
    balancing our requirements within fiscal constraints, and managing
    risks as we endeavor to strengthen the asymmetric advantages our Nation
    and the Joint Team currently enjoy.
        We will have neither the buffer of time nor the barrier of oceans
    in future conflicts. The Air Force's Regular component is smaller in
    February 2008 than the United States Army Air Forces was in December
    1941. The character, tempo, and velocity of modern warfare already
    severely test our ability to adapt. Therefore, redefining the Air Force
    for the 21st century is an urgent national security requirement--not a
    luxury we can defer.
        America looks to airmen to provide dominance that spans the air,
    space, and cyberspace warfighting domains. Our airmen are fighting
    today's fight, while standing watch across the frontiers of technology
    and the future. They need your support today to defend the Nation from
    tomorrow's threats. Full funding and support for America's airmen will
    ensure America's continued freedom of action; increase global
    awareness; reassure America's allies and strengthen our partnerships;
    reinforce our sovereign homeland defenses; and set conditions for joint
    and coalition success across the entire spectrum of human conflict and
    crisis.
        We imperil our security, our people, and our way of life if we fail
    to maintain and sharpen America's Edge--the Air Force-provided Global
    Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power advantages which underwrite
    the defense and sovereignty of our Nation.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary.
        General Moseley.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF,
                        UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

        General Moseley. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
    distinguished members of the committee, instead of an oral
    statement, allow me to introduce five great Americans that wear
    the uniform of the United States Air Force.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Please proceed to do that.
        General Moseley. Sir, first, let me thank you and the
    committee for all you do for soldiers, sailors, marines, coast
    guardsmen, and airmen. Thank you for the opportunity for my
    boss, Secretary Wynne, and I to spend some time with you and
    talk about the posture of your Air Force, and the vision for
    the future, and the strategy to achieve it.
        The face on those 670,000 airmen are seated behind me, and,
    with great pride, I'd like to introduce them and tell you a
    little bit about each of them.
        First is Lieutenant Colonel Brian Turner. Please stand.
    He's a Virginia Air National Guardsman who flies F-22s at
    Langley AFB in the first of our classic associations with the
    F-22 in the Air National Guard and the Reserve. He's a graduate
    of the University of Virginia. He's a symbol of the Air Force's
    ironclad commitment to total force integration. He's logged
    over 3,600 flying hours in the F-16A, B, C, and D, and now the
    F-22. He has over 300 combat hours in Operations Desert Storm,
    Allied Force, and Iraqi Freedom, and one of his current roles
    at Langley AFB is flying Operation Noble Eagle, which is our
    air sovereignty and air defense of the country over the top of
    Washington, New York, and the east coast, in the F-22, as he
    defends the Homeland. So, that's Lieutenant Colonel Brian
    Turner, sir, Virginia Air National Guard.
        Next is Captain Kari Fleming. She's a C-17 pilot from
    Charleston AFB. She's a 2003 graduate of the United States Air
    Force Academy. So, Charleston is her first and only operational
    assignment. Still, she's amassed over 1,200 total flying hours,
    including 900 hours in the C-17, including 124 combat missions,
    278 combat hours since 2005, just in Operations Enduring
    Freedom and Iraqi Freedom alone. Her missions have included not
    only delivery of equipment and cargo, but aeromedical
    evacuation for fallen airmen and operational airdrops. I was
    having a chat with her the other day, and I asked her the last
    time she landed the big airplane in the dirt, and she says
    she's done that quite often, landed it on dirt roads and
    riverbeds. So, sir, that's Captain Kari Fleming from Charleston
    AFB.
        Next is Technical Sergeant Jim Jochum. He's in the business
    end of offensive air power. He's an aerial gunner on our
    special operations AC-130 gunships out of Hurlburt Field, FL.
    He joined the Air Force in August 1989, and spent 5 years as a
    maintenance airman, then joined Air Force Special Operations.
    Since November 1995, he's logged over 4,300 total flying hours,
    2,500 of that being combat hours, 367 combat sorties in the AC-
    130, which is more than anyone else in Air Force Special
    Operations Command. He has 35 combat support hours on an
    additional seven other sorties. But since October 2001, he's
    accrued 892 days deployed; about 3 years. He wears an Air Medal
    with 16 oakleaf clusters.
        Mr. Chairman, next is Technical Sergeant Michelle Rochelle.
    She's a lead operator for Joint Team of Cyber Operators. She's
    under the tactical control of United States Strategic Command's
    Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. She's
    the leading edge of this business of cyberspace. Her roles in
    conducting computer network attack missions and exploitation
    means she has direct involvement in the global war on terrorism
    and supplying strategic intelligence to America's political and
    military leaders. She truly represents the vanguard of the
    forces that we are attempting to organize, train, and equip to
    operate in cyberspace for the Nation's combatant commanders.
    She also reminds us how critical the cyber-domain is, and that
    it's the nexus of cross-domain dominance, with cyberspace,
    space, and air. She's one of those professionals that you never
    see, you never hear about, but you know they exist, and they do
    this magic work every single day.
        Next is Technical Sergeant Michael Shropshire. He's
    currently the acting operations superintendent for the 12th
    Combat Training Squadron at Fort Irwin, CA. That is our
    embedded operation that we marry our operations at Nellis and
    the National Training Center with the United States Army. He's
    a tactical air control (TAC) party member. He enlisted in July
    1992, as a battlefield airman. He's spent his entire career
    associated with the United States Army; multiple deployments,
    from Joint Endeavor, in Bosnia, to Iraqi Freedom. He wears a
    Silver Star and a Bronze Star. His Silver Star is for
    individual heroic actions while surrounded, cut off under hail
    of enemy gunfire in the largest sandstorm in four decades,
    alongside our Army comrades. He quickly coordinated close-air
    support, putting 12 joint direct-attack munitions (JDAMs) on 10
    Iraqi T-72 tanks, while constantly switching from his radio
    handset to his rifle, personally engaging and killing three
    enemy soldiers at close range. For that, he wears a Silver
    Star. His Bronze Star is for exceptional performance as a TAC
    party member during the 3rd Infantry Division's push on Baghdad
    in March and April 2003.
        So, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished
    members, thank you for the opportunity to bring five of your
    airmen to the hearing so you can put a face on the 670,000
    airmen that Secretary Wynne and I are so proud to represent.
    Thank you to the committee, again, for watching over soldiers,
    sailors, marines, coast guardsmen, and airmen, and for
    understanding that these folks make miracles happen every day.
    [Applause.]
        Chairman Levin. We thank you, General, for taking the time
    to bring these airmen to this committee. We thank you for the
    way you introduced them, for the passion that you show for the
    men and women in the Air Force, as does Secretary Wynne. It's
    an honor to be in their presence.
        General Moseley. Sir, it's an honor to wear the same
    uniform that they're wearing this morning.
        Senator Warner. I think you should stop while you're ahead
    now. [Laughter.]
        General Moseley. Yes, sir, I'll just sit back.
        Chairman Levin. Let Secretary Wynne answer all the
    questions now, right? [Laughter.]
        General Moseley. Sir, I'm ready.
        Chairman Levin. Let me start with the issue of the C-17
    procurement. The Air Force budget for fiscal year 2009 does not
    include any funding to keep the C-17 production line open.
    General Moseley, you've been quoted, though, as saying that
    you'd like to buy more C-17 aircraft. The Air Force stopped
    requesting C-17s when they got to 180 aircraft. Two years ago,
    Congress then added 10 C-17s, the 2007 bridge supplemental.
    That brought it up to 190. Last year, Congress authorized an
    additional eight. The final supplemental appropriation for
    fiscal year 2008 will likely provide an appropriation for at
    least eight C-17s. That would bring us to a total of 198 C-17
    aircraft.
        The Commander of the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM),
    General Schwartz, said late last year that he believed that
    meeting the requirement for strategic airlift aircraft would
    mean having 205 C-17s. So, assuming that the appropriations
    process yields the eight aircraft that were authorized, we
    would then need only to buy another seven aircraft to meet
    General Schwartz's requirements. Nonetheless, this year,
    General Moseley, you've requested 15 more C-17s on your
    unfunded priority list, at a cost of about $4 billion.
        Now,  knowing  that  the  TRANSCOM  requirement  totals
    205  C-17s, my first question is: Why didn't the administration
    include any C-17s? The second question is: Why would you want
    to buy, on your unfunded requirements list, more C-17s than are
    necessary to get to the 205 requirement of the TRANSCOM
    Commander? I think you know these numbers well enough by heart,
    so I won't apologize for throwing a bunch of numbers at you,
    but there's two questions that are involved there.
        General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question.
    Sir, I will tell you, the C-17 is performing magnificently in
    the arena that we have it in. We're doing things with the C-17
    that we've only previously done with C-130s, like landing it in
    the dirt and providing forward resupply to land component and
    special operations.
        When we testified in 2006 that 180 is enough, it was
    predicated on the requirement for strategic airlift remaining
    constant and the C-5 capability being modernized. Mr. Chairman,
    since then, the goal post has moved on us a bit, and we
    continue to struggle with defining that requirement.
        The Army's grown, and the Marines have grown, close to
    100,000. The Future Combat System vehicle that we have counted
    on being able to fit in the C-130, we're told now that it
    likely won't fit in a C-130; we'll have to put it into C-17s
    and C-5s. Africa Command has stood up, which will be an
    incredibly mobility-intense operation, to be able to move
    humanitarian relief and disaster relief equipment and people
    around that huge continent.
        Sir, as we look at the difference in uparmored Humvees and
    Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and to be able
    to move those, it takes us away from the C-130 capability.
        Then, on top of that, every month we fly as much as we can
    off the roads to avoid improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
    insurgents, and we're averaging somewhere around 3,500 convoys
    a month, and close to 9,000 people a month that we get off of
    the roads, away from IEDs and convoys.
        So, as we support the President's budget and support the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in these tough
    decisions on resourcing and affordability, we continue to
    struggle with the notions of: How do we meet those growing
    demands as the goal post moves on us? Those are the discussions
    we have inside the Department as we attempt to come to closure
    on this.
        Chairman Levin. Did you request those additional C-17s of
    DOD?
        General Moseley. Sir, we had those discussions as we put
    the budget together, but it's simply an affordability issue.
        Chairman Levin. But, you did make the request.
        General Moseley. We did talk about it, yes, sir, in the
    unfunded requirements list, as we replied to a request from
    Congress, our desire was to be absolutely open and transparent,
    and to show you where the next dollar would go, if we had an
    additional dollar.
        Chairman Levin. I'll put it this way. Did you argue for it
    in the budget?
        Secretary Wynne. We  could  not  overcome  the  fact  that
    the  MCS-05 capped us at 300 strategic airlifters. There was a
    law basically restricting us from retiring C-5s, so we had to
    use all 110, and the debate over the Nunn-McCurdy was still
    there, so we were not well received with any increase in the C-
    17s, and we knew that.
        Chairman Levin. Does that mean your argument for it wasn't
    well received?
        Secretary Wynne. We did not offer it after we received the
    analysis back.
        Chairman Levin. All right.
        By the way, we'll have a 6-minute first round, if that's
    all right with everybody. On the F-22 issue, there is a
    difference of opinion here between the Air Force and DOD, as
    well, about how many of these planes should be acquired. One of
    the issues, as I understand it, is whether the currently-
    planned 183 aircraft would be sufficient to meet wartime
    requirements. We can't talk about the specific differences in
    an unclassified setting, but it does appear that the Air Force
    and the Office of the Secretary are using different estimates
    for the threat. My understanding is that the Defense
    Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible for publishing
    coordinated threat estimates, against which the whole
    Department fields capability. So my question, General, to you
    is: Is the Air Force using the DIA-approved threat estimates in
    arriving at its conclusion that you need more F-22s?
        General Moseley. Sir, we use all threat information that we
    can get. Of course, inside DIA, each of the Services
    participate aggressively in understanding those threats.
        Sir, I would tell you, we completely support the
    President's budget, and the Secretary of Defense's budget
    submission, but this is also an affordability issue, and that's
    where the discussions really come down as to what we can
    afford, as we have these discussions about meeting our top
    line.
        Chairman Levin. I can understand that, inside of DIA, when
    you have these discussions, there are differences, but there is
    a final threat estimate that is issued by DIA after that
    discussion takes place. Is the Air Force using the final DIA-
    approved threat estimate in arriving at your conclusion that
    you need more F-22s?
        General Moseley. Sir, we use the DIA threat estimate, yes.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Following on the chairman's line, the questioning on the C-
    17, I wonder if you could put a little more emphasis on the
    fact that when we go into a big aircraft program like this, we
    try to set the end-number limit based on what we perceive, at
    that time, to be the challenges for that aircraft over its
    lifetime. I would dare say that the challenges that the C-17
    has met far exceed those projections, in terms of flying hours
    in these operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Those are
    remote places on the globe, and that should be considered as a
    basis for the additional C-17s. Would I be correct, General?
        General Moseley. Sir, you are. Inside the affordability
    discussion is still the notion of another mobility capability
    study that we're working on now, which will be due, I believe,
    in January 2009, to try to capture that movement of the goal
    posts on a larger Army, on vehicles that will or won't fit, and
    on what we're doing with these aircraft, as far as over-flying
    the program flying hours to take convoys and people off the
    roads.
        Senator Warner. So, that has been very substantial.
        General Moseley. Yes, sir, and we're working our way
    through that next mobility capability study to try to better
    define that requirement.
        Senator Warner. From an engineering perspective, is the
    airframe holding up under these stressful conditions?
        General Moseley. Sir, it is. It's a wonderful airplane. I
    won't speak for the pilot back here, but we've not found
    anything that we can't do with the airplane that we couldn't do
    with the C-130, and that's a strat-lifter that we're using in
    the tactical environment.
        Senator Warner. I remember when we worked on this airplane,
    from the congressional perspective, we asked you to make sure
    you make one to do short landing, takeoffs, and drive around on
    the dirt. The captain testifies that they work well on the
    dirt.
        Captain, is that correct?
        Captain Fleming. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much. [Laughter.]
        On the tanker contract, the Secretary spoke to his strong
    affirmation of the procedures that were followed, and I'd like
    to have your perspective on how the winning contract prevailed.
    In my understanding, we have five criteria; was it four out of
    the five that the winning contract, in your judgment, exceeded
    the other contract?
        General Moseley. Sir, since I'm not in the acquisition
    business, I would ask the professionals inside Secretary
    Wynne's world to provide that information for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Air Force made a best value determination based on an
    integrated assessment of the following five evaluation factors: mission
    capability, proposal risk, past performance, cost/price, and an
    Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment. Specific information on
    the assessments of the proposed aircraft, and the comparison of these
    assessments, is source selection sensitive. At this time, such
    information can only be provided verbally in a closed session; we are
    ready to provide a briefing, when requested by the chairman or ranking
    member of the committee.

        General Moseley. I will tell you that we were very
    stringent on the requirements that we laid down for either
    airplane to meet. We made sure we could take these airplanes
    into the 21st century, fight with them, and provide refueling
    for the entire joint team.
        Senator Warner. But, there were clear criteria. In meeting
    the criteria, it appears that the winning contract had the
    stronger aircraft for a number of those criteria.
        Secretary Wynne. Senator Warner, if I could relieve the
    Chief of his anxiety, I can tell you this. There were nine key
    performance parameters. Across that spectrum, all evaluated,
    the Northrop Grumman airplane was clearly a better performer.
        In the area of the proposal factors, there are factors that
    are reviewed, and, in that area, the Boeing proposal was judged
    to be just a little bit more risky, primarily because of the
    complexity of their offering.
        In the area of price, the Northrop Grumman proposal was
    judged to be less, across the board, narrowing slightly at the
    total life-cycle estimate. I think they're going to be
    debriefed on Friday. I have been advised, by lots of folks,
    that if I go into any more depth than that, I have to have it
    in a private session, because it gets into proprietary
    information. But, sir, it confirms your view.
        Senator Warner. At this point, this committee is not going
    to be involved until all those procedures have finished. It's
    the appropriate time for Congress to review how you reached the
    contract and determine if it's consistent with the law. I think
    it's just important, as this debate is beginning to build up,
    to have some facts out there which show that this aircraft is
    the best performer. I'll just close on that.
        On the question of the cyberspace, it was quite interesting
    that you had one of your outstanding airmen here today on that
    subject. Tell us a little bit about the cyber command. This is
    an area in which I've had a lot of interest.
        Secretary Wynne. We stood up a provisional command down in
    Louisiana last September, in order for it to shape itself and
    become organized. There are elements around the country that
    have an interest, and a continuing interest. We have, so far,
    been solicited by 16 States for the location of the final
    command. We are going to communicate with the point of contact
    in each of those States on or about mid-month, this month.
    We're going to cut off the supply of information, so we can do
    an evaluation, between July 4th and November. We intend to
    down-select to four of the prime candidates in November, and
    then down-select to a single candidate in December, and try to
    do it in as fair and unbiased manner as we can.
        We've also asked the command to become virtual. In other
    words, we've said, ``We don't want you to be a standard pro-
    forma command, as you might see from the Napoleonic era.'' We
    think we should go into the information age, so we asked them
    to look at Accenture and Amazon and companies like that, see
    how they operate, and minimize the headquarters. By the way,
    the units that are already located in the various States around
    the country; our first inclination is to leave those in place.
        Senator Warner. Let me turn to my last question, on the
    unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. Congress, in its
    infinite wisdom, and I had a hand in this, laid down some goals
    that by 2010, one-third of the aircraft in the operational
    deep-strike force should be unmanned. Now, I have to tell you,
    at the time we did that, it was to try to push your Department
    into more forward thinking on this. However, the Unmanned
    Systems Roadmap for 2007 to 2032, just delivered to Congress,
    did not describe how it plans to achieve that goal, nor does it
    include striking targets as key UAV role missions in the
    future.
        UAVs are really performing magnificently, particularly on
    the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It's becoming an
    essential component of our overall Armed Forces. We were
    privileged, yesterday, to have the CENTCOM Commander before the
    committee, and the Commander of the Special Operations Forces.
    He reiterated his growing dependency on the UAV for Special
    Operations and various programs across the board.
        Secretary Wynne. We're extremely proud of the partnership
    we have with the Special Operations Command. By the way, the
    reachback activities that you cannot find in country, you have
    to come to Beale AFB, or you have to come to Nellis, or
    sometimes you have to come to areas here in Washington, DC, to
    find the actual operators who are doing that. Sir, you may look
    in the budget this year and find that we are asking for 92
    airplanes, of which half of them are unmanned. That's one of
    the reasons that we're running into a little stress, if you
    will, on our manned fleet. Our unmanned fleet is burgeoning,
    and deliberately so. We're actually running into a little bit
    of buildout constraints, if you will, in being asked by the
    suppliers to add to their capacity, to make sure that we can
    order more.
        That having been said, we're also asking our Army
    colleagues if we can show them, and use their resources,
    because they have a lot of Shadow aircraft that we think we can
    press into the fight, and maybe meet some of your larger goals.
    As we go forward in our unmanned long-range strike, we're
    actually thinking about having that aircraft be a manned and
    unmanned variant, because we see the manned as, in fact, a
    constraint. He can only go for 11, 12, 13 hours, as we have in
    the U-2, and SR-71 programs. Absent the individual, we find
    Global Hawks can go 24 to 27 hours.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time is up.
        General Moseley. Senator Warner, that number is 93
    airplanes, and 52 are unmanned, that the Secretary talked
    about. Our Reapers, our MQ-9s, that we're using, that you
    talked to Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson about, we have those
    in strike squadrons, not reconnaissance squadrons. The vector
    we got from the committee awhile back on moving into strike,
    that version of the UAV is a strike platform, not a
    reconnaissance airplane.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Just for the information of Senators, on this question of
    the tanker contract, the committee staff is going to schedule a
    briefing after your briefing of the parties.
        Secretary Wynne. Excellent.
        Chairman Levin. They, and we, will be notified of the time
    and place of that briefing, in case any Senator might want to
    attend, personally. Senators, of course, may ask for individual
    briefings. That'll be up to each Senator.
        As a matter of timetable, if there is an appeal to the
    Comptroller General, which the law apparently allows, what is
    the timetable for that?
        Secretary Wynne. I think it's shortly after they get
    debriefed, which will be this Friday.
        Chairman Levin. Is there a 10-day, 20-day, 30-day?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, I'd have to get that back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Code of Federal Regulations covers the timetable for an
    unsuccessful offeror to file a protest. According to 4 C.F.R.
    21.2(a)(2), protests shall be filed not later than 10 days after the
    basis of protest is known or should have been known (whichever is
    earlier), with the exception of protests challenging a procurement
    conducted on the basis of competitive proposals under which a
    debriefing is requested and, when requested, is required. In such
    cases, with respect to any protest basis which is known or should have
    been known either before or as a result of the debriefing, the initial
    protest shall not be filed before the debriefing date offered to the
    protester, but shall be filed not later than 10 days after the date on
    which the debriefing is held.

        Secretary Wynne. I thought it was 10, but it could be 30, I
    don't want to misspeak.
        Chairman Levin. Very good. Thank you very much.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, General, thank you. Thanks, to all those who
    serve under you, who are behind you today and in many other
    places around the world to protect our security and our
    freedom.
        I would like to talk to you for a moment about the Multi-
    Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP). This
    extraordinary, next-generation X-band radar that has been
    developed for airborne surveillance systems can provide
    unprecedented situational awareness to the warfighter of both
    ground and air targets.
        There's a history here, obviously, which is that this was
    being developed for the E-10A. That plane was canceled by the
    Air Force. At one point, the work on the MP-RTIP was stopped,
    even though we had spent over $1 billion on it. Then, I think,
    quite correctly and wisely, the Air Force realized that was not
    the right way to go, and began to come back to developing MP-
    RTIP, because it is a unique capability. You've listed MP-RTIP
    as one of your unfunded priorities, for $285.5 million. The
    description is, ``Accelerates MP-RTIP development while the Air
    Force determines the most viable platform to carry the future
    MP-RTIP sensor.''
        I want to make a pitch, and then ask you what you think. I
    know there's consideration of doing this radar system on a
    smaller variant to be used on a Global Hawk. That's obviously
    positive, but I hope that you're also considering using it on
    the E-8, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
    (JSTARS) platform, because of the additional capabilities that
    the larger version of MP-RTIP gives you that can be put on the
    JSTARS. I'm thinking, particularly, about the increased ability
    of the larger system to detect and track targets with a much
    smaller radar signature. Here I include cruise missiles because
    of the ability to protect our forces in the field. But as the
    chair of the Homeland Security Committee, my concern is the
    potential for a cruise-missile attack by terrorists or enemies
    on the U.S. Homeland.
        So,  my  question  is  whether  the  larger  platform  and
    a  larger  MP-RTIP are under consideration as part of this
    unfunded priority list?
        General Moseley. Sir, it is. If you remember the reason we
    had to cancel the E-10 was because of cost growth on it, and we
    couldn't see our way clear to spend that kind of money on a
    single demonstration airplane. But, the concept of the
    technology is still most attractive. We've looked at versions
    to put on the 707 airframe, but we're limited on the 707
    airframe, just from the distance from the belly to the runway
    on the size of an antenna that you can put on it.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Moseley. So, there is a version of it that will fit
    on the existing 707 airframe, and we've worked with the
    contractor for that.
        We've also kept it alive to put it on the Global Hawk which
    addresses Senator Warner's question about unmanned vehicles and
    persistence.
        So, sir, I think there is a future for this capability,
    because of the need to be able to see things small, both on the
    unmanned and on the manned side of this.
        Now that we have a tanker contract with another type of
    aircraft that is bigger, we have options to go back to the
    bigger antenna, to create a bigger aperture, so that we can
    take a look at that.
        We've had the conversation amongst ourselves about: How do
    we start that program, now that we have an airframe that is big
    enough, the distance from the runway to the belly of the
    airplane, that we can put the bigger antenna on it? So, it's
    very much alive.
        Senator Lieberman. You might put the antenna on the
    tankers?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, all of our derivative aircraft are
    707s.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Secretary Wynne. What we're looking at now is, thinking
    about going to the systems houses and asking them to,
    essentially, design their product for a platform that's in the
    Air Force inventory, and give them the right to come back to us
    with: What does it fit on? I think that would put the impetus,
    if you will, on the electronics instead of the platform.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. That's very
    encouraging, even exciting, so long as we can find a way to
    acquire that larger MP-RTIP piece of this.
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, in your chairmanship of the Homeland
    Security Committee, you might think about the reason that the
    National Guard is so excited about the F-22, frankly, is that
    it also can chase down cruise missiles.
        Senator Lieberman. Hear, hear. Although I think its
    capacity, as great as it is, will be amplified by the MP-RTIP.
        Secretary Wynne. If it gets cued, it's much easier.
        Senator Lieberman. That's the key.
        Briefly, on the fighter programs. First, on the JSF, you do
    not fund the alternate engine for the JSF in your budget
    request. During hearings last year on this issue, you
    characterized it as unnecessary and a potential cost that could
    delay fielding of the JSF. Is that still your position, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Wynne. I think the issue really is affordability.
    It fails the business case. I would note that Senator Warner
    emphasized reliability. If you go to a single airplane for 8,
    9, 10 nations, then the question is: Does it have to pass a
    business case in order to just be an investment in uber
    reliability? Recognizing it doesn't pass its business case, as
    Senator Levin pointed out on the C-17, we don't get much
    support for putting it forward. We do agree with the
    President's budget, as it sits, but we also look at it and
    think: What should America take responsibility for in the area
    of reliability?
        Senator Lieberman. Understood.
        General Moseley. Senator Lieberman, if I could piggyback my
    boss.
        Senator Lieberman. You sure can.
        General Moseley. The holding of the F-35-series aircraft,
    F-35 A, B, and C, timeline to the original requirement is
    something we're very sensitive to. Being able to deliver that
    airplane on time, for not just the Air Force, but the
    international community, as well as the Marines and the Navy,
    is a concern to all of us about being able to bring that
    aircraft online, in the numbers that we need, on time.
        Senator Lieberman. I agree, and appreciate the answer.
        My time's up. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I was going to start off with my concern over the number of
    the F-22s, but I see that Senator Chambliss is here, and I'm
    sure he'll cover that in enough detail, I won't have to use my
    time to do it.
        A lot of discussions are taking place about the aging
    equipment. I know that you guys have tunnel vision, you're
    concerned mostly about the Air Force, but this could be a
    hearing of the Army, the Marines, and the Navy. All of them
    have this same problem. We had a conversation a couple of days
    ago with General Wurster, the Air Force Special Operations
    Command Commander, and he told me about a refueling mission
    with a KC-135, where they had problems transferring gas from
    one of its wings through the boom; instead of aborting the
    mission, the crew devised a workaround, offloading gas from the
    good wing, and then pumping it over to replace it and maintain
    the balance all at the same time. So I know this is happening.
    Things like this are going on.
        Going into Baghdad, they always put me in the oldest C-130s
    they can find. [Laughter.]
        I'd say, ``You know, I'm convinced. You don't have to do
    that with me.'' [Laughter.]
        We actually lost two engines going in once. Not one, but
    two engines. Then, of course, the last time, we were about 8
    minutes out, we were shot at, and if we had had something that
    performed better, we would have been out of range by that time.
    So, I don't have to be convinced. I know that's a problem. But,
    I wonder how many people in this room know that, in the case of
    the lift vehicles, that Tinker has a reverse engineering
    facility, where it reverse engineers parts of our aging
    aircraft, because there just aren't the parts available. Is
    this a program you're familiar with, General Moseley?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir. Also in our wings, when the old
    aircraft go through phased maintenance, we work very closely
    with the depot teams associated with that mission design series
    so that we're actually manufacturing parts for aircraft that
    there's no supply for. Even in phased maintenance, not just in
    depot, we are supplying things down to the wing level to be
    able to keep the old airplanes flying.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. I know it's true in Georgia and Utah,
    and in Oklahoma, that the Air Logistics Centers are really
    doing a great job, much better job than they used to do. We had
    occasion to take a team around to all of them and compare as to
    how it's being done. It's being done very well.
        I am glad that people are now talking about the overall
    problem. I can remember 7 years ago when Donald Rumsfeld was up
    for confirmation, asking him the question about the overall
    problem: How can we assure that 10 or 15 years from now, we're
    going to have the best of everything? We went through this
    thing where we didn't have the best of everything. Certainly
    John Jumper was very courageous in the late 1990s to point that
    out. He said, ``Well, we went through the entire 20th century,
    for 100 years, averaging 5.7 percent of gross domestic product
    (GDP) for military.'' This was 7 or 8 years ago, he said,
    ``It's down now to about 2.7 percent.'' Now it's up to about
    3.4 percent. So, I said, ``Where should it be?'' A lot of
    people have done a study on this thing, and it's somewhere
    around 4 to 4\1/2\ percent. Well, nothing happened for about 6
    years. Now people are talking about it.
        I noticed, General Moseley, in February 29th's Early Bird,
    you were quoted that you are looking at that, too. You came up
    with something, probably off the top of your head; 4 percent. I
    would like to hear any comments the two of you might have right
    now about this, where we should be, and then make a request.
        Go ahead.
        Secretary Wynne. Actually, we have swung in to support the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who looked at it, conducted what
    I would say is probably a short assessment, and felt that 4
    percent was an appropriate floor. But when you fall below that,
    you really begin to build up a bow wave because you begin to
    shut things down. If we were to shut down a shipyard or an
    aircraft line, these things just do not start back up again on
    their own initiative. That's where you begin to really build a
    bow wave forward and cause yourself to really think about
    getting back into the 4s and 5s. Whereas, if you a had a nice,
    steady rate, I think it wouldn't have gotten us there.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes.
        General Moseley. Senator, my analysis takes us to that 4
    percent number, which allows us, whether it's shipbuilding or
    aviation or space, to be able to lay in the capital investment,
    in the long term, to be able to recapitalize aging systems, and
    to stay ahead of obsolescence on the inventory, whether it's
    ships or whether it's aircraft. If you could stabilize the
    contractors and lay that in, then you can also get economic
    order quantities that you can deliver the systems much faster,
    at lower cost, and you can field the capability much faster for
    the entire joint team. Less than that, we are making
    fundamental decisions based on affordability, not on notions of
    protecting the industrial base and delivering capability.
        Senator Inhofe. All of that affects the risk that these
    guys over here to your left are facing on a daily basis.
        I saw something in your written statement that surprised
    me, and it pleased me. Each of us up here is on two standing
    committees. Of course, this is the Senate Armed Services
    Committee. My other one deals with the crisis that we have in
    terms of energy. I'm quoting now out of your statement, it
    says, ``Finally, as a result of congressional interest, we have
    begun considering a potential for small-scale nuclear power
    production on Air Force property.'' Could you elaborate a
    little bit on that?
        General Moseley. Sir, the Secretary and I have discussed
    the opportunity to put a small nuclear reactor on an AFB or on
    a military installation because you can protect it, you can
    secure it, and you can also generate the power from it in a
    very clean way.
        We've asked the question: What would it look like, and how
    would we efficiently ask the question? But, I think it merits
    some discussion.
        Secretary Wynne. Right, you can't terrorist-proof it, but
    what we want is something that is not dangerous to the
    community.
        Senator Inhofe. Sure.
        Secretary Wynne. They have, now available, interesting
    designs which we can put on parts of our base. You can actually
    almost bury it, but it takes up about a football field, and
    produces about 50 megawatts, which would take the military off
    the grid, which I think might be valuable in the event of a
    grid catastrophe. It could also provide the surrounding
    community with a maintenance amount. It's one of those things
    that I've been worried about since we stood up Cyber Command
    and people began to tell me about what the threats are. I said,
    well, maybe we ought to make sure that we're protected, in
    several ways.
        General Moseley. Senator, we've pushed the limit about as
    far as we can on geothermal, on wind, on renewable energy, and
    alternative energy sources. We run most of our bases west of
    the Mississippi on alternative energy. We've also flown
    airplanes with synthetic jet fuel. With the Secretary's
    leadership, we've pushed very hard into that world of renewable
    and alternative energy, but there's a limit to wind and
    geothermal and solar that seems to be an opportunity to begin
    to ask the question: What can we do next?
        Secretary Wynne. Right.
        Senator Inhofe. My time is expired, but I applaud you for
    that, and encourage you to pursue that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and thanks to our men
    and women in Air Force blue, for your commitment and your
    service, as well.
        Senator Levin was talking about the unfunded request that
    you're looking at to recapitalize and modernize the fleet. As I
    understand it, we're talking in terms of $20 billion this
    budget cycle, but it's also my understanding that you're
    thinking in terms of $20 billion for each of the next four
    budget cycles after this one. Is that correct?
        General Moseley. That's correct.
        Senator Ben Nelson. We've gotten ourselves into a situation
    where the budget really is never a budget, it's maybe not even
    a blueprint at times. My concern is that, when we continue to
    put requests outside the budget, we're creating a bypass of the
    process, in part, but, also, we're skewing what the budget
    really looks like. So, what we should be thinking about is,
    whatever comes here next year, if it doesn't include that $20
    billion, just begin to automatically add $20 billion in our
    thinking, because that's what's going to automatically happen?
    I'm not trying to pin you down, as much as I am raising serious
    questions about the process, not suggesting you don't need the
    money.
        Secretary Wynne. Senator, I think one of the best ways to
    look at it is, we have been below 4 percent now for several
    years. We have been actively engaged in a war for 17 years. We
    went through a procurement holiday, and we have built up a bow
    wave. Now, the American taxpayer can tell us that, ``You know,
    we don't want the kind of defense you all are offering. We
    would rather that you were smaller or that you just let
    yourself grow old.'' I think there's enough of a democracy out
    in the world that we owe you what we believe it takes. However,
    when the die is cast and the gavel comes down, this is America
    and we follow direction.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is the theory that it might be easier
    to convince us than it is to convince the administration?
        General Moseley. Sir, I wouldn't say that. Remember the
    unfunded requirements list was a request from Congress as to
    where we would put the next dollar.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I know. I know. I just wonder why it
    comes to us in that situation, as opposed to coming through the
    regular budget.
        General Moseley. Sir, the last budget that we submitted,
    the Air Force spent 2.2 million manhours on submission of that
    program objective memorandum (POM) inside the Department. So,
    we do spend some time trying to get it right, given the fiscal
    guidance that we're given by the Department. We have those
    discussions inside the Department, and we salute smartly when
    the Secretary of Defense makes a decision and submits that
    budget to the President. I have no problem with that; I support
    that fully. But, when asked, ``Where would you put the next
    dollar?'' I think the right way to answer is to be absolutely
    transparent and honest.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I don't want to put a penalty on
    candor.
        General Moseley. We did the same thing last year, sir. The
    last 2 years, we've told Congress exactly where we would put
    the next dollar, if we had an extra dollar.
        Senator Ben Nelson. If we could move to cyber for a moment,
    as we look toward the high-tech requirements that protecting
    cyberspace is going to require, are we in a position to be able
    to recruit young people and/or people from industry with the
    right technical background for that kind of command?
        Secretary Wynne?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, first of all, we can't afford not to
    because it is a warfighting domain, and we consider ourselves a
    net-centric operation. I would also tell you that my
    interaction with industry is, they are ready, willing, and able
    to help us in that, and many of them have constructed some
    network operations centers on their own, that they're willing
    to share with us, as to where they're going and what their
    innovation is. We have, in our own Air Force Institute of
    Technology, a master's degree program in cyberspace, in aspects
    of technology relating to cyberspace, and we're establishing,
    actually, National Guard squadrons, in the Silicon Valley and
    in Seattle, Washington, that are very well attended. So, we
    find that this is an area whose time may have come. The
    question is: How do we organize, train, and equip correctly,
    and how do we make sure that we maintain the right kind of
    leadership to get this done?
        Senator Ben Nelson. The importance of a public/private
    partnership is fairly obvious because we can certainly acquire
    a great deal of technology and information that can help us
    from the private side. Is there any effort to try to make this
    a three-party arrangement so that you have the private side
    together with Homeland Security, as well as the Air Force?
        Secretary Wynne. I want to be sure that we can organize,
    train, equip, and present forces where we are asked to do it.
    So I am working very closely with Strategic Command, as the
    combatant commander, and making sure that we have the right
    attributes to support him. When it comes to the Director of
    Homeland Security, the mission is a little bit different. When
    it comes to some of our partners in the Intelligence Community,
    the mission is a little bit different. We see it as a cross-
    domain exercise. In fact, we have a warfighter school set up at
    Nellis, that the Chief set up, so that we could show if you can
    synchronize a cyberdefense together with an air attack and a
    ground attack, it is a remarkable, remarkable difference.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, you think that there is a
    possibility of synchronizing what happens with the requirements
    from Homeland Security, together with the Cyber Command
    component?
        Secretary Wynne. I think we will all learn from each other,
    but the missions are a little bit different.
        General Moseley. Senator, I think we have to do it that
    way. I think we have to look at ways to capture those
    synergies. I would offer that the two of us, as we've stood up
    this provisional command and looked for a full command, we're
    just now beginning to understand how to ask the question about
    cyberspace. So, I'm not sure we have the answers yet.
        So, the first steps are to understand the domain, get our
    professionals, like our Technical Sergeant here, involved in
    that, and look for ways to partner with both the academic world
    and the industry and the other departments to see how to even
    ask the right questions.
        Senator Ben Nelson. The assets of the private sector are
    considerable, and if they can be made available to assist, that
    certainly would provide not only synergy, but I think it would
    provide compatibility, to bring all of our interests in
    protecting the cyber area together.
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to say, General Moseley, that a good friend,
    Chuck Larson, U.S. Attorney in Iowa, sent me a book by his son,
    Major Chuck Larson, who served in Iraq, about heroes, people
    who won Silver Stars. This individual, who won the Silver Star,
    gave great credit to his tactical air traffic controller, who
    was under fierce fire, as your airman, here, and he said, when
    that was over, he had one goal; that was to go find those guys
    and hug them, because they would not have survived without
    them. Those soldiers, who were in very desperate situations,
    made a reference to their ability to call in air support that
    was critical in saving the lives of Americans. Of course, we
    have a lot of airmen in Iraq and Afghanistan, serving in all
    kinds of different circumstances today. We thank you for that.
        I thought I would mention the tanker. Mobile is a strong
    Air Force town. Brookley AFB had 40,000 people working there at
    one time, and it was just closed in the 1960s, and the town
    endured 30 years of struggling. Now, the Northrop Grumman team
    searched the world over and selected that as the place to
    construct a new tanker, if they were able to win the contract.
    They have been able to do so. I just have never seen anything
    like the excitement that our people feel for the opportunity to
    once again be a part of the Air Force community, to see the
    revitalization of that fabulous old runway and the engineering
    building they have already constructed. They intend to move
    forward.
        I just want to share a few thoughts about that process.
    This committee became engaged in it. The lease proposal that
    turned out to be an embarrassment for us all was raised.
    Senator McCain, in the Airland Subcommittee that I chaired at
    the time, long before Mobile was ever considered a site for
    this, objected to the lease agreement. He made a number of
    valid points. We had analyses of alternatives, that formal
    procedure, and Government Accountability Office reports. It
    came up to full committee, and Senator Warner, as he noted, and
    Senator Levin, as ranking member at that time, believed that
    this was not the way to go, and that we should have a
    competitive bid process. Congress voted on that. We said, ``No,
    we're not going to do a sole-source lease. We're going to have
    a competitive bid process.''
        Now, Secretary Wynne, if you're going to buy a large
    aircraft transport plane, and you're going to have a
    competitive bid process, you need more than one bidder, don't
    you, to have the benefits of bidding?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir, you do.
        Senator Sessions. In the world, how many companies produce
    major large aircraft?
        Secretary Wynne. Right now there are three. We are actually
    running MRAP vehicles back on Antonovs, and then there's EADS,
    and then there is Boeing.
        Senator Sessions. Yes, there were basically two at the
    time, and so, you had the two bidders. They bid, and did you
    make a commitment, implicitly and explicitly, that you would
    fairly evaluate those bids, and that, when it was over, you
    would award the contract to the best bidder?
        Secretary Wynne. We made a commitment that we would be
    transparent, that we would apply the laws of the land in a fair
    way, and be very communicative to Congress, as well as to the
    companies. I think we've done that.
        Senator Sessions. Did anybody claim and object, at any
    time, that the Northrop Grumman lead responsible bidder and the
    EADS partner was unqualified to bid and shouldn't be allowed to
    bid, and didn't meet the standards for bidding, that you're
    aware of?
        Secretary Wynne. Not that I'm aware of.
        Senator Sessions. I didn't hear that either. So the
    complaints have come now from some who didn't win. I think
    that's a bit late. We can discuss the bidding process, if we'd
    like, and what kind of changes we'd like, but it's not
    acceptable to change the rules in the middle of a game. It's
    certainly not acceptable to change the rules after the game is
    over and the winner has been declared. So, I think politicians
    really need to be more circumspect than what I've been hearing
    from some; not on this committee, but others.
        I would just note a couple of things about that contract,
    because it is important to me, and I've watched it. There will
    be 25,000 new American jobs created in 49 States; 230 companies
    will participate in this process. The Commerce Department has
    said, despite some different numbers being floated, they
    estimate that the Boeing plant would amount to 25,000 jobs,
    also. So, it was the same number. I would note that we have
    gotten an aircraft that I think, in all the major criteria, is
    superior.
        Let me just ask you, Secretary Wynne, my time has run out,
    but with regard to the criteria, that includes how far the
    plane can fly, how long it can stay in the air, how much fuel
    it can carry, and life-cycle cost, and other factors. Those are
    fairly objective criteria.
        Secretary Wynne. We had nine key performance parameters
    (KPPs). We actually allowed the competitors to trade off
    anything that was not a KPP. So, you're right, those were
    actually contributions to the warfighting mission.
        Senator Sessions. I thank you for your leadership, and I
    believe the Air Force conducted the most transparent and open
    bidding process, perhaps in the history of this kind of
    procurement, perhaps setting a model for the future. You did it
    on an objective basis, I believe, and came out with one
    conclusion, which was that this aircraft, that was selected
    according to your professionals who analyzed it, was clearly,
    clearly was the word they used, superior. I don't think
    politicians should now seek to alter a process we've approved
    all along.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, good morning. Thanks again, I enjoyed the visit
    yesterday. Thank you all for your service to our country.
        One of the things in our private meeting that I didn't
    bring up, that we've talked at length about, is, back a year
    ago, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the Air
    Force to produce two reports on the future of the test and
    evaluation wing at Eglin AFB. We've gotten one of those
    reports. We have another one that's coming. As I understand,
    it's coming pretty soon. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you, is
    the Air Force planning restructuring of test and evaluation
    that will affect Eglin by reducing manning or capacity?
        Secretary Wynne. Remember, sir, we were waiting for the two
    reports to come in, and I understand that OSD is also looking
    at the Defense Test and Readiness Management Center. We'll have
    to wait to see what they say, but as far as I know, it appeared
    to me the capacity was held.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you will make your decision on a
    comprehensive analysis and a coordination with DOD and the
    other Services before you come to a conclusion, then I feel
    confident. As the first RAND study has already shown us, what
    was originally planned by the Air Force was certainly not in
    the interest, not only of the Air Force, but not in the
    interest of DOD. For example, in that first attempt to try to
    squeeze money out of the Air Force Materiel Command, you were
    shutting down the climatic lab. It's one resource in the world.
    You can't duplicate it. You could say, ``Well, we can send
    people to Greenland to simulate cold, then we can send them to
    the desert to simulate hot.'' But, what about if you want a
    combination of sleet with the snow, or what if you want a
    combination of wind from a certain direction coming in with a
    certain temperature? You certainly can't simulate what we can
    do in that climatic lab.
        Secretary Wynne. I think, sir, you've hit upon a stress
    point across our Nation, frankly, that affordability can't
    always be the rule.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Here's where the problem is. This is
    the nub of the problem. DOD said we have to cut X number of
    billions of dollars. The Comptroller of DOD allocates it out to
    the various Services. The Services allocate it out to the
    various commands. Materiel Command got a cut of $1.7 billion,
    and it tries to figure out how it's going to do it, and it
    says, ``Well, we can get $800 million by shutting down these
    things in test and evaluation, and squeezing it together with
    Edwards AFB.''
        Now, that's wrongheaded decisionmaking on the basis of an
    artificial number imposed by a comptroller of DOD, allocated
    out, because that's not considering the mission of the entire
    DOD. The mission of DOD, in this case, is to be able to test
    and evaluate all of our systems, highly sophisticated weapons
    systems, so that they will work when we call on them to work.
    So here's the wrongheaded budgetary thinking, ``Well, we have
    to impose this much cuts.'' I appreciate the drill that you all
    have to go through, and I know the discomfort. But, when it is
    an artificial number given to certain commands, and they're
    looking at it through a tunnel, they don't see the big picture
    of how it's going to affect DOD.
        Now, the reason I get so worked up about this that I had to
    get into it, and I had to put an amendment on the authorization
    bill to stop it, because it was going to happen by my amendment
    causing the studies. The RAND study came out and basically
    corroborated a lot of what I've said, and we're waiting on the
    second study right now. I just want to make sure that behind
    the scenes, that suddenly this guy with the green eyeshade up
    there in the Comptroller's office who is saying, artificially,
    for you all to cut a certain amount, that this is not
    happening, and it becomes a fait accompli, to the detriment of
    the defense of the United States.
        Secretary Wynne. I think there is some support, without a
    doubt, for the climatic laboratory and some other facilities
    there at Eglin in the RAND report, and as I remember, even in
    the second one that's still being reviewed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I'm just using the climatic lab as one
    example. There are other unique facilities there, and a unique
    mission of test and evaluation. That's why we have almost the
    entire Gulf of Mexico off of Florida that is restricted
    airspace, so you all can go out there and test and evaluate
    those weapon systems.
        General, I didn't ask you any questions, but do you want to
    comment?
        General Moseley. Sir, test and evaluation is a big deal for
    us, because the Air Force lives on technology, the Air Force
    lives on fielding technology to make the warfight quicker with
    less losses. We live at the leading edge of technology, whether
    it's altitude, speed, lethality, precision, or efficiencies of
    being able to deliver ordnance. Eglin is an important part of
    that for us, as is China Lake for the Navy, as is Fallon for
    the Navy, and Edwards is. The synergy of all of this is a big,
    big deal for us. Getting it right is a big deal for us.
        Sir, having said that, it wouldn't surprise you for a
    Secretary or a Chief to say, ``But, we're still living inside
    the world of what's affordable and what's our top line.'' Those
    are the decisions that we're struggling with every day. But,
    sir, rest assured, test and evaluation and fielding systems is
    at the top of our list.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I don't want this to happen in the
    dead of night. It almost did, 2 years ago. I was just fortunate
    that this little country boy happened to be in the right place
    at the right time before it happened. As the Good Book says,
    ``Come, let us reason together.'' I hope you will be mindful of
    that in the future.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me just make a few observations about the tanker
    replacement announcement last week. The chairman mentioned this
    in his opening remarks, and I'm glad to know that there will be
    further opportunity for information, Mr. Chairman, on the basis
    for the award, which, of course, is information that should be
    provided after the competitors are debriefed. But, I would just
    note, for those who might not have been in the room, that the
    Air Force has been commended for the special efforts toward
    transparency in this particular process. Those are not my
    words, those are the words of the chairman of this committee. I
    would echo the words of my chairman, in that respect, to our
    two witnesses today.
        Of course, the assembly of these aircraft will occur in
    Mobile. That's right next door to Jackson County, MS. I expect
    a lot of Mississippians will be among the 25,000 Americans who
    will participate in the new jobs created by this program. So,
    as a Mississippian, and as an American, I am very pleased about
    this.
        It has been mentioned, also, that the KC-135, which was
    about a decade old when I was in field training at Grissom AFB,
    and got to take a flight and lie in the boom, there, and watch
    a refueling, is now 48 years old, and time is wasting on the
    new tanker replacement. We've already lost a lot of time in
    this regard. Those are not my words today, those are the words
    of our esteemed colleague, Senator Warner. I would just, again,
    say to our two witnesses and to our colleagues, that I
    appreciate Senator Warner's statement that Congress should not
    get into the business of rewriting contracts. Certainly, we'll
    be debriefed about it, as I've already said.
        Had the award gone to the competitor, I would, no doubt,
    have been disappointed. But, I do think that we should not lose
    sight of the central question, and that is producing the best
    aircraft for our service men and women, and for the mission. I
    also appreciate other Senators today pointing out that, on the
    categories of mission capability, proposal risk, past
    performance, cost, and integrated fleet aerial refueling
    assessment, the Northrop bid did come out first in four of the
    five key areas, and tied in the other key areas.
        Ms. Payton, the Air Force Acquisition Executive, has stated
    publicly that this decision had to do with the requirements the
    warfighter needed. We need to keep that in mind. I'm glad these
    jobs are coming to the Gulf Coast. I'm glad that it's going to
    an aircraft that's 60 percent U.S. content, as compared to the
    other proposal, which was only 57 percent U.S. content. But,
    that wasn't part of the criteria that the Air Force was asked
    to look at; they were asked to look at the requirements.
        General Arthur Lichte, Commander of the Air Mobility
    Command, has stated about the Northrop Grumman proposal that
    this is an American tanker. It's flown by American airmen. It
    has a big American flag on the tail. It will be saving American
    lives every day. He went on to say that it can be summed up in
    one word, more: more passengers, more cargo, more fuel to
    offload, more patients that we can carry, more availability,
    more flexibility, and more dependability. The KC-135, according
    to the information I have, will have 22 percent more fuel
    offloaded, 30 percent more booms on station time, 68 percent
    more cargo capacity; and more aircraft fly-by-wire and state-
    of-the-art avionics.
        An independent aerospace analyst, Loren Thompson, said of
    the award, mentioning four of the five key areas where Northrop
    bested the opposition, that the outcome and victory by Northrop
    Grumman was not even close.
        I would also point out to the committee that the KC-45,
    which was chosen by the Air Force in this transparent process,
    has won the last five international competitions against the
    other competitor; the United Kingdom, Australia, the United
    Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, and now, of course, our own
    United States Air Force.
        I would just hope that the disappointment by people who
    have worked real hard on the other project has subsided, that
    we won't lose sight of the main objective; that we're already a
    little bit behind on this, we've lost some time, and we need to
    get on with it.
        So, gentlemen, I haven't asked a question, either. If I've
    stated anything that's factually incorrect, I'd invite you to
    comment on that.
        I thank the chair for indulging me.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wynne, I just want to say, from my point of view,
    you've done an outstanding job of leading the Air Force. I know
    you've had some tough issues to deal with over there, but
    you've been a straight shooter, and we really appreciate what
    you've brought to the table.
        General Moseley, I've known you for a long time. I really
    appreciate your service and leadership. I'm not going to talk
    about the tanker deal; I guess because none of it is in South
    Carolina. But, from a 30,000-foot view of the Air Force, the
    question for Congress is: Do we need more money for the Air
    Force and the Navy as we grow the Army and the Marine Corps?
    When you add the supplemental budgeting with the baseline,
    Secretary Wynne or General Moseley, what percentage of GDP have
    we been spending?
        General Moseley. Senator, I believe that's 4.6 or 4.7
    percent. But, if you'd allow us to get the exact number, we'll
    provide that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

         The National Defense Budget Estimates For Fiscal Year 2009 Office
    of the Secretary of Defense ``Green Book'' provides the following
    information with respect to DOD funding as a percent of GDP.

        Senator Graham. The point is, for my colleagues, whether
    you believe defense spending should be 4 percent of GDP. We're
    spending more; we're just not doing it in a very wise way. I
    think we could baseline 4 percent and probably get what we
    need. So, I hope the committee and Congress will look at trying
    to avoid all these supplementals, and get a baseline that
    works.
        For the last 17 years, we've been in states of undeclared
    war, in terms of the Air Force. Is that correct, General
    Moseley?
        General Moseley. Yes, Senator, that's right.
        Senator Graham. We've been flying 2.2 million hours per
    year for the last 17 years.
        General Moseley. Averaging about 17 years, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Of that, how much is combat time?
        General Moseley. Sir, I've asked them to get those numbers,
    and we'll provide that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Information previously provided to Senator Graham. (In response to
    questions from Senator Graham on the FHP, we [A3] provided a full
    breakout on Operations (Combat and Combat Support) and training hours
    from fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 2007.)

        General Moseley. Combat, combat support, and the rest of
    the training time.
        Senator Graham. Now, for a military lawyer, that sounds
    like a lot. Is it?
        General Moseley. Sir, that's a lot.
        Senator Graham. Okay. For 17 years, we've been in some form
    of combat somewhere, flying 2.2 million hours, and doing it
    with 30 percent less airplanes. Is that correct?
        General Moseley. That's correct, sir. From the baseline of
    1989 and 1990, Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, to where
    we are now, we have a little over 30 percent fewer aircraft.
        Senator Graham. A lot more challenges.
        General Moseley. They're over 40 percent older.
        Senator Graham. So, let me get this right. We've been
    flying the wings off these things for 17 years, performing
    missions in combat. The air fleet is 30 percent less than it
    used to be. The age of the planes have grown 40 percent during
    this period of time. Is that correct?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Now, we're going to grow the Army and the
    Marine Corps. Do you support that?
        General Moseley. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. We need more boots on the ground, right?
        General Moseley. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Now, tell me what happens to the Air Force
    when you grow the Army and the Marine Corps.
        General Moseley. Sir, first off, when the Army grows, we
    grow--a certain percentage, because, like our TAC party
    member--behind me here, we have members of the Air Force
    embedded into Army formations. So, when the Army grows the
    brigade combat teams that we see now, that's at least 1,000 or
    so more airmen that live inside the Army formations. When the
    Army grows to those larger numbers of brigade combat teams,
    same with the Marine regimental combat teams, the mobility
    requirement obviously goes up, to be able to support either
    forces in the field or force rotation modules.
        Senator Graham. So, the workload of the Air Force is going
    to grow as the Army and the Marine Corps grow. Is that correct?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Tell me about the C-17, the assumptions we
    had a few years ago about its utilization and reality now. How
    has the C-17 mission changed?
        General Moseley. Senator, we're using the C-17 a lot like
    we've used all our strat airlifters, but also like we've used
    our theater airlifters. We're using C-17s like we have C-130s
    when we take convoys and people off the roads.
        Senator Graham. How much of that are you doing?
        General Moseley. Sir, somewhere around 3,500 to 3,600
    convoys, and around 9,000 people a month that we take off the
    roads, away from IEDs or insurgents.
        Senator Graham. So, in-theater airlift allows us to take
    9,000 people off the roads.
        General Moseley. Rough numbers, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Tell me about how the C-130 utility has
    changed, given the new needs of the Army.
        General Moseley. Sir, the C-130 is still a wonderful
    airplane. The C-130J is the gold standard for intra-theater
    airlift. That's why we continue to support that program, and
    the numbers that we see to replace the old C-130s, which we're
    obviously flying the wings off of.
        But, sir, as we look to support a modernized Army, as the
    Army moves into the future with their digital system, we're
    told now that the baseline vehicle that they're looking at
    won't fit in a C-130. So, to move the new Army around, we're
    going to have to use C-17s or C-5s to be able to do that.
        Senator Graham. So, the assumptions we had a few years ago
    about the C-17 have changed, because the Army is changing.
        General Moseley. The Army is modernizing, changing, and
    growing. I support all of that.
        Senator Graham. Now, your son's an F-15 pilot. Is that
    correct?
        General Moseley. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Graham. Is he flying the same plane you flew,
    basically?
        General Moseley. Sir, he's flown several airplanes that I
    flew.
        Senator Graham. I don't know how old you are, but that's a
    pretty old plane. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Do you want to tell us, off the record, how
    old you are, General? [Laughter.]
        General Moseley. Sir, a pretty old fighter pilot.
        Sir, he's flown several airplanes that I've flown, and he's
    flown several airplanes that I flew as a captain. So, not just
    because I have a son that does that, but because they're all
    sons and daughters to all of us, I think we owe it to them, to
    the folks behind me here, to have the best flying machine and
    the best satellites that we can field for the joint team.
        Senator Graham. Some people say, ``Why do you need
    fighters? We don't have any enemies out there anymore.'' Tell
    me about China and their fighter aircraft.
        General Moseley. I believe, in the world of modernization
    out there, we're not the only ones that are modernizing the
    systems. I think there are threat systems out there that as the
    DIA baseline reports, that Chairman Levin referenced, are not
    just fighters, but they're surface-to-air missiles (SAMs),
    integrated systems, early-warning radars, target-tracking
    radars, as well as the fighters. There are countries out there
    that are producing wonderfully capable, very lethal systems. To
    be able to survive in that world, or better yet, to be able to
    deter or dissuade, I believe we need the best systems that we
    can possibly field.
        Senator Graham. Can the F-22 and the F-35 meet those
    threats?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir, they both can.
        Senator Graham. Finally, I believe the number that you're
    talking about to put the Air Force in good shape is $20 billion
    a year.
        General Moseley. Rough number, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay. So, for $20 billion more, the
    American public would have a modernized Air Force, where the F-
    15 pilots would not be flying the same planes you flew; we'd
    have a C-17 capable of supporting the Army; we'd have the
    ability to suppress any new air defense systems out there and
    continue to support the Army and the Marine Corps in their
    missions. Is that correct?
        General Moseley. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Graham. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to add my welcome to the Secretary and to the Chief
    of Staff, and thank you so much for your service to our great
    country, and also thank all the personnel in the Air Force, as
    well.
        The Air Force is currently conducting operations, and this
    has been mentioned here already, in the oldest fleet of
    aircraft in its history. As chairman of the Readiness and
    Management Support Subcommittee, I'm especially interested in
    helping to maintain the air superiority that has protected our
    military forces since the Korean War, which was the last time
    an American soldier was attacked by an enemy air force. I look
    forward to working with you and address the concerns that you
    have.
        Mr. Secretary, the Air Force continues to train and provide
    airmen for ground combat duties in Iraq. They call it the ILO
    program, where they are performing missions that have
    traditionally been carried out by our Army personnel. I
    understand the benefits these airmen have provided to our
    overstretched ground forces, but what has been the impact of
    the ILO program on Air Force readiness and ability to perform
    its own core competencies?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, we've taken this for the most part
    out of hide; meaning that most of our units operate with a
    little bit less competent players.
        I'm very proud of the service that our airmen have provided
    in the ILO opportunities. I was a little bit surprised that we
    haven't had the combat service support come up faster in order
    to replace them. I've had a theory that I've advanced, that
    every airman or rifleman doesn't work in the limit. I'm very
    proud of what they've done, to date, and I tell my Army
    colleagues that they love the innovation and imagination that
    they bring. But, they have had an impact on our operational
    readiness. We've stretched this out, and it has not impacted us
    in a way we can highlight.
        General Moseley. Senator, with our end strength headed for
    316,000, we will have less capacity to offer up the magnitude
    of the ILO tasking that we are performing now. We have a little
    over 6,000 deployed this morning, and about 15,000 or so in the
    pipeline; so, a little over 20,000 or so wrapped up in that. As
    we go from 330,000, where we are now, to 316,000, we will have
    less capability to offer up that magnitude of people outside
    the career field or outside the workplace that they're involved
    in, in their Air Force job.
        That's the piece of this that we're working through with
    Joint Forces Command to identify where we can continue to
    contribute to the joint fight, the long war on terrorism, and
    still not begin to influence or impact negatively on the units
    that we have for the other combatant commanders. Because, on
    any given day, 53 percent of your Active Air Force is committed
    to a combatant commander, higher than any other Service,
    because of space, because of mobility, because of command and
    control. So, when you have 53 percent committed to the global
    set of combatant commanders, and you're taking 20,000-plus
    people out, I want to make sure we have that right. Those are
    the discussions we're having now with Joint Forces Command and
    the OSD staff.
        Senator Akaka. My concern has been for the Air Force and
    whether what's happening in this program takes away anything
    from the Air Force.
        General Moseley, the Army's shift to transform to a more
    flexible, modular force will involve the use of many more
    unmanned systems than is in use today. Even now, Army UAVs are
    being piloted by Army personnel in conducting operations in the
    global war on terrorism. As both the Army and the Air Force
    transition to greater numbers of unmanned systems, I am
    concerned about overlapping roles, missions of two Services.
    The word joint Services, of course, is an important word, as it
    is being used now.
        My question to you is: What type of future integration will
    be necessary between the Air Force and the Army to ensure unity
    of effort when conducting close air support and reconnaissance
    missions? How will the Services cooperate with their respective
    unmanned systems in managing the battle space?
        General Moseley. Sir, the Army Chief and I have been
    friends for a long time, and we've worked this personally. In
    fact, we have agreed to merge our two Concepts of Operations
    (CONOPs) into a single CONOPs for looking at theater
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and
    looking at fielding these systems.
        On the tactical side, we effectively buy what the Army
    buys, and they have a great operation in Alabama to do that. On
    the strategic side, all the Joint Force leverages off of Air
    Force strategic systems, be they Global Hawk, U-2, Rivet Joint,
    or the other systems, manned or unmanned. The seam between the
    strategic side and the tactical side, or the high altitude and
    the low altitude, is that area that we're working now to make
    sure we understand fully how to employ the maximum amount of
    combat effectiveness with the minimum amount of friction. So,
    sir, the Army Chief and I are working this very hard.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
        My time is expired, Mr. Chairman. I'll submit my other
    questions for the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you very much for
    your outstanding service.
        I, for one, believe that we do need to increase the top
    line. I hate to see you robbing from Peter to pay Paul. I think
    that the Air Force is at a pretty remarkable crossroads, in
    terms of deciding what to buy next, and how many to buy. We
    have aircraft that are getting older and flying more than
    expected. I appreciate your focus on modernization, and I think
    we have to stay ahead of our adversaries out there. But, the
    facts are pretty daunting, and they're evident in my State of
    South Dakota, just like they are everywhere else in the Air
    Force. You look at the 114th Fighter Wing, an Air National
    Guard unit in Sioux Falls, the F-16s there are F-16s that were
    built in 1985, they're 23 years old, they have an average of
    5,000 hours apiece on the airframes, which is an astounding
    measure, by any account. The B-1s that we have at Ellsworth AFB
    are also showing their age, and they're being used much more
    than was projected. Most of those aircraft are over 20 years
    old. Due to the support of the operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan last year, the 28th Bomb Wing flew 171 percent more
    than normal.
        So, I guess I want to hone in a little bit on a couple of
    the questions with regard to replacing those.
        Secretary Wynne, as you look at the roadmap for future
    sites and potential bed-downs of some of these new aircraft, I
    was pleased to see that the Sioux Falls Air National Guard Base
    at Joe Foss Field was on the Air Force's future weapon systems
    roadmap. By replacing some of the F-16s and A-10s and F-15Es in
    our inventory, the F-35, of course, is going to be critical to
    our Nation's Air Force. I was also pleased to see that
    Ellsworth AFB was on the roadmap as a potential bed-down for
    the next-generation bomber.
        I guess I'd be interested in getting your comments on the
    status of the roadmap, maybe some insights into potential
    timetables for when the Air Force is going to begin analyzing
    potential bed-down sites and initiating those environmental
    impact statements that go with it.
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, first of all, we are pleased to tell
    you that we work closely with the Adjutants General across the
    United States to do our total force, because we are becoming
    increasingly reliant on our Reserve component as the Air Force
    gets smaller. We look at the roadmap that has been devised, as
    a guiding tool, because the timing of all of our product that
    we can replace, we're not replacing at a rate that causes us to
    run around to try to figure out where the roadmap goes. Even
    with the long-range strike airplane, we're talking about an
    initial operational capability (IOC) of 2018. We're not backing
    off of that, but we recognize that you're not going to have a
    squadron of those. You're going to have a flight-ready system
    of that ability in the 2020 timeframe, which is going to
    require sitting and everything else in around the 2012-2013
    timeframe to get that started.
        We're a little bit surprised that, every time we move a
    fighter squadron to a fighter squadron base, we would have to
    do an environmental impact study, but that's the way it is.
    That will come, I think, on the roadmap, with enough time to
    allow us to do it, maybe in 2, 3, or 4 years, right in that
    range.
        But, we are excited about the prospects for maintaining the
    funding profile, maintaining the level of competition we have.
    We'll probably be back here, as we can declassify our ongoing
    pursuit of the next-generation bomber. I think the committee's
    going to be extremely pleased with the way we've integrated
    technologies that are available to us across this great
    country, to make this happen, and make it, not really a
    revolutionary vehicle, but, in fact, an evolutionary vehicle.
    It gives us hope that we can maintain our timelines.
        General Moseley. Senator, I would also add, with the
    Secretary, that when we look at having some definition by 2012
    or 2013 to be able to do the environmental work to look at
    bedding down the new bomber, we're working the 2010 budget
    right now, so we're there. We're beginning to look at the bed-
    down and the fielding and the criteria, not only for the total
    force, but also the new systems. The budget for 2010 is not
    that far from a set of activities in 2012, so I would say we're
    there.
        Senator Thune. Mr. Secretary, you noted in your prepared
    testimony that the Air Force is already the model for melding
    its Guard, Reserve, and civilians into the regular Air Force
    elements, and I wholeheartedly agree with that, and that you're
    looking to push that synergy to new levels. One of the things
    that you have done in the Air Force is use this concept of
    active association units, which I understand is a program that
    brings Active Duty airmen and mechanics to Air Guard bases to
    receive training from the more seasoned Air Guard counterparts.
    Could you just state for the record a few details about that
    program, how many of those associations exist, what the process
    is for an Air Guard base to obtain an active association unit?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, I'd have to get that for you for the
    record, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        There are 22 Chief of Staff of the Air Force-approved Active
    Associations (18 flying, 4 non-flying) on the current Total Force
    Integration (TFI) List.
        The objective of the TFI associations is to meet Air Force
    operational mission requirements by aligning equipment, missions,
    infrastructure, and manpower resources to enable a more efficient and
    effective use of Air Force assets. While the desire for associations is
    on the rise, proposed TFI initiatives require concurrence between both
    gaining and associating MAJCOMs, and must satisfy an existing MAJCOM/
    COCOM requirement. Headquarters Air Force, in close coordination with
    MAJCOMs and the National Guard Bureau, develop missions and identify
    potential integration opportunities that satisfy current and future
    capabilities requirements that align with national security
    requirements. Prior to making any TFI association decisions, the Air
    Force takes into consideration factors such as facilities,
    environmental impact, available manpower, usable airspace, and current
    number of aircraft. Additionally, there is a prerequisite to craft and
    submit a TFI Initiative Review Worksheet and Reserve MAJCOM/NGB legal
    approval of the proposed initiative. The initiative must then be vetted
    through the Air Staff, approved by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
    and must ultimately compete for funding in the Air Force programming/
    budgeting process. A summary of the complete TFI vetting process can be
    found in AFI 90-1001.

        Senator Thune. Okay.
        General Moseley, one avenue for keeping the aircraft flying
    is modernizing them. We had a briefing yesterday on some of the
    things that are in the budget this year to modernize the B-1.
    What's proposed is placing advance targeting pods on the B-1s,
    and the question I have is: What kind of a capability does that
    give to a B-1? Does it in any way obviate the need for fielding
    a new bomber by 2018?
        General Moseley. Sir, the answer to the second question is
    no. To be able to bring the B-1 inventory up to the best
    capability that we can, given the missions that we're operating
    now in Iraq and Afghanistan, putting the targeting pods on
    there, and being able to use that both as a striking platform
    and a nontraditional ISR platform, just makes perfect sense.
        The lethality and the precision that you get with the
    Sniper, or the Littening pod on that airplane, to be able to
    deliver ordnance is just an incredible capability. Who would
    have thought a few years ago that we would be doing this to the
    B-1? The airplane has proven to be an outstanding striking
    platform in the scenarios that we have right now; supporting
    Army and Marine and Special Operations Forces.
        Senator Thune. Just one last question, if I might. One of
    the things that you all have focused on, and I commend you for,
    is pursuing alternative fuels to alleviate our dependence upon
    foreign oil. The Air Force, in particular, is the biggest user
    of fuels in the country. In the prepared testimony, you said
    the B-1 is on track to be certified to fly on a synthetic fuel
    blend sometime this year. My question would be: How helpful
    would it be to the Air Force to be able to enter into multiyear
    contracts, beyond the statutory 5 years, perhaps out to 10
    years, when it comes to purchasing those types of fuels?
        Secretary Wynne. It's really crucial to making a market,
    because this is really about using the muscle of big government
    to make a market in a marketplace that's not there yet. You
    have to get beyond the timelines that the bankers require, to
    make sure that there is a successful market out there. We can
    take all of our payments, essentially, in fuel, but the fact of
    the matter is, we're going to need, probably, 5- to 7-year
    commitments out there, plus some options, to make sure that we
    are convincing to the marketplace, that they should invest, and
    it is a substantial investment, in these new alternative energy
    products and processes, to make sure that we're still going to
    be there as a consumer. It is my intent to be a consumer, to
    make a market, and not to be a producer.
        So, as we go forward in time, whether it's natural gas to
    liquid, coal to liquid, biofuels to liquid, whatever it is, we
    recognize that we have to have a long-term arrangement so that
    they can build the facility, produce the facility, and then
    we're still there to take the fuel.
        General Moseley. Senator, if I remember the numbers right,
    we burn a little over 4 billion gallons of fuel a year.
        Secretary Wynne. Right.
        General Moseley. Not all of that is jet fuel. We burn about
    7 million gallons of jet fuel a day. So, 4 billion gallons
    includes diesel and gasoline and jet fuel. Alternative energy
    and synthetic fuels are a big deal for us.
        Secretary Wynne. I will tell you, very proudly, that the B-
    1 that we're about to qualify, the two-stage engines, is going
    to get us into the supersonic realm, and that allows me to
    branch out and now begin to qualify some supersonic fighters,
    as well as supersonic bombers.
        Senator Thune. Huge savings, I think, but also really
    important, in terms of our getting away from that dependence on
    petro dictators when it comes to our energy supply.
        So, General, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your
    service.
        General Moseley. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you as always for your great service to
    our country. To those men and women who are sitting in blue
    behind you, thanks for the great job you do each and every day
    to make this world a safer place, and a safer place for my
    children and my grandchildren.
        I had a chance to speak to about 500 of your chief master
    sergeants earlier this week in Atlanta, and what a great bunch
    of men and women they are. They're really, really great
    leaders, and we all know they're doing a terrific job in
    providing the kind of leadership that makes America a safer
    place.
        Gentlemen, Senator Levin asked if the Air Force was using
    the DIA validated threat assessment, earlier, regarding how
    many F-22s you need. I believe you said that you were. One key
    issue regarding how many F-22s we need relates to how many
    advanced SAMs countries like Iran may have in the future.
        We just checked, and the DIA has those assessments and
    projections for the short-term, for 5 to 10 years, but not for
    any further. The OSD study assumes that Iran will have only a
    handful of advanced SAMs in 2024. However, as far as I can
    tell, there is no DOD assessment to support that number. If you
    have any comment on this, I would appreciate it.
        General Moseley. Sir, I would only say, relative to the
    threat assessment, as a squadron commander, you only know what
    you know. It's easy to build those systems, and it's easy to
    proliferate those systems; and so, you don't really know what's
    there until it shoots at you or you have the signature of it.
    The notion of a capability is probably the more critical of the
    opening arguments, equally to the numbers. The fact that the
    SA-20 or the SA-15 or the SA-10 exists, and the fact that they
    can be bought on the open market, and sold alongside the target
    tracking radars and early warning radars, is the threat that we
    worry about.
        Senator Chambliss. Gentlemen, at the DOD posture hearing
    earlier in February, Secretary Gates commented that we are
    fighting two wars, but that the F-22 has not performed a
    mission in either theater. Isn't it a fact that we have an
    awful lot of expensive weapons systems in our inventory that
    we've never used in Iraq, or in Afghanistan, but because we
    don't know who the next enemy's going to be, it's important
    that we have these weapons systems in our inventory, to make
    sure that we're always the world's strongest military?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir. If you'll let me defend my
    Secretary of Defense for a minute, I think he was answering a
    question about: Has the aircraft deployed, and have we got it
    out into the inventory? We have it in the Air Expeditionary
    Force rotation. We've used it for Operation Noble Eagle, but
    we've not deployed it into the theater. So, he's correct.
        However, the ability to have the capacity or the capability
    to defend against the threats that you described is the
    fundamental question.
        Senator Chambliss. Is it correct that the F-22 is designed
    to gain access and create and maintain air dominance?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. Is it correct that the F-22 has
    capabilities for gaining access and achieving air dominance by
    countering other advanced aircraft and SAMs that the JSF does
    not have?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. Is it correct that the JSF is optimized
    for the air-to-ground mission, and that, although it has some
    anti-access capability, it is not optimized for the anti-access
    mission?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir, and that's why our requirements
    are for both airplanes, and the requirements to have the
    synergy of both airplanes to be able to field that for the
    whole joint team.
        Senator Chambliss. The vision of the Air Force is that
    these two great weapons systems are to work hand in hand to
    make sure that we never have to worry about air dominance.
        General Moseley. Correct, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. I understand that, in 2015, when we are
    scheduled to be procuring 80 F-35s a year, that the cost per
    plane is estimated to be $77 million per copy. Is it true,
    however, that given all the uncertainties that go into weapons
    procurement programs, we really don't know how much the F-35 is
    going to cost?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, we're just not producing airplanes at
    the rate of 180 a year, like we did the F-16. We're not
    producing them at the rate of 100 tankers, that we used to. So,
    our trend is definitely that our great plans for producing or
    acquiring 100 of these fine F-35s may not come true. In other
    words, if we reduce the manufacturing volume at any plant you
    can assume that the price is going to rise.
        Senator Chambliss. The F-15 has been a great weapon system,
    and a great fighter. General Moseley, as you said, you've been
    in that plane. Is there any value in purchasing any additional
    F-15s today?
        General Moseley. Sir, my personal opinion is no, because
    you can make the airplane reasonably lethal, but you can never
    make the airplane as survivable as the F-35 and the F-22. You
    can get a missile off of it, you can increase the ability of
    the radar to see a little bit, but you'd never make it as
    stealthy, you can't reduce the signature; therefore, you can't
    make the airplane as survivable.
        Senator Chambliss. Are there comparable aircraft flying, in
    the hands of other countries today, to the F-15?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. PA&E's Joint Air Dominance Study states
    that the Air Force only needs 183 F-22s, which is our current
    projected buy. This study assumed that, in 2024, of the two
    near-simultaneous major combat operations (MCOs) that the
    United States must be prepared to fight, only one of those MCOs
    would require the Air Force to defeat advanced SAMs. Do you
    agree with that assumption?
        General Moseley. Sir, we're working very hard to get those
    baselines right. We're working very hard with PA&E, and with
    the folks in OSD, to better understand those threat levels. My
    personal opinion is, we have to be prepared to deal in a
    variety of locations, in a variety of places, and a lot of that
    is threat-dependent. Your opponent gets to choose where they
    decide to fight, and in the numbers that they decide to fight.
    I think we should be prepared to deal across that full
    spectrum.
        Secretary Wynne. An interesting fact there is that these
    advanced integrated air defense systems are getting less and
    less expensive, and as people who have a tendency to use them
    are, in fact, accruing more and more wealth, it becomes just a
    decision on their part as to whether they want to engage.
        Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, I know my time's up. I
    have a couple of more questions.
        Chairman Levin. Go ahead.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
        The PA&E study also assumed that it would take
    approximately 10 days for the Air Force to achieve air
    dominance in the most stressing MCO, and then swing to another
    MCO. Do you agree with those assumptions? In your estimation,
    does TRANSCOM have the logistical network to support such a
    swing?
        General Moseley. Sir, as a guy that's commanded two air
    campaigns in combat, I would tell you that any projection on a
    week or 10 days is still adversary-dependent. What we would
    like to impose on an adversary and what actually happens may
    not necessarily work that way. It's back to the notion of, what
    can you afford, what capacity can you field, and what
    contingencies and what depth are you looking for? Given ideal
    circumstances, 10 days might work. But again, that's adversary-
    dependent, and it's hard to bet the farm on something that is
    adversary-dependent.
        Secretary Wynne. I note that, in the Millennium Challenge,
    it was a Marine Corps general, I think, that was in command of
    the adversaries, and he did something so unusual that we
    actually had to restart the game. So, planning on how the enemy
    will react to you might not work out.
        Senator Chambliss. Has the Air Force ever proposed any
    reduction in the JSF to procure additional F-22s?
        General Moseley. No, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. The fiscal year 2009 budget request
    contains $497 million in F-15 operation and maintenance (O&M),
    presumably to fix the F-15s that are currently grounded due to
    fatigue and cracked longerons. I understand that there are
    currently nine F-15s that you've identified for longeron
    replacement, at a cost of $235,000 per plane, for a total of
    $2.1 million, and that these costs may be covered by fiscal
    year 2008 funds. Is that correct?
        General Moseley. That's what we understand, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. I understand that, based on the current
    funding profile, long-lead suppliers for the F-22 program will
    begin shutting down in the fall of 2008, and that procuring
    another four aircraft in the supplemental, as has been
    suggested, will keep these suppliers operating for another 2 to
    3 months. Again, is that what you've been advised?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, that's up to every individual
    supplier. But, if you look at the profiles in which they are
    funding, the amount of funding that is available from four
    airplanes, and by the way, the cost of those airplanes will
    probably rise fairly dramatically, we're just not sure of the
    sufficiency.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay. The projected buy of F-22s today
    is 183. I understand that's a budget number, and it's what's
    been proposed by the Air Force. From a personal standpoint,
    General Moseley, do you think that number's enough?
        General Moseley. No, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wynne?
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, not being the warfighter, my reliance
    is on the outside agencies, and I think there's a study out
    there that basically says about 277 gets you to the minimum
    medium risk. So, that's what I would rely on. Otherwise, we're
    driven by affordability.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay.
        General Moseley. Senator Chambliss, I would offer, this has
    been a true affordability discussion inside the Department
    about trying to meet our top line in the fiscal guidance both
    for 2008 and the 2009 budgets. As we look at the POM10 budget,
    it is all about trying to get as much capability as we possibly
    can get into the budget, as we understand it, and the guidance
    that we've been given.
        Senator Chambliss. Let me just say to both of you
    gentlemen, obviously we've had a number of conversations about
    this particular weapons system, as well as others, including
    the C-17, I think it's a mistake to shut down that line. But,
    I've also had those same discussions with OSD and individuals
    in that office, and I appreciate your frankness. This committee
    operates somewhat independently, but yet dependent on what
    comes out of OSD. But, we're the ones that ultimately are
    charged with the decisions of how to spend the taxpayer money,
    and how much of it to spend. We can't do that without your
    being frank and straightforward with us. I want you to know I
    appreciate your doing that, in spite of the fact that you can
    have disagreements within the building over various issues. I
    would hope that those who have an opinion otherwise will allow
    us to continue discussion with them until we resolve this
    between Capitol Hill and the Pentagon.
        Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Thune asked about long-term arrangements for
    synthetic fuels and alternative energy. Mr. Secretary, you
    talked about the desirability of making a market for that by
    entering into, potentially, long-term contracts. Is legislation
    required to do that?
        Secretary Wynne. As near as I can tell, sir, it is. The
    Defense Energy Supply believes that they have only a 5-year
    contract, and I think the companies are looking for 7 to 9
    years.
        Chairman Levin. Have you recommended to them that authority
    be----
        Secretary Wynne. We requested. Yes, sir, we have.
        Chairman Levin. Of them?
        Secretary Wynne. I've asked that they request the
    authority, because I don't want to go into the buying business.
    They should be in the buying business.
        Chairman Levin. You've asked them to ask Congress for
    increased authority?
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Any memos that you can give us
    on that subject, we'd appreciate.
        Secretary Wynne. Okay.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        No formal memorandum from the Air Force has been issued. The Air
    Force expressed support for long-term contract authority for the
    purchase of synthetic fuels to the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC)
    in various meetings over the past several months. DESC was also
    supportive of the long-term contract authority and drafted a
    legislative proposal and we understand this proposal is in review at
    the Office of Management and Budget.

        Chairman Levin. I'll ask both of you, should we terminate
    the JSF alternate engine program?
        Secretary Wynne. Here's where we have to be very supportive
    of the President's budget.
        Chairman Levin. Why do you have to be supportive here, but
    not on the F-22s and not on the C-117s?
        Secretary Wynne. We're actually supportive of the
    submission. If you were to ask us for a personal opinion, I
    think we could perhaps offer you that.
        Chairman Levin. Okay, let's try a personal opinion.
        Secretary Wynne. On a personal level, we were very happy to
    have the F-16 fighters available when the F-15s got stood down
    because of cracking. To offer America reliability on the air
    dominance fighter fleet, it was nice to have two airplanes.
        One of the things we have here is the possibility of having
    two airplanes, but with one being a very short fleet and the
    other one supporting eight countries, you have to ask yourself:
    What reliability should be there? So, we looked to high
    reliability operations to ask the question. I'll note for you
    that, on the Shuttle, there are quadruple redundancies that
    would not make a business case; they only made a strategic
    reliability case. You have to look at: What is America doing in
    involving nine countries and essentially taking decisions on an
    affordability basis, and not looking at the statistics for
    reliability, and just pushing them all the way to the nines?
        Right now, the Pratt & Whitney engine is making its mark,
    and doing a great job. We expect that they will have problems
    downstream, because this is an aircraft program, and this is an
    engine program.
        Chairman Levin. In your personal judgment, should we cancel
    the alternate engine program?
        Secretary Wynne. I would tell you that's a very tough
    decision, but my personal opinion is, I would keep it alive.
        Chairman Levin. General? Your personal opinion on whether
    we ought to keep the program going or not.
        General Moseley. Sir, we do support the President's budget
    and the submission out of DOD. The issues on affordability,
    though, take us to these other discussions on a variety of
    levels.
        To use the money that would perhaps slip the entire program
    would not be advantageous to all of us. I believe there should
    be a second engine. My personal opinion is, there should be a
    second engine. We have had some problems with turbine blades on
    the F-35B.
        Sir, this goes back, again, to the affordability question,
    and it goes back to: How much money do we have to put into
    these programs to keep them online and on-time delivery?
        Secretary Wynne. Right.
        Chairman Levin. These issues always come back to
    affordability. That's what budgets are for, and that's what
    appropriations are for, and that's what priorities are for, and
    that's what judgment is for, and that's what difficult
    decisions are for, but nothing new about affordability being
    the issue, at the end of the day, that you have to figure out,
    what can you afford, what will you pay for, and what can't you
    pay for?
        On the readiness issues, on your list of unfunded
    priorities you don't make reference to readiness at all. I
    don't believe that the word appears there.
        General Moseley. Sir, we have several entries in there on
    modernization things, and on sustainment.
        Chairman Levin. Right. But, on the readiness issue, in
    terms of depot maintenance, 77 percent of the projected depot
    maintenance requirements are met in this budget, so that leaves
    a shortfall, on depot maintenance, of 23 percent. That's a
    pretty significant shortfall. Perhaps not quite as big a
    shortfall as last year; but, nonetheless, a shortfall. Is that
    troubling to you?
        Secretary Wynne. Depot maintenance is periodicity, as well
    as usage. I would say that those folks have managed to use
    productivity improvements and lots of things, but they have a
    list of things, to make them better, and I think part of this
    maintenance fee can be deferred, and that's what we're trying
    to judge. When you come to affordability, you build it up,
    section by section and level by level. We think that 77 percent
    gives them exactly what they need to make their mission.
        Chairman Levin. Are you comfortable with 77 percent,
    General?
        General Moseley. Senator Levin, I'd like to have it higher.
    I would like to have it so that we could maintain the aging
    systems until we can recap them with new systems. General
    Corley gave me a note the other day that said every dollar he
    spends on modifications to his existing inventory, 86 percent
    of that goes to safety and sustainment, with only 14 percent
    going to enhanced warfighting capability. I think that gives
    you a rough gauge on what the depots are doing for us. The 77-
    or-so-percent number is a true baseline. We can survive with
    that, but we don't have the depth and the capacity, and we
    don't know what part of this old inventory is going to break
    next.
        Chairman Levin. Now, another readiness issue is the flying-
    hour program. In your testimony last year, Mr. Secretary, you
    explained that the Air Force was increasing the risk in
    readiness accounts in order to protect modernization accounts.
    Your budget request last year included a 10 percent reduction
    in flying hours, compared to fiscal year 2007.
        General, you indicated last year that you had some
    discomfort with that reduction in flying hours, and you were
    trying to find ways to, as you, I think, put it, or we put it,
    ``migrate funds back into the flying-hour program.'' But, the
    request for fiscal year 2009 included an additional reduction,
    it's a modest one, but, nonetheless, a continuing reduction, to
    the flying-hour program. We are concerned that the reductions
    in the readiness account are, like you say, budget-driven
    rather than driven by the operational requirements, safety
    requirements, and risk requirements.
        So, here's my question. Are you troubled, General, by this
    additional reduction in flying hours?
        General Moseley. Sir, there's two answers to that. I'm
    always troubled by the reduction in flying hours; but, in this
    budget, we also lose, I think, 270 aircraft out of the
    inventory, so we have less airplanes to fly. We've also
    restructured a bit of training command, so we take some of the
    time out of the undergraduate pilot training and undergraduate
    navigation training syllabus. So that particular piece, I'm
    comfortable with.
        The operational composite-force training, the preparation
    for Afghanistan and Iraq, or whatever we have to go do next,
    I'm less comfortable with that, and we work that, hard.
        Secretary Wynne. Senator, I think there's a mismatch of
    numbers here. What General Moseley's saying is that we think
    it's the mix of the fleet that actually caused the appearance
    of a reduction in flight hours; but per pilot, we have not
    reduced flying hours.
        Chairman Levin. Can you get us those figures, if we don't
    already have them?
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. If we do already have them, just let our
    staff know where they are because I think that's a very
    important distinction.
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir, we will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In the Air Force fiscal year 2009 President's budget submission,
    the active Air Force O&M flying hour program delta between fiscal year
    2008 and fiscal year 2009 was programmed at 26,968 FHs (2.5 percent
    reduction). Although all programs have minor changes, the major factors
    driving this decrease are:

              13,342 FHs for AETC T-38C - shift of student pilot production
            from fighter to heavy aircraft to meet the Chief of Staff of
            the Air Force's guidance to right size unit manning.
              5272 FHs for AETC F-15C/D anticipated force structure
            reductions.
              5803 FHs for AETC F-16C/D - shift of student pilot production
            from fighter to heavy aircraft to meet the Chief of Staff of
            the Air Force's guidance to right size unit manning.
              2638 FHs for ACC F-117A - weapons system retirement.

        The programmed hours per crew per month (HCM) data:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Fiscal Year
                                                     -----------------------
                                                         2008        2009
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fighters \1\....................................        14.4        13.9
    Bombers \2\.....................................        15.3        14.5
    Tanker..........................................        15.1        15.1
    Airlift.........................................        23.0        22.9
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Drivers of HCM change between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009
    \1\ Fighters
      (1) MAJCOMs had the option to decide which aircraft's flying hour
      program to adjust and how many hours to adjust in each fiscal year to
      meet their ``10 percent'' flying hour program funding reduction.
      (2) DMO.
      (3) Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP).
    \2\ Bombers
      (1) MAJCOMs had the option to decide which aircraft's flying hour
      program to adjust and how many hours to adjust in each fiscal year to
      meet their ``10 percent'' flying hour program funding reduction.

        Note: There were no explicit programmatic actions taken to reduce
    hours per pilot in fiscal year 2009. The HCM calculation used pilot
    numbers as of the end of the forth quarter for each year. As the pilot
    numbers catch up with the force structure drawdowns, the resultant
    fiscal year 2009 HCM will be closer to the fiscal year 2008 levels.

        Chairman Levin. I think you were, nope, almost made it.
    [Laughter.]
        General Moseley. We would be remiss.
        Chairman Levin. We're delighted that Senator Warner got
    here in the nick of time.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I was privileged to join with our Senate leadership in
    having a small meeting with His Majesty, the Prince of Jordan.
        The question I would ask is just to recite the pros and the
    cons, as you see it, of having a competitive engine process
    continue for the F-35 aircraft. I recognize the position of
    your Department. I respect that. But, just let's evaluate the
    pros and the cons of that issue.
        Chairman Levin. If I could interrupt, Senator Warner, when
    you were out, they crossed the Rubicon on this issue, in terms
    of their personal support for the second engine; they both
    expressed their personal support for it. I did not ask,
    however, your question, which is the pros and cons. I don't
    want to interrupt that, but since you weren't able to be here,
    I just wanted to bring you up to date.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Secretary Wynne. Sir, as we start this, first of all,
    supporting the President's budget, it was arrived at from
    affordability. It was arrived at because the Pratt & Whitney
    engine was, in fact, going along very well, and seemed to be
    hitting its statistical levels. The impact on the program
    appeared to be that it failed the business case. So it did not
    get into the budget, and I think we, both of us, have that as
    our starting point.
        If I could, as Senator Levin said, cross the Rubicon once
    again to offer you, from a professional standpoint and a
    personal level, what the pros and cons could be, I would say it
    this way. I was very pleased to have two airplanes when the F-
    15 developed cracks. The reason I was very pleased to be able
    to do that is, we swung a lot of F-16s in to support and
    essentially accomplish the mission of the F-15 while they were
    being examined for reflight. We were very pleased to have two
    engines for the F-16, sometime back, when we had an engine
    failure. Quite a few of our international partners had been
    here, and General Moseley had to go to all of our international
    flying partners on the F-15s to reassure them that America, in
    fact, produced a very high-reliable craft. He has accomplished
    that mission in a very good way. We have offered transparency
    in the reflight characteristics for that airplane, because they
    only have the single airplane as their air-dominant fleet. Here
    in the JSF, we now have a partnership across nine air forces.
        I would tell you that while it does not pass the business
    case, the question of, ``How much reliability should you have
    to ensure your air-dominance inventory is available to you'' is
    a question that has not really been asked, and it is where I
    came down on the side of continuing the investment, at this
    point.
        There is a secondary question: What kind of capability will
    you have in the future to grow your engine, design and
    manufacturing capability, and what kind of capability do you
    have there now? I think having the competitive forces at work
    allow you some mission creep, which is going to happen across
    our air fleet, and maintains the competition out there, which
    has proven itself to be somewhat apropos for the engine
    companies. It also has really helped in the international
    market, because the engine companies will compete.
        So, after assessing all of that, I would tell you, from
    where we are to look at the to-go costs versus a sum cost, I
    think the to-go costs are appropriate.
        Senator Warner. I thank you. So it really comes down
    against an array of advantages; i.e., competition, reliability,
    international partnerships; possibly, there's a variance in the
    thrust which could affect the vertical and/or short takeoff and
    landing aircraft versus the other plane. On the down side, it's
    just the difficult question of the dollar budget.
        Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Is that about a summary of it?
        Secretary Wynne. I think you've hit it.
        General Moseley. Senator, that question of the dollar
    budget inside that program, we're all very sensitive to
    fielding that airplane on time.
        Secretary Wynne. Right.
        General Moseley. Not just the A model, but the B model and
    the C model for the Navy and the Marine Corps, to be able to
    bring that airplane online so we can move into the 21st century
    with the new capabilities. Any large programmatic cut inside
    that program puts those IOC times at risk.
        Senator Warner. In a few words, look elsewhere for the
    money.
        General Moseley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        General Moseley. Or, sir, help us protect the IOCs on these
    critical airplanes as we develop them and field them for the
    joint team.
        Senator Warner. I look forward to the challenges of working
    with each of you. You're a great team.
        I caught that little comment of yours when we started, Mr.
    Secretary: this could be your last budget presentation. We'll
    wait and see. But, in any event, I do know this will be my last
    hearing with the Department of Air Force on the posture of your
    Department. There will be others, I'm sure.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, gentlemen. We are adjourned.
        [Additional information submitted for the record:]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Question Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                   energy development and range encroachment
        1. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, the
    Department of Defense (DOD) ``Strategic Plan for DOD Test and
    Evaluation (T&E) Resources'' (September 30, 2007) identifies
    encroachment threats which ``threaten the DOD's ability to conduct
    realistic and safe T&E.'' Among the principal challenges faced by DOD's
    test ranges, the plan identifies ``energy-related projects.''
    Specifically, the plan identifies new energy production and
    transmission infrastructure, including energy corridors and wind farms,
    as range encroachment threats. The Air Force is actively pursuing the
    development of new energy production facilities on Air Force
    installations. Has the Air Force evaluated its drive for new energy
    projects against the potential for such projects to exacerbate
    encroachment issues at Air Force test and training ranges?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Yes. Each proposed energy
    project is evaluated through a rigorous planning process prior to
    approval. Ensuring there is no impact to mission is the first hurdle
    energy projects must overcome in the process.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                                  f-22 fighter
        2. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, the F-22 has come under
    criticism of late for its lack of direct contribution to operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan and the broader global war on terrorism. In the
    context United States Pacific Command, could you please outline the
    unique capabilities and advantages provided by the F-22 in performing
    missions, for example, in defense of South Korea or Taiwan that help us
    understand why it is so critical to invest in this weapon system?
        General Moseley. The F-22's primary mission is air dominance. It
    was designed from inception to dominate in the air-to-air fight,
    providing air superiority and targeting advanced surface-to-air missile
    systems. Our current legacy fighters have reached parity with foreign
    fighters and are unable to access high threat areas that contain
    advanced surface-to-air missile sites. The Raptor's combined attributes
    of integrated avionics, multi-role, stealth, advanced maneuverability,
    and supercruise give the F-22 unprecedented lethality and
    survivability. This allows the F-22 to access high threat areas that
    are defended by advanced surface-to-air missiles on day one of any
    conflict. In the defense of South Korea or Taiwan, the F-22 will fly
    into environments where our F-15s and F-16s can no longer operate in
    order to clear out the enemy fighters and begin to pick apart the
    enemy's integrated air defense systems. This air dominance mission is
    the Air Force's job number one--it enables all the other joint forces
    to operate by allowing them freedom from attack, freedom to maneuver,
    and freedom to attack.
        The F-22 has not been requested by Combatant Command (COCOM)
    commanders for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. The Air Force has
    been operating over the skies of Iraq for the last 18 years and has
    obtained air dominance. Sufficient numbers of F-22s are required to
    meet the National Military Strategy requirements this Nation may face
    over the next 20 years and beyond. The current program of record
    provides the Air Force with 126 combat coded aircraft fielded in seven
    combat squadrons. Based on normal attrition, this combat force will
    steadily decrease over time and result in the Air Force closing an F-22
    squadron by 2014--only 6 years from now.

                                 f-35a fighter
        3. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, the F-35A will primarily be
    replacing the aging fleet of F-16 and A-10 aircraft, most of which were
    acquired in the 1970s and 1980s to counter the Soviet air and air
    defense capability. Large attrition was expected had the Cold War ever
    turned ``hot'', which helped justify the large number of them procured.
    It is my understanding that the current number of F-35s that the Air
    Force wants to acquire will replace these aircraft on an approximate
    one-for-one basis. Please comment on the nature of the foreseen threat
    to American air operations over the operational life of the F-35 that
    helps explain the need for this kind of replacement ratio, given the
    technological capabilities of this new fighter.
        General Moseley. The technological capabilities of the F-35 are
    indeed greater than the legacy aircraft it will replace, but the threat
    we face today and in the future is much more lethal than the threat in
    the 1970s and 1980s when our legacy aircraft were designed and built.
    Fifth generation capabilities are required to survive and be lethal
    against the advanced threats that are both in development and in
    production. Today we face increasingly sophisticated Integrated Air
    Defense Systems (IADS) armed with significantly more lethal surface-to-
    air and air-to-air missile systems. These systems possess far greater
    lethal ranges, greater detection ranges, and use missiles with greater
    maneuverability than in the past. We face enemy fighters with radar,
    missile, avionics, and performance capabilities that exceed the
    capabilities of our current systems and require us to field fifth
    generation aircraft to retain our advantage.
        The F-35 will be the Air Force's future core fighter for air-to-
    ground strike operations. As such, the Air Force must build sufficient
    force structure to provide persistent global attack across the spectrum
    of air-to-ground missions against a large and diverse target set. The
    Air Force's total buy of 1,763 F-35s resulting from previous
    Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) was reviewed and remained unchanged
    in the 2005 QDR. It's important to note that the 1,763 F-35s will field
    and operate over a 47-year period (based on the planned procurement
    rate of 80 aircraft/year starting in fiscal year 2015, the period of
    operational service starts in 2013 and ends in 2060). This means that
    due to the 25 year production period as aircraft steadily enter the
    inventory, the peak number of 1,016 operational F-35s will not be
    reached until 2032. This inventory number then begins to decrease
    steadily 2 years later as early production aircraft enter retirement.
        Bottomline: 1,763 Air Force F-35s are required to ensure adequate
    force structure to meet national security requirements over the
    extended life cycle of the F-35.

        4. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, taking into account all the
    priorities of the Air Force, is a reduction in the total number of F-
    35s procured a reasonable solution that will meet fiscal constraints
    and yet still protect adequate future capability?
        General Moseley. Recapitalizing and modernizing the force is one of
    the Air Force's three strategic priorities. The F-35A program is a key
    element contributing to that strategic priority and as such ranks among
    the Service's top five acquisition priorities. However, the F-35A
    program is a decades-long procurement process that culminates with
    1,763 aircraft in the 2030s. Reducing the total number of F-35As to
    address fiscal constraints without other viable alternatives will force
    the Air Force to a much smaller force structure resulting in a loss of
    capability and capacity and not meet the National Defense Strategy or
    National Military Strategy. The total number of F-35As with its
    persistent attack capabilities complements the air superiority
    capabilities of the F-22A, and their combined advanced combat
    capabilities provide air dominance to the Joint Force for freedom of
    maneuver, for enhanced interoperability with global partners, and for a
    strengthened national security.

                              domain of cyberspace
        5. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, the mission of the Air Force now
    includes fighting in the domain of cyberspace. We've recently heard
    testimony from the Director of National Intelligence and the Director
    of the Defense Intelligence Agency about the grave nature of the cyber
    threat now facing the data and infrastructure of American information
    systems by nations with an increasing ability to target these
    vulnerabilities. What do you feel are the inherent strengths of the
    current Air Force that position it to be the lead Service to handle
    cyberspace operations?
        General Moseley. Cyberspace operations are inherently fast-paced
    and dynamic, and require the capability to reach out anywhere across
    the globe in a moment's notice. This is an environment where the Air
    Force thrives, having developed the training, skills, and a culture of
    global reach and global power to rapidly strike our adversaries
    wherever they may hide. Cyberspace operations are not new to the U.S.
    Air Force. We have executed non-kinetic operations with more
    traditional kinetic operations and integrated them from the Air and
    Space Operations Center for many years. We count on cyberspace
    superiority for achieving both air and space superiority. We have also
    fielded diverse capabilities to hold our adversaries at risk in and
    through cyberspace across the globe. What is new, however, is the Air
    Force's leadership in recognizing the importance of this domain in
    modern warfighting, and our renewed emphasis in ensuring maximum
    effectiveness in organizing, training, and equipping airmen to meet the
    rapidly growing need of the warfighters. Our Nation's warfighting
    combatant commanders regularly use Air Force cyberspace operations
    capabilities. Air Force forces find themselves not only heavily engaged
    in achieving cyberspace superiority for U.S. Central Command, but also
    actively engaged with or in demand by all the other geographic and
    functional COCOMs.

        6. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, how will you and your successors
    prioritize allocation of resources to maintain capability in the three
    domains, given the very high capital costs of acquiring assets like
    high technology aircraft and space systems?
        General Moseley. The Air Force recognized that while pursuing air
    dominance through focused investment of resources, it had become
    increasingly dependent on space and cyberspace to provide desired
    effects. Accordingly, the Air Force committed to the strategic
    imperative of providing Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global
    Power through cross-domain (air, space, cyber) dominance to underwrite
    the security and sovereignty of the Nation. The standup of the new
    Cyber Command, along with Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and
    Air Force Space Command, provides an organizational structure to
    support advocacy, awareness, priorities, and resource implications of
    cross domain requirements. The Air Force understands that loss of
    dominance in one could lead to loss of dominance in all and through
    continual assessment of the strategic environment will allocate
    resources to provide dominance in all three domains. The Air Force uses
    a variety of end-to-end processes to determine and implement cross-
    portfolio prioritization--to include strategic planning, senior leader
    forums (e.g., CORONA and Blue Summit conferences), and the Air Force
    Corporate Structure with its senior leadership oversight and direction
    throughout the complete process.

                       next generation long range bomber
        7. Senator Akaka. General Moseley, you have argued that the F-35
    fighter will complement the advanced air-to-air capabilities of the F-
    22, and that they are both needed to ensure a well-rounded 5th
    generation air power structure that can dominate air and space in the
    21st century. Given the proposed number of 1,763 F-35A strike aircraft
    that are requested by the Air Force, with their enhanced survivability
    and technology improvements over previous generations of multi-role
    fighters, what arguments would you use to justify the cost expenditures
    required for a next generation long-range bomber?
        General Moseley. While providing significant capability advances
    over the legacy fighters they'll replace, the F-35A is not optimized to
    conduct long-range, persistent, deep-penetration strike operations
    envisioned for the next generation bomber. The extended-range
    characteristics of the next generation bomber permit it to be employed
    from beyond the threat area thus mitigating anti-access and area denial
    strategies. The next generation bomber's high survivability,
    persistence in the threat area, and enhanced payload capacity of
    precision munitions ideally suit the platform for operating in
    environments beyond the capability of multi-role fighters and providing
    truly global power projection.

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                          cost estimating on the f-22
        8. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, the cost estimating systems
    at Lockheed Martin Aerospace have come under attack several times in
    the past few years. The cost estimating on the F-22 has been
    particularly questioned and, for some, puts the extremely high cost of
    the F-22 into question. I am aware that the Air Force, in a perfect
    world, wants to buy 380 F-22s, but because of its cost and limited
    budget room in DOD, you are being limited to buying about 180 F-22s.
    Some say this reduced buy produces a national security risk. When you
    pair the Air Force's desire for more F-22s with a potentially
    questionable process that has been used to establish costs for its
    development, one might conclude that perhaps we could buy more F-22s if
    we hadn't let faulty systems drive its cost up.
        Let me discuss some specifics that have me especially concerned. A
    July 2007 Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit of Lockheed's cost
    estimating systems (Audit Report No. 3711-2006A24010501) ``disclosed
    eight significant deficiencies in Lockheed Martin Aerospace's
    estimating system that result in the development of noncompliant cost
    estimates,'' including vast noncompliance with DOD regulations and
    Truth in Negotiation Act violations (as expressed in the audit
    executive summary). The audit further found that, ``Lockheed Martin
    Aerospace's contract negotiators are often not informed by estimating
    personnel or the functional area of changes or updates to cost and
    pricing data that should be disclosed to the Government prior to final
    definitization of the contract price.'' The DCAA audit also noted that
    the control environment and accounting at Lockheed was inadequate as of
    April last year as well.
        In a June 22, 1998, memorandum, Bill Bullock, then the President of
    Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, stated, ``Lockheed Martin
    Aerospace must have a measurement system that is capable of providing
    the information and data we need to manage the company . . . our
    current program and functional reviews are not capable of providing
    what we need'' (underline in original).
        Finally, I am informed that there was a February 19, 2008, meeting
    between numerous senior Air Force and Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
    and Logistics officials to discuss Lockheed Martin's plan to get their
    cost estimating system compliant. Such a high level meeting seems to
    indicate that there are serious problems at Lockheed. How confident are
    we that the cost of the F-22 is not based on faulty cost estimating by
    Lockheed Martin?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force is confident F-22 costs are not
    based on faulty data. The contracts to procure F-22s are firm fixed
    price contracts and were negotiated with Lockheed Martin. As part of
    the negotiation process, the Air Force is required to have its own cost
    position independent of Lockheed Martin. In addition, there is enough
    historical data from previous lots, actual costs incurred, and enough
    insight by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to assist in
    driving overhead costs as low as possible that the Air Force is
    confident it is receiving a fair and reasonable price for each lot of
    aircraft. Because multi-year procurement authority was provided by
    Congress, the Government receives the benefit of financial stability
    and obtains most efficient use of Lockheed Martin's supply chain and
    economic ordering.

        9. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what is being done to
    address Lockheed Martin's cost estimating faults in general?
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force, in coordination with DCMA formally
    notified Lockheed Martin Aerospace on August 7, 2007, of their
    estimating deficiencies identified in DCAA Audit Report 3711-
    2006A24010501 via a DCMA Level II Corrective Action Request (CAR). The
    CAR listed the deficiencies and requested a formal, comprehensive
    Corrective Action Plan (CAP) by September 10, 2007. Prior to the audit
    being issued, the contractor had already started corrective actions
    based on preliminary findings. Those early responses by the contractor
    were captured in the CAP along with the detailed actions requested by
    DCMA. Biweekly meetings among DCMA, DCAA, and Lockheed Martin Aerospace
    took place in conjunction with those early responses. These meetings
    continue to take place to address the contractor's progress.
    Additionally, DCAA has begun its field work on their follow-up audit to
    assess the contractor's implementation of the CAP and should issue a
    report in July 2008.

        10. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, how are they affecting
    Lockheed's work on other Air Force programs, such as the JSF and C-5
    RERP?
        Secretary Wynne. The DCMA audit of Lockheed Martin's Earned Value
    Management System (EVMS) highlighted some shortcomings that may be
    impacting the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program office's ability to
    accurately project future performance based on earned value data. The
    JSF program office will continue to work with DCMA and Lockheed Martin
    to correct the deficiencies in the EVMS.

        11. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, what has the Air Force done
    to address the issues raised in the DCAA audit discussed herein (Audit
    Report No. 3711-2006A24010501)? Please be very specific.
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force, in coordination with DCMA, formally
    notified Lockheed Martin Aerospace on August 7, 2007, of their
    estimating deficiencies identified in DCAA Audit Report 3711-
    2006A24010501 via a DCMA Level II CAR. The CAR listed the deficiencies
    and requested a formal, comprehensive CAP by September 10, 2007. Prior
    to the audit being issued, the contractor had already started
    corrective actions based on preliminary findings. Those early responses
    by the contractor were captured in the CAP along with the detailed
    actions requested by DCMA. Biweekly meetings among DCMA, DCAA, and
    Lockheed Martin Aerospace took place in conjunction with those early
    responses. These meetings continue to take place to address the
    contractor's progress. Additionally, DCAA has begun its field work on
    their follow-up audit to assess the contractor's implementation of the
    CAP and should issue a report in July 2008.

        12. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Wynne, has the Air Force recovered
    any payments made to Lockheed Martin where faulty cost estimating led
    to overbilling? If not, why not?
        Secretary Wynne. Lockheed Martin credited the JSF contract via a
    voucher (invoice) for the $126,637,869.76 billing error. In addition, a
    deposit of $28,346,781.00 was returned to the General Treasury for
    interest. The amounts identified and returned to the Air Force were a
    self-disclosed error that Lockheed Martin found within their award fee
    arrangement with their subcontractors and not a result of any cost
    estimating system issues.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
                           air refueling tanker fleet
        13. Senator Collins. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, there has
    been much debate over the past few months about a split buy for the air
    refueling tanker fleet, and it was reported recently that the Air Force
    may be reconsidering its stance on its current acquisition strategy to
    support a winner-take-all position. I would encourage you to explore
    all options that will provide a best value capability and best value
    solution for our service men and women and the American taxpayer.
    Please comment on the current acquisition strategy for this program and
    the capabilities that each proposal would provide the Air Force.
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force considered a
    split buy approach when it developed the KC-X acquisition strategy in
    2006. We decided against split buy because it was not affordable. Such
    an approach would double the development costs and $3 billion annual
    production costs and complicate manpower and logistics by creating two
    production lines, two support networks, and two training systems. OSD
    approved the winner-take-all acquisition strategy just prior to release
    of the Request for Proposal (RFP) in January 2007; they reaffirmed this
    approach during a review in preparation for the KC-X Defense
    Acquisition Board in February 2008. The Air Force remains committed to
    a winner-take-all strategy. A decision to direct a split buy at this
    point would require termination of the awarded contract and a new
    competition, delaying the recapitalization of today's 47-year-old fleet
    at least 18 to 24 months.
        Conducting a competition to select the KC-45 has served the
    warfighter and taxpayers very well. Both competitors offered viable
    solutions but Northrop Grumman was selected because their proposal
    represented the best value solution based on an integrated assessment
    of the evaluation factors. Since a protest has been filed with the GAO,
    we cannot discuss specifics about the proposals or any issues under
    review.

        14. Senator Collins. General Moseley, based on the results of the
    initial award for the KC-X program, size does seem to have mattered
    apparently. Ultimately, the commitment to this aircraft will come at a
    cost of some other capability that the Air Force needs to meet its
    missions. It is my understanding that this award was to be a best value
    solution, is that correct? If so, are you concerned about the increased
    life cycle costs that logically come from supporting the KC-45 aircraft
    as the air refueling choice for the tanker fleet?
        General Moseley. The Air Force articulated requirements based on
    capability, not on size. It was the offerors' responsibility to propose
    a solution that met the requirements in the RFPs and provided the best
    overall value to the government. They were free to offer a tanker of
    any size. There was also nothing to preclude them from offering more
    than one aircraft.
        Northrop Grumman was awarded the contract because they proposed the
    best value solution. We were concerned about life cycle costs, and in
    fact, it was one of the five evaluation factors. Life cycle costs
    include development and production costs as well as operation and
    support costs. These were considered in making the best value
    determination.
        The RFP stated the contract would be awarded on a ``best value''
    basis using the following factors:

              (1) Mission Capability which included Key System
            Requirements, System Integration and Software, Product Support,
            Program Management, and Technology Maturity and Demonstration,
              (2) Proposal Risk (evaluating potential weaknesses of an
            offeror's proposal),
              (3) Past Performance (recent and relevant),
              (4) Cost/Price (based on a Most Probable Life Cycle Cost
            (MPLCC) analysis), and
              (5) Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA).

        Factors 1 through 3 were of equal importance and individually more
    important than Cost/Price and IFARA. Cost/Price and IFARA are of equal
    importance. Factors 1, 2, 3, and 5 combined are significantly more
    important than Cost/Price.

        15. Senator Collins. Secretary Wynne, fiscal constraints need to be
    considered over the life of the program to help in determining best
    value. Where did life cycle cost factor into the evaluation criteria
    for this program?
        Secretary Wynne. Life cycle cost was one of the five evaluation
    factors. It was of less importance than mission capability, proposal
    risk, and past performance but it was equal in importance to the IFARA
    which analyzed the offerors' aircraft in a wartime scenario.

        16. Senator Collins. Secretary Wynne, based on the general
    reactions that I am hearing about the award, I want to ensure, as do my
    colleagues, that the process used for this evaluation was sound. Please
    provide information on the process and evaluation criteria used for
    this important competition.
        Secretary Wynne. The Air Force had extensive dialogue with the
    offerors through a Request For Information, Industry Days, and two
    draft RFPs in 2006. This dialogue promoted a clear understanding of the
    requirements and evaluation factors prior to the start of the
    competition. During the source selection, we spent an unprecedented
    amount of time to gain a thorough understanding of their proposals.
    Through hundreds of formal exchanges, including three face-to-face
    interim reviews, we provided the offerors feedback on the strengths and
    weaknesses of their proposals. We also shared government cost estimates
    during interim reviews; in the past, this typically was done during the
    post-award debriefings. Near the end of the source selection, both
    offerors praised the Air Force for the way the source selection was
    conducted.
        The requirements were fully vetted through the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council, which validated them in December 2006. The
    requirements are still the same today. For the source selection, the
    requirements were articulated in the System Requirements Document,
    which was released with the final RFP. The DOD Inspector General issued
    a report on May 30, 2007, that stated the requirements were properly
    established and documented.
        As mentioned above, a best value determination was made based on an
    integrated assessment of the five evaluation factors: mission
    capability, proposal risk, past performance, Cost/Price, and the IFARA.
        The requirements and the five evaluation factors did not change
    after the final RFP was released on January 30, 2007.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
                            active association units
        17. Senator Thune. Secretary Wynne, you note in your prepared
    testimony that the Air Force ``is already the model for melding its
    Guard, Reserve, and civilians with its Regular Air Force elements,''
    and I wholeheartedly agree. You also state that you are looking to
    ``push this synergy to new levels.'' One of the ways the Air Force is
    doing this is through Active Association Units, which I understand is a
    program that brings Active Duty airmen and mechanics to Air Guard bases
    to receive training from their more seasoned Air Guard counterparts.
    Please provide more details about this program, such as how many Active
    Association Units currently exist, where they're located, and what the
    process is for an Air Guard base to obtain an Active Association Unit?
        Secretary Wynne. There are currently 22 Chief of Staff of the Air
    Force-approved Active Associations on the Total Force Integration (TFI)
    List.
        The type of Association and their respective locations are:

      F-16, Dannelly Field, AL                  C-130, Elmendorf AFB, AK
      C-130, Peterson AFB, CO                   C-21, Petersen AFB, CO
      A-10, Engine CIRF Bradley IAP, CT         F-16, Homestead ARB,FL
      F-22, Hickam AFB, HI                      KC-135, Hickam AFB, HI
      C-40, Scott AFB, IL                       C-21, Scott AFB, IL
      F-15, Engine CIRF NAS New Orleans, LA     A-10, Barksdale AFB, LA
      C-21, Martin State, MD                    A-10, Whiteman AFB, MD
      RED HORSE, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC        C-130, Pope AFB, NC
      KC-135, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC           RED HORSE, Charleston AFB,
                                                 SC
      F-16, McEntire AFB, SC                    F-16, NAS Ft Worth, TX
      C-130, Cheyenne MAP, WY                   F-16, Burlington AGS, VT

        The objective of the TFI associations is to meet Air Force
    operational mission requirements by aligning equipment, missions,
    infrastructure, and manpower resources to enable a more efficient and
    effective use of Air Force assets. While the desire for associations is
    on the rise, proposed TFI initiatives require concurrence between both
    gaining and associating MAJCOMs, and must satisfy an existing MAJCOM/
    COCOM requirement. Headquarters Air Force, in close coordination with
    MAJCOMs and the National Guard Bureau, develop missions and identify
    potential integration opportunities that satisfy current and future
    capabilities requirements that align with national security
    requirements. Prior to making any TFI association decisions, the Air
    Force takes into considerations factors such as facilities,
    environmental impact, available manpower, usable airspace, and current
    number of aircraft. Additionally, there is a prerequisite to craft and
    submit a TFI Initiative Review Worksheet and gaining MAJCOM/NGB legal
    review of the proposed initiative. The initiative must then be vetted
    through the Air Staff, approved by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
    and must ultimately compete for funding in the Air Force budget. A
    summary of the complete TFI vetting process can be found in AFI 90-
    1001.

                       total force integration initiative
        18. Senator Thune. Secretary Wynne, could you comment on the Air
    Force's ongoing TFI Initiative and how important it has been to you?
        Secretary Wynne. TFI continues to be a fundamental element of Air
    Force transformation. TFI creates efficiencies, retains invaluable
    human capital, and, above all, increases the capabilities of all the
    Air Force components. It encompasses new technology, new concepts of
    operation, and new organizational constructs. The Air Force's
    transformation to a more dynamic, integrated Total Force extends to all
    areas of Air Force operations. Integration initiatives range from Rapid
    Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadrons (RED HORSE) to
    space and cyberspace operations. In order to produce a smaller, more
    capable, more affordable Air Force, all areas of operations must be
    reviewed for efficiencies and integration opportunities. The Air Force
    is committed to recapitalizing the force by changing organizational
    constructs in a way that defends against, deters, and defeats every
    adversary in any future challenge to the American way of life.
        To date, 130 individual initiatives are either being developed or
    are under investigation by integrated process teams. Some are near
    completion, such as the classic association of Regular Air Force and
    Reserve personnel on F-16s at Hill AFB, UT and the classic association
    of Regular Air Force and Air National Guard personnel on F-22s at
    Langley AFB, VA, both outstanding success stories. TFI has led to new,
    ground-breaking organizational constructs. The first ever Air Force
    Reserve and Air National Guard association in the KC-135 at Tinker AFB,
    OK, is bringing the inherent strengths of these two components together
    into one organization. In the future, full integration of the Air Force
    components at all levels of organizational construct should be one of
    the going-in assumptions as we beddown future weapon systems.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
                              new tanker aircraft
        19. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, what is
    the status of the current decision on where to locate the new tanker
    aircraft?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The KC-45 program is still in
    a very early stage of development, and analyses regarding future tanker
    basing are not complete. The first beddown locations are Edwards for
    testing and Altus for the Formal Training Unit. Beyond those two
    locations, the phasing and basing of the KC-45 will be based on several
    criteria, including objective operational requirements and
    environmental studies in accordance with the National Environmental
    Policy Act. As we make these decisions, the Air Force will optimize
    timing and placement of weapons systems in the best interest of our
    Nation's defense.

        20. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, could you
    discuss if the Air Force plans to begin retiring the KC-135 before the
    new tanker arrives in the field?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. Fiscal year 2009 President's
    budget procures 44 KC-45A aircraft with 17 scheduled to be delivered by
    the end of fiscal year 2013. Fiscal year 2009 President's budget does
    not retire any KC-135R aircraft. There will be no KC-135R retirements
    before the KC-45A arrives in the field. However, the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 allows the retirement of
    48 KC-135E air refueling aircraft with provisions for more pending a
    successful KC-45A contract award and the resolution of any contract
    protest. The Air Force will retire 48 KC-135E air refueling aircraft in
    fiscal year 2008 with the remainder retiring before the end of fiscal
    year 2009.

                                air guard bases
        21. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, it is
    critical to maintain the proficiency of our pilots, crews, and
    maintenance personnel at our Air Guard bases, and we should ensure the
    capacity and flexibility these bases provide the Air Force is not lost.
    If some of the Air Guard bases lose their refueling mission, such as
    the 186th Air Refueling Wing at Key Field, MS, what can we do to ensure
    that these bases receive a new mission, such as a lift capability
    mission?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The Air Force agrees that it
    is critical to preserve the skills, experience, and proficiency of our
    Guardsmen at locations where aircraft are scheduled to be reassigned
    under BRAC. As such, we have worked closely with the National Guard
    Bureau, the Air National Guard, and leadership at the other Major
    Commands to identify future missions for all of these locations. In
    addition, we have identified transition, or bridge, missions for Guard
    locations scheduled to lose their aircraft before a new mission can
    begin.
        The 186th Air Refueling Wing in Meridian, MS, is one such unit. The
    Air Force has identified Meridian as a location scheduled to receive
    the C-27B (JCA) mission. Since the KC-135Rs are scheduled to be
    reassigned in fiscal year 2011, the transition mission for the
    Mississippi Air National Guard will be flying the C-17 aircraft
    assigned to the 172nd Airlift Wing in Jackson, MS. This premier
    airlifter has an identical crew complement and similar mission to the
    C-27, and will serve as an ideal platform to develop the necessary
    skills for transition, as well as preserve the experience and
    proficiency of the Mississippi Air National Guard crews.
        Meridian is also identified as a location for a Component Numbered
    Air Force mission, or C-NAF, beginning in 2011. This mission will begin
    after reassignment of the KC-135R aircraft. Some retraining will be
    required, but the skills and experience of the Mississippi Air National
    Guard will prove invaluable to this new, emerging mission. While some
    details remain to be finalized, it is expected this mission will
    require approximately 300 guardsmen.

                             c-17 and c-5 aircraft
        22. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, does the
    current force of 301 C-17 and C-5 aircraft meet the Department's
    strategic airlift requirements, and if so, is it the Department's
    intent to allow the C-17 production line to shut down?
        Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. The current fleet does not
    satisfy the Department's strategic airlift requirements. The 2005
    Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS 05) set the baseline for a strategic
    airlift fleet ranging from 292 to 383 C-5 and C-17 aircraft. The study
    concluded that 112 fully modernized and reliability enhanced C-5s were
    required. The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act further refined
    the low end of that range by directing the Secretary of the Air Force
    to maintain a fleet of at least 299 strategic airlift tails. Of these,
    111 fully modernized C-5s became the standard as the Air Force lost 1
    aircraft in a crash at Dover AFB.
        However, the C-5 RERP Nunn-McCurdy process reduced the programmed
    number of fully modernized or RERP'd C-5s from 111 to 52. The capacity
    shortfall left by excluding the remaining 59 C-5As from the RERP
    program is equivalent to 8 C-17s. This shortfall is based on a Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council validated organic strategic airlift
    capacity of 33.95 million ton miles/day (MTM/D).\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Includes C-5 and C-17 contribution only.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Additional changes since publication of MCS 05 include Future
    Combat System Manned Ground Vehicle growth beyond C-130 transport
    capability, introduction of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
    vehicle, a 92,000 increase in Army and Marine forces, and the stand up
    of Africa Command. The next opportunity to gauge the effects of these
    changes on the airlift fleet will be the Mobility Capability
    Requirements Study 2008 (MCRS 08) due in summer 2009. Similar to MCS
    05, MCRS 08 will include analysis of sealift and prepositioned
    requirements.
        Without additional procurement, the C-17 production will begin to
    shut down in 2008. The last C-17 delivers in August 2009, which
    includes Air Force and foreign sales. Although the last delivery is not
    until late fiscal year 2009, the 34-month C-17 manufacturing span time
    dictates that procurement must significantly precede delivery. Boeing
    is currently protecting the manufacturing schedule by putting company
    funds at risk; however, without additional orders (i.e., fiscal year
    2008 global war on terror additions), it is anticipated that Boeing
    will cease production.

        [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Bill Nelson, McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Collins, Thune, and
    Martinez.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell,
    professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional
    staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K.
    Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member;
    Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Jessica L.
    Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka;
    Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; M.
    Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson,
    assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator
    Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark
    J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Jason Van Beek,
    assistant to Senator Thune; and John L. Goetchius, assistant to
    Senator Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to hear from two regional combatant
    commanders with responsibility for the Western Hemisphere,
    General Gene Renuart, Commander, U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM) and of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
    (NORAD); and Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of the U.S.
    Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). We thank you both for your
    service, your personal service, your family support. We're
    particularly grateful, as we hopefully never miss saying, to
    the men and women who you lead for their commitment and service
    to this Nation, and also to their families, and we would
    appreciate your extending our gratitude, this committee's
    gratitude, to those men and women.
        NORTHCOM was established in October 2002 after the
    terrorist attacks of September 11, so it's a relatively new
    command. It has the missions of Homeland defense and providing
    military support to civil authorities for response to domestic
    disasters, whether natural or manmade, including a terrorist
    attack using conventional weapons or weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD).
        NORAD is a binational command with Canada, responsible for
    protecting the approaches to the North American continent.
    General Renuart assumed command of NORTHCOM and NORAD 1 year
    ago. We look forward to hearing his report on what has happened
    during the last year and what is planned for the future with
    this dual command.
        Last month we received the report of the Commission on the
    National Guard and the Reserves. It contained a number of
    findings and recommendations relative to NORTHCOM and the role
    of the National Guard in domestic disaster response. Some of
    these findings and recommendations were controversial and some
    were critical of NORTHCOM. For example, the Commission
    recommended that the Governors of our States should be able to
    direct Active-Duty military forces in their States to respond
    to emergencies. The Commission also recommended that NORTHCOM
    be required to have a majority of its headquarters personnel
    with National Guard or Reserve qualifications. The Commission
    also suggested that NORTHCOM's planning and capabilities to
    support a Federal response to a domestic attack involving WMD
    are inadequate. We look forward to hearing General Renuart's
    views on the findings and recommendations of the Commission's
    report.
        The committee also welcomes Admiral Stavridis, Commander of
    SOUTHCOM, who's responsible for an area including Latin America
    south of Mexico, the countries and territories of the
    Caribbean, as well as the surrounding waters. The greatest
    challenges here include State stability and illicit drug
    trafficking.
        We're now entering the 8th year of U.S. assistance to
    Colombia in its fight against narcoterrorists. The Colombian
    Government has made great strides regaining territory and
    establishing a government presence in local municipalities.
    Over 30,000 paramilitaries have been demobilized and the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) numbers about
    9,000 fighters, down from an estimated 12,000 to 18,000.
        The FARC, which is the captor of about 750 hostages,
    including 3 Americans, remains a threat to Colombian society
    and to human rights. President Uribe has again instituted a
    one-time wealth tax to raise money for the fight against the
    narcoterrorists and has committed his government to local
    development and to improving Colombia's human rights record.
        Our government is working with Bogota to assist them in
    economic development, judicial reform, and human rights, and we
    will continue to push for implementation of those aspects of
    Colombia's plan.
        The illicit drug problem that Colombia is fighting is one
    that threatens the entire hemisphere. According to the
    Department of State (DOS) 2008 International Narcotics Control
    Strategy Report that was released last week, Colombia's
    neighbor Venezuela ``is a major drug transit country with
    rampant high-level corruption and a weak judicial system.''
        Recent increases in the price of cocaine in the United
    States have apparently been the result of the Mexican
    Government's crackdown on drug cartels, not, for example, a
    result of the millions of dollars that we have poured into
    eradication into Colombia. In light of this, the committee will
    want to hear what we can do to forge a counterdrug strategy for
    the Western Hemisphere that applies U.S. assistance most
    effectively.
        We also hope to hear SOUTHCOM's perspective regarding the
    leadership change in Cuba, and United Nations (U.N.)
    peacekeeping operations in Haiti. With the direct
    responsibility of the command, Admiral Stavridis, we would also
    like to have your assessment of the ongoing detention and
    interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I take note that we have a
    vote at 10:50. Therefore, I'll ask to have my statement placed
    in the record so that the committee can receive the testimony.
        Chairman Levin. We appreciate that.
        Senator Warner. I'd like to make a comment. General
    Renuart, in our discussions yesterday I raised the issue of the
    Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, headed by Major
    General Arnold Punaro. I said you'd be given an opportunity
    this morning to reply to some of their observations. It is a
    commission that this committee established and I think on the
    whole they did some very constructive work. This happens to be
    one of the more controversial elements and we welcome to hear
    your testimony.
        Admiral, I'm interested in how you have stressed the need
    to include economic, political, and social developments as part
    of your overall approach, just not heavy--well, heavy emphasis
    on, the needed emphasis on the military, but you recognize that
    in your area of responsibility that is a very heavy component
    of what you achieve.
        Your thoughts on Plan Colombia--that was a bipartisan
    achievement of this committee some several years ago, that
    seems to have worked.
        Mr. Chairman, I felt your statement was very comprehensive,
    so I'll just put mine in the record. But I also join you in
    expressing our appreciation to our witnesses today and their
    families and the men and women under their command for doing
    such an outstanding job. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses here
    today. I would like to thank General Renuart and Admiral Stavridis for
    their long and distinguished service to our Nation. I also wish to
    convey my deep appreciation for the fine men and women serving in your
    command. While much of our attention is focused in other theaters, we
    cannot neglect our responsibility to protect the Homeland and our vital
    national interest in the Western Hemisphere. As combatant commanders,
    we value your insights on the challenges facing your respective areas
    of responsibility. We also welcome your assessment of the fiscal year
    2009 defense budget request.
        We welcome General Victor Renuart, Commander of U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM). NORTHCOM, stood up in 2002, has the important
    mission of providing both Homeland defense and defense support to civil
    authorities, drawing upon Active-Duty, Reserve, and National Guard
    units. Over the past few years, NORTHCOM has experienced growing pains
    associated with military planning, interagency coordination, equipment
    shortages, and its relationship with the National Guard and Reserve.
        On January 31, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve,
    headed by Major General Arnold Punaro, submitted its report and
    recommendations regarding the role and mission of the Reserve
    components. The Commission generated some controversy with its
    assessment that current planning for crises within the United States is
    deficient and that the Defense Department is not prepared to play a
    primary role, at the President's direction, in restoring order and
    providing assistance in the aftermath of weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD) events and other incidents likely to produce mass casualties.
        This committee conducted a hearing on the Commission's report on
    February 7. I entered into the record at that hearing the official
    response of NORTHCOM to the Commission's report, which stated: ``U.S.
    NORTHCOM's primary mission is Homeland defense, and the command stands
    ready to respond to any Homeland defense or civil support mission
    requirement. . . . Americans can be assured the U.S. military is ready
    and capable of responding to attacks within the United States.'' This,
    along with Assistant Secretary of Defense McHale's public comments, was
    reassuring. I'm aware that the Department is preparing a formal
    response to the most recent report of the Commission, but I hope we can
    learn more from you today about the Nation's readiness to deal with the
    consequences of a WMD event that is likely to quickly overwhelm the
    capability of local first responders.
        We also welcome Admiral Stavridis, Commander of U.S. Southern
    Command (SOUTHCOM) who has the awesome responsibility of fostering
    peace and stability in our Western Hemisphere. We often forget how
    vital Latin America is to our national interests. Our national defense
    is intricately tied to the prosperity and security of our southern
    neighbors. SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility, comprised of 32 nations,
    represents a region full of diverse challenges and opportunities. It
    requires a comprehensive approach--to include economic, political, and
    social development. Under your command, SOUTHCOM has embarked on an
    ambitious reorganization that embraces this concept. I am confident
    your efforts will serve as model for other combatant commands. I look
    forward to hearing about your progress integrating various components
    of the interagency into your command.
        SOUTHCOM is responsible for what is perhaps one of this committee's
    greatest bipartisan achievements--Plan Colombia. For years, Colombia
    teetered on the brink of being a failed state. Today, Colombia has
    emerged from being a nearly failed state to one that has aggressively
    disrupted narco-trafficking in the country and gained control over
    regions and towns once controlled exclusively by the terrorist group,
    the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Today, Colombia is a
    functioning democracy and our best partner in the region, but there is
    still much work to do. Earlier this week, Colombian forces killed a
    senior FARC rebel in Ecuador, which prompted Venezuela and Ecuador to
    close their embassies in Bogota and send troops to their Colombian
    borders--raising tensions between the three nations. I look forward to
    hearing your assessment of this recent development and the role we
    might play to enhance stability there and throughout the region.
        In addition to recent troop movements in Venezuela and Ecuador, the
    committee will be interested in your assessment of: the threat of
    radical Islam, including violent extremists with ties to Hamas,
    Hezbollah, and al Qaeda in the region; efforts to curb the flow of
    illegal drugs into the United States from the south; the links between
    violent regional criminal groups and gangs in the United States; the
    effects of referendum defeat on Hugo Chavez's popularity; Cuba after
    Fidel Castro; foreign influences on the Panama Canal, particularly the
    Chinese influence; operations at the Guantanamo detention center; and,
    to the extent you can tell us of the progress to locate our three
    hostages held by FARC guerrillas in Colombia since 2003.
        Again, I would like to express my deep appreciation to all of you,
    and to the brave men and women of your commands, for all of their
    efforts to provide for the Nation's defense. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        General Renuart?

      STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER,
      NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN
                                COMMAND

        General Renuart. Good morning. Thank you. Chairman Levin,
    Senator Warner, and members of the committee. It is really a
    privilege to be here this morning representing the men and
    women of NORTHCOM and NORAD and truly, most especially, to sit
    here with my very close friend, Jim Stavridis. Not only is our
    personal relationship strong, but our professional relationship
    between the two commands grows stronger every day, and I think
    we do have the ability to answer some of the questions that you
    have, both of you have mentioned with respect to drug
    trafficking and mutual interest areas in the Caribbean.
        I also want to take a moment to introduce and make note of
    three members of my team who are critical to our success every
    day. Major General Steve Villacorta is my advisor from the Army
    National Guard. He serves in a key position within my staff.
    We're also pleased to have with us a member of the National
    Guard Bureau team, Brigadier General Fick, who is here again to
    demonstrate the partnership that we have. Finally, to represent
    the young men and women who wear the cloth of our Nation every
    day in harm's way, Command Sergeant Major Dan Wood. I
    appreciate them being here to witness the proceedings.
        Chairman Levin. We welcome them and thank them.
        General Renuart. Sir, you talked about the relationship of
    these two commands in the hemisphere, and we have worked very
    hard over the last couple years with SOUTHCOM, with Admiral
    Stavridis' joint interagency task force, to begin to close the
    seams that may be there as we move from one area combatant
    commander to another. I'm pleased to say that that
    collaboration is continuing to strengthen. We're finding new
    ways to collaborate, and I know Jim and I are happy to talk
    about those in the course of the day.
        As Commander of NORTHCOM, I'm assigned two distinct and
    critical missions: to defend our Homeland from attack, whether
    it is an attack of a conventional nature or one of
    unconventional nature, and then to support the Nation with
    unique Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities during time of
    crisis, the natural or manmade disaster.
        We really can't prioritize one or the other because they
    move across the spectrum almost simultaneously. So we put a
    great deal of effort each day to both our Homeland defense and
    to our support of civil authorities mission. As we move into
    the hurricane season, for example, that mission of civil
    support becomes very significant in terms of the weight of
    effort, but those mission sets can move back and forth.
        Our missions we believe are especially meaningful because
    nothing is really more important than keeping our citizens, our
    families, all safe. This requires a culture of anticipation. We
    understand all too well that failure is not an option. In fact,
    we rewrote our mission statement soon after I arrived and added
    the keyword ``anticipate'' to emphasize this new standard of
    preparedness. Over the past year we have substantially
    increased our focus on planning, training, exercising, and
    readiness.
        We updated our Homeland defense and civil support plans. We
    ensured our plans are consistent with the National Response
    Framework and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) support
    plans for those 15 National Planning Scenarios. All of this is
    done in close partnership with DHS's Incident Management
    Planning Team. In fact, we carry the lead DOD role for concept
    planning across the Department.
        We have successfully completed the Maritime Domain
    Awareness Concept of Operation and the interagency investment
    strategy to go along with that. These developments improve
    situational awareness and provide a way ahead to rapidly assess
    and respond to maritime threats. We have made historic progress
    in both military and civil response collaboration with our
    friends in Canada. On our southern border, the United States
    and Mexico work more closely every day to confront the threat
    of narcotics trafficking and we are hopeful Congress will
    continue its support of the Merida Initiative as it provides a
    real opportunity for meaningful progress in this area.
        We train with over 50 Federal, State, and local partners at
    all operational levels. As an example, we exercised our
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
    Explosives Consequence Management Response Force during
    Exercise Ardent Sentry and Northern Edge not quite a year ago
    and exercised a portion of that again this past fall in the
    State of Oregon.
        We have assisted the National Interagency Firefighting
    Center in battling wildfires in the northwest and the
    southwest, prepared for the worst when Hurricane Dean
    threatened Puerto Rico and Texas, and we provided a broad range
    of DOD capabilities to a lot of events around the country, such
    as the I-35 bridge collapse, the Utah mine tragedy, and midwest
    ice storms.
        Supporting DHS and the Government of Canada during National
    Special Security Events has also been one of our principal
    tasks over the last year. We provide military support to
    Federal law enforcement partners along the borders as they
    continue to counter transnational threats.
        At the same time, we provide civil assistance and
    continually watch intelligence indicators, early warning
    information, and the operational picture. Specifically, we
    monitor, assess, and evaluate 12 to 20 potentially dangerous
    events affecting the Homeland every day, every day. This
    includes such things as vessels of interest, suspicious
    aircraft activity, missile launches around the world, and
    myriad manmade and natural disasters.
        As an example, we worked closely hand-in-hand with the
    State of Florida during the recent power losses to ensure that
    if there was a requirement that could be met by DOD we were
    ready.
        Every day we see the benefits of this collaboration in so
    many ways. Our officers sit side-by-side with the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Joint Terrorism Task Force
    and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), all to ensure
    that we have the same threat picture. This allows us to
    routinely collaborate and assess information. We've built a
    high degree of confidence with our partners and I'm happy with
    that.
        We also rely on the information expertise provided by our
    Joint Interagency Coordination Group. This group synchronizes
    and integrates the activities of over 40 Federal and regional
    support agencies, including a private sector cell which allows
    us to tap into the private sector for areas of Homeland
    response.
        We recognize there's plenty to do. There's still more
    improvements that can be made. But we spend a great deal of our
    effort trying to anticipate the threats to our security, to
    improve Homeland defense and our global support plans, and
    strengthen relations with our mission partners both at home and
    abroad.
        Mr. Chairman, before I close I'd like to briefly comment on
    the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and
    Reserves. It is clear that a great deal of effort went into the
    report. In conjunction with the DOD, we are continuing our
    review to provide Congress a thorough assessment of each of the
    recommendations in that report.
        I agree with the Commission that we need to increase
    support to our Nation's Active-Duty and Reserve Forces, to
    build and enhance the Nation's capability to provide chemical,
    radiological, biological, and nuclear incident consequence
    management capabilities. I am leading the DOD charge to do just
    that and have received strong support from both the Chairman
    and the Secretary.
        My Integrated Priority List to the Secretary of Defense
    supports recapitalizing and equipping our National Guard to
    support domestic missions. I firmly believe that our Nation
    needs a strong and well-equipped Guard and Reserve Force. That
    said, some of the findings in the final report I believe are
    incomplete and can be misleading. I disagree with the
    Commission's assessment of a so-called ``appalling gap'' in our
    capabilities to respond to a WMD attack. Let me assure you
    there are plans in place and there are forces available and a
    range of capabilities across the government to respond to these
    events, and we are ready to respond today.
        The Commission also suggests that the Governors should have
    complete command and control of Title 10 forces in certain
    circumstances within their State. I disagree. I believe current
    command provisions allow the Governors to have the authority
    they need to direct all efforts within their States. Upon
    taking command, I made relationship-building with each of these
    Governors a high priority. I'm pleased to say that I've visited
    now over 30 States and in those visits I've met now with 19
    Governors and Lieutenant Governors, every State Adjutant
    General, and most of their emergency management directors.
        My message is clear and consistent: NORTHCOM is here to
    support you. These Governors and Lieutenant Governors with whom
    I have spoken are confident in their adjutants general and
    their ability to lead State efforts in times of crisis, and
    they know they can count on NORTHCOM for the support when it is
    requested.
        I believe it's more important to ask the Governors, are
    they receiving the support they need, than to have a struggle
    over the lines of command and control. They are the supported
    elements in their State and our role is to make sure that they
    have all they need.
        Finally, let me set the record straight on the Commission's
    comments regarding the need for State-level experience within
    NORTHCOM. Today 46 percent of my staff has Guard and Reserve
    experience and, as you see General Villacorta here, 6 of my 13
    general and flag officers, my key advisors, are guardsmen and
    reservists. I rely on them daily and they are integral members
    of my team. We're also doubling the number of full-time Guard
    positions within our headquarters. I believe these statistics
    stand on their own two feet and provide the right kind of
    experience in our command.
        In closing, our mission is to protect our fellow citizens
    and the freedoms that uphold our way of life. We are proud to
    be part of a combined Federal, State, and local team.
    Coordination with international, Federal, State partners,
    Governors, and the National Guard is paramount. General Steve
    Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, said just
    recently: ``The coordination and cooperation between our two
    agencies has never been better,'' and I do agree.
        By anticipating threats, exercising our capabilities, and
    increasing information-sharing with our partners, we strengthen
    our ability to protect each of you, your families, our
    families, and our Homeland.
        Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to be
    here and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Renuart follows:]
            Prepared Statement by Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
    and report to you on the state of our two commands, U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command
    (NORAD). Together, these Commands protect and defend the United States
    and Canadian homelands. I want to leave no doubt in your minds that in
    the 5-year history of NORTHCOM and 50-year history of NORAD, the men
    and women assigned to these Commands have never been more committed to
    this no-fail mission--they are vigilant, prepared, and responsive to
    threats that may harm our families and our countries.
        Since standing up in 2002, NORTHCOM, partnered with our NORAD
    teammate, has protected our Nation from attack. The NORTHCOM and NORAD
    team has been successful thanks to the combined work of our Nation's
    leaders, the Department of Defense (DOD), the interagency community,
    and especially support from Congress. Additionally, since the Hurricane
    Katrina disaster, NORTHCOM has re-defined readiness; we have made
    landmark improvements in our planning, anticipating, communicating and
    coordinating the Federal, State, and local response to natural
    disasters and other events requiring civil support. The National
    Strategy for homeland security states, ``as we face the dual challenges
    of preventing terrorist attacks in the Homeland and strengthening our
    Nation's preparedness for both natural and manmade disasters, our most
    solemn duty is to protect the American people.'' This pledge
    underscores the missions of NORTHCOM and NORAD, as we monitor 12-20
    potentially dangerous events every day.
        We continue to place strong emphasis on three focus areas:
    anticipating threats to our continental security, improving our
    homeland defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and
    strengthening relationships with our mission partners. It is my
    privilege today to report not only on the state of our commands, but
    also on our goals for the future.
                 our missions--anticipate, prepare, and respond
        NORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands--neither being subordinate
    to the other--with complementary homeland defense missions. We share
    common values, understand the urgency and significance of our duties in
    light of very real and present dangers, and operate in a dynamic and
    uncertain security environment. A range of threats across all domains
    represents an immediate and future challenge for both commands. Whereas
    the enemies of yesterday were relatively predictable, homogeneous,
    hierarchical, and slow to change, today's adversaries are agile,
    unpredictable, diverse, increasingly networked, and dynamic. These
    adversaries benefit from technologies and materials readily accessible
    in world markets, to include disruptive systems or the ingredients
    required to fabricate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This potential
    availability of WMD to terrorist groups is of vital concern, especially
    as terrorists thrive in the ``gray area'' where notions of crime and
    armed conflict overlap.
        Our missions require a culture of anticipation. With every
    potentially harmful event, through constant vigilance throughout
    NORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR), we anticipate appropriate
    levels of DOD response to provide capabilities that protect and defend
    the American people to prevent and minimize loss of life, suffering,
    and property damage.
        NORTHCOM is prepared to support its Federal, State, and National
    Guard partners in responding to a wide range of events. Natural
    disasters such as major hurricanes, earthquakes, or pandemics can
    quickly exceed the capabilities of local and State emergency response
    assets and require significant allocation of military resources to help
    mitigate the effects of and support for relief and recovery efforts.
    Likewise, a terrorist attack, particularly one involving WMD, may not
    only cause overwhelming numbers of casualties, but may also initiate a
    multitude of cascading events which could require substantial defense
    support of civil authorities. When needed, our military assets are
    organized, trained, equipped, and immediately accessible to leverage
    national, and as appropriate, continental strengths.
        An essential element of NORTHCOM and NORAD success is our ability
    to anticipate events that may require a military response. We work hard
    to have global situational awareness of potential events that can
    affect the safety and security of our homeland. Toward this end, in
    2006, the commands began a project to build a single, integrated
    command center that supports our requirements for global situational
    awareness and interconnectivity with key homeland defense and civil
    support partners. This remains a high priority for the commands, and we
    are on track to begin initial operations out of the new, integrated
    command center by May 2008. The NORAD and NORTHCOM command center will
    provide a more efficient and effective means of executing homeland
    defense against threats coming from all domains. In addition to an
    increased capacity to coordinate defense activities with other
    stakeholders, especially Canada command, the integrated command center
    will provide a significantly enhanced capability to execute defense
    support of civilian authorities.
        We understand Congress' concerns with the Command Center
    Integration project. In response, we provided the House and Senate
    Armed Services Committees' leadership a cost-benefit analysis for the
    integration and a summary of our actions to mitigate physical security
    vulnerabilities in early December 2007. As required by the 2008
    National Defense Authorization Act, we have completed a report to
    Congress on command center integration and provided that report to the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for coordination and subsequent
    submittal to Congress.
                   planning efforts--integral to our response
        The number one priority for NORTHCOM is continuing to build Active-
    Duty and Reserve component capabilities to support training and
    readiness for response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
    and high yield explosives (CBRNE) incidents. On behalf of DOD, NORTHCOM
    is prepared to provide a rapid and effective Federal-level response to
    a catastrophic domestic CBRNE incident, whether it is a deliberate
    terrorist attack or an accident. Currently, our Nation has 53 certified
    National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, one in every State, the
    District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, ready to provide initial
    detection and identification in a chemical, biological, radiological,
    or nuclear event. Additionally, there are 17 regional consequence
    response Joint National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package
    units, each consisting of nearly 200 trained people, as well as an
    active-duty military response unit of nearly 450 marines which is the
    gold standard for responding to a WMD attack. Should the event require
    additional Federal forces, we have active duty units of over 3,000
    members in each unit who are on a short recall to reinforce the initial
    response teams.
        We refined our CBRNE Consequence Management Concept Plan and led
    efforts within DOD to identify, train and make ready the CBRNE
    consequence management response capabilities the plan enumerates.
    Although the DOD response force is intended to augment those of state
    authorities, such as National Guard WMD-Civil Support Teams and CBRNE
    Enhanced Response Force Packages, we strongly recommend robust Federal
    response units, referred to as CBRNE Consequence Management Response
    Forces (CCMRF). This capability is needed because local and State
    capabilities will likely require additional DOD resources in the event
    a CBRNE incident is catastrophic or multiple events occur
    simultaneously. When operational, each CCMRF will deliver a range of
    ready capabilities, including incident assessment, command and control,
    medical, decontamination, logistics, transportation, mortuary affairs,
    general support, and public affairs. In May 2007, NORTHCOM successfully
    exercised the first-ever substantial CCMRF deployment to Camp
    Atterbury, IN, during Exercise Ardent Sentry-NORTHCOM Edge 07; we will
    exercise these CCMRF capabilities again in May and then annually to
    maintain critical readiness.
        Today, we have notional sourcing for the units we have been tasked
    to build. This remains a high priority for our command, and we are
    diligently working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Services, and the National
    Guard Bureau to source the full CCMRFs. The Secretary of Defense has
    directed a full-time, dedicated force be trained and equipped by the
    end of this fiscal year. I appreciate Congress' direction to establish
    an advisory panel to assess DOD's capabilities to provide support to
    U.S. civil authorities in the event of a catastrophic CBRNE incident,
    and look forward to providing input to the panel's assessment.
        We worked hard to complete detailed plans that will guide our
    operational response in the event of a catastrophic event. NORTHCOM's
    homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to our Nation's
    ability to deter, prevent and defeat threats to our security, and
    assist civil authorities when called upon by the President or Secretary
    of Defense. We continue to adjust these plans as we evaluate lessons
    learned from exercises and real world operations. Since the inception
    of NORTHCOM, our planning efforts with our mission partners,
    particularly Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Guard
    Bureau, and Canada command, have matured significantly.
        Our Nation uses the 15 National Planning Scenarios as a vehicle to
    shape nation-wide planning efforts for terrorist attacks and
    synchronize planning for natural disasters such as hurricanes and
    earthquakes. NORTHCOM plans, such as CONPLAN 3501, Defense Support of
    Civil Authorities, address each of the National Planning Scenarios that
    may require NORTHCOM support. We have established a close partnership
    with the DHS's Incident Management Planning Team to ensure DOD plans
    are integrated into the broader government-wide plans being developed
    by DHS. These plans will address the range of activities across the
    prevention, protection, response, and the recovery phases for each of
    the National Planning Scenarios. In coordination with the Joint Staff,
    the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
    and Americas' Security Affairs, and DHS, we have developed a yearly
    civil disaster assistance Execute Order and 26 Pre-Scripted Mission
    Assignments to put specific capabilities on alert in order to respond
    to specific predetermined requests for assistance from designated
    primary agencies, which streamline DOD response activation.
        In preparation for a potential Pandemic Influenza, NORTHCOM is
    leading the DOD effort to globally synchronize military efforts to
    minimize contamination and prevent further spread of the pandemic. In
    October 2007, NORTHCOM completed a DOD Global Synchronization Plan for
    Pandemic Influenza. This plan provides guidance to all the geographic
    combatant commands, functional combatant commands, Services, and DOD
    agencies to assist in development of regional plans addressing
    operations in a pandemic influenza environment.
        Each year, NORTHCOM anticipates, prepares, and trains for
    significant events that may require a DOD response. The command, in
    partnership with NORAD, annually sponsors two large-scale exercises
    (Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield) and participates in over 30
    additional exercises. Our exercise scenarios have involved: air (civil
    and military) incidents and attacks, maritime and port security,
    maritime interception operations, missile defense, consequence
    management in support of civil authorities, nuclear proliferation,
    nuclear weapon accidents, weapons of mass destruction attacks, and
    natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes.
        Our exercises (in full partnership with Canada, primarily through
    Canada command) arc integrated within the annual DHS-coordinated
    national exercise program, wherein we participate in National Level
    Exercises, and demonstrate our full response capabilities, including
    the deployment of elements of the CCMREs. We enthusiastically support
    and participate in the national level exercises, particularly those
    with senior cabinet involvement, because they are tremendous
    demonstration and training opportunities for the spectrum of civil and
    military personnel who may respond to a real world event.
      our operational response--helping americans where they live and work
        We implemented many improvements following Hurricane Katrina that
    make NORTHCOM well-prepared for seasonal natural disasters that occur
    in our homeland, such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires. For
    example, in August 2007, Hurricane Dean threatened the United States
    Gulf Coast as a Category V storm. In anticipation of the significant
    threat posed by the storm and the possibility of a Presidential
    Emergency Declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
    Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, NORTHCOM quickly responded,
    including the following:

             Established direct linkage to the Texas and Puerto
            Rico State Emergency Operations Centers and the Adjutants
            General Joint Task Force Headquarters.
             Activated our Future Operations Center.
             Pre-deployed Defense Coordinating Officers and their
            staffs to St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (Federal Emergency
            Management Agency (FEMA) Region II) and Corpus Christi, TX
            (FEMA Region VI) in coordination with DHS (FEMA).
             Coordinated with U.S. Transportation Command to
            transport the FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Support vehicles
            from Westovcr, MA, to Puerto Rico to provide emergency
            communications support to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
            Islands, if necessary.
             Developed the first-ever validated transportation plan
            for a pre-hurricane evacuation of citizens from Texas and
            Louisiana.
             Propositioned Mobile Aero-Medical Staging Facility
            teams in south Texas, prepared to evacuate special needs
            medical patients.

        As Hurricane Dean advanced across the Western Caribbean and gained
    strength, the State of Texas requested activation of the National
    Disaster Medical System and the President approved a pre-landfall
    Emergency Declaration for Texas. We had already anticipated these
    developments and, in coordination with U.S. Transportation Command,
    prepared to assist in the immediate general air evacuation of up to
    26,000 people from the Rio Grande River Valley. As it turned out,
    Hurricane Dean made landfall on the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico on 21
    August 2007 and did not reach the United States. However, if the storm
    had made landfall in Texas or elsewhere along the U.S. Gulf Coast as
    some storm models predicted, we were positioned to assist state and
    local authorities in all aspects of disaster response.
        Last fall, we quickly provided the DOD response to help fight the
    fast-moving, Santa Ana-driven wildfires that threatened hundreds of
    thousands of California residents. To help save lives and protect
    homes, we:

             Deployed a Defense Coordinating Officer and staff
            element to facilitate Federal response efforts;
             Deployed U.S. Army North's Operational Command Post to
            command and control Title 10 forces engaged in assisting State
            and local authorities, as well as a Mobile Air Staging Facility
            to process any potential casualties, especially burn patients;
             Tasked, in coordination with the National Guard and
            Reserves, six Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems (MAFFS).
            MAFFS-equipped, C-130 aircraft: flew a total of 76 sorties,
            dropping retardant to help contain the fires;
             Employed Incident Awareness and Assessment assets that
            provided critical imagery for local responders.

        This was a historical first-use of a DOD unmanned aerial system,
    the Global Hawk, for a Defense Support of Civil Authorities event. It
    identified 50 additional hotspots, enabling local responders to
    optimize the firefighting locations. We conducted these Incident
    Awareness and Assessment activities while simultaneously safeguarding
    the civil liberties of American citizens and adhering to appropriate
    statutes and DOD regulations. NORTHCOM employment of three Incident
    Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video communications suites
    enabled the Command to receive real-time video from incident sites and
    then disseminate unclassified video to all of our partners via the
    Internet.
        In summary, NORTHCOM remains vigilant and ready to respond to all
    types of disasters, large or small. Our support even extended to
    several small-scale events, such as the Minnesota I-35 bridge collapse
    and the Utah mine collapse. When the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi
    between downtown Minneapolis and St. Paul collapsed into the river in
    August 2007, killing several people and injuring many more, we
    responded. In support of Minnesota Governor Pawlenty's request,
    NORTHCOM deployed the FEMA Region V Defense Coordinating Officer and
    coordinated with U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Navy for the
    deployment of underwater salvage capabilities to support Federal
    (Department of Transportation, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
    Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
    assistance to the State and local efforts at the scene.
        Just 5 days later, when a portion of the Genwal Coal Mine collapsed
    in central Utah, trapping six miners approximately 1,500 feet below the
    surface and 4 miles from the mine entrance, we responded again.
    NORTHCOM, in coordination with U.S. Transportation Command,
    synchronized the delivery of the Department of Labor's Seismic
    Detection equipment to the incident site.
             our operational response--homeland defense is job one
        Although NORTHCOM is better known for coordinating the DOD response
    to disasters in our AOR, the men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD remain
    vigilant in our number one responsibility, homeland defense. Through
    our operational missile defense program, maritime and air defense
    activities, both Commands are vigilant and maintain a high state of
    readiness to respond as necessary against man-made threats.
        NORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense operations
    within our AOR and Hawaii to protect the homeland, allies, and other
    national interests from potentially hostile acts. We have made great
    strides in the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) capability
    and have fielded 23 Ground-Based Interceptors and additional sensor
    capability standing ready to defend the United States' and its allies'
    infrastructure and population centers, if needed.
        Last year, I testified that I would do my best to make sure Missile
    Defense flight tests realistically reflect NORTHCOM's operational
    environment. In September 2007, I personally participated in a flight
    test conducted by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which successfully
    demonstrated the GMD's warfighting capability. We are also working with
    MDA to develop systems such as the Multiple Kill Vehicle program, the
    21-inch SM-3 program, and the Theater High Altitude Air Defense
    program. These improved capabilities will significantly enhance our
    Nation's protective shield against missile threats.
        For over 6 years now, NORAD has executed Operation Noble Eagle and
    provided the air defense of the United States and Canada through
    airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, air patrols, and the unique
    National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System. We have flown
    over 48,000 sorties for this operation, and appreciate the National
    Guard's contribution of flying over 70 percent of these sorties. We
    continue to fly irregular air patrols to achieve a balance between
    readiness and sustainability while assuring the defense of our
    homelands. Despite a grounding of 37 percent of the U.S. Air Force F-
    15s due to structural cracks in aging airframes, NORAD air defense
    fighters remain mission-capable and on alert protecting North America.
    Reflective of the enduring nature of the NORAD Agreement, during the
    initial phase of the F-15 grounding, Canadian F-18s seamlessly
    supported NORAD'S Northern Sovereignty Operations.
        While our mission requirements are now being met by other aircraft
    with similar capabilities, such as the F-16s and F-22s, this places an
    operational strain on the globally-committed F-16s and F-22s. Maritime
    patrols of our homeland have similar operational challenges, due to the
    grounding of U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft caused by deterioration of
    airframes. As such, we strongly support the U.S. Air Force and U.S.
    Navy efforts to recapitalize the air defense and maritime patrol
    aircraft to keep our Nation safe and ensure future homeland defense
    missions are supported at the required levels.
        In the National Capital Region, NORAD continues to improve the
    robust air- and ground-based air defense system. Improvements to
    aircraft surveillance systems and close coordination with our
    interagency partners have resulted in quicker detection and
    identification of intruders into the protected airspace around
    Washington, DC. In addition to the alert fighters at Andrews AFB, the
    U.S. Coast Guard supports NORAD with alert helicopters to intercept
    low-and-slow aircraft in the National Capital Region. NORAD's ability
    to detect and deter intrusions to the National Capital Region will be
    further enhanced in the coming year by the interagency effort to
    delineate the airspace around the region. This rulemaking effort is
    critical to the long-term goal of securing the skies over the Nation's
    capital.
        In January 2008, NORAD and NORTHCOM provided DOD support to the
    President's 2008 State-of-the-Union Address, designated as a National
    Special Security Event. We provided unique DOD capabilities, including
    small medical teams of advanced cardiac and trauma life support teams
    and the Initial Response Force of the Chemical Biological Incident
    Response Force. We are currently planning support for two other
    National Special Security Events: the Democratic National Convention,
    24-28 August 2008, in Denver, CO, and the Republican National
    Convention, 1-4 September 2008, in Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN.
        NORTHCOM and U.S. Coast Guard coordinate operations in multiple
    national defense mission areas: maritime intercept operations, mine
    countermeasure operations, maritime security and defense, theater
    security cooperation, and environmental defense operations. Twenty U.S.
    Coast Guard personnel are integrated within the NORTHCOM staff, and the
    command is fully engaged with U.S. Coast Guard Pacific and Atlantic
    Area commands in maritime planning and execution. Although maritime
    defense operations are not widely publicized, this quiet mission
    remains a strong deterrent capability for our Nation. In any given
    month, our Command tracks, and in partnership with DHS and other DOD
    agencies, takes appropriate measures to ensure these potential threats
    do not reach our shores:

             40 foreign flag vessels with potential for
            intelligence gathering;
             25 vessels of interest to law enforcement (potential
            contraband);
             8 foreign nation warships entering NORTHCOM's AOR;
             100 regulatory vessels (containing hazardous materials
            or other dangerous cargo); and
             7 vessels of interest to our national security.

        Our command also supports DHS in the conduct of port security
    operations, and we developed plans enabling a rapid response to
    Secretary of Defense-approved requests for assistance. A significant
    challenge for port security is our ability to counter underwater mines.
    An underwater explosive device, either purpose-built or improvised, is
    a credible threat that could have huge consequences for our Nation's
    port facilities, and would prompt an expensive and challenging recovery
    effort. The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan tasks DOD as the
    lead agency for mine countermeasures in the maritime domain with
    NORTHCOM assigned that responsibility for the continental United
    States. NORTHCOM, in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, will
    employ tailored, rapidly deployable forces to respond to a domestic
    mine incident to re-establish maritime commerce in an expeditious
    manner balanced with acceptable risk.
        The trafficking of illegal drugs continues to be a threat to
    national security. While our interagency partners have scored record
    seizures of illegal drugs this year, drugs continue to flow across our
    northern and southern borders. NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force-North (JTF-
    N) supports law enforcement agencies and ensures unity of effort
    between Title 10 and Reserve component forces and those National Guard
    forces operating under State control (Title 32). Through JTF-N's
    missions and activities, we continue to sustain important relationships
    with Federal law enforcement agencies and National Guard counterdrug
    task forces engaged in securing our Nation's borders against drug
    traffickers and their associated activities.
                         partnering with reserve forces
        We understand the vital contributions of the National Guard and
    Reserves and are firmly committed to helping reconstitute and improve
    the Reserve component's operational capabilities. It is in our Nation's
    best interests to enable the States and Federal authorities to have the
    robust resources they need in times of catastrophic events.
        Toward that end, NORTHCOM has been closely coordinating with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
    meet milestones laid out in the DOD implementation plan for
    recommendations made by the Commission on the National Guard and
    Reserves Second Report (1 March 2007), and will do so as well for the
    Final Report (31 January 2008). Much of what has been said in the press
    about the Nation's ability to defend itself is not correct. I agree
    that NORTHCOM's plans can always be improved; however, make no
    mistake--we are trained, ready, and prepared to defend our homeland. I
    look forward to providing my perspective on some of the more
    significant recommendations made by the Commission in the Final Report.
        Specifically, I take exception to the recommendation regarding
    Governors directing Federal forces. NORTHCOM is committed to supporting
    Governors. Based on the Secretary's direction, we have numerous options
    that allow Federal forces to assist State emergency response personnel
    in order to have a coordinated response to domestic catastrophes and
    other emergency operations. NORTHCOM's role is clear--we respond in
    support of Governors, adjutants general, and designated Federal
    agencies.
        I also believe the commission's recommendation regarding NORTHCOM
    staff qualifications is unnecessary. The Commission recommends that ``a
    majority of NORTHCOM's billets, including those for its service
    component commands, should be filled by leaders and staff with Reserve
    qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior leaders and
    other key positions at NORTHCOM should contain the requirement of
    significant Reserve or National Guard experience or service.'' In fact,
    this already occurs. This recommendation does not reflect the fact that
    in addition to the nearly 50 full-time National Guard officers we have
    in NORTHCOM, 46 percent of NORTHCOM servicemembers have previous
    experience working with National Guard and Reserve personnel and units.
    I have six two-star National Guard and Reserve officers who serve as my
    Chief of Staff, subordinate commanders and direct advisors. Virtually
    all of my air component and a large percentage of my land component are
    guardsmen or reservists. Thus, while we can always improve, and we
    will, I am satisfied that we possess sufficient experience levels to
    provide timely and effective support to the States.
        Furthermore, I take my role as the combatant commander advocate for
    the Reserve component very seriously. This advocacy role was also one
    of the many recommendations in the second report of the Commission on
    the National Guard and Reserves that has been implemented throughout
    the DOD. In each of NORTHCOM's annual Integrated Priority List and
    Program Objective Memorandum submissions to the DOD, we advocate for
    and support correcting Guard and Reserve capability shortfalls for both
    Federal and non-Federal roles. NORTHCOM also advocated for and
    supported National Guard Bureau efforts to validate key initiatives
    such as Joint Force Headquarters-State and CBRNE Enhanced Response
    Force Packages through DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council. We
    advocate for changes to DOD policies that allow for more collaborative
    planning to ensure proper resourcing for National Guard and Reserve
    units' equipment, personnel, and training for civil support operations.
        Lessons learned during past events serve to underscore the
    importance of providing training and education opportunities to members
    of the National Guard including potential Joint Task Force-State
    Commanders, Commanders of Joint Force Headquarters-State and their
    respective staffs. At the request of the National Guard Bureau,
    NORTHCOM eagerly took the task to further develop these important
    National Guard Joint Task Force capabilities. Upon completion of
    training, participants are better able to conduct and support
    operations across the entire operational spectrum (State Active Duty,
    Title 32 status, and Title 10 status). In the past year, this program
    trained over 750 students; in 2008 we plan to train up to 1,000
    students.
        Three years ago, NORTHCOM, National Guard Bureau and U.S. Joint
    Forces Command launched a combined initiative entitled Joint Force
    Orientation. The primary objective of this program is to facilitate a
    mutual understanding of joint operational concepts and information
    sharing between States, territories, and NORTHCOM. The program
    currently uses two avenues for reaching the States. The first
    engagement is a 2-day conference held at the NORTHCOM headquarters
    targeting senior civilian and National Guard leadership from States
    within a FEMA region. The second engagement consists of a team from
    NORTHCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N) traveling
    to a State's Joint Force Headquarters. To date, NORTHCOM has engaged
    all 54 States and territories through the 2-day conference and our
    SJFHQ-N team has traveled to 23 States and territories for individual
    State engagements, the most recent being New Hampshire in early
    February. State feedback has been extremely positive, reflecting the
    value and importance of a NORTHCOM-state mission partnership that is
    based on mutual trust.
        We support proposed DOD legislative changes regarding the expanded
    employment of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard reservists
    in the homeland. Normally, these reservists are only available for
    civil emergencies while in voluntary Inactive-Duty for Training status.
    To eliminate this restriction, we ask for your support of DOD's fiscal
    year 2009 legislative proposals that will allow the President to order
    Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard reservists to Active-
    Duty to provide assistance in large-scale manmade, natural, and
    accidental disasters or catastrophes when the response capabilities of
    Federal, State, and local civilian agencies have been, or will be,
    exceeded. For example, a third of the Army's medical capabilities are
    resident with the Army Reserve. By enacting the legislative changes,
    these medical capabilities would also be available in the case of a
    domestic disaster or emergency. The bottom line is that enactment of
    these legislative proposals will increase the source of force options
    available to the President to support the Governors and likely decrease
    the need to Federalize National Guard forces.
                     partnering with states and territories
        Working with our mission partners is essential to ensuring the
    American people obtain assistance during times of need, whether at the
    international, interagency, or State and local level. Our Nation's
    Governors take very seriously their role as Commanders in Chief of
    their State and we respect that authority. Our job is to support our
    Nation's Governors in their leadership role to respond to emergency
    situations and threats in their States.
        We are expanding working relationships with the State Adjutants
    General. Since taking command, I have personally met with 19 Governors,
    32 State Adjutants General, and 25 Emergency Management Directors. In
    2007, our Command hosted many Adjutants General, including members of
    the Adjutants General Association Homeland Security Committee, in
    forums designed to increase information sharing, promote unity of
    effort and facilitate mutual advocacy. I have also addressed the annual
    meeting of the National Guard Association of the United States and the
    Adjutant General Association's Winter Meeting. In each instance, my
    message is the same: Our forces are trained, equipped and ready to
    support the needs of a State when disaster strikes or during special
    security events, and we do it in direct support of the Governor, his or
    her Adjutant General, and the primary Federal agency. In the years
    since Hurricane Katrina, we have built much stronger mutual
    understanding and respect between NORTHCOM and the State Adjutants
    General as we work together during exercises and real-world incidents.
                   partnering with the interagency community
        NORTHCOM supports and enables other agencies in our common
    objectives of homeland defense and civil support. Our NORAD and
    NORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate and the Commander's Joint
    Interagency Coordination Group integrate and synchronize activities of
    multiple civilian, Federal, state and private sector organizations. The
    group includes 60 full-time people from 40 other Federal and DOD-
    supporting agencies resident at NORTHCOM. Among the Federal agencies
    are DHS (FEMA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Coast
    Guard), Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services,
    Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Transportation
    Security Administration, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Geological
    Survey, and the Central Intelligence Agency. We also integrate similar
    expertise from five Canadian agencies.
        Cooperation with DHS on requirements, science and technology is a
    key aspect of our partnership. Improvements in coordination have led to
    a forward-leaning, anticipatory, operational sequence that reacts
    quickly to requests for assistance from civil authorities, as approved
    by the Secretary of Defense or the President.
        NORTHCOM closely coordinates and cooperates with FEMA in a number
    of areas related to the planning process. DOD liaison officers from
    NORTHCOM, the Joint Director of Military Support, and the National
    Guard Bureau have been assigned to FEMA Headquarters. These experts
    help ensure effective coordination of activities, provide advice, and
    facilitate relationship building. We maintain visibility of FEMA's
    logistical preparations and Defense Logistics Agency-sourced
    deliveries. This improves situational awareness, helps reduce the need
    for short-notice airlifts and improves our ability to anticipate and
    rapidly respond to emerging requirements during civil support missions.
        Additionally, NORTHCOM assigned Defense Coordinating Officers,
    supported by a six-person Defense Coordinating Element, to each of
    FEMA's 10 Regions to ensure close coordination in planning. FEMA and
    NORTHCOM also co-sponsor an annual Federal Coordinating Officer-Defense
    Coordinating Officer Conference that maintains and enhances civilian-
    military understanding and support for planning and disaster response
    activities.
        During the 2007 hurricane season, NORTHCOM and U.S. Transportation
    Command provided in-depth evacuation planning assistance to FEMA
    Headquarters and Region VI planners, resulting in an updated Louisiana
    Hurricane Plan. We have maintained this planning momentum throughout
    the off-season to prepare for the 2008 hurricane season through
    involvement in FEMA's Joint Coordination Evacuation Planning
    teleconferences. Additionally, we volunteered to assist FEMA in the
    development of their 2008 Hurricane CONPLAN. We are also in the midst
    of coordinating a 2008 Hurricane Transportation Planning Conference for
    DOD and Federal partners.
        Working with the DHS Private Sector Office, we have facilitated
    appropriate relationships for planning with the private sector
    (business, nonprofit, nongovernmental, faith-based, and academia) to
    promote mutual understanding, situational awareness, and unity of
    effort for homeland defense and civil support arenas, including
    hurricane and other natural disaster support. For instance, we have a
    particularly strong relationship with the American Red Cross. They
    participate in our Joint Interagency Coordination Group and we maintain
    close contact with their representatives to coordinate actions during
    real-world contingencies and exercises.
        One of our primary goals is to ensure DOD is prepared to provide a
    prompt and effective health services support response to homeland
    events as delineated in the 15 National Planning Scenarios. To meet
    this goal, we are working hard to:

             Improve synchronized medical pre-event planning with
            public, private and Federal partners through participation in
            exercises, working groups and planning efforts.
             Encourage paradigm shifts in the provision of health
            services support, presenting alternative solutions to event
            preparation and execution, e.g., Shelter-in-Place planning
            versus sole reliance on Strategic Air Evacuation during a
            hurricane event.
             Enhance utilization of our Joint Regional Medical
            Planners at all levels of medical planning, providing greater
            visibility of state and local plans while also working to fully
            train and integrate National Guard Joint Regional Medical
            Planners to bridge the gaps in synchronization between Title 32
            and Title 10 medical support.
             Improve unity of effort for health services support
            with our international medical partners in Canada and Mexico,
            coordinating planning efforts for cross-border events.
             Refine National Disaster Medical System planning in
            our organizational plans to improve and increase DOD's
            capability to evacuate patients through a well-coordinated
            effort among Active, Guard, and Reserve component personnel.
                       partnering with canada and mexico
        The DOD Security Cooperation Guidance's top priority is to build
    the capacity of allies and partners to help win the global war on
    terror by enhancing coordination with our continental neighbors. In
    2007, NORTHCOM, NORAD, and Canada command initiated a study to examine
    future roles, missions, and relationships for the three commands, with
    a desired end state of increasing North American defense and security
    while enhancing the valued relationship between the United States and
    Canada. The study will focus on strengthening the U.S. and Canadian
    armed forces' ability to act in a timely and coordinated fashion to
    identify, deter, disrupt, and defeat threats to the United States and
    Canada in all domains and to provide timely, effective, and efficient
    support of civil authorities as directed.
        The development of NORTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy
    and Implementation Plan have significantly strengthened our
    relationship with our Mexican defense and interagency counterparts. In
    2007, NORTHCOM hosted high-level members of the Mexican military and
    interagency community to improve their understanding of our mission in
    defending the U.S. Homeland, while fostering trust and confidence.
        The Government of Mexico has undertaken an unprecedented war
    against narco-violence and organized criminal groups, which has been
    accompanied by improving Mexican interagency relations, with new
    partnerships being born between the Mexican military and police. The
    Merida Initiative captures an opportunity with our critical neighbor to
    jointly confront the threat of narcotics trafficking and organized
    crime. We are hopeful that Congress will be able to move this
    initiative forward this year.
        We greatly appreciate Congress' action to lift American
    Servicemembers Protection Act sanctions in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Your action removed
    longstanding barriers to enhancing our ability to build partner
    capacity to effectively counter threats such as terrorism and narcotics
    trafficking in North America by modernizing Mexico's capabilities and
    improving interoperability against common threats. In support of the
    Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap, we are already
    collaborating with other U.S. and Mexican governmental agencies to
    enhance emergency preparedness and response activities along the
    southern border.
        While much progress has been made, building partnership capacity is
    an area that still requires additional congressional support. There are
    serious shortfalls in the U.S. Government's ability to help build the
    capacity of foreign partners-both within and outside DOD. The
    Departments of State and Defense conducted a systematic review of gaps
    in authority and developed an omnibus bill called the Building Global
    Partnerships Act, which was personally brokered by the Secretaries of
    State and Defense. I strongly urge Congress to enact all of these
    authorities. Building partner capacity is fundamental to our national
    security strategy and will make our Nation safer.
         improving our homeland defense and civil support capabilities
        As part of the larger DOD effort to assess its roles, missions,
    capabilities, and resources needed to combat threats to our Homeland,
    NORTHCOM and NORAD are leading a comprehensive homeland defense and
    civil support Capabilities-Based Assessment. This Assessment will
    define DOD's core capability requirements in our AOR; evaluate existing
    capabilities; understand capability interdependencies; and determine
    where gaps, excesses, and redundancies exist and prioritize them to
    help inform the Department's decisions on risk management and
    resourcing in a limited resource environment. DHS and the National
    Guard Bureau are playing an integral role throughout this analytical
    effort. Most importantly, DHS will lead the effort to define the
    contributions of non-DOD agencies to homeland defense and civil
    support, thus identifying DOD's capability requirements as well as
    facilitating DHS's continued actions under Homeland Security
    Presidential Directive ``National Preparedness'' (HSPD-8).
        NORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center North (JIOC-N)
    relies on collaborative Intelligence Community networks to gain insight
    and understanding of emerging international terrorist and strategic
    threats to North America. Recognizing the challenges of sharing
    information across agencies and with partner nations, JIOC-N continues
    teaming efforts with the Federal Bureau of Investigations, National
    Counterterrorism Center and the Central Intelligence Agency's
    Counterterrorism Center. Additionally, as a result of lessons learned
    during the NORTHCOM response to the California wildfires, JIOC-N is
    working to centralize the sharing of critical imagery and geospatial
    information to support first responders and deployed DOD personnel
    responding to crises.
        To effectively execute our missions, NORAD and NORTHCOM rely on the
    uninterrupted use of the internet and communications systems that
    comprise our Nation's cyber infrastructure. There are a variety of
    global actors who threaten the security of commercial and government
    cyber infrastructure. To reduce vulnerabilities and defend against
    cyber infrastructure attacks, we are working closely with the DHS and
    U.S. Strategic Command.
        Space situational awareness is essential to our ability to predict
    threats from space. Distinguishing a foreign space launch from a
    missile launch is central to our Nation's defense and NORAD requires
    this space data to determine if North America is under attack.
    Similarly, the re-entry of a spent rocket body over North America has
    consequence management implications for NORTHCOM and NORAD. Having a
    window from which to view space activities enables us to have an
    overall picture of the next threat to North America. There are over
    17,000 manmade objects orbiting Earth and thousands more we cannot
    track. There are eight nations able to launch their own spacecraft and
    a few that are perfecting this technology. At the same time, there are
    commercial assets that could--even if unwittingly--launch a malicious
    payload into space. Saying ``don't know what we don't know'' is not
    good enough. I recommend that Congress support the efforts of U.S.
    Strategic Command to enhance our space situational awareness
    capability. NORAD requires survivable, protected and dynamic tactical
    satellite communications capabilities throughout our area of
    operations, including coverage of the northern Polar Regions.
        NORTHCOM requires dynamic satellite communications for capacity and
    coverage throughout our entire area of responsibility that will support
    real-time joint force networking, battle space awareness and land air,
    and sea-borne command, control, communications, computers,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Both Commands' networks
    must seamlessly bridge with Federal, State, and local agencies. In our
    view, transformational satellites offer the most viable course of
    action to satisfy our requirements for high-speed, secure, protected,
    dynamically-allocated and efficiently-utilized communications.
        NORTHCOM communications efforts are focused on ensuring DOD is
    completely interoperable with our partners in DHS, FEMA, the National
    Guard, States, and local organizations to rapidly and effectively share
    information to ensure a prompt, coordinated response. We made advances
    in the area of deployable communications by aggressively addressing
    shortfalls identified during the response to Hurricane Katrina. In
    partnership with FEMA and the National Guard, we now have a combined
    total of 25 deployable cellular-based suites which include cellular
    towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile Radio
    interfaces, and ancillary devices for emergency responders. All of the
    suites are interoperable and can be immediately deployed to an incident
    site to provide reliable communications for civil authorities.
        In 2007, we published our Concept of Operations for Domestic
    Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Operations, which explains how NORTHCOM
    envisions domestic employment of DOD UASs to help accomplish our
    missions of homeland defense and civil support. UASs will be employed
    in homeland defense missions to accomplish intelligence, surveillance
    and reconnaissance, communications, and CBRNE detection. Civil support
    applications of UASs include Incident Awareness and Assessment,
    communications, search and rescue, and CBRNE detection.
        Beyond our efforts to solve interoperable communications
    challenges, we must also resolve challenges with our surveillance
    radars. Inhibitors to these systems significantly impact our
    situational awareness and threat detection capability.
        The U.S.-Canada Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy is the NORAD and
    NORTHCOM centerpiece strategy for improving wide area surveillance of
    the North American continent. Current surveillance gaps leave our
    countries vulnerable to attacks in multiple domains. We are conducting
    a command and control gap filler joint capability technology
    demonstration (JCTD) and are developing a Next Generation Over-the-
    Horizon Radar JCTD candidate as near-term steps in the strategy to
    achieve eventual full operational deployment. These technology
    demonstrations will focus on integrating surveillance sensor data in a
    developmental command and control system, fielding an enhanced sensor
    data fusion correlation system at the Continental U.S. NORAD Region Air
    Operations Center, and operationalizing a more capable wide area
    surveillance radar system for the homelands.
        Our Nation lacks an integrated air and missile defense of the
    homeland against cruise missiles, low-flying aircraft and short-range
    ballistic missile attacks. As the threat of terrorism looms and the
    proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities grows, I recommend
    the DOD initiate the development of a truly integrated air and missile
    defense system-of-systems tailored to meet the unique needs of the
    homeland. This system-of-systems must allow for military action to
    protect the homeland and our citizens against surprise attack while
    operating within the constraints appropriate to protect our way of life
    and national freedoms.
        The Maritime Domain Awareness Concept of Operations and Interagency
    Investment Strategy, advocated by NORAD and NORTHCOM and, approved this
    past year, provides an interagency way ahead to continue to improve
    maritime awareness in this vital domain. NORTHCOM directly supports the
    newly established Global Maritime Situational Awareness Office and also
    coordinates with the Global Maritime and Air Intelligence Integration
    office in their efforts to improve awareness. NORTHCOM has worked
    extensively with U.S. Joint Forces Command to conduct an
    experimentation series to further understand the current maritime
    domain awareness practices and allow evaluation of future ideas.
        Since Maritime Warning was added to the NORAD Agreement in 2006,
    mission development has steadily progressed, with the planning staff
    working in cooperation with several external agencies in the United
    States and Canada. Building upon the initial maritime warning
    capability established in late 2006, our staff prepared a strategic
    concept that will set the framework to establish and formalize
    agreements for improved maritime information sharing, to ensure a
    comprehensive shared understanding between both nations, and to
    institute the Maritime Warning process.
        NORTHCOM and NORAD continually evaluate global changes that may
    impact our continental security. One area of concern recognized by the
    United States government and DOD is the need to study the implications
    of Arctic climate change and how it will affect our military
    capabilities, organizations, and infrastructure in the area. Our
    homeland defense and civil support plans address the DOD response to
    potential effects of climate change. We support prudent steps to
    strengthen our Nation's disaster preparedness regardless of the
    political debate on climate change. We are grateful for Congress'
    direction in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2008 that the next National Security Strategy and the new National
    Defense Strategy include guidance for military planners to assess the
    risks of projected climate change to current and future missions of the
    Armed Forces. We also urge the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea
    Treaty, as it will enable the U.S. to be party to the adjudicating body
    which will determine rights to the region's resources.
        There is no doubt future threats will look to exploit seams and
    vulnerabilities. Our Commands must close seams, eliminate
    vulnerabilities and enhance security so as to meet evolving challenges
    that are associated with an interconnected world. Achieving a truly
    seamless security posture is our perpetual objective.
                                   conclusion
        NORTHCOM and NORAD are steadfastly committed to our mission of
    defending our homelands, and we know we cannot fail. Through continued
    emphasis on anticipating and preparing for all-hazards response with
    our mission partners, strengthening relationships with our mission
    partners, improving our homeland defense and civil support capabilities
    and anticipating future impacts to our continental security, we are on
    the right path for a secure nation.
        Our committed team of active duty members, civilians, Reserve
    component forces, Canadian personnel, interagency personnel, and
    contractors is trained, ready, and vigilant in our missions to defend
    our homelands and provide civil support. We appreciate the committee's
    efforts to ensure our men and women in uniform continue to have the
    best possible equipment, education, training, and care for their
    families. We applaud the President's call for Congress to enact
    legislation to allow U.S. servicemembers to transfer their education
    benefits to family members, to expand access to childcare for military
    families, and to increase government employment opportunities and
    funding for professional certification for military spouses. If
    enacted, these initiatives will greatly help military families cope
    with the challenges they face with frequent moves. We also strongly
    encourage support for the lifelong needs of our Wounded Warriors--it is
    an obligation our Nation must meet. With Congress' sustained support,
    NORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to protect and defend our fellow
    citizens and the freedoms they enjoy.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Stavridis?

       STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            SOUTHERN COMMAND

        Admiral Stavridis. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
    Member, Senators of this truly bipartisan committee. I thank
    you so much for the opportunity to appear today. I thank you
    also for the great support this committee has given to the men
    and women not only of SOUTHCOM, but of the entire Armed Forces.
        I'd echo what Gene said, that he and I are close friends
    and I'm very proud to sit next to him. It's not just a personal
    relationship. There's a deep professional relationship between
    NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM that has to exist to address the security
    issues that we face together in this region.
        I know we want to get right to questions, so I'll be very
    brief. I would like to have my statement entered in the record,
    Mr. Chairman, if I could.
        I would make the comment, sir, that as I go about my
    business at SOUTHCOM people often say to me: Admiral, what you
    do is so important; you know, that's America's backyard. I
    think that's the wrong expression. This is America's home that
    we share together in the Americas. So our mission at SOUTHCOM
    is to approach the security challenges in this home we share
    together in a way that brings to bear international
    cooperation, interagency partnership, and partnerships within
    the military, like working with our brothers and sisters north
    of us in NORTHCOM.
        It's an area of the world with extraordinary promise, but
    it is burdened by poverty and, Mr. Chairman, as you said, it is
    burdened by narcotics, and it is burdened by instability. It's
    our home and I think we need to address the challenges in it
    seriously, and we should move forward in a variety of programs
    that do so.
        I put two photos up here today. I just want to mention what
    they are. Mr. Chairman, you spoke about the drug threat. On the
    right, this is a self-propelled semi-submersible submarine. It
    was captured off the coast of Guatemala between Colombia and
    Mexico. It was moving more than 5 tons of cocaine to the United
    States. It was captured in August 2007.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        It is indicative of the magnitude of the threat of
    narcotics flowing north and also indicative of the challenges
    of facing up to this threat.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, could he explain the position
    of this? I don't understand what we're looking at here.
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, it's a semi-submersible submarine.
    It floats just below the surface of the ocean, and it was
    caught carrying 5 tons of cocaine from Colombia bound for
    Mexico and transshipment to the United States.
        It's again indicative of the drug threat. Mr. Chairman, the
    drug threat is a big national threat. There's a demand side in
    the United States, there's a supply side that you alluded to in
    Colombia and other parts of the Andean Ridge, and there's an
    interdiction challenge. Our part of the mission at NORTHCOM and
    SOUTHCOM is the interdiction portion of it. I put this graphic
    up to show that this is a significant threat and we are
    addressing it hard every day.
        Second, on my left is a photograph of something very good.
    It's the Hospital Ship Comfort. The DOD with interagency
    partnership and with international partners deployed this ship
    to the Caribbean and South America last summer. We did 400,000
    patient encounters, 100,000 individual patient treatments, and
    25,000 pairs of eyeglasses. I could go on and on. It was a
    tremendous demonstration of positive U.S. engagement in the
    region.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        So I put those two pictures up to simply make the point
    that there are challenges in this region, many of them stem
    from narcotics, instability, gangs, corruption, and drugs, but
    there are also solution sets that we need to think about
    applying, as we did last summer, and I hope we'll talk about
    some of those.
        In closing in my oral statement, sir, again thank you for
    taking the time. I look forward to your questions about current
    events in the region, which are certainly bubbling. Again, I
    want to close by thanking the committee for all the support
    over the years. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]
               Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to discuss the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and our work
    in Latin America and the Caribbean. I would like to thank all the
    committee members for your support over the past year and for your
    continued support as we face the challenges and opportunities of this
    promising, yet complex 21st century.
        SOUTHCOM is charged with promoting security cooperation and
    conducting military operations in Central America, the Caribbean, and
    South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
    Successfully accomplishing this mission enhances the security and
    stability in the Western Hemisphere and ensures the forward defense of
    the United States.
        Our efforts are significantly influenced by our understanding of
    the complexities of the hemisphere and our ability to foster
    cooperation with--and among--willing and capable partners. As
    globalization trends continue, we are certain that our security will
    involve deeper cooperation with multinational, interagency, and public-
    private partners.
        2007 was an important year for SOUTHCOM. We celebrated our
    headquarters' 10th anniversary in Miami, conducted numerous bilateral
    and multilateral exercises, responded to several natural disasters,
    built new relationships and strengthened existing ones, launched a
    series of valuable medical missions, and put the command on track for a
    reorganization to meet the security challenges of the new millennium.
    With the ongoing support of Congress, we hope to continue our progress.
        Today in the Americas, from northern Canada to the tip of South
    America, 45 nations, territories, and protectorates are interdependent
    in many ways. While each of us celebrates our uniqueness and diversity
    across the hemisphere, we also share tremendous linkages and natural
    alignments that bring us closer together with each year that passes. As
    our hemisphere ``virtually'' shrinks, each of our Nations--working
    together--becomes more important in facing the challenges posed by this
    new century.
        Last year, in my first posture statement, I reported on the status
    of the diverse region we are assigned. I discussed the tremendous
    linkages that we share with Latin America and the Caribbean--important
    geographic, cultural, economic, and geopolitical linkages. I outlined
    some difficult underlying conditions faced by the region--led by
    poverty and unequal wealth distribution--and how they contribute to
    specific challenges such as crime, violence, and illicit trafficking of
    drugs, people, and weapons.
        This year, I would like to give you an update on our region,
    discuss the challenges we still face, report on SOUTHCOM's key
    initiatives, and detail our efforts to modify our organization to meet
    current and future security demands.
                             economics and culture
    Economic momentum
        According to the United Nations' Economic Commission on Latin
    America and the Caribbean, this past year was an encouraging one for
    the region in terms of economic growth, with all of Latin America and
    the Caribbean benefiting from 5 consecutive years of positive economic
    performance. The year 2007 ended with an average overall economic
    growth rate of 5.6 percent, with some individual economies growing as
    much as 8 percent. From a historical point of view, the region has not
    seen an equivalent sustained economic performance in over three
    decades.
        A key contributor to this growth was the increase in formal
    employment, with an overall reduction in the unemployment rate to 8
    percent and an increase in real wages of about 1.5 percent--all leading
    to a rise in household consumption and a slight decrease in poverty
    levels. These positive economic indicators, coupled with expanding
    credit and rising commodity prices, stimulated the region's demand-
    driven economic performance.
        ``Ours is a region of cruel contrasts,'' wrote one of the current
    Presidents in the region. Despite its economic growth, great wealth,
    abundance of natural resources, and the vast potential of its creative
    people, Latin America and the Caribbean still suffer from widespread
    poverty, unequal wealth distribution, and social exclusion. The level
    of these social ills does vary, however, by region, country, and the
    economic policies and practices of each government. But, as a
    developing region, notwithstanding its recent year-on-year growth,
    Latin America and the Caribbean are still lagging behind other
    developing areas.
        In terms of trade, the rest of the Americas continue to be a major
    trading partner with the United States, with almost 40 percent of total
    U.S. trade--imports and exports--flowing north and south in the
    hemisphere. From important sources for oil, metals, and other
    commodities, to key destinations for our exports such as machinery
    parts and other technical equipment, the Nations of the Americas are
    increasingly interdependent and important to the United States. In
    fact, we are either the primary or the secondary trading partner with
    almost every nation in the Americas. This continuous two-way flow of
    materiel, ideas, and people is reshaping the hemisphere. In essence,
    our economic exchange is the lifeblood of the hemisphere, sustaining
    our economies and ultimately providing security and prosperity for our
    people.
        The Free Trade Agreements we have with our partners in the region
    help facilitate this beneficial exchange and contribute to the
    demonstrated growth of all of our economies, thus contributing to
    security and stability. I would like to thank Congress for its support
    of the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement late last year--this is extremely
    important for security in the region. Additionally, we currently have a
    unique opportunity to strengthen our economic ties to two key friends
    and allies--Colombia and Panama--by passing Free Trade Agreements that
    could help bolster their economic security, and in the case of
    Colombia, help solidify the significant gains it has made towards
    achieving peace and stability for its citizens. Both agreements would
    help the overall level of security in the region.
    Dynamic Cultures
        The Americas are an interacting system--a diverse, yet
    interconnected community, which in every sense of the word is our home.
    We have tremendous geopolitical, economic, and social linkages that
    make up the foundation of this home, and Latin America and the
    Caribbean are an integral part of its structure. Frequently, this
    important region is offhandedly referred to as the ``backyard'' of the
    United States--an image that is inaccurate and inappropriate--
    especially since it is vitally important to our hemisphere and to the
    future of the United States. It is not our ``backyard,'' nor our
    ``front porch.'' The Americas are a home we share together. A clear
    indication of this is the mixing and merging of cultures we see in the
    region, with a significant amount occurring here in the United States.
        To see some of the linkages, all you have to do is turn on the
    television or walk down the street. Fifteen percent of our population
    traces its heritage to Latino origin. Almost 50 million people, who as
    a popular commercial once said, ``live in English, but feel in
    Spanish.'' By the middle of this century, almost 30 percent of the U.S.
    population will be of Latino descent.
        In fact, the Latino advertisement sector is booming and seeks to
    attract this growing Latino population--a population with a combined
    economic power of nearly $1 trillion. Steadily, more channels and
    broader programming are available in Spanish, with viewers concerned
    about issues affecting their population and that of their countries of
    origin.
        This past year, the United States probably became the second
    largest nation of Spanish-speakers in the world--behind only Mexico,
    but ahead of Argentina, Colombia, and Spain. Four of the top 15
    surnames in the United States are now of Latino origin, and as the U.S.
    Census Bureau statistics illustrate, seven of the top ten largest
    cities in the United States are now arrayed in States along our
    southern border--San Jose, Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Dallas,
    Houston, and San Antonio. This represents a huge population density
    shift from 100 years ago, when all 10 major cities were in the
    northeastern part of the United States.
        What does this great mixing of cultures in our country mean? For
    starters, it represents a U.S. population interested in and connected
    to Latin America and the Caribbean. It represents a linkage to the
    hemisphere that we should leverage along with our various other natural
    alignments. We should couple this human connection with our country's
    natural generosity and ability for innovation and ultimately apply them
    to solve our shared challenges.
                                   challenges
        When it comes to security challenges, fortunately, we do not see
    any conventional military threats to the United States developing in
    the region, nor do we foresee any major military conflict between
    nations in Latin America or the Caribbean. Although some historical
    competition and occasional tension between neighbors do exist, we are
    confident that any disagreements will be resolved through dialogue--a
    strength in the region--and not through state-on-state violence.
    However, public security threats--such as crime, gangs, and drug
    trafficking and use--pose the principal near-term security challenges
    to the region. Given the depth of our linkages in the Americas, these
    ills pose a threat to the United States as well. For example, the U.S.
    Department of Justice's National Drug Intelligence Center reports that
    there were an estimated 5,500 U.S. deaths that listed cocaine poisoning
    as a factor in 2004--a 43 percent increase from 1999. If this
    statistical trend continues at the same rate, and considering all
    cocaine-related deaths--such as accidents and homicides--it can be
    assumed that several thousand more people will die in the United States
    this year related to cocaine, most of which comes from Colombia, Peru,
    and Bolivia in the Andean Ridge of South America.
    Poverty and inequality
        In many cases, the underlying conditions of poverty and inequality
    provide fertile soil for the principal security challenges in the
    region. Although recent positive economic growth has begun to make a
    dent in poverty rates, still about 35 percent of Latin Americans are
    living in poverty--subsisting on less than $2 U.S. per day.
        Moreover, about 13 percent of the people in the region live in
    extreme poverty--less than $1 U.S. daily--and nearly 80 percent of the
    entire region lives on less than $10 per day. When you add these
    poverty figures--which represent millions of people trying to provide
    for their families--to the world's most unequal distribution of wealth
    and a high level of corruption, you have a strong catalyst for
    insecurity and instability. Poverty and inequality--although not
    uniform across the region--make whole populations susceptible to the
    lure of illicit activity--such as an involvement with the drug trade,
    crime, gangs, or illegal immigration. It also creates a large
    constituency predisposed to vote for any demagogue espousing political
    or economic changes that might improve their financial circumstances,
    regardless of the ultimate consequences. This also provides a basis for
    terrorists seeking to exploit such conditions.
    Drugs
        Drug trafficking is one of the greatest threats to public order in
    our hemisphere. The Andean Ridge in South America is the world's only
    significant source of coca cultivation. Cocaine is the fuel that feeds
    many public security ills in Latin America and the Caribbean--from
    criminal violence, to corruption, to political instability. But the
    drug trade's toxic effects are not isolated to our south. As mentioned
    earlier, we estimate that several thousand people will die in the
    United States this year due to cocaine-related events that can be
    traced to illicit drugs from this region.
        The global business of illegal drug production, distribution, and
    consumption is devastating societies in Latin America and the
    Caribbean. Narcotraffickers continuously adjust their operations to
    adapt to law enforcement efforts by developing new trafficking routes
    and consumer markets. Consequently, nations that were once isolated
    from the illicit drug trade are now experiencing its corrosive effects.
    Most nations in the hemisphere are now struggling to counteract the
    drug trade's destabilizing and corrupting influence.
        Each nation that finds itself affected by the drug trade will need
    to increase cooperation and dedicate more resources to combat this
    growing and adapting threat. Drug traffickers are innovative, adaptive,
    and organized. For example, as we interdict their shipments along
    coastal routes, they reroute west of the Galapagos Islands to avoid
    detection. As we stop them on the high seas, they build and operate
    self-propelled semi-submersibles that skim along the water line to
    avoid visual and radar detection. Through international and interagency
    efforts, we have interdicted several such semi-submersible vessels,
    which are showing improved capability and technology. Last year, a
    ``ship building'' site was discovered in the Colombian jungle where
    five semi-submersibles were being built--each with a capacity to bring
    several tons of cocaine into the United States. To put this threat into
    perspective, each load aboard one of these vessels is the rough
    equivalent of one cocaine hit for each U.S. high school student--all 18
    million of them.
        Fortunately, we are making progress in Colombia--the major global
    source of cocaine. Colombian efforts have significantly eliminated key
    leaders involved in the drug trade. In September 2007, Colombian
    authorities captured Diego Leon Montoya Sanchez, one of the world's
    most dangerous drug traffickers responsible for nearly two-thirds of
    the hundreds of tons of cocaine exported from Colombia each year.
    Experts attribute nearly 1,500 murders to this ruthless criminal.
    Through fear and corruption, Montoya, like Pablo Escobar before him,
    played a huge, destabilizing role throughout Latin America. His arrest
    marks a major milestone for Colombia--a nation that has labored for
    years to build a foundation for legitimate governance and rule of law.
        Here in the United States, illegal drug use continues to be a
    serious challenge that needs to remain a high priority on the national
    agenda. There are legitimate needs on the ``demand side'' as well as on
    the ``interdiction and supply side.'' Every effort devoted to solving
    the drug abuse epidemic in this country and preventing the flow of
    illicit drugs is an effort well spent in directly saving the lives of
    U.S. citizens, enhancing our national security, and stabilizing fragile
    democracies in our hemisphere.
        SOUTHCOM's unique counternarcotics task force located in Key West,
    FL, is a role model for the kind of innovative cooperation and fusion
    of capabilities we need to counter this dynamic and pernicious threat.
    This Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) combines the efforts
    of international partners, the U.S. armed services, and numerous U.S.
    and international departments and agencies, including Panama Express,
    an interagency Strike Force of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
    Task Force supported by the Department of Justice dedicated to maritime
    interdiction originating in Colombia and related investigations. Thanks
    to this cooperative and effective arrangement, large quantities of
    narcotics moving through the region are interdicted each year. Last
    year this task force stopped approximately 210 metric tons of cocaine
    from entering the United States and facilitated the capture by law
    enforcement or partner nations of hundreds of drug traffickers. These
    efforts prevented the equivalent of roughly 1 billion cocaine hits from
    reaching our streets. More must be done, however. Drug traffickers
    respond to pressure by changing their tactics, as well as by
    diversifying their markets, such as in Europe and beyond, thereby
    compounding the global drug problem. JIATF-S has an outreach plan that
    includes interaction with European law enforcement agencies and liaison
    with most of the U.S. geographic combatant commands.
        Our task force uses a multinational and interagency approach that
    bridges the gap between the military's role of detection and monitoring
    and law enforcement's role of interdiction and apprehension. We will
    continue to address this problem with all available resources.
    Violence and crime
        Violence and crime have become a major threat to the security of
    many nations in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, murder is one of the
    five main causes of death in several Latin American countries. The
    annual homicide rate for Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the
    highest in the world at 27.5 murders per 100,000 people. This murder
    rate stands in stark contrast to 5.5 in the U.S. and 1 in Western
    Europe. Recent surveys in Central America report that two-thirds of the
    respondents cite crime as the number-one problem facing their
    countries--six times the number of respondents choosing poverty.
        These crime rate trends are exacerbated by the growing influence of
    gangs and are severely challenging security and civil society
    throughout Latin America, with some gang population estimates reaching
    over one hundred thousand in Central America alone. Primarily, these
    are urban gangs comprised of disenfranchised youth, thus creating a
    challenging long-term and generational aspect to this threat. Central
    American street gangs--maras--are known for their brutal initiations
    and their extortion of ``protection'' money--or ``War Taxes'' as the
    locals call it. These gangs do not just pose a concern in Latin
    America. Central American gangs routinely cross borders and operate
    inside the United States.
        The size and reach of these gangs severely stress regional law
    enforcement capabilities. Partner nation law enforcement units are
    often out-gunned, out-manned, and overwhelmed when attempting to
    counter these criminal enterprises. As a result, partner nation
    military forces are often called in to support their law enforcement
    counterparts. These militaries then turn to the U.S. seeking assistance
    and advice, yet U.S. military forces are legally prohibited in our
    ability to provide such support. Support in these areas often resides
    in Department of Justice, Department of State (DOS), or U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) programs, underscoring the fact that
    coordinated interagency solutions will be required to confront these
    threats.
        In recognition of these dynamics and the need for broader
    interagency involvement on crime and gang issues in the region,
    SOUTHCOM has worked with counterparts in the intelligence community, in
    Federal development agencies, and in domestic U.S. law enforcement
    organizations to improve mutual understanding of these complex social
    issues. Gang challenges and the need to address broad rule of law
    issues regionally have also led, in part, to expanded personnel
    representation at SOUTHCOM by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), the USAID, the DOS, and the Drug Enforcement Administration
    (DEA).
        In September 2007, we hosted a major Interagency Coordination Group
    conference on gangs in Latin America and the Caribbean. This conference
    underscored the pivotal role U.S. law enforcement and development
    agencies play in countering the regional criminal threat, linked
    disparate U.S. agency and law enforcement representatives, facilitated
    information exchange, and reinforced understanding of why U.S. military
    involvement in such efforts remains appropriately constrained.
    Colombia
        Colombia continues to be a focus nation and valued partner for
    SOUTHCOM. Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a
    crucial country for the future stability and security of this
    hemisphere. Colombia has access to the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans,
    shares a border with Panama that forms a natural land bridge to the
    United States, and is the second oldest democracy in the hemisphere.
    Yet Colombia continues to face challenges: it has been waging an
    internal struggle for peace for over four decades, and it remains the
    source for most of the world's cocaine.
        Overall, Colombia continues to make great progress in its complex
    struggle for peace and security. There is a building momentum for real
    peace in this long troubled country. I encourage the members of the
    committee to visit Colombia to experience first hand the sense of
    accomplishment and hope most Colombians feel today. A tour of Bogota--
    recently named by the New York Times as one of ``The 53 Places to Go in
    2008''--will quickly highlight the economic growth and progress the
    country has made. Cartagena is an international tourist destination and
    a U.N. World Heritage City on the Caribbean coast. New construction is
    booming, citizens flock to the malls, restaurants are packed, and
    ordinary people routinely drive across the country in relative safety--
    all activities unheard of a decade ago.
        With the steady support of the United States, Colombia is on the
    brink of winning its peace and making its successful gains against
    terrorism and social disorder irreversible. Desertions by members of
    the various subversive armed groups continue to rise. For example,
    Colombia's main narcoterrorist group--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia (FARC)--has been reduced to an estimated 9,000 fighters
    today--a significant decrease from the 17,500 fighters in 2002. The
    Colombian armed forces have had numerous operational successes against
    the FARC with the clearing of former FARC strongholds and the removal
    or bringing to justice of numerous high-ranking FARC leaders, such as
    Negro Acacio and Martin Caballero. Over the course of the last 5 years,
    homicides have decreased by 40 percent, kidnappings for ransom
    decreased by 76 percent, and terror attacks against civilians decreased
    by 61 percent--due in large part to the current Colombian
    administration's strategy of establishing security and governance
    throughout its sovereign territory.
        Colombia has made these difficult gains within an increasingly open
    and transparent political and judicial system. The press in Colombia
    has free reign to investigate and publish on any subject that it
    wishes. Just as in the United States, as illegal activity becomes
    known, accusations are made public and trials take place in an open
    legal system. Like many nations fighting for peace against capable and
    well-resourced foes, Colombia has uncovered some excesses and abuses
    linked to corruption and human rights violations. To Colombia's credit,
    regardless of the level of implication, they are attempting to
    prosecute these cases in a transparent and public manner.
        All of these and many other hard-fought successes are the result of
    dedicated effort on part of the Colombian Government with the
    assistance of the United States. Continued U.S. support at current
    levels for the next 3 years is critical, and we believe it will enable
    Colombia to achieve irreversible gains as it moves into the
    consolidation phase of its peace plan. During this important phase, as
    the Colombian Government extends effective government services and
    security presence throughout its territory, we predict this key
    strategic ally will benefit from progress toward peace, while the
    ability of narcoterrorists to grow, process, and ship illicit drugs
    will be significantly reduced--ultimately saving U.S. lives and
    resources.
        Over the next 3 years, support for the Colombian armed forces'
    campaign to defeat the FARC and for their interagency efforts to bring
    governance and economic opportunity to areas recaptured from the FARC
    is essential. Paramount to this support will be training, mobility, and
    sustainment of key infrastructure programs to provide long-term self-
    sufficiency. Our continued support over the next 3 years will be
    critical through the ``nationalization'' period, as the Colombian
    government assumes responsibility and funding of the majority of
    current programs through the resources raised by its tax system--
    specifically $3.7 billion that Colombians have agreed to generate
    between 2007 and 2010 to increase their defense budget by 12 percent.
    U.S. Hostages
        For 5 years, U.S. citizens Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and
    Thomas Howes have been held hostage by the FARC in Colombia. Their safe
    return to the United States is a top priority for SOUTHCOM.
    Unfortunately, the FARC are extremely capable and experienced at
    holding and hiding hostages in the dense Colombian triple-canopy
    jungles. We are hopeful that our efforts and those of Colombia and the
    international community will soon see Marc, Keith, and Tom returned to
    U.S. soil alive and well. Last fall, a videotape seized from FARC
    operatives by Colombian authorities showed our three U.S. hostages
    alive. Since their capture in February 2003, we have maintained
    vigorous 24/7 activities in pursuit of their recovery, including tens
    of thousands of hours of surveillance and intelligence gathering in
    concert with our Colombian partners. We dedicate numerous personnel to
    this end, and have recently conducted a review of all activities and
    procedures to expand coordination, integration, and cooperation with
    our interagency partners and international efforts to achieve their
    repatriation.
    Terrorism
        Since September 11, the potential for terrorist activity in the
    region is a growing concern. We consider Latin America and the
    Caribbean to be potential bases for future terrorist threats to the
    United States and others in the Americas. The conditions in parts of
    the region--easily skirted borders, black market economies, corruption,
    poverty, established illicit trafficking routes--all could provide
    maneuvering room for any form of terrorism to exploit, to include
    Islamic radical groups. The alleged plot to bomb the gas lines leading
    to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York and the leading
    suspects' roots in the Caribbean raise the specter of Islamic terrorist
    activity gaining traction. We believe members, facilitators, and
    sympathizers of Islamic terrorist organizations are indeed present in
    our hemisphere.
        As with all of the Department of Defense (DOD), SOUTHCOM dedicates
    significant effort to remaining vigilant of terrorism. We have a unique
    regional plan to combat this threat through multiple avenues--including
    shaping the strategic environment through humanitarian operations that
    deter radical organizations from gaining a foothold in the region, and
    building partner nation capacity to detect and defeat threats in a
    cooperative environment. These efforts will help ensure the forward
    defense of the United States and increased security of our partners. We
    thank the committee for providing us the resources dedicated to this
    mission. We appreciate any effort that will provide flexible funding
    sources, such as those requested in the administration's Building
    Global Partnerships Act, to help us rapidly address emerging capability
    gaps of our partners as the strategic situation develops. SOUTHCOM will
    continue to work with our interagency and regional partners to ensure
    our Nation and those of our friends remain secure.
    Guantanamo Bay
        We conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of
    the less than 280 detainees currently at the facility. More than 500
    detainees have left Guantanamo, and all activities there occur under
    close supervision and in full compliance with U.S. laws, Common Article
    Three of the Geneva Convention, the Army Field Manual, and the Detainee
    Treatment Act. Hundreds of reporters and legislators have visited the
    facility and observed the operations there first hand.
        Of particular note, the task force and the detainee camps exist on
    the grounds of U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo. Whatever the future holds
    for the detainee facility, the U.S. Naval Station, which reports
    through the U.S. Navy chain and not to U.S. Southern Command, will
    continue to be an important strategic location with both port and
    airfield facilities for the United States in the Caribbean.
    International Competition and Cooperation
        There is much debate over where Latin America and the Caribbean are
    heading in a geopolitical sense. Some argue that there are ``two
    Americas'' with various distinctions between the two--left or right,
    pro-U.S. or not, market friendly or protectionist. Our job at SOUTHCOM
    is simply to build cooperative security relationships and to promote
    U.S. interests in the region. Unfortunately, some trends in a few
    countries impede security cooperation as their governments espouse
    vocal anti-U.S. messages and undertake policies that portend a less
    stable and secure hemisphere.
        Additionally, there are other international actors--notably Iran--
    who are establishing political and economic inroads in the Americas.
    Unfortunately, they often espouse anti-U.S. messages, and, in the case
    of Iran, bring the potential for radical Islamic activity into this
    hemisphere.
        In order to counter these trends, we need to continue to engage
    proactively in the region and to counter anti-U.S. messaging with
    persistent demonstrations of our goodwill. The U.S., in general, needs
    to be capable of assisting our partners in addressing underlying
    conditions of poverty and inequality, while SOUTHCOM needs to build
    relationships and create innovative security initiatives with
    cooperative partners to confront transnational security threats.
    Cuba
        Cuba continues as a vestigial colony of the failed communist
    system. It literally and figuratively stands as an island of oppression
    and tyranny amidst the democratic nations of the Americas. Over a year-
    and-a-half ago, Fidel Castro's failing health sparked renewed hope that
    Cuba might soon join the community of democracies. Despite Fidel
    Castro's recent comments indicating he will not serve as the President,
    Cuba appears to remain entrenched in its repressive past. To the
    detriment of its people, the Cuban regime continues to embrace
    totalitarian control and the subjugation of its citizens. Consequently,
    we saw the highest levels of migration activity from Cuba last year
    since the 1994 migrant crisis, and we are prepared to support
    interagency efforts, if necessary, to respond to a mass migration
    emergency.
                                  initiatives
        Throughout the year ahead, SOUTHCOM is committed to executing
    innovative initiatives to build capacity and capability to counter
    security challenges, enhance our own readiness, and increase linkages
    with our neighbors.
    U.S Naval Ship Comfort
        A very visible and successful recent initiative was the deployment
    of the hospital ship Comfort  to the Caribbean, Central America, and
    South America. For 4 months last summer, this unique ship--with its
    specially tailored joint, interagency, international, and private
    sector crew--traveled to 12 countries in Latin America and the
    Caribbean to bring modern medical care to almost 100,000 men, women,
    and children through nearly 400,000 patient encounters. This symbol of
    goodwill brought renewed hope to those who might have given up on a
    healthy future and to those who might have previously been sympathetic
    to anti-U.S. rhetoric. This one deployment alone directly changed the
    lives of many and indirectly touched the lives of several hundred
    thousand throughout the region.
        More than just a medical mission, U.S. Naval Ship Comfort provided
    dental care to about 25,000 patients, conducted medical training for
    almost 30,000 host nation students and medical providers, and sponsored
    over 20 construction and restoration projects at local schools and
    health care facilities. U.S. Naval Ship Comfort also extended
    veterinarian services throughout its journey, treating and vaccinating
    thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of many families.
        It is difficult to assess precisely the overall impact of a
    training mission with humanitarian benefits of this scale. But based
    upon the positive local and international press, the number of national
    leadership visits, and the vast number of people touched by the U.S.
    Naval Ship Comfort mission, we believe it was a significant success.
    Certainly, there are many lessons learned from this first-ever
    deployment to Latin America and the Caribbean--and we will incorporate
    them into any future deployments--but the integrated and cooperative
    nature of this mission really serves as a model for the future of
    engagement and training: Joint . . . Interagency . . . International .
    . . Public-Private. We plan to conduct similar missions on a regular
    basis.
    Disaster Relief
        Also demonstrating U.S. goodwill, last year, SOUTHCOM directed
    military forces to provide disaster relief to six of our partner
    nations in times of dire need. These disaster relief operations, which
    were integrated with USAID-led efforts and those of the international
    community, helped alleviate the suffering of many and assisted affected
    regions in their recovery. Specifically, we provided much needed flood
    relief to Bolivia in March, and quickly provided relief to Peru
    following an earthquake in August. Also in August, we assisted Belize
    after the passage of Hurricane Dean. We were critical first-responders
    to a Nicaraguan request for relief following Hurricane Felix in
    September, arranged the procurement of firefighting equipment for
    Paraguay during a widespread wildfire also in September, and assisted
    the Dominican Republic after Tropical Storm Noel ravaged the island
    nation in October.
        In almost every case, our Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B), located
    in Soto Cano, Honduras, was a major contributor to the success of these
    disaster relief operations. Essentially a small, joint air wing
    comprised of 18 helicopters, JTF-B is our only permanently deployed
    contingency force in the region. JTF-B responds to crises as a first-
    responder and routinely participates in humanitarian assistance,
    disaster relief, search and rescue, personnel recovery, and
    noncombatant medical evacuations. JTF-B has a long history of answering
    the call for assistance and is a tremendously valuable asset to
    SOUTHCOM's partnership and goodwill efforts in the region.
    Humanitarian Assistance
        Throughout the year, SOUTHCOM's Humanitarian Assistance Program
    augments traditional military-to-civilian engagement activities in
    order to increase our partner nations' ability to respond independently
    to natural and manmade disasters. Our program helps local populations
    who could benefit from completed projects such as schools, clinics,
    community centers, orphanages, emergency operations centers, disaster
    response warehouses, wells, and potable water systems. Last year we
    completed 49 construction projects and provided critical training
    programs for first responders, disaster managers, firefighters, and
    disaster warehouse managers.
        A close corollary to the Humanitarian Assistance Program is the New
    Horizons series of joint and combined humanitarian assistance exercises
    that SOUTHCOM conducts with Latin American and Caribbean nations. These
    exercises provide readiness training for U.S. Engineer, Medical, and
    Combat Service Support units, but also provide great benefit to the
    host nation. Each New Horizon exercise lasts several months and usually
    takes place in remote areas. SOUTHCOM strives to combine these efforts
    with those of host nation doctors and civic personnel. In 2007, we
    conducted these exercises with four Nations--Belize, Guatemala, Panama,
    and Nicaragua.
        Along with the New Horizons exercises, SOUTHCOM also conducts
    medical readiness training exercises to bring medical aid to needy
    rural, isolated populations and to provide valuable training for our
    medical units--primarily from our Air Force and Army component
    commands. These demonstrations of goodwill reached over 200,000
    patients in 13 countries. Complemented by our coastal U.S Naval Ship
    Comfort mission, these unique training exercises had tremendous
    humanitarian impact inland across the region at 63 separate locations--
    changing lives, influencing opinions, and spreading goodwill through
    quality donated medical assistance.
    Global Fleet Station--Pilot Deployment
        Last summer, SOUTHCOM sponsored the pilot deployment of a new U.S.
    Navy program called Global Fleet Station. The new concept provides a
    modular platform for sustained engagement tailored to each unique
    region. SOUTHCOM quickly realized the great benefit for this program,
    given that all but two of our partner nations have direct access to the
    sea. Last summer, the High Speed Vessel (HSV) Swift conducted a 7-month
    tour of the Caribbean Basin with visits to seven countries.
        The focus of the HSV Swift deployment was to train local security
    units on port security operations, small boat operations and repair,
    and small unit tactics. This floating theater security cooperation
    platform hosted more than 1,000 military and civilian personnel and
    involved a joint, multinational, and interagency approach at each
    training site. HSV Swift also conducted community relations projects in
    each port to refurbish local schools and community centers and to
    deliver tons of donated goodwill materials. As with U.S. Naval Ship
    Comfort, this deployment represents the future of engagement--visible,
    persistent, scalable, and cooperative engagement that trains our
    personnel and demonstrates the goodwill of the United States while
    building partner nation security capabilities.
        The return on investment of the HSV Swift is very high. It is
    relatively inexpensive to operate; it can maneuver into very shallow
    ports; and it supports modular, tailored security cooperation missions.
    Providing more of this type of capability would greatly facilitate the
    achievement of SOUTHCOM's mission.
    Partnership of the Americas 2007
        For the second year in a row, SOUTHCOM conducted a maritime
    Partnership of the Americas (POA) event in our region. Evolving from
    the initial 1-month event in 2006, POA 2007 involved a 6-month Navy and
    Marine Corps mission throughout Latin America and the Caribbean that
    focused on enhancing relationships with regional partners and improving
    operational readiness and interoperability. During the deployment, a
    four-ship multinational task force circumnavigated South America,
    participated in several multinational exercises sponsored by SOUTHCOM,
    and conducted theater security cooperation and community relations
    events on shore. Our POA events serve as visible symbols of U.S.
    commitment to bilateral and multilateral military cooperation and have
    evolved into comprehensive engagement missions that maximize exposure
    to international partners and local communities.
    Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean and Central America (OEF-CCA)
        This year, SOUTHCOM began OEF-CCA as a key initiative to address
    potential terrorist threats in the region. Within a cooperative
    regional environment, OEF-CCA seeks to improve the capabilities of
    Caribbean and Central American partners to interdict and disrupt
    terrorists who might leverage illicit transnational routes and
    uncontrolled areas to threaten the United States and/or our neighbors.
    OEF-CCA is a long-term endeavor and will create a multi-layered
    counterterrorism posture of mutual benefit to the United States and
    regional partners.
    Exercises
        In 2007, SOUTHCOM sponsored numerous military and security force
    training exercises throughout the region. Our largest exercise, Fuerzas
    Aliadas (Allied Force) Panamax, brought together 19 nations from three
    continents, all operating in a combined task force to simulate the
    defense of the Panama Canal and surrounding region from traditional and
    nontraditional threats. Panamax also involved representatives from the
    United Nations and the Organization of American States. As one of the
    DOD's largest exercises, Panamax 2007 was a resounding success. The
    exercise placed 30 ships, numerous aircraft, and several brigades of
    simulated ground forces under the control of multinational staffs, and
    all participants left with an improved understanding and capability for
    multinational cooperation.
        We also conducted a multinational exercise--Tradewinds--that
    focused on transnational threats in the Caribbean Basin. This
    successful exercise brought together security forces and interagency
    personnel from 18 nations to practice coordinated first-responder,
    fire, police, and military responses to security threats. The exercise
    scenario emphasized basic security operations, counterdrug activities,
    and disaster preparedness in a field environment with a focus on
    regional cooperation.
        We conducted two multinational peacekeeping exercises (PKO North
    and PKO South) designed to improve the capability of partner nations to
    plan and conduct peacekeeping operations. The emphasis of this exercise
    series was operational planning, command and control, and
    interoperability with regional armed forces assigned to U.N. missions
    and involved the integration of nongovernmental agencies and
    international organizations.
        Another of our exercise is Fuerzas Comando (Commando Forces), a
    skills competition and senior leadership seminar designed to enhance
    cooperation and trust between international Special Operations Forces
    while improving their training, readiness, and interoperability.
    Eighteen countries from throughout the region participated in this
    SOUTHCOM-sponsored exercise in 2007. Each year, this exercise assembles
    antiterrorism experts to exchange information and share tactics,
    techniques, and procedures for counterterrorism operations.
        Another significant exercise is our Unitas maritime exercise
    program that we conduct on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of South
    America. These two exercises sponsor multinational maritime forces to
    enhance security cooperation and improve coalition operations. Unitas
    is our longest running exercise program and is coming up on its 49th
    year. Last year's exercises were conducted as part of our Partnership
    of the Americas event and trained each participant in a variety of
    maritime scenarios designed to practice operations within a
    multinational force.
    Building Partnership Capacity
        Throughout U.S history, our Nation has depended upon external
    partners to help maintain our own security and to spread the benefits
    of security and stability to ensure a cooperative worldwide economic
    system. This is true now more than ever, as today's transnational
    security threats cross borders, use distributed networks, and leverage
    information technology to threaten peace-seeking nations worldwide.
        In addition to conducting exercises that build understanding and
    multinational cooperation, SOUTHCOM conducts a comprehensive Theater
    Security Cooperation program to develop the capability and capacity of
    our partners to respond to mutual security threats--either
    independently or with regional partners.
        SOUTHCOM participates in the Regional Counter Terrorism Fellowship
    Program that sponsors seminars, symposiums, and tactical and
    operational training designed to build the counterterrorism capability
    of participating nations. Our training involves information collection
    and sharing, professional development, port security procedures, quick-
    reaction force actions, explosive device response, and civil-military
    responses to terrorism.
        Another of our partnership capacity building programs is Enduring
    Friendship (EF)--a multi-year maritime security assistance program that
    enhances the capability of select Central American and Caribbean
    partner nations to patrol their sovereign waters and share information.
    EF provides interceptor boats, operation and maintenance training,
    command and control systems, and a common operating picture to improve
    maritime domain awareness and interoperability. This key program shares
    U.S. information on illicit traffickers and builds or improves partner
    nations' ability to detect and interdict illicit trafficking along
    their shores.
        Besides our peace operations exercises, we also assist with the
    Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which is a DOS-funded and
    DOD-executed program. The intent of GPOI in our region is to train a
    multinational peacekeeping battalion from the Conference of American
    Armed Forces (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
    Nicaragua) and two multi-role engineer companies from Paraguay to
    prepare them for deployment on U.N. peacekeeping missions. Through
    GPOI, SOUTHCOM assisted in the establishment of a regional training
    center located in Coban, Guatemala, which became operational in 2007
    and is the primary location for peacekeeping training, unit
    qualifications, and exercises. This important training center will also
    receive instructor and curriculum support from Argentina, Chile, and
    Uruguay--who already have their own well-established peacekeeping
    training centers.
        The State Partnership Program (SPP) is another example of
    successful partnership building that has had a tremendous benefit and
    return on investment. The SPP links 26 partner nations to 18 U.S.
    States using the U.S. National Guard as the executive agent. Last year,
    state National Guards conducted 113 separate training events that
    developed core competencies in regional military forces, promoted the
    concept of citizen-soldiers as public servants, and reinforced our
    bilateral relationships.
        In order to build understanding, SOUTHCOM conducts or facilitates
    military and defense exchanges, numerous defense seminars, and mobile
    training teams throughout the region. We also facilitate International
    Military Education and Training (IMET), which invests in the
    professional development of key military officers and senior enlisted
    leaders of our partners. IMET improves the professionalism and
    interoperability of partner military and defense forces and builds a
    sense of mutual understanding between the United States armed forces
    and the partner nation armed services. Training at our security
    institutions continues to be very popular and beneficial to our
    partners in the region, and access to funded billets at U.S. schools
    significantly diminishes the draw of extra-hemispheric military
    influence.
        A significant tool for building capacity is the Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) program. FMF represents a powerful method of supporting
    military relationships, ensuring interoperability of equipment in
    coalition operations, regional cooperation, and developing partner
    nations' response capability to mutual threats and challenges. Although
    SOUTHCOM's focus region covers one-sixth of the globe and represents a
    region with significant linkages and shared challenges with the United
    States, FMF to this region in 2007 amounted to a slight fraction of the
    worldwide total. The FMF we did receive was spent on critical capacity
    building programs with our partners.
        A number of nations from this region were previously subject to
    sanctions under the American Servicemembers Protection Act. I would
    like to thank Congress for the recent lifting of the sanctions on those
    nations. This will have an enduring and positive effect on building
    long-lasting partnerships.
    Human Rights Initiative
        All of our exercises, training evolutions, and partnership building
    activities are done within a framework of respect for human rights.
    SOUTHCOM has a unique and dedicated group of experts that assist the
    region's militaries and security forces in the human rights arena.
    Several nations in Latin America are still dealing with a not-so-
    distant history darkened by abuses committed by uniformed militaries,
    militias, and guerrilla groups. We sponsor a Human Rights Initiative in
    a unique public-private partnership with a Costa Rica-based human
    rights organization. This initiative has created a consensus document
    on human rights through which the militaries and security forces of
    nine nations and a multinational organization have committed to advance
    an institutional respect for human rights and promote a zero-tolerance
    environment for violations. We support development of doctrine,
    education and training programs, internal control systems, and civil-
    military outreach efforts by military and security forces of the
    region.
                            an interagency approach
        The 21st century security environment presents us with some
    significant new challenges, both globally and regionally, such as the
    global reach of radical organizations, nation states fighting in
    unconventional settings with unfamiliar tool sets, and growing
    environmental security concerns to name a few.
        These global conditions and the already described realities in this
    region, all require an interagency-focused approach. With the approval
    of the Secretary of Defense, we are initiating action toward
    reorganizing the command along more interagency lines--with
    interagency, multinational, and even limited private sector partnering
    as core organizing concepts.
        This is a critical and logical step towards better accomplishing
    our mission. Our goal is to establish an integrated interagency team
    with senior representatives from key departments and agencies assigned
    throughout the command. Toward that end, we are coordinating closely
    with those other departments and agencies in ensuring that our goal can
    be met in a manner that is consonant with their core mission interests
    and resources. This new organization will have functional divisions
    that reflect the types of missions we face in the 21st century. We will
    focus on teaming with DOS and will seek new and expanded partnering
    arrangements with the Nations and territories in the region. Despite
    its new integrated structure, however, SOUTHCOM will always retain a
    principal competency to conduct military operations, with an unbroken
    and capable military chain-of-command and authority.
        Fortunately, we already have significant interagency integration at
    SOUTHCOM. Over the last year, we created a directorate designed to
    foster collaboration with interagency partners. We have exchanges,
    liaisons, and/or representatives from 17 Federal agencies and
    departments that participate in our planning efforts and help
    coordinate command activities. We have hosted extremely successful
    interagency conferences, exercises, and coordination group meetings on
    a number of strategic topics related to our assigned region. Each of
    these events, from the tactical worker level to senior interagency
    leadership, gave all participants an improved understanding of complex
    issues and a baseline for future cooperation.
        In addition to our interagency integration efforts, we have also
    created a staff section dedicated to understanding and developing
    public-private cooperation. This unique group reaches out to the
    private sector and finds where we can legally build synergy in our
    efforts to engage in the region. To date, we have coordinated the
    delivery of tons of donated goodwill material to the needy of the
    region and have facilitated the delivery of higher-end needs such as
    donated ambulances and operating room equipment. This effort, which
    truly has the potential to harness the good nature and resources of the
    U.S. private sector, will add depth and breadth to our interaction with
    our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.
        Together with our partners in the U.S. Government, private sector,
    and international community, we should be able to better defend the
    United States and to enable a secure, stable, and prosperous hemisphere
    of cooperating and democratic nations.
                                 looking ahead
        Looking forward, we have identified critical capability
    requirements that will allow us to confront the challenges we see in
    the region today and the security trends noted for the future.
    Fusion
        In order to coordinate joint, multinational, interagency, and even
    limited public-private efforts in our region, SOUTHCOM needs the
    physical and virtual capability to fuse information from diverse
    entities and to operate from a location that facilitates idea exchange
    and integrated planning. This location will allow our diverse partners
    to integrate into our organization in a transparent manner, allowing
    them to participate in daily activities while building mutual trust and
    cooperation. Our new headquarters building and the information systems
    scheduled for installation will serve to meet this requirement. We
    thank the committee for its support in authorizing the new construction
    of our headquarters, which we are scheduled to occupy in 2010. The
    construction timeline should greatly enhance our effectiveness once
    complete.
    Persistent engagement
        As discussed above, the capability to forge willing and capable
    partnerships throughout the region and to create a sense of goodwill
    towards the United States are essential to achieving our mission. In
    order to do this, we need persistent engagement. We plan to conduct
    deployments similar to the U.S.N.S. Comfort  and HSV Swift on a regular
    basis. We need military and civilian, public and private exercises and
    initiatives throughout the region, with more microbursts of assistance,
    as well as long-term initiatives integrated across the Federal
    Government. In short, we need coordinated, whole-of-government,
    persistent efforts that meld with the efforts of the international
    community and the private sector.
        In order to strengthen and/or gain partners, first we need to earn
    and maintain their trust. This will require a unified approach with
    consistent, effective, and flexible engagement. It will require
    cohesive strategic messaging and innovative and earnest information
    sharing across the board. It will require innovative ways to make our
    various exercises, programs, and partnerships more inclusive and more
    effective in reinforcing our connection to the peoples of the region.
        Along with this engagement, we need to ensure our message gets out
    effectively and that we understand the impact of our efforts. Over the
    past year, SOUTHCOM has refocused efforts on strategic communication,
    making it a priority at all levels of the command.
    Capable partners
        Continued globalization and the diffusion of high technology have
    made it certain that the United States cannot ensure its forward
    defense alone. Working alone, we cannot stop drug traffickers from
    penetrating our borders; nor can we locate and neutralize terrorist
    threats abroad without capable partners willing to cooperate with us.
    Persistent engagement will go a long way toward building willingness,
    but we also need to identify capability shortfalls with these partners
    and flexibly expend resources to build overall regional security
    capability and capacity. Just as important, we need to be able to
    rapidly address capability shortfalls with key partners to meet
    emerging transnational threats.
    Sovereignty and peacekeeping
        As our partners build capability and capacity, we need them to be
    able to deny transnational threats from using their sovereign
    territory. We need them to be able to ``see'' these threats, whether on
    land, in the air, on the sea, or in cyberspace. This involves the
    appropriate awareness systems--coastal radars and air surveillance
    radars, for example--as well as physical assets such as patrol boats
    and aircraft with crew trained and proficient to operate and maintain
    them. It will also require the ability to share information with the
    United States and with adjacent neighbors in order to build a common
    operating picture in a regional sense.
        We also need these partners to be able to conduct peacekeeping
    operations. Already, we see many nations in the region contributing to
    international peacekeeping in places such as Haiti. By developing a
    regional capability, we will reduce the demand for U.S. forces to
    perform peacekeeping missions, while also increasing the legitimacy of
    peacekeeping forces by diversifying international representation.
    Interagency core
        Besides the ability to fuse information and efforts across the
    command, we also need to create an environment where the various U.S.
    Government agency representatives are willing and authorized to
    integrate into our efforts. We need to create a whole-of-government
    program where integrated planning and career exchanges are the norm. It
    should be a positive career step for someone from the military to fill
    an exchange in one of the other Federal agencies, and the converse
    should be equally true. By working together and building a regional
    focus point for policy implementation, we should be able to reduce
    redundancy, gain resource efficiencies, and ultimately better ensure
    our security and that of our partners.
    Flexible access
        The use of the sea affords us tremendous flexibility for maritime
    partnering with the Nations in the region. But in order to maintain
    persistent engagement and more fully cooperate with our partners, we
    are looking for more flexible land and aviation access agreements under
    the Secretary of Defense's Global Defense Posture. Our current access
    agreements limit us to aerial counternarcotics detection and monitoring
    missions from existing cooperative security locations and to a single,
    more flexible agreement at the forward operating site of our Joint Task
    Force-Bravo. We are looking to establish improved regional access that
    supports broad-spectrum operations and that is mutually beneficial to
    the host partner nations and the United States.
    Understanding
        The last of our required priority capabilities is probably the most
    important--the ability to understand the region, know what transpires,
    and how to act or interact with our partners. Modern information
    systems, extensive language capability, and cultural training and study
    are the tools necessary for this command to achieve this understanding.
    The importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States
    cannot be overstated. It merits frequent high-level visits to see first
    hand the tremendous linkages and challenges we share and to demonstrate
    U.S. interest and commitment to our partners in Latin America and the
    Caribbean.
                                command heading
        Thanks to the support of Congress, this year is already on track to
    be another good year for SOUTHCOM and the pursuit of our mission in the
    region. We will be planning and executing numerous multinational
    exercises, exchanges, and humanitarian events. We are building on
    lessons learned from last year and are further integrating joint,
    multinational, interagency, and public-private efforts into as many of
    our actions as possible.
        Soon the aircraft carrier U.S.S. George Washington will be sailing
    around the region as the centerpiece of our Partnership of the Americas
    event. As we did last year, this deployment will encompass much more
    than just traveling around the region; it will encompass our major
    maritime exercises and other smaller exercises. We have the perfectly
    named ship for this event, U.S.S. George Washington. Washington was an
    early idol of Simon Bolivar, who was the father of liberty in South
    America and an iconic ``American'' in the broadest sense of the term.
        We also are revamping our land engagements this year, with the
    beginning of a program called ``Beyond the Horizon.'' This program will
    maximize the impact of our land events by increasing the number of
    ``microburst'' engagements--engineer construction, small unit
    familiarization, subject matter exchanges, medical readiness training
    exercises--as well as establishing longer-term programs that integrate
    the efforts of other U.S. Federal agencies, host nations, and the
    private sector.
        Also this year, we will be conducting Continuing Promise, a multi-
    month training mission with the U.S.S. Kearsarge--a large deck
    amphibious ship--which will continue the successful mission of the
    hospital ship U.S.N.S. Comfort  from last year. This deployment will
    highlight persistent engagement with innovative interagency,
    multinational, and public-private cooperation.
        We will continue our Regional AirSpace Integration (RASI)
    initiative with a focus on improving Central American capability to
    detect and monitor aircraft in their predominantly unmonitored
    airspace. This initiative involves integrating the civil, military, and
    security air domain in the region, modernizing air traffic management,
    and building a multinational common operating picture through a
    regional surveillance center and new surveillance radars. A
    complementary program to RASI is our Regional Aircraft Modernization
    Program (RAMP), which conducts surveys to identify gaps in the aviation
    capability of our partners to respond to transnational threats.
    Ultimately, RAMP aims to promote regional air sovereignty through
    increased cooperation, interoperability, and modernization of regional
    air security assets, with cooperating nations better prepared to
    perform humanitarian and air sovereignty missions.
        We have numerous other programs and initiatives coming on line--all
    working to advance our mission in the region. We are progressing
    steadily on our reorganization efforts and have received significant
    support from our sister agencies on this effort. We continue to track
    along our command heading: understanding the linkages the United States
    shares with the region; working together with partners to overcome
    shared challenges; and fulfilling the promise of a secure, cooperating,
    and prospering hemisphere through innovative and effective strategic
    initiatives.
                                   conclusion
        I take great pride in our exciting and important mission and in the
    tremendous efforts of the men and women of SOUTHCOM. I believe we have
    made good progress over the last year; and that this year and those to
    come promise to see solid return on Congress's investment in the
    region. I would like to thank all of the members of the committee and
    indeed all the Members of Congress for your support of SOUTHCOM and the
    hard work we are doing for our country in Latin America and the
    Caribbean.
        Although the likelihood of large-scale military combat in our
    region remains very low, this region continues to play a critical role
    to the continued security and prosperity of the United States. Despite
    some challenges, I believe that through the sharing of ideas, economic
    interdependence, cultural understanding, and an integrated approach to
    partnering, the United States will continue to be a welcomed partner of
    choice in this hemisphere. At SOUTHCOM, we will work hard to help make
    this vision a reality. We are committed to being the military partner
    of choice and will continue to harness innovation and to develop the
    relationships necessary to accomplish our mission.
        Finally, I would like to say a word about the superb soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians--Active-Duty,
    Reserve, and Guard--who serve in the region. They are volunteers and
    patriots, and I am proud and lucky to serve with them everyday. Our
    greatest strength is our people, and I ask continued support for the
    programs that support them and their families.
        I thank you for your support and am prepared to answer your
    questions.

        Chairman Levin. Let's have a 6-minute round for our first
    round.
        Admiral, in June 2006, the President declared that he
    ``would like to close Guantanamo.'' Have there been any
    directions to you relative to that policy?
        Admiral Stavridis. No, sir. Since that time I believe the
    Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have
    both spoken to the subject. They have also indicated a desire
    to close Guantanamo Bay. At this moment I'm unaware of any
    direction to me to do so.
        I will make the point that since the high point of 800
    detainees we're down to about 270. I know the administration in
    cooperation with other international partners is seeking to
    reduce that number.
        Chairman Levin. How many of the 270 detainees have had
    status determination hearings?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I'll take that one for the record,
    because I don't at SOUTHCOM--I'm not involved in the judicial
    side of this. That is a totally separate part of the command.
    Our mission at Guantanamo is the humane and transparent
    treatment of the detainees, and I'm very satisfied we're living
    up to our part of it at SOUTHCOM.
        Chairman Levin. Give us that number for the record.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        According to the Office for the Administrative Review of the
    Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC), all detainees held by Joint
    Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), except for the six most recent
    arrivals, have been determined to be enemy combatants through the
    Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) process. As neither U.S.
    Southern Command nor JTF-GTMO conduct CSRTs or control the CSRT
    process, I defer further questions on the matter to the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs and OARDEC.

        Chairman Levin. Relative to Cuba, what changes, if any, do
    you expect in Cuba's approach to security in the hemisphere and
    to the United States under Raul Castro?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, unfortunately I do not expect
    significant change under Raul Castro. Sir, he was elected on a
    Sunday and, as I've said to people, Cuba on Monday looked a lot
    like Cuba on Friday. The change was the first name of the
    president, from Fidel to Raul.
        Raul quickly consolidated his power by bringing into his
    immediate organizations his senior vice presidents, a group of
    men who are in their 70s by and large and also very much
    reflect the Castro view of how power ought to be consolidated.
    This is a national assembly with 614 seats and 614 candidates
    ran for office. It's not a vibrant democracy, to say the least.
        So as I look at the future of Cuba under Raul, sir, I do
    not see significant political change in the offing.
        Chairman Levin. Do we have any military contacts with the
    Cuban military?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, there is one set of routine contact
    that occurs between the commander of the Guantanamo Naval
    Station and a senior Cuban colonel, and those are the so-called
    Fenceline Talks. They happen about once a month and they are to
    discuss routine issues of the management of the air space and
    the water space over Guantanamo Bay. Beyond that, I'm not aware
    of any military-to-military contacts.
        Chairman Levin. Are they professional?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, they are very professional,
    very courteous. There is absolutely no problems between those
    two.
        Chairman Levin. Do you welcome increased military-to-
    military contacts with the Cubans?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, that's clearly a national policy
    decision that would have to be taken by the administration in
    concert with Congress. I don't think that's mine to address.
        Chairman Levin. General, you talked about coordination with
    Governors and with The Adjutants General (TAGs), the State
    TAGs. You have indicated that coordination and cooperation is
    very close. You've given us your statistics in terms of the
    number of reservists and guardsmen that are on your staff. So I
    think I'll ask you about some different aspects of your work,
    even though that is a critically important subject.
        Your prepared statement mentions a U.S.-Canada surveillance
    gap and a strategy to fill that gap. I gather this is the
    number one unfunded priority. Could you describe that program
    briefly and why is it your highest unfunded priority?
        General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.
    Today the surveillance network that we use--and it's important
    to note that this is both a NORAD and a NORTHCOM-related
    program--those surveillance tools that we use, the network that
    is created is aging rapidly. Congress and the Department have
    funded a service life extension program, and again these are
    predominantly for older style radars that allow us to maintain
    visibility on aircraft working in our national air space system
    of both countries.
        I am also tasked to provide maritime warning for both
    countries and as the NORTHCOM commander, respond to maritime
    threats for the United States. We have a gap in the ability to
    maintain situational awareness on vessels in the maritime
    domain. So this initiative allows us first to look at advanced
    technologies that can replace the fixed radar sites that we use
    around the country today with a combination of other sensors,
    both active like a radar and passive, that might be available.
        So it is a program, a project, that will allow us to look
    at the advanced technologies available and be prepared for the
    time in the vicinity of 2015 to 2020 where these radar systems
    truly will be at the end of their capable life cycle, and to
    have an integrated set of sensors available to us that can
    continue to carry that load.
        As an example, the Federal Aviation Agency is moving
    towards a more compliant system based on global positioning
    systems and the like. The challenge for us in our Homeland
    mission is that threat-based capabilities aren't necessarily
    compliant. So we need a means of identifying those.
        We are working closely with the Government of Canada and
    with their defense department on technologies. We've looked at
    places like Australia who have done some great work in over-
    the-horizon radar and we're trying to find the best sweet spot,
    if you will, for a smart investment strategy, but capable
    sensors for the future.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner?
        Senator Warner. General, I'd like to go back to the
    question of the Commission's report, which was critical of our
    current national state of preparedness or lack of preparedness
    for natural and manmade disasters. That was a very substantive
    criticism directed, not to you personally, but to your command
    and the work of your predecessor. Secretary McHale came up and
    talked to Congress.
        I want to make certain that the record that is before
    Congress, before this committee and perhaps other committees,
    really has a reply from your command which addresses each one
    of the points that they raise, because should they have the
    misfortune of an incident in this country, people will turn to
    determine what was the problem and, if there is a problem which
    Congress, as opposed to the executive branch, has some
    responsibility, I and others on this committee would like to
    know what it is that you think should be done. Is it a shortage
    of appropriations, is it a shortage of authority? Or how would
    you summarize--and I'll ask you to put the rest of it into the
    record, we're so short on time this morning--but summarize.
        Say, for example, is it your professional judgment we're
    prepared today, the United States and our 50 States, to react
    to a WMD? I suppose there's a whole spectrum of them out there,
    but just take the logical one, a dirty bomb type situation or
    something of that nature.
        General Renuart. Senator, thanks for that question.
    Actually, I do take the report somewhat personally because I
    sat with Secretary Gates before taking command and listened to
    the interim briefing from the committee. Frankly, I agreed with
    the----
        Senator Warner. From the Commission or the committee?
        General Renuart. From the Commission, I'm sorry. From the
    Commission.
        I agreed with a number of those early recommendations and
    took those on, with the Secretary's support, a personal mandate
    as we arrived at NORTHCOM. But having said that, I think that,
    first, your question is do I have the authority necessary from
    Congress to conduct our mission. The answer absolutely is yes.
    I believe that the gaps in our national capability that we saw
    post-Hurricane Katrina, we have worked aggressively to ensure
    those gaps no longer exist. We have a relationship with the
    National Guard Bureau, with the States, all through the country
    now that has created through this idea of anticipation a sense
    of what bad could happen and then how are we prepared to
    respond to that.
        With respect to WMD, the capabilities are available to me
    today. I would ask the Secretary for them to be deployed and
    have them made available to me. In the future, I would like
    forces assigned to me that I have every day, that I can
    exercise and train and evaluate their readiness every day.
    We're on the road to creating that force. By early this fall,
    we will have a dedicated force fully trained, fully equipped,
    fully funded, and then exercised and certified that will allow
    us a near-immediate response to a catastrophic event, whereas
    today it may take a few days in order to have that force
    available.
        Senator Warner. Now, should an incident occur--let's talk
    about the command and control. With due respect to the
    sovereignty of our States, and very proud, and hard-charging
    Governors presumably in each, is there a clear chain of command
    to who takes charge, particularly when it's a multi-State?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think each event begins as a
    local response, obviously. So that local first set of first
    responders, supported by State responders, clearly are the
    right people to be the first ones on the scene. The Governor in
    many cases----
        Senator Warner. Our units which we establish nationwide,
    the name has changed now. They're responders. They could be
    first responders.
        General Renuart. They could be, but again it would depend
    on the size of the event and the circumstances surrounding it.
    If we use the concept of a catastrophic event as the test case
    of this, I think you would still have various State Governors
    beginning to respond. The President would clearly make a
    decision on the Federal nature of this response. But our forces
    would be in a position to be on the ground within hours and to
    begin to assist.
        In terms of the command and control, if the President's
    decision is to allow Governors to continue to manage for their
    State and have a regional Federal military capability that can
    go across lines, we have processes agreed to with our National
    Guard friends, that are understood by the States, that can
    allow----
        Senator Warner. I'm going to stop at that because I have
    just a few minutes.
        General Renuart. I'm sorry.
        Senator Warner. Please finish, but put it in the record.
        General Renuart. I will put that in the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Today, Governors have the authority to direct all operations in
    their States and I am very supportive of this authority. My goal is to
    achieve the highest levels of coordination between State and Federal
    military forces. Our current system achieves that goal with the Federal
    military forces under the command and control (C2) of U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM) responding to requests from State or local
    governments through the primary Federal agency. All of my operations
    would be seamlessly coordinated with National Guard State Joint Task
    Force Headquarters, National Guard Bureau, and all appropriate Federal
    agencies.
        As a combatant commander, my primary concern regarding this
    recommendation from the Commission on National Guard and Reserves is
    that it would create more issues than it would resolve by impeding the
    coordinated Federal response established in the National Response
    Framework (NRF) and the comprehensive National Incident Management
    System (NIMS). It simply is not necessary; and in the end, our response
    would not be as effective as it is today.
        When conducting consequence management in support of State and
    local officials, NORTHCOM is part of a coordinated Federal response
    under the NRF and NIMS. Under this structure, NORTHCOM provides support
    requested by State and local officials, through the primary Federal
    agency. The scope and focus of each mission is controlled by a State's
    initial request to the primary Federal agency, and the subsequent
    request for support from the primary Federal agency through the
    Department of Defense (DOD) to NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM remains, at all
    times, under the C2 of the Secretary of Defense. Within the general
    parameters of the approved mission and keeping the integrity of its
    Federal C2, NORTHCOM coordinates with the on-site State or local
    commander, and responds to the developing needs of the situation.
        Currently, there are few, if any, problems with this C2 structure.
    NORTHCOM tests this C2 structure on a daily basis as various situations
    arise, and puts the structure under immense pressure during our
    national level exercises. But even with that, we have continued to work
    on improvement. In July 2007, I directed a comprehensive Organizational
    Mission Analysis. This analysis included NORTHCOM Headquarters and our
    subordinates. Our intent was to assess C2 structures and internal
    procedures to determine if they provided the best framework for
    success. Based on that analysis, I approved a realignment that will
    further streamline NORTHCOM's internal C2 structure and provide for a
    more seamless integration with our mission partners.

        Senator Warner. You give us the assurance it is in place,
    it is understood, and it will work?
        General Renuart. Senator, I will give you that personal
    assurance and I will put that in the record.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Admiral, as you look back over your long, distinguished
    career, I dare say the chapter when you had a mere three
    stripes and was the commander of a destroyer was one of your
    greatest. As a matter of fact, you're working on a new book to
    cover that.
        That is an interesting vehicle right there. The first
    question is, was it homemade in a garage or is there somebody
    making these, and how many of them are out there now? That's a
    destroyer's job together with air assets.
        Admiral Stavridis. It is a combined job of surface ships,
    of aviation. It certainly is an intelligence function. It's an
    interagency.
        Senator Warner. It's everything.
        Admiral Stavridis. It is everything.
        Senator Warner. How many of them are out there?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we don't know how many of them are
    out there. Let me give you a set of numbers, though. In 2006 we
    were tracking either via intelligence or capturing around three
    of these, in 2006. In 2007, it jumped to about 30. This year so
    far, in 3 months we've seen about 30. So we are seeing more and
    more of these.
        We don't know how many there are that we are not seeing.
        Senator Warner. Have you captured one?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, we've captured several and we
    are exploiting them. Typically what happens--
        Senator Warner. Reverse engineered it?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, we are doing all of that. At the
    moment we have a prosecution that we have just completed. What
    normally happens with these guys is they scuttle them and they
    go to the bottom, and we're lucky to recover the drugs and get
    the people off. We have captured several. We are reverse
    engineering them and we are very aggressively pursuing this.
        Senator Warner. Are they made in a shipyard somewhere?
        Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, I don't think they're made in
    shipyards. They really are essentially garage-level technology.
    It's just a diesel engine, a fiberglass hull, a snorkel, a
    primitive periscope, seating in a crude sense for two to four
    personnel.
        We are working very hard on the intelligence front to find
    out where they are coming from.
        Senator Warner. They're able to traverse quite a long
    distance?
        Admiral Stavridis. They can go hundreds of miles. They have
    diesel engines, which are very economical. Then the drug
    cartels will come out and do a refueling at sea, if you will,
    and then they'll continue on.
        Senator Warner. That's quite interesting. My time's up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Warner.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, General and Admiral. You're really two impressive
    people and we're lucky to have you working for us. I appreciate
    it very much.
        I do want to ask on this first round, Admiral Stavridis, a
    few questions. But before I do that, General, following up on
    the earlier questions on the Commission report, I just want to
    reflect from my point of view wearing my other hat as chairman
    of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
    (HSGAC) that we are a lot better prepared to respond today than
    we were on September 11, 2001, or during Hurricane Katrina. I
    think you'd be the first to agree. We have a ways to go.
        But I just want to ask you very briefly. I've been
    impressed with the development of the Consequence Management
    Response Teams.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. I say this for my colleagues and for the
    public insofar as anybody's watching. Just spend a moment. Your
    goal is to have three almost brigade-sized units, 4,000, ready
    with the unique and targeted purpose of responding to homeland
    disasters, terrorist or natural.
        General Renuart. Senator, thank you. That is exactly right.
    Today there are elements of that in place in our States, 53
    Civil Support Teams, 17 smaller units.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Renuart. But these forces in particular are
    substantial in size and in capability. They're trained and
    equipped with the technical skills necessary to respond to an
    all-threat catastrophic event. We do intend, the Secretary's
    intent is to grow these incrementally over the coming couple of
    years so that we would have three of those forces in place very
    soon. As I said, the first one will be full up this fall.
        Senator Lieberman. This fall, and of course, none of that
    existed on September 11, 2001.
        General Renuart. No, sir, that did not.
        Senator Lieberman. Or at the time of Hurricane Katrina.
        General Renuart. It did not.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        Admiral, I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about
    the current crisis around Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. It
    certainly seems to me, and I'm going to ask you what your
    position and understanding is and what our government's is,
    that the Colombian Government had the right to take action
    against the terrorists who were striking at them from a camp in
    Ecuador. Is that your position and the position of our
    government?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I can't speak for the U.S.
    Government. My understanding, reading the President's remarks
    yesterday and listening to what I can at the policy level, is
    that that would be an accurate representation. But I would not
    speak for the U.S. Government position.
        I can tell you that from a SOUTHCOM position we are
    monitoring events closely. We are talking to our interlocutors.
    I agree with what Secretary Gates said yesterday, that I
    personally see a very low likelihood, very low, of actual
    shooting conflict here. I think there is some level of troop
    movement. We're watching that on the Venezuelan-Colombian
    border, and a lesser movement on the Ecuadoran-Colombian
    border.
        I'm encouraged over the last couple of days by the
    Organization of American States, which has held meetings on
    this and is providing a forum. Certainly this is a diplomatic
    issue that needs to be worked between the three countries.
        I'm also encouraged to see significant actors in the
    region, like President Lula of Brazil and President Bachelet of
    Chile, making offerings of the ability to hold talks and help
    the three countries through this.
        The good news in this region is that there is not a strong
    history of prolonged warfare, and so again I think there's a
    low likelihood of conflict and I'm encouraged over the last day
    or so by what I've seen in that regard.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that answer.
        Have you been privy to any review of the information that's
    led I guess the Colombian Government to conclude that the
    Chavez Government in Venezuela has made substantial monetary
    contributions to the FARC, the narcoterrorists in Colombia?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we have not seen those actual
    computer hard drives at SOUTHCOM. I don't know whether anyone
    else in the U.S. Government has seen them yet. But we are
    certainly following very closely the open source reporting on
    that. I would comment that, even if a fraction of what is
    reported in the laptop revelations that are being reported is
    true, that, as Ambassador Tom Shannon said yesterday from DOS,
    is extremely worrisome, to say the least.
        Senator Lieberman. I agree.
        Let me ask you, because in your position at SOUTHCOM you
    have a really unique overview of what's happening, and I like
    what you said. It's not our backyard; it's our home. We're all
    part of the same region.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. A critical part of your work, it's
    always seemed to me has been the partner-to-partner, military-
    to-military relationships. I want you to talk a little bit,
    because we get information that there are other countries from
    around the world who have been moving into Latin America to
    develop similar relations, weapons sales, even military-to-
    military, on the most threatening level Iran, less threatening
    but worth following, China. Give us your sense of what you see
    from other nations to the south of us, from elsewhere in the
    world; and two, how are you doing in your partner-to-partner
    relations, and do you need anything else from us to improve
    those relations?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, thank you. That is a terrific
    question. First of all, the good news is the United States
    remains the partner of choice to I would say the majority of
    nations in the region, including almost everywhere in Central
    America, most of the Caribbean, and most of South America. We
    have close military-to-military relations with almost every
    state, with the exception of Cuba and Venezuela. Even in
    countries where we have differences at the government-to-
    government level like Nicaragua or Bolivia, Ecuador at times,
    we continue to have strong military-to-military relations. So
    that's a good thing.
        In terms of the competition, if you will--and we are, in
    this part of the world, in the competitive marketplace. We the
    United States need to be engaged, show that we should be the
    partner of choice. So the competition, if you will--just as you
    mention, I worry a lot about Iran.
        Senator Lieberman. What do you see?
        Admiral Stavridis. What I'm seeing from the Iranian side is
    the president of Iran making frequent trips to the region. I
    see Iranian embassies opening all over the region. Iran is a
    state sponsor of terrorism. I am concerned as I see Iran move
    into the region.
        On the other nation you mentioned, the Chinese, I think
    it's more of an economic interest that they have. There is some
    military-to-military contact, but I would not categorize it as
    large or rising at this point.
        Finally, Russia is involved I think almost strictly on a
    commercial sales basis, most notably to Venezuela. The Russians
    have recently sold 30 advanced fighter aircraft, 50 attack
    helicopters, 100,000 AK-103 rifles with a license to produce
    25,000 more per year. There's a large component of Russian arms
    sales to Venezuela that is of concern.
        So that's a bit of an overview, but I would close by saying
    again that I think the United States remains the partner of
    choice and we're working hard at SOUTHCOM to make sure that
    stays that way.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Admiral. I appreciate that.
        My time is up. At some point I'd like to ask you, not now,
    whether you have enough in the way of authority and resources
    to meet that competition in the interest of American security.
    Thank you.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        These are 6-minute rounds, so I'm going to ask for very
    brief answers to several questions here. First of all, General,
    I think you outlined very well the operational tempo (OPTEMPO),
    the problems that we're having right now with the Guard. I'm
    very proud of the 45th from Oklahoma. They're in Iraq now. I'll
    be with them in a week or 2. I was there when they were in
    Afghanistan. They actually were participating in the training
    of the Afghan National Army to train themselves and they've
    done a great job. So the performance is wonderful.
        The OPTEMPO is not. It's a serious problem. So I'd like to
    have you get on record here. My feeling is Operation Jump
    Start, it was a good idea, it worked very well. It's going to
    sunset in I think 2008. There is legislation now that would
    leave that open, that would provide and mandate 6,000 of our
    Guard on the borders, southwest borders, until the borders were
    secure. So that means it's open-ended.
        I need to ask you, number one with the OPTEMPO, do you
    agree that this is a good policy? I guess that would be the
    main question. Would you like to address that for us?
        General Renuart. I would, Senator. Thank you. First, you're
    right, the Guard has been asked to do a great deal for the
    Nation and they have served selflessly every time we've asked.
    This Operation Jump Start was designed to be a gap-filling
    capability for a period of time, and the Secretary extended the
    numbers of that for an additional period and that will expire
    this July. The Secretary has been very clear that he believes
    that's the right time to draw that mission down.
        I would tell you from both a NORTHCOM perspective and
    having watched the Guard that I think that makes sense. I think
    there are other----
        Senator Inhofe. Correct me if I'm wrong, but in the event
    there's a reason that they have to have more down there they
    can still make application after this expires.
        General Renuart. Absolutely.
        Senator Inhofe. You can then evaluate where it's needed the
    most.
        General Renuart. Senator, absolutely, either in State
    Active-Duty or in a Title 32 status that could be done.
        Senator Inhofe. Now the question I always ask every group
    that comes in, and just for a very, very brief response. My
    three favorite programs are: first, train and equip, that's
    1206, 1207, 1208, which is due to expire next year and we were
    trying to extend it, but we just didn't have time to do it
    before, and there's not really opposition to it; second, the
    Commanders' Emergency Response Program, to take it out of its
    position now and include--make it global; and then third, the
    International Military Education and Training program.
        Those three, I'd like to know from each one of you real
    quickly just how a priority do you put on these three programs?
        General Renuart. Senator, from my Central Command days, my
    Pacific Command (PACOM) days, and now, those are critical to
    our ability to generate coalition support in their own
    countries. I'm very much supportive of each of those and would
    look forward to their continuing.
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral?
        Admiral Stavridis. I completely associate myself with
    General Renuart in every regard. I would add just as a quick
    example 1206-type moneys are how we equip partner nations to go
    after things like these self-propelled semi-submersibles. We
    have used them to provide our partners with high-speed boats,
    command and control, the ability to control the area around
    them. So all of those programs are excellent and critical in
    every way.
        Senator Inhofe. Yesterday or the day before when we had the
    special operations people in here they were talking about 1208
    being the same thing.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's good.
        Now let me ask you, Admiral. I saw that--I think there are
    two of them. There's the U.S.S. Comfort  and the U.S.S. Mercy,
    is that right?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. They are sister ships.
        Senator Inhofe. Did I see one in the west, the west side of
    Africa?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. I saw one there, but I'm not sure it was
    one of ours.
        Admiral Stavridis. No, sir. The U.S.S. Comfort  is on the
    east coast and comes periodically into my area and it has been
    to Africa. On the west coast, the U.S.S. Mercy went after the
    tsunami, for example, and 2 years ago went through the
    Philippines. They are powerful, powerful statements.
        Senator Inhofe. I'm very much impressed. I think that was
    the one I saw on the west coast. I think it was the U.S.S.
    Mercy.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Now, probably the only area where you and I
    disagree is in the Law of the Sea Treaty. What I'd like to do,
    rather than just start any kind of a debate here, because I
    consider you an expert--I've opposed this since the Reagan
    administration and I haven't seen a lot of changes in it. But I
    have four things I'd like for the record you to respond to
    specifically, four things.
        One of my objections is, the International Seabed Authority
    and the fact that it has regulatory powers over some 70 percent
    of the Earth. I'm concerned about the sovereignty issue.
        Second would be, the way I read it--and we've had several
    hearings for this committee about 3 years ago and then also the
    other committee that I'm on, the Environment and Public Works
    Committee--that it has the power to level a global tax. I just
    would like to know, if you disagree with that, specifically
    what precludes that from happening.
        Third, there are only four circumstances under which they
    can be stopped on the high seas, which are listed as human
    trafficking, drug trafficking, piracy, and then unauthorized
    broadcasting. I'm not sure what that is. I'd like to see, have
    you comment on that.
        Then lastly, they always argue that military actions are
    exempt, but it doesn't define military actions.
        So if you would do that for the record so that I would be
    able to have that, I would appreciate it.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        As an official policy matter, I defer questions associated with the
    U.N. Law of the Sea Convention to the Chief of Naval Operations.
    However, as a professional naval officer, I support U.S. accession to
    the Convention and offer the following personal thoughts on the
    questions posed:
        First, as to your seabed and sovereignty concern, I believe the
    United States would have more influence on deep seabed mining than any
    other nation. The United States would have a permanent seat in the
    Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and a seat on ISA's
    Finance Committee, and any decision that could result in a substantive
    obligation on the United States, or that could have financial or
    budgetary implications, would require U.S. consent. Additionally, no
    deep seabed mining revenues, should any ever be accumulated, could ever
    be distributed without U.S. approval.
        Second, as to your concern as to a global tax, I understand that
    the Convention does not provide for or authorize any international
    institution (the United Nations, the ISA, or any other body) to tax the
    United States, its citizens, or its corporations.
        As to your third concern regarding circumstances under which
    vessels can be stopped on high seas, the Convention does not limit or
    restrict our maritime interdiction activities in any regard--in fact,
    it bolsters them. With regard to your specific question concerning the
    meaning of ``unauthorized broadcasting,'' Article 109 of the Convention
    defines ``unauthorized broadcasting'' as the transmission of sound
    radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the high
    seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to
    international regulations. ``Unauthorized broadcasting'' from the sea
    is rare; but, by way of example, if a ship were suspected of
    broadcasting radio or TV into the United States illegally, the U.S.
    Navy could rely on Article 110 to board the suspect vessel.
        Finally, as to your fourth concern regarding whether military
    actions are exempt, Article 298 of the Convention permits the United
    States to completely exempt its military activities from dispute
    resolution and, under the express terms of the Convention itself, a
    determination by the United States that its activities are military
    activities exempt from dispute resolution may not be overturned by any
    court, tribunal, or foreign state.

        Senator Inhofe. Now, General Renuart, one of the things, a
    presentation that I make quite often on the missile defense
    system, which I've been concerned with for many, many years, is
    the boost phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase. Now, on
    the boost phase what I'd like to have you do, and either
    comment now in whatever time I have left or, if I run out of
    time, then do it for the record--it's my understanding we
    really don't--we're kind of naked on the boost phase. We're
    working on these things, the Airborne Laser, the Kinetic
    Booster, but they aren't to a position to do us much good.
        We've seen on the midcourse phase the performance of Aegis.
    We're very, very pleased with that, and also some 23 or 24
    ground-based systems that are working as far as the Multiple
    Kill Vehicle, that's still in design.
        Then third, on the terminal defense segment, the High
    Altitude Area Defense, I think that's going to come up in 2009
    or 2010. I'm not sure. Then of course, the PAC-3, which is
    already very capable.
        So any of those that you could comment on. Where do we need
    to do the most the quickest in these phases?
        General Renuart. Senator, I'll try to be very quick, but
    our principal role is in the ground-based midcourse interceptor
    mission for defense of our Homeland. We've been involved in a
    series of both spiral development tests as well as----
        Senator Inhofe. In case you have to write it for the
    record, I understand that for the Homeland, but I'm talking
    about for the overall system, which goes beyond that. I know
    you're familiar with that.
        General Renuart. Let me do this. Let me provide you a
    little bit more detail for the record if I might, in the
    interest of time. But I think there are some real capabilities
    that we need to continue to pursue, both in the boost and in
    the terminal phase.
        Senator Inhofe. For Homeland, what would be the weakest
    link?
        General Renuart. For the Homeland, I think maybe the one of
    least applicable right now is the capability in the boost
    phase. We really don't have something there that is immediately
    available.
        Senator Inhofe. When you answer this for the record, if you
    don't mind, have it go beyond just the Homeland, and also get
    as many dates. We're getting conflicting information sometimes,
    and then of course this requires legislation every year.
        General Renuart. Absolutely.
        Senator Inhofe. We just need to know just where the
    greatest needs are in your opinion.
        General Renuart. Senator, I'll be happy to do that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        General, welcome----
        Chairman Levin. Senator Collins, would you forgive this
    interruption.
        I didn't have a chance to ask Senator Warner if he agreed
    with this. Because there's at least a chance that we may be
    able to finish by 11 o'clock, which would be about 10 minutes
    after the vote starts, could we ask our staffs to find out if
    any of the Senators that are not here now are expected to come
    back after that vote, so if we do vote and finish by 11 o'clock
    we'd be able to agree to adjourn, unless there are Senators
    that we don't know of who are going to come back after that
    vote expecting that we will still be in session.
        Thank you, Senator Collins. Excuse the interruption.
        Senator Collins. Sure. Thank you.
        General, you testified this morning that you disagree with
    the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves' assessment
    of an appalling gap in our ability to respond to an attack with
    WMD. You and I had a good discussion about this in my office. I
    want to put aside what may be overblown rhetoric and look very
    directly at our capabilities.
        If you read before that term of ``appalling gap,'' the
    assertion of the Commission is that we do not have sufficiently
    trained and ready forces available. The Commission says that
    they're not fully budgeted for, sourced, manned, trained, and
    equipped, which is a very specific indictment.
        Clearly we've made tremendous progress since the attacks on
    our country and since Hurricane Katrina, as my friend and
    colleague Senator Lieberman points out. But aren't there in
    fact still gaps in our ability to respond effectively? You've
    talked about troops coming on line, but if there were an attack
    tomorrow would you be able to marshal sufficiently trained and
    equipped troops to respond quickly?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think the best answer to that
    is yes, I would. Are they the best available? We clearly would
    have to take those forces from what is at home today. We
    certainly have those forces available who have the skill sets
    necessary. But as I mentioned to you, they have not trained
    together on a routine basis. So we would, if you will, create
    the integrated team on the scene.
        Would it be as effective? It's not as effective as I would
    like, and that's the reason why we're pushing for this
    dedicated force that I mentioned to Senator Lieberman. But they
    would be capable within a matter of days to respond to the
    scene and provide credible capability to respond.
        Senator Collins. Right now, however, the system is pretty
    ad hoc.
        General Renuart. It is.
        Senator Collins. You're bringing units from here and there.
    You've talked about the new team that will come on line, I
    think you said this fall will be the first one.
        General Renuart. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Collins. But don't we need three such teams? Isn't
    that the plan?
        General Renuart. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Collins. When will we have three such teams in
    place?
        General Renuart. Right now the plan is to in each
    subsequent year add a second team, again budgeted for,
    equipped, trained, and evaluated. So at the embarrassment of
    doing public math, I would say that would get us out to about
    fiscal year 2011 with three full capable teams. So I think
    that's the plan that we currently have. If there's an ability
    to accelerate that, we'll continue to look at that.
        But I'm comfortable that that gives me the ability to
    respond with the right forces and I think we're on the right
    track.
        Senator Collins. I am skeptical about the Commission's
    recommendation of giving Governors operational control of Title
    10 forces in the event of a catastrophe. At the same time,
    however, I know from the HSGAC's intensive investigation into
    the failed response to Hurricane Katrina that there were
    enormous coordination problems involving the National Guard
    units and the Active-Duty troops. Indeed, Admiral Keating, your
    predecessor, testified very frankly that he was unaware that
    the levies had been breached until he read it in the paper or
    saw it on television. He did not have visibility into the
    whereabouts of National Guard units that were coming under the
    Emergency Management Assistance Compact agreements from all
    over the country to assist. There was an appalling--I use that
    word in this case because I think it's appropriate--there was
    an appalling lack of coordination.
        I know you're concerned about that. I know you don't
    dispute that. What have you done to improve the coordination
    with our States, our emergency managers, the TAGs, our
    Governors? Is this more of a problem of inadequate planning and
    exercising, rather than truly a problem of command?
        General Renuart. Senator, thanks. What I'd like to do,
    twofold. I'd like to put a very detailed answer in the record
    if I might.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I fully and enthusiastically recognize the need to coordinate
    directly with States and State leadership to accomplish our mutual
    missions. We have the imperative to anticipate, plan, and respond
    collaboratively with the States and tribal nations within the U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) area of responsibility. Developing
    understanding, trust, and mutual respect between NORTHCOM and the
    National Guard is of particular importance as we plan and execute our
    mutual State and Federal missions. We are developing strong
    relationships with Governors, Emergency Managers (in collaboration with
    DHS and FEMA), and Adjutants General (in collaboration with National
    Guard Bureau). Each time I visit a State, I try to meet with the
    Governor, his Adjutant General, Homeland Security Advisor, and
    Emergency Manager. I've met with 19 Governors, all of the TAGs, and
    every State director of emergency management. I recently had the honor
    of being the keynote speaker at both the National Guard Association of
    the United States Annual Meeting in Puerto Rico and the recent National
    Emergency Management Association Conference. As a matter of priority
    early in my command, I met with the Homeland Security Committee of the
    Adjutants General Association.
        Direct State engagement is not a specified task for the Department
    of Defense (DOD) or for NORTHCOM. However, it's imperative that we
    develop relationships with our State mission partners that will
    contribute to success in saving lives, protecting infrastructure, and
    promoting a resilient society. I'm working to ensure my staff
    understands Governors' concerns and that senior State staff have an
    appreciation for NORTHCOM's role in security and defense. This
    understanding will promote the unity of effort our citizens deserve.
        We develop relationships with States in concert with National Guard
    Bureau and DHS. Planning partnerships ensure we have unity of effort
    with the States in addressing areas of mutual concern, including the 15
    National Planning Scenarios directed by the Homeland Security Council.
    In day-to-day operations, we connect to the States through the National
    Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center and maintain situational awareness
    24/7 through a dedicated National Guard desk in my Command Center. In
    the training and exercise arena, we work with National Guard Bureau and
    DHS to develop and execute a comprehensive knowledge exchange and
    exercise program that facilitates State and regional exercises and
    develops the military skills of both my staff and State Joint Force
    Headquarters staffs. NORTHCOM partnerships with National Guard Bureau
    and DHS result in direct benefit to Governors, State emergency
    managers, and Adjutants General.

        Senator Collins. Yes.
        General Renuart. Let me summarize just very quickly. I
    think your last statement actually is really the key. If you
    plan ahead, if you exercise routinely, and if you train
    together, then there is no gap in so-called command and
    control. We each know what each other brings to the fight. We
    each know what capabilities are needed and we then exercise and
    execute them when called for.
        I would just use the example of our two national level
    exercises. I think Senator Lieberman mentioned the dirty bomb
    scenario. We trained with our Federal, State, and local
    responders on that this past October, three events across the
    country simultaneously. We planned and exercised against a
    nuclear detonation in Indianapolis last May. Those allowed us
    to see the synergies that can be created when you work
    together. That has become part of our culture every day, that
    plus the relationships, as I talked about earlier, that we are
    building with State and local responders, as well as our
    Federal partners, have put us in a significantly better
    position than we were during Hurricane Katrina, and I'm
    comfortable that there will not be a dispute of command and
    control, but rather the understanding of how we support a State
    or a Federal agency in a large response.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        I know my time has expired. I'm going to submit for the
    record a question for you, Admiral, on Venezuela.
        Admiral Stavridis. Thank you.
        Senator Collins. I know we'll have that opportunity.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Martinez?
        Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here with us. We appreciate
    your service.
        Admiral, I want to go back to Venezuela. Actually, it's
    really the Colombian-Ecuadoran situation. I saw you say the
    three countries. The fact is from my understanding this was an
    action by the Colombians that apparently did violate
    territorial integrity of Ecuador, but Venezuela had nothing to
    do with it.
        Admiral Stavridis. Not that I can see.
        Senator Martinez. In fact the only thing Venezuela may have
    to do with it is what was found on the computer files of this
    rebel leader Reyes, correct?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. There's an apparent indication of maybe
    $300 million transferred to the Colombian narcoterrorists from
    the Venezuelan Government?
        Admiral Stavridis. That has been reported in the open
    press. I have not seen that myself, nor do I know that's
    verified yet. But that is what has been reported repeatedly in
    the open press.
        Senator Martinez. This fellow Reyes that was killed in
    action is reported to be the number two person in the FARC.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. My understanding is that this was also an
    international criminal, on the FBI Most Wanted List and
    Interpol's Most Wanted List, with a long string of kidnappings
    and murders in addition to narcotrafficking to his credit,
    correct?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I would underline that he was
    the number two leader of the FARC, who are holding, as the
    chairman said, at least 750 hostages, including three U.S.
    citizens: Tom Howes, Marc Gonsalves, and Keith Stansell.
        Senator Martinez. Those hostages--by the way, also some
    Venezuelans are held as hostage.
        Admiral Stavridis. That's correct also.
        Senator Martinez. To this date, I've not heard the
    Government of Venezuela express any concern about the
    Venezuelan hostages that are kept.
        But the conditions of hostages kept by the FARC, would you
    describe what you know about that and how they're kept?
        Admiral Stavridis. I will. Sir, we think we have good
    visibility on that because some hostages have escaped, some
    have been rescued, and some have been released in international
    negotiations. To use a word we've used several times this
    morning, the conditions are appalling. They really are
    appalling.
        These individuals are kept either chained or in cages. They
    are not well fed. Their medical condition is reportedly very
    bad. We have firsthand reports on that from other released
    hostages. We are deeply concerned, we at SOUTHCOM are deeply
    concerned about all the hostages, and we focus a great deal of
    our attention and effort on the search for our three U.S.
    hostages in cooperation with our Colombian partners.
        Senator Martinez. Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt
    of Colombia is one of those hostages----
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez.--as well as over time several members of
    the Colombian parliament----
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Martinez. The current serving Foreign Minister of
    Colombia is a former hostage.
        Admiral Stavridis. He is an escaped hostage.
        Senator Martinez. Escaped hostage. I talked to him and----
        Admiral Stavridis. He's an extraordinary man.
        Senator Martinez. He is. It's gripping to hear his tale.
        There was some report of a dirty bomb interest. What do you
    know about that?
        Admiral Stavridis. Well, again----
        Senator Martinez. By the FARC.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes. I hasten to say this is strictly
    what is being reported in the open press, so I would hesitate
    to categorize it at all as a dirty bomb. What I have seen
    reported is that there were allegations of interest on the part
    of the FARC in obtaining uranium. There was no mention to my
    knowledge that I read in the press about a dirty bomb, but
    there was interest on the part of the FARC in obtaining uranium
    and that's as far as it has been reported in the press.
    Obviously, very worrisome and we are working hard from an
    intelligence perspective to learn all we can about that.
        Senator Martinez. Admiral, I know for some time I have
    suspected that the FARC were receiving aid and comfort and
    sanctuary by the country of Venezuela. This evidence now
    suggests that that may in fact be the case. Venezuela is
    increasing its armament purchases beyond their national defense
    needs in my view and they do maintain a close level of
    cooperation with the Cuban dictatorship.
        What can you tell us about the influence that Venezuela is
    creating for the region in terms of the stability of the region
    and the military needs of Venezuela and Cuba and their
    cooperation?
        Admiral Stavridis. I would start by observing that
    historically the United States and Venezuela have had very
    close relations, and it is unfortunate that at the moment we do
    not enjoy that at a government-to-government level. At a
    military-to-military level, Senator, we have no relationship,
    unfortunately. We have tried to reach out to the Venezuelan
    military. We've invited them to conferences. We want to have
    some level of understanding and dialogue with them. But they
    have rejected that.
        The Government of Venezuela has not been cooperative in the
    narcotics fight, and we are very concerned about transshipment
    of cocaine through Venezuela.
        Finally, I would say from a political perspective it is
    clear that the current Government of Venezuela espouses
    positions that are very contrary to those of the United States
    and they seek to influence others. They have a very close
    relationship in particular, as you mentioned, with Cuba and
    that is of concern to us at SOUTHCOM.
        Senator Martinez. Would you speak for a minute about the
    U.S.S. Comfort? I know you spoke about what it does, but I'd
    love for you to tell the committee about the journey of the
    U.S.S. Comfort and the ports of call and some about the tour.
        Admiral Stavridis. I will, very quickly. U.S.S. Comfort is
    a large hospital ship. It's essentially a big hospital that
    floats. It's manned up by about 1,000 people. We put a crew on
    it that is both military and loaded up with nongovernmental
    charitable organizations, volunteers. We had some international
    partners who came with us, notably the Canadians.
        We sent it on a 4-month voyage through 12 different ports
    throughout South America and Central America and the Caribbean.
    It was extremely well received--400,000 patient encounters,
    25,000 sets of eyeglasses, thousands of surgeries. A very
    visible, prominent, and compassionate signal from our country
    to the region.
        Thank you for that opportunity.
        Senator Martinez. My time is up, but I want to close by
    saying to you that I have visited Guantanamo on more than one
    occasion. When I have, I had the opportunity to see the care
    and treatment of the detainees there by our forces and, as
    having been a former Mayor of Orange County, FL, I assure you
    that their conditions are far in excess of what Orange County
    provides common prisoners in the Orange County jail. They're
    well cared for. They seem well fed, with sensitivity to their
    religious needs and all of that and more.
        I would say that, as compared to the way that our three
    Americans are being kept by the FARC in the jungle or the way
    that many Cubans are kept in Cuban prisons by the mere
    expression of a political view different from that oppressive
    government, that we're doing pretty well by the detainees in
    Guantanamo.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Stavridis, I think when General Craddock was here
    in April 2006 he indicated that we would be able to draw down
    some of our military forces in Colombia within, at that time,
    18 months. We're bumping up against that proposed deadline.
    What's your comment on the forces in Colombia?
        Admiral Stavridis. I'm optimistic, sir. Colombia has made
    enormous progress as a result of Plan Colombia, which came out
    of the Clinton administration, was followed in the Bush
    administration. Murders down 40 percent, kidnappings down 76
    percent, terrorist incidents down 60 percent. Police presence
    throughout the country. It's a much safer country.
        As the chairman indicated, the Colombians have just self-
    financed with a wealth tax $3.5 billion. I fully expect over
    the next 24 months we should be able to move toward a reduction
    in our very small forces that are there. Senator, we have a cap
    of 800 U.S. military. We typically average well below that, in
    the 500 range. I'm very confident that Colombia can handle
    herself, as Secretary Gates said yesterday in reference to this
    Venezuela issue.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
        General, Mexico is within your responsibilities.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. For many times my understanding was it was
    outside of anyone's responsibility, that it was sui generis.
    But now you have essentially operational responsibility. There
    is a proposal to significantly increase aid to the Mexican
    security forces. But of more imminent concern to me is the
    repeated reports in the press of open gun battles along the
    border of the United States, as Mexican security forces try to
    interdict drug operations.
        Can you give me a sense of how you're supporting Mexico and
    your outlook as to what's happening on the border? That's a
    startling revelation when you read about these open gun
    battles.
        General Renuart. Senator, I'd be happy to. Thank you for
    the question. I would say first that the Mexican Government
    under President Calderon's leadership has really made a
    commitment to take on the mission of counternarcotics and the
    narcoterrorism efforts and events that occur.
        In doing so, he has given a clear mandate to both of his
    senior military leaders that they would engage actively, and
    they have. We've seen, as was mentioned by the chairman, the
    price of narcotics in our country rise significantly, due in
    substantial part to the efforts of the Mexicans to interdict.
    As Admiral Stavridis mentioned, these boats are trying to get
    their products into Mexico to then move over land into the
    United States.
        We have been involved with our partners in the Federal
    agencies--Drug Enforcement Agency; Alcohol, Tobacco, and
    Firearms; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and others--in a
    support role along the border to help identify and interdict
    cross-border transit. We've been substantial partners to our
    friends in Customs and Border Protection in terms of providing
    them logistical support, surveillance capabilities, and the
    like. I think that has made good progress.
        With respect to Mexico, we are strong supporters of the
    Merida Initiative. That will begin to provide funding for the
    Mexican counternarcotics missions. As you may know, in Mexico a
    good deal of that is done by the military. Both of the senior
    leaders of their military forces are working hard on
    eliminating corruption within their own militaries and in the
    local police forces.
        Having said all of that, the cartels are beginning to feel
    that pressure and are lashing out in more violent ways, and I
    think that as we begin to see more pressure from the Mexican
    military and their counternarcotics agencies you may see some
    more violence, but I think they're making good progress with
    good training to begin to----
        Senator Reed. In general, how would you categorize your
    assistance to Mexican authorities? Is it training, logistical
    support, advice, or joint planning?
        General Renuart. I think joint planning in a collaboration,
    with information-sharing, and then feeding as much as we can to
    our Federal law enforcement partners who work with their
    components. I would also say that Admiral Stavridis and I are
    connected both with Joint Interagency Task Force-South and my
    Joint Task Force-North to have a transparent flow of
    information, and the Mexicans are eager participants with both
    of us.
        Senator Reed. Thank you sir.
        General Renuart, shifting gears a bit, do you--the National
    Guard and Reserve units which you include in your plans for
    emergencies within the United States, they would report to you
    on a regular basis their readiness?
        General Renuart. Senator, I would tell you 2 years ago I
    couldn't say this. Today I'm comfortable that, in collaboration
    with the National Guard Bureau, we monitor the readiness of all
    of those forces that we would take advantage of in a response.
    That information is transparent to both the Guard Bureau and to
    us and I'm comfortable that I have a much better picture on
    their readiness today.
        Senator Reed. I know these readiness numbers are
    classified, but what percent roughly are command (C-1), both in
    training, equipment, and personnel, of these Reserve and
    National Guard units?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think General Blum has been out
    in public with some numbers. Let me get the specific numbers
    for the record if I might.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Readiness is not reported in ``C'' ratings within the Defense
    Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Readiness reporting is based upon
    the ability to accomplish assigned Joint Mission Essential Task Lists
    (JMETLs). In conjunction with the National Guard Bureau (National Guard
    Bureau), we have established JMETLs for Defense Support of Civil
    Authorities missions. Currently we have an ongoing effort to establish
    reporting in DRRS at each of the 54 Joint Force Headquarters-State. The
    National Guard Bureau is leading a 3-5 year implementation plan led by
    three DRRS Implementation in the Guard teams. These teams are
    incorporating State National Guard units into DRRS.
        As of 31 March 08, 18 States/territories are reporting in DRRS. The
    breakdown is as follows:

             18 States Total Reporting in DRRS
             6 Reporting Green (Fully Mission Capable)
             11 Reporting Yellow (Qualified with Concerns)
             1 Reporting Red (Not Mission Capable)

        Senator Reed. All right. But just in general, because we
    don't want to cross the line here, but in general my impression
    is that the majority, the vast majority of the units that are
    reporting to you, are not reporting C-1 in these categories.
        General Renuart. I think that's a fair approximation, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Reed. What's your estimate of how that affects your
    ability to carry out your plans, which is the bottom line about
    readiness numbers?
        General Renuart. Senator, each of those units are reporting
    against a whole variety of plans. So from my perspective, I
    watch the things that are unique to the Homeland, and I think
    our concerns are maybe less acute than the overall warfighting.
    I would see our numbers for our mission being up in the 75 or
    so percent equipment rate and so a higher C status. But again,
    that's reported against that broader question.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask another question in this regard,
    final question. That is, one of the problems I think
    particularly with land forces is that they've been so
    preoccupied with missions in and out of Iraq that their whole
    training focus has been oriented on a very limited set of
    important skills, basically urban counter-guerrilla warfare. To
    what extent are your units because of this demand, if they're
    doing any training at all, it's so Iraq-specific and so Afghan-
    specific that your missions, your training missions, are
    neglected?
        General Renuart. Senator, I'd actually say I do not have a
    problem in that regard, because each of those Guard units has a
    State mission and those are very compatible with the roles that
    I have. So they maintain a good training level for their State
    missions.
        Senator Reed. The only other question I ask, and that is to
    the effect that you have to call on an asset--and I'll ask this
    of the Admiral--regular forces as part of your contingency
    planning, the fact that those forces are committed almost
    entirely, the land forces that is, what effect does that have
    on your ability to carry out contingencies, Admiral?
        Admiral Stavridis. Very minor in the context of Latin
    America and the Caribbean, for the obvious reasons. It's very
    unlikely we'd use a large standing army down there.
        Senator Reed. General?
        General Renuart. Sir, I'd just say that we do have the
    ability, if needed, to go into our home bases and get forces
    should we need them. So right now we're sensitive to that
    OPTEMPO, but it has not had a dramatic effect on our
    operations.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Now I'm going to call on Senator Nelson and I'm going to
    ask him to turn this over to the next in line, that the staff
    will identify for you, and we'll be back. We are not going to
    finish this. There's a vote that should start any minute.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, General, thank you both for your public service.
    Admiral, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) told us the other
    day that he is making a recommendation to the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs, and I understand Admiral Mullen also is going to
    make that recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy, and then
    to go on up to the Secretary of Defense, about reactivating the
    Fourth Fleet, which would give you additional capability that
    you need to project your forces in the Western Hemisphere. Do
    you want to share with the committee your thoughts on that?
        Admiral Stavridis. I will, Senator. Thank you for asking
    that. As we just talked about, this part of the world is not a
    place where I could foresee using large standing land forces.
    On the other hand, naval and air forces are very helpful in the
    kinds of missions that we do, from drug interdiction to medical
    types of missions to disaster response to counterterrorism. So
    all of those kinds of mission sets require a strong naval
    presence.
        So the CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead, a good friend, Admiral
    Mike Mullen, his predecessor as CNO, have both been very
    supportive of our request to activate the Fourth Fleet. It
    gives us a fleet presence that is focused on this region. It
    gives us real command and control capability. It is the right
    answer to also show the region that we want to engage, we want
    to continue the kinds of efforts and missions that we've done
    successfully and can do much better if we have a Fourth Fleet
    in place.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us what you think the timing on
    this is going to be?
        Admiral Stavridis. Certainly as you said, sir, it has to go
    up through the Department, but I think it's going to be soon.
    I'm very hopeful that it will be soon. The sooner the better
    from where I sit, because as the combatant commander who would
    use the capabilities of a Fourth Fleet, that would be very
    helpful, to have that in place this year if at all possible.
        Senator Bill Nelson. It would be a headquarters for a
    Fourth Fleet and then you would reach out, pick and choose the
    assets that you needed to tailor it to the particular threat
    that you see?
        Admiral Stavridis. Exactly, yes, sir. It would give us the
    ability to do that in real time in ways that would allow a much
    better and more concerted response to problem sets that range
    from hurricanes to medical diplomacy to counternarcotics moving
    through the region to the nascent counterterrorism kinds of
    operations. Speed is very important in all those scenarios.
        Senator Bill Nelson. There is precedent for this kind of
    arrangement, both in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. In the Persian Gulf we have
    the Fifth Fleet. In the Mediterranean we have the Sixth Fleet.
    This would be the Fourth Fleet and would focus on the Caribbean
    and the waters of South America.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, the question at some point in
    the future if a European national missile defense system is set
    up--and that's still a question now; particularly that's a
    question in light of the Central Intelligence Agency report
    that was made public that said that Iran has stopped their
    weapons program as of 2001, because the initial idea for a
    national missile defense system in Eastern Europe was to
    protect U.S. assets and also European assets from the threat of
    a nuclear-tipped Iranian rocket.
        Now, assuming that we were to proceed with such a European-
    based two-stage instead of national missile defense three-stage
    rocket which we have, the question is, is it controlled by the
    European Command (EUCOM) commander or the NORTHCOM commander?
    Do you want to weigh in on that?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think we have to proceed on a
    couple avenues in this regard. First, the mission to protect
    the Homeland is clearly one that NORTHCOM has the
    responsibility for and should exercise that, and we do that
    every day.
        As we see capabilities, for example with Iran, to reach out
    at the intercontinental range, I think we have to have some
    serious discussions between the two commanders and make
    recommendations to the Secretary on how to manage the resources
    for both potentially a European threat and a Homeland threat.
        If the threat is limited just to Europe with a certain
    capability, then I think clearly the commander of EUCOM has
    that role and responsibility. Most importantly in all of this
    is that we have a common integrated operating picture, so that
    any of the combatant commands can understand the threats to
    their area and respond if needed. I think Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM) is working very hard on that and we're a big
    supporter of their efforts.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In our last National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA), we were allowing the negotiations to
    proceed with regard to the acquisition of real estate in
    Eastern Europe. But all of those seem to have come to a halt
    because it has neither approved--it has not approved, been
    approved, by the host countries: one, where there would have to
    be the radar; and the other, that would actually be the launch
    site.
        Do you have any update? Of course, I can ask this when the
    national missile defense team comes in and I will. But do you
    want to share any of that timetable with us?
        General Renuart. Senator, I'm really not--I don't have that
    information, so it would be unfair of me to comment on that.
    I'm sure that General Obering can be more specific.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        I know there has been other questioning about the
    Commission's report on the National Guard and Reserve, but I
    don't think we have touched upon one of the recommendations
    that talks about how we have changed basically the use of our
    Guard and Reserves into an Operational Reserve and Guard, as
    opposed to Strategic. That is, pardon the expression, a sea
    change as to what we have typically done in our military, and
    it presents many, many challenges.
        We can boil it down to the pragmatic everyday challenge,
    and that is when I was the prosecutor in Kansas City I looked
    on a resume for that entry of being in the Reserve or the Guard
    because it said something to me about that person in terms of
    me wanting to hire them as an assistant prosecutor in my
    office. I know that now if I was looking at that I think I
    would still, hopefully, feel the same way, but as an employer
    you have to go: Wait a minute, this is really hard to put
    someone in a key position in your operation knowing that
    they're going to be called on operationally consistently and,
    frankly, unfortunately, constantly in this particular
    contingency that we're engaged in.
        So I thought the recommendation that the Commission made
    about separating out a Strategic and an Operational Reserve
    certainly makes sense. I understand that it would be a big
    stressor right now in terms of what pressure it would put on
    our need for activation of those men and women with what we
    have committed--frankly, what we are in for the long haul
    whether some of us think it needs to be quite as long as it's
    been or not.
        I would like you all to speak to that, about should we,
    shouldn't we, be working towards a goal to have a--and frankly,
    the Strategic Reserve is something we've always had in our back
    pocket for a national catastrophe, for the kinds of things that
    we traditionally always thought of particularly the Guard for,
    and I know that's been touched upon by other Senators in terms
    of drug control and all the other things that we had relied on
    them for.
        If you would briefly--I know we're going to have to vote
    here and I have another quick question before we go. So if you
    would briefly address that, so I don't miss the vote.
        General Renuart. Sure, Senator. Thanks. First I will say as
    just a bit of context, I spoke to a number of members of the
    Delaware National Guard just a few weeks ago and I asked the
    question, why are you here, why do you wear this uniform? A
    young lady stood up, a young lieutenant, and she said: Sir, my
    father served in the Guard and my brother is an Active-Duty
    person, and serving the Nation and wearing this uniform and
    making a difference is important to me.
        I think we have to be careful not to lose that belief among
    our young men and women who are citizen soldiers. They are
    critical to our Nation. Having an Operational Reserve makes
    good sense in many, many ways and I think the recommendation of
    the Commission is sound in that regard. I think there is a need
    for some Strategic Reserve. How you mix that, I think, is
    something we have to continue to study.
        Finally, I'd say there is no doubt that the effect on
    employers as well as on those guardsmen and their families is
    profound, and I think we have to look at ways to find a balance
    between operational and strategic, and we have to continue to
    thank and remind those employers of the importance of those
    citizen soldiers we use every day.
        Senator McCaskill. I couldn't agree with you more. It seems
    to me that there would be--I know we're trying to keep people
    in. It seems to me that once you have been in an Operational
    Reserve or in the Operational Guard it would be realistic, I
    think, to say to those men and women: We would now like you to
    re-up and stay with us, but if you would like we would give you
    the choice of being in the Strategic Reserve, which would
    obviously have a different connotation in terms of how likely
    it is that they would be called upon to spend extended periods
    of time, a year or more, every 2 or 3 years or, frankly, even
    more frequently than that, as we have witnessed.
        It seems to me that would be good for maintaining some of
    that experience that we have, that we may be losing.
        General Renuart. Senator, I think there are both practical
    and potentially even legal ramifications of the
    differentiation. That will take some study to come up with a
    good recommendation. But I think Secretary Gates and the
    Chairman both have said that we are moving towards a more
    predictable OPTEMPO for our guardsmen and reservists, with 1
    year sort of, if you will, active or in the hopper to be used
    and then 5 years, 4 or 5 years as a target, not to be, and that
    allows employers a more predictable timetable.
        I think we have to work all of those simultaneously.
        Senator McCaskill. I agree, but I want to make sure that we
    don't make the mistake of thinking that because we can be more
    predictable now we might not be right back in this place,
    because, by the way, I've heard ``deja vu all over again''
    several times since I've been on this committee. If we don't
    learn from what has happened in terms of the stressors on our
    Active-Duty Forces and this kind of contingency, then shame on
    us.
        Let me just ask you this question. I'm confident, based on
    some answers previously given, you may not have the answer, and
    I have to run now or I'm not going to make this vote. If you
    would get to me the answer: How many of the detainees at
    Guantanamo have been transferred to Bagram? There has been a
    huge increase in the number of people at Bagram and I want to
    make sure that we're not just rerouting folks, and if we are I
    would like to understand why. So the numbers at Bagram have
    gone from several hundred to over 600, while the numbers at
    Guantanamo have dropped, and I would like to know the
    percentage of people who have left Guantanamo and how many have
    gone back to their home countries, and then obviously a
    percentage if any of them have been transferred to Bagram.
        Admiral Stavridis. I think that would be mine. I'm the
    Guantanamo end of it. I know nothing about Bagram and neither
    does General Renuart. But, ma'am, I will take that question for
    the record and get you an answer to it from the Department.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
    Affairs (DASD-DA), no detainees have been transferred from Joint Task
    Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) to the U.S. military detention facility at
    Bagram. In 2007, 124 detainees from JTF-GTMO were transferred or
    released to foreign governments. As neither U.S. Southern Command nor
    JTF-GTMO determine which detainees are transferred or released or to
    whom, I defer further questions on the matter to the Deputy Secretary
    of Defense and DASD-DA.

        Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much. Thank you.
        Now what should I do? We're going to recess, but they
    should stay. But you should stay. The voice of Carl Levin is
    being channeled to me, and the voice of Chairman Levin says you
    must stay, and I always do what Chairman Levin says.
        General Renuart. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you. [Recess.]
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. General, I'd like to ask a
    couple questions of you about ballistic missile defense
    testing. You and I have spoken about this in my office.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree that we need robust and
    operationally realistic testing, in other words testing our
    missile defense system the way it was intended to be used in an
    operational mission, to demonstrate its operational
    capabilities?
        General Renuart. Yes, sir, I do, absolutely.
        Chairman Levin. Should such testing include salvo launches
    and multiple target tests, as well as tests with
    countermeasures and decoys?
        General Renuart. Senator, I do, and I believe those are
    built into the test program.
        Chairman Levin. The independent Director of Operational
    Test and Evaluation, who is the Pentagon's independent test and
    evaluation director, reported in December that ``The Ground-
    Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) flight testing to date is not
    sufficient to provide a high level of statistical confidence in
    its limited capabilities.'' Do you agree with that?
        General Renuart. Senator, I would only say that the tests
    that I've been a part of have been very successful within the
    parameters of that particular test, and that I'm comfortable
    that the test development program over the coming days will
    expand both the types of tests and the degree of difficulty, if
    you will, of the test objectives.
        Chairman Levin. Why are you not able to comment on whether
    you agree with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
    that overall the flight testing to date has not been sufficient
    to provide yet a high level of statistical confidence in its
    limited capabilities?
        Are you not in a position to give an opinion?
        General Renuart. I don't know what the previous test
    probabilities have been. I can tell you that the tests that
    I've been a part of since taking command have been absolutely
    successful. So I guess I would disagree to the degree of my
    observations. Those two tests have been very, very successful
    that I've observed, and so I have every reason to believe they
    would continue to be successful.
        Chairman Levin. The key I think for all of this is whether
    or not there's sufficient, has been sufficient testing. Do you
    believe that we have to conduct more than one operationally
    realistic test per year to demonstrate consistent operational
    capability?
        General Renuart. Sir, I think we do, yes.
        Chairman Levin. We placed some provisions in the National
    Guard Empowerment Act of 2007, which was part of the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2008, which affects NORTHCOM, and I'd like to ask
    you whether or not the requirements which are now in law create
    problems for NORTHCOM. First, establishing in the functions of
    the National Guard Bureau the duty to assist the Secretary of
    Defense in coordinating with NORTHCOM on the use of National
    Guard personnel and resources. Does that create a problem?
        General Renuart. No, Senator, it does not. In fact, we're
    working that daily.
        Chairman Levin. We require a review of the civilian and
    military positions, job descriptions, and assignments within
    NORTHCOM, with the goal of determining the feasibility of
    significantly increasing the number of members of the Reserve
    components and civilians in NORTHCOM. Does that review create a
    problem?
        General Renuart. It does not, Senator, and that's ongoing
    as we speak.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, I think that you have addressed
    this question. If you have, I'll read your answer for the
    record. I believe that Senator Reed asked you this, but let me
    make sure. I believe we were told originally that the military
    support for Colombia at the current level was going to be
    lasting about 18 months. This was extended after that first 18-
    month period elapsed. Were you asked when you believe we can
    start to drawdown U.S. forces?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I was.
        Chairman Levin. The short answer to that?
        Admiral Stavridis. The short answer is let's say 24 months
    from now I think would be a good window. I would add to what I
    said earlier if I could, Mr. Chairman. I think signing a free
    trade agreement with Colombia would be helpful in that regard,
    strictly speaking from a national security perspective.
        Chairman Levin. You may have also in your answers, I
    believe to Senator Martinez, but perhaps others, about the
    Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia border, that border issue with
    Ecuador and Colombia--I understand the Colombian Government has
    apologized to Ecuador; is that correct, that it expressed
    regrets?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I've read in the open press that
    they have, I believe, expressed regrets. But I would not attest
    to that.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Is there a danger that Venezuela
    or Ecuador would take military action against Colombia, do you
    believe?
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I personally find that highly
    unlikely.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. I'd like to follow on the chairman's very
    important line of questioning about missile defense. He talked
    about the testing features and so forth. I want to go to a
    broader question to you, General. What is your assessment of
    the current readiness as of today of the GMD system now
    deployed in Alaska to intercept a long-range ballistic missile
    fired against the United States?
        General Renuart. Senator, I believe on a limited basis--and
    by that I mean not multiple missiles all being fired, but on a
    single event like the one we saw with the Taepodong in North
    Korea--I monitor that readiness every day and I believe it to
    be capable of providing us that limited defense that we seek
    against that threat.
        I do believe that we have to continue to expand our test
    program. We will have a series of tests this year that will add
    the full suite of sensors, the sea-based X-band, for example,
    the forward-based X-band radar, that will give us a much more
    end-to-end realistic test, and we will begin to look at both
    decoys and multiple vehicles as we get further into the test
    program. So I'm comfortable that we're continuing to expand.
        In terms of the readiness of the systems, I monitor them
    every day. Today they are in the test process. We work back and
    forth with the Missile Defense Agency to move missiles in and
    out of the test phase so that they can conduct the work they
    need to do and yet I have the forces available to respond
    should that be necessary.
        Senator Warner. That's quite reassuring then.
        Now, the most recent activity where we had to as a matter
    of safety bring down that crippled system using naval
    capabilities, what interrelationship did that event in terms of
    the use of our existing capabilities, both sea-borne and the
    missile itself, what relationship does that--what lessons do we
    learn from that that relate to the question of our missile
    defense?
        General Renuart. Senator, first, that was, as Secretary
    Gates has mentioned, a one-time event to protect human life.
        Senator Warner. Yes, but it worked.
        General Renuart. It did work.
        Senator Warner. It was to the commendation of the Services
    that it did work.
        General Renuart. The Department of the Navy and their
    engineers were fantastic in essentially reengineering the
    capability of that particular system.
        Senator Warner. I'd throw in the contractors. Everybody
    kicks them around like a football.
        General Renuart. Yes, sir, absolutely. They really did a
    magnificent job.
        Senator Warner. They really did.
        General Renuart. It was coordinated among all of the
    players: Commander of PACOM, Admiral Keating, myself, certainly
    General Chilton at STRATCOM. General Chilton was the supported
    commander for that. But we maintained full visibility on the
    process. Importantly, NORTHCOM was in a position to provide
    consequence management if that satellite had fallen into
    territory where we could be of assistance.
        Senator Warner. But did it add some credibility to our
    missile defense system?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think it would be unfair to
    characterize that, because it really was done for a very unique
    set of circumstances. Missile defense has a very different set
    of parameters there. So while we learned a lot about the
    process, I would be careful not to equate that event with
    developments in missile defense.
        Senator Warner. Maybe to the extent that the seaborne
    platform concept worked.
        General Renuart. Senator, every day our naval vessels
    carrying the SM-3 missile are used in a missile defense role,
    and they are exquisite in the performance of that role.
        Senator Warner. I just wanted to get a little naval plug
    in, Admiral.
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I want to associate myself with the
    word ``exquisite'' as it was just used there. [Laughter.]
        Senator Warner. The chairman asked questions about what
    Congress has done and what it hasn't done on the question of
    your department, General. The Commission recommended--that's
    the famous Punaro Commission--that Congress codify the DOD's
    responsibility to provide support for civil authorities.
        However, it would appear that the Constitution of the
    United States, existing laws such as the Stafford Act and the
    Insurrection Act, as well as DOD policy, the reference being
    DOD's strategy for Homeland defense and support to civil
    authorities, all of this taken together would seem to us at
    this time--I'm not going to render judgment; maybe I should say
    it would seem to me; I can't speak for my colleagues--provide
    ample, sufficient authorities for DOD to provide support for
    civil authorities.
        So what's your view about the need for review and a
    possible new Federal statute for the mission of supporting our
    State and civil authorities?
        General Renuart. Senator, I believe that today I have the
    authorities I need to provide that kind of support to the
    American people, and they deserve it, and I think existing
    policies within DOD allow me to do that. We're working, by the
    way, closely with our Department, with DHS, to ensure that we
    look at the kinds of support that may be needed in the future
    and that we're positioned to help in that.
        I include in my commander's Integrated Priority List and to
    my inputs to the budget development programs in the Department,
    those unique capabilities that are required by the Guard to
    help us respond. So it is an integrated effort in this regard.
        So I think today the existing authorities are more than
    sufficient and it is really the relationships and the planning
    and integration and exercising that will win the day for us.
        Senator Warner. Can I get two more quick questions?
        Chairman Levin. Senator Thune, are you happy to yield to
    your ranking member?
        Senator Warner. I didn't realize we had someone come.
        Senator Thune. No, please.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner?
        Senator Warner. Usually we sit here together and rattle on
    back and forth. [Laughter.]
        We'll need for this important hearing, Admiral, from you a
    submission for the record about the status of issues on the
    Panama Canal.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. I follow that very closely.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I know.
        Senator Warner. I want you to describe the current
    counterterrorism cooperation that we now have with Panama. I
    understand Panama, we have a very strong cooperative
    relationship.
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, it is excellent.
        Senator Warner. But you do see that Panama has recognized
    Taiwan. How do you sort that out with some Chinese interests at
    both ends of the Canal which were the subject of a lot of
    discussion here years ago?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I will.
        Senator Warner. Then of course, we have underway this
    referendum which authorized the Panamanian Government to go
    ahead and do a major upgrade of the Canal. What's your degree
    of confidence in their ability to achieve this?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I can address all those for
    the record for you, sir.
        Senator Warner. For the record.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, if that's your preference.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is in the second consecutive year
    of a training program by which Special Operations Command South through
    Naval Special Warfare Detachment South (NSW Det South) is providing
    counternarcoterrorism training to the Panamanian Public Forces. NSW Det
    South continues to train groups comprised of personnel from the
    Panamanian National Police Special Forces and Frontier Forces, as well
    as personnel from Panamanian National Maritime Service. Panama's
    Minister of Government and Justice, accompanied by the Commander of the
    Frontier Force, visited SOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami in January, to
    forge an even closer relationship with the United States on
    counternarcoterrorism and other issues.
        For the diplomatic relationships between Panama and Taiwan and
    Panama and China, I defer such matters to the Department of State.
        Concerning the expansion of the Panama Canal, I have a high degree
    of confidence that the Panamanian Government can achieve their goal to
    upgrade the Canal. I think the Panama Canal Authority has a well
    thought out plan and they have the support of the Government and people
    of Panama to make this a very successful project.

        Senator Warner. Then I think you should address the alleged
    quantities of narcotics or other illicit materials that are
    transitting the Canal.
        Admiral Stavridis. Aye-aye, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In 2007, the interagency Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB)
    estimated that approximately 1,400 metric tons (MTs) of cocaine flowed
    from South America. Of those 1,400 MTs, the CCDB estimates that
    approximately 3.3 MTs flowed through the Panama Canal. This represents
    less than a quarter of 1 percent of the total cocaine flowing out of
    South America. However, enforcement agencies admit they have little to
    no solid statistics on quantities or percentage of flow that actually
    transits the Canal since containerized cargo is not routinely
    inspected.
        Although illicit trafficking through the Canal does occur, the
    consensus amongst enforcement and intelligence officials is that
    utilizing the Canal is not the preferred route for most maritime
    smugglers and drug traffic organizations. Statistics and intelligence
    support that drug trafficking organizations still prefer smaller
    noncommercial maritime conveyance and tactics such as go-fasts and
    semi-submersibles that utilize more littoral and coastal routes
    reducing the risk of detection and interdiction.

        Senator Warner. Lastly, the ship over here. I was greatly
    impressed with that. Through the years, somehow I've had
    something to do with that ship. I can't remember exactly when
    she was made and launched. But I guess somebody ought to run an
    analysis of--you recited all the wonderful things that it's
    done.
        Admiral Stavridis. Right.
        Senator Warner. 25,000 pairs of eyeglasses?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Has anybody done a cost analysis of how
    that goodwill by the United States and medical help to these
    people translates into lessening the burdens that you have on
    your military for performing the needed military missions? If
    so, should we think about urging the Department to commission
    another one of these ships?
        In other words, is it a cost effective way to achieve our
    goals in that region, and should we begin to step up this?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I would welcome the chance to
    provide some of that analysis----
        Senator Warner. Would you?
        Admiral Stavridis.--which has been--excuse me. Which has
    been done.
        I think the short answer to the question is that we can
    demonstrate effectiveness in attitudes toward the United
    States, which then turns toward helping solve other problems. I
    will put the answer in the record.
        Senator Warner. Because the region is just frightfully
    turbulent.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. The more that we can convince them that our
    mission there is simply to provide for their own, protect their
    own individual sovereignty and achieve some democratic form of
    government for their people, this can do it.
        So if you want to get behind it, slip me a little piece of
    paper and I'll see if I can talk to my chairman and maybe get
    some long-range planning for a new ship or something.
        Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I'll be glad to submit that for the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Soon after the completion of the deployment of the hospital ship
    U.S.N.S. Comfort  to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of
    focus, SOUTHCOM conducted a Comfort Deployment Initial Impact
    Assessment. The Comfort was one of many humanitarian and engagement
    activities in the SOUTHCOM theater in 2007 that were aimed at achieving
    the strategic objectives of ensuring security, enhancing stability, and
    enabling prosperity in Central and South America and the Caribbean. The
    Initial Impact Assessment sought to isolate the impact of Comfort's 4-
    month deployment.
        The Comfort's mission in Latin America and the Caribbean was
    primarily a training and forward presence deployment in support of
    SOUTHCOM's theater security cooperation mission. The Comfort also
    performed humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction
    with the training and forward presence deployment (both onboard the
    Comfort and ashore in various partner nations). These activities were
    conducted principally under the authority of Title 10, U.S.C., section
    401, humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with
    military operations.
        During their 4-month deployment, the medical professionals of the
    Comfort completed over 380,000 medical encounters with over 98,000
    patients. All levels of care were provided, from general medicine to
    over 1,100 surgeries. The Comfort's veterinarian staff completed over
    17,000 veterinary encounters. Over 24,000 eyeglasses were distributed,
    as well as 132,000 pharmaceuticals dispensed. Comfort technicians
    affected 438 biomedical equipment repairs for partner nation medical
    providers. Additionally, a small contingent of naval engineers
    (SEABEEs) completed over $398,000 worth of infrastructure construction
    and repairs.
        In addition to the services provided, the deployment also
    highlighted exceptional cooperation with interagency partners and
    Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). The U.S. Public Health Service
    and U.S. Coast Guard provided critical medical personnel. Project Hope
    medical providers were onboard throughout the deployment and greatly
    enhanced the capabilities of the medical team. Project Hope also
    provided over $3.4 million worth of medical supplies and vaccines for
    the mission. Operation Smile participated in two of the port visits,
    providing life-changing cleft palate and cleft lip surgeries. The
    participation of the NGOs demonstrated how a coordinated effort can
    enhance Department of Defense missions and provide greater benefit to
    partner nations.
        The medical services provided were not the only benefits to host
    nations and their citizens. The deployment of the Comfort also had a
    significant economic impact in the region. The assessment captured a
    variety of economic injections including the value of medical services,
    training, infrastructure projects, port visits and Panama Canal transit
    costs, and NGO donations. It is estimated that the deployment had an
    economic impact of over $45 million dollars in the region.
        The Comfort deployment received significant media coverage from
    international, U.S., and regional media outlets. Over 88 percent of
    print media analyzed was of a positive or factual nature. When
    monitored, television coverage was informational and very positive,
    focusing largely on human interest stories. The level of media coverage
    of Comfort far exceeded any other activities of any kind in the
    SOUTHCOM theater. Additionally, the level of interest from and
    participation by high-level host nation officials was unprecedented.
    During the deployment, 105 foreign distinguished visitors toured the
    Comfort, including seven at the President/Vice President/Prime Minister
    level.
        There was also evidence suggesting the Comfort visit had an effect
    on the behavior of host nation populations. The most compelling example
    occurred following the visit of the Comfort to Buenaventura, Colombia.
    The Colombian military reported that in the weeks following the visit,
    reports from the local population regarding illegal trafficking
    activities in a FARC stronghold more than doubled.
        The assessment showed convincingly that hospital ship deployments
    are not only excellent training platforms for U.S. military medical
    professionals, but are also effective and highly visible means of
    demonstrating the commitment and goodwill of the United States. In
    addition, they serve to enhance existing and develop new regional
    partnerships, build partner nation capacity and capabilities and
    provide much needed medical care to people in need. All of these
    attributes of the missions help to address the underlying conditions of
    poverty, inequality and corruption that facilitate many of the regional
    security challenges, including gangs and illicit trafficking. SOUTHCOM
    intends to continue maritime medical missions, based on the strong
    belief that persistent engagement is the key to achieving theater
    objectives.

        Senator Warner. All right. Thank you very much.
        I thank the chair and I thank my colleague.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Just adding one request in support of that, if you'd like,
    you could give us for the record some examples of clippings
    from newspapers in ports too.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. If you could translate them for us, too, if
    you would.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. What the public reads about and knows about
    in these countries.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, Admiral, thank you for your service. Be sure to
    express our appreciation to those who serve under your command
    for the great work that they do in protecting freedom,
    protecting our country.
        General, this is probably somewhat of a theoretical
    question, but I'd like to get your thoughts on the
    intersection, on the role of law enforcement in the military.
    On both ends of the spectrum I think it's clear what those
    roles are; they're fairly well-defined. But it seems like the
    middle is becoming increasingly grey.
        Do you see a change from using law enforcement resources to
    military resources for threats against the Homeland?
        General Renuart. Senator, I think, as you say, the bounds
    are very clear. I think we have approached the law enforcement
    aspect of our role in the Homeland as a supporting agency, and
    I think that's the prudent way to do that. In other words, we
    have great capabilities within our law enforcement agencies to
    respond both locally and nationally to threats, whether they be
    threats to the border or natural threats that just require, if
    you will, the law of order in a particular county or city, et
    cetera.
        I'm comfortable that the provisions that we have in the
    Constitution provide the appropriate bounds for Active-Duty
    military in their use to respond in a role that is more active
    in law enforcement, and I don't think that's something that we
    need to change at this point. I'm comfortable that the National
    Guard, who has more of those authorities, is available and
    trained to support the Governors in that respect.
        I think our key enabler, if you will, is to find more ways
    that we can assist our law enforcement agencies with
    information-sharing and with logistical support to enable them
    to do their role, and the Secretary has asked us to continue
    things like our work along the southern border with the El Paso
    Intelligence Center, and their support to law enforcement
    agencies. So I think that's the appropriate level for us.
        Senator Thune. General, our military forces started flying
    Operation Noble Eagle right after September 11. Do you still
    see that operation as vital to national security?
        General Renuart. Senator, I do. To date we've flown about
    48,000 missions or sorties, predominantly by the National
    Guard, but not exclusively. We've flown those in a variety of
    missions to support security of our national air space system.
    I think there was some press even yesterday of an aircraft who
    entered the restricted area around the National Capital Region
    and was intercepted by our fighters and diverted to an air base
    where they could question the pilot on the reasons for that.
    Fortunately, it was a benign event.
        But I think we do need to have a capability to respond in
    that regard. The systems that we use to identify traffic in our
    national air space system are aging. We are working on some
    advanced technologies to allow us to perform that via a broader
    means. In fact, that's my number one unfunded requirement
    today.
        So in the meantime, the ability to put eyes and, if you
    will, radars on an air threat is critical to us. I think also
    we have to be cognizant of low observable and cruise missiles
    and again the air defense mission, the Noble Eagle Mission, has
    a key role to play in that.
        So for the future I see that role continuing. I see it to
    be vital to our national defense and I would continue to
    recommend to the Secretary that we keep that force available to
    us.
        Senator Thune. Your testimony details how important it is
    to anticipate threats against the Homeland, and I guess I'm
    wondering maybe what you think is the most lethal threat and
    maybe what is the most probable threat that we might come up
    against.
        General Renuart. Senator, I think this anticipation, this
    concept of integrating our intelligence resources with the NCTC
    and others, is a great way to go in that regard. Clearly, the
    most lethal threat that we might see would be the acquisition
    of a WMD, primarily a nuclear weapon--and having that detonated
    somewhere in our country. The impact of that would be
    substantial, obviously. The loss of life would be huge, as well
    as the injury and the long-term effect. So that is what I would
    say is the most lethal threat that we face out there.
        I don't believe that is the most likely, because I believe
    the integrated effort of all of our agencies of government is
    focused on those and we are being successful at reaching out
    and deterring or defeating some of those threats as they try to
    develop.
        I think the most likely threat that we have frankly comes
    from Mother Nature, because she does not work on our time
    schedule. So a Hurricane Katrina-like event or a large-scale
    earthquake, something like the historic New Madrid Fault Line
    earthquakes that occurred back in the 1800s. Those things will
    have a broad effect on the civilians across the country, and we
    need to be prepared for that. I call it a threat because, if
    you will, that is another enemy force out there that we have to
    deal with.
        Senator Thune. Admiral, in your prepared statement you said
    you believe ``Members, facilitators, and sympathizers of
    Islamic terrorist organizations are indeed present in our
    hemisphere.'' I think most Americans are probably unaware of
    the increasing activities undertaken by Hezbollah and Hamas in
    the tri-border area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. To the
    extent that you can talk about that in open forum, could you
    describe what you're observing in the tri-border area, as well
    as commenting on what efforts you're making to counter this
    threat to our national security?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Within the constraints of
    classification, I will say that I continue to be concerned
    about the tri-border area. It is in my view, principally
    Hezbollah activity. There is clearly fundraising, money
    laundering, drug trafficking, and certainly a portion of the
    funds that are raised in that are making their way back to the
    Middle East.
        We are receiving good cooperation from the nations in that
    region. We are actively pursuing both military-to-military
    conversations, but principally this is a law enforcement
    effort, and our law enforcement branches here in the United
    States are talking to their counterparts in the entire range of
    instruments that one would take against those kinds of things,
    both drug enforcement activities, following the money, and a
    variety of other things that I can report appropriately to the
    committee in writing.
        Senator Thune. Thank you both very much for your service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Any additional questions? [No response.]
        In that case, our thanks again to you, your people who work
    with you, your families, for the great job you all do. We stand
    adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
               responsibility for domestic consequence management
        1. Senator Levin. General Renuart, Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has
    a mission to provide military support to other Federal agencies for
    domestic consequence management, primarily the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS). Can you describe the relationship between NORTHCOM and
    DHS, and what your support to DHS entails? Please provide specific
    examples of cooperation and coordination.
        General Renuart. NORTHCOM has always enjoyed a cooperative
    relationship with DHS and takes operationally prudent, collaborative
    steps necessary to both better protect our country and, in the event of
    an incident, ensure a prompt, competent, unified response.
        In the planning arena, we have provided direct support to the DHS
    Incident Management Planning Team's work on strategic plans for the 15
    National Planning Scenarios and the development of an Integrated
    Planning System. We enjoy continuous collaboration with all Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) planning efforts, from hurricanes to
    recent preparations for the possibility of a dangerous satellite
    impact. In coordination with FEMA, NORTHCOM developed more than two
    dozen all-hazard Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments. We are working now
    to provide special emphasis on assisting FEMA with logistics planning.
    At the regional and State level, our Defense Coordinating Officers and
    their staffs work daily with FEMA regional planners.
        Our North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and NORTHCOM
    Command Center partners closely with the DHS National Operations Center
    24x7x365 to monitor nation-wide events that might require unified
    Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS action. For contingencies and major
    training events, NORTHCOM provides a liaison to the DHS National
    Infrastructure Coordinating Center to share information and ensure
    unified operations regarding the Nation's 17 Critical Infrastructure/
    Key Resource and Private Sectors. NORTHCOM is a standing member of the
    DHS Operations Coordination Group and participates in all DHS
    contingency conferences led by both the DHS Operations Coordination
    Directorate and FEMA. NORTHCOM and DHS also co-led the development of
    an Information Sharing Plan that codifies procedures for the exchange
    of operational information between DOD, DHS, and the National Guard
    Bureau (National Guard Bureau).
        We have focused NORTHCOM and DHS teamwork on scenario-specific
    exercises involving international, national, regional, State, and local
    partners. Senior DHS representatives recently made invaluable
    contributions during a NORTHCOM-hosted Senior Leader Seminar designed
    to refine the objectives, scenario, and issues for Exercise Vigilant
    Shield 09. NORTHCOM is responsible for DOD's Defense Support of Civil
    Authorities course, and collaborates with DHS on curriculum
    development, regularly providing senior leaders to one another's
    training courses to ensure effective integration of messages and
    procedures. We also work closely with DHS to support efforts to
    integrate the private sector in all appropriate training events.
        Full-time liaisons complement well-established NORTHCOM and DHS
    operational and planning procedures, facilitate synchronization, and
    quickly highlight any emerging threats. We include Senior Advisors in
    one another's headquarters; have NORTHCOM representation in FEMA's
    National Response Coordination Center and FEMA, Customs and Border
    Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and United States
    Coast Guard have representatives at NORTHCOM who are fully integrated
    into the Command's operations. NORTHCOM has also provided advice and
    best practices as the DHS Operations Coordination Directorate develops
    its own ``Battle Command'' and Operations and Planning organizations
    and procedures.
        Senior NORTHCOM and DHS leaders actively monitor collaboration,
    identify potential issues, and empower staffs to work areas of mutual
    benefit. For example, DHS is a full partner in the NORTHCOM-led
    Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), a 16-month effort to identify
    DOD's capabilities and shortfalls that will inform DOD's homeland
    defense and civil support missions and resourcing priorities. We
    partner closely in innovation, experimentation, and science and
    technology.
        NORAD and NORTHCOM have also worked closely with DHS, particularly
    FEMA, in implementing DOD's Building Partner Capacity Program in the
    NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). This has resulted in important
    progress in international collaboration with Canada and, significantly,
    Mexico. NORAD and NORTHCOM collaboration with DHS in the international
    arena is active and growing. NORTHCOM and DHS are key partners in
    several international forums, including the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint
    Board on Defense and the North American Security and Prosperity
    Partnership.

               coordination with governors and adjutants general
        2. Senator Levin. General Renuart, one of the key objectives for
    Federal consequence management is to ensure coordination and
    cooperation of various Federal, State, and local response forces and
    plans. Please describe the role of NORTHCOM in working with the
    Governors and their Adjutants General to coordinate these various
    levels of disaster response forces and planning with Federal
    capabilities.
        General Renuart. I recognize the need to coordinate directly with
    States and State leadership to accomplish our mutual missions. We have
    the imperative to anticipate, plan, and respond collaboratively with
    the States and tribal nations within the NORTHCOM AOR. Developing
    understanding, trust, and mutual respect between NORTHCOM and the
    National Guard is of particular importance as we plan and execute our
    mutual State and Federal missions. We are developing strong
    relationships with Governors, Emergency Managers (in collaboration with
    DHS and FEMA), and Adjutants General (in collaboration with National
    Guard Bureau). Each time I visit a State, I try to meet with the
    Governor, the Adjutant General (TAG), Homeland Security Advisor, and
    Emergency Manager. I've met with 19 Governors, all of the TAGs, and
    every State director of emergency services. I recently had the honor of
    being the keynote speaker at both the National Guard Association of the
    United States Annual Meeting in Puerto Rico and the recent National
    Emergency Management Association Conference.
        Direct State engagement is not a specified task for DOD or for
    NORTHCOM. However, it's imperative that we develop relationships with
    our State mission partners that will contribute to success in saving
    lives, protecting infrastructure, and promoting a resilient society.
    I'm working to ensure my staff understands Governors' concerns and that
    senior State staff have an appreciation for NORTHCOM's role in security
    and defense. This understanding will promote the unity of effort our
    citizens deserve.
        We maintain relationships with States in concert with National
    Guard Bureau and DHS. Planning partnerships ensure we have unity of
    effort with the States for the 15 National Planning Scenarios directed
    by the Homeland Security Council. In day-to-day operations, we connect
    to the States through the National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center
    by maintaining situational awareness 24/7 through a dedicated National
    Guard desk in my Command Center. In the training and exercise arena, we
    work with National Guard Bureau and DHS to develop and execute a
    comprehensive knowledge exchange and exercise program that facilitates
    State and regional exercises and develops the military skills of both
    my staff and Joint Force Headquarters-State staffs. NORTHCOM
    partnerships with National Guard Bureau and DHS result in direct
    benefit to Governors, State emergency managers, and Adjutants General.

                           maritime domain awareness
        3. Senator Levin. General Renuart, one of the initiatives being
    pursued by NORTHCOM and other Federal organizations and agencies is
    Maritime Domain Awareness, an effort to have a much better
    understanding of the location and status of potential threats at sea.
    What is NORTHCOM's role in Maritime Domain Awareness, and how is it
    being coordinated among various government organizations and agencies,
    including the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Intelligence Community?
        General Renuart. NORTHCOM is a key leader in advocating for
    Maritime Domain Awareness to provide timely, accurate, and actionable
    information that aids our ability to detect threats to the Homeland and
    our neighboring allies. Below are two of the initiatives the Command
    has undertaken:

             Developed, jointly with U.S. Coast Guard, the National
            Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness. In August
            2007, the National Security Council and Homeland Security
            Council approved the Maritime Domain Awareness Concept of
            Operations, which executes the National Plan to Achieve
            Maritime Domain Awareness in support of the National Strategy
            for Maritime Security.
             Partnered with U.S. Joint Forces Command to design and
            execute the maritime portions of Noble Resolve 08. This
            experiment will involve numerous organizations to include the
            Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness, Customs and
            Border Protection, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

        In addition, NORTHCOM serves as the Operational Manager for two
    Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations: Comprehensive Maritime
    Awareness and Maritime Automated Super Track Enhanced Reporting, which
    correlates and automates over 300 information sources into a maritime
    common operating picture.
        In May 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed the Navy as
    the Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness. The lead for this
    effort is the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy. As the Executive
    Agent, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy is responsible for
    implementing Maritime Domain Awareness for the DOD. NORTHCOM continues
    to engage with the Navy to ensure command requirements are met within
    the Maritime Domain Awareness technology development process.
        At NORTHCOM, we understand that global Maritime Domain Awareness
    will only be achieved through continued interagency and international
    outreach. National Security Presidential Directive-41 and Homeland
    Security Presidential Directive-13 set U.S. Policy for Maritime
    Security and direct the development of a National Strategy for Maritime
    Security along with eight supporting policy action plans. The National
    Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is one of the eight plans and
    was approved by the President in October 2005. The Maritime Domain
    Awareness Plan lays out the strategy, goals, and priorities for
    enhanced information sharing within the maritime domain. The Office of
    Global Maritime Situational Awareness was established by the Maritime
    Domain Awareness Concept of Operations as one of two interagency
    offices, along with the Office of Global Maritime Intelligence
    Integration, dedicated to removing barriers to maritime information
    collection, fusion, analysis, and dissemination.
        NORTHCOM will remain fully engaged in future development of
    Maritime Domain Awareness through continued support for the Office of
    Global Maritime Situational Awareness, strengthened ties with U.S.
    Fleet Forces Command, and advocacy for U.S. Joint Forces Command
    experimentation.

                         major exercise program results
        4. Senator Levin. General Renuart, you have two major annual
    exercises. Can you describe their objectives and what we learn from
    them? For example, how large are they, and do they involve Federal,
    State, and local personnel?
        General Renuart. Our two major exercises are Ardent Sentry and
    Vigilant Shield.
        Ardent Sentry is primarily focused on Defense Support of Civil
    Authorities training for NORTHCOM, and asymmetric threat missions for
    NORAD; it is a Field Training Exercise typically involving 10,000 to
    20,000 personnel, including full interagency participation. Vigilant
    Shield is primarily focused on homeland defense training for NORTHCOM,
    and strategic war scenarios for NORAD; it is a Command Post Exercise
    normally involving approximately 5,000 personnel.
        Both exercises are designed to train NORAD and NORTHCOM
    Headquarters, Components, Regions, Sectors, and Subordinate Commands to
    practice, in a 7- to 10-day execution window, one or more of our
    mission-specific Concept Plans and Functional Plans. Each exercise
    routinely includes participants from several Federal departments and
    agencies (e.g., FEMA, United States Coast Guard, Department of Justice,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Transportation, Federal
    Aviation Administration, Department of Heath and Human Services, Center
    for Disease Control, Department of Energy); State organizations (e.g.,
    State-level Department of Emergency Management/Emergency Operations
    Center, State National Guard units); and local responders (county and
    city). We also frequently exercise with nongovernmental organizations
    such as the American Red Cross; private industry organizations, such as
    the Association of American Railroads; tribal governments; and
    international organizations (e.g., Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
    Public Safety Canada, and Canada Command).
        Each of our exercises (and real-world contingency operations)
    includes a comprehensive data collection and management effort to
    capture and record pertinent observations for each mission area
    performed. Analysis of that information leads to recommendations for
    sustainment of best practices or changes to plans and procedures. The
    revised plans and procedures are then verified in follow-on exercises
    and operations. When appropriate, such as for recommended changes in
    policy, we forward relevant observations to the Joint Staff for DOD-
    wide consideration, or to make them available to our interagency
    partners.

        5. Senator Levin. General Renuart, do any of these exercises
    involve any of our specialized weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    response units? If so, please describe how they are used and how the
    exercises improve their capabilities.
        General Renuart. Yes; depending on the number, size, and location
    of simulated incidents (e.g., hazardous chemical spill, biological
    attack, radiological dispersal device, improvised nuclear device,
    hijacked aircraft ``missile''), we exercise deployment and employment
    of the full range of response capabilities. The capabilities range from
    a State Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) to a
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive
    (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) to one or more CBRNE
    Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs). A relatively limited
    response may be coordinated with a Defense Coordinating Officer and
    Element. Larger responses may call for a Joint Task Force, and a Joint
    Force Command may be appropriate for a wide-area, massive response.
        It is important to note that we often exercise alongside non-DOD
    organizations with specialized response capabilities, such as the
    National Disaster Medical System, Disaster Medical Assistance Team,
    Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team, and local Hazardous
    Material Teams. The opportunity for these units to train and respond to
    WMD scenarios in the Homeland is valuable at all levels of government,
    as the large, complex exercises bring most, if not all of the key
    responders and decision makers together in a dynamic operating
    environment that is as realistic as training resources will allow.

                          capabilities-based analysis
        6. Senator Levin. General Renuart, your prepared statement mentions
    that you have started a capabilities-based analysis of NORTHCOM's needs
    for homeland defense and civil support, and that the DHS is also
    assisting in this effort. What do you expect this analysis to produce
    in terms of concrete results, and when will it be completed?
        General Renuart. NORTHCOM is leading a comprehensive Homeland
    Defense and Civil Support (HD/CS) CBA in accordance with the Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development System. The CBA will define
    DOD's HD/CS core capabilities, help define capability
    interdependencies, and identify capability gaps and excesses to
    influence and inform decisions on risk management and resourcing, to
    include National Guard and Reserve Forces. This effort is one of DOD's
    Top 25 Transformational Priorities.
        The end result of this study will be a document that prioritizes
    the Department's capability gaps and excesses and provides
    recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on
    which areas should undergo further analysis to identify programmatic
    and system materiel solutions or non-materiel solutions. We expect to
    provide a CBA approval brief to the JROC, the accepting authority, in
    December 2008.
        DHS is fully supporting the CBA and actively collaborating with the
    CBA team. They believe this CBA will facilitate their actions under
    Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (National Preparedness
    System and Target Capabilities List) and set a foundation for their
    Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.

                          joint tactical radio system
        7. Senator Levin. General Renuart, the DOD is developing a Joint
    Tactical Radio System (JTRS) that will be able to accept software to
    utilize multiple types of waveforms to allow all DOD users, including
    the National Guard, to be able to talk to each other. The waveforms are
    owned by the DOD and licensed to various manufacturers of the radios.
    One of NORTHCOM's missions is to provide support to civil authorities.
    A key element of this capability must be the ability to communicate
    with State and local responders. Will State and local authorities be
    able to purchase the JTRS radios, or will the JTRS radios be programmed
    so that they can communicate with all State and local authorities?
        General Renuart. The latest information we have from the Program
    Manager for JTRS indicates that JTRS radios will be available to the
    National Guard in all States and that the radios will also be available
    to all U.S. Government activities, including State and local
    authorities. This means that those organizations with JTRS will be able
    to interoperate with DOD forces on approved DOD portions of the
    spectrum.
        JTRS radios are capable of tuning throughout the available
    spectrum, including frequencies assigned to public safety Land Mobile
    Radios (LMRs). However, the Project 25 (P25) waveform, which is
    required to be interoperable with public safety LMRs, is not included
    in the JTRS waveform Increment 1, which is currently under development.
    The P25 waveform is included in the requirements for JTRS Increment 2
    development, but the Increment 2 schedule is not approved at this time.
    NORTHCOM is advocating with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Command, Control
    Communications and Computers System Directorate for P25 development to
    be accelerated within Increment 2.
        In the meantime, radio bridges (such as the ACU-1000 currently used
    by NORTHCOM and the National Guard) enable interoperability between
    different radio systems. Radio bridges allow the users to maintain
    their different radio network configurations and still communicate
    across disparate radios. By physically connecting radios into the radio
    bridge equipment, voice communications can be passed between the
    different radio networks. With the multitude of radio configurations
    for LMR, radio bridges are a common technology found across local,
    State, and Federal agencies. In short, radio-bridging is the simplest
    and most efficient means for connecting different radio systems while
    we continue to work on fielding a common radio and interoperability
    standard.

        8. Senator Levin. General Renuart, how will NORTHCOM ensure
    compatibility and interoperability among Federal, State, and local
    radio users in domestic incident responses where NORTHCOM is providing
    civil support?
        General Renuart. We have taken a number of steps here at NORTHCOM
    to ensure compatibility and interoperability when our forces provide
    civil support. Our command has a standards document that publishes the
    interoperability standards for DOD forces operating in the AOR. One of
    the items identified in that document is the Audio Controller Unit-1000
    (ACU-1000), which was used effectively during Hurricane Katrina relief
    to bridge the radio interoperability gap between DOD forces and State
    and local organizations. NORTHCOM command and control elements have
    ACU-1000s as part of their deployable equipment.
        Deployable cellular systems, known as the Interoperable
    Communications Extension System, were fielded during Hurricane Katrina
    relief operations in 2005, and have since increased in density and
    capabilities. These systems are now in use by NORTHCOM, FEMA, and the
    Air National Guard. In addition to cellular telephones and data links
    that reach back to DOD teleports for out of area communications, these
    systems also have ACU-1000s in order to interconnect Land Mobile Radio
    and DOD radio systems or make telephone calls. The National Guard also
    uses the ACU-1000 as a component of their Joint Incident Scene
    Communications Capability.
        NORTHCOM also participates in the DOD Interoperability
    Communications Exercise (DICE); a Joint Interoperability Test Command-
    sponsored exercise designed to test and certify communications
    equipment. As part of DICE, NORTHCOM organized a Homeland Security,
    Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities
    interoperability communications exercise, 24-28 Mar 08. For 2008,
    NORTHCOM used two separate venues for the exercise: one at Fort Sam
    Houston, TX, hosted by U.S. Army North, and one at Fort Monroe, VA,
    hosted by Joint Task Force Civil Support. Participants for DICE 2008
    included communications assets from NORAD and NORTHCOM, the DHS, U.S.
    Coast Guard, Texas (State and local), Virginia (State and local), Texas
    National Guard, Virginia National Guard, American Red Cross, Army
    Signal Company, Air Force Communications Squadrons, and other first
    responders. DHS assets participating in the DICE 2008 exercise included
    the Fredrick, MD, FEMA Mobile Response Vehicle (MRV), the Denton, TX,
    FEMA MRV, and various regional FEMA assets participating from their
    home stations.
        NORTHCOM is also working on information sharing between operating
    centers: the NORAD and NORTHCOM Command Center; the National Military
    Command Center, DHS National Operations Center, and the National
    Guard's Joint Operations Center. The goal of this Strategic Operations
    Information Sharing Plan of Action is to capture and codify the common
    information sharing processes between operations centers and missions.
    This effort supports the National Command Capability Information
    Sharing Environment vision and sets the stage for an evolution to a
    broader implementation. The new vision includes the use of net-centric
    capabilities and shared standards among mission partners across the
    Homeland Security and Homeland Defense mission environment.

                  counterdrug eradication versus interdiction
        9. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, Colombia has made great
    strides in taking control of territory and expanding the influence of
    the State. However, it is not clear whether all the resources we have
    put into counternarcotics in Colombia have yielded much progress. Coca
    cultivation has increased and kept up with eradication.
        Moreover, my understanding is that interdiction efforts are under-
    resourced and in recognition of this the Director of the Office of
    National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has requested that DOD increase
    support to interdiction in the transit zone to help law enforcement
    agencies achieve interdiction of 40 percent of the cocaine headed to
    the United States. Do you believe that eradication efforts are the most
    efficient use of U.S. counterdrug funds?
        Admiral Stavridis. I firmly believe that no single action will stem
    the flow of drugs into our cities or drug use in our Nation. Countering
    the drug threat requires coordinated effort against all aspects of the
    illicit narcotics industry--education, treatment, cultivation,
    production, transportation, and consumption--to fully attack this
    complex problem. Eradication is an integral part of the attack on drug
    production operations. However, U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM)
    focus is on detection and monitoring operations. We normally receive
    approximately 35-45 percent of the stated detection and monitoring
    requirements to meet ONDCP's interdiction goal. This percentage
    represents the total requirement against all allocated air and surface
    assets from the DOD, the DHS, and our international partners. I defer
    to our Department of State colleagues on the efficacy of eradication as
    they are the lead agency for eradication in Colombia.

        10. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, would you support shifting
    some of the resources used for eradication to focus on interdiction
    throughout the transit zone from Colombia to the United States?
        Admiral Stavridis. Most, if not all, of the assets used to execute
    the eradication mission are not capable of performing an interdiction
    role. For example, spray aircraft and helicopters used for security in
    Colombia would be of little use as detection and monitoring assets in
    the transit zone. While I cannot speak to the availability of
    eradication resources since that is the purview of the Department of
    State, I could certainly use more detection and monitoring assets,
    which constitute the DOD's contribution to law enforcement agencies.

        11. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, do you have sufficient
    resources to track and interdict drugs in the transit zone?
    Specifically, do you have sufficient reconnaissance assets? If not,
    what would you need to reach the ONDCP goal?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

                           interdiction-intelligence
        12. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, your opening statement last
    year before this committee mentioned that it appears that some cocaine
    movements go undetected each year because of a lack of an appropriate
    detection resource to respond to intelligence queuing, a real missed
    opportunity because nearly 90 percent of illicit drug movements that
    are successfully detected by Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-
    South) are eventually interdicted. Is this still a problem? If so, can
    you elaborate on what the problem is?
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, this is still a problem. During calendar
    year 2007, JIATF-South had intelligence knowledge of 683 non-commercial
    maritime events of which only 150 were physically detected (22 percent
    detection rate). Of those 150 detected events, 132 were interdicted (88
    percent interdiction rate). The problem lies in the fact that over the
    past several years we have seen an increase in awareness of the number
    of cases as a result of more robust intelligence, but we have not had a
    corresponding increase in the number of detection and monitoring
    resources, assets, or capabilities. In fact, we have observed an
    overall decrease in air support over the past 3 years, while
    maintaining a steady maritime presence. Recent trends indicate that
    traffickers are distributing cocaine loads via greater numbers of
    smaller, faster, and stealthier methods of conveyance (go-fast boats,
    self-propelled semi-submersibles, single engine Pangas). The net result
    is that there are more targets on the water, but we have fewer
    interdiction resources to bring to bear.

        13. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, what detection resources are
    we missing, and how can we take steps to ensure that you have such
    resources?
        Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

        14. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, what would it take to detect
    the new threats you mentioned in your testimony, like the semi-
    submersible submarines being used to transport cocaine?
        Admiral Stavridis. Drug trafficking organizations are adaptable and
    continue to evolve as we become more proficient against their methods.
    Self-propelled semi-submersible are the newest and most challenging
    conveyance being employed. I have recently asked the Naval Warfare
    Development Center to assist ongoing Joint Interagency Task Force-South
    (JIATF-S), SOUTHCOM, and U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command efforts to
    develop new tactical procedures for maritime detection and monitoring.
    An initial assessment of available self-propelled semi-submersible
    intelligence, gathered primarily by JIATF-S, has produced preliminary
    requirements that include expanded radar, acoustic detection, and
    intelligence capabilities.

                               mexico-counterdrug
        15. Senator Levin. General Renuart and Admiral Stavridis, what are
    the greatest weaknesses in Mexico's counterdrug abilities?
        General Renuart and Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

        16. Senator Levin. General Renuart and Admiral Stavridis, do they
    need help with respect to their intelligence and operations?
        General Renuart and Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

                              unified command plan
        17. Senator Levin. General Renuart and Admiral Stavridis, are you
    comfortable with the delineation of your geographic commands? Is there
    anything that you would like to change?
        General Renuart. We both agree that the NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM boundary
    should be adjusted in the Caribbean to place the U.S. Virgin Islands,
    Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos inside the NORTHCOM AOR.
    NORTHCOM missions of Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS) make
    it best postured to support the requirements in the U.S. Virgin Islands
    and Puerto Rico. This AOR adjustment will enhance the overall HD and CS
    mission unity of effort and unity of command for these U.S. territories
    in the Caribbean. NORTHCOM has already established deliberate and
    contingency plans, as well as trained personnel for all-hazard disaster
    response in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. NORTHCOM, as an
    interim measure in August 2007 and with approval of the Secretary of
    Defense, assumed responsibility for natural disaster-related Defense
    Support of Civil Authorities for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
    Islands. NORTHCOM tailored State, local, and interagency coordination
    for U.S. HD and CS requirements to ideally engage with Puerto Rico and
    the U.S. Virgin Islands on these issues. This AOR boundary shift will
    also include placing the British Virgin Islands, the Bahamas, Turks and
    Caicos Islands in the NORTHCOM AOR. This move will enhance unity of
    command and effort for HD in the approaches to the United States from
    our ``third border,'' the Caribbean. Including these bordering HD
    partners in our theater security cooperation focus will support their
    security posture and the security of the region. In addition, our
    unique depth, capability, reach back, and coordination with interagency
    partners in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief support will
    greatly benefit our closest Caribbean neighbors and partners.
        Admiral Stavridis. Yes, there is a geographic change currently
    being reviewed within the DOD. In August 2007, we submitted a joint
    proposal to modify the Unified Command Plan that would reposition the
    existing Caribbean boundary between our commands. If approved by the
    President, this change would reassign responsibility for the Bahamas,
    Turks and Caicos, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico from SOUTHCOM to
    NORTHCOM. We believe this recommendation to be prudent and in the best
    interest of the DOD as it eliminates duplication in effort and ensures
    the best utilization of limited resources.

        18. Senator Levin. General Renuart and Admiral Stavridis,
    specifically, with regard to Mexico, would you both agree that the best
    place to put responsibility for Mexico is in NORTHCOM and not in
    SOUTHCOM?
        General Renuart. Yes, consistent with national policy and strategic
    guidance regarding the future intended role of Mexico as a major
    participant in continental security, Mexico should remain under the
    overall responsibility of NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM, as Mexico's primary
    military partner, has forged very constructive links with Mexico's
    military services since the inauguration of President Calderon. The
    United States Government must ensure the integration of Canada, Mexico,
    and the Caribbean basin into a comprehensive and mutually beneficial
    architecture that protects North America's critical infrastructure and
    its land, air, sea, and space approaches. However, the United States
    Government must work to integrate the North American security
    architecture into a broader, functional hemispheric security framework.
    Because of the need for hemispheric security, we have determined that
    Mexico is a partner nation of interest to both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM
    under the overall responsibility of NORTHCOM.
        Admiral Stavridis. This issue was a topic during our August 2007
    staff discussions and, after extensive review and consideration, we
    agreed the most appropriate place for Mexico was within the NORTHCOM
    area of focus. As a leader throughout the Western Hemisphere, Mexico
    has security interests that span the geographic areas of responsiblity
    assigned to both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. Recognizing Mexico's importance
    to each of our commands, we provided a joint proposal to modify the
    Unified Command Plan to include language that would benefit all
    geographic combatant commands that recognize countries that are of
    particular importance to more than one combatant commander. This
    proposal, if approved, would provide combatant commands the opportunity
    to coordinate more readily with countries of mutual interest that are
    located outside their assigned geographic AOR.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
                                 national guard
        19. Senator Akaka. General Renuart, section 351 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the DOD
    to incorporate National Guard domestic support missions into its
    current title 10 readiness reporting system. In addition to improving
    our ability to respond to domestic emergencies, Congress intends this
    provision to help define lines of Federal and State responsibility for
    achieving and maintaining agreed-upon levels of equipment and personnel
    readiness. What are your views on the current and projected levels of
    National Guard readiness to respond to domestic emergencies, given
    current rotation plans and equipment levels?
        General Renuart. The National Guard Bureau just shared their Report
    on National Guard Readiness for Emergencies and Major Disasters with
    us. This report describes the methodology for assessing the readiness
    of the National Guard in the 54 States and Territories as required by
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008.
        NORTHCOM is involved with the National Guard and its readiness
    assessment and reporting process. Our command's Training and Exercise
    Directorate directly supports the National Guard Bureau with the
    Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) Implementation in the Guard
    (DIG) effort. This long-term effort helps the National Guard implement
    DRRS at each of the 54 State Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).
        The National Guard is pursuing increased capability to respond to
    terrorist incidents involving WMD and Domestic Operations. The limited
    availability of Secret Internet Protocol Router Network access is a
    common problem. Below are four additional deficient areas identified by
    National Guard Bureau in the report:
    Personnel Gaps
        The impact of the sustained operations tempo of Guard Title 10
    operational support to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring
    Freedom, and Joint Task Force Horn of Africa has been significant. In
    spite of these demands, the National Guard has maintained a manning
    level of 87 percent in support of domestic and overseas operations.
    Equipment, Sustainment, and Modernization Gaps
        There are equipment, sustainment, and modernization gaps that may
    prevent the immediate response and sustained capabilities for many of
    the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Explosive and major
    disaster scenarios.
    Training Gaps
        The National Guard has established numerous courses, programs, and
    exercises that support and enhance readiness capabilities at all
    echelons. There is definitive need for funding, aggressive curriculum
    review and exercise participation.

        20. Senator Akaka. General Renuart, what is NORTHCOM's role in
    analysis, development, testing, and implementation of a National Guard
    domestic support readiness reporting system?
        General Renuart. NORTHCOM has had the opportunity to review the
    National Guard's Joint Capabilities Database (JCD), an unclassified
    readiness system for domestic operations. We have not participated
    directly in the development, testing, or implementation of the system,
    but acknowledge that it plays an important interim role in supporting
    ongoing National Guard and NORTHCOM civil support planning. NORTHCOM
    strongly supports the Secretary of Defense policy that requires DOD
    organizations to utilize the DRRS as the single reporting system for
    readiness reporting. In that regard, NORTHCOM is very actively involved
    with the National Guard and its readiness assessment and reporting
    process. We directly support the National Guard Bureau through the DRRS
    Implementation in the Guard (DIG) effort. This long-term effort helps
    the National Guard implement DRRS at each of the 54 State and Territory
    Joint Force Headquarters.

        21. Senator Akaka. General Renuart, are you satisfied so far that
    the development of this system will meet NORTHCOM's requirements for
    visibility of the readiness of the National Guard for domestic support
    contingencies?
        General Renuart. I am satisfied that National Guard Bureau is
    moving in the right direction in developing and implementation of their
    JCD, an unclassified system the National Guard currently utilizes to
    report readiness of capabilities for domestic operations. NORTHCOM
    needs to ensure that the JCD can effectively feed information into the
    DRRS to comply with the Secretary of Defense requirement of having one
    single reporting system for readiness. Additionally, the functionality
    of the JCD needs to link to the DHS Target Capabilities List. DOD and
    DHS must be integrated in this respect if they are to achieve
    integrated and accurate understanding of readiness and abilities to
    provide requested capabilities.

        22. Senator Akaka. General Renuart, how would you envision using
    such a system in the development of your Integrated Priorities List,
    contingency plans, training exercises, and experiments?
        General Renuart. Knowing that we are indeed partners with the
    National Guard in domestic and civil support missions in the Homeland,
    we have advocated through our Integrated Priority List (IPL) for Guard
    capabilities. The emphasis in our exercise and training plans is to
    coordinate our events with participation from the local first
    responders and the National Guard through the Vigilant Guard exercise
    program. Our primary visibility into National Guard capabilities is
    through the DRRS. We have collaborated with the National Guard Bureau
    to participate in DRRS Implementation Group teams. Through
    collaborative efforts to get mission assessments into DRRS, we are
    developing visibility into the different States and territories and
    their probable capability gaps in order to anticipate what will be
    needed by these entities. DRRS is a classified system that is the
    Secretary of Defense directed single readiness reporting system for the
    DOD. Our process for developing our IPL and training plans come from
    our Joint Mission Essential Task List readiness assessments. We also
    use these assessments for our training and exercise planning strategy.
    Our visibility into National Guard capabilities and mission assessments
    are used the same way.
        The JCD is an unclassified readiness system that the National Guard
    intends to utilize for domestic operations. The JCD could effectively
    feed DRRS and meet the Secretary of Defense requirement of having one
    single reporting system for readiness. The JCD's greatest value to
    NORTHCOM is its ability to support planning, exercise development, and
    experimentation in a manner complementary to the DRRS system. The data
    in the JCD also supports planning and decisionmaking within DHS, so
    this should be further developed with that potential use in mind.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
    command and control of european ground-based midcourse defense 3rd site
        23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Renuart, as Commander of NORTHCOM,
    you are the combatant commander with the responsibility for operating
    the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the United
    States against long-range ballistic missiles. You would presumably also
    be the combatant commander responsible for operational command and
    control of the proposed deployment of the GMD system to Europe if it
    were used to defend the United States against potential future long-
    range missiles from Iran. What would be the role of the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO), if any, in the command and control of the
    proposed European GMD system?
        General Renuart. United States policy currently supports U.S.
    command and control of the proposed European GMD system. The United
    States is discussing the issue of data sharing and interoperability
    with the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense theater
    defense system for situational awareness purposes. I am working with
    the other effected combatant commanders and with the Chairman to ensure
    we evolve an Integrated Missile Defense Global Concept of Operations to
    most accurately determine operational and battle management
    requirements and thereby eliminate gaps or seams.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. General Renuart, what would be the role of
    the Governments of Poland and the Czech Republic, if any, in the
    command and control of the system proposed to be based on their
    territory?
        General Renuart. United States policy currently supports U.S.
    command and control of the proposed system based in Poland and the
    Czech Republic. There is no indication that either host nation would
    reject this position of exclusive U.S. control. The United States has
    offered both host nations the capability to share data for situational
    awareness.

                   new southern command headquarters facility
        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Stavridis, what is the status of
    the new SOUTHCOM headquarters facility and how will this facility
    enable the interagency collaborative work you are doing at SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Stavridis. SOUTHCOM is in the process of awarding the
    design-build contract and the recently (March 2008) signed land lease
    has been sent to congress for review (April 2008). By the end of April
    we will have issued a Notice-to-Proceed and construction is expected to
    be completed by September 2010, allowing the full move in to the new
    headquarters building by December 2010. All leases on the old
    headquarters will expire by 2011.
        The facility will enable SOUTHCOM's interagency collaborative work
    in a number of ways:

             Consolidate SOUTHCOM and collaborative partners into one
            complex, as opposed to being spread around nine buildings today
            in Miami:

                     Sufficient space, tailored to facilitate joint
                    interagency collaboration, flexible to reconfigure
                     Eliminates requirement to drive to/from buildings,
                    increasing efficiencies

             Provide Modern Information Technology Systems:

                     Enhanced access to internet, NIPR, CENTRIX, and SIPR
                    networks
                     Increases VTC capable conference rooms from 20 to 49
                    (all classification levels)

             Provide an integrated command center:

                     Enables interagency and coalition unescorted access
                    during releasable operations
                     Integrates operators and planners via LCD glass
                    walls, promoting collaboration

             Provide a stand-alone coalition and interagency collaboration
            center:

                     Eliminates escorts for coalition and interagency
                    partners for unclassified events
                     Back-up coalition-interagency operations center
                    (during U.S.-only operations in Command Center)

             Better allow layered security (meets DOD anti-terrorism/force
            protection standards):

                     Increases access for interagency and coalition
                    without escorts
                     Grants dependents and retirees easy access to
                    services without escorts

             Provide Category-5 Hurricane protection:

                     Reduces the need to relocate the command center for
                    CAT-2 and CAT-3 hurricanes
                     Provides back-up power for full strategic operations
                    (IT, security, HVAC, etc)

                                     brazil
        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Stavridis, you and I recently
    visited Brazil; in your personal opinion, how do you see our
    relationship with that nation?
        Admiral Stavridis. I hold the Brazilian military in the highest
    regard and I value the excellent cooperation and friendship our nations
    share. As with all partner nations in Latin America, SOUTHCOM continues
    to remain engaged with Brazil. In May 2008, Brazil will be hosting the
    Southern Cone Defense Conference (SCONDEC). This conference, which is
    cosponsored by SOUTHCOM, provides a forum for senior-level discussions
    on topics that are of mutual interests to all militaries from the
    Southern Cone of South America. In addition to conferences such as
    SCONDEC, SOUTHCOM engages with Brazil through bilateral training
    exercises. Finally, the United States is pursuing a Defense Cooperation
    Agreement and a Status of Forces Agreement with Brazil--such agreements
    would foster an environment that encourages more regional engagement
    and enhances the opportunity to strengthen our mutual ties.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
                                 climate change
        27. Senator Clinton. General Renuart, section 951 of the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2008 directs the DOD to consider the effects of climate
    change on facilities, capabilities, and missions in the next National
    Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense
    Review.
        The provision reflects increasing concerns about the national
    security implications of climate change, as reflected in a report
    issued in April 2007 by the Center for Naval Analyses Corporation
    titled ``National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.'' That
    report was written by 11 retired three-star and four-star admirals and
    generals. The report explores ways in which projected climate change is
    a threat multiplier in already fragile regions, exacerbating conditions
    that lead to failed states--the breeding grounds for extremism and
    terrorism.
        Section 951 directs the DOD to implement a number of
    recommendations of that report. The provision states that the National
    Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy should include
    appropriate guidance to military planners to assess risks to current
    and future missions of projected climate change, guidance for updating
    defense plans based on these assessments, and the capabilities needed
    to reduce future impacts. This guidance should include appropriate
    revisions to defense plans, including working with allies and partners,
    to incorporate climate mitigation strategies, capacity building, and
    relevant research and development. It also states that the next
    Quadrennial Defense Review should examine the capabilities of the
    United States military to respond to the consequences of climate
    change, in particular, preparedness for natural disasters from extreme
    weather events, pandemic disease events, and other missions the United
    States military may be asked to support both at home and abroad.
        With that provision in mind, I note with interest the portion of
    your testimony which states that: ``One area of concern recognized by
    the United States Government and DOD is the need to study the
    implications of Arctic climate change and how it will affect our
    military capabilities, organizations, and infrastructure in the area.
    Our homeland defense and civil support plans address the DOD response
    to potential effects of climate change.'' How are you planning to
    address the concerns that you outlined in your testimony?
        General Renuart. We have a clear interest in understanding climate
    change challenges and their impact to the changing security environment
    in our area of operations (AOO) and AOR. Changes are occurring in the
    accessibility of the Arctic region and these changes are directly
    influencing the current and potential future economic activity
    throughout the northern reaches of our AOO and AOR. I have stressed the
    importance of advancing U.S. Arctic policy and ratification of the
    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty.
        These actions will provide a foundation for constructive U.S.
    leadership in the evolving international Arctic regime. I expect the
    Quadrennial Defense Review and additional strategic guidance to be
    contained in the National Security Strategy and National Military
    Strategy.
        Actions recently taken include incorporating these considerations
    in the ongoing periodic revision of NORTHCOM concept plans directing
    the missions of homeland defense and civil support. NORTHCOM and
    subordinate commanders continue to foster relations with allied and
    interagency partners to enhance execution of these missions. One
    concrete example is the NORAD maritime warning mission. In concert with
    mission partners Canada Command and NORTHCOM, NORAD is working to
    better understand the impact of increased maritime activity in the
    Arctic due to climate change.
        I have also recently altered a fundamental concept within my
    command mission statement to highlight and emphasize the importance of
    anticipation. We must have a forward leaning stance on probable
    homeland defense and civil support missions in the future. One of my
    subordinate commands, Joint Task Force Alaska, has taken the initiative
    on climate change by initiating significant research; they continue to
    work within the interagency framework of ``Team Alaska'' to address
    these concerns across the State of Alaska and the northern boundaries
    of the NORTHCOM AOR.
        The full measure of military risk assessment, organizational
    agility, and adaptation in considering climate change is being applied.
    Highlighting these concerns today provides the opportunity for the
    joint military acquisition and procurement processes to adjust in
    meeting the changing environment. NORAD and NORTHCOM will work closely
    with Canada Command to focus on climate change considerations as we
    continuously monitor, anticipate, and adapt to an ever changing global
    security environment.

        28. Senator Clinton. General Renuart, what else are you doing to
    implement section 951?
        General Renuart. NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada Command continually
    monitor changes in the global security environment and consider the
    possibility of adjustments in defending North America against foreign
    threats and aggression. NORTHCOM anticipates changes that may affect
    how we might be required to support civil authorities in the future.
    However, for the present, we believe the National Response Framework
    and the 15 National Planning Scenarios have bounded the foreseeable
    civil support requirements the DOD may be reasonably required to plan
    for and provide, when approved by the President and directed by the
    Secretary of Defense.

        29. Senator Clinton. General Renuart, how is your work being
    integrated into other work at the DOD to implement this provision?
        General Renuart. Climate change is a national security problem,
    requiring a comprehensive national strategy to synchronize the
    diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of
    national power. As U.S. climate policies are translated into specific
    national security actions, we will address DOD requirements through
    advocacy for force structure improvements (Guidance for Development of
    the Force), and revisions to command structures and arrangements
    (Unified Command Plan).
        I anticipate the new administration will publish an updated
    National Security Strategy. This strategy, as in previous versions,
    will state the essential tasks the Nation must accomplish. In turn,
    this strategy will drive changes to the National Defense and National
    Military Strategies in the assessment of risks associated with
    projected climate change. As these documents shape our future missions,
    they will also shape the national policy that drives the acquisition of
    capabilities we will require to accomplish the essential tasks outlined
    by our superiors. We will work in the near-term to help understand the
    evolving environment and to anticipate what tactics, techniques, and
    procedures will be required to meet future climate change challenges.
    We will then advocate for the capabilities needed to successfully
    execute them.
        As these changes to DOD planning, organization, and forces are
    implemented, we will work closely with the DHS, Department of State,
    and other interagency partners to continuously review and update our
    Homeland Defense and Civil Support operation plans. This will ensure
    that the military is fully prepared to defend national interests.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
                                  hugo chavez
        30. Senator Collins. Admiral Stavridis, Venezuelan President Hugo
    Chavez's plans for military arms purchases, his relations with
    countries such as Cuba and Iran, and his efforts to spread anti-
    Americanism in Central and South America are all issues of concern to
    this committee. In recent days he has ordered Venezuelan military
    forces to deploy to the border with Colombia as the result of the
    killing of a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia terrorist leader by
    the armed forces of Colombia. What is SOUTHCOM's assessment of
    President Chavez's influence in the region?
        Admiral Stavridis. From my perspective, Venezuela is attempting to
    form diplomatic, informational, military, and economic alliances
    throughout the region, and through a barter-style exchange system
    (e.g., fuel oil for agricultural goods), Venezuela is attempting to
    create a counterweight to U.S. diplomacy. As to the impact of
    Venezuela's efforts, those nations most in need (especially of
    petroleum) may acquiesce to some aspects of Venezuela's agenda in order
    to address their own needs and to advance their own interests; however,
    acceptance of the ideological tenets of President Chavez's agenda is
    expected to be minimal.

        [Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2009

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

          UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, Webb, Warner, Thune, Martinez, and Wicker.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
    and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
    staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; David M.
    Morriss, minority counsel; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
    member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F.
    Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Ali Z.
    Pasha, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Bonni Berge and Darcie Tokioka, assistants
    to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill
    Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra
    Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Brian Polley, assistant to
    Senator Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and
    Brian W. Walsh and Erskine W. Wells III, assistants to Senator
    Martinez.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. On behalf of the committee, we welcome our
    witnesses: Admiral Timothy J. Keating, United States Navy,
    Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); and General
    Burwell B. Bell III, United States Army, Commander of the
    United Nations Command, the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined
    Forces Command, and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
        This will be General Bell's last hearing before our
    committee. We want to thank him particularly for his strong and
    capable leadership throughout the years. We also welcome Jim
    Roy, PACOM's Command Master Sergeant. The committee thanks you
    all for your service and, through you, to the men and women
    that you lead and the families who support you and them, for
    the hard work and sacrifice that makes our military so strong.
        The U.S. PACOM encompasses the most populous area of the
    world, with almost 60 percent of the world's population. This
    area is also home to five of the world's six largest
    militaries, not including the United States, and three of the
    five largest economies in the world. The Asian Pacific area is
    complex and changes rapidly. In the last several years we've
    witnessed two of Asia's largest countries and economies, China
    and India, substantially increase their economic and military
    power and that has affected the strategic dynamic throughout
    the Asia Pacific region.
        At the same time, another major phenomenon transforming the
    strategic calculus, especially in south and southeast Asia, is
    the role of the armed forces of the region to counter terrorist
    organizations.
        Finally, with the 2006 North Korean nuclear test, the
    threat of nuclear proliferation has increased. All of this
    makes our alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia
    critical and lends new significance to our relationships with
    other friendly nations, such as Singapore, India, Thailand,
    Taiwan, and the Philippines.
        The committee hopes to explore the implications of this
    strategic dynamic in Asia and on the Korean peninsula in
    particular with our two witnesses today. With China, we've seen
    an unprecedented interest in military-to-military cooperation,
    but at the same time a sudden denial of first a U.S. Navy
    carrier port call in November, and second denial of requests
    for refuge by two U.S. Navy minesweepers.
        The 2008 report on the military power of the People's
    Republic of China, which came out last week, is a catalogue of
    China's growing military capabilities. What is missing from the
    picture is what intelligence professionals call intent; what
    does China intend to do with these military assets?
        Regarding South Asia, this committee has held several
    hearings recently that focused on an issue in Central Command's
    (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), the terrorist threat
    found in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This committee and many
    Members of Congress have been concerned about whether Pakistan
    is doing enough to fight terrorism in South Asia. A related
    issue relevant to the PACOM is the extent to which Pakistan is
    a threat to India and vice versa. Admiral Fallon told the
    committee last week that in the past Pakistan was ``focused on
    India as the big threat to the country. I think they see things
    differently now.''
        In the not so distant past, in 2006 Pakistan signed a $3.5
    billion deal to purchase advanced F-16 fighter aircraft. Even
    at that time, and especially after the October 2006 earthquake
    in Pakistan, some observers felt they would be better off
    investing in helicopters that they could use for humanitarian
    and counterterrorist operations.
        What is the assessment on the other side of the border in
    the PACOM area of operation? Does India regard Pakistan as a
    threat? If so, to what extent, and what can the United States
    do to ensure that India and Pakistan devote more of their
    resources to working together and with the United States to
    address the threat of terrorism and other threats that are
    common to each of them?
        With respect to the Korean peninsula, this committee in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
    directed the administration to appoint a high level envoy to
    coordinate policy towards North Korea and to engage seriously
    in negotiations with Pyongyang to eliminate its nuclear weapons
    program. Last year, finally, four to eight or more additional
    plutonium-based nuclear bombs and one nuclear test later, the
    administration started negotiating in earnest.
        Today we inquire: Is there more that the United States and
    South Korea need to do together on the conventional military
    front to ensure that we are negotiating from a position of
    strength? How likely is it that we will see North Korea move
    from nuclear disablement to nuclear dismantlement within the
    next couple of years, and what are the implications for our
    force posture if they don't do that?
        Finally, I hope our witnesses will give us an assessment of
    the readiness of the nondeployed forces in the Pacific theater
    and how personnel and equipment shortages are affecting the
    ability of the United States to meet commitments and challenges
    there. How much risk results for the United States from that
    shortfall in personnel and equipment shortages and is that an
    acceptable risk, and how are we mitigating that risk?
        So again we thank our two witnesses for their tremendous
    service to this Nation, for their leadership of the men and
    women who they do lead. Now I turn this over to Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    welcoming these two distinguished public servants. Indeed,
    Admiral Keating does go back a way. I think we were on the same
    watch a long time ago. General Bell, you and I have discussed
    Korea and your knowing of my interest in that strategic part of
    the world, myself having spent the winter of 1951-1952 there. I
    commend both of you for your long service and thank your
    families.
        Mr. Chairman, I think you've covered basically the same
    points I have in mind, so I'll put my statement in the record
    so we can proceed directly to the witnesses.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
        I join Senator Levin in welcoming Admiral Keating and General Bell,
    and in thanking them for their service to our country. General Bell,
    this will be your last appearance before this committee, given your
    planned retirement in June, so we'll try to make it memorable for you.
    We thank you and your wife Katie for 39 years of service to our Nation.
        Admiral Keating and General Bell, the Pacific area of
    responsibility (AOR) presents enormous opportunities and challenges for
    the United States. Among those challenges, the most immediate is the
    situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's nuclear and missile
    programs continue to pose a threat to its neighbors and to America's
    interests in East Asia. It is unclear whether North Korea is truly
    committed to a complete declaration and verifiable elimination of its
    nuclear program, and whether the February 2007 agreement by the Six
    Parties will ultimately lead to a denuclearized Korean peninsula. On
    the positive side, we are encouraged that Pyongyang has nearly
    completed all the steps required to disable its Yongbyon nuclear
    reactor. On the negative side, Pyongyang is overdue in providing a
    complete declaration of its nuclear programs, materials and facilities
    as it has pledged to do. It is essential that North Korea fulfill its
    commitment to make a full and complete declaration of its nuclear
    program. In the meantime, Pacific Command and USFK play a vital role in
    providing stability and deterrence in support of this diplomatic
    effort.
        Admiral Keating and General Bell, we look forward to hearing your
    assessments of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including any
    changes you have seen over the past year in North Korea's military
    posture, and your assessment of North Korea's nuclear program,
    ballistic missile and proliferation activities, and the readiness of
    our forces to respond to any possible developments on the Peninsula,
    both now and in the future.
        Admiral Keating, Pacific Command (PACOM) plays a critical role in
    sustaining and expanding not only the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance,
    but also the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance, the cornerstone of our
    security umbrella in northeast Asia. We look forward to your assessment
    of these critical alliance relationships in the pacific region.
        I am also interested to hear your assessment, Admiral Keating, of
    China's military modernization program and plans, to include China's
    continuing build-up of missiles across the Strait; the impact of
    China's military modernization on U.S. interests in the region; and
    your assessment of the current state of China-Taiwan cross-Strait
    relations, which remains at the core of U.S. interests in the region.
    As Beijing's regional and global aspirations grow, properly managing
    this relationship remains vital. In that vein, I look forward to your
    report on the U.S.-China military-to-military activities that have been
    undertaken under your leadership.
        In the Asia-Pacific region, the war on terrorism is being waged in
    Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and other
    nations. I look forward to an update on the efforts of your command to
    counter the numerous terrorist and transnational threats in your AOR.
        Fortunately, the United States does not face these challenges
    alone. One of the vital responsibilities of the PACOM commander is to
    work closely with our key allies in the region--Japan, South Korea,
    Australia, to name a few--to strengthen bilateral relations and to
    develop multilateral approaches and responses to the challenges and
    opportunities that we face in the U.S. Pacific Command.
        We welcome our witnesses this morning and look forward to their
    testimony.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Admiral Keating?

      STATEMENT OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                         STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To you and
    Senator Warner, Senator Reed, Senator Akaka: Good morning and a
    warm aloha from the 350,000 men and women who are proud to
    serve the United States PACOM. They're all throughout the Asia
    and the Pacific region, and they're building capacity in the
    theater, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.
        I have had the great privilege of serving as the Commander
    of PACOM for a year now since you confirmed me and allowed me
    and Wandalee to return to Camp Smith. In a word, I'm
    optimistic. The region is stable, the guns are silent all
    throughout the Pacific, security is improving across the board,
    economies are growing, and things are generally positive.
        There are a few key points that I'd emphasize to support
    what I think is a solid foundation for that perspective. There
    are several new leaders all throughout the Asia Pacific region,
    in Japan, in Thailand, the Republic of Korea, and in Australia.
    In each case we visited those countries and met with those new
    leaders and their respective administrations, and the beat goes
    on for the United States PACOM.
        There's a collaborative mind-set amongst all of these
    partners and our counterparts. We have been to 21 of the 39
    nations in our AOR in less than a year. We had the 23 chiefs of
    defense from those countries visit our headquarters in Hawaii.
    Without exception, they all agree that we can improve our
    security and a multilateral mind-set is to be recommended.
    Capacity-building is on their mind. They view the United States
    as the indispensable element in combatting terrorism and
    enhancing maritime security and providing humanitarian
    assistance when needed.
        Indonesia is one country in particular where we're making
    significant progress. In close coordination with our State
    Department colleagues, Ambassador Christie Kenny in particular,
    we're making great progress in the southern Philippines in the
    war on terror as well. We're pleased with the humanitarian
    efforts and civil-military operations that are transforming
    this at-risk environment. The U.S.S. Pellalu visited last year
    to conduct medical, engineering, and dental assistance. The
    U.S.N.S. Mercy, our hospital ship, will go again this summer,
    repeating her visit of 2 years ago. Pellalu saw over 30,000
    patients. There were 1,000 major surgeries performed by this
    one ship in a short period of time, and it wasn't just United
    States military personnel on board. There were members from
    health organizations and the commercial sector as well.
        Exercise Balikatan was just concluded. We had 8,000
    soldiers and marines from the Pacific region who were in the
    central and southern Philippines and they saw over 10,000
    medical patients, rebuilt schools, and contributed in a big way
    to enhancing our perception in the Philippines and making it
    ever harder for the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jamail al-Azmiya to
    continue to prosecute the people of the Philippines.
        The train-and-equip authorities that you give us through
    1206 money are very, very helpful in the war on terror. It
    allows us in a very short period of time to improve maritime
    security in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines
    in particular. That triborder area had been a rather fertile
    area for violent extremists. It is much tougher for those folks
    to move around in that part of the woods now because of the
    1206 money that you have given us. It was $95 million in 2006
    and 2007 and we're hoping that we can continue that very
    responsive funding.
        Mr. Chairman, you mentioned North Korea. In regard to the
    Six-Party Talks, General Bell lives in there and can address
    the topic well. I have met with Ambassador Hill on several
    occasions, as late as last week in Thailand. The way I would
    characterize PACOM's perspective is we are cautiously
    optimistic, very, very, very cautiously optimistic. But we
    think that there is progress being made by Ambassador Hill and
    his colleagues. The readiness and the force posture of our
    forces in South Korea and throughout the Pacific region remain
    high, and I'd be happy to address particulars with you if
    questions remain.
        You mentioned India, Mr. Chairman. We have wonderful
    opportunities that we're exploring with India. I was there in
    1985 as the flag lieutenant to then Commander in Chief-Pacific
    Admiral William J. Crowe. We visited last August. So it's been
    22 or 23 years since I was there. The difference is startling.
    Admiral Crowe's reception was much less warm, much less
    engaging, than was ours. We have engaged with the Indians in
    significant exercises in the Bay of Bengal, where we had two
    aircraft carriers of ours, one of theirs, and ships from
    Australia, Japan, and Indonesia in a very sophisticated
    maritime exercise, and we were communicating real-time across
    secure circuits with all the ships in that entire battle group.
        The Pakistan-India border remains calm. We are in frequent
    discussion with our colleagues in India. Their force readiness
    throughout the country has not increased significantly due to
    perceived pressures from Pakistan. So we see no significant
    difference there on the Indian side of that particular border.
        That said, there are challenges for us in the Pacific.
    There was a coup in Fiji. The situation in Burma is certainly
    unsettled. We think in both cases a return to democratic
    institutions is essential.
        The struggle against violent extremism continues all
    throughout the AOR. Progress is being made in Malaysia,
    Indonesia, and the Philippines to the contrary, but that
    remains our number one concern, the struggle against violent
    extremism.
        As you mentioned, the People's Republic of China is in our
    AOR. We have been there twice. Our more recent visit about 6
    weeks ago was much more constructive and warm, and there was
    more dialogue. That said, there are miles to go before we sleep
    in our relationship with China. We want a mature, constructive,
    and cooperative relationship. We are making progress, but, as I
    said, we have a long way to go.
        You mentioned Chief Master Sergeant Jim Roy. He will go to
    China. One of the interesting parts about dealing with China is
    they do not have a senior noncommissioned officer corps. It
    doesn't exist in the People's Liberation Army. So when Jim Roy
    goes he doesn't have a counterpart with which to meet. So he
    will sit down and talk with colonels and captains. Those are
    his counterparts in China.
        We are working with them to help them understand the
    authorities and responsibilities we vest in our senior
    noncommissioned officer corps and we hope that opens the door a
    little bit more to the kind of dialogue that we're looking to
    not just initiate, but sustain and enhance with the People's
    Republic of China.
        All that said, we're moving forward in the PACOM. Our
    initiatives fall into four major priorities. In regard to
    warfighting readiness, we are ready to respond today. There are
    30,000-some soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors who are
    forward deployed, added to Admiral Fallon's AOR. That said, we
    remain ready across the board.
        We are working to make even more dominant our presence and
    our force posture. We're looking at ways to engage with all the
    countries in our AOR in exercises and personnel exchanges,
    including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and we
    are increasingly focused on pandemic influenza.
        Regional engagement is the ticket. We seek multilateral,
    rather than just a series of bilateral agreements. We find that
    this could be very beneficial in dealing with countries whose
    military power is significantly less than the United States,
    and they're happy to be partners of ours, not necessarily
    allies, and it works better if we bring more than one country
    with us when we show up to engage with them.
        Last but most important of all is your continued support
    for those 350,000 men and women in uniform by continuing to
    improve the quality of life for them and their families all
    through the AOR. Your support is of course key in all these
    initiatives. Thank you very much for that support and I'd be
    happy to take your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Keating follows:]
               Prepared Statement by ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:
        On behalf of the men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command
    (USPACOM), thank you for this opportunity to testify regarding the
    posture of our command and security in the Asia-Pacific.
        The region is secure and stable. This year, I have had the
    opportunity to visit 21 regional nations--more than one-half the total
    in our area of responsibility (AOR). I also hosted 23 National Chiefs
    of Defense in Hawaii this past November. From these first-hand
    experiences, I gained the sense that my counterparts see a secure and
    prosperous future for the region, particularly if we choose to approach
    security issues with a collaborative mindset. I share their optimism
    and a desire to seek multilateral solutions when possible.
        2007 was a year of considerable change in the region. Positive
    economic trends continued for most of Asia, which has three of the
    world's top 10 economies (Japan, China, and India). The region played a
    greater role on the global diplomatic stage. Many Asia-Pacific nations
    improved, and some expanded, their military capabilities as well. All
    these trends are impacting how nations interact with each other and the
    U.S. This dynamism and interplay offer more opportunity than challenge
    but will require our continued, confident leadership and a commitment
    of resources commensurate with the importance of this vibrant region to
    our Nation.
        Working in this constantly evolving arena, USPACOM forces conducted
    meaningful military-to-military engagement with regional partners and
    realized progress in a number of security areas. We improved
    multilateral information sharing with partners and held the first-ever
    conference among Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs; enhanced the
    capacity of our regional partners to counter transnational crime and
    terrorism; changed attitudes in populations at risk for terrorist
    exploitation; advanced U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense
    capabilities; and, mitigated human suffering in the wake of natural
    disasters. Our military accomplished all of these things, and
    significantly, they did so in full cooperation with our embassy country
    teams, allies, and partners.
        Outside our AOR, Pacific-based forces continue to serve with
    surpassing distinction in Iraq and Afghanistan. Next year, we expect to
    sustain about 30,000 USPACOM-assigned personnel in the U.S. Central
    Command AOR. Many Asia-Pacific nations have made and are still making
    significant contributions to our efforts in the Middle East, including
    Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Fiji,
    Mongolia, Tonga, and New Zealand. Having visited our people and
    partners in Iraq, I assure you USPACOM forces on the ground are
    confident, believe in their mission, and see progress being made. I
    could not be more proud of them and their families.
        Based on my first-hand observations, there are several key
    assessments that merit upfront consideration. In the main, they convey
    the progress and challenge of the past year.
        We welcomed new, democratically-elected leaders in several allied
    nations--Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand. From
    USPACOM perspective, elections reaffirm the strength of these
    governments and our alliances. While we build new relationships on a
    personal level, we retain policy alignment with our allies.
        In Northeast Asia, our alliances with Japan and the Republic of
    Korea remain indispensable to peace and security. Resolute action by
    both allies kept Six-Party Talks on track and the goal of a
    denuclearized peninsula within the realm of the possible. Military
    transformation and realignment in Japan and the Republic of Korea
    continue on planned timelines. The allies also made major contributions
    to the protection of our people and resources with upgrades to missile
    defense capabilities.
        This year demonstrated that our military-to-military relationship
    with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is not to the level we desire.
    Progress was decidedly uneven. We saw positive outcomes from senior-
    level visits but also experienced the perplexing cancellation of some
    routine activities. Nevertheless, improving the interaction between
    USPACOM and the PLA is critically important--in terms of maintaining
    stability across the Taiwan Strait and in assuring regional nations.
    For our part, we will continue to pursue a mature, constructive
    relationship with Chinese counterparts. We view the effort as the best
    means to reduce the chance of miscalculation, increase our mutual
    understanding, and encourage cooperation on areas of common concern.
        That said, I remain concerned about Chinese double-digit growth in
    annual defense spending and investment in systems which threaten Taiwan
    and our own capabilities. Consistent with U.S. policy and legislation,
    USPACOM is encouraging Taiwan to improve its self-defense capabilities
    and thereby deter potential People's Republic of China (PRC)
    aggression.
        Southeast Asia remains the central front against terrorism in the
    Pacific. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) sustained its
    momentum against terrorism in the southern Philippines. Of special
    note, civic action-type activities by the AFP reinvigorated a healthy
    relationship with the local populace. This bond between the people and
    security forces has created a southern Philippines far less susceptible
    to extremist influences.
        USPACOM interaction with the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara
    Nasional Indonesia (TNI)) remains positive and encouraging. We see no
    surer sign of Indonesian commitment to professionalize its military
    than their request for U.S. assistance to improve TNI Enlisted and
    Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) training. Of global significance,
    Indonesia, in partnership with Singapore and Malaysia, and most
    recently Thailand, is markedly improving maritime domain awareness and
    law enforcement capabilities in the strategically vital Strait of
    Malacca.
        U.S.--India military-to-military activities continued on an upward
    vector this year. From my discussions with Indian leaders, it is clear
    we share many of the same security concerns in South Asia and the
    broader Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean region. We agreed to work toward more
    mature interaction in the areas of maritime security, counterterrorism,
    and humanitarian assistance.
        Political conditions in Fiji and Burma are unsatisfactory. In the
    case of Fiji, with a return to a democratically-elected government,
    USPACOM would welcome a quick renewal of our previously strong
    military-to-military ties.
        These impressions highlight the security landscape of the Asia-
    Pacific. We have in place key elements to enhance regional stability
    and advance U.S. security interests--healthy alliances, opportunities
    for new partnerships, combat ready and agile forces, and committed
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to lead our efforts. As we move
    forward, our initiatives are organized across four priorities--
    Warfighting Readiness, Presence and Force Posture, Regional Engagement,
    and Quality of Life.
                             warfighting readiness
        First and foremost, USPACOM is a warfighting command committed to
    maintaining preeminence across the full spectrum of operations. We are
    ready to fight and win, and to dominate in any scenario, in all
    environments, without exception.
    War on Terror in the Pacific
        We will win the current war on terror. In coordination with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, and our
    U.S. Ambassadors, we continue to work with and through our regional
    partners to combat violent extremism and transform at-risk
    environments. We are making progress in the war on terror, particularly
    in the Philippines.
        Through Operation Enduring Freedom--Philippines (OEF-P), USPACOM
    forces, predominantly from Special Operations Command Pacific, advised
    and trained Philippine allies in counterterrorism operations and
    activities. Our efforts have served to both enhance Philippine ability
    to conduct sustained direct action against terrorists and to build
    their civic action capacity to mitigate terrorist support within the
    community. In 2007, the AFP, with U.S. support, conducted continuous
    counterterrorism/civic action operations for 8 months. In addition to
    killing or capturing several high-value individuals and their
    followers, the AFP rebuilt a cooperative market; constructed new
    schools, clinics, and community centers; and brought solar-powered
    electricity to multiple locations in the Sulu Province. As a complement
    to OEF-P, USPACOM has increased levels of Civil Military Operations
    activity in Balikatan, our major annual exercise in the Philippines.
        With assistance from our allies, especially Australia, Japan, and
    South Korea, OEF-P future operations will continue to build AFP
    capacity while setting conditions for expanded operations in Central
    Mindanao. We will also continue to encourage multilateral cooperation,
    in particular among the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, to
    disrupt terrorist activities and transit in the shared maritime space
    of the Celebes and Sulu Seas.
        In Indonesia, we witnessed no significant increase in terrorist
    activity. We are encouraged by the success of the Indonesian National
    Police in countering Jemaah Islamiyah operations, to include the arrest
    of Abu Dujana.
        Our partners in the war on terror benefit greatly from continued
    U.S. military assistance to improve the effectiveness of
    counterterrorism operations. With continued congressional support,
    assistance will take the form of Theater Security Cooperation
    activities, Security Assistance, Defense Security Cooperation Agency-
    led Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), and capacity building authorities.
    NDAA Section 1207
        The Department of State, led by our embassy country team in the
    Philippines, seamlessly integrated with USPACOM efforts through the
    Southeast Asia Tri-border Initiative (SATI). Enabled by section 1207
    authority, $16.9 million toward SATI will considerably expand economic
    development in the region as well as improve responsiveness of regional
    military and law enforcement forces, a tremendous complement to ongoing
    regional efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime.
    NDAA Section 1206
        With congressional 1206 authority, USPACOM also contributed more
    than $64 million in fiscal year 2007 toward increasing maritime
    security capacity in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri
    Lanka. In fiscal year 2008, we intend to build upon these initiatives
    by enhancing capabilities of partner nations to monitor and control
    areas in and around borders that may be used to transport, shelter,
    supply, or finance terrorist organizations.
        Sections 1207 and 1206 authorities, executed in full cooperation
    with the Department of State and our regional Ambassadors, are highly
    effective tools to build regional capacity and undermine terrorism in
    Southeast Asia. USPACOM thanks Congress for supporting these
    authorities and recommends making them permanent.
        Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-West) counterdrug
    operations support war on terror objectives. Importantly, JIATF-West,
    with a focus on the global drug threat, is able to achieve a high
    degree of law enforcement cooperation with regional partners, a level
    of cooperation that would not be possible with a singular
    counterterrorism agenda. Enhanced law enforcement cooperation has
    proved beneficial in countering all transnational threats, including
    terrorism. The command successfully applied NDAA Section 1022 authority
    to support counterterrorism law enforcement by providing training for
    bomb blast investigations and evidence collection in Malaysia and the
    Philippines, respectively. JIATF-West was the only entity to apply this
    provisional authority, and we would welcome continued authority in the
    future.
        The warfighting landscape today also includes significant
    nontraditional, transnational security threats. Drug trafficking is a
    key concern in the Asia-Pacific, as a threat to the human condition and
    as enabler for other security threats. In 2007, JIATF-West, in
    cooperation with our embassies and partners, achieved important
    successes. Focus remained on areas where crime-terror linkages exist or
    are likely to emerge: the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
    Thailand. The Interagency Fusion Center program--a key element of our
    assistance portfolio--played an integral role in a recent high-profile
    case. Last October, the Indonesian National Police used the Jakarta
    Interagency Counterdrug Operations Center to support raids and post-
    seizure analysis on a large crystal methamphetamine laboratory,
    estimated to be the world's fifth largest, and its support facilities
    on the island of Batam, located at the southern entrance to the Strait
    of Malacca. This capability will prove increasingly beneficial to
    partner nations as they combat all aspects of transnational crime and
    terror networks.
        JIATF-West successes to date highlight the benefits of expanded but
    targeted congressional authority. As a logical and important next step,
    USPACOM advocates for NDAA Section 1033 authority, which would allow
    JIATF-West to equip security forces, in key countries of concern--the
    Philippines and Indonesia.
        While USPACOM forces will continue to be called on to execute a
    full-range of military missions, security and stability in the region
    depend on our readiness to dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat
    any adversary who chooses to operate on the high end of the spectrum of
    conflict. We must continue to posture forces forward, backed up by
    ready and agile forces in the continental U.S. Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets must be sufficient to maintain
    situational awareness. Our maritime, air, and ground forces must have
    the capability and capacity to prevail in a warfighting environment in
    which potential adversaries are rapidly closing the technological gap.
    Ensuring the survivability of our networks, both military and those
    commercial networks that support military operations, is becoming
    increasingly critical in a battlespace sure to place additional
    emphasis on the domains of space and cyberspace.
        USPACOM requires pervasive and persistent surveillance to
    understand adversary plans and intended actions. The size of our
    theater and scarcity of available assets hampers opportunities to shape
    the environment. To improve this situation, USPACOM would welcome new
    resources--new sensors to increase dwell and access to potential
    adversary territory and communications and more human intelligence.
    These capabilities are critical to preventing strategic or tactical
    surprise.
        Implementation of Joint Intelligence Operation Centers has become
    key to synchronizing operational requirements with national and Service
    intelligence providers, particularly those requirements that support
    indications and warnings analysis.
    Communications System
        USPACOM requires reliable, secure, and interoperable communications
    systems to provide the foundation for command and control. Robust
    information networks enable information sharing and collaborative
    planning across the full spectrum of joint and multinational operations
    throughout the Asia-Pacific region. We must invest appropriately to
    preserve critical communication capability and capacity. USPACOM
    concentrates its effort on sustaining required levels of communication
    assurance despite existing limitations. However, long-term success
    depends on collective action by the Department of Defense (DOD) and
    Congress.
        Satellite failures as well as funding cuts and delays in follow-on
    SATCOM systems have reduced availability of Military SATCOM. USPACOM is
    engaged with the national satellite community to ensure satellite and
    terminal programs are synchronized and address this availability gap.
        The DOD communications infrastructure continues to be vulnerable to
    cyber exploitation and attack. USPACOM works daily with Joint Task
    Force-Global Network Operations to defend the Global Information Grid
    against cyber threats. Critical C2 networks must be proactively
    defended to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the information.
    The mitigation of computer network vulnerabilities is a top priority.
        Expanding coalition communication networks is essential to support
    USPACOM missions. USPACOM fully supports the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Networks and Information Integration and the Joint Staff
    implementation of a Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) program.
    The goal of this program is to build and sustain a single network that
    supports multinational information sharing requirements.
    Undersea Superiority
        Continued improvement of air, surface, subsurface, C\4\I systems,
    and acoustic modeling and navigation charts through oceanographic
    surveys, and cooperative training and operations with partners and
    allies will enhance our ability to operate effectively in the maritime
    domain. However, in the face of fast-paced PLA-N modernization and
    their ever-expanding area of operations, anti-submarine warfare remains
    a challenge and is the number one priority for U.S. Pacific Fleet.
    Maintaining an operational advantage also requires rigorous training at
    sea, before deployment in the AOR. Without the exemption recently
    granted by the President, the restrictions placed on use of active
    SONAR in the waters of Southern California would have presented a
    significant training challenge for our maritime forces preparing for
    deployment in the Western Pacific.
        Continuing to balance the risk between today's fight against terror
    and the need to maintain the readiness of our forces to dissuade,
    deter, and if necessary, defeat potential high-end adversaries is
    perhaps the single greatest military challenge faced by our Nation's
    leaders. USPACOM is achieving an acceptable balance in this regard but
    we must work at it, constantly mitigating shortfalls by making
    adjustments with our resources or in coordination with other geographic
    combatant commanders.
        Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction capability in the Asia-
    Pacific is another warfighting priority. Along with allies and
    partners, the centerpiece for our activity remains the Proliferation
    Security Initiative (PSI), which aims to build global capacity to
    disrupt weapons of mass destruction proliferation among states, and
    between states and terrorist organizations. Eleven nations within the
    AOR endorse the PSI (Australia, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, the
    Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Mongolia, the Marshall Islands, Sri
    Lanka, Papua New Guinea). We continue work to expand participation
    during our regional military-to-military engagements.
        While a common commitment to counterproliferation is important, we
    also made gains with the essential next step--exercising
    counterproliferation capabilities. In October 2007, PACOM forces
    participated in a Japan-hosted PSI exercise that included units from
    Australia, New Zealand, France, Singapore, and U.K, as well as
    observers from some 30 additional countries. Japan's exercise
    demonstrated a full range of counterproliferation actions, from law
    enforcement and customs actions to maritime interdiction. On the
    domestic front, PACOM participated in the Homeland Security
    Department's Exercise Topoff 4 and tested and refined our full range of
    existing procedures for managing a domestic terrorist WMD event. In
    September 2008, USPACOM will participate in another PSI exercise, the
    New Zealand-hosted exercise Maru.
    Pandemic Influenza
        Pandemics can be difficult to predict. Should a pandemic influenza
    (PI) contingency develop, USPACOM has a robust plan in support of our
    national strategy for a PI response and is prepared to support lead
    agencies (Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Health and
    Human Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of
    State) at a national level. This past year, in addition to an internal,
    no-notice planning and response exercise, we conducted our most
    comprehensive PI exercise to date, with participation from all USPACOM
    Service components and representatives from the State of Hawaii, U.S.
    interagency, and international humanitarian communities. The exercise,
    Tempest Express 13, tested strategic and operational level civil-
    military coordination mechanisms. We also collaborated with the Centers
    for Disease Control and Prevention to hold ``Laboratory and Rapid
    Response'' train-the-trainer workshops with participants from
    Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.
                           force presence and posture
        U.S. force presence and posture--in Japan, Korea, and across the
    Asia-Pacific AOR--has long been a guarantor of peace and stability in
    the Asia-Pacific. We will continue to position our forces in theater to
    optimize agility and flexibility, ensure rapid response to crises, and
    provide the force presence that both assures allies and partners and
    dissuades and deters threats to security. We will remain a force ready
    and a force present.
        The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched by the
    Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense with their Japanese
    counterparts in December 2002, serves as the framework to manage U.S.-
    Japan alliance transformation and posture realignment. Major elements
    of DPRI include plans to relocate the functions of two U.S. air bases
    from urbanized to rural areas; relocate over 8,000 marines from Okinawa
    to Guam; co-locate U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities;
    deploy U.S. missile defense capabilities in Japan, in conjunction with
    Japan's own deployments; and improve operational coordination between
    U.S. and Japanese forces. These activities will strengthen capabilities
    and maintain deterrence in the region while reducing impacts of U.S.
    presence on local communities in Japan.
        Since implementation details were agreed to in May 2006, progress
    has been made in all priority areas. Most notably this past year, the
    Japanese Diet approved a comprehensive legislative package that
    provides financial incentives to local communities and authorizes
    financing to build housing on Guam for Marines relocating from Okinawa.
    Additionally, the Government of Japan initiated the environmental
    assessment so that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility on
    Okinawa can progress. The completion of this facility is critical to
    finalizing our force posture changes in Guam by 2014. Currently, we are
    on schedule to meet construction timelines on this and other major
    DPRI-related facilities throughout Japan.
    USMC Relocation to Guam
        The rebasing of 8,000 marines and their dependents from Okinawa to
    Guam remains a vital component of USPACOM engagement with the GOJ and a
    cornerstone of continued U.S. force projection capability. This action
    will return desirable land to Japan while enhancing the flexibility of
    the forward-based Marine presence in the USPACOM AOR. The Joint Guam
    Program Office, led by the Department of the Navy, is managing all
    aspects for this relocation effort. Rebasing beddown alternatives have
    been finalized, and we seek to begin upgrades to the military
    infrastructure, housing, and training facilities on Guam in 2010. The
    Japanese have reaffirmed their commitment to bear approximately $6
    billion of the cost for facilities and infrastructure. USPACOM
    advocates for similar resolve within the DOD and Congress in
    shouldering the approximately $4 billion U.S. share for the Guam
    posture change. The relocation will be a monumental undertaking
    requiring maximum involvement from all branches of the military and
    active participation from numerous Federal agencies and territorial
    governments.
    U.S. Forces Korea Transformation
        On the Korean peninsula, with the full support of the Republic of
    Korea (ROK) government, we are reducing and consolidating our footprint
    into two hubs south of the Han River. To increase readiness and boost
    the quality of life for our Korea-based force, we are considering
    longer, accompanied tours for our servicemembers.
        Over the last year, we have also made strides in formalizing the
    path to transfer warfighting operational control from U.S. to ROK
    responsibility in 2012. With the disestablishment of the U.S.-led
    Combined Forces Command (CFC), U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK) will become a
    U.S. joint warfighting headquarters, provisionally-described as U.S.
    Korea Command, supporting the ROK armed forces during armistice and in
    war. In order to succeed, USFK will require significant transformation
    of the command force structure, logistics architecture, and a robust
    training and exercise program. We will execute new theater-level
    exercises, Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve, to maintain CFC
    readiness, as well as train, certify, and validate the alliance's new
    command construct.
    Prepositioned Stocks/Preferred Munitions
        Due to the time-distance challenges in this theater, USPACOM forces
    require readily available and properly maintained prepositioned stocks
    and preferred munitions at the outset of any conflict. During this past
    spring, the Army downloaded APS-3 afloat equipment sets to support
    Iraq-bound Army units. This event, in addition to existing shortages in
    the remaining prepositioned programs, creates a need for close
    monitoring of the replenishment of equipment and stocks throughout the
    USPACOM AOR. Also, achieving the appropriate mix and inventory levels
    of key munitions, particularly GPS-aided and laser-guided weapons, the
    Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot (PAC-3) missiles,
    Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile version C-7, and the Joint
    Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, is imperative.
    Missile Defense
        To defend U.S. forces, interests, and allies from short- and
    medium-range ballistic missiles, USPACOM seeks a forward-deployed,
    layered, and integrated air and missile defense system that is capable
    of intercepting threat missiles throughout the entire time of flight.
    USPACOM has established an initial missile defense capability by
    forward deploying the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) aboard U.S. Navy AEGIS
    ships, integrating a forward-based X-band radar into the Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) architecture, conducting BMD exercises and
    training with key partners, and refining the tactics, techniques, and
    procedures required for coordination with USNORTHCOM and other
    Geographic Combatant Commands during the employment of the missile
    defense system in defense of the U.S. Increased inventories of both
    PATRIOT PAC-3 and SM-3 interceptors, forward basing of a Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense fire unit in Guam, and accelerated development of
    sea-based terminal and kinetic boost phase interceptor capabilities
    would effectively build on the initial missile defense capability
    already deployed in the USPACOM AOR.
        As the Government of Japan fields their own national BMD capability
    with Patriot PAC-3 Fire Units and AEGIS SM-3 capable ships, USPACOM
    will continue to work closely with them to maximize the combined
    efforts and achieve the most effective capability. As we grow the
    overall BMD architecture, interoperability will play an even greater
    role. It is vital to mission success to have communication systems that
    can not only integrate across the joint spectrum, but also with our
    partner nations.
        Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) enhance
    interoperability and readiness, and provide a cost effective mechanism
    for mutual logistics support between U.S. and allied or partner
    military forces. ACSAs have been particularly helpful in the conduct of
    war on terror operations. For example, we have made extensive use of
    the current agreement with the Republic of the Philippines to support
    the AFP operations against terrorist cells in that country. USPACOM has
    12 ACSAs in place. We signed an agreement with Sri Lanka in March 2007
    and both the Philippines and Tonga renewed their ACSAs during 2007.
    Agreements with Fiji and Australia are both up for renewal in 2008.
    Additionally, we are currently negotiating an agreement with Indonesia
    and hope interest by Timor-Leste and Brunei will yield results. We view
    these agreements as vital in maximizing our interoperability and
    helping increase the readiness of coalition partners in the Pacific
    region.
                               regional engagment
        Our Theater Security Cooperation Plan serves as the primary
    blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of
    allies and regional partners. The plan is fully coordinated with our
    embassy country teams and integrates security assistance, military-to-
    military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and
    outreach programs into a coherent, mutually supportive set of
    activities for each country, whether ally, partner, or cooperating
    state.
        These security cooperation activities are essential to the success
    of U.S. national security strategy. For relatively low cost, we have an
    opportunity to make progress in each of the USPACOM priorities, and
    facilitate situations in which future security challenges can be met
    through regional collaboration and capacity.
    Japan
        The U.S.-Japan alliance is a cornerstone for maintaining a secure
    and stable Asia-Pacific. Nearly 38,000 U.S. Armed Forces personnel are
    stationed in Japan, along with an additional 14,000 forward-deployed
    personnel. Japan also provides over $4 billion in host nation support--
    the most generous of any U.S. ally--and remains steadfast in supporting
    its share of the costs of alliance transformation.
        Transformation of the U.S.-Japanese alliance continues on its
    positive, steady pace. From the USPACOM perspective, significant
    changes within the defense organization--a new Joint Staff in 2006 and
    a ministerial-level defense department in 2007--strengthen Japan Self-
    Defense Force ability to defend Japan and demonstrate a desire to
    enhance cooperation with the U.S. and other regional partners to ensure
    peace and stability in the region. USPACOM is encouraging more
    trilateral cooperation between Japan, the ROK, and the U.S. militaries,
    particularly in the areas of peacekeeping operations (PKO) and
    humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Increased cooperation in these
    areas would be beneficial regionally and internationally, much as
    ongoing Japanese support of the war on terror continues to be.
        Japan continues its full commitment to BMD. During the past year,
    Japan has fielded its own PAC-3 missiles to defend Tokyo, and has
    tested SM-3 missiles which will soon be operational in the waters off
    the coast of Japan, providing additional BMD capability.
    Republic of Korea
        The U.S.-ROK Alliance remains strong and critically important to
    stability on the Korean Peninsula. Despite warranted optimism from
    progress in the Six-Party Talks and Inter-Korea Summit, the alliance
    remains focused on the most immediate security threat, North Korea. We
    do not foresee a near-term, overt challenge by North Korea. However,
    North Korea retains a significant conventional capability with massed
    forces near the demilitarized zone and a potent missile arsenal. We
    remain convinced that the strong U.S.-ROK alliance is the key to
    deterring North Korea.
        In recognition of growing military capabilities of our forces, the
    U.S.-ROK alliance continues to transform to better meet security
    challenges, both on and off the peninsula. All on-peninsula
    transformational goals are on track. Regionally, we seek increased
    partnering with the ROK in counterproliferation, maritime security, and
    disaster relief, as well as trilateral military cooperation between the
    U.S., ROK, and Japan. This is particularly relevant since our three
    nations have the financial resources, logistical capability, and
    planning ability to handle complex contingencies throughout the region.
    The relevancy of our alliance grows globally as well, demonstrated by
    ROK contributions to the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and by
    the deployment of ROK forces to Lebanon in support of the United
    Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon mission.
        Australia is our most steadfast ally, committed to enhancing
    security, regionally and globally. Australian leadership in the Pacific
    was noteworthy in 2007. For example, this past year Australia continued
    to lead the International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the
    Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. The Australia
    Defence Force also worked with USPACOM on building regional security
    capacity, particularly in the area of maritime security.
        As a sure sign of the enduring nature of our alliance, Australia
    places major emphasis on advancing interoperability with the U.S.
    through well coordinated acquisition and training programs. They are a
    Joint Strike Fighter level three partner and have made great progress
    in implementing Strategic Level and Operational Level Review
    recommendations to enhance U.S.-Australia interoperability. Exercise
    Talisman Sabre 2007, our premier high-end combined warfighting exercise
    with Australia, was highly successful and validated the U.S.-Australia
    Joint Combined Training Capability. We are now improving that bilateral
    capability by increasing the fidelity and numbers of virtual and
    constructive forces that can be integrated into exercise and training
    environments. In accordance with the Presidential agreement announced
    at the last APEC Summit, we are also enhancing cooperation with
    Australia on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and on
    regional Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief response.
    Republic of Philippines
        Our partnership with the Republic of the Philippines is central to
    success in meeting our war on terror goals in Southeast Asia. With U.S.
    advice, training, and monetary support, the AFP have had remarkable
    success against terrorists in the southern Philippines. The Philippine
    government and its security forces are increasingly assuming a regional
    leadership role against terrorism and transnational crime. Most
    noteworthy is the Maritime Security effort in the Tri-border Region (an
    area shared with Indonesia and Malaysia) to bring security to the Sulu
    and Celebes Seas and improve economic viability.
        PDR, an innovative and highly-effective approach to building
    partner capacity, continues to strengthen civilian control over the
    military, inject transparency into Philippine Department of National
    Defense processes, and increase the overall professionalism and
    capability of the armed forces. It is a blueprint by which other
    nations in the region can model and implement similar efforts.
    Thailand
        The December 2007 elections and certification of a democratically-
    elected government has allowed us to move forward--at an appropriate
    pace--with restoration of our military relations with Thailand, a major
    regional ally. For 2008, we place emphasis on completing a fully
    robust, Thailand-hosted Cobra Gold, the premier USPACOM multilateral
    exercise. This annual exercise is a centerpiece for building regional
    competencies to respond to a wide range of transnational security
    threats and humanitarian relief contingencies. We appreciate Thailand's
    important global security contributions in the war on terror,
    counternarcotics efforts, and PKO, including an 800-troop contingent to
    the U.N. mission in Sudan.
    India
        Delay with the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative has not
    adversely affected interaction between USPACOM and Indian military
    counterparts. Collectively, we see our militaries building a
    constructive relationship. We foresee great potential for cooperation
    in areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, and disaster relief.
        During my visit to India in August 2007, the Indian Foreign
    Secretary, Defence Secretary, and all three Service Chiefs expressed
    support for our military-to-military cooperation and a desire to
    increase the quality and complexity of these events in the future. The
    U.S.-Indian naval exercise, Malabar 07, which also involved
    participants from Singapore, Australia, and Japan, is indicative of the
    kind of progress we seek with our relationship.
        Singapore continues to be one of our strongest security partners in
    Asia and a key coalition partner in the war on terror. Beyond providing
    strategic access to ports and airfields for transiting U.S. forces,
    Singapore cooperates with us on shared maritime security,
    counterterrorism, and command and control initiatives. In 2007,
    Singapore broke ground on a multinational Command and Control Center at
    Changi Naval Base, which will facilitate information sharing among
    regional nations and enhance maritime security in the Malacca Strait.
    Their decisions to purchase U.S. platforms such as F-15 aircraft and
    Seahawk helicopters strengthen our level of cooperation. Singapore has
    provided niche capabilities to support operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
    Indonesia
        Since the normalization of our military relationship with Indonesia
    in 2005, we have moved deliberately to upgrade our ties with the
    Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Sitting astride key sea lanes, Indonesia
    is the largest nation in Southeast Asia and the world's third-largest
    democracy. We and the Indonesians have a broad range of shared
    interests, and it is important that our security relationship matures
    to reflect these shared interests. USPACOM conducted significant
    military-to-military engagement activity with the TNI in 2007. Two
    events were particularly noteworthy: a peacekeeping-focused, brigade-
    level Command Post exercise, Garuda Shield, and the multilateral intra-
    agency Southeast Asia Disaster Management Conference, which exercised
    the Indonesian government's ability to respond to disasters at the
    strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In both evolutions,
    interaction between the TNI and U.S. military--at all levels--was
    strongly positive, professional, and marked by a desire to improve
    peacekeeping and disaster relief skills. Consistent with this view,
    Indonesia has deployed a second set of troops to support PKO in
    Lebanon, recently completed its first PKO course through the U.S.
    Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program, and is developing
    its own PKO center.
        In 2008, we anticipate greater Indonesian leadership within our
    theater security cooperation activities. For example, Indonesia has
    already agreed to co-host this year's Pacific Armies Management Seminar
    and the Chiefs of Defense Conference. TNI will also host the fourth
    maritime trilateral exchange with Malaysia and the Philippines, an
    effort to improve greater cooperation and security in the Sulu and
    Sulawesi Seas.
    People's Republic of China
        Our dealings with the PRC and Taiwan are guided by the Taiwan
    Relations Act, the three Joint U.S.-PRC communiques (1972, 1979, 1982),
    and the one-China policy. We abide by restrictions stipulated in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
        Our military-to-military interaction with the PLA fell short of
    expectations this year. We achieved some success with several high-
    level visits to the PRC, including the Secretary of Defense, Chief of
    Naval Operations, and two Commander, USPACOM visits. In each case, PLA
    hosts provided access to platforms and facilities not visited before,
    and discussions with their senior military leaders were candid and
    open. However, we saw little change in PRC willingness to conduct port
    visits, simple exercises at sea, mid-level officer exchanges, or
    pragmatic interaction like the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
    talks--the activities USPACOM views as most useful in reducing the
    potential for miscalculation and misunderstanding between our forces.
    The growing PLA military capability remains a concern, and our
    understanding of PLA intentions is limited.
        USPACOM will continue to pursue military-to-military activity with
    the PLA, with the clear purpose to reduce chances of miscalculation,
    increase understanding, and create opportunities for cooperation. We
    seek--in the long-term--a mature relationship with the PLA.
    Cross-Strait Assessment
        Sustaining stability across the Taiwan Strait is a top priority.
    Vital to preserving this current stability is a credible Taiwan self-
    defense capability. In accordance with legislation and policy, we make
    available to Taiwan advice, training, and equipment necessary for a
    sufficient self-defense capability. Through regular engagement, we have
    advocated to Taiwan military leaders a variety of defensive measures
    such as increased joint training, critical infrastructure protection,
    and capability acquisitions. The Taiwan military has improved its self-
    defense capabilities considerably.
        Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, USPACOM will also
    continue to maintain its own capabilities to defend against any
    potential military aggression in the region.
    Mongolia
        Mongolia is an enthusiastic U.S. partner and supports major U.S.
    security efforts, including the war on terror and President Bush's
    GPOI. USPACOM remains primarily focused on helping Mongolia transform
    its military into a rapidly deployable, elite peacekeeping force that
    is interoperable with U.N. and coalition forces. Our high-tempo
    interaction in 2007 included strategic dialogue, bilateral and
    multilateral exercises, security operations exchanges, defense reform,
    and NCO development. We foresee the Mongolian Armed Forces continuing
    to participate in international PKO and increasingly assisting with
    Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief efforts.
    Russia
        USPACOM coordinates all its security cooperation activities with
    the Russian Far East Military District with U.S. European Command,
    ensuring the efforts of both geographic combatant commands are mutually
    supportive. Our direct interaction with the Russians this year was
    positive and helpful, with USPACOM hosting the Far East District
    Commander's first visit to Hawaii in 10 years.
        This year we also witnessed a more assertive Russia, particularly
    in the form of increased and more visible Russian bomber activity in
    the USPACOM AOR. We do not assess Russian action as a threat, but we
    prefer to deal with Russia more openly and directly to prevent any
    misinterpretation. To that end, we encourage Russia to restart the
    ``flight announcement'' process. My first trip to Russia is scheduled
    for summer 2008.
    Sri Lanka
        We support the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) efforts to defend
    themselves against terrorist attacks by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
    Eelam but are concerned about GSL withdrawal from the 2002 cease fire,
    increased levels of violence, and allegations of human rights abuses.
    USPACOM security cooperation programs focus on institutionalizing
    respect for human rights, enhancing the Sri Lankan armed forces ability
    to deter renewed violence, and improving their maritime security
    capabilities through Section 1206 capacity building authority. We also
    continuously stress that GSL seek a suitable resolution to the
    conflict--a solution that meets the needs of the Sinhalese, Tamil, and
    other communities. Additionally, we are now working with the Sri Lankan
    military to enhance their nation building and disaster relief
    capabilities.
        Sri Lanka continues to demonstrate support for the war on terror by
    providing blanket over-flight and landing rights in support of
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Nepal
        The uncertainty of the political situation in Nepal caused by
    delays in the national elections and contentious differences between
    the ruling party and the Maoists has affected our military-to-military
    engagement with Nepal. Until the political situation is resolved,
    USPACOM security cooperation will continue to focus on non-lethal
    assistance with the emphasis on professional military education,
    peacekeeping training, and respect for human rights.
    People's Republic of Bangladesh
        Bangladesh continues to make progress in countering their internal
    extremist threat. Over the past year, they have brought to justice
    numerous leaders of various Muslim extremist organizations. Assisting
    the Bangladesh government to enhance their counterterrorism
    capabilities is the focus of our bilateral cooperation. USPACOM further
    seeks to enhance Bangladesh ability to conduct international
    peacekeeping and to increase capacity to conduct domestic humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief missions, which will improve national
    response in the wake of events like the November 2007 cyclone crisis.
        Since the declaration of Emergency Rule in January 2007, USPACOM
    has remained watchful of the role of the military within the Caretaker
    Government. We initiated defense sector reform programs that focused on
    maintaining a professional military that adheres to human rights and is
    respectful of civilian control of the military.
    Malaysia
        Defense ties with Malaysia are strong and improving, best
    exemplified by a five-fold increase in our ship visit program,
    acceptance of high-level visits, and Malaysia's partnering with us in
    numerous multilateral venues. In the last 18 months Malaysia has co-
    hosted three high-level major multilateral conferences, including the
    first ever Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference. This strong
    relationship is important as Malaysia influences the evolution of
    ASEAN, demonstrates strong leadership in maritime security, and
    actively participates in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization
    of the Islamic Conference. Malaysia also continues to lead the peace
    monitoring mission in southern Philippines and has renewed its
    contribution of peacekeeping troops to Lebanon.
    Vietnam
        Our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam has made
    positive strides in recent months, most significantly in the areas of
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. A beneficiary of the
    U.S.S. Peleliu humanitarian mission, Vietnam also contributed directly
    to the mission success regionally, providing a medical team on board
    the ship. During my December trip, I encouraged Vietnam to continue to
    grow its capabilities in the humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping
    mission areas. USPACOM also agreed to sustain information exchanges
    that allow the Vietnamese to better prepare for and respond to severe
    typhoons. This year we continued our support of the Presidential
    Emergency Program for AIDS Relief, with the DOD contribution exceeding
    $5 million. With this incremental progress, we look forward to
    increased military cooperation with the Vietnamese, both bilaterally
    and multilaterally.
    Cambodia
        Our military relationship with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
    (RCAF) continues to progress steadily. They have shown increased
    willingness to cooperate closely on counterterrorism, peacekeeping,
    disaster response, and medical and health related activities. After a
    2006 assessment of RCAF requirements, the U.S. delivered 49 laptop
    computers in 2007 and will deliver 30 2.5-ton trucks in Spring 2008,
    all from excess defense articles. Reinforcing the positive outcome from
    last year's first ship visit to Cambodia since the Vietnam War, U.S.
    Pacific Fleet conducted a second visit in 2007 with the U.S.S. Essex.
    The sailors were well-received and completed a robust schedule of
    medical and dental civic action programs with their Cambodian
    counterparts. Cambodia was also a recipient of peacekeeping training
    through the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative and sent a
    platoon to Mongolia for the region's premier peacekeeping exercise,
    Khaan Quest. Cambodia is playing a lead role in the region by
    conducting Exercise Tempest Express 14 to test and refine national,
    regional, and broader international mechanisms for disaster and
    emergency response.
    Laos
        We are slowly building security-related activities with Laos beyond
    traditional personnel recovery and humanitarian assistance cooperation.
    The Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic (PDR) leadership is receptive to
    increased military engagement, as evidenced by their decision to accept
    the exchange of Defense Attaches. Engagement activities will be focused
    initially on English language training for mid-level and senior
    officers, medical training and avian influenza preparedness, military
    cooperation on unexploded ordnance detection and removal, and increased
    Lao participation in regional conferences and activities. USPACOM
    remains mindful of the poor past performance of the Lao PDR regarding
    human rights and reinforces international standards of behavior in all
    engagement activities.
        New Zealand shares many U.S. security concerns about terrorism,
    maritime security, transnational crime, and proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction and delivery systems and cooperates closely with us.
    They are an active and positive force in Pacific Islands security
    initiatives, including support to stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste
    and the Solomon Islands. While the 1987 legislative declaration of New
    Zealand as a nuclear free zone remains an impediment to bilateral
    military-to-military relations, we support New Zealand Defence Force
    participation in approved multilateral events that advance our mutual
    security interests.
        New Zealand remains supportive of coalition efforts in the war on
    terror and has extended its lead of the Provincial Reconstruction Team
    in Afghanistan through at least September 2008. New Zealand also
    continues to provide excellent support to Operation Deep Freeze
    missions supporting U.S. scientific exploration in Antarctica.
    Compact Nations
        USPACOM enjoys a special relationship with the three Compact
    Nations--the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
    Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. We fully support their
    initiatives to expand capacity and operations to protect their valuable
    economic exclusion zone resources. The U.S. Army Pacific Joint Task
    Force for Homeland Defense leads our partnership with these nations to
    ensure our mutual defense, as set forth in the Compacts of Free
    Association. We are grateful for the extraordinary support from the
    citizens of these nations, particularly those who serve with great
    distinction in the U.S. military and Coast Guard. The Marshall Islands
    host the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, integral to
    the development of our missile defense programs and conduct of space
    operations.
    Timor-Leste
        The recent attempted assassinations of President Ramos-Horta and
    Prime Minister Gusmao highlight the continued political unrest in
    Timor-Leste. However, there are several reasons to remain optimistic
    about the future of this fledgling democracy. This past year, Timor-
    Leste successfully held its first democratic presidential and
    parliamentary elections. The Timor-Leste civil-military defense
    establishment is in place, and their Defense Forces operate under the
    rule of law. With international support, Timor-Leste is again
    experiencing the relative stability necessary to begin critical
    institutional development. Regarding USPACOM interaction, our U.S.
    security assistance program with Timor-Leste is focused on English
    language training. We have also recently completed a highly successful
    port visit and look forward to increasing our engagement opportunities
    with the Timor-Leste Defense Forces this year.
    Tonga
        With a military of 600 personnel, Tonga remains an extraordinarily
    committed U.S. partner in the war on terror and is a regional leader in
    PKO. Royal Tongan Marines returned to Iraq in September 2007 for two 6-
    month rotations with the possibility of providing additional troop
    rotations in the future. These efforts and their other regional
    peacekeeping commitments mean that one-third of deployment-eligible
    Tongan soldiers are engaged in peacekeeping missions, worldwide.
    USPACOM security cooperation with Tonga supports their efforts to
    strengthen and refine the peacekeeping capacity of the Tongan Defence
    Service through our annual Marine-led exercise, Exercise Tafakula and
    our GPOI capstone exercise.
    Burma
        The policies and practices of the Burmese government undermine
    regional security through violent suppression of peaceful protests (as
    observed as recently as September 2007), human rights violations,
    particularly against ethnic minority civilians, and narcotics
    trafficking. USPACOM fully supports U.S. policy to increase pressure on
    the military junta to engage in a credible transition to democracy. Our
    military-to-military engagement with Burma is limited to coordination
    of the recovery of missing U.S. personnel, the last activity having
    occurred in 2004.
    Security Assistance
        One of the most important features of PACOM theater security
    cooperation is the security assistance effort we execute in partnership
    with the Department of State and our embassy country teams. Powerful
    engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing
    countries include International Military Education and Training (IMET)
    and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). IMET advances U.S. interests by
    educating participants in essential principles of a professional
    military force. IMET is of life-long value to the participants and the
    respective regional nations. The program also develops personal
    relationships among nations in the Asia-Pacific. FMF continues to prove
    its value in equipping and training regional partners to more
    effectively contribute toward common security goals. FMF is vital to
    supporting U.S. coalition partners in the war on terror, such as the
    Philippines, Indonesia, and Mongolia. USPACOM countries typically
    receive less than 1 percent of the annual worldwide allocation of FMF.
    Because modest investments in security assistance foster a more secure
    and stable region, increased funding in this area merits consideration.
    Enlisted Leader Development
        We place a premium on developing the enlisted leaders of partner
    nations in the Asia-Pacific. To that end, we are assisting selected
    countries as they work to create a professionally-committed, competent,
    and empowered enlisted force. Growing these leaders will contribute
    directly to a partner nation success across the full gamut of security
    interests, from the war on terror to maritime security initiatives.
    Joint Exercise Program
        USPACOM joint exercises are tangible and productive elements of our
    theater engagement strategy and joint training program. Our exercises
    develop and sustain habitual relationships that promote overall
    operational effectiveness among USPACOM forces and with the armed
    forces of other nations and civilian organizations. Exercises also are
    the primary vehicle we use to improve, demonstrate, and certify the
    readiness of USPACOM forces and our joint command and control
    headquarters.
        To maximize opportunities for training, we continue to leverage the
    capabilities of live, virtual, and constructive simulations in all of
    our training and exercises. These simulations bring greater fidelity
    and realism to our exercises while preventing increased operational and
    personnel OPTEMPO. Validation of the Joint and Combined Training
    Capability program with Australia during exercise Talisman Saber was a
    milestone achievement and showed how effective the integration of live,
    virtual, and constructive environments can be.
        The establishment of the Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement
    (CE2) account, this year, is a significant and welcome improvement. The
    CE2 account allows the DOD to efficiently and effectively support joint
    training and exercises. It provides flexibility to focus support when
    and where it is needed to meet USPACOM and national security
    requirements. We appreciate Congress' leadership in establishing this
    account. Your continued support for the Joint Exercise Program plays a
    critical part in maintaining security and stability in the Pacific.
        GPOI is a presidential and G-8 initiative to build competent and
    professional peacekeepers worldwide. Within the Asia-Pacific region,
    USPACOM GPOI program continues to leverage existing host nation
    programs, institutions, policies, and exercises. Our continued emphasis
    is on encouraging long-term sustainment of qualified peace support
    operations forces through a train-the-trainer focus, and ensuring
    standardization and interoperability by taking a regional approach, and
    by working within the framework of United Nations Guidelines. This
    program is one of our key components for fostering military-to-military
    relationships and in meeting security cooperation objectives among
    nations within the Asia-Pacific region. USPACOM successes include
    producing over 1,116 tactical peacekeepers, 272 qualified staff
    officers, and 145 Trainers available for immediate deployment
    worldwide. In late 2007, the Philippines and Tonga were added as GPOI
    participating nations.
        In 2008, the USPACOM GPOI program will be fully implemented in
    Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Tonga.
    We expect to train 5,000 peacekeepers. USPACOM, in conjunction with
    Bangladesh, will host the largest multinational peacekeeping capstone
    exercise conducted in the Asia Pacific region in April 2008 with all
    the current regional GPOI partner nations.
        Other key programs in USPACOM contribute more broadly to security
    cooperation by addressing transnational concerns. The periodic
    deployment of humanitarian missions and outreach organizations like the
    Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
    (COE) and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) provide
    expertise and establish enduring relationships between nations of the
    region. Additionally, the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, through the
    conduct of their important mission, serves as a powerful tool in our
    efforts to improve relationships in the region, particularly in
    Southeast Asia, but also in China.
        U.S.S. Peleliu deployed to the Western Pacific for 120 days from
    June to September 2007 to perform a humanitarian assistance and theater
    security cooperation mission, reinforcing relationships and goodwill
    established during U.S.N.S. Mercy missions in 2005 and 2006. The
    Pacific Partnership team of regional partners, NGOs, military
    engineers, doctors, dentists, and veterinarians provided support to the
    governments of the Philippines, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Federated
    States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Peleliu Island, and the Republic
    of the Marshall Islands. Together they treated 31,684 medical patients,
    4,242 dental patients, 2,614 veterinary patients and completed 42
    engineering civic-action projects for the betterment of the host nation
    populace.
        This past summer USPACOM also leveraged the Pacific Air Forces
    International Health Services to conduct Pacific Angel, a C-17 based
    humanitarian assistance mission, to the island nations of Kiribati,
    Nauru, and Vanuatu. In less than 9 days, this 50 person team of
    talented dentists, nurses, surgeons, and engineers cared for over 1,800
    patients and rehabilitated 3 clinics. We will continue similar missions
    this year, using the unique capability of the C-17 to bring assistance
    to remote, generally inaccessible Asia-Pacific areas.
        Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
    Assistance (COE), a direct reporting unit to USPACOM, offers a unique
    tool in our continuing efforts to promote stability and human security
    in the Asia-Pacific region. COE educational programs in humanitarian
    response, peacekeeping, stability operations, and public health engage
    non-traditional partners from the civilian community and help maintain
    critical key relationships with our civilian disaster relief partners
    such as the United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations,
    and civilian authorities in partner nations. COE activities also build
    indigenous capacity and promote consensus on strategies to improve our
    collective security against the emerging threats of climate change,
    urbanization, and potential pandemics.
        APCSS provides regular executive education to key regional
    security-practitioner leaders. APCSS has broadened its audience beyond
    traditional defense practitioners to encompass whole-of-government,
    non-governmental, and international organizations in order to address
    complex security issues more comprehensively. During fiscal year 2007,
    APCSS held security-related workshops in Cambodia, Nepal, Japan,
    Bangladesh, and Brunei. Feedback from the region indicates that APCSS
    Alumni are routinely leveraging the knowledge, skills, and
    relationships gained at APCSS to make progressive change in specific
    security cooperation areas.
    Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command
        USPACOM has no more important and honorable mission than achieving
    the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing from our Nation's
    conflicts. Our Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) successfully
    accomplished more than 50 missions globally last year. Additionally,
    JPAC Central Identification Laboratory identified 62 unaccounted
    individuals from the Vietnam War, Korean War, and World War II. In
    conducting its mission, JPAC relied upon cooperation from Cambodia,
    Vietnam, Laos, the ROK, Japan, the Pacific Islands, and several
    countries in Europe.
        We anticipate similar results in the coming year. JPAC has also
    received tentative approval to conduct a recovery mission in the
    People's Republic of China and to engage Government of India officials
    regarding potential recovery missions in Northeast India. Operations in
    North Korea remain suspended, but JPAC is prepared to resume operation
    once conditions in North Korea are again appropriate.
        This year, with the support of the Department, USPACOM will
    complete the design for a new JPAC headquarters at Hickam Air Force
    Base. In fiscal year 2010, we will seek congressional authority and
    military construction funds for this $105 million project.
                                quality of life
        We thank Congress for the extraordinary support you give our
    people--our most valuable asset. We are grateful for consistent pay
    raises, improved housing, enhanced medical and dental services,
    exemplary education programs, enriching family and deployment support
    programs, and other new quality of life initiatives for our families.
        With regards to education for our children, the number one priority
    for our families, your support allowed a new high school to open in
    Guam and construction to begin on the elementary/middle school. In
    Daegu, Korea an addition to the high school was completed, offering
    Junior Reserve Officer Training facilities, a music wing, gym and
    counseling center.
                               summary statement
        USPACOM long-term priorities emphasize a region that is stable,
    secure and at peace. We are engaged extensively throughout the AOR to
    advance theater security goals. We are committed--along with our allies
    and partners--to turn the promise of a stable and secure region into
    reality and convert challenges into opportunities that strengthen
    regional relationships and cooperation. We are fortunate to have
    traditional allies and partners, as well as emerging partners, who are
    willing to help set conditions for security and stability and work
    together for the common good of the people of the Asia-Pacific. We
    appreciate the staunch support of Congress and American people. I am
    proud and honored to represent the men and women of U.S. PACOM. On
    their behalf, thank you for your support, and thank you for this
    opportunity to testify on the defense posture in the USPACOM AOR.

        Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you so much.
        General Bell?

     STATEMENT OF GEN BURWELL B. BELL III, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
     NATIONS COMMAND AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA/UNITED STATES COMBINED
         FORCES COMMAND; COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

        General Bell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Warner, distinguished members of the committee.
        Your support for our alliance with Korea in an area of the
    world which I view as of vital interest to the United States of
    America is greatly appreciated, as is your commitment to our
    servicemembers serving there in Korea, about 8,000 miles from
    home.
        Sir, for the record I'd like to submit my 2008 posture
    statement.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General Bell. On February 25, 2008, just last month, Lee
    Myung-bak was inaugurated as the president of the Republic of
    Korea in a landslide victory. In his inaugural address before
    international heads of state, diplomats, and dignitaries, with
    45,000 South Koreans gathered there, he spoke eloquently about
    the relationship with the United States. Singling us out
    individually, he said, ``We will work to develop and further
    strengthen traditional friendly relations with the United
    States into a future-oriented relationship. Based on the deep
    mutual trust that exists between our two peoples, we will also
    strengthen our strategic alliance with the United States.''
        It was an interesting moment for him in his inaugural
    address to stop and talk about the United States specifically,
    and then he went on, of course, and dealt with other subjects.
        Our partnership with the Republic of Korea is entering in
    my view an extremely positive era, wherein the South Koreans
    strongly desire to reinvigorate our alliance. In recent State
    Department public polling, 75 percent of South Koreans viewed
    the American military presence to be important to South Korean
    national security. Sixty-eight percent believe that the United
    States-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty should be maintained
    even if the threat of aggression from North Korea ended.
        Today we are indeed welcome and wanted in the Republic of
    Korea. It's my strongest recommendation that the United States
    seize this moment and extend a reciprocating welcoming hand to
    one of our most steadfast and long-term allies.
        Today the Republic of Korea is a modern first-world nation.
    Rising from the third-world stagnation to an economic
    powerhouse, South Korea is bidding to become 1 of the 10
    largest economies in the world and they do rank 11th right now.
        Korea is strategically located on the east Asian mainland
    at the regional nexus of an economically advancing China,
    resurgent Russia, and economically powerful Japan. Illustrative
    of this is that Seoul is 100 miles closer to Beijing than it is
    to Tokyo. I cannot overstate the strategic importance of the
    long-term U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea to help
    ensure continued peace and stability in northeast Asia.
        Today North Korea does remain the single most dangerous
    threat to regional security in East Asia in my view. With the
    fourth largest military in the world, North Korea continues to
    train and ready itself for potential war. North Korea employs a
    military-first policy while depriving its citizens of basic
    sustenance. North Korea focuses proportionately enormous energy
    on developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and it has
    worked hard to develop a sophisticated missile capability. Its
    past record of proliferation coupled with its recent nuclear
    weapons and missile developmental activities are a matter of
    great concern, as you all know.
        I too believe, as Admiral Keating stated, the Six-Party
    Talks process is the most viable path to achieve
    denuclearization of North Korea, and I too remain hopeful that
    North Korea will continue to demonstrate good faith in
    executing the agreement that they signed up for. Until full
    denuclearization is achieved, progress in lowering the risks to
    regional and even global peace and stability will remain
    problematic.
        Meanwhile, in working with South Korea to modernize and
    transform our alliance, we're on the threshold of transferring
    operational command or operational control, ``OPCON,'' as we
    call it, of South Korean military forces in potential wartime
    from the U.S. Combined Forces headquarters, which I command, to
    the South Korean military itself. That's going to take place in
    2012 and this OPCON transfer will realize the final step in
    sovereign self-reliance for the South Korean government, with
    the United States remaining a trusted ally, fully committed to
    fighting side by side with our partner.
        Gentlemen, I conclude my statement today by reiterating my
    view that Korea is located at the geographical and geopolitical
    nexus of Northeast Asia. Global economic prosperity, including
    our own, is immensely dependent on continued peace and economic
    enterprise with our trading partners in this area of the world.
    My strongest recommendation is that the United States approach
    our alliance with South Korea from a long-term strategic
    perspective.
        Next month President Lee Myung-bak will visit the United
    States and Washington. We are the first country that he will
    travel to since assuming the presidency and I hope that
    Congress will embrace this very friendly, pro-U.S., and
    visionary South Korean leader. He's extending a welcoming hand
    of friendship to us and I think that we must be no less
    forthcoming and seize this opportunity.
        It's my best judgment that our alliance with U.S. forces
    stationed in South Korea is of vital importance to us and it
    should be the centerpiece of our foreign and security policy
    throughout the 21st century and beyond, regardless of any
    future resolution of the North Korean issue.
        I thank you for allowing me to make this statement and,
    gentlemen, I'll be glad to take your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Bell follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by GEN B.B. Bell, USA
        Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you today. As the Commander,
    United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea-United
    States Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States
    Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the servicemembers
    and their families who serve in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf
    of these outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, I thank
    you for your unwavering support which allows us to promote prosperity
    and stability in Northeast Asia and ensure security on the Korean
    peninsula. I appreciate this opportunity to present my updated
    assessment of the command and our plan for continued transformation and
    strengthening of the United States-ROK Alliance.
        Our Alliance was forged in blood when our countries fought side-by-
    side during the Korean War, and was formalized by the signing of our
    Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. This treaty has since served both
    nations well, while continually assuring the ROK and its citizens that
    the United States is a committed ally. Our Mutual Defense Treaty with
    Korea is a model of foresight, strategic thinking, and global
    understanding. Behind the shield of our alliance, the ROK has rebuilt
    from the devastation of war and is now a thoroughly modern nation with
    a vibrant democracy and a flourishing trade-based economy. South Korea
    now showcases the 11th largest economy in the world. For the past 55
    years, our bilateral military alliance has provided the stability and
    security that is essential for preserving peace, promoting democracy,
    and fostering prosperity for the citizens of the ROK. The Alliance
    still serves its original purpose of deterrence against North Korea.
    However, it is in our best interest to cultivate and expand the
    Alliance into one that more fully serves our two nations by
    contributing to a broader strategy for the promotion and enhancement of
    regional security. Regardless of the outcome of ongoing negotiations
    with north Korea and the possibility that a future peace treaty might
    further contribute to regional security, our Alliance with the ROK
    along with a meaningful U.S. force presence should be maintained
    throughout the 21st century and beyond.
        The previous administration of President Roh put a high priority on
    developing cooperative relations between north and South Korea in an
    effort to lay the foundations for a peaceful and prosperous peninsula.
    Inter-Korean dialogue was highlighted by the second north--South Korean
    Presidential Summit in October 2007. Newly inaugurated President Lee,
    Myung-bak has articulated a policy of continued engagement and
    cooperation with north Korea, but has noted that any such engagement
    should occur in parallel with further progress toward complete
    denuclearization. The U.S. is supportive of inter-Korean dialogue and
    there is reason for optimism that bilateral north-South engagement
    could bolster the Six-Party Talks effort to achieve the complete
    denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula while advancing the path to
    peace. However, the strategic rationale for a future U.S. force
    presence in Korea far transcends the important, yet one-dimensional
    north Korea issue.
        Historically, security interests have been the initial basis for
    long-term U.S. defense alliances. Security and stability underpin
    opportunities for peace, economic growth, and social development. To
    remain healthy, an alliance can and should change and expand over time.
    As an example, after the fall of the former Soviet Union many believed
    that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would become
    obsolete due to the perception that it existed only to deter Soviet
    aggression during the Cold War. However, instead of disbanding after
    the fall of the Iron Curtain, NATO has evolved into a multi-dimensional
    alliance whose members share the fundamental values of democratic
    principles, individual freedom, and free market enterprise. Indeed in
    the post-Cold War era, NATO has blossomed from 16 to 26 nations,
    including Eastern European countries. Further expansion is possible.
        Nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War, we can clearly see
    that the members of NATO demonstrated exceptional strategic courage and
    foresight, transforming the alliance into one committed beyond its
    single dimension of military security in Europe, into an alliance with
    global impact in support of democracy and increasing prosperity for all
    its members. In the United States, there was never any thought that we
    should disband NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union. The United
    States led the effort to expand NATO, while refocusing and redefining
    its purpose. Today, the foresight of 20 years ago appears remarkably
    wise, as the Trans-Atlantic Alliance engages with an increasingly
    complex European, Central Asian and Global environment.
        Similarly, it is time for Washington to reexamine its Defense
    Treaty with Seoul and look beyond the narrow scope of the DMZ threat,
    and solidify the Alliance as a pillar of stability and cooperation that
    will be an example for all the Nations of Northeast Asia and the world.
    Today, Northeast Asia is changing and its nations are engaging across a
    broad range of activities. Located on the Asian mainland, Korea is
    situated at the regional nexus of an emerging China, a resurgent Russia
    and a prosperous Japan. Indeed, Seoul is geographically closer to
    Beijing than it is to Tokyo. Keeping in mind this central position of
    Korea in the region, it is important for America to fully appreciate
    that Northeast Asia is home to four of our nine largest trading
    partners. The region accounts for 24 percent of all U.S. trade as well
    as a $191 billion U.S. direct investment position in 2006. With nearly
    a quarter of the world's population (1.5 billion people) and 4 of the
    world's 16 largest economies, having a combined 2006 gross domestic
    product (GDP) of approximately $16.4 trillion (25 percent of the global
    GDP), Northeast Asia is crucial to the world's expanding free trade
    system and is certain to remain an area absolutely critical to U.S.
    national interests.
        Within the Northeast Asia region, the ROK plays a vital role in
    sustaining U.S. prosperity. With expanding markets, the prospect of a
    mutually beneficial free trade agreement with the United States, and as
    one of the most technologically and scientifically advanced countries
    in the world, the ROK is a first-class economic power and a major
    business, banking and commerce center. South Korea is already the
    world's largest shipbuilder, the 3rd largest steel producer, and the
    5th largest car manufacturing nation. As a major U.S. economic partner,
    South Korea ranks as our seventh largest trading partner and seventh
    largest export market. South Korea's economic strength will continue to
    develop under the newly elected ROK president.
        While the region generates much of the world's commerce, it is also
    highly vulnerable to flashpoints which can threaten stability.
    Notwithstanding progress toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula borne
    from the Six-Party Talks process and the ongoing disablement of north
    Korea's nuclear facilities, we remain concerned about north Korea's
    proliferation of military equipment and ballistic missiles along with
    missile-related technologies. Beyond the north Korean threat, the
    presence of five of the world's six largest militaries and three proven
    nuclear powers, heightened nationalism, historical animosities,
    territorial disputes, resource competition, and historical struggles
    for regional hegemony all come together to pose long-term regional
    security challenges in this area which is so critical to our economy
    and other national interests.
        In view of U.S. economic and security interests in the ROK and the
    region, it is my most considered judgment that the U.S. should set a
    cooperative policy based on shared interests and values with the ROK to
    maintain a meaningful American troop presence on the Korean Peninsula
    throughout the 21st century and beyond, even subsequent to a peace
    treaty with north Korea, should that come about. Peace, stability and
    prosperity in this region of the world have not been attained for the
    past 55 years by accident or good luck. They are a function of a
    reliable and credible long-term U.S. presence in Korea, Japan, and the
    Pacific Rim.
        Korea-based U.S. forces are the only U.S. forces present on the
    East Asian mainland. In considering our future engagement,
    opportunities and influence in East Asia, we should take counsel of
    history and recall stated policies for the area following World War II.
    Many argue that America's perceived policy of retrenchment from the
    Asian mainland, highlighted by Secretary of State Acheson's
    ``Perimeter'' speech to the National Press Club in 1950, set conditions
    for instability and emboldened north Korean aggression, supported by
    outside influences. Now is the time for the United States to reaffirm
    the tenets of our Mutual Defense Treaty Alliance with Korea and set our
    course for cooperative engagement on the Asian mainland throughout the
    21st century. A stated long-term commitment to our South Korean Ally on
    the Asian mainland which is independent of a peace treaty with north
    Korea is the most cost-effective approach to long-term peace and
    stability in East Asia.
        In considering our long-term interests, the United States will be
    best served by balancing the ongoing on-peninsula transformation of
    today's Alliance with an additional and fundamental change in our troop
    stationing policies in the ROK. I am convinced that we have an historic
    opportunity to end our outdated and debilitating legacy system of 1
    year family unaccompanied short tour rotations, and replace it with
    normal 3 year family accompanied tours of duty. Recall that at the
    height of the Cold War and with U.S. Army divisions facing numerically
    superior Russian and Warsaw Pact divisions armed with modern equipment
    and tactical nuclear weapons, we still welcomed our families to Europe
    and fully offered 3 year family accompanied tours to our married
    servicemembers. Not only did this policy provide a solid measure of
    stability and eliminate family separations for our post-Vietnam
    volunteer military, it also sent a powerful message to our friends and
    adversaries alike that America was fully committed to our NATO Alliance
    for the long-term.
        With a force in Korea less than 10 percent the size of our
    commitment to the Cold War in Europe, we can easily afford and should,
    in coordination with our Korean ally, initiate a policy now to begin
    the implementation of a 10-year program to transition to family
    accompanied tours in Korea. Such a policy will eliminate a significant
    added source of family separations in a military already
    extraordinarily stretched by repeated unaccompanied short tour combat
    rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, with major burden
    sharing financial support from our Korean Ally, including anticipated
    increases, the financial burden to the United States will be
    comparatively low, particularly given the return on investment in long-
    term security and stability in the region. Last, a family accompanied
    policy will bring our stationing practices in line with the same
    practices we have set for our forces in both Europe and Japan--policies
    that have enjoyed long-term congressional support.
        With family accompanied servicemember tour normalization
    implemented over a 10 year transition period and in close coordination
    with our Korean Ally as provided for in our current bilateral Strategic
    Flexibility Agreement, the United States will be in a position to
    consider selected levels of worldwide deployment of our Korean based
    force, not unlike the way our forces deploy from and return to their
    bases in Europe and Japan. Deployment from and return to our Korean
    Main Operating Bases (MOBs) where our families would be located would
    be a function of any continued threat from north Korea, and U.S. global
    force generation requirements. In all decision making related to our
    alliance with Korea, the U.S. would be obligated to continue to ensure
    we meet our security responsibilities with the ROK, without ever
    sending a message of reduced commitment or weakness to any and all
    potential adversaries, including North Korea.
                i. the united states-republic of korea alliance
        While established to deter the North Korean threat, the U.S.-ROK
    Alliance is maturing from a single purpose military relationship to a
    broader partnership committed to expanding prosperity and regional
    stability which should be continued and reinforced. It is in our
    national interest to do so. The presence of U.S forces and the strength
    of the Alliance form a cornerstone of continued regional peace and
    stability, essential for stable global markets, expansion of prosperity
    through free trade, and promotion of freedom and democracy. The United
    States and the ROK have agreed to transition from the U.S.-led Alliance
    warfighting CFC, to an arrangement where U.S. forces are in a
    doctrinally supporting role to the ROK military. The ROK military will
    assume responsibility for commanding and controlling the warfighting
    readiness and operations of their own forces in wartime for the first
    time since the end of the Korean War. Towards this end, the U.S.
    military will form an independent U.S. headquarters to command U.S.
    forces serving in Korea during wartime, while the Koreans will form a
    Korean national warfighting headquarters referred to by them
    provisionally as the ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC). This transition is
    referred to by many as ``Operational Control (OPCON) Transfer'' and
    will take place on 17 April 2012. The current U.S. led combined
    warfighting command, CFC, will be disestablished. The transition will
    convey a strong message to all regional actors of continuing solidarity
    with our Korean ally, while providing us an opportunity to strengthen
    our close and cooperative relationship with the ROK. With OPCON
    transition, one of the longstanding perceived infringements on ROK
    sovereignty and self determination will be removed along with a
    lightning rod for political dissent and anti-American sentiment. This
    move is healthy, long overdue, and in the best interest of both the
    United States and the ROK.
    The Republic of Korea Today
        Over the course of the Alliance's half-century of security
    cooperation, the ROK has flourished while becoming a leader in the 21st
    century global community, and the envy of many nations throughout the
    world. Within this vibrant democracy, South Korean citizens have
    achieved an incredible standard of living, a modern transportation
    infrastructure, and world-class universities and hospitals. As the 11th
    largest economy in the world, the ROK is a hub of economic activity
    within Northeast Asia, and an integral player in the global trading
    system. It is a true testament to the South Korean people that within a
    single lifetime they have realized the joy and pride of rebuilding
    their country from the ashes of war to prosperity and leading-power
    status.
    U.S.-ROK Alliance Partnership
        Since the end of the Korean War, each generation has dreamed of
    achieving a true and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. With the
    North-South Korean Presidential Summit in late 2007 and the ongoing
    Six-Party Talks process, there is reason for hope and optimism.
    However, optimism must be tempered with caution due to North Korea's
    unpredictability. The U.S.-ROK Alliance provides diplomatic leaders
    with a mechanism to develop options for confidence building measures
    that can assist in the overall effort to denuclearize the Korean
    Peninsula and promote dialogue between the North and South with the
    purpose of eventually realizing a peace treaty between the two Koreas.
    The Alliance fully supports this process. Until peace becomes reality,
    the U.S.-ROK Alliance must remain vigilant and capable of deterring
    North Korean aggression.
        To ensure future viability, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to embark
    on the most profound defense transformation on the peninsula since the
    end of the Korean War. For the past 58 years, the United States has led
    the warfighting command responsible for the defense of the ROK. Today,
    it is both prudent and the ROK's sovereign right to assume the primary
    responsibility for the lead role in its defense, given its advanced
    military and economic capabilities. The transition to a ROK-led
    national defense will be a success story for both the United States and
    the ROK and is the cornerstone to future regional stability.
    Transition of Wartime Operational Control
        In September 2006, the Presidents of the United States and the ROK
    agreed that South Korea should assume the lead for its own defense. In
    early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National
    Defense determined that South Korea will assume wartime OPCON of its
    forces on April 17, 2012. U.S. Forces Korea will transform into a new
    joint warfighting command, provisionally described as Korea Command
    (KORCOM). KORCOM will be a fully capable and resourced complementary
    U.S. joint warfighting command in a doctrinally supporting role to the
    ROK JFC. The United States views this effort as an affirmation of the
    tremendous success of the Alliance since the end of the Korean War.
    U.S. and ROK civilian and military leaders have been discussing wartime
    OPCON transition for nearly two decades as part of the normal
    progression of the Alliance. Transitioning the Alliance to a new ROK-
    led military command and control structure in 2012, with U.S. and U.N.
    forces in doctrinally supporting roles, will enhance relationships that
    best serve both nations' interests and are well suited for the long-
    term. In the future, ROK Army ground forces will leverage quick
    reacting and readily available U.S. air and naval capabilities to
    counter initial North Korean provocations or aggression. Though
    transitioning to a doctrinally supporting military relationship, the
    Commander of the new KORCOM will still maintain uninterrupted national
    command over all U.S. forces.
    ROK Defense Initiatives
        Since assuming peacetime OPCON of its armed forces in 1994, the ROK
    has made great strides in readiness through upgrading equipment and
    force training. Since 1998, the ROK Army has fielded 13 modern
    mechanized brigades including approximately 1000 K-1 tanks, South
    Korea's main battle tank similar to the U.S. M-1 Abrams. In addition,
    there are 11 field artillery battalions, two multiple launch rocket
    system battalions, and an extremely capable special operations force.
    The ROK Marine Corps is highly trained and in the midst of fielding a
    modern battle command and control system, and the Navy is emerging as a
    blue-water force, having commissioned its first amphibious assault ship
    in 2007, a vessel similar to a U.S. Navy Landing Helicopter Assault
    ship. In 2007, the ROK Navy also launched its first of three KDX-III
    class Aegis radar equipped destroyers. Finally, the ROK Air Force is
    modernizing with the acquisition of F-15K fighters and precision-guided
    munitions to enhance deep strike and core facility protection
    capabilities.
        Under its ambitious Defense Reform 2020 plan, the ROK military
    strives to be a more modern and agile fighting force. Its goal is to
    develop a self-reliant, technology-oriented, qualitative defense force.
    As a result of its emphasis on technology under this plan, the ROK
    plans to reduce its total (Active and Reserve) Army ground forces by
    approximately 45 percent over the next 12 years leading up to its
    target date of 2020. The overall active and Reserve Forces will be
    reduced from about 3.7 million to about 2 million. It is my assessment
    that the ROK military is well on its way to achieving a military force
    capability that as the ROK Ministry of National Defense puts it, ``sees
    farther, moves faster, and strikes more precisely.'' Nonetheless, as
    the CFC Commander responsible to both the Presidents of Korea and the
    United States for deterrence and for executing a warfight with North
    Korea, I do believe that planned drawdowns of the ROK Army should be
    executed commensurate with similar drawdowns by the North Korean Army.
    Republic of Korea's Support to Global and Regional Security
        The ROK is a committed U.S. ally and active defender of freedom
    around the world having previously committed troops to Vietnam,
    Operation Desert Storm, Somalia, and East Timor. Reflecting its greater
    political, economic and military capacity, the ROK continues to
    demonstrate a larger international role with deployments into Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and most recently, a peacekeeping battalion to Lebanon
    supporting United Nations operations. In December 2007, the ROK's
    National Assembly approved a fourth, 1-year extension of its
    commitments in Iraq through 2008, although their force has been reduced
    by approximately 600 soldiers. In Afghanistan, the ROK's support
    included medical and engineer construction units and other military
    assistance worth millions of dollars. Though the ROK Government
    recently redeployed the majority of its troops from Afghanistan and
    will replace them with a small civilian-led medical team, I am
    confident that this redeployment will not lessen either the South
    Korean commitment to the U.S.-ROK Alliance, or its commitment to peace
    and stability around the world.
            ii. north korea challenges regional and global security
        North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast
    Asia. Notwithstanding progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks and the
    ongoing disablement of its Yongbyon nuclear reactor facility, North
    Korea's historical opposition to meaningful reform and its long-term
    pattern of provocative behavior and proliferation present significant
    challenges to achieving lasting regional and global stability. In
    addition to North Korea's nuclear threat, its missile program, coupled
    with its aging but still lethal and forward positioned conventional
    force, continues to present significant challenges.
    North Korean Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Developments
        Progress in the Six-Party Talks notwithstanding, North Korea
    continues to use its nuclear program and suspected stockpile as both a
    deterrent and leverage in negotiations, as highlighted by the recent
    failure to meet the 31 December 2007 nuclear declaration deadline as
    agreed in the Six-Party Talks process. Currently, the intelligence
    community assesses that North Korea extracted plutonium at its Yongbyon
    nuclear facility and possesses weapons-grade plutonium sufficient for
    several nuclear devices.
        North Korea is also believed to have pursued a highly enriched
    uranium development program that if fully developed could provide an
    alternative method of nuclear weapons development independent of North
    Korea's plutonium production facility at Yongbyon. Regardless of the
    fact that the Yongbyon reactor was shut down in July 2007 with physical
    disablement beginning in November, the nuclear threat will remain until
    full implementation of North Korea's commitment under the September
    2005 Joint Statement to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing
    nuclear programs.
        North Korea views its ballistic missile program as a source of
    international power and prestige, a strategic deterrent, and a source
    of hard currency derived from exports. As a leading supplier of
    missile-related technologies with known export programs to Syria, Iran
    and other nations of concern, North Korea continues to build missiles
    of increasing range, lethality and accuracy, bolstering its current
    stockpile of 800 missiles for its defense and external sales. With its
    recent intercontinental missile test conducted in July 2006, and
    preparations underway to field a new intermediate range missile capable
    of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska, North Korea's missile development
    and export program present a threat which can not be ignored.
    North Korean Armed Forces
        Despite chronic economic hardship, North Korea retains the fourth
    largest armed force in the world with 1.2 million Active Duty and 5
    million Reserves, devoting up to one third of its available resources
    to sustain its conventional and asymmetric military capabilities.
    Though aging and unsophisticated by U.S. standards, its military
    arsenal, which includes 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and over
    13,000 artillery systems, still constitutes a substantial threat.
    Seventy percent of North Korea's ground forces are located within 90
    miles of the Demilitarized Zone, with up to 250 long range artillery
    systems capable of striking the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area, a
    thriving urban area of over 20 million inhabitants. While I do not
    assess that its military is capable of sustained offensive maneuver
    that could successfully defeat the combined military power of the ROK
    and United States, North Korea still has the capacity to inflict major
    destruction and significant military and civilian casualties in South
    Korea, with little to no warning.
        Supplementing its conventional forces, North Korea also maintains
    the world's largest Special Operations Force (SOF), with over 80,000 in
    its ranks. Tough, well trained, and profoundly loyal, these forces are
    capable of conducting strategic reconnaissance and asymmetric attacks
    against a range of critical civilian and military targets. Among the
    best resourced in its military, North Korean special operations forces
    provide an asymmetric enabler to North Korea in crisis, provocation, or
    war. Given the dense South Korean civilian population which is heavily
    dependent on sophisticated infrastructure, fuels, utilities, and
    transportation, North Korean SOF poses a major threat to the Alliance's
    ability to effectively protect and defend South Korea.
    North Korean Threat Outlook
        North Korea will remain a major destabilizing force in our efforts
    to maintain security in Northeast Asia and globally until we have
    achieved the complete implementation of the September 2005 Joint
    Statement of Principles. With little tolerance for economic reform, and
    an infrastructure, agricultural and industrial sector incapable of
    meeting the needs of its populace, North Korea's long-term approach to
    maintaining its ``military first'' policy will remain a major challenge
    for the north. My assessment is that while aware of the depths of its
    economic crisis and the dangers of its significant dependence on
    foreign aid to meet basic sustenance requirements, North Korea will
    continue to resist fundamental change, focusing its international
    engagement, strategic dialogue and military readiness to ensure its
    long-term survival.
           iii. ensuring peace and stability on the korean peninsula
        As Commander of CFC, UNC, and USFK, force readiness is my first
    priority. Readiness can only be maintained by training and executing
    all key tasks and responsibilities to standard in conditions
    approximating those expected to be encountered in wartime. We must
    ensure that our training facilities and training opportunities fully
    support the transformation of our U.S. military forces stationed in
    Korea. Since my last testimony to Congress in April 2007, measurable
    progress has been made in improving training range and airspace
    availability for our ground and air forces in Korea, but we must still
    make additional progress with our Korean ally to put ourselves in a
    position to achieve the highest levels of readiness. USFK still
    requires increased access to modern and instrumented air to ground
    bombing ranges in the ROK, with the requisite training schedule
    required to maintain readiness levels. The ROK military is working hard
    in coordination with civilian ministries to provide the required
    training ranges and airspace, and we appreciate their efforts. We look
    forward to continued progress in this area throughout the remaining
    fiscal year 2008 and into fiscal year 2009.
        Continued congressional support for force capability enhancements
    is also critical to readiness. USFK has continued to make meaningful
    progress in several key focus areas for modernization: joint command,
    control, communications, and computers (C4); intelligence, surveillance
    and reconnaissance (ISR); theater missile defense (TMD); prepositioned
    equipment and logistics; and counter-fire and precision munitions. I
    ask for your support and help to ensure our necessary upgrades and our
    transformational requirements are met evenly and predictably.
    C4 and ISR
        Modernization of C4 and ISR capabilities is a top command priority,
    and crucial to transforming the U.S.-ROK Alliance. As we prepare to
    transition command of Korean forces in wartime to the ROK military in
    2012, combined intelligence interoperability will be paramount to
    establishing a seamless command and control capability, to maintain
    Alliance access to U.S. capabilities, and to leverage the increasing
    capabilities of the ROK intelligence community. Major C4 and ISR
    initiatives which are important include the integration of ROK
    intelligence systems through Project Morning Calm, the expansion of our
    combined intelligence networks, the establishment of an Intelligence
    Fusion Center, and support for U.S. National Multi-Intelligence Support
    Elements at the ROK defense intelligence centers.
        Congressional support is essential to sustain and improve C4 and
    ISR during this critical period of Alliance transformation. Validated
    U.S. requirements for Global Hawk, Predator, the Joint Surveillance and
    Target Attack Radar System, along with improved signals and human
    intelligence capabilities continue to exist. Support for our
    intelligence requirements ensures that we close the most critical gaps,
    support diligent ongoing daily operations, and improve the overall
    long-term intelligence posture in the region.
    Theater Missile Defense
        North Korea's missile tests in 2006 highlighted the importance of
    an active theater missile defense system for South Korea. The ROK must
    field its own TMD system, capable of full integration with the U.S.
    system, in the near-term. It recently approved the purchase of eight
    Configuration-2 German Patriot fire units. When fielded in 2008 and
    2009, these firing units will possess a U.S. PAC-2 equivalent theater
    ballistic missile defensive capability. The regional missile threat
    from North Korea requires the ROK to develop its own missile defense to
    protect its critical civilian and military command capabilities,
    critical infrastructure and population centers. As of now, these Korean
    military and civilian facilities are highly vulnerable to North Korean
    missile attacks.
        PAC-3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have
    significantly enhanced our posture to protect critical United States
    facilities in Korea. There remains, however, a significant shortage of
    PAC-3 missiles currently positioned on the Peninsula to counter North
    Korea's missile inventory. Continued production of PAC-3 missiles in
    the near-term, followed by continued development of the Theater High
    Altitude Air Defense, Airborne Laser, and Aegis Ballistic Missile
    Defense will provide the layered missile defense capability we require
    for the future. Your continued support remains essential to these and
    other Service component programs that protect our forces on the
    peninsula, and sustain our ability to reinforce South Korea in the
    event of a crisis.
    Theater Logistics, War Reserve Materiel and Strategic Transportation
        An integral aspect of USFK transformation is developing the
    necessary logistics structures and resources to enhance our ability to
    respond to contingencies. The proximity of the North Korean threat
    coupled with the long distances from U.S. sustainment bases in the
    Pacific and continental United States requires a robust and responsive
    logistics capability. The capability enhancements currently planned
    will significantly improve our core logistics functions through pre-
    positioned equipment upgrades, responsive strategic transportation, and
    modern logistics tracking systems.
        Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)-4, which includes critical
    equipment, weapon systems, preferred munitions, repair parts, and
    essential supplies, is vital for rapid combat power projection to the
    Korean theater. Critical combat systems are currently at 100 percent
    fill and the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) equipment set is 97
    percent Fully Mission Capable. During the Reception, Staging, Onward
    Movement, and Integration exercise in 2007, Task Force Blackhorse, from
    the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, CA, drew selected APS-
    4 HBCT combat vehicles and conducted a road march that culminated in a
    live-fire exercise. The task force certified the equipment as fully
    mission capable, remarking that the combat systems--Abrams tanks,
    Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and Paladin self-propelled
    howitzers--were the best that they had seen.
        Clearly, the Army Materiel Command is making great strides in
    maintaining the prepositioned stocks in Korea. However, sustainment
    shortages still exist and can only be overcome through the commitment
    of additional funding while increasing the priority of fill for Army
    prepositioned stocks. For example, we have less than 5 percent of our
    full authorization of uparmored HMMWVs or trucks in our Army
    operational and prepositioned fleets. This is a significant shortfall
    and is a major risk.
        Responsive strategic transportation platforms, such as cargo
    aircraft and maritime prepositioning ships, remain essential to our
    ability to rapidly reinforce the Korean theater and sustain U.S. forces
    in the event of crisis. Our critical strategic airlift capability was
    recently tested in February 2008 during the FOAL EAGLE exercise. U.S.
    Air Force C-17 aircraft transported a combat-ready platoon of Army
    Stryker vehicles from Alaska to the Korean Peninsula, where the unit
    conducted gunnery and maneuver live-fire exercises. During the same
    exercise, a battalion from the 7th Marine Regiment conducted a Maritime
    Prepositioning Force offload of combat equipment at Chinhae, followed
    by a combined live-fire exercise with the 2nd ROK Marine Division.
    These types of strategic deployments will continue to be a part of
    future Foal Eagle exercises, and exemplify the command's requirement
    for expeditionary capability and responsive strategic lift.
        Equally important is the ability to maintain in-transit visibility
    of supplies and equipment with a modernized joint logistics C4 and
    information system. Past experience has shown that relatively small
    investments in asset tracking systems and theater distribution yield
    significant efficiencies and improve overall effectiveness of our
    logistics systems. Your continued support for modern pre-positioned
    equipment, responsive transit requirements, and logistics tracking
    systems will ensure that U.S. forces have the right equipment and
    supplies at the right time.
    Precision Strike and Preferred Munitions
        Precision strike engagement capabilities are critical requirements
    for our contingency plans that allow us to change the dynamics of a
    conflict and rapidly achieve campaign objectives. Increasing the
    forward stocks of preferred munitions is also vital to operational
    success in the Korean theater. Our priority ordnance requirements
    include: the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System with extended range
    capability; a ground-launched, extended range, all weather capability
    to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets; precision-guided
    munitions; and air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles. Your continued
    support to these programs provides the overmatching capabilities to
    deter aggression.
    War Reserve Stocks Allies-Korea
        Legislation signed in December 2005 permits the U.S. to offer, for
    sale or concession, surplus ammunition and military equipment to the
    ROK. Negotiations for the War Reserve Stocks Allies-Korea (WRSA-K)
    program began in 2007. By successfully transferring these stocks to the
    ROK, the U.S. will avoid up to $1.2 billion in transportation and
    demilitarization costs, reduce its storage footprint, and increase ROK
    readiness.
                          iv. combined forces command
        The ROK and the United States established the CFC on November 7,
    1978, and it has proven to be the most advanced, capable, bilateral
    warfighting command in our Nation's history. Led by a U.S. four star
    commander, CFC has effectively deterred aggression and provided a
    peaceful and stable setting for the citizens of the ROK and the region
    for nearly 30 years.
        With the end of the Cold War and significant downturn in external
    conventional military support to the North Koreans, coupled with
    continued major enhancements to the ROK military, the ROK and United
    States have frequently discussed and negotiated changes to the
    Alliance's military command and control mechanisms. In fact since the
    Korean War and until 1994, a U.S. four star commander operationally
    controlled the ROK military in peacetime, as well as in potential
    wartime. On conclusion of negotiations in 1994, peacetime OPCON of the
    ROK military was transferred from the U.S. led CFC, to the ROK Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. Since 1994, the ROK and the United States have
    discussed and negotiated the next logical step in Alliance command
    arrangements, the full transfer of wartime OPCON of ROK military forces
    from the U.S. led CFC to a new ROK JFC. Final negotiations to set a
    date for this transition were agreed to in 2007, with a ROK military
    OPCON transition from CFC to the ROK JFC date set for 17 April 2012.
        To achieve realignment of responsibilities in the transition of
    wartime OPCON in 2012, the ROK and U.S. militaries completed a
    transition road map--the Strategic Transition Plan (STP)--signed in
    2007, identifying requirements and milestones for the next 5 years.
    Prior to the ROK assuming wartime OPCON of its own forces in 2012, U.S.
    and ROK planners will develop new terms of reference, crisis action
    standard operating procedures, wartime command and control procedures,
    and operational plans through formal alliance consultative processes,
    such as the bi-monthly Security Policy Initiative and the annual
    Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings.
        This is all made possible by the enormously successful economic and
    military development of the ROK. Celebrating the 11th largest economy
    in the world, the ROK is a solid democratic nation, with a world-class,
    highly competent and professional military dedicated to the
    preservation of its republic and clearly poised, with U.S. continued
    support, to assume responsibility for wartime operational command of
    its forces.
        Through the OPCON transition path to April 2012 and as part of the
    STP, the Alliance has initiated two major simulation-driven exercises
    each year. Ulchi Freedom Guardian will focus on training and certifying
    the 2012 and beyond future command structure, and Key Resolve/Foal
    Eagle (KR/FE) will ensure CFC readiness until 2012, while visibly
    demonstrating the strength of the Alliance. We just completed our first
    KR/FE Exercise under this new paradigm, and I am extremely confident
    that CFC remains highly capable of deterring aggression, and should
    deterrence fail, defeating a North Korean attack quickly and
    decisively.
        Lessons learned from each exercise will help to eliminate
    shortfalls in combined capabilities in order to maintain a strong and
    credible deterrent during the transition period. The culmination of the
    STP will be marked with a certification exercise in March 2012,
    followed shortly thereafter by the disestablishment of CFC and the
    simultaneous establishment of separate and complementary U.S. and South
    Korean national military commands, with the U.S. in a doctrinally
    supporting role to the ROK warfighting JFC. Our intent is to achieve
    initial operational capability for the doctrinally supporting KORCOM
    and its Service components, followed by full operational capability
    prior to the final certification exercise in March 2012.
                           v. united nations command
        As the longest standing peace enforcement coalition in the history
    of the United Nations, the UNC represents the international community's
    enduring commitment to the security and stability of the Korean
    Peninsula. With 15 current member nations and the ROK, the UNC provides
    a unified and prompt international response mechanism to preserve the
    security of the ROK if there is a North Korean attack. Furthermore, the
    UNC actively supervises compliance with the terms of the 1953 Korean
    Armistice Agreement fulfilling the members' mutual pledge to ``fully
    and faithfully carry out the terms'' of the Armistice. With
    responsibility south of the Military Demarcation Line for the
    maintenance of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC meets with the Korean
    People's Army (KPA) representatives, inspects South Korean units
    positioned along the DMZ, and conducts investigations into alleged
    Armistice violations to prevent minor incidents from escalating into
    destabilizing crises.
        As we progress towards the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012, the
    UNC will continue to be a vital component of our deterrent and
    warfighting capabilities in the ROK. The ROK and the U.S. are
    addressing current disconnects in UNC authorities and responsibilities,
    which will become untenable with the transition of wartime OPCON to the
    ROK JFC in 2012. In the current arrangement, the UNC Commander, the
    U.S. Forces Korea four-star general, is ultimately responsible for
    Armistice maintenance, crisis management and resolving Armistice
    violations, even though he has no peacetime authority to posture or
    position ROK military forces in response to provocations or violations
    along the Demilitarized Zone. Today, these responsibility--authority
    mismatches are mitigated through the U.S. Commander's dual-hat as CFC
    commander. Once the transition of wartime OPCON is complete, the U.S.
    commander, and thus the UNC commander, will no longer have any chain of
    command access or direct authority over ROK forces--the very forces
    that are arrayed along the DMZ--in peacetime, crisis escalation, or
    war.
        In accordance with the STP, both countries are jointly studying
    future arrangements for Armistice maintenance responsibilities, as well
    as the enduring role and authorities of the UNC. It is our goal to
    transfer or delegate appropriate armistice authorities and
    responsibilities to the ROK, while ensuring that the UNC remains a
    critical component in deterring aggression and supporting combat
    operations should conflict erupt on the peninsula. Through the UNC we
    must also maintain the United Nations--Japan Status of Forces Agreement
    (SOFA), which provides throughput access to critical Japanese air and
    naval bases for U.S. and U.N. forces during crisis.
                         vi. united states forces korea
        Under the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), signed by the U.S. and ROK
    in 2004, U.S. joint force elements operating in the Yongsan Garrison in
    Seoul will relocate to our MOB at Garrison Humphreys, near Pyongtaek,
    approximately 40 miles southwest of Seoul. The relocation of the Second
    Infantry Division is also part of a separate U.S.--ROK realignment
    plan, the Land Partnership Plan, which, when complete, will enable
    United States Army forces to assume a more efficient and less intrusive
    footprint within two sanctuary main operating base locations south of
    Seoul. It will remove our forces from the traditional military
    operational avenues between Seoul and the DMZ, thus putting U.S. forces
    in ground force and artillery sanctuary locations well south of the
    Nation's capital. Relocation will also significantly improve the
    quality of life of our servicemembers, while returning valuable land to
    the citizens of the ROK.
        For 4 of the past 5 years, the relocation of U.S. forces has
    frequently been contentious between the ROK and U.S. Governments. The
    central issue has been the application of the bilaterally negotiated
    SOFA procedures to return vacated U.S. base camps to the ROK. However,
    over the past year, the ROK Minister of National Defense has led an
    inspired effort which has largely resolved the disagreements and
    friction. We are confident that the new government will continue to
    negotiate in good faith with the United States regarding this most
    important issue.
        In 2007, we returned an additional five installations and expect to
    return two installations and seven other SOFA granted facilities in
    2008. To date, we have closed 37 installations encompassing over 17,208
    acres with a tax assessed value of over $500 million and returned 35
    installations to the ROK. Along with these camps and in accordance with
    our SOFA, we have transferred free of cost to the ROK the full range of
    buildings, capital assets, and improvements found on these camps, many
    built with U.S. appropriated military construction funds. It remains
    our goal to close a total of 63 facilities and areas--two thirds of all
    land granted under the SOFA, totaling more than 38,000 acres. Given the
    recently established cooperative effort as noted above, we are hopeful
    that this process will proceed smoothly to the mutual benefit of both
    nations in accordance with the U.S.-ROK SOFA.
        In exchange for the return of the majority of our dispersed camps,
    the ROK, per our agreements, has purchased 2,800 acres of land required
    to expand Garrison Humphreys and the Air Force's Osan Air Base.
    Allied Burdensharing
        At the end of 2006, the ROK and the United States concluded talks
    on a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) regarding ROK cost sharing
    support for USFK in 2007-2008. The resulting ROK SMA burden sharing
    contribution represented approximately 41 percent of U.S. Non-Personnel
    Stationing Costs (NPSC) over this 2-year period--725.5 billion won
    ($770 million) for 2007 and a Consumer Price Index adjusted increase in
    2008 to 741.5 billion won ($787 million). This is an improvement from
    the 2006 SMA contribution of 680.4 billion won ($722 million)
    representing 38 percent of NPSC.
        Defense burdensharing is advantageous to both Alliance partners.
    For the United States, the ROK's willingness to equitably share
    appropriate defense costs is a clear indicator that United States
    forces in Korea are welcome and wanted. Host nation funded construction
    satisfies critical infrastructure requirements that would otherwise be
    borne by U.S. taxpayers. In the past year ROK SMA contributions funded
    the construction of an $8.5 million Vehicle Maintenance Facility at
    Camp Mujuk and an $8.3 million upgrade of 22 Hardened Aircraft Shelters
    at Osan Air Base. We also authorized the design and construction of a
    $36.6 million U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Brigade headquarters
    facility at Osan Air Base, and began construction of a $41.8 million
    barracks complex for enlisted personnel at Kunsan Air Base. We are in
    the process of approving the construction of a $35 million humidity
    controlled warehouse to support APSs at U.S. Army Garrison Carroll and
    a $39.4 million joint senior noncommissioned officer dormitory at Osan
    Air Base.
        For the ROK, nearly all ROK SMA burdensharing funds are expended
    directly into the Korean economy by paying the salaries of Korean local
    national employees, Korean contractors and service agents, and Korean
    construction firms. In 2007 the ROK contributed 295.4 billion won ($314
    million) toward Korean local national employee wages, funding the
    majority of the cost of this absolutely necessary workforce on U.S.
    bases. ROK SMA contributions also offset 132.5 billion won ($141
    million) of U.S. logistics requirements last year, through contracts
    with Korean companies in critical warfighting functions such as
    equipment repair, maintenance, and munitions storage.
        In principle, both sides agree to the goal of reaching an equitable
    level of commitment to allied cost sharing. The U.S. Department of
    Defense believes that to achieve equitability, the ROK should share
    approximately 50 percent of NPSC. While this year's contribution did
    not meet DOD's goal, the ROK and the U.S. will continue to negotiate
    and coordinate in pursuit of reaching a more equitable sharing level of
    USFK stationing costs.
    Upgrading and Building New Infrastructure
        Currently I assess our facilities overall in Korea to be the most
    dilapidated in the U.S. military, outside of active combat or peace
    enforcement zones. This regrettable situation is not in keeping with
    our stated commitment to the young men and women who selflessly serve
    our Nation. In Korea we need to commit to recapitalizing our facilities
    and infrastructure. As a reliable and trusted ally, we are committed to
    helping defend one of the most prosperous and advanced countries in the
    world, yet the facilities that we subject our servicemembers and their
    families to in Korea resemble something only a couple of years out of a
    combat zone.
        Year after year our servicemembers and their families are subjected
    to substandard and often decrepit facilities and housing here in Korea,
    8,000 miles from home. The war in Korea ended nearly 55 years ago and
    it is time to put our personnel into facilities and infrastructure they
    rightfully deserve as American citizens, military volunteers and
    patriots. ``Out of sight--out of mind'' is not an acceptable facilities
    and infrastructure strategy for our priceless young men and women, and
    their families. As a Nation, we simply cannot turn a blind eye to this
    decades long lack of capitalization and maintenance.
        Our facilities and infrastructure are old, particularly Army
    facilities where over one-third of the buildings in the command are
    between 25 and 50 years old and another one-third are classified as
    temporary structures. In 2007, our estimates are that the Eighth United
    States Army was underfunded by 26 percent ($28 million) in sustainment
    and 78 percent ($307 million) in restoration and modernization
    requirements. The Seventh Air Force was underfunded by 40 percent ($20
    million) in sustainment and 93 percent ($244 million) in restoration
    and modernization requirements. As a result of long-term annual
    shortfalls, many buildings have substantial deferred maintenance,
    contributing to continual deterioration. Without the investment to
    sustain, restore, and modernize our facilities, our Servicemembers and
    their families will continue to be perpetually relegated to live and
    work in run-down, dilapidated, patched-up facilities. Your commitment
    to our SRM Program requirements, supplemented by host nation financial
    burden sharing contributions, will allow us to begin to effectively
    pursue an infrastructure renewal program to enhance our readiness and
    upgrade the quality of life for our personnel and their families.
        In looking to the future, our realignment to two sanctuary MOBs in
    the ROK provides us with a unique opportunity to change the paradigm
    and begin to meet the needs of our servicemembers and families,
    allowing us to focus on improving living and working conditions. To
    this end, sustained access to several different funding programs will
    be essential, including United States military construction, host
    nation-funded SMA construction, and commercial build-to-lease programs.
    Using these different funding streams, we have recently constructed
    several modern unaccompanied housing quarters and barracks for our
    servicemembers. However, as time passes, the goal to achieve ``to
    standard'' facilities and infrastructure becomes more illusive. It is
    long since time to act.
    Family Housing, Senior Occupant Housing and other Military Construction
        As part of the YRP signed by the U.S. and the ROK in 2004 to move
    the U.S. joint force footprint from Seoul to the new MOB at Garrison
    Humphreys south of Seoul, the ROK agreed to provide at their expense
    the majority of the required buildings and infrastructure at a cost of
    billions of dollars. The ROK is aggressively pursuing their agreed to
    requirements, already spending nearly $2 billion in pursuit of project
    goals. For our part, the United States agreed to provide the majority
    of required family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for
    our force, at a cost we estimate to be between $1 and $2 billion.
    Although the number of family housing units required under the YRP is
    substantially less than what will be required for a future normalized
    stationing environment, should that be approved, meeting YRP family
    housing requirements provides a solid foundation for a normalized tour
    path over the next 10 to 15 years.
        To date, we have been unable to gain Congressional support to fund
    our family housing commitments to meet our obligations under the 2004
    YRP. The result of this situation is that the United States is
    telegraphing to our long time Korean Ally that we are not prepared to
    execute our commitments in the YRP. My assessment is that failure to
    execute our obligations under this plan will result in a crisis in the
    Alliance, and signal a clear lack of commitment to our national
    interests and to our ROK Ally in this most important area of the world.
    This will send a chilling message to the regional players, including
    Japan, China, and Russia.
        In the past year, I have emphasized the need for a solution to meet
    our family housing requirements under the YRP during congressional
    hearings, numerous office calls with members, and continuing
    correspondence in order to empower the Army to provide the necessary
    family housing and unaccompanied senior quarters at MOB Garrison
    Humphreys. After consultation and debate and in spite of our many, many
    pleas, we have not achieved consensus. Right now we are dead in the
    water.
        For fiscal year 2009, the Army is requesting $145 million in
    military construction funds. A portion of the requested funds--$20
    million--will be used to construct a much needed vehicle maintenance
    complex at MOB Garrison Humphreys. The majority of the funds--$125
    million--is requested to build the first 216 joint force family housing
    units at MOB Garrison Humphreys. While this is a necessary start, and
    your support for these family housing apartment towers is needed and
    greatly appreciated, our future stationing at MOB Garrison Humphreys
    requires more than 2,100 additional housing units. We would appreciate
    your support when the funding for these necessary units is requested.
        Without the support and funding to procure military housing, we
    will remain in Seoul, which is within range of North Korean artillery,
    while essentially refusing to relocate from land in Seoul which we have
    promised to return to our Korean Ally. We have absolutely no business
    continuing to garrison troops in our Ally's capital city, and it is in
    both our interests to execute the YRP on time and on schedule. Until we
    have appropriate housing constructed that meets DOD standards for our
    servicemembers just as we do in Europe and Japan, we cannot meet U.S.
    obligations agreed to under the YRP. Determining an immediate solution
    to our family housing requirements ensures the success of our historic
    endeavor with the ROK to both transform the current U.S.-ROK Alliance
    command structure, and relocate the footprint of U.S. forces to
    sanctuary locations in accordance with national and strategic policy
    level guidance. As the commander in the field, it is my most considered
    judgment that it is imperative that Congress support the President's
    Budget request, thus authorizing the initiation of requests for
    proposals and construction for the initial housing units. In this way,
    we can begin the process of taking care of our servicemembers and their
    families in a way that all Americans will endorse, while meeting our
    agreements with the ROK.
    Normalizing Tours for United States Forces-Korea
        With the momentum of our relocation into two sanctuary MOBs south
    of Seoul and the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK in 2012, the
    U.S. is uniquely positioned to execute a tour length policy change in
    Korea. Much like our agreements with our European and Japanese Allies,
    and at the invitation of our Korean Ally, it is my assessment that we
    should normalize U.S. servicemember tour lengths in Korea to fully
    authorize 3 year family accompanied tours.
        In 55 years, the ROK has transformed from a war ravaged country to
    one of the most modern, progressive, and democratic countries in the
    world. It is an economic powerhouse with modern world class medical
    centers and universities. Unfortunately, in a modern and vibrant ROK,
    the U.S. still rotates servicemembers on 1 year unaccompanied
    assignments as though this remained an active combat zone. It is not.
    Indeed, during the Cold War and in the face of the Soviet and Warsaw
    Pact war machine, our servicemembers were encouraged to bring their
    families with them to Europe. This created a stable military and sent a
    strong message of U.S. commitment and reliability to our European
    Allies. We resourced and practiced noncombatant evacuation procedures
    to ensure that in the event of crisis we could redeploy our family
    members to the United States. Today, our force in Korea is less than 10
    percent the size of our Cold War force in Europe.
        With long-term operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are
    needlessly contributing to family separations for the U.S. military
    with our current rotational practices here in Korea, while continuing
    to send a message to our Northeast Asian partners and allies that we
    either expect imminent conflict, or that we are not fully committed and
    can withdraw our forces on a moment's notice. Conflict is not imminent
    and with our force in sanctuary locations south of Seoul, our immediate
    no-notice vulnerability will be dramatically less than that faced by
    our force in the Cold War in Europe--again, a force where we welcomed
    family members. We should make a long-term commitment to South Korea
    and the other members of the Northeast Asia community by signaling that
    the United States has important national interests in the area and, at
    the invitation of the ROK, is committing to a policy of 3 year family
    accompanied tours in Korea, exactly as we have in Japan and across
    Europe. We could implement this policy with an infrastructure expansion
    plan over 10 to 15 years, with the costs being subjected to burden
    sharing negotiations between the ROK and the United States.
        The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved
    continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional,
    institutional, and cultural knowledge. Also, the end-state will result
    in reduced entitlement costs and an overall savings as we decrease the
    number of permanent change of station (PCS) moves and lower the need
    for entitlements resulting from family separations.
        Currently, in addition to receiving a cost-of-living allowance that
    ensures equitable pay for our servicemembers who serve in Korea, the
    Army, Air Force, and the Navy offer their servicemembers Assignment
    Incentive Pay (AIP), a program that authorizes a monthly cash incentive
    for servicemembers who are willing to extend their tours in Korea. AIP
    has saved the Department of Defense millions upon millions of dollars
    in reduced PCS costs. So far, since the AIP program began in 2004, the
    Army and the Air Force have had over 19,000 soldiers and airmen
    volunteer for AIP. While AIP has been a major success, for our family
    unaccompanied servicemembers--over 80 percent of our authorized force
    in Korea--accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in
    the States. Rather than providing incentives to unaccompanied personnel
    to stay longer in Korea, it is my assessment that we should focus on
    enabling servicemembers to bring their families to Korea and establish
    a more family oriented environment. With 3 year tour normalization, we
    could end the AIP program.
        I have submitted a formal proposal to the Department of Defense
    recommending an endorsement to move to a normal 3-year accompanied tour
    policy in Korea, along with the opening of negotiations with the ROK
    regarding their assessment, and hopefully their support. It is under
    consideration. Endorsement of this proposal will provide our
    servicemembers a better quality of life, strengthen the U.S-ROK
    Alliance, and send a powerful message to the Nations of the area of
    America's long-term commitment to stability and security in Northeast
    Asia.
                        vii. an alliance for the future
        The U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of the greatest bilateral success
    stories in modern history with many chapters ahead. In 1950, the UNC
    was created to defend the ROK when it was attacked by North Korea. In
    1957, establishment of U.S. Forces-Korea provided the command structure
    necessary to support the Alliance. In 1978, the Alliance underwent a
    major evolutionary change when we created the CFC to provide a unified
    ROK and U.S. command structure. The Alliance evolved once again in 1994
    when peacetime OPCON of ROK forces was transferred to the ROK Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. With the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK Joint
    Force Command in 2012, the United States and the ROK will enter a new
    era of cooperation, an era marked by a first-world ROK with military
    capabilities to match its stature. In a broader context, the Alliance
    will be key to maintaining and advancing U.S. national interests in
    this strategically vital region of the world. This is a natural
    evolution--one whose time has come both militarily and politically. We
    look forward to continuing this vital partnership--one that promotes
    freedom, democracy, and global free trade in Northeast Asia--throughout
    the 21st century and beyond.
        I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
    civilians serving in the ROK who selflessly support the Alliance, and
    because of their presence, ensure regional stability. Your continued
    support for our servicemembers and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is greatly
    appreciated. I know you will agree that our young men and women in
    uniform deserve the very best working, living, and training
    environment, and we should do everything feasible to provide it. Thank
    you.

        Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
        Admiral, let me start with a few questions for you. Let's
    have an 8-minute first round.
        What do you believe or assume the intent of the Chinese is
    in their increasing military capability?
        Admiral Keating. Mr. Chairman, I asked them that question
    many times during two visits. The answer that comes back is the
    same answer with a slightly different turn of phrase each time.
    The Chinese would say: We only look to protect that which we
    think is ours.
        They do not state any hegemonic intentions. They do not
    state any desire for expansion. They don't state any desire for
    a grab or to reach beyond their ability to protect those things
    that are theirs. That obviously includes an increased presence
    in the maritime domain. Their appetite for oil is significant
    and is growing. They can't keep up with their demand with their
    own coal. So the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, and the
    Bay of Bengal are of critical strategic importance to them just
    to supply their energy demands.
        When we counter with questions along the lines of
    development of area denial weapons, anti-satellite (ASAT)
    tests, and similar military technological advances, we don't
    get much back and forth here. The saw doesn't cut both ways. It
    goes to your request from us to them to understand intentions.
    The transparency that they profess is insufficient in my view.
    Being able to see what they have doesn't tell us what they
    intend to do with that equipment.
        So I think that they are developing a blue water
    capability. They want to develop weapons systems that will
    allow them, should they so choose, to make it harder for other
    military forces to operate within 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers of
    their borders. Also, they're obviously demonstrating a
    capability to exercise some control in space.
        It is overall I believe a desire to improve their position
    strategically in the world. They view themselves as a rising
    military power, and it is something that in our view merits
    close observation.
        Chairman Levin. You've had a number of visits now with
    China. You made reference to them. What is your relationship?
    How do you get along with your Chinese counterparts?
        Admiral Keating. Fair to good, Mr. Chairman. I have seen
    now some of these senior officers three times, twice in China
    and once at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. We're hardly
    let's-go-to-the-club-and-have-a-beer pals, but I know them
    enough to see them now. But it is such a different sort of
    friendship. I mentioned in a couple of calls yesterday
    afternoon that while visiting them in their offices in Beijing
    and Guanxio and Nanjing you notice a phone on their desk. Many
    of them have aides who have cell phones. So I would say to each
    and every one of them somewhere during our call: May I please
    have your phone number. I'd like to call you when I get back to
    Hawaii to thank you for your hospitality, and if something
    comes up in the South China Sea that maybe we can talk about
    and defuse tensions and spread some information around, I'd
    just like to call you. I can't get the phone number.
        So it is hardly like we're as close as I am with many
    military officers in Japan and in South Korea, much less the
    relationship that B.B. Bell and I enjoy. So, better friends
    than we were a year ago; a long way to go, and even then the
    breakdown of decades-old mistrust and custom is going to take a
    lot more effort.
        Chairman Levin. I take it you offered them your phone
    number?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. I gave them our card and it has
    our phone number on it. They haven't called.
        Chairman Levin. On the Indian side, India with Pakistan,
    have you talked to the Indian military about their possibly
    developing confidence-building measures with their Pakistani
    counterparts?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, we did. It goes back a couple of
    years. I had the pleasure of serving in Bahrain as the Naval
    Component Commander for CENTCOM, so we came at it from the
    Pakistan side, if you will. We had discussions then. That was
    in 2003, 2004.
        Now, in the Pacific we're on another side of it. We had
    discussions with senior Indian army and naval officers,
    including Admiral Mehta, and encouraged them and continue to
    encourage them to find ways to cooperate, albeit in a very
    small, measured approach right now, to increase their
    cooperation with Pakistan. It is a very important part of an
    overarching theater security cooperation plan to enhance
    stability in the region. I think it's very important.
        Chairman Levin. Now let me ask both of you about the
    readiness of our nondeployed forces and what effect that has on
    you. I believe, Admiral, you made reference to 30,000 of your
    forces being forward deployed and obviously that has an effect
    on your readiness to some extent. But what about the
    nondeployed forces that we have? To what extent are those
    problems affecting your capability? What are the risks that are
    entailed from your perspective when our nondeployed forces are
    not ready, which is the case today?
        Why don't I start with you, General, and make sure that we
    hear from you during my first round. Then, Admiral, we'll turn
    to you. General?
        General Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm very pleased
    with the forces that are ashore and Korea's readiness. We put
    enormous energy into that, the commands have, and the Services
    have supported us.
        Our principal capability ashore is Army and Air Force. Air
    Force gives us the ability to assure deterrence because it's
    ready to fight tonight and respond to some kind of provocation.
    I'll just tell you, we completed an exercise 3 days ago called
    Key Resolve-Foal Eagle. Quite frankly, as the cards just played
    out we had a large number of forces involved. Certainly all of
    our on-peninsula forces were involved. I got around to see all
    of them, plus deploying forces that came to Korea, and I was
    very impressed.
        Our Second Infantry Division, which has one maneuver
    brigade and then some enabling brigades like an artillery
    brigade, fires brigade we call it now, military intelligence,
    et cetera, is doing very, very well and is fully resourced.
        I will tell you they don't have all the equipment that we
    see we need in Iraq, which I would want. For example, they do
    not have all uparmored wheeled vehicles yet and given the
    experience that we've had in Afghanistan and Iraq, and knowing
    the special operating force capability of North Korea, I want
    all of my wheeled vehicles to be uparmored on the peninsula,
    and that has not taken place yet.
        So I would say the readiness of our forces, certainly the
    Army and the Air Force, is very good, particularly against the
    criteria, if you will, pre-war. Some of the things I've seen in
    Iraq and Afghanistan I would like to bring to Korea and that
    has not happened yet.
        Last point if I might. Our Army Prepositioned Stock (APS)
    that is ashore there, APS-4 it's called, is in extremely good
    shape and is ready to fight, and we've drawn it and used it and
    it has a very good record. So I'm satisfied.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, let me focus in on the contingency
    plans that you have if you needed to bring forward nondeployed
    forces and the problem we have with the readiness of the
    nondeployed forces. It's a different situation, I think, than
    General Bell has described. What concerns do you have about the
    challenges that are faced by our nondeployed forces and how
    does it affect your current contingency plans, which require
    and assume that those nondeployed forces be ready?
        Admiral Keating. We address those contingency plans and
    assess them daily in our headquarters and I report back on a
    monthly basis to the Secretary of Defense on our readiness to
    execute those plans. I have not yet had to submit to the
    Secretary anything other than, ``We can execute the plans as
    they are on the shelf.'' Now, that said, with a larger
    proportion of land forces out of our AOR, we have shifted some
    of our focus and some of our planning to the naval and air
    forces that we would use in the early stages of those
    contingency plans. There is increased risk attendant thereto
    and I have reported that to the Secretary of Defense. It is not
    unmanageable. It is not a cause of great concern for us, and I
    would back that up or move that timeline left a little bit from
    the execution of the contingency plan. An area of some concern
    to us is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
    Because assets are forward-deployed and for other reasons I'm
    sure of which the committee is aware, we don't have quite the
    visibility into the regions we would watch carefully in the
    weeks and days leading up to a potential conflict.
        So it's ISR assets and capabilities that are of increasing
    concern to us.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, Mr. Chairman, we note that General Bell will be
    stepping down, and I'd like to comment that I have vivid
    memories of earlier appearances in this hearing room when we
    assessed the challenges that faced you in the first years of
    your distinguished service there. I recall very well that in
    the Army we were experiencing, particularly among younger
    officers, that they would rather leave the Army than face
    another tour in Korea, given the harshness of the weather and
    oftentimes the families couldn't accompany them.
        But you turned that around, and I had a nice visit this
    week with your successor, General Sharp, and he gave you full
    credit for that. How'd you do it?
        General Bell. Senator, thank you for the compliment. I
    don't know that I deserve that much. I think we've seen a turn-
    around in attitude about serving in Korea, I think principally
    because it is a vital national interest area for America. I've
    tried to craft with the servicemembers there how important
    their service is, and I think they realize that.
        Part of it is just attitude about why we are there today.
    We are there to deter, let there be no doubt about it. That's
    our principal mission, to deter North Korean aggression. But
    also I think the mission goes much broader than that. As Tim
    Keating has said, the U.S. engagement in that area of the
    world, given the situation that we see developing in East Asia,
    is vital. I think that we've been able to instill in our young
    servicemembers a sense of duty about the future of the United
    States. This is a vital place for us; 25 percent of our trade
    flows through that area and 25 percent of the world's gross
    domestic product is generated in that area.
        Senator Warner. I think you've answered the question, but
    you did a lot to make that happen.
        General Bell. Thank you.
        Senator Warner. I remember some declined to take on their
    first major command as maybe a battalion commander, rather than
    go there.
        General Bell. Those were different days.
        Senator Warner. Tough times.
        You said that 2012 would be the shift of the responsibility
    in the command structure.
        General Bell. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Warner. Run a quick mathematics. I was scribbling
    it down. The war started in 1950. This is 2008. That's 58
    years. You're saying it's going to take another 4 for them to
    come to the realization that they're going to step up and take
    a greater degree of responsibility for the defense of that
    peninsula. That's in the face of South Korea today which is, I
    believe, the 11th strongest economy in the world.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Now, maybe they've been spending a little
    too much time on building up the economy and not enough on the
    military. Is that 2012 locked in place? There was a target of
    2009.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. What happened to that?
        General Bell. Senator, I was a proponent of 2009. I thought
    in 2006 that we could effectively do this over a 3-year period
    of transition, both in terms of training and assisting our
    allies to execute high-level battle command. Their formations
    are very competent. They're very good. It's an impressive
    military, one of the best in the world. But at high-level
    battle command, they've allowed the United States, and we've
    certainly pursued that, to have the theater command structure
    apparatus.
        It takes quite a bit to train high-level battle staffs to
    function. So I said 2009.
        Senator Warner. General, 3 or 2 years is a long time to
    train some senior officers to take over the command. I must
    express a degree of indignation and disappointment, and I don't
    know that it quite rests on your shoulders. It rests on
    basically the South Korean government's shoulders to take it
    over. I think it would be a matter of a sense of pride for them
    to do it.
        After all, we're relocating a number of our forces down the
    peninsula, away from the demilitarized zone, to add somewhat of
    an element of security and for other reasons. I can't
    understand why they don't step up and accept the challenge.
        General Bell. Senator, I will tell you that the Secretary
    of Defense of the United States and the Minister of National
    Defense of South Korea agreed last year that 2012 would be
    satisfactory to both of them. I have a very good timeline
    worked out now with the South Korean military.
        Senator Warner. I've made my point, you've made yours, and
    you did your best.
        Admiral, I picked up on your colloquy with the chairman
    here. I'm concerned about the lack of transparency with the
    Chinese. You would think that they might take an element of
    pride on growing as they have with their military
    professionalism and the size of their forces. I think in
    response to the chairman's question, while you didn't say it
    directly, you inferred that the current size of the force
    structure that they now have and, as a matter of fact, I think
    they increased their defense budget this year, am I not
    correct?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. That force structure goes well beyond the
    size of force structure that might be needed just to, as you
    say, protect that which is ours. Do you not agree with that?
        Admiral Keating. I do agree, Senator.
        Senator Warner. Now, your predecessors, again having had
    the privilege of being in this chair for a number of years,
    made efforts, I recall distinctly, of urging that we do an
    incident-at-sea (INCSEA) type of agreement that we successfully
    had with the Soviet Union in the height of the Cold War. The
    tensions between our Nation and then the Soviet Union and the
    European nations, we pushed that aside and realized the
    military necessity for rapid communications between the Soviet
    Union, the United States, and other North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) nations, and it was done.
        I remember very well, Mr. Chairman, you and I together with
    Senator Nunn worked on the hot line to the Soviet Union,
    whereby we literally had a phone on the NATO commander's desk
    and back here in the Pentagon with a direct line into the
    senior elements of the military of the Soviet Union.
        Have you explored the possibility of a hot line? These
    people have to remove themselves from the dark ages if they
    want to be respected, I think, by other military powers.
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. The Secretary of Defense has
    just concluded technical discussions with counterparts in the
    People's Republic of China. A hot line will likely be in place
    and functional I'll say within 2 months.
        Senator Warner. That's encouraging news.
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, it is. It's not the end-all, as
    you'd expect, but it's a step.
        Senator Warner. But it's a step forward.
        Admiral Keating. On the INCSEA agreement, we took your
    advice and we have engaged with the People's Liberation Army-
    Navy. As recently as 4 or 5 days ago, within the past week, our
    J-5, General Conan, has been in Shanghai with his counterparts
    for the Marine Consultative Agreement discussions. Not very
    productive and a lot of political back and forth, not much
    hard-core military yes and no, but it's a step in the direction
    that you recommend for us. We cite as an example that we got it
    done with the Russians in times of increased tension.
        So we have that underway. It is going to take a while, but
    that is our goal, to have something very similar to the INCSEA
    agreement.
        Senator Warner. I take that as at least some progress. But
    it's in the mutual interest of the United States and China, and
    indeed other nations in that area, to have it, because
    sometimes mistakes are made at a flashpoint and they should
    avoid that mistake. I'm not suggesting the mistake is on their
    side. It could well be on the side of another military power.
    But instant communications to determine the nature of the
    problem and the corrective measures that should be taken can
    save lives.
        Admiral Keating. I couldn't agree more.
        Senator Warner. I listened carefully. I said a few things
    about Taiwan and their relationship, but that always concerns
    me. We have the Taiwan Relations Act in this country and I'm
    concerned that Taiwan thinks that's a 911: Dialing the United
    States, come rescue us.
        What is the current status of that situation now, the
    degree of tension, the degree of armaments that each are
    building up, and in your professional judgment the likelihood
    that anything could happen by way of an outbreak of the use of
    force?
        Admiral Keating. I think it very unlikely, Senator, that
    anything will happen across the strait. It is our overarching
    concern when discussing with Taiwan or China, we want to
    maintain stability in the region, across the strait in
    particular. There has been significant military buildup by the
    People's Republic of China on their side of the strait. The
    Taiwan officials certainly notice that. We caution both sides
    against untoward military activity.
        The Taiwan election is on March 22. The two leading
    candidates both advocate a more moderate, less bellicose
    approach in Taiwan's dealings with the People's Republic of
    China. So we're cautiously optimistic that a little bit of the
    steam will leave the kettle after March 22.
        We do then have that period of transition between election
    and inauguration, which is in late May. So there will be a
    period of a couple of months where we'll continue to watch very
    carefully cross-strait tensions. I think it very unlikely that
    any hostilities will break out.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, General, welcome. Admiral, I'd like to follow up a
    little bit on the line of questioning that the chairman began
    and that Senator Warner picked up on with respect to
    understanding how China is asserting its pressure in the region
    irrespective of whether there is predictable actual kinetic
    hostilities against Taiwan. You're right to say that it's
    difficult to speculate about intentions and that we should look
    at capabilities. But I think we can also look at decipherable
    actions in order to try to examine exactly what this set of
    increasing pressures might mean.
        I'm thinking specifically of three different areas in the
    immediate region around China and the South China Sea. One is
    the Paracel Islands, which China and Vietnam both claim. China
    years ago put an air strip on the Paracels at the same time
    that it was articulating a more offensive military posture in
    the way it was structuring its military, downsizing a lot of
    the army units, and upgrading its technology.
        The second is the Spratlys, which I think five countries
    claim at least pieces of, including China, Vietnam, Malaysia,
    Brunei, and the Philippines. China several years ago had
    actually erected a structure that could be interpreted as a
    military structure on the Spratlys.
        Then the Senkaku Islands between Taiwan and the Ryukyus
    Islands, where there was some naval activity a year or so ago
    that the Japanese were pretty engaged about and I think
    actually had sent in some of their own destroyer squadrons. I
    don't remember the exact details of it, but Japan does claim
    the Senkakus. China has never accepted that the Ryukyus are
    actually a part of Japan. They've been active in the Ryukyus,
    which include Okinawa, since the late 1960s.
        If we take a look at these three data points as they give
    us some indication of how China has been expanding its
    activity, what do you make of it?
        Admiral Keating. If I could, a very brief anecdote,
    Senator. While in discussions with a senior Chinese naval
    officer on our first visit, he with a straight face, so
    apparently seriously, proposed the following deal to me. He
    said: As we develop our aircraft carriers, an interesting note
    to begin with, why don't we reach an agreement, you and I. You
    take Hawaii east, we'll take Hawaii west, we'll share
    information, and we'll save you all the trouble of deploying
    your naval forces west of Hawaii.
        Even if in jest, it indicates some consideration of the
    strategic vision that the People's Liberation Army, Navy, and
    Air Force might have. While not necessarily hegemonic, they
    clearly want to expand their areas of influence and those
    strategic goals of theirs, while not necessarily counter to
    ours, are at least of concern to us.
        So it is for that reason and many others that we stress our
    forward engagement, that we stress the readiness of those
    forces that we have who can move around those parts of the
    world, engage in exercises with smaller countries on a
    multilateral basis, so as to be the offset for the Chinese
    presence in the area and this increased pressure applied by
    Chinese checkbook diplomacy.
        So we're watching very carefully. We are actively engaged
    in activities that we think serve as an effective foil to this
    increased Chinese presence and pressure.
        Senator Webb. Thank you for that. I would suggest that is
    every bit as much an indicator, not simply of military
    strategy, but it's of a piece when you look at a nation's grand
    strategy, the way that the Chinese have been increasing their
    pressure in a lot of countries in that region.
        There was a piece in The Economist magazine just a couple
    of weeks ago saying that Burma, now calling itself some other
    name, but still it's Burma, may be moving toward the Chinese
    currency as their national currency. When I was in that country
    in 2001, I think you and I have had a discussion about this
    previously, that you went an hour outside of Yangon, there was
    a huge port facility that had been built by the Chinese, which
    if you follow the strategic logic of it could result in oil
    pipelines and other pipelines moving through Myanmar or
    whatever they want to call themselves now, up to the southern
    part of China, so that the Straits of Malacca, the Straits of
    Longbok, and these other places, would be less strategically
    vulnerable to them than they are to us.
        Have you been following those developments at all?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, we have. The Chinese expansion,
    as you say, is not just straight military, with destroyers and
    potential aircraft carriers. They are working all throughout
    Oceania, the area that is Australia's front porch, if you will,
    on through the Indian Ocean and all the way to the coast into
    internal Africa, to develop these ports of call so as to
    provide, it would seem, some sort of foothold in the area, not
    just a military port presence, so as to be able to protect that
    which is theirs and to ensure access to those maritime domains.
        So the answer to your question is yes, sir, we are watching
    that, and not necessarily attempting to counter it, but just to
    serve as a balance on a military basis at PACOM headquarters to
    those countries who are subjected to the Chinese pressure.
        Senator Webb. Thank you.
        General, my time is about to run out, but I am curious as
    to the level, if any, of exchange programs, military-to-
    military programs, with the North Koreans that might allow the
    future leaders of North Korea to see what the rest of the world
    looks like. This was done with very good success in Vietnam as
    we began the normalization process there.
        General Bell. Senator, it's pretty sparse. We do have
    weekly contact and, frankly, we can have it any time we want
    with the North Korean People's Army at Pammunjon. It's at the
    colonel level, in other words not the brigadier general or
    higher level, unfortunately. But we do have contact, and we do
    talk about a range of issues.
        That doesn't seem to go very far, however. I believe the
    North Koreans treat it as a bureaucratic process more than an
    opportunity for advancement. Over the years the North Koreans
    have rejected any number of opportunities. They run the Neutral
    Nations Supervisory Commission out of North Korea. We still
    have them with us, and that was a great opportunity for
    dialogue. Certainly the high-level meetings we had at Pammunjon
    for years at the general officer level produced some merit.
    They don't allow that now.
        So frankly, other than those meetings that we have at
    Pammunjon about once a week at the colonel level, our contact
    with the North Korean military is nonexistent, and I regret
    that. I do agree with you, sir, that that is something that
    down the road we need to find a way at the right diplomatic
    levels to re-engage somehow and to convince them that re-
    engagement is in their interest.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, Admiral, thank you for your service to our country
    and thank you for being with us today.
        Admiral, there's a lot of discussion around here about the
    next generation bomber, which is scheduled to be fielded in
    2018. I'm just wondering if you might comment on the importance
    of long-range strike as a deterrent capability in your
    command's area of operations.
        Admiral Keating. It's a critical element of our operational
    planning and conceptual planning, Senator. We're very
    interested in the Air Force program. The particular platform is
    of less consequence to us. The capability is, of course, where
    our focus remains. So the short answer to your question, we're
    very interested in that long-range penetration capability and
    it is an important element of our planning.
        Senator Thune. Admiral, the Chinese have recently undergone
    an incredible leap forward in terms of their air defense
    capability by fielding a lot of systems such as the SA-10, SA-
    20, SAN-20, SAN-7, HQ-9, and HHQ-9. What are the capabilities
    and survivability of our legacy fighter and bomber forces
    versus these advanced surface-to-air missile systems, and are
    you concerned about these and other Chinese anti-access
    technologies?
        Admiral Keating. Senator, we are concerned about the
    Chinese surface-to-air capabilities. It is a source of
    discussion between those of us at PACOM and our counterparts
    when we visit China and on those rare occasions when they come
    visit us. We have state-of-the-art equipment that we can deploy
    if we need to. That said, we also are flying some airplanes
    that I flew when I was still doing that sort of thing as a
    younger man.
        The electronic countermeasures we enjoy are in most cases
    sufficient, and in some cases insufficient. So, at large, we
    are concerned with the Chinese electronic warfare developments
    and it has been a topic that I've discussed with the Joint
    Chiefs within the past couple months expressing our concern.
        Senator Thune. Thanks.
        Admiral, let me just ask a question too if I might
    regarding some of China's claims that there's no threat to U.S.
    interests. But on the other hand, there has been this issue
    with cyber intrusions that originate in China and attempt to
    gain access to various U.S. institutions that deal with
    national security, ranging from the Pentagon to think tanks.
        What's your opinion of the message that China is attempting
    to deliver, at least publicly, and how that conflicts with some
    of the things they're doing, and have you communicated with the
    Chinese military leadership about these intrusions, and what's
    their reply when you ask them?
        Admiral Keating. We have communicated our concerns,
    Senator. We asked them to try and describe for us their
    intentions in the warfare specialty they call
    informationization. They study it in their war colleges. They
    have books on informationization. It's a concept a little
    foreign to us, but fundamentally it comes down to asymmetric
    warfare, computer network attack, and computer network defense.
        They acknowledge that they are pursuing these specialties
    and subspecialties, but they do not acknowledge, at least to
    me, their engagement in those activities. It is clear they are
    engaging in those activities. We have expressed our concern. I
    know that the State Department, the Department of Homeland
    Security, and Department of Defense (DOD) have efforts to
    provide better protection for our networks and to be able to
    determine conclusively who it is conducting the penetration.
        Senator Thune. General, as the ranking member on the
    Readiness Subcommittee I'm interested in the preparedness of
    U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula. How would you rate the
    preparedness of your units and are there enough exercise venues
    and events to effectively train on the peninsula, or do you see
    a necessity to deploy forces more for training events?
        General Bell. Senator, last year I was getting nervous
    about this, but I have to tell you, over the last year I've
    seen a lot of emphasis placed from off the peninsula to
    ensuring my readiness on the peninsula is where it ought to be.
    We've just concluded a major exercise, both a command post
    exercise that's driven by simulation, and real field exercises,
    land, sea, and air, and all those were done in a very, very
    professional way, a very pleasing way to me, and reiterated for
    me, I think, the capacity that we've achieved in the last year.
        Our Air Forces ashore are ready. We've gotten upgrades to
    our F-16 fleet that are very impressive. Our Army forces ashore
    are very ready. However, they do not have all the equipment
    that I wish they had, given our lessons in Iraq, for example
    uparmored wheeled vehicles. If you walked amongst the Second
    Infantry Division right now, you'd see a very ready division
    without uparmored vehicles. So that piece, given what we've
    seen in Iraq and that vulnerability, does concern me, and we're
    working with the Army to get in line to make sure that we get
    this equipment over to Korea quickly.
        But I'm pleased with our readiness ashore and I would put
    it at a high level right now. It's very good.
        Senator Thune. Let me ask both of you. I'd like to explore
    the North Korean ballistic missile threat. Where do you see the
    biggest gap in defense against that threat and how do you
    propose that we solve it?
        General Bell. North Korea has a range of ballistic
    missiles, obviously. They cross all the spectrum of missile
    capability from relatively short-range missiles, which they've
    just begun to field a modern version of. It's called the KN-02
    missile, solid fuel, very mobile, and something like our
    Multiple Launch Rocket System or our Army Tactical Missile
    System (ATACMS), pretty sophisticated; all the way up through
    their traditional Scuds, which are liquid fuel but very
    reliable. Every time they test them they work. They land where
    they're supposed to go.
        They have the No-dong missile, which is a medium-range
    ballistic missile. The Musadon they have in research and
    development (R&D), which is an intermediate range ballistic
    missile which could threaten Guam and certainly threatens all
    of Japan, all the way out to their hard work on an
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) called the Taepodong-
    2, which failed in its last flight test.
        So they have the whole range and we have to protect against
    all those ranges. Ashore in Korea I have today eight Patriot
    batteries. That is adequate to protect my U.S. force. Our
    Republic of Korea ally does not have adequate theater ballistic
    missile defenses on their peninsula. They recognize this as a
    shortcoming. They are now purchasing Patriot systems, believe
    it or not, from Germany and they're fielding Aegis cruisers
    that could have an air defense capability as well.
        My biggest concern is not theater ballistic missiles coming
    at South Korea. I think we are adequately prepared for that.
    It's the off-peninsula missile capability that they are
    developing and have to either threaten Japan, Guam, Hawaii, or
    even the continental United States that is the biggest issue
    for us to address right now.
        I will hand that off to Admiral Keating because he is more
    aware of and into the layered defense that we have to defend
    against that threat.
        Senator Thune. Admiral?
        Admiral Keating. The lower 48 States and Alaska and Hawaii
    can be well defended against ICBMs from North Korea with our
    ground-based mid-course interceptors and increasingly by our
    sea-based ballistic missile defensive capabilities. I am more
    concerned about helping our allies protect themselves. Senator,
    the Japanese just conducted a successful test of one of their
    Aegis ships. The Japanese ship Congo launched an SM-3 missile
    and intercepted a target ICBM over the Pacific Missile Range
    Facility and successfully destroyed that target ICBM.
        So Japan is developing the capability themselves, but there
    are other countries, of course, that do not have any capability
    throughout our AOR. Helping our allies protect themselves is a
    source of some concern to us. I am satisfied that we continue
    the development of the integrated system to which B.B. alludes.
    It is important for the 48 States, Alaska, and Hawaii, and
    we're working with our allies for their own self-protection.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your
    service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you, gentlemen, for joining us today.
        General Bell, I want to thank and commend you for your
    extraordinary service to the Army and the Nation. You have
    inspired great confidence in many, and good luck as you move
    forward, and thank you.
        Admiral Keating, you say in your written statement that
    anti-submarine warfare is a top priority of U.S. Pacific Fleet
    and that PACOM requires pervasive and persistent surveillance
    to understand the adversary's plans, et cetera. Do you have a
    sufficient number of submarines in your AOR to do that?
        Admiral Keating. I do today, yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Looking forward in terms of your longer-term
    and medium-term?
        Admiral Keating. Through the mid-term, through the Future
    Years Defense Program, Senator, 5 to 10 years, we have
    sufficient numbers of U.S. attack submarines.
        Senator Reed. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but
    you probably have missions that you would like to run but you
    can't at the moment, that you have excess demand?
        Admiral Keating. That would be true, sir.
        Senator Reed. General Bell, you are recommending, I
    believe, departing from the 1-year tour in Korea and going to a
    3-year stabilized tour with family. Can you talk to that
    recommendation, and also the impact on your plans on the
    constant draw of troops into Iraq and Afghanistan, and just
    generally the whole flow of troops back and forth?
        General Bell. Senator, I'm an advocate of what I call troop
    normalization. I am convinced, after serving over there for
    over 2 years, that the 1-year unaccompanied tours that we
    pursued over there sends a message of temporary commitment by
    the United States. Just 1 year in and we can be out. I believe
    that a 3-year tour would send the right message of commitment
    of the United States to that area of the world, first. Second,
    it adds measurably to the personnel tempo of our military
    Services right now, unnecessarily in my view.
        I admit that I've advocated a 10-year transition period to
    a normalization policy over there because there are a lot of
    issues to be dealt with. You just can't one afternoon say,
    bring another 15,000 U.S. families over there. But over time
    and with the help of our ally, who I believe would help us
    resource part of this, I believe that it's best for our
    families and it's best for our readiness. If I had a
    servicemember over there for 3 years, he or she would be very
    ready, as opposed to just being there 1 year.
        I think it sends the right message to our allies of a
    commitment to that area of the world, which is of vital
    interest to the United States of America.
        Now, there are a lot of details to be worked out here and I
    have not yet gotten the policy decision out of the DOD yet, and
    I certainly haven't even had a formal request from my Korean
    ally yet. But I believe those may be forthcoming, and then with
    that in hand we could lay out a program to achieve this.
        I do believe it's necessary for the United States to send
    the message to all of our friends in that area of the world
    that that area of the world is important to us and that if the
    North Korean issue is resolved, through whatever methodology,
    peace treaty, reunification, or otherwise, that does not mean
    the end of U.S. commitment and we're not going to just take our
    troops and go home. As long as we're welcome and wanted by the
    Republic of Korea and they desire our alliance to continue, I
    believe it's in our interest, and the best way to demonstrate
    that is through normalization.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        The Second Infantry Division, at this juncture, and correct
    me, but my impression is they have one brigade in Korea and two
    plus brigades in Iraq or Afghanistan or in combination. Is that
    correct?
        General Bell. Yes, sir. We have one brigade that is
    permanently stationed in Korea with the division headquarters.
    The other brigades are permanently stationed in the United
    States and there is no desire to bring them forward unless, of
    course, we had a conflict break out. In addition to the one
    maneuver brigade, we have other important brigades there in the
    Second Infantry Division, an aviation brigade with attack
    helicopters, a fires brigade, artillery, military intelligence,
    engineers, et cetera. It's still a pretty good-sized division,
    but it only has that one maneuver brigade. I deem it essential
    to force protection, quick reaction force capability, and,
    believe it or not, if I had to do a noncombatant evacuation
    operation. There are 100,000 U.S. citizens that live in Seoul
    pursuing American business. I would need those maneuver troops
    to help run an evacuation.
        So we're at about the lowest level I'm interested in
    getting to on Army troops right now, Senator.
        Senator Reed. That brigade has so far been immune to
    deployment as a brigade into Iraq and Afghanistan?
        General Bell. It has. We had two maneuver brigades there
    until 2 years ago. One of them was withdrawn, went to Iraq, and
    it's now stationed at Fort Carson, CO. This brigade is not on
    the deployment list.
        Senator Reed. But are you seeing some personnel turmoil?
    Not brigade units and battalions, but individuals moving in and
    out of the division because of Army-wide demands? Is that
    affecting your readiness at all?
        General Bell. The Army does a good job of keeping up with
    the 1-year rotations. What I think is due to the fallout from
    the current commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan it's very normal
    for me to get a servicemember, a soldier mostly because it does
    affect the Army more perhaps than it does the Air Force, but
    it's not unusual for a soldier to show up, a young specialist,
    a staff sergeant, or a master sergeant, having just returned
    from Iraq 5 or 6 months ago. Here they are with another set of
    orders for a short tour in Korea and continued family
    separation.
        That's fairly common now, and of course I would like to end
    that practice by a normalization tour. So the issue is that
    they are not getting much time at home before they're ordered
    on forward to Korea, having come out of Iraq. The same thing
    happens when they're going back, Senator. They'll leave Korea
    after a year, end up in a unit, and then off they are to Iraq
    or Afghanistan, perhaps fairly quickly.
        Senator Reed. I have read in news accounts of incidents of
    depression with troops based on service in combat, in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, that are being medicated with Prozac still in
    combat areas. Are you detecting that in terms of your soldiers
    and airmen who are coming back through Korea?
        General Bell. I'm really not seeing that in Korea. I think
    this is an issue for our military. I'm not trying to minimize
    it. But I can tell you that, having been in this business now
    39 years, this Army that we have remains an Army of great
    morale, great commitment, brotherhood, and sisterhood. It's
    very special. It is different than some of the issues that we
    had during other wars, Vietnam, et cetera. I can tell you in
    Korea these troops are high-spirited, they're committed,
    they're dedicated, and I'm very proud of them and I do not see
    a degradation in their morale or their readiness because of
    Iraq or Afghanistan.
        Senator Reed. My impression is similar to yours, but I
    think this is a fault line in terms of some of the mental
    health issues of our troops. It's something, as you suggested,
    that the Army particularly, and the Marine Corps, and all of
    our Services have to be acutely aware of because we're asking
    these young men and women to do some extraordinary things
    repeatedly, and it adds up.
        General Bell. It is, it is.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Keating, we spoke briefly about the
    renewed relationship with Thailand. Can you comment on your
    efforts on cooperation with the Thais, particularly the anti-
    drug efforts?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. We were just there 2 weeks ago
    and we met their supreme commander, General Boonsrang, who was
    a good friend from previous engagements. The Thai military
    remains strong. They are solid. They're aware of some concerns
    we have had about their observing what the rest of the world
    would regard as appropriate human rights measures and
    expectations, and I have the assurances of him, General
    Boonsrang, that they have that in hand, and our trainers who
    work with them agree.
        We have a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West
    headquartered at the United States PACOM, headed by a Coast
    Guard one-star, and they work extensively the counterdrug
    challenges throughout the Asia Pacific AOR. The Thailand
    military is certainly aware of their position on the flow and
    the flow points for narcotics. They are actively engaged. They
    did not share with me any particular efforts they have
    underway, but I did note that General Boonsrang mentioned his
    concern and his active involvement in trying to stem the flow
    of those drugs. So too are Coast Guard-led forces at JIATF
    West.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        My time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        The Clerk's notes say that Senator Wicker arrived 1 minute
    before Senator Martinez. However, review of the videotape shows
    some uncertainty in this regard. [Laughter.]
        I've had extensive conversations with the ranking member
    and we decided to leave it up to you gentlemen. Did you arrive
    simultaneously?
        Senator Martinez. I will go with the chair.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. A random act of kindness by my colleague.
        General Bell, we appreciate that high level of commitment
    and morale that you just testified about. I want to follow up
    on a conversation you and I had last year when I was in the
    House of Representatives and you testified before the
    Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction. At that
    time you mentioned a need for a TRICARE representative to
    assist all the servicemembers' families you have living in
    Korea on the economy.
        Can you provide me with an update on that situation?
        General Bell. We're making progress. I don't have the full
    TRICARE service contract in place yet. It's coming. This is a
    competitive process. You just can't order it one day. There has
    to be a request for a proposal through the contracting agencies
    and different companies have to bid for it, et cetera. But we
    expect that in the very near-term, Senator.
        The good news is that in the interim the Army has committed
    several individuals who are wearing Department of the Army
    civilian hats as administrators for me. So now I have people in
    critical locations across the peninsula who are fundamentally
    doing the job of a TRICARE contractor in an interim way. They
    are coordinating with the local Korean hospital. They are
    setting up hot lines and phone lines with them, so when a
    patient comes in and they need care at the local hospital we
    have that liaison working for us. Then the reimbursement of the
    servicemember is handled in an expeditious way.
        We had a situation there for a while where the
    servicemember was expected to pay up front. Can you imagine
    something like that, walking in and saying, I need an
    appendectomy, and having to reach into your pocket as a staff
    sergeant and pay for your appendectomy before you had it? It
    was completely unacceptable. We fixed all that.
        Senator Wicker. Has Congress given you everything you need
    in this regard?
        General Bell. Senator, they have. I'm very pleased. I'm
    working inside the DOD now. I think we're on the right track,
    and I'll report back to you if it comes unglued. But I think we
    are on the right track.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Another thing we talked about at that hearing last year was
    your concern for ensuring that you have a medical activity
    hospital instead of a combat hospital.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Could you update us on that also?
        General Bell. Yes, sir. It's done. We activated the medical
    activity about 5 months ago, which gives us all the authorities
    to requisition the right kind of doctors, the right kind of
    practitioners, and the right kind of nurses for our clientele.
    Embedded in that remains the combat support hospital. So we
    have exactly the right organization now, and that was something
    I look at very positively. I'm very excited about that.
        Senator Wicker. Congratulations on that.
        Now, let me then follow up on something that I'm told you
    testified to earlier before I was able to attend and that's the
    need for uparmored wheeled vehicles. Now, Congress has made
    quite an investment in the mine resistant ambush protected
    (MRAP) vehicle. Would that meet your needs?
        General Bell. Senator, I am concerned about not having
    uparmored vehicles there in the Republic of Korea. I agree with
    the prioritization that the Army has now. For example, in the
    old days a National Guard unit would never be prioritized over
    an Active unit. But National Guard units are going to Iraq.
    They need them before I do. So we have a requirement in for
    various types of vehicles, including the MRAP vehicle, to meet
    our needs, and I believe we'll start seeing that fielding here
    in about the next year.
        But we are at the tail end of that fielding chain and I
    think rightfully so. I'm not complaining at all, because I'm
    not facing imminent combat. So the answer is yes, MRAP is part
    of our future. So are other uparmored kits, whether it's on our
    2\1/2\- and 5-ton vehicles or even our Humvees, and we don't
    have any of that right now of merit. We have about 2 percent of
    our vehicles uparmored, which is not really satisfactory.
        So it's a good program that is laid out and not resourced
    yet.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Now, Admiral, let me quote from page 6 of your testimony:
    ``Southeast Asia remains the central front against terrorism in
    the Pacific.'' It strikes me that many people, many Americans,
    don't understand that the war on terrorism affects the region
    that you have charge of. Could you give us the status on the
    fight against terrorism specifically in the Philippines and its
    impact on regional stability?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, I'll try. We were there 2 weeks
    ago and met with Ambassador Kenney and the leader of the Joint
    Special Operations Forces, Philippines, an Army colonel. He is
    in charge of about 500 Special Forces personnel, Army, who are
    deployed throughout central and southern Philippines in support
    of, and it is very important to emphasize, the Armed Forces of
    the Philippines (AFP) in their war against violent extremists
    and terrorists in the southern Philippines.
        Progress is being made. It is measurable, discernible, and
    palpable. As we traveled throughout the southern Philippines,
    the support demonstrated by young men and women who greet the
    AFP as they are moving through the very dense jungle in the
    Philippines is a visual demonstration of the support enjoyed by
    the AFP.
        That said, the AFP are also killing and capturing a
    significant number of Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah al-Islamiah
    leaders and lieutenants. There is work to be done, to be sure,
    acknowledged by the Philippines and by our Armed Forces who are
    there now. But the progress is measurable, demonstrable, and
    I'm very proud of the work being done by those 500 soldiers who
    have been there for a while now and are there for the
    foreseeable future.
        Senator Wicker. What would be the consequences of not
    getting the job done in the Philippines to the average American
    citizen?
        Admiral Keating. To the average American citizen who might
    be in the Philippines, we have seen American citizens kidnapped
    there and some killed.
        Senator Wicker. To my constituents back in Mississippi?
        Admiral Keating. To your constituents in Mississippi, it
    would be a gradual erosion of peace and stability all
    throughout the Asia Pacific region. It would have an economic
    impact, and it would have a social impact, it would have an
    impact on one of our longest standing allies in all of the
    world, the Republic of the Philippines.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Thank you both for your service.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, General, thank you for your testimony. Good
    morning.
        In some sense I want to follow up on Senator Wicker's line
    of questioning. Admiral, you have reported to us this morning
    that your AOR, the Pacific, is secure and stable, but obviously
    you have concerns of different kinds. One is the terrorism just
    mentioned, the other is our relations with China, managing
    those in a way that is peaceful and constructive, and of course
    the particular threats represented by North Korea.
        Of the various concerns that you have in your AOR, which
    would you say is your top concern?
        Admiral Keating. The struggle against violent extremism,
    Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. In that sense, this is the regional
    expression of Islamist extremism and terrorism?
        Admiral Keating. Good point. Not just in the Philippines,
    but all throughout the Asia Pacific region, from the east coast
    of Africa to the west coast of the United States.
        Senator Lieberman. It's a very significant answer because
    obviously we're focused on North Korea and China in different
    ways, but you would say from the region that your number one
    concern is to stop the spread of Islamist extremism and
    terrorism. It does make the point that Senator Wicker made,
    which is that this war against Islamist extremism and terrorism
    is global. It's a world war.
        At this point, would you say that the enemy in your region
    is gaining, receding, or being held about where it's been?
        Admiral Keating. Receding, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. Why is that?
        Admiral Keating. Progress made in the Philippines, progress
    made in Indonesia, progress made in Malaysia, and progress
    being made in India. The kinetic attacks being conducted by
    violent extremists are down. There have been, thank God, very,
    very few significant attacks that have been conducted in our
    AOR since September 11, 2001, as you're aware.
        They are on a much smaller scale. The activities are much
    more local. That makes them no less onerous for those who
    suffer the sting of the terrorists, to be sure. But it is not a
    widespread, coordinated, collaborated effort the likes of which
    we have seen in the wake of September 11.
        Progress is being made on not just a military front, but in
    the sharing of intelligence, on the curtailment of movement of
    violent extremists, and the support that they need to conduct
    their onerous activities. All of these are being reduced in our
    region.
        Senator Lieberman. That's good news.
        Would you say that the Joint Special Operations Task Force,
    Philippines is a model for the way in which we might combat
    extremism and terrorism in other countries in the world?
        Admiral Keating. I would, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. So if you would, and if you've done this
    before I was able to arrive you can make it short, but talk a
    little bit about what that task force does and how you see it
    as that model being applied to other areas of the world?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, I'll try. Our Special Operations
    Forces are world-class counterterrorism experts. It is a
    different kind of expertise than many nations possess. So our
    ability to train the trainers and work through the host
    nation's armed services in preparing the host nation for the
    different aspects of intelligence gathering, of monitoring, of
    prosecuting attacks on a very small scale that are some urban,
    some suburban, and some jungle, it's a very diverse warfare
    set.
        Our Special Forces troops are the best in the world. So by
    training them to train their own personnel we can, one, reduce
    the demand signal for our forces; two, make them better to much
    better the armed forces of our host nations; and three, develop
    information-sharing and collaboration techniques that are at
    least uncommon, if not unprecedented, between those countries
    themselves, and encourage those other countries to share
    between themselves, and it gets to be a network that is very
    powerful and effective.
        Senator Lieberman. I think that's a very important
    statement, an important model. It makes the point that we have
    allies in this war against Islamist terrorism. They tend to be,
    fortunately, the local indigenous security forces, but they
    need help. It also makes the point that we don't have to, we
    can't really be on the front lines in that world war everywhere
    it's taking place. I appreciate that.
        Now, the other good news that you reported on is that we
    have very strong relationships throughout the region, and we
    have some very significant good allies, Australia of course,
    and South Korea. I want to ask you to focus a little bit on two
    others that maybe we don't focus on enough because they are
    such good allies. One is our long-time strong relationship with
    Japan and the second is very significant, improving relations
    with India.
        Give us your report on both the military-to-military and
    political relationships with those two great allies of ours,
    Japan and India.
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir, thank you. Wandalee and I had
    the pleasure of living in Japan for a couple of years. As you
    say, we have no more steadfast or important ally in the world
    in my view than we do in Japan. I have been there seven times
    since assuming command of PACOM. In each case, though I will
    see sometimes a different minister of defense than I saw in the
    previous visit, the leadership remains constant. Admiral Saito,
    who is their chief of defense staff, is a good friend. They
    remain committed to improving, not just sustaining but
    improving, the military-to-military relationships that we
    enjoy.
        As an example, you know that we are swapping out the U.S.S.
    Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. George Washington. The Kitty Hawk
    will retire this summer, the longest serving ship in the United
    States Navy inventory, to be replaced by the George Washington,
    a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. While I lived in Japan and
    served on the Kitty Hawk, this would have been an unattainable
    goal, to put a nuclear aircraft carrier in Japan.
        Senator Lieberman. It's important. It's a mark.
        Admiral Keating. It's happening. The swap-out will take
    place this summer, and there is almost no commotion about it.
        They are committed to the same goals as us, Senator, and I
    am very confident that if we called upon them for support they
    would answer the bell. They have resumed their oiler operations
    in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        Admiral Keating. India; I have been there once. I mentioned
    a little bit ago I went through there in the mid-1980s carrying
    Admiral Crowe's bags. The relationship we enjoy with them is a
    much more open, a much more productive, and a much more
    energetic relationship on a military-to-military basis. Our
    visit there in August was very reassuring to me. We were
    conducting exercises with them. They are interested in
    personnel exchanges.
        They are at a critical strategic crossroads for all of us
    and they want to work with us in providing maritime and air
    security over the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. They're
    critical partners.
        Senator Lieberman. Those are encouraging reports. I thank
    you for them.
        I know that a while back there was a joint exercise carried
    out among some of our most significant allies in the Pacific.
    Tell us what happened and how it went?
        Admiral Keating. Exercise Malabar I think, Senator, is that
    to which you refer?
        Senator Lieberman. Correct.
        Admiral Keating. I've been doing this for many years and I
    would not have conceived of anything this ambitious, this
    sophisticated, or this successful. Aircraft carriers, two
    carrier battle groups of the United States, one from India, an
    Indian aircraft carrier, and ships from Japan, Singapore, and
    Australia all participated, tens of thousands of servicemen and
    servicewomen, in a Bay of Bengal-located high-end technological
    and military tactics, techniques, and procedures exercise.
        It went very well. It was conducted in August. There were
    search and rescue challenges posed by operations and everybody
    pitched in. Of note, it doesn't get headlines, but each of the
    vessels and command centers involved in the exercise were able
    to communicate real-time on a secure channel. So that is a
    dramatic change and a significant step forward in our ability
    to communicate with our allies and partners. It was a very
    successful exercise.
        Senator Lieberman. My time is up. Thank you. Those are very
    significant reports. Obviously, we're a global power with
    global interests and global responsibilities. But the
    encouraging news here in the Pacific is that we have
    increasingly significant assistance from a range of very
    important allies who have a shared interest, obviously, in the
    security and stability of the Pacific. I thank you for the job
    you're doing.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Martinez?
        Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, good morning and thank you both for being here
    and for your service to the Nation.
        Admiral, I think I'll begin with you and just talk about
    Chinese military expenditures. This may have been covered
    before I came and if it was I apologize. But I realize that
    they're on an upward trend that is rather significant, and I
    was wondering if you could describe for us how significant it
    is, whether it is escalating or in any way tapering off. Also,
    I would like for you to comment on the merger of civilian and
    military efforts, which would mask true military spending
    because of whatever participation the civilian sector may have
    into that as well.
        Admiral Keating. Senator, thank you. The shortest way to
    say this is, the defense budget is going up, it's going way up.
    I don't know how much it's going up, but it's going up. I don't
    know how much it is. Estimates in a recently released report
    have it around 50 billion U.S. dollars. The Chinese will not
    discuss this with me when I'm there. We don't even bring it up
    any more.
        In my first visit, when we did bring it up, they said:
    ``Well, you don't understand; it's all going to personnel and
    quality of life accounts,'' which is true enough. The Chinese
    are learning the lesson that we could have and do instruct them
    upon: It costs a lot of money to recruit, train, and equip a
    modest, much less high end, military like we enjoy. They are
    finding out how expensive it is to provide a senior
    noncommissioned officer corps, to provide health care, to
    provide cost of living allowances for folks who get orders from
    the western part of the country to, let's say, the Shanghai
    Naval District. It is a very expensive proposition to recruit
    and train and equip a navy, an army, an air force, and marine
    corps.
        That said, there is no question that they are putting
    significant amounts of money into research, technology, and
    development. The higher end weapons capabilities they're
    developing are of concern to us: area denial weapons, ASAT
    technology, submarines. They have 65 submarines. They're
    building more. That's nearly two and a half times the number of
    submarines we have in the Pacific.
        So long answer to a short question. Their developments are
    of concern to us. It is an increased budget that they enjoy and
    I don't believe all of their increased budget is going into
    personnel costs.
        Senator Martinez. Speaking of the submarines, 65 is a
    substantial number, is it not?
        Admiral Keating. It is.
        Senator Martinez. What does that tell us, those two
    elements, about their intentions or their goals?
        Admiral Keating. When I ask them that question, they choose
    not to answer, Senator, which is in a way an answer in my view.
    They do not share with us their intentions beyond the
    overarching: ``We seek to defend those things that are ours, we
    seek a harmonious integration into civilization, and we're
    pursuing a peaceful rise.'' We get the same response to almost
    every question we direct to them as to intentions.
        It would seem to us at the United States PACOM that the
    development of a blue water navy capability, a significant
    subset of which is their submarine force, which is quiet and
    getting quieter, and capable of going further and further to
    sea, the development of the blue water navy capability and
    these area denial weapons go beyond that which would be
    normally expected of a country who only wanted to protect their
    littoral region.
        Senator Martinez. General, I was interested also in talking
    a little bit with you about the quality of life issues. I was
    interested in your testimony about the deterioration of
    facilities, the fact that apparently your budgets for housing
    and things of this nature have deteriorated over time and a lot
    of the housing is quite aged.
        I was just wondering if you could dwell on that a little
    bit and explain to us your concerns there and what might be
    necessary in order for us to improve the situation.
        General Bell. Thank you for letting me address it. To be
    honest with you, two-thirds of our facilities are either
    temporary or they are between 25 and 50 years old even if
    they're not temporary. So only a third of the facilities that
    we enjoy in Korea are the kinds that we would be proud of, say,
    if that force was in the United States.
        I can only attribute this to a 1-year-at-a-time mentality
    over the years and, instead of improving our facilities, we've
    worked hard on our combat readiness, but we've not really put
    the resources into the facilities that we should have.
        We have a strategic window now. We're moving the Second
    Infantry Division from its location north of Seoul to south of
    Seoul, to a garrison that we call Humphreys. The area at
    Humphreys that we're expanding into, much of the construction
    costs down there are being borne by our Republic of Korea
    allies. These are brand new facilities being built to our
    specifications, but with their money.
        But at the same time, we have to maintain the stuff that we
    do have in other locations, and the amount of money that I've
    been given to do the maintenance and sustainment on those
    standing facilities is inadequate. The best I've done in any
    given year is about 25 percent of what I believe is necessary
    to give full readiness to those kind of facilities.
        So while we have this strategic window to see an
    improvement, I do believe that if we're going to change the
    paradigm in Korea, particularly if we're going to adopt, and I
    hope that we will, a more normal approach to stationing in an
    area that's of vital interest to the United States, we're going
    to have to make the investment. It's not a big investment. We
    don't have a large force there. I don't see this as being a
    major fiscal challenge for the United States. I think it's a
    matter of priorities.
        I am making this a major area of interest for myself and
    the DOD, and I am hopeful that we will continue to see it
    rising. It has gotten better, Senator, in the last couple of
    years. But we are still a long way from the kind of sustainment
    operation for facilities that we see both in the United States
    and in Europe for our forces. I think that's in need of change.
        Senator Martinez. I commend you for your efforts in that
    regard because I think those are really important, both the
    effort to regularize by allowing family tours as well as the
    improvement in the facilities. I think those are very, very
    important to our future in the area.
        Admiral, I was really pleased to hear your answer, in
    response to Senator Lieberman's questions about the Islamic
    extremists in the region. I think one of the great surprises to
    me and perhaps to many others was the growth of Islamic
    extremism in your region, which became apparent immediately
    after September 11, when it was obvious that we had problems in
    those parts of the world.
        Can you give us a comparison as to what the situation that
    you found or we found immediately after September 11, 2001,
    when we became aware of the fact that we were in a global war
    on terror, and where we are today?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. You and all the members will
    recall that many of those extremists who were in the attack
    against us on September 11 were trained or moved through South
    Asia during their training track, if that's the right term to
    use. So it was our area of the world that movement was
    uncontested and financial and logistical support was
    unfettered. It was a much more open area for the movement and
    lodging of terrorists.
        Today that is a much different situation. It started with
    intelligence, information-sharing, intelligence-gathering, and
    intelligence-sharing, in my opinion. Not just military, but all
    manner of agencies, Federal, State, local, and private
    personnel became aware of the challenge. They knew what to do
    with the information that they gathered. Remember, these are
    some of the largest Muslim populations in the world. Indonesia,
    210 million; Malaysia, almost 100 million; India, tens of
    millions. India is the largest democratic country in the world
    with a significant Muslim population.
        All that said, it is a much tougher area of the world for
    radical extremists to navigate around. The flow of money to
    support them is being very, very closely monitored and
    curtailed in a very quick fashion, and all of this below the
    radar. So those who would pursue violent extremist tactics are
    finding it much tougher to live and to operate in the southern
    part of our AOR.
        It's not just a military effort. It is civilian, law
    enforcement, State and local governments, and the private
    population, all combining to make it a very inhospitable
    atmosphere for them.
        Senator Martinez. I commend you for the success and thank
    you both for your service.
        Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning, gentlemen, and thank you
    for your service to our country.
        As a matter of fact, the largest Muslim population country
    in the world is Indonesia. This surprises people. The second
    largest Muslim population country is India, more than Pakistan.
        Gentlemen, I have the privilege of chairing the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee for the leadership of our Armed Services
    Committee and I want to ask you about the Theater High Altitude
    Area Defense (THAAD), the Aegis ballistic missile systems,
    designed to go after short- and medium-range ballistic
    missiles. Now, the testimony we received in our committee is
    that we've only got about half of what we need or what we
    project to need. This came out of a study called the Joint
    Capability Mix Study.
        I'm curious. In your theater were you consulted on your
    needs to come out with the result of this study?
        General Bell. Senator, I am consulted and I lay my
    requirements out with great clarity for the DOD. What I can
    tell you is that, while the majority of what I do on the Korean
    peninsula is protected with Patriots and so that's the weapon
    of choice, I still have a significant requirement, particularly
    for Aegis cruisers. What they can do for me off the southern
    coast of Korea is protect my port facilities, and instead of
    having to use Patriots for those, having this picket line of
    Aegis cruisers protecting those ports is of vital interest to
    me. I'm encouraging the South Koreans to purchase this system
    and, of course, we have our own significant capability.
        My biggest issue is getting the most modern Patriot system
    in Korea, which I do not have sufficient numbers of now, the
    PAC-3 missile. Why the PAC-3? It engages at a higher altitude
    and prevents the kind of fallout of chemical munitions or
    whatever on the local population. So I have a shortage of PAC-
    3s. I have plenty of missiles of older varieties. They are
    effective, but they are not as effective as the PAC-3, and I am
    fairly vocal about my requirement for additional PAC-3s.
        So from my foxhole I'm a PAC-3 man. I'll pass over to my
    good friend Tim Keating because I think he has a lot more to
    say about THAAD than I do. But I would sure like more PAC-3s.
        Admiral Keating. Senator, we were consulted and B.B.'s
    perspective is understandable since he would have a somewhat
    more land-centric focus. We are more interested in the system
    of systems and the connectivity between those systems whether
    it's afloat, land-based in the United States, or mobile but
    still land-based in South Korea or in many of our allies' and
    partners' countries.
        It's the integration of the system of systems in which
    we're principally interested, successes realized by our Navy in
    the maritime portions, and successes realized by our allies at
    hand, and, not insignificantly, the U.S.S. Lake Erie's launch
    of this one-time shot. To be sure, it was a maritime capability
    that we witnessed as we brought down our defunct intelligence
    satellite.
        All of these support our increased emphasis that we're
    recommending for the development of an integrated system of
    systems that includes THAAD, Patriot, and land-based mid-course
    interceptors.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So the conclusion of this Capability
    Mix Study is that we need to buy about twice of both THAAD and
    Aegis systems. You have stated here that you were consulted.
    Should we rely on this Capability Study?
        Admiral Keating. Let me take that for the record, Senator,
    if I could.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Both of you have testified that you
    need more. In your case, General Bell, you need more Patriots,
    but you could sure use more Aegis. You're saying that you could
    use more of both THAAD and Aegis.
        General Bell. I need the right model of the Patriot.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Right.
        Now, Mr. Chairman, this thing's coming up as an issue
    because the administration has requested less than what we put
    in last year's authorization bill as report language on where
    we should be going with these two systems. So as we get ready
    for this authorization bill for this year, this is going to be
    something. I wanted to hear directly from the theater
    commanders.
        These are two effective systems and when you add Patriot to
    it you have multiple layers of protection that any theater
    commander would certainly like to have on incoming warheads,
    trying to knock them down.
        Chairman Levin. Anything additional that they want to
    supply for the record we ought to tell them would be welcome.
        Admiral Keating. I will, sir. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        While not OSD-approved, the Joint Capabilities Mix II study is
    helpful in identifying the significant ballistic missile threat we face
    in the Pacific. The study is also correct in recognizing an existing
    shortfall in U.S. active defense interceptor inventories to address
    this threat.
        From USPACOM perspective, we are making improvements in our missile
    defenses at a satisfactory pace, particularly given the worldwide
    demand on defense resources.

        Chairman Levin. We'll try a short second round, perhaps
    maybe 3 to 4 minutes. General Bell, in your written testimony
    you say that, ``We remain concerned about North Korea's
    proliferation of military equipment and ballistic missiles,
    along with missile-related technologies.'' Security Council
    Resolution 1718 bans imports and exports from North Korea and
    to North Korea of military items, including missiles or missile
    systems. Are they complying with 1718?
        General Bell. Senator, they're complying, but I'm not sure
    it's because of 1718, to be honest with you. The last
    significant sale that I've seen, and this is in the public
    record, of missiles by North Korea to anybody was in 2005. That
    doesn't mean for a second that they wouldn't like to, but the
    atmosphere today is not conducive to North Korea proliferating.
    There's a huge amount of pressure from the Six-Party Talk
    process. Certainly these Security Council resolutions put
    enormous pressure on them, and right now their proliferation,
    which they have such a history of, is at a near-zero balance.
        I believe they would certainly want to proliferate. It's a
    source of income for them and I think it's something of great
    concern for us. Nonetheless, today this Security Council
    resolution on balance is being complied with.
        Chairman Levin. What about other conventional military
    equipment?
        General Bell. Sir, they get very little equipment in from
    other countries, almost none. In terms of proliferation
    outbound, we're not seeing that either right now. I would just
    say that North Korea is behaving to a level that is consistent
    with progress in the Six-Party Talks and I think that's
    encouraging.
        Chairman Levin. Have you seen any other rhetoric or do you
    have any other information coming from North Korea that would
    indicate a potential shift of North Korean resources from the
    military to other government sectors? Is there any sign of
    that?
        General Bell. No, sir. I read about that, but I have not
    seen any shift at all.
        Chairman Levin. Do you anticipate that the new
    administration in South Korea will be making any changes in
    policy towards the north?
        General Bell. Yes, sir, I do.
        Chairman Levin. Would you describe them?
        General Bell. I will. This president has a policy that he
    will require reciprocity with North Korea. By that, he
    articulates that if something is given to North Korea by the
    South, economic aid or agreements with the Six-Party Talks
    process, that North Korea must return the favor.
        We've not necessarily seen that with the previous
    government. There were a lot of steps going to the north,
    economic aid, et cetera, but not much reciprocity. Lee Myong-
    bak has been very clear in his short time as president that
    whenever the Republic of Korea offers assistance to the North,
    reciprocity will be required.
        I really haven't seen that play out yet because he's such a
    new president but he's very firm about it. He is on public
    record, and we will see how the next months go.
        Chairman Levin. Does that include food aid?
        General Bell. Sir, it does.
        Chairman Levin. Does it include visits from South Koreans
    to the North, which give them some currency? Is he going to cut
    off the South Korean visits, for instance, to the Kumgang
    Mountain? Is that included?
        General Bell. I don't believe that that is going to be cut
    off. Both the tourist trade in the eastern corridor, as it's
    called, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the west, there's
    no indication that that process is going to stop. So I would
    say that flow of income to the North is not part of this policy
    at this point.
        Chairman Levin. May I just ask one final question for this
    round? That's the North Korean position relative to nuclear
    matters. According to your written statement, it says that,
    ``The leadership of North Korea spent decades developing a
    nuclear deterrent and this will not be relinquished without an
    explicit security guarantee from the United States that
    includes in practice a declaration of permanent peace on the
    Korean peninsula.''
        Can you just state that or expand on that a bit?
        General Bell. Yes, sir. That's what the North Koreans want,
    Senator, very clearly.
        Chairman Levin. Do you believe that they mean it?
        General Bell. I believe that they will not give up their
    nuclear weapons unless they are convinced that they are going
    to be allowed to live with their current governmental system
    into the future and that it will not be subjected to any kind
    of offensive maneuvers.
        Of course, we wouldn't do that anyway, but that is their
    stated policy, and I believe they will hold to that as we go
    through these negotiations.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner?
        Senator Warner. I was going to ask you two gentlemen to
    describe for the committee the current maritime protection that
    we have in place against North Korea exporting what we have
    reason to believe are WMD and the respective responsibilities
    in that area. General?
        General Bell. Sir, there are two things, of course. The
    United States has been the leader in both. First is the
    Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which the United
    States pursues and retains the right to board ships, and mostly
    it's ships that are leaving North Korean waters, heading into
    international seas, if we choose to.
        Senator Warner. Now, where do we do that interdiction? In
    international water or territorial water?
        General Bell. First, Senator, I'm not aware of any actual
    execution of the PSI authorities in the recent term. But the
    United States reserves the right to do that and it would be in
    international waters, yes, sir.
        So if there was a ship that was suspected to contain some
    kind of missile capability and it was on the high seas, through
    this PSI mechanism the United States has the right to board, or
    with our allies if they would assist us. So Admiral Keating is
    very aware of this procedure.
        Senator Warner. Do you have the command and control of
    those ships within your AOR?
        Admiral Keating. I do, sir.
        Senator Warner. Under what authority does the United States
    exercise this right to board ships in international water which
    embark from North Korea?
        Admiral Keating. It is that PSI, Senator.
        Senator Warner. Clear authority there.
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. International authority.
        Admiral Keating. Correct.
        Senator Warner. We do maintain a ship on station for that
    purpose?
        Admiral Keating. We don't maintain it for that express
    purpose. There's a ship on station, Senator.
        Senator Warner. Do you have assets you can call on in short
    order to get up there?
        Admiral Keating. Can and have.
        Senator Warner. General, it's important that we cover the
    issue of family housing, given that the military in your
    command are relocating. This is one that I have followed with
    great interest. I observe in the hearing room today your able
    staff assistant, Kathy Abell.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Who has been working on this for many
    years.
        What's the status of that now?
        General Bell. Sir, we are dead in the water at this moment
    on the family housing that we agreed to provide in a 2004
    agreement with the Republic of Korea. Fundamentally, they
    agreed to build almost all the facilities that we would need in
    the vicinity of Camp Humphreys. We call it now Garrison
    Humphreys. We agreed to provide the majority of the family and
    senior leader quarters for those who are there on 1-year tours.
        Our approach to that was the build-to-lease mechanism. We
    also have the potential for a military construction approach.
    Neither of those have been considered favorably here in
    Congress.
        I will tell you the Army this year is pursuing yet a third
    option, and that is a full privatization approach without any
    lease guarantees with South Korea or, frankly, to companies.
        Senator Warner. Right. But do you find that the dead in the
    water situation is largely owed to congressional inaction or
    executive branch decisionmaking?
        General Bell. Sir, over the period of 2004 to 2008, in my
    view, it has been a shortcoming in three areas. First, we did
    not properly articulate the requirement at U.S. Forces Korea.
        Senator Warner. Was it articulated to Congress?
        General Bell. Back in 2004 and 2005, I see no history of
    effectively articulating it in a way that you could deal with
    it.
        In 2006 we began to properly articulate the requirement
    that we had signed up for. We had a lot of resistance in the
    administration, a lot, both in the building, in the Pentagon,
    and also in the Office of Management and Budget. When we
    finally worked our way through that in 2006 and did submit a
    proposal that was in the National Defense Authorization Bill,
    it was taken out last year.
        Senator Warner. Here in Congress?
        General Bell. Yes, sir, it was.
        Senator Warner. So again, it looks like the burden is on
    Congress if this thing is to be straightened out.
        General Bell. We're going to try a different approach, not
    just with Congress, but to see if we can get a privatization
    effort going. That may work for us.
        Senator Warner. My last question, Mr. Chairman, relates to
    Australia. It's interesting that Australia is a nation that has
    participated with U.S. forces in every single international
    combat situation we've had since World War I. Am I correct on
    that, Admiral?
        Admiral Keating. I believe you are, sir, yes.
        Senator Warner. Give us your own view now. You have a new
    Labour government in Australia that has decided with respect to
    its continued participation in the coalition of operations in
    Iraq. Similarly, did the Australians indicate there would be
    any changes in the level and character of the Australian
    contribution to the NATO International Security Assistance
    Force mission in Afghanistan? Bring us up to date on those?
        Admiral Keating. We were in Australia 3 weeks ago, Senator,
    for what's called the Australian ministerials. Their minister
    of defense, their chief of defense staff, our Secretary of
    Defense, our Secretary of State, it was in this case Secretary
    Negroponte, Admiral Mike Mullen, and I representing the United
    States.
        During the course of 2 days of discussions on a wide
    variety of topics, the Australians expressed their continued
    support for Operation Enduring Freedom, and their drawdown of
    forces deployed, though not complete withdrawal of forces, in
    support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The theme that was
    unmistakable from our allies was a continued emphasis from them
    on fighting and winning the global war on terror by working
    carefully with us at PACOM on those countries that are closer
    to them that are less solid and very fragile. Timor, Papua New
    Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands foremost among them. They
    are working carefully in collaboration with us on their
    relations with Indonesia.
        So I came away from that day and a half session reassured
    that the new government and the new policies were largely
    consistent with those of their predecessors and were in support
    of in particular PACOM's strategy and goals.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I may want to submit for
    the record a question on India. I'm not sure our record today
    has your full dissertation on the Indian-U.S. military-to-
    military cooperation.
        Admiral Keating. I'd be happy to take it. Thank you very
    much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) military-to-military interaction with
    Indian Armed Forces is positive and steadily improving. Initial
    cooperative efforts in the areas of counterterrorism, maritime
    security, and disaster relief have been effective and successful in
    increasing trust between our militaries. For the future, we are
    developing a military-to-military program that includes progressively
    more complex exercises. This is best exemplified by the recent U.S.-
    Indian Naval Exercise Malabar 07, which involved two U.S. and one
    Indian aircraft carrier as well as participants from Japan, Singapore,
    and Australia. Similarly, completed and potential defense sales to
    India have increased levels of cooperation and interoperability.
        From discussion with Indian leaders, it is clear we share many of
    the same security concerns in South Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific-
    Indian Ocean region. PACOM will continue to be a key contributor in the
    important U.S.-India strategic partnership.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I take the opportunity on the second round, General, to do
    what I should have done on the first, which is to thank you for
    your service, not just in the time you've been in Korea, but
    over a distinguished career in the national interest, and I
    wish you the best in the next chapter.
        Admiral Keating, as I hear you talk it strikes me, and I
    think we appreciate it enough here, that those of you who are
    regional commanders have a critically important diplomatic role
    as well as a military role, and that in many ways in an area as
    farflung and diverse as the Pacific the Commander of PACOM is
    really the face of America, with all the credibility of the
    American military behind them. So I thank you for all that
    you've done and all that those who serve with you have done.
        I wanted to come back on this round just to ask you if you
    would comment on the current status of what has looked like a
    real breakthrough agreement with India. That is, the U.S.-India
    civil nuclear agreement.
        Admiral Keating. I'll try, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes. I set you up as a diplomatic
    authority before asking you the question. I want to establish
    your credibility. But I actually meant what I said. It wasn't
    just for the purpose of asking this question.
        Admiral Keating. I'll give it my best shot, sir. While
    there in August, those folks with whom I met expressed concern
    that they weren't able to get this over the goal line, the
    nuclear agreement.
        Senator Lieberman. Meaning within their political system?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. Some in sidebar conversations
    weren't just concerned, they were frustrated. They think that
    this is very much to India's benefit as well as ours. They see
    a program of significant strategic benefit to them being all
    balled up in pure local politics. I don't think much has
    changed. I was in the State Department yesterday, Senator, and
    a relatively brief discussion indicated to me that this program
    is still wrapped up in local politics. The folks with whom I
    discussed this at State are cautiously optimistic that there
    may be light at the end of the tunnel, if that's the right
    metaphor, but it is not yet a done deal. It is something that
    would indicate to us at PACOM passage of this bill would be a
    significant step forward in even better relations we enjoy with
    India. So we'd be anxious to see it improved.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, I agree. I think it's a significant
    development in our bilateral relationship.
        If I'm correct, in the last few weeks Secretary Nicholas
    Burns made a statement to a newspaper in India that he thought
    that China would accept, if not endorse, the U.S.-India nuclear
    agreement. I wonder if you could comment, if you have any
    knowledge, on not just China, but what the reaction in the
    region has been thus far to the proposed nuclear agreement with
    India?
        Admiral Keating. There has been almost no discussion with
    me in any country, including China, Senator. I'm sure they're
    watching it, but there's been no demonstration.
        Senator Lieberman. So that's important. In other words,
    nobody in your various travels around the region has raised the
    question with you?
        Admiral Keating. Zero.
        Senator Lieberman. Needless to say, they're not objecting.
        Thank you very much. Thanks to both of you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        What is the status of the Six-Party Talks, General?
        General Bell. The Six-Party Talks are still ongoing and
    there is still optimism. Physically, what's happened is that we
    expected a declaration by the North Koreans by December 31 of
    their full nuclear program laydown, including anything about
    their highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. That was not
    forthcoming on time with our negotiators.
        It's being led by our State Department. What we're doing
    now is attempting to get the North Koreans to fully comply with
    their agreement, and that was during phase 2 to provide us with
    a complete list of their nuclear programs, including HEU
    programs. I'm still optimistic. I watch the North Koreans
    closely. They are still disabling the Yongbyon reactor. There
    are somewhere in the vicinity of 8,000 uranium rods in that
    reactor and they are extracting about 30 a day from the reactor
    and moving them to a cooling tank, and they've not stopped
    doing that.
        Chairman Levin. What percentage of the rods have been
    moved?
        General Bell. About 25 percent, Senator, around 2,000 of
    the 8,000.
        Chairman Levin. At the rate they're doing it, when would
    that be completed?
        General Bell. About August, which is a lot later than we
    had hoped for. But they're still doing it. It's actually
    happening.
        Chairman Levin. What happens if at the end of the day they
    just simply say they don't have and never did have an HEU
    program?
        General Bell. I'm not certain that they will say that, but
    they may. We have a lot of evidence. You can go back to 2005
    when the president of Pakistan in a news conference articulated
    that A.Q. Khan had passed on to the North Koreans 12
    centrifuges. There is some other classified evidence perhaps
    that our community is concerned about, that I have not been
    privy to.
        But we want a clear declaration. I think, based on what
    they say, if they'll just provide it to us, we can make a
    judgment about whether to accept that or whether to draw a hard
    line.
        Chairman Levin. General, you made reference to the South
    Koreans contributing resources to our presence in South Korea.
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Give us some idea of the cost to South
    Korea each year of that contribution to our presence, if you
    have a number?
        General Bell. They pay about a third of our operations and
    maintenance costs. We call them bureaucratically non-personnel
    stationing costs. In other words, all the sustainment money.
    Our sustainment requirements are in excess of $2 billion a
    year. They paid this year $787 million in cash to us to assist
    in sustainment, payment of local national labor, and a
    percentage towards military construction.
        Frankly, the majority, a significant majority, of the
    military construction I do in the Republic of Korea is through
    this burdensharing account that we have. So it's not where I
    want it. I believe that they could contribute more and I've
    been relatively vocal about that. But they are contributing
    significantly and I think it's very positive.
        Chairman Levin. By the way, I want to share Senator
    Warner's thoughts in terms of their taking command. It has been
    delayed. You say that 63 percent of the people in South Korea
    want us to stay even after that command is shifted? I believe
    that was the statistic.
        General Bell. I think it's 68.
        Chairman Levin. Sixty-eight percent.
        General Bell. Sir, that's even if the North Korea problem
    is solved.
        Chairman Levin. Even if that problem is solved.
        General Bell. Seventy-five percent want us to stay even if
    that command shift happens.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you for that clarification.
        What that means is that they're happy with us to basically
    not only stay, but to continue in our present situation. They
    are not pressing us for a shift in command, apparently; we're
    pressing them; is that true?
        General Bell. Senator, I don't think that's true.
        Chairman Levin. Then why hasn't it been shifted?
        General Bell. We do have a plan that we both signed up to.
    It's very detailed. It's called a Strategic Transition Plan. I
    do believe we got to that plan later in our evolution with the
    Republic of Korea than we should have. But when we signed that
    plan last year it was a firm commitment by both nations for
    them to take operational control of their military in wartime
    in 2012.
        So I believe we could have done this earlier effectively.
    I've said that many times, sir, even on the record here. But we
    do have a good plan now. Both nations are signed up for it, and
    the South Koreans are very much working hard. They're spending
    money. They're producing enormous energy. They're exercising
    with us now.
        I will just conclude by telling you that in August of this
    year we will conduct an exercise where we attempt to separate
    the commands into a leading South Korean command, we're calling
    it Joint Forces Command, with the United States in a supporting
    role, and we'll try that out for the first time. Then we'll
    take the lessons learned and we'll try it again later. So this
    is making substantial progress.
        Chairman Levin. Had there been a firm commitment to do this
    by 2009?
        General Bell. There was never a commitment to do it by
    2009, no, sir, there was not.
        Chairman Levin. Just a discussion to do that?
        General Bell. I was proposing that, yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. We want to again thank you both.
    Particularly we'll single you out, General Bell, because of
    your shift.
        General Bell. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Do you know what you're going to be doing
    after the change of command?
        General Bell. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. I don't want to pry into your personal
    plans.
        General Bell. I'd like to put it on the record. I have an
    appointment with a trout in the Smokey Mountains, and he or she
    and I have an arrangement to work out.
        Chairman Levin. Can you tell us the approximate length of
    that trout? My hunch is it's probably that big [indicating].
        General Bell. It doesn't matter, and I will return that
    trout alive to those waters. I don't kill trout.
        Chairman Levin. You've been a terrific asset to our country
    and to our Nation.
        Admiral, we feel the same about you, but you've still got a
    little longer tour of duty ahead of you.
        Admiral Keating. My hair is not quite white enough yet,
    sir.
        Chairman Levin. We are grateful to both of you for your
    service. Thank you. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
               additional ground-based midcourse defense testing
        1. Senator Levin. Admiral Keating, with respect to flight testing
    of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) ballistic missile defense
    system, the Pentagon's independent Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation reported in December that ``GMD flight testing to date is
    not sufficient to provide a high level of statistical confidence in its
    limited capabilities.'' On March 6, 2008, General Renuart, Commander of
    U.S. Northern Command, testified that he agrees that we need to conduct
    robust and operationally realistic testing of the GMD system, in other
    words, testing the system the way it is intended to be used in an
    operational mission, to demonstrate its operational capabilities. He
    also agreed that such testing should include salvo launches and
    multiple target tests, as well as tests with countermeasures. Do you
    agree with General Renuart that we need such additional testing of the
    GMD system?
        Admiral Keating. I agree with General Renuart's assessment.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                                     china
        2. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, how would you characterize
    the relationship that exists between the U.S. military and China's
    military?
        Admiral Keating. The military-to-military relationship is
    constructive and cordial. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) recognizes
    the value in working with us to reduce potential for miscalculation. In
    this regard, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) continues to advocate for
    pragmatic engagement with the PLA. We are encouraging a more mature,
    constructive, and potentially cooperative relationship. At the same
    time, PACOM will retain the capability to credibly maintain a secure
    and stable Asia-Pacific.

                            shoot down of satellite
        3. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, what has the reaction been
    in the region to the shoot down of the National Reconnaissance Office
    (NRO) satellite?
        Admiral Keating. Regional reactions to the U.S. shoot down of the
    NRO satellite were largely muted. The Governments of Australia and
    Japan publicly supported the shoot down. China, Russia, and North Korea
    denounced our actions.

        4. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, planning for the shoot
    down effort actually began in December of last year. Generally, what
    was involved in reconfiguring the Aegis missile defense system to
    conduct the shoot down and how long did it take?
        Admiral Keating. Modifications were made to the software of the
    shipboard Aegis Weapon System and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). I
    would defer to the Missile Defense Agency for specifics on the length
    of time to implement those modifications and the exact nature of the
    changes.

              impacts of transformational communications satellite
        5. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, in your various planning
    activities, what do you see as the growing demand for satellite-based
    communications including the bandwidth needed to fly unmanned aerial
    vehicles?
        Admiral Keating. PACOM requires medium and high data rates capacity
    to enable real-time and persistent worldwide connectivity. For the
    future, the requirement to bring voice, data, and imagery to our
    tactical users for communications-on-the-move will demand increased
    bandwidth. In addition, the requirement is expanding for wideband
    protected communications such as unmanned airborne vehicles and
    airborne and space, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    assets.

        6. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, would the Transformational
    Communications Satellite (TSAT) meet some of those requirements?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, the TSAT System would provide tremendous
    capacity to meet PACOM requirements. TSAT will support both wideband
    and protected requirements, and ensure uninterrupted communications for
    command and control and intelligence missions. Also, TSAT will employ
    crosslinks between satellites which will reduce the satellite
    vulnerability footprint.

        7. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, is there some general
    percentage of your communications requirement that you plan to be
    commercially provided, and if so, what is the percentage now and the
    percentage expected in the future?
        Admiral Keating. PACOM use of commercial satellites is driven by
    demand. Currently, our communications modeling shows 73 percent of our
    requirements filled by commercial satellites.
        Because commercial satellite communications resources are scarce in
    the PACOM area of responsibility and we face stiff competition for
    access to them, we advocate for alternatives to commercial assets.
    Timely deployment of the Wideband Global Satellite Communications
    System, Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications
    System, and TSAT System are necessary to reduce our reliance on
    commercial satellites in the future.

        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Keating, in your various war games
    and scenarios, do you exercise losses or decreases in availability of
    various satellite services, such as communications, intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance or the navigation and timing provided by
    the Global Positioning System, and if so, what are those results?
        Admiral Keating. Yes, we regularly train to scenarios in which
    satellite communications are degraded or denied for various reasons. In
    these simulations, we have achieved satisfactory results by realigning
    priorities and offloading mission to other space or alternate ground
    assets.

        [Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee adjourned.]